Republic of the Philippines v.

Maria Lourdes
Sereno G.R. No. 237428 11 May 2018

DOCTRINE: SEPARATION AND BLENDING OF

POWERS
Doctrine of Separation of Powers: Legislation belongs to the Congress, implementation to the
executive, and settlement of legal controversies and adjudication of rights to the judiciary. Each is
therefore prevented from invading the domain of the others. In this case,
Doctrine of Blending of Powers: Refers to an instance when powers are not confined exclusively
within one department but are assigned to or shared by several departments.
* The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, filed a Petition
for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare void Respondent Sereno’s
appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (SC) and to oust and altogether exclude her
therefrom.

FACTS:

1. Respondent Sereno served as a faculty member of the UP College of Law (UP) from 1986-
2006 and a legal counsel for several government agencies from 1994-2009. Records from the
UP Human Resources Development Office, Central Records Division of the Office of the
Ombudsman, and the Office of Recruitment Selection and Nomination (ORSN) of the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) show that the only Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net
Worth (SALN) available on record and filed by Respondent were those for the years 1985,
1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002 [only 11 out of 25 SALNs
that ought to have been filed]. 2. Respondent was appointed Associate Justice in August
2010 by President Benigno Aquino
III. 3. Position for Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012. JBC announced the opening for
applications and nominations, requiring applicants to submit all previous SALNs up to 31
December 2011 (instead of the usual last two years of public service). 4. OSRN required
Respondent to submit her SALNs for the years 1995-1999, the period within which she was
employed by UP. Respondent replied through a letter that considering that such government
records in UP are more than 15 years old, “it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve
all those files.” Despite having submitted only three SALNs (2009-2011), the Report
regarding documentary requirements and SALNs of candidates shows that her name was
annotated with “COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS”. 5. Respondent was appointed by Pres.
Aquino III on 25 August 2012. Five years later, an impeachment complaint was filed by
Atty. Larry Gadon with the House Committee of Justice on the grounds that Respondent
failed to make a truthful statement of her SALNs. Such complaint filed in the House spawned
a letter dated 21 February 2018 of Atty. Eligio Mallari to the OSG requesting the latter to
initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Respondent. 6. OSG (Petitioner) argues that quo
warranto is an available remedy in questioning the validity of Respondent’s appointment, and
that the one-year bar rule does not apply against the State. It also argues that the SC has
jurisdiction over the petition. Failure of Respondent to submit her SALNs and prove her
integrity disqualifies her, at the outset, from being a candidate for Chief Justice. 7.
Respondent argues that the Chief Justice may only be ousted from office by impeachment on
 the basis of the Constitution and jurisprudence. Public officers without pay are not required
to
file a SALN. Thus, Respondent argues that for the years that she was on official leave
without pay, she was actually not required to file any SALN. To require the submission of
SALNs as an absolute requirement is to expand the qualifications provided by the
Constitution.

ISSUE: W/N the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto against Respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment
complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives? → YES

HOLDING:

● The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative
of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo
warranto proceedings does not preclude the House of Representatives from enforcing its own
prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles
of Impeachment, nor will it preclude the Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed
power of impeachment. In this case, it is incidental that the non-filing of SALNs also formed
part of the allegations in the Articles of Impeachment, which in itself is a Constitutional
requirement, the violation of which constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution. But
unlike other impeachable officers, Respondent’s position also demands compliance with the
qualifications of having to be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence — and the failure to submit SALNs goes into the very qualification of integrity.
● [May the Court assume jurisdiction and give due course to a petition for quo warranto against
an impeachable officer?] The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not
foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers. The provision uses the
permissive term “may” which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be
construed as having a mandatory effect. The term “may” is indicative of a mere possibility, an
opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which
he has the option to exercise. An option to remove by impeachment admits to an alternative
mode of effecting the removal. Therefore, Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution allows the
institution of a quo warranto action against an impeachable officer.
● Doctrine of Blending of Powers: While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in
the ouster of the public official, the two proceedings materially differ. Thus, they are not
mutually exclusive remedies and may proceed simultaneously. At its most basic, impeachment
proceedings are political in nature, while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding
traditionally lodged in the courts. Aside from the difference in their origin and nature, quo
warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are
distinct as to jurisdiction, grounds, applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal,
and limitations.
Petition for Quo warranto is GRANTED. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is
found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING
and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent Maria
Lourdes P. A. Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.
RATIO:
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution states that the SC has original jurisdiction over petitions
for quo warranto. This jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). Section 7, Rule 66 of Rules of Court provides that the venue for an action
for quo warranto is in the RTC of Manila, CA, or SC when commenced by the Solicitor General.
While the
hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction in this case is justified
considering that the qualification of a Member of the Court is in question, and the issue is of public
concern.