PALE Digest Honorico Ralph

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)
Case Digests: Based on the assigned cases of Atty. Arnold Abejaron
Submitted by: Ralph Vincent I. Honorico

Case Digests based on the assigned cases of Atty. Arnold Abejaron
LAWYER CLIENT PRIVILEGE
UY CHICO vs. THE UNION LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY, LIMITED, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-9231, January 6, 1915
Facts:
The Uy Chico (plaintiff) seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies upon a stock of
dry goods destroyed by fire.
It appears that the father of the plaintiff died in 1897, at which time he was conducting a
business under his own name, Uy Layco. At the time of the fire "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted
and subsequent thereto the creditors of the estate of the plaintiff's father. During the course of
these proceedings, the plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to the
administrator of the estate, who compromised with the insurance company for one-half their
face value, or P6,000. The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that the policies and
goods insured belonged to him and not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he
is not bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of his father's estate.
The defendant insurance company sought to show that the plaintiff had agreed to compromise
settlement of the policies, and for that purpose introduced evidence showing that the plaintiff's
attorney had surrendered the policies to the administrator with the understanding that such a
compromise was to be effected. The plaintiff was asked, while on the witness stand, if he had
any objection to his attorney's testifying concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he
replied in the negative. The attorney was then called for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for
the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver previously given by the plaintiff and objected to the
testimony of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged.
Issue: Whether or not the privilege communication rule applies in the present case?
Ruling: No.
Lawyer’s practice Act provides:
"A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve the secrets of his
client. He shall not be permitted in any court, without the consent of his client, given in
open court, to testify to any facts imparted to him by his client in professional
consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining advice upon legal matters."
In the case at bar, it must be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the
plaintiff's attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy which
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surrounds communications made between attorney and client, is that such communications are
not intended for the information of third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of the purpose
of advising the client as to his rights. It is evident that a communication made by a client to his
attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially
inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his
instructions be delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and
the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a
privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a
communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication
between the client and a third person, and that the attorney simply occupies the role of
intermediary or agent. Therefore, the testimony made by the lawyer is not covered by the
attorney-client privilege rule.
2
WILLIAM ONG GENATO vs. ATTY. ESSEX L. SILAPAN
A.C. No. 4078, July 14, 2003
Facts:
Atty. Silapan (respondent) is the former counsel of Genato (petitioner). The conflict between the
parties started when respondent borrowed two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from
complainant. Respondent issued post-dated checks in favor of the petitioner. Complainant tried
to encash respondent's postdated check with the drawee bank but it was dishonored as
respondent's account therein was already closed.
Respondent failed to heed complainant's repeated demands for payment. Complainant then
filed a criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case
for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
In the foreclosure case, respondent Essex L. Silapan stated that the complainant wanted him,
as a former counsel in a particular case, to offer bribe money to the members of the review
committee of the Department of Justice or in the event that the said petition for review is denied,
the complainant wanted him to offer bribe money to the prosecutor and to the presiding judge
for his (complainant) acquittal.
Complainant alleged that in making such allegations, respondent is guilty of breaking their
confidential lawyer-client relationship and should be held administratively liable therefor.
Consequently, he filed this complaint for disbarment, praying also that an administrative
sanction be meted against respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check.
Issue: Whether or not the allegations of Atty. Silapan against Ong Genato is covered by the
privilege communication rule.
Ruling: Yes.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
“A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him.”
The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made
to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to
preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The
protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another,
or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential

communications or information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and
properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made
in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in
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this case, the complainant's alleged intention to bribe government officials in relation to his
case, the communication is not covered by the privilege as the client does not consult the
lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he
may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not
attach, there being no professional employment in the strict sense.
Be that as it may, respondent's explanation that it was necessary for him to make the
disclosures in his pleadings is not meritorious. The disclosures were not indispensable to
protect his rights as they were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the
respondent to use it against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject
matter of litigation therein and respondent's professional competence and legal advice were not
being attacked in said case. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his
clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients
should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness. Therefore, the Court
found Atty. Silapan guilty of breach of fidelity.
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RAMON SAURA, JR. vs. ATTY. LALAINE LILIBETH AGDEPPA
ADM. CASE No. 4426 February 17, 2000
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
HELEN BALDORIA and RAYMUNDO SAURA vs. ATTY. LALAINE LILIBETH AGDEPPA
ADM. CASE No. 4429 February 17, 2000
Facts:
Atty. Lalaine Lilibeth Agdeppa was charged for violation of her lawyer's oath and disregard of
Sections 15, 22, 25, 29, 31 and 32 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
The complaints arose from the handling of the respondent of a settlement case involving a piece
of property owned in common by the petitioners with their other siblings.
In this case, petitioners learned that the administrators of the property had, with the assistance
of the respondent, who in fact notarized the Deed of Sale, sold the property without the
knowledge and participation of petitioners. To compound matters, petitioners alleged that
despite repeated demands, the vendors or their counsel, respondent herein, have refused to
disclose the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds. The petitioners have thus been
constrained to institute criminal and civil actions to enforce and protect their rights.
Atty. Lalaine Lilibeth Agdep argued she could not answer the administrative charges against her
without divulging certain pieces of information in violation of the attorney-client privilege.
Issue: Whether or not the request for the information regarding the sale of the property and to
account for the proceeds is a violation of the attorney-client privilege.
Ruling: No.
The request for the information regarding the sale of the property and to account for the
proceeds is not a violation of the attorney-client privilege. Rule 130, Section 24 (b) of the Rules
of Court provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following

persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or
with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer,
or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any
fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.
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The information requested by petitioners is not privileged. The petitioners are only asking for the
disclosure of the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds. Petitioners certainly have the
right to ask for such information since they own the property as co-heirs of the late Ramon E.
Saura and as co-administrators of the property. Hence, respondent cannot refuse to divulge
such information to them and hide behind the cloak of the attorney-client relationship.
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GLORITO V. MATURAN vs. ATTY. CONRADO S. GONZALES
A.C. No. 2597 March 12, 1998
Facts:
Glorito V. Maturan filed a complaint for disbarment against his counsel, Atty. Conrado S.
Gonzales, charging him with immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts. The respondent filed his
comment thereto on February 6, 1984.
Glorito Maturan engaged the services of respondent in ejecting several squatters occupying a
certain lot. While said lot was registered in the name of Celestino Yokingco, Antonio Casquejo
had, however, instituted a case for reconveyance of property and declaration of nullity against
the former, docketed as Civil Case No. 2067.
As a consequence of his engagement by petitioner, respondent Gonzales filed Civil Case No.
1783-11 for Forcible Entry and Damages against several individuals. Subsequently, a judgment
was rendered in favor of petitioner. Petitioner, through respondent, filed a motion for issuance of
a writ of execution on March 10, 1983. In the interim, the parties to Civil Case No. 2067 entered
into a compromise agreement.
While the motion for issuance of a writ of execution was pending, and without withdrawing as
counsel for petitioner, respondent filed, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et al., Civil Case No.
2746, an action to annul the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 2067.
As a result of such act by Atty. Gonzales, petitioner filed an administrative complaint against the
former for immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts and asked for his disbarment.
Respondent declared that he was of the belief that filing a motion for issuance of a writ of
execution was the last and final act in the lawyer-client relationship between himself and
petitioner, and that his formal withdrawal as counsel for the Casquejos was unnecessary in
order to sever the lawyer-client relationship between them.
Issue: Whether or not the lawyer-client relationship has been severed upon the filing of a
motion for issuance of a writ of execution.
Ruling: No.
Atty. Gonzlaes’ justification for his actions reveal a patent ignorance of the fiduciary obligations
which a lawyer owes to his client. A lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by the filing of a
motion for a writ of execution. His acceptance of a case implies that he will prosecute the case
to its conclusion. He may not be permitted to unilaterally terminate the same to the prejudice of
his client. Thus, the Court found Atty. Gonzales guilty of conflicting interests.
The Court added that it is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one party against the
adverse party who is his client in a related suit, as a lawyer is prohibited from representing
conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty of
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professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his
present or former client.
Atty. Gonzales was found by the Court guilty of the charges filed against him and is suspended
from the practice of law for 2 years.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANUESTO V.

HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET
G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997
Facts:
Paredes is at present a Congressman in the Province of Agusan del sur and a former Provincial
Attorney and a former Governor of the sad province. Atty. Sansaet serve as the counsel of
Paredes in different cases. In 1976, Paredes applied for and was granted a free patent over a
specific piece of land. However, the Director of Lands found out that Paredes obtained such free
patent through fraudulent misrepresentations with respect to his application. A civil and criminal
case was filed against Paredes and Atty. Sansaet served as his counsel for such cases.
Later, Gelacio, a taxpayer filed a criminal case of perjury and graft charges against Paredes and
Sansaet alleging that they acted in conspiracy. To evade criminal responsibility for his
participation, Sansaet claimed that he was instigated and induced by Paredes to do such acts.
He also wanted to discharge himself as a government witness. However, the Sandiganbayan
denied such discharge claiming that Sansaet cannot testify against Paredes on the ground that
it violates the attorney-client privilege.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Atty. Sansaet violates the attorney-client privilege.
Ruling: No.
The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof and actuations of
both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule. It is true that by now, insofar as
the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are concerned, those crimes were
necessarily committed in the past. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege,
however, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made
by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to
a crime intended to be committed in the future.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made
by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications.
Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between
attorney and client having to do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or
furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to
communications between attorney and client.
Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of falsification
which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well settled
that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be
for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end.
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RULE ON MULTIPLICATION OF SUITS AND FORUM-SHOPPING
BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. ATTY. ERNESTO B. FLORES
A.C. No. 4058 March 12, 1998
Facts:
The Supreme Court rendered its Decision in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. National

Labor Relations Commission, et al. and upon motion of BENECO, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R.
Rimando issued a writ of execution ordering the clerk of court and ex officio city sheriff of the
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City to levy on and sell at public auction personal and real
property of the members of the Board of Directors of BENECO.
On March 18, 1993, Respondent Flores, acting as counsel for BENECO Board Members Victor
Laoyan, Nicasio Aliping, Lorenzo Pilando and Abundio Awal, filed with the RTC an injunction
suit praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) "to preserve the status
quo as now obtaining between the parties," as well as a writ of preliminary preventive injunction
ordering the clerk of court and the ex officio city sheriff of the MTC of Baguio to "cease and
desist from enforcing by execution and levy the writ of execution from the NLRC-CAR, pending
resolution of the main action raised in court."
When this injunction case was dismissed, Respondent Flores filed with another branch of the
RTC two identical but separate actions both entitled "Judicial Declaration of Family Home
Constituted, Exempt from Levy and Execution; with Damages, etc.," docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415. The said complaints were supplemented by an "Urgent
Motion Ex Parte" which prayed for an order to temporarily restrain Sheriff Wilfredo V. Mendez
from proceeding with the auction sale of plaintiffs' property" to avoid rendering ineffectual
judgment of the court later in this cases, until further determined by the court."
The IBP found that the complaint filed by the respondent lacks the certification of non-forum
shopping required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 which took effect on January 1, 1992.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Flores violated the rule against forum shopping.
Ruling: Yes.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held that forum shopping exists when, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
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or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on

the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
The most important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the "vexation
caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same
or related causes or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs."
In this case, Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415 are groundless suits. Their real objective
was to restrain or delay the enforcement of the writ of execution. In his deliberate attempt to
obtain the same relief in two different courts, Respondent Flores was obviously shopping for a
"friendly" forum which would capitulate to his improvident plea for an injunction and was thereby
trifling with the judicial process.
The Court remined that under the Code of Professional Responsibility, he had a duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 27 The Code also enjoins him from unduly
delaying a case by impeding the execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.
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ROSALINA BUAN, RODOLFO TOLENTINO, TOMAS MERCADO, CECILIA MORALES, LIZA

OCAMPO, Quiapo Church Vendors vs. OFFICER-IN-CHARGE GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR.,
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF MANILA
G.R. No. 75349 October 13, 1986
Facts:
On August 5, 1986 petitioners instituted in this Court a special civil action for prohibition to the
end that respondent Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., acting as Mayor of the City of Manila on the
ground that their licenses and permits as street vendors was arbitrarily, whimsically and
capriciously revoked.
It appears that on July 7, 1986 there was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed as
Civil Case No. 8636563, a special civil action of "prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Acting Manila City Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr. It was filed the “Samahan”. The president of the
Samahan is Rosalina Buan and its Press Relations Officer, Liza Ocampo, Rosalina Buan and
Liza Ocampo are two of the five petitioners in the case at bar, described in the petition before
this Court as suing "for themselves and all others similarly situated as themselves": i.e., vendors
"around the Quiapo Church." The three other petitioners also appear to
be Samahan members.
The petition in Case No. 86-36563 is grounded on the same facts as those in the case at bar:
Issue: Whether or not there is forum shopping in the case at bar.
Ruling: Yes.
Indeed, the petitioners in both actions, described in their petitions as vendors of religious
articles, herbs and plants, and sundry merchandise around the Quiapo Church or its
"periphery," have incurred not only the sanction of dismissal of their case before this Court in
accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, but also the punitive measure of dismissal of
both their actions, that in this Court and that in the Regional Trial Court as well Quite recently,
upon substantially identical factual premises, the Court en banc had occasion to condemn and
penalize the act of litigants of hearing the same suit in different courts, aptly described as
"forum-shopping," viz:
The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum shopping, an act of

malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and
abusing their processes. It is improper conduct that tends to degrade the
administration of justice. The rule has been formalized in Section 17 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 in
connection with the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act,
specifically with the grant in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 of equal original
jurisdiction to the Intermediate Appellate Court to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, etc., and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
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xxx
As already observed, there is between the action at bar and RTC Case No. 86-36563, an
identity as regards parties, or interests represented, rights asserted and relief sought, as well as
basis thereof, to a degree sufficient to give rise to the ground for dismissal known as auter
action pendant or lis pendens. That same identity puts into operation the sanction of twin
dismissals just mentioned. The application of this sanction will prevent any further delay in the
settlement of the controversy which might ensue from attempts to seek reconsideration of or to
appeal from the Order of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 86-36563 promulgated on
July 15, 1986, which dismissed the petition upon grounds which appear persuasive.
In this case, it was also found out that that the five (5) petitioners in the action before this Court
who are members of the Samahan "were forcibly brainwashed and guarded by Atty. Reynaldo
Aralar and his associates to accede to the invitation of the said counsel which is to appear for
them and file the case before the Honorable Court knowing that he was furnished the status
quo-order of the same case pending before the Regional Trial Court Branch 45 of Manila.
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FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY and FAR EASTERN
SHIPPING COMPANY
G.R. No. 130150 October, 1998
Facts:
Sometime in 1980, M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping
Company, arrived at the Port of Manila. When the vessel reached the landmark, Gavino ordered
the engine stopped and anchor dropped which was relayed by Kavankov to the crew. However,
the anchor did not take hold and the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier
causing considerable damage to the pier and the vessel.
The PPA, through the OSG, filed a complaint for a sum of money against the FESC, Capt.
Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots Association, praying that the defendants therein be held
jointly and severally liable to pay for damages plus costs of suit., which the trial court and the
CA decided in the affirmative. Neither of the defendants was happy with the decision and both
of them elevated their respective plaints to the SC via separate petitions for review on certiorari.
However, on matters of compliance with procedural requirements, the conduct of the respective
counsel for FESC, PPA and OSG leaves much to be desired, to the displeasure and
disappointment of the Court. The records showed that the counsels of FESC filed several
motion for extension of time to file petition totaling to 210 days, and 180 days for the OSG
before the comment was filed to the court and copies where not furnished to the parties
involved; the certification against forum shopping is also defective.
The records show that the required sworn certification against forum shopping was defective for:
1. Failure to make disclosure of Manila Pilots Association’s petition (GR. No. 130140);
2. It being filed by the counsel, and not the petitioner himself.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation on the rule against forum shopping in the present
case.
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Ruling: Yes.
The second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42 provides:
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath
that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the
status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he
undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency
thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
Petitioner FESC failed to inform the court of the fact of MPA’s petition (GR No. 130150) through
its certification against forum shopping, even when it presumable already received a copy of the
former. For failure to make such disclosure, the certification then becomes defective, and can
be a ground for dismissal thereof.
A certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification, equivalent to non-

compliance with the requirement, and constituting a valid ground for dismissal. In the case at
bar, the initial certification appended to the motion for extension of time to file petition in G.R.
No. 130068 is executed in behalf of FESC by Atty. Tria. But considering that it was a superfluity
at that stage of the proceeding, it being unnecessary to file such a certification with a mere
motion for extension, the SC disregarded such error. Furthermore, the certification subsequently
executed by Teodoro P. Lopez in behalf of FESC cures that defect to a certain extent, despite
the inaccuracies earlier pointed out.
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SUB-JUDICE RULE
EDUARDO L. MARTELINO, CIRILO OROPESA, TEODORO FACELO, RUPERTO AMISOTO,

ALBERTO SOTECO, SOLFERINO TITONG, ET AL. vs. JOSE ALEJANDRO, RUBEN S.
MONTOYA, SIXTO R. ALHAMBRA, AVELINO C. MENEZ, EFRAIN S. MACLANG, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-30894 March 25, 1970
Facts:
Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul Latif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and the officers and men under him was charged for violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of
War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then
undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor.
It appears that at the hearing on August 12, 1969 the petitioner Martelino sought the
disqualification of the President of the general court-martial, following the latter's admission that
he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. The petitioner contended that the case
had received such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was
being exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election on November
11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the
challenge.
Issue: Whether or not the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to
prejudice their right to a fair trial.
Ruling: No.
In this case did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the
Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by
newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a showing
of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those
connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of information or
to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall
have subsided. Indeed, we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners was being held under
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circumstances which did not permit the observance of those imperative decencies of procedure
which have come to be identified with due process.
At all events, even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the
petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply
that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the suspension of the court-martial
proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by
postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since
been cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that we
believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.
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TIMOTEO V. CRUZ vs. FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA
G.R. No. L-12871 July 25, 1959
Facts:
Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved
and implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found
Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and
others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the
sentence although without said appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the
case would have to be reviewed automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial
which was granted and upon retrial, he was again found guilty and his former conviction of
sentence was affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court.
It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the
case. the investigation was conducted not in respondent's office but in the session hall of the
Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness
the proceeding, including members of the press. A number of microphones were installed.
Reporters were everywhere and photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words,
apparently with the permission of, if not the encouragement by the respondent, news
photographers and newsmen had a field day.
Issue: Whether or not the heightened publicity of the investigation conducted by salva was
prejudicial to the petitioner.
Ruling: Yes.
The newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the
investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on
the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took
place during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of
Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and
which was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in
the press, and all with the apparent place and complaisance of respondent.
The members of the Supreme Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and
sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he
committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which the Court fail to find
any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the
bounds of prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity
when a criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court;
but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on
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appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable,
even abhorrent, and the Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an
end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure,
even a penalty to the one liable.
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RE: SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE

PROSECUTOR
ADM. CASE No. 7006 October 9, 2007
Facts:
This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in a criminal case entitled
People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan,
Regional Trial Court of Surigao City..
In the course of the proceedings, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
dated November 12, 2002, which motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated
February 10, 2003. In October, 2003, respondent appealed from the Orders dated November
12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals.
Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an
article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled "Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for
allowing murder suspect to bail out," reads:
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer
whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss.
For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.6 The Court's Order dated September 30, 2003 reads:
Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He
appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.
Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for
interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial
court's disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Bagabuyo’s actions is in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Ruling: Yes.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.18 Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect
20
due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others."
Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall submit grievances against a judge to the
proper authorities only."
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press
conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing
the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying
judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing
murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold
Star Daily. Respondent's statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144
was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that "a lawyer shall
not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party."
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for
redress of his grievances against Judge Tan.
21
RE: SHOW CAUSE ORDER IN THE DECISION D ATED MAY 11, 2018 IN G.R. NO. 237428
(REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C.
CALIDA v. MARIA LOURDES P.A SERENO)
A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC JULY 17, 2018
Facts:
This administrative matter is related to the case entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Maria
Lourdes P. A. Sereno, hereinafter referred to as the quo warranto case.
While the quo warranto case was pending, Sereno continuously opted to defend herself in
public through speaking engagements before students and faculties in different universities,
public forums, interviews on national television, and public rallies. In other words, respondent
chose to litigate her case before the public and the media, instead of the Supreme Court.
Sereno contends that she should not be judged on the stringent standards set forth in the CPR
and NCJC since her participation in the quo warranto case is not as counsel or a judge as a
party-litigant. She also argued that the imputed acts against respondent did not create any
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice to warrant the Court’s exercise of its
power of contempt in accordance with the “clear and present danger” rule.
Issue: Whether or not Sereno may be made administratively liable for her actions and public
statements as regards the quo warranto case against her during its pendency?
Ruling: Yes.
CANON 11- A LAWYER SHALL BE OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.
The Supreme Court is reluctant to accept respondent’s position that she should be treated as an
ordinary litigant in judging her actions. The fact that respondent was only a litigant in the subject
case does not strip her off her membership in the Bar, as well as her being a Member of the
Judiciary at that time. Her being a litigant does not mean that she was free to conduct herself in
less honorable manner than that expected of a lawyer or a judge.
Sub Judice Rule
Sub Judice is a Latin term which refers to matters under or before a judge or court; or matters
under judicial consideration. In essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to pending judicial proceedings. The restriction applies to litigants and witness, the
public in general, and most especially to members of the Bar and the Bench. All told,
respondent’s reckless behavior of imputing ill motives and malice to the Court’s process is
plainly evident in the present case. Her public statements covered by different media
organizations incontrovertibly brings the Court in a position of disrepute and disrespect, a patent
transgression of the very ethics that members of the Bar are sworn to uphold.
22
The present case is not a contempt proceeding, but is rather an administrative matter. The
court is not geared towards protecting itself from such prejudicial comments outside of court by
the exercise of its inherent contempt power. Rather, the Supreme Court is discharging its
Constitutionally-mandated duty to discipline members of the Bar and judicial officers.
The Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through administrative
proceedings, to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession. Hence, what applies in
this administrative matter is the Code of Professional Responsibility and New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which mandate the strict observance of the sub-judice rule
both upon members of the Bar and the Bench.
While it may be true that the quo warranto case was controversial and naturally invited public
attention to itself without necessity of respondent's statements, the fact remains that respondent
succumbed to and participated in the affray that diverted the quo warranto proceeding from its
primary purpose and created a great deal of antipathy from the public to the Court and its
Members
23
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON ALEXANDER RONQUILLO,

represented by their Attorney-in-Fact SERVILLANO A. CABUNGCAL vs. ATTY.
HOMOBONO T. CEZAR
A.C. No. 6288 June 16, 2006
Facts:
Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the practice of law for
unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. They allege that respondent sold them a
piece of property over which he has no right nor interest, and that he refuses to return to them
the amount they have paid him for it.
In May 1999, complainants and respondent entered into a Deed of Assignment. For the price
of P1.5M, respondent transferred, in favor of the complainants, his rights and interests over a
townhouse unit and lot. Respondent also obligated himself to deliver to complainants a copy of
the Contract to Sell he executed with Crown Asia, the townhouse developer, dated April 19,
1996. Upon full payment of the purchase price, respondent further undertook to have Crown
Asia execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of the complainants.
Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia that respondent has not paid
in full the price of the townhouse at the time he executed the Deed of Assignment. Respondent
also failed to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with
Crown Asia. For these reasons, complainant Marili Ronquillo ordered the bank to stop payment
on the second check she issued to respondent in the amount of P187,500.00.
Complainants wrote several letters to the respondent. Respondent promised to perform his
obligation to refund the amount received. However, respondent failed to do such obligations
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Cezar violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling: Yes.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
24
superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as used in this rule, does
not refer exclusively to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. This Court has made
clear in a long line of cases7 that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.
In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into a
contract with complainant Marili representing to have the rights to transfer title over the
townhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in his undertaking, respondent fell short of
his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot be
gainsaid that it was unlawful for respondent to transfer property over which one has no legal
right of ownership. Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct when he
concealed this lack of right from complainants. He did not inform the complainants that he has
not yet paid in full the price of the subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right
to sell, transfer or assign said property at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment.
His acceptance of the bulk of the purchase price amounting to Nine Hundred Thirty-Seven
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P937,500.00), despite knowing he was not entitled to it, made
matters worse for him.
Respondent’s adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo the money she paid
him, which was the fruit of her labor as an Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10) years, is
morally reprehensible. By his actuations, respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of
morality required by the Code of Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect
reposed in him as a member of the Bar, and an officer of the court.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral
character.9 The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Lawyers must
conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or
the public at large,11 and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies
the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.
25
DOLORES C. BELLEZA vs. ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA
A.C. No. 7815 July 23, 2009
Facts:
This treats of the complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Dolores C. Belleza against
respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa for unprofessional and unethical conduct in connection with
the handling of a criminal case involving complainant’s son.
Complainant wanted to avail of respondent’s legal services in connection with the case of her
son, Francis John Belleza. Respondent agreed to handle the case for ₱30,000.
The following day, complainant made a partial payment of ₱15,000 to respondent thru their
mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an additional ₱10,000. She paid the
₱5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments were also made thru Chua. On all three
occasions, respondent did not issue any receipt.
On November 21, 2004, respondent received ₱18,000 from complainant for the purpose of
posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainant’s) son. Again, respondent
did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day, she found out that
respondent did not remit the amount to the court.
Complainant demanded the return of the ₱18,000 from respondent on several occasions but
respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainant’s son
and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorney’s Office for her son’s
defense.
Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint 2 for disbarment against respondent in the
Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Macasa is administratively liable.
Ruling: Yes.
Respondent Failed to Return

His Client’s Money
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the
duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client.
26
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for
filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to
the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he
must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the
money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant
disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client’s funds or properties as they fall due or
upon demand. His failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of
the trust reposed in him by the client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment. Indeed, it may border on the criminal as it may constitute a prima facie case of
swindling or estafa.
Respondent never denied receiving ₱18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting a
bond to secure the provisional liberty of her son. He never used the money for its intended
purpose yet also never returned it to the client. Worse, he unjustifiably refused to turn over the
amount to complainant despite the latter’s repeated demands.
Moreover, respondent rendered no service that would have entitled him to the ₱30,000
attorney’s fees. As a rule, the right of a lawyer to a reasonable compensation for his services is
subject to two requisites: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship and (2) the rendition
by the lawyer of services to the client.31 Thus, a lawyer who does not render legal services is not
entitled to attorney’s fees. Otherwise, not only would he be unjustly enriched at the expense of
the client, he would also be rewarded for his negligence and irresponsibility.
27
SPOUSES JONATHAN and ESTER LOPEZ vs. ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS
A.C. No. 7618
Facts:
Jonathan and Ester Lopez (complainants) filed a petition against respondent Atty. Sinamar E.
Limos (respondent), praying that the latter be meted disciplinary sanctions for her alleged
numerous and repeated violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) by failing to
perform her undertaking as counsel and to return complainants' money despite demands.
Complainants alleged that sometime in June 2006, and while living abroad, they secured the
services of respondent as counsel in connection with their intention to adopt a minor child. In
consideration therefor, complainants, through a representative, paid respondent the aggregate
amount of P75,000.00, which was duly received by the latter. A few months later, or on October
6, 2006, they purposely came back to the Philippines for a two (2)-week stay to commence the
filing of the adoption case before the proper court. However, despite payment and submission of
all the required documents to respondent, no petition was filed during their stay.
Sometime in May 2007, complainants received a letter from the respondent requesting that
complainants be allowed to come home to the Philippines to appear and testify in court for the
adoption case she purportedly filed on behalf of complainants before the Regional Trial Court.
However, the spouses found out that there was no case filed for the adoption on their behalf. As
a result, complainants withdrew all their documents from the respondent and hired another
lawyer. Complainants demanded the return of the amount of P75,000.00 given as legal
fees. However, respondent refused to return such money, retorting that as a standard operating
procedure, she does not return "acceptance fees." In view of the foregoing, complainants filed
the instant administrative case against respondent before this Court.
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
Ruling: Yes.
Respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when she failed to return the
amount of P75,000.00 representing legal fees that complainants paid her, viz.:
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES

OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.1âwphi1
28
xxxx
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a
lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes
upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from
his client. Thus, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his
client - as in this case - gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his
own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of
general morality, as well as of professional ethics.
29
ADDITIONAL CASES
IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY POTENCIANO

A. PALANCA. WILLIAM C. PFLEIDER vs. POTENCIANO A. PALANCA
Adm. Case No. 927 September 28, 1970
Doctrine: A document given by a client to his counsel not in his personal capacity in not
privilege communication.
Facts:
The respondent Atty. Potenciano A. Palanca was the legal counsel of the complainant William
C. Pfleider. According to the complainant, he retained the legal services of Palanca from
January 1966, whereas the latter insists that the attorney-client relationship between them
began as early as in 1960.
At all events, the relations between the two must have attained such a high level of mutual trust
that on October 10, 1969, Pfleider and his wife leased to Palanca a 1,328-hectare agricultural
land for a period of ten years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a
specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to Pfleider, and the remainder would be
delivered by Palanca to Pfleider's listed creditors.
The arrangement worked smoothly until October 14, 1969 when the rupture came with the filing
by Pfleider of a civil suit (civil case 9187 of the CFI of Negros Occidental) against Palanca for
rescission of the contract of lease on the ground of alleged default in the payment of rentals.
If Pfleider was the object of a warrant of arrest in December 1969, no substantial blame can be
laid at the door of the respondent Palanca inasmuch as the latter's services were implicitly
terminated by Pfleider when the latter sued his lawyer in October of the same year. While the
object of the suit is the rescission of the contract of lease between the parties, the conflict of
interest which pits one against the other became incompatible with that mutual confidence and
trust essential to every lawyer-client relation. Moreover, Pfleider fails to dispute Palanca's claim
that on October 26, 1968, Pfleider refused to acknowledge receipt of a certain letter and several
motions for withdrawal, including Palanca's withdrawal as counsel in the estafa case.
With this history in, perspective, we shall now consider the administrative charges of gross
misconduct in office brought by Pfleider against Palanca.
30
It is charged that the list of creditors which Pfleider had "confidentially" supplied Palanca for the
purpose of carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by
Palanca, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to
those of Pfleider.
Issue: Whether or not Palanca violated the lawyer-client privilege.
Ruling: No.
As Pfleider himself, however, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract
between the parties, complainant furnished respondent with a confidential list of his creditors."
This should indicate that Pfleider delivered the list of his creditors to Palanca not because of the
professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. A
violation therefore of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list would partake
more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.
Moreover, Pfleider fails to controvert Palanca's claim that there is no such thing as a
"confidential" list of creditors and that the list of creditors referred to by Pfleider is the same list
which forms part of the pleadings in civil case 9187 (the action for rescission of the lease
contract) now, pending between the complainant and the respondent lawyer, and therefore is
embraced within the category of public records open to the perusal of persons properly
interested therein.
Therefore, Palanca should not be held administratively liable.
31
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS
Adm. Case No. 4749 January 20, 2000
Facts:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
Complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr. alleged that Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of
years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of
issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using
this for at least three years already.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly
admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law".
There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues
for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Complainant filed a certification, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991.
Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the
present."
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Llamas is administratively liable.
Ruling: Yes.
Respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP
dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this
Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years
1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and
receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is
only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the
payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme
32
Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter
shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the
compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this

Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by
paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No.
7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income
taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the
exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in
court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his
express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, 8 we
believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
33
34

PALE Digest Honorico Ralph

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PALE Digest Honorico Ralph

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PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

Case Digests: Based on the assigned cases of Atty. Arnold Abejaron

Submitted by: Ralph Vincent I. Honorico

LAWYER CLIENT PRIVILEGE

UY CHICO vs. THE UNION LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY, LIMITED, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-9231, January 6, 1915

Lawyer’s practice Act provides:

WILLIAM ONG GENATO vs. ATTY. ESSEX L. SILAPAN

A.C. No. 4078, July 14, 2003

Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential

RAMON SAURA, JR. vs. ATTY. LALAINE LILIBETH AGDEPPA

ADM. CASE No. 4426 February 17, 2000

ADM. CASE No. 4429 February 17, 2000

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following

GLORITO V. MATURAN vs. ATTY. CONRADO S. GONZALES

A.C. No. 2597 March 12, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANUESTO V.

G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997

RULE ON MULTIPLICATION OF SUITS AND FORUM-SHOPPING

BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. ATTY. ERNESTO B. FLORES

A.C. No. 4058 March 12, 1998

The Supreme Court rendered its Decision in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. National

or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on

ROSALINA BUAN, RODOLFO TOLENTINO, TOMAS MERCADO, CECILIA MORALES, LIZA

G.R. No. 75349 October 13, 1986

Issue: Whether or not there is forum shopping in the case at bar.

The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum shopping, an act of

G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998

G.R. No. 130150 October, 1998

The second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42 provides:

A certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification, equivalent to non-

EDUARDO L. MARTELINO, CIRILO OROPESA, TEODORO FACELO, RUPERTO AMISOTO,

G.R. No. L-30894 March 25, 1970

TIMOTEO V. CRUZ vs. FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA

G.R. No. L-12871 July 25, 1959

RE: SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE

ADM. CASE No. 7006 October 9, 2007

MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON ALEXANDER RONQUILLO,

A.C. No. 6288 June 16, 2006

DOLORES C. BELLEZA vs. ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA

A.C. No. 7815 July 23, 2009

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Macasa is administratively liable.

Respondent Failed to Return

SPOUSES JONATHAN and ESTER LOPEZ vs. ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS

A.C. No. 7618

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY POTENCIANO

Adm. Case No. 927 September 28, 1970

Issue: Whether or not Palanca violated the lawyer-client privilege.

Therefore, Palanca should not be held administratively liable.

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS

Adm. Case No. 4749 January 20, 2000

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Llamas is administratively liable.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

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