Table of Contents

RULE 72: EXCLUSIONS .................................................................................... 2

Hernaez vs IAC ........................................................................................... 2
ARRIOLA vs ARRIOLA.................................................................................. 4
SPOUSES KELLY vs PLANTERS PRODUCTS .................................................. 9
RAMOS vs PANGILINAN ........................................................................... 11
MOHAMAD, ET AL vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY .......................................... 13
OTHER SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS: ................................................................... 47
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES; ORGANIZATION vs CA ... 47
RULE 72, SEC. 2: EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCEPTION ....................................... 52
GUY vs CA ................................................................................................ 52
ENRICO vs HEIRS OF SPOUSES MEDINACELLI ........................................... 56
GARCIA-QUIAZON vs BELEN ..................................................................... 59
RULE 73, SEC. 1: ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES .............................................. 63
LIMJOCO vs INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRAGRANTE ...................................... 63
LIM vs CA ................................................................................................. 67
CMH vs CA ............................................................................................... 73
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE .............................................................................. 77
GERILLA vs DE FIGURACION ..................................................................... 77
PEREIRA vs CA .......................................................................................... 79
AVELINO vs CA ......................................................................................... 82
TEVES vs CA.............................................................................................. 84
HERNANDEZ vs ANDAL ............................................................................ 89
CUA vs VARGAS........................................................................................ 94
SAMPILO vs CA ......................................................................................... 98
ALCALA vs PABALAN .............................................................................. 101
RULE 72: EXCLUSIONS
Hernaez vs IAC
G.R. No. 73864 May 7, 1992
TEODORO PALMES HERNAEZ, JR., represented by his mother and natural guardian,
EVELYN PALMES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, TEODORO HERNAEZ, SR., ESTRELLA G.
HERNAEZ, FERDINAND R. HERNAEZ, DOUGLAS F. HERNAEZ, ARLENE F. HERNAEZ,
WINSTON F. HERNAEZ, NIEL F. HERNAEZ, and MA. ESTRELLITA F.
HERNAEZ, respondents.
Pepino Law Office for petitioner.
NOCON, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the decision dated November 6, 1985 of the
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) 1 in AC-G.R. No. SP-
05928, Teodoro G. Hernaez, et al. vs. Hon. Regina G. Ordoñez Benitez, et. al., which
held as void the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XLVII, in Civil
Case No. E-02786 declaring petitioner Teodoro Palmes Hernaez, Jr. as the recognized
natural child of private respondent Teodoro G. Hernaez and entitled to a P400.00
monthly support.
It appears from the records that on September 2, 1980, petitioner represented by his
mother and natural guardian, Evelyn Palmes, filed a complaint with the then Juvenile
and Domestic Court (now Regional Trial Court) against Teodoro Hernaez for
acknowledgment and support with support pendente lite. A decision dated March 23,
1984 was rendered by said court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring plaintiff, Teodoro Palmes Hernaez, Jr., the recognized natural child of
defendant, Teodoro G. Hernaez;
2. Ordering said defendant to give a monthly support of P400.00 to the minor until
he reaches the age of majority or completes his education or training commencing
February 10, 1979. The total amount in arrears shall be paid in two equal
installments, the first, one (1) month after this Decision shall have become final and
executory; and the second, two (2) months after the first installment. The monthly
support for June, 1984 shall be paid within the first five (5) days of July, 1984.
Thereafter, the monthly support shall be paid within the first five (5) days of the
succeeding months, which shall be deposited with the Cashier of the Regional Trial
Courts of Manila at City Hall, Manila, from whom plaintiff's mother or her duly
authorized representative may withdraw the same; and
3. Ordering the defendant to give plaintiff the amount of P2,000.00 for attorney's
fees. 2
On June 29, 1984, Teodoro Hernaez filed a notice of appeal of said decision which he
received on May 31,1984.
As the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period of 15 days as mandated by
Section 39 of Batas Pambansa 129, petitioner moved to dismiss the appeal as the
decision of the trial court has become final and executory.
Realizing the defect in his notice of appeal, Teodoro Hernaez filed a Motion to Give
Due Course to Appeal or Petition for Relief on August 8, 1984 which was denied in
the Order of September 12, 1984 on the ground that the motion was filed out of time
and the petition did not comply with Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of
Court. 3
On September 19, 1984, Teodoro Hernaez thru his new counsel, filed another
Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that he was not aware of the decision of
the lower court. On the same date, private respondent's wife, Estrella Hernaez,
together with their six children likewise filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with
Motion to Intervene because they were not included as parties in the instant case,
which petitions and motion were denied in the order of December 21, 1984 4 for lack
of merit and on the ground that the decision had already become final and executory.
From said order, private respondents appealed which was granted in an order dated
January 25, 1985.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
January 25, 1985 which was also granted by the trial court on February 20, 1985.
Private respondents then filed a motion for clarification inquiring as to whether their
appeal which was granted on January 25, 1986 was subsequently denied because of
the order of February 20, 1985. The trial court issued an order declaring that there is
no need for a clarification.
On March 20, 1985, petitioner filed a motion to require private respondent Teodoro parents recognize the child, in which cases the action is brought against the putative
Hernaez to deposit support in arrears or to be cited for contempt. parent's heirs.

During the hearing of the motion for contempt, private respondents' counsel In fine, an action for compulsory recognition is an ordinary civil action. Thus, service
requested for 10 days within which to comply with the questioned decision. of summons on the putative parent shall be as provided for under Rule 14. Said action
However, on April 10, 1986, private respondents, instead of complying with said shall be brought against the putative parent only; his heirs may be made party
decision, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus or alternatively, an defendants only under the circumstances mentioned in Article 285.
action for the annulment of judgment with preliminary injunction with the
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
Intermediate Appellate Court, 5 which declared the decision of the trial court null and
and the decision dated March 23, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
void for lack of summons by publication being an action in rem. 6
XLVII in Civil Case No. E-02786 is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 21, 1986, private respondents.
petitioner instituted this Petition for Review.
SO ORDERED.
It is petitioner's contention that the requirement of publication is not necessary in an
action for compulsory acknowledgment and support of an illegitimate child since said
action is not one of the instances enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 72 of the Revised
Rules of Court requiring publication of the petition before jurisdiction can be acquired
by the Court. Under the "expressio unius est exclussio alterius" principle on statutory
construction, this action should be considered a proceeding in personam.

We find merit in the petition.

An action for compulsory recognition of minor natural children is not among cases of
special proceedings mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, such an action should be governed by the rules on ordinary civil
actions.

The case at bar does not fall under Rule 105 of the Rules of Court since the same
applies only to cases falling under Article 281 of the Civil Code where there has been
a voluntary recognition of the minor natural child, i.e., prior recognition of the minor
natural child in a document other than a record of birth or a will, which is absent in
the instant case.

Private respondents' claim that notice of an action for compulsory recognition should
also be given to the wife and legitimate children of the putative parent, Teodoro
Hernaez, Sr., is unmeritorious. First of all, in a case for compulsory recognition, the
party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself.

Secondly, implicit in both Articles 283 7 and 285 8 of the Civil Code is the general rule
that an action for compulsory recognition should the brought against the putative
father, 9 the exceptions being the instances when either the putative parent died
during the minority of the child, or when after the death of the parent a document
should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both of the
ARRIOLA vs ARRIOLA
G.R. No. 177703 January 28, 2008
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA, petitioners,
vs.
JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the November 30, 2006 Decision1 and April 30, 2007 Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93570.
The relevant facts are culled from the records.
John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 03-0010 with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Piñas City (RTC) against Vilma G. Arriola and
Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners) for judicial partition of the properties of
decedent Fidel Arriola (the decedent Fidel). Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel
with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent
Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.
On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John
Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of
one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees
thereon, if any;
2. Attorney's fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS is hereby
awarded to be reimbursed by the defendants to the plaintiff;
3. Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.3
The decision became final on March 15, 2004.4
As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land covered by
TCT No. 383714 (subject land), respondent sought its sale through public auction, and
petitioners acceded to it.5 Accordingly, the RTC ordered the public auction of the
subject land.6 The public auction sale was scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had to
be reset when petitioners refused to include in the auction the house (subject house)
standing on the subject land.7 This prompted respondent to file with the RTC an
Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court,8 praying that petitioners be
declared in contempt.
The RTC denied the motion in an Order9 dated August 30, 2005, for the reason that
petitioners were justified in refusing to have the subject house included in the
auction, thus:
The defendants [petitioners] are correct in holding that the house or improvement
erected on the property should not be included in the auction sale.
A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision and of the evidence adduced
during the ex-parte hearing clearly show that nothing was mentioned about the
house existing on the land subject matter of the case. In fact, even plaintiff's
[respondent's] initiatory Complaint likewise did not mention anything about the
house. Undoubtedly therefore, the Court did not include the house in its adjudication
of the subject land because it was plaintiff himself who failed to allege the same. It is
a well-settled rule that the court can not give a relief to that which is not alleged and
prayed for in the complaint.
To hold, as plaintiff argued, that the house is considered accessory to the land on
which it is built is in effect to add to plaintiff's [a] right which has never been
considered or passed upon during the trial on the merits.
In the absence of any other declaration, obvious or otherwise, only the land should
be partitioned in accordance to[sic] the aforementioned Decision as the house can
not be said to have been necessarily adjudicated therein. Thus, plaintiff can not be
declared as a co-owner of the same house without evidence thereof and due hearing
thereon.
The Decision of the Court having attained its finality, as correctly pointed out,
judgment must stand even at the risk that it might be erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court filed by
plaintiff is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.10
The RTC, in its Order dated January 3, 2006, denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration.11
Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari12 where he sought to have the
RTC Orders set aside, and prayed that he be allowed to proceed with the auction of
the subject land including the subject house.
In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the Petition for Certiorari, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders dated August 30, 2005
and January 3, 2006 issued by the RTC, in Civil Case No. SCA 03-0010, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the sheriff is ordered to proceed with the public auction sale of
the subject lot covered by TCT No. 383714, including the house constructed thereon.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its
Resolution14 of April 30, 2007.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the CA erred in holding that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for contempt of
court.
The assailed CA Decision and Resolution must be modified for reasons other than
those advanced by petitioners.
The contempt proceeding initiated by respondent was one for indirect contempt.
Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure for the institution
of proceedings for indirect contempt, viz:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or
papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing
initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges
arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided
separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphases supplied.)
Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the requirements for initiating
an indirect contempt proceeding are a) that it be initiated by way of a verified petition
and b) that it should fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings
for civil actions. In Regalado v. Go,15 we held:
As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified petition that has
complied with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatory x
x x:
This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper procedure for
commencing contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as
special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogenous practice tolerated by
the courts, has been for any party to file a motion without paying any docket or lawful
fees therefore and without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings,
which is now required in the second paragraph of this amended section.
xxxx
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu propio by order
of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a
verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefore and shall be
disposed in accordance with the second paragraph of this section.
xxxx
Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the court
already acquired jurisdiction, the rules direct that the petition for contempt be
treated independently of the principal action. Consequently, the necessary
prerequisites for the filing of initiatory pleadings, such as the filing of a verified
petition, attachment of a certification on non-forum shopping, and the payment of
the necessary docket fees, must be faithfully observed.
xxxx
The provisions of the Rules are worded in very clear and categorical language. In case
where the indirect contempt charge is not initiated by the courts, the filing of a
verified petition which fulfills the requirements on initiatory pleadings is a
prerequisite. Beyond question now is the mandatory requirement of a verified
petition in initiating an indirect contempt proceeding. Truly, prior to the amendment
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, mere motion without complying with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings was tolerated by the courts. At the onset of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, such practice can no longer be
countenanced.16 (Emphasis ours.)
The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceeding initiated
by respondent. The latter did not comply with any of the mandatory requirements of
Section 4, Rule 71. He filed a mere Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt
of Court, and not a verified petition. He likewise did not conform with the
requirements for the filing of initiatory pleadings such as the submission of a
certification against forum shopping and the payment of docket fees. Thus, his
unverified motion should have been dismissed outright by the RTC.
It is noted though that, while at first the RTC overlooked the infirmities in
respondent's unverified motion for contempt, in the end, it dismissed the motion,
albeit on substantive grounds. The trouble is that, in the CA decision assailed herein,
the appellate court committed the same oversight by delving into the merits of
respondent's unverified motion and granting the relief sought therein. Thus, strictly
speaking, the proper disposition of the present petition ought to be the reversal of
the CA decision and the dismissal of respondent's unverified motion for contempt
filed in the RTC for being in contravention of Section 4, Rule 71.
However, such simplistic disposition will not put an end to the dispute between the
parties. A seed of litigation has already been sown that will likely sprout into another
case between them at a later time. We refer to the question of whether the subject
house should be included in the public auction of the subject land. Until this question
is finally resolved, there will be no end to litigation between the parties. We must
therefore deal with it squarely, here and now.
The RTC and the CA differed in their views on whether the public auction should
include the subject house. The RTC excluded the subject house because respondent
never alleged its existence in his complaint for partition or established his co-
ownership thereof.17 On the other hand, citing Articles 440,18 44519 and 44620 of the
Civil Code, the CA held that as the deceased owned the subject land, he also owned
the subject house which is a mere accessory to the land. Both properties form part
of the estate of the deceased and are held in co-ownership by his heirs, the parties
herein. Hence, the CA concludes that any decision in the action for partition of said
estate should cover not just the subject land but also the subject house. 21 The CA
further pointed out that petitioners themselves implicitly recognized the inclusion of
the subject house in the partition of the subject land when they proposed in their
letter of August 5, 2004, the following swapping-arrangement:
Sir:
Thank you very much for accommodating us even if we are only poor and simple
people. We are very much pleased with the decision of Presiding Judge Manuel B.
Fernandez, Jr., RTC Br. 254, Las Piñas, on the sharing of one-third (1/3) each of a land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) in Las Piñas City.
However, to preserve the sanctity of our house which is our residence for more than
twenty (20) years, we wish to request that the 1/3 share of John Nabor C. Arriola be
paid by the defendants depending on the choice of the plaintiff between item (1) or
item (2), detailed as follows:
(1) Swap with a 500-square meters [sic] lot located at Baras Rizal x x x.
(2) Cash of P205,700.00 x x x.
x x x x.22
We agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition for reasons
postulated by the CA. We qualify, however, that this ruling does not necessarily
countenance the immediate and actual partition of the subject house by way of
public auction in view of the suspensive proscription imposed under Article 159 of
The Family Code which will be discussed forthwith.
It is true that the existence of the subject house was not specifically alleged in the
complaint for partition. Such omission notwithstanding, the subject house is deemed
part of the judgment of partition for two compelling reasons.
First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject
house is deemed part of the subject land. The Court quotes with approval the ruling
of the CA, to wit:
The RTC, in the assailed Order dated August 30, 2005 ratiocinated that since the
house constructed on the subject lot was not alleged in the complaint and its
ownership was not passed upon during the trial on the merits, the court cannot
include the house in its adjudication of the subject lot. The court further stated that
it cannot give a relief to[sic] which is not alleged and prayed for in the complaint.
We are not persuaded.
To follow the foregoing reasoning of the RTC will in effect render meaningless the
pertinent rule on accession. In general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso
jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even
if the improvements including the house were not alleged in the complaint for
partition, they are deemed included in the lot on which they stand, following the
principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of judicial partition in this case
includes the house which is permanently attached thereto, otherwise, it would be
absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the house which is
permanently attached thereto.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was built by the
deceased.24 Petitioners never controverted such claim. There is then no dispute that
the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased; as such, it is owned in
common by the latter's heirs, the parties herein,25 any one of whom, under Article
49426 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of the subject
house.27 Therefore, respondent's recourse to the partition of the subject house
cannot be hindered, least of all by the mere technical omission of said common
property from the complaint for partition.
That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the subject
house as part of the co-ownership of the parties, we stop short of authorizing its
actual partition by public auction at this time. It bears emphasis that an action for
partition involves two phases: first, the declaration of the existence of a state of co-
ownership; and second, the actual termination of that state of co-ownership through
the segregation of the common property. 28 What is settled thus far is only the fact
that the subject house is under the co-ownership of the parties, and therefore
susceptible of partition among them.
Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the RTC is
an entirely different matter, depending on the exact nature of the subject house.
Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive
property.29 Petitioners add that said house has been their residence for 20
years.30 Taken together, these averments on record establish that the subject house
is a family home within the contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code,
particularly:
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by
an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family
reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such
and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic
constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a family residence,
without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the
defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home
not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on
which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the
specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a
family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began
occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back. 31
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the
family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate
partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz:
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses
or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there
is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied.)
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following
the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol
of family love, security and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its
partition: first, that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10
years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family,
or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second,
that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the
court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged by
the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of
the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or
through auction sale as suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate
partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the
family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been
willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an
ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights
of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights
granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house
and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed
to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March
10, 2003.32 Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer
period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he
constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for
the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the
property.
The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals33 that a claim for exception from
execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be set up and proved to the Sheriff
before the sale of the property at public auction. Herein petitioners timely objected
to the inclusion of the subject house although for a different reason.

To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the subject house
is part of the judgment of co-ownership and partition. The same evidence also
establishes that the subject house and the portion of the subject land on which it is
standing have been constituted as the family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs.
Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse
of a period of 10 years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013.

It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the

immediate public auction of the portion of the subject land covered by TCT No.
383714, which falls outside the specific area of the family home.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30, 2006 Decision
and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED in that the house
standing on the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714
is DECLARED part of the co-ownership of the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G.
Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by public
auction within the period provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES KELLY vs PLANTERS PRODUCTS
G.R. No. 172263 July 9, 2008
SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY, Complainants,
vs.
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA,1 Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on
consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther’s
failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 (RTC Makati City). This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 91-904.
After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ
of execution. Pursuant thereto, respondent sheriff Jorge A. Ragutana sold on
execution real property covered by TCT No. 15079 located in Naga City. A certificate
of sale was issued in favor of PPI as the highest bidder.
After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris
A. Kelley (Doris) filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC
Makati City on the ground that the subject property was their family home which was
exempt from execution. Petitioners’ motion was denied for failure to comply with
the three-day notice requirement.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of levy and sale
of the alleged family home with damages against Ragutana and PPI in the Regional
Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 (RTC Naga City). This was docketed as Civil Case
No. 2000-0188. The case was, however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and lack of
cause of action. The dismissal was upheld by the CA.
Petitioners now come to us in this petition for review on certiorari contending that
the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2000-0188 by the RTC Naga
City. They claim that Doris was a stranger2 to Civil Case No. 91-904 (in the RTC Makati
City) who could not be forced to litigate therein.
Petitioners anchor their action in Civil Case No. 2000-0188 on their contention that
TCT No. 15079 is the Kelley family home. No doubt, a family home is generally exempt
from execution3 provided it was duly constituted as such. There must be proof that
the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an
unmarried head of a family.4 It must be the house where they and their family
actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. 5 The family home must be part of
the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the
exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter’s consent, or on the property of
the unmarried head of the family.6 The actual value of the family home shall not
exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of ₱300,000 in urban areas and
₱200,000 in rural areas.7
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
(August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family
residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. 8
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as
such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. 9 Moreover,
the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred
after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988),
the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or
extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for
the following exceptions:
Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such
constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and
others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the
building.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 160. When a creditor whose claim is not among those mentioned in Article
155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that
the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article
157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing
the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the
actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of
the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum
amount allowed by law in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary
improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by
the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule
and procedure shall apply.

xxx xxx xxx

We grant the petition only to the extent of allowing petitioners to adduce evidence
in the trial court that TCT No. 15079 is in fact their family home as constituted in
accordance with the requirements of law. This is in consonance with our ruling
in Gomez v. Sta. Ines10 where we held:

[The husband and children] were not parties to the Pasig RTC case and are third-party
claimants who became such only after trial in the previous case had been terminated
and the judgment therein had become final and executory. Neither were they
indispensable nor necessary parties in the Pasig RTC case, and they could not
therefore intervene in said case. As strangers to the original case, respondents cannot
be compelled to present their claim with the Pasig RTC which issued the writ of
execution.xxx

In said case, the alleged family home was sold on execution by the sheriff of the Pasig
RTC.1avvphi1 The husband and children of the judgment debtor filed a complaint for
annulment of sale of the levied property in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya where the
alleged family home was situated. As they were considered strangers to the action
filed in the Pasig RTC, we ruled that the Nueva Vizcaya RTC had jurisdiction over the
complaint and that they could vindicate their alleged claim to the levied property
there.11

WHEREFORE, Civil Case No. 2000-0188 captioned Spouses Auther G. Kelley, Jr. and
Doris A. Kelley v. Planters Products, Inc. and Jorge A. Ragutana is
hereby REINSTATED and this case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
of Naga City, Branch 19 for determination whether or not the property covered by
TCT No. 15079 is a duly constituted family home and therefore exempt from
execution.

SO ORDERED.
RAMOS vs PANGILINAN be levied upon, the family home straddled two (2) lots, including the lot covered by
G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010 TCT No. 38978, hence, they cannot be asked to vacate the house. The Labor Arbiter
was later to deny, by Decision of May 7, 2009, the third-party claim, holding
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS WORAK, MANUEL T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA
R. ROTHMAN, SONIA R. POST, ELVIRA P. MUNAR, and OFELIA R. LIM, Petitioners, that Ramos’ death and petitioners’ substitution as his compulsory heirs would not
vs. nullify the sale at auction of the Pandacan property. And the NLRC6 would later affirm
DANILO PANGILINAN, RODOLFO SUMANG, LUCRECIO BAUTISTA and ROLANDO the Labor Arbiter’s ruling, noting that petitioners failed to exercise their right to
ANTENOR, Respondents. redeem the Pandacan property within the one 1 year period or until January 16, 2009.
The NLRC brushed aside petitioners’ contention that they should have been given a
DECISION fresh period of 1 year from the time of Ramos’ death on July 29, 2008 or until July 30,
2009 to redeem the property, holding that to do so would give petitioners, as mere
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
heirs, a better right than the Ramos’.
Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint1 for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos
As to petitioners’ claim that the property was covered by the regime of conjugal
Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein
partnership of gains and as such only Ramos’ share can be levied upon, the NLRC
petitioners. By Decision2 of April 15, 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
ruled that petitioners failed to substantiate such claim and that the phrase in the TCT
respondents and ordered Ramos and the company to pay the aggregate amount of
indicating the registered owner as "Ernesto Ramos, married to Juanita Trinidad,
₱1,661,490.30 representing their backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay &
Filipinos," did not mean that both owned the property, the phrase having merely
service incentive leave pay.
described Ramos’ civil status.
The Decision having become final and executory and no settlement having been
Before the appellate court, petitioners alleged that the NLRC erred in ruling that the
forged by the parties, the Labor Arbiter issued on September 8, 2005 a writ of
market value of the property was ₱2,177,000 as assessed by the City Assessor of
execution3 which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission
Manila and appearing in the documents submitted before the Labor Arbiter, claiming
(NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name covered by TCT No.
that at the time the Pandacan property was constituted as the family home in 1944,
38978, situated in Pandacan, Manila (Pandacan property).
its value was way below ₱300,000; and that Art. 153 of the Family Code was
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from applicable, hence, they no longer had to resort to judicial or extrajudicial constitution.
execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash
In the assailed Decision7 of September 24, 2008, the appellate court, in denying
the writ of execution.4 Respondents, however, averred that the Pandacan property
petitioners’ appeal, held that the Pandacan property was not exempted from
is not the Ramos family home, as it has another in Antipolo, and the Pandacan
execution, for while "Article 1538 of the Family Code provides that the family home
property in fact served as the company’s business address as borne by the company’s
is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
letterhead. Respondents added that, assuming that the Pandacan property was
residence, [it] did not mean that the article has a retroactive effect such that all
indeed the family home, only the value equivalent to ₱300,000 was exempt from
existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at
execution.
the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code."
By Order5 of August 2, 2006, the Labor Arbiter denied the motion to quash, hence,
The appellate court went on to hold that what was applicable law were Articles 224
Ramos and the company appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s
to 251 of the Civil Code, hence, there was still a need to either judicially or
Order.
extrajudicially constitute the Pandacan property as petitioners’ family home before
Ramos and the company appealed to the Court of Appeals during the pendency of it can be exempted; and as petitioners failed to comply therewith, there was no error
which Ramos died and was substituted by herein petitioners. Petitioners also filed in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution.
before the NLRC, as third-party claimants, a Manifestation questioning the Notice to
Vacate issued by the Sheriff, alleging that assuming that the Pandacan property may
The only question raised in the present petition for review on certiorari is the
propriety of the Court of Appeals Decision holding that the levy upon the Pandacan
property was valid.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the
land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy
such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It
cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. 9
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc. 10 lays down the rules relative to the levy on
execution over the family home, viz:
No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly
constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home was
constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It
must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which
it is situated. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either
spouse with the latter’s consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the
family. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its
constitution, the amount of ₱300,000 in urban areas and ₱200,000 in rural areas.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
(August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family
residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as
such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover,
the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred
after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988),
the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or
extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code. (emphasis supplied)
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to
what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be
complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before
August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially
as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. 11 Judicial
constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the
courts and the registration of the court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area
where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by
Articles 240 to 24212 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public
instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to
comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor
from availing of the privilege.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially,
and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as
any of its beneficiaries under Art. 15413 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family
home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if
exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other,
and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is
located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 15514 for which the family home is made answerable must have
been incurred after August 3, 1988.1avvphi1
And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it is not sufficient
that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family
home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved.15
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted
prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure
mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan
property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the
law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners. Parenthetically, the
records show that the sheriff exhausted all means to execute the judgment but failed
because Ramos’ bank accounts16 were already closed while other properties in his or
the company’s name had already been transferred,17 and the only property left was
the Pandacan property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
MOHAMAD, ET AL vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 231658
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO,
EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners
vs.
HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N.
LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND
MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR,
Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 231771
EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, VIRGILIO T. LIN CUNA, ATELIANA U. HIJOS, ROLAND
A. COBRADO, CARL ANTHONY D. OLALO, ROY JIM BALANGIDG, RENATO REYES, JR.,
CRISTIN A E. PALABAY, AMARYLLIS H. ENRIQUEZ, ACT TEACHERS' REPRESENTATIVE
ANTONIO L. TINIO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE
i\RLENED.BROSAS,KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO,
MAE PANER, GABRIELA KRISTA DALENA, ANNA ISABELLE ESTEIN, MARK VINCENT
D. LIM, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO, JOVITA MONTES, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA,
DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GENERAL EDUARDO ANO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA, Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 231774
NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, SITTIE NUR DYHANNA S. MOHAMAD, NORAISAH S. SANI,
ZAHRIA P. MUTI-MAPANDI, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG) SECRETARY (OFFICER-INCHARGE)
CATALINO S. CUY, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHEF OF STAFF GEN.
EDUARDO M. AÑO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL
RONALD M. DELA ROSA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON,
JR., Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo
Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
The full text of Proclamation No. 216 reads as follows:
WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016, was issued on 04 September 2016
declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao;
WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that 'x x x In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (the President) may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law x x x';
WHEREAS, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968,
provides that 'the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising and taking
arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives';
WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the series
of violent acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such as the attack on the
military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing and wounding several
soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016, freeing their arrested
comrades and other detainees;
WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a
hospital in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, established several checkpoints within the
City, burned down certain government and private facilities and inflicted casualties
on the part of Government forces, and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly attempting to remove from the
allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief
Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to
maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion;
and
WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other rebel
groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del
Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and by law, do
hereby proclaim as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the Mindanao group of
islands for a period not exceeding sixty days, effective as of the date hereof.
SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise be suspended in
the aforesaid area for the duration of the state of martial law.
DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23rd day of May in the year of our Lord, Two
Thousand and Seventeen.
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216.
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion
and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
Mindanao has been the hotbed of violent extremism and a brewing rebellion for
decades. In more recent years, we have witnessed the perpetration of numerous acts
of violence challenging the authority of the duly constituted authorities, i.e., the
Zamboanga siege, the Davao bombing, the Mamasapano carnage, and the bombings
in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others. Two armed groups
have figured prominently in all these, namely, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) and the
ISIS-backed Maute Group.1
The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to
capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute
Group was conducted. These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in
Mindanao, however, confronted the government operation by intensifying their
efforts at sowing violence aimed not only against the government authorities and its
facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties. As narrated in the
President's Report:
On 23 May 2017, a government operation to capture Isnilon Hapilon, a senior leader
of the ASG, and Maute Group operational leaders, Abdullah and Omarkhayam
Maute, was confronted with armed resistance which escalated into open hostility
against the government. Through these groups' armed siege and acts of violence
directed towards civilians and government authorities, institutions and
establishments, they were able to take control of major social, economic, and
political foundations of Marawi City which led to its paralysis. This sudden taking of
control was intended to lay the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a
DAESH wilayat or province in Mindanao.
Based on verified intelligence reports, the Maute Group, as of the end of 2016,
consisted of around two hundred sixty-three (263) members, fully armed and
prepared to wage combat in furtherance of its aims. The group chiefly operates in
the province of Lanao del Sur, but has extensive networks and linkages with foreign
and local armed groups such as the Jemaah Islamiyah, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur
and the ASG. It adheres to the ideals being espoused by the DAESH, as evidenced by,
among others, its publication of a video footage declaring its allegiance to the DAESH.
Reports abound that foreign-based terrorist groups, the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria) in particular, as well as illegal drug money, provide financial and logistical
support to the Maute Group.
The events commencing on 23 May 2017 put on public display the groups' clear
intention to establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly
constituted authorities - the President, foremost - of their powers and prerogatives.2
In particular, the President chronicled in his Report the events which took place on
May 23, 2017 in Marawi City which impelled him to declare a state of martial law and
suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, to wit:
• At 1400H members of the Maute Group and ASG, along with their sympathizers,
commenced their attack on various facilities - government and privately owned - in
the City of Marawi.
• At 1600H around fifty (50) armed criminals assaulted Marawi City Jail being manage
by the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP).
• The Maute Group forcibly entered the jail facilities, destroyed its main gate, and
assaulted on-duty personnel. BJMP personnel were disarmed, tied, and/or locked
inside the cells.
• The group took cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles (i.e., two [2]
prisoner vans and private vehicles).
• By 1630H, the supply of power into Marawi City had been interrupted, and sporadic
gunfights were heard and felt everywhere. By evening, the power outage had spread
citywide. (As of 24 May 2017, Marawi City's electric supply was still cut off, plunging
the city into total black-out.)
• From 1800H to 1900H, the same members of the Maute Group ambushed and
burned the Marawi Police Station. A patrol car of the Police Station was also taken.
• A member of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit was killed during the takeover
of the Marawi City Jail. The Maute Group facilitated the escape of at least sixty-eight
(68) inmates of the City Jail.
• The BJMP directed its personnel at the Marawi City Jail and other affected areas to
evacuate.
• By evening of 23 May 2017, at least three (3) bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod,
Bangulo, and Sauiaran, fell under the control of these groups. They threatened to
bomb the bridges to pre-empt military reinforcement.
• As of 2222H, persons connected with the Maute Group had occupied several areas
in Marawi City, including Naga Street, Bangolo Street, Mapandi, and Camp Keithly, as
well as the following barangays: Basak Malutlot, Mapandi, Saduc, Lilod Maday,
Bangon, Saber, Bubong, Marantao, Caloocan, Banggolo, Barionaga, and Abubakar.
• These lawless armed groups had likewise set up road blockades and checkpoints at
the Iligan City-Marawi City junction.
• Later in the evening, the Maute Group burned Dansalan College Foundation,
Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora, the nun's quarters in the church, and the Shia Masjid
Moncado Colony. Hostages were taken from the church.
• About five (5) faculty members of Dansalan College Foundation had been
reportedly killed by the lawless groups.
• Other educational institutions were also burned, namely, Senator Ninoy Aquino
College Foundation and the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School.
• The Maute Group also attacked Amai Pakpak Hospital and hoisted the DAESH flag
there, among other several locations. As of 0600H of 24May 2017, members of the
Maute Group were seen guarding the entry gates of Amai Pakpak Hospital. They held
hostage the employees of the Hospital and took over the PhilHealth office located
thereat.
• The groups likewise laid siege to another hospital, Filipino-Libyan Friendship
Hospital, which they later set ablaze.
• Lawless armed groups likewise ransacked the Landbank of the Philippines and
commandeered one of its armored vehicles.
• Latest information indicates that about seventy-five percent (75%) of Marawi City
has been infiltrated by lawless armed groups composed of members of the Maute
Group and the ASG. As of the time of this Report, eleven (11) members of the Armed
Forces and the Philippine National Police have been killed in action, while thirty-five
(35) others have been seriously wounded.
• There are reports that these lawless armed groups are searching for Christian
communities in Marawi City to execute Christians. They are also preventing
Maranaos from leaving their homes and forcing young male Muslims to join their
groups.
• Based on various verified intelligence reports from the AFP and the PNP, there
exists a strategic mass action of lawless armed groups in Marawi City, seizing public
and private facilities, perpetrating killings of government personnel, and committing
armed uprising against and open defiance of the government. 3
The unfolding of these events, as well as the classified reports he received, led the
President to conclude that -
These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to
establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of
a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao.
The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young
Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed
consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a
segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen display of DAESH flags
constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove Marawi City, and
eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government.
There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the
President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent
to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his
control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his
mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory
powers over local govemments.4
According to the Report, the lawless activities of the ASG, Maute Group, and other
criminals, brought about undue constraints and difficulties to the military and
government personnel, particularly in the performance of their duties and functions,
and untold hardships to the civilians, viz.:
Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty
sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide power outages.
Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from performing their functions.
Through the attack and occupation of several hospitals, medical services in Marawi
City have been adversely affected. The bridge and road blockades set up by the
groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to deliver basic services to its
citizens. Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government
from restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and
government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered.
The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being
provided by foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their blatant acts of
defiance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted in the
deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi City; they have likewise
compromised the security of the entire Island of Mindanao. 5
The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and
significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the
Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the
control of the lawless groups.
The groups' occupation of Marawi City fulfills a strategic objective because of its
terrain and the easy access it provides to other parts of Mindanao. Lawless armed
groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes,
supply lines, and backdoor passages.
Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local
criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining
their long-standing goal: absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao. These
circumstances demand swift and decisive action to ensure the safety and security of
the Filipino people and preserve our national integrity. 6
The President ended his Report in this wise:
While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the
on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the
continued implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is
completely quelled.7
In addition to the Report, representatives from the Executive Department, the
military and police authorities conducted briefings with the Senate and the House of
Representatives relative to the declaration of martial law.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S.
Resolution No. 3888 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and
finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance
with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no
compelling reason to revoke the same". The Senate thus resolved as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, by way of the sense of
the Senate, that the Senate finds the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 to be
satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law. The Senate hereby
supports fully Proclamation No. 216 and finds no compelling reason to revoke the
sarne.9
The Senate's counterpart in the lower house shared the same sentiments. The House
of Representatives likewise issued House Resolution No. 105010 "EXPRESSING THE
FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO PRESIDENT RODRIGO
DUTERTE AS IT FINDS NO REASON TO REVOKE PROCLAMATION NO. 216,
ENTITLED 'DECLARING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE
OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO"'.
The Petitions
A) G.R. No. 231658 (Lagman Petition)
On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C.
Alejano, Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed
a Petition11 Under the Third Paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
First, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of
Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute
rebellion12 since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part
thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory. 13 It labels the flying
of ISIS flag by the Maute Group in Marawi City and other outlying areas as mere
propaganda114 and not an open attempt to remove such areas from the allegiance to
the Philippine Government and deprive the Chief Executive of the assertion and
exercise of his powers and prerogatives therein. It contends that the Maute Group is
a mere private army, citing as basis the alleged interview of Vera Files with Joseph
Franco wherein the latter allegedly mentioned that the Maute Group is more of a
"clan's private militia latching into the IS brand theatrically to inflate perceived
capability".15 The Lagman Petition insists that during the briefing, representatives of
the military and defense authorities did not categorically admit nor deny the
presence of an ISIS threat in the country but that they merely gave an evasive
answer16 that "there is ISIS in the Philippines".17 The Lagman Petition also avers that
Lt. Gen. Salvador Mison, Jr. himself admitted that the current armed conflict in
Marawi City was precipitated or initiated by the government in its bid to capture
Hapilon.18 Based on said statement, it concludes that the objective of the Maute
Group's armed resistance was merely to shield Hapilon and the Maute brothers from
the government forces, and not to lay siege on Marawi City and remove its allegiance
to the Philippine Republic.19 It then posits that if at all, there is only a threat of
rebellion in Marawi City which is akin to "imminent danger" of rebellion, which is no
longer a valid ground for the declaration of martial law. 20
Second, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no
sufficient factual basis because the President's Report containef "false, inaccurate,
contrived and hyperbolic accounts".21
It labels as false the claim in the President's Report that the Maute Group attacked
Amai Pakpak Medical Center. Citing online reports on the interview of Dr. Amer Saber
(Dr. Saber), the hospital's Chief, the Lagman Petition insists that the Maute Group
merely brought an injured member to the hospital for treatment but did not overrun
the hospital or harass the hospital personnel. 22 The Lagman Petition also refutes the
claim in the President's Report that a branch of the Landbank of the Philippines was
ransacked and its armored vehicle commandeered. It alleges that the bank
employees themselves clarified that the bank was not ransacked while the armored
vehicle was owned by a third party and was empty at the time it was
commandeered.23 It also labels as false the report on the burning of the Senator
Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School. It
avers that the Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation is intact as of May 24, 2017
and that according to Asst. Superintendent Ana Alonto, the Marawi Central
Elementary Pilot School was not burned by the terrorists. 24 Lastly, it points out as
false the report on the beheading of the police chief of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, and
the occupation of the Marawi City Hall and part of the Mindanao State University. 25
Third, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis since the President's Report mistakenly included the attack on the
military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, the mass jail break in
Marawi City in August 2016, the Zamboanga siege, the Davao market bombing, the
Mamasapano carnage and other bombing incidents in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and
Basilan, as additional factual bases for the proclamation of martial law. It contends
that these events either took place long before the conflict in Marawi City began, had
long been resolved, or with the culprits having already been arrested. 26
Fourth, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no
sufficient factual basis considering that the President acted alone and did not consult
the military establishment or any ranking official27 before making the proclamation.
Finally, the Lagman Petition claims that the President's proclamation of martial law
lacks sufficient factual basis owing to the fact that during the presentation before the
Committee of the Whole of the House of Representatives, it was shown that the
military was even successful in pre-empting the ASG and the Maute Group's plan to
take over Marawi City and other parts of Mindanao; there was absence of any hostile
plan by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the number of foreign fighters allied
with ISIS was "undetermined"28 which indicates that there are only a meager number
of foreign fighters who can lend support to the Maute Group.29
Based on the foregoing argumentation, the Lagman Petition asks the Court to:
(1)"exercise its specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of Proclamation No. 216"; and (2) render "a Decision voiding and nullifying
Proclamation No. 216" for lack of sufficient factual basis. 30
In a Resolution31 dated June 6, 2017, the Court required respondents to comment on
the Lagman Petition and set the case for oral argument on June 13, 14, and 15, 2017.
On June 9, 2017, two other similar petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231771 and
231774 were filed and eventually consolidated with G.R. No. 231658. 32
B) G.R. No. 231771 (Cullamat Petition)
The Cullamat Petition, "anchored on Section 18, Article VII" 33 of the Constitution,
likewise seeks the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional
because it lacks sufficient factual basis that there is rebellion in Mindanao and that
public safety warrants its declaration. 34
In particular, it avers that the supposed rebellion described in Proclamation No. 216
relates to events happening in Marawi City only an not in the entire region of
Mindanao. It concludes that Proclamation No 216 "failed to show any factual basis
for the imposition of martial law in the entire Mindanao,"35 "failed to allege any act
of rebellion outside Marawi City, much less x x x allege that public safety requires the
imposition o martial law in the whole of Mindanao".36
The Cullamat Petition claims that the alleged "capability of the Maute Group and
other rebel groups to sow terror and cause death and damage to property" 37 does
not rise to the level of rebellion sufficient to declare martial law in the whole of
Mindanao.38 It also posits that there is no lawless violence in other parts of Mindanao
similar to that in Marawi City.39
Moreover, the Cullamat Petition assails the inclusion of the phrase "other rebel
groups" in the last Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216 for being vague as it
failed to identify these rebel groups and specify the acts of rebellion that they were
supposedly waging.40
In addition, the Cullamat Petition cites alleged inaccuracies, exaggerations, and
falsities in the Report of the President to Congress, particularly the attack at the Amai
Pakpak Hospital, the ambush and burning of the Marawi Police Station, the killing of
five teachers of Dansalan College Foundation, and the attacks on various government
facilities.41
In fine, the Cullamat Petition prays for the Court to declare Proclamation No. 216 as
unconstitutional or in the alternative, should the Court find justification for the
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Marawi City, to declare the same as unconstitutional insofar as its inclusion
of the other parts of Mindanao.42
C) G.R. No. 231774 (Mohamad Petition)
The Mohamad Petition, denominated as a "Petition for Review of the Sufficiency of
[the] Factual Basis of [the] Declaration of Martial Law and [the] Suspension of the
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,"43 labels itself as "a special proceeding"44 or
an "appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen"45 authorized under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution.
The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last resort 46 and should
be invoked by the President only after exhaustion of less severe remedies.47 It
contends that the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed
sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the armed forces; second, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and finally, the power to declare
martial law.48 It maintains that the President has no discretion to choose which
extraordinary power to use; moreover, his choice must be dictated only by, and
commensurate to, the exigencies of the situation.49
According to the Mohamad Petition, the factual situation in Marawi is not so grave
as to require the imposition of martial law.50 It asserts that the Marawi incidents "do
not equate to the existence of a public necessity brought about by an actual rebellion,
which would compel the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus".51 It proposes that "[m]artial law can only be justified if
the rebellion or invasion has reached such gravity that [its] imposition x x x is
compelled by the needs of public safety"52 which, it believes, is not yet present in
Mindanao.
Moreover, it alleges that the statements contained in the President's Report to the
Congress, to wit: that the Maute Group intended to establish an Islamic State; that
they have the capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities of their powers
and prerogatives; and that the Marawi armed hostilities is merely a prelude to a
grander plan of taking over the whole of Mindanao, are conclusions bereft of
substantiation.53
The Mohamad Petition posits that immediately after the declaration of martial law,
and without waiting for a congressional action, a suit may already be brought before
the Court to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
Finally, in invoking this Court's power to review the sufficiency ofthe factual basis for
the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the Mohamad Petition insists that the Court may "look into the
wisdom of the [President's] actions, [and] not just the presence of
arbitrariness".54 Further, it asserts that since it is making a negative assertion, then
the burden to prove the sufficiency of the factual basis is shifted to and lies on the
respondents.55 It thus asks the Court "to compel the [r]espondents to divulge
relevant information"56 in order for it to review the sufficiency of the factual basis.
In closing, the Mohamad Petition prays for the Court to exercise its power to review,
"compel respondents to present proof on the factual basis [of] the declaration of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Mindanao"57 and declare as unconstitutional Proclamation No. 216 for lack of
sufficient factual basis.
The Consolidated Comment
The respondents' Consolidated Comment58 was filed on June 12, 2017, as required
by the Court. Noting that the same coincided with the celebration of the 119th
anniversary of the independence of this Republic, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) felt that "defending the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216" should
serve as "a rallying call for every Filipino to unite behind one true flag and defend it
against all threats from within and outside our shores". 59
The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court
with the authority or power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law.60 The OSG, however, posits that although Section 18,
Article VII lays the basis for the exercise of such authority or power, the same
constitutional provision failed to specify the vehicle, mode or remedy through which
the "appropriate proceeding" mentioned therein may be resorted to. The OSG
suggests that the "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Section 18, Article VII may
be availed of using the vehicle, mode or remedy of a certiorari petition, either under
Section 1 or 5, of Article VIII.61 Corollarily, the OSG maintains that the review power
is not mandatory, but discretionary only, on the part of the Court. 62 The Court has
the discretion not to give due course to the petition. 63
Prescinding from the foregoing, the OSG contends that the sufficiency of the factual
basis of Proclamation No. 216 should be reviewed by the Court "under the lens of
grave abuse of discretion"64 and not the yardstick of correctness of the
facts.65 Arbitrariness, not correctness, should be the standard in reviewing the
sufficiency of factual basis.
The OSG maintains that the burden lies not with the respondents but with the
petitioners to prove that Proclamation No. 216 is bereft of factual basis.1âwphi1 It
thus takes issue with petitioners' attempt to shift the burden of proof when they
asked the Court "to compel [the] respondents to present proof on the factual
basis"66 of Proclamation No. 216. For the OSG, "he who alleges must prove" 67 and
that governmental actions are presumed to be valid and constitutional. 68
Likewise, the OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual basis must be assessed
from the trajectory or point of view of the President and base on the facts available
to him at the time the decision was made. 69 It argues that the sufficiency of the
factual basis should be examined not based on the facts discovered after the
President had made his decision to declare martial law because to do so would
subject the exercise of the President's discretion to an impossible standard. 70 It
reiterates that the President's decision should be guided only by the information and
data available to him at the time he made the determination.71 The OSG thus asserts
that facts that were established after the declaration of martial law should not be
considered in the review of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law. The OSG suggests that the assessment of after-proclamation facts lies
with the President and Congress for the purpose of determining the propriety of
revoking or extending the martial law. The OSG fears that if the Court considers after-
proclamation-facts in its review of the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
proclamation, it would in effect usurp the powers of the Congress to determine
whether martial law should be revoked or extended.72
It is also the assertion of the OSG that the President could validly rely on intelligence
reports coming from the Armed Forces of the Philippines;73 and that he could not be
expected to personally determine the veracity of thecontents of the reports. 74 Also,
since the power to impose martial law is vested solely on the President as
Commander-in-Chief, the lack of recommendation from the Defense Secretary, or
any official for that matter, will not nullify the said declaration, or affect its validity,
or compromise the sufficiency of the factual basis.
Moreover, the OSG opines that the petitioners miserably failed to validly refute the
facts cited by the President in Proclamation No. 216 and in his Report to the Congress
by merely citing news reports that supposedly contradict the facts asserted therein
or by criticizing in piecemeal the happenings in Marawi. For the OSG, the said news
articles are "hearsay evidence, twice removed,"75 and thus inadmissible and without
probative value, and could not overcome the "legal presumption bestowed on
governmental acts".76
Finally, the OSG points out that it has no duty or burden to prove that Proclamation
No. 216 has sufficient factual basis. It maintains that the burden rests with the
petitioners. However, the OSG still endeavors to lay out the factual basis relied upon
by the President "if only to remove any doubt as to the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 216".77
The facts laid out by the OSG in its Consolidated Comment will be discussed in detail
in the Court's Ruling.
ISSUES
The issues as contained in the revised Advisory78 are as follows:
1. Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774
are the "appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required of this Court when
a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is promulgated;
2. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus:
a. is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;
b. is required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of
National Defense;
c. is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation,
even if subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported;
3. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis [of] the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by
Congress jointly or separately;
4. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence? relaxation of the rule on legal standing, a prime example of which is found in Section
18 of Article VII which provides that any citizen may file the appropriate proceeding
5. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the
to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief,
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he only requisite for
namely calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas standing to challenge the validity of the suspension is that the challenger be a citizen.
corpus, and declaration of martial law;
He need not even be a taxpayer."81
6. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, vague
Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as citizens of
and thus null and void:
the Republic;"82 similarly, petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be "Filipino
a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups;" or citizens, all women, all of legal [age], and residents of Marawi City". 83 In the Lagman
Petition, however, petitioners therein did not categorically mention that they are
b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the suing's citizens but merely referred to themselves as duly elected
entire Mindanao region; Representatives.84 That they are suing in their official capacities as Members of
Congress couLd have elicited a vigorous discussion considering the issuance by the
7. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in
House of Representatives of House Resolution No. 1050 expressing full support to
the Report of the President to Congress are sufficient [bases]:
President Duterte and finding no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216. By such
a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or resolution, the House of Representatives is declaring that it finds no reason to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the martial law declaration, which is in direct
b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ contrast to the views and arguments being espoused by the petitioners in the Lagman
of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao 1 region; Petition. Considering, however, the trend towards relaxation of the rules on legal
8. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual standing, as well as the transcendental issues involved in the present Petitions, the
rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or Court will exercise judicial self-restraint85 and will not venture into this matter. After
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and all, "the Court is not entirely without discretion to accept a suit which does not satisfy
the requirements of a [bona fide] case or of standing. Considerations paramount to
9. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 will: [the requirement of legal standing] could compel assumption of jurisdiction." 86 In any
case, the Court can take judicial cognizance of the fact that petitioners in the Lagman
a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
Petition are all citizens of the Philippines since Philippine citizenship is a requirement
b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless for them to be elected as representatives. We will therefore consider them as suing
violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region. in their own behalf as citizens of this country. Besides, respondents did not question
petitioners' legal standing.
After the oral argument, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and
supplemental memoranda. II. Whether or not the petitions are the
"appropriate proceeding" covered by paragraph
OUR RULING 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
I. Locus standi of petitioners. sufficient to invoke the mode of review required
by the Court.
One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., "the constitutional
question is brought before [the Court] by a party having the requisite 'standing' to All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third paragraph
challenge it."79 As a general rule, the challenger must have "a personal and of Section 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury provides:
as a result of its enforcement."80 Over the years, there has been a trend towards
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension task under Section 18, Article VII.
of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
c) Purpose/significance of
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
Section 18, Article VII is to
During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court constitutionalize the pre-Marcos
under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis.87 It is a special and martial law ruling in In the Matter of
specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang.
Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.88
The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987
The Court agrees. Constitution to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In
the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang,92 to wit: that the factual
a) Jurisdiction must be
basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
specifically conferred by the
of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely within the ambit of judicial
Constitution or by law. review.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
"In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional provision,
Constitution or by the law.89 Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the
the history of the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally
Constitution or by some legislative act, no body or tribunal has the power to act or
supposed to bear some direct relationship, the evils intended to be remedied, and
pass upon a matter brought before it for resolution. It is likewise settled that in the
the good to be accomplished are proper subjects of inquiry."93 Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
absence of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language
S.J. (Fr. Bernas), a member of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
of the Constitution or a statute.90 It must appear clearly from the law or it will not be
Constitution, explained:
held to exist.91
The Commander-in-Chief provisions of the 1935 Constitution had enabled President
A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically
Ferdinand Marcos to impose authoritarian rule on the Philippines from 1972 to
grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
1986. Supreme Court decisions during that period upholding the actions taken by Mr.
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
Marcos made authoritarian rule part of Philippine constitutional jurisprudence. The
corpus.
members of the Constitutional Commission, very much aware of these facts, went
b) "In an appropriate about reformulating the Commander-in-Chief powers with a view to dismantling
proceeding" does not refer to a what had been constructed during the authoritarian years. The new formula included
petition for certiorari filed under revised grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating
Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII them, the scope of the powers, and review of presidential action. 94 (Emphasis
supplied)
It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase
"in an appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to To recall, the Court held in the 1951 case of Montenegro v. Castaneda95 that the
Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition authority to decide whether there is a state of rebellion requiring the suspension of
for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is lodged with the President and his decision
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions. thereon is final and conclusive upon the courts. This ruling was reversed in the 1971
Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the case of Lansang where it was held that the factual basis of the declaration of martial
proclamationor suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political
the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's question and is within the ambit of judicial review. 96 However, in 1983, or after the
exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of declaration of martial law by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Court,
in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile,97 abandoned the ruling in Lansang and reverted
to Montenegro. According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional power of the existence of an invasion or rebellion and the second factor of determining whether
President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not subject to the public safety requires it or not, may I call the attention of the Gentleman to what
judicial inquiry.98 happened to us during the past administration. Proclamation No. 1081 was issued by
Ferdinand E. Marcos in his capacity as President of the Philippines by virtue of the
Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the powers vested upon him purportedly under Article VII, Section 10 (2) of the
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
Constitution, wherein he made this predicate under the "Whereas" provision:
corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect constitutionalized and reverted
to the Lansang doctrine. Whereas, the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless elements of
the Communists and other armed aggrupations organized to overthrow the Republic
d) Purpose of Section 18,
of the Philippines by armed violence and force have assumed the magnitude of an
Article VII is to provide additional
actual state of war against our people and the Republic of the Philippines.
safeguard against possible abuse by
the President on the exercise of the And may I also call the attention of the Gentleman to General Order No. 3, also
extraordinary powers. promulgated by Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of all
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated
Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse
September 21, 1972 wherein he said, among other things:
by the President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos Whereas, martial law having been declared because of wanton destruction of lives
martial law, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third and properties, widespread lawlessness and anarchy and chaos and disorder now
paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII.99 This is clear from the records of the prevailing throughout the country, which condition has been brought about by
Constitutional Commission when its members were deliberating on whether the groups of men who are actively engaged in a criminal conspiracy to seize political and
President could proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress. state power in the Philippines in order to take over the government by force and
Thus: violence, the extent of which has now assumed the proportion of an actual war
against our people and the legitimate government ...
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means
corpus and declare martial law in our country without justifiable reason. Would the
that he is vesting exclusively unto the President the right to determine the factors
Gentleman still insist on the deletion of the phrase 'and, with the concurrence of at
which may lead to the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ
least a majority of all the members of the Congress'?
of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and compelling reasons in seeking to
delete this particular, phrase. May we be informed of his good and substantial MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr.Marcos, he is undoubtedly
reasons? an aberration in our history and national consciousness. But given the possibility that
there would be another Marcos, our Constitution now has sufficient safeguards. As I
MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous
said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman has mentioned, that there is an exclusive
interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights,
right to determine the factual basis because the paragraph beginning on line 9
as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual invasion or rebellion. In
precisely tells us that the Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
these situations, the President has to act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
fuse. It is only good for a maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must
terminates. Thirdly, the right of the judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the
promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.
factual basis of the proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to balance
MR. SUAREZ. Given our traumatic experience during the past administration, if we
the interests of the country. And here we are trying to balance the public interest in
give exclusive right to the President to determine these factors, especially the
case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights of citizens. And I am saying that
there are enough safeguards, unlike in 1972 when Mr. Marcos was able to do all again discarding jurisprudence which render[s] the executive action a political
those things mentioned.100 question and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate.

To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution For the first time, there is a provision that the state of martial law does not suspend
not only placed the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the the operation of the Constitution nor abolish civil courts or legislative assemblies, or
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the ambit of judicial review, it also vest jurisdiction to military tribunals over civilians, or suspend the privilege of the
relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen to question before this Court the writ. Please forgive me if, at this point, I state that this constitutional provision
sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or suspension. Moreover, the vindicates the dissenting opinions I have written during my tenure in the Supreme
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon any citizen a Court in the martial law cases.101
demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of said
f) To interpret "appropriate
proclamation or suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal
proceeding" as filed under Section 1
to examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis and to
of Article VIII would be contrary to
render its decision thereon within a limited period of 30 days from date of filing.
the intent of the Constitution.
e) Purpose of Section 18,
To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed
Article VII is to curtail the extent of
under the expanded jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore, contradict the clear
the powers of the President.
intention of the framers of the Constitution to place additional safeguards against
The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment possible martial law abuse for, invariably, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article
of the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of Article VIII. In other words, the framers of
why the provision was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but the Constitution added the safeguard under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article
remained under Article VII or the Executive Department. VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court.

During the closing session of the Constitutional Commission's deliberations, g) Jurisdiction of the Court is
President Cecilia Muñoz Palma expressed her sentiments on the 1987 Constitution. not restricted to those enumerated in
She said: Sections I and 5 of Article VIII

The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected by the
people for a six-year term with no reelection for the duration of his/her life. While
traditional powers inherent in the office of the President are granted, nonetheless
for the first time, there are specific provisions which curtail the extent of such
powers. Most significant is the power of the Chief Executive to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law.
The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and
5 of Article VIII. For instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President can be
found in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII. 102 The power of the Court to
review on certiorari the decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on Elections and
Commission on Audit can be found in Section 7, Article IX(A). 103

The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-Chief by Mr. Marcos caused h) Unique features of the third
the imposition of martial law for more than eight years and the suspension of the paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
privilege of the writ even after the lifting of martial law in 1981. The new Constitution make it sui generis.
now provides that those powers can be exercised only in two cases, invasion or
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate
rebellion when public safety demands it, only for a period not exceeding 60 days, and
that it should be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated
reserving to Congress the power to revoke such suspension or proclamation of
in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed
martial law which congressional action may not be revoked by the President. More
pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it.
importantly, the action of the President is made subject to judicial review, thereby
Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual
period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under
the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within
which this Court has to promulgate its decision.
A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be
brought and defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the
mode of deciding them, of opposing judgments, and of executing."104 In fine, the
phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section
18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency
powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a
matter to be resolved by the Court.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension,
the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to
or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed td "undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings."106 On the other hand, Congress may take into
consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
declaration. Unlike the Court I which does not look into the absolute correctness of
the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further;
it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a
petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress'
review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress
itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.

III. The power of the Court to review the Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not
sufficiency of the factual basis of the only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly,
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
independent of the actions taken by Congress.
b) The framers of the 1987
During the oral argument,105 the OSG urged the Court to give! deference to the Constitution intended the judicial
actions of the two co-equal branches of the Government: on' the part of the power to review to be exercised
President as Commander-in-Chief, in resorting to his extraordinary powers to declare independently from the congressional
martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and on the part power to revoke.
of Congress, in giving its imprimatur to Proclamation No. 216 and not revoking the
If only to show that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to vest the
same.
Court and Congress with veto powers independently from each other, we quote the
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the extraordinary following exchange:
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said
MS. QUESADA. Yesterday, the understanding of many was that there would be
presidential action. In particular, the President's extraordinary powers of suspending
safeguards that Congress will be able to revoke such proclamation.
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law are subject to the
veto powers of the Court and Congress. MR. RAMA. Yes.
a) The judicial power to review MS. QUESADA. But now, if they cannot meet because they have been arrested or that
versus the congressional power to the Congress has been padlocked, then who is going to declare that such a
revoke. proclamation was not warranted?
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate xxxx
proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the
other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation MR. REGALADO. May I also inform Commissioner Quesada that the judiciary is not
shall not be set aside by the President. exactly just standing by. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus, if the Members are
detained, can immediately be applied for, and the Supreme Court shall also review graduated powers he will avail of in a given
the factual basis. x x x107 situation.

c) Re-examination of the The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers of: a)
Court's pronouncement in Fortun v. calling out the armed forces; b) suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
President Macapagal-Arroyo corpus; and c) declaring martial law.112 These powers may be resorted to only under
specified conditions.
Considering the above discussion, the Court finds it imperative to re-examine,
reconsider, and set aside its pronouncement in Fortun v. President Macapagal- The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the powers of the Commander-
Arroyo108 to the effect that: in-Chief by revising the "grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the manner
of activating them, the scope of the powers, and review of presidential action." 113
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power
to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a a) Extraordinary powers of the
proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review President distinguished.
powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its
express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and
involves ordinary police action.114 The President may resort to this extraordinary
Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President's
power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a
invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to the
political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the
President;"115 the only limitations being that he acts within permissible constitutional
hands of the Court.109
boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion. 116 In fact,
xxxx "the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is x x x not subject to
judicial review."117
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the
proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
step in, hear the petitions challenging the President's action, and ascertain if it has a corpus and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is actual
factual basis. x x x110 invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed
the following limits in the exercise of these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2)
By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own
review and possible revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and possible
power and surrendered the same to Congress as well as: abdicated from its bounden
nullification by the Supreme Court."118
duty to review. Worse, the Court considered' itself just on stand-by, waiting and
willing to act as a substitute in case Congress "defaults." It is an aberration, a stray The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase
declaration, which must be rectified and set aside in this proceeding. 111 "imminent danger thereof' as grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law.119 They perceived the phrase
We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review
"imminent danger" to be "fraught with possibilities of abuse;" 120 besides, the calling
with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any
out power of the President "is sufficient for handling imminent danger."121
perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the
Court of its power to review. The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights and individual freedom.
IV. The judicial power to review the sufficiency
Thus, the declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive
of factual basis of the declaration of martial law
Department has called upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law and
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of order, and while the emergency remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest and
habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration
punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more difficult to restore order and
of the President's decision of which among his
enforce the law.122 As such, their exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the
Congress, and review by the Court.123
b) What really happens during martial law?
During the oral argument, the following questions cropped up: What really happens
during the imposition of martial law? What powers could the President exercise
during martial law that he could not exercise if there is no martial law? Interestingly,
these questions were also discussed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
FR. BERNAS. That same question was asked during the meetings of the Committee:
What precisely does martial law add to the power of the President to call on the
armed forces? The first and second lines in this provision state:
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies...
The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the Supreme Court. I
think it is the case of Aquino v. COMELEC where the Supreme Court said that in times
of martial law, the President automatically has legislative power. So these two
clauses denied that. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution; therefore, it does not suspend the principle of separation of powers.
The question now is: During martial law, can the President issue decrees? The answer
we gave to that question in the Committee was: During martial law, the President
may have the powers of a commanding general in a theatre of war. In actual war
when there is fighting in an area, the President as the commanding general has the
authority to issue orders which have the effect of law but strictly in a theater of war,
not in the situation we had during the period of martial law. In other words, there is
an effort here to return to the traditional concept of martial law as it was developed
especially in American jurisprudence, where martial law has reference to the theater
of war.124
xxxx
FR. BERNAS. This phrase was precisely put here because we have clarified the
meaning of martial law; meaning, limiting it to martial law as it has existed in the
jurisprudence in international law, that it is a law for the theater of war. In a theater
of war, civil courts are unable to function. If in the actual theater of war civil courts,
in fact, are unable to function, then the military commander is authorized to give
jurisdiction even over civilians to military courts precisely because the civil courts are
closed in that area. But in the general area where the civil courts are open then in no
case can the military courts be given jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to
a theater of war where the civil courts, in fact, are unable to function.
MR. FOZ. It is a state of things brought about by the realities of the situation in that
specified critical area.
FR. BERNAS. That is correct.
MR. FOZ. And it is not something that is brought about by a declaration of the
Commander-in-Chief.
FR. BERNAS. It is not brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-Chief. The
understanding here is that the phrase 'nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians' has reference to the practice under the
Marcos regime where military courts were given jurisdiction over civilians. We say
here that we will never allow that except in areas where civil courts are, in fact,
unable to function and it becomes necessary for some kind of court to function. 125
A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises
police power, which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the
President exercises police power, with the military’s assistance, to ensure public
safety and in place of government agencies which for the time being are unable to
cope with the condition in a locality, which remains under the control of the State. 126
In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,127 the Court, quoting Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza's (Justice Mendoza) Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on
March 13, 2006, stated that under a valid declaration of martial law, the President as
Commander-in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial
warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies
and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x x x".128
Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may perform
do not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during
martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative
assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in place during
its pendency. And in such instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
also suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially charged with
rebellion or offenses connected with invasion.129
Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil
liberties,130 the Constitution has safeguards against the President's prerogative to
declare a state of martial law.
c) "Graduation" of powers
refers to hierarchy based on scope
and effect; it does not refer to a
sequence, order, or arrangement by MR. PADILLA.x x x
which the Commander-in-Chief must
We all agree with the suspension of the writ or the proclamation of martial law should
adhere to.
not require beforehand the concurrence of the majority of the Members of the
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in- Chief, a Congress. However, as provided by the Committee, the Congress may revoke, amend,
'sequence' of 'graduated power[s]'. From the most to the least benign, these are: the or shorten or even increase the period of such suspension. 134
calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
xxxx
corpus, and the power to declare martial law."131 It must be stressed, however, that
the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope and effect. It does not in any MR. NATIVIDAD. First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's thesis that in
manner refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief the first imposition of martial law there is no need for concurrence of the Members
must follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the of Congress because the provision says 'in case of actual invasion or rebellion.' If there
manner by which the President decides which power to choose. is actual invasion and rebellion, as Commissioner Crispino de Castro said, there is a
need for immediate response because there is an attack. Second, the fact of securing
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as
a concurrence may be impractical because the roads might be blocked or barricaded.
Commander-in-Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that the power and prerogative
x x x So the requirement of an initial concurrence of the majority of all Members of
to determine whether the situation warrants a mere exercise of the calling out
the Congress in case of an invasion or rebellion might be impractical as I can see it.
power; or whether the situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of martial law, also lies, at Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may revoke the declaration or lift the
least initially, with the President. The power to choose, initially, which among these suspension.
extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the
part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable question and no
include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger the longer a political one in that it is subject to judicial review at any point in time. So on
government, and the very integrity of the State.132 that basis, I agree that there is no need for concurrence as a prerequisite to declare
martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. x x x135
It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to
calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail xxxx
given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that
solely, at least initially, lies with the President. The Commissioner is suggesting that in connection with Section 15, we delete the
phrase 'and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the Members of the
d) The framers of the 1987
Congress...'
Constitution intended the Congress
not to interfere a priori in the MR. PADILLA. That is correct especially for the initial suspension of the privilege of
decision-making process of the the writ of habeas corpus or also the declaration of martial law.
President.
MR. SUAREZ. So in both instances, the Commissioner is suggesting that this would be
The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of prior an exclusive prerogative of the President?
concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further supports the conclusion that judicial MR. PADILLA. At least initially, for a period of 60 days. But even that period of 60 days
review does not include the calibration of the President's decision of which of his may be shortened by the Congress or the Senate because the next sentence says that
graduated powers will be availed of in a given situation. Voting 28 to 12, the framers the Congress or the Senate may even revoke the proclamation. 136
of the 1987 Constitution removed the requirement of congressional concurrence in xxxx
the first imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege. 133
MR. SUAREZ. x x x xxxx

The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means
that he is vesting exclusively unto the President the right to determine the factors
which may lead to the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and compelling reasons in seeking to
delete this particular phrase. May we be informed of his good and substantial
reasons?
MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous
interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights,
as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual invasion or rebellion. In
these situations, the President has to act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time
fuse. It is only good for a maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically
terminates. Thirdly, the right of the judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.
MR. SUAREZ. Would the Gentleman not feel more comfortable if we provide for a
legislative check on this awesome power of the Chief Executive acting as
Commander-in-Chief?
MR. MONSOD. I would be less comfortable if we have a presidency that cannot act
under those conditions.
MR. SUAREZ. But he can act with the concurrence of the proper or appropriate
authority?
MR. MONSOD. Yes. But when those situations arise, it is very unlikely that the
concurrence of Congress would be available; and, secondly, the President will be able
to act quickly in order to deal with the circumstances.
MR. SUAREZ. So, we would be subordinating actual circumstances to expediency?

xxxx MR. MONSOD. I do not believe it is expediency when one is trying to protect the
country in the event of an invasion or a rebellion.137
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos[,] he is undoubtedly
an aberration in our history and national consciousness. But given the possibility that The foregoing exchange clearly manifests the intent of the Constitution not to allow
there would be another Marcos, our Constitution now has sufficient safeguards. As I Congress to interfere a priori in the President's choice of extraordinary powers.
said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman mentioned, that there is an exclusive right
e) The Court must similarly
to determine the factual basis because the paragraph being on line 9 precisely tells
and necessarily refrain from
us that the Supreme court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
calibrating the President's decision of
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
which among his extraordinary
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must promulgate
powers to avail given a certain
its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.
situation or condition.
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to balance
It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in situations necessitating the
the interests of the country. And here we are trying to balance the public interest in
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights of citizens. x x x
corpus. It was precisely this time element that prompted the Constitutional
MR. SUAREZ. Will that prevent a future President from doing what Mr. Marcos had Commission to eliminate the requirement of 1 concurrence of the Congress in the
done? initial imposition by the President of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
MR. MONSOD. There is nothing absolute in this world, and there may be another
Marcos. What we are looking for are safeguards that arereasonable and, I believe, Considering that the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
adequate at this point. On the other hand, in case of invasion or rebellion, even writ of habeas corpus is now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when
during the first 60 days when the intention here is to protect the country in that public safety requires it, and is no longer under threat or in imminent danger thereof,
situation, it would be unreasonable to ask that there should be a concurrence on the there is a necessity and urgency for the President to act quickly to protect the
part of the Congress, which situation is automatically terminated at the end of such country.138 The Court, as Congress does, must thus accord the President the same
60 days.
leeway by not wading into the realm that is reserved exclusively by the Constitution V. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 may
to the Executive Department. be considered vague and thus void because of (a)
its inclusion of "other rebel groups"; and (b) the
j) The recommendation of the
absence of any guideline specifying its actual
Defense Secretary is not a condition operational parameters within the entire
for the declaration of martial law or
Mindanao region.
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the ground of "vagueness" by
the insertion of the phrase "other rebel groups"139 in its Whereas Clause and for lack
Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National
of available guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire
Defense, or other high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President
Mindanao region, making the proclamation susceptible to broad interpretation,
to declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
misinterpretation, or confusion.
shows that the President's power to declare martial law is not subject to any
condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public This argument lacks legal basis.
safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of
a) Void-for-vagueness doctrine.
the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego.
Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of common
the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed. intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application."140 "[A] statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
g) In any event, the President
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
initially employed the most benign
at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such instance, the statute] is repugnant
action - the calling out power -
to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
before he declared martial law and
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
suspended the privilege of the writ of
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
habeas corpus.
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."141
At this juncture, it must be stressed that prior to Proclamation No. 216 or the
b) Vagueness doctrine applies
declaration of martial law on May 23, 201 7, the President had already issued
only in free speech cases.
Proclamation No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency
on account of lawless violence in Mindanao. This, in fact, is extant in the first Whereas The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces"
Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Based on the foregoing presidential actions, it can statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
be gleaned that although there is no obligation or requirement on his part to use his cases.142 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one
extraordinary powers on a graduated or sequential basis, still the President made the which is overbroad because of possible "'chilling effect' on protected speech that
conscious anddeliberate effort to first employ the most benign from among his comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his
extraordinary powers. As the initial and preliminary step towards suppressing and speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain
preventing the armed hostilities in Mindanao, the President decided to use his calling himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or
out power first. Unfortunately, the situation did not improve; on the contrary, it only vague law thus chills him into silence."143
worsened. Thus, exercising his sole and exclusive prerogative, the President decided
to impose martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special application only to free-
belief that the armed hostilities in Mindanao already amount to actual rebellion and speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal
public safety requires it. statutes.144 Justice Mendoza explained the reason as follows:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible 'chilling effect' upon protected speech. The theory is
that ' [w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.' The possible harm
to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed
for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as
in the area of free speech.
xxxx
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical
tools developed for testing 'on their faces' statutes in free speech cases or, as they
are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do
service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.' x x x145
Invalidation of statutes "on its face" should be used sparingly because it results in
striking down statutes entirely on the ground that they might beapplied to parties
not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. 146 "Such
invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of 'actual case
and controversy' and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having
no factual concreteness."147
c) Proclamation No. 216
cannot be facially challenged using
the vagueness doctrine.
Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds of vagueness is
unwarranted. Proclamation No. 216 does not regulate speech, religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights that may be facially challenged.148 What it seeks to penalize
is conduct, not speech.
As held by the Court in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,149 the facial review of
Proclamation No. 1017, issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declaring
a state of national emergency, on ground o vagueness is uncalled for since a plain
reading of Proclamation No. 10171 shows that it is not primarily directed at speech
or even speech-related1 conduct. It is actually a call upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Like
Proclamation No. 1017, Proclamation No. 216 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not
free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
d) Inclusion of "other rebel
groups " does not make Proclamation
No.216 vague.
The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216
open to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be sustained.
In People v. Nazario,150 the Court enunciated that:
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application.' It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1)
it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by
either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for 'three or more
persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by.' Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all
'because one may never know in advance what annoys some people but does not
annoy others.'
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a 'perfectly vague' act whose obscurity
is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in
imprecise language - but which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively
phrased - in which case, it may be 'saved' by proper construction.151
The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's declaration
viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation of a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through
No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016, where he called upon the Armed
by way of reference in its Whereas clauses. Forces and the Philippine National 1 Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to
suppress any and all forms of lawless violence in the Mindanao region, and to prevent
e) Lack of guidelines/
such lawless violence from spreading and escalating elsewhere in the Philippines.
operational parameters does not
make Proclamation No. 216 vague. In Kulayan v. Tan,152 the Court ruled that the President's calling out power is in
a different category from the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus void, on the
corpus and the power to declare martial law:
ground that it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within
the entire Mindanao region. Besides, operational guidelines will serve only as mere x x x Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review
tools for the implementation of the proclamation. In Part III, we declared that judicial the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
review covers only the sufficiency of information or data available to or known to the provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President's action to call out
President prior to, or at the time of, the declaration or suspension. And, as will be the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different
discussed exhaustively in Part VII, the review will be confined to the proclamation category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the
itself and the Report submitted to Congress. privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution
would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their
Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality
revocation and review without any qualification.153
of the implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and
other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces
any act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be resolved in a separate to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible
proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.
be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in
Even so, the Court's review of the President's declaration of martial law and his calling
the exercise of its power to revoke.
out the Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for that
VI. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. particular purpose.
216 will (a) have the effect of recalling
As explained in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,154 the President's exercise
Proclamation No. 55; or (b) also nullify the acts
of his power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
of the President in calling out the armed forces to
invasion or rebellion may only be examined by the Court as to whether such power
quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
of the Mindanao region.
grave abuse of discretion.155
a) The calling out power is in a
In Zamora, the Court categorically ruled that the Integrated Bar of the ' Philippines
different category from the power to
had failed to sufficiently comply with the requisites of locus standi, as it was not able
declare martial law and the power to
to show any specific injury which it had suffered or could suffer by virtue of President
suspend the privilege of the writ of
Joseph Estrada's order deploying the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility
habeas corpus; nullification of
patrols around the metropolis.156
Proclamation No. 216 will not affect
Proclamation No. 55. This locus standi requirement, however, need not be complied with in so far as the
Court's jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege ofthe writ of habeas corpus is
concerned. In fact, by constitutional design, such review may be instituted by any
citizen before the Court,157 without the need to prove that he or she stands to sustain
a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned Presidential act/s.
But, even assuming arguendo that the Court finds no sufficient basis for the
declaration of martial law in this case, such ruling could not affect the President's
exercise of his calling out power through Proclamation No. 55.
existence' appears to be indisputable. What is more appropriate and logical then than
to consider it as 'an operative fact?' (Emphasis supplied)159
However, it must also be stressed that this "operative fact doctrine" is not a fool-
proof shield that would repulse any challenge to acts performed during the effectivity
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, purportedly
in furtherance of quelling rebellion or invasion, and promotion of public safety, when
evidence shows otherwise.

b) The operative fact doctrine. VII. The Scope of the Power to Review.

Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of a) The scope of the power of
the acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the "operative fact doctrine," review under the 1987 Constitution
the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an "operative fact" before it is declared refers only to the determination of the
unconstitutional.158 sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and
Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary
suspension of the privilege of habeas
to the Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: 'When the courts
corpus.
declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and
the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall To recall, the Court, in the case of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.' The above Lansang,160 which was decided under the 1935 Constitution,161 held that it can
provision of the Civil Code reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, inquire into, within proper bounds, whether there has been adherence to or
whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, compliance with the constitutionally-imposed limitations on the Presidential power
and affords no protection. This doctrine admits of qualifications, however. As the to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.162 "Lansang limited the review
American Supreme Court stated: 'The actual existence of a statute prior to such a function of the Court to a very prudentially narrow test of arbitrariness." 163 Fr. Bernas
determination [of constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences described the "proper bounds" in Lansang as follows:
which cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
What, however, are these 'proper bounds' on the power of the courts? The Court
subsequent ruling as to the invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, -
first gave the general answer that its power was 'merely to check - not to supplant -
with respect to particular regulations, individual and corporate, and particular
the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional
conduct, private and official.
limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
The orthodox view finds support in the well-settled doctrine that the Constitution is wisdom of his act. More specifically, the Court said that its power was not 'even
supreme and provides the measure for the validity of legislative or executive acts. comparable with its power over civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by appeal...in
Clearly then, neither the legislative nor the executive branch, and for that matter which cases the appellate court has all the powers of the courtof origin,' nor to its
much less, this Court, has power under the Constitution to act contrary to its terms. power of quasi-judicial administrative decisions where the Court is limited to asking
Any attempted exercise of power in violation of its provisions is to that extent whether 'there is some evidentiary basis' for the administrative finding. Instead, the
unwarranted and null. Court accepted the Solicitor General's suggestion that it 'go no further than to satisfy
[itself] not that the President's decision is correct and that public safety was
The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the governmental organ which
endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in
has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid leads to suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.'164
a more appreciative attitude of theemerging concept that a declaration of nullity may
have legal consequences which the more orthodox view would deny. That for a Lansang, however, was decided under the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution,
period of time such a statute, treaty, executive order, or ordinance was in 'actual by providing only for judicial review based on the determination of the sufficiency of
the factual bases, has in fact done away with the test of arbitrariness as provided
in Lansang.
b) The "sufficiency of factual
basis test".
Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the
1987 Constitution are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time
they were drafting the Constitution. Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test for
judicial review of the President's power to declare martial law and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather
it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual
bases.
We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial review
by the introduction of the "sufficiency of the factual basis" test.
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law
and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the
revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these
powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to
whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only
on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made
the declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may
be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past
events. As to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the
President.
Past events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension
as long as these are connected or related to the current situation existing at the time
of the declaration.
As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is up to
the President.165 As Commander-in-Chief, he has sole discretion to determine what
to include and what not to include in the proclamation and the written Report taking
into account the urgency of the situation as well as national security. He cannot be
forced to divulge intelligence reports and confidential information that may prejudice
the operations and the safety of the military.
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are
included in the written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had
already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be used only as tools, guides or
reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual basis, but not as
part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.
In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual
basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute
correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the
President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts
reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the
President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede the
process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the
President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to
him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate.
Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the President in peril but would also
defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to
borrow the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to "immediately put an end
to the root cause of the emergency".166 Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied
with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it would be too late in the day as
the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated to a level that is hard, if not
impossible, to curtail.
Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence reports of
military officers as credible evidence that the President ca appraise and to which he
can anchor his judgment,167 as appears to be the case here.
At this point, it is wise to quote the pertinent portions of the Dissenting Opinion of
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. in Fortun:
President Arroyo cannot be blamed for relying upon the information given to her by
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, considering
that the matter of the supposed armed uprising was within their realm of
competence, and that a state of emergency has also been declared in Central
Mindanao to prevent lawless violence similar to the 'Maguindanao massacre,' which
may be an indication that there is a threat to the public safety warranting a
declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ.
Certainly, the President cannot be expected to risk being too late before declaring
martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution, as couched,
does not require precision in establishing the fact of rebellion. The President is called conditions, the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the
to act as public safety requires.168 privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down.

Corollary, as the President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is a need As a general rule, a word used in a statute which has a technical or legal meaning, is
to proclaim martial law even only on the basis of intelligence reports, it is irrelevant, construed to have the same technical or legal meaning. 171 Since the Constitution did
for purposes of the Court's review, if subsequent events prove that the situation had not define the term "rebellion," it must be understood to have the same meaning as
not been accurately reported to him. the crime of "rebellion" in the Revised Penal Code (RPC).172

After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the During the July 29, 1986 deliberation of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, then
information at hand during the declaration or suspension; subsequent events do not Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado alluded to actual rebellion as one defined under
have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is concerned. In any event, safeguards Article 134 of the RPC:
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution are in place to cover such a
MR. DE LOS REYES. As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no
situation, e.g., the martial law period is good only for 60 days; Congress may choose
longer imminent rebellion. Does the Committee mean that there should be actual
to revoke it even immediately after the proclamation is made; and, this Court may
shooting or actual attack on the legislature or Malacañang, for example? Let us take
investigate the factual background of the declaration.169
for example a contemporary event - this Manila Hotel incident, everybody knows
Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this case. what happened. Would the Committee consider that an actual act of rebellion?
Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and
MR. REGALADO. If we consider the definition of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135
the written report are not enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration
of the Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual assemblage of men in an
and/or suspension as long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the
armed public uprising for the purposes mentioned in Article 134 and by the means
written Report that support the conclusion that there is an actual invasion or
employed under Article 135. x x x173
rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension.
Thus, rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution could only refer to rebellion as
In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the
defined under Article 134 of the RPC. To give it a different definition would not only
President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
create confusion but would also give the President wide latitude of discretion, which
corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would be limited to an
may be abused - a situation that the Constitution see k s to prevent. 174
examination on whether the President acted within the bounds set by the
Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the Article 134 of the RPC states:
declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. - The crime of rebellion or
insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government
VIII. The parameters for determining the for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the
sufficiency of the/actual basis/or the declaration territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or
of martial law and/or the suspension of the other armed forces, depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
a) Actual invasion or rebellion, Thus, for rebellion to exist, the following elements must be present, to wit: "(l) there
and public safety requirement. is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and (2) the
purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to
Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the
the Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege
(ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief
of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public
Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives."175
safety requires the exercise of such power."170 Without the concurrence of the two
b) Probable cause is the the President. As such, he is not expected to completely validate all the information
allowable standard of proof for the he received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ
President. of habeas corpus.

In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince We restate the elements of rebellion for reference:
himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a
1. That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking up arms against the Government;
rebellion was committed or is being committed.176 To require him to satisfy a higher
and
standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers. Along this
line, Justice Carpio, in his Dissent in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, concluded 2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either: (a) to remove from the
that the President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in allegiance to said Government or its laws the territory of the Philippines or any part
determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces or (b) to deprive the Chief
martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. 178
expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-
existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi
writ. This is because unlike other standards of proof, which, in order to be met, would City.179 However, they insist that the armed hostilities do not constitute rebellion in
require much from the President and therefore unduly restrain his exercise of the absence of the element of culpable political purpose, i.e., the removal from the
emergency powers, the requirement of probable cause is much simpler. It merely allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines
necessitates an "average man [to weigh] the facts and circumstances without or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to
resorting to the calibration of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
knowledge. He [merely] relies on common sense [and] x x x needs only to rest on and prerogatives.
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed x x x by the
The contention lacks merit.
accused."177
a) Facts, events and
To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as
information upon which the President
follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two
anchored his decision to declare
requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe
martial law and suspend the privilege
that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
of the writ of habeas corpus.
Having laid down the parameters for review, the Court shall nowproceed to the core
Since the President supposedly signed Proclamation No. 216 on May 23, 2017 at
of the controversy - whether Proclamation No. 216,Declaring a State of Martial Law
10:00 PM,180 the Court will consider only those facts and/or events which were
and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao,
known to or have transpired on or before that time, consistent with the scope of
lacks sufficient factual basis.
judicial review. Thus, the following facts and/or events were deemed to have been
IX. There is sufficient factual basis for the considered by the President in issuing Proclamation No. 216, as plucked from and
declaration of martial law and the suspension of extant in Proclamation No. 216 itself:
the writ of habeas corpus.
1. Proclamation No. 55 issued on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national
At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao;181
determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored
2. Series of violent acts182 committed by the Maute terrorist group including:
his declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President a) Attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur m February 2016, killing and
that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It must also be reiterated that wounding several soldiers;
martial law is a matter ofurgency and much leeway and flexibility should be accorded
b) Mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016 of the arrested comrades of the
Maute Group and other detainees;
3. On May 23, 2017:183
a) Takeover of a hospital in Marawi;
b) Establishment of several checkpoints within Marawi;
c) Burning of certain government and private facilities;
d) Mounting casualties on the part of the government;
e) Hoisting the flag of ISIS in several areas; and
f) Capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause
death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of
Mindanao; and the Report184 submitted to Congress:
1. Zamboanga siege;185
2. Davao bombing;186
3. Mamasapano carnage;187
4. Cotabato bombings;188
5. Sultan Kudarat bombings;189
6. Sulu bombings;190
7. Basilan bombings;191
8. Attempt to capture Hapilon was confronted with armed resistance by combined
forces of ASG and the Maute Group;192
9. Escalation of armed hostility against the government troops;193
10. Acts of violence directed not only against government authorities and
establishments but civilians as well;194
11. Takeover of major social, economic and political foundations which paralyzed
Marawi City;195
12. The object of the armed hostilities was to lay the groundwork for the
establishment of a DAESH/ISIS wilayat or province;196
13. Maute Group has 263 active members, armed and combat-ready;197
14. Extensive networks or linkages of the Maute Group with foreign and local armed
groups;198
15. Adherence of the Maute Group to the ideals espoused by ISIS;199
16. Publication of a video showing Maute Group's declaration of allegiance to ISIS;200
17. Foreign-based terrorist groups provide financial and logistical support to the
Maute Group;201
18. Events on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City, particularly:
a) at 2:00 PM, members and sympathizers of the Maute Group and ASG attacked
various government and privately-owned facilities;202
b) at 4:00 PM, around fifty (50) armed criminals forcibly entered the Marawi City Jail;
facilitated the escape of inmates; killed a member of PDEA; assaulted and disarmed
on-duty personnel and/or locked them inside the cells; confiscated cellphones,
personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles;203
c) by 4:30 PM, intem1ption of power supply; sporadic gunfights; city-wide power
outage by evening;204
d) from 6:00 PM to 7:00 PM, Maute Group ambushed and burned the Marawi Police
Station; commandeered a police car;205
e) BJMP personnel evacuated the Marawi City Jail and other affected areas;206
f) control over three bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo, and Sauiaran,
was taken by the rebels;207
g) road blockades and checkpoints set up by lawless armed groups at the Iligan-
Marawi junction;208
h) burning of Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora, the nuns'
quarters in the church, and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony;209
i) taking of hostages from the church;210
j) killing of five faculty members of Dansalan College foundation;211
k) burning of Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and Marawi Central
Elementary Pilot School;212
1) overrunning of Amai Pakpak Hospital;213
m) hoisting the ISIS flag in several areas;214
n) attacking and burning of the Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital;215
o) ransacking of a branch of Landbank of the Philippines and commandeering an
armored vehicle;216
p) reports regarding Maute Group's plan to execute Christians;217
q) preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes;218
r) forcing young Muslims to join their group;219 and
s) intelligence reports regarding the existence of strategic mass action of lawless
armed groups in Marawi City, seizing public and private facilities, perpetrating killings
of government personnel1 , and committing armed uprising against and open
defiance of the Government.220
b) The President's Conclusion
After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he arrived at the
following conclusions, as mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report:
1) The Maute Group is "openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the
Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his
powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order
and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion."221
2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms and committed public uprising
against the duly constituted government and against the people of Mindanao, for the
purpose of removing Mindanao - starting with the City of Marawi, Lanao del Sur -
from its allegiance to the Government and its laws and depriving the Chief Executive
of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public
order and safety in Mindanao, to the great damage, prejudice, and detriment of the
people therein and the nation as a whole."222
3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display the groups' clear intention to
establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly constituted
authorities - the President, foremost - of their powers and prerogatives. "223
4) "These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to
establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of
a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao."224
5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young
Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed
consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a
segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen display of DAESH flags
constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove Marawi City, and
eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government."225
6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the
President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent
to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his
control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his
mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory
powers over local governments."226
7) "Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty
sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide power outages.
Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from performing their functions.
Through the attack and occupation of several hospitals, medical services in Marawi
City have been adversely affected. The bridge and road blockades set up by the
groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to deliver basic services to its
citizens. Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government
from restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and
government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered."227
8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being
provided by foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their blatant acts of
defiance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted in the
deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi City; they have likewise
compromised the security of the entire Island of Mindanao."228
9) "Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups,
local criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege f Marawi City is a vital cog in
attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao.
These circumstances demand swift and decisive action to ensure the safety and
security of the Filipino people and preserve our national integrity."229
Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed
public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to
the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief
Executive of any of his powers and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that
there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and
that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to
show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was an armed
public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance
of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the
President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical
consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden
of proof.
After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause
for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. As Justice Carpio decreed in his Dissent in Fortun:
x x x [T]he Constitution does not compel the President to produce such amount of
proof as to unduly burden and effectively incapacitate her from exercising such
powers.
Definitely, the President need not gather proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is
the standard of proof required for convicting an accused charged with a criminal
offense.x x x
xxxx
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the highest quantum of evidence, and to require
the President to establish the existence of rebellion or invasion with such amount of
proof before declaring martial law or suspending the writ amounts to an excessive
restriction on 'the President's power to act as to practically tie her hands and disable
her from effectively protecting the nation against threats to public safety.'
Neither clear and convincing evidence, which is employed in either criminal or civil
cases, is indispensable for a lawful declaration of martial law or suspension of the
writ. This amount of proof likewise unduly restrains the President in exercising her
emergency powers, as it requires proof greater than preponderance of evidence
although not beyond reasonable doubt.
Not even preponderance of evidence, which is the degree of proof necessary in civil
cases, is demanded for a lawful declaration of martial law.
xxxx
Weighing the superiority of the evidence on hand, from at least two opposing sides,
FACTUAL STATEMENTS
before she can act and impose martial law or suspend the writ unreasonably curtails
the President's emergency powers.
(1) that the Maute group attacked Amai Pakpak
Similarly, substantial evidence constitutes an unnecessary restriction on Hospital
the
President's use of her emergency powers. Substantial evidence is the amountseveral
of
proof required in administrative or quasi-judicial cases, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
I am of the view that probable cause of the existence of either invasion or rebellion
suffices and satisfies the standard of proof for a valid declaration of martial law and
suspension of the writ.
Probable cause is the same amount of proof required for the filing of a criminal
information by the prosecutor and for the issuance of an arrest warrant by a judge.
Probable cause has been defined as a 'set of facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the
Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested.'
In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no
technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more
than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction.
Probable cause, basically premised on common sense, is the most reasonable, most
practical, and most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the
existence or non-existence of rebellion, necessary for a declaration of martial law x x
x230
c) Inaccuracies, simulations,
falsities, and hyperboles.
The allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation No. 216
and the Report are false, inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic, does not
persuade. As mentioned, the Court is not concerned about absolute correctness,
accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so would unduly tie the hands of the
President in responding to an urgent situation.
Specifically, it alleges that the following facts are not true as shown by its counter-
evidence.231
COUNTER-EVIDENCE
Statements made
and hoisted the DAESH flag there, among (a) Dr. Amer Saber, Chief of the Hosp
locations. As of 0600H of 24 May 2017, (b) Health Secretary Paulyn Ub
 mbers of the Maute Group were seen guarding the
ry gates of the Amai Pakpak Hospital and that they
d hostage the employees of the Hospital and took
er the PhilHealth office located thereat
oclamation No. 216 and Report);
(c) PNP Spokesperson Senior Supt. Dionardo Carlos; Cullamat Petition which likewise submitted online news articles238 as basis for their
claim of insufficiency of factual basis.
(d) AFP Public Affairs Office Chief Co. Edgard Arevalo;
and Again, it bears to reiterate that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no
(e) Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra denying that application in these cases. As long as there are other facts in the proclamation and
the hospital was attacked by the Maute Group citing the written Report indubitably showing the presence of an actual invasion or
online news articles of Philstar, Sunstar, Inquirer, and
rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension, the
Bombo Radyo.232 finding of sufficiency of factual basis, stands.

that the Maute Group ambushed and burned the Statements made by PNP Director General Ronald d) Ruling in Bedol v.
Commission
rawi Police Station (Proclamation No. 216 and the dela Rosa and Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra in on Elections not
port); Applicable.
the online news reports of ABS-CBN News and CNN
233
Philippines denying that the Maute group occupied
Petitioners, however, insist that in Bedol v. Commission on Elections,239 news reports
the Marawi Police Station. may be admitted on grounds of relevance, trustworthiness, and necessity.
Petitioners' reliance on this case is misplaced. The Court in Bedol made it clear that
that lawless armed groups likewise ransacked the Statement made by the bank officials in the on-line
the doctrine of independent relevant statement, which is an ·exception to the
ndbank of the Philippines and commandeered one news article of Philstar234 that the Marawi City branch
hearsay rule, applies in cases "where only the fact that such statements were made
ts armored vehicles (Report); was not ransacked but sustained damages from isthe relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial."240 Here, the question is not
attacks. whether such statements were made by Saber, et. al., but rather whether what they
said are true. Thus, contrary to the view of petitioners, the exception in Bedol finds
that the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School Statements in the on-line news article noofapplication here.
s burned (Proclamation No. 216 and the Report); Philstar235 made by the Marawi City Schools Division
e) There are other independent
Assistant Superintendent Ana Alonto denying that the
facts which support the finding that,
school was burned and Department of Education
more likely than not, rebellion exists
Assistant Secretary Tonisito Umali stating that they
and that public safety requires it.
have not received any report of damage.
Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels
hat the Maute Group attacked various government Statement in the on-line news article ofofthe Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent
ilities (Proclamation No. 216 and the Report). Inquirer236 made by Marawi City Mayor Majul facts showing that more likely than not, actua1 rebellion exists, and public safety
Gandamra stating that the ASG and the Maute Terror
requires the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
Groups have not taken over any government facility
ofinhabeas corpus. To be precise, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are
Marawi City. only five out of the severa1 statements bulleted in the President's Report. Notably,
in the interpellation by Justice Francis H. Jardeleza during the second day of the oral
However, the so-called counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that he was not aware or that he had no
articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have personal knowledge of the other incidents cited. 241 As it thus stands, there is no
affirmed the contents thereof It was not even shown that efforts were made to question or challenge with respect to the reliability of the other incidents, which by
secure such affirmation albeit the circumstances proved futile. As the Court has themselves are ample to preclude the conclusion that the President's report is
consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus unreliable and that Proclamation No. 216 was without sufficient factual basis.
without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the
truth of the matter asserted.237 This pronouncement applies with equal force to the
Verily, there is no credence to petitioners' claim that the bases for the President's a) The overriding and
imposition of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were mostly paramount concern of martial law is
inaccurate, simulated, false and/or hyperbolic. the protection of the security of the
nation and the good and safety of the
X. Public safety requires the declaration of public.
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Considering the nation's and its people's traumatic experience martial law under the
Mindanao. Marcos regime, one would expect the framers of the 1987 Constitution to stop at
nothing from not resuscitating the law. Yet it would appear that the constitutional
Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely
writers entertained no doubt about the necessity and practicality of such specie of
not the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
extraordinary power and thus, once again, bestowed on the Commander-in-Chief the
corpus. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
power to declare martial law albeit in its diluted form.
of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or
invasion and the public safety requirement. In his Report, the President noted that Indeed, martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not corpus are necessary for the protection of the security of the nation; suspension of
only against government forces or establishments but likewise against civilians and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "precautionary , and although it might
their properties.242 In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats [curtail] certain rights of individuals, [it] is for the purpose of defending and
were issued;243 road blockades and checkpoints were set up;244 schools and churches protecting the security of the state or the entire country and our sovereign
were burned;245 civilian hostages were taken and killed;246 non-Muslims or Christians people".253 Commissioner Ople referred to the suspension of the privilege of the writ
were targeted;247 young male Muslims were forced to join their group;248 medical of habeas corpus as a "form of immobilization" or "as a means of immobilizing
services and delivery of basic services were hampered;249 reinforcements of potential internal enemies" "especially in areas like Mindanao."254
government troops and civilian movement were hindered;250 and the security of the
Aside from protecting the security of the country, martial law also guarantees and
entire Mindanao Island was compromised.251
promotes public safety. It is worthy of mention that rebellion alone does not justify
These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities had already the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare martial corpus; the public safety requirement must likewise be present.
law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the last paragraph of
b) As Commander-in-Chief, the
his Report, the President declared:
President receives vital, relevant,
While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the classified, and live information which
on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the equip and assist him in making
continued implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the decisions.
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is
In Parts IX and X, the Court laid down the arsenal of facts and events that formed the
completely quelled.252
basis for Proclamation No. 216. For the President, the totality of facts and events,
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial more likely than not, shows that actual rebellion exists and that public safety requires
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ f habeas corpus have been properly the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being corpus. Otherwise stated, the President believes that there is probable cause that
probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the actual rebellion exists and public safety warrants the issuance of Proclamation No.
martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas 216. In turn, the Court notes that the President, in arriving at such a conclusion, relied
corpus. on the facts and events included in the Report, which we find sufficient.

XI. Whole of Mindanao

To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and the Report are far from being [D]epartment;"259 in turn, the Executive Department will have to open its findings to
exhaustive or all-encompassing. At this juncture, it may not be amiss to state that as the Court,260 which it did during the closed door session last June 15, 2017.
Commander-in-Chief, the President has possession of documents and information
d) The 1987 Constitution
classified as "confidential", the contents of which cannot be included in the
grants to the President, as
Proclamation or Report for reasons of national security. These documents may
Commander-in-Chief, the discretion
contain information detailing the position of government troops and rebels, stock of
to determine the territorial coverage
firearms or ammunitions, ground commands and operations, names of suspects and
or application of martial law or
sympathizers, etc. , In fact, during the closed door session held by the Court, some
suspension of the privilege of the writ
information came to light, although not mentioned in the Proclamation or Report.
of habeas corpus.
But then again, the discretion whether to include the same in the Proclamation or
Report is the judgment call of the President. In fact, petitioners concede to this. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion,
During the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that "the assertion of facts [in when the public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of
the Proclamation and Report] is the call of the President."255 writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine the
It is beyond cavil that the President can rely on intelligence reports and classified
territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
documents. "It is for the President as [C]ommander-in[C]hief of the Armed Forces to
of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under
appraise these [classified evidence or documents/]reports and be satisfied that the
martial law.
public safety demands the suspension of the writ." 256 Significantly, respect to these
so-called classified documents is accorded even "when [the] authors of or witnesses This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive
to these documents may not be revealed."257 Department, particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository
of vital, classified, and live information necessary for and relevant in calibrating the
In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of information before him, he
territorial application of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
also has the right, prerogative, and the means to access vital, relevant, and
of habeas corpus. It, too, is a concession that the President has the tactical and
confidential data, concomitant with his position as Commander-in-Chief of the
military support, and thus has a more informed understanding of what is happening
Armed Forces.
on the ground. Thus, the Constitution imposed a limitation on the period of
c) The Court has no machinery application, which is 60 days, unless sooner nullified, revoked or extended, but not
or tool equal to that of the on the territorial scope or area of coverage; it merely stated "the Philippines or any
Commander-in-Chief to ably and part thereof," depending on the assessment of the President.
properly assess the ground
e) The Constitution has
conditions.
provided sufficient safeguards against
In contrast, the Court does not have the same resources available to the President. possible abuses of Commander-in-
However, this should not be considered as a constitutiona1 lapse. On the contrary, Chief's powers; further curtailment of
this is in line with the function of the Court, particularly in this instance, to determine Presidential powers should not only
the sufficiency of factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. As thoroughly discussed in be discouraged but also avoided.
Part VIII, the determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be
Considering the country's history, it is understandable that the resurgence of martial
limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.
law would engender apprehensions among the citizenry. Even the Court as an
In fact, the Court, in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,258 cautioned not to
institution cannot project a stance of nonchalance. However, the importance of
"undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." In this regard, "the
martial law in the context of our society should outweigh one's prejudices and
Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the [E]xecutive
apprehensions against it. The significance of martial law should not be undermined
by unjustified fears and past experience. After all, martial law is critical and crucial to
the promotion of public safety, the preservation of the nation's sovereignty and
ultimately, the survival of our country. It is vital for the protection of the country not
only against internal enemies but also against those enemies lurking from beyond
our shores. As such, martial law should not be cast aside, or its scope and potency
limited and diluted, based on bias and unsubstantiated assumptions.
Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the Constitution placed several
safeguards which effectively watered down the power to declare martial law. The
1987 Constitution "[clipped] the powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief because of
[the] experience with the previous regime."261 Not only were the grounds limited to
actual invasion or rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at 60 days, unless
sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at the same time, it is subject to the veto
powers of the Court and Congress.
Commissioner Monsod, who, incidentally, is a counsel for the Mohamad Petition,
even exhorted his colleagues in the Constitutional Convention to look at martial law
from a new perspective by elaborating on the sufficiency of the proposed safeguards:
MR. MONSOD. x x x
Second, we have been given a spectre of non sequitur, that the mere declaration of
martial law for a fixed period not exceeding 60 days, which is subject to judicial
review, is going to result in numerous violations of human rights, the predominance
of the military forever and in untold sufferings. Madam President, we are talking
about invasion and rebellion. We may not have any freedom to speak of after 60
days, if we put as a precondition the concurrence of Congress. That might prevent
the President from acting at that time in order to meet the problem. So I would like
to suggest that, perhaps, we should look at this in its proper perspective. We are only
looking at a very specific case. We are only looking at a case of the first 60 days at its
maximum. And we are looking at actual invasion and rebellion, and there are other
safeguards in those cases.262
Even Bishop Bacani was convinced that the 1987 Constitution has enough safeguards
against presidential abuses and commission of human rights violations. In voting yes
for the elimination of the requirement of prior concurrence of Congress, Bishop
Bacani stated, viz.:
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, just two sentences. The reason I vote II yes is that despite my
concern for human rights, I believe that a good President can also safeguard human
rights and human lives as well. And I do not want to unduly emasculate the powers
of the President. Xxx263
Commissioner Delos Reyes shared the same sentiment, to wit:
MR. DE LOS REYES. May I explain my vote, Madam President.
x x x The power of the President to impose martial law is doubtless of a very high and
delicate nature. A free people are naturally jealous of the exercise of military power,
and the power to impose martial law is certainly felt to be one of no ordinary
magnitude. But as presented by the Committee, there are many safeguards: 1) it is
limited to 60 days; 2) Congress can revoke it; 3) the Supreme Court can still review as
to the sufficiency of factual basis; and 4) it does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution. To repeat what I have quoted when I interpellated Commissioner
Monsod, it is said that the power to impose martial law is dangerous to liberty and
may be abused. All powers may be abused if placed in unworthy hands. But it would
be difficult, we think, to point out any other hands in which this power will be more
safe and at the same time equally effectual. When citizens of the State are in arms
against each other and the constituted authorities are unable to execute the laws,
the action of the President must be prompt or it is of little value. x x x 264 (Emphasis
supplied)
At this juncture, it bears to stress that it was the collective sentiment of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution that sufficient safeguards against possible misuse and abuse
by the Commander-in-Chief of his extraordinary powers are already in place and that
no further emasculation of the presidential powers is called for in the guise of
additional safeguards. The Constitution recognizes that any further curtailment,
encumbrance, or emasculation of the presidential powers would not generate any
good among the three co-equal branches, and to the country and its citizens as a
whole. Thus:
MR. OPLE. The reason for my concern, Madam President, is that when we put all of
these encumbrances on the President and Commander-in-Chief during an actual
invasion or rebellion, given an intractable Congress that may be dominated by
opposition parties, we may be actually impelling the President to use the sword of
Alexander to cut the Gordian knot by just declaring a revolutionary government that
sets him free to deal with the invasion or the insurrection. x x x 265 (Emphasis supplied)
f) Rebellion and public safety;
nature, scope, and range.
It has been said that the "gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public
uprising against the government;"266 and that by nature, "rebellion is x x x a crime
of masses or multitudes, involving crowd action, that cannot be confined a
priori, within predetermined bounds."267 We understand this to mean that the
precise extent or range of the rebellion could not be measured by exact metes and
bounds.
To illustrate: A contingent armed with high-powered firearms publicly assembled in
Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila where the Court's compound is situated. They
overpowered the guards, entered the Court's premises, and hoisted the ISIS flag.
Their motive was political, i.e., they want to remove from the allegiance to the
Philippine government a part of the territory of the Philippines, particularly the
Court's compound and establish it as an ISIS-territory.
Based on the foregoing illustration, and vis-a-vis the nature of the crime of rebellion,
could we validly say that the rebellion is confined only within the Court's compound?
Definitely not. The possibility that there are other rebels positioned in the nearby
buildings or compound of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) or the Manila Science
High Schoo1 (MSHS) could not be discounted. There is no way of knowing that
all participants in the rebellion went and stayed inside the Court's compound.
Neither could it be validly argued that the armed contingent positioned in PGH or
MSHS is not engaged in rebellion because there is no publicity in their acts as, in fact,
they were merely lurking inside the compound of PGH and MSHS. However, it must
be pointed out that for the crime of rebellion to be consummated, it is not required
that all armed participants should congregate in one place, in this case, the Court's
compound, and publicly rise in arms against the government for the attainment of
their culpable purpose. It suffices that a portion of the contingent gathered and
formed a mass or a crowd and engaged in an armed public uprising against the
government. Similarly, it cannot be validly concluded that the grounds on which the
armed public uprising actually to6k place should be the measure of the extent, scope
or range, of the actual I rebellion. This is logical since the other rebels positioned in
PGH, MSHS, I or elsewhere, whose participation did not involve the publicity aspect
of rebellion, may also be considered as engaging in the crime of rebellion.
Proceeding from the same illustration, suppose we say that the President, after
finding probable cause that there exists actual rebellion and that public safety
requires it, declares martial law and suspends the writ of habeas corpus in the whole
of Metro Manila, could we then say that the territorial coverage of the proclamation
is too expansive?
To answer this question, we revert back to the premise that the discretion to
determine the territorial scope of martial law lies with the President. The
Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that martial
law should be confined only in the particular place where the armed public uprising
actually transpired. This is not only practical but also logical. Martial law is an urgent
measure since at stake is the nation's territorial sovereignty and survival. As such, the
President has to respond quickly. After the rebellion in the Court's compound, he
need not wait for another rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he could
impose martial law thereat. If that is the case, then the President would have to wait
until every remote corner in the country is infested with rebels before he could
declare martial law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this is not the scenario
envisioned by the Constitution.
Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to impose
martial law only within the Court's compound because it is where the armed public
uprising actually transpired, he may do so if he sees fit. At the same time, however,
he is not precluded from expanding the coverage of martial law beyond the Court's
compound. After all, rebellion is not confined within predetermined bounds.
Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law,
"involves the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the
safety of the general public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as
crimes or disasters."268 Public safety is an abstract term; it does not take any physical
form. Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not be physically measured by metes
and bounds.
Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of martial law should not
necessarily be limited to the particular vicinity where the armed public uprising
actually transpired, is because of the unique characteristic of rebellion as a crime.
"The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a
complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion[,]
though crimes in themselves[,] are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
rebellion."269 Rebellion absorbs "other acts committed in its pursuance". 270 Direct
assault,271 murder,272 homicide,273 arson,274 robbery,275 and kidnapping,276 just to
name a few, are absorbed in the crime of rebellion if committed in furtherance of
rebellion; "[i]t cannot be made a basis of a separate charge."277 Jurisprudence also
teaches that not only common crimes may be absorbed in rebellion but also
"offenses under special laws [such as Presidential Decree No. 1829]278 which are
perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense". 279 "All crimes, whether
punishable under a special law or general law, which are me e components or
ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of
rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. 280
Thus, by the theory of absorption, the crime of murder committed in Makati City, if
committed in furtherance of the crime of rebellion being hypothetically staged in
Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila, is stripped of its common complexion and is absorbed
in the crime of rebellion. This all the more makes it difficult to confine the application
of martial law only to the place where the armed public uprising is actually taking
place. In the illustration above, Padre Faura could only be the nerve center of the
rebellion but at the same time rebellion is also happening in Makati City.
In fine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law
in direct proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply
because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their
transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the
determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from
arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these
limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining
the territorial scope of martial law.
Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only
to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the
present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent
the escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy
reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from different parts of
Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where
there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law,
it will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless.
g) The Court must stay within
the confines of its power.
The Court can only act within the confines of its power.1âwphi1 For the Court to
overreach is to infringe upon another's territory. Clearly, the power to determine the
scope of territorial application belongs to the President. "The Court cannot indulge
in judicial legislation without violating the principle of separation of powers, and,
hence, undermining the foundation of our republican system."281
To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical machinery
to determine the strategical value of other places in the military's efforts to quell the
rebellion and restore peace. It would be engaging in an act of adventurism if it dares
to embark on a mission of deciphering the territorial metes and bounds of martial
law. To be blunt about it, hours after the proclamation of martial law none of the
members of this Court could have divined that more than ten thousand souls would
be forced to evacuate to Iligan and Cagayan de Oro and that the military would have
to secure those places also; none of us could have predicted that Cayamora Maute
would be arrested in Davao City or that his wife Ominta Romato Maute would be
apprehended in Masiu, Lanao del Sur; and, none of us had an inkling that the
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) would launch an attack in Cotabato City.
The Court has no military background and technical expertise to predict that. In the
same manner, the Court lacks the technical capability to determine which part of
Mindanao would best serve as forward operating base of the military in their present
endeavor in Mindanao. Until now the Court is in a quandary and can only speculate
whether the 60-day lifespan of Proclamation No. 216 could outlive the present
hostilities in Mindanao. It is on this score that the Court should give the President
sufficient leeway to address the peace and order problem in Mindanao.
Thus, considering the current situation, it will not serve any purpose if the President
is goaded into using "the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot" 282 by
attempting to impose another encumbrance; after all "the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is essentially an
executive act."283
Some sectors, impelled perhaps by feelings of patriotism, may wish to subdue, rein
in, or give the President a nudge, so to speak, as some sort of reminder of the nation's
experience under the Marcos-styled martial law. However, it is not fair to judge
President Duterte based on the ills some of us may have experienced during the
Marcos-martial law era. At this point, the Court quotes the insightful discourse of
Commissioner Ople:
MR. OPLE. x x x
xxxx
Madam President, there is a tendency to equate patriotism with rendering the
executive branch of the government impotent, as though by reducing drastically the
powers of the executive, we are rendering a service to human welfare. I think it is
also important to understand that the extraordinary measures contemplated in the
Article on the Executive pertain to a practical state of war existing in this country
when national security will become a common bond of patriotism of all Filipinos,
especially if it is an actual invasion or an actual rebellion, and the President may have
to be given a minimum flexibility to cope with such unprecedented threats to the
survival of a nation. I think the Commission has done so but at the same time has not,
in any manner, shunned the task of putting these powers under a whole system of
checks and balances, including the possible revocation at any time of a proclamation
of martial law by the Congress, and in any case a definite determination of these
extraordinary powers, subject only to another extension to be determined by
Congress in the event that it is necessary to do so because the emergency persists.
So, I think this Article on the Executive for which I voted is completely responsible; it
is attuned to the freedom and the rights of the citizenry. It does not render the
presidency impotent and, at the same time, it allows for a vigorous representation of
the people through their Congress when an emergency measure is in force and
effect.284
h) Several local armed groups f. On April 11, 2017, the ASG infiltrated Inabaga, Bohol resulting in firefights between
have formed linkages aimed at rebels and government troops.295
committing rebellion and acts in
g. On April 13, 2017, the ASG beheaded Filipino kidnap victim Noel Besconde. 296
furtherance thereof in the whole of
Mindanao. h. On April 20, 2017, the ASG kidnapped SSg. Anni Siraji and beheaded him three days
later.297
With a predominantly Muslim population, Marawi City is "the only Islamic City of the
South."285 On April 15, 1980, it was conferred the official title of "Islamic City of There were also intelligence reports from the military about offensives committed by
Marawi."286 The city's first name, "Dansalan," "was derived from the word 'dansal', the ASG and other local rebel groups. All these suggest that the rebellion in Marawi
meaning a destination point or rendezvous. Literally, it also means arrival or has already spilled over to other parts of Mindanao.
coming."287 Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact, the Kilometer Zero marker
in Mindanao is found in Marawi City thereby making Marawi City the point of Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages
reference of all roads in Mindanao. established among rebel groups, the armed uprising that was initially staged in
Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to Marawi. The Court therefore will not
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the simply disregard the events that happened during the Davao City bombing, the
rebellion, both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City siege, and the countless bombings in
the whole of Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed groups have Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others. 298 The Court cannot
historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and simply take the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a crime without predetermined
backdoor passages;"288 there is also the plan to establish a wilayat in Mindanao by bounds, the President has reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of martial
staging the siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017, Abdullah Maute law, as well as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
had already dispatched some of his men to various places in Mindanao, such as whole of Mindanao, is most necessary, effective, and called for by the circumstances.
Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and the
murder of military and police personnel,289 must also be considered. Indeed, there is i) Terrorism neither negates
some semblance of truth to the contention that Marawi is only the start, and nor absorbs rebellion.
Mindanao the end.
It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao has been ongoing for
Other events also show that the atrocities were not concentrated in Marawi City. decades. While some groups have sought legal and peaceful means, others have
Consider these: resorted to violent extremism and terrorism. Rebellion may be subsumed under the
crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope covering a wide range of predicate
a. On January 13, 2017, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded in Barangay crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can be
Campo Uno, Lamita City, Basilan. A civilian was killed while another was wounded. 290 committed.299 However, while the scope of terrorism may be comprehensive, its
purpose is distinct and well-defined. The objective of a "'terrorist" is to sow and
b. On January 19, 2017, the ASG kidnapped three Indonesians near Bakungan Island,
create a condition of widespread fear among the populace in order to coerce the
Taganak, Tawi-Tawi.291
government to give in to an unlawful demand. This condition of widespread fear is
c. On January 29, 2017, the ASG detonated an IED in Barangay Danapah, Albarka, traditionally achieved through bombing, kidnapping, mass killing, and beheading,
Basilan resulting in the death of two children and the wounding of three others.292 among others. In contrast, the purpose of rebellion, as previously discussed, is
political, i.e., (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its
d. From March to May 2017, there were eleven (11) separate instances of IED
laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; (ii) any body of land, naval,
explosions by the BIFF in Mindanao. These resulted in the death and wounding of
or armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially,
several personalities.293 of any of their powers and prerogatives.
e. On February 26, 2017, the ASG beheaded its kidnap victim, Juergen Kantner in
Sulu.294
In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective Can we not sheathe our swords and pause for a while to bury our dead, including our
of the malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance differences and prejudices?
of Mindanao to the Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the crime
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of
is rebellion. If, on the other hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a
Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in
consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand, the crime is
terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled that the President did not err SO ORDERED.
in believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the crime
of rebellion.

In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be
characterized as terrorism, the same will not in any manner affect Proclamation No.
216. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security
Act of 2007 expressly provides that "[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a
curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally recognized powers of the
executive branch of the government." Thus, as long as the President complies with
all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of terrorism cannot
prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial ' law or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. After all, the extraordinary
powers of the President are bestowed on him by the Constitution. No act of Congress
can, therefore, curtail or diminish such powers.

Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 which states that
rebellion and terrorism are mutuallty exclusive of each other or that they cannot co-
exist together. RA 9372 does not expressly or impliedly repeal Art. 134 of the RPC.
And while rebellion is one of the predicate crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb
the other as they have different elements.300

Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.

At the end of the day, however ardently and passionately we may believe in the
validity or correctness of the varied and contentious causes or principles that we
espouse, advocate or champion, let us not forget that at this point in time we, the
Filipino people, are confronted with a crisis of such magnitude and proportion that
we all need to summon the spirit of unity and act as one undivided nation, if we are
to overcome and prevail in the struggle at hand.

Let us face up to the fact that the siege in Marawi City has entered the second month
and only God or Allah knows when it would end. Let us take notice of the fact that
the casualties of the war are mounting. To date, 418 have died. Out of that were 303
Maute rebels as against 71 government troops and 44 civilians.
OTHER SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS: Corporation." 3 The petition was approved, after which creditors filed their claims
with the court.
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES; ORGANIZATION vs
On May 17, 1991, a new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Nañagas,4 President of the Philippine
CA Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), was appointed by the Central Bank.
G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995
On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, for short), petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking
and its officers and members, petitioners, payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary increase differential,
vs. Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAÑAGAS II, as Liquidator employees of PaBC. In its order dated September 13, 1991, the trial court ordered
of Pacific Banking Corporation, respondents. payment of the principal claims of the Union.5
G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995 The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On October 16,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as 1991, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the order. In his order
Liquidator of the Pacific Banking Corporation , petitioner, of December 6, 1991, the judge modified his September 13, 19916 but in effect
vs. denied the Liquidator's motion for reconsideration. This order was received by the
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY SHERIFF Liquidator on December 9, 1991. The following day, December 10, 1991, he filed a
RAMON ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG JOO, ANG KEONG LAN and E.J ANG INT'L. LTD., Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. On
represented by their Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY, respondents. December 23, 1991, another Notice of Appeal was filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General in behalf of Nañagas.

MENDOZA, J.:
These cases have been consolidated because the principal question involved is the
same: whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, otherwise
known as the Central Bank Act, is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action. The
Fifth and the Fourteenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals reached opposite results
on this question and consequently applied different periods for appealing.
The facts are as follows:
I.
Proceedings in the CB and the RTC
On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership
by the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary
Board. A few months later, it was placed under liquidation1 and a Liquidator was
appointed.2
On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch
31, a petition entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking
In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's
Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt
of the decision. The judge declared his September 13, 1991 order and subsequent
orders to be final and executory and denied reconsideration. On March 27, 1992, he
granted the Union's Motion for issuance of a writ of Execution.
Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No. 112991, likewise
filed claims for the payment of investment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares
of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18. The shares of stocks, consisting of 154,462
common shares, constituted 11% of the total subscribed capital stock of the PaBC.
They alleged that their claim constituted foreign exchange capital investment entitled
to preference in payment under the Foreign Investments Law.
In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC directed the
Liquidator to pay private respondents the total amount of their claim as preferred
creditors.7
The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On September 30, 1992
he moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the court on October 2,
1992. He received the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on October 5,
1992. On October 14, 1992 he filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders of September
16, 1992 and October 2, 1992. As in the case of the Union, however, the judge
ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had been
filed without authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days. In his order of
October 28, 1992, the judge directed the execution of his September 11, 1992 order
granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim.
II.
Proceedings in the Court of Appeals
The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in
the Court of Appeals to set aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal from
the orders granting the claims of Union and of the Stockholders/Investors. The two
Divisions of the Court of Appeals, to which the cases were separately raffled,
rendered conflicting rulings.
In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R. No. 09373)
the Fifth Division8 held in the case of the Union that the proceeding before the trial
court was a special proceeding and, therefore, the period for appealing from any
decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the
Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision granting the Union's
claims, the appeal was brought on time. The Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the
orders of the lower court and directed the latter to give due course to the appeal of
the Liquidator and set the Record on Appeal he had filed for hearing.
On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division9 ruled in CA-G.R.
SP No. 29351 (now G.R. No. 112991) in the case of the Stockholders/Investors that a
liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action. Therefore, the period for appealing from
any decision or final order rendered therein is 15 days and that since the Liquidator's
appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed from,
deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration was pending, the
notice of appeal was filed late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed the
Liquidator's petition.
III.
Present Proceedings
The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this Court.
In G.R. No. 109373 the Union contends that:
1. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of the suit.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the petition
for certiorari filed by Nañagas who was without any legal authority to file it.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the case is a special proceeding
governed by Rules 72 to 109 of the Revised Rules of Court.
4. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding that the notice of appeal filed
by Nañagas was filed on time.
5. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in declaring that the second notice of appeal
filed on December 23, 1991 by the Solicitor General is a superfluity.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 112991 the Liquidator contends that:
1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking Corporation s
a Special Proceeding case and/or one which allows multiple appeals, in which case
the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from receipt of the order/judgment
appealed from.
2. Private respondents are not creditors of PaBC but are plain stockholders whose
right to receive payment as such would accrue only after all the creditors of the
insolvent bank have been paid.
3. The claim of private respondents in the amount of US$22,531,632.18 is not in the
nature of foreign investment as it is understood in law.
4. The claim of private respondents has not been clearly established and proved.
5. The issuance of a writ of execution against the assets of PaBC was made with grave
abuse of discretion.
The petitions in these cases must be dismissed.
First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is whether a
petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature of a special
proceeding. If it is, then the period of appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must,
in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in order
to perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action, the
period of appeal is 15 days from notice of the decision or final order appealed from.
BP Blg. 129 provides:
§39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or decision appealed
from: Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases the period for appeal shall be
forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire
record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively,
together with an index of the contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases
wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of
Court.
The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:
19. Period of Appeals. —
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases referred to in
paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment, order, resolution or award appealed from.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court
and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeals shall be
thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required.
The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding is an
ordinary action similar to an action for interpleader under Rule 63. 10 The Fourteenth
Division stated:
The petition filed is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court where
there are conflicting claimants or several claims upon the same subject matter, a
person who claims no interest thereon may file an action for interpleader to compel
the claimants to "interplead" and litigate their several claims among themselves.
(Section I Rule 63).
An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action under Rule 62 which, like an
ordinary action, may be appealed only within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or order appealed from. Under Rule 62, the preceding rules covering
ordinary civil actions which are not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the
provisions of the rule relating to such civil actions are applicable to special civil
actions. This embraces Rule 41 covering appeals from the regional trial court to the
Court of Appeals.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an action is defined as "an ordinary
suit in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement
or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong." On the other hand,
Section 2 of the same Rule states that "every other remedy including one to establish
the status or right of a party or a particular fact shall be by special proceeding."
To our mind, from the aforequoted definitions of an action and a special proceeding,
the petition for assistance of the court in the liquidation of an asset of a bank is not
"one to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." Contrary to the
submission of the petitioner, the petition is not intended to establish the fact of
insolvency of the bank. The insolvency of the bank had already been previously
determined by the Central Bank in accordance with Section 9 of the CB Act before
the petition was filed. All that needs to be done is to liquidate the assets of the bank
and thus the assistance of the respondent court is sought for that purpose.
It should be pointed out that this petition filed is not among the cases categorized as
a special proceeding under Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, nor among the
special proceedings that may be appealed under Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules.
We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2 of the Rules
of Court provide:
§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which the
party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.
§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by special
proceeding.
Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special
proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states:" 11
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special
proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or
a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the
former is a formal demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is but a
petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to
recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is
to seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special
proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of
guardianship.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation
should be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition
does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress
of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from
a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced
against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency
so that its creditors may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the
corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a
declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the
petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the
concomitant right of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the
disposition of the corporation's assets.
Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not
resemble petitions for interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves
claims on a subject matter against a person who has no interest therein. 12 This is not
the case in a liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the
corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the
creditors.13 He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the corporation are
paid only to rightful claimants and in the order of payment provided by law.
Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state
of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a
common purpose: the determination of all the assets and the payment of all the
debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the
administrator or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the
claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is not
disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights and
the determination of their order of payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in
proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent corporation. As the Fifth Division of the
Court of Appeals, quoting the Liquidator, correctly noted:
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number of cases
properly classified as "claims." It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The first phase
is concerned with the approval and disapproval of claims. Upon the approval of the
petition seeking the assistance of the proper court in the liquidation of a close entity,
all money claims against the bank are required to be filed with the liquidation court.
This phase may end with the declaration by the liquidation court that the claim is not
proper or without basis. On the other hand, it may also end with the liquidation court
allowing the claim. In the latter case, the claim shall be classified whether it is
ordinary or preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order
allowing or disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be appealed by the
party aggrieved thereby.
The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution plan
prepared by the duly appointed liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in detail
the total amount available for distribution to creditors whose claim were earlier
allowed. The Order finally disposes of the issue of how much property is available for
disposal. Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the liquidation proceeding —
payment of all allowed claims in accordance with the order of legal priority and the
approved distribution plan.
Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of allowance or disallowance of
a particular claim cannot be overemphasized. It is the operative fact that constitutes
a liquidation proceeding a "case where multiple appeals are allowed by law." The
issuance of an Order which, by its nature, affects only the particular claims involved,
and which may assume finality if no appeal is made therefrom, ipso facto creates a
situation where multiple appeals are allowed.
A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition by the
Solicitor General with a court of competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All claims against
the insolvent are required to be filed with the liquidation court. Although the claims
are litigated in the same proceeding, the treatment is individual. Each claim is heard
separately. And the Order issued relative to a particular claim applies only to said
claim, leaving the other claims unaffected, as each claim is considered separate and
distinct from the others. Obviously, in the event that an appeal from an Order
allowing or disallowing a particular claim is made, only said claim is affected, leaving
the others to proceed with their ordinary course. In such case, the original records of
the proceeding are not elevated to the appellate court. They remain with the
liquidation court. In lieu of the original record, a record of appeal is instead required
to be prepared and transmitted to the appellate court.
Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation proceedings. Consequently, a
record on appeal is necessary in each and every appeal made. Hence, the period to
appeal therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required.
(Record pp. 162-164).
In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice
of appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the order
granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not
file a record on appeal with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already
stated a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in
special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason for
this is that the several claims are actually separate ones and a decision or final order
with respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal
must remain in the trial court where other claims may still be pending.
Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims
of the Stockholders/Investors became final. Consequently. the Fourteenth Division's
decision dismissing the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus must be affirmed albeit for a different reason.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), we find that the
Fifth Division correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition
and Mandamus. As already noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a
motion for extension to file a record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30
days of his receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for the
resolution of his motion for extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 within the
extension sought a record on appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in disallowing the
notice on appeal and denying the Liquidator's motion for extension to file a record
on appeal.
The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus and its decision should, therefore, be
affirmed.
held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith (Ramos v. Central Bank of
the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).
In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank but also of
the insolvent bank. Under §§28A-29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he acts in behalf of the bank
"personally or through counsel as he may retain, in all actions or proceedings or
against the corporation" and he has authority "to do whatever may be necessary for
these purposes." This authority includes the power to appeal from the decisions or
final orders of the court which he believes to be contrary to the interest of the bank.
Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time
to file the record on appeal filed in behalf of the Central Bank was not filed by the
office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the Central Bank. This contention has no
merit. On October 22, 1992, as Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta
informed the trial court in March 27, 1992, the OSG had previously authorized
lawyers of the PDIC to prepare and sign pleadings in the case. 16 Conformably thereto
the Notice of Appeal and the Motion for Additional Time to submit Record on Appeal
filed were jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I. Saludares in behalf of the OSG and
by lawyers of the PDIC. 17
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the decisions appealed from
are AFFIRMED.

Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, the SO ORDERED.
court merely assists in adjudicating the claims of creditors, preserves the assets of
the institution, and implements the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board
and that, therefore, as representative of the Monetary Board, the Liquidator cannot
question the order of the court or appeal from it. It contends that since the Monetary
Board had previously admitted PaBC's liability to the laborers by in fact setting aside
the amount of P112,234,292.44 for the payment of their claims, there was nothing
else for the Liquidator to do except to comply with the order of the court.

The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the function of the

trial court is not limited to assisting in the implementation of the orders of the
Monetary Board. Under the same section (§29) of the law invoked by the Union, the
court has authority to set aside the decision of the Monetary Board "if there is a
convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith." 14 As this
Court held in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 15

There is no question, that the action of the monetary Board in this regard may be
subject to judicial review. Thus, it has been held that the Court's may interfere with
the Central Bank's exercise of discretion in determining whether or not a distressed
bank shall be supported or liquidated. Discretion has its limits and has never been
RULE 72, SEC. 2: EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCEPTION
GUY vs CA
G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch
138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI,
represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed the Orders dated July 21,
20002 and July 17, 20033 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in SP
Proc. Case No. 4549 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its May 25, 2004
Resolution4 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes
Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for
letters of administration5 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138.
The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and entitled Intestate Estate of Sima
Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children
of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate
valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs
are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and
Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a
regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise
prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be
appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Attached to private respondents'
petition was a Certification Against Forum Shopping 6 signed by their counsel, Atty.
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez.
In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He
asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled
without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have established their
status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175
of the Family Code.
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss 8 on the ground that the
certification against forum shopping should have been signed by private respondents
and not their counsel. They contended that Remedios should have executed the
certification on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,9 petitioner
and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release
and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational
assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the
estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim
was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly
constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right occurred.
Applying a liberal application of the rules, the trial court also rejected petitioner's
objections on the certification against forum shopping.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court in
its assailed Decision dated January 22, 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed
Orders dated July 21, 2000 and July 17, 2003 are hereby both AFFIRMED. Respondent
Judge is hereby DIRECTED to resolve the controversy over the illegitimate filiation of
the private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei who
are claiming successional rights in the intestate estate of the deceased Sima Wei,
a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED.10
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, this
petition.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on certification
against forum shopping; that the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios
released and discharged the Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei from any claims
or liabilities; and that private respondents do not have the legal personality to
institute the petition for letters of administration as they failed to prove their filiation
during the lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsel's certification can be considered
substantial compliance with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping, and
that the petition raises no new issues to warrant the reversal of the decisions of the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents' petition should be
dismissed for failure to comply with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping;
2) whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from
claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether private respondents are barred by
prescription from proving their filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum
shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply
with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal
application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be served.
In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,11 we ruled that while a petition may have been flawed
where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by
the party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial
justice.12 So it is in the present controversy where the merits 13 of the case and the
absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered as
compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the rules.
As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private
respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver
must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver
may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince
an intent to abandon a right.14
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and
Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely
states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor
daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims
of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy
Susim."15 Considering that the document did not specifically mention private
respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a
waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private
respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code,
provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or
repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their
parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to
their wards only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons
designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property,
or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards
without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of
property16 which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the
ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the
instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as
heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of
a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which
waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot
be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. 17
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their
successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged
illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that
private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they
waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such
right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents
must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that a ruling on the same would be premature considering that private respondents
have yet to present evidence. Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law
on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to
wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment
of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of
which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the
child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the
document. (Emphasis supplied)
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo18 that illegitimate children who were still minors at the
time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their
minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from
attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the
passage of the Family Code.19
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which superseded
Article 285 of the Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or
in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within
which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death
of either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his
or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession
of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or
special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the
type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation.
However, it would be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been
no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be
resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial.
While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of
administration, the trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private
respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to
the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate,
including the determination of the status of each heir. 20 That the two causes of
action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined
in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.21 As held in Briz v. Briz:22
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event
maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same
time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of
this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions
justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular
case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to
compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful
conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in
the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that
generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this
court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have
held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a
natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact
acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance
against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62);
and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate
of his deceased natural father, or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil., 135; Conde
vs. Abaya, 13 Phil., 249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these situations
has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution
proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court;
and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's
motion to dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
ENRICO vs HEIRS OF SPOUSES MEDINACELLI
G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI,
REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure assails the Order,1 dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its
Order,2 dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating respondents’ Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and
Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the
complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962,
in Lal-lo, Cagayan.3 They begot seven children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo,
Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. 4 On 1 May 2004,
Trinidad died.5 On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal
Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed
away.7
In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same
was entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article
348 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living
together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a
marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not
have lived together under the circumstances required by said provision. Respondents
posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter’s
death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage
of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their cause,
respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to
Eulogio’s serious illness which made its performance impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband
and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted
from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico
and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October
1991, respectively. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was
performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal
Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the
ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7 March
2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its
position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which
took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a) 11 that a petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple which states that such a
petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is clear and
unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the petition for Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to
bring such petition is exclusive and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently,
the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the
action to declare the marriage null and void.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer
is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby
DISMISSED with costs de officio. 13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by
petitioner of her Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an Order 14 dated 3
May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the
complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayadog,15 which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased
spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter.
It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living. 16 Where
one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to
declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122
(March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a
deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after his death.
The Order subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case of Niñal vs.
Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has
rejected the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void
Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic)
the only parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage
and such right is purely personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the
parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog
and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case
of Niñal vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the]
basic rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered
into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their successional
rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate right over
the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it would be
proper that it should solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition to
declare his marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have
already a vested right over whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right
should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules of
Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law. The heirs, then, have a
legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their
parent, especially when the marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give
premium to such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for
the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance of
validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after the death of the
parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void
marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the void
marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the
Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be the
ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable. 17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated
October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case.18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order;
however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new
matter was raised therein.19
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the
sole question of whether the case law as embodied in Niñal, or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the
case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court,
countenancing the hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their
respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants
are well advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court. 20 Instead, they should
initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last resort, this
Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle
of hierarchy of courts.21 However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the
discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the
nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its
jurisdiction.22 Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for
its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed
to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario,
respondents posit that it is Niñal which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the
deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent
after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason
that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. The Court in Niñal recognized that the applicable law to determine the
validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration.23 What we have before us belongs to a
different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during
the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner’s
marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.1âwphi1
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to
wit:
Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.24
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the
RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the
ruling in Niñal, because they vary in scope and application. As has been emphasized,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and
is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated
on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When
the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable
marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot
be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section
2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot
be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.
Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. 25 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all
is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without
any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional
Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed
in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to
challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in
a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
GARCIA-QUIAZON vs BELEN
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the
Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal portion
of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto. 2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo
Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and
daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon
(Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth
Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her
mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. 3 In her Petition docketed as SP
Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry
each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous
for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others,
attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live
Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo
left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth
₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation
of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with
her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted
that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and
not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have
been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for
Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that
the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the
position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as
hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any
disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of
administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued
to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of a bond
in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her. 9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November
2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In
validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to
prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a
common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City,
from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion
reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. 16 It signifies
WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions
ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS; and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. 18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA- actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING
consistency.19
MARRIAGE; AND
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of
SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his
The Court’s Ruling lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said
We find the petition bereft of merit. city.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they
where the decedent resides at the time of his death: insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be
considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant
thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall
found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and
be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the
First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time
fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage
now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction
with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that
to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis
the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive
supplied).
and binding upon this Court.21
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can
rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence
be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 22 It must be
rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word
pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in
sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration
and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 15 In other words, "resides"
of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party
but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not
after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack
a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and
it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond
the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights
would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence
of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be
questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by
raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, 26 has a
cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of
Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now
proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for
being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous
marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the
Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating
priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage
certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification from the
National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not
diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact
that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility
that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the
interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any
showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s
marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has
not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who
are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next
of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known
to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of
the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose
relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as
distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo,
the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as
a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of
the estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate
as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party
within the purview of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August
2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 73, SEC. 1: ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES
LIMJOCO vs INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRAGRANTE
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.
Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy
Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O.
Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and
operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the
evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted
in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of
another ice plant of two and one-half (2-½) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that
the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death;
and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed
service". The commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case and
ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to
maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-
half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said
plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong,
Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail
(petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by
evidence.
3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold
Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable
opportunity to meet the increased demand.
4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from
its announced policy with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant.
(Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission
to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante
for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and
in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be
in contravention of law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had
the right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion.
No one would have denied him that right. As declared by the commission in its
decision, he had invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000, and from what the
commission said regarding his other properties and business, he would certainly have
been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His
transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a
Filipino citizen and continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in
its decision, in view of the evidence before it, that his estate was financially able to
maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to
prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse
through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which a
right was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have
denied application, although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the
application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the
ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the
certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate
as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire
such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the
decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his
death.
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and
during the life of the option he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary
course of business and not out of special consideration for his person, there would
be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have survived to his
estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would also be the possibility of
failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative fail to
comply with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's
undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience
— the evidence established that the public needed the ice plant — was under the law
conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and
operate the service. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of
public convenience was subject to failure to secure its objective through
nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different from the
legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend
actions, among other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the
deceased which survive, and it says that such actions may be brought or defended
"in the right of the deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or
administrator, the making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge, or to the
possession of any other person for him.
In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the
present chief Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from the decisions
cited by him:
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the
property or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought
by or against him if he were alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or
against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because death extinguishes
the right . . . .
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience
before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions
and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not
extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate
which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or
administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the
benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent.
And if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished
proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience of the
deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal
representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right
effective in that proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the
Civil Code, respectively, consider as immovable and movable things rights which are
not material. The same eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that
article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently
expressive of all incorporeal rights which are also property for juridical purposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property
includes, among other things, "an option", and "the certificate of the railroad
commission permitting the operation of a bus line", and on page 748 of the same
volume we read:
However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared
to include every species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie
in contract, whether executory or executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O.
Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the
jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:
As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed
after the death of the man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may
be prosecuted as with the intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54,
55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of
forgery committed after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his
estate. The objection was urged that the information did not aver that the forgery
was committed with the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per Elliott, J.,
disposed of this objection as follows:
. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard
the estate of a decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The
estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says
Mr. Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as well
as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters',
etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another work that 'persons are of
two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons
include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a
collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and
duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in
our law. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L.
Law Dict. 954. Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition
given by the authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient,
in pleading a claim against a decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the
estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we that case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the innovations
accept this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases where, as introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased
here, the forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; and persons, it has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property,
this is a result to be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. We perceive rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes
no difficulty in avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise.
estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality
law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made, and,
simply by legal fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood — the reason
although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest in the
was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs
property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The interest which natural
succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal
persons have in it is not complete until there has been a due administration; and one
system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and
who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument purporting to be a promissory
fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not
note must be regarded as having intended to defraud the estate of the decedent, and
indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the
not the natural persons having diverse interests in it, since ha cannot be presumed
executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of
to have known who those persons were, or what was the nature of their respective
the deceased. The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the
interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, — the estate — and not
same in both cases. This is why according to the Supreme Court of Indiana in
the natural persons who have direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6
Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954, among the artificial
N.E. 914-915.)
persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the law
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro attributes the capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a
O. Fragrante is considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other bankrupt or deceased person.
reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O.
P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not counting the expenses and
Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of
disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him
section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof
during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this
expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue certificates
jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person
of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity "only to
is also considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among the
citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, copartnerships,
most recent cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil.,
associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of
712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota,
the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-
and this Court gave judgment in favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in
up capital of such entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the
these words:
United States.
. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal
Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69
fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is
....
considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the
Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially the
as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of
first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said
the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, State said:
46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the
Civil Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13, 22. In
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an extension above adverted to. If for reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction
artificial person. it is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of of extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante
the assets to be properly made . . . . should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find no
justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one for the purposes of this proceeding.
example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed
therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the
section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for
otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his
deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to
searches and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was
artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary
and in others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino
estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the framework of the citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate
Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or or enjoining them from inheriting it.
juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of
which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of
said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the
those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his
personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within
death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application before the
the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the
Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said
constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the
opposite course. Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered
extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and
any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs,
respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the
same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for the
purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service
Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure
to the benefit of the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could
not allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have done if
Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such
extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by
the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is made
necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by
reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has
already made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the
instant proceeding, from the Public Service Commission of this Court.

We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution
(Article IV), its provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of
LIM vs CA 116717, 116718, 116719 and 5182 and it is hereby further ordered that the
G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000 properties covered by the same titles as well as those properties by (sic) Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 613494, 363123, 236236 and 263236 are excluded from these
RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner, proceedings.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., SO ORDERED.
ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition9 which contained the
INC. respondents. following averments:
BUENA, J.: 3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the following business
May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the entities, to wit:
inventory of the estate of a deceased person?
Business Entity Address:
Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review on certiorari, the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP No.
xxx xxx xxx
38617, which nullified and set aside the orders dated 04 July 19952 , 12 September
19953 and 15 September 19954 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93,
sitting as a probate court. Alliance Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF Homes,
Marketing, Inc. Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is
the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In xxx xxx xxx
Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, represented by George Luy,
Petitioner".1âwphi1.nêt
Speed
910 Barrio Niog, Aguinaldo
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing
Highway, Bacoor, Cavite.
Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations Inc.
formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real
properties covered under the Torrens system. xxx xxx xxx
On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse
and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, fried on 17 March 1995, a joint Auto Truck TBA 2251 Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon
petition5 for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Corp. City.
Court of Quezon City.

Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of xxx xxx xxx
the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion 6 for the lifting of lis pendens and
motion7 for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent. Active
Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF Homes,
Distributors,
8
In an order dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Inc.
sitting as a probate court, granted the private respondents' twin motions, in this wise:

Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to lift, expunge xxx xxx xxx
or delete the annotation of lis pendens on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 116716,
 Action 100 20th Avenue Murphy,
Company Quezon City or 92-D Mc-Arthur
Highway Valenzuela Bulacan.
3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged in business with the
public as corporations, all their capital, assets and equity were however, personally
owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders and officers
appearing in the respective articles of incorporation of the above business entities
were mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed therein only for purposes
of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the following
banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace Park, Caloocan City and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank (formerly Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation and in other banks whose identities are yet to be determined.
5. That the following real properties, although registered in the name of the above
entities, were actually acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during his marriage with petitioner,
to wit:
Corporation Title Location
xxx xxx xxx
8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim which
petitioner could not as yet identify. Petitioner, however will submit to this Honorable
Court the identities thereof and the necessary documents covering the same as soon
as possible.
On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioner's motion issued an
order10 , thus:
Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens in
case said annotation had already been deleted and/or cancelled said TCT Nos.
116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 51282.
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123, 236256 and
236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant petition.
SO ORDERED.
On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special
administrator11 and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators
of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of administration were accordingly
issued.
In an order12 dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew private
respondents' motion for exclusion, in this wise:

The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the corporations
k. Auto Truck TCT No. Sto. Domingo TBA are the mere alter egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim, Otherwise (sic) stated, the
617726 Corporation Cainta, issue involves the piercing of the corporate veil, a matter that is clearly within the
Rizal jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and not the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Thus, in the case of Cease vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 483, the crucial issue decided
q. Alliance by the regular court was whether the corporation involved therein was the mere
TCT No. 27896 Prance, Metro Manila extension of the decedent. After finding in the affirmative, the Court ruled that the
Marketing
assets of the corporation are also assets of the estate.
Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and/or Tax Declarations
A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that the SEC's
are hereto attached as Annexes "C" to "W".
exclusive (sic) applies only to intra-corporate controversy. It is simply a suit to settle
xxx xxx xxx the intestate estate of a deceased person who, during his lifetime, acquired several
properties and put up corporations as his instrumentalities.
7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late Pastor Y. Lim,
are all conjugal in nature, having been acquired by him during the existence of his SO ORDERED.
marriage with petitioner.
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by
petitioner, issued an order13 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under enumerated
are hereby ordered to comply strictly with this order and to produce and submit to
the special administrators, through this Honorable Court within (5) five days from
receipt of this order their respective records of the savings/current accounts/time
deposits and other deposits in the names of Pastor Lim and/or corporations above-
mentioned, showing all the transactions made or done concerning savings/current
accounts from January 1994 up to their receipt of this court order.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari14 , with an urgent prayer
for a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals
questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court.
On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private respondents,
rendered the assailed decision15 , the decretal portion of which declares:
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari is
hereby granted, The impugned orders issued by respondent court on July 4, 1995 and
September 12, 1995 are hereby nullified and set aside. The impugned order issued
by respondent on September 15, 1995 is nullified insofar as petitioner corporations"
bank accounts and records are concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner Rufina Luy
Lim now comes before us with a lone assignment of
error16 :
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the lower court
which merely allowed the preliminary or provisional inclusion of the private
respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased (sic) Pastor Y. Lim with the
respondent Court of Appeals arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey
or to ignore the clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of
Court and thereby preventing the petitioner, from performing her duty as special
administrator of the estate as expressly provided in the said Rules.
Petitioner's contentions tread on perilous grounds.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders issued by
the probate court which were subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals.
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on jurisdiction
over probate proceedings is indeed in order.
The provisions of Republic Act 769117 , which introduced amendments to Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, are pertinent:
Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the
estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate matters in
Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000);
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate
and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the
value of the personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs, the amount of which must be specifically
alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's, litigation
expenses and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees, Provided
further, that where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same
or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;
xxx xxx xxx
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of
probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent.
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on the
principle that a probate court may pass upon title to certain properties, albeit
provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory.
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may extend its
probing arms in the determination of the question of title in probate proceedings.
This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,18 held:
. . . As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate
court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title.
We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS19 :
. . . The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one
clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, the court's
determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.
Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE20 citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE21 , We made an
exposition on the probate court's limited jurisdiction:
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether
testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be
a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All
that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so.
Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO22 , We had occasion to elucidate, through Mr. Justice
Andres Narvasa23 :
Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as
a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person
adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal
interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the
question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are
not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the question of
whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the court in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate,
land registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural
one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived. . . .
. . . . These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title
is not in the decedent's name but in others, a situation on which this Court has
already had occasion to rule . . . . (emphasis Ours)
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under the
Torrens system and registered in the name of private respondent corporations
should be included in the inventory of the estate of the decedent Pastor Y. Lim,
alleging that after all the determination by the probate court of whether these
properties should be included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not
conclusive and subject to a final determination in a separate action brought for the
purpose of adjudging once and for all the issue of title.
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are registered in the
name of private respondent corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY
vs., ALCID 24 is of great essence and finds applicability, thus:
It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support
her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in
their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has
been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which of course, does not
include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. . . .
. . . . In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property
covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title
should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action,
particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the
persons named in the title. . . .
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever
presented by petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased
Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The
Property Registration Decree", proscribes collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the property subject
of the controversy was duly registered under the Torrens system, We categorically
stated:
. . . Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of
title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have
denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in
question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to
deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. . . .
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the Late
Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of private
respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and
distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil
of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of
private respondents should stand undisturbed.
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents' motion
for exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted
capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue
orders involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the
estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over
properties, it is no less true that such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced
by jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the
peculiar circumstances of each individual case.
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens
system in the name of private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the
presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court obviously opted to shut its
eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to issue the impugned orders.
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter
disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private
respondents. Certainly, the probate court through such brazen act transgressed the
clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on this matter.
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent
corporations are properly part of the decedent's estate but also the private
respondent corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy contention, petitioner cited
that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime, organized and wholly-owned the five
corporations, which are the private respondents in the instant case. 25 Petitioner thus
attached as Annexes "F"26 and "G"27 of the petition for review affidavits executed by
Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which among others, contained averments that the
incorporators of Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on the list had no actual and
participation in the organization and incorporation of the said corporation. The
affiants added that the persons whose names appeared on the articles of
incorporation of Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as incorporators thereof, are mere
dummies since they have not actually contributed any amount to the capital stock of
the corporation and have been merely asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix their
respective signatures thereon.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from
that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the
persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its
stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.28
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality
distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a
corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective
mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE
INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS29 , We enunciated:
. . . When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as
a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the
achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or
crime, the veil with which the law covers and isolates the corporation from the
members or stockholders who compose it will be lifted to allow for its consideration
merely as an aggregation of individuals. . . .
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective
shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be
subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly separate one, were it
not for the existing corporate fiction.30
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless
corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where the affiant themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is sought
As to the order36 of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of Appeals
to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity should come
correctly observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted without jurisdiction
to naught.31
in issuing said order; The probate court had no authority to demand the production
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of bank accounts in the name of the private respondent corporations.
of corporate fiction is as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby
control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified
practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this
and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a
transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) Such
probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt
control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to
perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and SO ORDERED.
unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The aforesaid control and
breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. The
absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the corporate veil". 32

Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all

of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding
the fiction of separate corporate personalities.33

Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrong-

doing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed. 34

Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely acting in
a limited capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce
competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil of
corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the affidavits executed
by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing considering that the aforementioned
documents possess no weighty probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides
it is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits are inadmissible in evidence
inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented during the course of the
proceedings in the lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to uphold the
admissibility of said documents would be to relegate from Our duty to apply such
basic rule of evidence in a manner consistent with the law and jurisprudence.

Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. LEONIDAS35 finds
pertinence:

Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by
the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's
statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing
them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
CMH vs CA
G.R. No. 112625 March 7, 2002
CMH AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION, CARLOS M. HOJILLA, CESAR M. HOJILLA,
CLAUDIO M. HOJILLA, CORA M. HOJILLA AND CORNELIO M. HOJILLA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND CRISTOBAL M. HOJILLA, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
seeks to review and set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
28893 promulgated on October 25, 1993 holding that the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bacolod City, Branch 45, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering
its Order dated November 22, 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 6256 for lack of
jurisdiction.2
The antecedent facts show that the private respondent, Cristobal M. Hojilla, filed a
complaint for "Disregarding and Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction, Formal
Declaration or Recognition of Successional Rights and Recovery of Title with
Damages"3 with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 45, docketed as Civil Case No. 6256
against his siblings namely: Carlos M. Hojilla, Cesar M. Hojilla,Cornelio M. Hojilla,
Claudio M. Hojilla and Corazon M. Hojilla (with the latter two (2) impleaded as
unwilling co-plaintiffs), and CMH Agricultural Corporation (CMH for brevity).
Cristobal alleged in his complaint that CMH was a dummy corporation created to be
the alter-ego of their mother, the late Concepcion Montelibano-Hojilla, who
purposely organized the same in 1975 to shield her paraphernal properties from
taxes by fictitiously assigning them to CMH, with her children acting as dummy
stockholders. Immediately upon its incorporation, the following properties of his
mother were assigned to CMH: Hacienda Manayosayao, Hacienda Nangka and a
house and lots on 23rd Street, Bacolod City, consisting of Lot Nos. 240, 241, 242, 246,
247 and 248. After their mother's death, Cristobal and his siblings extrajudicially
partitioned the properties with Carlos, Cesar and Cornelio taking Hacienda Nangka
and the commercial lots of their late father, Mattias J. Hojilla, situated in Silay City,
while Corazon, Claudio and Cristobal were apportioned Hacienda Manayaosayao, the
house and lots on 23rd Street, Bacolod City, and some lots which were not assigned
to CMH. Thereafter, with the promise that the title over the property would be
delivered to them, Corazon, Claudio and Cristobal took possession of the subject
house and lots. However, Cristobal claimed that the title over the said property had
not been turned over to them and on several occasions Carlos, Cesar and Cornelio
had, without his and his co-owners' knowledge, mortgaged the said lots comprising
the 23rd Street property in Bacolod City to several banking institutions and even
leased the same to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, which, however, was only
curtailed by court action. Thus, Cristobal prayed that the veil of corporate fiction be
pierced as CMH was being used to deprive and defraud him of his successional rights
over the house and lots on 23rd Street, Bacolod City.
Carlos, Cesar, Cornelio, Claudio and Corazon, as defendants therein, countered, by
way of special and affirmative defenses:4 first, regular courts had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the complaint since it involved an intra-corporate controversy
- the complaint being instituted by Cristobal who is a stockholder and incorporator of
CMH against his siblings, who are likewise stockholders of the same corporation, and
as such within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC for brevity); second, the creation of CMH as an alleged dummy
corporation was a device or scheme amounting to fraud, thus falling under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC; third, the claim of ownership over the
house and lots by Cristobal which was ventilated in the ejectment case filed by the
said defendants against Cristobal in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Bacolod City, Branch III and docketed therein as Civil Case No. 17698, was resolved in
favor of CMH; fourth, Cristobal committed forum-shopping since he had previously
filed a case against CMH, its incorporators and stockholders before the SEC, docketed
as SEC Case No. 03559; fifth, Cristobal had no cause of action since the power to sue
and be sued was vested alone in the board of directors of the corporation, CMH in
particular, and not on a mere stockholder.
Finding the arguments meritorious, the trial court issued on November 22, 1991, an
order5 dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 6256. However, upon filing by
Cristobal of a motion for reconsideration6 dated December 6, 1991, the court a
quo in its order7 dated April 20, 1992 reversed itself and set aside its previous order
dismissing the complaint. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for
reconsideration8 but it was denied in the order9 dated August 17, 1992 of the trial
court.
Carlos, Cesar, Cornelio, Claudio and Corazon elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals through a petition for certiorari10 alleging that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
Cristobal's motion for reconsideration despite the absence of notice of time and place
of hearing in violation of procedural rules and in reconsidering its extensive and
exhaustive order dated November 22, 1991 with a minute resolution denying their
motion to dismiss.1âwphi1.nêt
Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo, the appellate court
resolved on October 25, 1993 that the filing of the opposition to Cristobal's motion
for reconsideration cured the defect of lack of notice and hearing; and that the
complaint in Civil Case No. 6256 did not involve an intra-corporate controversy but
Cristobal's successional rights which is within the jurisdiction of the court. 11
Hence, the instant petition which is anchored on the following grounds:
I Civil Case No. 6256 as it involves a suit filed by a stockholder against other
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN OBVIOUS
DEFIANCE OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT, IN NOT DISMISSING A CASE
WHICH IS PURELY AN INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSY AND THEREFORE, FALLS
UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION PURSUANT TO P.D. 902-A;
II
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS HAS AGAIN DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE,
CONTRARY TO THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, IN NOT DISMISSING THE
CASE FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHO PURSUED SIMULTANEOUS
REMEDIES IN TWO (2) DIFFERENT FORA, AND IS THEREFORE GUILTY OF FORUM
SHOPPING;
III
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, IN NOT DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON THE GROUND OF PENDENCY OF
ANOTHER ACTION;
IV
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, IN NOT DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT OF A MERE STOCKHOLDER, WITHOUT BEING AUTHORIZED BY THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS;
V persons without the knowledge of private respondent and his co-heirs. Thus, private
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF A
"MERE SCRAP OF PAPER", A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WHICH DOES NOT
CONTAIN THE NOTICE OF TIME AND PLACE OF HEARING, IN VIOLATION OF THE
MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULES OF COURT.
At the outset, we note that the alleged errors attributed on the part of the Court of
Appeals by the petitioners are mere reiteration of those already raised in the court
below but which we will nonetheless consider to put an end to this dispute.
First, petitioners argue that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the complaint in
stockholders and the corporation itself; thus, it is an intra-corporate controversy
within the jurisdiction of the SEC and not of the regular courts. Likewise, petitioners
argue that the allegation of fictitious creation of CMH as an alter-ego of the late
Concepcion M. Hojilla and the concomitant prayer to pierce the veil of corporate
fiction falls within the category of a device or scheme employed by corporate officers
cognizable by the SEC alone.
The relationship of the parties to a suit has formerly been the lone indicia for its
classification either as an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of the
SEC or a civil dispute within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Thus, a dispute
arising between a stockholder and the corporation, without distinction, qualification
or exemption, was previously considered an intra-corporate controversy within the
jurisdiction of the SEC and not of the regular courts. Recent jurisprudence, however,
has established that in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, the
better policy would be to consider not only the status or relationship of the parties
but also the nature of the question that is the subject of the controversy. 12
A reading of the complaint filed by private respondent shows that its primary
objective is to protect his successional rights as an heir of his late mother, Concepcion
M. Hojilla, whose paraphernal properties he claimed were fictitiously assigned to
CMH to evade payment of taxes. He alleged therein that the properties had already
been the subject of extra-judicial partition between the heirs with the house and lots
on 23rd Street, Bacolod City, being bestowed upon him and his co-heirs Corazon and
Claudia. He claimed that the failure of his other siblings, Carlos, Cesar and Cornelio,
to turn over the title to him and his co-heirs allowed CMH to continue claiming the
house and lots as its own and even attempted to lease a few of the lots to other
respondent filed the complaint to consolidate his claim over the subject properties
and forestall any further intrusive act from the CMH which would place his and his
co-heirs/co-owners' rights over the properties in constant peril. Private respondent's
position as a stockholder of CMH and his relationship to the other stockholders,
became incidental only to the issue of ownership over the subject properties and did
not convert the action into an intra-corporate controversy within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the SEC but remained a civil action cognizable by the regular courts.
Neither does the allegation about CMH's formation as an alleged dummy corporation
designed to be the alter-ego of the late Concepcion M. Hojilla and the prayer for
piercing the corporate veil convert the action into an intra-corporate controversy as
the former is merely cited as the ground relied upon by private respondent to prove
his claim of ownership over the said house and lots whereas through the said prayer,
he in effect exhorts the court to confirm his allegations and thus, protect his
successional rights.
Thus, in Cease v. CA13 this Court took cognizance of the civil case filed by respondents
against their siblings (petitioners therein) and the Tiaong Milling and Plantation
Company, Inc. praying that the corporation be declared identical to their deceased
father, Forrest L. Cease, and that its properties be divided among his children as his
intestate heirs. The Court treated the case as an action for partition and, applying the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, disregarded the separate personality of the
corporation from that of its stockholders reasoning that if the legal fiction of separate
corporate personality were sustained, then it would be used to delay and ultimately
deprive and defraud respondents of their successional rights over the estate of their
deceased father.
Second, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in entertaining the complaint
in Civil Case No. 6256 despite the existence of a similar complaint filed by Cristobal
before the SEC, docketed as SEC Case No. 0355914 involving the same parties and the
same issues raised in Civil Case No. 6256.
We do not agree. As properly resolved by the appellate court, the filing of SEC Case
No. 03559 does not bar the subsequent filing of Civil Case No. 6256 because they
refer to different causes of action with distinct reliefs prayed for. The private
respondent in the SEC case prayed for the appointment of a receiver, dissolution and
liquidation of CMH, and to enjoin petitioners from leasing the house and lots at 23rd
Street, Bacolod City. However, in Civil Case No. 6256, he sought to preserve his
successional rights as heir of his deceased mother by piercing the veil of corporate
fiction to recover the title of the house and lots on 23rd Street, Bacolod City, and
claim payment of damages for the injury he has suffered.
Neither does the resolution of SEC Case No. 03559 dismissing the petition of private
respondent during the pendency of Civil Case No. 6256 constitute res judicata on the
matter since the cause of action and issues raised and resolved in the former are
different from those cited in the latter. The requirements of res judicata are: (a) the
former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d)
there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action.15 Notably, in the SEC case, the private respondent
averred that petitioner stockholders and CMH committed acts to defraud the public
such as the lack of accounting, lack of records, lack of proper notice of meetings, and
prayed for the dissolution of the corporation; whereas, in Civil Case No. 6256, the
private respondent contended that CMH was a mere dummy corporation and an
alter-ego of his deceased mother and thus, sought the delivery of the title over the
house and lots in question as his share of inheritance from his deceased mother.
Third, petitioners argue that the MTCC's adverse decision in the ejectment case, Civil
Case No. 17698, which they had filed against private respondent Cristobal M. Hojilla,
is already final and conclusive with regard to latter's claim of ownership over the
house and lots in question. Hence, petitioners contend that Civil Case No. 6256 of the
RTC should have been dismissed as it allegedly involves the same subject matter and
the same issue.
The record shows that the MTCC rendered a decision in the ejectment case, Civil Case
No. 17698, ordering private respondent to vacate the premises; and that decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. However, under Sec. 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, the judgment rendered by a municipal or metropolitan trial court in an action
for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to possession only and in
no wise shall affect or bind the title of ownership of the land or building. Such
judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting the title to the
land or building nor shall the facts found therein be held conclusive in another case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving
possession.16 Thus, the filing of Civil Case No. 6256 in the RTC was not barred by the
adverse decision of the MTCC in the ejectment case, Civil Case No. 17698, inasmuch
as the issue raised in the former was one regarding ownership while the issue
resolved in the ejectment case was priority of possession alone. 17
Fourth, petitioners contend that the complaint should have been dismissed as it was
filed by a mere stockholder in behalf of the corporation without being authorized by
its board of directors.
On the contrary, authorization from the board of directors of the CMH in the case at
bar was not necessary inasmuch as private respondent was not acting on behalf of
the corporation but in his own personal capacity; and precisely he was suing the
corporation itself (CMH) to preserve his successional rights.
Finally, petitioners point out that the lower court erred in granting the motion for
reconsideration of herein private respondent despite the lack of notice of time and
place of hearing in violation of the mandatory provision of the Rules of Court.
However, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the requirement of notice of time
and hearing in a party's pleading is necessary only to appraise the other party of the
actions of the former. Inasmuch as petitioners have timely filed their Opposition18 on
January 7, 1992 to private respondent's motion for reconsideration, any defect
regarding such notice had been cured.1âwphi1.nêt

In view of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in
its challenged decision.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated October 25, 1993 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 28893 holding that the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 45, did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering its Order, dated November 22,
1991, in Civil Case No. 6256 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City,
Branch 45, is hereby ordered to resume forthwith the trial of Civil Case No. 6256 and
to resolve the same with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
GERILLA vs DE FIGURACION
G.R. No. 154322 August 22, 2006
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION,* ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA,* HILARIA A.
FIGURACION, FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, QUINTIN FIGURACION and MARY
FIGURACION-GINEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari,1 petitioner Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla
challenges the decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 49,
which dismissed her complaint for partition. The properties involved are two parcels
of land which belonged to her late father, Leandro Figuracion.
The facts of the case follow.4
Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion (now both deceased) had six
children: petitioner and respondents Elena Figuracion-Ancheta (now deceased),
Hilaria Figuracion, Felipa Figuracion-Manuel, Quintin Figuracion and Mary Figuracion-
Ginez.
On August 23, 1955, Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in
favor of his six children. When he died in 1958, he left behind two parcels of land: (1)
Lot 2299 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta consisting of 7,547 square meters with
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 4221-P in the name of "Leandro Figuracion,
married to Carolina Adviento" and (2) Lot 705 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta
with an area of 2,900 sq. m. with TCT No. 4220-P also in the name of "Leandro
Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento." Leandro had inherited both lots from his
deceased parents,5 as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. 16731 and
16610, respectively, issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Pangasinan.
Leandro sold a portion of Lot 2299 to Lazaro Adviento, as a result of which TCT No.
4221-P was cancelled and TCT No. 101331 was issued to "Lazaro Adviento, married
to Rosenda Sagueped" as owner of the 162 sq. m. and "Leandro Figuracion, married
to Carolina Adviento" as owner of 7,385 sq. m. This lot continued to be in the name
of Leandro in Tax Declaration No. 616 for the year 1985.
What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was a dispute between
petitioner and her sister, respondent Mary, over the eastern half of Lot 707 of the
Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta with an area of 3,164 sq. m.
Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento, as evidenced by OCT No. 15867 issued on
February 9, 1916. When Adviento died, his two daughters, Agripina Adviento (his
daughter by his first wife) and respondent Carolina (his daughter by his second wife),
succeeded him to it. On November 28, 1961, Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor
of petitioner over the one-half eastern portion of Lot 707. Agripina died on July 28,
1963, single and without any issue. Before her half-sister’s death, however,
respondent Carolina adjudicated unto herself, via affidavit under Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court, the entire Lot 707 which she later sold to respondents Felipa and Hilaria.
The latter two immediately had OCT No. 15867 cancelled, on December 11, 1962. A
new title, TCT No. 42244, was then issued in the names of Felipa and Hilaria for Lot
707.
In February 1971, petitioner and her family went to the United States where they
stayed for ten years. Returning in 1981,6 she built a house made of strong materials
on the eastern half-portion of Lot 707. She continued paying her share of the realty
taxes thereon.
It was sometime later that this dispute erupted. Petitioner sought the extrajudicial
partition of all properties held in common by her and respondents. On May 23, 1994,
petitioner filed a complaint in the RTC of Urdaneta City, Branch 49, for partition,
annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against
respondents, praying, among others, for: (1) the partition of Lots 2299 and 705; (2)
the nullification of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by respondent Carolina
over Lot 707, the deed of absolute sale in favor of respondents Felipa and Hilaria, and
TCT No. 42244; (3) a declaration that petitioner was the owner of one-half of Lot 707
and (4) damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. U-5826.
On the other hand, respondents took the position that Leandro’s estate should first
undergo settlement proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place.
And they claimed that an accounting of expenses chargeable to the estate was
necessary for such settlement.
On June 26, 1997,7 the RTC8 rendered judgment nullifying Carolina’s affidavit of self-
adjudication and deed of absolute sale of Lot 707. It also declared Lots 2299 and 705
as exclusive properties of Leandro Figuracion and therefore part of his estate. The
RTC, however, dismissed the complaint for partition, reconveyance and damages on
the ground that it could not grant the reliefs prayed for by petitioner without any
(prior) settlement proceedings wherein the transfer of title of the properties should
first be effected.
On appeal, the CA upheld the dismissal of petitioner’s action for partition for being
premature. The CA reversed the decision, however, with respect to the nullification
of the self-adjudication and the deed of sale. Upholding the validity of the affidavit of
self-adjudication and deed of sale as to Carolina’s one-half pro-indiviso share, it
instead partitioned Lot 707. Dissatisfied, respondents elevated the CA decision to this
Court in G.R. No. 151334, entitled Carolina vda. de Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia
Figuracion-Gerilla.9
The issue for our consideration is whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement
of Leandro’s intestate estate (that is, an accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and
705, the payment of expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus compliance with other legal
requirements, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or distributed.
Respondents claim that: (1) the properties constituting Leandro’s estate cannot be
partitioned before his estate is settled and (2) there should be an accounting before
anything else, considering that they (respondents) had to spend for the maintenance
of the deceased Leandro Figuracion and his wife in their final years, which support
was supposed to come from the income of the properties. Among other things,
respondents apparently wanted petitioner to share in the expenses incurred for the
care of their parents during the ten years she stayed in the United States, before she
could get her part of the estate while petitioner apparently wanted her gross share,
without first contributing to the expenses.
In any event, there appears to be a complication with respect to the partition of Lot
705. The records refer to a case entitled Figuracion, et al. v. Alejo currently pending
in the CA. The records, however, give no clue or information regarding what exactly
this case is all about. Whatever the issues may be, suffice it to say that partition is
premature when ownership of the lot is still in dispute. 10
Petitioner faces a different problem with respect to Lot 2299. Section 1, Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having the
right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting
forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description
of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other
persons interested in the property.
The right to an inheritance is transmitted immediately to the heirs by operation of
law, at the moment of death of the decedent. There is no doubt that, as one of the
heirs of Leandro Figuracion, petitioner has a legal interest in Lot 2299. But can she
compel partition at this stage?
There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement
under Section 211 and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be
reached, under Sections 3 to 6.12
Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the
decedent’s estate. While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an
accounting of the real property’s income (rentals and profits) in the course of an
action for partition,13 there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which
property belonging to the decedent’s estate may be answerable, such as funeral
expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule
90 of the Rules of Court.
In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the
estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is
allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion’s only
legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that "certain expenses"
including those related to her father’s final illness and burial have not been properly
settled.14 Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father’s
estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done
in an action for partition.
In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of
all expenses for which the estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to
petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties may take possession thereof
even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned
on the payment of the estate’s obligations.15
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ decision and
resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 58290 are AFFIRMED in so far as the issue of the
partition of Lots 2299 and 705 is concerned.
But with respect to Lot 707, we make no ruling on the validity of Carolina vda. de
Figuracion’s affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of sale in favor of Felipa and
Hilaria Figuracion in view of the fact that Carolina vda. de Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia
Figuracion-Gerilla (G.R. No. 151334) is still pending in this Division.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
PEREIRA vs CA
G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989
VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents.
Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.
Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate
without leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the
deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased instead of the surviving
spouse? These are the main questions which need to be resolved in this case.
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on
January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate
spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister
Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional
Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance
of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased
Andres de Guzman Pereira. 1 In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the
following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the
deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased;
that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine
Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings
and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS), as well as
savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at
Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased
(herein petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-
half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased.
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition
of private respondent 2 alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for
purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist,
the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the
surviving spouse.
In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private
respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de
Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court
ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the deceased
and to file an inventory thereof within three months after receipt of the order. 3
Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the appointment of private
respondent as administratrix in its decision dated December 15, 1987. 4
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following
issues: (1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman
Pereira for purposes of administration; (2) Whether or not a judicial administration
proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who
has the better right to be appointed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased,
the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita Pereira
Nagac?
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased
for purposes of administration for the following reasons: firstly, the death benefits
from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the sole
beneficiary and in support of this claim she submitted letter-replies from these
institutions showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits;
secondly, the savings deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the PNB
and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as supported by several
receipts; and, finally, the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially
settled between the petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving heirs
of the deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide
what properties form part of the estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for
herself. She points out that this function is vested in the court in charge of the
intestate proceedings.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to
the estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a
handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot order
an unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the
estate of the deceased. 5
The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the
administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best position to
receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the
decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some
of the assets, if any. 6 The function of resolving whether or not a certain property
should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court. However,
the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the
parties.7
Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman
Pereira for purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the administration
proceedings instituted by private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by
petitioner for the reasons herein below discussed.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left
no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. 8 An
exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception,
when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they
may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs
from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or
obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for
partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as
they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision
does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course
of action. 10 It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if
the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not
resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of
court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without
good and compelling reasons. 11
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for
the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in
such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings . 12
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the
estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will
depend on the circumstances of each case.
In one case, 13 We said:
Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to
the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads
as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in
sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is unconvincing, because,
as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what property belonged to
the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition
proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir.
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as
administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such
appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that
same objective could be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not
justified in issuing letters of administration. 14 In still another case, We did not find so
powerful a reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a
usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary
in order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his
wife's deceased mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in
the intestate proceedings of the latter.15
We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two
surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that
there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these
two heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private respondent
seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged
properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are
presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently.
We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a
judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres
de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only
real property left has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for
no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or
squandered. In most instances of a similar nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to
the properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition
proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event.

We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration
proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there
being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman
Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.

With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as
between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira
Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix.

WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of

Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding
dismissed without prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a new
action for partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
AVELINO vs CA
G.R. No. 115181 March 31, 2000
MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO,
JR., TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY
AVELINO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 16, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well as its Resolution dated April
28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed Decision
affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Sp. Proc.
No. Q-91-10441 converting petitioner's petition for the issuance of letters of
administration to an action for judicial partition.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late
Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony
all surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an
American, is the second wife of Avelino Sr. The other private respondents are siblings
of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as SP Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who
died intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the administrator
of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a
motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition
which petitioner duly opposed.
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed Order which
reads:
Acting on the "Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for Judicial Partition",
considering that the petitioner is the only heir not amenable to a simple partition,
and all the other compulsory heirs manifested their desire for an expeditious
settlement of the estate of the deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr., the same is granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into judicial partition of the estate of deceased
Antonio Avelino, Sr. The parties are directed to submit a complete inventory of all
the real and personal properties left by the deceased. Set the hearing of the judicial
partition on APRIL 13, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Notify all the parties and
their counsel of this assignment.
SO ORDERED.1
On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
in an Order dated June 16, 1993.
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, in granting
private respondents' motion to convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of
letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. Her petition was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 31574.
On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court rendered the assailed decision,
stating that the "petition is DENIED DUE COURSE" and accordingly dismissed. 2
On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, but it was denied on
April 28, 1994.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
PARTITION IS PROPER UNDER THE PREMISES.
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY PENDING THE DETERMINATION
OF THE CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE.3
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this case, the sole issue here
is whether respondent appellate court committed an error of law and gravely abused
its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the instant case
as no determination has yet been made of the character and extent of the decedent's
estate. She points to the Court's ruling in Arcilles v. Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969),
where we held that when the existence of other properties of the decedent is a
matter still to be reckoned with, administration proceedings are the proper mode of
resolving the same.4 In addition, petitioner contends that the estate is in danger of
being depleted for want of an administrator to manage and attend to it.
Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of
a motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial
partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally inappropriate and
should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or
the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the
bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the
order established in Section 6 of Rule 78. 5 The exceptions to this rule are found in
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 746 which provide:
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left
no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by
their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties
may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves
as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. .
.
Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. — Whenever the gross value of
the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not
exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and
upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three
(3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may
direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or
administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any
there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the
estate and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts of
the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right,
if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally
appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and
enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them
respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of
the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course
thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or
award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's
office.1awp++i1
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at
the moment of the latter's death.7 Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows
heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of being
dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not
required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court.8
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no debts
and the heirs and legatees are all of age."9 With this finding, it is our view that Section
1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.
In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists that
there is nothing to partition yet, as the nature and character of the estate have yet
to be determined. We find, however, that a complete inventory of the estate may be
done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts.
Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that the
lower court did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of administration
into an action for judicial partition.
Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court converting
an action for letters of administration to one for judicial partition has no basis in the
Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court's order is
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs
disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible,
then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held
that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then
the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration
proceedings. 10 The trial court appropriately converted petitioner's action for letters
of administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private
respondents. No reversible error may be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it
found the trial court's action procedurally in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
TEVES vs CA
G.R. No. 109963 October 13, 1999
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES: RICARDO TEVES, ARCADIA TEVES, TOMAS ZAMORA,
FELICIA TEVES, HELEN TEVES, ALFREDO OSMEÑA, ROBERTO TEVES, JOAQUIN TEVES,
III, PETER TEVES, MILDRED TEVES, WILSON MABILOG, LEONILO PATIGAYON,
EDUARDO PATIGAYON, ALEXANDER PATIGAYON, ALDRIN PATIGAYON, NOEL
PATIGAYON, VICTOR PATIGAYON, MA. TEVES PATERNO OCHOTORENA, EXEQUILA
TEVES, EMILIO JO, EMILIANA TEVES, MILAGROS TEVES, EDSEL PINILI, VICENTE
TEVES, EMILIANA ISO, ALBERTO TEVES, ERLINDA TEVES, DIOSDADO TEVES,
VICTORIA TEVES AND VIVENCIO NARCISO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ASUNCION IT-IT NAMELY: ELISA IT-IT, SUSANA IT-IT,
NORBERTO IT-IT, ISA-AC IT-IT, JR., JAIME IT-IT, FELICITAS IT-IT, TERESITA IT-IT,
ANTONIO NODADO, CORAZON IT-IT, JIMMY LERO, DANILO IT-IT, EDITA GAMORA,
PACITA VAILOCES, CRIS VAILOCES, CECILIA CIMAFRANCA and CECILIA FLOR
CIMAFRANCA, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals which was promulgated on August 18, 1992 affirming the July 11, 1991
decision 2 of Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental in favor of
defendants-appellees.
The facts, as culled from the pleadings of the parties herein and the decision of the
lower courts, are as follows:
Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine children, namely Teotimo, Felicia,
Pedro, Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano, Arcadia and Maria. Andres,
however, predeceased both his parents and died without issue. After Marcelina
Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died, intestate and without debts, in 1943 and 1953,
respectively, their children executed extrajudicial settlements purporting to
adjudicate unto themselves the ownership over two parcels of land belonging to their
deceased parents and to alienate their shares thereto in favor of their sister Asuncion
Teves. The validity of these settlements executed pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court is the primary issue in the present case.1âwphi1.nêt
On May 9, 1984, plaintiffs-appellants Ricardo and Arcadia Teves filed a complaint
with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental for the partition and reconveyance
of two parcels of land located in Dumaguete, designated as Lots 769-A and 6409,
against the heirs of Asuncion Teves. The complaint was subsequently amended to
include Maria Teves and the heirs of Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, and Gorgonio Teves as
plaintiffs and the spouses Lucresio Baylosis and Pacita Nocete, and Cecilia
Cimafranca-Gamos and Cecilia Flor Cimafranca as defendants. 3 Plaintiffs-appellants
alleged that defendants-appellees, without any justifiable reason, refused to
partition the said parcels of land and to convey to plaintiffs their rightful shares. 4
Lot 769, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4682-A, 5 is registered in the
names of Urbana Cimafranca, one-fourth (1/4) share, Marcelina Cimafranca, the wife
of Joaquin Teves, one-fourth (1/4) share, Domingo Villahermosa, one-eighth (1/8)
share, Antero Villahermosa, one-eighth (1/8) share, Cecilia Cimafranca, one-eighth
(1/8) share and Julio Cimafranca, one-eighth (1/8) share. The present controversy
involves only Marcelina Cimafranca's one-fourth (1/4) share in the land, designated
as Lot 769-A.
On June 13, 1956, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Asuncion, Gorgonio and Arcadia Teves
executed a document entitled "Settlement of Estate and Sale," 6 adjudicating unto
themselves, in equal shares, Lot 769-A and conveying their shares, interests and
participations over the same in favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of
P425.00. A similar deed denominated "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale" 7 was
signed by Maria Teves on April 21, 1959. Under such deed, Maria conveys her own
share over Lot 769-A in favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of P80.00. The
two settlements were denounced by the plaintiffs as spurious. The trial court
summarized the claims of the plaintiffs, viz —
. . . Maria Teves Ochotorena herself, denied having executed this Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale over her share or interest in Lot 769 claiming that her signature
in said document is a forgery. She disowns her signature declaring that as a married
woman she always signs a document in her husband's family name. Further, she
declared that on the date she purportedly signed said document in Dumaguete City
before the notary public, she was in her home in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte.
On Exhibit "G" which is likewise offered as Exhibit "3" for the defendants, plaintiffs
hold that said document is spurious claiming that the signatures of Pedro Teves,
Felicia Teves and Gorgonio Teves are all forgeries. To support this allegation, Helen
T. Osmena, daughter of Felicia Teves and Erlinda Teves, daughter of Gorgonio Teves
were presented as witnesses. Being allegedly familiar with the style and character of
the handwriting of their parents these witnesses declared unequivocally that the
signatures of their parents appearing on the document are forgeries.
In sum, plaintiffs argue that these fraudulent documents which defendants rely in
claiming ownership to the disputed properties are all nullities and have no force in
law and could not be used as basis for any legal title. Consequently, in their view, they
are entitled to the reliefs demanded particularly, to their respective shares of the
disputed properties. 8
The other property in dispute is Lot 6409 which was originally covered by OCT No.
9091 9 and was registered in the name of Joaquin Teves and his two sisters, Matea
and Candida Teves. However, Matea and Candida died without issue, causing the
entire property to pass to Joaquin Teves. On December 14, 1971, Lot 6409 was
adjudicated and divided in equal shares in a "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement &
Sale" 10 executed by Joaquin Teves' children — Asuncion, Teotimo, Felisia, Gorgonio,
Arcadia and Maria Teves. In the same deed, the shares of these same heirs in Lot
6409 were sold to Asuncion Teves for P100.00. Asuncion Teves took possession of
the land and acquired title 11 over the same on March 22, 1972. After her death in
1981, her children, defendants-appellees It-it herein, extrajudicially settled Asuncion
Teves' property, adjudicating unto themselves Lot 6409. 12 On July 20, 1983 a new
transfer certificate of title 13 was issued in the names of Asuncion Teves' children,
namely Elisa, Susana, Norberto, Isaac, Jaime, Felicitas, Teresita, Corazon, and Danilo,
all surnamed It-it. On July 2, 1984, the It-its sold Lot 6409 to defendants-appellees
Lucrecio Baylosis, Sr. and Pacita Nocete-Baylosis for P20,000.00 14 and a transfer
certificate of title 15 was issued in the name of the Baylosis couple.
Plaintiffs-appellants claim that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering
Lot 6409 is also spurious. Their arguments were discussed in the trial court's decision
as follows —
Presented as Exhibit "D" and "1" for both the plaintiffs and defendants respectively,
is a document denominated as "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale" executed on
December 4, 1971 by and among the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina
Cimafranca. This document which gave birth to TCT No. 5761 over Lot 6409 registered
in the name of Asuncion Teves It-it is questioned by the plaintiffs as spurious for the
following reasons:
1. Erasure of the word "quitclaim" is superimposed with the word "sale" in
handwriting.
2. The consideration of "One peso" stated in document is intercalated with the word
"hundred" in handwriting.
3. The signature of Maria Teves Ochotorena, Pedro Teves and Felicia Teves are
forgeries.
4. The thumbmark imposed on the name of Gorgonio Teves does not actually belong
to Gorgonio Teves who was an educated man and skilled in writing according to his
daughter.
Aside from these defects which would make said document null and void, Arcadia
Teves who is one of the living sisters of the mother of the principal defendants
although confirming the authenticity of her signature averred that in reality no
consideration was ever given to her and that her impression of the said document
was that she was only giving her consent to sell her share of the land.
Plaintiffs likewise contend that as regards the share of Ricardo Teves, son of
Crescenciano Teves who predeceased Joaquin and Marcelina, it was not at all
affected in that extrajudicial settlement and sale since neither Crescenciano Teves
nor his son Ricardo Teves participated in its execution.
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, plaintiffs offered TCT No. 5761 for Lot 6409 registered in the name of
Asuncion Teves It-it as Exhibit "B" as proof that said property was later titled in trust
for all the heirs of Joaquin Teves and which was used later as basis in effecting a deed
of sale in favor of co-defendant Lucresio Baylosis. In this light, the plaintiffs argue that
the sale of said property is a nullity for it was not only attended with bad faith on the
part of both the vendor and the vendee but primarily the vendor had no right at all
to part with said property which is legally owned by others. 16
In answer to plaintiffs-appellants' charges of fraud, defendants-appellees maintained
that the assailed documents were executed with all the formalities required by law
and are therefore binding and legally effective as bases for acquiring ownership or
legal title over the lots in question. Furthermore, it is contended that plaintiffs-
appellants have slept on their rights and should now be deemed to have abandoned
such rights. 17
The trial court ruled in favor of defendants-appellees and rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint with costs against plaintiffs-appellants. As regards Lot 6409,
the court declared that the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale executed by the heirs of
Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca was duly executed with all the formalities
required by law, thus, validly conveying Lot 6409 in favor of Asuncion Teves.
Moreover, it stated that, even granting the truth of the imputed infirmities in the
deed, the right of plaintiffs-appellants to bring an action for partition and
reconveyance was already barred by prescription. An action for the annulment of a
partition must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud, while an
action for the reconveyance of land based upon an implied or constructive trust
prescribes after ten years from the registration of the deed or from the issuance of
the title. The complaint in this case was filed on May 9, 1984, exactly 12 years, 1
month and 17 days after the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name
of Asuncion Teves on March 22, 1972. Thus, ownership over Lot 6409 rightfully
belonged to defendants-appellees It-it.
Moreover, the trial court held that the extrajudicial settlements over both Lots 6409
and 769, having been prepared and acknowledged before a notary public, are public
documents, vested with public interest, the sanctity of which deserves to be upheld
unless overwhelmed by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence presented by
the plaintiffs to support their charges of forgery was considered by the court
insufficient to rebut the legal presumption of validity accorded to such documents. 18
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision affirming the validity of the
extrajudicial statements, with a slight modification. It disposed of the case, thus —
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
modification in that herein defendant-appellees are hereby ORDERED to partition Lot
769-A and deliver to plaintiff-appellant Ricardo Teves one-eight (sic) (1/8) portion
thereof corresponding to the share of his deceased father Cresenciano Teves. No
costs.
The appellate court said that plaintiffs-appellants' biased and interested testimonial
evidence consisting of mere denials of their signatures in the disputed instruments is
insufficient to prove the alleged forgery and to overcome the evidentiary force of the
notarial documents. It also ruled that the plaintiffs-appellants' claim over Lot 6409
was barred by prescription after the lapse of ten years from the issuance of title in
favor of Asuncion Teves, while their claim over Lot 769-A is barred by laches since
more than 25 years has intervened between the sale to Asuncion Teves and the filing
of the present case in 1984.
The appellate court noted that the conveyance of Lot 769-A in favor of Asuncion
Teves did not affect the share of Cresenciano Teves as he was not a signatory to the
settlements. It also found that Ricardo Teves, Cresenciano's heir, is in possession of
a portion of Lot 769-A and that defendants-appellees do no not claim ownership over
such portion. Thus, the defendants-appellees It-it were ordered to partition and
convey to Ricardo Teves his one-eighth share over Lot 769-A.1âwphi1.nêt
As regards the extrajudicial settlement involving Lot 6409, although it was found by
the appellate court that Cresenciano Teves was also not a signatory thereto, it held
that it could not order the reconveyance of the latter's share in such land in favor of
his heir Ricardo Teves because Cresenciano had predeceased Joaqin Teves.
Moreover, Ricardo Teves, by a deed simply denominated as "Agreement" executed
on September 13, 1955 wherein he was represented by his mother, authorized the
heirs of Joaquin Teves to sell his share in Lot 6409. 19
Plaintiffs-appellants assailed the appellate court's decision upon the following
grounds —
I. IN CONSIDERING RICARDO TEVES AS BOUND BY THE SIGNATURE OF HIS MOTHER,
INSPITE OF DEATH OF CRESENCIANO TEVES IN 1944; AND UNDER THE OLD CIVIL
CODE THE SPOUSE CANNOT INHERIT EXCEPT THE USUFRUCT;
II. IN UPHOLDING SWEEPINGLY THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF NOTARIZED
DEED, DESPITE CLEAR, CONVINCING, SUBSTANTIAL AND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT
MARIA OCHOTORENA WAS IN MINDANAO; THE NOTARY PULIC DID NOT KNOW
MARIA OCHOTORENA AND THE SIGNATURES OF THE OTHER HEIRS IN THE
QUESTIONED DOCUMENT ARE BELIED BY COMPARISON WITH THE GENUINE
SIGNATURE IN EXH. "E";
III. IN VALIDATING THE ONE PESO CONSIDERATION, INSPITE OF NO OTHER VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION, THE SUPERIMPOSED P100 WAS UNILATERALLY INSERTED,
SHOWING FICTITIOUS AND SIMULATED CONSIDERATION; AND
IV. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT START FROM A VOID CONTRACT. 20
We affirm that the extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves
and Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and binding.
The extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's estate is authorized by section 1 of Rule
74 of the Rules of Court, which provides in pertinent part
that —
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors
are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office
of the register of deeds, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, for a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid, the following
conditions must concur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts,
or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs are all of age, or if they are
minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives;
(4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with
the Register of Deeds. 21
We uphold, finding no cogent reason to reverse, the trial and appellate courts' factual
finding that the evidence presented by plaintiffs-appellants is insufficient to
overcome the evidentiary value of the extrajudicial settlements. The deeds are public
documents and it has been held by this Court that a public document executed with
all the legal formalities is entitled to a presumption of truth as to the recitals
contained therein. 22 In order to overthrow a certificate of a notary public to the
effect that the grantor executed a certain document and acknowledged the fact of
its execution before him, mere preponderance of evidence will not suffice. Rather,
the evidence must be so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all reasonable
dispute as to the falsity of the certificate. When the evidence is conflicting, the
certificate will be upheld. 23 The appellate court's ruling that the evidence presented
by plaintiffs-appellants does not constitute the clear, strong, and convincing evidence
necessary to overcome the positive value of the extrajudicial settlements executed
by the parties, all of which are public documents, being essentially a finding of fact,
is entitled to great respect by the appellate court and should not be disturbed on
appeal. 24
It is noted that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering Lot 6409 purports
to divide Joaquin Teves' estate among only six of his heirs, namely Asuncion, Teotimo,
Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Maria Teves. 25 It does not mention nor bear the
signatures of either Pedro or Cresenciano Teves although they are both intestate
heirs of Joaquin Teves and as such, are entitled to a proportionate share of the
decedent's estate. Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, the fact that
Cresenciano predeceased Joaquin Teves does not mean that he or, more accurately,
his heirs, lose the right to share in the partition of the property for this is a proper
case for representation, wherein the representative is raised to the place and degree
of the person represented and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he
were living. 26
However, notwithstanding their non-inclusion in the settlement, the action which
Pedro and Cresenciano might have brought for the reconveyance of their shares in
the property has already prescribed. An action for reconveyance based upon an
implied trust pursuant to article 1456 of the Civil Code prescribes in ten years from
the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title. 27 Asuncion Teves
acquired title over Lot 6409 in 1972, but the present case was only filed by plaintiffs-
appellants in 1984, which is more than 10 years from the issuance of title. 28
The division of Lot 769-A, on the other hand, was embodied in two deeds. The first
extrajudicial settlement was entered into by Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Gorgonio,
Arcadia and Asuncion Teves in 1956 29, while the second deed was executed in 1959
by Maria Teves. 30 Cresenciano was not a signatory to either settlement. However, in
contrast to the extrajudicial settlement covering Lot 6409, the two extrajudicial
settlements involving Lot 769-A do not purport to exclude Cresenciano from his
participation in Lot 769-A or to cede his share therein in favor of Asuncion. The
settlement clearly adjudicated the property in equal shares in favor of the eight heirs
of Marcelina Cimafranca. Moreover, the deeds were intended to convey to Asuncion
Teves only the shares of those heirs who affixed their signatures in the two
documents. The pertinent portions of the extrajudicial settlement executed in 1956,
of which substantively identical provisions are included in the 1959 deed, provide —
xxx xxx xxx
5. That by virtue of the right of succession the eight heirs above mentioned inherit
and adjudicate unto themselves in equal shares Lot No. 769-A and our title thereto is
evidenced by the O.C. of Title No. 4682-A of the Land Records of Negros Oriental.
THAT FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the sum of FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE
(P425.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency which we have received from ASUNCION
TEVES; WE, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Gorgonio and Arcadia, all surnamed Teves, do
hereby sell, transfer and convey unto Asuncion Teves, married to Isaac Itit, Filipino,
of legal age and resident of and with postal address in the City of Dumaguete, all our
shares, interests and participations over Lot 769-A of the subdivision plan, Psd, being
a portion of Lot No. 769 of the Cadastral Survey of Dumaguete, her heirs, successors
and assigns, together with all the improvements thereon.
xxx xxx xxx
It has even been admitted by both parties that Ricardo Teves is in possession of an
undetermined portion of Lot 769-A and defendants-appellees It-it do not claim
ownership over his share in the land. 31 Thus, contrary to the appellate court's ruling,
there is no basis for an action for reconveyance of Ricardo Teves' share since, in the
first place, there has been no conveyance. Ricardo Teves is entitled to the ownership
and possession of one-eighth of Lot 769-A.
Neither does Ricardo Teves have a right to demand partition of Lot 769-A because
the two extajudicial settlements have already effectively partitioned such property.
Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees
or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. 32 The extrajudicial settlements
executed in 1956 and 1959 adjudicated Lot 769-A in equal shares unto the eight heirs
of Marcelina Cimafranca. Such a partition, which was legally made, confers upon each
heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him. 33 Although
Cresenciano, Ricardo's predecessor-in-interest, was not a signatory to the
extrajudicial settlements, the partition of Lot 769-A among the heirs was made in
accordance with their intestate shares under the law. 34
With regards to the requisite of registration of extrajudicial settlements, it is noted
that the extrajudicial settlements covering Lot 769-A were never registered.
However, in the case of Vda. de Reyes vs. CA, 35 the Court, interpreting section 1 of
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, upheld the validity of an oral partition of the decedent's
estate and declared that the non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement does not
affect its intrinsic validity. It was held in this case that —

[t]he requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for
its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the
heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no
creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are
involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law.

Thus, despite its non-registration, the extrajudicial settlements involving Lot 769-A
are legally effective and binding among the heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca since their
mother had no creditors at the time of her death.

Except for the portion of Lot 769-A occupied by Ricardo Teves, both parcels of land
have been and continue to be in the possession of Asuncion Teves and her
successors-in-interest. 36 Despite this, no explanation was offered by plaintiffs-
appellants as to why they instituted the present action questioning the extrajudicial
settlements only in 1984, which is more than 25 years after the assailed conveyance
of Lot 769-A and more than 10 years after the issuance of a transfer certificate of title
over Lot 6409, both in favor of Asuncion Teves. Such tardiness indubitably constitutes
laches, which is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert
37
it. Thus, even assuming that plaintiffs-appellants had a defensible cause of action,
they are barred from pursuing the same by reason of their long and inexcusable
inaction.

An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine that the

law does not relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into with all the
required formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing, simply because
the contract turned out to be a foolish or unwise investment. 38 Therefore, although
plaintiffs-appellants may regret having alienated their hereditary shares in favor of
their sister Asuncion, they must now be considered bound by their own contractual
acts.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the August 18, 1992 decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
HERNANDEZ vs ANDAL It results that on the date last mentioned Andal executed a deed of sale for P970 in
G.R. No. L-273 March 29, 1947 favor of the intervenors, an amount which included Andal's expenses as well as the
normal sale price. The document of repurchase gave as reason for the transaction
CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellee, the fact that it had been agreed that in the event trouble should arise the sellers
vs. should return to the buyer what they had received and pay the latter his expenses.
ZACARIAS ANDAL, defendant-appellant.
QUIRINO DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ and AQUILINA On February 14, 1944, the defendant filed his answer alleging that Maria and Aquilina
HERNANDEZ, intervenors-appellants. Hernandez had sold him their respective portions of the inherited land for P860 and
that he had no objection to disposing of those portions in favor of the plaintiff for
Pedro Pañganiban y Tolentino for appellants. P860 plus the expenses he had incurred in the execution of the deed of sale
Vicente Reyes Villavicencio for appellee. amounting to P50, but that he was unwilling to accept P150, which was all the
plaintiff offered him besides his expenses.
TUASON, J.:
On April 4, 1944, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez's answer in intervention was filed.
The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez,
The intervenors alleged that there had been a partition among them and their
and Pedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not parties here, are brother and sisters.
brother and sisters "with the share of each delineated and marked, and after
They acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel of land of which he
partition and delineation everyone took exclusive, separate and independent
died seized and known as lot No. 120073 of the Batangas cadastral survey.
possession of his portion in the partition." They charged the plaintiff with bad faith
On January 23, 1944, the intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel, a portion in that "it was upon her request for chance that the sale to the defendant, about to
which is particularly described in the deed of conveyance Exhibit A, to Zacarias Andal, take place last November, was delayed till January of this year when she finally
the defendant, and Andal's wife in consideration of P860. This portion purports to be informed the intervenors that they could sell to the defendant, or she could pay only
the combined shares of the intervenors in the larger parcel, allotted to them in a P150 and could not raise the amount of P860 offered by the defendant."
verbal partition alleged to have been made (time not stated) among the five brother
Cresencia Hernandez, the plaintiff, was the only witness to testify on her own behalf.
and sisters.
Substantially she reiterated the allegations in her two complaints. Zacarias Andal, the
After the sale, on a date as to which the evidence is in disagreement but which is not defendant, also testified. He said that he was in possession of the land in question
now important, the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. until he returned it to the intervenors. He declared that the plaintiff offered to
According to her original complaint, dated February 3, 1944, she offered the repurchase the land from him long after he had bought it, that is, when she was about
purchasers P150 as price of repurchase, this being, according to that complaint, the to file her action. He stated that after he came from Candelaria, Tayabas, with the
amount Andal had paid for Maria Hernandez's and Aquilina Hernandez's shares, but document of sale he showed it to the plaintiff: that was on the 23rd of January. He
Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with the property. was able to do this because he lived near Cresencia and passed by her house on his
way home from Candelaria. He said that Cresencia Hernandez upon being shown the
On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint. She alleged that when the document merely exclaimed, "Oh, so you already have a document." When asked
cause was called for trial on March 8, she announced in open court that she was whether the land "described in the complaint of the herein plaintiff has been the
willing to repurchase her sister's share from Andal for P860 and reimburse Andal for object of partition among the co-owners Pedro, Basilia, Cresencia, Maria and Aquilina
his expense; that Andal asked for continuance until the 29th stating that he had made surnamed Hernandez," counsel for the plaintiff objected on the ground that the best
other expenses; that on 29th she brought P860 to repurchase the land in question evidence was the document of partition, and the objection was sustained. The same
but the case was again postponed because the plaintiff's sisters had intervened; and objection and the same ruling were made on the same ground when the witness was
that meanwhile, on the 26th, Andal resold the land fictitiously to the vendors for queried how it was that the land he had bought from Maria and Aquilina Hernandez
P970. had been specified in the deed of sale, Exhibit A.
In consequence of this ruling, counsel for the defendant and intervenors did not call
any more witnesses but only announced that he had witnesses ready to prove that a
parol partition among the five brother and sisters had been made, mentioning the
names of six such witnesses. Counsel for the plaintiff again objected asserting that
"under the Rules of Court agreement affecting real estate may not be proved except
by means of writing subscribed by the person against whom the proof is offered.
"Upon this objection, the court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of
Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as under article 1248 of the Civil Code, parol
evidence of partition was inadmissible, adding that to decide the case it had enough
with the testimony and evidence offered by the parties.
Thereafter the court handed down its decision declaring that the resale of the land
by Zacarias Andal in favor of Maria and Aquilina Hernandez was illegal and in bad
faith. It, however, did not seem to have found as a fact the allegation that the resale
was simulated. The court then made this judgment:
(a) declarando y sin valor alguno el documento de reventaotorgado por el
demandado Zacarias Andal en 26 de marzo de 1944, a favor de Maria y Aquilina
Hernandez sobre el terrenocuestionado que se presento como Exhibito 2 de
dichodemandado, y consiguientemente se anulan tambien todas lastransacciones
posteriores que las mencionadas Maria y Aquilina Hernandez hayan hecho sobre el
terreno cuestionado despuesdel 26 de marzo de 1944, asi como tambien cualquiera
anotacionen la Oficiana del Registrador de Titulos de Batangas que hayaanotado
dicha reventa por el demandado Zacarias Andal a favorde las terceristas Maria y
Aquilina Hernandez en el citado dia 26 de marzo de 1944; y
(b) se ordena al aqui demandado Zacarias Andal, que otorgue unaescritura de
reventa a favor de la aqui demandante Cresencia Hernandez, de las participaciones
de las terceristas en el terrenodescrito en la demanda suplementaria previo pago de
P860 mas lacantidad de P50 como gastos de documentacion. Se absuelve al
demandado de los daños y perjuicios que reclama la demandante. Se absuelve
tambien a la demandante de la contra-demanda de lasterceristas.
Sin especial pronunciamento en cuanto a las costas.
The defendant and the intervenors are appealing from the foregoing decision and in
their joint brief made one assignment of error:
The lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence for proving a contract of
partition among the heirs on the ground that it was not admissible.
Before proceeding with a discussion of the questions raised we are tempted to point
up some seeming incongruities in the above-quoted judgment. Although Zacarias
Andal is no longer interested in the case, as far as the land is concerned, and even
though the intervenors have become again the absolute owners and are now in full
possession of the property, while Andal has already gotten his money back, the
judgment would have Andal execute a deed of resale in favor of the plaintiff and
received from her the price of repurchase. The judgment is silent as to the
intervenors with reference to the execution of the deed of sale or the receipt of the
sale price. And the lower court made no finding and expressed no opinion as to
whether the offer of P150 instead of P860, not to mention Andal's expenses, by the
plaintiff as price of repurchase was sufficient compliance with article 1067 of the Civil
Code on which the court rested the plaintiff's cause of action.
However, in this decision we are concerned mainly with the application of section 21
of Rule 123 and section 1 of Rule 74 both of the Rules of Court. Article 1248 of the
Civil Code has no bearing on the case.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is such a
contract as is required to be in writing under the statute of frauds. One line of
authorities holds the affirmative view; other authorities say no. The reason for the
rule that excludes partition from the operation of the statute of frauds is that
partition is not a conveyance but simply a separation and designation of that part of
the land which belongs to each tenant in common. (27 C.J., 206.) The differences in
the conclusions reached are "due perhaps to varied phraseology of the statutes" in
the several states. (40 Amer. Jur., 15.) However the case may be, as enacted in the
Philippines, first in section 335 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, and now in Rule
123, section 21, of the Rules of Court, the law has been uniformly interpreted in a
long line of cases to be applicable to executory and not to completed or executed
contracts. (27 C.J., 206.) In this jurisdiction performance of the contract takes it out
of the operation of the statute. (Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26 Phil., 485; Almirol and
Cariño vs. Monserrat, 48 Phil., 67.) The statute of frauds does not declare the
contracts therein enumerated void and of no legal effect, but only makes ineffective
the action for specific performance. (Almirol and Cariño vs. Monserrat, supra.) In the
United States, even in those states where the affirmative view of the question has
been followed, "the weight of authority upholds the rule that an oral partition is
effective when several possession is taken under it by the respective parties to the
agreement." (27 C.J., 206.)
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of
equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and
enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually
been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of
ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and
enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has
been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the
parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly
performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a
proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained
on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common
as to parts of the land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty
was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will
recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of
concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective
parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have
acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising
acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the
partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have
stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the
operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition
in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would
have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties. (40 Amer. Jur.,
15-18.)
It is on the effects of Rule 74, section 1, of the Rules of Court on a parol partition that
there are sharp divergences of opinion among the members of this Court. This section
reads:
If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors
are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters
of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a
public instrument file in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one
legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed
in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no
debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after
the death of the decedent.
It is contended that under this rule a verbal partition is entirely void and cannot be
validated by any acts of the parties short of the execution of a public document and
its registration.
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are required
to be reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a means of
providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written form exacted by the statute of
frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes only." (Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil.,
471.) The decisions of this Court which we have noticed were predicated on this
assumption. The Civil Code, too, requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in
a public instrument, not in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its
efficacy so that after the existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the
party bound may be compelled to execute the document. (Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs
.Hernaez, 45 Phil., 746.)
Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and not merely evidential of partition? In other
words, is writing the act that confers legal validity upon the agreement? There are no
indications in the phraseology of this rule which justify an affirmative answer to these
questions. It must be noted that where the law intends a writing or other formality
to be the essential requisite to the validity of the transactions it says so in clear and
unequivocal terms. Thus, the statute of frauds as originally enacted in England and
as enacted in some of the states, uses the words "utterly void" with statute
transactions required to be in writing are absolutely void and not merely voidable if
not made in the manner indicated. Again article 633 of the Civil Code says that
donation may be valid only when made in a public document. Article 146 of the
Mortgage Law makes known its intention to have the execution of a public
instrument and its registration in the registry indispensable to the validity of the
contract by using this phrase: "in order that voluntary mortgages may be legally
created in a valid manner." Article 1765 of the Civil Code also employs for the same
purpose similar expression with reference to the execution of a public document: "in
order that mortgage may be validly constituted." And with respect to the formalities
of last wills and testaments, section 618 of Act No. 190 makes this emphatic
statement: "No will shall be valid to pass upon any estate real or personal nor change
or affect the same, unless it be written etc." Other examples might be mentioned.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the required
public instruments is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent
element of its effectiveness as between the parties. And this Court had no apparent
reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a partition as between the
parties dependent on the execution of a public instrument and its registration. On
the other hand, the opposite theory is not without reasonable support. We can think
of possible factors against the proposition that a public document and its registration
were contemplated as necessary ingredients to give life to a contract of partition so
that without them no oral partition can bind the parties.
1. In the first place, the Rules of Court of which the rule under consideration forms a
part were promulgated by the Judicial Department under authority to deal with
matters of procedure exclusively. For this court to prescribe what is to be a binding
agreement between co-heirs in the settlement of their private affairs which in no way
affect the rights of third parties would be to transcends its rule-making power. We
bring out this limitation upon the authority of this court to make rules, as an aid to
interpretation, as a method of arriving at the conclusion that section 1 of Rule 74 was
meant to be remedial and not a rule of substantive law of far-reaching importance
and serious juridical and practical implications. It is to be presumed that the framers
of the Rules of Court realized the bounds of this court's functions and did not intend
to trespass on purely substantive rights of the parties to the partition. To the extent
the execution and registration of a notarized instrument are made essential elements
to validity to protect innocent third parties, the rule is legitimate and necessary;
legitimate because decedent's estate are placed under the jurisdiction of the courts
to administer and distribute. The interests of third parties eliminated, the rule loses
its character as one of procedure and practice and invades the realm of substantive
law.
Section 596 of Act No. 190, which is the precursor of section 1 Rule 74, is enlightening
and instructive. The former after stating that heirs may apportion and divide the
estate among themselves as they may see fit by agreement duly executed in writing
by all of them, adds the words "and not otherwise." These words, in our opinion,
were expressive of an intention to make the written formality inherent element of
the validity of a parol partition. But what is far more to the point is that by logical
process of deduction the elimination from the new rule of the words "and not
otherwise" imports the casting away from the prescribed public document of its jural
character which the document enjoyed in the former code. At the same time, the
inclusion of the aforesaid words in the old provision serves to emphasize the
necessity of a positive and clear language if a given contractual formality is to be the
exclusive basis of the contract's binding effect on the parties. It is of course
unnecessary to say that the attaching of jural character to the prescribed public
instrument in section 596 of Act No. 190 is no argument for contending that such
document must be clothed with the same raiment in the new Rules. Act No. 190 was
a mixture of procedural and substantive provisions, having been enacted by the
legislative body itself which, unlike this court, was unhampered and untrammelled,
except by the fundamental law, in the choice of its subjects of legislation.
2. The civil law looks upon the role of public instruments in acts and contracts with
greater liberality with a view to better adaptation to human frailties and
idiosyncracies. In their blind faith in friends and relatives, in their lack of experience
and foresight, and their ignorance, men, in spite of laws, will make and continue to
make verbal contracts. The advantages of an air-tight policy concerning such
contracts fall far short of compensating for the resulting damage, injustice,
inconveniences and confusion. So even though articles 1278, 1279 and 1280 of the
Civil Code have made provisions for public instrument for all transactions and
contracts whose object is the creation, modification or extinction of real rights in
immovables, it has been recognized and held that verbal contracts may be effective
between the parties. A leading case on this subject is Thunga Chui vs. Que Bentec (2
Phil., 561), Mr. Justice Williard writing the decision. It was said in that case that when
the essential requisites for the existence of a contract are present, the contract is
binding upon the parties, and, although required to be in writing by article 1280 of
the Civil Code, the plaintiff can maintain an action under article 1279 to compel the
execution of a written instrument. It says that "article 1279 does not impose an
obligation, but confers a privilege upon both contracting parties, and the fact that the
plaintiff has not made use of same does not bar his action." It further says that article
1279, far from making the enforceability of the contract dependent upon any special
intrinsic form, recognizes its enforceability by the mere act of granting the
contracting parties an adequate remedy whereby to compel the execution of public
writing or any other special form whenever such form is necessary in order that
contract may produce the effect which is desired according to whatever its object.
This doctrine was iterated and reiterated in a series of decisions perhaps longer than
that on any other legal topic. And it has been extended even to verbal contracts
involving land registered under the Torrens Act. Do the Rules of Court adhere to this
salutary principle? We can perceive no sufficient ground for the new Rules to depart
from it. No considerations of public policy enter into a partition of hereditary estate
among co-heirs greater than those involved in a contract between strangers which
operates to create, transmit, modify or extinguish property rights in land. If as
between strangers the creation, transmission, modification or extinction of real rights
may be lawfully effected by parol agreement notwithstanding the requirement that
it be put in writing, the new rule could not be more intransigent when the transaction
is between co-heirs and there is no change of ownership but simply designation and
segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.
The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has, in
our opinion, for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the
protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. Note that the last sentence
of the section speaks of debts and creditors. The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice, and this means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic
validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into
play when, as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not
affected. No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an
estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan
different from those provided by law.

It is said that the findings, conclusions and judgment in the appealed decision are not
assigned as errors and that for this reason the appeal should be dismissed. We do not
think that the premise of this objection is exactly correct. The evidence on parol
partition tendered by the defendant and intervenors was ruled out and they
specifically complain of this exclusion as error. In this manner the assignment of error
squarely meets and attacks the opinion and judgment of the trial court. A superficial
analysis of the case will show that on the validity of the alleged partition hangs the
result of the entire litigation, and on that validity depends in turn the competence of
the excluded evidence. These two interrelated points are the core of the whole case.
All other points are incidental to and revolve around them. If a completed oral
partition may be enforced, as the defendant and the intervenors contend and as we
opine, their evidence should be allowed, and if allowed and it establishes their
allegation, the plaintiff's cause of action vanishes.

If the appellant's assignment of error be not considered a direct challenge to the

decision of the court below, we still believe that the objection takes a narrow view of
practice and procedure contrary to the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of
Court. The first injunction of the new Rules (Rule 1, section 2) is that they "shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding." In line with the modern trends of procedure, we are told that, "while an
assignment of error which is required by law or rule of court has been held essential
to appellate review, and only those assigned will be considered, there are a number
of cases which appear to accord to the appellate court a broad discretionary power
to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and consider errors not assigned.
And an unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which
the determination of the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent,
will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as
error." (4 C.J.S., 1734; 3 C.J., 1341, footnote 77.) At the least, the assignment of error,
viewed in this light, authorizes us to examine and pass upon the decision of the court
below.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further
proceeding and a new decision not incompatible with this decision, with costs of this
appeal against the appellee.
CUA vs VARGAS
G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006
JOSEPH CUA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS,
EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal
of the decision1 dated March 26, 2002, and the resolution2 dated December 17, 2002,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59869 entitled "Gloria A. Vargas, Aurora
Vargas, Ramon Vargas, Marites Vargas, Edelina Vargas and Gemma Vargas v. Joseph
Cua."
The facts are as follows:
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan,
Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994,
a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among
Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V.
Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and
Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question,
each one of them getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina
and Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida
and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the
Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks.3
On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale 4 was
again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with
the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario
signed the document and their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold
to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.
According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas and one of respondents
herein, she came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale
dated November 16, 1994 only when the original house built on the lot was being
demolished sometime in May 1995.5 She likewise claimed she was unaware that an
earlier Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the
same property had been published in the Catanduanes Tribune. 6
After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried
to redeem the property, with the following letter7 sent to petitioner on her behalf:
29th June 1995
Mr. Joseph Cua
Capilihan, Virac, Catanduanes
Sir:
This is in behalf of my client, Ms. Aurora Vargas,8 (c/o Atty. Prospero V. Tablizo) one
of the lawful heirs of the late Paulina Vargas, original owner of Lot No. 214 of Virac,
Poblacion covered by ARP No. 031-0031 in her name.
I understand that a document "Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale" was
executed by some of my client's co-heirs and alleged representatives of other co-
heirs, by virtue of which document you acquired by purchase from the signatories to
the said document, five (5) shares with a total area of fifty-five square meters of the
above-described land.
This is to serve you notice that my client shall exercise her right of legal redemption
of said five (5) shares as well as other shares which you may likewise have acquired
by purchase. And you are hereby given an option to agree to legal redemption within
a period of fifteen (15) days from your receipt hereof.
Should you fail to convey to me your agreement within said 15-day-period, proper
legal action shall be taken by my client to redeem said shares.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
JUAN G. ATENCIA
When the offer to redeem was refused and after having failed to reach an amicable
settlement at the barangay level,9 Gloria Vargas filed a case for annulment of Extra
Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner and consigned the amount His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present
of P100,000 which is the amount of the purchase with the Clerk of Court on May 20, petition for review.
1996.10 Joining her in the action were her children with Santiago, namely, Aurora,
The issues are:
Ramon, Marites, Edelina and Gemma, all surnamed Vargas.
Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their
Subsequently, Carlos Gianan, Jr. and Gloria Arcilla, heirs of the alleged primitive
failure to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate
owner of the lot in question, Pedro Lakandula, intervened in the case.11
when the extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published; and,
Respondents claimed that as co-owners of the property, they may be subrogated to
Assuming a published extrajudicial settlement and partition does not bind persons
the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him the price of the sale. They likewise
who did not participate therein, whether the written notice required to be served by
alleged that the 30-day period following a written notice by the vendors to their co-
an heir to his co-heirs in connection with the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger
owners for them to exercise the right of redemption of the property had not yet set
before partition under Article 1088 of the Civil Code17 can be dispensed with when
in as no written notice was sent to them. In effect, they claimed that the Extra Judicial
such co-heirs have actual knowledge of the sale such that the 30-day period within
Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale
which a co-heir can exercise the right to be subrogated to the rights of a purchaser
were null and void and had no legal and binding effect on them. 12
shall commence from the date of actual knowledge of the sale.
After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a decision13 in favor of petitioner,
Petitioner argues, as follows:
dismissing the complaint as well as the complaint-in-intervention for lack of merit,
and declaring the Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale valid and Firstly, the acquisition by petitioner of the subject property subsequent to the
binding. The MTC upheld the sale to petitioner because the transaction purportedly extrajudicial partition was valid because the partition was duly published. The
occurred after the partition of the property among the co-owner heirs. The MTC publication of the same constitutes due notice to respondents and signifies their
opined that the other heirs could validly dispose of their respective shares. Moreover, implied acquiescence thereon. Respondents are therefore estopped from denying
the MTC found that although there was a failure to strictly comply with the the validity of the partition and sale at this late stage. Considering that the partition
requirements under Article 1088 of the Civil Code 14 for a written notice of sale to be was valid, respondents no longer have the right to redeem the property.
served upon respondents by the vendors prior to the exercise of the former's right of
redemption, this deficiency was cured by respondents' actual knowledge of the sale, Secondly, petitioner is a possessor and builder in good faith.
which was more than 30 days before the filing of their complaint, and their
Thirdly, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint because its subject matter
consignation of the purchase price with the Clerk of Court, so that the latter action
was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The complaint should have been filed with
came too late. Finally, the MTC ruled that respondents failed to establish by
the RTC.
competent proof petitioner's bad faith in purchasing the portion of the property
owned by respondents' co-heirs.15 Fourthly, there was a non-joinder of indispensable parties, the co-heirs who sold their
interest in the subject property not having been impleaded by respondents.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42, of Virac, Catanduanes affirmed
the MTC decision in a judgment dated November 25, 1999. The matter was thereafter Fifthly, the appeal to the CA should have been dismissed as it was not properly
raised to the Court of Appeals (CA). verified by respondents. Gloria Vargas failed to indicate that she was authorized to
represent the other respondents (petitioners therein) to initiate the petition.
The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts in the assailed decision dated March
Moreover, the verification was inadequate because it did not state the basis of the
26, 2002, declaring that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra
alleged truth and/or correctness of the material allegations in the petition.
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale, dated February 4, 1994 and November
15, 1994, respectively, were void and without any legal effect. The CA held that, The petition lacks merit.
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, 16 the extrajudicial settlement
made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon respondents considering the latter The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule
never participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent to the same. plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an
extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. 18 It contemplates a notice that
has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed
upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already
been executed19 as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first
deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs
who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after
the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of
creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the
decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that
respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered
their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule
74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made
without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.
This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their
hereditary rights to third persons even before the partition of the estate. The heirs
who actually participated in the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which
included the sale to petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the subject property, are
bound by the same. Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these
shares pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost
because respondents were never notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-
heirs. Based on the provision, there is a need for written notice to start the period of
redemption, thus:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition,
any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the
vendor. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time that
a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale. Written notice is
indispensable and mandatory,20 actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other
manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time
advance notice is given of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-
heir thirty days from the time written notice of the actual sale within which to make
up his or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption. 21
Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any
distinctive method for written notification of redemption, the method of notification
remains exclusive, there being no alternative provided by law. 22 This proceeds from
the very purpose of Article 1088, which is to keep strangers to the family out of a
joint ownership, if, as is often the case, the presence of outsiders be undesirable and
the other heir or heirs be willing and in a position to repurchase the share sold.23
It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves upon
the vendor co-heirs because the latter are in the best position to know the other co-
owners who, under the law, must be notified of the sale. 24 This will remove all
uncertainty as to the fact of the sale, its terms and its perfection and validity, and
quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. 25 As a result, the party notified
need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation. 26
Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this
requirement, there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents to redeem the
shares sold to petitioner given the former's obvious willingness and capacity to do so.
Likewise untenable is petitioner's contention that he is a builder in good faith. Good
faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land the latter is building on is one's
own without knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's title. 27 Petitioner derived his
title from the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs With Sale dated November 15,
1994. He was very much aware that not all of the heirs participated therein as it was
evident on the face of the document itself. Because the property had not yet been
partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no particular portion of the
property could have been identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale.
This is because the alienation made by respondents' co-heirs was limited to the
portion which may be allotted to them in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. Despite this glaring fact, and over the protests of respondents, petitioner
still constructed improvements on the property. For this reason, his claim of good
faith lacks credence.
As to the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner is estopped from raising the same for
the first time on appeal. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings below and
sought affirmative ruling from the lower courts to uphold the validity of the sale to
him of a portion of the subject property embodied in the extrajudicial settlement
among heirs. Having failed to seasonably raise this defense, he cannot, under the
peculiar circumstances of this case, be permitted to challenge the jurisdiction of the
lower court at this late stage. While it is a rule that a jurisdictional question may be
raised at any time, an exception arises where estoppel has already supervened.
Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before challenging
the jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its
decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief
against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has, time and
again, frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction when adverse.28
Petitioner's fourth argument, that there is a non-joinder of indispensable parties,
similarly lacks merit. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom
there can be no final determination of an action and who is required to be joined as
either plaintiff or defendant.29 The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit
and in the relief sought is so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that the
former's legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. Hence,
an indispensable party is one whose interest will be directly affected by the court's
action in the litigation. In the absence of such indispensable party, there cannot be a
resolution of the controversy before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable.30
requiring the submission of such certification considering that although it is
obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.33
Thus, when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause
of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against
forum shopping substantially complies with the rules. 34 The co-respondents of
respondent Gloria Vargas in this case were her children. In order not to defeat the
ends of justice, the Court deems it sufficient that she signed the petition on their
behalf and as their representative.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

In relation to this, it must be kept in mind that the complaint filed by respondents
ultimately prayed that they be allowed to redeem the shares in the property sold by
their co-heirs. Significantly, the right of the other heirs to sell their undivided share
in the property to petitioner is not in dispute. Respondents concede that the other
heirs acted within their hereditary rights in doing so to the effect that the latter
completely and effectively relinquished their interests in the property in favor of
petitioner. Petitioner thus stepped into the shoes of the other heirs to become a co-
owner of the property with respondents. As a result, only petitioner's presence is
absolutely required for a complete and final determination of the controversy
because what respondents seek is to be subrogated to his rights as a purchaser.

Finally, petitioner contends that the petition filed by respondents with the CA should
have been dismissed because the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping
appended to it were defective, citing specifically the failure of respondent Gloria
Vargas to: (1) indicate that she was authorized to represent her co-respondents in
the petition, and (2) state the basis of the alleged truth of the allegations.

The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all
the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case and the signature of only one of them is
insufficient.31 Nevertheless, the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to
promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert their own ultimate and
legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certificate
of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded.32 Under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule
SAMPILO vs CA
G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958
BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.
Clodualdo P. Surio for petitioners.
Moises B. Ramos for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
Certiorari against decision of the Court of Appeals, Third Division, affirming with slight
modification a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring
plaintiffs owners of one-half portion of four parcels of land described in the
complaint, with costs. The judgment was rendered in an action instituted by Felisa
Sinopera, administrative of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, to recover from defendants
one-half share of the aforesaid parcels of land, which, it is alleged belong to the
deceased Teodoro Tolete.
According, to the facts found by the Court of Appeals, Teodoro Tolete died intestate
in January, 1945. He left for parcels of land, lots Nos. 12006, 119967, 14352 and
12176 of the cadastral survey of San Manuel, Pangasinan He left as heirs his widow,
Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces, children of deceased brothers and
sisters. On July 25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his widow executed an
affidavit stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or respondent
neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters,
nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife of the
deceased, the one and only person to inherit the above properties" (Record on
Appeal, p. 9). This affidavit was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan. On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above parcels of
land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000. This sale was also registered
in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On June 17, 1950, Benny
Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for P50,000 and
this sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan (See
Annexes "A", "B", "C", attached to the complaint).
In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the
estate of Teodoro Tolete (Special Proceeding No. 3694, Pangasinan), and having
secured her appointment as administratrix, brought the present action on June 20,
1950. Notice of lis pendens was filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds and said
notice was recorded on certificates of title covering the said properties on June 26,
1950. This notice, however, was subsequent to the registration of the deed of sale,
in favor of Honorato Salacup, which took place on June 17, 1950.
The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the
affidavit of adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands
sold to him, and that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said
properties. Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended answer alleging that the complaint
states no cause of action; that if such a cause exists the same is barred by the statute
of limitations; that defendants are innocent purchasers for value; and that the
complaint is malicious, frivolous and spurious, intended to harass and inconvenience
the defendants.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa
Sinopera, declaring that the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", the deed of sale
Exhibit "B", and the deed of sale Exhibit "C", are all null and void; declaring plaintiff
owner of one-half portion of the four parcels of land in question, and finally declaring
that the usufructuary rights of Leoncia de Leon to said properties are terminated. The
case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. This court held that the annulment of the
affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", by the trial court was correct but that the
annulment of the deeds Exhibits "B" and "C", insofar as one-half of the properties,
conveyed is concerned, and in adjudicating one-half of the same to the heirs of the
deceased, is premature. Hence, it modified the judgment, declaring that Exhibits "B"
and "C" are null and void only insofar as the properties thereby conveyed exceed the
portion that the responds to Leoncia de Leon. Therefore, it ordered the defendants
to deliver to the plaintiff, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Teodoro
Tolete, for disposition according to the law, one-half of the lands described in the
complaint, but reserved to Honorato Salacup the right to claim and secure
adjudication in his favor of whatever portion of said properties may correspond to
Leoncia de Leon and also his right to bring an action for the damages that he may
have suffered against Leoncia de Leon and Benny Sampilo.
Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup have appealed to this Court by certiorari and
have assigned the following errors in their brief:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of
action to recover her and her co-heirs' participation to the lands in question had not
prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the petitioners are innocent purchasers
for value.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the lower court's denial of petitioner's motion
for new trial.
In support of the first assignment of error, it is argued that as the action was
instituted almost four years after the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", was
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of action of
the administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not brought
within the period of two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, and as decided in the cases of McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 869.
Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows:
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two
years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the
provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other has been
unduly deprived of his lawful participation of the such heir or such other person may
compel the settlement estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for
the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. . . .
Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs. — If the decedent
left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented
by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a
public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one
legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed
in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no
debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after
the death of the decedent.
It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted contains two parts, the first
referring to a case in which there are two or more heirs interested in the estate of a
deceased person, and the second in which there is only one heir. The section was
taken from Section 596 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190, as amended
by Act No. 2331). Said Section 596 as amended, was as follows:
SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings. — Whenever
all the heirs of a person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and
there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may,
by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion
and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in
court.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is
required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in
the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more imperative in the old law
(Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the
title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are indicates the persons to answer
for rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also
significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial
settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge
thereof. There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of
the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear that if
they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the
estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest
within the period of two years, and both the distributes and estate would be liable to
them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they are the persons in accordance with
the provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice to their rights within the two-year
period. But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of
the death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct or express provision
is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to assert their claims within the
period of two years. To extend the effects of the settlement to them, to those who
did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision
to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law. In
the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, cited by the appellants in this case, we held:
It will be noted that while the law (see. 754) provides that the order of distribution
may be had upon the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, no provision is made for notice, by publication or otherwise,
of such application. The proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and purposes ex parte.
As will be seen our law is very vague and incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held
that a purely ex parte proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by
publication, by which the court undertakes to distribute the property of deceased
persons, can be conclusive upon minor heirs who are not represented therein.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by
affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended
that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no
knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or
affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by
implication. We have examined the two cases cited by appellants and there is no
similarity at all between the circumstances on which the ruling therein had been
predicated and those of the case at bar.
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur,
supra, we are of the opinion and so hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74,
barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the
expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to
persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial
partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been
strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken
part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all the
heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of
Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and
nieces living at the time of his death.
The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of
limitations. The origin of the Provision (Section 4, Rule 74), upon which this
contention is predicated, which is Section 596 of Act No. 190, fails to support the
contention. In the first Place, there is nothing therein, or in its source which shows
clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third person's. It is only a
bar against the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not
against third persons not Parties thereto. In the second place, the statute of
limitations is contained in a different chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL, and if
Section 596 of the Act had been meant to be a statute of limitations, it would
naturally have been included in the chapter which defines the statute.
But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing to the
defendants. The action is one based on fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner
of the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition that the deceased left no
nephews or niece, or other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on
fraud and which has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190; Article
1146, Civil Code), does not appear to have lapsed the action was instituted. Judicial
proceedings where instituted in March, 1950 and these proceedings must have been
instituted soon after the discovery of fraud. In any case, the defendants have the
burden of proof as to their claim of the statute of limitations, which is their defense,
and they have not proved that when the action was instituted, four years had already
elapsed from the date that the interested parties had actual knowledge of the fraud.
The second assignment of error, i.e., that the defendants-appellants are innocent
purchasers for value was rejected as unfounded by the court of Appeals. Said court
said.
The claim that defendants-appellants did not have sufficient knowledge or notice of
the claim of the heirs of Teodoro Tolete, deceased, over the land in question does
not find support in the evidence of record. As regards defendant Benny Sampilo, it is
an admitted fact that he is a nephew of Leoncia de Leon and he had been living with
the latter. Both Benny Sampilo and the heirs of the deceased who are claiming the
property are residents of San Manuel, Pangasinan. It is hard, therefore, to believe
that Benny Sampilo did not know the existence of said heirs, and that he was not
aware that they were nephews and nieces, children of the deceased brothers, of the
deceased Teodoro Tolete. The fact furthermore that Benny Sampilo accompanied his
aunt Leoncia de Leon to Sison, Pangasinan, when the later saw Notary Public Ladislao
Villamil, who was the former's uncle, to have him prepare the affidavit of adjudication
Exhibit "A", and the deed of conveyance Exhibit "B" by which on the same date she
conveyed to Sampilo all the property which she had adjudicated to herself, both of
which she acknowledged before said notary public, coupled with the fact that there
is no sufficient showing that the consideration for the conveyance of P10,000 had in
fact been paid, strengthens our belief that said Benny Sampilo knew that the
deceased Teodoro Tolete had other heirs who may claim the property, and that the
immediate conveyance thereof to him was a strategem concocted to defeat the
former's rights. And as regards Honorato Salacup, while the claim that no notice of lis
pendens appeared annotated in the certificates of title issued to Benny Sampilo when
he acquired the property might be true, for he purchased the property on June 17,
1950, and the notice of lis pendens was noted on said certificates of title on June 26,
1950, nevertheless, he cannot claim that he was a purchaser in good faith for value
of the property. It is well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that a purchaser of registered
lands who has knowledge of facts which should put him upon inquiry and investigate
as to the possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such inquiry and
investigation cannot claim that he as a purchaser in good faith for value and he had
acquired a valid title thereto. Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644;
Dayao vs. Diaz, G.R. L-4106, May 29, 1952.
Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hereby affirm it in toto,
with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.
ALCALA vs PABALAN
G.R. No. L-6463 August 12, 1911
DAMASA ALCALA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MODESTA PABALAN, PROCOPIO PABALAN, BASILIO SALGADO and JUAN BANAY-
BANAY, defendants-appellants.
Pedro Guevara for appellants.
No appearance for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 11th day of June, 1910, the plaintiff and appellee presented a petition in the
Court of First Instance of the Province of La Laguna, praying that she be appointed
administratrix of the property described in paragraph 4 of her petition.
After hearing the respective parties, the lower court appointed the plaintiff as
administratrix of said property. From that decision the defendants appealed to this
court and made several assignments of error.
The undisputed facts, as presented by the record brought to this court, seem to be
as follows:
That on the 23rd day of April, 1897, Juan Banatin died, leaving a widow (Damasa
Alcala), the plaintiff herein, and seventeen nieces and nephews, whose names are
set out in the petition; that on the 13th day of June, 1897, the said widow and all of
the seventeen nieces and nephews, except Tranquilina Banatin, entered into a
voluntary agreement among themselves for the division "entre ellos," of all of the
property left by the said Juan Banatin, deceased, except the house described in
paragraph 4 of the petition; that by the terms of said agreement, the said house was
to remain undivided; that the widow (the plaintiff herein) should receive the one-half
of the usufruct of said house during her lifetime; that the other one-half of the
usufruct should be distributed equally among the other seventeen heirs; that
Francisco Salgado, one of the nephews, should administer the said house, collecting
the rents of the same and deliver one-half to the widow (Damasa Alcala) and the
other one-half to the nieces and nephews; that Francisco Salgado, having failed to
pay to Damasa Alcala her share of the usufruct of said property, was sued by her and
a judgment was finally rendered against him for the same. (Alcala vs. Salgado, 7 Phil.
Rep., 151.) An execution was issued upon said judgment and one-half of the
undivided property in question was sold some time in the year 1907, to one Macario
Decena. On the 22nd and 24th days of October, 1908 (see Exhibits 2 and 3), the said
one-half of the property in question was repurchased by the heirs of Francisco
Salgado. The money used in repurchasing the property by the heirs of Francisco
Salgado was the money of four of the heirs of Juan Banatin, to wit: Modesta Pabalan,
Procopio Pabalan, Basilio Salgado, and Juan Banay-banay (see Exhibit 4 of the
defendants herein), and not the money of the heirs of Francisco Salgado. On the 25th
day of November, 1908, thirteen of the nieces and nephews or heirs of Juan Banatin,
by means of a public document, recognized the right of the said Modesta Pabalan,
Procopio Pabalan, Basilio Salgado, and Juan Banay-banay as the owners of the one-
half of the undivided property in question. (See Exhibit 5.) On the 25th day of
November, 1908, sixteen of the heirs of the said Juan Banatin, by a public document,
unanimously appointed the said Modesta Pabalan as "administradora" of all of the
house in question, in substitution of the said Francisco Salgado deceased. (See Exhibit
6.) Since the 25th day of November, 1908, until the commencement of the present
action, Modesta Pabalan had administered the property in question, collected the
rents of the same and had paid the one-half of said rents to the plaintiff herein as the
usufructuary of the one-half of said property.
The first assignment of error made by the plaintiff is that "El juzgado erro al estimar
que la testamentaria del finado Juan Banatin no ha finalizada."
With reference to this assignment of error, the heirs of Juan Banatin were at perfect
liberty to divide the estate among themselves, assuming the responsibility of any
debts which might exist. There is no proof that any debts existed. After the actual
division of the estate among themselves they became the absolute owners of their
respective allotments and were tenants in common of that portion of the property
which remained pro indiviso. After the mutual agreement among themselves for the
division of the estate, either actually distributing their respective shares or leaving
the same undivided, the property in question was no longer the property of the
estate of Juan Banatin, but the undivided property of the heirs. They were tenant in
common of that portion of the property which remained undivided. As such tenants
in common the majority of them had a right to agree upon the appointment of an
administrator of their property. (Art. 398, Civil Code.) The property belonged to them.
They had a right to administer it.
The lower court in appointing the plaintiff and appellee as administratrix of the
property in question, evidently did so upon the theory that the said property was still
the property of the estate of Juan Banatin. In this theory the lower court was
mistaken. There was nothing left of the estate of Juan Banatin to be administered.
The heirs by mutual agreement had divided the property among themselves. There
was no occasion and no reason for the appointment of an administrator by the
probate court, and, therefore, the judgment of the lower court appointing Damasa
Alcala as administratrix of the estate of Juan Banatin for the purpose of administering
the property mentioned in paragraph 4 of the petition, is hereby revoked.
We deem it unnecessary in the present case to discuss the right of a usufructuary to
manage or assist in managing or to administer the property in usufruct which belongs
to tenants in common. That question is not presented in the present cause.

Without any finding as to costs, it is hereby directed that a judgment be entered

reversing the judgment of the lower court appointing Damasa Alcala as administratrix
of the property in question. It is so ordered.

Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.