NOTES AND HIGHLIGHTS ON CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE (2005)
BY ATTY. CAESAR S. EUROPA

JURISDICTION
ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES:

a) Territorial Jurisdiction (Sec. 2 Interim Rules)

- The limits of the geographical boundaries of a place within which a court has
jurisdiction to act judicially and outside of which its judicial acts are null and
void.

- Jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined by (a) the geographical

area over which the court presides and (b) the fact that the crime was
committed or any of its essential elements took place within said area.

NOTE: SC can Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice (Par 4,
Section 5, Article 8 of the 87 Const)

Example:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAMILO PILOTIN, ET AL G.R. Nos. L-35377-78.

July 31, 1975

Defendant-appellant Vincent Crisologo sought the transfer of Criminal Case No.

3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur to the New Bilibid Prisons or,
alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas on the ground that if he were to be
confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial, his life would be in jeopardy.

Finding the motion meritorious and applying Sec. 5(4), Article X of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court directed the transfer of the record of the case to
the City Court of Quezon City and the holding of the trial at Camp Crame.

b) Jurisdiction over the subject matter:

- is determined by the allegations of the criminal complaint or information in

accordance with the law in force at the time of the institution of the criminal
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.

- Essentially it is determined by the penalty provided by law for the offense as

that offense is charged in the complaint or information.

c) Jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

- conferred upon the court either by the voluntary surrender of the accused or
by his arrest to answer for the crime charged.
- is not lost once acquired.

NOTE : ALL THE THREE ELEMENTS MUST EXIST OTHERWISE THE COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE A CRIMINAL CASE.
 2

OUTLINE OF THE JURISDICTION OF PHILIPPINE

COURTS
APPELLATE COURTS
RULE OF THUMB ON APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE RTC:
.
General Rule:

Appeals, by notice of appeal or petition for review, from Decisions of the Regional Trial Court
are appealable to the COURT OF APPEALS

EXCEPT in the following cases:

To the Supreme Court directly as amended by DUE TO PEOPLE VS. EFREN G. MATEO (G.R.
NO. 147678-87 July 7, 2004)

1.. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. Note: in cases where
the jurisdiction of a court or the constitutionality of a law is in issue, it must be THE
ONLY issue left otherwise the appeal will be a mixed question of fact and law and
must be appealed to the CA.

PROCEDURE IN CASES WHERE PENALTY INVOLVED IS DEATH OR RECLUSION PERPETUA

1. If Death, appeal is AUTOMATIC to the Court of Appeals;

2. If Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment, appeal is to the Court of Appeals but is

NOT AUTOMATIC, a Notice of Appeal must be filed.

NOTE: In BOTH INSTANCES, If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the
corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering
judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final
disposition.

To the Sandiganbayan:

4. All cases decided by the RTC, whether in its original or appellate jurisdiction which
would have been within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan if any of the accused
had been occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade '27' or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned in
the Sandiganbayan law.

NOTE: DECISIONS OF THE MTC, MTCC, MCTC, are ALWAYS appealable to the RTC
regardless of the ISSUE.
 3

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
RULE OF THUMB IN DETERMINING WHICH COURT HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICITON OVER A
CRIMINAL CASE:

“Determining the court which has original jurisdiction over a criminal case is a process of
elimination in the following order

1. Sandiganbayan

2. Special Courts:
a. Family Courts
b. Dangerous Drugs Court
c. Intellectual Property Courts

Note: These special courts are all Regional Trial Courts designated
by the Supreme Court to take cognizance of special cases.

3. Regular Courts in the following order:

a. MTC, MTCC, MCTC
b. RTC

Note: In the process of elimination, the MTC, MTCC,

MCTC comes before the RTC because the RTC is the catch
all court meaning if a case does not fall within the original
jurisdiction of any other court, then it is the RTC that will have
jurisdiction over it.

SANDIGANBAYAN
1 + 1 = 2 METHOD

A very good exercise to have familiarity with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is to
prepare TWO COLUMNS, THUS:

1+ 1 =2

IN THE FIRST COLUMN LIST IN THE SECOND COLUMN IF BOTH THE CRIME AND
DOWN ALL THE CRIMES LIST DOWN ALL THE THE PERSON ARE
COVERED BY THE PERSONS COVERED BY COVERED BY THE
SANDIGANBAYAN LAW THE SANDIGANBAYAN SANDIGANBAYAN LAW
LAW THEN SANDIGANBA-YAN
WILL HAVE ORIGINAL
JURISDIC-TION OVER THE
CASE IF NOT THEN THE
REGULAR COURTS WILL
HAVE JURISDICTION

Section 4 of RA 8249
 4

" Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (A) of this section in relation to their
office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986. “

“In relation to their office”

The tricky part of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determining whether or not common
crimes and felonies committed by public officials and employees were done “in relation to their office”
 5

Guidelines as laid down in People vs. Demosthenes Magallanes (Oct. 11, 1995)

An offense may be considered as committed in relation to the office if

a. it cannot exist without the office, or

b. if the office is a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for
instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the
Revised Penal Code.

c. the offense must be intimately connected with the office of the offender, and

d. the fact that the offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the
information.

Some Cases:

Azarcon vs. SB. 268 SCRA 747 (Feb. 26, 1997)

- The SB does not have jurisdiction over a private individual charged with malversation of
public funds simply because he was designated by the BIR as a custodian of distrained property. He
did not become a public officer thereby.

People vs. Magallanes 249 SCRA 298 (Oct 11, 1995)

- the allegation “taking advantage of his position” by itself is insufficient to bring the offense
within the purview of “offenses committed in relation to public office”

Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary 301 SCRA 298 (Jan. 20, 1999)

How to allege an offense committed by the accused “in relation to his office.

“The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his
office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information
that the offense was committed by the accused public officer "in relation to his office" is not sufficient.
That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy
between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.”

“In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase "committed in
relation to public office" does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is
not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.”

Other notable matters:

1. The Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a case if it has jurisdiction over ANY ONE OF
THE ACCUSED. Example: Janitor charged with Anti-Graft together with a
Regional Director.

2. The Sandiganbayan will also have jurisdiction over PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS who are accused
together with public officers over whom and in cases where the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction.
 6

FAMILY COURT (RA 8369)

SECTION 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. — The Family Courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age
but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor
at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found
guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the
accused may have incurred. The sentence, however, shall be suspended without
need of application pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the
"Child and Youth Welfare Code";

XXXXXXXXXXX
i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;

j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by
Republic Act No. 7658; and

k) Cases of domestic violence against:

1) Women — which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely
to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and
other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which
violate a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom of movement; and

2) Children — which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect,

cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions
prejudicial to their development.

If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal
proceedings and the corresponding penalties.

If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case
pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court.

DANGEROUS DRUGS COURT

The Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court as Dangerous Drugs Courts have
jurisdiction over ALL VIOLATIONS of the Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 9165) except cases against
minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES COURT

The Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court as Intellectual Properties Courts
will have jurisdiction over all criminal violations of the Intellectual Property Code and related laws.
 7

REGULAR COURTS
FROM B.P. 129 and RA 7691, the jurisdiction of regular courts, the RTC and the MTC may be outlined
as follows:

RTC MTC, MTCC, MCTC

IF PENALTY IS PENALTY > 6 years PENALTY < 6 years

IMPRISONMENT OR
IMPRISONMENT AND FINE

IF PENALTY IS PURELY FINE is > 4 thousand FINE is < 4 thousand

FINE pesos pesos

IMPT. ALL cases of reckless imprudence resulting to DAMAGE TO PROPERTY are

cognizable by the MTCC MCTC MTC, REGARDLESS of the amount of the fine (cf
RA 7691)

NOTE: JURISDICTION IS BASED ON THE MAXIMUM IMPOSABLE PENALTY

NOTE2: The General Rules do not apply if the law specifies the court that
will have jurisdiction over the case e.g. Libel (Art. 360 RPC)
 8

THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

AS AMENDED
(RULES 110 - 127, RULES OF COURT)
EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 1, 2000

RULE 110 - PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

WHERE WILL THE CASE BE FILED [Section 1 pars. (a) and (b)]

GENERAL RULE:

Penalty > 4 YRS 2 mos. -Preliminary Investigation is required

-file with the Prosecutor’s Office and or MTC for PI
EXCEPT in chartered cities where it can only be filed
with the prosecutor’s office unless otherwise provided
in the city’s charter.

Penalty < 4YRS 2 mos. -NO PI is required

-file directly with MTC for trial, except in chartered
cities where it should be filed with the prosecutor's
office unless otherwise provided in the city’s charter

Cognizable by SB. - OMBUDSMAN or Prosecutor’s Office but in case of

the latter, the Resolution will be approved by the
Ombudsman

"The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of
the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws" (Sec. 1, last paragraph)

ISSUE: Will the filing of a complaint for preliminary investigation interrupt the running of the
period of the prescription of the offense charged?

RULE: Prescription will be interrupted unless the special law provides otherwise.

MEANING: If covered by the Revised Penal Code, prescription is interrupted. If under a Special
Law then the provisions of that law on prescription will apply (If the law requires
“institution of judicial proceedings” then prescription will not be interrupted) Finally, if
the Special Law does not have provisions on prescription, SEC. 2 of ACT NO. 3326
(Dec. 4, 1926) will apply and prescription will not be interrupted until the information or
complaint is filed in court for trial.

Based on REODICA vs. CA 292 SCRA 87

LLENES vs. DICDICAN 260 SCRA 207 (1996)
 9

COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION (Sec. 2)

1. Must be in writing

2. in the name of the People of the Philippines

- a mistake in the complaint or information where it is made in the name of the offended party
(e.g. Maria Dimapasok vs. Juan Dimakatusok for Rape) is only a formal defect. Though, if
raised, the complaint or information can be quashed, it will not invalidate the complaint or
information and it is curable by a formal amendment.

3. against all persons who appear to be responsible

-the public prosecutor has no authority to exclude anybody if there is a showing that such
person appears to be guilty of the offense.

Complaint defined. – A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with

an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged
with the enforcement of the law violated. (Sec. 3, R110)

Who can file a complaint?

a) the offended party

b) peace officer

c) other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated

What if the complaint is not sworn or signed?

This is a formal defect that can be cured by having the complaint signed and sworn to by the
person who filed it.

“other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated”

Examples of these persons are Customs Officials in cases involving violations of the Customs
and Tariff Code, BIR officials in vilations of the NIRC, DENR Officials for violations of the Forestry
Code or environmental laws, SSS officials for violations of the SSS law. etc.

Information defined. – An information is an accusation in writing charging a person

with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. (Sec. 4, Rule 110)

“subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court”

An information can be filed only by a public prosecutor and only in court.

The person filing a complaint or information must have authority to do so.

CUDIA vs. CA 284 SCRA 173 (1998)

City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information for Illegal Possession of Firearms
committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga.

HELD: If the person who signed the information is not authorized to do so, the entire
proceedings will be null and void even if the accused participated actively in the proceedings.

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN A COMPLAINT AND AN INFORMATION

 10

1. A complaint may be signed or subscribed by the offended party, a peace oficer, or any
other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated while an information can only be
subscribed by the public prosecutor.

2. A complaint may be filed with the public prosecutor or with the MTC, in places other than
chartered cities, for preliminary investigation or it can be filed with the proper MTC or MCTC, for trial in
the cases where direct filing is allowed by law. An information, on the other hand, can only be filed
with the proper court for trial of the accused.

NOTE: Only a complaint filed in court for TRIAL not PI must be subscribed by the offended party,
peace officer or other public officer charged with enforcing the law violated.

EVARLE vs. SUCALDITO 156 SCRA 808

A complaint filed for purposes of preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor need not
be filed by the offended party. Such a complaint may be filed by any complainant. The complaint
referred to in Section 3 of Rule 110 is one filed in court and not with the public prosecutors office in
which case it has to be initiated by the aggrieved party.

NOTE: This is because the public prosecutor is authorized by law to investigate any
complaint. If such an investigation leads to a finding of probable cause to hold a respondent for trial,
the public prosecutor can file the proper information in court.

Who must prosecute criminal actions? (Sec. 5, R110)

GEN. RULE: Under the direction or control of the public prosecutor

EXCEPTION: AS AMENDED BY En Banc Resolution dated April 10, 2002 A.M. No. 02-2-07 SC

In case of heavy work schedule of a public prosecutor or in the event of lack of public
prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office
or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court. Once so
authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case
up to the end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or
otherwise withdrawn.

BEFORE THE AMENDMENT THE EXCEPTION WAS:

IN CASES BEFORE MTCs, or MCTCs where the prosecutor assigned is NOT available, the
following may prosecute:

a) the offended party

b) peace officer

c) other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated

PRIVATE CRIMES “Crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio” Based on Art. 344 of the Revised
Penal Code.
 11

Adultery and Concubinage

- the complaint or information must be signed by the offended spouse and must be against
BOTH guilty parties unless one is already dead.

- Consent and pardon are valid defenses in adultery or concubinage.

NOTE:
PP vs. ILARDE 125 SCRA 11

The affidavit complaint began with this statement:

“I’m formally charging my wife and “X” and would request this affidavit be considered a formal
complaint against them”

The prosecutor phrased the Information, filed after the death of the complainant, in this manner:

“the undersigned city fiscal upon sworn statement originally filed by the offended husband,
xerox copies of which are hereto attached as annexes “A” AND “B”

HELD: The Information sufficiently complies with the requirement that the complaint or information be
signed by the offended party.

Seduction, Abduction and Acts of Lasciviousness

NOTE: Rape has been removed from the coverage of private crimes because under the new
Anti-Rape Law, rape is now a crime against persons rather than chastity. It is no longer a private
crime.

Section 5 provides a list of the people who can file the complaint in cases of seduction,
abduction and acts of lasciviousness. These are the following:

a) The Offended Party, EVEN IF SHE IS A MINOR.

b) The offended party’s parents;

c) The offended party’s grandparents;

d) The offended party’s guardian; or

e) The State;

As stated in Section 5, from the parents to the State, the list is exclusive and followed in the
order given.

In practical terms this means that if the offended praty, EVEN IF SHE IS A MINOR, unless she
is incompetent or incapable of filing the complaint for reasons other than minority, if she wants to file
the case, her decision is to be followed regardless of the decision of her parents or of other people.

As probably discussed in the study of the Revsed Penal Code, the reason for this is the fact
that the offended party may choose to suffer in silence rather than suffer the scandal of a public trial.

In these cases, even if there is clear evidence that a crime has been committed the public
prosecutor is helpless to do anything unless there is a complaint signed by the offended party.

NOTE: Section 5 DOES NOT APPLY to SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES

 12

If an information in the crimes under Section 5 is filed without a complaint, is the defect
jurisdictional or not?

G.R. No. 124391. July 5, 2000.

PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs. ELMER YPARRAGUIRE y SEPE

“Once the violation of the law becomes known through a direct original participation initiated
by the victim, the requirements of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to the effect that the
offense of rape "shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
parents," are satisfied. Said provision is not determinative of the jurisdiction of courts over the
private offenses because the same is governed by the Judiciary law, not the Revised Penal
Code which deals with the definition of felonies and their punishment. Stated differently, the
complaint required in Article 344 is but a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper
authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties.”

“No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of any of the
offe4nses mentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint filed
by the offended party.”

DEFAMATION: SLANDER OR LIBEL IS NOT A PRIVATE CRIME

EXCEPT IF THE DEFAMATION IMPUTES THE COMMISSION OF Adultery,
Concubinage, , seduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness

Notable case:

Gonzales vs. Arcilla 203 SCRA 629

“MANG-AAGAW NG ASAWA NG MAY ASAWA” is not an imputation of adultery as the elements are
not imputed.

What must a complaint or information contain? (Sec. 6, R110)

a. the name of the accused;

b. the designation of the offense given by the statute;
c. the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
d. the name of the offended party;
e. the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
f. the place where the offense was committed.

Purpose:

Pp. vs. Rosalindo Cutamora, Et. Al

G.R. Nos. 133448-53. October 6, 2000

The purpose of the above-quoted rule is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, a right guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
Elaborating on the accused's right to be informed, this Court held in Pecho v. People (262 SCRA 518)
that the objectives of this right are:

1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make the defense;

2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further prosecution
for the same cause; and

3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had.
 13

On the Name of the Accused (Sec. 7, R110)

- An Erroneous name is not material it can be cured by amendment for as long as the
identity of the accused is established.

On the Designation of the Offense (Sec. 8., R110)

The rule is that the designation of the offense is not material. What is material are the
averments in the body of the information. Thus, an error in the designation of the offense will not
invalidate the information.

EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: When the facts appearing in the body of the complaint or information
are AMBIGUOS as to permit two or more interpretations, the designation appearing in the caption
controls.

Example:
U.S. vs. TICSON 25 PHIL 67

Early in the morning of October 6, 1911, and on an occasion when Braulio Calang, the
husband of Epifania Cupo, was absent from home and she was asleep with her young child in her
arms, the defendant entered their house, situated in Surigao, by cutting the fastenings of the door,
approached the sleeping woman and raised her skirt.

CRIME DESIGNATED WAS TRESPASS TO DWELLING BUT THE FACTS COULD ALSO
CONSTITUTE ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS. RULE: FOLLOW THE DESIGNATION

On the Cause of the accusation (Sec. 9, R110)

-recite the elements of the crime but not necessarily in the actual words of the law.

-Other words can be used for as long as the same idea is conveyed

Example:

intent to kill in homicide can be inferred from the other allegations in the information.

Intent to gain in theft can be presumed from the allegation of appropriating a thing belonging to
another.

Must conspiracy be expressly alleged or may it be inferred from the other allegations in the
information?

People vs. Ronnie Quitlong

292 SCRA 360

“A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege
all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence
proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the
conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity
required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of
the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much
certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his
acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that
an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the
 14

accused of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the
language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the
respective statutes defining them."

VERY IMPORTANT:

Sections 8 and 9 of the Rules have been amended by the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. The said provisions now require that BOTH QUALIFYING AND ORDINARY
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES MUST be stated in the Information.

This requirement is MANDATORY and, being favorable to the accused, should be given
retroactive effect. Thus it affects cases filed prior to the effectivity of the the Revised Rules on
December 1, 2000.

Pp. vs. Daniel Mauricio

G.R. No. 133695. February 28, 2001

“The use of the word "must" indicates that the requirement is mandatory, therefore failure to
comply with Sec. 4, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although proven at the
trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are not stated in the
information. It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application
insofar as they benefit the accused.”

Example:

Pp. vs. Rogelio R. Moreno

G.R. No. 140033. January 25, 2002

Nocturnity was not alleged in the information filed prior to December 1, 2000 but it cannot be
appreciated EVEN IF PROVEN because the new rule is MANDATORY and is to be given retroactive
effect.

May an aggravating circumstance which was not alleged in the information be appreciated in
determining CIVIL liability?

People vs. Suela

373 SCRA 163 (Jan. 15, 2002)
citing People vs. Catubig
363 SCRA 621

-While, under the new rules, an aggravating circumstance that is NOT alleged in the information
CANNOT be appreciated in determining the criminal liability of the accused, the rules do not prevent
its appreciation for the purpose of determining CIVIL liability.

IMPORTANT ISSUE:

Since both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must now be stated in the Information, is
it necessary to specify which circumstances are alleged as qualifying and which are alleged as
ordinary aggravating circumstances?

People vs. Rodelio R. Aquino

G.R. Nos. 144340-42. August 6, 2002

“xxxxx, the Court has repeatedly held, even after the recent amendments to the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, that qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as
"qualifying" or "qualified by" to properly qualify an offense. The Court has repeatedly qualified cases of
 15

rape 6 where the twin circumstances of minority and relationship have been specifically alleged in the
Information even without the use of the descriptive words "qualifying" or "qualified by."

"The fact that the circumstances were described as "aggravating" instead of "qualifying" does
not take the Information out of the purview of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 248 does
not use the word "qualifying" or "aggravating" in enumerating the circumstances that raise a killing to
the category of murder. Article 248 merely refers to the enumerated circumstances as the "attendant
circumstances."

“We therefore reiterate that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that the Information
allege, specify or enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law to qualify the offense.
These circumstances need not be preceded by the words "aggravating/qualifying," "qualifying," or
"qualified by" to be considered as qualifying circumstances. It is sufficient that these circumstances be
specified in the Information to apprise the accused of the charges against him to enable him to
prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding surprises during the trial. When the prosecution
specifically alleges in the Information the circumstances mentioned in the law as qualifying the crime,
and succeeds in proving them beyond reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained to impose the higher
penalty mandated by law. This includes the death penalty in proper cases.”

In cases of rape, is the allegation in the Information that the accused is the “uncle” of the
victim or that the latter is his “niece” sufficient to qualify the offense?

People vs. Marcial L. Llanto

G.R. No. 146458. January 20, 2003

The information:

"That on or about (the) twelfth day of November, 1999 at Pasay City and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, actuated by lust, with use of a knife, through
force, violence and intimidation, and by taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over his twelve (12)
year old minor niece MARIA CRISTY T. BALISI, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of Ma. Cristy T. Balisi against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice in whatever amounts may be awarded to her under provisions of the Civil Code."

Held:
“In a catena of cases, we have ruled that the allegation that the accused is the "uncle" of the
victim and the latter is his "niece" is not specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance
of relationship under Art. 266-B, supra. In People v. Lachica, we held:

"If the offender is merely a relation — not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or
common law spouse of the mother of the victim — it must be alleged in the Information that he is
'a relative by consanguinity or affinity [as the case may be] within the third civil degree.'"
(People v. Libo-on, GR No. 136737, May 23, 2001, per Gonzaga-Reyes, J.; People v. Banihit, 339
SCRA 86, 96, August 25, 2000, per Ynares-Santiago, J. — both citing People v. Ferolino, 329 SCRA
719, 735, April 5, 2000, per Davide, CJ.) Moreover, even if the relationship by consanguinity or affinity
is alleged in the Information, it is still necessary to allege further that such relationship is within the
third civil degree. . ." (emphasis supplied)

Consequently, because of the defect in the information, the accused can only be held liable for
simple rape.

The failure to allege the accused’s lack of a license for a gun in the Information negates the
appreciation of the special aggravating circumstance against him

People vs. Jessielito Badajos, Et. Al.

G.R. No. 139692. January 15, 2004
 16

“Under Republic Act No. 8294, the use of an unlicensed gun to commit homicide is a special
aggravating circumstance. The culprit's lack of a license for the gun is an essential element of such
circumstance, which must be alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, there is no allegation in the Information that the
appellant had no license to possess the firearm he used to kill Donque. Thus, the appellant's use of an
unlicensed firearm cannot be considered against him.”

The allegation in the information that the accused is “armed with a knife” is sufficient to
comply with the need to allege that the accused was “armed with a deadly weapon” to qualify
the crime of rape to rape with the use of a deadly weapon

People vs. Joseph Orilla

G.R. Nos. 148939-40. February 13, 2004

“Appellant on the other hand argues that the allegation in the Amended Information that he
was "armed with a knife" does not comply with Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The allegation in the Amended Information that the accused was "armed
with a knife" is not in any way equivalent to "use of a deadly weapon." The "knife" could simply be a
"butter knife," a harmless knife. Appellant opines that the Amended Information should have stated
that accused was "armed with a deadly knife, which is a deadly weapon."

We have held in several cases that the allegation "armed with a knife" is sufficient to inform
the accused of the nature of the accusation against him. 45 The prosecution also proved during the
trial appellant's use of a deadly weapon. Remilyn testified that she was not able to shout because
appellant pointed an eight-inch kitchen knife at her throat.”

On the place of commission of the offense (Sec. 10, R 110)

-the place need not be specific for as long as it is clear that the offense was committed within
the jurisdiction of the court where it was filed.

-EXCEPTION: The place must be specific only in cases where it is an essential element of
the offense or necessary for the identification of the offense.

Example: Some Violations of the Omnibus Election Code such as entering a polling
place where the accused is not a voter therein nor an authorized watcher of a candidate or
party.

On the date of the commission of the offense (Sec. 11, R110)

- The date or the time of commission need not be specific. The phrase “On or about” is
sufficient to cover a span of a few months.

- EXCEPTION- when the date or time is an essential element of the offense.

Examples: Violation of the liquor ban on the day prior to or on the day of the elections.
Also in the crime of “infanticide” which must be committed within 72 hours (three days) from
the birth of the child otherwise it would be murder.

On the Name of the Offended Party (Sec. 12, R110)

General Rule: “The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the person
against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or
nickname by which such person has been or is known”.

Examples:
 17

Slander

Pp vs. Juliana Uba, 99 Phil 134

“While it is probably true that the fiscal or his clerk made a clerical error in putting in the
information the name of Pastora Somod-ong instead of that of Demetria Somod-ong, as the offended
party, the mistake thus committed was on a very material matter in the case, such that it necessarily
affected the identification of the act charged. The act of insulting X is distinct from a similar act of insult
against Y, even if the insult is preferred by the same person, in the same language and at about the
same time. Note that the pleading that give the court jurisdiction to try the offense is not the complaint
of the offended party, but the information by the fiscal, because the charge is the utterance of insulting
or defamatory language, not the imputation of an offense which can be prosecuted only at the instance
of the offended party. (People vs. Marquez, 68 Phil., 521; Blanco vs. People, 70 Phil., 735.)

Arturo Borjal vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126466. January 14, 1999

In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the
person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the
object of the libelous publication.

citing:

Kunkle v. Cablenews-American, 42 Phil. 757 (1922). See also Corpus v. Cuaderno, Sr., No. L-16969,
30 April 1966, 16 SCRA 807; People v. Monton, No. L-16772, 30 November 1962, 6 SCRA 801.

Statutory Rape
“the victim must be described as being below 12 years of age”

Pp. vs. Renato Puzon

G.R. Nos. 123156-59. August 29, 2000

“Clearly, conviction of appellant for statutory rape (absent any allegation in the information that
the complainants were below 12 years of age at the time of the rape), and not for rape through force or
intimidation, which was the method alleged — would violate the right of the appellant to be informed of
the nature of the accusation against him; which right is granted. by the Constitution to every accused
to the end that he could prepare an adequate defense for the offenses charged against him.
Convicting appellant of a crime not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the offense
alleged would be unfair and underhanded.”
 18

EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE-

In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must
be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.

IN CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

People vs. CFI of Quezon City

G.R. No. L-41903. June 10, 1992

We rule that it was error for the lower court to dismiss the information. The information was
already sufficient in form and substance. The argument that it was fatal for the prosecution not to have
alleged the State as the offended party is without merit for in the case of Sayson v. People, (G.R. No.
51745, October 28, 1988, 166 SCRA 680) in construing Sec. 11 of Rule 110 (now Sec. 12, Rules of
Court of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), we have clearly held that in offenses against
property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable as long as
the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified.

Ramon F. Sayson vs. People of the Phils.

G.R. No. L-51745. October 28, 1988

“The petitioner vigorously maintains that he cannot be justifiably convicted under the
information charging him of attempting to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of America because
the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution show very clearly that the accused allegedly
attempted to defraud Mever Films, Inc., a corporate entity entirely separate and distinct from Ernesto
Rufino, Sr. He firmly asserts that his conviction was in gross violation of his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Petitioner's claim is unavailing. The rule in this jurisdiction is that "variance between the
allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the prosecution in support thereof does not
of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal." [People v. Catli, G.R. No. L-11641, November 29, 1962, 6
SCRA 642.]
The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name and surname of
the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed or any appellation or
nickname by which such person has been or is known and if there is no better way of identifying him,
he must be described under a fictitious name [Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule
110, Section 12 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] In case of offenses against property, the
designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the
criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified.

EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION

Robbery with violence or intimidation

The case of U.S. VS. Lahoylahoy, 38 Phil., 330, appears to us to be in point and decisive of
the case. The reasons for the decision in that case were, first, because, to convict a person of robbing
X when the person robbed is Y is violative of the principles of pleading and, second, because then the
plea of double jeopardy would be of no avail to an accused. To this same effect is our decision in
People vs. Balboa, 90 Phil., 5. (quoted from the Uba case)
 19

DUPLICITOUS COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION (Sec. 13, R 110)

Duplicitous Information

An information charging more than one offense is called a duplicitous information.

Rule:

Pp. vs. Manalili

G.R. No. 121671. August 14, 1998

Under the Constitution, an accused has the right to be informed, before trial, of the nature of
the offense with which he or she is charged. Regardless of how conclusive and convincing the
evidence of guilt may be, there can be no conviction, unless the offense is charged (or is necessarily
included) in the complaint or information. On the other hand, an accused, who fails to object prior to
arraignment to a duplicitous information, may be found guilty of any or all of the crimes alleged therein
and duly proven during the trial, for the allegation of the elements of such component crimes in the
said information has satisfied the constitutional guarantee that an accused be informed of the nature of
the offense with which he or she is being charged

Does not apply to complex crimes, compound crimes, continued crimes, and special complex
crimes and other instances where only one penalty will be imposed on several crimes.

Complex Crimes in General

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code

1. Delito Complejo (Complex Crimes Proper)

- when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other

Example: Estafa through falsification of public documents

Note: Article 48 also applies to culpable felonies (criminal negligence)

Pp vs. Glenn De Los Santos

G.R. No. 131588. March 27, 2001

In Reodica v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that if a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results
in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Thus, in Lapuz v. Court of
Appeals, the accused was convicted, in conformity with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the
complex crime of "homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence," and was sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead of the two penalties
imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court of Appeals, 29 the accused was convicted of the
complex crime of "multiple homicide with damage to property through reckless imprudence" for
causing a motor boat to capsize, thereby drowning to death its twenty-eight passengers.

2. Delito Compuesto (Compound Crimes)

- a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies

e.g. one gunshot hitting and killing two people

 20

Interesting case:

Is there such a crime as Murder with Abortion?

Pp. vs. Bonifacio Lopez

G.R. No. 136861. November 15, 2000

It must be emphasized that accused-appellant was charged with the complex crime of murder
with abortion, not of two independent charges of murder and unintentional abortion. In a complex
crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes
of the law. The stabbing and killing of the victim which caused likewise the death of the fetus arose
from the single criminal intent of killing the victim, as shown by accused-appellant's pursuit of the
victim after she was able to escape (People vs. Alacar, 211 SCRA 580 [1992]).

Effect of Complex Crimes:

In a complex crime, the penalty for the more or the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period. As between murder and unintentional abortion, murder is
the more serious crime and the penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua to death. Death being the
maximum or the greater penalty must then be imposed, and since this is an indivisible penalty, the
presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances is inconsequential.

3. Delito Continuado (Continued Crimes)

a.k.a. “Single Larceny Doctrine”

-a series of acts arising out of a singe criminal intent
not under Article 48 but applied by the Supreme Court in the case of 49 Phil. 437 [1926]

APPLIED IN THE FOLLOWING:

(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the same
place and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939]).

(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the
same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974]).

(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v. De Leon, 49
Phil. 437 [1926]).

(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he collects veteran's
benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out of said
benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964]). The collections of the legal fees were
impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of
collection were made under the same criminal impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955]).

NOT APPLIED IN THE FOLLOWING:

(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to
December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil.
306 [1961]). The said acts were committed on two different occasions.

(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications to conceal
the said offenses committed in August and October 1936. The malversations and falsifications
"were not the result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ."
(People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 [1938]).
 21

(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the collector to
turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the
installments for a sewing machine (People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976]).

(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from customers of
the employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).

Explained in Santiago vs. Gartichorena 228 SCRA 214

and made to apply to special laws under Article 10 of the RPC

In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single
criminal act — that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law
to enjoy such privilege.

The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information,
except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states
the name of the individual whose stay was legalized.

As Applied to Shooting Incidents

-one shot 3 dead= I crime (Pp vs. Hubilo 220 SCRA 389)-compound crime (delito complejo)

-3 shots 3 dead on one occasion = separate crimes (People vs. Ducay, 225 SCRA 1

-single pressing of the trigger of a machine gun resulting to multiple victims

= separate crimes (Pp. vs. Tabaco 270 SCRA 32) as many crimes as there are victims

4. Hernandez Doctrine

99 Phil 515 and Enrile vs. Salazar 186 SCRA 217

-The felony of rebellion absorbs common crimes committed pursuant to the rebellion.

5. Special Complex Crimes

-specifically provided for in the Revised Penal Code

Examples:

Robbery with Rape Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659

Robbery with Homicide Article 294

Note: An Information alleging more than one way the same crime was committed IS NOT
DUPLICITOUS

Example:

People vs. Buenviaje, 47 Phil. 536,

“where the defendant was charged with violation of the Medical Law and the information
charged both illegal practice of medicine and illegally advertising oneself as a doctor, it was held that
"the information was not bad for duplicity inasmuch as the acts charged were merely different means
of committing the same offense, notwithstanding the fact that they are prohibited by separate sections
of the statute”

Bernardo Gallego vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. L-57841. July 30, 1982
 22

The chairman and three other members of the Board for Marine Deck Officers in the May,
1979 examinations, two of whom are petitioners, were charged in the Sandiganbayan for violation of
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for giving unwarranted benefits to particular
examinees. In the motion to quash the aforesaid information, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo
claimed, among others, that Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is null and void
because it is unconstitutionally vague and therefore cannot be a basis of any criminal prosecution and
that the information charges the accused with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: "(a) the giving of
'unwarranted' benefits through manifest partiality; (b) the giving of 'unwarranted' benefits through
evident bad faith; and (c) the giving of 'unwarranted' benefits through gross inexcusable negligence"
while in the discharge of their official and/or administrative functions. The motion to quash was denied
by the Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition.

The Supreme Court held that Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not
suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness since the phrases "manifest partiality,'' "evident bad
faith'' and "gross inexcusable negligence'' merely describe the different modes by which the offense
penalized in the said section of the statute may be committed, and the use of all the phrases in the
same information does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses

AMENDMENT OR SUBSTITUTION (Sec. 14, R110)

RULES ON AMENDMENTS BEFORE PLEA

General Rule: Before the arraignment of the accused, the prosecution may amend the information
whether in form or in substance.

Exception Introduced in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged
in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons
in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended
party. (n)

RULES ON AMENDMENTS AFTER PLEA

“After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused”

Requisites:

1. The amendment is merely formal.

2. There must be leave of court.

3. It must not prejudice the rights of the accused.

Formal vs. Substantial Amendments

Substantial amendments consists of major or material changes in the information, such as a

change in the manner of the commission of the offense, in the date of the commission over a wide
span of time, or change in the name of the victim or offended party. Formal amendments come in the
form of correcting the spelling or clerical errors or other minor changes in the information which merely
states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information, and
which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.
 23

Examples of Formal Amendments:

In the case of Dennis T. Gabionza vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 140311. March 30, 2001),
the Supreme court said that “Jurisprudence allows amendments to information so long as:

1. it does not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription;

2. it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged;

3. it does not involve a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to require the
accused to undergo any material change or modification in his defense;

4. it does not expose the accused to a charge which would call for a higher penalty;

5. it does not cause surprise nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment.

Cases:

Vega v. Panis, No. L-40842, 30 September 1982, 117 SCRA 269.

People v. Casey, No. L-30146, 24 February 1981, 103 SCRA 21

Examples of Substantial Amendments:

1. An amendment which changes the manner of the commission of the offense

Pp. vs. Zulueta 89 Phil. 755

The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was not
previously included in the original information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling the
respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court.

2. An amendment which changes the name of the offended party

Pp vs. Juliana Uba, 99 Phil 134

An amendment to change the name of the offended party in the information to the name of the
true victim as established by evidence is substantial because defamation against X is different from
defamation against Y.

Do not confuse this with

Danilo Buhat vs. CA

G.R. No. 119601. December 17, 1996

“the amendment to replace the name, "John Doe" with the name of Renato Buhat who was
found by the Secretary of Justice to be one of the two persons who held the arms of the victim while
petitioner was stabbing him, is only a formal amendment and one that does not prejudice any of the
accused's rights. Such amendment to insert in the information the real name of the accused involves
merely a matter of form as it does not, in any way, deprive any of the accused of a fair opportunity to
present a defense; neither is the nature of the offense charged affected or altered since the revelation
of accused's real name does not change the theory of the prosecution nor does it introduce any new
and material fact. In fact, it is to be expected that the information has to be amended as the unknown
participants in the crime became known to the public prosecutor.”

3. An amendment to change the date of commission of the offense over a wide span of
time.
 24

People vs. Alfredo C. Reyes

G.R. No. L-32557. October 23, 1981

In the present case, private respondent Francisco Estrella was investigated for an offense
allegedly committed in August of 1964. Then, he was charged for an offense allegedly committed in
August of 1969. He pleaded not guilty to the latter charge. Now petitioner desires to put him on trial for
the alleged 1964 offense. This cannot legally be done.

While it has been held that except when time is a material ingredient of an offense, the precise
time of commission need not be stated in the information, this Court stated that this does not mean
that the prosecuting officer may be careless about fixing the date of the alleged crime, or that he may
omit the date altogether, or that he may make the allegation so indefinite as to amount to the same
thing. The prosecution is given the chance to allege an approximation of time of the commission of the
offense and the precise date need not be stated but it does not mean that it can prove any date
remote or far removed from the given approximate date so as to surprise and prejudice the accused.

NOTE:

Dennis T. Gabionza vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 140311. March 30, 2001

“The public prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Information, to change the
material dates stated in the Information from "January 1991 to May 1993" to "January 1991 to May
1992." Petitioner opposed the motion contending that the proposed amendment was substantial in
nature, hence to allow the same would be a violation of his right to be informed of the cause and
nature of the accusation against him, and would negate or prejudice defenses that were otherwise
available to him.”

Held: In the case at bar, it is clear that the questioned amendment is one of form and not of
substance. The allegation of time when an offense is committed is a matter of form, unless time is a
material ingredient of the offense. It is not even necessary to state in the Information the precise time
the offense was committed unless time is a material factor. It is sufficient that the act is alleged to have
been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the
Complaint or Information will permit.

Thus, petitioner's argument that the amendment prejudiced his rights is untenable. We fail to
see how his original defenses would be rendered inapplicable by the amendment, nor the
prosecution's theory in anyway altered by the same. Petitioner failed to adduce any evidence in
support of his allegation that the amendment would adversely affect his rights.

Note: but if the change is only within a span of a few months such as from June 24, 1981 to August
28, 1981, the amendment is formal (Pp. vs. Borromeo, 123 SCRA 253) (See also Pp. vs. Molero 144
SCRA 397)

4. An amendment for the purpose of making the information charge an offense when the
original information does not charge any offense

5. An amendment which changes the fact or ground of responsibility of the accused.

People vs. Hon. Eduardo Montenegro, Et. Al.

G.R. No. L-45772. March 25, 1988

It will be observed that private respondents were accused as accessories-after-the-fact of the

minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in the original
 25

information. To charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime different from that
committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by the Court.

“when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused”

TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED WILL BE PREJUDICED BY THE

AMENDMENT

“The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint
or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no
longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have,
would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended.” (People vs. Hon. Eduardo
Montenegro, Et. Al. G.R. No. L-45772. March 25, 1988)

SUBSTITUTION

“If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of
a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the
accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give
bail for their appearance at the trial. (14a)”

Rule

There can be substitution only if the offense charged is WHOLLY DIFFERENT from the
offense proven.

Test to determine identity of offenses:

There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one
offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly
the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this
connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And,
vice-versa, and offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter(Teehankee, Jr. vs
Madayag, et al.,G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 134, 140.)

Does not apply if the offense proven is necessarily included in or necessarily includes the
offense charged
Galvez vs. CA 237 SCRA 695
The first paragraph provides the rule for amendment of the information or complaint, while the
second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint. Under the second
paragraph, the court can order the filing of another information to charge the proper offense, provided
the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and that could only be true if the offense
proved does not necessarily include or is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the
original information.
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SUBSTITUTION AND AMENDMENT

Teehankee, Jr. vs Madayag, et al.,

G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 134, 140.

"It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be
made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:
 26

1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution

necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;

2. Except for amendments which downgrade the offense or excludes any of the
accused, an amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave
of court, but substitution of information must ALWAYS be with leave of court as the
original information has to be dismissed; (as amended by the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure)

3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accuse; in substitution of information,
another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the
new information; and

4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information
or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original
charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been
taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information
would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand,
substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different
offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge,
hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.

"In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of
Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is
that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes
or is ecessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient;
otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that
initially charged, a substitution is in order."

WHERE SHOULD A CRIMINAL CASE BE INSTITUTED? (Sec. 15, R110)

GENERAL RULE: -shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

Ratio Legis

What is the reason why the rules provide that the case should be tried in the place where the crime
was committed?

1. The interest of the public requires that to secure the best results and effects in the punishment
of crimes, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place or as near as
may be where he committed the crime.

2. Insofar as the interest of the accused is concerned, it will be inconvenient for him to took for
witnesses and other evidence in another place.

Exceptions when existing laws provide otherwise:

Examples:

1. Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code on Libel allows the filing of the case (a) where
the libelous matter was printed or first published (b) where the offended party resides
or (c) if he is a public officer, where he holds office at the time of commission.

2. R.A. 8429- Cases covered by the Sandiganbayan Law will be tried in the places
designated by the law
 27

3. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution- The Supreme Court can order a change
of venue in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

What are the types of offenses as to place of commission:

1. Local -refers to an offense where all the elements were committed in the same
place or, in other words, one which was fully consummated in one place.

2. Transitory -refers to a case where the elements of the offense were committed in several
places.

Cases on Transitory Offenses:

People vs. Hon Nathaniel Gorospe

G.R. Nos. L-74053-54. January 20, 1988

As to estafa:

Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its
basic elements of deceit and damage may arise independently in separate places (People vs. Yabut,
supra). In this case, deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, while the damage was inflicted in
Bulacan where the check was dishonored by the drawee bank in that place (See People vs. Yabut,
supra). Jurisdiction may, therefore, be entertained by either the Bulacan Court or the Pampanga
Court. For while the subject check was issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was not completely drawn
thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was uttered and delivered. What is of decisive
importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its
consummation as an obligation. (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725, cited in People vs. Yabut, supra).

As to B.P. 22

In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature.
It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance (Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-
27126, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of
dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check (People
vs. Hon. Veridiano, II, No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523). The case, therefore, could have been filed also in
Bulacan. As held in Que vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987 "the
determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check". However, it is
likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his
funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the
accused be within one territory or another (People vs. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04,
December 11, 1987). Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the
Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.

Robbery and Anti-Fencing Law

People vs. Hon Jose C. De Guzman

G.R. No. 77368. October 5, 1993

Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means
of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything. "Fencing," upon the
other hand, is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or shall be known to him,
to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The crimes of robbery and
fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The law on fencing does not require the accused to have
participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission
 28

of, the crime of robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act of
fencing in order that it can be consummated. True, the object property in fencing must have been
previously taken by means of either robbery of theft but the place where the robbery or theft occurs is
inconsequential. It may not be suggested, for instance, that, in the crime of bigamy which presupposes
a prior subsisting marriage of an accused, the case should thereby be triable likewise at the place
where the prior marriage has been contracted.

Specific rule on offenses committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle
in the course of its trip

-instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft, or other
vehicle passed during its trip, including the place of its departure and arrival.

Example:

People vs. Francisco Zafra

Oct. 19, 1994

The accused stole a passenger jeepney and killed the owner in Alabang, Muntinlupa and
were arrested, still riding the stolen jeepney in Calamba, Laguna

Held: “As accused-appellants were apprehended in Calamba while they were in the
carnapped jeepney, the information was validly filed in Calamba.”

Specific rule on offenses committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage

-shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory
where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of
international law.

Venue of a Criminal Case committed aboard a seagoing vessel:

1. First Port of Entry- where the vessel will first dock. Note: does not include place
of departure

2. Any Municipality or Territory through which the vessel passed

Example:

Wenefredo Calme vs. CA

G.R. No. 116688. August 30, 1996

Petitioner and four other persons were accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by allegedly
throwing him overboard the M/V "Cebu City," an interisland passenger ship owned and operated by
William Lines, Inc., while the vessel was sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu City on the night of 12 May
1991. The case was filed in Oroquieta City

Petitioner claims that the proper venue is Siquijor because, according to the Marine Protest
filed by the vessel's captain, Elmer Magallanes, the ship was 8.0 miles off Minalonan Point, Siquijor
Island, when he (Capt. Magallanes) received the report that "a passenger jumped overboard."

“The exact location where the alleged offense was committed was not duly established. The
Marine protest simply adverted that the vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the
captain was informed of the incident, which does not necessarily prove that the alleged murder took
place in the same area. In any case, where the crime was actually committed is immaterial
since it is undisputed that it occurred while the vessel was in transit. "In transit" simply
 29

means "on the way or passage; while passing from one person or place to another. In the
course of transportation." Hence, undoubtedly, the applicable provision is par. (c) of Sec. 15 (now
Section 14), Rule 100 which provides that "(w)here an offense is committed on board a vessel in the
course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port
of entry of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage subject
to the generally accepted principles of international law."

Petitioner further contends that even if Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 governs, Oroquieta City would
still be excluded as a proper venue because the reckoning point for determining the venue under the
aforementioned paragraph is the first port of entry or the municipalities/territories through which the
ship passed after the discovery of the crime, relying on Act No. 400.

We disagree. Obviously, Act No. 400 was amended by Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court in that under the former law, jurisdiction was conferred to the CFI of any province into
which the ship or water craft upon which the crime or offense was committed shall come after the
commission thereof, while the present rule provides that jurisdiction is vested "in the proper court of
the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such
voyage . . ." This is the applicable provision and since it does not contain any qualification, we do not
qualify the same.

Specific rule on “Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article
2 of the Revised Penal Code”

- shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed. (15a)”

Principle of Extraterritoriality in the Revised Penal Code

ARTICLE 2.Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of
preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the
Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also
outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:

1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;

2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations
and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;

3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations
and securities mentioned in the preceding number;

4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their
functions; or

5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in
Title One of Book Two of this Code.

In these cases, the first court that takes cognizance of the case will have jurisdiction to try
it.

PRIVATE PROSECUTORS:

Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant
to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
(Sec. 16, R110)

What are the rights of the offended party in relation to a criminal case?
 30

1. To take part in the prosecution of the offense;

2. To recover civil liabilities arising out of the offense charged.

3. To appeal an adverse judgment or order affecting his claim

to such civil liability:

Can an offended party intervene in a case punished under a special law when the said law does
not provide for the civil aspect of the case?

Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22

Charmina Banal vs. Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr.,

156 SCRA 325, 330 (1987).

-it is the fact of damage or injury party that is the basis of civil liability in a criminal case, thus there can
be an award of civil liability in Violations of B.P. 22 even if it is a crime against public order.

Who can be an offended party?

Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 140576-99. December 13, 2004

Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party
may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly
injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is
damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right;
a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the
substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand
and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a
mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not
one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party
 31

RULE 111-- PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

Institution of criminal and civil actions (Sec. 1, R. 111)

MAJOR AMENDMENT

Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising out of ALL SOURCES of civil liability was deemed instituted in the criminal case and a waiver
of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others and even the institution of, or the reservation of the
right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

However, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure ONLY THE CIVIL LIABILITY
ARISING OUT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED IS DEEMED INSTITUTED.

SOME MAJOR EFFECTS OF THE AMENDMENT

1. Actions premised on quasi delicts and other independent civil actions may be filed
separately by the complainant/plaintiff WITHOUT ANY RESERVATION OF THE
RIGHT TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION. (Casupanan vs. Laroya, August 26,
2002)

2. The acquittal of the accused in the criminal case or the failure of the judge therein to
award civil liability against the accused will not bar, by res judicata, the filing of a
separate civil action based on quasi delicts. (Jose S. Cancio, Jr. vs. Emerenciana
Isip Nov. 12, 2002)

3. The judge in a criminal case MAY NO LONGER APPLY the provisions in the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts as basis for an award of civil liability. (This is an abandonment
of the rulings in the cases of Maniago vs. CA 253 SCRA 674 and San Idelfonso Lines
vs. CA 289 SCRA 568)

4. The pendency of the criminal case will not preclude THE ACCUSED therein from filing
a separate civil action based on quasi-delict against the private complainant.
(Casupanan vs. Laroya, August 26, 2002)

When is the claim for civil liability ARISING out of the offense charged NOT deemed instituted?

1. The offended party waives the civil action;

2. He reserves the right to institute it separately

3. He institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

4. He institutes the civil action after the criminal action but before presentation of prosecutions
evidence and he duly informs the court where the criminal case is pending of the institution of
the civil action. (Yakult vs. CA 190 SCRA 357)

NOTE: Again, the civil action referred to here is one ARISING OUT OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED
 32

DOCKET (FILING) FEES

RULE: There is NO FILING FEE for claims for ACTUAL DAMAGES in criminal cases. EXCEPTION: If
the Rules Provide otherwise. Example: B.P. 22 cases. and recently Estafa Cases

Claims for OTHER (moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary) will be assessed filing fees upon
filing of the case in court ONLY when the amounts thereof are specified in the complaint or
information. If the amounts are not specified then the filing fees will be first lien on the judgment based
on whatever is awarded by the court.

Distinguish rules on docket fees in criminal cases from the rules in civil cases.

1. In civil cases, docket fees are levied on ALL FORMS OF DAMAGES while in criminal cases
no docket fees are charged on ACTUAL DAMAGES.

2. In civil cases, the amount of the claims must be stated in the Complaint or Counterclaim so
that the proper docket fees can be computed and paid. In criminal cases in general, even if
the amount of the damages are not stated I the information or complaint, these can still be
proven and the docket fees on these claims will be a lien on the judgment.

ANOTHER AMENDMENT:

“No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in

the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)”
- This abandons the Rulings in Shafer vs. RTC of Olongapo (167 SCRA 376) and Javier vs.
IAC (171 SCRA 376)

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 (incorporation of Circ. 57-97 into the rules)

- Exception to the rule that no filing fees are assessed on ACTUAL DAMAGES in criminal
cases. In B.P. 22 cases, filing fees are based on the amount of the check which is considered
as the actual damages claimed.

- As to other kinds of damages the applicable rule is the same as in other criminal cases.

- The rules now require MANDATORY consolidation of the claim for civil liability in B.P.
22 cases but if the civil case was filed ahead, consolidation will be done only if the trial of the
civil case has not yet commenced and there must be an application for consolidation in the
court trying the criminal case.

Under OCA Circular 21-03, docket fees are NOW also assessed on estafa cases UPON filing of
the information in court

SUSPENSION OF CIVIL ACTION (Sec. 2, R112)

Note: This applies only to the civil aspect arising out of the offense charged (based on Art. 100
of the RPC and related articles)

-If the offended party reserves the right to file a separate civil action, it cannot be filed until the
criminal case is finished.

-if he filed the separate civil action ahead of the criminal case, then the civil case will be
suspended until the criminal case is finished.

-The prescriptive period of the suspended action will be tolled until there is a final judgment in
the criminal case while the criminal case is still ongoing.
 33

Option:

-The offended party can ask for the consolidation of the separate civil action with the criminal
case only if there has been no judgment yet in the civil case.

-In case of such a consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be
deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action but the accused/defense shall have
the right to cross-examine the witnesses of the offended party in the civil case and both
parties may present additional evidence.

Note:

The provision stating “without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine
the witness presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence”- MUST BE A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR.

This should be “without prejudice to the right of the accused/defense to cross-examine

the witness presented by the offended party in the civil case.”

Otherwise, it would not make sense. Why would the prosecution cross-examine the witnesses
of the offended party when they are on the same side?

If the consolidation cannot be done under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it may be allowed
under the Rules of Civil Procedure

Naguiat vs. IAC 164 SCRA 505

-Violation of P.D. 957 cannot be consolidated, under Section 2 of Rule 111, with civil action for
specific performance to deliver titles because the civil action “did not arise out of the act
complained of in the criminal case”

However, consolidation can be done under the Rules of Civil Procedure which allow
consolidation of cases with similar questions of fact and law.

GENERAL RULE:

CONSOLIDATION IS OPTIONAL EXCEPT

1. Article 360 of the RPC.

2. Cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

3. B.P. 22 cases (SC Circ No. 57-97)

These are cases where the law imposes MANDATORY CONSOLIDATION

“The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist”

OLD RULE-

Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.
 34

G.R. No. 128927. September 14, 1999.

REMEDIOS NOTA SAPIERA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RAMON SUA,
respondents.

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil
liability is not extinguished by acquittal where:

(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt;

(b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not
criminal but only civil in nature; and. (Even if not expressly declared if based
on an exempting circumstance.)

(c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of
which the accused is acquitted.

Plus some others based on criminal law:

(d) acquittal is based on an exempting circumstance

NOTE: *IF ACQUITTAL IS BASED ON AN JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE except STATE OF

NECESSITY then there is NO CIVIL LIABILITY”

Note: People vs. Salao

284 SCRA 493

“The civil liability referred to in this Rule is the civil liability arising from crime (ex delicto). It is
not the civil liability for quasi delict which is allowed to be brought "separately and independently" of
the criminal action by Art. 33 of the Civil Code. The civil liability based on such cause of action is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Indeed, because the offended party does not
intervene in the criminal prosecution, it is entirely possible that all the witnesses presented in the civil
action may not have been presented by the public prosecutor in the criminal action with the result that
the accused in the criminal case may be acquitted. This is what happened in the recent case of Heirs
of Guaring v. Court of Appeals where, because the only survivor in a motor car accident whose
testimony proved to be pivotal in the civil case was not called to testify in the criminal prosecution of
the driver of the other vehicle, the latter was acquitted on reasonable doubt.”

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS (Sec. 3, R111)

RESERVATION IS NO LONGER REQUIRED IN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS

DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative, Inc. Hon. Alejandro Velez

G.R. No. 129282. November 29, 2001

“Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred
to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged.
This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even
without a reservation." “
 35

What are the effects of the removal of the reservation requirement for independent civil
actions?

Neplum, Inc., vs. Orbeso,

G.R. No. 141986, July 11, 2002 3rd Division

“At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted the
requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from
criminal ones. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall
remain "separate, distinct and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here
are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:

1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the
criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.

2. The institution or waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime
charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.

3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act
or omission.

EFFECT OF THE DEATH OF THE ACCUSED ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY (Sec. 4, R111)

- An entirely new provision inserted that was based on the case of PP. vs. Bayotas. 236 SCRA 239

“the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability ex delicto. The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Corollarily, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict.”

Pp. vs. Pedro Abungan, Sept. 28, 2000

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, 'the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.' "

"2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) ...
e) Quasi-delicts

"3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section
1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
 36

"4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency
of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription."”

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION (Secs. 6 and 7, R110)

MAJOR CHANGE:

OLD ELEMENTS:

a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action;

(b) the resolution of such issue is determinative of whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

NEW ELEMENTS:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

Where and when may prejudicial questions be raised?

-During preliminary investigation (whether by a public prosecutor or an MTC) or in court if the

case has already been filed in court. However, the issue must be raised before the prosecution
rests.

Some cases::

Alfredo Ching vs. Court of Appeals,

April 27, 2000

- civil action for nullity of documents is not a PQ in a case for estafa.

“Verily, under the prevailing circumstances, the alleged prejudicial question in the civil case for
declaration of nullity of documents and for damages, does not juris et de jure determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal action for estafa. Assuming arguendo that the court hearing
the civil aspect of the case adjudicates that the transaction entered into between the parties was not a
trust receipt agreement, nonetheless the guilt of the accused could still be established and his
culpability under penal laws determined by other evidence. To put it differently, even on the
assumption that the documents are declared null, it does not ipso facto follow that such declaration of
nullity shall exonerate the accused from criminal prosecution and liability”.
Isabela Marbella Bobis vs. Isagani D. Bobis
July 31, 2000

- a civil action for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question in a criminal
case for bigamy.

“In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy.
He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to
 37

disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge
by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for
lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of
the absence of a requisite — usually the marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage
is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy”.

“(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first
marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy. “

GOING BACK TO THE GENERAL RULE:

CRIMINAL CASES WILL HAVE PRECEDENCE OVER CIVIL EXCEPT:

1. Independent Civil Actions

2. When the civil action presents a prejudicial question.

3. Where the civil action is consolidated with the criminal action.

4. When the civil action is not one intended to enforce the civil liability arising
from the offense.
(Naguiat vs. CA)
 38

RULE 112 - PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Preliminary investigation -an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.

PI is required if the imposable penalty for the offense exceeds 4 years and 2 months

Note: The “4 y 2 m” guideline is a major amendment because the 1985 Rules required PI for all RTC
cases and this was heavily affected when RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the MTCs. The
amendment, restored the situation prior to RA 7691.

PURPOSE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION:

People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 126005. January 21, 1999.)

citing Ledesma v. Court of Appeals

“The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free the respondent from the
inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal
trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt in a more or less summary proceeding by a
competent office designated by law for that purpose. Secondarily, such summary proceeding also
protects the state from the burden of the unnecessary expense and effort in prosecuting alleged
offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges”.

IS LACK OF PI A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT?

Sanciangco, Jr. vs. People 149 SCRA 1

Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan 177 SCRA 354 (1989)
as cited in Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan 221 SCRA 349

"The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case.
Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective, but, if there were no
preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the
court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the Information, should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the
preliminary investigation may be conducted . . ."

“Lack of jurisdiction is not waivable but absence of preliminary investigation is waivable. In

fact, it is frequently waived”

Is a new P.I. required if there is an amendment of the information.?

Remember the case of Teehankee vs. Madayag.

If the change in an information is only formal and thereby does not affect the defense of the
accused, a new P.I. is not required.
 39

The test of Probable Cause

Teresita Domalanta, Et Al vs. COMELEC, Et Al

G.R. No. 125586, June 29, 2000

“Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well
founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution
and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does
not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion
and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there
is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence
of the prosecution in support of the charge.”

Who may conduct Preliminary Investigations? (Sec. 2, R112)

(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;

(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.

What is the scope of their authority?

-all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions

CUDIA vs. CA 284 SCRA 173 (1998)

City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms
committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga.

HELD: If the person who signed the information is not authorized to do so, the entire
proceedings will be null and void even if the accused participated actively in the proceedings.

Other officers :

Criminal Violations of the Omnibus Election Code

-P.I. to be conducted by the COMELEC

Office of the Ombudsman

May the Office of the Ombudsman investigate a public official even if the offense is not in
relation to his public office?
Deloso vs. Domingo G.R. No. 90591. November 21, 1990
“The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace
any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or
omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require
that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official
duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we. The reason for the creation of the
Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to
insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals'
offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of
official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and
misfeasances committed by public officers.”
 40

“In Relation to Public Office” is material in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but it
its NOT a limit to the investigative powers of the Office of the Ombudsman

Natividad vs. Felix (G.R. No. 111616. February 4, 1994)

As we held in Aguinaldo v. Domagas and recently, Sanchez v. Demetriou, such authority of

the Ombudsman "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of
the offense charged," in other words, concurrent with similarly authorized agencies of the government.
Accordingly, the Ombudsman may take over the investigation of such case at any stage from
any investigative agency of the Government.

A careful scrutiny of Sec. 15 (1) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 will reveal that the word "may"
is used in regard to the Ombudsman's assumption of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan. The word "may," being generally permissive and since it operates to confer
discretion, it follows that the Ombudsman's investigatory powers are but directory in nature.

IMPORTANT CHANGES IN THE PROCEDURE FOR PI (Sec. 3, R112)

“The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant
which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is
voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the
respondent, and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his
expense.

Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for
examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party”

This provision came from Webb vs. De Leon 247 SCRA 652

We uphold the legal basis of the right of petitioners to demand from their prosecutor, the NBI,
the original copy of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report during their
preliminary investigation considering their exculpatory character, and hence, unquestionable
materiality to the issue of their probable guilt. The right is rooted on the constitutional protection of due
process which we rule to be operational even during the preliminary investigation to a potential
accused. It is also implicit in section (3)(a) of Rule 112 which requires during the preliminary
investigation the filing of a sworn complaint which shall ‘. . . state the known address of the respondent
and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting
documents. . . ."

Will a delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation violate the right of the respondent
to speedy disposition of cases?

The Tatad Ruling

(Tatad v. Sandiganbayan 159 SCRA 70, 82, March 21, 1988)

- The delay of 3 years was already violative of the right of the respondent to speedy
disposition of cases and right to due process in view of the simplicity of the issues in the cases.
 41

How should the Tatad Doctrine be applied?

Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan- G.R. Nos. 116259-60

February 20, 1996

“We have only to reiterate the declaration made in Tatad to the effect that in the application of
the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be
taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. It is palpably clear that the application of
the Tatad doctrine should not be made to rely solely on the length of time that has passed but equal
concern should likewise be accorded to the factual ambiance and considerations.

Binay vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 120681-83. October 1, 1999

In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that the length of delay and the simplicity of the
issues did not justify the delay in the disposition of the cases therein. The "unexplained inaction" of the
prosecutors called for the dismissal of the cases against petitioner Tatad.

In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court also ruled that there was no violation of the right to
speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent
amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing
prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of
personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court
likewise considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by
the delay to the accused.

In Santiago vs. Garchitorena, (228 SCRA 214)the complexity of the issues and the failure of
the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat to her
claim to the constitutional guarantee.

In Cadalin vs. POEA’s Administrator, the Court, considering also the complexity of the cases
("not run-of-the-mill variety") and the conduct of the parties’ lawyers, held that the right to speedy
disposition was not violated therein
.
Will the Tatad Ruling apply even if the respondent did not take actions to accelerate the
disposition of his case?

Elpidio C. Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan

May 18, 1999

“ It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the
Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with
his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him.”

NOTABLE ISSUES ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR AND IT’S

REVIEW (Sec. 4, R 112)

Will the lack of certification invalidate an information?

Sec. 4, R112 requires that in preparing the resolution and information when a prosecutor finds
probable cause, he shall “certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him;
and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence”
 42

Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan 220 SCRA 45

-The lack of a certification will not invalidate the information because the certification is not an
essential part of the information. It is merely a formal defect.

NOTE:

Resolutions of investigating prosecutors are forwarded for approval, within five days, to:

Provincial Prosecutor If PI is conducted by the Provincial

Prosecutor’s Office or by MTC conducting PI

City Prosecutor If PI is conducted by the City Prosecutor’s

Office

Chief State Prosecutor If PI is conducted by the Regional State

Prosecutors’ Office

Ombudsman or his Deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the

Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction

Note: the amendment to include the Ombudsman or his deputy is intended to avoid conflicts of
jurisdiction since the authority of the Office of the Ombdusman to conduct PIs is concurrent
with the prosecutors.

What happens if a resolution of dismissal is disapproved?

“Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his
recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file
the information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do
so without conducting another preliminary investigation.”

What happens in case a resolution is reversed by the Secretary of Justice?

If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe
or motu propio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the
corresponding information without conducting anther preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move
for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same rule shall apply in
preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman. (4a)

What is the difference between a PI conducted by a prosecutor and one conducted by an MTC
Judge?

An MTC Judge can issue a warrant of arrest even during PI “without waiting for the conclusion
of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing
and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers,
that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.”

NOTE: When an MTC judge conducts a preliminary investigation, he is performing an

EXECUTIVE function and, in this case, his resolution is subject to review and
modification by the city or provincial prosecutor or by the Ombudsman or his
 43

deputy and these persons can even order the release of a respondent who was
ordered arrested by the judge conducting the PI.

Balagapo vs. Duquilla 238 S 645 Dec. 5, 1994

When a Municipal Judge conducts preliminary investigation he performs a non-judicial

function, as an exception to his usual duties. The assignment of such executive function to the
Municipal Judge under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court is dictated by necessity and practical
considerations. Consequently, the findings of an investigating Judge are subject to review by the
Provincial Fiscal whose findings in turn may also be reviewed by the Secretary of Justice in
appropriate cases. Hence, an investigating judge, after conducting a preliminary investigation, shall
perform his ministerial duty which is to transmit within ten (10) days after the conclusion thereof the
resolution of the case together with the entire records to the Provincial Prosecutor, regardless of his
belief or opinion that the crime committed, after conducting the preliminary investigation, falls within
the original jurisdiction of his court. As held in Daplas v. Arguiza, while an investigating Judge may
be excused for occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, particularly when incurred in fine and
complex points of law, or mitigated by the difficulty of keeping abreast with this Court's ever-increasing
decisions, judges are expected to show more than cursory acquaintance with the elementary rules
governing procedure as well as settled authoritative doctrines.

Can a Municipal Judge conducting a prelim inv. Grant bail after the records had already been
sent to the provincial prosecutor?

Dolores L. Español vs. Lorinda T. Mupas

A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348. November 11, 2004

“If it happens for instance, that the accused was in detention during the preliminary
investigation conducted by the municipal trial court but wished to put up bail after the records of the
investigation had been forwarded to the fiscal, bail may be filed not in the municipal trial court which
fixed the amount of his bail but with the Regional Trial Court of the place where he is being held.  
Also, if no charge has as yet been filed but the person under arrest would wish to go on temporary
liberty, he may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held.

However, when the preliminary investigation has been concluded and the judge has
recommended the filing of the corresponding information against the accused and had
forwarded the records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor, the court loses its preliminary
jurisdiction over the said case.  Having been divested of jurisdiction over the case, the
municipal trial court no longer has any authority to issue any order or directive in connection
therewith, especially such as would involve the liberty of the accused”

ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST

BY MTC DURING PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

“without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest
if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of
placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.”
 44

BY RTC OR MTC UPON FILING OF AN INFORMATION

“Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence
of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5)
days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of
the complaint of information.”

NO WARRANT OF ARREST IS NECESSARY IF:

1. Accused is already in detention due to:

a. Warrantless arrest and subsequent inquest investigation.

b. Accused was already arrested based on a warrant issued by an MTC

judge during preliminary investigation.

2. Cases where the penalty is purely fine.

3. Cases covered by the Summary Rules. Note in cases covered by the Summary rules, a
warrant is issued only if the accused fails to appear during arraignment despite notice.

SOME NOTES:

The requirement that the judge, upon filing of the information, shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence and the additional power of the judge to
immediately dismiss a case if he finds that the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause or to require the prosecutor to present additional evidence in case he has doubts as to the
existence of probable cause are amendments recognizing jurisprudence establishing the following:

1. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest on the basis of the records of the preliminary
investigation but he cannot rely on the certification of the prosecutor alone. (Soliven
vs. Makasiar 167 SCRA 393, Lim vs. Felix 194 SCRA 292, Teresa Ho vs. People of
the Philippines 280 SCRA 365).

2. The judge is now clearly empowered to dismiss a case if he finds that the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause or to require the prosecutor to present
additional evidence in case he has doubts as to the existence of probable cause.
(This clarifies some confusion as to what the judge is supposed to do if the prosecutor
finds probable cause to hold the accused for trial but the judge does not find probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest.
 45

Distinguish probable cause to hold an accused for trial from probable cause to issue a warrant
of arrest.

People vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and
circumstance that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of
arrest, "must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime
has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof."

On the other hand, probable cause to hold an accused for trial is a reasonable ground of
presumption that a matter is, or may be well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest
or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does nor mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it
import absolute certainly. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.

The determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial is within the authority of the
prosecutor while the determination of probable cause to issue a warrant is within the exclusive
authority of the judge.

CAN THE PROSECUTION OF A CRIMINAL CASE BE ENJOINED?

Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438- General rule

Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 (1990)
Deloso v. Desierto, G.R. 129939, September 9, 1999.
Roger Posadas, et al vs. Ombudsman et al
G.R. No. 131492. September 29, 2000

GENERAL RULE: The prosecution of a criminal case MAY NOT be enjoined except in the
following circumstances:

a. To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al. L-
19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity
of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun
vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);

c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33
Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia, 109 Phil.
1140);

g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October
29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
 46

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No.
4760, March 25, 1960);

i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs.
Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962;
Cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577);

What happens if a person is arrested without a warrant? (Sec. 7, R112)

If a person is arrested without a warrant, the police have a limited time within which to FILE A
CASE WITH THE COURT because Article 125 requires the delivery of the person arrested to
JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES within the periods provided therein.

If the entire process of a preliminary investigation is utilized, all of our police officers will end
up in jail.

Breakdown of the Process:

1. Arrest

2. Recording at the police station.

3. Inquest Investigation- The fiscal will determine probable cause on the basis of the
affidavit of the arresting officer and the witnesses, whether by affidavit or examination.

Except if the accused asks for a full preliminary investigation and executes a waiver
of his rights under Article 125 of the RPC in the presence of his counsel in which
case the normal procedure for a preliminary investigation will be followed. Note: The
waiver of Article 125 of the RTC must be in the presence of the counsel of the
accused due to Section 2 (e) of R.A. 7438)

4. The prosecutor will file the information in court.

5. Within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, the accused may ask for a
preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as
provided in this Rule (People vs. Court of Appeals March 23, 1995- the five day
period is mandatory)

-but a motion for preliminary investigation must be filed before arraignment (Go v.
Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138, 153 (1992). The right to a preliminary investigation
is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea
on arraignment. by her failure to invoke her right to a preliminary investigation, Pria
forfeited her right to one and she can no longer invoke it for the first time on appeal.
( People v. Lazo, 198 SCRA 274, 284 (1991).)

DIRECT FILING WITH THE RTC (THIS IS AN ENTIRELY NEW PROVISION)

“In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the
offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of
the offended party or arresting officer or person.

IT SEEMS THAT THE RULES NOW ALLOW A SITUATION WHERE DIRECT FILING WITH THE
RTC IS ALLOWED.

Situation:

1. A person is arrested via warrantless arrest.

 47

2. Inquest prosecutor is absent or unavailable.

3. The complaint can be filed by the offended party or a peace officer

on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer
or person.

When may a criminal case be filed DIRECTLY with the courts for trial ?

1. In cases in municipalities not requiring preliminary investigation, the complaint may be

filed directly with the MTC for trial by the offended party, peace officer, or person charged with the
enforcement of the law violated

2. In cases cognizable by the RTC where the accused was arrested via a warrantless
arrest and no inquest prosecutor is available, the complaint can be filed by the offended party or a
peace officer on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.

Procedure in cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure. (Sec. 9, R112)

(a) If filed with the prosecutor. – If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor
involving an offense punishable by imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The
prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on the affidavits and other supporting documents
submitted by the complainant within ten (10) days from its filing.

(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court – If the complaint or information is filed with
the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this section,
the procedure in section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within ten (10) days after the
filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause after personally
evaluating the evidence, or after personally examining in writing and under oath the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, he shall
dismiss the same. He may, however, require the submission of additional evidence, within ten
(10) days from notice, to determine further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still
finds no probable cause despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from its
submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already been
arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity for
placing the accused under custody, he may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest. (9a)
 48

REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE

November 15, 1991

B.   Criminal Cases:

 
(1)   Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2)   Violations of the rental law;

(3)   Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

(4) Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law); 1

(5) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise,
or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the
imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).

Thus, the foregoing procedure is generally applicable to cases punishable with a penalty from 6 mos.
1 day to 4yrs. 2 mos.

RULE 113 – ARREST

Definition of arrest. – Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense.

Cf. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused:

The Courts will acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused through the arrest or
voluntary submission of the accused.

Rule 113 deals with the provisions or procedure relating to the arrest of persons accused of
criminal offenses.

Relevance of the Constitution

Considering that the arrest of a person will necessarily involve a distraint of his personal
liberty, the provisions of the Bill of Rights, particularly on the right of all persons to be secure in their
persons and property will necessarily come into play.

Section 2 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.

NORMALLY, a person will be arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest. The exceptions are the
cases where warrantless arrest are allowed.

1
As amended by A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC. March 25, 2003 to take effect on April 15, 2003
 49

Under the constitution, as we have already discussed, there are requirements for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest

1. Issued by a judge

2. probable cause

3. premised upon the judge’s personal

evaluation of the affidavits of witnesses
and evidence

4. particularly describing the person to be seized.

Pangandaman vs. Casar (159 SCRA 599, April 14, 1988)

“A warrant is issued against fifty (50) "John Does" not one of whom the witnesses to the
complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long
proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally subversive of the liberty of the
subject." Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly
describe the person or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be
voided.”

An invalid arrest will mean that the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
accused

However in

Pp. vs. Salvatierra 276 SCRA 55

Appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never
raised this before entering his plea. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. This is the first time that appellant is raising this issue as
he did not even move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on the ground of illegal
arrest. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, had been cured by his voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his plea and participated during the
trial. Verily, the illegal arrest of appellant is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint and where the trial was free from error.

PP vs. ROLANDO ZASPA

September 21, 2000

“any objection regarding the regularity of an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea
otherwise, the defect shall be deemed cured by the voluntary submission by the accused to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. “

Execution of a warrant of arrest (Sec 4, R. 113)

The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered for execution shall cause
the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the
expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report to the
judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the reason
therefore. (4a)
What is the lifetime of a warrant of arrest?
 50

Malaloan vs. CA
May 6, 1994

“In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and
although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must
be made to the issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable
indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled.”

People vs. CESAR G. GIVERA

G.R. No. 132159. January 18, 2001

“Accused-appellant claims that his arrest at the East Avenue Medical Center on May 4, 1996
was made without a warrant. This is not true. He was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the
court on April 27, 1995. However, as the records show, the warrant of arrest was returned unserved
by the arresting officer on June 7, 1995 as accused-appellant could not be found. He was finally found
only on May 4, 1996. Now, no alias warrant of arrest is needed to make the arrest. Unless
specifically provided in the warrant, the same remains enforceable until it is executed, recalled
or quashed. The ten-day period provided in Rule 113, §4 is only a directive to the officer
executing the warrant to make a return to the court.”

WARRANTLESS ARRESTS (Sec. 5 R113)

When may a person be arrested without a warrant?

Under Section 5 of Rule 113:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.

PLUS

(d) If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued, any person may immediately
pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the
Philippines. (Sec. 13, of R113)

(e) For the purpose of surrendering the accused, his bondsmen may arrest him without a
warrant. (Sec. 23, R114)

(f) An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he
attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the case
is pending. (Sec. 23, R114)

“OR A PRIVATE PERSON”

In the situations covered by Section 5, even a private citizen can cause a CITIZEN’s ARREST.
 51

“When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense”

IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO

What is meant by “in his presence”?

Pp. vs. Sucro March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 388

repeated in People vs. Evaristo 216 S 431
as stated in Pp. vs. Joselito del Rosario
April 14, 1999

“It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SP04 De Leon during the police raid at
the place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People vs. Sucro44 [G.R. No. 93239,
18 March 1991, 195 SCRA 388.] we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at
a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene
thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113,
since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5,
par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught
immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the
purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following the commission of the
robbery with homicide. “

“When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it”

-A.K.A. ARREST EFFECTED IN HOT PURSUIT

“just been committed”

People vs. Manlulu

April 22, 1994

-nineteen (19) hours later is no longer “just been committed”

What is meant by “personal knowledge of facts”?

Pp. vs. Anthony Escordial

G.R. No. 138934-35. January 16, 2002
Posadas v. Ombudsman, 341 SCRA 388, 397 citing People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 709 (1991).

Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5(b) of Rule 113 must
be based upon "probable cause" which means "an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,
the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officer making the arrest.

Probable Cause to justify a warrantless arrest?

Pp. vs. Doria January 22, 1999

“probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
 52

that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts,
i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt
of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest”

Pp. vs. Nasario Molina, February 19, 2001

-Comprehensive discussion of situations relating to “probable cause”

“When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.”

-no explanation needed

Interesting case on the authority of a police officer to effect a warrantless arrest.

Pp. vs. Jose Rayray

G.R. No. 90628. February 1, 1995

“We cannot yield to appellant's view that just because Lt. Ancheta was assigned in Baguio
City he could not arrest persons caught in the act of committing a crime in some other place,
especially so where he was the intended victim. A policemen cannot callously set aside his essential
duty of apprehending criminal offenders and of keeping peace and order on the shallow excuse that
he is not in his place of assignment. His responsibility to protect the public by apprehending violators
of the law, especially one caught in flagrante delicto is not limited by territorial constraints. It follows
him wherever he goes. Moreover, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure authorizes a warrantless arrest, otherwise called a citizen's arrest, "when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense." Thus, although officially assigned in Baguio City, Lt. Ancheta’s act of arresting accused-
appellant (after the latter offered to sell him marijuana in San Fernando, La Union) is justified not only
by his duty as a law enforcer but also by Sec. 5 of Rule 113, which authorizes instances of
warrantless or citizens' arrests.”

WHEN MAY AN ARREST BE EFFECTED? (Sec. 6, R113)

An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night. (6)

-Under present law, there is no prohibition against arrests made on Fridays or weekends or at
night.
 53

In effecting an arrest with a warrant, what must the person to be arrested be informed of? (Sec.
7, R113)

GEN ERAL RULE: Person to be arrested must be informed:

1. The cause of the arrest.

2. The fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest.

EXCEPT:

1. When the person to be arrested flees

2. He forcibly resists before the arresting officer had opportunity to inform him

3. When giving the information will imperil the arrest.

“The officer NEED NOT HAVE THE WARRANT in his possession at the time of the arrest but
after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon
as practicable.”

Diosdado Mallari vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 110569. December 9, 1996.

“At this juncture, the Court would like to stress that this is not a case of a warrantless arrest
but merely an instance of an arrest effected by the police authorities without having the warrant in their
possession at that precise moment. Finding as it does, this Court deems it unnecessary to delve into
the applicability of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and on the merits of both the petitioner's
and the Office of the Solicitor General's arguments with respect thereto. The applicable provision is
not Section 5, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests, but Section 7, Rule 113 which
provides as follows:

"Sec. 8. Method of Arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. — When making an

arrest by virtue of a warrant the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the
cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except
when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform him or
when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have
the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person
arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable."
[Emphasis supplied]”

In effecting an arrest without warrant by a peace officer, what must the person to be arrested
be informed of? (Sec. 8, R113)

GENERAL RULE: Person to be arrested should be informed of:

1. The authority of the person making the arrest

2. The Cause of the arrest.

 54

EXCEPT:

1. When the person to be arrested is then ENGAGED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE

OFFENSE

2. He is being pursued immediately after the commission

3. He is being pursued immediately after escaping or fleeing;

4. He forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to inform him

5. When the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.

Pp. vs. Larry Mahinay

G.R. No. 122485. February 1, 1999

It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or

indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must
update in the light of new legal developments:

1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a
language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown
the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a
language known to and understood by said person;

2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may
be used as evidence against him;

3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of
an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;

4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will
be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or
may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;

5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial
investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a
valid waiver has been made;

6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or
confer by the most expedient means — telephone, radio, letter or messenger — with his
lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical
doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his
counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government
organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;

7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;

8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must
be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the
waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;

9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or
stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes
such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the
interrogation must cease if it has already begun;
 55

10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the
right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the
process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some
statements;

11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in
violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
be inadmissible in evidence.

In effecting an arrest without warrant by a private person, what must the person to be arrested
be informed of? (Sec. 9, R113)

GENERAL RULE: Person to be arrested should be informed of:

1. The intention of the private person of arresting him.

2. The Cause of the arrest.

EXCEPT:

1. When the person to be arrested is then ENGAGED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE

OFFENSE

2. He is being pursued immediately after the commission

3. He is being pursued immediately after escaping or fleeing;

4. He forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to inform him

5. When the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.

OFFICER MAY SUMMON ASSISTANCE. (Sec. 10, R113)

An officer making a lawful arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary
to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer shall assist him
in effecting the arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself. (10a)

History of this provision

U.S. vs. Silvestre Pompeya

G.R. No. 10255. August 6, 1915

“This ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good
order of his community is still recognized in all well-organized governments in the "posse comitatus"
(power of the county, poder del condado). (Book 1 Cooley's Blackstone's Commentaries, 343; Book 4,
122.) Under this power, those persons in the state, county, or town who were charged with the
maintenance of peace and good order were bound, ex officio, to pursue and to take all persons who
had violated the law. For that purpose they might command all the male inhabitants of a certain age to
assist them. This power is called "posse comitatus" (power of the county). This was a right well
recognized at common law. Act No. 1309 is a statutory recognition of such common-law right. Said
Act attempts simply to designate the cases and the method when and by which the people of the town
(pueblo) may be called upon to render assistance for the protection of the public and the preservation
of peace and good order. It is an exercise of the police power of the state.”
When can an officer making an arrest break into any building or enclosure?
(Sec. 11, R113)

1. He has announced his authority to effect the arrest

 56

2. He has announced his purpose in making the arrest

3. He is refused admittance after the foregoing announcements.

Right to break out from building or enclosure. (Sec. 12, R113)

– Whenever an officer has entered the building or enclosure in accordance with the preceding section,
he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate himself. (12a)

Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested (Sec. 14)

– Any member of the Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the person arrested or of another acting in
his behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately with such person in the jail or any other place of
custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable regulations, a relative of the person
arrested can also exercise the same right. (14a)
This provision should be cross-referenced with RA 7438

Section 2 R.A. 7438 (took effect on July 7, 1992)

“f. Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by
or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious
minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national
non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by any
international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The
person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother
or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.”

-NOTE: A fiancé or fiancée is considered as “immediate family”

Section 4

“SECTION 4. Penalty Clause. — a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any

investigating officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less
than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been previously convicted
of a similar offense.

The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting
upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and
independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.

b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the
immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical
doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or from
ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four
thousand pesos (P4,000.00). “

G.R. No. 129211. October 2, 2000

People vs. Wilfredo Rodriguez

“In People v. De la Cruz, 279 SCRA 245 (1997), we declared as inadmissible the extrajudicial
confession of accused where the interrogation started at 9:00 A.M. and his lawyer arrived only at
11:00 A.M.. Jurisprudence is clear that an accused under custodial investigation must continuously
 57

have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. In this case, Rodriguez and appellant were in
the hands of the police for about four days without the assistance of counsel. In People v. Compil,
244 SCRA 135, 142 (1995) we held that:

The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing
by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession. Thus in People v. de Jesus
(213 SCRA 345 [1992]) we said that admissions obtained during custodial
investigation without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and
signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.

So flagrant a violation of the constitutional right to counsel of the accused cannot be

countenanced. In People v. Olivarez, Jr., 299 SCRA 635, 650 (1998). we explained that:

The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is

to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession even by the slightest coercion
as would lead the accused to admit something false. What is sought to be avoided is
the "evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for
the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and
thereafter convict him." These constitutional guarantees have been made available to
protect him from the inherently coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of
such investigation.”

RULE 114 - BAIL

Bail defined. (Sec. 1, R114)

Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by
him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the
conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property
bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. (1a)

Constitutional Provision on the Right to Bail

Section 13, Article III, 1987 Constitution

“SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”
 58

The Right to Bail does not apply to military personnel

under Court Martial

Jose Comendador vs. Renato S. De Villa

G.R. No. 95020, 20 August 1991.

“We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general
rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the
right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist."

The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt

military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers

operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of
firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and
are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry
out their activities outside of and against the existing political system.

xxx xxx xxx

National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable

Court that release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine
a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if
the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on 'provisional" bail. The sheer
number alone is already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they
could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow
of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same
with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice.

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection
clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly
situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others.
The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not.
But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same
right that is extended to civilians.”

Purpose and Nature of Bail

Paderanga v. Court of Appeals

247 SCRA 741 (1995)
reiterated in Go, et al. v. Judge Benjamin A. Bongolan
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1464, 26 July 1999
“Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all
indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as
amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a
matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its personal nature and which, to
repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from the
presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted
incarceration at the outset since after the trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt
be established beyond reasonable doubt.”
 59

The person seeking to be admitted to bail

must first be in the CUSTODY OF THE LAW

Manigbas vs. Luna, 98 Phil. 466 [1956]

Necito C. Hilario vs. Julian C. Ocampo III
ADM. CASE No. 3066. December 3, 2001

“Bail is defined as the "security given for the release of a person in custody of the law." By its
definition, bail requires that a person must first be arrested or deprived of liberty before it can be
availed of: Thus, although the posting thereof is tantamount to submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, it presupposes that the accused is under detention or in the custody of law. Indeed, it would be
absurd and incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. In this case, respondent deemed it
appropriate for the accused to file the corresponding bail bonds, even when the latter had not yet been
arrested or placed under custody.”

Guillerma Delos Santos-Reyes vs. Judge Camilo O. Montesa

Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-983. August 7, 1995

“From the above recitals of the factual and procedural antecedents of the criminal cases
before the trial court, it is obvious that the accused filed their petitions to grant bail and to reduce bail,
motion to reinstate petition to grant bail and urgent motion to quash warrants of arrests before the
court acquired jurisdiction over their persons either through the effective service and enforcement of
the warrants of arrest or their voluntary surrender, i.e., before they were placed in the custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of their liberty. Such being so, the trial court, initially, denied correctly the
petition for grant of bail but subsequently disregarded law and jurisprudence when it favorably acted
on the motion to reinstate the petition for grant of bail and set the motion for hearing on 6 April 1991,
directing, for that purpose the Department of Justice and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to
forward to it the records of the preliminary investigation.
In this jurisdiction it is settled that a person applying for bail should be in the custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of his liberty xxxx”

Theory of Constructive Custody

-an exception to the General Rule that an accused has to be arrested or has to voluntarily
surrender before he can be admitted to bail

Paderanga v. Court of Appeals

247 SCRA 741 (1995)
Santiago vs. Vasquez
217 SCRA 633

“It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it known
to the prosecution and to the trial court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally appear
as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute
costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution
and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner,
never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but
the slightest effort to place petitioner in the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then
incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering
his confinement or placing him under guard.
 60

The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never attempted to
have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal
control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trial court; secondly, by
furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by uneguivocally
recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant
for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the
clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in
court, up to the submission of his application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.”

TYPES OF BAIL

Corporate Surety

Refers to the type of bail, similar to an insurance contract whereby a bonding company will
issue a bond in the amount fixed by the court which will be forfeited if the bonding company fails in its
obligation to warrant compliance with the conditions of bail.

Property Bond

Refers to a situation where property is put up by the accused or somebody else to warrant
compliance with the conditions of bail. If such conditions are violated, the said property will be sold at
public auction and the proceeds thereof, up to the amount of bail fixed by the court will be forfeited in
favor of the government.

Cash Bond

Refers to the type of bail whereby the accused or somebody else will actually deposit the
amount fixed by the court as bail to warrant compliance with the conditions of bail. If these conditions
are violated, the money can be forefeited.

Recognizance

Refers to the type of bail where a person is released in his own custody or to the custody of a
responsible person. This type of bail is allowable only in the cases when specific provisions of the law
or the rules allow it.

Victory Liner vs. Reynaldo B. Bellosillo

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321. March 10, 2004

REQUIRING BAIL TO BE POSTED IN CASH AND IN THE AMOUNTS OF P50,000.00 AND

P350,000.00 IN CASES OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE AMOUNTS TO
A DENIAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BAIL. THE DECISION TO POST A SURETY
BOND OR CASH AS BAIL BELONGS TO THE ACCUSED AND THE COURT CANNOT REQUIRE
HIM TO POST CASH

Conditions of the bail; requirements (Sec. 2, R114)

All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions:

(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain in
force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it;

(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the court of these
Rules;
 61

(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite due notice
shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may
proceed in absentia; and

(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the final judgment.

The Court has the right to restrict the travel of the accused

Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 149
Ricardo C. Silverio vs. Court of Appeals
195 SCRA 760 (1991);
Imelda Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan,
247 SCRA 127 (1995).

“A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This
is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon
petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as
a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935). ".
. . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times
to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the
jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and
inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the
Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction." Indeed, if the accused were
allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the
courts.”

WHEN IS BAIL A MATTER OF RIGHT (Sec. 4, R114)

1. BEFORE conviction by the MTC

2. AFTER conviction by the MTC

3. BEFORE conviction by the RTC except if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, where the evidence of guilt is strong.

4. BEFORE conviction by the RTC in cases punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment where the court has already ruled that the evidence of guilt is NOT STRONG.

WHEN IS BAIL A MATTER OF DISCRETION? (Sec. 5, R114)

1. AFTER conviction by the RTC if the penalty IMPOSED is 6 years or lower.

2. AFTER conviction by the RTC even if the penalty imposed is greater than six years if none of
the conditions under par. 3 of Section 5 are present except if the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
 62

WHEN MUST BAIL BE DENIED (Secs. 5 and 7 R114)

1. BEFORE conviction by the RTC if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion

perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, where the evidence of guilt is strong.

2. AFTER conviction by the RTC where the penalty imposed is greater than 6 years and
any of the following conditions are present:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has

committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That the accused has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that the accused may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.

3. AFTER conviction by the RTC if the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment.

The conviction of the accused rebuts the presumption of innocence

Francisco Yap, Jr. vs. CA

G.R. No. 141529. June 6, 2001

The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be
granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that
uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a
person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior
applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From
another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so
enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on
bail than before conviction.

CAPITAL OFFENSE- is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and of
the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death. (Sec. 6, R114)

THE APPLICATION FOR BAIL (Sec. 8, R114)

- Once an application for bail has been filed in cases, punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE shifts to the prosecution to prove that the evidence
of guilt is strong

NOTE: What is discretionary on the part of the court in a hearing under Section 8 is only the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
 63

IMPORTANT: Where the imposable penalty is death, reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment and the accused files an application for bail, the court’s
discretion is limited to determining whether or not the evidence of guilt
is strong.

If the evidence of guilt is strong the court MUST DENY bail. On the other
hand if the evidence of guilt is not strong the court MUST GRANT bail.

Steps to be taken by the judge when there is an application for bail

Basco vs. Rapatalo

269 SCRA 220,

"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation

"(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong
for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion

"(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution ;

"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied."

Hearing is MANDATORY

Borinaga v. Tamin
26 SCRA 206 (1993);
Cardines v. Rozete, 242 SCRA 557 (1995).

“the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present its evidence within a reasonable time
whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a
summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial. If the prosecution is denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process.”

Joselito V. Narciso vs. Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz

G.R. No. 134504. March 17, 2000

“When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a
hearing must be conducted by the trial judge before bail can be granted to the accused. Absent such
hearing, the order granting bail is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion” -EVEN
IF THE PETITION FOR BAIL HAS THE PROSECUTOR’S CONFORMITY.

People vs. Cresenia C. Reyes

G.R. Nos. 101127-31. August 7, 1992

If the accused in a case where the imposable penalty is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is granted bail pending trial, such will be cancelled, and the accused placed in
confinement upon conviction for the crime charged.

Modifying Circumstances Shall NOT be considered in determining

the right to bail UNLESS admitted by the prosecution

Jojo Pastor Bravo, Jr. vs. Hon. Melecio B. Borja

G.R. No. L-65228. February 18, 1985
 64

“Petitioner's posture hardly finds support in the law. Under Section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, a capital offense is "an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission,
and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death." It his clear from
this provision that the capital nature of an offense is determined by the penalty prescribed by law, with
reference to which it is relatively easy to ascertain whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. Moreover, when the Constitution or the law speaks of evidence of guilt, it evidently to refers to
a finding of innocence or culpability, regardless of the modifying circumstances.”

“Where it has been established without objection that the accused is only 16 years old, it
follows that, if convicted, he would be given "the penalty next lower then that prescribed by law," which
effectively rules out the death penalty. The Constitution withholds the guaranty of bail from one who is
accused of a capital offense where the evidence of guilt is strong. The obvious reason is that one who
faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee. This reason does not
hold where the accused has been established without objection to be a minor who by law cannot be
sentenced to death.”

Things to be considered in determining the amount of bail (Sec. 9 R114)

(a) Financial liability of the accused to give bail;

(b) Nature and circumstance of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

ON RECOGNIZANCE:

What are the instances when recognizance is allowed by the law and the rules?

Roberto Espiritu vs. Eduardo Jovellanos

Oct. 16, 1997 280 SCRA 579

(a) when the offense charged is for violation of an ordinance, a light felony, or a criminal
offense, the imposable penalty for which does not exceed 6 months imprisonment
and/or P2,000 fine, under the circumstances provided in R.A. No. 6036;

(b) where a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum
of the imposable principal penalty, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law or any modifying circumstance, in which case the court, in its discretion, may
allow his release on his own recognizance;

(c) where the accused has applied for probation, pending resolution of the case but no
bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one; and

(d) in case of a youthful offender, held for physical and mental examination, trial, or
appeal, if he is unable to furnish bail and under the circumstances envisaged in P.D.
No. 603, as amended (Art. 191).

R.A. 7610
 65

“SECTION 25. Rights of Children Arrested for Reasons Related to Armed Conflict. — Any
child who has been arrested for reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier, guide
or spy is entitled to the following rights;

(a) Separate detention from adults except where families are accommodated as family units;
(b) Immediate free legal assistance;
(c) Immediate notice of such arrest to the parents or guardians of the child; and
(d) Release of the child on recognizance within twenty-four (24) hours to the custody of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or any responsible member of the community
as determined by the court.”

P.D. 603

ARTICLE 191. Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or Trial. — A youthful offender
held for physical and mental examination or trial or pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail, shall from
the time of his arrest be committed to the care of the Department of Social Welfare or the local
rehabilitation center or a detention home in the province or city which shall be responsible for his
appearance in court whenever required: Provided, That in the absence of any such center or agency
within a reasonable distance from the venue of the trial, the provincial, city and municipal jail shall
provide quarters for youthful offenders separate from other detainees. The court may, in its discretion,
upon recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare or other agency or agencies authorized by
the Court, release a youthful offender on recognizance, to the custody of his parents or other suitable
person who shall be responsible for his appearance whenever required.

SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 20-79

R.A. 6036

SECTION 1. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, bail shall not be
required of a person charged with violation of a municipal or city ordinance, a light felony and/or a
criminal offense the prescribed penalty for which is not higher than six months imprisonment and/or a
fine of two thousand pesos, or both, where said person has established to the satisfaction of the court
or any other appropriate authority hearing his case that he is unable to post the required cash or bail
bond, except in the following cases:

(a) When he is caught committing the offense in flagrante;

(b) When he confesses to the commission of the offense unless the confession is later repudiated
by him in a sworn statement or in open court as having been extracted through force or
intimidation;

(c) When he is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
jumped bail;

(d) When he is found to have previously violated the provisions of Section 2 hereof;

(e) When he is found to be a recidivist or a habitual delinquent or has been previously convicted
for an offense to which the law or ordinance attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or
more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty;

(f) When he commits the offense while on parole or under conditional pardon; and

(g) When the accused has previously been pardoned by the municipal or city mayor for violation
of municipal or city ordinance for at least two times.
 66

SECTION 2. Instead of bail, the person charged with any offense contemplated by Section
1 hereof shall be required to sign in the presence of two witnesses of good standing in the community
a sworn statement binding himself, pending final decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of the
Court hearing his case periodically every two weeks. The Court may, in its discretion and with the
consent of the person charged, require further that he be placed under the custody and subject to the
authority of a responsible citizen in the community who may be willing to accept the responsibility. In
such a case the affidavit herein mentioned shall include a statement of the person charged that he
binds himself to accept the authority of the citizen so appointed by the Court. The Clerk of Court shall
immediately report the presence of the accused person to the Court. Except when his failure to report
is for justifiable reasons including circumstances beyond his control to be determined by the Court,
any violation of this sworn statement shall justify the Court to order his immediate arrest unless he files
bail in the amount forthwith fixed by the Court.

Where a person is charged with any offense contemplated by Republic Act No. 6036
(copy attached), the Judge should as therein provided order the release of the accused on
recognizance instead of requiring bail.

SEC. 16. OF REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE

SECTION 16. Arrest of accused. — The court shall not order the arrest of the accused
except for failure to appear whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall either be on bail
or on recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court.

SEC. 16. OF RULE 114

“When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible
maximum imprisonment prescribed for the offense charged, he shall be released immediately, without
prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the maximum penalty to which
the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive
imprisonment.”

A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty
prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any
modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the
discretion of the court. (16a)

WHERE SHOULD BAIL BE FILED (Sec. 17, R114)

GENERAL RULE:

Bail must be filed with the court where the case is pending.

EXCEPTIONS:

1. If the judge of the court where the case is pending is absent or unavailable bail
may be filed with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal
trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city or municipality.

2. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where

the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said
place, of if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

3. Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with
any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held..
 67

EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION:

Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released
on recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the case is pending,
whether on preliminary investigation, trial, or appeal.

PROCEDURE FOR THE FORFEITURE OF BAIL (Sec. 21, R114)

When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall
be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in
person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within
which to produce their principal and to show why no judgment should be rendered against them for the
amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:

(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.

Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and
severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the
bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted. (21a)

CANCELLATION OF BAIL. (Sec. 22, R114)

Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be
cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of
the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail. (22a)

POSTING BAIL IS NOT A WAIVER OF ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST OR LACK OF

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION (Sec. 26-NEW PROVISION)

“SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation. – An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the
validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefore, or from assailing the regularity or
questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he
raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not
later than the start of the trial of the case. (n)”

-This abandons the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Timon 281 SCRA
597 (1997) and similar cases that “ an application for bail constitutes a waiver of right of the accused
to question whatever irregularities and defects attended the arrest”

This principle was reiterated as lately as the case of People vs. Carmen Lacson G.R. No.
126174. August 29, 2000.
 68

RULE 115 - RIGHTS OF ACCUSED

On the Presumption of Innocence

The equipoise rule

People vs. Edgar Lagmay April 21, 1999

“where the evidence in a criminal case evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused.” (People vs. Benemerito, 264 SCRA
677.)

On the right to be informed of the charges against him

Rationale

“Inasmuch as `not only the liberty but even the life of the accused may be at stake, it is always
wise and proper that the accused should be fully apprised of the true charges against them, and thus
avoid all and any possible surprises which may be detrimental to their rights and interests.’ The main
purpose of this requirement is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed
to be innocent and has, therefore, no independent knowledge of the acts that constitute the offense
with which he is charged. (Matilde v. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456)

Pp. vs. Artemio Calayca Jan. 20, 1999

Pp. vs. Cesar Larena June 29, 1999

A person charged with simple rape cannot be convicted of qualified forms of rape if the
qualifying circumstances are not stated in the information. Otherwise there will be a violation of his
right to be informed.

On the right of the accused to be present and defended by counsel

Pp. vs. Rufino Bermas April 21, 1999

"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to
be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he
is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it so implemented that
under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have
an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own." Citing Pp. vs. Holgado 85 Phil. 752.

On the right to remain silent

Pp. vs. Donato Continente August 25, 2000

The rights to remain silent and to counsel may be waived by the accused provided that the
constitutional requirements are complied with. It must appear clear that the accused was initially
accorded his right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. In addition, the waiver must be in writing and in the
presence of counsel. If the waiver complies with the constitutional requirements, then the extrajudicial
confession will be tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely — without coercion, intimidation,
 69

inducement, or false promises; and credibility, 2 i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of
mankind.
We have consistently declared in a string of cases that the advice or "Paliwanag" found at the
beginning of extrajudicial confessions that merely enumerate to the accused his custodial rights do not
meet the standard provided by law. They are terse and perfunctory statements that do not evince a
clear and sufficient effort to inform and explain to the appellant his constitutional rights. 36 We
emphasized that when the constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his
rights to remain silent and to have an independent and competent counsel preferably of his own
choice, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just
the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. 37 In other words, the
right of a person under investigation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the
police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding of what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right.

Pp. vs. Ayson July 7, 1989

In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its
commission in court, has the following rights in that matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to
wit:

1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary
investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in
some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in
violation of these rights rejected; and

2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT —

a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify to his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to
incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is prosecuted.

A pro-forma question and answer form prepared by the police is insufficient to inform the
accused of his rights prior to questioning him under custodial investigation

People vs. Benjamin Sabayoc

G.R. No. 147201. January 15, 2004
Citing People vs. Jara 144 SCRA 516,

“The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators either
automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even
copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an
impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a
spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.

The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just
the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It should allow the
suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. More
so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a
stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police officers for two days
previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.”
 70

A counsel assisting the accused who remains silent throughout the custodial investigation
indicates that the accused was not afforded his constitutional right to a competent counsel.

People vs. Benjamin Sabayoc

G.R. No. 147201. January 15, 2004
citing People vs. Deniega 321 Phil. 1028, 1043 (1995)

“The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless
if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the
person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is
impaired.”

“This is not to say that a counsel should try to prevent an accused from making a confession.
Indeed, as an officer of the court, it is an attorney's duty to, first and foremost, seek the truth.
However, counsel should be able, throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of the questions
by conferring with his client and halting the investigation should the need arise. The duty of a lawyer
includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial investigation is aware that the right of an accused
to remain silent may be invoked at any time.”

On the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself

Beltran v. Samson 53 Phil. 570 (1929).

the prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness against himself extends to any
attempt to compel the accused to furnish a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparing it
with the handwriting in a document in a prosecution for falsification. "Writing is something more than
moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act because it requires
the application of intelligence and attention,"

Pp. vs. Radel Gallarde

Feb. 17, 2000

“The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not
required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the
giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman
charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her
pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a
substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from
gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline
of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured,
or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to
be done.”

On the Right to crossexamine the witnesses against him

Pp. vs. Edgar Crispin, March 2, 2000

Affidavits cannot be allowed because they cannot be cross-examined.

An affidavit is hearsay and has weak probative value, unless the affiant is placed on the
witness stand to testify on it. Being hearsay evidence, it is inadmissible because the party against
whom it is presented is deprived of his right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the
statement or writing is attributed. The right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him is
a fundamental right of every accused which may not be summarily done away with. Another reason
 71

why the right to confrontation is so essential is because the trial judge's duty to observe and test the
credibility of the affiant can only be met by his being brought to the witness stand. That the affidavit
formed part of the record of the preliminary investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence
because the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the
RTC. Such record must be introduced as evidence during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to
take judicial notice of the same. The prosecution having failed to present Cesar Delima as a witness,
his sworn statement was patently inadmissible and deserves no consideration at all.

On the Right to compulsory processes

If the defense believes that there are other witnesses who could have exculpated the accused, it
should have called for them even by compulsory process. (People v. Boholst, 152 SCRA 263 [1987]).

On the Right to Speedy Trial

Roque vs. Desierto May 12, 1999

Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law and to speedy trial, the
Constitution commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed against
public officials. Thus, the failure of said office to resolve a complaint that has been pending for six
years is clearly violative of this mandate and the public officials’ rights. In such event, the aggrieved
party is entitled to the dismissal of the complaint.

Canson vs. Garchitorena, July 28, 1999

Once again we reiterate that tired old legal maxim, justice delayed is justice denied. It need
not be overemphasized that this oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes
much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy
trial, which, as defined is one "[c]onducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules
and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays." The primordial purpose of this
constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of the accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an
indefinite period of time. It, likewise, is intended to prevent delays in the administration of justice by
requiring judicial tribunals to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions.

Binay vs. Sandiganbayan Oct. 1, 1999

However, the right to speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his
right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both
the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons
for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused
by the delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept.

Right to appeal The only right under Rule 115 not found in the constitution
 72

RULE 116 - ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

“The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information
was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or
clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same
in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information.” (Sec. 1, par (a))

Is arraignment mandatory or can it be waived?

Pp vs. Demetrio Cabale May 8, 1990

In the instant cases, counsel for the appellant entered into trial without objecting that his client,
the appellant herein, had not yet been arraigned. Said counsel had also the full opportunity of cross-
examining the witnesses for the prosecution. Then, when the cases were being retried after the
appellant had been arraigned, appellant's counsel filed a joint manifestation with the prosecution,
adopting all proceedings had previous to the arraignment of the appellant. There was, therefore, no
violation of the appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.

What is the effect of arraignment on the right of an accused to preliminary investigation?

The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke
it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. (Go v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138)

Exceptional case:

Francisco Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, March 13, 1998

“The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to
invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been
actively and consistently demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before he was charged in
court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during the arraignment because there was a pending
case in this Court regarding his right to avail of a regular preliminary investigation. Clearly, the acts of
petitioner and his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminary investigation is part of procedural
due process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed.”

Can there be an arraignment of a respondent during a preliminary investigation by a municipal

trial court judge?

Warlito Alisangco vs. Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. (224 SCRA 1)

Considering that the MCTC of Manukan-Jose Dalman only had preliminary jurisdiction over
the case, the respondent judge did not have any authority to set the case for arraignment. All it could
do was to calendar the same for preliminary investigation. There is no law or rule requiring an
arraignment during the preliminary investigation. Under Section 1, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the arraignment must be conducted by the court having jurisdiction to try the case on its merits.
Thus, with respect to the case filed against the complainant, this would be the proper Regional Trial
Court which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said case by reason of the prescribed penalty.
 73

“reading the same in the language or dialect known to him”

Pp. vs. Arnel B. Alicando Dec. 12, 1995

Pp. vs. Melchor Estomaca , April 22, 1996

“The records of the court must clearly indicate full compliance with Section 1 of Rule 116,
otherwise, the arraignment, and consequently all subsequent proceedings will be declared null and
void.

The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused
understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be
strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-
important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the precise
nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist
the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the
Constitution”.

“ (b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both
arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall not affect the validity of
the proceedings.”

NO ARRAIGNMENT BY PROXY This is one of the instances when the rules requires the
presence of the accused (cf Bail)

“(c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not guilty shall
be entered for him. (1a)”

What is considered by law to be a proper plea of guilty is an absolute plea of guilt.

If the accused will make a conditional plea, i.e. I am guilty but it was his fault or “Opo sinakal
ko sya pero kasi inunahan nya ako” or if he refuses to plea at all, the court will enter a plea of not
guilty.

What is deemed admitted when a plea of guilty is entered?

"While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it, at the same time, constitutes an admission
of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein
recited (People vs. Egido, 90 Phil. 762; People vs. Santos and Vicente, 105 Phil. 40)

What is then not deemed admitted?

1. facts and circumstances not alleged in the complaint or information.

2. Conclusions of fact
3. Jurisdiction of the court (conferred by law not by admission)
4. Sufficiency of the Complaint or Information

“ When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence, his plea shall be deemed
withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall se entered for him. (n)”

Pp. vs Padernal 21 SCRA 34 (1967)

Where the accused pleads guilty and proceeds, in a hearing to prove the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense, to state facts constituting full and complete self-defense. The
trial judge should declare his plea of guilty thereby withdrawn, order that a plea of not guilty be entered
and proceed to trial on the merits.
 74

“ When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its records
transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within three (3) days from the filing of
the information or complaint. The accused shall be arraigned within ten (10) days from the date
of the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case shall be held within ten (10) days after
arraignment.”

-This provision is NEW and is meant to ensure compliance with the right of an accused to
speedy trial.

“The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for purposes of plea
bargaining, determination of civil liability, and other matters requiring his presence. In case of
failure of the offended party to appear despite due notice, the court may allow the accused to
enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged
with the conformity of the trial prosecutor alone. (cir. 1-89)

This is from Section B par. 1 of Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89. However, there is an
additional proviso that the failure of the private offended party to appear will be a waiver of the
requirement of his consent to a plea bargain.”

Plea of guilty to a lesser offense

At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and prosecutor, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said
lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary. (Sec. 2, R116)

Plea bargaining in criminal cases “ is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval” (Pp. vs. Martin
Villarama June 23, 1992)
REQUISITES

1. It must be B4 trial (cf Pp. vs. Martin Villarama)

2. The prosecutor and the offended party must consent except if the offended
party fails to appear during arraignment DESPITE NOTICE in which case the
consent of the prosecutor alone is sufficient.

3. the plea of guilt must be to a lesser offense necessarily included in the

offense charged.

Pp. vs. Martin Villarama June 23, 1992

In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense
after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial
court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly
exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the
rules allow such a Plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the
guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462,
February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the
rationale or the law:
". . . (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the
fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change his former
plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing
more nothing less than the evidence already in the record. The reason for this being
that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser
offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for
compromise, much less bargaining."
 75

“necessarily included”

UNDER THE 1985 RULES

“regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a

court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court”

Theoretically, under the 1985 Rules, an accused charged with serious physical injuries could
plead guilty to jaywalking.

This produced too much confusion and the Supreme Court apparently decided to go back to
the language of the 1964.

Thus, the rule under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now require that the plea
be made to an offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.

Can a person charged with murder plead guilty to attempted homicide?

Panfilo Amatan vs. Vicente Aujero Sept. 27, 1995

“Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows
the accused in a criminal case to plead guilty "to a lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charged." The fact of death of the victim for which the accused
Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled
with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide as defined in
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily produces death, attempted homicide does not.
Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the case before us, which could either lead to a
misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright confusion. Such a result was itself recognized
by the Deputy Court Administrator when he recommended an amendment to the provision in his
Memorandum”.

PLEA OF GUILT TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE (Sec. 3, R116)

-Despite a plea of guilt to a capital offense, the Court MUST require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and to determine the precise degree of culpability.

Pp. vs. Joseph Lakindanum G.R. No. 127123. March 10, 1999
People vs. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637 reiterated n People vs. Jonathan Besonia
G.R. Nos. 151284-85. February 5, 2004

The rule is that where the accused desires to plead guilty to a capital offense, the court is
enjoined to observe the following:

1. It must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea;

2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability; and

3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him
to do so if he desires
 76

Guidelines on what is covered by the “searching inquiry” particularly in relation to cases

punishable by death.

People vs. Jonathan Besonia

G.R. Nos. 151284-85. February 5, 2004

“A searching inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension
by the accused of the consequences of the plea so that the plea of guilty can truly be said to be based
on a free and informed judgment. While there can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may
conduct a searching inquiry, we declared in People v. Aranzado, [418 Phil. 125 (2001)] citing a
plethora of cases, that it would be well for the court to do the following:

(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the
law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial
and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the
possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress by
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters.

(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he has conferred with,
and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of
guilty.

(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational background which may serve as a trustworthy index
of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

(4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under
the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or
because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit
guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does
not labor under these mistaken impressions.

(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against
him or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him
to supply missing details of significance.

Moreover, in some cases, we ruled that the trial court should also explain to the accused the
essential elements of the crime charged, as well as the penalty and civil liabilities.”

Pp. vs. Paulino Sevilleno March 29, 1999

Facts: After the accused pleaded guilty to rape with homicide, the judge asked him only two
questions, First, “Do you understand your plea of guilt?” and second “Do you know that your plea of
guilt could bring death penalty?”

Held: “Only a clear, definite and unconditional plea of guilty by the accused must be accepted
by trial courts. There is no such rule which provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to
the charge that his conviction should automatically follow. A judge should always be an embodiment of
competence. As an administrator of justice, it is imperative that the trial judge carry out his duties ably
and competently so as not to erode public confidence in the judiciary.”

The judge was found to have committed grave abuse of discretion.

 77

Plea of guilty to non-capital offense (Sec. 4)

-Reception of Evidence is DISCRETIONARY

Please take note of the exceptional case of:

People vs. Mendoza 231 SCRA 264

Facts: Accused pleaded guilty to robbery but the court required presentation of
evidence. When the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence, the court acquitted the
accused.

Was the procedure proper?

Held: While the court was correct in acquitting the accused, the proper procedure should have
been to consider the plea of guilt withdrawn and a plea of not guilty entered before acquitting the
accused to avoid the absurd situation of an acquittal when the plea was guilty.

Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty. (Sec. 5, R116)

– At any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may permit an improvident
plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty.

Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel (Sec. 6, R116)

Counsel De Parte- engaged by the accused himself

Counsel De Officio- appointed by the court to defend the accused.

What are the steps that a court must take to properly inform the accused of his right to
counsel?

Pp. vs. Holgado 85 Phil. 752

(1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned;

(2) after giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an
attorney;

(3) if he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio
to defend him; and

(4) if the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a
reasonable time therefor.

The right of an accused to a counsel de parte is not absolute

Pp. vs. Mario Serzo, Jr., June 20, 1997

“Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented

either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented by
counsel is immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute.
The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the state's and the
offended party's equally important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict
the accused's option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot
afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the
accused for a valid reason, e. g. conflict of interest and the like.”
 78

Bill of particulars

- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead
and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and
the details desired. (Sec.9, R116)

A Bill of Particulars is one of the Modes of Discovery.

The accused is basically asking the Court to Order the the prosecution to set forth the details
in vague portions of a complaint or information.

Cinco vs. Sandiganbayan 202 SCRA 726

Webb vs. De Leon, et al., 247 SCRA 652

-The remedy of a Bill of Particulars is not available in a preliminary investigation

Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution.

Procedure:

There must be a motion of the accused showing good cause and with notice to the
parties, the court, in order to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration.

Coverage:

The court may order the prosecution to produce and permit the inspection and
copying or photographing of any written statement given by the complainant and other
witnesses in any investigation of the offense conducted by the prosecution or other
investigating officers, as well as any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, object, or tangible things not otherwise privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the case and which are in the possession or under
the control of the prosecution, police, or other law investigating agencies.

Purpose:
The purpose of this remedy is to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration of
evidence.

When may the arraignment be suspended? (Sec. 11, R116)

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose;

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of
Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not
exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. (12a)

Effects of insanity:

a. Time of Commission- Exempting (Art. 12, RPC)

b. Time of Arraignment Suspension of Arraignment (11, 116)
c. Time of Trial Suspension of Trial (
d. Serving Sentence Suspension of Execution of Sentence
(ART. 79 RPC)
 79

RULE 117 - MOTION TO QUASH

When must a motion to quash be filed:

-BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT because generally, the arraignment of the accused will operate as
a waiver of the defects in the information or preliminary investigation.

Is the movant in a motion to quash limited to what is stated in the information?

General Rule:

In resolving the motion to quash a criminal complaint or information, the facts alleged in the
complaint or information should be taken as they are.

Exception:

However, the following may be considered in a motion to quash:

a) facts showing the extinction of criminal liability

b) double jeopardy: and

c) facts that have been admitted or are not denied by the prosecution (Edgardo Lopez
vs. Sandiganbayan October, 13, 1995)

People v. Alagao 16 SCRA 879

Jose Garcia vs. Court of Appeals
January 27, 1997

“The petitioner's contention that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the information
in Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 which states that the crime was discovered in 1989, is
palpably unmeritorious. Even People v. Alagao, 24 which he cites, mentions the exceptions to
the rule as provided in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2, and Sections 4 and 5 of the old
Rule 117 viz., (a) extinction of criminal liability, and (k) double jeopardy. His additional claim
that the exception of extinction can no longer be raised due to the implied repeal of the former
Section 4, 25 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court occasioned by its non-reproduction after its
revision, is equally without merit.”

“It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal
grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among
the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that
facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds.”

“The court shall consider no ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged.”

This is because jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case IS CONFERRED BY LAW and
CANNOT BE WAIVED.
 80

Can the judge initiate the consideration of a ground for quashal?

Pp. vs. David G. Nitafan, Feb. 1, 1999

“It is also clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the
accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a
motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused. A motion contemplates an initial action
originating from the accused. It is the latter who is in the best position to know on what ground/s he will
based his objection to the information. Otherwise, if the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is
not only pre-judging the case of the prosecution but also takes side with the accused. This would
violate the right to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. Such independence and
impartiality cannot be expected from a magistrate, such as herein respondent judge, who in his show
cause orders, orders dismissing the charges and order denying the motions for reconsideration stated
and even expounded in a lengthy disquisition with citation of authorities, the grounds and justifications
to support his action. Certainly, in compliance with the orders, the prosecution has no choice but to
present arguments contradicting that of respondent judge. Obviously, however, it cannot be expected
from respondent judge to overturn the reasons he relied upon in his different orders without
contradicting himself. To allow a judge to initiate such motion even under the guise of a show cause
order would result in a situation where a magistrate who is supposed to be neutral, in effect, acts as
counsel for the accused and judge as well. A combination of these two personalities in one person is
violative of due process which is a fundamental right not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution.”

Grounds for a Motion to quash:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses
is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

This ground simply means that the facts as alleged in the complaint or information do not
charge an offense.

In other words, there is no law penalizing the acts stated in the complaint or information.
NULLUM CRIMEN NULLE POENA SINE LEGE

Example: “Than on or about the evening of September 12, 2001, X went inside the premises
of the Hallelujah Massage Parlor and went out one hour later with a big smile on his face.

Contrary to law”

-These facts do not constitute an offense.

 81

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

This refers to lack of jurisdiction over the

1) person of the accused

2) subject matter of the case; or
3) territory;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

Can the lack of authority on the part of the officer signing the information be cured by silence,
acquiescence or express consent?

CUDIA vs. CA
G.R. No. 110315. January 16, 1998

City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms
committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga.

HELD: If the person who signed the information is not authorized to do so, the entire
proceedings will be null and void even if the accused participated actively in the proceedings.

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

Refer to Rule 110 on the essential requisites of a sufficient complaint or information. If there is
no compliance with these requisites, this is the proper ground for a motion to quash.

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law;

This refers to DUPLICITOUS COMPLAINTS OR INFORMATIONS. Cf. Rule110, Section 13.

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

How is criminal liability extinguished?

ARTICLE 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
 82

In relation to Libel

Danguilan-Vitug vs. CA 232 SCRA 460

Where the complaint or information itself alleged that the averred libelous material was
privileged communication, then this would constitute a legal excuse or justification.

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or
the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent. (3a)

- double jeopardy

PROCEDURE IF GROUND IS CURABLE BY AMENDMENT (Sec. 4, R117)

1. If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information

which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. (4a)

2. If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion
shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still
suffers from the same defect despite the amendment. (n)

What is the effect if a motion to quash is sustained? (Sec. 5, R. 117)

– If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed
except if it was sustained on the grounds of double jeopardy or extinction of criminal liability,
In such case, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail.

-If not, or if the prosecutor fails to comply with the order of the court within the time allowed, the
accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody of another charge.

NOTE: The quashal of an information will not prevent the refilling of the same case unless it
was quashed due to double jeopardy or extinction of the criminal liability. (Sec. 6, R117)

DOUBLE JEOPARDY (Sec. 7 R117)

BASIS: Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution

“Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.”

1st Sentence SAME OFFENSE

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

2nd Sentence SAME ACT

If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.”

RULE: Double jeopardy will bar a second prosecution for the SAME ACT only if it is punished by
a national law AND a local ordinance

Example: B.P. 22 and ESTAFA can co-exist because both are punished by national laws. Nierra vs.
Dacuycuy 181 S 1
 83

Elements of Double Jeopardy

People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238,

People v. Tampal, 244 SCRA 202.

(a) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second,
(b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated and
(c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof

When does the first jeopardy attach?

Cudia v. CA, G.R. No. 110315, January 16, 1998;

Guerrero v. CA, 257 SCRA 703

(1) upon a valid indictment,

(2) before a competent court,
(3) after arraignment,
(4) when a valid plea has been entered, and
(5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.

Will the pendency of another criminal case for the same offense bar subsequent prosecution
by reason of double jeopardy?

This is already clear under the new rules because the phrase “previously convicted or in
jeopardy of being convicted” under the old Section 3 has been amended to read “ previously
convicted or acquitted of the offense charged”

The change was based on the ruling in Pp. vs. Pineda which overturned the ruling in cases
like Pp. vs. City Court of Manila 121 S 627 where a contrary rule was espoused.

Later reiterations:

Pp. vs. David G. Nitafan, Feb. 1, 1999

-other pending cases will not amount to double jeopardy

Binay vs. Sandiganbayan Oct. 1, 1999.

The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy
even though they had already pleaded "not guilty" to the information earlier filed in the RTC. The first
jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent jurisdiction. There
can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered as plea in a court that had no jurisdiction. The
remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the quashal of the information pending in the
Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy. Their remedy was to move for the quashal of the
information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
 84

EXCEPTIONS UNDER SECTION 7

(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same
act or omission constituting the former charge;
(E.G. TEEHANKEE)

(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only
after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or

Note: Under the 1985 RULES “after filing of the information” NEW RULES “after a
plea was entered”

why?- b4 plea there can be, as yet, no double jeopardy

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the
prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule
116.

1(f) of Rule 116- If the offended party fails to show up during the arraignment, there can be a plea to a
lesser offense even if only the prosecutor agrees.

DISMISSAL WAS WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED

If the accused invokes his right to a speedy trial and the case is dismissed, can the case be
refiled?- NO, it cannot because DOUBLE JEOPARDY WILL ATTACH.

If the accused moves for a reinvestigation and, thereafter, the prosecutor moves for the
dismissal of the case, will double jeopardy lie to bar subsequent prosecution?

People vs. Vergara 221 SCRA 960

Filing a Motion for Reinvestigation does not amount to express consent to the dismissal of the
case. Express consent means direct and unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication.

If the acquittal was void, double jeopardy will not lie (Pp. vs. Bagul
131 S 296 Gorion vs. RTC of Cebu)
213 S 138

TEST TO DETERMINE IDENTITY OF OFFENSES

Andres S. Suero vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 156408. January 31, 2005

“The test for the third element is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an
attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court”
 85

Can double jeopardy operate to bar a prosecution for falsification of public documents when
there is already a prior acquittal in a case for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019?

Andres S. Suero vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 156408. January 31, 2005

“Indeed, the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 shares two common elements with the
felony under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code — that the offender is a public officer and that the
act is related to the officer's public position. However, the latter offense is not necessarily inclusive of
the former. The essential elements of each are not included among or do not form part of those
enumerated in the former. For there to be double jeopardy, the elements of one offense should — like
the ribs of an umbrella — ideally encompass those of the other. The elements of a violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 fall outside the realm of those of falsification of a public document and vice versa. At
most, the two offenses may be considered as two conjoined umbrellas with one or two common ribs.
Clearly, one offense does not include the other. “

Provisional dismissal. (NEW, Sec. 8, R117 )

A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused
and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more
than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of
the order without the case having been revived. (n)

THE FAILURE TO RAISE A GROUND IN A MOTION TO QUASH OPERATES AS A WAIVER OF

THE GROUND EXCEPT THE FOLLOWING:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(d) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (Sec. 9,
R 117)

RULE 118 - PRE-TRIAL

PURPOSE OF PRE-TRIAL

Abubakar vs. Abubakar Oct 22, 1999

That a pre-trial is indispensable in any civil or criminal action in this jurisdiction is clearly laid
out in Rules 18 and 118 of the Rules of Court. It is a procedural device meant to limit the issues to be
tackled and proved at the trial. A less cluttered case environment means that there will be fewer points
of contention for the trial court to resolve. This would be in keeping with the mandate of the
Constitution according every person the right to a speedy disposition of their cases. If the parties can
agree on certain facts prior to trial — hence, the prefix "pre" — the court can later concentrate on
those which are seemingly irreconcilable. The purpose of pre-trials is the simplification, abbreviation
and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. The stipulations are perpetuated in a pre-trial
order which legally binds the parties to honor the same.
 86

Pre-trial agreement. (Sec. 2)

All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be
reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the
accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved
by the court. (from sec. 4 cir. 38-98)

Is the approval by the court of the pre-trial agreement necessary for it to be binding upon the
parties?

Bayas, Et Al vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 143689-91. November 12, 2002

“for a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy the following conditions: (1) the
agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be signed by both the accused and their
counsel. The court's approval, mentioned in the last sentence of the above-quoted Section, is
not needed to make the stipulations binding on the parties. Such approval is necessary merely to
emphasize the supervision by the court over the case and to enable it to control the flow of the
proceedings.”

Cristeta Chua-Burce, vs. CA

G.R. No. 109595. April 27, 2000.

Petitioner was arraigned and assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty. While
the trial of the criminal case was suspended, the trial of the civil case continued. At the time of
arraignment, the civil case was already submitted for decision. Hence, during the pre-trial conference
of the criminal case, the parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in the civil case as their
respective evidence in the criminal case. The trial court ordered the parties to submit their written
agreement pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, petitioner, duly
assisted by her counsel, with the conforme of the public prosecutor, entered into a pre-trial agreement.

The accused now assails the validity of the proceedings in the criminal case.

HELD: It was during pre-trial conference when the parties agreed to adopt their respective
evidence in the civil case to the criminal case. This is allowed under Section 2 (e) of Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court 17 which provides that during pre-trial conference, the parties shall consider "such
other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial." The parties, in compliance with Section 4 of
Rule 118, 18 reduced to writing such agreement. Petitioner, her counsel, and the public prosecutor
signed the agreement. Petitioner is bound by the pre-trial agreement, and she cannot now belatedly
disavow its contents.

The express admission of the accused during pre-trial that he is the father of the complainant
is inadmissible if he and his counsel did not sign the Stipulation of Facts.

People vs. Dionisio

G.R. No. 142431. January 14, 2004

“Moreover, the fact that appellant admitted that he is the father of Ginalyn during the pre-trial,
thus dispensing with the need to present evidence to prove the same, will not justify the trial court's
appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of relationship. A perusal of the pre-trial order would
readily show that the said stipulation was not signed by the appellant and his counsel. Hence, it
cannot be used as evidence against him. Rule 118, Sec. 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that "all agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be
reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the
accused." This requirement is mandatory. Thus, the omission of the signature of the accused and his
counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence.”
 87

SEC. 3. Non-appearance at pre-trial conference. – If the counsel for the accused or the
prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse
for his lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties. (sec. 5, cir. 38-
98)

SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. – After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order
reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the
parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course f the action during the
trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice. (3)

RULE 119 – TRIAL

Trial is the time allotted by law for the parties to present their evidence in accordance
with the rules of procedure.

SECTION 1. Time to prepare for trial.– After a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused
shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. The trial shall commence within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order. (sec. 6, cir. 38-98)

- under the old rule (1985 Rules) the time to prepare for trial was only 2 days.

SEC. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. – Trial once commenced

shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a
reasonable period of time for good cause. (2a)

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the
case for continuous trail on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible
time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme
Court. (sec. 8, cir. 38-98).

The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not
apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.
(n)

The second and third paragraphs are new provisions that are taken from the Speedy Trial Act
and, more particularly, from Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98

What is important to remember here is to remember that the law now sets or provides for a
time limit of (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme
Court. for the trial to be terminated.

NOTA BENE:

Sections 3 to 10 ARE ALL NEW PROVISIONS LIFTED FROM THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
AND SC Circular No. 38-98 REVIEW THEM!

SEC. 9 IS VERY IMPORTANT

SEC. 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit. – If the
accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 1(g), Rule 116 and
Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this rule, the information may be dismissed on motion
of the accused on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused shall have the
burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with
 88

the evidence to establish the exclusion of time under section 3 of this rule. The dismissal shall
be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.
Section 1 (g) Rule 116- accused should be arraigned within 30 days from the
date the court acquires jurisdiction over his person
excluding the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill
of particulars or other grounds for suspending arraignment

Section 1 Rule 119- trial should begin within (30) days from receipt of pre-
trial order (Note pre-trial should be conducted within
30 days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused – Sec. 1 Rule 118)

Extension under Sec. 6- period from arraignment to trial is 80 days (Note: This
is because over three years have already passed
since September 15, 1998)

NOTE: Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of
the right to dismiss under this section. (sec. 14, cir. 38-98)

Law on speedy trial not a bar to provision on speedy trial in the Constitution. (Sec. 10, R119)

– No provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be interpreted as
a bar to any charge of denial of the right to speedy trial guaranteed by section 14(2), article III,
of the 1987 Constitution. (sec. 15, cir. 38-98)

-VERY IMPORTANT

SEC. 12. Application for examination of witness for accused before trial. – When the
accused has been held to answer for an offense, he may, upon motion with notice to the other
parties, have witnesses conditionally examined in his behalf. The motion shall state: (a) the
name and residence of the witness; (b) the substance of his testimony; and (c) that the witness
is sick or infirm as to afford reasonable ground for believing tha the will not be able to attend
the trial, or resides more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial and has no
means to attend the same, or that other similar circumstances exist that would make him
unavailable or prevent him from attending the trial. The motion shall be supported by an
affidavit of the accused and such other evidence as the court may require. (4a)
SEC. 13. Examination of defense witness; how made. – If the court is satisfied that the
examination of a witness for the accused is necessary, an order shall be made directing that
the witness be examined at a specific date, time and place and that a copy of the order be
served on the prosecutor at least three (3) days before the scheduled examination. The
examination shall be taken before a judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good
standing so designated by the judge in the order, or if the order be made by a court of superior
jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein. The examination shall proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the prosecutor provided he was duly notified of the hearing. A
written record of the testimony shall be taken. (5a)

SEC. 14. Bail to secure appearance of material witness. – When the court is satisfied,
upon proof of oath, that a material witness will not testify when required, it may, UPON
MOTION OF EITHER PARTY, order the witness to post bail in such sum as may be deemed
proper. Upon refusal to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he complies or is
legally discharged after his testimony has been taken. (6a)

-applies to witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense.

Cross reference with WITNESS PROTECTION LAW (R.A. 6981) – to protect witnesses who
do not want to testify by reason of fear.
 89

SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it is satisfactorily appears
that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the
court, of has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the
presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination
has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial.
Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the
accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. (7a)

Distinguish Section 13 and 15

13- Defense Witness

14- Prosecution Witness
13- examination may be made before any member of the bar in good standing or the
judge of an inferior court designated by the judge of the court where the case is
pending.
14- Examination may be made only before the judge or the court where the case is
pending.

Why? Because the prosecution (the State) is presumed to have all the resources of the
government available to it to cause the production of its witnesses.

SEC. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. – When two or more persons
are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution
before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be
discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after
requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied
that:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge
is requested;

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;

(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;

(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.

Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of

the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness,
his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence. (9a)

SEC. 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. – The order indicated in

the preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall
be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or refuses
to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting
the basis for his discharge. (10a)
 90

Important principles:

1. Since the discharge of the accused operates as an acquittal, (SEC. 18) regardless of whether
or not his testimony is used by the prosecution.

2. Even if the judge erred in granting the discharge (e.g. the accused was not the least guilty)
this will not affect the validity of the discharge or the admissibility of the testimony of the
witness but judges are warned in these instances to take the said testimony with a grain of
salt. ( GOCO CASE 209 scra 329)

3. The term “does not appear to be the most guilty” refers to degree of actual participation and
not to the imposable penalty which would be equal if there is conspiracy (Pp. Vs. Sumail 212
SCRA 626)

4. The witness who is an accused may be discharged AFTER he testifies (for as long as the
prosecution has not yet rested “upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case “
(Sec 17) ) Rosales vs. CA 215 SCRA 102)

5. The fiscal has no right to omit the inclusion of any of the accused from the information even if
he intends to use him as a state witness (because under Rule 110 Sec. 2 the information is
supposed to be filed against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense
involved) and it is the judge who is trying the case who has the authority, under Sec. 17, to
order the discharge of the accused.

6. For this same reason, an MTC JUDGE who is conducting a preliminaryi nvestigation in a crim
case cognizable by the RTC cannot order the discharge of an accused since he is not the
judge trying the case.

7. What is meant by the requirement of “a hearing in support of the discharge”? It is the

hearing where the affidavit of the witness who is proposed to be discharged is presented to
the court and the other accused are given an opportunity to oppose the motion to discharge
him. The witness is not actually required to testify during that same hearing (Pp. Vs. CA and
Jose Pring 223 SCRA 479)

Note: The requirement of the submission of an affidavit of the proposed witness was
introduced in the 1985 Rules so that the judge would have an idea as to what this witness will
be testifying on. (This inadequacy in the old law was noted by the SC in the case of
Flores vs. SB 124 scra 109)

SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. – When it
becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other
offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears
good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the
proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information. (11a)

Cf with last par of Sec. 14, R. 110

“If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not
be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at
the trial. (14a)
 91

Also Secs. 4 and 5 of R117

SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. – If the motion to quash is based on an

alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order
that an amendment be made. (4a)

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution
shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be
granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers
from the same defect despite the amendment. (n)

SEC. 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. – If the motion to quash is sustained, the
court may order that another complaint or information be filed except as provided in section 6 of this
rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If
no order is made or if having been made, no new information is filed within the time specified in the
order or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody,
shall be discharged unless he is also in custody of another charge. (5a)

Exclusion of the public. (Sec. 21, R119)

– The judge may, motu proprio, exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be
produced during the trial is offensive to decency or public morals. He may also, on motion of
the accused, exclude the public from the trial except court personnel and the counsel of the
parties. (13a)

The right of the accused to a public trial is not absolute. The public may be excluded if the
evidence to be produced is offensive to decency or public morals.

Examples of instances when the public or some of the public may be excluded:

1. The evidence to be presented is of such character as to be offensive to public morals.

2. When the accused requests it.

3. To prevent disorder in the court.

4. To prevent the embarrasment of a witness.

5. To limit the attendance to seating capacity.

Consolidation of trials of related offenses. (SEC. 22, R119)

– Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of
similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the court. (14a)

Cf: Section 2, R 111- TAKE NOTE that R111 refers to consolidation of the civil aspect
with the criminal in case where a separate civil action was filed..

Section 22 refers to consolidation of trials of related cases.

 92

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

SOME PRINCIPLES RELATING TO DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE:

1. After the prosecution rests, the court motu propio can dismiss the case due to insufficiency
of evidence without the accused filing a demurrer to evidence. However, the judge must give
the prosecution an opportunity to be heard before he can dismiss the case.

2. The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall be filed within a non-extendible
period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case and the prosecution may oppose the
motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.

3. If a demurrer to evidence is filed with leave of court, the accused can present evidence if it
is denied. However, if it is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to
present evidence.

4. The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer
itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.

5. If the court grants a demurrer to evidence and thus, dismisses the case, this amounts to an
acquittal. DOUBLE JEOPARDY CAN ARISE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DEMURRER
WAS FILED BY THE ACCUSED. (i.e., filing a demurrer to evidence does not amount to the
express consent of the accused to the dismissal)

Section 15, Rules 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear on the fact that if an accused
files a Demurrer to Evidence WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT, he WAIVES the right to present
evidence if it is DENIED.

People vs. Dominador Cachola

G.R. Nos. 148712-15. January 21, 2004

“The filing by the appellants of a demurrer to evidence in the absence of prior leave of court
was a clear waiver of their right to present their own evidence. To sustain their claim that they had
been denied due process because the evidence they belatedly sought to offer would have exculpated
them would be to allow them to “wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing
inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience.”

Reopening (SEC. 24, R119)

.– At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or
upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order granting it.
(n)

Crossreference Rule 119 with

RA 4908- SPEEDY TRIAL OF CASES WHERE OFFENDED PARTY IS ABOUT TO LEAVE

THE PHILS WITH NO DEFINITE DATE OF RETURN.

RA 6033 - PREFERRENCE OF CASES INVOLVING INDIGENTS

RA 6034 TRANSPORT AND ALLOWANCES FOR INDIGENT LITIGANTS

RA 6035 FREE TRANSCRIPTS FOR INDIGENT LITIGANTS

 93

RULE 120 – JUDGMENT

Judgment; definition and form.

– Judgment is the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense
charged and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be written
in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall
contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based. (1a)

JUDGMENT MUST BE IN WRITING

Abay, Sr. vs. Garcia

162 SCRA 665

Marcelino Rivera, Jr. vs. Pp

August 30, 1990

"Where there is a valid information and the accused has been arraigned, an order of dismissal
issued by the court, motu proprio, in the course of a trial of a criminal case, whether based on the
merits or for failure of prosecution witnesses to appear, has the effect of a judgment of acquittal and
double jeopardy attaches. The order is also immediately executory. However, this order of dismissal
must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by
him conformably with the provisions of Rule 120, section 2 of the Rules of Court. In the instant case, it
is very clear that the order was merely dictated in open court by the trial judge. There is no showing
that this verbal order of dismissal was ever reduced to writing and duly signed by him. Thus, it did not
yet attain the effect of a judgment of acquittal, so that it was still within the powers of the judge to set it
aside and enter another order, now in writing and duly signed by him, reinstating the case."

What must a judgment contain? (Sec. 2 R120)

IF FOR CONVICTION:

(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused
and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission;

(2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory after the fact;

(3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and

(4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered
from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the
civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

Pp vs. Marcelino A. Bugarin

June 13, 1997
Pp. vs. Elegio Nadera
Feb. 2, 2000
Eligio Madrid vs. CA
May 31, 2000

In a two-page decision, promulgated on February 11, 1993, the trial court, after giving a
summary of the testimonies of the complainant and accused-appellant, laconically ruled:
 94

The issue is simple. Is the private complainant credible in her story of how she
was raped? The answer of this Court is an undoubtful and a definite yes.

Does this comply with the required contents of a judgment?

“ The decision of the trial court falls short of this requirement in at least three respects. First, it
does not contain an evaluation of the evidence of the parties and a discussion of the legal questions
involved. It does not explain why the trial court considered the complainant's testimony credible
despite the fact that, as accused-appellant points out, complainant could not remember the time of the
day when she was allegedly raped. It does not explain why accused-appellant's licking of
complainant's genital constituted attempted rape and not another crime. Second, the complainant
testified that she had been raped five times, to wit, in November 1989, on December 24, 1989, in June
1990, on March 14, 1991, and on December 23, 1991, and that once, on January 17, 1992, she was
molested by her father who licked her private part, for which reason six informations were filed against
him, but the decision found the accused-appellant guilty of only four counts of rape (which the trial
court erroneously said three counts) and one count of attempted rape, without explaining whether
accused-appellant was being acquitted of one charge of rape. Third, the decision is so carelessly
prepared that it finds the accused-appellant guilty of three counts of consummated rape but sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua "for each of the four counts of . . . rape."”

“The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is
intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if
any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points
of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in
reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard
against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither
the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of
passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on
the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision. The decision of the
trial court in this case disrespects the judicial function.”

These requirements are applicable even on appealed cases

Ong Chiu Kwan vs. CA

Nov. 23, 2000

The Court notes that in the decision of the Regional Trial Court which the Court of Appeals
affirmed peremptorily without noticing its nullity, the Regional Trial Court merely quoted the decision
of the Municipal Trial Court in full and added two paragraphs, thus:

"This Court, in accordance with the rules, required the parties to submit their corresponding
memorandum or brief. The prosecution filed its memorandum, and also with the defense.

"After a careful perusal of the record of the case and evaluating the evidence thereto and
exhibits thereof, this Court finds no ground to modify, reverse or alter the above-stated decision and
hereby affirms the decision of the lower court in toto."

The Constitution requires that "[N]o decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." The 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that "[T]he judgment must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly
and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the
judgment is based."
 95

Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it cannot merely refer
to the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court. The court must make a full findings
of fact and conclusion of law of its own.

Consequently, the decision of the regional trial court is a nullity.

IF FOR ACQUITTAL

“In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (2a)

Judgment for two or more offenses. – (Sec. 3, R120)

Considering that it has already been settled that while under Rule 110, an information or
complaint should only charge one offense and that this is a ground for quashal under Rule 117, this
defect is waivable.

Thus, if it is waived, the accused can be convicted of as many crimes as there are charged in
the information or complaint.

People vs. Conde Rapisora

January 25, 2001

“The information against the accused has charged him with multiple rape, at least six times
according to the trial court in its findings. Section 3, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court provides that
"when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information, and the accused fails to
object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and
proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them . . ." Rapisora can thus be held
responsible for as many rapes as might have been committed by him which are duly proven at the
trial.”

Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. (Sec. 4, R120)

– When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and
that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved. (4a)

SIMPLE PRINCIPLE: The accused can be convicted of an offense necessarily included in

the offense charged but he can NEVER be convicted of a higher
offense

e.g. Charged with murder. If only homicide is proven he can be convicted of homicide.

But if charged with homicide, even if murder is proven, he can only be convicted of homicide.

When does an offense include and when is it included in another offense?

(Sec. 5, R120)

An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
 96

IMPT: If the offense proven is not necessarily included or does not necessarily include the
offense charged then follow the rule on mistake in charging the offense. This is because, in this
situation, the offense proven it is clearly a WHOLLY DIFFERENT OFFENSE from the offense
charged.

Edgar Teves vs. Sandiganbayan (EN BANC)

G.R. No. 154182. December 17, 2004

Can a municipal mayor charged with UNLAWFUL INTERVENTION in the issuance of a cockpit
license be convicted of POSSESSION OF PROHIBITED INTEREST of the same cockpit when
the latter offense is not included in the information but was proven during the trial?

The answer is in the affirmative in view of the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in
relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure.,

Can a person accused of murder as a principal be convicted of murder as an accessory?

Lito Vino vs. CA

Oct. 19, 1989

“In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The commission of
the said crime was established by the evidence. There is no variance as to the offense committed.
The variance is in the participation or complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being held
responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence adduced, however, showed that his
participation is merely that of an accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser.
An accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information charging
him as a principal.”

Is Malversation included in Technical Malversation?

Oscar Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan

May 15, 1991

“A comparison of the two articles reveals that their elements are entirely distinct and different
from the other. In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own
personal use or allows any other person to take such public funds for the latter's personal use. In
technical malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his or
another's personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund was appropriated by law
or ordinance. Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily include the
crime of malversation of public funds charged in the information. Since the acts constituting the crime
of technical malversation were not alleged in the information, and since technical malversation does
not include, or is not included in the crime of malversation of public funds, he cannot resultantly be
convicted of technical malversation.”

Rape and Qualified Seduction

Pp. vs. Servillano Velasquez
205 PHIL 741
“Assuming it to be a fact that the appellant may be considered a "domestic" within the
meaning of Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code — a point disputed by the appellant who claimed that
he was not staying in the house of his sister but only operated a radio repair shop in the ground floor
of said house — still, no conviction for qualified seduction may be decreed against the appellant. This
is because there is no allegation in the information filed against him of two of the essential elements of
the crime of qualified seduction, to wit: virginity of the offended party, and that the latter is over 12 but
under 18 years of age. In the event of a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved or established by the evidence, the accused may only be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is
proved. The view that conviction for qualified seduction may not be had on a charge of rape had
 97

already been expounded by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in People vs. Ramires, 69 SCRA 144.
For similar reasons, neither may the appellant be validly convicted of the crime of simple seduction.
As may be noted from the information filed against the appellant, there is likewise no allegation therein
of the elements of the good reputation of the offended party and of the latter being over 12 but under
18 years of age, which are essential for the commission of the crime simple seduction.”
Pp. vs. Napoleon Subingsubing
Nov. 25, 1993

The verified complainant for rape contains allegations, sans averment on the use of force,
which impute the crime of qualified seduction. Any deficiency in the complaint is supplied by the
supporting affidavit, where complainant averred that the accused Napoleon Subingsubing, her uncle,
who was living in the same house as the complainant, had sexual intercourse with her. The accused
took advantage of his moral ascendancy if not dominance over the complainant. She was presumably
a virgin. As already stated, the accused was a domestic in relation to the complainant within the
meaning of Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code.

Apolinario Gonzales vs. CA

May 31, 1994

Rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses. The elements of rape — (1) that the
offender has had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act is accomplished (a) by using
force or intimidation, or (b) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c)
when the woman is under twelve (12) years of age — substantially differ from the elements of
qualified seduction. The latter requires (1) that the offended party is a virgin, which is presumed if she
is unmarried and of good reputation; (2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18)
years of age; (3) that the offender has sexual intercourse with her; and (4) that there is abuse of
authority, confidence or relationship on the part of the offender. While the two felonies have one
common element, i.e., carnal knowledge of a woman, they significantly vary in all other respects.
Contrary to the assertion of accused-petitioner, the case of People vs. Samillano (56 SCRA 573), did
not hold that qualified seduction is necessarily included in rape; what this Court has said is that one
who is charged with rape may be found guilty of qualified seduction when the "verified complaint for
rape contains allegations which aver the crime of seduction."

Pp. vs. Benjamin Ortega

July 24, 1997

-Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning under an information

that charges murder by means of stabbing.

Odon Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan

Nov. 14, 1994

There is no such thing as attempted violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
These stages apply only to felonies under the RPC.

Can an accused held liable for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide if the information
charges murder?

Pp. vs. Eutiquia Carmen, Et. Al.

G.R. No. 137268. March 26, 2001

The parents of a young boy, believing that their son is “possessed” brought him to a “healer”
who said she could exorcise the “bad spirit”. However the process of “exorcism” done through
immersing the boy head first into a drum of water resulted to his death. The accused, the healer and
her assistants, were charged with murder.
 98

HELD: “In United States v. Divino, the accused, who was not a licensed physician, in an
attempt to cure the victim of ulcers in her feet, wrapped a piece of clothing which had been soaked in
petroleum around the victim's feet and then lighted the clothing, thereby causing injuries to the victim.
The Court held the accused liable for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. It was noted
that the accused had no intention to cause an evil but rather to remedy the victim's ailment.

In another case, People v. Vda. de Golez, the Court ruled that the proper charge to file
against a non-medical practitioner, who had treated the victim despite the fact that she did not
possess the necessary technical knowledge or skill to do so and caused the latter's death, was
homicide through reckless imprudence.”

“While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon
v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself,
designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the
former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon
the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.”

“The fact that the information odes not allege that the falsification was committed with
imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by
appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him”

“In People v. Fernando, the accused was charged with, and convicted of, murder by the trial
court. On appeal, this Court modified the judgment and held the accused liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide after finding that he did not act with criminal intent.”

Can an information charging the accused with having “sexually abused” the victim be
sufficient to justify a conviction for rape?

People vs. Pedro Flores

December 27, 2002

The information:

“That on the 28th day of December 1996, in the evening at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran
West, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloniously sexually abuse the
herein complaining witness FILIPINA FLORES, an 11 years old and daughter of the herein accused
with the use of sharp pointed bladed weapon and all against her will”

HELD
The case at bar, however, is not one of variance between allegation and proof. The recital of
facts in the criminal complaints simply does not properly charge rape, "sexual abuse" not being an
essential element or ingredient thereof.
Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of acts of lasciviousness or of any offense for
that matter under our penal laws. It is settled that what characterizes the charge is the actual recital of
facts in the complaint or information. For every crime is made up of certain acts and intent which must
be set forth in the complaint or information with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff
and defendant), and circumstances. In other words, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of
every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged, the accused being presumed
to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
And even under the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), accused-appellant cannot be held liable.
 99

Section 2 (g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation
of Child Abuse Cases 40 , issued pursuant to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7610,
defines "sexual abuse" by inclusion as follows:
Sexual abuse includes 1) the employment, use, persuasion, enticement, or
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or 2) the molestation, 3) prostitution, or 4) incest
with children. (Emphasis supplied)
From this broad, non-exclusive definition, this Court finds that the phrase "sexually abuse" in
the criminal complaints at bar does not comply with the requirement that the complaint must contain a
specific averment of every fact necessary to constitute the crime. Notably, the phrase "sexual abuse"
is not used under R.A. No. 7610 as an elemental fact but as an altogether separate offense. above-
quoted Section 5 thereof enumerates the punishable acts that must be alleged in the complaint or
information to hold an accused liable, none of which is reflected, in the complaints at bar charging
accused-appellant.”
-The Supreme Court found the information to be VOID and DISMISSED the case.
Can an accused be convicted of illegal discharge of firearm if the charge is murder?
People vs. Geronimo Dado
Nov. 18, 2002
“In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the wound inflicted on the victim's
right outer lateral arm for the same reason that there is no evidence proving beyond moral certainty
that said wound was caused by the bullet fired from petitioner's .45 caliber pistol.
Nevertheless, petitioner is not completely without liability. The Court sustains the finding of
the trial court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. From the attendant
circumstances, it appears that there is no evidence tending to prove that petitioner had animus
interficendi or intent to kill the victim. Note that the prosecution witnesses did not see whether
petitioner aimed to kill the victim. Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that
the use of firearms is dangerous to life. Animus interficendi must be established with the same degree
of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not
be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for
the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of
this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the
offender has no intention to kill that person. Though the information charged the petitioner with
murder, he could be validly convicted of illegal discharge of firearm, an offense which is necessarily
included in the crime of unlawful killing of a person.”

In case of an acquittal may the accused be found CIVILLY LIABLE in the same criminal case?

Anamer Salazar vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 151931, Sept. 23, 2003

The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of
the case where:

(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;

(b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil;

(c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of
which the accused was acquitted.
 100

Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him”
 101

On PROMULGATION

“In the presence of the accused”

Promulgation of judgment is one of the instances where the presence of the accused is
required.

As provided, one of the exceptions is when the conviction is for a light offense.

What are light felonies?

Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code

“Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both, is provided.”

What about if the judgment is for acquittal?

Myla Paredes Et. Al. vs. Judge Jacinto Manalo

May 10, 1995

The delay in the promulgation of the decision in Crim. Case No. 1603 was ironically caused by
respondent Judge. We find that he acquitted complainants in the case. Such being the case, the
presence of accused was not necessary as the judgment was one of acquittal. Moreover, Sec. 6, Rule
120, of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that if the accused fails to appear, the promulgation shall
consist in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof served upon his
counsel.

Yolanda Cruz vs. Filomeno Pascual

May 12, 1995

With regard to the absence of the accused during the promulgation of the judgment, we hold
that respondent Judge did not administratively err in proceeding with the promulgation. In a verdict of
acquittal, the presence of the accused is not indispensable since no appeal is necessary and the
judgment become final and executory immediately after promulgation. The reading of the sentence in
open court to counsel for the accused or giving a copy of the decision to the accused or his counsel is
sufficient promulgation.

Is it necessary for the offended party to be notified?

Abraham Ramirez vs. Antonia Corpuz- Macandong

Sept. 26, 1986

Neither could respondent be held administratively liable for failing to notify complainant of the
promulgation of the decision in said criminal case. While it may be the better practice to notify the
offended party of such promulgation, the Rules of Court do not require a judge to do so.

The last paragraph was taken from the case of Pp. vs. Omar Mapalao May 14, 1991

“If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the
court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state
the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
(6a)”
 102

The reason for this rule is because once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or
submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the
court.

NOTE: THE JUDGEMENT MUST BE PROMULGATED DURING THE

INCUMBENCY OF THE JUDGE RENDERING THE DECISION
OTHERWISE IT WOULD NO LONGER BE A DECISION PENNED
PERSONALLY AND DIRECLY BY THE JUDGE.

Pp. vs. CFI of QUEZON CITY

227 SCRA 457

Judge who penned the decision detailed to another branch of the RTC OF QC

- No violation because he belongs to the same court even if different branch.

TYPES OF PROMULGATION (Sec. 6)

1. ORDINARY PROMULGATION- reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge
of the court in which it was rendered.

2. PROMULGATION OF CONVICTION IN A LIGHT FELONY- the judgment may be

pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.

3. PROMULGATION BY CLERK OF COURT- When the judge is absent or outside the

province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

4. PROMULGATION BY EXEC. JUDGE- If the accused is confined or detained in another

province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the
Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention
upon request of the court which rendered the judgment.

5. PROMULGATION IN ABSENTIA- In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled

date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by
recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last
known address or thru his counsel.

Essential requisites of promulgation in absentia:

(a) that the accused was notified of the scheduled date of promulgation

(b) that despite such notice, he failed to appear;

(c) that the judgment be recorded in the criminal docket; and

(d) that a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel.

If the accused fails to appear during promulgation despite notice and the judgment is read in
the presence of her counsel, will the failure of the recording of the judgment in the criminal
docket affect the validity of the promulgation?

Marilyn C. Pascua vs. Court of Appeals

December 14, 2000

In the absence of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket, there can be NO
VALID PROMULGATION.
 103

In the same case, will the fact that the accused subsequently received a copy of the decision
cause the 15 day period to appeal to begin to run?

“We rule in the negative. Petitioner's later receipt of the copy of the decision does not in
any way cure an invalid promulgation. And even if said decision be recorded in the criminal docket
later, such piece-meal compliance with the Rules will still not validate the May 5, 1998 promulgation
which was invalid at the time it was conducted. The express mention in the provision of both
requirements for a valid promulgation in absentia clearly means that they indeed must concur.”

If the accused jumps bail, it amounts to an abandonment of his appeal and the judgment
immediately becomes final and executory.

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 147703.  April 14, 2004

“As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:

“A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or
has applied for probation.”

In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the
proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment
against him has become final and executory.”

Modification of judgment. (Sec. 7)

A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or
has applied for probation. (7a)

NOTE: Prosecution cannot move for modification.

Pp. vs. Eladio Viernes

G.R. Nos. 136733-35. December 13, 2001

In 1985, Section 7 of Rule 120 was amended to include the phrase "upon motion of the
accused" — effectively resurrecting the Ang Cho Kio ruling (95 Phil. 475) prohibiting the prosecution
from seeking a modification of a judgment of conviction.

Under this Rule, a judgment of conviction, before it became final, could be modified or set
aside upon motion of the accused. It obviously aims to protect the accused from being put anew to
defend himself from more serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have
overlooked in the original trial. It does not however bar him from seeking or receiving more favorable
modifications.

Significantly, the present Rules, as amended last year, retained the phrase "upon motion of the
accused,"

NOTE: EVEN IF FINALITY OF THE CRIM ASPECT IS ACCELERATED, THE CIVIL ASPECT WILL
BECOME FINAL ONLY AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE 15 DAY PERIOD TO APPEAL.
 104

Pp. vs. Pedro Santiago

June 20, 1989
Reiterated in

Palu-ay vs. CA, July 30, 1998

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution
of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal
case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal
aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General
may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant
may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil
aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.

RULE 121 - NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

New trial or reconsideration. – At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final,
the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused,
grant a new trial or reconsideration. (Sec. 1, R 121)

“At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final”

1. This Rule applies only to judgments of conviction- an acquittal is immediately final and
executory.

2. Within fifteen days from the date of promulgation the accused can appeal. The period to
appeal is interrupted by the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for New Trial.
The period will continue to run again from notice of the denial of the Motion.

3. If the accused files a Motion for New Trial or a Motion for Reconsideration, he waives the right
against double jeopardy. This means that the court can modify the judgment to a graver
offense. E.G. Charged with Murder Convicted of Homicide, filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
judge modified the judgment to murder.

4. Distinctions between Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial and Modification of judgment.

BOTH can affect only judgments of conviction.

a) Modification of judgment can be had only upon motion of the accused while Recon
and New Trial can also be at the court’s own instance with the consent of the
accused.

b) In modification of judgment the original judgment stands while in a Motion for Recon
or New Trial, if it is granted, there will be an entirely new judgment.
 105

Grounds for a new trial. (Sec. 2, R121)

“That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial”

This refers to instances where there was a serious breach of procedure that prejudiced the
substantial rights of the accused. Examples:

1. The accused was forced to go into trial without counsel;

2. The counsel for the accused turned out to be a fraud who is not actually a
lawyer.

3. A material witness for the accused was not allowed to testify on the basis on
an erroneous application of the rules.

4. The court erroneously refused to issue subpoena to compel the attendance of

a material witness for the accused.

“newly discovered evidence”

Requisites:

Pp. vs. Alberto Tirona

Dec. 22, 1998

For newly discovered evidence to be a ground for new trial under paragraph (b) above, it is required
that

i) the evidence is discovered after trial;

ii) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and
iii) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such
weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment. There is nothing on record to
indicate that these requisites have at all been met.

Will the recantation of a witness through an affidavit of desistance be sufficient a new trial?

Gomez vs. IAC 135 SCRA 6

Pp vs. Eduardo Garcia
March 31, 1998
“When confronted with an affidavit of recantation, courts are called upon to weigh
countervailing values in our legal and judicial system. A recantation, as a general rule, is not sufficient
to warrant a new trial. If it were otherwise, a new trial would be granted whenever an interested party
succeeds in intimidating or inducing any or some of the witnesses to retract after trial their testimony,
thus, opening the door to endless litigation. It is also injudicious to reject a testimony solely on the
basis of such recantation, which may later be repudiated, as this "will make a solemn trial a mockery
and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses."

To warrant a new trial, Joylyn's affidavit of desistance must constitute a recantation and not a
mere withdrawal from the prosecution of the case. The Court en banc in Alonte, speaking through Mr.
Justice Jose C. Vitug, held that the complainant's affidavit of desistance did not constitute a
recantation, because she did not deny the truth of her complaint but merely sought to "be allowed to
withdraw" and "discontinue" the case because she wished "to start life anew and live normally again."
She never absolved or exculpated the accused. In other words, a recantation of a prior statement or
testimony must necessarily renounce the said statement or testimony and withdraw it formally and
publicly
 106

Ground for reconsideration (Sec. 3, R121)

“errors of law or fact in the judgment, which requires no further proceedings”

What are the grounds?

1. court made a mistake in arriving at its decision

2. decision is not in accordance with the law.

3. decision not in accordance with the evidence.

Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. (SEC. 6, R121)

– The effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration are the following:

(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities
committed during the trial, all the proceedings and evidence affected thereby
shall be set aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice,
allow the introduction of additional evidence.

(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the
evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other
evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall
be taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record.

(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original
judgment shall be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered
accordingly. (6a)

RULE 122 - APPEAL

Who may appeal?( Sec. 1, R122)

. – Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in
double jeopardy. (2a)

1. Prosecution for as long as the accused will not be placed in double jeopardy.

GEN RULE: PROS. CANNOT APPEAL BECAUSE THE ACCUSED WILL BE

PLACED IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY

EXCEPTION E.G. - ACCUSED FILED MOTION TO QUASH ON THE BASIS

OF LACK OF JURISDICTION GRANTED BY COURT, PROS CAN APPEAL,
NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY SINCE IT WAS AT THE INSTANCE OF THE
ACCUSED.

2. The accused. (An appeal by the accused waives double jeopardy. Thus, if he was
convicted for homicide under a charge of murder and he appeals, the appellate court
can convict him for murder)

3. Offended party insofar as the civil aspect is concerned. (Palu-ay vs. CA, July 30,
1998)
 107

Pp. vs. Madali

Jan 16, 2001.

“Rule 122, §1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "(a)ny party may
appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy." It has
been held that the word "party" in the provision in question includes not only the government and the
accused but other persons as well, such as the complainant who may be affected by the judgment
rendered in the criminal proceedings. The complainant has an interest in the civil liability arising from
the crime, unless of course he has reserved to bring a separate civil action to recover the civil liability.
Hence, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is that of a witness for the prosecution.
Ordinarily, the appeal of criminal cases involves as parties only the accused, as appellants, and the
State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, as the appellee. The participation of the
private offended party would be a mere surplusage, if the State were simply to seek the affirmation of
a judgment of conviction. However, where the Office of the Solicitor General takes a contrary position
and recommends, as in this case, the acquittal of the accused, the complainant's right to be heard on
the question of award of indemnity and damages arises. In the interest of justice and equity and to
provide perspective for this appeal, therefore, the Court hereby allows in this case the memorandum
filed by complainant which is hereby admitted as part of the records of this appeal”.

4. bondsmen of the accused in relation to liability on the bond.

5. employer in relation to subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the RPC

If the employee absconds or jumps bail and there is a judgment for civil liability, can the
employer appeal?

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 147703.  April 14, 2004

“When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final
and executory.  The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on
its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability.  Both the primary civil
liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one
single decision that has become final and executory.”

“Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does
not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary.   Neither will its
participation erase its subsidiary liability.  The fact remains that since the accused-employee’s
conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.”

“As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is
sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the employee’s
criminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the
conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latter’s insolvency, in the same way that acquittal
wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employer’s subsidiary liability for his criminal
negligence

It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in
the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such exercise.[54] Hence, the legal
requirements must be strictly complied with”
 108

Effect of appeal by any of several accused. (Sec. 11, R122)

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the
latter.

(b) The appeal of the offended party from the civil aspect shall not affect the criminal aspect
of the judgment or order appealed from.

(c) Upon perfection of the appeal, the execution of the judgment or final order appealed from
shall be stayed as to the appealing party. (11a)

Withdrawal of appeal (Sec. 12 R122)

- Notwithstanding perfection of the appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may
be, may allow the appellant to withdraw his appeal before the record has been forwarded by the clerk
of court to the proper appellate court as provided in section 8, in which case the judgment shall
become final. The Regional Trial Court may also, in its discretion, allw the appellant from the judgment
of a Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court to withdraw his appeal, provided a motion to that effect is filed before rendition of the
judgment in the case on appeal, in which case the judgment of the court of origin shall become final
and the case shall be remanded to the latter court for execution of the judgment. (12a)

People vs. Ricardo Rio

G.R. No. 90294 Sept. 24, 1991

This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an accused by a trial
court. It continues, even during appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio
persists where an accused interposes an intent to appeal. Even in a case, such as the one at bar,
where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire into
the reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in
this case, the court must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect
the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After all, "those who have less in
life must have more in law." Justice should never be limited to those who have the means. It is for
everyone, whether rich or poor. Its scales should always be balanced and should never equivocate or
cogitate in order to favor one party over another.

It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of court of trial courts to be more
circumspect with the duty imposed on them by law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court) so
that courts will be above reproach and that never (if possible) will an innocent person be sentenced
for a crime he has not committed nor the guilty allowed to go scot-free.

SEC. 13. Appointment of counsel de oficio for accused on appeal - It shall be

the duty of the clerk of court of the trial court, upon filing of a notice of appeal to
ascertain from the appellant, if confined in prison, whether he desies the Regional Trial
Court, Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to appoint a counsel de oficio to defend
him and to transmit with the record on a form to be prepared by the clerk of court of the
appellate court, a certificate of compliance with this duty and of the response of the
appellate to his inquiry. (13a)
 109

RULE 123 - PROCEDURE IN THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL

COURTS

SECTION 1. Uniform Procedure. – The procedure to be observed in the

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall be the same as in the Regional Trial Courts, except where a particular provision
applies only to either of said courts and in criminal cases governed by the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. (1a)

1991 RULES OF SUMMARY PROCEDURE

Coverage as to Criminal Cases (Sec. 1 B)

B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law);
(5) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding (P1,000.00), or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising
therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00).

This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiffs cause of action is pleaded in the
same complaint with another cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor to a criminal
case where the offense charged is necessarily related to another criminal case subject to the
ordinary procedure.

Section 15 2nd Par.

Except in rebuttal or surrebuttal, no witness shall be allowed to testify unless his affidavit was
previously submitted to the court in accordance with Section 12 hereof.

Atty. Hugolino V. Balayon, Jr., vs. Judge Gaydifredo O. Ocampo

January 29, 1993

In Orino vs. Judge Gervasio, the Supreme Court ruled in a Minute Resolution that even if a
witness has not priorly submitted his/her affidavit, he may be called to testify in connection with a
specific factual matter relevant to the issue. Thus, a medical doctor whose medical certificate is
among the evidence on record may be called to testify. This also applies to a Register of Deeds or
Provincial Assessor in connection with official documents issued by his office.
 110

RULE 126 - SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides —

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

This Rule speaks of searches where a warrant is issued.

Jurisprudence mentions the following instances under which a warrantless search and seizure
may be effected, to wit:

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCHES:

From the concurring opinion of Justice Panganiban
In the case of People vs. Florencio Doria
January 22, 1999

1. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest

Section 12 of Rule 126 provides that a lawfully arrested person may be searched without a
warrant for dangerous weapons or anything else that may be used as evidence of the offense. Such
incidental search is, however, limited to the person of the arrestee at the time of the apprehension.
The search cannot be extended to or made in a place other than the place of the arrest.
2. The "Plain View" Doctrine
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law
enforcement officer is in a position where he has a clear view of a particular area or has prior
justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently comes across (or sees in plain view) a piece
of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is immediately apparent to such officer that the item he sees may
be evidence of a crime or a contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.
3. Search of Moving Vehicles
The warrantless search of moving vehicles (including shipping vessels and aircraft) is justified
by practicability, viz.:
"The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures construed as recognizing
a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a
search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for
contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
xxx xxx xxx
"The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle . . . Constructed as covered vehicles to
standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish
for successful commission of crime a distinguishing means of silent approach and swift escape
unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The question of their police control and
reasonable search on highways or other public place is a serious question far deeper and broader
than their use in so-called 'bootlegging' or 'rum running,' which in itself is no small matter. While a
possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and
transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of
which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to which
they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against
 111

morality, chastity, and decency to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common
knowledge. Upon that problem, a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our
criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place
without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question
in view of all the circumstances under which it is made."
4. Customs Searches
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, searches, seizures and arrests may be made even
without warrants, for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to
priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the Code specifically allows police authorities to "enter, pass through
or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to
inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any
person on board[;]or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding
or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law."
5. Search With Consent
Waiver of any objection to the unreasonableness or invalidity of a search is a recognized
exception to the rule against a warrantless search. The consent to the search, however, must be
express, knowing and voluntary. A search based merely on implied acquiescence is not valid, because
such consent is not within the purview of the constitutional guarantee, but only a passive conformity to
the search given under intimidating and coercive circumstances.
In People v. Lacerna, it was held that the otherwise prohibited intrusive search of appellant's
plastic bag was validated by the express consent of appellant himself, who was observed to be
"urbanized in mannerism and speech," and who moreover stated that he had nothing to hide and had
done nothing wrong.
6. "Stop and Frisk"
The "stop and frisk" concept is of American origin, the most notable case thereon being Terry
v. Ohio. The idea is that a police officer may after properly introducing himself and making initial
inquiries, approach and restrain a person manifesting unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to
check, the latter's outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The strict manner in which this
notion should be applied has been laid down as follows:
". . . where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in the light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior, he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own and others' safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him."
As in the warrantless arrest of a person reasonably suspected of having just committed a
crime, mere suspicious behavior would not call for a "stop and frisk." There must be a genuine reason,
in accordance with the police officer's experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him.
A valid application of the doctrine was recognized in Posadas v. Court of Appeals and in
Manalili v. Court of Appeals. In Manalili, the law enforcers who were members of the Anti-Narcotics
Unit of the Caloocan City Police, observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and
was walking in a wobbly manner along the city cemetery which, according to police information, was a
popular hangout of drug addicts. Based on police experience, such suspicious behavior was
characteristic of persons who were "high" on drugs. The Court held that past experience and the
surrounding circumstances gave the police sufficient reason to stop the suspect and to investigate if
he was really high on drugs. The marijuana that they found in the suspect's possession was held to be
admissible in evidence.

Some cases where “tipped information” was sufficient to justify warrantless searches
 112

From People vs. Samuel Valdez

March 3, 1999

In People v. Tangliben, two police officers and a barangay tanod were conducting
surveillance mission at the Victory Liner terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against
persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of
dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen
noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. An informer pointed to the
accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but
he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of
Tangliben on the night of his arrest. Hence, faced with such on-the-spot tip, the police officers acted
quickly as there was not enough time to secure a search warrant.
In People v. Maspil, a checkpoint was set up by elements of the First Narcotics Regional Unit
of the Narcotics Command at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize vehicles on
the highway going towards Baguio City. This was done because of a confidential report by informers
that Maspil and Bagking, would be transporting a large quantity of marijuana to Baguio City. In fact,
the informers were with the policemen manning the checkpoint. As expected, at about 2 o'clock in the
early morning of November 1, 1986, a jeepney approached the checkpoint, driven by Maspil, with
Bagking as passenger. The officers stopped the vehicle and saw that on it were loaded 2 plastic
sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big round tin cans. When opened, the sacks and cans were seen to contain
what appeared to be marijuana leaves. The policemen thereupon placed Maspil and Bagking under
arrest, and confiscated the leaves which, upon scientific examination, were verified to be marijuana
leaves. The Court upheld the validity of the search thus conducted, as being incidental to lawful
warrantless arrest and declared that Maspil and Bagking had been caught in flagrante delicto
transporting prohibited drugs. LLphil
In People v. Malmstedt, Narcom agents set up checkpoint at Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province in view of reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana. They
likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited
drugs. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially since the identity of the
suspect could not be readily ascertained. Accused's actuations also aroused the suspicion of the
officers conducting the inspection aboard the bus. The Court held that in light of such circumstances,
to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a search without a warrant,
would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
In People v. Bagista, the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all
vehicles coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they
received from their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-
appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search
accused-appellant's belongings since she fitted the description given by the NARCOM informant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of the
Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching the
place, they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be "high" on drugs. He was
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be
trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried
to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had
sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his
suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug
addicts
 113

What is the extent of an allowable “routine search” at police or military checkpoints (part of
Search of Moving Vehicles) ?
Rudy Caballes vs. Court of Appeals
January 15, 2002
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances:
(1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on
the public fair grounds;
(2) simply looks into a vehicle;
(3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors;
(4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
(5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and
(6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

Examples of valid warrantless searches with consent:

Also from Rudy Caballes vs. Court of Appeals
January 15, 2002
In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals, the apprehending officers sought the permission of
petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his
consent to said search.
In People vs. Lacerna, the appellants who were riding in a taxi were stopped by two
policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants readily agreed. In upholding
the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant himself who was "urbanized in
mannerism and speech" expressly said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had
nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong.
In People vs. Cuizon, the accused admitted that they signed a written permission stating that
they freely consented to the search of their luggage by the NBI agents to determine if they were
carrying shabu.
In People vs. Montilla, it was held that the accused spontaneously performed affirmative acts
of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should
properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right.
In People vs. Omaweng, the police officers asked the accused if they could see the contents
of his bag to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." Then the
policemen asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered "you can see it." The Court said
there was a valid consented search

SECTION 1. Search warrant defined. – A search warrant is an order in writing

issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and
bring it before the court. (1)

SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed.– An

application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
 114

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the
crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall
be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only
be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. (n)

THIS IS AN ENTIRELY NEW PROVISION

Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in
connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant
to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction.

Elizalde Malaloan, et al, vs. CA

G.R. No. 104879. May 6, 1994

Application for search warrant was filed with RTC of Caloocan and enforced/implemented in
Quezon City

HELD:

“No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no
such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the American
jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our
jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten
days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the
issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the
same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly
set in our Rules at ten days but there is no provision as to the extent of the territory wherein it may
be enforced, provided it is implemented on and within the premises specifically described therein
which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court”

GUIDELINES LAID DOWN IN MALALOAN

In relation to the authority of courts to issue warrants of arrest

1. The Court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search
warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant
may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the
applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due
course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the
same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.

2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in
and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the
appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All
grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or
subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed
waived.

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the
interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression
as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein
for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this
situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are
alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to
quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that
 115

objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on
the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate
higher court.

4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is
not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under
the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is
pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.

5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in
different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original
jurisdiction over the criminal action. When the issue of which court will try the case shall have
been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on
applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for

the search and seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (2a)

Requisites for issuing a search warrant

Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
255 SCRA 438. March 29, 1996.

(1) probable cause is present;

(2) such presence is determined personally by the judge;

(3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the
judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation;

(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and

(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized

ADD

(6) the warrant is in connection with one specific offense

1 Probable Cause is present

Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA

Quintero vs. National Bureau of Investigation, et al.,
June 23, 1988, 162 SCRA 467

“In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched”
 116

2. Determined Personally by the judge

Abdula vs. Guiani

Feb. 18, 2000

Similar to the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest where jurisprudence clearly
explains that “What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause”

3. the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by
the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation;

Paper Industries Corp. of the Phil. vs. Asuncion

May 19, 1999

“Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was supported by (1) the joint
Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, (2) a summary information and (3)
supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for Pascua and Bacolod,
however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial court.
Moreover, the applicant's participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant consisted
only of introducing Witness Bacolod and it turned out that even Bacolod testified only that he believed
that the PICOP security guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. This, however, does
not meet the requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief.

HELD:

"Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that Judge may
be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for
perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

"It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive not merely routinary or
pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not
simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification
of the application

4. The Applicant And The Witnesses Testify On Facts Personally Known To Them;

Paper Industries Corp. of the Phil. vs. Asuncion

May 19, 1999

-affidavits and hearsay testimony is not sufficient

5 The Warrant Specifically Describes The Place To Be Searched And The Things To Be
Seized

Frank Uy, Et. Al, vs. BIR

G.R. No. 129651. October 20, 2000

As to place

Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy as "Hernan Cortes
St., Cebu City" while the body of the same warrant states the address as "Hernan Cortes St.,
Mandaue City." Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B consistently state the address of
petitioner as "Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City."
 117

The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from
other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the
place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement. Thus, in Castro vs. Pabalan, where the search warrant mistakenly
identified the residence of the petitioners therein as Barrio Padasil instead of the adjoining Barrio
Maria Cristina, this Court "admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its
invalidation."

In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in
Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises
of petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified the city where
the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrant's invalidation in this case.

As to things to be seized

“We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity,
especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be
seized. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of these documents from said
photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a generic term or a
general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be
seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a general description
in a warrant. The use by the issuing judge of the terms "multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers,
journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records, provisional & official receipts,"
"production record books/inventory lists, stock cards," "sales records, job order," "corporate financial
records," and "bank statements/cancelled checks" is therefore unacceptable considering the
circumstances of this case.

As regards the terms "unregistered delivery receipts" and "unregistered purchase & sales
invoices," however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that the serial markings
of these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because they are
unregistered. 36 Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather
general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant
could issue. Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other
more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to
give a particular description of the contents thereof. 37 Although it appears that photocopies of these
unregistered documents were among those handed by Abos to the issuing judge, it would be
impractical to require the latter to specify each and every receipt and invoice, and the contents thereof,
to the minutest detail.

The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the
entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered delivery
receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The search warrant
is severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole
warrant.

6. In Connection With One Specific Offense

GENERAL WARRANT OR “SCATTER-SHOT WARRANT”

SHOTGUN WARRANT
Tambasan vs. People,
246 SCRA 184, July 14 1995
On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The caption of
Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession
of firearms, ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant
No. 365 was therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and void.
 118

Kenneth Roy Savage vs. Aproniano Taypin, Et. Al

May 11, 2000

Search warrant issued in relation to alleged “unfair competition” (Intellectual Properties case)

No such crime under the Intellectual Properties Code that should be given retroactive effect to
benefit the accused.

No basis for the issuance of a warrant.

Paper Industries Corp. of the Phil. vs. Asuncion

May 19, 1999

“The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that
Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.”

SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. – The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and
authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a
house or anything therein to execute the warrant to liberate himself or any person
lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.

SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two

witnesses. – No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except
in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the
absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality. (7a)

Quintero vs. NBI

162 SCRA 467

NBI agents, armed with a search warrant, raided a house. There was a witness but the NBI
agents searched different rooms simultaneously.

This cannot be allowed because it defeats the purpose of having a witness. The witness
cannot be in all the places being searched at the same time.

People vs. Court of Appeals

Dec. 8, 2000

But was the witness-to-search rule violated by the police officers who conducted the search
notwithstanding the absence of private respondent and despite the refusal of the members of his
household to act as witnesses to the search?
The witness-to-search rule is embodied in Section 7 of Rule 126, which reads:

"SECTION 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in presence

of two witnesses. — No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or
in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality."

Petitioner submits that there was no violation of the aforementioned rule since the searchers
were justified in availing of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion, after respondent's wife and
maid refused. The regularity of the search is best evidenced by the "Certification of Orderly Search"
and the receipt of the property seized signed by respondent's wife.
 119

We find merit in the petitioner's argument that private respondent's wife had no justifiable
reason to refuse to be a witness to the search and that her refusal to be a witness cannot hamper the
performance of official duty. In the absence of the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of
his family, the witness-to-search rule allows the search to be made "in the presence of two witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality." There was no irregularity when the PNP-
CISC team asked the bailiff of the Parañaque court and the barangay security officer to act as
witnesses to the search. To hold otherwise would allow lawful searches to be frustrated by the mere
refusal of those required by law to be witnesses.

SEC. 9. Time of making search. – The warrant must direct that it be served in
the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the
place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be
served at any time of the day or night. (8)

People vs. Court of Appeals

Dec. 8, 2000

The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime. However, the rule
allows an exception, namely, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night, when the application
asserts that the property is on the person or place ordered to be searched. In the instant case, the
judge issuing the warrant relied on the positive assertion of the applicant and his witnesses that the
firearms and ammunition were kept at private respondent's residence. Evidently, the court issuing the
warrant was satisfied that the affidavits of the applicants clearly satisfied the requirements of Section
8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule on issuance of a search warrant allows for the exercise of
judicial discretion in fixing the time within which the warrant may be served, subject to the statutory
requirement fixing the maximum time for the execution of a warrant. We have examined the
application for search warrant, and the deposition of the witnesses supporting said application, and
find that both satisfactorily comply with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126. The inescapable
conclusion is that the judge who issued the questioned warrant did not abuse his discretion in allowing
a search "at any reasonable hour of the day or night." Absent such abuse of discretion, a search
conducted at night where so allowed, is not improper.”

Mustang Lumber vs. CA 257 SCRA 430

We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4
April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search
warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the
said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be
continued the following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one
day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following day, provided it is still
within the ten-day period.

Validity of search warrant.

– A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be void.
(Sec. 10 R126)

-Unlike a warrant of arrest, a search warrant has a DEFINITE LIFETIME.

 120

IMPORTANT QUESTIONS:

1. How should an accused challenge the admissibility of evidence derived from the
implementation of a search warrant?

2. WHICH COURT should resolve the motion to quash search warrant in a case where the
court that issued it is not the court with which the case is filed as a consequence of the
service of the warrant?

A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be
filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has
been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued search warrant.
However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another
court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court. (Sec. 14, R 126)

Can the court that issued the warrant entertain a motion to quash the warrant if the case is still
pending preliminary investigation?

Solid Triangle Sales Corp. The Sheriff of RTC QC, Et Al

November 23, 2001

“Petitioners also argue that Section 14, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
supra, while intended "to resolve conflicts of responsibility between courts," "does not expressly cover
the situation where the criminal complaint is pending with the prosecutor." In such a case, petitioners
submit, the public prosecutor should be allowed to resolve the question of whether or not probable
cause exists.

The Court finds this interpretation too contrived. Section 14, Rule 126 precisely covers
situations like the one at bar. Section 14 expressly provides that a motion to quash a search warrant
and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where
the action has been instituted. Under the same section, the court which issued the search warrant
may be prevented from resolving a motion to quash or suppress evidence only when a criminal case
is subsequently filed in another court, in which case, the motion is to be resolved by the latter court. It
is therefore puerile to argue that the court that issued the warrant cannot entertain motions to
suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation is ongoing. Such erroneous interpretation would
place a person whose property has been seized by virtue of an invalid warrant without a remedy while
the goods procured by virtue thereof are subject of a preliminary investigation”

RULE 127 - PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL

CASES
SECTION 1. Availability of provisional remedies. – The provisional remedies in
civil actions, insofar as they are applicable, may be availed of in connection with the
civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action. (1a)

SEC. 2. Attachment.– When the civil action is properly instituted in the criminal
action as provided in Rule 111, the offended party may have the property of the
accused attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered from the accused in the following cases:

(a) When the accused is about to abscond from the Philippines;

(b) When the criminal action is based on a claim for money or property embezzled
or fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of the accused who is a
public officer, officer of a corporation, attorney, factor, broker, agent or clerk, in
 121

the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary

capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
(c) When the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property, or is
about to do so; and
(d) When the accused resides outside the Philippines. (2a)

What are the provisional remedies?

1. Preliminary Attachment- Rule 57

2. Preliminary Injunction- Rule 58
3. Receivership- Rule 59
4. Replevin- Rule 60
5. Support Pendente Lite Rule 61

GROUNDS FOR ATTACHMENT IN CIVIL CASES:

(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than
moral and exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract,
delict or quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with
intent to defraud his creditors;

(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted

to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor,
broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other
person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;

(c) In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken,

detained or converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed,
removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an
authorized person;

(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance
thereof;

(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is about
to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors; or

(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, or
on whom summons may be served by publication. (1a)

Very Important

Court MUST have jurisdiction over the person of the accused for it to act on
applications for provisional remedies.

Section 5 of Rule 57 provides, in part thus:

“xxxx No levy on attachment pursuant to the writ issued under section 2 hereof shall be
enforced unless it is preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons,
together with a copy of the complaint, the application for attachment, the applicant's affidavit
and bond, and the order and writ of attachment, on the defendant within the Philippines.

The requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply

where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent
efforts, or the defendant is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom, or the
defendant is a non-resident of the Philippines, or the action is one in rem or quasi in rem. (5a)”
 122

KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY

History

Originally covered by P.D. 1508 “Katarungang Pambarangay Law” replaced by Secs. 399-
422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160 “The Local Government
Code”

Guidelines:

Guidelines in the implementation of the Katarungang Pambarangay system were given by the
Supreme Court in Administrative Circular No. 14-93, dated July 15, 1993.

Applicability to Criminal Cases:

Applicable to all Criminal Cases Except:

1. Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical entities, since only

individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or
respondents (Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules);

2. Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities,
except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit
their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;

3. Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one (1)
year or a fine over five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

4. Offenses where there is no private offended party;

5. Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or detention (See Sec. 412 (b)(1),
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law);

Venue:

(a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable
settlement before the lupon of said barangay.

(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall
be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at
the election of the complaint.

(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where
the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.

(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution
where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace
or institution is located.

Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong barangay;
otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the punong
barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of
Justice, or his duly designated representative, whose ruling thereon shall be binding. (Section 409,
RA 7160)

Procedure:
 123

(a) Who may initiate proceeding — Upon payment of the appropriate filing fee, any individual
who has a cause of action against another individual involving any matter within the authority of the
lupon may complain, orally or in writing, to the lupon chairman of the barangay.

(b) Mediation by lupon chairman — Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon chairman
shall within the next working day summon the respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for
them and their witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of their conflicting interests. If he fails in
his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him, he shall
forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this
Chapter.

(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses — While the dispute is under mediation,
conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action under existing laws
shall be interrupted upon filing the complaint with the punong barangay. The prescriptive periods shall
resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complainant or the certificate of repudiation or of the
certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That such
interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.

(d) Issuance of summons; hearing; grounds for disqualification — The pangkat shall
convene not later than three (3) days from its constitution, on the day and hour set by the lupon
chairman, to hear both parties and their witnesses, simplify issues, and explore all possibilities for
amicable settlement. For this purpose, the pangkat may issue summons for the personal appearance
of parties and witnesses before it. In the event that a party moves to disqualify any member of the
pangkat by reason of relationship, bias, interest, or any other similar grounds discovered after the
constitution of the pangkat, the matter shall be resolved by the affirmative vote of the majority of the
pangkat whose decision shall be final. Should disqualification be decided upon, the resulting vacancy
shall be filled as herein provided for.

e) Period to arrive at a settlement — The pangkat shall arrive at a settlement or

resolution of the dispute within fifteen (15) days from the day it convenes in accordance with this
section. This period shall, at the discretion of the pangkat, be extendible for another period which shall
not exceed fifteen (15) days, except in clearly meritorious cases. (Section 410, RA 7160)

Can the absence of a prior referral to Barangay Conciliation be raised after arraignment? Is it
jurisdictional?

Bañares II vs. Balising G.R. No. 132624. March 13, 2000

The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression of petitioners and the
municipal trial court that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation as required under the
Local Government Code of 1991 51 may be raised in a motion to dismiss even after the accused has
been arraigned.

It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required
under the law is not jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised
seasonably in a motion to dismiss. The Court notes that although petitioners could have invoked the
ground of prematurity of the causes of action against them due to the failure to submit the dispute to
Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as soon as they received the complaints against them, petitioners
raised the said ground only after their arraignment.

However, while the trial court committed an error in dismissing the criminal cases against
petitioners on the ground that the same were not referred to the Lupon prior to the filing thereof in
court although said ground was raised by them belatedly, the said order may no longer be revoked at
present considering that the same had already become final and executory, and as earlier stated, may
no longer be annulled by the Municipal Trial Court, nor by the Regional Trial Court or this Court.
 124

FINAL IMPORTANT REMINDER

DO NOT FORGET TO REVIEW THE CODAL PROVISIONS. A LOT OF

THESE PROVISIONS WERE NO LONGER REPRODUCED IN THESE NOTES
NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE UNIMPORTANT BUT BECAUSE NO FURTHER
EXPLANATION IS NEEDED.

-IT IS ALWAYS BETTER TO MASTER THE BLACK LETTER OF THE LAW

GOOD LUCK