1. JOEY M. PESTILOS, et al v.

MORENO GENEROSO AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
On February 20, 2005, there was an altercation ensued between the petitioners and the defendant,
Atty. Generoso. The defendant then called the Central Police District to report the incident. The police
then acted on the report and dispatched officers to go to the scene of the crime and to provide
assistance. Upon arriving at the scene of the crime, they saw the defendant badly beaten.
The defendant pointed the petitioners as those who mauled him which prompted the police officers to
“invite” the petitioners to go to the police station for investigation. At the inquest proceeding, it was
found out that the petitioners stabbed the defendant with a bladed weapon.

On February 22, 2005, the petitioners were then indicted for attempted murder. On March 07, 2005,
the petitioners filed for an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they
had not been lawfully arrested since there was no valid warrantless arrest that took place because the
police officers did not personally know that they were the perpetrators of the crime.

The Regional Trial Court denied the petitioners’ Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation
and likewise denied their motion for reconsideration. The petitioners then challenged the decision of
the RTC before the Court of Appeals but the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of
merit. The CA recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant.
2. WON the petitioners were lawfully arrested when they were merely invited to the police precinct.
3. WON the order denying the motion for preliminary investigations is void for failure to state the facts
and the law upon which it was based.

RULINGS:
1. With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the
time of the arrest of the petitioners, it is deemed reasonable to conclude that the police officers have
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners’ warrantless arrests. Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
The circumstances qualify as the police officers’ personal observation, which are within their personal
knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.

2. The term “invited” is construed to mean as an authoritative command. Arrest is defined as the taking
of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one
of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression
that submission is necessary. The application of actual force would only be an alternative if the
petitioners had exhibited resistance.
3. There is no taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the
motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary
matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the
preliminary incidents leading up to the trial. Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides
 that it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefore. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what
happened to this case. Hence, the court upholds the validity of the RTC’s order as it correctly stated
the reason for its denial of the petitioners’ Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
The Supreme Court denies the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals. The City
Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ordered to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the
petitioners.
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. ENRICO BRIONES BADILLA, G.R. No. 218578, August
31, 2016

FACTS:

On September 6, 2010, PO2 Paras received a phone call from a concerned citizen informing him that
someone was indiscriminately firing a gun at BMBA Compound, Caloocan City. PO2 Paras and three
more police officers responded to the call and reached the target area. There they saw a male person,
later identified as appellant Enrico Briones Badilla, standing along the alley. Appellant was suspiciously
in the act of pulling or drawing something from his pocket; thus, as a precautionary measure, and
thinking that a concealed weapon was inside his pocket, PO2 Paras immediately introduced himself as
a police officer, held appellant's arm, and asked the latter to bring out his hand from his pocket which
turned out to be a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance. PO2 Paras confiscated the plastic
sachet from appellant, informed him of his constitutional rights, and arrested him. Badilla was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A. No.) 9165
by the RTC and said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Appellant argues that there was no basis for his apprehension because there was no prior knowledge
that he was the suspect in the alleged indiscriminate firing incident and that there was no mention that
he executed an overt act reflecting any intention to commit a crime. Also, there was no testimony that
he had just committed an offense, such that, it cannot be said that PO2 Paras had any immediate
justification for subjecting him to any search. Thus, the shabu may not be utilized as evidence to sustain
his conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged
despite the existing doubt and patent illegality which attended his arrest.

HELD:

NO. The Court finds no reason to set aside or modify said decisions.

The police officers, in the course of the performance of their official duties, inadvertently recovered from
appellant a plastic sachet of shabu which was voluntarily given by appellant himself. Clearly, the item
recovered from appellant was not a product of illegal search and seizure, because appellant voluntarily
surrendered the drugs in his possession. In short, appellant was not forced or coerced to bring out the
contents of his pocket, thus, the recovery of evidence was appellant's own volition.

Accordingly, appellant was arrested because he was caught in flagrante delicto of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, given that mere possession of a prohibited drug already constitutes a
criminal offense.
Appellant's arrest was completely justified pursuant to Section 5 (a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure which provides that a person may be arrested without a warrant when in a
presence of the arresting officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.

3. Elmer Sindac vs People GR No. 220732, Sep 6, 2016

Facts:
From March 15, 2007 to April 30, 2007, the Philippine National Police, Real, Quezon (PNP Real),
conducted surveillance operations on Sindac's alleged drug trade. At around 7 o'clock in the morning
of April 17, 2007, the PNP Real conducted a briefing, and thereafter, proceeded to the port of Barangay
Ungos. There, PO3 Bonifacio Peñamora and PO1 Erbert Asis saw Sindac headed for Barangay
Poblacion Uno, prompting them to follow him. Along the national road of said barangay, PO3 Peñamora
and PO1 Asis saw Sindac meet with a certain Alladin Cañon who sold and handed over a plastic sachet
to him. Suspecting that the sachet contained shabu, PO3 Peñamora and PO1 Asis rushed to the scene
and introduced themselves as police officers. Cañon escaped but the policemen were able to
apprehend Sindac. When ordered to empty his pocket, Sindac brought out his wallet which contained
a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. After initially determining that such
substance is shabu, the policemen arrested Sindac and brought him to the police station. There,
Sindac's arrest was recorded, the seized item was marked in Sindac's presence, and a request for
chemical test was prepared. A laboratory examination later confirmed that the plastic sachet seized
from Sindac contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest is lawful and the evidence obtained is admissible.

Ruling:

The Court is of the view that Sindac's conviction must be set aside.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable
cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of
said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures,
Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In
other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and
seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous
tree.

One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.

Considering that PO3 Peñamora was at a considerable distance away from the alleged criminal
transaction (five [5] to ten [10] meters), not to mention the atomity of the object thereof (0.04 gram of
white crystalline substance contained in a plastic sachet), the Court finds it highly doubtful that said
arresting officer was able to reasonably ascertain that any criminal activity was afoot so as to prompt
him to conduct a lawful in flagrante delicto arrest and, thereupon, a warrantless search.

According to jurisprudence, "the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5
(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or
circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested," which, however
do not obtain in this case.

Verily, warrantless arrests conducted without this indispensable requisite should be struck down as
unlawful, as in this case.

Since the shabu purportedly seized from Sindac constitutes inadmissible evidence in violation of
Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, and given that the confiscated shabu is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, the Court finds Sindac's conviction to be improper and therefore, acquits
him.
4. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO ALVARIO G.R. Nos. 120437-41. July
16, 1997
Second Division, Romero J:
Doctrine:
A warrantless arrest may be made by police officers based on their personal knowledge culled from the
information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to the suspect as the man who raped her at the
time of his arrest
Facts:
Merlyn informed the Makati Police that her sister Esterlina was being held captive at No. 6
Hercules St., Bel-Air, Makati by a man who supposedly raped her. Alvario was arrested right then and
there without a warrant of arrest by the police, and was later charged with five counts of rape allegedly
committed five times. Makati Regional Trial Court, rendered judgment finding Alvario guilty of five
counts of rape
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest by the police is valid
Held:
The Court notes that during the trial, Alvario consistently protested his warrantless arrest. Suffice it
to say that his arrest falls within the purview of Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, viz.: “Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: x x x (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; x x x.”
(Italics supplied) The personal knowledge of the arresting officers in the case at bar was culled from
the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the
time of his arrest.
Armando is acquitted due to significant circumstances which, when taken together with the
conflicting narration of facts of the protagonists, would greatly erode the credibility of the victim. Also,
although the Court finds this theory intrinsically weak, there may be instances where the same is
applicable, such as if there is a strong possibility that the accused and the victim may, indeed, be
intimately related, except that such relationship may have been strained due to extraneous
circumstances, for instance, loss of trust and threat of criminal prosecution, as in the case at bar.
Alvario’s claim of innocence is further buttressed by his submission of proofs of affection or
“understanding” between him and Esterlina in the form of her undergarment embroidered with the words
“ESTER LOVE ARMAN” and handkerchief bearing the name of “ESTER.”
5. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. JESUS NUEVAS y GARCIA, REYNALDO
DIN y GONZAGA, and FERNANDO INOCENCIO y ABADEOS, Appellants. February 22, 2007

FACTS:

Respondents Jesus Nuevas, Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio wereapprehended by PO3
Teofilo B. Fami and SPO3 Cesar B. Cabling after bricks ofmarijuana were seized from them on the
morning of September 27, 1997 in OlongapoCity. Accused Jesus Nuevas voluntarily gave the bag
containing bricks of dried marijuanaleaves. With respect to the confiscation of 2 ½ kilos of marijuana
and the apprehensionof accused Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, it was a result of a
continuedoperation by the team which this time was led by accused Nuevas to get someconcession
from the team for his own earlier apprehension. As the apprehension ofNuevas was upon a probable
cause, in the same vein was the apprehension of ReynaldoDin and Fernando Inocencio and the
recovery from them 2½ kilos of dried marijuanaleaves.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless searches and seizure made by the police officers is valid?

RULING:

No. SC holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first exception,
warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests. A search substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of
the search.

In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of the police
officers. Police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that the persons to be arrested had committed an offense. SC held that neither could the searches
be justified under the plain view doctrine. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the
object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. An acquittal is warranted despite the prosecution’s insistence that the
appellants have effectively waived any defect in their arrest by entering their plea and by their active
participation in the trial of the case. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

SC reversed and modified the decision of the RTC and CA

--- (optional lng po if like pa isulat)

Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom
is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The constitutional proscription, however, is not
absolute but admits of exceptions, namely:
 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rulesof Court and
prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view."The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle.Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

6. Chemical and Coating Corporation v. Herbert Tan and Amalia Sonsing G.R. 163891, May 21,
2009
Facts:
Respondents Herbert Tan and Amalia Sonsing (respondents) were employed as officer-in-
charge and office secretary, respectively, at petitioner's Davao branch. On 4 March 2000, respondents
were placed under preventive suspension for their failure to satisfactorily explain the discrepancies in
the stock inventory at the Davao depot warehouse. Respondents were also asked to explain the alleged
dishonesty in the punching of their time cards. On 24 March 2000, petitioner advised respondents that
they were being terminated from the service. On 7 June 2000, respondents filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and money claims against petitioner. Labor Arbiter Sayson ruled in favor of the respondents.
Petitioner received a copy of the Labor Arbiter's Decision on 7 February 2001. On 16 February 2001,
petitioner sent its notice of appeal to the NLRC through Luzon Brokerage Corporation (LBC). The NLRC
received the notice of appeal on 26 February 2001. NLRC dismissed petitioner's appeal for having
been filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 6 February 2002 Resolution, the NLRC granted
the motion and gave due course to petitioner's appeal. Subsequently, the NLRC dismissed
respondents' complaint for illegal dismissal. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22
April 2002 Resolution, the NLRC denied respondents' motion. Respondents then filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In its 9 March 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals granted
respondents' petition and ruled that the NLRC Charter acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting
petitioner's belated appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 4 June 2004 Resolution,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the 9 March 2004 Decision and the 4 June 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence?
Ruling:
The petition has no merit. Petitioner argues that the NLRC acted within its jurisdiction when it
relaxed the application of the rules on appeal in labor cases because the failure to comply with the
reglementary period to appeal was brought about by LBC's difficulty in finding the new address of the
NLRC. There is no dispute that petitioner received a copy of the Labor Arbiter's decision on 7 February
2001. Thus, pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code, petitioner had only until 17 February 2001, the
10th calendar day from 7 February 2001, within which to file an appeal. However, as 17 February 2001
fell on a Saturday, petitioner had until the next working day, or until 19 February 2001, to file its appeal.
On 16 February 2001, petitioner consigned its notice of appeal to LBC for delivery to the NLRC. The
NLRC received petitioner's notice of appeal only on 26 February 2001.
Since the NLRC received petitioner's notice of appeal on 26 February 2001, the appeal was
clearly filed out of time. Petitioner had thus lost its right to appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC should have dismissed its notice of appeal.
7. Orquinaza vs. People
Facts:
In 2003, Arida, an employee of Calamba Model Makers factory, together with her witness
Espinili, executed a sworn statement before the Calamba City Police Station regarding the alleged act
of Orquinaza, the general manager of the said factory, of kissing her and touching her breasts while
she was taking a nap inside a room of the factory. The Calamba City Police designated the offense
as sexual harrassment and referred the case to the Office of the Prosecutor.

The assistant city prosecutor issued a subpoena ordering respondent Arida and Orquinaza to appear
for preliminary investigation. Orquinaza filed a motion to dismiss before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, arguing that the affidavits of Arida and Espinili do not contain allegations to constitute the
crime of sexual harassment.

Soon, the assistant city prosecutor issued a resolution finding that there was no transgression of the
anti-sexual harassment law, but petitioner's act of grabbing complainant's breasts and kissing her
constitute acts of lasciviousness. Thus, he filed with the MTCC an information charging petitioner with
acts of lasciviousness.

A warrant of arrest was issued against Orquinaza. Orquinaza filed an omnibus motion praying that
the warrant be recalled, the information be quashed, the arraignment be invalidated and the case be
dismissed. He also claims that he was deprived of his right to due process since the information for
acts of lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor was for
sexual harassment and not for acts of lasciviousness. The MTCC denied the motion.

Issues:

1.Isthere a need for new preliminary investigation?

2. Should the case be dismissed on the ground of lack of preliminary investigation? Is lack of
preliminary investigation a ground for the quashal of the information?

Held:

1. No. Arida's statement contains all the allegations to support the charge of acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness
or lewdness, (2) under any of the following circumstances: (a) using force or intimidation, (b) the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) offended party is under 12
years of age. Petitioner had the opportunity to refute all the allegations made by Arida when the
Assistant City Prosecutor required him to submit his counter-affidavit. The conduct of another
preliminary investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness would be a futile exercise because
the complainant would only be presenting the same facts and evidence which have already been
studied by the prosecutor. The Court frowns upon such superfluity which only serves to delay the
prosecution and disposition of the criminal complaint.

The designation by the police officer of the offense as sexual harassment when she referred the case
to the Office of the Prosecutor is not conclusive as it is within the competence of the prosecutor to
assess the evidence submitted and determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be charged. That
is precisely the purpose of the preliminary investigation. It is a means to allow the parties to present
their affidavits and counter-affidavits before the prosecutor to enable the latter to ascertain whether
there is sufficient ground to indict the accused and to help him prepare the information to be filed in
court. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.

2. Even if it were necessary to conduct another preliminary investigation for the charge of acts of
lasciviousness, the lack of such preliminary investigation would still not be a ground to quash the
information against the accused. The Court has often held that the lack of preliminary investigation is
not a ground to quash or dismiss a complaint or information. Much less does it affect the court's
jurisdiction. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the
case nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. The remedy of the
accused in such case is to call the attention of the court to the lack of a preliminary investigation and
demand, as a matter of right, that one be conducted. The court, instead of dismissing the information,
should merely suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation. (Orquinaza
vs. People, G.R. No. 165596, November 17, 2005)

(8) MANUEL SY Y LIM vs. CA G.R. No. L-37494 March 30, 1982

Facts:
In or about June 1970 to October 1970, in Valenzuela, Bulacan, accused Manuel Sy y Lim was
charged with the crime of infringement of trademark for selling or offering for sale hand pumps of inferior
quality and labeled JETMATIC DRAGON HAND PUMP and at a lower price, giving the public general
appearance of the JETMATIC Dragon hand pumps of the Sea Commercial Company, Incorporated as
to the outside appearance, including, among others, the color, the embossed words PAT No. 463490
on the spout the embossed word MODEL chamber assembly, the embossed words JETMATIC
DRAGON HAND PUMP on the lateral surface of the cylinder assembly and many other parts both as
to the design and the materials used which induced the public to believe that the JETMATIC DRAGON
HAND pumps offered are those of the Sea Commercial Company, Incorporated, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Sea Commercial Company, Incorporated and the general public.

RTC found Lim not guilty and acquitted him on the charge of infringement of trademark due to failure
of the prosecution to prove that the accused gave his goods the general appearance of the goods of
another manufacturer or dealer. However, the court finds that the evidence submitted show prima facie
evidence that the accused has violated Article 188 No. 2 (unfair competition) and therefore, orders the
Fiscal to prepare the corresponding information charging Lim the crime of unfair competition.

The respondent Fiscal filed the information as ordered by the trial court.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information alleging that it did not conform to the prescribed form;
that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case because no preliminary investigation was conducted,
thereby depriving accused of due process; and that the new information would place accused in double
jeopardy.
Issues:

1. WON the honorable court of appeals erred in holding that petitioner is not placed in double
jeopardy by his prosecution under the second information in question.

2. WON the honorable court of appeals erred in holding that petitioner could be validly arraigned
and tried under the second information without a preliminary investigation having been
previously conducted thereon by the fiscal, as insisted upon.
Held:

1. No. Acquittal was for the offense specifically charged, without the trial court expressly finding
that for the other offense, which also charged but not expressly so by the statutory designation
of the offense. Evidence exists to justify his being held to answer for such offense, in accordance
with Section 12, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, as the trial court in the instant case very explicitly
did. It is this circumstance that, clearly and undisputably would prevent double jeopardy to attach,
for there is neither acquittal nor conviction, not even dismissal of the case, which might result in
double jeopardy arising to ban the proceedings contemplated in the aforecited provisions of the
Rules of Court.

It is justified by petitioner's own theory that the offense of infringement as charged in the second
information was also sufficiently included in the first information as a separate offense. But with
respect thereto, the trial court made no decision, either of acquittal or conviction. It felt that under
the information as so worded, conviction was not legally possible obviously for not sufficiently
informing the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, which is one of his
constitutional rights, although factually, the assessment of the evidence by the court tended
towards justifying conviction.

2. The situation fits into what is contemplated by the provisions of the Rules of Court already
referred to, which do not call for a new or separate preliminary investigation, which petitioner
contends is indispensable, to which the Solicitor General expressed agreement.

However, if petitioner insists on another preliminary investigation, the same may be granted by
way of "reinvestigation", the Solicitor General who actually represents also the prosecution
having expressed conformity to the holding of one, Let it not be said that We are not mindful of
the rule that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, a rule which itself should be
liberally construed in his favor.

WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Solicitor General, the decision appealed from is

modified as to give petitioner the right of preliminary investigation before he is arraigned and
tried under the second information for violation of Article 188, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code. No costs.

9. CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR. vs. HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 103102; March 6, 1992

FACTS:

Herein petitioner was originally charged in an Information for the crime of frustrated murder for
shooting Maureen Hultman on the head, which would have caused her death but was prevented due
to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to her. She however died thereafter before petitioner
could file a demurrer to evidence.

Private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan then filed an amended information for the crime of murder but
the petitioner refused to be arraigned thereon since the amended information charges an entirely
different offense, and it is essential that another preliminary investigation on the new charge be
conducted before the new information can be admitted. Petitioner avers that there is a need to establish
that the same mortal wounds, which were initially frustrated, ultimately caused the death of the victim,
because it could have been caused by a supervening act or fact which is not imputable to the offender.
He argues that there being a substantial amendment, the same may no longer be allowed after
arraignment and during the trial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary

investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be
admitted.

RULING:

Yes. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that: The information or
complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the
court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused. (amendment)

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed
thereby in double jeopardy and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the
trial. (substitution)

It is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime of murder, hence the
former is necessarily included in the latter crime charged. It is indispensable that the essential element
of intent to kill, as well as qualifying circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation, be
alleged in both an information for frustrated murder and for murder, thereby meaning and proving that
the same material allegations are essential to the sufficiency of the informations filed for both. This is
because, except for the death of the victim, the essential elements of consummated murder likewise
constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.

In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the
amended information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses
charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to
consummated murder. Therefore, an amendment of the original information will suffice and the filing of
the amended information for murder is proper.

Amendments are allowed after arraignment and during the trial but only as to matters of form and
provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The amended information for murder
filed against herein petitioner shows that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually
changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was
merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. Under the
circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended information for murder is, at most, an
amendment as to form which is allowed even during the trial of the case. It consequently follows that
since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the second information, a preliminary
investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. The filing of the amended
information without the requisite preliminary investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be
secured against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and
public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

Petition is dismissed.
10. ROMAN CRUZ vs SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
An information was filed by the PCGG Chairman, with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner
Roman Cruz, Jr. and certain other individuals with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Said information was filed after a preliminary investigation was conducted by Fiscal Freddie A. Gomez
of the respondent PCGG, based on a complaint, various affidavits and counter-affidavits and exhibits
submitted to him.

Respondent PCGG informed the court that it will file an amended information. Petitioner filed his
comment and opposition to the amended information and a supplementary motion to quash.

After a hearing on the matter, the respondent court issued an order that the position of the
accused Cruz is that, on the face of the complaint and of the information filed with the PCGG to support
that complaint, the "crony related crime" alleged thereon did not exist and for which reason from the
very first instance, the PCGG did not have the "literal" justification to even entertain the matter under
its enabling enactments. The parties agree that the issue, therefore, to be presented before the Court
is whether or not the complaint, and the affidavits in support of that complaint, would sustain the
proposition, assuming that these affidavits are duly substantiated, that the crime charged in the present
Information is "crony related crime" for which the PCGG has adequate authority to investigate and to
file an Information on the very first instance.

ISSUE:

WON the PCGG has the authority to prosecute the present case

HELD:

NO. The PCGG only has jurisdiction over cases which involves recovery of ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by the former President Marcos, his relatives and cronies.

The amended information that was filed against petitioner does not fall under the category of
criminal actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth filed against a member of the family of President
Marcos, relatives, subordinates or close associates, who took undue advantage of their office or
authority as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.

What the petitioner is actually charged with is for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019. Public
respondent PCGG does not pretend that the President assigned to it this particular case against the
petitioner for investigation and prosecution in accordance with Section 2(b) of Executive Order No. 1.

Moreover, an examination of the complaint filed with respondent PCGG, as well as the affidavits,
counter-affidavits and exhibits submitted at the preliminary investigation show that there is no evidence
at all that this alleged violation is crony related, committed by petitioner by taking advantage of his
public office, and was committed in relation with the ill-gotten wealth being sought to be recovered
aforestated. There is, therefore, no evidence in the hands of the respondent PCGG to justify the
amendment of the information.

Indeed, the said amendment appears to be an afterthought to make it fall under the type of
offenses respondent PCGG may investigate and prosecute under the law. It is a fundamental principle
that when on its face the information is null and void for lack of authority to file the same, it cannot be
cured nor resurrected by an amendment. Another preliminary investigation must be undertaken and
thereafter, based on evidence adduced, a new information should be filed.

Consequently all the actions respondent PCGG had taken in this case including the filing of the
information and amended information with the respondent court should be struck down.

11. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SPO4 EMILIANO ANONAS G.R. NO. 156847
JANUARY 31, 2007

FACTS:
On November 19, 1996, SPO4 Anonas, the respondent, was apprehended by his colleagues
during a raid in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The apprehending officers claimed that the respondent and four other
suspects were seen sniffing Shabu and that he was in possession of an unlicensed firearm.
On December 1996, two separate Informations were filed against herein respondent. He later
filed a motion for reinvestigation on the ground that he was apprehended without a warrant of arrest
and that no preliminary investigation was conducted. The Trial Court granted the motion. On February
2001, four years after the apprehension of the respondent, the Prosecutor manifested before the trial
court that the reinvestigation has been terminated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent was prejudiced for the delay of the termination of the preliminary
investigation.

RULING:
Yes. The constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial has been reinforced by Sec. 3(f),
Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which requires that “the investigating officer shall
resolve the case within ten (10) days from the conclusion of the investigation.”
There can be no question that the respondent’s right to due process and speedy trial has been
violated by the delay, having to be confined for more than four oppressive years for failure of the
investigating prosecutors to comply with the law on preliminary investigation.

12. Gilbert Dee vs CA GR 111153 Nov 21,1994

Facts:
On March 21, 1990, spouses Jose and Betty Chua (hereinafter referred to as the Chuas) filed a
Joint Affidavit/Complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor of Pasay City accusing petitioner herein, et
al. of the crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial document alleging that the latter
fraudulently made it appear that they signed a promissory note. After several months of investigation,
the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding a prima facie case for the filing of an
information for estafa. Consequently, the corresponding information was filed before the Regional
Trial Court in Pasay City. The accused filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice but the
same was denied by the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor. However, on reconsideration, the petition
for review was granted by then Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III who set aside the resolution
dated September 30, 1991 and directed the City Prosecutor of Pasay to move for the dismissal of the
information in Criminal Case. On February 3, 1992, the Chuas filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
above-mentioned directive but the same was denied on September 2, 1992. On September 15, 1992,
the subject information was ordered withdrawn by the trial court upon manifestation of Assistant City
Prosecutor that the same has to be withdrawn per the directive of the Acting Department of Justice
Secretary. A Motion for Reconsideration of the above order was filed by the Chuas on September 29,
1992 but the resolution of the same was suspended because they filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals. Finding that respondent Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
in ordering the withdrawal of the information. On February 10, 1993, a manifestation with motion was
filed by the Chuas with the conformity of the City Prosecutor informing the trial court of the decision.
The City Prosecutor likewise prayed for immediate arraignment of the accused and hearing of the case.
The trial court granted the motion and ordered the reinstatement of the information. A Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision was filed by the Dees, et al., as private respondents.
The same was however denied in a resolution of the appellate court. Public respondents did not move
for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the withdrawal
of the information.
Ruling:
No. The dismissal was based merely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice that no
libel was committed. The trial judge did not make an independent evaluation or assessment of the
merits of the case. Reliance was placed solely on the conclusion of the prosecution that "there is no
sufficient evidence against the said accused to sustain the allegation in the information" and on the
supposed lack of objection to the motion to dismiss, this last premise being, however, questionable, the
prosecution having failed, as observed, to give private complainant a copy of the motion to dismiss. In
other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations other than the judge's
own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the accused. Whether to approve or
disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like
this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the
accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the
possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial judge's own assessment
of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to
accept the prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency. In the case at bench, the vacillation of the
officials of the Department of Justice with respect to the disposition of the petition for review of the city
prosecutor's action is apparent. As borne out by the records, when the prosecutor's finding of probable
cause was first brought before the Department of Justice for review, the petition was denied, only
resolutions of prosecutors dismissing a criminal complaint are cognizable for review by this Office.
While there may be exceptions to the rule, there is no showing that the case subject of your appeal falls
within the excepted cases where there appears that manifest error or grave abuse of discretion has
been committed.” On motion for reconsideration, however, the same petition for review was granted by
then Acting Secretary of Justice who directed the city prosecutor of Pasay to move for the dismissal of
the information; Such ambivalence does not serve the best interest of justice especially so when there
exists prima facie case against the petitioners in the case at bar. The instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
13. GREGORIO B. HONASAN II vs. THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FACTS:

On July 27, 2003, Capt. Gerardo Gambala, for and in behalf of the military rebels occupying
Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national television, stating their withdrawal of support to
the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and that
they are willing to risk their lives in order to achieve the National Recovery Agenda of Sen. Honasan,
which they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society. In subsequent to this, CIDG
PNP/P Director Eduardo Matillano filed a complaint with the Department of Justice against Senator
Gringo Honasan II alleging that he committed the crime of coup d’etat. When the Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors of the Department of Justice issued a subpoena for preliminary investigation, Sen.
Honasan filed a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ’s jurisdiction over the case, asserting that the
imputed acts he allegedly committed is in relation to his public office, that it is the Office of the
Ombudsman who has the jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation and if that
should be filed in court the Sandiganbayan shall legally take cognizance of the case considering that
he belongs to the group of public officials with Salary Grade 31.

Later on, Sen. Honasan was directed by the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of
Justice to file a counter affidavit, but instead of filing the same he filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo
Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo before the Supreme Court, attributing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order on the ground that the DOJ
has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Department of Justice Panel of Investigators has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation over the charge of coup d'etat against Sen. Honasan?

HELD:

Yes, because under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so that it may take over at any stage from any
investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. The authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government. Such investigatory agencies
referred to include the PCGG and the provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants, the state
prosecutors and the judges of the municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial court.

In other words the provision of the law has opened up the authority to conduct preliminary investigation
of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all investigatory agencies of the government including
DOJ Panel investigators which is duly authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation as provided
under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the only qualification that the
Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such investigation in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction.
Also, the fact that Sen. Honasan holds a Salary Grade 31 position does not by itself remove from the
DOJ Panel Investigators the authority to investigate the charge of coup d'etat against him
14. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, vs.THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.

Facts:

The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, Antonio de los Reyes,
former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public Information (DPI) and Assistant
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential
Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner, who was then Secretary and Head of the Department
of Public Information, with alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said report. Then, in October 1979,
or five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner had submitted his resignation as Minister of
Public Information, and two months after, or on December 12, 1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a
complaint with the Tanodbayan (TBP Case No. 8005-16-07) against the petitioner, accusing him of
graft and corrupt practices in the conduct of his office as then Secretary of Public Information. The
complaint repeated the charges embodied in the previous report filed by complainant before the Legal
Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC).

On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint of Antonio de los Reyes to the
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. On June 16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon,
CIS Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation Report, with the
following conclusion, ". . . evidence gathered indicates that former Min. TATAD have violated Sec. 3
(e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019, respectively. On the other hand, Mr. ANTONIO L. CANTERO is also liable
under Sec. 5 of RA 3019," and recommended appropriate legal action on the matter.

Issue:

1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the Sandiganbayan had
deprived petitioner of his constitutional light to due process and the right to a speedy disposition of the
cases against him.

2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.

Ruling:

A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political motivations
played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the
complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos.
Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which
require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and
their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for
finding investigation and report.

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in
the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by
the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental
law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the
1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights.
A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan
to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a
painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In the first
place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected.
Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn
statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would
justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges
relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting
more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years,
which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case. After a careful review of the facts and circumstances
of this case, we are constrained to hold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.

15. GELACIO V. SAMULDE vs. RAMON M. SALVANI, Jr. GR. No. 78606 September 26, 1988

Facts:

Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a

complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a
portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted the records of
the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie evidence of robbery as
charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that
the transmittal of the records was “premature” because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of
arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that
although he found that a probable cause existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested.
Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC
dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the
performance of the act to be required of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to perform
it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of
the 1985 Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a warrant of arrest of the accused in
view of his finding, after conducting a preliminary investigation, that there exists prima facie evidence
that the accused committed the crime charged.

HELD:
 The purpose of a preliminary investigation does not contemplate the issuance of a warrant of arrest
by the investigating judge or officer. Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis
of affidavits to determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To
determine whether a WA should issue, the investigating judge must have examined in writing and under
oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied that
a probable cause exists; and there must be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the
investigating judge to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the accused
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal should,
instead, have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the arrest of the
accused.

16. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MONDA, JR. y SAMPER and NESTOR BALBALOSA y
RIVERA G.R. No. 105000-01
November 22, 1993

FACTS:

For the killing of eight government personnel and a civilian in an ambuscade accused-appellant
Jose Monda, Jr. and Nesto Balbalosa, supposedly conspired with Avelino Carusa and sixty others who
were identified with fictitious names under the surname “Doe”, allegedly armed with high-powered
firearms and acting with treachery and evident premeditation, were charged with multiple murder in an
information, the victims in said case were all members of the Integrated National Police (INP) at Buhi,
Camarines Sur, and Bonifacio Fabillar, a civillan. Seriously wounded in the same incident were
patrolmen Gil Eusebio and Pelagio Oatemar, Jr. As a consequence, accused-appellants were further
charged with frustrated murder in another information, under the same circumstances aforementioned
but with exception of treachery and evident premeditation.

The lower court acquitted appellants of the charge of frustrated murder for insufficiency of
evidence, but convicted them of multiple murder, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each of the deaths of the victims appellants interposed the present appeal, alleging that
the court a quo erred in (1) giving weight to their identification by the prosecution witnesses despite the
inherent improbability thereof; (2) not giving exculpatory weight to their defense of alibi; and (3) not
acquitting them on the ground of reasonable doubt. Merilles could not have accurately ascertained the
identity of the assailants since he himself admitted that, after the first barrage of gunshots, some of his
companions were instantly killed and he himself admitted that, after the first barrage of gunshots, some
of his companions were instantly killed and he immediately hid himself by taking cover in a nearby
canal. Merilles was so preoccupied in scampering for this safety while they were being sprayed with
bullets from high-powered firearms that it was virtually impossible for him to be really spending his time
scrutinizing and trying to recognize his attackers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest was valid.

RULING: NO. It is interesting to note that appellants were arrested without a warrant despite the fact
that three days had elapsed from the date of the ambush to their arrest. Their apprehension may
accordingly not be considered as justified by Section 5(b) of rule 113 which allows warrantless arrests
only "when an offense has in fact just been committed" and connotes an immediacy in point of point,
thereby excluding situations under the old rule which only provided that an offense "has in fact been
committed" no matter how long ago. If it were true that the prosecution witnesses were able to identify
appellants during the ambush due to their distinguishing marks as they claimed, it would have been
easy for them to secure a John Doe warrant using appellants' alleged "distinguishing marks" as their
descriptio personae which would enable the arresting officer to serve the same infallibility.
It is true that appellants' warrantless arrest is not in issue in this case. Nevertheless, we deem it
necessary to dwell on that fact and to further show the unreliability and incredibility of the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. Appellants' warrantless arrest only magnify the fact that the prosecution
witness were not at all that certain as to the identities of the real assailants, and consequently lend
credence to the postulate that appellants were summarily taken into custody on mere suspicion and
without regard to their constitutionally guaranteed right against illegal arrest.

17. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO MANLULU AND DANTE SAMSON G.R. No.
102140 April 22, 1994

FACTS:

Gerardo Alfaro, Rolando Manlulu, and Dante Samson had a drinking spree in the house of Wally
Manlapaz. According to Manlapaz (Witness of the prosecution), at around 12 in the evening, Samson
and Manlulu stabbed Alfaro in the abdomen several times with an ice pick they used to chip ice. Samson
then grabbed the .45 cal. service pistol of Alfaro and shot him in the neck. Right there and then, the
accused fled. After a few seconds, both accused returned and got Alfaro's wristwatch and wallet.

On the other hand, accused’ version was self-defense and that the non-issuance of a search warrant
and warrant of arrest should nullify their arrest and consequently exclude from judicial consideration
the evidence thus obtained. Wherein, according to the accused, Alfaro repeatedly pointed the gun to
them. Fearful that it might fire, the accused grabbed the ice pick and stabbed Alfaro.

Samson then, voluntarily surrendered to the police station. While Manlulu, was arrested by Patrolman
Reynaldo Perez, 19 hours later and without warrant of arrest. Upon review, the appellate court raised
their penalties to reclusion perpetua with conspiracy and certified the case to this Court pursuant to
Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused acted in self-defense and the non-issuance of search warrant and warrant
of arrest would tantamount to their acquittal.

HELD:

The account of the accused does not inspire belief.

By invoking self-defense, the accused admit killing Alfaro. The burden of proof is thus shifted to them.
Their duty now is to establish by clear and convincing evidence the lawful justification for the killing. In
this regard, they have failed since one of the requisites of self-defense –unlawful aggression, is not
present in the case.

On the other hand, the reliance of the accused on the Constitution however is warranted. Certainly, the
police authorities should have first obtained a warrant for the arrest of accused Rolando Manlulu, and
for the search and seizure of his personal effects. The killing took place at one o'clock in the morning.
The arrest and the consequent search and seizure came at around seven o'clock that evening, some
nineteen hours later. However, the flaw, fatal as it may be, becomes moot in view of the eyewitness
account of Manlapaz which we find to be credible. Hence, in spite of the nullification of the arrest of
accused Manlulu, and the exclusion of real evidence, i.e., the .45 cal. service pistol of Agent Alfaro and
his Casio wristwatch, as well as his extra-judicial confession which was taken in violation of the
provisions of the Constitution, still the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. After all, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the state of its right to
prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability.

As regards accused Dante Samson, although he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, the same is offset by reiteracion or habituality he having previously been convicted once of
robbery and thrice of theft within ten (10) years prior to this incident, each time serving sentence
therefor, which further bars him from availing of the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Therefore, the defenses of the accused is unwarranted.

18. People Vs Florencio Doria

Facts:
Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama were charged with violation Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. The accused were arrested on an entrapment operation by NARCOM agents during
a buy-bust operation. Jun (Doria) was caught by P03 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and used marked
bills to buy the drugs from the former. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon
inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth. Upon
entering Neneth’s (Violeta) house the authorities noticed a carton box under the dining table which
contained marijuana.
The accused denied the allegation and contended that the policemen asked Doria to direct them
to a person named “totoy”. The accused pointed at Totoy’s house and the authorities entered the
premises. Upon arrival, the policemen arrested Neneth (Totoy’s wife) to come with them upon seeing
a carton box containing a block of marijuana.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants. The trial
court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-
appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest was lawful
Held:
Yes, the arrest was lawful. Under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of
committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust
operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.

19. MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA VS.COURT OF APPEAL GR NO. 130644

OCTOBER 27, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
before the RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and was detained without the filing of the necessary
information and warrant of arrest. The petitioner alleged that he must be released and be subject to a
preliminary investigation. However, pending the resolution of the court for the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary and mandatory injunction filed by the petitioner. The
RTC judge issued a warrant by arrest against the petitioner.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioner be given due course and be accorded his right to preliminary investigation.

RULING:

YES. Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular preliminary
investigation. Section 7 of Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify petitioner’s inquest investigation. Said
section clearly provides that “When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense
cognizable by the RTC, the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer
or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been filed conducted on the basis of the affidavit of
the offended party or arresting officer or person.

The records do not show that petitioner was lawfully arrested “ for one the petitioner was not arrested
on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the arresting officer that he would instead be
presented in the preliminary to be conducted in Cebu City on September 17, 1997. For another the
arresting officer had no legal authority to make a warrantless arrest of the petitioner for a crime
committed some two (2) months before.

Secondly, we do not belie that the warrantless arrest or detention of petitioner in the instant case
falls within the terms of Section 5 Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides:

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant : when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jai, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, section 7.

Petitioner arrest took place six days after the shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers obviously
were not present, within the meaning of section 5 (a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan.
Neither could the arrest affected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as affected.
‘When the shooting had in fact just had been committed within the meaning of section 5(b). Moreover,
none of the arresting officers had any personal knowledge of facts indicating that petitioner was the
gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman;
another was able to take down the alleged gunman’s car plate number which turned out to be registered
in petitioner’s wife name. That information did not, however, constitute personal knowledge.

It is thus clear to the court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning
of Section 5 Rule 113. It is clear too that section 7 Rule 112 is not applicable.. When the police filed a
complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a
preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court
for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier the prosecuted proceeded under the erroneous
supposition that Section 7 Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of
Article 125 of the RPC as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive
error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorder
him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant,
he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary
investigation.

20. Roberto Cabanlig Vs Sandiganbayan GR 148431 Jul 28,2005

Facts:
On September 24 1992 a robbery occurred and four days later, On September 28 1992, Police
authorities arrested Magat, Reyes and Valino. Most of the stolen items were recovered however a vase
and a small radio were still missing.
SPO 2 Cabanlig with SPO1 Padilla, PO2 Abesamis, SPO2 Mercado and SPO1 Esteban was
escorting Jimmy Valino to retrieve a stolen flower vase and a radio when Valino suddenly alighted from
the jeep and grab a M16 rifle from Mercado who shouted “Hoy”. Without warning Cabanalig fired one
shots and a few seconds later fired three more at Valino which resulted in his death.
Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban was charged with murder, however Padilla,
Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan as the court did not find any
evidence of conspiracy. Cabanlig was found guilty of homicide.
Isuue:
WON Cabanlig can use fulfillment of duty as a defense.
Ruling:
Yes, the elements of fulfillment of duty as a defense, 1 The accused acted in the performance
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, 2 The injury caused or the offense committed be
the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office,
is present.
 A policeman in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably
necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture
him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm. Cabanlig’s shooting of Valino was an
immediate and spontaneous reaction to imminent danger. Mercado shouted "hoy" when Valino grabbed
the M16 Armalite. Although Cabanlig admitted that he did not hear Mercado shout "hoy", Mercado’s
shout should have served as a warning to Valino. The verbal warning need not come from Cabanlig
himself.
21. Felimon Manangan vs Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya GR No. 82760 August 30,
1990

Facts:
The petitioner counsel for himself was charged in the Court of First Instance(CFI) of Nueva
Vizcaya with the violation of Execution of Deeds by Intimidation under the Revised Penal Code. On the
same date, and order of arrest was issued.

Petitioner then filed a petition of CPM with Temporary Restraining Order assailing the jurisdiction of the
lower court, but it was dismissed for the non-payment of legal fees.

A preliminary investigation was conducted, during the same, petitioner was no where to be found and
even disappeared for a year. When he surfaced, an Alias Warrant was issued. He contested the warrant
in CFI but the latter said that the warrant was valid and in force even after the lapsed of the time.

Issue:
Whether or not the Alias Warrant of Arrest is valid.

Ruling:
Yes, the Alias Warrant of Arrest is Valid.

The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner evaded arrest by disappearing from the jurisdiction of
respondent court, and there is no indication in the records that the property bond had been accepted
by the Respondent Court.

The Alias Warrant differs from a Warrant. The latter is valid of only ten (10) days as found under the
Rule 126, Section 9 of the Rules of Court. A warrant of arrest remains valid until arrest is effected or if
the same warrant is lifted.

22. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @

"DON," Accused-Appellant,
G.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014

FACTS:
The case before this Court is an appeal from said decision affirmed with modification the Joint
Decision in Criminal Case, which convicted the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of
illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs under Sections 15 and 16 Article III of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
On April 1, 1998, a confidential informant reported that a certain Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal
drug activity. This alias Don supposedly claimed that he was an employee of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). P/Insp. Fajardo was then instructed to form a team and conduct a possible buy-
bust against alias Don.
At about 9:00 p.m. on even date, the informant introduced P/Insp. Fajardo to alias Don as the buyer of
shabu. She asked alias Don if he was indeed an employee of the NBI and he replied in the affirmative.
They agreed for the sale of 250 grams of shabu for ₱250,000.00 to take place at around 1:30 to 2:00
a.m. on April 3, 1998 in front of alias Don’s apartment at 765 Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila.
The buy-bust team went to the target area at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998. Alias Don
handed P/Insp. Fajardo a big brown envelope, which the latter opened. P/Insp. Fajardo then handed to
alias Don a green plastic bag containing the buy-bust money and gave the pre-arranged signal. When
PO2 Trambulo saw this, he immediately summoned the rest of the team and rushed to the suspects.
He was able to recover the buy-bust money from alias Don’s male companion. Upon frisking alias Don,
PO2 Trambulo retrieved 12 pieces of plastic sachets of suspected drugs. On August 6, 2009, the RTC
convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction of the appellant. The appellate court ruled that the prosecution sufficiently proved the
elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu.
The appellant appealed his case to impugn his conviction on two grounds: (1) the purported illegality
of the search and the ensuing arrest done by the police officers and (2) his supposed authority to
possess the illegal drugs seized from him. He argues that the police officers did not have a search
warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the
appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was inadmissible in court. As the corpus
delicti of the crime was rendered inadmissible, the appellant posits that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Appellant further insists that he was able to prove that he was authorized to keep
the drug specimens in his custody, given that he was an employee of the NBI Forensic Chemistry
Laboratory who was tasked with the duty to bring drug specimens in court.
Issue:
WON the appellant can assail the validity of his arrest
Ruling:
No, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest.
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We
reiterated in People v. Tampis that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be
made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the
information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the
legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s
jurisdiction." Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto
of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls
within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest
made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this
case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise
valid. We held in People v. Cabugatan that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances
of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or
consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if]
effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to
wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the
subsequent search upon his person.
We now rule on the substantive matters.
To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following
elements should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. As held in People v. Chua
Tan Lee, in a prosecution of illegal sale of drugs, "what is material is proof that the accused peddled
illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti." On the other hand, the elements
of illegal possession of drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified
to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED.
23. Antonio Sanchez Vs Harriet O. Demetrieou GR 111771-77 Nov 9,1993

Facts:
Seven Informations of Rape with Homicide were filed against Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of
Calauan Laguna and six other persons in connection with the rape - slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and
the killing of Allan Gomez. Acting on the request of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, the panel
of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation. Sanchez was
not present but he was represented be Atty. Brion. An “invitation” issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad
was also served on Sanchez and he was immediately taken to Camp Vicente Lim. Sanche was placed
on “arrest status” upon the positive identification by Centeno and SPO3 Malabanan that Sanchez was
the principal in the rape -slay case. The respondent prosecutors conducted an inquest upon Sanchez’
arrival, with Atty. Panelo as his counsel. After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez
in connection with a criminal case for violation of RA 6713. The Informations for Rape with Homicide
were filed in RTC Laguna and warrants of arrest were issued against all of the accused. The venue of
the case was then transferred to Pasig, Metro Manila upon the expressed apprehension of the
Secretary of Justice. Sanchez filed a Motion to Quash on the following grounds: 1) he was denied the
right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the competence
to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not acquired
jurisdiction over him; 4) he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two
persons; 5) the informations are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and
Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer , he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
The Motion to Quash was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
1. WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction of the case
2. WON the unlawful arrest of the accused resulted in the failure to acquired jurisdiction over his person.

Ruling:
1. No. The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall
under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph
(2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner.
2. No. "Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of
the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Application of actual force, manual touching
of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not, required. It is enough that there
be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. It is not denied that the arresting
officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and
the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal knowledge that the
petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis of the arrest was the sworn statements of
Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June
28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had
"in fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested.chanThe original warrantless arrest of
the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against
him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was
nonetheless legal.

24. EVANGELINE L. DINAPOL vs. JUDGE ISMAEL O. BALDADO, Regional Trial Court, Branch
45, Bais City, respondent.

FACTS:
An Information for Murder was filed against Crozoro and Jovy Palermo, with no bail
recommended. Respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused. Before the RTC could
acquire jurisdiction over their persons, accused filed a motion to grant and fix bail. Evangeline Dinapol,
the complaining witness and a sister of the victim filed an opposition.

The accused did not appear on the hearing (motion). Respondent Judge issued an order (a) denying
the motion to grant bail on the ground that the court "has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the accused," (b) ordering the issuance of an alias warrant of arrest and (c) directing the PNP of
Guihulngan to arrest the accused. The alias warrant was then issued. The accused filed an urgent
motion for reconsideration on the ground that "the accused are forthcoming, and are willing to
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the Court".

Respondent Judge issued an order resetting the hearing of the motion to grant and fix bail, subject to
the condition that "the accused shall surrender to the custody of the court" Respondent Judge further
directed the issuance of subpoenas to the prosecution witnesses and warned the prosecution "that
failure to present evidence on said date without justifiable reason will be considered as lack of strength
of its evidence". Accused failed to appear on the set date. While the prosecution was ready with one
witness, it did not present the latter as the accused were still at large and not under the jurisdiction of
the court.

Respondent Judge issued an order resetting, subjected to the condition that accused shall have
voluntarily surrendered and submitted themselves to the custody of the court. The subpoena and
warrant server executed a return, informing the trial court that the warrant had not been duly served as
the accused "are not found here in Guihulngan, Negros Oriental," and the information gathered that
they were temporarily residing in Cebu City proved to be false.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Ismael Baldado erred in entertaining the motion for bail despite the failure to
acquire jurisdiction of over the persons of the accused spouses.
RULING:
Yes. Bail is defined Section 1, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court as "the security given for
the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearance before any court as required under the conditions" specified in Section 2 thereof. A person
is considered to be in the custody of the law(a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest
issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or even without a warrant under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation
to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. Elsewise stated, the purpose of
requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial.

Since the accused in Criminal Case No. 775-G were not arrested by virtue of both the original warrant
arrest and the alias warrant of arrest, and did not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
they had no standing in court to file a motion for bail. Nor did the court have any business setting the
same for hearing. By setting the said motion for hearing despite the fact that his court had not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused, the respondent Judge blatantly disregarded
established rule and settled jurisprudence.

25. Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Policarpio S. Camano, Jr. A.M. RTJ-00-1522 January 20, 2000

Facts:
Respondent Judge is being charged with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion,
grave abuse of authority, violation of Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and
incompetence in connection with granting bail to the accused in a criminal case for child abuse.
The complaint alleges that respondent Judge granted bail while pending the holding of a
preliminary investigation. The defense moved to quash the information against the accused on the
alleged absence of a preliminary investigation. Consequently, respondent Judge ordered that a
preliminary investigation be had by the state prosecutor. During the pendency of this, he granted bail
in favor of the defendant after several notices of hearing to the state prosecutor to which the latter failed
to appear. After such grant, complainant herein now accuses respondent of denying the prosecution
the chance to adduce evidence to show that the guilt of the accused was strong and that bail should
not have been granted in his favor.

Issue:

Whether or not there was an abuse of discretion resulting to denial of due process on the part
of respondent?

Held:
No. Art. 3 Sec. 13 of the Constitution provides that, before conviction, all persons shall be
allowed bail, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua (or higher) when
the evidence of guilt is strong. On the other hand, Rule 114, §4 of the Revised Rule on Criminal
Procedure, provides that "all persons in custody shall, before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a
matter of right." Thus, when the charge against an accused is for an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, there must be a hearing with the participation of the
prosecution and the defense, in order to determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong, and ultimately to determine whether he should be granted bail. For this purpose, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present within a reasonable time all evidence that it may
want to adduce before the court. And even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition
to the motion for bail, the court must nevertheless endeavor to ascertain the strength of the State’s
evidence in order to determine whether bail should be granted.

In the case at bar, the complainant failed to appear and present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused was strong. Considering that the case was referred to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
for preliminary investigation, the accused could be considered as entitled to bail as a matter of right.
Thus, respondent judge’s decision granting bail to the accused was proper and in accordance with law
and jurisprudence.

(26) DIRECTOR J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,. JUDGE ROMEO G.
MAGLALANG and BENJAMIN S. ESCAÑO ) [G.R. No. 78162. April 19, 1991.]

FACTS:
Petitioner Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Antonio Carpio charges
respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion for having granted bail to Benjamin S. Escaño, an
accused in the ambush-slaying of Mayor Jose C. Payumo, Jr. of Dinalupihan, Bataan and for having
taken petitioner to task for his alleged refusal to release said accused to the custody of the Dinalupihan
police.

Escaño's counsel filed an an application for bail stating that Escaño was arrested by NBI agents on
December 7, 1986 without a warrant having been presented to him and that since then he had been
detained in the lock-up cell of the NBI; that said agents, also without a warrant, searched his house
when he was arrested; that he was subjected to inhuman torture and forced to admit participation in
the killing of Mayor Payumo and to implicate other persons, and that during the custodial investigation,
he was not represented by counsel.

In opposing said application, the public prosecutor averred that the accused was charged with a capital
offense for which no bail may be availed of, that the reasons advanced in said application would be
overcome by strong and sufficient evidence; and that during the custodial investigation, he was
represented by counsel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the granting of bail of Escano is valid

HELD:
No. The Court ordered the granted bail are hereby void. The order granting bail had been
rendered moot not only by the fact that he had been released from NBI custody, but also because
Escaño jumped bail and did not appear on the date set for his arraignment.

Although the right to bail is principally for the benefit of the accused, in the judicial determination of the
availability of said right, the prosecution should be afforded procedural due process. The court’s
discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence
presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it could be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical.
Hence, the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. (People v. San
Diego, G.R. No. L-29676, December 24, 1968)
 Under Rule 114, Section 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, persons charged with a capital
offense when the evidence of guilt is strong are not entitled to bail.

Section 4 of the same Rule defines a capital offense as "an offense which, under the law existing at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished
with death." It should be noted that the crime involved must be punishable by death during two points
of time: the time of its commission and the time of the application for bail.

(27) Alexander and Cecilia Trinidad vs Victor Ang GR No. 192898, Jan. 31, 2011

Facts:
On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City, issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg 22 against the
petitioners. On October 10, 2007, the petitioners filed with the DOJ a petition for review challenging this
Resolution.

On March 3, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed before the MTCC of Masbate City, an
Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg 22 against the petitioners. The MTCC ordered the
petitioners to submit their counter affidavits and to appear in court within 10 days from receipt of the
said order.

The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings and Hold in
Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest praying for the deferment of their arraignment in view of
the pendency of their petition for review before the DOJ.

The MTCC granted the motion. On August 10, 2009, the MTCC reconsidered this order, and set the
petitioners’ arraignment on September 10, 2009.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC. The RTC denied this petition. The
petitioners moved to reconsider this decision, but the RTC denied their motion.

The RTC held that the MTCC judge did not err in setting the arraignment of the petitioners after the
lapse of one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ. It
explained that the cases cited by the petitioners were decided before the amendment of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. After the amendment of the Rules on December 1, 2000, the Supreme
Court applied the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment in case of a pendency of a petition for
review with the DOJ.

The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari essentially claiming that the 60-
day limit on suspension of arraignment is only a general rule.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for review filed is a ground for suspension of arraignment.

Ruling:
No. The SC deny the petition for its failure to show any reversible error in the challenged RTC
order.
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:

SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto.
In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for
such purpose;

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department
of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed
sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on October 10, 2007.
When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had
already lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60-day limit provided for by the Rules.

28. SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and PEOPLE vs. HON. ROLANDO HOW and MA. FE
F. BARREIRO
G.R. No. 140863. August 22, 2000.
THIRD DIVISION, GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Parañaque filed an Information1 for estafa against Ma. Fe Barreiro based
on the complaint filed by Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. Before the scheduled arraignment of private
respondent could take place, respondent court issued an Order dated June 29, 1999, resetting the
arraignment of private respondent on the ground that private respondent had “filed an appeal with the
Department of Justice (DOJ).

Private respondent again filed another “Motion to Defer Arraignment, and on November 15, 1999
respondent court issued an Order further deferring the arraignment of private respondent “until such
time that the appeal with the said office (SOJ) is resolved.

Issue:
Whether or not the public respondent act with grave abuse of discretion when it suspended the
arraignment of private respondent to await the resolution of her petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice.

Ruling:
No. The power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after
the information has already been filed in court is well settled. Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors
are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises
the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify,
reverse or modify their rulings.
Procedurally speaking, after the filing of the information, the court is in complete control of the case and
any disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion. The decision to suspend arraignment to await
the resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of such discretion. We have
since then held in a number of cases that a court can defer to the authority of the prosecution arm to
resolve, once and for all, the issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to file the information.
This is in line with our general pronouncement in Crespo that courts cannot interfere with the
prosecutor’s discretion over criminal prosecution. Petition is dismissed.

Court is however not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since the court is
mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case, and may either agree or disagree
with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine prima facie case

29. PANFILO S. AMATAN vs. JUDGE VICENTE AUJERIO,

Facts:
Rodrigo Umpad was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he and his counsel, the offended
party and the public prosecutor entered into a plea bargaining whereby, with the approval of the judge,
the information was amended to attempted homicide and the accused pleaded guilty thereto. The plea
bargaining agreement was entered into and approved by Judge Aujero pursuant to Section 2, Rule 116
of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure - which allows an accused with the consent of the
offended party, to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not such offense is
necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction. Amatan filed
an administrate suit against Judge Aujero for gross ignorance of the law for approving the plea
bargaining agreement and sentencing the accused for the crime of attempted homicide, the Judge
explained that what he did was in accordance with Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide.

Held:
Yes, Judge Aujero is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
While it is true that Sec. 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, allows the accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser offense regardless of whether
or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged", the fact of death of the victim for which the
accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be
reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide.

In instances where a literal application of a provision of law would lead to injustice or to a result
so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable,
the Civil Code admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the
intent is to promote right and justice. The fact of the victim's death, a clear negation of frustrated or
attempted homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not only to a possibly inconsistent result but to an
injustice. The failure to recognize such principles so cardinal to our body of laws amounts to ignorance
of the law and reflects respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not competence, in the performance of
his duties.

(30) Emilio Gonzales VS Office of the Pres GR 196231 Jsn 28,2014 -

(31) Joselito Daan Vs Sandiganbayan GR 163972-77 Mar 28,2008 –
Facts:
The accused were charged for three counts if malversation of public funds which they
purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying public document thus, in addition to the charge for
malversation, the accused were also indicted before this Court for 3 counts of falsification of public
documents by a public officer. In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw the plea of ‘not
guilty’ and substitute the same with the plea of ‘guilty’ provided that the mitigating circumstances shall
be appreciated in favor of them, or in alternative, that he will plea ‘guilty’ to the crime of falsification of
public document by a private individual. On the otherhand, in malversation cases, the accused offered
to substitute their plea of ‘not guilty’ to ‘guilty’ but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer
to render accounts. Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable
recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no
cogent reason was presented to justify its approval.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Plea Bargain offer of the petitioner shall be accepted
Held:
Yes, the Court see no reason to deny the plea bargain offer of the petitioner given the
subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should
be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction. Equity
as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law,
through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the
intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by
different court and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of
lower courts, in order to afford equal justice to petitioner.

32. CHIEF PROSECUTOR ZENON L. DE GUIA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO MA. GUERRERO, JR. A.M.
No. RTJ-93-1099 August 1, 1994

Facts:
The incident subject of the present complaint occurred during the trial of Criminal Case No. 2689-
90-C 3 in the sala of respondent Judge. At the trial on September 20, 1993, Macario A. Agosila,
representing the Prosecution Office was trying to prove that the accused mortgaged to the complaining
witness a falsified and forged document — Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-164 — covering a non-
existent property. Three (3) of the documents presented and marked by the prosecution during the pre-
trial were the affidavit of complaining witness Fe Ochoa-Baybay (Exhibit "A"), TCT No. 164 (Exhibit
"C"), and TCT No. RT-164 (2766) (Exhibit "E"). He then requested for a suspension of the trial in order
to have the original of TCT No. RT-164 (2766) photocopied. Instead of acting on Agosila's request,
respondent Judge declared him in direct contempt of court allegedly in order to "teach him (Agosila) a
lesson" for unduly delaying the business of the court on account of his failure to prepare ahead of time
the photocopies of the original of the documents to be presented and marked during the trial; and for
his failure to investigate the pertinent records in the office of the Register of Deeds to ascertain his
facts.
Chief State Prosecutor Zenon L. De Guia filed a letter-complaint dated October 4, 1993 at the Office of
the Court Administrator impugning as arbitrary the act of respondent Judge Francisco Ma. Guerrero 1
in citing for contempt Macario A. Agosila, 2 and ordering his arrest and detention for five (5) hours (later
reduced to two (2) hours) in the Calamba Police Station Jail. Complainant charges respondent Judge
with gross ignorance of the law, and with acts constituting a direct affront to the dignity not only of
Agosila, but more importantly, to the dignity of the office of the Prosecutor which Agosila represents.

ISSUE:
WON Judge Guerrero, Jr. acted arbitrarily in ordering contempt of court against Fiscal Agosila.

Held:
Yes. judges are enjoined to exercise utmost restraint in the use of their contempt powers. They
are expected to avail of the contempt power only as a last resort when all other alternative courses of
action are exhausted in the pursuit of maintaining respect to the court and its processes. Thus, when a
less harsh remedy presents itself to the judge, he should at all times hesitate to use his contempt power,
and instead opt for the less harsh remedy. It is quite clear that respondent Judge had an alternative to
the exercise of the court's contempt power. We agree with the observations of the OCA in its
recommendation, to wit:

“From the facts on record, it is very evident that respondent acted rather arbitrarily in ordering the
confinement of Fiscal Agosila in jail for the latter's unpreparedness and for unduly delaying the trial and
wasting the time of the court. The undersigned cannot entirely disagree with Chief State Prosecutor de
Guia's assertion that the grounds relied upon by respondent in holding Fiscal Agosila liable for direct
contempt of court cannot in any way be considered as constitutive of direct contempt under Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court. If respondent really believes that the purpose of Prosecutor Agosila in requesting
for a continuance of the trial is merely to delay the proceedings, the former could have easily denied
the request instead of ordering personally the arrest and confinement of the latter in jail along with
hardened criminals. Assuming, without admitting, that Prosecutor Agosila was indeed unprepared on
the day of the hearing, respondent should have taken into consideration the fact that the former is also
an officer of the court who does not have to be treated the way he was treated and should have been
accorded the appropriate respect from the judge.”

WHEREFORE, for improperly citing Agosila for direct contempt and ordering his detention without
sufficient legal basis, a fine in the amount of P2,500.00 is hereby IMPOSED upon respondent Judge
Francisco Ma. Guerrero, Jr. with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

33. CORPUZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN GR. NO. 162214 NOVEMBER 11, 2004

FACTS: Balicena and Andutan, Sr., both public officers, Dept. of Finance. Conspiring and
confederating with each other, together with accused-Corpuz, and other officers of Filsyn Corp.,
recommended and criminally approved the transfer of 61 Tax Credit Certificates totally amounting to
P131,543,043.00 issued to Filsyn Corp. thus changed with violation of Sec. 3(e) of 3019, “tax credit
scam.”
The prosecution was specifically warned by the Court that should it fail to resolve the accused’s pending
motion for reconsideration, it was possible that Criminal Cases would be dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court committed a grave abuse of its discretion in issuing the
Resolution which set aside the order of dismissal issued by J. Nario.

RULING:
No. The Verbal Order of Dismissal by J. Nario is a nullity. Sec. 1, Rule 120 Mandate that a
judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and
signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which
it is based. The rule applies to a final order dismissing a criminal case grounded on the violation of the
rights of the accused to a speedy trial.
A verbal judgment or order of dismissal is a violation of the provision. Thus, there has been no valid
and effective order of dismissal of the cases.
The petition is denied.

34. DACANAY vs PEOPLE

Facts:

Petitioner filed a motion for immediate and separate trial invoking his constitutional right to a
speedy trial in connection with a criminal complaint for economic sabotage through smuggling, with
regard to the importation of raw sugar in 1983 and 1984 by National Sugar Trading Corporation
(NASUTRA). The Tanond bayan found sufficient prima facie evidence against petitioner and his co-
accused to warrant the filing of an information with respondent Sandiganbayan for violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.

Petitioner filed a motion for immediate and separate trial invoking his constitutional right to a speedy
trial where respondent People of the Philippines opposed the said motion on the ground that a separate
trial for petitioner would entail a lengthy and repetitious proceeding

In a resolution dated April 24, 1991, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a separate trial.

Held:

A separate trial necessarily requires a repetition of the presentation of the same evidence. But
the resulting in convenience and expense on the part of the Government cannot be given preference
over the right to speedy trial and the protection to a person's life, liberty or property accorded by the
Constitution. This is particularly true in the case of petitioner where the prosecutors' opposition to the
request for separate trial was based on the ground that the principal accused in the case, the former
President of NASUTRA, was abroad and was not yet arrested. If an accused cannot be placed under
arrest because he remains outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, with more reason should
his co-accused, who are under arrest, be entitled to a separate trial.
Section 8, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly states: "When two or more
accused are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly, unless the court in its discretion
upon motion of the fiscal or any accused orders separate trials for one or more accused."

A separate trial is in consonance with the right of an accused to a speedy trial as guaranteed to him by
the 1987 Constitution, more specifically under Section 14(2) of Article III thereof. The primordial purpose
of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an accused by delaying criminal prosecution
for an indefinite period of time. Likewise, it is intended to prevent delays in the administration of justice
by requiring judicial tribunals to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions.

It has been eight years since the information against petitioner was filed, but the case against him has
yet to be tried. The long delay has clearly prejudiced petitioner, who is now more than seventy-three
yeas of age. Respondents are ORDERED to proceed with the trial of petitioner in Criminal Case No.
11957, separately if it need be.

(35) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA,

CEFERINO S. PAREDES,JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET G.R. NO. 115439-41 July 16,
1997

FACTS:
In a resolution dated February 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification charges
against all the herein private respondents. To evade responsibility for Sansaet’s own participation in
the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement his client,and also one of
the herein respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government
witness in the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefore was filed by the prosecution pursuant
to their agreement.
However, the proposal for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness was rejected
by the Ombudsman due to the fact that an attorney-client relationship exists between Sansaet and
Paredes. To forestall any further controversy, he decided to file separate informations for falsification
of public documents against each of the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases, each of which
named one of the three private respondents here as the accused therein, were filed in the graft court.
However, the same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sansaet is eligible for discharge to testify as a as a State Witness.
RULING:
Yes. Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaet's discharge as state witness,
he can, nevertheless, be discharged even if indicted under a separate information. I suppose the three
cases were consolidated for joint trial since they were all raffled to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows consolidation
in only one Division of cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common
questions of law and fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes, Sansaet stood as co-accused
and he could be discharged as state witness. It is of no moment that he was charged separately from
his co-accused. While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure uses the
word jointly, which was absent in the old provision, the consolidated and joint trial has the effect of
making the three accused co-accused or joint defendants, especially considering that they are charged
for the same offense. In criminal law, persons indicted for the same offense and tried together are called
joint defendants.
(36) Edward Marcelo Vs CA GR 106695 Aug 4,1994
Facts:

In a complaint-affidavit sworn to on 18 March 1991 and filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City, Jose T. Marcelo charged the petitioners with falsification of public documents
committed by forging the signature of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. in six voting trust agreements
(VTA's). Submitted in support of the affidavit-complaint were the findings of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and of the PC/PNP Crime Laboratory that the signature on the VTA's purporting to
be that of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. and the specimen or standard signature of the latter were not written by
one and the same person. The VTA's were purportedly executed in Quezon City and acknowledged
before petitioner Dionilo Marfil, a notary public. On 10 December 1991, the private complainant filed
with the Secretary of Justice an appeal from the 15 November 1991 resolution of the Review
Committee. On 27 January 1992, then Secretary of Justice Silvestre R. Bello III handed down a
resolution granting the complainant's appeal, reversing the 15 November 1991 Resolution of the
Review Committee, and ordering the filing of a new information.

Issue:

Whether a pre-arraignment dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court, which relied on the
reversal by the Review Committee of the Office of the City Prosecutor of the investigating prosecutor's
resolution to file the information, bars the filing of a new information for the same offense after the
Secretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the review committee.

Ruling:

No. The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioners' special civil action for certiorari not
necessarily for the reason it relied upon, i.e., "certiorari and prohibition are not the correct remedies
against an order denying a motion to quash," but because the Santiago court did not act without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash. It is settled that
if a court, in denying the motion to quash (or a motion to dismiss), acts without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion, certiorari or prohibition lies.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Do

37. Tomasa De Jacob vs. Hon. Ricardo Puno GR Nos. L-61554-55

FACTS:
Tomasa Vda. De Jacob filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur two
(2) criminal complaints for falsification of public documents against Jorge Centenera, Teodor Alarcon,
Pablo Paqueo, Jr. Amelia Lamit, Alfredo Silva, Jose Cea, Miguel Moll and Olympio Clapis claiming that
they connived and confederated with each other in falsifying two deeds of absolute sale making it
appear that her husband, Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob participated in the execution of the aforementioned
deeds thereof as a seller when in truth and in fact he never did so participate in any manner as he was
already seriously ill and practically bed ridden when the said documents appeared to have been
executed.

After preliminary investigation the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued separate resolutions
recommending the filing in court of the corresponding information for falsification of public documents
by private individuals as defined under Article 171 in relation to Article 172, par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, the private respondents appealed to the Minister of Justice who directed the Provincial
Prosecutor to desist from filing in court the corresponding information against the private respondents
because based on his opinion the evidence on hand cannot sustain a prima facie case of falsification
of public documents as the medical certificates submitted in evidence does not show in definite and
precise terms that Dr. Jacob was actually not in Camarines Sur on the dates of the execution of the
deeds in question.

ISSUE:

Whether the Minister of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion?

HELD:

No, because the power of supervision and control by the Minister of Justice over the fiscals
cannot be denied. As stated under “Section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code” ‘the power of
control of the Department Head to alter, modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter’
implies to the right of the Minister of Justice to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be
vested by law in the officers of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers.
Therefore, while it is the duty of the prosecutor to prosecute persons who according to evidence
received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime, the Minister of Justice is likewise
bound by his oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless false or serious prosecution.
He would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he orders or sanctions the filing of information
based upon a complaint where he is not convinced that the evidence would warrant the filing of the
action in court.

Furthermore, Presidential Decree No. 911 provides that where the resolution of the Provincial or City
Fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor is, upon review, reversed by the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice,
the latter may, where he finds that no prima facie case exists, authorize and direct the investigating
fiscal concerned or any other fiscal or state prosecutor to cause or move for the dismissal of the case,
or, where he finds a prima facie case, to cause the filing of an information in court against the
respondent, based on the same sworn statement or evidence submitted, without the necessity of
conducting another preliminary investigation.

38. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GERRJAN MANAGO Y ACUT,

Facts
According to the prosecution, at around 9:30 in the evening of March 15, 2007, PO3 Antonio Din
(PO3 Din) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Mobile Patrol Group was waiting to get a haircut at
Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor when two (2) persons entered and declared a hold-up. PO3 Din identified
himself as a police officer and exchanged gun shots with the two suspects. After the shootout, one of
the suspects boarded a motorcycle, while the other boarded a red Toyota Corolla. The plate numbers
of the vehicles were noted by PO3 Din.
After the incident, PO3 Din received word from Barangay Tanod that the robbery suspects were last
seen in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os. Thus, S/Insp. George Ylanan conducted an investigation in the said
barangay, and discovered that before the robbery incident, Manago told Cano that three persons -
namely, Rico Lumampas, Arvin Cadastra, and Allan Sordiano - are his employees in his roasted
chicken business, and they were to stay in Manago's house. Further, upon verification of the getaway
vehicles with the Land Transportation Office, the police officers found out that the motorcycle was
registered in Manago's name, while the red Toyota Corolla was registered in the name pf Zest-O
Corporation, where Manage worked as a District Sales Manager.11chanrobleslaw
With all the foregoing information at hand, the police officers, comprised of a team and conducted a
"hot pursuit" operation one (1) day after the robbery incident, or on March 16, 2007, by setting up a
checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait. At around 9:30 in the evening of even date, the red Toyota Corolla, then
being driven by Manago, passed through the checkpoint, prompting the police officers to stop the
vehicle. The police officers then ordered Manago to disembark, and thereafter, conducted a thorough
search of the vehicle. As the search produced no contraband, the police officers then frisked Manago,
resulting in the discovery of one (1) plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance suspected
to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The police officers seized the plastic pack, arrested
Manago, informed him of his constitutional rights, and brought him and the plastic pack to their
headquarters.
Issue:
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Manago's conviction for violation of Section
11, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.
Ruling:
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 2, Article III32 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause,
absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),
Article III33 of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion
of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.
A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a general rule - be complied
Under the foregoing provision, there are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully
effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was
the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has
escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The foregoing circumstances show that while the element of personal knowledge under Section 5 (b)
above was present - given that PO3 Din actually saw the March 15, 2007 robbery incident and even
engaged the armed robbers in a shootout - the required element of immediacy was not met. This is
because, at the time the police officers effected the warrantless arrest upon Manago's person,
investigation and verification proceedings were already conducted, which consequently yielded
sufficient information on the suspects of the March 15, 2007 robbery incident. As the Court sees it, the
information the police officers had gathered therefrom would have been enough for them to secure the
necessary warrants against the robbery suspects. However, they opted to conduct a "hot pursuit"
operation which - considering the lack of immediacy - unfortunately failed to meet the legal requirements
therefor. Thus, there being no valid warrantless arrest under the "hot pursuit" doctrine, the CA erred in
ruling that Manago was lawfully arrested.
39. RODOLFO DELA CRUZ vs. HON. FELIX MOYA G.R. No. L-65192, April 27, 1988 | Cortes, J.:
Doctrine – One of essential requisites for a valid court proceeding is that court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of case being heard, and jurisdiction over subject matter is determined by the statute in
force at time the action was commenced. The Court also ruled that General Order No. 59 dated 24
June 1977 applies to Dela Cruz’s case and PD 1822 and 1822-A are inapplicable.
Facts:
Dela Cruz of the AFP received a mission to apprehend persons who were engaged in illegal
cockfighting. His team caught in flagrante the cockfighting operators but the latter resisted arrest.
On 2 August 1979, petitioner Rodolfo Dela Cruz, member of Armed Forces of the Philippines and
assigned to the Intelligence and Operations Section of 432nd Company of Philippine Constabulary,
was charged for crime of homicide in Court of First Instance Davao in an information filed by the
Provincial Fiscal on 2 August 1979, for allegedly killing Eusebio Cabilto during an operation to verify
and apprehend operators of illegal cockfights in Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao. The case
was filed as Criminal Case No. 40080.
During pendency of the case, Presidential Decree Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by Pres.
Marcos on 16 January 1981, which vested jurisdiction of courts-martial over crimes committed by
members of (then) Philippine Constabulary and Armed Forces during performance of their duties.
Dela Cruz claimed that his act was related to performance of his duties. Then, he filed a motion to
transfer the case to the military authorities so that he could be tried by a court martial, but his motion
was denied.
Hence, the present petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Courts have jurisdiction over Dela Cruz’s homicide case

Ruling:
The Supreme Court GRANTED Dela Cruz’s petition and the proceedings in the CFI Davao were
declared null and void, without prejudice of filing the proper action against him in proper forum.

PREFATORY: jurisdiction over the subject matter

 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action… and once jurisdiction is vested in the Court, it is retained up to the
end of litigation.
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no dispute that Dela Cruz was a member of the Philippine
Constabulary at the time the alleged offense was committed, and he was executing the Mission Order
when he shot to death Eusebio Cabilto.

The Court ruled that General Order No. 59 dated 24 June 1977 applies to Dela Cruz’s case and PD
1822 and 1822-A are inapplicable.

The Court stated that one of essential requisites for a valid court proceeding is that court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of case being heard, and jurisdiction over subject matter is determined by the
statute in force at time the action was commenced.

The military tribunals created under General Order No. 8 exercised exclusive jurisdiction over “(a)ll
offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the
performance of their official duty or which arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of
their official duty; Provided, that for the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while
in the performance of official duty or whether it arose out of an act or omission done in the performance
of official duty, a certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense to that effect shall be conclusive
unless modified or revoked by the President.”

(40) PANFILO O. DOMINGO, Petitioner, v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 109376. January 20,
2000
Facts:
26 May 1987, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan against
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos; Rodolfo M. Cuenca, then president of the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP); and Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., former Deputy
Presidential Assistant.
In an Order dated 1 September 1987, Special Prosecutor Juan T. Templonuevo dropped from the
complaint Ferdinand Marcos, who was out of the country and therefore outside the criminal jurisdiction
of the Tanodbayan, so as not to delay the preliminary investigation against the other respondents. In
the same order, it was also directed that a subpoena be issued to DOMINGO, the President of PNB at
the time of the questioned transactions, it appearing from the evidence on record that he was involved
in the case.3 However, the subpoena addressed to DOMINGO at PNB, Escolta, Manila, his last known
address, was returned "unserved," since he was no longer connected with the said bank at the time it
was served.

PANFILO O. DOMINGO, being then the President of the Philippine National Bank, a government
financial institution, and hence a public officer, while in the performance of his official functions,
committing the offense in relation to his office and conspiring and confederating with then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and with RODOLFO M. CUENCA, a private individual, being then the Chairman
of the Board of Directors of the Construction and Development Company of the Philippines (CDCP), a
corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the Philippines, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, criminally, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality cause undue injury to
the Philippine National Bank and grant unwarranted benefits to CDCP

Issue:

Whether or not the crime prescribed

Ruling: No, the crime did not prescribe.

 In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered:
(1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to
run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.

The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) provides for its own prescriptive period.
Section 11 thereof reads: "All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten years." This was
later amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, approved on 16 March 1982, which increased the
prescriptive period of the crime from ten years to fifteen years.

Since the law alleged to have been violated, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable
rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326,17 as amended, which
provides:

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the aggrieved party, to have known
the violations committed at the time the questioned transactions were made because both parties to
the transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to perpetrate fraud against the government. 19 The alleged
anomalous transactions could only have been discovered after the February 1986 Revolution when
one of the original respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to said
date, no person would have dared to question the legality or propriety of those transactions. 20 Hence,
the counting of the prescriptive period would commence from the date of discovery of the offense, which
could have been between February 1986 after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the
initiatory complaint was filed.

As to when the period of prescription is interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2 of Act. No. 3326,
as amended, provides that it is "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person." Whether
the running of the prescriptive period was tolled on 1 September 1987, when DOMINGO was impleaded
as an accused, or on 30 July 1992, when the information against him was filed with the Sandiganbayan,
is immaterial; for only about one or six years, respectively, has elapsed from the date of the discovery
of the alleged offense. Thus, the prescriptive period, whether ten years as provided in R.A. No. 3019
or fifteen years as provided in the amendatory Act, has not yet lapsed. The motion to quash on the
ground of prescription was, therefore, correctly denied.

41. HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-
Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then
President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term
starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall
Annex in UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. 4 President Estrada
gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed
renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. 5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine
Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-
wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. 6

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and
her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:

(a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa;

(b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees

Ruling:

(a.) No. Under Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in
relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses
included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction
is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is
committed in relation to their office.

As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan
also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to their
office.

(b) It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v.
People,43 We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and
higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of
the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by
express provision of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a
non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. 46 At most,
it is merely incidental to the public office.47

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public
makes one a public officer.48

42. Ramon B. Revilla Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

DOCTRINE: Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion
and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing
the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out
of control. We have held that discretion is guided by: first, the applicable provisions of the Constitution
and the statutes; second, by the rules which this Court may promulgate; and third, by those principles
of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land. The discretion of the court, once
exercised, cannot be reviewed by certiorari nor controlled by mandamus save in instances where such
discretion has been so exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
FACTS:
An Information dated 5 June 2014 filed by the Office of the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan
charged Revilla, Cambe and Napoles, among others, with the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized
under Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080, as amended.
In a Resolution dated 19 June 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued warrants of arrest against Revilla,
Cambe, and Napoles. On the same day, Revilla voluntarily surrendered to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) and filed a Motion to Elect Detention Facilities Ad Cautelam praying for his detention at the PNP
Custodial Center in Camp Crame. On 20 June 2014, Cambe also voluntarily surrendered to the
Sandiganbayan and filed an Urgent Motion to Commit Accused to Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) pending trial of the case.
Revilla filed a Petition for Bail Ad Cautelam dated 20 June 2014; Cambe filed an Application for Bail
dated 23 June 2014; and Napoles filed a Joint Petition for Bail dated 25 June 2014, together with co-
accused Ronald John Lim (Lim) and John Raymund De Asis (De Asis).
The Sandiganbayan denied the separate applications for bail filed by Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles.
The Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution duly established with strong evidence that Revilla,
Cambe, and Napoles, in conspiracy with one another, committed the crime of plunder defined and
penalized under RA 7080; thus, they are not entitled to the constitutional right to bail.
In a Resolution dated 26 March 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied for lack of merit: (a) Napoles' Motion
for Reconsideration dated 17 December 2014; (b) Revilla's Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration,
and (2) To Adduce Additional Evidence dated 17 December 2014; and (c) Cambe's: (1) Motion for
Reconsideration dated 15 December 2014, and (2) Motion to Adduce Additional Evidence and Request
for Subpoena embodied in his Reply dated 28 January 2015.
---
Meanwhile, on 14 July 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, filed a Motion to Transfer the Place of Detention of Accused Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles
to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) facility in Camp Bagong Diwa or other similar
facilities of the BJMP. The motion states that the PNP Custodial Center is not a detention facility within
the supervision of BJMP under RA 6975 and their continued detention in a non-BJMP facility affords
them special treatment.
In a Resolution dated 4 September 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for failure to advance
justifiable grounds for Revilla and Cambe's transfer. The Sandiganbayan held that detention in facilities
other than a jail is sanctioned in our jurisdiction and there is no law mandating that detention prisoners
shall only be detained in a jail supervised by the BJMP. The Sandiganbayan also found that it was not
shown that Revilla and Cambe were granted benefits above the standards set for other detention
prisoners.
In a Manifestation (Re: Unauthorized Movement of Accused Revilla on 14 February 2015) with Motion
(For the Issuance of an Order Directing the Concerned PNP Officials to Explain) dated 27 February
2015, the prosecution alleged that Revilla was allowed to attend the birthday celebration of Juan Ponce
Enrile in the PNP General Hospital under the guise of a medical emergency on 14 February 2015,
bolstering its argument that Revilla's detention in the PNP Custodial Center is improper.
In a Resolution dated 20 May 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration of the
prosecution for lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan did not consider as sufficient reason the reported
unauthorized visit of Revilla to the hospital room of Enrile to justify his transfer to Camp Bagong Diwa,
since the concerned PNP officials have already been admonished for failure to comply with the
Sandiganbayan's Order.
---
On 27 October 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed
an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Attachment/Gamishment against the monies
and properties of Revilla to serve as security for the satisfaction of the amount of P224,512,500.00
alleged as ill-gotten wealth, in the event that a judgment is rendered against him for plunder. The motion
states that there is an imminent need for the issuance of the ex parte writ to prevent the disappearance
of Revilla's monies and properties found to be prima facie unlawfully acquired, considering that the
AMLC reported that many investment and bank accounts of Revilla were "terminated immediately
before and after the PDAF scandal circulated in [the] media," and Revilla himself publicly confirmed
that he closed several bank accounts when the PDAF scam was exposed.
In a Resolution dated 5 February 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution's motion upon
finding of its sufficiency both in form and substance. The Sandiganbayan held that the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment is properly anchored on Sections I and 2 of Rule 57, and Sections 1 and
2 (b) and (c) of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the Sandiganbayan issued a Writ of Attachment
directed to the Acting Chief, Sheriff and Security Services of the Sandiganbayan. On 10 July 2015, the
Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution's amendatory motion and issued an Alias Writ of Preliminary
Attachment, which included the properties under the known aliases or other names of Revilla and his
spouse, Lani Mercado.
Revilla filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan denied in a Resolution dated 28
May 2015. The Sandiganbayan held that the writ of preliminary attachment is not the penalty of
forfeiture envisioned under Section 2 of RA 7080, contrary to Revilla's argument. The Sandiganbayan
further elucidated that the issuance of the writ is an ancillary remedy which can be availed of during the
pendency of the criminal case of plunder, and it is not necessary to await the final resolution of the bail
petition before it can be issued.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the applications for bail of Napoles
and Cambe? (Revilla withdrew his petition on this question)

NO. The Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it denied bail to Cambe and Napoles, upon a finding of strong evidence that they committed the crime
of plunder in conspiracy with one another. The SC cited the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, and ruled that
thus, the latter exercised its judicial discretion within the bounds of the Constitution, law, rules, and
jurisprudence after appreciating and evaluating the evidence submitted by the parties. During the bail
hearings, both parties were afforded opportunities to offer their evidence. The prosecution presented
nine witnesses and documentary evidence to prove the strong evidence of guilt of the accused. The
defense likewise introduced evidence in its own rebuttal and cross-examined the witnesses presented
by the prosecution. Only after both parties rested their case that the Sandiganbayan issued its
Resolution, which contains the summary of the prosecution's evidence. The summary of the
prosecution's evidence shows the basis for the Sandiganbayan's discretion to deny bail to Cambe and
Napoles.

In finding strong evidence of guilt against Cambe, the Sandiganbayan considered the PDAF
documents and the whistleblowers' testimonies in finding that Cambe received, for Revilla, the total
amount of P103,000,000.00, in return for Revilla's endorsement of the NGOs of Napoles as the
recipients of Revilla's PDAF. It gave weight to Luy's summary of rebates and disbursement ledgers
containing Cambe's receipt of money, which Luy obtained from his hard drive. The Sandiganbayan
likewise admitted Narciso as expert witness, who attested to the integrity of Luy's hard drive and the
files in it.

In finding strong evidence of guilt against Napoles, the Sandiganbayan considered the AMLC
Report, as attested by witness Santos, stating that Napoles controlled the NGOs, which were the
recipients of Revilla's PDAF. The Sandiganbayan found that the circumstances stated in the AMLC
Report, particularly that the bank accounts of these NGOs were opened by the named presidents using
JLN Corp. IDs, these accounts are temporary repository of funds, and the withdrawal from these
accounts had to be confirmed first with Napoles, are consistent with the whistleblowers' testimonies
that they were named presidents of Napoles' NGOs and they withdrew large amounts of cash from the
NGOs' bank accounts upon instruction of Napoles. The Sandiganbayan also took note of the COA
report, as confirmed by the testimony of Garcia, that Revilla's PDAF projects failed to comply with the
law, Napoles' NGOs were fake, no projects were implemented and the suppliers selected to supply the
NGOs were questionable.
2. WoN, as Cambe further alleged, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in relying on the
concept of totality of evidence, which only applies in writ of amparo cases?

NO. We specifically held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis that the: "unique situations that call for the issuance of
the writ [of amparo], as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these situations,
may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and
proceedings." Thus, the case of Razon should not have been applied in this case. On the other hand,
as we held in People v. Cabral: "[e]ven though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused,
if on an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital
offense, bail should be refused." Accordingly, an examination of the entire record totality of evidence -
is necessary to determine whether there is strong evidence of guilt, for purposes of granting or denying
bail to the accused.
We will not set aside the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan, absent any showing that the
Sandiganbayan exercised its discretion out of whim, caprice, and outright arbitrariness amounting to
grave abuse of discretion.
Also, there is no need to prove that Cambe and Napoles likewise amassed, accumulated or
acquired ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 or that Revilla talked with Napoles about their
alleged agreement. The charge against them is conspiracy to commit plunder. In Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, we held that "the gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each
accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion
of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle
Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from
commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of
and/or for [petitioner Estrada]."
As for the weight given by the Sandiganbayan to whistleblowers' testimonies, expert's testimony,
AMLC report, the hard disk, disbursement ledger and summary of rebates, we emphasize that for
purposes of bail, the court does not try the merits or enter into any inquiry as to the weight that ought
to be given to the evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on
what further evidence may be offered therein. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the
court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination.

3. WoN Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied the prosecution's motion to transfer the detention of Revilla and Cambe from
the PNP Custodial Center to a BJMP-operated facility?

NO. However, both Section 3 of Rule 113 and Section 63 of RA 6975 are inapplicable in the present
case. It must be noted that Revilla and Cambe voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan, and there
is no opportunity for the arresting officer to execute the warrants of arrest against them. Moreover, the
said rule merely refers to the duty of the arresting officer to deliver the arrested person to the nearest
police station or jail. The rule did not state about the duty "to detain" the arrested person to the nearest
police station or jail. There is nothing in the rule referring to the place of detention of the arrested person.
In the same manner, there is nothing in Section 63 of RA 6975 which expressly mandates and limits
the place of detention in BJMP-controlled facilities. On the other hand, it merely provides that: "there
shall be established and maintained in every district, city and municipality a secured, clean, adequately
equipped and sanitary jail x x x." When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room
for interpretation, only application.
Section 61 of the same law states that the BJMP shall exercise supervision and control over all
city and municipal jails, while the provincial jails shall be supervised and controlled by the provincial
government within its jurisdiction. Evidently, a provincial jail is a place of detention not within the
supervision and control of the BJMP. From the law itself, there are places of detention for the accused,
which are not within the control and supervision of the BJMP. Thus, to argue, as the prosecution did,
that Revilla and Cambe's detention in the PNP Custodial Center afforded them special treatment
because it is not a jail supervised by the BJMP would be similar to saying that detention of an accused
in a provincial jail supervised by the provincial government would afford such accused special
treatment.

4. WoN the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment against Revilla's monies and
properties?

NO. In its Motion, the prosecution alleged that: "[Revilla] converted for his own use or caused to be
converted for the use by unauthorized persons the sum of Php515,740,000.00 worth of public funds
sourced from his PDAF through 'ghost' projects." In Cambe v. Office of the Ombudsman, we agreed
with the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against Revilla and held that for purposes of arriving
at a finding of probable cause, "only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the [accused]
are required, not absolute certainty." Thus, we held that the prosecution's evidence established a prima
facie case for plunder against Revilla. Thus, contrary to Revilla's insinuations, there exists a prima facie
factual foundation for the attachment of his monies and properties.
Contrary to Revilla's allegation, a writ of preliminary attachment may issue even without a hearing. Also,
contrary to Revilla's allegation, there is no need for a final judgment of ill-gotten wealth, and a
preliminary attachment is entirely different from the penalty of forfeiture imposed upon the final
judgment of conviction under Section 2 of RA 7080.

NOTES: This Decision does not touch upon the guilt or innocence of any of the petitioners.

43. Mario FL. Crespo vs. Hon. Leodegario L. Mogul G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987

FACTS:

Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion for defer arraignment on the ground
that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. However, Justice Mogul
denied the motion, but the arraignment was deferred in a much later date to afford time for the petitioner
to elevate the mater to the appellate court.

The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of
injunction to the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to refrain from proceeding with the arraignment until
further orders of the Court. Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolved the petition
for review reversed the resolution of the office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the Fiscal to move
for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. Judge Mogul denied the motion
for dismissal of the case ad set the arraignment. The accused then filed a petition for Certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or
temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA dismissed the order and lifted the restraining order.

Issue:

Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders
fro, the Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits.

HELD:

It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action
depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under
the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private
persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same
is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe
and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or
reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a
motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie
case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in
the proper court.
44. G.R. No. 71782 April 14, 1988

HADJI IBRAHIM SOLAY PANGANDAMAN, MAGAMBAAN PANGANDAMAN, MACARIAN

PANGANDAMAN, MAMINTAL PANGANDAMAN, PACALUNDO PANGANDAMAN,
MANGORAMAS PANGANDAMAN, MACADAOB P. PANGORANGAN KILATUN PANGANDAMAN,
MARIO PANGANDAMAN, MACABIDAR PANGANDAMAN, PUYAT P. ROMAMPAT, SANTORANI
P. DIMAPENGEN, NASSER P. DIMAPENGEN and DIAMA OPAO petitioners,
vs.

DIMAPORO T. CASAR, AS MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL JUDGE OF POONABAYABAO,

TAMPARAN AND MASIU, LANAO DEL SUR and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Facts:
The case originated in Lanao. The offended party was ambushed in Lanao, but he survived.
Based on his description, there were around 50 persons who staged the ambush from both sides of
the hill. However, he could not recognize anyone of the 50. But he filed a case against all 50 ambushers,
all “JOHN DOES”. So the court issued a warrant of arrest against the 50 John Does.
Issue:
W/N the warrant of arrest is valid? Can a court issue a warrant of arrest against an unknown
accused?

Held:
NO it is not valid. It is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a call of writs long prescribed as
unconstitutional and once anathematized as totally subversive of the liberty of the subject. Clearly
violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person
or persons to be seized. The warrant as against unidentified subjects will be considered as null and
void.

45. RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G. R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012
Doctrine:The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of
said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize
may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented
without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.

FACTS:
On March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was
then assigned as a traffic enforcer saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban
Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; this prompted
him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers
to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle, he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station
since the place is almost in front of the said sub-station.
 He was alerted of the accused’s uneasy movement and thus asked to take out the contents of
the pocket of his jacket, as the latter may have a weapon inside it; the accused obliged and slowly put
out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2)
to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife;
upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; after the accused opened the
container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and upon his instruction, the accused
spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the
two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.

The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs as the substances are
positive of methampethamine hydrochloride. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

Upon a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and
seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest
was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city
ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the
search conducted upon him.

ISSUE:
Whether the roadside questioning of a motorist, pursuant to a routine traffic stop can be
considered a formal arrest.

RULING:
There was no valid arrest. When the petitioner was flagged down for committing a traffic violation,
he was not, by the fact itself (ipso facto) and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a
person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission
to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of
the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be
an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part
of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. There being no
valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are the
instances when a warrantless search is allowed:

1. a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. search of evidence in “plain view;”
3. search of a moving vehicle;
4. consented warrantless search;
5. customs search;
6. a “stop and frisk” search; and
7. exigent and emergency circumstances.
 None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are
applicable to this case. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs
are the very concrete evidence (corpus delicti) of the crime illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused

46. G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB

OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON,
JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial
Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Respondent.

Facts:

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N.
Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners' motion to declare respondents
Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their failure to file an
answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of
summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank's motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was
denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after
trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was
also denied because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial. [1]

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss on
the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations
of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.

In an order [2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint on the ground
that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal
on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration [3] which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal [4] and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days
late. [5] This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.

Issue:
Whether or not the appeal was filed on time by the petitioners
Ruling:
Yes. We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period
of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration).
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within
the fresh appeal period of 15 days
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice
of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this 'fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to
the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies [31] to the Court of Appeals and
Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. [32] The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given
another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final
at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.