Criminal Procedure: Case Compilation

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CASE COMPILATION
Based on Atty. Justin Ryan Morilla’s Syllabus
Digested and Compiled by 4th Year - 4 Year Program Law Students
Jose Maria College - College of Law
RULE 118
CASE TITLE PERSON ASSIGNED DIGESTED
SUBJECT MATTER: Section 2
People v. Hernandez, July 30, 1996 Cayetano ✔
Binay v. Sandiganbayan, November 12, 2002 De Peralta ✔

(Correct case: Bayas v. Sandiganbayan)
People v. Ancheta, January 14, 2004 Dulay ✔
Abubakar vs Abubakar, October 22, 1999 Pacquiao, JL ✔
People v. Guzman, Jan 26, 2007 Gierran ✔
RULE 119
CASE TITLE PERSON ASSIGNED DIGESTED
SUBJECT MATTER: Section 1 & 2
Mari v. Judge Gonzales, GR 187728, September Macatol ✔

12, 2011
Olbes v. Buemio GR 173319, December 4, 2009 Miranda ✔
Adorio v. Bersamin GR 120074, June 10, 1997 Olaco ✔

People v. SPO1 Marcial, Gr 152864, September Pacquiao, JP ✔
27, 2006
Cuenco v. Risos, GR 152643, August 28, 2008 Pajaro ✔
Hubert Webb v. Judge De Leon, GR 121234, Paniza ✔

August 23, 1995
People v. Fajardo, GR 173022, January 23, 2007 Roxas ✔
Salvanera v. People and Parane, GR 143093, Salcedo ✔

May 21, 2007
Monge v. People, GR 170308, March 7, 2008 Soriano ✔
People v. Dela Cruz, GR 173308, June 25, 2008 Tado ✔
Ampatuan v. De Lima, GR 197291, April 3, 2013 Tan ✔
Park v. Choi, GR 165496, February 12, 2007 Usman ✔
Dayap v. Sendiong, GR 177960, January 29, Villarin ✔

2009
People v. Tolentino, GR 176385, Feb 26, 2008 Abellana ✔
Cabador v. People, GR 186001, October 2, 2009 Alaba ✔
Nicholas v. Sandiganbayan, Gr 175930, February Arevalo ✔

11, 2008
Cabarles v. Judge Maceda, GR 161330, February Banuelos ✔

20, 2007
RULE 118
People v. Hernandez
July 30, 1996
Elsie P. Cayetano
Facts: Accused-appellant Cristina Hernandez was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment
committed in large scale in violating of Article 38 (a) and (b) in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c)
of the New Labor Code. Hernandez contends that the prosecution failed to prove one of the
essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment — that the offender is a non-licensee or
non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. The
aforementioned element, specifically the fact that neither appellant nor Philippine-Thai was
licensed or authorized to recruit workers as shown by the records of the POEA, was the subject
of a stipulation proposed by the prosecution and admitted by the defense during trial.
Appellant assails as erroneous the reliance placed by the prosecution on the said stipulation of
facts in dispensing with the presentation of evidence to prove the said element of the crime of
illegal recruitment. Appellant argues that: (1) the stipulation of facts was not tantamount to an
admission by the appellant of the fact of non-possession of the requisite authority or license
from the POEA, but was merely an admission that the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA, if
presented in court, would testify to this fact, and (2) the stipulation of facts is null and void for
being contrary to law and public policy. Appellant posits the foregoing arguments to bolster her
contention that the stipulation of facts did not relieve the prosecution of its duty to present
evidence to prove all the elements of the crime charged to the end that the guilt of the accused
may be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant further contends that granting arguendo that defense counsel had in fact agreed to
the above stipulation of facts, the same is null and void for being contrary to the well-
established rule that a stipulation of facts is not allowed in criminal cases.
Issue: WON the stipulation of facts is valid.
Ruling: Yes. The rule prohibiting the stipulation of facts in criminal cases is grounded on the
fundamental right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and corollary
duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is therefor
advanced that the prosecution being duty-bound to prove all the elements of the crime, may
not be relieve of this obligation by the mere expedient of stipulating with defense counsel on a
matter constitutive of an essential elements of the crime charged.
However, in the light of recent changes in our rules on criminal procedure, particularly the pre-
trial provisions found in Rule 118, the prohibition against a stipulation of facts in criminal cases
no longer holds true. Rule 118 provides the following:
RULE 118 & 119 | 1

Sec. 1. Pre-trial; when proper — To expedite trial, where the accused and counsel
agree, the court shall conduct a pre-trial conference on the matters enunciated in
Section 2 hereof, without impairing the rights of the accused.
Sec. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects . . . The pre-trial conference shall consider the
following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
By virtue of the foregoing rule, a stipulation facts in criminal cases is now expressly sanctioned
by law. In further pursuit of the objective of expediting trial by dispensing with the presentation
of evidence on matters that the accused is willing to admit, a stipulation of fact should be
allowed not only during pre-trial but also and with more reason, during trial proper itself.
Parenthetically, although not expressly sanctioned under the old rules of court, a stipulation of
facts by the parties in criminal cases has long been allowed and recognized as declarations
constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the parties.
Issue No. 2: WON the admission should be reduced into writing before the same may be used
in evidence.
Ruling No. 2: No. A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel
during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official
transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in the form of his
signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: ". . . an attorney who is
employed to manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit . . . has prima facie authority to make
relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, . . . which unless allowed to be
withdrawn are conclusive." In fact, "judicial admission are frequently those of counsel or of the
attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such
admissions are made . . . for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, they bind the
client, whether made during, or even after, the trial."
The foregoing find basis in the general rule that a client is bound by the acts of his counsel who
represents him. For all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense of a case are the
acts of his client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and negligence committed by the lawyer
except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice to the client.
In the case at bar, it is worth noting that Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in the lower court,
agreed to the stipulation of facts proposed by the prosecution not out of mistake nor
inadvertence, but obviously because the said stipulation of facts was also in conformity of
defense's theory of the case. It may be recalled that throughout the entire duration of the trial,
appellant staunchly denied ever having engaged in the recruitment business either in her
personal capacity or through Philippine-Thai. Therefore, it was but logical to admit that the
POEA records show that neither she nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized to recruit
workers.
RULE 118 & 119 | 2

RULE 118 & 119 | 3
Bayas v. Sandiganbayan
November 12, 2002
Erika Aira S. De Peralta
Facts: Three Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging Petitioners Ernesto T.
Matuday and Sixto M. Bayas with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 and malversation
through falsification in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal treasurer of Kabayan,
Province of Benguet. During their arraignment, petitioners pled "not guilty."
The parties submitted a "Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents," duly signed by the two
accused and their counsel Atty Molintas.
Later on, the accused, represented by their new counsel, Atty. Cinco, moved to withdraw the
Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents. Specifically, they sought to withdraw, first, Stipulation
1(b) which states that "Both the accused admit the disbursement of the amount of P510,000.00
and P55,000.00"; and second, Exhibits "1" to "8-a".
Petitioners contend that pretrial stipulations may be unilaterally withdrawn by the accused
because allegedly, they are not binding until after the trial court has issued a pretrial order
approving them. Petitioners further contend that the law on pretrial requires the issuance of a
pretrial order to make pretrial stipulations binding.
The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw Joint Stipulation.
Issue: Whether or not the accused be allowed to withdraw unilaterally from the Joint Stipulation
of Facts and Documents.
Ruling: No. Petitioners fail to appreciate the indispensable role of stipulations in the speedy
disposition of cases. The new Rules on Criminal Procedure mandate parties to agree on matters
of facts, issues and evidence. Such stipulations are greatly favoured because they simplify,
shorten or settle litigations in a faster and more convenient manner. They save costs, time and
resources of the parties and, at the same time, help unclog court dockets.
Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause. They should
be enforced especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and sound
public policy. When made before the court, they are conclusive. And the party who validly made
them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion, duress, fraud,
misrepresentation as to facts, and undue influence; or upon a showing of sufficient cause on
such terms as will serve justice in a particular case. Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a
stipulation validly made lies in the court’s sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave
abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal.
Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court states:
RULE 118 & 119 | 4

Sec. 2. Pre-trial agreement. -- All agreements or admissions made or entered [into] during the
pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel,
otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters
referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court.
Based on the foregoing provision, for a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must
satisfy the following conditions: (1) the agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it
must be signed by both the accused and their counsel. The court's approval, mentioned in the
last sentence of the above-quoted Section, is not needed to make the stipulations binding on
the parties. Such approval is necessary merely to emphasize the supervision by the court over
the case and to enable it to control the flow of the proceedings.
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they
become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or
facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to
rescind them unilaterally; it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.
Verily, during pretrial, attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions as to what the real
issues of the trial would be. They should not be allowed to embarrass or inconvenience the court
or injure the opposing litigant by their careless preparation for a case; or by their failure to raise
relevant issues at the outset of a trial; or, as in this case, by their unilateral withdrawal of valid
stipulations that they signed and that their clients fully assented to. Furthermore, a new counsel
cannot justify such withdrawal by the simple expedient of passing the blame on the previous
counsel, who had supposedly not sufficiently discharged his duty to the client.
RULE 118 & 119 | 5

People v. Ancheta
January 14, 2004
Mary Bessadel B. Dulay
Facts: Ancheta raped his daughter, Ginalyn who was almost 12 years old at the commission of
the crime. Ginalyn who was then living with her father was inside her bedroom when Ancheta
entered and forcibly undressed her. After removing his clothes, he laid on top of her and
proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina.
The Information specifically alleged the qualifying circumstances of minority and

relationship. However, only the circumstance of minority was proved by the presentation
of the birth certificate of Ginalyn. The prosecution failed to adduce independent and
competent evidence to prove the special qualifying circumstance of RELATIONSHIP of the
victim to the offender.
Ancheta interposed the defense of denial and alibi. During Pre-trial, Ancheta admitted that
Ginalyn is his daughter, and that she was twelve years old and living with him when the alleged
incident took place. He, nevertheless, denied the commission of rape.
The RTC convicted Ancheta and imposed the penalty of death.
Issue: WON the RTC correctly imposed the death penalty, when it appreciated the
qualifying circumstance of Relationship based on the admission of Ancheta during Pre-
trial that is the victim’s father.
Ruling: NO. The express admission of the accused during pre-trial that he is the father of
the complainant is inadmissible if he and his counsel did not sign the Stipulation of Facts.
Thus, Ancheta could only be convicted with simple rape.
Aside from the testimony of Ginalyn that Ancheta is her father and the admission of Ancheta
during the pre-trial and during the trial that Ginalyn is his daughter with his estranged wife,
Erlinda V. Aquino, the trial court has no basis in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of
relationship.
We have recently held in People v. Mendoza that the bare testimony of the complainant and
the admission of the accused during pre-trial and trial as to their relationship do not
suffice for an accused cannot be condemned to suffer the supreme penalty of death on
the basis of stipulations or his own admissions . This strict rule is warranted by the seriousness
of the penalty of death. The fact that Ancheta is the father of the complainant must be
sufficiently established by competent and independent evidence.
Moreover, the fact that Ancheta admitted that he is the father of Ginalyn during the pre-
trial, thus dispensing with the need to present evidence to prove the same, will NOT
justify the trial court's appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of relationship.
RULE 118 & 119 | 6

A PERUSAL OF THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER WOULD READILY SHOW THAT THE SAID
STIPULATION WAS NOT SIGNED BY THE ANCHETA AND HIS COUNSEL. HENCE, IT
CANNOT BE USED AS EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.
Rule 118, Sec. 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "all agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and
signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused."
This requirement is mandatory. Thus, the omission of the signature of the accused and his
counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence.
Considering that the relationship of the victim and the offender was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt, Ancheta can only be convicted of simple rape, punishable by reclusion
perpetua.
RULE 118 & 119 | 7

Abubakar v. Abubakar
October 22, 1999
Jose Luis P. Pacquiao
Facts: Petitioner Aminin and respondent Aurora were married in Jolo, Sulu in accordance with
Islamic law.
Sometime in February 1996, Aurora filed before the 1st Shari’ah Circuit Court of Isabela, Basilan
Province a complaint against Aminin for "Divorce with Prayer for Support and Damages." The
complaint was mainly premised on the alleged failure of Aminin to secure Aurora’s consent
before contracting a subsequent marriage, in violation of Articles 27 and 162 of Presidential
Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines."
In its pre-trial order, the circuit court limited the issue to be resolved at the trial to a
determination of "the rights or the respective shares of the (parties) with respect to the property
subject of partition after divorce."
Subsequently, Judge Jainul issued an order dissolving the marriage of Aurora and Aminin,
distributing the properties equally between them as co-owners, and ordering Aminin to pay her
the amount of P10,000 as support during the three-month ‘idda (waiting period).
Aurora duly filed a notice of appeal from this decision but only "as far as it involves the issue of
partition of property, and not to the grant of divorce and damages it being in her favor."
Actually, both parties were concerned only with the conclusion of the circuit court that the
properties were conjugal.
The decision was affirmed but with modifications. Now, Aminin is before this Court praying that
the decision be reversed and set aside. Specifically, the petition seeks confirmation regarding
the effects of a pre-trial order and the finality of matters not appealed by an Appellant.
Issue: What are the effects of a pre-trial order?
Ruling: That a pre-trial is indispensable in any civil or criminal action in this jurisdiction is clearly
laid out in Rules 18 and 118 of the Rules of Court. It is a procedural device meant to limit the
issues to be tackled and proved at the trial. A less cluttered case environment means that there
will be fewer points of contention for the trial court to resolve. This would be in keeping with the
mandate of the Constitution according every person the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases. If the parties can agree on certain facts prior to trial. Hence, the prefix "pre" — the court
can later concentrate on those which are seemingly irreconcilable. The purpose of pre-trials is
RULE 118 & 119 | 8

the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. The
stipulations are perpetuated in a pre-trial order which legally binds the parties to honor the
same.
In the case at bar, Aminin and Aurora "agreed" on the divorce, the ‘idda, and the limitation of
partition of assets to the properties. The pre-trial order whose content and validity were never
questioned by either party — stated the sole issue to be determined at the trial in this wise:
"What are the rights or the respective shares of the herein plaintiff and defendant with respect
to the property subject of partition after divorce?"
The marriage was dissolved, the properties awarded and evenly distributed to the parties as co-
owners, and support in the nominal amount of P10,000 during the three-month ‘idda or waiting
period was awarded to Aurora. Such final order was, therefore, consistent with the pre-trial
order.
RULE 118 & 119 | 9

People v. Guzman
Jan 26, 2007
Earl Clarence N. Gierran
Facts: For review is the Decision of the CA, dated 28 February 2005,1 affirming with modification
the Decision of the RTC, finding accused-appellant Nicolas Guzman y Bocbosila guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
One of the issues raised by defendant is that his constitutional rights to produce evidence on his
behalf and to due process were violated when the trial court denied the motion of his counsel to
present substitute witnesses when two of his original witnesses failed to attend the hearing to
testify.
Issue: WON the trial court erred in not allowing the accused-appellant to produce substitute or
additional witnesses for his defense
Ruling: The RTC was correct in denying the defense counsel’s motion for substitution of
witnesses since Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates that
the matters agreed upon in the pre-trial conference and as stated in the pre-trial order shall
bind the parties.
SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. – After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting
the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties,
limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial,
unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice
The pre-trial order issued by the RTC clearly showed that the defense named only four
witnesses. The parties were also informed therein that witnesses who were not mentioned in the
pre-trial order will not be entertained during the trial on the merits. Thus, the denial of the
defense counsel’s motion for substitution of witnesses is justified. Moreover, if appellant’s
motion for substitution of witnesses is given due course, it will amount to an unreasonable
disregard of solemn agreements submitted to and approved by the court and would make a
mockery of the judicial process.
The Supreme Court however, held that the rule is not absolute, and may be relaxed for the
greater interest of justice. Nevertheless, the exception does not apply in favor of appellant as the
RTC had observed that his motion for substitution of witnesses appears to be a "fishing
expedition" of evidence which is clearly unfair to the case of the prosecution. Moreover, if the
two other witnesses of appellant were indeed afraid or hesitant to testify, he should have moved
RULE 118 & 119 | 10

the RTC to subpoena the said witnesses to testify in court. Unfortunately, appellant did not avail
himself of this remedy
RULE 118 & 119 | 11

RULE 119
Mari v. Judge Gonzales

GR 187728, September 12, 2011
Jhon Dave L. Macatol
Facts: On October 25, 2004, petitioner Mari, executed a sworn statement toan Investigator of
the PNP-CIDG in Tacloban City, stating that she wasraped by private respondent Rudyard
Paloma on October 10, 2004 at her boarding house at Sogod, Southern Leyte.Preliminary
investigation of the case was done on November 4, 2004 before the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sogod.Warrant of arrest was issued against private
respondent, so hevoluntarily surrendered to the Chief of Police of Sogod on November 18,2004
and was then incarcerated at the Sogod Municipal Jail.On November 20, 2004, Paloma filed a
Motion for Bail. Hearings onthe motion commenced on December 7, 2004, but petitioner failed
toappear. Only private respondent presented evidence. On March 16, 2005,the MCTC of Sogod
issued an Order allowing private respondent to post bailset at P200,000.00 and then Paloma was
released from confinement.
The Prosecutor's Office issued a Resolution dated May 26, 2008,finding probable cause against
private respondent and an Information for Rape was filed on June 11, 2008. Warrant of arrest
was immediately issuedagainst private respondent.
On June 27, 2008, Paloma was committed to detention and on June 30,2008, the RTC issued an
Order stating that accused had voluntarilysurrendered to the Office of the Clerk of Court and
arraignment was set for July 31, 2008. On July 3, 2008, Paloma filed a Motion to Admit Cash
Bond but the RTC denied the motion and cancelled the July 31, 2008 schedule for arraignment
and reset the arraignment and hearing on said motion for August 20, 2008 where nobody
appeared for the prosecution. Hence, theRTC issued the resetting of the arraignment on
October 31, 2008.
On October 28, 2008, Mari filed through her private counsel, aMotion for Cancellation of
Hearing praying that the scheduled arraignmenton October 31, 2008 be cancelled due to the
pendency of privatecomplainant's petition for transfer of venue before this Court. Theauthorized
private prosecutor did not appear on said hearing date. The hearing on October 31, 2008
proceeded as the RTC ruled, in its Order andissued that unless restrained by a higher court, the
mere pendency of a petition for transfer of venue is not sufficient reason to suspend the
proceedings. Moreover, counsel for accused invoked the accused's right to aspeedy trial. Paloma
was arraigned in the presence of the ProvincialProsecutor who was designated by the RTC to
represent the prosecution for the purpose of arraignment. Pre-trial was set for November 13,
2008. Thesaid schedule for pre-trial was again cancelled. On November 24, 2008, theday of the
pre-trial itself, the private prosecutor again filed a Motion for Cancellation of Hearing, again
RULE 118 & 119 | 12

using as justification the pendency of the petition for transfer of venue. The RTC issued an Order
denying thecancellation of the hearing.
The said Order also scheduled the initial hearingfor trial on the merits for December 12, 2008.
Again, on the said date, noone appeared for the prosecution, prompting counsel for accused
privaterespondent to move for dismissal of the case on the ground of failure to prosecute. But
private respondent's motion to dismiss was denied andhearing was reset to January 16, 2009.
Again, on January 16, 2009 hearing, the private prosecutor filed anUrgent Motion for
Cancellation of Hearing, stating that it was only onJanuary 14, 2009 that he was furnished a copy
of the notice of the January16, 2009 hearing and he had to attend a previously scheduled
hearing for another case he was handling, set for the very same date. Because of this, theRTC
ordered for the dismissal of the case pursuant to the rule on the right of the accused on speedy
trial because of failure of the prosecution to prosecuteor nolle prosequi.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, alleging that publicrespondent acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excessof jurisdiction in rashly and precipitately dismissing the
rape case against private respondent.
Issue: Whether private respondent’s constitutional right to speedy trial was violated. YES
Ruling: Petitioners insist that the RTC dismissed the criminal case against private respondent
too hurriedly, despite the provision in Section 10 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (Republic Act
No. 8493), now incorporated in Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 3. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time
within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but
not limited to the following:
xxxx
(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases
or transfer from other courts;
xxxx
A careful reading of the above rule would show that the only delays that may be excluded from
the time limit within which trial must commence are those resulting from proceedings
concerning the accused. The time involved in the proceedings in a petition for transfer of venue
can only be excluded from said time limit if it was the accused who instituted the same. Hence,
in this case, the time during which the petition for transfer of venue filed by the private
complainant is pending, cannot be excluded from the time limit of thirty (30) days from receipt
of the pre-trial order imposed in Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
The records reveal that the 30-day time limit set by Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
had, in fact, already been breached. The private prosecutor received the Pre-trial Order dated
November 24, 2008 on December 3, 2008, while the Provincial Prosecutor received the same on
RULE 118 & 119 | 13

December 2, 2008. This means that at the latest, trial should have commenced by January 2,
2009, or if said date was a Sunday or holiday, then on the very next business day. Yet, because
of the prosecution's failure to appear at the December 12, 2008 hearing for the initial
presentation of the prosecution's evidence, the RTC was constrained to reset the hearing to
January 16, 2009, which is already beyond the 30-day time limit. Nevertheless, the prosecution
again failed to appear at the January 16, 2009 hearing. Indeed, as aptly observed by the RTC,
petitioners showed recalcitrant behavior by obstinately refusing to comply with the RTC's
directives to commence presentation of their evidence. Petitioners did not even show proper
courtesy to the court, by filing motions for cancellation of the hearings on the very day of the
hearing and not even bothering to appear on the date they set for hearing on their motion. As
set forth in the narration of facts above, the prosecution appeared to be intentionally delaying
and trifling with court processes.
The trial court cannot be faulted for refusing to countenance delays in the prosecution of the
case. The Court's ruling in Tan v. People is quite instructive, to wit:
An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases
by Section 14 (2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as
one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to
assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or,
if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating
historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal
maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious
resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally
guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.
Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 8493,
otherwise known as "The Speedy Trial Act of 1998," was enacted, with Section 6 of said act
limiting the trial period to 180 days from the first day of trial. Aware of problems resulting in the
clogging of court dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular
No. 38-98, which has been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of
Rule 119.
Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused's right to speedy trial is deemed

violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
In determining whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance
are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure
to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.
xxxx
We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to
do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled
RULE 118 & 119 | 14

hearings of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient,
and particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had already been deprived of his liberty on
two occasions. First, during the preliminary investigation before the MCTC, when he was
incarcerated from November 18, 2004 to March 16, 2005, or a period of almost four months;
then again, when an Information had already been issued and since rape is a non-bailable
offense, he was imprisoned beginning June 27, 2008 until the case was dismissed on January 16,
2009, or a period of over 6 months. Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for
any duration of time is quite oppressive. Because of private respondent's continued
incarceration, any delay in trying the case would cause him great prejudice. Thus, it was
absolutely vexatious and oppressive to delay the trial in the subject criminal case to await the
outcome of petitioners' petition for transfer of venue, especially in this case where there is no
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by a higher court against
herein public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
RULE 118 & 119 | 15

Olbes v. Buemio
GR 173319, Dec 4 2009
Vienna Mae J. Miranda
Facts: Olbes was indicted for Grave Coercion in MeTC. Petitioner posted bail and was released.
Denying petitioner’s motion to defer or suspend his arraignment in light of his pending petition
for review before the Department of Justice from the City Fiscal’s Resolution finding probable
cause to hale him into court, Judge Hipolito dela Vega proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment
on February 12, 2003 in which he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Pre-trial was thereupon set
to May 28, 2003 which was, however, declared a non-working day due to the occurrence of
typhoon "Chedeng." The pre-trial was thus reset to October 23, 2003.
At the scheduled pre-trial on October 23, 2003, petitioner failed to appear, prompting the trial
court to issue a warrant for his arrest, which warrant was, however, later recalled on discovery
that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified of said schedule. Pre-trial was again reset to
January 21, 2004.
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information on the ground of violation of his right to a
speedy trial under Republic Act No. 8493 or the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 and Supreme Court
Circular (SCC) No. 38-98. He argued that "considering that [he] was not - without any fault on
his part - brought to trial within 80 days from the date he was arraigned, this case should be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 119, Section 9 in relation to Rule 119, Section 6 of the Rules."
Petitioner draws attention to the time gap of 105 days from his arraignment on February 12,
2003 up to the first pre-trial setting on May 28, 2003, and another gap of 148 days from the
latter date up to the second pre-trial setting on October 23, 2003 or for a total of 253 days - a
clear contravention, according to petitioner, of the 80-day time limit from arraignment to trial.
It bears noting, however, that on his arraignment on February 12, 2003, petitioner interposed no
objection to the setting of the pre-trial to May 28, 2003 which was, as earlier stated, later
declared a non-working day. Inarguably, the cancellation of the scheduled pre-trial on that date
was beyond the control of the trial court.
Petitioner argues, however, that the lapse of 253 days (from arraignment to October 23, 2003)
was not justified by any of the excusable delays as embodied in the time exclusions specified
under Section 3 of Rule 119. The argument is unavailing.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s right to speedy trial had been violated.
Ruling: No. While the records indicate that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified of the
resetting of the pre-trial to October 23, 2003, the same appears to have been occasioned by
RULE 118 & 119 | 16

oversight or simple negligence which, standing alone, does not prove fatal to the prosecution’s
case. The faux pas was acknowledged and corrected when the MeTC recalled the arrest warrant
it had issued against petitioner under the mistaken belief that petitioner had been duly notified
of the October 23, 2003 pre-trial setting.
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and
not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is
supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public
justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution
and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that
intent.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of
the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason
for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not thus preclude justifiable
postponements and delays when so warranted by the situation. To the Court, the reasons for the
postponements and delays attendant to the present case reflected above are not unreasonable.
Reiterating the Court’s pronouncement in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. that "speedy trial" is a
relative and flexible term, Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr. summons the courts to maintain a delicate
balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial on the one hand,
and the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals on the other.
Applying the balancing test for determining whether an accused has been denied his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of his case, taking into account
several factors such as the length and reason of the delay, the accused’s assertion or non-
assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the accused resulting from the delay, the Court does
not find petitioner to have been unduly and excessively prejudiced by the "delay" in the
proceedings, especially given that he had posted bail.
RULE 118 & 119 | 17

Adorio v. Bersamin
GR 120074, June 10, 1997
Jan-Lawrence P. Olaco
Facts: A special civil action for certiorari which seeks to set aside the Order of Judge Lucas P.
Bersamin dated May 5, 1995 insofar as it holds petitioner, Leah Adorio, private prosecutor
representing Philip See, in direct contempt. Judge Bersamin found particularly contemptuous
were petitioner's statements in her motion alleging that (1) the issuance of the subpoenas duces
tecum was irregular; and (2) the court and court procedure were subject to the "control" of the
accused. As alleged by the petitioner, on March 8, 1995, the prosecution was scheduled to
present its first witness, the private complainant, Philip See. The regular (as against the
"irregular") procedure would have been for the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of
evidence pursuant to Rule 119, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. The prosecution was not, able to
move along, due to the presence of numerous bank officials from various banks who appeared
pursuant to the subpoenas issued to them by the court. The person who requested for the
subpoena was the counsel for the accused. The regular or usual procedure would have been for
the subpoena to be issued during the pre-trial stage or during the time that the defense is
presenting its evidence and not during the time of presentation of evidence by the prosecution
as what happened in this case. Moreover, the petitioner here alleged that during arraignment
the court was subject to the “control” of the accused.
Issue: Was there an “irregularity” in the conduct of the trial of the case?
Ruling: None. The order of trial in criminal cases does not preclude the defense from procuring
subpoenas duces tecum during the time of the prosecution's presentation of evidence. In this
case, counsel for the accused felt that he needed the documents subject of the subpoenas for
his cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. Accordingly, respondent judge called a
recess to enable said counsel to secure said documents from the bank officials. The order of trial
was not in any way altered; counsel for the accused did not even attempt to call any of the bank
officials to the stand. Under these circumstances, the resulting delay cannot be considered
unreasonable nor "irregular."
In the matter of "irregularity " in the accused's arraignment. The court sided with the counsel for
the accused and points out: The fact that the Presiding Judge issued a warrant of arrest and
ordered the cancellation of the accused's bond shows that he gives no special favor to the
accused. And it is of common knowledge that orders like that are easily reconsidered/lifted even
for excuses like traffic, ill health or failure to remember the hearing. The fact that the Presiding
Judge opted to wait for the accused upon information that the latter is coming only shows that
he was very aware of the common practice. Waiting saved so much of the court's and parties'
time as it did away with the usual motion for reconsideration and the necessity for a resetting.
Court personnels, practitioners and even judges know, of course that it is not uncommon for
litigants, especially those coming for trial late, to call the court's office by phone. Besides, if the
RULE 118 & 119 | 18

plaintiff found it necessary to have those matters stated in the Order or placed on record, there
were two (2) lawyers (the private and the public prosecutors) who could have stood up and
made the proper manifestations or requests. But that incident happened way back 13 July 1994
and it is only now, in their motion of 15 March 1995, that they mention the same in their
attempt to create an issue on the impartiality and fairness of the Presiding Judge. Hence,
Petitioner's allegation that the proceedings before the trial court were "irregular" therefore lacks
basis.
RULE 118 & 119 | 19

People V. SPO1 Marcial
GR 152864, September 27, 2006
Pacquiao, JP
Facts: Two informations, one for homicide and one for frustrated homicide, were filed with the
RTC against respondents SPO1 Mario Marcial, SPO1 Monico Bolotano, SPO1 Anastacio Maglinte,
SPO1 Alfredo Nuñez, SPO1 Rudy Bunalos and PO3 Tomas Duhaylunsod, all members of the
Philippine National Police, in connection with a shooting incident that occurred on December
18, 1999. As a result of the incident, one Junnyver Dagle died while one Wendell Sales was
seriously injured.
During the hearing held on February 6, 2002, petitioner made an oral motion to reverse the
order of the trial upon the ground that respondents admitted committing the acts for which
they were charged in the two informations but interposed lawful justifying circumstances. The
motion was denied by the RTC for lack of merit in the assailed order dated February 6, 2002. Its
motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied, petitioner filed the present petition.
Issue: Whether it is mandatory for a trial court to modify or reverse the order of trial when an
accused admits the offense but interposes a lawful defense.
Ruling: NO.
The Court finds that the RTC did not commit any reversible error in denying the request for a
reverse order of trial, a matter which under the rules is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. In fact, the rule relied upon by petitioner clearly reflects this discretionary nature of
the procedure, thus:
Rules of Court, Rule 119, Section 11(e):

(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, the RTC correctly exercised its discretion in denying petitioner's request for a
reverse order of trial.
RULE 118 & 119 | 20

Concepcion Cuenco Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos et al

GR 152543, August 28, 2008
Adrian Pajaro
Facts :
On November 4, 1999, respondent RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY.
GAMALIEL D.B. BONJE were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document
before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19, through a criminal information dated October 27, 1999,
which was subsequently amended on November 18, 1999. The case rose the falsification of a
deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear
that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed
her signature to the document. Hence, the criminal case.
On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter’s deposition. He
explained the need to perpetuate Concepcion’s testimony due to her weak physical condition
and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.
On August 25, 2000, the RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcion’s deposition be
taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City The respondents’ motion for reconsideration was
denied by the trial court on November 3, 2000. The court ratiocinated that procedural
technicalities should be brushed aside because of the urgency of the situation, since Concepcion
was already of advanced age.13 After several motions for change of venue of the deposition-
taking, Concepcion’s deposition was finally taken on March 9, 2001 at her residence.
Issue: whether Concepcion’s advanced age and health condition exempt her from the
application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the
application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ruling:The contention does not persuade.The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt
Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once the ground which places her squarely
within the coverage of the same provision. Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be
conditionally examined:
1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or

2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.
Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that
time, her motion would have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the
RULE 118 & 119 | 21

trial court, she would have been compelled to appear before the court for examination during
the trial proper.
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be
made before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, there is
nothing in the rule which may remote ly be interpreted to mean that such requirement
applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is
kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not contemplated.33
When the words are clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation. There is only
room for application.
Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the rules on civil
procedure apply suppletorily to criminal cases.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure
apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of
civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that
the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the
instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his
deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. We find no necessity to
depart from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made
elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is under detention. More
importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the witness’
deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is especially true when the
witness’ testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case.
RULE 118 & 119 | 22

Hubert Webb v. Judge de Leon

GR 121234, August 23, 1995
Lyndzelle Jane D. Paniza
Facts: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-
complaint charging Hubert Webb and others with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela
Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer on June 30, 1991.
The DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation. During the
preliminary investigation, one of the documents the NBI presented was the sworn statement of
their principal witness, Jessica Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission of the crime.
The DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to hold Webb and others
for trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed against them.
Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued. Webb and others voluntarily surrendered.
Webb and others then filed several petitions with the Supreme Court. One of the issues they
raised in their petitions was that the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative
when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused, considering her alleged
conspiratorial participation in the crime of rape with homicide.
For DOJ’s part, the non-inclusion of Jessica Alfaro was anchored on Republic Act No. 6981,
entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security And Benefit Program And For
Other Purposes", particularly citing Sections 10 and 12.
However, the validity of these provisions was challenged by Webb alleging that they constitute
". . . an intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the power under the
Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused as a state witness."
Issue: Whether it was indeed an intrusion of the judicial prerogative on the part of the DOJ
when it discharged Jessica Alfaro as a state witness.
Ruling: No.
The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 119 which gives the court the prerogative to approve
the discharge of an accused to be a state witness. Webb's argument lacks appeal for it lies on
the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole
prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution
of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed.
A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion — the
RULE 118 & 119 | 23

discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.
We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981
vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the
program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not
support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent
judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court, is given the power to discharge a state
witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The
discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an
inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never been interpreted to be
beyond change by legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice system. R.A.
No. 6981 is one of the much sought penal reform laws to help government in its uphill fight
against crime, one certain cause of which is the reticence of witnesses to testify.
The rationale for the law is well put by the Department of Justice, viz.: "Witnesses, for fear of
reprisal and economic dislocation, usually refuse to appear and testify in the
investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal
complaints/cases have been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more
effective administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to pass a law protecting
witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their appearance in
investigative bodies/courts." Webb's challenge to the validity of R.A. No. 6981 cannot therefore
succeed.
RULE 118 & 119 | 24

People v. Fajardo
GR 173022, January 23, 2007
Editha L. Roxas
Facts: On 11 March 1997 an Information was filed against appellants Rey Plata, alias "Jeffrey" (Plata),
Darius Rodrigo, alias "Jun" (Rodrigo), and Feliciano Fajardo, Jr., alias "Gerry" (Fajardo) together with Lanie
dela Cruz (dela Cruz), Armando Rodrigo, Helen Joven, Boyong Catindig, Jun Parubrob, and a John Doe for
the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom.
Four of the accused were apprehended, namely: Plata, Rodrigo, Fajardo and dela Cruz. The rest remained
at large. The trial court, upon motion of the prosecution, discharged Dela Cruz to serve as state witness.
On 31 May 2000, the RTC rendered its decision finding all appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellants elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
decision except that it acquitted Rodrigo.
Fajardo questions dela Cruz’s discharge as a state witness on the ground that she was a co-conspirator.
He contends that the testimony of Pedro, Oliver and Eleazar Caparas would already suffice as direct
evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed.
Issue: Whether or not dela Cruz was eligible to be a state witness.
Ruling: Yes.
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides:
When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the
prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged
with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to
present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies
the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
The power to prosecute includes the initial discretion to determine who should be utilized by the
government as a state witness. The prosecution has gathered the evidence against the accused and is in a
better position to decide the testimonial evidence needed by the State to press its prosecution to a
successful conclusion. Under our Rules, however, it is the courts that will finally determine whether the
RULE 118 & 119 | 25

requirements have been satisfied to justify the discharge of an accused to become a witness for the
government.
We affirm the finding of the trial court that the testimony of dela Cruz was an absolute necessity. Only
dela Cruz, according to them, could supply the much needed information to pin down the whole bunch
that took Caparas forcibly for ransom.
Neither does dela Cruz appear to be the most guilty of the accused. The trial court held that dela Cruz was
not privy to the kidnap plan and was merely taken in later by the group because they suspected that she
already knew too much.
The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and
strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest. The
testimony of dela Cruz was substantially corroborated by no less than the victim himself, Oliver, as well as
Pedro.
As noted by the trial court, there may have been inconsistencies in the narration of dela Cruz. These,
however, were minor details and simply could be attributed to the frailty of human memory. It cannot be
expected that her testimony would be entirely flawless. Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor the veracity or weight of their testimonies. Such
minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate any suspicion that the
testimonies have been rehearsed. Moreover, the testimony of dela Cruz coincides with that of Oliver and
Pedro relating to the principal occurrence and the positive identification of appellants.
RULE 118 & 119 | 26

Salvanera v People and Parane
GR 143093, May 21, 2007
Zusmitha D.Salcedo
Facts: On November 30, 1996, Salvanera, Abutin, Lungcay and Tampelix, is charged with the
murder of Ruben Parane wherein Salvanera was the alleged mastermind. On March 4, 1997, the
Prosecution moved for the discharge of Abutin and Tampelix, to serve as state witnesses.
However, the trial court denied the said motion. On appeal, the CA sustained the prosecution. It
discharged Abutin and Tampelix from the Information to become state witnesses.
Issue: Is the CA correct when it sustained the prosecution’s appeal for the discharged Abutin
and Tampelix from the Information to become state witnesses?
Ruling: Yes. In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the
following conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and
Tampelix on the exact same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be
no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except
the testimony of the state witness.” The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not
have to consist of the very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses.
We have ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by
any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator are corroborated by
other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony
only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other
respects.” It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other
witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that the
testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each other’s
testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of the other prosecution
witnesses, and "to such extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest."
RULE 118 & 119 | 27

As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the
conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is
essential because only they have knowledge of the crime.The other prosecution witnesses are
not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the conspirators knew
and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin
and Tampelix can directly link Salvanera to the commission of the crime.
RULE 118 & 119 | 28

Monge v. People
GR 170308, March 7, 2008
Emilio O. Soriano
Facts: Petitioner Galo Monge and Potencio were found by barangay tanods Serdan and Molina
in possession of and transporting three (3) pieces of mahogany. The tanods demanded that they
be shown the requisite permit and/or authority from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) but neither petitioner nor Potencio was able to produce any.
Petitioner fled the scene in that instant whereas Potencio was brought to the police station for
interrogation.
An information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35 charging petitioner
and Potencio with violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended by
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, series of 1997.
Potencio was discharged to be used as a state witness on motion of the prosecutor. Accordingly,
he testified on the circumstances of the arrest but claimed that for a promised fee he was merely
requested by petitioner, the owner of the log, to assist him in hauling the same down from the
mountain.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where he challenged the discharge of
Potencio as a state witness on the ground that the latter was not the least guilty of the offense
and that there was no absolute necessity for his testimony.
Issue: Is the discharge of Potencio as a state witness proper? NO
Ruling: Petitioner’s challenge against Potencio’s discharge as a state witness must also fail. Not
a few cases established the doctrine that the discharge of an accused so he may turn state
witness is left to the exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion limited only by the
requirements set forth in Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus, whether the accused
offered to be discharged appears to be the least guilty and whether there is objectively an
absolute necessity for his testimony are questions that lie within the domain of the trial court, it
being competent to resolve issues of fact. The discretionary judgment of the trial court with
respect this highly factual issue is not to be interfered with by the appellate courts except in case
of grave abuse of discretion. No such grave abuse is present in this case. Suffice it to say that
issues relative to the discharge of an accused must be raised in the trial court as they cannot be
addressed for the first time on appeal.
Moreover and more importantly, an order discharging an accused from the information in order
that he may testify for the prosecution has the effect of an acquittal. Once the discharge is
ordered by the trial court, any future development showing that any or all of the conditions
provided in Section 17, Rule 119 have not actually been fulfilled will not affect the legal
consequence of an acquittal. Any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution, therefore, in
moving for the discharge and of the court in granting the motion—no question of jurisdiction
RULE 118 & 119 | 29

being involved—will not deprive the discharged accused of the benefit of acquittal and of his
right against double jeopardy. A contrary rule would certainly be unfair to the discharged
accused because he would then be faulted for a failure attributable to the prosecutor. It is
inconceivable that the rule has adopted the abhorrent legal policy of placing the fate of the
discharged accused at the mercy of anyone who may handle the prosecution. Indeed, the only
instance where the testimony of a discharged accused may be disregarded is when he
deliberately fails to testify truthfully in court in accordance with his commitment, as provided for
in Section 18, Rule 119. Potencio lived up to his commitment and for that reason, petitioner’s
challenge against his discharge must be dismissed.
RULE 118 & 119 | 30

People v. Dela Cruz
GR 173308, June 25, 2008
Diann Kathelline A. Tado
Facts: Charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom were accused-appellants De la Cruz and
Martinez, along with three others, namely, Aldrin Tano (Tano), Romeo Dano (Dano) and Rex
Tarnate (Tarnate). Thereafter, while in the process of presenting its witnesses, the prosecution
filed a motion to discharge accused Tano as a state witness. Accused-appellants De la Cruz and
Martinez filed their separate oppositions thereto. The RTC granted the motion and denied the
motion for reconsideration. As established during the trial, accused-appellant De la Cruz was
employed by Erwin as a family driver. He brought Aaron, then an eight-year-old third-grade
student, to and from Claret School.
State witness Tano relayed that on November 4, 1998, he, accused-appellants De la Cruz and
Martinez, along with Dano, had a meeting wherein De la Cruz broached the idea of kidnapping
Aaron. According to De la Cruz, the child was a "good catch" as his boss’ family had "plenty of
money." He knew this because he had accompanied Erwin to the bank thrice. Martinez agreed
that it was a good idea to abduct Aaron.
Issue: Whether or not Tano can be discharged as a state witness
Ruling: Yes. For an accused to be discharged as a state witness, the following conditions must
be present:
When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon
motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the
accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when,
after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:
a. There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b. There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
c. The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d. Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e. Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. 13
xxx
The provision does not require that a state witness should appear to be the "least guilty" among
the accused. Rather, it provides that he "does not appear to be the most guilty." The findings of
the lower court revealed that Tano merely facilitated the commission of the crime. He merely
RULE 118 & 119 | 31

boarded the car and sat beside accused-appellant De la Cruz throughout the whole ride and
accompanied accused-appellant Martinez in going back to Batasan Hills after leaving Aaron and
accused-appellant De la Cruz in Bulacan. True, he was the one who placed the call to Erwin to
demand ransom. However, he was neither the mastermind nor the one who hatched the plan to
kidnap Aaron in exchange for money. Clearly, he did not appear to be the most guilty among
the accused. Thus, we uphold the propriety of the trial court's designation of Tano as state
witness.
Moreover, his testimony was absolutely necessary as it was the only direct evidence establishing
the presence of conspiracy, from the planning stage up to the commission of the crime.
RULE 118 & 119 | 32

Ampatuan v. De Lima,
GR 197291, April 3, 2013
Cesnee Joyce Tan
Facts: Relying on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, the panel of prosecutors charged
196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. Dalandag was
thereafter admitted into the witness protection program of the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Datu Andal Ampatuan Jr. is then mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay and one of the
principal suspects in the massacre, wrote to Secretary Leila De Lima requiesting the inclusion of
Dalandag in the information for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his
participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. Secretary De Lima denied
Ampatuan Jr.’s request, prompting Ampatuan Jr. to file a petition for mandamus before the RTC,
seeking to compel Secretary De Lima to charge Dalandag as another accused.
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Justice can be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge
Dalandag as a co-accused in the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission as state witness
(NO)
Ruling: No. The Secretary of Justice cannot be compelled to charge Dalandag as a co-accused
since his exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the panel of prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an
accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, which requires that “the complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons
who appear to be responsible for the offense involved,” albeit a mandatory provision, may be
subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime
becomes a state witness.
While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the
information in order that he may be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound
discretion of the trial court, such discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily
but with due regard to the proper administration of justice. Anent the requisite that there must
be an absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial
court has to rely on the suggestions of and the information provided by the public prosecutor.
The reason is obvious – the public prosecutor should know better than the trial court, and the
Defense for that matter, which of the several accused would best qualify to be discharged in
order to become a state witness. The public prosecutor is also supposed to know the evidence
in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his case, as well as the availability or non-
availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of the accused is the ‘most guilty’
one, and the like.
On the other hand, there is no requirement under RA 6981 for the Prosecution to first charge a
person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness
Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under RA 6981 also operates as an
acquittal, and the said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information
RULE 118 & 119 | 33

except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the
DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an accused,
the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of admission into the
Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. The
Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the information.
RULE 118 & 119 | 34

Park v. Choi
GR 165496, February 12, 2007
Hanna-Tunisia Fatima Usman
Facts: Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing on June 28, 1999
PNB Check No. 0077133 postdated August 28, 1999 in the amount of ₱1,875,000 which was dishonored
for having been drawn against insufficient funds. After the prosecution rested its case, Choi filed a Motion
for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the
prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the
element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.
MeTC- Makati, Branch 65 granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecution’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. Park appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC Makati, contending that
the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect.
By Decision of September 11, 2003, Branch 60 of the RTC held that while the evidence presented was
insufficient to prove respondent’s criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It
accordingly granted the appeal of petitioner and ordered respondent to pay him the amount of
₱1,875,000 with legal interest.
Upon Choi’s motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand
of the case to the MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the defendant [-respondent herein] may adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of the Criminal complaint also dismisses the Civil Complaint with finality.
Ruling: No. Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case.
The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the
Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a
witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from the
delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the
trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.
It bears recalling that the MeTC acquitted Choi. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and
executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy.
Either the offended party or the accused may, however, appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite
the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect
of a decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated as far as he is
concerned. The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the
accused.
When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on
the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to
RULE 118 & 119 | 35

present evidence. At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect,
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved.
If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly instituted or the enforcement of civil
liability is not waived, the trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or damages
caused by the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there
is any.
For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The civil action based on delict
may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing
evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the
case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of
the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same
time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to
prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish
civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it
does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the
court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only
recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when
there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such
determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue. Thus this Court, in Salazar v.
People, held:
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist.
In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Choi did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand.
Indicatively, Choi stands by his defense that he merely borrowed ₱1,500,000 with the remainder
representing the interest, and that he already made a partial payment of ₱1,590,000. Park counters,
however, that the payments made by Choi pertained to other transactions. Given these conflicting claims
which are factual, a remand of the case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate,
and for the trial court to resolve the same.
RULE 118 & 119 | 36

Dayap v. Sendiong
GR 177960, January 29, 2009
Paulo Jose S. Villarin
Facts: Dayap was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious physical
injuries and damage to property. It was alleged that Dayap was the driver of a cargo truck which
figured in an accident with a Colt Galant driven by Lou Gene Sendiong causing instant death to
the latter and less serious physical injuries to the latter’s passenger. The MTC granted Dayap
Demurrer to Evidence saying that prosecution failed to establish that Dayap was really the one
driving the cargo truck. The MTC further stated that prosecution also wasn’t able to prove the
death and injuries of the victim as there were not death certificate and medical certificates
submitted as evidence. The MTC gave credence to the evidence of the Dayap, showing that it
was the victim’s car which swerved into the cargo truck’s lane thereby being the proximate
cause of the accident. The MTC relied on the accident sketch contained in the police blotter to
support this conclusion.
Aggrieved, Sendiong filed a petition for certiorari under 65 with the RTC. The RTC affirmed the
acquittal of Dayap but ordered the case remanded to the MTC for the hearing of the civil aspect.
Sendiong filed a petition for review (42) with the CA. the CA concluded that it was the RTC which
had jurisdiction and not the MTC. The CA explained that according to Cuyos v Garcia,
jurisdiction over damage to property cases should be determined by the imposable fine and not
the penalty for the physical injuries and following BP 129, MTC only has jurisdiction over those
felonies with imposable fine not exceeding 10,000. Since in this case, no proof of total damage
was given and Sendiong claims 1.5M in civil damages, the same should have been brought
before the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not a grant of a demurrer is reviewable.
Ruling: A grant of a demurrer to evidence is tantamount to an acquittal and cannot be reviewed

on appeal otherwise, the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is offended. A
demurrer must be filed after the prosecution rests its case. It entails an appreciation of the
evidence of the prosecution and when the same is found insufficient to support a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt, the demurrer is proper. Once granted, the court must enter a partial
judgment of conviction but must continue with the trial for the reception of the defense’
evidence on the civil aspect. This is because at the moment the demurrer is granted, only
prosecution’s evidence (both as to the criminal and civil aspect) is on record.
MTC granted petitioner’s demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar,
is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,
tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of
demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in
RULE 118 & 119 | 37

double jeopardy. But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not
subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing
court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to
evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus
rendering the assailed judgment void.
Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC
gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the
prosecution in resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as
mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTC’s conclusions were based on facts
diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence
presented by the prosecution. The records also show that the MTC correctly followed the
procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.
RULE 118 & 119 | 38

People v. Tolentino
GR 176385, February 26, 2008
Jean Marie L. Abellana
Facts: Three separate informations of murder and two counts of frustrated murder were filed
before the RTC against Tolentino and Trinidad.
In Criminal Case No. 98-0258 for murder - shooting Josita Fernandez-Novelo on her face
causing upon the latter serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and proximate cause
of the death of the victim; Criminal Case No. 98-0260 for frustrated Murder- poking a firearm at
Antonio Bea, tying his hands with a rope and stabbing victim on different parts of his body, thus
causing upon the latter serious and mortal wounds capable of causing death; and in Criminal
Case No. 98-0270 for frustrated murder, with a shotgun, hitting Antonio Novelo on the different
parts of his body and then shot the latter but missed.
The prosecution rested its case and made a formal offer of evidence. Tolentino and Trinidad,
through counsel filed a Demurrer to Evidence, without leave of court. In an order dated 17 May
2000, the RTC denied the demurrer and submitted the case for decision pursuant to Section 15,
Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Then, appellants filed a motion for
reconsideration, praying that the order denying their Demurrer to Evidence be recalled and that
they be allowed to present evidence. The RTC denied the said motion. Unfazed, they filed a
petition for certiorari before the SC. The SC denied the petition which became final and
executory. As a result, the case was submitted for decision without any evidence proffered by
the defense. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision finding appellants guilty of the crimes
charged in Criminal Case No. 98-0258 and Criminal Case No. 98-0260 for murder and frustrated
murder, respectively.
The trial court, however, acquitted appellants of the crime of frustrated murder allegedly
committed against Antonio Novelo in Criminal Case No. 98-0270.
The CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants, with modifications on
the award of civil liabilities.
Hence, Tolentino and Trinidad urge the Supreme Court to revisit the issue as to the propriety of
the trial court’s Order dated 17 May 2000 denying the Demurrer to Evidence and preventing
them from presenting evidence due to their failure to seek leave of court prior to the filing of
the demurrer to evidence.
Issue: Is the trial court’s Order in denying the Demurrer to Evidence due to their failure to seek
leave of court prior to the filing of the demurrer to evidence proper?
RULE 118 & 119 | 39

Ruling: Yes. It must be pointed out that the issue on the validity of the trial court’s order dated
17 May 2000 was elevated to the SC via petition for certiorari. The Court in a Resolution dated 2
December 2000, dismissed the said petition, and upheld the trial court’s ruling that Tolentino
and Trinidad are barred from presenting their evidence for failure to seek leave of court prior to
the filing of the demurrer to evidence which was denied by the lower court. Since the issue of
whether or not Tolentino and Trinidad may be allowed to adduce evidence despite their failure
to file a prior leave of court had already been finally put to rest, the same has attained finality
and constitutes the law of the case. Any attempt to pass upon anew this final ruling constitutes a
crass contravention of elementary rules of procedure.
Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, it is stated that when an
accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court and the same is denied, he waives
his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence of
the prosecution, thus:
SEC. 15. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may
dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after
giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed
with prior leave of court.
If the Court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court,
he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis
of the evidence for the prosecution.
The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right
to present evidence for the accused. The rationale for this rule is that when the accused moves
for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution evidence, he does so
in the belief that said evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for him to
present any evidence is negated. An accused cannot be allowed to wager on the outcome of
judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience.
The purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal
as a demurrer to the evidence and, after denial thereof, the defense would then claim the right
to present its evidence. Thus, when the trial court disallowed Tolentino and Trinidad to present
evidence on their behalf, it properly applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Not even the gravity of the penalty for a particular offense can change this rule.
The filing of the demurrer to evidence without leave of court and its subsequent denial results in
the submission of the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence on record. Considering
that the governing rules on demurrer to evidence is a fundamental component of criminal
procedure, respondent judge had the obligation to observe the same, regardless of the gravity
of the offense charged. It is not for him to grant concessions to the accused who failed to obtain
prior leave of court. The rule is clear that upon the denial of the demurrer to evidence in this
RULE 118 & 119 | 40

case, the accused, who failed to ask for leave of court, shall waive the right to present evidence
in his behalf.
RULE 118 & 119 | 41

Cabador v. People
GR 186001, October 2, 2009
Michelle M. Alaba
Facts: On June 23, 2000, Antonio Cabador was charged before the RTC of QC for murder in
conspiracy with others. On February 2006, after presenting only five witnesses over five years of
intermittent trial, the RTC declared an end to the prosecution’s presentation of evidence and
required the prosecution to make a formal offer of its documentary evidence. However, the public
prosecutor asked for three extensions of time and still did not make the required written offer not
until August 1, 2006
On the same date, August 1, 2006, Cabador filed a motion to dismiss, complaining of a turtle-paced
proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial.
On August 31, 2006 the RTC issued an Order treating Cabador’s motion to dismiss as a demurrer to
evidence, and, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the RTC declared him to have waived
his right to present evidence in his defense. The trial court deemed the case submitted for decision.
Cabador filed MR of this Order but the RTC denied it.
Issue: WON Cabador’s motion to dismiss filed before the trial court was a demurrer to evidence.
Ruling: NO. Cabador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial,
not a demurrer to evidence.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused’s right to
speedy trial. This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without
fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial. This was
the main thrust of Cabador’s motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by
the trial court.
Cabador of course dropped a few lines in his motion to dismiss in paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12,
saying that the trial court "has no evidence to consider," "the charge has no leg to stand on," and
that "the witnesses x x x had no knowledge of any connection with or any participation by the
accused in the incident." But these were mere conclusions, highlighting what five years of trial had
accomplished.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer. He did
not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects such
evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime charged. His so-called "demurrer" did not touch
on any particular testimony of even one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit. Indeed, he could
not because, he did not know that the prosecution finally made its formal offer of exhibits on the
same date he filed his motion to dismiss. To say that Cabador filed a demurrer to evidence is
equivalent to the proverbial blind man, touching the side of an elephant, and exclaiming that he had
touched a wall.
Besides, a demurrer to evidence u that the prosecution has already rested its case. Section 23,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads:
RULE 118 & 119 | 42

Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused with or without
leave of court.
But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in the case,
the remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he shall
be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be considered submitted
for judgment.
To determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court
must consider:
(1) the allegations in it made in good faith;
(2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and
(3) the primary objective of the party filing it.
Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits, on the same day Cabador filed his
motion to dismiss, the trial court still needed to give Cabador an opportunity to object to the
admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after such a
ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case. Since Cabador filed his motion
to dismiss before he could object to the prosecution’s formal offer, before the trial court could act on
the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it could not be said that he had intended
his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence.
RULE 118 & 119 | 43

Nicholas v. Sandiganbayan
GR 175930, February 11, 2008
Honeelee E. Arevalo
Facts: Nicolas and Arriola, former Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, respectively, of the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), stand charged before public respondent
in Criminal Case Nos. 26267 and 26268, for violation of Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs
Code in the first case, and Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019 in the second.
Petitioners separately filed motions for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence with Motion
to Admit Attached Demurrer to Evidence.
Respecting the first Information, petitioners' respective Demurrer maintained that the evidence
admitted by public respondent failed to identify and prove that they were the perpetrators of
the crimes charged, for there was no showing that they caused, approved or acted in any
manner relative to the release of the goods.
Respecting the second Information, petitioners' Demurrer maintained that the prosecution failed
to establish each and every material element thereof.
In the main, petitioners thus argued that the prosecution was not only unable to show that they
were the perpetrators of the crimes charged or that they committed any prohibited act; it was
also not able to prove that undue injury was caused the government.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper remedy in assailing a
denial of a demurrer to evidence.
Ruling: YES. On whether certiorari is the proper remedy in the consolidated petitions, the
general rule prevailing is that it does not lie to review an order denying a demurrer to
evidence, which is equivalent to a motion to dismiss, filed after the prosecution has
presented its evidence and rested its case.
Such order, being merely interlocutory, is not appealable; neither can it be the subject of a
petition for certiorari.The rule admits of exceptions, however. Action on a demurrer or on
a motion to dismiss rests on the sound exercise of judicial discretion. In Tadeo v. People,
this Court declared that certiorari may be availed of when the denial of a demurrer to
evidence is tainted with "grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive
exercise of judicial authority."
Indeed, resort to certiorari is expressly recognized and allowed under Rules 41 and 65 of the
Rules of Court, viz:
Rule 41:
SEC. 1. Subject of appeal. - No appeal may be taken from:
RULE 118 & 119 | 44

(c) An interlocutory order;
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Did the public respondent commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners'
Demurrer? The Court finds that it did.
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence. - After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may
dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving
the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused with prior leave of
court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense.
When the accused files such motion without the express leave of court, he waives the right to
present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.
A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law to make out a case or
sustain the issue.
The party filing the demurrer in effect challenges the sufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence. The Court is thus tasked to ascertain if there is competent or sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
Absent the element of evident bad faith and gross neglect of duty, not to mention want of proof
of manifest partiality on the part of Nicolas, the graft case against him cannot prosper.
To stress, not one of the documents admitted for the prosecution contained Arriola's name,
initials or signature.
Even granting arguendo Arriola made a recommendation for the withdrawal of the van as the
prosecution suggested, this alone does not prove that he acted in bad faith. The presumption of
law being in favor of good faith, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove bad faith.
Given that the evidence presented by the prosecution against petitioners does not prima facie
prove petitioners' culpability beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence did not shift to
the defense. The Court thus finds that the public respondent gravely abused its discretion in
denying their Demurrer to Evidence.
RULE 118 & 119 | 45

Cabarles v. Judge Maceda

GR 161330, February 20, 2007
Kelvinn L. Banuelos
Facts: A day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment on April 2, 2003, Judge Maceda
motu proprio issued the questioned order reopening the case. In it, he observed that the
prosecution may not have been given its day in court resulting in a miscarriage of justice. He
explained that because there was a mix-up in the dates specified in the subpoena and the
hearing dates of when the case was actually heard, the prosecution was unable to present its
evidence on the first four of the five hearing dates: April 18, May 4, 11 and 18, 2001 assigned to
it. Judge Maceda found that there was no hearing conducted on April 18, 2001.
According to Judge Maceda, since the prosecution was not able to present its evidence on the
first four hearing dates and there was either no return on the subpoenas subsequently issued or
there was no subpoena issued at all to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen, the prosecution should have been
given a last chance to present the alleged eyewitness and the doctor.
Finally, on June 19, 2003, Pedrosa took the witness stand and completed her direct examination.
A few days thereafter, Cabarles filed the present petition questioning Judge Maceda’s order,
alleging that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Cabarles insists that Judge Maceda gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the
reopening of the case before promulgation of judgment although both parties had already
rested their case. Cabarles argues that a case may only be reopened after a judgment of
conviction has been made but before its finality, as provided in Section 24, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Cabarles insists that the reopening of a case under Section
24 presupposes that judgment has already been promulgated, which is not the case here.
According to the petitioner, the cases cited by the People are not at all applicable in this case
since they were tried and decided before the introduction of Section 24 under the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
For Judge Maceda, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that Section 24 is a new
provision which merely formalized the long accepted practice of judges of reopening a case to
avoid a miscarriage of justice. This being the case, jurisprudence providing that a judge has the
discretion to reopen a case even before promulgation of judgment still holds.
Issue: Did Judge Maceda commit grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio reopening of the
case?
Ruling:YES. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements
for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction;
(2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued
only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and
RULE 118 & 119 | 46

(5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty
days from the issuance of the order.
Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to
offer rebutting evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice,
may allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the
appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. A motion to reopen may thus properly be
presented only after either or both parties had formally offered and closed their evidence, but
before judgment is rendered, and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment and
the only controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice.
This remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case before judgment is rendered,
Section 24 requires that a hearing must first be conducted. Judge Maceda issued the April 1,
2003 Order without notice and hearing and without giving the prosecution and accused an
opportunity to manifest their position on the matter. This failure, to our mind, constitutes grave
abuse of discretion and goes against the due process clause of the Constitution which requires
notice and opportunity to be heard. The issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a
hearing, is contrary to the express language of Section 24, Rule 119.
RULE 118 & 119 | 47

Criminal Procedure: Case Compilation

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Criminal Procedure: Case Compilation

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CASE TITLE PERSON ASSIGNED DIGESTED

SUBJECT MATTER: Section 2

People v. Hernandez, July 30, 1996 Cayetano ✔

Binay v. Sandiganbayan, November 12, 2002 De Peralta ✔

People v. Ancheta, January 14, 2004 Dulay ✔

SUBJECT MATTER: Section 4

Abubakar vs Abubakar, October 22, 1999 Pacquiao, JL ✔

People v. Guzman, Jan 26, 2007 Gierran ✔

CASE TITLE PERSON ASSIGNED DIGESTED

SUBJECT MATTER: Section 1 & 2

Mari v. Judge Gonzales, GR 187728, September Macatol ✔

SUBJECT MATTER: Section 6 & 9

Olbes v. Buemio GR 173319, December 4, 2009 Miranda ✔

SUBJECT MATTER: Section 11

Adorio v. Bersamin GR 120074, June 10, 1997 Olaco ✔

SUBJECT MATTER: Section 15

Cuenco v. Risos, GR 152643, August 28, 2008 Pajaro ✔

SUBJECT MATTER: Section 17

Hubert Webb v. Judge De Leon, GR 121234, Paniza ✔

People v. Fajardo, GR 173022, January 23, 2007 Roxas ✔

Salvanera v. People and Parane, GR 143093, Salcedo ✔

Monge v. People, GR 170308, March 7, 2008 Soriano ✔

People v. Dela Cruz, GR 173308, June 25, 2008 Tado ✔

Ampatuan v. De Lima, GR 197291, April 3, 2013 Tan ✔

SUBJECT MATTER: Section 23

Park v. Choi, GR 165496, February 12, 2007 Usman ✔

Dayap v. Sendiong, GR 177960, January 29, Villarin ✔

People v. Tolentino, GR 176385, Feb 26, 2008 Abellana ✔

Cabador v. People, GR 186001, October 2, 2009 Alaba ✔

Nicholas v. Sandiganbayan, Gr 175930, February Arevalo ✔

SUBJECT MATTER: Section 24

Cabarles v. Judge Maceda, GR 161330, February Banuelos ✔

SUBJECT MATTER: Section 2

Issue: WON the stipulation of facts is valid.

RULE 118 & 119 | 1

RULE 118 & 119 | 2

The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw Joint Stipulation.

Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court states:

RULE 118 & 119 | 4

RULE 118 & 119 | 5

The Information specifically alleged the qualifying circumstances of minority and

The RTC convicted Ancheta and imposed the penalty of death.

RULE 118 & 119 | 6

RULE 118 & 119 | 7

Issue: What are the effects of a pre-trial order?

RULE 118 & 119 | 8

RULE 118 & 119 | 9

RULE 118 & 119 | 10

RULE 118 & 119 | 11

SUBJECT MATTER: Section 1 & 2

Mari v. Judge Gonzales

RULE 118 & 119 | 12

RULE 118 & 119 | 13

Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused's right to speedy trial is deemed

RULE 118 & 119 | 14

RULE 118 & 119 | 15

Issue: Whether petitioner’s right to speedy trial had been violated.

RULE 118 & 119 | 16

RULE 118 & 119 | 17

RULE 118 & 119 | 18

RULE 118 & 119 | 19

Rules of Court, Rule 119, Section 11(e):