GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.
GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN
DIEGO, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
FACTS:
I. Pork Barrel General Concept
Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum,
discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal destinations from “Congressional Pork Barrel”, now known as Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation of the Pork Barrel is merged in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Allocation of the PDAF since 2011:
a. 70 Million Php – for each member of the lower house; 40
million for hard projects, 30 million for soft projects b. 200 Million Php- for each senator; 100 million for hard projects, 100 million for soft projects c. 200 Million Php- for the Vice President; 100M for hard projects, 100M for soft projects
Certain Cabinet members may realign the funds into their
department, provided that the realignment is approved by the legislator concerned.
The president also has his own pork barrel (Presidential
Pork Barrel), from 2 sources: a. Malampaya funds from the Malampaya Gas Project, b. Presidential Social Fund derived from the earnings of PAGCOR.
II. Probing PDAF Allocation Allegations
In July 2013, the NBI began its probe in the corruption
allegations regarding the PDAF. It was alleged that the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects. JLN Corporation (JLN stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos to fund ghost projects using 20 dummy NGOs for a decade.
On September 3, 2013 Greco Belgica and several others filed
petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel Systems.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is
constitutional. II. Whether or not the presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is
unconstitutional as it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of powers- as a rule, Congress has
the budgeting power. It regulates the release of funds. Only the executive can implement the law however, under the pork barrel systems, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers.
b. Principle of checks and balances- Under this
principle, the president may deny items on the GAA which he may deem inappropriate. This power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.” II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel system is constitutional. The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides: No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes
from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation. The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit: (i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct; (ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws, which met the requirement of
Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECTS OF DECISION:
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s
pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the
recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.”
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore