From the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, Administrative

Order No. 7, Rule II: Procedure in Criminal Cases

Section 1. Grounds. — A criminal complaint may be brought for an offense in
violation of R.A. 3019, as amended, R.A. 1379, as amended, R.A. 6713, Title VII,
Chapter II, Section 2 of the Revised Penal Code, and for such other offenses
committed by public officers and employees in relation to office. (Estrada v. Office of
the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, [January 21, 2015], 751 PHIL 821-980)
In criminal actions, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for conviction; in civil actions and
proceedings, preponderance of evidence, as support for a judgment; and in administrative cases,
substantial evidence, as basis for adjudication. In criminal and civil actions, application of the Rules
of Court is called for, with more or less strictness. In administrative proceedings, however, the
technical rules of pleading and procedure, and of evidence, are not strictly adhered to; they
generally apply only suppletorily;||| (Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41,
[January 21, 2015], 751 PHIL 821-980)

Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 mandates the submission of the sworn SALNs by all public
officials and employees, stating therein all the assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and
business interests of their spouses, and of their unmarried children under 18 years of age living
in their households. Paragraph (A) of Section 8 sets three deadlines for the submission of the
sworn SALNs, specifically: (a) within 30 days from the assumption of office by the officials or
employees; (b) on or before April 30 of every year thereafter; and (c) within 30 days after the
separation from the service of the officials or employees. HCaDIS
R.A. No. 6713 does not expressly state the prescriptive period for the violation of its
requirement for the SALNs. Hence, Act No. 3326 — the law that governs the prescriptive periods
for offenses defined and punished under special laws that do not set their own prescriptive
periods 24 — is controlling. Section 1 of Act No. 3326 provides:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a
year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one
month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more
than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those
punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years;
and (d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six
years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty
years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two
months. (Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 199930, [June 27, 2018])

the period of prescription is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, to wit:

Section 2. Prescription of violation penalized by special law shall begin to run
from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the violation be
not known at the time from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Under Section 2, there are two modes of determining the reckoning point when
prescription of an offense runs. The first, to the effect that prescription shall "run from the day
of the commission of the violation of the law," is the general rule. We have declared in this
regard that the fact that any aggrieved person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his
right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises does not prevent the running of the
prescriptive period. 25 The second mode is an exception to the first, and is otherwise known as
the discovery rule. (Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 199930, [June 27, 2018])
The applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, a special law, is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended. If the commission of the crime is
known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on that day but if the date is not known the
period will begin only from the discovery thereof. The anomaly could only have been discovered
after the February, 1986 Revolution when former President Marcos was ousted from office as
before that date no one would have dared to question the legality or propriety of those
transactions. Thus, the crime had not yet prescribed as it was only 6 years when the information
was filed against petitioner, a period within the prescribed period.||| (Domingo v. Sandiganbayan,
The concept of speedy
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is guaranteed - to
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inordinate (Domingo
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in resolving
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 109376, [January 20, 2000], 379 PHIL 708-729)
criminal complaint, being violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process and to the speedy disposition of cases, warrants the dismissal of the
criminal case.

Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman46and Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman,47 this

Court held that the delay of almost or more than six (6) years in resolving the
criminal charges against the petitioners therein amounted to a violation of their
constitutional rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases
against them, as well as the Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to act
promptly on complaints filed before him.

in Williams v. United States, for the government to sustain its right to try the
accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the accused suffered
no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable
delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to
the ordinary processes of justice.

Article III of the Constitution, which declares:Section 16. All persons shall have the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies.

The constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all
proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial.36 In this accord, any party to a case
may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.37 This right, however, like the right to a speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays.38

Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution provides: Section 15. (1) All cases or
matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved
within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts,
and three months for all other lower courts.
 The right to speedy disposition of cases is most commonly invoked in fact-finding
investigations and preliminary investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman since
neither of these proceedings form part of the actual criminal prosecution. The
Constitution itself mandates the Office of the Ombudsman to "act promptly" on
complaints filed before it:
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in
appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof. 79

The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is invoked even against quasi-
judicial or administrative bodies in civil, criminal, or administrative cases before
them. As Abadia v. Court of Appeals75 noted:

The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to
expand substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural
machinations which tend to nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16, Article III of
the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases "before
all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies." This protection extends to all
citizens, including those in the military and covers the periods before, during and
after the trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees
merely the right to a speedy trial.

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan: The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a

speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression
of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite
time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts
to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a
speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding
is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to
whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise
qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative tem1 and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,81 where this Court was constrained to apply the "radical
relief' of dismissing the criminal complaint against an accused due to the delay in
the termination of the preliminary investigation.

The Barker balancing test provides that courts must consider the following factors
when determining the existence of inordinate delay: first, the length of delay;
second, the reason for delay; third, the defendant's assertion or non-asse1iion of his
or her right; and fourth, the prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay.
Barker v. Wingo
Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan: It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy
disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to
determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay,
reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered
people v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division 131 must be re-examined.
When an anonymous complaint is filed or the Office of the Ombudsman conducts a
motu proprio fact-finding investigation, the proceedings are not yet adversarial.
Even if the accused is invited to attend these investigations, this period cannot be
counted since these are merely preparatory to the filing of a formal complaint. At
this point, the Office of the Ombudsman will not yet determine if there is probable
cause to charge the accused.
This period for case build-up cannot likewise be used by the Office of the
Ombudsman as unbridled license to delay proceedings. If its investigation takes too
long, it can result in the extinction of criminal liability through the prescription of
the offense.
In People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, 132 the ruling that fact-finding
investigations are included in the period for determination of inordinate delay is
abandoned.

Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court requires that the case against the accused
be dismissed if there has been a violation of the right to speedy trial: Section 9.
Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit. - If the accused
is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 1 (g), Rule 116 and
Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this rule, the information may be dismissed
on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial. The
accused shall have the burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have
the burden of going forward with the evidence to establish the exclusion of time
under section 3 of this Rule. The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double
jeopardy. Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a
waiver of the right to dismiss under this section. First, the right to speedy
disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for
both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal
prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases,
however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial.
What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding
for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.An exception to this rule is
if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by
malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued
prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the
behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is
properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be
dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay. Another exception would be
the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to
speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the
constitutional right can no longer be invoked. In all cases of dismissals due to
inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed
by the relevant court. Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to
speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the
appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods.
Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of
cases. (G.R. No. 206438
The ruling in People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division 172 that factfinding
investigations are included in the period for determination of inordinate
delay is ABANDONED. (G.R. No. 206438

SECTION 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. – A verified complaint

against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as follows: (b) A complaint
against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the sangguniang
panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President; and

(Rules of Court, RULE 113||| (Rules of Court, [July 1, 1940]) [July 1, 1940]) SECTION
10. Failure to Move to Quash — Effect of — Exception. — If the defendant does not
move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads thereto he shall be
taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash except
when the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is
without jurisdiction of the same. If, however, the defendant learns after he has
pleaded or has moved to quash on some other ground that the offense with which
he is now charged is an offense for which he has been pardoned, or of which he has
been convicted or acquitted or been in jeopardy, the court may in its discretion
entertain at any time before judgment a motion to quash on the ground of such
pardon, conviction, acquittal or jeopardy.

SECTION 2. Motion to Quash — Grounds. — The defendant may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction of the offense charged or of
the person of the defendant;

(c) That the fiscal has no authority to file the information;

(d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; AIaSTE

(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;

(f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification;

(h) That the defendant has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being
convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged;

(i) That the defendant is insane.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1606 Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall have
jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;
If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect in the complaint or information
which can be cured by amendment the court shall order the amendment to be
made and shall overrule the motion.

|(Revised Rules of Criminal ProcedureRULE 117||| , A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, [October 3,

2000])

SECTION 9. Failure to Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor. — The

failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to
the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections
except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of
section 3 of this Rule.

SECTION 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or

information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. (3a) ATcE

||| (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, [October 3, 2000])

Elected or regular members of the Sangguniang Bayan must at least be 18 years

old on election day; the first-past-the-post voting system is used to elect these
members. They are elected for a three-year term and may serve up to three
consecutive terms. Elections are held simultaneously with the general elections held
every three years since 1992. The term begins at noon of June 30 following election
day, and ends at noon of June 30 of the third year.