People vs Judge Antonio Evangelista and Guildo Tugonon

GR No. 110898, February 20, 1996

Statutory rule: If the law makes no distinction, neither should the court.
Facts:
Private respondent Guildo Tugonon was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide.
He filed a petition for probation. However, the Chief Probation and Parole Officer
recommended denial of private respondent's application for probation on the ground
that by appealing the sentence of the trial, he had already waived his right to make his
application for probation. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer's
recommendation and granted private respondent's application on April 23, 1993.

Issue: W/N respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by granting private
respondent's application for probation despite the appeal filed by the private respondent.
Held:
Yes. Private respondent filed his application for probation on December 28,
1992, after PD 1990 had taken effect. It is thus covered by the prohibition that "no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfect the
appeal from the judgment of conviction" and that "the filing of the application shall
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal." having appealed from the judgment of the trial
court and applied for probation after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction,
private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.
Furthermore, the law makes no distinction between meritorious and unmeritorious
appeals so neither should the court.

RP vs Eutropio Migrinio and Troadio Tecson

GR No. 89483, August 30, 1990
Statutory rule: Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis,
that is where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only
to persons or things of the same kind or class as those especially mentioned
Facts:
Acting on information received which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his
lawful income, the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required private respondent Lt. Col.
Tecson to submit his explanation or comment, together with supporting evidence thereto.
Private respondent was unable to provide supporting evidence because they were
allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The anti-graft Board
was created by the PCGG to "investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of
AFP personnel, both retired and in active service." Private respondent mainly argues that
he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders No. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A
are acts of his alone and not connected with being a crony, business associate or
subordinate. Hence, the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.
Issue: W/N private respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board, an
agency of the PCGG, for violation of RA 3019 and 1379.
Held: No. Applying the rule in statutory construction, the term "subordinate" as used in
EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys close association or relation with former
President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative and
close associate in E) 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent or
nominee in EO 2

Note: Ejusdem Generis – General words followed by an enumeration of persons or things by words
of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned

MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE vs. MUNICIPALITY OF

MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, G.R. No. 169435
Petitioner: MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipa
l Mayor, CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA
Respondents: MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its
Municipal Mayor,SALVADOR PILLOS, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

Statutory Rule:EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS (Express Mention and

Implied Exclusion)Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a
meaning that doesnot appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot
be placedtherein.
Law in Dispute:SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas
and Agunit in theMunicipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the
said municipalityand constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as
the Municipality of Marcos,with the following boundaries:On the Northwest, by the barrios
Biding-Rangay boundary going down to thebarrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot
path and feeder road; on theNortheast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of
barrios Agunit andNaglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary
; on the South, by thePadsan River which is at the same time the boundary between the
municipalities of Bannaand Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by the boundary between the
municipalities ofBatac and Dingras.The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government
in the barrio ofBiding.

F A C T S1.
The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong,
Cabittaoran,Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which
were previously organized as rancherias, each of which was under the independent control of a
chief. Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial
government of IlocosNorte, united these rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era by
virtue of Executive Order(E.O.) No. 66 5 dated September 30, 1916.2.
The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to
RepublicAct (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province
of IlocosNorte."
3.

Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear that Marcos shall
bederived from the listed barangays of Dingras, namely: Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao,
Alabaan,Ragas and Agunit. The Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangays was not
mentioned.Hence, if based only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be considered
as asource of territory of Marcos.4.

There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as
themother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of
Marcos'boundaries as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase:
"on the East, by theIlocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary."
5.

On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos' eastern boundary, Marcos claimed that
the middle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins its eastern side, formed part of its territory. Its
reasoning was founded upon the fact that Nueva Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos Norte-
Apayao boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos Norte-
Apayaoboundary, part of Nueva Era would consequently be obtained by it.6.

Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years,7 oronly
on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.8 Saidresolution
was entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, ButNow
Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."7.

Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval. The SP,
onthe other hand, required Marcos to submit its position paper.8.

On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era, by dismissing the case of
Marcos. This decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte.9.

In a decision dated June 6, 2005,the Court of Appeals partly reversed the Regional Trial Court
decision with the following disposition:10.
“
WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition treated as one for certiorari. The Decisions of
boththe Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte are REVERSED and
SETASIDE insofar as they made the eastern boundary of the municipality of Marcos co-terminous
withthe eastern boundary of Dingras town, and another is rendered extending the said boundary
ofMarcos to the boundary line between the province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, but
thesame Decisions are AFFIRMED with respect to the denial of the claim of Marcos to the
detachednorthern portion of barangay Sto. Niño which should, as it is hereby ordered to, remain
with themuni
cipality of Nueva Era.”
I S S U EWhether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of
Nueva Era.

R U L I N G1.

Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are namedin
R.A. No. 3753. To wit:SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan,
Ragas and Agunit inthe Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated
from the saidmunicipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as
theMunicipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:

Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva
Era'sterritory is, therefore, excluded.3.

Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies
theexclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is
tooperate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation
andeffect.49 This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic
andnatural workings of the human mind.4.

Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it
couldhave easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are expressly limited
tocertain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. Therule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerationsin a
statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to thoseexpressly
mentioned.5.

Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration ofbarangays
out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to havebeen done
intentionally. This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omissohabendus est,
which states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must beheld to have been
omitted intentionally.6.

Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by the explanatorynote
of the bill which paved the way for the creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note mentionedonly
Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos.7.

Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory noteto
clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute.8.

Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating Marcos, the latter
stillcontends that said law included Nueva Era. It alleges that based on the description of
itsboundaries, a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.9.

The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-
Rangay boundary going down to the barriosCapariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path
and feeder road; on the Northeast, bythe Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios
Agunit and Naglayaan; on theEast, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by
the Padsan River whichis at the same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and
Dingras; onthe West and Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac
andDingras.10.

Marcos contends that since it is "bounded on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Provinceboundary,"
a portion of Nueva Era formed part of its territory because, according to it, Nueva Erais between
the Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary. Marcos posits that in order forits eastern side
to reach the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary, it will necessarily traverse themiddle portion of
Nueva Era. Marcos further claims that it is entitled not only to the middleportion of Nueva Era but
also to its northern portion which, as a consequence, was isolated fromthe major part of Nueva
Era.11.

The Court cannot accept the contentions of Marcos. Only Dingras is specifically named by law
assource territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive
onlyof the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory. Considering that
thedescription of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same
mustbe interpreted in light of the legislative intent. The law must be given a reasonable
interpretation,to preclude absurdity in its application. We thus uphold the legislative intent to
create Marcos outof the territory of Dingras only.12.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is partly
REVERSED.The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is Reinstated

ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC and NSC

[G.R. No. 109902. August 02, 1994]
FACTS:
Petitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC), filed separate
complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits with the NLRC,
Sub- Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. The complaints were consolidated and after
hearing, the Labor Arbiter declared petitioners “regular project employees who shall continue their
employment as such for as long as such *project+ activity exists,” but entitled to the salary of a
regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. It also ordered
payment of salary differentials.The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified theLabor
Arbiter’s decision. It affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s holding that petitioners were project employees
since they were hired to performwork in a specific undertaking the Five Years Expansion Program,
the completion of which had been determined at the time of their engagement and which operation
was not directly related to the business of steel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the
award to petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal and factual
basis. The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners argue that they
are “regular” employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are “necessary, desirable and work-related
to private respondent’s main business, steel-making”; and (ii) they have rendered service for six
(6) or more years to private respondent NSC.
ISSUE:Whether or not petitioners are considered “permanent employees” as opposed to being
only “project employees” of NSC.

HELD:NO. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of merit. NLRC Resolutions affirmed.

RATIO:Function of the proviso. Petitioners are not considered “permanent employees”. However,
contrary to petitioners’ apprehensions, the designation of named employees as “project
employees” and their assignment to a specific project are effected and implemented in good faith,
and not merely as a means of evading otherwise applicable requirements of labor laws.On the
claim that petitioners’ service to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify them as “regular
employees”, the Supreme Court believed this claim is without legal basis. The simple fact that the
employment of petitioners as project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract
from, or legally dissolve, their status as “project employees”. The second paragraph of Article 280
of the Labor Code, quoted above, providing that an employee who has served for at least one (1)
year, shall be considered a regular employee, relates to casual employees, not to project employees

G.R. No. 111097July 20, 1994MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF
CAGAYAN DE ORO,
petitioners,vs.PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC.& PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,

FACTS:There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in
Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The trouble arose when
in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its
operations to Cagayan de Oro City. He reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de
Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this
all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances
before the Courtof Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental
petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the
ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD:NoLocal Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision
excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale
of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling
is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has thestatus of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation
of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced
therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.