Consti case digests on equal protection 1-9

Case 1 PEOPLE VS VERA

G.R. No. L-45685 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION,
petitioners,

vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.

Facts:

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four
motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court
remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for
probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI
directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera
upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor
countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation
of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to
provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable
to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila
is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal
protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes
undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the
executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issues:

Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power

Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Discussions:

An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose
upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is
granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission”
which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature
does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in
reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine.

The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification of equal
protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of the class.

Rulings:

The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no
set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of
probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and
the doctrine of the non delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the
constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall
apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation
Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary
of a probation officer.

It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the
denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from
the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in
every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer,
while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation
in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview
of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly
situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination.
Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the
salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result
for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative
action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.

CASE 2:

Villegas vs. Hui Chiong Tsai Pao Ho

FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or engage or participate
in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual,
without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of
P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop
the enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void. Trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this case.
ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection
rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City
Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people
in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not
obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without
due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the
due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

CASE 3 Dumlao-vs-comelec

Facts: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4
provides that any retired elective provicial or municipal official who has received payments of retirement
benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks
to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also
assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52, which states that any person who has committed
any act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other
similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any
partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive
evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.

Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus, should
be declared null and void

Held: In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional and
valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. One
class can be treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified
differently from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the “need for new blood”
in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null and void for
being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. “Explicit is the
constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19,
1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The
challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is
disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him
before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to
the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one
against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public
office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against
him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of
arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the
term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).”

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be
rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the
prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather
than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between
two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided.
Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted
for a judicial determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable
portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.

Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid and that
portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and
void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

CASE 4. PASEI v. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D.
ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.

G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J.

Facts:

The department of Labor and employment issued Department order No 1. Series of 1988 “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers”, for
the temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers. It claims that such
order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it
also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law. The Philippine association of service exporters Inc. (PASEI).
Challenges said order for being discriminatory against helpers and women of similar skills.

ISSUE: WON Assailed department order violated the equal protection clause of the constitution

Held: NO. There is no question that Department order 1 applies only to “female contract workers”, but it
does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. There is strong evidence that women
domestic workers are being ill- treated abroad in massive instances. Such is not the case for male workers.

Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of department order No. 1 to “enhance the protection for
Filipino female overseas workers”. This court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment
Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
Petition is dismissed.

CASE 5: Himagan vs. People

FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder
of and attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending
the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form
and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6)
years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case
is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807
of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an
imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a
violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

HELD: No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or
intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended
policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his
victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to
silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive
suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

CASE 6: