Maoists struck again with impunity when they blew up a passenger bus on Dantewada-

Sukma road in Chhattisgarh, killing at least 44 civilians including 18 special police officers
(SPOs). This follows the ambush at Chintalnar, which killed 75 CRPF personnel in the thick
Mukrana forests of Dantewada. The belligerence of Maoists underscores their strong
position in the area in relation to security forces. Their actions have seriously undermined
the authority of the Indian state as they run a parallel administration in the areas they
control, with people's courts and an economy fuelled by extortion money. Unless the
government recalibrates its strategy against Maoists, as home minister P Chidambaram has
suggested, it will only flounder in its efforts to tackle the problem. 

Let's begin, for the sake of clarity, by describing the situation as what it is: a full-fledged
insurgency. The underdevelopment argument favoured by some civil society organisations
has a lot to be said for it, but it becomes irrelevant in territories where the government's writ
no longer runs. It is futile on the part of the government to wait for an elusive political
consensus within the party and outside when Maoists are unambiguously targeting security
personnel and now civilians as well. Increasing Maoist violence has to be dealt with sternly
if the state doesn't want to lose this asymmetric war. 

Anti-Maoist operations are at a critical juncture. At the tactical level, the repeated failure of
the state police and paramilitary forces to act against the Maoist challenge shows lack of
adequate training. Questions will be raised on the conduct of SPOs who were travelling in a
civilian bus in a Maoist stronghold. They have failed to adopt and employ best counter-
insurgency practices, which could come only with rigorous training in jungle warfare. 

It is disturbing that no action has been taken on the report of the E N Rammohan probe
after the Chintalnar massacre, which recommended disciplinary action against CRPF and
state police officials. Such uncertainty adversely affects the morale of the security forces.
The suggestion of bifurcating the CRPF to form a special anti-Naxal force, on the lines of the
Special Operations Group of Orissa and Greyhound Force of Andhra Pradesh, is a good one
and needs to be acted on. It can be debated how much air power should be employed against
Maoists due to fears of collateral damage. While holding off on armed engagement,
helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles can be utilised for reconnaissance and logistical
back-up for ground forces.