Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 184098 November 25, 2008

AMADO TAOPA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac,
Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver,
Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent
detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain
Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber.

Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section 68 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705,1 as amended, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Virac, Catanduanes. The information against them read:

That on or about the 2nd day of April 1996 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning
at Barangay Capilihan, Municipality of Virac, Province of Catanduanes,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to possess, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally possess, transport in a
truck bearing Plate No. EAS 839 and have in their control forest products,
particularly one hundred thirteen (113) pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany
Group and Apitong species with an aggregate net volume of One Thousand Six
Hundred Eighty Four (1,684) board feet with an approximate value of Ninety-Nine
Thousand One Hundred Twenty (Php99,120.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency,
without any authority and/or legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, prejudicial to the public interest.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial on the merits,
the RTC found them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt.3
Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed.4 The dispositive portion of
the CA decision read:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED with respect to

accused-appellant Placido Cuison, who is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on
reasonable doubt, and MODIFIEDwith respect to accused-appellants Amado
Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco by reducing the penalty imposed on them to four (4)
years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum,
to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.5

In this petition,6 Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him. He alleges that
the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as
he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.

We deny the petition.

Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi because Cuison's
testimony proved Taopa's active participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In
particular, the RTC and the CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of
Taopa's house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by
Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopa's (and
Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck. The
acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber or
other forest products without the required legal documents. Moreover, the fact that
Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of the police was likewise largely
indicative of guilt. We are thus convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the
seized lumber.

However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed on Taopa.

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,7 refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68
of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft.8 The law treats cutting,
gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license as
an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.

Articles 309 and 310 read:

Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
 amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (emphasis supplied)

2. xxx

Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding articles xxx (emphasis supplied).

The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630.9 Following
Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty should be reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14 years, eight
months and one day to 20 years plus an additional period of four years for the excess
of P47,630.

The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence10 imposable on Taopa shall be the
penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall
be anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years and eight months or prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the medium
period11 of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or 16 years, five
months and 11 days to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal. The
maximum term therefore may be anywhere between 16 years, five months and 11 days
of reclusion temporal to 22 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 31, 2008 decision and July
28, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30380
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Amado Taopa is hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as
amended, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 10
years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum, with the accessory penalties provided for by law.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

*DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* As replacement of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro who is on official

leave per Special Order No. 539.
1 Revised Forestry Code.
2 Rollo, p. 27.
3 Rollo, pp. 30-31. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision read:

WHEREFORE, In view of the foregoing, this Court finds:

Accused Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt as principal of the crime charged and applying Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby
sentences both of them to suffer imprisonment from ten (10) years and
one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum.
 Accused Placido Cuison GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as accessory
to the crime by transporting the lumber materials in his truck covered by
bundles of abaca fiber, which is akin to concealing the body of the crime in
order to prevent its discovery, and hereby sentences him to suffer an
imprisonment, the maximum period of which is two (2) degrees lower than
that of the principal and the minimum period of which is one (1) degree
lower, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hence, from two (2)
years four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years eight
(8) months and one (1) day as maximum.

The lumber materials are likewise confiscated in favor of the government

to be disposed of through public auction sale to be conducted by the Clerk
of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of
Virac, Catanduanes. The truck, which was included in the Seizure Receipt
is ordered released to its owner inasmuch as the evidence proved that it
was hired purposely for the transport of abaca fibers and not lumber
materials.

SO ORDERED.
4Despite Ogalesco's failure to appeal, the CA held that the modification of the
penalty will benefit him pursuant to Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Rollo, p. 14.

5 Decision dated January 31, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30380. Penned by

Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justices
Rosmari D. Carandang and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo of the Third Division of
the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 26-40. The motion for reconsideration thereto
was denied in a Resolution dated July 28, 2008. Rollo, pp. 56-58.

6 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

7 Section 68 provides: "Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or
Other Forest Products without License. - Any person who shall xxx possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code."
8Merida v. People, G.R. No. 158182, 12 June 2008 citing People v. Dator, 398
Phil. 109, 124 (2000).
9 The CA did not contest the correctness of the value as stated in the information.
However, the CA clarified that the value of the lumber pegged at P99,120 was
inclusive of surcharges and forest charges. The CA thus provided a breakdown
of the values for a more correct computation of the penalties to be imposed on
the accused. The relevant portion of the CA decision reads: "The Statement of
 Lumber Apprehended, which was prepared by Forest Ranger Jose San Roque,
states that the market value of the 113 pieces of lumber is only P67,630. It
appears that that the amount of P99,120 was arrived at by adding regular forest
charges in the amount of P7,940 and 300% surcharges in the amount of P23,820
to the market value of the lumber pegged at P67,[63]0."Rollo, p. 39.

10 Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (RA 4103) provides: "SECTION

1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules
of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. xxx"
11 The medium period is imposed following Article 64 of the RPC which states:
"When there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall
impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period." Although PD No. 705
is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the RPC. Hence, the rules
in the RPC for graduating by degrees or determining the period should be
applied. This is pursuant to People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994, 234
SCRA 555.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-52518 August 13, 1991

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE

PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., respondents-
appellants.

Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna dated 3
June 1968 in a special civil action for declaratory relief with injunction, Civil Case No.
SC-650 entitled International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines vs.
University of the Philippines and Jose Campos, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner and

against the respondents:

(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of the
Philippines, in lieu of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry, to
scale, measure and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within the tract of land
referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding forest charges prescribed
by the National Internal Revenue Code therefor; and

(b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim.

respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R.
No. 49409-R.

After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division) promulgated on 28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to this
Court as the "entire case hinges on the interpretation and construction of Republic Act
3990 as it applies to a set of facts which are not disputed by the parties and therefore, is
a legal question.1

Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on 28
June 1966.2 Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that respondent University of the
Philippines (hereafter referred to as UP) does not have the right to supervise and
regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products, to scale, measure
and seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties
from petitioner and/or impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of
its concession, covered by License Agreement No. 27-A issued on 1 February 1963,
ceded in full ownership to the UP by Republic Act No. 3990; asks that respondents be
enjoined from committing the acts complained of and prays that respondents be
required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as damages and costs of the suit.

Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably acted
upon, and pursuant to the order of the trial court of 26 August 1967, respondents filed
their Answer on 13 September 1987,3 wherein they interpose the affirmative defenses
of, among others, improper venue and that the petition states no cause of action; they
further set up a counterclaim for the payment of it by petitioner of forest charges on the
forest products cut and felled within the area ceded to UP under R.A. No. 3990 from 18
June 1964, with surcharges and interests as provided in the National Internal Revenue
Code.

Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim.4

On 18 October 1967, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint
Submission of the Case for Judgment,5 which reads as follows:

COME NOW the parties in the above entitled case by the undersigned counsel,
and respectfully submit the following JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND
JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT, without prejudice to the
presentation of evidence by either party:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and

exportation of plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the Government an
exclusive license for a period of 25 years expiring on February 1, 1985, to cut,
collect and remove timber from that portion of timber land located in the
Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and Sampaloc Province of Quezon and in the
Municipalities of Siniloan, Pangil, Paete, Cavite and Calauan, Province of Laguna
under License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) issued and promulgated by the
Government through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on
January 11, 1960. ... ;

3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a renewal of

the Timber License Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by the Government
to the plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to February 1, 1963. ... ;

4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been in

peaceful possession of said timber concession and had been felling cutting and
removing timber therefrom pursuant to the aforementioned Timber License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960;

5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement executed by the

Government on June 4,1953 (License Agreement No. 27-A) and of the License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, has constructed roads
and other improvements and installations of the aforementioned area subject to
the grant and purchased equipment in implementation of the conditions
contained in the aforementioned License Agreement and has in connection
therewith spent more than P7,000,000.00 as follows: ... ;

6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License Agreement

No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President of the Philippines
issued Executive Proclamation No. 791 which reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF

THE PHILIPPINES, AS EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE PROPOSED
DAIRY RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE AND FOR
 AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION STUDIES OF THIS
COLLEGE A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN,
SITUATED PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF PAETE AND PAKIL
,PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, AND PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF
INFANTA, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, ISLAND OF LUZON.

Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia, President
of the Philippines, do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the
College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, as experiment station for the
proposed Dairy Research and production studies of this College, a certain parcel
of land of the Public domain situated partly in the municipalities of Paete and
Pakil province of Laguna, and partly in the municipality of Infants, Province of
Quezon, Island of Luzon, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to the
condition that the disposition of timber and other forest products found therein
shall be subject to the forestry laws and regulations, which parcel of land is more
particularly described as follows, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila this 25th day of September, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the
sixteenth.

(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA

President of the Philippines

xxx xxx xxx

7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the aforementioned
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11, 1960, Republic Act No.
3990 was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines and approved by the
President of the Philippines, which Republic Act provides as follows:

AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT STATION FOR

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines

in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central experiment station for

the use of the University of the Philippines in connection with its research
 and extension functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College
of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.

SEC. 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public domain consisting of
three thousand hectares, more or less, located in the Municipality of
Paete, Province of Laguna, the precise boundaries of which are stated in
Executive Proclamation 791, Series of 1961, is hereby ceded and
transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines, subject to
any existing concessions, if any.

SEC. 3. All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment

station shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income
therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the
Philippines.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, June 18,
1964.

8. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990, and prior to
the institution of the present suit, defendants have demanded, verbally as well as
in writing to plaintiff-.

(a) That the forest charges due and payable by plaintiff under the License
Agreement 27-A (Amendment) referred to in paragraph 2 hereof be paid
to the University of the Philippines, instead of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue; and

(b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by plaintiff within the
boundaries of the Central Experiment Station as defined in Republic Act
No. 3990 be performed by personnel of the University of the Philippines.

9. That the position of the plaintiff oil the demand of the defendants was fully
discussed in the letter dated April 29, 1966 of plaintiffs lawyer addressed to the
President of the University of the Philippines, copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex "A" hereof.

10. That in line with its position as stated in paragraph thereof, plaintiff has
refused to allow entry to personnel of the University of the Philippines to the
Central Experiment Station area assigned thereto for the purpose of supervising
the felling cutting and removal of timber therein and scaling any such timber cut
and felled prior to removal

11. That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff and in Relation to the
implemetation of Republic Act No. 3990 the defendant Business Executive sent
the letter quoted below to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
 xxx xxx xxx

February 8, 1966

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Manila

Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant

Dear Sir:

Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June, 1964 a parcel of forest land
approximately 3,500 hectares in area was ceded in full ownership by the
government to the University of the Philippines. This area is known as
Paete Land Grant, the title to which is presently issued in the name of the
University of the Philippines. The law transferring the ownership to the
University of the Philippines gives the university full rights of dominion and
ownership, subject to the existing concession of International Hardwood
and Veneer Company of the Philippines. Under the terms of this law all
forest charges due from the concessionaire should now be paid to the
University of the Philippines. The purpose of giving this land grant to the
University is to enable us to generate income out of the land grant and
establish a research and experimental station for the Colleges of
Agriculture, Forestry, Arts and Sciences and Veterinary Medicine.

I would like, therefore, to inform you and to secure your approval of the
following matters:

1. All forest charges paid by Interwood to the District Forester of

Laguna from June, 1964 up to the present should be remitted in
favor of the University of the Philippines pines;

2. All forest charges presently due from Interwood shall hereafter

be paid to the University of the Philippines and lastly

3. Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall receive all forest

charges and royalties due from any logging concession at the land
grant.

May we request that proper instructions be issued by the district Forester

of Laguna about this matter. Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Sgd.) JOSE C. CAMPOS JR.

Business Executive
12. That in reply to the above letter of defendant Business Executive dated
February 8, 1966, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the following
letter-ruling dated March 11, 1966:

xxx xxx xxx

March 11, 1966

U.P. Paete Land Grant

University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City

Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr.

Business Executive

Gentlemen:

This has reference to your letter dated February 8, 1966 stating as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you as follows:

In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code as amplified by Section

15(a) of Revenue Regulations No. 85, the Forest Products Regulations,
forest products, cut, gathered and removed from registered private
woodlands are not subject to forest charges, but they must be invoiced
when removed to another municipality or for commercial purposes in the
manner prescribed by the regulations. As the Paete Land Grant was
ceded by law to the U.P. in full private ownership and as the grant is
manifestly to be considered registered, no forest charges are actually due
and payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom. The forest charges
purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing
agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are, therefore, to be
considered not as the charges contemplated by the National Internal
Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by the concessionaires
for the exploitation of the timber resources of the land grant.

Accordingly, you queries are answered viz:

1. The University may directly collect the supposed forest charges

payable by concessionaires of the land grant.

2. The forest charges paid by International Hardwood and Veneer

Company of the Philippines may be refunded provided that a formal
claim for the refund thereof is made within two years from the date
 of payment. The proper claimant shall be International Hardwood
and not the University.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MISAEL P. VERA

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

13. That subsequently, defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted
below to the District Forester of the province of Laguna una dated April 18, 1
966:

April 18, 1966

The District Forester

Bureau of Forestry
Sta. Cruz, Laguna

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

concerning the right of the University of the Philippines to collect forest
charges from the existing logging concessionaire at the Laguna Land
Grant (formerly Paete Land Grant). This tract of forest land containing
some 3,500 hectares was ceded to the University of the Philippines in full
ownership by Republic Act No. 3990, approved in June, 1964. In view
thereof, the University of the Philippines requested that its authority over
said land be recognized and that the existing concessionaire, International
Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines, in turn pay its forest
charges directly to the University instead of to the national government.

Please take note of page "2" of the enclosed letter of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on the official ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
the following points raised by the University:

1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly collect

forest charges from INTERWOOD, the existing logging
concessionaire.

2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau of

Forestry from June, 1964 up to April, 1966 shall be refunded to the
University of the Philippines. In this manner, INTERWOOD is
requested to file a claim for the refund in the amount heretofore
paid by it to be remitted to the University of the Philippines.
 On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is
understood that forest charges on timber cut from the Laguna Land Grant
as scaled by scalers of the University of the Philippines shall now be paid
directly to the University of the Philippines. In another ruling by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the University, particularly the Laguna
Land Grant, is exempted from all kinds of Internal Revenue taxes.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) Jose C. Campos, Jr.

Business Executive

14. That the above quoted letter of defendant Business Executive dated April 18,
1966 was duly endorsed by the District Forester of the province of Laguna to the
Director of Forestry.

15. That on or about June 7, 19667 the Assistant Director of Forestry addressed
to plaintiff the letter dated June 7, 1966, which states as follows:

Sirs:

This is in connection with your request for this Office to comment on your
reply to the letter of Mr. Jose C. Campos, Jr. of the University of the
Philippines.

In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is stated that the University of
the Philippines is claiming the right:

(a) To scale, measure and seal the timber cut inside the area
covered by the U.P. Land Grant at Paete, Laguna;

(b) To collect the corresponding forest charges;

(c) To collect royalties aside from the forest charges; and

(d) To exercise in effect all the authority vested by law upon the
Bureau of Forestry in the cutting, removal and disposition of the
timber from said area, and the authority of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue respecting the measurement and scaling of the logs and
the collection of the corresponding forest charges and other fees in
connection therewith.

This office is in full accord with your arguments against the claim of the
University of the Philippines to have acquired the above rights. We believe
that the right vested the INTERWOOD by virtue of number License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) to utilize the timber inside subject area
 is still binding and should therefore, be respected. It is on the basis of this
acknowledgment that we sent your client our letter of November 4,1965
requesting him to comment on the application of the State University for a
Special Timber License over the said area.

16. That acting on the endorsement referred to in paragraph l4, the Director of
Bureau of Forestry issued the letter ruling quoted below, dated June 30,1966:

xxx xxx xxx

June 30, 1966

District Forester
Sta. Cruz, Laguna

(Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila)

Sir:

This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd paragraph of your letter
dated April 26, 1966, designated as above, as to whether or not you shall
turn over the scaling work for logs cut from the area of the International
Hardwood & Veneer Company of the Philippines in the Pacto Land Grant
to Scalers of the University of the Philippines.

In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the

Paete Land Grant, which embraces the area of the International
Hardwood & Veneer Company of the Philippines, is considered a
registered private woodland of the University of the Philippines and
therefore no forest charges are actually due and payable on the timber cut
and removed therefrom, and in view further of the ruling of said
Commissioner that the forest charges purportedly to be paid by any
concessionaire under any licensing agreement entered or to be entered
into by the U.P. are to be considered not as the charged contemplated by
the National Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by
the concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of the land
grant, you may turn over the scaling work therein to the scalers of the U.P.

However, you should guard against the use of such licensing agreements
entered or to be entered into by the U.P. as a means of smuggling forest
products from the neighboring public forests.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) ANTONIO A. QUEJADA

 xxx xxx xxx

On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS, the pleadings filed in the
case, and whatever additional evidence may be presented by the parties, the parties
hereto, through counsel, jointly move and pray of this Honorable Court that judgment be
rendered granting full and appropriate relief, on the following issues:

1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest
charges due and payable under its timber License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof', to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines; and

2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges
are to be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not the University of
the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, telling and removal of timber within the Central Experiment Station area
as described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled and
cut.

Manila for Laguna, September 29,1967.

Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial court rendered its judgment on 3 June
1968 in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which is quoted at the beginning
of this decision. In deciding the case against UP, it held:

... the court finds that the respondents' demand on the petitioner has no legal
basis. In the first place, the cession in full ownership of the tract of land referred
to in the Act was expressly made 'subject to any existing concessions.' Inasmuch
as at the time of the enactment of the Act, the petitioner's timber concession over
the tract of land was existing and would continue to exist until February 1, 1985,
the University of the Philippines will acquire full ownership' and exclusive
jurisdiction to control and administer the property only after February 1, 1985.
The cession of the property to the University of the Philippines is akin to the
donation of a parcel of land, subject to usufruct. The donee acquires full
ownership thereof only upon the termination of the usufruct. At the time of the
donation, all what the donee acquires is the 'naked' ownership of the property
donated. In the second place, the respondents' demand cannot be valid unless
the provisions of Sees. 262 to 276 of the National Internal Revenue Code
regarding the measuring of timber cut from the forest and the collection of the
prescribed forest charges by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of
Forestry are first amended. In their arguments, the respondents tried to stretch
the scope of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990 in order to include therein
such amendment of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and
Revised Administrative Code, but they failed to convince the Court, not only
because of the first reason above stated, but also because it clearly appears that
such amendment is not intended in Republic Act No. 3990, which does not
 contain even a remote allusion thereto in its title or a general amendatory
provision at the end. In the third place, under Republic Act No. 3990, the
University of the Philippines cannot legally use the tract of land ceded to it for
purposes other than those therein expressly provided, namely, 'for the use of the
University of the Philippines in connection with its research and extension
functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary
Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.' Hence, upon the expiration of the
petitioner's timber concession, the University of the Philippines cannot even
legally renew it or grant timber concession over the whole tract of land or over
portions thereof to other private individuals and exercise the functions of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry by scaling and measuring
the timber cut within the area and collecting from them the forest charges
prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code.

Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court erred:

... WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
WITH INJUNCTION INSPITE OF ITS INHERENT JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS
THAT SHOULD WARRANT A DISMISSAL.

II

... WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3990 DOES NOT
EMPOWER THE RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN LIEU
OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF FORESTRY,
TO SCALE, MEASURE AND SEAL THE TIMBER CUT BY THE PETITIONER
WITHIN THE TRACT OF LAND REFERRED TO IN SAID ACT, AND COLLECT
THE CORRESPONDING FOREST CHARGES PRESCRIBED BY THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.

1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the parties
jointly move and pray that the trial court render judgment granting full and appropriate
remedy on the following issues:

1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay
forest charges due and payable under its Timber License Agreement No.
27-A (Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines; and

2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest
charges are to be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not
the University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly
appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the
 Central Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990,
and to scale the timber thus felled

These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief under
Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the appeal to the rule
laid down in Sarmiento, et al. vs. Caparas, et al.6 that declaratory relief cannot be joined
by injunction, because herein petitioner, for all legal intents and purposes, abandoned it
by its failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus, what attains is an amendment to
both pleadings (the complaint and the answer), which is authorized by Section 5, Rule
10 of the Rules of Court. Said section pertinently provides:

SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of

evidence.— When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respect, as if
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of
the trial by these issues. ...

The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy the
requisites for declaratory relief. (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue
invoked must be ape for judicial determination.7

There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the ripening

seeds of one exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court,
and that the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A doubt becomes a
justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually
contested.8

2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a) Under R.A. No. 3990, the
Republic of the Philippines may effect collection of forest charges through the University
of the Philippines because the License Agreement does not expressly provide that the
forest charges shall be paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue; in the absence of a
specific contractual provision limiting it to a particular agency in collecting forest charges
owing to it, the Republic may effect such collection through another agency. (b) Having
been vested with administrative jurisdiction over and being the owner of the tract of land
in question, the UP acquired full control and benefit of the timber and other resources
within the area. Timber areas within the ceded property but outside the concession of
petitioner can be fully exploited by UP. However, in respect to timber areas within the
ceded property but covered by the concession of petitioner, only forest charges (or
more appropriately, royalties) may be enjoyed by UP until the expiration of petitioner's
license. To deny it such charges would render its "full ownership" empty and futile. (c)
The UP is clearly entitled to the income derived from the tract of land ceded to it, for
Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 expressly provides:

All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station

shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom
shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines.
(emphasis supplied for emphasis).

(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a
central experiment station; since this law does not provide for appropriations for such
purpose, it is clearly the legislative intention that the establishment and maintenance
thereof must be financed by the earnings or income from the area, which can only come
from the timber and the royalties or charges payable therefrom. This is in accordance
with the general principle that a grant of authority or jurisdiction extends to all incidents
that may arise in connection with the matter over which jurisdiction is exercised. (e)
Supervision of the License Agreement in favor of petitioner by UP was intended by R.A.
No. 3990. (f) Finally, the two government agencies affected by R.A. No. 3990 have
issued specific rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties or charges and
to supervise petitioner's logging operations.

Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by asserting that: (a) The UP
has not been granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect forest charges or the
authority to supervise the operation by the petitioner of the timber concession affected
by said Act.

The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the
public and most strongly against the grantee, and nothing will be included in the grant
except that which is granted expressly or by clear implication. Under Section 262 of the
Tax Code, as amended, the duties incident to the measuring of forest products and the
collection of the charges thereon shall be discharged by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
under the regulations of the Department of Finance. The reforestation fee shall be
collected by the Bureau of Forestry.9 The supervision and regulation of the use of forest
products and of the cutting and removal of forest products are vested upon the Bureau
of Forestry.10 R.A. No. 3990 does not expressly, or even impliedly, grant the UP any
authority to collect from the holders of timber concessions on the area ceded to it forest
charges due and payable to the Government under the Tax Code, or to enforce its
provisions relating to charges on forest products or to supervise the operations of the
concessions by the holders thereof; (b) The cession in full ownership of the land in
question was expressly made "subject to any concession, if any", and that petitioner's
concession would continue until 1 February 1985; the UP then would acquire full
ownership and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the property only after 1
February 1985. The position of UP is akin to that of a donee of a parcel of land subject
to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Acting
Director of the Bureau of Forestry are patently incorrect; moreover, said agencies do not
have the power to interpret the law, which is primarily a function of the judiciary. (d)
Finally, it has acquired a vested right to operate the timber concession under the
supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry.

There is merit in the second assigned error.

Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the public
domain described therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the very parcel of
land subject of R.A. No. 3990, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and was reserved
for the College of Agriculture of the UP as experiment station for the proposed Dairy
Research and Training Institute and for research and production studies of said college,
subject however to private rights, if any, and to the condition that the disposition of
timber and other forest products found thereon shall be subject to forestry laws and
regulations.

The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's timber license.

Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment station for
the use of the UP in connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by
the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and
Sciences, the above "reserved" area was "ceded and transferred in full ownership to the
University of the Philippines subject to any existing concessions, if any."

When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines
completely removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the
areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a
public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished and
conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject
only to the existing concession. That the law intended a transfer of the absolute
ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full" to describe
it. Full means entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any
essential quality.11 The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the timber
license of petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber
licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar
as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license
were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a consequence of the above
transfer of full ownership. This is further home out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which
provides, inter alia, that "any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the
general fund of the University of the Philippines. Having been effectively segregated
and removed from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted
into a registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry over it were likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition
in Proclamation No. 971 to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject to
forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced iii R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not
likewise provide that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation. An
owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those
established by law.12 The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to receive
from the thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing
by its use.13 As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code, to the owner belongs the
natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are, however, exceptions to
this rules, as where the property is subject to a usufruct, in which case the usufructuary
gets the fruits.14 In the instant case, that exception is made for the petitioner as licensee
or grantee of the concession, which has been given the license to cut, collect, and
remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until I February
1985.1âwphi1 However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest
charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided for in the
Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore to the Republic of the Philippines
through the Bureau of Internal Revenue because of the very nature of the transfer as
aforestated. Consequently, even the Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its
authority and jurisdiction to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect
forestry charges and other fees due thereon.

The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not grant
the UP the authority to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of its
concession insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned. Its argument that it
has acquired vested rights to operate its concession under the supervision and control
of the Bureau of Forestry is preposterous. The grantor, Republic of the Philippines, was
by no means bound under the License to perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither is
there force to its contention that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of
the public and most strongly against the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is
transfer of absolute, full and entire ownership which leaves no room for a strict
interpretation against the grantee, the UP. The reservation therein made is in favor of
the private party pursuant to the license, which is nevertheless protected. It is the
concession in favor of the petitioner which should, on the contrary, be bound by the rule.

It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed
personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the area covered by R.A. No.
3990.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING

the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on 3 June 1968;
DECLARING that forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut
pursuant to its License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within the area ceded and
transferred to the University of the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to
the University of the Philippines; DECLARING that the University of the Philippines is
entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and
removal of timber within the aforesaid area covered by R.A. No. 3990.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008

SESINANDO MERIDA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution
dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. The 28 June 2002 Decision affirmed the
conviction of petitioner Sesinando Merida (petitioner) for violation of Section
68,3 Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705),4 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.
The Resolution dated 14 May 2003 denied admission of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.5

The Facts

Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81
(trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting],
gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod,
Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant Oscar M.
Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership.6

The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that
petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to
Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998,7 Royo
summoned petitioner to a meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted during the
meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that
he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner,
bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de
retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's written authorization signed by Calix's
wife.8

On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez
(Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon. When Hernandez confronted petitioner about the
felled tree, petitioner reiterated his earlier claim to Royo that he cut the tree with Calix's
permission. Hernandez ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into
lumber.

On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the
narra trunk into lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement
officers, went to the Mayod Property and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six
smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of the lumber,9 deposited them for
safekeeping with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger
portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently
conducted an investigation on the matter.10

Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon
(Provincial Prosecutor) charging petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit
reiterating his claim that he cut the narra tree with Calix's permission. The Provincial
Prosecutor11 found probable cause to indict petitioner and filed the Information with the
trial court (docketed as Criminal Case No. 2207).

During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses including Tansiongco, Royo,
and Hernandez who testified on the events leading to the discovery of and investigation
on the tree-cutting. Petitioner testified as the lone defense witness and claimed, for the
first time, that he had no part in the tree-cutting.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty as
charged, sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and ordered the seizedlumber forfeited in
Tansiongco's favor.12 The trial court dismissed petitioner's defense of denial in view of
his repeated extrajudicial admissions that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property
with Calix's permission. With this finding and petitioner's lack of DENR permit to cut the
tree, the trial court held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial. Petitioner
also contended that (1) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because
it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided
under Section 80 of PD 705 and (2) the penalty imposed by the trial court is excessive.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling
but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor.13 The Court of
Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial
admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR permit.
The Court of Appeals also found nothing irregular in the filing of the complaint by
Tansiongco instead of a DENR forest officer considering that the case underwent
preliminary investigation by the proper officer who filed the Information with the trial
court.

On the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals, in the dispositive portion of its ruling,
sentenced petitioner to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years of reclusion
temporal. However, in the body of its ruling, the Court of Appeals held that "the penalty
to be imposed on [petitioner] should be (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,"14 the same penalty the trial court imposed.

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated 14
May 2003, did not admit his motion for having been filed late.15

Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:

I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED PROHIBITING

THE CUTTING, GATHERING, COLLECTING AND REMOVING TIMBER OR
OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS FROM ANY FOREST LAND APPLIES TO
PETITIONER.

II. WHETHER x x x POSSESSION OF THE NARRA TREE CUT IN PRIVATE

LAND CONTESTED BY VICAR CALIX AND PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT OSCAR
TANSIONGCO IS COVERED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.

III. WHETHER PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT CAN INITIATE THE CHARGE EVEN

WITHOUT THE STANDING AUTHORITY COMING FROM THE
INVESTIGATING FOREST OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AS MANDATED BY SECTION
80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.

[IV.] WHETHER x x x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE

OF THE CASE FILED BY PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT
THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705
AS AMENDED WHO MUST BE THE ONE TO INSTITUTE THE FILING OF THE
SAME.16

In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that
(1) the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even though Tansiongco, and not a
DENR forest officer, filed the complaint against petitioner and (2) petitioner is liable for
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

The Issues

The petition raises the following issues:17

 1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even
though it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR
forest officer; and

2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over

Criminal Case No. 2207

We sustain the OSG's claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case
No. 2207. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) list the cases
which must be initiated by a complaint filed by specified individuals,18 non-compliance of
which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying such cases.19 However, these cases
concern only defamation and other crimes against chastity20 and not to cases
concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not
prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Section 80 of PD 705 provides in
relevant parts:

SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x

Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses

defined in this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or
employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be
investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was
allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the
report or complaint.

If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the

investigating forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the
appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court. (Emphasis
supplied)

We held in People v. CFI of Quezon21 that the phrase "reports and complaints" in
Section 80 refers to "reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer
assigned to the area by other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development or any of the deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest
laws not committed in their presence."22

Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or
any of the deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in
the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the
Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation
to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report." 23 At
any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the
Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's
alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the trial court
correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within its
exclusive original jurisdiction.24

Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private

Property Without Permit

Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts25 penalized under PD 705, provides:

SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest

Products Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the
case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as
well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or
removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land without any authority;
(2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority;26 and (3) the
possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations.27 Petitioner stands charged of having "cut,
gathered, collected and removed timber or other forest products from a private
land28 without x x x the necessary permit x x x " thus his liablity, if ever, should be
limited only for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing] timber," under the
second category. Further, the prosecution evidence showed that petitioner did not
perform any acts of "gathering, collecting, or removing" but only the act of "cutting" a
lone narra tree. Hence, this case hinges on the question of whether petitioner "cut x x
xtimber" in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit.29

We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts' rulings.
On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property without a
DENR permit, petitioner adopted conflicting positions. Before his trial, petitioner
consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property
and that he did so only with Calix's permission. However, when he testified, petitioner
denied cutting the tree in question. We sustain the lower courts' rulings that petitioner's
extrajudicial admissions bind him.30 Petitioner does not explain why Royo and
Hernandez, public officials who testified under oath in their official capacities, would lie
on the stand to implicate petitioner in a serious criminal offense, not to mention that the
acts of these public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity. Further, petitioner does
not deny presenting Calix's authorization to Royo and Hernandez as his basis for cutting
the narra tree in the Mayod Property. Petitioner has no use of Calix's authorization if, as
he claimed during the trial, he did not cut any tree in the Mayod Property.

We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod Property
constitutes "timber" under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. PD 705 does not define
"timber," only "forest product" (which circuitously includes "timber.")31 Does the narra
tree in question constitute "timber" under Section 68? The closest this Court came to
defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to provide that "timber," includes "lumber"
or "processed log."32 In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with
specified dimensions33 or certain "stand age" or "rotation age."34 In Mustang Lumber,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court was faced with a similar task of having to define a
term in Section 68 of PD 705 - "lumber" - to determine whether possession of lumber is
punishable under that provision. In ruling in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should
be taken in its ordinary or common usage meaning to refer to "processed log or timber,"
thus:

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber.

While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of
Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of "Processing plant," which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination

of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials
into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp,
paper or other finished wood products.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common
usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for
the market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words

and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and
common usage meaning. And in so far as possession of timber without the
required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended,
 makes no distinction between raw and procesed timber. Neither should we. 36 x x
x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)

We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68 cannot be
taken in its common acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for building or
for carpentry or joinery."37 Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for
use as posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber. 38

Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra tree and converted the same
into "several pieces of sawn lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6 and three (3) pcs.
2x18x7 x x x consisting of 111 board feet x x x." These measurements were indicated in
the apprehension receipt Hernandez issued to petitioner on 26 January 1999 which the
prosecution introduced in evidence.39 Further, Hernandez testified that the larger portion
of the felled log left in the Mayod Property "measured 76 something centimeters [at the
big end] while the smaller end measured 65 centimeters and the length was 2.8
meters."40 Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was
"timber" fit "for building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under the ambit of
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner

Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as Qualified Theft under

Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), thus:

Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding article x x x.

Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in
this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but
the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal, as
the case may be.

2. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods,

if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not
exceed 12,000 pesos.
 3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
if the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not
exceed 6,000 pesos.

4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisión correccional in its

minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but
does not exceed 200 pesos.

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does
not exceed 50 pesos.

6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does
not exceed 5 pesos.

7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is

committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the
next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5
pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.

8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos,

when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender
shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of
earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.

The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the six pieces of lumber measuring
111 board feet were valued at P3,330. However, if the value of the log left at the Mayod
Property is included, the amount increases to P20,930.40. To prove this allegation, the
prosecution relied on Hernandez's testimony that these amounts, as stated in the
apprehension receipt he issued, are his "estimates" based on "prevailing local price." 41

This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the
penalty imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the RPC, the prosecution
must present more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. 42 In the
absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, courts may either
apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based
on the attendant circumstances of the case.43 In People v. Dator44 where, as here, the
accused was charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for
possession of lumber without permit, the prosecution's evidence for the lumber's value
consisted of an estimate made by the apprehending authorities whose apparent lack of
corroboration was compounded by the fact that the transmittal letter for the estimate
was not presented in evidence. Accordingly, we imposed on the accused the minimum
penalty under Article 309(6)45 of the RPC.46
Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC and taking into account the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, we find it proper to impose on petitioner, under the
circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correcional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated
14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals with the modification that petitioner Sesinando
Merida is sentenced to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to three (3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13298 November 19, 1918

CORNELIO RAMOS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellee.

Basilio Aromin for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, denying the registration of the larger portion of parcel No. 1
(Exhibit A of the petitioner), marked by the letters A, B, and C on the plan, Exhibit 1, of
the Government.

One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable tract of

land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882.
He took advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a possessory
information title to the land, registered as such on February 8, 1896. Parcel No. 1,
included within the limits of the possessory information title of Restituto Romero, was
sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos, the instant petitioner, and his wife Ambrosia
Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Opposition was
entered by the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good
title from the Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the
first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the objectors and excluded parcel
No. 1 from registration. So much for the facts.

As to the law, the principal argument of the Solicitor-General is based on the provisions
of the Spanish Mortgage Law and of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, commonly
known as the Maura Law. The Solicitor-General would emphasize that for land to come
under the protective ægis of the Maura Law, it must have been shown that the land was
cultivated for six years previously, and that it was not land which pertained to the "zonas
forestales." As proof that the land was, even as long ago as the years 1894 to 1896,
forestal and not agricultural in nature is the fact that there are yet found thereon trees
from 50 to 80 years of age.

We do not stop to decide this contention, although it might be possible, following the
doctrine laid down by the United States Supreme Court with reference to Mexican and
Spanish grantes within the United States, where some recital is claimed to be false, to
say that the possessory information, apparently having taken cognizance of the
requisites for title, should not now be disturbed. (Hancock vs. McKinney [1851], 7 Tex.,
192; Hornsby and Roland vs.United States [1869], 10 Wall., 224.) It is sufficient, as will
later appear, merely to notice that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least
held this tract of land under color of title.

Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended
by Act No. 1908, reads as follows:

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been
in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen
hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the
Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of
July, nineteen hundred and four, except when prevented by war or force
majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.

There are two parts to the above quoted subsection which must be discussed. The first
relates to the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
what, for present purposes, can be conceded to be agricultural public land, under a
bona fide claim of ownership.

Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of

such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. Relative to
actuality of possession, it is admitted that the petitioner has cultivated only about one
fourth of the entire tract. This is graphically portrayed by Exhibit 1 of the Government,
following:

The question at once arises: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in
the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of
land?lawphil.net

The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that
the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a
constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of
another. (Barr vs. Gratz's Heirs [1819], 4 Wheat., 213; Ellicott vs. Pearl [1836], 10 Pet.,
412; Smith vs. Gale [1892], 144 U. S., 509.) Of course, there are a number of
qualifications to the rule, one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy
with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant. It is here only
necessary to apply the general rule.

The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable,
and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the
community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment. (See arts. 446, 448, Civil
Code.) Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet
on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos
and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition
that he premises consisted of agricultural public land.
The second division of the law requires consideration of the term "agricultural public
land." The law affirms that the phrase is denied by the Act of Congress of July 1st,
1902, known as the Philippine bill. Turning to the Philippine Bill, we find in sections 13 to
18 thereof that three classes of land are mentioned. The first is variously denominated
"public land" or "public domain," the second "mineral land," and the third "timber land."
Section 18 of the Act of Congress comes nearest to a precise definition, when it makes
the determination of whether the land is more valuable for agricultural or for forest uses
the test of its character.

Although these sections of the Philippine Bill have come before the courts on numerous
occasions, what was said in the case of Jones vs. Insular Government ([1906], 6 Phil.,
122), is still true, namely: "The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to
give to them a construction that will be entirely free from objection." In the case which
gave most serious consideration to the subject (Mapa vs. Insular Government [1908],
10 Phil., 175), it was found that there does exist in the Act of Congress a definition of
the phrase "agricultural public lands." It was said that the phrase "agricultural public
lands" as used in Act No. 926 means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are
not timber or mineral lands."

The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the land is forestal or mineral
in nature and, if not so found, to consider it to be agricultural land. Here, again,
Philippine law is not very helpful. For instance, section 1820 of the Administrative Code
of 1917 provides: "For the purposes of this chapter, 'public forest' includes, except as
otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove
swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character." This definition of "public forest,"
it will be noted, is merely "for the purposes of this chapter." A little further on, section
1827 provides: "Lands in public forests, not including forest reserves, upon the
certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests
to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural
lands." With reference to the last section, there is no certification of the Director of
Forestry in the record, as to whether this land is better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes.

The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth
of trees and underbrush; a large wood." The authorities say that he word "forest" has a
significant, not an insignificant meaning, and that it does not embrace land only partly
woodland. It is a tract of land covered with trees, usually of considerable extent.
(Higgins vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 114 N. Y. Supp., 262; People vs. Long Island R.
Co. [1908], 110 N. Y. Supp., 512.)

The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is practicable or useful. B. H. Baden-
Powell, in his work on Forest Law of India, states as follows:

Every definition of a forest that can be framed for legal purposes will be found
either to exclude some cases to which the law ought to apply, or on the other
 hand, to include some with which the law ought not to interfere. It may be
necessary, for example, to take under the law a tract of perfectly barren land
which at present has neither trees, brushwood, nor grass on it, but which in the
course f time it is hoped will be "reboise;" but any definition wide enough to take
in all such lands, would also take in much that was not wanted. On the other
hand, the definition, if framed with reference to tree-growth, might (and indeed
would be almost sure to) include a garden, shrubbery, orchard, or vineyard,
which it was not designed to deal with.

B. E. Fernow, in his work on the Economics of Forestry, states as follows:

A forest in the sense in which we use the term, as an economic factor, is by no

means a mere collection of trees, but an organic whole in which all parts,
although apparently heterogeneous, jumbled together by accident as it were and
apparently unrelated, bear a close relation to each other and are as
interdependent as any other beings and conditions in nature.

The Director of Forestry of the Philippine Islands has said:

During the time of the passage of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, this
question of forest and agricultural lands was beginning to receive some attention
and it is clearly shown in section 18 of the above mentioned Act; it leaves to the
Bureau of Forestry the certification as to what lands are for agricultural or forest
uses. Although the Act states timber lands, the Bureau has in its administration
since the passage of this act construed this term to mean forest lands in the
sense of what was necessary to protect, for the public good; waste lands without
a tree have been declared more suitable for forestry in many instances in the
past. The term 'timber' as used in England and in the United States in the past
has been applied to wood suitable for construction purposes but with the
increase in civilization and the application of new methods every plant producing
wood has some useful purpose and the term timber lands is generally though of
as synonymous with forest lands or lands producing wood, or able to produce
wood, if agricultural crops on the same land will not bring the financial return that
timber will or if the same land is needed for protection purposes.

xxx xxx xxx

The laws in the United States recognize the necessity of technical advice of duly
appointed boards and leave it in the hands of these boards to decide what lands
are more valuable for forestry purposes or for agricultural purposes.

In the Philippine Islands this policy is follows to as great an extent as allowable

under the law. In many cases, in the opinion of the Bureau of Forestry, lands
without a single tree on them are considered as true forest land. For instance,
mountain sides which are too steep for cultivation under ordinary practice and
which, if cultivated, under ordinary practice would destroy the big natural
resource of the soil, by washing, is considered by this bureau as forest land and
in time would be reforested. Of course, examples exist in the Mountain Province
where steep hillsides have been terraced and intensive cultivation practiced but
even then the mountain people are very careful not to destroy forests or other
vegetative cover which they from experience have found protect their water
supply. Certain chiefs have lodged protests with the Government against other
tribes on the opposite side of the mountain cultivated by them, in order to prevent
other tribes from cutting timber or destroy cover guarding their source of water for
irrigation.

Dr. M. S. Shaler, formerly Dean of the Lawrence Scientific School, remarked that
if mankind could not devise and enforce ways dealing with the earth, which will
preserve this source of like "we must look forward to the time, remote it may be,
yet equally discernible, when out kin having wasted its great inheritance will fade
from the earth because of the ruin it has accomplished."

The method employed by the bureau of Forestry in making inspection of lands, in

order to determine whether they are more adapted for agricultural or forest
purposes by a technical and duly trained personnel on the different phases of the
conservation of natural resources, is based upon a previously prepared set of
questions in which the different characters of the land under inspection are
discussed, namely:

Slope of land: Level; moderate; steep; very steep.

Exposure: North; South; East; West.

Soil: Clay; sandy loam; sand; rocky; very rocky.

Character of soil cover: Cultivated, grass land, brush land, brush land and timber
mixed, dense forest.

If cultivated, state crops being grown and approximate number of hectares under
cultivation. (Indicate on sketch.)

For growth of what agricultural products is this land suitable?

State what portion of the tract is wooded, name of important timber species and
estimate of stand in cubic meters per hectare, diameter and percentage of each
species.

If the land is covered with timber, state whether there is public land suitable for
agriculture in vicinity, which is not covered with timber.

Is this land more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes? (State
reasons in full.)
 Is this land included or adjoining any proposed or established forest reserve or
communal forest? Description and ownership of improvements.

If the land is claimed under private ownership, give the name of the claimant, his
place of residence, and state briefly (if necessary on a separate sheet) the
grounds upon which he bases his claim.

When the inspection is made on a parcel of public land which has been applied
for, the corresponding certificate is forwarded to the Director of Lands; if it is
made on a privately claimed parcel for which the issuance of a title is requested
from the Court of Land Registration, and the inspection shows the land to be
more adapted for forest purposes, then the Director of Forestry requests the
Attorney-General to file an opposition, sending him all data collected during the
inspection and offering him the forest officer as a witness.

It should be kept in mind that the lack of personnel of this Bureau, the limited
time intervening between the notice for the trial on an expediente of land and the
day of the trial, and the difficulties in communications as well as the distance of
the land in question greatly hinder the handling of this work.

In the case of lands claimed as private property, the Director of Forestry, by

means of his delegate the examining officer, submits before the court all
evidence referring to the present forest condition of the land, so that the court
may compare them with the alleged right by the claimant. Undoubtedly, when the
claimant presents a title issued by the proper authority or evidence of his right to
the land showing that he complied with the requirements of the law, the forest
certificate does not affect him in the least as such land should not be considered
as a part of the public domain; but when the alleged right is merely that of
possession, then the public or private character of the parcel is open to
discussion and this character should be established not simply on the alleged
right of the claimant but on the sylvical condition and soil characteristics of the
land, and by comparison between this area, or different previously occupied
areas, and those areas which still preserve their primitive character.

Either way we look at this question we encounter difficulty. Indubitably, there should be
conservation of the natural resources of the Philippines. The prodigality of the
spendthrift who squanders his substance for the pleasure of the fleeting moment must
be restrained for the less spectacular but surer policy which protects Nature's wealth for
future generations. Such is the wise stand of our Government as represented by the
Director of Forestry who, with the Forester for the Government of the United States,
believes in "the control of nature's powers by man for his own good." On the other hand,
the presumption should be, in lieu of contrary proof, that land is agricultural in nature.
One very apparent reason is that it is for the good of the Philippine Islands to have the
large public domain come under private ownership. Such is the natural attitude of the
sagacious citizen.
If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the
Government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land
can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of
the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to
demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to
the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for
forest purposes. Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be,
paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on
forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for
the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts
from giving title to the claimant.

We hold that the petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for
which he asked registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act
No. 926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the
Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and his possessory information.

Judgment is reversed and the lower court shall register in the name of the applicant the
entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A, without special finding as to
costs. So ordered.
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002]

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Region
VIII, Tacloban City, Represented by Regional Executive Director Israel
C. Gaddi, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO DARAMAN, NARCISO LUCENECIO and
Hon. CLEMENTE C. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 32, Calbayog City, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized
representative may order the confiscation in favor of the government of, among others,
the vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by the said Code.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the December 6, 1995 Decision[1] and the June 3, 1996 Order[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case No. 1958.
The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused GREGORIO
DARAMAN and NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de
[o]ficio.

The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.

The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee who is taking
custody of the Holy Cross Funeral Services vehicle St. Jude, with Plate No. HAJ-848, to return
the said vehicle to the owner thereof.[3]
The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last
paragraph of the Decision regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein
respondents.

The Facts
In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with] violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277 in an
information which is quoted herein below:

That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon,
at Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, with
a total volume of 72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY NINE PESOS
(P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining any permit or
license thereforfrom the proper authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.
705, as amended and further Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea of not guilty.

Thereafter trial was conducted.

The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:

That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a Forest

Ranger. On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, while he was in his house
in Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge, Samar, a vehicle named St. Jude with Plate No. HAJ-848 coming
from barangay Blanca Aurora passed by. He stopped the said vehicle and found some lumber of
assorted sizes [and] wood shavings inside. The lumber consisted of 62 pieces of 1 x 2 x 4, 16
pieces of 1 x 24 x 2.3 and 1 piece of 1 x 2 x 4. In his estimate at the price of P10.00 per board
foot the total value of the lumber would be P729.30. He asked the driver for [the] owner of the
lumber and he was informed that it was a certain Asan of Brgy. Blanca Aurora. The driver also
informed him that the vehicle was owned by his employer, Narciso Lucenecio of the Holy Cross
Funeral Services in Calbayog City. He then took hold of the vehicle and the assorted lumber and,
thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt marked as Exhs. B and series. He also took photographs
of the lumber which are now marked as Exhs. C and series. Besides, he signed a Joint Affidavit
with Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest Ranger. When he asked the driver Gregorio Daraman for
some papers for the assorted lumber, the latter replied that he had none because they were not
his. Daraman further told him that [they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood
shavings from the furniture shop owned by Asanand Asan merely asked him a favor of loading
his assorted lumbers in the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought to his
(Asans) house in BarangayAbrero, Calbayog City.

The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag, but both the
prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony considering that the case
would be merely corroborative [of] those already offered by Pablo Opinion. The prosecution
rested its case with the admission of Exhs. A and B and their series. Its Exhs. C and series were
rejected because the photographer who took them did not testify to identify [them].

For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused would merely
offer corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following facts have been established:

That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer Baby Lucenecio instructed him to
procure some wood shavings (sinapyo) in San Jorge, Samar. He used the service vehicle of the
Holy Cross Funeral Services. His companion[s] were Melio Bedoya,
Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol. They went to barangay Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar and
thereat, they got some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by a certain Asan Abing.
They loaded 20 sacks of wood shavings, each sack measuring 22 inches in height by 32 1/2
inches in circumference as he demonstrated in court. The wood shavings [were] being used by
the Holy Cross Funeral Services as cushions in the coffin. After the 20 sacks of wood shavings
were loaded, Asan Abing asked him a favor to bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to his house
in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the Holy Cross Funeral Services [was] also
located. Asan himself personally loaded his assorted lumber into the vehicle. The subject
assorted lumber were already in the furniture shop where they got the wood shavings. On their
way home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao, Pablo Opinion stopped him and took the wood
shavings. Opinion also inquired about the assorted lumber and he told him that they were owned
by Asan, owner of the furniture shop in Brgy. Blanca Aurora, who loaded them in his vehicle to
be brought to his (Asans) house in Barangay Obrero, Calbayog City. He told Opinion also
that Asanadvised him that if somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to tell the person
that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him in his furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca Aurora,
San Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead impounded the
vehicle together with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, the vehicle was
still not returned to him and so Gregorio Daraman left and returned to his employer
at Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City and told the latter about what happened.[4]
After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed
vehicle to Lucenecio.
 Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-
CENRO) of Catbalogan, Samar conducted administrative confiscation proceedings on
the seized lumber and vehicle in the presence of private respondents. [5] The two failed
to present documents to show the legality of their possession and transportation of the
lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the
Regional Executive Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and
conveyance.[6] Atty. Pastor C. Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January 26, 1994,
concurring with the recommendation to forfeit the lumber and the vehicle seized from
private respondents. The Memorandum was approved by RED Augustus
L. Momongan and Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the DENR, Region
VIII, Tacloban City.[7]
Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the
reconsideration of the assailed Decision, only insofar as it ordered the return of the said
vehicle to the owner thereof.[8] He contended that the vehicle had already been
administratively confiscated by the DENR on December 2, 1993, and that the RED
approved its forfeiture on January 26, 1994.[9] He further claimed that the DENR had
exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance, which had been used in violation of the
Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277.
The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence.
The unrebutted testimony of Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood
shavings from Asan, the former agreed to take the lumber to the latters house
in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross Funeral Services office was also
located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers showing the
authorization for the lumber were in the formers shop in Barangay Blanca Aurora.
Finding the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise insufficient, the RTC
considered the vehicle as an effect of the crime and ordered its delivery to him.
In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration was
untenable on procedural and substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Feliciano Aguilar did not sign the Motion, the RTC deemed his silence a sign
of his disapproval of the Motion.
Substantively, the trial court ruled:
x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as found by the Court
the owner of the vehicle in question, St. Jude, which is the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor owned by
accused Narciso Lucenecio, did not commit any violation of P.D. 705. Likewise, the prosecution
failed to sufficiently establish that accused Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept control of the
lumber subject of the motion which would thereby demonstrate that he had x x x possession of
the subject forest products. Instead, as established by the evidence it was a certain Asan who
owned the subject lumber. xxx.
 xxx xxx xxx

The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same has long become
final and executory.

Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings conducted by the OIC
DENR Officer Marciano Talavera of Samar on December 2, 1992, the lumber in question [was]
found to be owned by Asan Abing. But notwithstanding this fact, for reasons not known to the
Court, the said Asan Abing was never made an accused in the present case.

Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle is himself a
violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to have conspired with any other persons who committed
the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented to the use of his vehicle in violating the said
law. In the present case as shown by the evidence, neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or its
owner accused Narciso Lucenecio has committed a violation of P.D. 705 as already declared by
the Court in its decision of December 6, 1995 nor the driver, accused Gregorio Daraman. In fact
both were declared acquitted of the violation charged, and the decision has not been appealed.[10]
Hence, this Petition.[11]

Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts
consideration:

(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order x x x the return
of property already owned by the government.

(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the provisions of

Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.

(C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by reason of mistake,
error or failure of its officers to perform their duties.[12]
Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the
confiscated vehicle; (2) whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and
(3) whether, as a result of its filing of the criminal action, petitioner is estopped from
confiscating the vehicle administratively.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle
 Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the
return of the disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already become government
property by virtue of the forfeiture Order issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The
DENR secretary or his duly authorized representative, under Section 68-A of PD 705 as
amended by EO 277, may order the confiscation and disposition of all conveyances --
by land, water or air -- used in illegally cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or
abandoning forest products.
We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.[13] A comparison of the
provisions of the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the
jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or forest products as well as
the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the
confiscation of forest products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission
of the offense. Section 68 reads:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: x x x.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products
are found.[14]
Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:

SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest
laws rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order
the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the
offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on
the matter.[15]
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its literal
meaning and applied without resort to interpretation, on the presumption that its wording
correctly expresses its intent or will. The courts may not construe it differently. [16]
Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the industrial
arts;[17] equipment covers physical facilities available for production, including buildings,
machineries and tools;[18] and implements pertains to whatever may supply a want,
especially an instrument, tool or utensil.[19] These terms do not
include conveyances that are specifically covered by Section 68-A. The implementing
guidelines of Section 68-A define conveyance in a manner that includes any type or
class of vehicle, craft, whether motorized or not, used either in land, water or air, or a
combination thereof or any mode of transport used in the movement of any forest
product.[20]
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of all
conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same is vested in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) secretary or a duly authorized representative. The DENR secretary has
supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and
wildlife laws, rules and regulations.[21]
To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No. 54-
93, amending Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides
the guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in
violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed to
private respondents to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess
seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, x x x without first securing and
obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, x x x. The
Information did not contain any allegation pertaining to the transportation or conveyance
of illegally cut, gathered, possessed or abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of
PD 705, as amended.

Confiscation Without Due Process

Private respondents main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex C) is a
false, falsified and perjurious document. The Order was attached to and made part of
the record only when petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated February 6,
1996, or only after the trial court rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner made it
appear, according to the private respondents, that RED Momongan had approved the
Memorandum on January 26, 1994. This does not appear to be true because
Atty. Marmita, officer-in-charge (OIC) of the DENR Legal Division of Tacloban City,
signed the Memorandum recommending approval only on January 31, 1994.
Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch 32)
ordered the provincial environment and natural resources officer to transfer the
confiscated vehicle and pieces of lumber in connection with the prosecution of Criminal
Case 1958.[22] Reynaldo R. Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his office could not deliver the vehicle because
it was not in running condition.[23]
We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls
outside the ambit of the review of the assailed Decision and Order. The basis for the
assailed Order to release the vehicle was private respondents acquittal of the charge of
violating Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture Order issued by the DENR was
based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and separate matter cognizable by it.
Petitioner is questioning only the RTCs jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release
the confiscated vehicle. Private respondents have not appealed the DENRsOrder of
Forfeiture, the validity of which can thus be presumed.[24] The genuineness of the Order
and its proper service upon them are factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this
Court, which is not a trier of facts.[25]
The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in the
main limited to reviewing legal errors committed by a lower court.[26] Under PD 705, the
actions and the decisions of the DENR are reviewable by the courts only through
special civil actions for certiorari or prohibition.[27]

Second Issue:
Construing PD 705, as Amended
Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section 68-
A, PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the
violator or was a conspirator with other violators of that law. Department Order No. 54,
Series of 1993, provides that the proceedings for the confiscation and the forfeiture of
the conveyance shall be directed against its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its
illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture.
In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section 68-A of
PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law
or conspired with other persons who violated it or consented to the use of his or her
vehicle in violating it. Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have
violated PD 705, and their acquittals were not appealed.
We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal
case is immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation,
movement or conveyance of forest products without legal documents. The DENR
secretary or the authorized representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction; thus,
they are not capable of making such a ruling, which is properly a function of the courts.
Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that
authority.
Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts the confiscation of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws. Hence, we
cannot expect the DENR to rule on the criminal liability of the accused before it
impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A covers only the movement of lumber or forest
products without proper documents. Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation is
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an
injustice.[28]
We also uphold petitioners argument that the release of the vehicle to private
respondents would defeat the purpose and undermine the implementation of forestry
laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the urgency to conserve
the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit of the present and future
generations. Our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected only
through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws. [29] Strong
paramount public policy should not be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that
frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably restrict its scope.[30]

Third Issue:
Estoppel
In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve petitioners
third issue. It is no longer material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to
hold that the assistant provincial prosecutors failure to comment on petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration was an implied disapproval thereof. The public prosecutors
disapproval does not vest in the trial court the jurisdiction or authority to release the
vehicle to private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996]

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief,
Special Actions and Investigation Division, DENR, respondents.

[G.R. No. 106424. June 18, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TERESITA DIZON-
CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and
RI CHUY PO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 123784. June 18, 1996]

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY.
VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation Division,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), ATTY.
NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA,
JR., respondents.
 DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally
assigned to the Second and Third Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were
subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of the Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna
Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo
de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the
Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-
092590-0469. Its permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A.
Robles were, during all the time material to these cases, the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the
Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches,
shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct
surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw
coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded
with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver
could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the
truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas
Avenue, Quezon City.[1] The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because
of the refusal of the owner.[2]
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive
Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioners lumberyard
four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra
lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.[3]
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner 's lumberyard in
Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because
the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber
origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the
invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin. [4]
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner
retains the physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is
taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from
disposing them until further orders.[5]
 On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an
extension of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the required documents
covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber
origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied the motion on the
ground that the documents being required from the petitioner must accompany the
lumber or forest products placed under seizure.[6]
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to
Secretary Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of
Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard and resaw
mill and possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the
required documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the
truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the
DENR compound in the event its owner fails to submit documents showing
legitimacy of the source of said lumber within ten days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber
Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal possession of
narra and almaciga lumber and shorts if and when recommendation no. 2
pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV-458 as well as the
lumber loaded therein for transport lumber using recycled documents. [7]
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the
petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner
to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be
cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing
the latter that the petitioner had already secured the required documents and was ready
to submit them. None, however, was submitted.[8]
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting the
events which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered CONFISCATED in
favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law the approximately
311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside
the petitioner's lumberyard.[9]
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order or preliminary injunction
against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The case
(hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and
assigned to Branch 35 o the said court. The petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure
on 1 April 1990, without any search and seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck with
Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and
lauan of different sizes and dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the
orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing and of
3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting
upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of 1990, a team of
DENR agents went to the business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan
Luna Street, Tondo, Manila. The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber
dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had already been suspended on 23 April
1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was open, the team went inside and
saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the team
was informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the petitioner's
customer. It also came upon the sales invoice covering the transaction. The members of
the team then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to
be the wife of the petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was
then out of town. The team's photographer was able to take photographs of the
stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting
machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber. The team
thereupon effected a constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan
lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt therefor.[10]
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter,
the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned to
Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint
against the petitioner's president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate preliminary
investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a
resolution[11] whose dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed

against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber
consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of
Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.

It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs covered by
legal documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa.[12]
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III,
who served as Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging.[13]
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ
with Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the information
reads as follows:
 That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within
the premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his possession truckloads
of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations.[14]
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision [15] in the
FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:

1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio
S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation in favor of the
Government the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and
almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and seized from the
lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside
and vacated, and instead the respondents are required to report and bring to
the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCJR,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and
almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with as directed by law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate action
before the proper court regarding the lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted
sizes and dimensions loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322
which were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990
shall be rendered functus oficio upon compliance by the respondents with
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment;
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the lauan, supa and almaciga
lumber, shorts and sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
judgment be returned to said petitioner, is withheld in this case until after the
proper court has taken cognizance and determined how those lumber, shorts
and sticks should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and
seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the
petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of
lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not
offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be supported by a valid
warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where
warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle.[16] As to
the seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected
on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a continuation of that
made the previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant
issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even
question.[17] And, although the search warrant did not specifically mention almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that the
executing officer is not required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of
the search.[18]
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990
ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for the reason
that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive
Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with the directive in
the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial court
ruled that the same had been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the
petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner admitted
in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the
Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to
Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a) the
information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed to timber,
is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even
granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same may
not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure;
and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL
CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of the
seizure, raises a prejudicial question.[19]
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section 68
of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and possession thereof without the required legal
documents is penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order
No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that
exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to
minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest
resources.[20]
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, [21] respondent Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the
ground that "possession of lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws
and regulations is not a crime."[22]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October
1991,[23] the People filed a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424,
wherein it contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.
 On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision [24] in CA-G.R. SP
No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the
FIRST CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As to the
claim that the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law punishing
the possession of lumber, and that lumber is not timber whose possession without the
required legal documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of
Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product
involved has always been foisted by those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate
business of lumber dealership. But what is important to consider is that when appellant
was required to present the valid documents showing its acquisition and lawful
possession of the lumber in question, it failed to present any despite the period of
extension granted to it.[25]
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution of 3 March 1992.[26] Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by
way of a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was filed on 2 May
1992.[27]
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a decision in
the SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition because
(a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies; (b) when the seizure was
made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its license
was still under suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No.
705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was justified as a warrantless search and seizure
under Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed
the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.
In its decision[28] of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's
appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied
upon by the trial court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the definition
of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the
market," and by the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood,
esp. when suitable or adapted for various building purposes," the respondent Court held
that since wood is included in the definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No.
705, as amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the term forest
product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can seize
the forest product involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to
Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in part as follows:

SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or
any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall arrest even without
warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses
defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools
and equipment used in committing the offense, or the forest products cut, gathered or taken by
the offender in the process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are the
cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products or possession
of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in
the resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February
1996 a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. 106424 with which the
other two were consolidated.

G.R. No. 106424

The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91
on the ground that it does not charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong
granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in the CRIMINAL
CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68
of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof without the required legal
documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may
be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It
has been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the sufficiency of the
averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, constitute the elements of the offense,[29] and matters aliunde will not be
considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:

SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well
as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found.
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of
timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority;
and (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex
gratia that this omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage,
do the facts averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation
of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion
that lumber is not solely its subject matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged
to be in the possession of the private respondent, without the required legal documents,
are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.
The almaciga and lauan specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as lumber.
They cannot refer to the lumber in no. (2) because they are separated by the words
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. with the conjunction and, and not with the preposition of.
They must then be raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under Section 3(q)
of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:

SEC. 3. Definitions.
xxx xxx xxx

(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil,
honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the
associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geological resources in forest
lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The
public and the private respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the
information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items
therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the
information validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting opinion
that this Court go beyond the four corners of the information for enlightenment as to
whether the information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and
the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that only lumber has been envisioned
in the indictment.
 The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the rule
that only the facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law violated must be
considered in determining whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his
conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman
Belleng, which is one of the annexes he referred to,[30] cannot lead one to infer that what
the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4)
truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber,
and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited wood species. (Italics supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution[31] of the investigating
prosecutor, which served as the basis for the filing of the information, does not limit itself
to lumber; thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed

against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of
almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD
705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.(Italics supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an
affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the
coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof
without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules
that such possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the
term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While
the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the
latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of Processing plant;
which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the
processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard,
block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In
the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for the market. [32] Simply put,
lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning.[33] And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw
or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distanguit nec nos distinguere
debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion
to quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said case.

G.R. No. 104988

We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to show
that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29
November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No.
CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied with
the required invoices and transport documents.The seizure of such truck and its cargo
was a valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section
80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was
conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted without a
search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
constitutional mandate[34] that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable
cause. The other exceptions are (1) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure
of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless
search.[35]
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and
by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge
Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime
of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object
or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the
following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one
day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following day,
provided it is still within the ten-day period.[36]
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession
of lumber without the required legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, since lumber is neither specified therein nor included in the
term forest product, the same hardly merits further discussion in view of our ruling in
G.R. No. 106424.

G.R. No. 123784

 The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpably fail to
show prima facie that a reversible error has been committed by the Court of Appeals in
its challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need to
require the respondents to comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the judgment
of the trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that
its lumber-dealer's license or permit had been suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23
April 1990. The suspension was never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of
up to 25 September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or
otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his authorized
representative had the authority to seize the lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows:

Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws,
rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative may order the
confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned. .
..
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must
also fail in view of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No.
106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which
involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the violation of the suspension of
the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than rituals to
cover up blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No.
705), as amended. They are presumably trifling attempts to block the serious efforts of
the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the commendation of the public
in light of the urgent need to take firm and decisive action against despoilers of our
forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to the generations to come, if not the
present, an inheritance of parched earth incapable of sustaining life.The Government
must not tire in its vigilance to protect the environment by prosecuting without fear or
favor any person who dares to violate our laws for the utilization and protection of our
forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and
ANNULLING, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the
challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October 1991 of respondent
Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled People of
the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po; (c) REINSTATING the information in the said
criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING the respondent Judge on her successor
to hear and decide the case with purposeful dispatch; and
 2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter
failure of the petitioner to show that the respondent Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error in the challenged decisions of 29 November
1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of 31 July
1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 in the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

ERNESTO AQUINO, G.R. No. 165448

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 27, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 5 June 1997 Decision[2] and 24
September 2004 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.
The Antecedent Facts

On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the
Teachers Camp in Baguio City. The trees, which had a total volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were
to be used for the repairs of Teachers Camp.
On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of members from the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng
(Cuteng), a forest ranger of the Forest Section of the Office of the City Architect and Parks
Superintendent of Baguio City, conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut.

Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing the
cutting of 14 trees under the following terms and conditions:

2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by the permittee;

3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140) pine
seedlings in an appropriate place within the area. In the absence of
plantable area in the property, the same is required to plant within forest
area duly designated by CENRO concerned which shall be properly
maintained and protected to ensure/enhance growth and development of
the planted seedlings;

4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under Section 68 of

PD 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987; and

5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or violations of forestry

laws and regulations shall render this permit null and void without
prejudice to the imposition of penalties in accordance with existing laws
and regulations.

This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days from issuance
hereof or as soon as the herein authorized volume is exhausted whichever comes
first.[4]

On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepea, Daniel Salamo, Pablo
Guinawan, Antonio Abellera, and Forester Paul Apilis received information that pine trees were
being cut at Teachers Camp without proper authority. They proceeded to the site where they
found Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising the
cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and Mike Masing
(Masing) on the site, together with Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew Nacatab (Nacatab),
who were also supervising the cutting of the trees. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out
of which only 12 were covered by the permit. The volume of the trees cut with permit was 13.58
cubic meters while the volume of the trees cut without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The
market value of the trees cut without permit was P182,447.20, and the forest charges
were P11,833.25.
An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705[5] (PD 705) was filed
against petitioner, Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago, as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent thereto, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another,
and without any authority, license or permit, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously cut nine (9) pine trees with a total volume and market
price as P182,447.20 (Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and unit price P26.00 bd.
ft.) and with a total forest charge of P11,833.25 or having a total sum
of P194,280.45 at Teachers Camp, Baguio City, without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, particularly the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 05, Series of 1989, in violation
of the aforecited law.[6]
Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he was not given a copy
of the permit. Masing stated that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of petitioner who
claimed to be in possession of the necessary permit. He stated that three of the trees were stumps
about four or five feet high and were not fit for lumber. He stated that while he was cutting trees,
petitioner and Salinas were present.

Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioners supervision. He stated that petitioner was in
possession of the permit. He stated that he cut 10 trees, six of which were cut into lumber while
two were stumps and two were rotten.

Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired as sawyers and they merely
followed petitioners instructions.

Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees to be cut before the permit
was issued. He stated that the trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.

Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers Camp on 13 July 1993 and he saw Santiago and
Masing cutting down the trees in petitioners presence.

Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers Camp. He
allegedly informed his superior, Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the
permit. However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity
map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the
overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were accompanied by
three other men.
The Decision of the Trial Court

In its 26 May 1994 Decision,[7] the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 (trial court),
ruled as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused ERNESTO AQUINO y
ESTIPULAR, MICHAEL CUTENG y LESCAO and BENEDICTO SANTIAGO
y DOCLES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby
sentences EACH of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS
of prision correccional, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government in the
amounts of P182,477.20 and P11,833.25, representing the market value of and
forest charges on the Benguet pine trees cut without permit; and to pay their
proportionate shares in the costs.

The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is hereby declared forfeited
in favor of the Government.

On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y DODOY and MIKE
MASING y GANAS are acquitted on reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio, and
the cash bonds they deposited for their provisional liberty in the amount
of P7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos. 139605 and 139646, dated February 4, 1996
and February 23, 1994, respectively, are ordered released to them upon proper
receipt therefor.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the allowed number of the trees authorized to be
cut. The trial court further ruled that the cutting of trees went beyond the period stated in the
permit.

Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial courts Decision.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 5 June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. The accused-

appellants Benedicto Santiago and Michael Cuteng are hereby acquitted on
reasonable doubt. The appellant Ernesto Aquino is found guilty, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award of damages is deleted. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.[9]
The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the CENRO, DENR, petitioner had
the duty to supervise the cutting of trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied with the terms
of the permit which only he possessed. The Court of Appeals ruled that while it was Teachers
Camp which hired the sawyers, petitioner had control over their acts. The Court of Appeals
rejected petitioners claim that he was restrained from taking a bolder action by his fear of
Santiago because petitioner could have informed his superiors but he did not do so. The Court of
Appeals further rejected petitioners contention that the law contemplated cutting of trees without
permit, while in this case there was a permit for cutting down the trees. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the trees which were cut by the sawyers were not covered by the permit.

The Court of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not sufficiently proven. As such, the Court of
Appeals found that the prosecution failed to prove Cutengs guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
Court of Appeals likewise acquitted Santiago because he was only following orders as to which
trees to cut and he did not have a copy of the permit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24 September 2004 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 68 of PD 705.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied because petitioner only raises
questions of facts and not questions of law. We do not agree.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.[10] For questions to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.[11] The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.[12]

In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of PD 705.

Section 68 of PD 705 provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest

Products Without License.-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
 timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case
of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens,
they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on
the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest

products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority; and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal

documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.[13]

The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise
the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed
the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the
cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers Camp for repairs.Petitioner could not
likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-accused were
acquitted of the charges against them.

Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting
trees more than what was covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could
have informed his superiors if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only
make petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section
68 of PD 705.

Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as he is not
an officer of a partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or
collection, or is in possession of the pine trees.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5 June 1997 Decision and 24
September 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534. Petitioner
Ernesto Aquino is ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree
No. 705. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-44649 April 15, 1988

DAYLINDA A. LAGUA, MANUEL P. LAGUA, HONORATO ACHANZAR and

RESTITUTO DONGA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Davao City, Branch I, CONSTANCIO MAGLANA and the
EASTCOAST DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISES, respondents.

Wilfred D. Asis for petitioner.

Carlos A. Carbonilla for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for damages which was
instituted by the petitioners against the private respondents for closing a logging road
without authority.

In their complaint, the petitioners, alleged, among others:

In Paragraph 5(a):

a) On 1 January 1976, Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel for

defendants, issued a memorandum to the Chief Security Guard of
Defendant Eastcoast directing the latter to prevent the passage of Plaintiff
Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with logs for the Japanese vessel (there
were no other trucks hauling logs at that time) on the national highway
loading towards where the vessel was berthed. In compliance with this
directive, the security force of Defendant Eastcoast closed the road to the
use by plaintiffs trucks and other equipments and effectively prevented
their passage thereof while the vehicles and trucks of other people were
curiously not disturbed and were allowed passess on the same road. It
resulted that the loading of logs on the M/S "Kyofuku Maru" was
discontinued. A xeroxed copy of this Nombrado memorandum, the original
of which is however in the possession of defendants, is hereto attached as
Annex "C" and made an integral part hereof.

In Paragraph 5(b):
 b) Upon representations made to Indalecio L. Aspiras, Acting Station
Officer-in-Charge, BFD Lambajon Forest Station, and in response to
plaintiff Laguas' complaint, a letter dated 2 January 1976 was addressed
by Aspiras to the Resident Manager of Defendant Eastcoast with
instructions to open and allow Plaintiff Laguas' trucks and machineries to
pass that road closed to them (but not to others) by Defendant Eastcoast.
A xeroxed copy of this letter is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made a
part hereof. Accordingly, Sagrado Constantino, Resident Manager of
Defendant Eastcoast, issued an order to their Chief Security Guard for the
latter to comply with the Aspiras letter. These events, however, took the
whole day of 2 January 1976 so that notwithstanding the lifting of the road
closure no hauling of logs could be made by Plaintiff Laguas on that day.

In Paragraph 5(c):

c) When Plaintiffs Laguas were already resuming the hauling operations of

their logs towards the Japanese Vessel on 3 January 1976, again that
same road, only the day before ordered by the BFD to be opened for use
and passage by plaintiffs, was closed to them by Defendant Eastcoast's
security men upon a radio message order of Defendant Maglana. Even
the vessel M/S "Kyofuku Maruwas" ordered by Defendant Maglana to
untie her anchor contrary to existing laws, rules and regulations of the
Bureau of Customs and the Philippine Coastguard. A xeroxed copy of the
Maglana message, the original of which is in the possession of the
defendants, is hereto attached as Annex "E" and made an integral part
hereof.

And in paragraph 5(d):

d) Given no recourse in the face of the blatant and illegal closure of the
road in defiance of BFD orders to the contrary by the Defendant Eastcoast
through the order of Defendant Maglana, Plaintiff Laguas had to depart
postpaste to Mati, Davao Oriental, from Baganga where the shipment and
the road closure were made, to seek the assistance of the PC thereat.
Thus on 5 January 1976, Provincial Commander Alfonso Lumebao issued
a directive to the PC Detachment Commander at Baganga to lift the illegal
checkpoint made by defendants. A xeroxed copy of this directive is hereto
attached as Annex "F" and made a part hereof. (Rollo, pp. 57-58)

The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, namely: (1) lack of
jurisdiction, and (2) lack of cause of action.

The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners
arose out of the legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast Development Enterprises,
Inc., rights as a timber licensee, more particularly in the use of its logging roads,
therefore, the resolution of this question is properly and legally within the Bureau of
Forest Development, citing as authority Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705. The private
respondents also argued that petitioner Daylinda Laguas has no capacity to sue as her
name was not registered as an "agent" or "dealer" of logs in the Bureau of Forestry.

On August 3, 1976, the trial court issued the questioned order dismissing the petitioners'
complaint on the basis of the abovementioned grounds. It ruled:

The Court agrees with the defendants that under the law, the Bureau of
Forest Development has the exclusive power to regulate the use of
logging road and to determine whether their use is in violation of laws.
Since the damages claimed to have been sustained by the plaintiffs arose
from the alleged illegal closure of a logging road — in the language of the
defendants on page 3 of their motion to dismiss. The simple fact is there
was an illegal closure of the national highway affecting the private rights of
the plaintiffs who sustained damages and losses as a consequence
thereof — the question whether or not the road was illegally closed must
first be determined by the Bureau of Forest Development. If the said
Bureau finds that the road was legally closed, an action for damages may
be filed in Court. Otherwise, no civil action would prosper, for there would
be no tortious act. (Rollo, pp. 58-69).

xxx xxx xxx

After the logging road was closed for the first time, more so after the
second time, by the defendant Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc.,
the plaintiffs should have asked the Bureau of Forest Development to
determine the legality or illegality of the closure since they wanted to file,
as they did file, an action for damages based on the alleged illegal
closure. The fact that the letter of January 2, 1976, directed defendant
Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc. to open the road does not
necessarily mean that the Bureau of Forest Development had found that
the closure was illegal. There must be a positive finding that the closure
was illegal. ... (Rollo, p. 60)

xxx xxx xxx

As an attorney-in-fact, Daylinda A. Lagua is not entitled to, and cannot

cannot claim, damages in her personal capacity. For she could not have
sustained damages as a result of the alleged illegal closure of the road in
her personal capacity while acting in her representative capacity. So if she
and her husband sustained damages, it must have been because their
legal rights were violated by a tortious act committed by the defendants
other than the alleged illegal closure of the road. But as stated elsewhere
in this order, even the plaintiffs admit that the damages they claimed to
have sustained arose from the alleged illegal closure of the logging road.
Assuming, however, that another tortious act violated the legal rights of
 the Laguas, still they could not joint Achanzar and Donga in this complaint
for there would be misjoinder of parties. (Rollo, pp. 61-62)

Hence, this petition for mandamus which we will treat as a petition for certiorari in the
interest of justice.

The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular courts have
jurisdiction over the same. According to them, the respondent court had no basis for
holding that the Bureau of Forestry Development must first determine that the closure of
a logging road is illegal before an action for damages can be instituted.

We agree.

P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power
in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a
logging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an
action for damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the
petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging
road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of
the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents. This should
appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and
authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a
passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such
closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Forest Development. As we have held in Ateneo de Manila University v. Court of
appeals (145 SCRA 100, 110):

The issue in this court was whether or not the private respondents can
recover damages as a result of the of their son from the petitioner
university. This is a purely legal question and nothing of an a
administrative nature is to or can be done (Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9
SCRA 230; Tapales v. University of the Philippines, 7 SCRA 533; Limoico
v. Board of Administrators. (PJA) 133 SCRA 43; Malabanan v. Ramonte,
129 SCRA 359). The case was brought pursuant to the law on damages
provided in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try the case belongs to the
civil courts.

The private respondents, in their memorandum filed with the respondent court, alleged
that the logs of petitioner Achanzar were cut down and removed outside of the area
granted to the latter under his Private Timber License No. 2 and therefore inside the
concession area of respondent company's Timber License Agreement. This, apparently,
was the reason why the respondent company denied to the petitioners the use of the
logging road. If we hold the respondents to their contention that the Bureau of Forest
Development has the power and authority not only to regulate the use or blockade of
logging roads but also to exclusively determine the legality of a closure of such roads,
why then did they take it upon themselves to initially close the disputed logging road
before taking up the matter with the Bureau and why did they close it again
notwithstanding the Bureau's order to open it after the petitioners had duly informed the
said Bureau of the closure? To use the Bureau's authority which the respondents
ignored to now defeat the court's jurisdiction would be totally unacceptable. We,
therefore, find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Anent the legal capacity to sue of the petitioners, spouses Laguas, we affirm the trial
court's ruling that since they were mere agents of petitioners Achanzar and Donga and
were suing in their own behalf, they did not have the capacity to sue for damages. They
are not the real parties in interest. However, the complaint can still be maintained. It
cannot be dismissed because the real parties in interest, Achanzar and Donga were
also plaintiffs. Thus, the trial court should have ordered only the dropping of the names
of the spouses Laguas pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court but
not the dismissal of the complaint.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

questioned order of the respondent court is SET ASIDE and this case is ordered
remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983

WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO THE

SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y.
FELICIANO, respondents-appelllees,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND N ATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respon dents-
appellees,RAVAGO COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO HAPPICK and ATANACIO
MALLARI, intervenors,

Camito V Pelianco Jr. for petitioner-appellant.

Solicitor General for respondent Director.

Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent Ravago Comm'l Co.

Anacleto Badoy for respondent Atanacio Mallari.

Mariano de Joya, Jr. for respondent Jorge Lao Happick, Jr.

MAKASIAR, J:
This is an appeal from the order dated January 20, 1965 of the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch VII, in Civil Case No. 56813, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (p. 2. rec.), which
dismissed the petition of petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan on the ground that
it does not state a sufficient cause of action, and upon the respondents-appellees'
(Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources and the Director of Forestry) motion to
dismiss (p. 28, rec.).

Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for
public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales,
provided tenders were received on or before May 22, 1961 (p. 15, CFI rec.). This public
forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval
Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the
United States Government to the Philippine Government (P. 99, CFI rec.).

On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application

in due form after paying the necessary fees and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine
other applicants submitted their offers before the deadline (p. 29, rec.).

Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared as a forest
reserve or allow the same to be awarded to the most qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961,
then President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of
Forestry, which read as follows:

It is desired that the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation be

made a forest reserve for watershed purposes. Prepare and submit
immediately a draft of a proclamation establishing the said area as a
watershed forest reserve for Olongapo, Zambales. It is also desired that
the bids received by the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of the timber
license in the area during the public bidding conducted last May 22, 1961
be rejected in order that the area may be reserved as above stated. ...

(SGD.
)
CARL
OS P.
GARC
IA

(pp. 98, CFI rec.).

On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources

sustained the findings and re comendations of the Director of Forestry who concluded
that "it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is made available for
exploitation under certain conditions," and
We quote:

Respectfully forwarded to the honorable, the Executive Secretary

Malacanang. Manila inviting particular attention to the comment and
recommendation of the Director of Forestry in the proceeding in
indorsement in which this Of fice fully concurs.

The observations of responsible forest officials are most revealing of their

zeal to promote forest conservation and watershed protection especially in
Olongapo, Zambales area. In convincing fashion, they have demonstrated
that to declare the forest area involved as a forest reserve ratify than open
it for timber exploitation under license and regulation would do more harm
than of to the public interest. To convert the area into a forest reserve
without an adequate forest protection force, would make of it a 'Free Zone
and Logging Paradise,' to the ever 'Problem Loggers' of Dinalupihan,
Bataan . . . an open target of timber smugglers, kaingineros and other
forms of forest vandals and despoilers. On the other hand, to award the
area, as planned, to a reputable and responsible licensee who shall
conduct logging operations therein under the selective logging method
and who shall be obliged to employ a sufficient number of forest guards to
patrol and protect the forest consecration and watershed protection.

Worthy of mention is the fact that the Bureau of Forestry had already
conducted a public bidding to determine the most qualified bidder to whom
the area advertised should be awarded. Needless to stress, the decision
of the Director of Forestry to dispose of the area thusly was arrived at after
much thought and deliberation and after having been convinced that to do
so would not adversely affect the watershed in that sector. The result of
the bidding only have to be announced. To be sure, some of the
participating bidders like Mr. Edgardo Pascual, went to much expense in
the hope of winning a virgin forest concession. To suddenly make a turn
about of this decision without strong justifiable grounds, would cause the
Bureau of Forestry and this Office no end of embarrassment.

In view of the foregoing, it is earnestly urged that the Director of Forestry

be allowed to proceed with the announcement of the results of the bidding
for the subject forest area (p. 13, CFI rec.).

The Office of the President in its 4th Indorsement dated February 2, 1962, signed by
Atty. Juan Cancio, Acting Legal Officer, "respectfully returned to the Honorable
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources for appropriate
action," the papers subject of Forestry Notice No. 2087 which was referred to the
Bureau of Forestry for decision (p. 14, CFI rec.).

Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to herein
petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of
Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against this award, bidders Ravago Commercial Company
and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the
Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963.

On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M.
Gozon — who succeeded Secretary Cesar M. Fortich in office — issued General
Memorandum Order No. 46, series of 1963, pertinent portions of which state:

xxx xxx xxx

SUBJECT: ... ... ...

(D)elegation of authority to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber

licenses.

1. ... ... ...

2. The Director of Forestry is hereby authorized to grant (a) new ordinary

timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000
hectares each; and (be the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas
not exceeding 5,000 hectares each;

3. This Order shall take effect immediately (p. 267, CFI rec.).

Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting secretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources, replacing secretary Benjamin M. Gozon. Upon assumption of office
he Immediately promulgate on December 19, 19b3 General memorandum Order No.
60, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry, under General
Memorandum order No. 46, to grant ordinary timber licenses, which order took effect on
the same day, December 19, 1963. Pertinent portions of the said Order read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order No 46 dated May

30, 1963 —

1. In order to acquaint the undersigned with the volume and Nature of the
work of the Department, the authority delegated to the Director of forestry
under General Memorandum Order No. 46, dated May 30, 1963, to grant
(a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not
more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber
licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares each is hereby
revoked. Until further notice, the issuance of' new licenses , including
amendments thereto, shall be signed by the secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.
 2. This Order shall take effect immediately and all other previous orders,
directives, circulars, memoranda, rules and regulations inconsistent with
this Order are hereby revoked (p. 268, CFl rec.; Emphasis supplied).

On the same date that the above-quoted memorandum took effect, December 19, 1963,
Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) dated April 22, 1963, in the name of
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Estanislao R.
Bernal without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On
January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Office of the Director of Forestry (p.
30, CFI rec.; p. 77, rec.). It was not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources as required by Order No. 60 aforequoted.

On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be considered by tile Natural Resources
praying that, pending resolution of the appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company
and Jorge Lao Happick from the order of the Director of Forestry denying their motion
for reconsideration, OTI No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or
revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to
existing forestry laws, rules and regulations.

On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by Ravago Commercial

Company, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated an order
declaring Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons
Tan, as having been issued by the Director of Forestry without authority, and is
therefore void ab initio. The dispositive portion of said order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office is of the opinion and so

holds that O.T. License No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan
should be, as hereby it is, REVOKED AND DECLARED without force and
effect whatsoever from the issuance thereof.

The Director of Forestry is hereby directed to stop the logging operations

of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, if there be any, in the area in question and
shall see to it that the appellee shall not introduce any further
improvements thereon pending the disposition of the appeals filed by
Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge lao Happick in this case" (pp.
30-31, CFI rec.).

Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion in an Order dated March 25,
1964, wherein this paragraph appears:

In this connection, it has been observed by the Acting Director of Forestry

in his 2nd indorsement of February 12, 1964, that the area in question
composes of water basin overlooking Olongapo, including the proposed
Olongapo watershed Reservation; and that the United States as well as
 the Bureau of Forestry has earmarked this entire watershed for a
watershed pilot forest for experiment treatment Concerning erosion and
water conservation and flood control in relation to wise utilization of the
forest, denudation, shifting cultivation, increase or decrease of crop
harvest of agricultural areas influenced by the watershed, etc. .... (pp.
3839, CFI rec.; p. 78, rec.).

On April 11, 1964, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, acting on the
separate appeals filed by Jorge Lao Happick and Ravago Commercial Company, from
the order of the Director of Forestry dated April 15, 1963, awarding to Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan the area under Notive No. 2087, and rejecting the proposals of the other
applicants covering the same area, promulgated an order commenting that in view of
the observations of the Director of Forestry just quoted, "to grant the area in question to
any of the parties herein, would undoubtedly adversely affect public interest which is
paramount to private interests," and concluding that, "for this reason, this Office is of the
opinion and so holds, that without the necessity of discussing the appeals of the herein
appellants, the said appeals should be, as hereby they are, dismissed and this case is
considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is concerned" (p. 78, rec.).

On April 18, 1964, on the basis of the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, petitioner-appellant filed the instant
case before tile court a quo (Court of First Instance, Manila), Special Civil Action No.
56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory
injunction (pp. 1-12, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant claims that the respondents-
appellees "unlawfully, illegally whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted without or in
excess of their jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and
existing timber license without just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the equal
protection of the laws, by depriving him of his constitutional right to property without due
process of law, and in effect, by impairing the obligation of contracts" (P. 6, CFI rec.).
Petitioner-appellant prayed for judgment making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction against the respondents- appellees; declaring the orders of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources dated March 9, March 25, and April 11, 1964, as well
as all his acts and those of the Director of Forestry implementing said orders, and all the
proceedings in connection therewith, null and void, unlawful and of no force and effect;
ordering the Director of Forestry to renew OTI No. 20-'64 upon expiration, and
sentencing the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the petitioner-appellant the
sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.000) by way of pecuniary damage,
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) by way of moral and exemplary
damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000-00) as attorney's fees and costs. The
respondents-appellees separately filed oppositions to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, Ravago Commercial Company, Jorge Lao, Happick and Atanacio
Mallari, presented petitions for intervention which were granted, and they too opposed
the writ.

The Director of Forestry in his motion to dismiss dated April 24, 1964, alleges the
following grounds: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction; (2) that the respondents may not
be sued without their consent; (3) that the petitioner has not exhausted all available
administrative remedies; (4) that the petition does not state a cause of action; and (5)
that purely administrative and discretionary functions of administrative officials may not
be interfered with by the courts. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
joined the motion to dismiss when in his answer of May 18, 1964, he avers the following
special and affirmative defenses: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the
action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; (2) that the petitioner has no cause of
action; (3) that venue is improperly laid; (4) that the State is immune from suit without its
consent; (5) that the court has no power to interfere in purely administrative functions;
and (6) that the cancellation of petitioner's license was dictated by public policy (pp.
172-177, rec.). Intervenors also filed their respective answers in intervention with
special and affirmative defenses (pp. 78-79, rec.). A hearing was held on the petition for
the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, wherein evidence was submitted by all the
parties including the intervenors, and extensive discussion was held both orally and in
writing.

After the said hearing, on January 20, 1965, the court a quo, from the evidence
received, resolved not only the question on the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction but also the motion to dismiss, declared that the petition did not state a
sufficient cause of action, and dismissed the same accordingly. To justify such action,
the trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, stated that "the court feels that the
evidence presented and the extensive discussion on the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction should also be taken into consideration
in resolving not only this question but also the motion to dismiss, because there is no
reason to believe that the parties will change their stand, arguments and evidence" (p.
478, CFI rec.). His motion for reconsideration having been denied (p. 488, CFI rec.),
petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan appealed directly to this Court.

Petitioner-appellant now comes before this Court, claiming that the trial court erred in:

(1) holding that the petition does not state a sufficient cause of action: and

(2) dismissing the petition [p.27,rec. ].

He argues that the sole issue in the present case is, whether or not the facts in the
petition constitute a sufficient cause of action (p. 31, rec.). Petitioner-appellant, in his
brief, presented a lengthy discussion on the definition of the term cause of action
wherein he contended that the three essential elements thereon, — namely, the legal
right of the plaintiff, the correlative obligation of the defendants and the act or omission
of the defendant in violation of that right — are satisfied in the averments of this petition
(pp. 31-32, rec.). He invoked the rule that when the ground for dismissal is that the
complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the facts
alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider other
matters aliunde He further invoked the rule that in a motion to dismiss based on
insufficiency of cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint are deemed
hypothetically admitted for the purpose of the motion (pp. 32-33, rec.).

A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner-appellant's contentions are
untenable. As already observed, this case was presented to the trial court upon a
motion to dismiss for failure of the petition to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted (Rule 16 [g], Revised Rules of Court), on the ground that the timber license
relied upon by the petitioner- appellant in his petition was issued by the Director of
Forestry without authority and is therefore void ab initio. This motion supplanted the
general demurrer in an action at law and, as a rule admits, for the purpose of the
motion, ail facts which are well pleaded however while the court must accept as true all
well pleaded facts, the motion does not admit allegations of which the court will take
judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply to legally impossible facts, nor to
facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document
included in the pleadings to be unfounded (Vol. 1, Moran's Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1970 ed., p. 505, citing cases).

It must be noted that there was a hearing held in the instant case wherein answers were
interposed and evidence introduced. In the course of the hearing, petitioner-appellant
had the opportunity to introduce evidence in support of tile allegations iii his petition,
which he readily availed of. Consequently, he is estopped from invoking the rule that to
determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a motion to dismiss, only the facts
alleged in the complaint must be considered. If there were no hearing held, as in the
case of Cohen vs. U.S. CCA Minn 1942,129 F. 2d 733), "where the case was presented
to District Court upon a motion to dismiss because of alleged failure of complaint to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and no answer was interposed and no
evidence introduced, the only facts which the court could properly consider in passing
upon the motion were those facts appearing in the complaint, supplemented be such
facts as the court judicially knew.

In Llanto vs. Ali Dimaporo, et al. (16 SCRA 601, March 31, 1966), this Court, thru
Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, held that the trial court can properly dismiss a complaint
on a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action even without a hearing, by taking
into consideration the discussion in said motion and the opposition thereto. Pertinent
portion of said decision is hereby quoted:

Respondents moved to dismiss. Ground therefor is lack of cause of action.

The Court below granted the motion, dismissed the petition. The motion to
reconsider failed. Offshoot is this appeal.

1. The threshold questions are these: Was the dismissal

order issued without any hearing on the motion to dismiss?
Is it void?

WE go to the record. The motion to dismiss was filed on February 1, 1961

and set for hearing on February 10 following. On February 8, 1961
 petitioner's counsel telegraphed the court, (r)equest postponement motion
dismissal till written opposition filed.' He did not appear at the scheduled
hearing. But on March 4, 1961, he followed up his wire, with his written
opposition to the motion to dismiss. Adverting to the 5-page motion to
dismiss and the 6-page opposition thereto, We find that the arguments pro
and con on the question of the board's power to abolish petitioner's
position to discussed the problem said profusely cited authorities. The
May 15, 1961 8-page court order recited at length the said arguments and
concluded that petitioner made no case.

One good reason for the statutory requirement of hearing on a motion as

to enable the suitors to adduce evidence in support of their opposing
claims. But here the motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of
action. Existence of a cause of action or lack of it is determined be a
reference to the facts averred in the challenged pleading. The question
raised in the motion is purely one of law. This legal issue was fully
discussed in said motion and the opposition thereto. In this posture, oral
arguments on the motion are reduced to an unnecessary ceremony and
should be overlooked. And, correctly so, because the other intendment of
the law in requiring hearing on a motion, i.e., 'to avoid surprises upon the
opposite party and to give to the latter time to study and meet the
arguments of the motion,' has been sufficiently met. And then, courts do
not exalt form over substance (Emphasis supplied).

Furthermore even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion to dismiss
for- insufficiency of cause of action will be granted if documentary evidence admitted by
stipulation disclosing facts sufficient to defeat the claim enabled the court to go beyond
disclosure in the complaint (LOCALS No. 1470, No. 1469, and No. 1512 of the
International Longshoremen's Association vs. Southern Pacific Co., 6 Fed. Rules
Service, p. 107; U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Dec. 7, 1952; 131 F. 2d
605). Thus, although the evidence of the parties were presented on the question of
granting or denying petitioner-appellant's application for a writ of preliminary injunction,
the trial court correctly applied said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss.
Moreover, in applying said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss, the trial
court, in its order dismissing the petition, pointed out that, "there is no reason to believe
that the parties will change their stand, arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.).
Petitioner-appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, nor presented new
arguments in his motion for reconsideration (pp. 482-484, CFI rec.). This omission
means conformity to said observation, and a waiver of his right to object, estopping him
from raising this question for the first time on appeal. " I question not raised in the trial
court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal" (Matienzo vs. Servidad, Sept. 10,
1981, 107 SCRA 276).

Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground for asking
dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, its sufficiency must be
determined only from the allegations in the complaint. "The rules of procedure are not to
be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help
secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their
aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in importance are made
to override the ends of justice; the technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice
of the substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced" (Vol. 1,
Francisco, Civil Procedure, 2 ed., 1973, p. 157, citing cases).

What more can be of greater importance than the interest of the public at large, more
particularly the welfare of the inhabitants of Olongapo City and Zambales province,
whose lives and properties are directly and immediately imperilled by forest denudation.

The area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license practically comprises the

entire Olongapo watershed (p. 265, CFI rec.). It is of public knowledge that watersheds
serves as a defense against soil erosion and guarantees the steady supply of water. As
a matter of general policy, the Philippine Constitution expressly mandated the
conservation and proper utilization of natural resources, which includes the country's
watershed. Watersheds in the Philippines had been subjected to rampant abusive
treatment due to various unscientific and destructive land use practices. Once lush
watersheds were wantonly deforested due to uncontrolled timber cutting by licensed
concessionaries and illegal loggers. This is one reason why, in paragraph 27.of the
rules and regulations included in the ordinary timber license it is stated:

The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the
discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to
expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require (Exh. D, p. 22,
CFI rec.).

Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case, We therefore take
judicial notice of the fact that, on April 30, 1964, the area covered by petitioner-
appellant's timber license has been established as the Olongapo Watershed Forest
Reserve by virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 238 by then President Diosdado
Macapagal which in parts read as follows:

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1824 of the Revised Administrative

Code, as amended, 1, Diosdado Macapagal, President of the Philippines
do hereby withdraw from entry, sale, or settlement and establish as
Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve for watershed, soil protection, and
timber production purposes, subject to private rights, if any there be, under
the administration and control of the Director of Forestry, xx the following
parcels of land of the public domain situated in the municipality of
Olongapo, province of Zambales, described in the Bureau of Forestry map
No. FR-132, to wit: ... ... (60 O.G. No. 23, 3198).

Petitioner-appellant relies on Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) for his alleged
right over the timber concession in question. He argues thus: "The facts alleged in the
petition show: (1) the legal right of the petitioner to log in the area covered by his timber
license; (2) the legal or corresponding obligation on the part of the respondents to give
effect, recognize and respect the very timber license they issued to the petitioner; and
(3) the act of the respondents in arbitrarily revoking the timber license of the petitioner
without giving him his day in court and in preventing him from using and enjoying the
timber license issued to him in the regular course of official business" (p. 32, rec.).

In the light of petitioner-appellant's arguments, it is readily seen that the whole

controversy hinges on the validity or invalidity of his timber license.

WE fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner- appellant's timber
license was signed and released without authority by then Acting Director Estanislao R.
Bernal of Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio. WE hereby quote such findings:

In the first place, in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30,
1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new ordinary
timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more than
3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner
contained 6,420 hectares (Exhs. 2-A and 2-B Ravago, embodied in Annex
B; Exh. B). The petitioner contends that only 1,756 hectares of the said
area contain commercial and operable forest; the authority given to the
Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license of not more
than 3,000 hectares does not state that the whole area should be
commercial and operable forest. It should be taken into consideration that
the 1,756 hectares containing commercial and operable forest must have
been distributed in the whole area of 6,420 hectares. Besides the license
states, 'Please see attached sketch and technical description,' gives an
area of 6,420 hectares and does not state what is the area covered of
commmercial and operable forest (Exh. Ravago Also Annex B of the
petition, which was marked as Exhibit B, states:

Under Notice No. 2087, a tract of public forest containing

6,420 hectares located in Olongapo, Zambales was declared
available for timber utilization and development. Pursuant to
this Notice, there were received bid proposals from the
following persons: ...

Wherefore, confirming the findings of said Committee, the area described

in Notice No. 2087 shall be awarded, as it is hereby awarded to
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, subject to the following conditions: ... ...

In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the
Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any license. The
license was signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on December 19,
1963, and released to the petitioner on January 6, 1964 (Exh. RavaGo
The authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary
timber license was contained in general memorandum order No. 46 dated
 May 30, 1963. This was revoked by general memorandum order No. 60,
which was promulgated on December 19, 1963. In view thereof, the
Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on
January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore void ab initio (pp. 479480,
CFI rec.).

The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was
ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of the Director of Forestry
was revoked. But, what is of greatest importance is the date of the release or issuance,
and not the date of the signing of the license. While petitioner-appellant's timber license
might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was released only on January 6,
1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee. As pointed out by the trial
court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on
January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under
such void license. This is evident on the face of his petition as supplemented by its
annexes which includes Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW). Thus, in the case
of World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs. Macrohon, et al. (105 Phil. 250, Feb. 28,
1959), this Court held that if from the face of the complaint, as supplemented by its
annexes, plaintiff is not the owner, or entitled to the properties it claims to have been
levied upon and sold at public auction by the defendants and for which it now seeks
indemnity, the said complaint does not give plaintiff any right of action against the
defendants. In the same case, this Court further held that, in acting on a motion to
dismiss, the court cannot separate the complaint from its annexes where it clearly
appears that the claim of the plaintiff to be the A owner of the properties in question is
predicated on said annexes. Accordingly, petitioner-appellant's petition must be
dismissed due to lack of cause of action.

II

Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that he has exhausted all his administrative
remedies to no avail as respondents-appellees have failed, neglected, refused and
continue to refuse to allow petitioner-appellant to continue operation in the area covered
by his timber license. He further alleged that he has neither recourse by way of appeal,
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru
this special civil action, as the last official act of the respondent-appellee Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in declaring void the timber license referred to above
after denying petitioner-appellant's motion for reconsideration, is the last administrative
act. Petitioner-appellant relies on the case of Demaisip vs. The Court of Appeals, et al.
(106 Phil. 237, Sept. 24, 1959), wherein it was held that the failure of the plaintiff to
appeal from the adverse decision of the Secretary to the President cannot preclude the
plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department
is merely an alter-ego of the President. The presumption is that the action of the
Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved
by the latter (Villena vs. the Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451; p. 7, CFI rec.).
To this We cannot agree. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who
issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation,
and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the
President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-
appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part
to exhaust his administrative remedies. Thus, this Court, in the case of Calo vs. Fuertes
(5 SCRA 399, 400, June 29, 1962), held that:

At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President and his acts or
decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the
decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and that, such being the
case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands he had
exhausted the administrative remedies, is untenable.

The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is

tantamount to not appealing all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because
the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an
administrative case.

In 1912, in the case of Lamb vs. Phipps (22 Phil. 491-92, July 22, 1912), this Court
stressed the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, thus:

When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the
executive department of the government the courts will not interfere until
at least that remedy has been exhausted. Jao Igco vs. Shuster, 10 Phil.
Rep. 448; Ekiu vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 651; U.S. vs. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161;
U.S. vs. Ju Toy 198 U.S. 253; Chill Yow vs. U.S., 28 Sup. Ct. Rep.
201). The administrative remedies afforded by law must first be exhausted
before resort can be had to the courts, especially when the administrative
remedies are by law exclusive and final. Some matters and some
questions are by law delegated entirely and absolutely to the discretion of
particular branches of the executive department of the government. When
the law confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive
department of the government to dispose of particular questions, their
judgments or the judgments of that particular department are no more
reviewable by the courts than the final judgment or decisions of the courts
are subject to be reviewed and modified by them" (emphasis supplied).

Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove
that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy (Diego vs. The Court of Appeals, et
al., 54 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956). In the case at bar, petitioner- appellant's speedy and
adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the Philippines.
Accordingly, "it is settled to the point of being elementary that the only question involved
n certiorari is jurisdiction, either want of jurisdiction or excess thereof, and abuse of
discretion shall warrant the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari when the
same is so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law" FS Divinagracia Agro-Commercial Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 191 [April .1, 1981]). The foregoing is on the
assumption that there is any irregularity, albeit there is none in the acts or omissions of
the respondents-appellees. certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time and
again by this Court (People vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465), "it being a time honored
and well known principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party must first exhaust
the administrative remedies available" (Garcia vs. Teehankee, 27 SCRA 944, April 18,
1969).

Moreover, from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
complained of, petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appealing
therefrom to the Chief Executive. In other words, before filing the present action for
certiorari in the court below, they should have availed of this administrative remedy and
their failure to do so must be deemed fatal to their case [Calo vs. Fuertes, et al., G.R.
No. L-16537, June 29,1962]. To place petitioners' case beyond the pale of this rule, they
must show that their case falls — which it does not — within the cases where, in
accordance with our decisions, the aggrieved party need not exhaust administrative
remedies within his reach in the ordinary course of the law [Tapales vs. The President
and the Board of Regents of the U.P., G.R. No. L-17532, March 30, 1963; Mangubat vs.
Osmena, G.R. No. L- 12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio vs. Hon. Jose Rodriguez, G. R. No.
L-11078, May 27, 1959; Pascual vs. Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-11959, Oct. 31, 1959;
Marinduque Iron Mines, etc. vs. Secretary of Public Works, G.R. No. L-15982, May 31,
1963; Alzate vs. Aldaba, G.R. No. L-14407, Feb. 29, 1960 and Demaisip vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L- 13000, Sept. 25, 1959] (Ganob vs. Ramas, 27 SCRA 1178, April
28, 1969).

III

Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also
failed to note that his action is a suit against the State which, under the doctrine of State
immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued
Kawananakoa vs. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349; Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152; Sec. 16, Art. XV,
1973 Constitution).

The respondents-appellees, in revoking the petitioner-appellant's timber license, were

acting within the scope of their authority. Petitioner-appellant contends that "this case is
not a suit against the State but an application of a sound principle of law whereby
administrative decisions or actuations may be reviewed by the courts as a protection
afforded the citizens against oppression" (p. 122, CFI rec.). But, piercing the shard of
his contention, We find that petitioner-appellant's action is just an attempt to circumvent
the rule establishing State exemption from suits. He cannot use that principle of law to
profit at the expense and prejudice of the State and its citizens. The promotion of public
welfare and the protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are property, rights
and interest of the State. Accordingly, "the rule establishing State exeraiption from suits
may not be circumvented by directing the action against the officers of the State instead
of against the State itself. In such cases the State's immunity may be validly invoked
against the action as long as it can be shown that the suit really affects the property,
rights, or interests of the State and not merely those of the officer nominally made party
defendant" (SINCO, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 35; Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil.
724; see also Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-
10943-44, Dec. 28, 1957, 102 Phil. 789, 800-802; Mobil PhiL vs. Customs Arrastre
Service, 18 SCRA 1120, 1121-1125; Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing
Employees' Association, 1 SCRA 340, 341, 343).

Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry
acted in their capacity as officers of the State, representatives of the sovereign authority
discharging governmental powers. A private individual cannot issue a timber license.

Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner-appellant would result in the

government losing a substantial part of its timber resources. This being the case,
petitioner-appellant's action cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be
sued.

IV

Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-

appellees can validly revoke his timber license. As pointed out earlier, paragraph 27 of
the rules and regulations included in the ordinary timber license states: "The terms and
conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of
Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public
interests so require" (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.). A timber license is an instrument by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the
due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this ceise

"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is
not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create
a vested right; nor is it taxation" (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin 54 O.G. 7576). In the case of Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal
(56 Phil. 123), it was held that:

A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not

property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of
 law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when public interests so
require.

The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed
of to defeat the proper exercise of police power (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs.
Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968). The State has inherent power
enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society (Edu vs.
Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct. 24,1970).

As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to the authority of
the Director of Forestry. The utilization and disposition of forest resources is directly
under the control and supervision of the Director of Forestry. However, "while Section
1831 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut,
gathered and removed from any forest only upon license from the Director of Forestry, it
is no less true that as a subordinate officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to the
control of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(See. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in
the exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer" (Director of Forestry vs.
Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 5, 1981). The power of control of the Department Head
over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts of
subordinate officials (Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31, 1969; Montano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144,
147-148). Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources has the authority to revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the
Director of Forestry. There being supporting evidence, the revocation of petitioner-
appellant's timber license was a wise exercise of the power of the respondent- appellee
(Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid.

Thus, "this Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources,
as corollary to which the alleged right to them of private individuals or entities was
meticulously inquired into and more often than not rejected. We do so again" (Director
of Forestry vs. Benedicto, supra). WE reiterate Our fidelity to the basic policy of
conserving the national patrimony as ordained by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED FROM

IS HEREBY .AFFIRMED IN TOTO. COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

SO ORDERED,
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. WILSON B. QUE, accused-
appellant.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705[1] as amended by Executive Order (E.O.)
277.[2]
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a
member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a
ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will
pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task
Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in
Laoag City.[3]
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1
Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted
themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes
later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed
the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.[4]
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-
appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified accused-appellant
as the owner of the truck and the cargo.[5]
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When
interviewed, accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted
in between the coconut slabs.[6]
SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the Cargos supporting documents,
specifically: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3)
auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger
regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. Accused-appellant failed to present any of
these documents. All he could show was a certification[7] from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he
legally acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate transport of
the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.[8]
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force
at the provincial capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the members of the
Provincial Task Force that there were sawn lumber under the coconut slabs. [9]
At 10:00 oclock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force, together
with three CENRO personnel examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the
cargo consisted of coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were
piled at the sides of the truck, concealing the tanguile lumber. [10] When the CENRO
personnel inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they counted two hundred
fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79
cubic meters) and total assessed value of P93,232.50.[11]
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court
of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The
Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of
gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession,
control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn lumber
(Species of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic
meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit,
license or authority to do so from the proper authorities, thus violating the aforecited
provision of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the
258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the
private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa[13] and Elpidio Sabal.[14] The PLTP
authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by
the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by th
PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as
payment for his hauling services.[15]
Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as
evidence against him. He contended that they were fruits of an illegal search and
seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua. It also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck
owned by accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision[16] states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B. Que guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277 and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law. The bail bond filed for
the provisional liberty of the accused is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and the ten-
wheeler truck bearing plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the commission of the
crime are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in
accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of errors: [18]
 1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD705 as
amended by EO 277 for possessing timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations on the
ground that since it is only in EO No. 277 where for the first time mere
possession of timber was criminalized, there are no existing forest laws and
regulations which required certain legal documents for possession of timber and
other forest products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional
rights of accused against unlawful searches and seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional
rights of accused under custodial investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be convicted for
violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to
penalize the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession
legal. Neither did the other forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its
enactment.
Appellants argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705
provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations,
the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without
further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber
or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber
or forest products are found. (emphasis supplied)
Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations to refer to those
laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O.
277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory
construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to
refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest
products.DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents
required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the
Administrative Order provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.
Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood, veneer, non-
timber forest products and wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities shall be
covered with appropriate Certificates of Origin, issued by authorized DENR officials, as
specified in the succeeding sections.
xxx

3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be accompanied
by a CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly
authorized representative which has jurisdiction over the processing plant producing the
said lumber or the lumber firm authorized to deal in such commodities. In order to be
valid, the CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or delivery receipt, and in
case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.
xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present any
certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court found:
xxx
xxx When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could not present
a single document to justify his possession of the subject lumber.xxx
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices, he readily
showed documents to justify his possession of the coconut slabs.Thus, he showed a
certification issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO,
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a xerox copy of the original certificate of title
covering the parcel of land where the coconut slabs were cut. (Exhibit "F")
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:
THIS IS TO
CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to be transported by Mr.
Wilson Que on board truck bearing Plate No. PAD 548were derived from
matured coconut palms gathered inside the private land of Miss Bonifacia
Collado under OCT No. P-11614 (8) located at Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira,
Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson Que for the
purpose of facilitating the transportation of said coconut slabs from Sanchez
Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid up to March
11, 1994 or upon discharge of its cargoes at its final destination, whichever
comes first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR to
transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The
accused was apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his
truck bearing plate number PAD-548 which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but
with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from the
outside. The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs
which were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very much
aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not
secure one and, therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the same in such a manner
that they could not be seen by police authorities by merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated March 3, 1994
addressed to the OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the
CENRO that he would be transporting the subject lumber on March 7, 1994 from
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the
reason that he did not need a permit to transport the subject lumber. (Exhibit 8, 8-A)
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on March 4,
1994, the court has doubts that this was duly filed with the concerned office. According
to the accused, he filed the letter in the morning of March 4 and returned in the
afternoon of the same day. He was then informed by an employee of the CENRO
whom he did not identify that he did not need a permit to transport the lumber because
the lumber would be for personal used (sic) and x x came from PLTP. (Ibid) The letter-
request was returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the stance of the
accused. Documents or other papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a
government agency are not returned. Hence, when a person files or submits any
document to a government agency, the agency gets the original copy. The filer only
gets a duplicate copy to show that he has filed such document with the
agency. Moreover, his avoidance as regards the identity of the employee of the CENRO
who allegedly returned the letter-request to him also creates doubts on his stance. Thus,
on cross-examination, the accused, when asked about the identity of the employee of
the CENRO who returned the letter-request to him answered that he could recognize
the person x x but they were already reshuffled. (TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one
point, the accused also said that he did not know if that person was an employee of the
DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this letter-request,
to wit:
xxx
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in view of the
fact that I am hauling and transporting my own lumber for my own needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate of transport
agreement. Why then, if he was telling the truth, did he not take this letter with him
when he transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted source.[19]
xxx
Accused-appellants possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly
constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
We also reject appellants argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal
forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the
cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are two
(2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the
authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial
whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or
not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates
the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because
E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the
proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized
lumber are inadmissible in evidence for being fruits of a poisonous tree. Appellant avers
that these pieces of lumber were obtained in violation of his constitutional right against
unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right to counsel.
We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized by
this court in People vs. Bagista,[20] thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no
person shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his
residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The
basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the
aforementioned right shall, among others, be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
 The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search
had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that
the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause.When a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to
be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause
to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to
a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search
appellants truck. A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a
reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with
illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the
Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the
ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos
Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there
were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the
lumbers supporting documents, accused-appellant could not present any. The foregoing
circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the
extensive search of appellants truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of
tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to
prove the guilt of accused-appellant.
The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether appellants
right to counsel under custodial investigation was violated. The Resolution of the issue
will not affect the finding of guilt of appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED. Costs Against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and G.R. No. 175289

ANIANO LATAYADA,
Petitioners, Present:
 CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. August 31, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest laws and regulations makes
one automatically liable of violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,[1] as
amended. Lack of criminal intent is not a valid defense.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the June 28, 2005 Decision[2] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 which affirmed in all respects the Judgment[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Cagayan De Oro City, finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended. Likewise assailed in this
petition is the September 22, 2006 Resolution[4]denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[5]

Factual Antecedents

In a Criminal Complaint[6] filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan de
Oro City by Marcelino B. Pioquinto (Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement
Unit under the TL Strike Force Team of Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria
(Sudaria) of Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac),
were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.[7]

Subsequently, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a
Resolution[8] dated March 13, 1996 recommending the filing of an Information for the aforesaid charge
not only against Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac but also against petitioner Crisostomo Villarin (Villarin),
then Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City. The dismissal of the complaint against
Sudaria was likewise recommended.Said Resolution was then approved by the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao through a Resolution[9] dated May 9, 1996 ordering the filing of the Information
in the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City.

Thus, on October 29, 1996, an Information[10] was filed against petitioners Villarin and Latayada
and their co-accused Baillo and Boyatac, for violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as follows:
 That on or about January 13, 1996, in Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, pursuant to RA 7975, the
accused, Crisostomo Villarin, a public officer being the Barangay Captain of Pagalungan,
this City, with salary grade below 27, taking advantage of his official position and
committing the offense in relation to his office, and the other above-named accused, all
private individuals, namely: Marlon Baillo, Cipriano Boyatac, and Aniano Latayada,
confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously gather and possess sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of varying sizes
belonging to the Apitong specie with a total volume of Four Thousand Three Hundred
Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued at P108,150.00, without any authority and
supporting documents as required under existing forest laws and regulation to the
damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]

On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.[12] They
alleged that the Joint Affidavit[13]of the personnel of the DENR which became one of the bases in filing
the Information never mentioned Villarin as one of the perpetrators of the crime while the accusations
against Baillo and Boyatac were not based on the personal knowledge of the affiants. They also asserted
that their indictment was based on polluted sources, consisting of the sworn statements of witnesses like
Latayada and Sudaria, who both appeared to have participated in the commission of the crime charged.
Instead of resolving the Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC, in its Order[14] dated January 27,
1997, directed Villarin, Boyatac, and Baillo to file their Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, it being the entity which filed the Information in Court. On March 31, 1997,
only Villarin filed a Petition for Reinvestigation[15] but same was, however, denied by the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao in an Order[16] dated May 15, 1997 because the grounds relied upon were not
based on newly discovered evidence or errors of fact, law or irregularities that are prejudicial to the
interest of the movants, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 07 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman in Criminal Cases. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao likewise opined that
Villarin was directly implicated by Latayada, his co-accused.

The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who entered separate pleas of not
guilty.[17] Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

On December 31, 1995, at around five oclock in the afternoon, prosecution witness Roland Granada
(Granada) noticed that a public utility jeep loaded with timber stopped near his house. The driver,
petitioner Latayada, was accompanied by four to five other persons, one of whom was Boyatac while the
rest could not be identified by Granada.[18] They alighted from the jeep and unloaded the timber 10 to 15
meters away from the Batinay bridge at Barangay Pagalungan, Cagayan De Oro City. Another
prosecution witness, Pastor Pansacala (Pansacala), also noticed the jeep with plate number MBB 226 and
owned by Sudaria, loaded with timber.[19] Being then the president of a community-based organization
which serves as a watchdog of illegal cutting of trees,[20] Pansacala even ordered a certain Mario Bael to
count the timber.[21]

At six oclock in the evening of the same day, Barangay Captain Angeles Alarcon (Alarcon)[22] noticed
that the pile of timber was already placed near the bridge. Since she had no knowledge of any scheduled
repair of the Batinay bridge she was surprised to discover that the timber would be used for the
repair. After inquiring from the people living near the bridge, she learned that Latayada and Boyatac
delivered the timber.[23]

Another prosecution witness, Ariel Palanga (Palanga), testified that at seven oclock in the
morning of January 1, 1996, Boyatac bought a stick of cigarette from his store and requested him to cover
the pile of timber near the bridge for a fee. Palanga acceded and covered the pile with coconut leaves.[24]

On January 13, 1996, at around ten oclock in the morning, prosecution witness Juan Casenas (Casenas), a
radio and TV personality of RMN-TV8, took footages of the timber[25] hidden and covered by coconut
leaves. Casenas also took footages of more logs inside a bodega at the other side of the bridge.In the
following evening, the footages were shown in a news program on television.

On the same day, members of the DENR Region 10 Strike Force Team measured the timber which
consisted of 63 pieces of Apitong flitches and determined that it totaled 4,326 board feet[26] and
subsequently entrusted the same to Alarcon for safekeeping.

Upon further investigation, it was learned that the timber was requisitioned by Villarin, who was
then Barangay Captain of Pagulangan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarin gave Sudaria the specifications for
the requisitioned timber. Thereafter, Boyatac informed Villarin that the timber was already delivered on
December 31, 1995.[27]

On January 18, 1996, Felix Vera Cruz (Vera Cruz), a security guard at the DENR Region 10 Office,
received and signed for the confiscated timber since the property custodian at that time was not around.

The filing of the aforestated Information followed.

The Version of the Defense

In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-an, Tuburan and Taglinao,
all in Cagayan De Oro City, Villarin, decided to repair the impassable Batinay bridge. The project was
allegedly with the concurrence of the Barangay Council.

Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin commissioned Boyatac to inquire from
Sudaria about the availability of timber without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for the
specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and Boyatac to attend to the same.When the
timber was already available, it was transported from Tagpangi to Batinay. However, the timber flitches
were seized by the DENR Strike Force Team and taken to its office where they were received by Vera
Cruz, the security guard on duty.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Memorandum filed before the trial court, the defense notified the court of Boyatacs
demise.[28] However, the trial court did not act on such notice.Instead, it proceeded to rule on the
culpability of Boyatac. Thus, in its Judgment, the trial court found herein petitioners and the deceased
Boyatac guilty as charged. On the other hand, it found the evidence against Baillo insufficient. The
dispositive portion of the Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, judgment is hereby rendered

finding the accused Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as
amended, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

Accused Marlon Baillo is hereby acquitted for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.[29]

In reaching said conclusions, the RTC noted that:

Without an iota of doubt, accused Crisostomo Villarin, being then a Barangay Captain of
Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City, was the one who procured the subject flitches, while
accused Aniano Latayada and Cipriano Boyatac mutually helped him and each other by
transporting the flitches from Sitio Batinay to the Pagalungan Bridge. The accused would
like to impress upon the Court that the subject fltiches were intended for the repair of
the Pagalungan Bridge and were acquired by virtue of Barangay Resolution No. 110 of
Barangay Pagalungan. The Court is not impressed by this lame excuse. There is no
dispute that the flitches were intended for the repair of the bridge. The Court finds it a
laudable motive. The fact remains though that the said forest products were obtained
without the necessary authority and legal documents required under existing forest laws
and regulations.[30]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[31] which was denied by the

RTC in its Order[32] dated August 20, 2002.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners filed an appeal which was denied by the CA in its Decision dated June 28, 2005. The
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the court a quo finding
[d]efendant-[a]ppellants Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree 705 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to cost.
 SO ORDERED.[33]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34] which the appellate court denied for lack of
merit in its Resolution[35] promulgated on September 22, 2006.

Issues

Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE] MATTER OF

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION[,] DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD WITH
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT;

2. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM

WHAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALWAYS BEEN SAYING, THAT, TO
CONVICT AN ACCUSED ALL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME MUST BE
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT and;

3. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] IN AFFIRMING THE

PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE COURT A QUO[,] DEPARTED FROM
JURISPRUDENCE THAT EVEN IN CRIMES [INVOLVING] VIOLATION OF
SPECIAL LAWS[,] SPECIAL CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT [CAN BE CONSIDERED AS MITIGATING HAD
THE VIOLATION BEEN PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
IN ORDER TO REDUCE PENALTY].[36]

Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation is tantamount to a denial
of the right to due process. As Villarin was indicted in the Information despite his not being included in
the criminal complaint filed by Pioquinto of the TL Strike Force Team of the DENR, they claim that he
was not afforded a preliminary investigation. They also bewail the fact that persons who appear to be
equally guilty, such as Sudaria, have not been included in the Information. Hence, they argue that the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition for reinvestigation because it
deprived Villarin of his right to preliminary investigation and in refusing and to equally prosecute the
guilty. They contend that the Ombudsman should not have relied on the prosecutors
Certification[37] contained in the Information to the effect that a preliminary investigation was conducted
in the case.

Moreover, petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt since they had no intention to possess the timber and dispose of it for personal
gain. They likewise claim that there was failure on the part of the prosecution to present the timber, which
were the object of the offense.

Our Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.

Villarin was properly afforded his right to due process.

Records show that the investigating prosecutor received a criminal complaint charging Sudaria, Latayada,
Baillo and Boyatac with violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.[38] The said complaint did
not state the known addresses of the accused. Neither was the notarized joint-affidavit of the complainants
attached thereto. The subpoena issued to the accused and the copy of their counter-affidavits were also
not part of the record. Moreover, the complaint did not include Villarin as a respondent. However, said
infirmities do not constitute denial of due process particularly on the part of Villarin.

It is evidently clear from the Resolution dated March 13, 1996 of the Office of the City
Prosecutor that Villarin and all the accused participated in the scheduled preliminary investigation that
was conducted prior to the filing of the criminal case.[39] They knew about the filing of the complaint and
even denied any involvement in the illegal cutting of timber. They were also given the opportunity to
submit countervailing evidence to convince the investigating prosecutor of their innocence.

Foregoing findings considered, there is no factual basis to the assertion that Villarin was not
afforded a preliminary investigation. Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in denying Villarins motion for reconsideration. It validly relied on
the certification contained in the Information that a preliminary investigation was properly conducted in
this case. The certification was made under oath by no less than the public prosecutor, a public officer
who is presumed to have regularly performed his official duty.[40] Besides, it aptly noted that Villarin was
implicated by x x x Latayada in his affidavit dated January 22, 1996 before Marcelino B. Pioquinto,
Chief, Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit. The denial of Villarin cannot prevail over the
declaration of witnesses.[41]

Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have
been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation
or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which, necessarily involves a re-examination and re-
evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial
finding of probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary
investigation.[42]

Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for
Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He
accepted the Ombudsman's verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment and actively
participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-examinations
and testifying on his own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he
once again assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for
Reconsideration.[43] Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a preliminary
investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he is
deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.

Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been included as a principal in the commission of
the offense. However, whether Sudaria should or should not be included as co-accused can no longer be
raised on appeal. Any right that the petitioners may have in questioning the non-inclusion of Sudaria in
the Information should have been raised in a motion for reconsideration of the March 13, 1996 Resolution
of the Office of the City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against Sudaria.[44] Having failed to avail of the proper
procedural remedy, they are now estopped from assailing his non-inclusion.

Two Offenses Penalized Under Sec. 68 of Presidential

Decree No. 705.

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or

Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession
shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authorization; and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations.[45]

The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is consummated by the mere
possession of forest products without the proper documents.

We reviewed the records and hold that the prosecution had discharged the
burden of proving all the elements of the offense charged. The evidence of the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioners were in custody of timber without the necessary legal
documents. Incidentally, we note that several transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) were not submitted
by the trial court. No explanation was provided for these missing TSNs. Notwithstanding the incomplete
TSNs, we still find that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt petitioners culpability.

The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that timber was confiscated from
petitioners. It presented a Tally Sheet[46] to prove that the DENR Strike Force Team examined the seized
timber on January 13, 1996. The number, volume and appraised value of said timber were also noted in
the Tally Sheet. Seizure receipts were also presented to prove that the confiscated timber were placed in
the custody of Alarcon[47] and eventually taken to the DENR Office.[48] There was a photograph of the
timber taken by the television crew led by Casenas.[49]

The prosecution likewise presented in evidence the testimonies of eyewitnesses Granada and
Pansacala who testified that Latayada and Boyatac were the ones who delivered the timber.[50]

More significantly, Villarin admitted that he was the one who commissioned the procurement of
the timber[51] for the repair of the Batinay bridge. He even deputized Boyatac to negotiate with Sudaria
and gave Latayada P2,000.00 to transport the logs. Boyatac later informed him of the delivery of
timber. However, he could not present any document to show that his possession thereof was legal and
pursuant to existing forest laws and regulations.
Relevant portions of the testimony of Villarin are as follows:

Q As Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, of course, you heard reports prior to the incident
on December 31, 1995 that Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria was also engaged
in supplying forest products like forest lumber?
A Yes, because I always go to Cagayan de Oro and I can always ride on his jeepney.

Q And you were sure that information of yours was received by you and not only by one
but several persons from Barangay Tagpangi even up to Barangay Pagalungan?
A Thats true because he even has a record with the police.

Q And you learned [this] prior to January 1995?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And your information was even to the effect that Sudaria was supplying illegally cut
lumber regularly?
A What I have noticed because I always ride on his jeep wherein lumber was being
loaded, the lumber will be taken when it arrived in Lumbia, kilometer 5.

Q Even if there were already raids being conducted to the person of Camilo Sudaria, still
he continued to load illegally cut lumber?
A He slowed down after several arrest because maybe he was ashamed because he was
the Barangay Captain of Tagpangi.

Q And his arrest and the slackening of his activities of illegally cut lumber occurred prior
to June 1995?
A Yes, sir.

Q [In spite] of your knowledge that he is engaged [in] illegally cut[ting] forest products,
you as Barangay Captain of Pagalungan transacted with him for the purpose of
acquiring lumber [for] the bridge at Pagalungan?
A As we rode together in his jeep, he informed me that he has some lumber to be used to
build his house and he told me he will sell it for the repair of the bridge in
Pagalungan.
Q And because of that, in addition, you sent him the specifications of materials for the
repair of the bridge in Pagalungan?
A I let Boyatac go to him and [inquire] from him if he has those specifications.

Q And he communicated to you that he has available lumber of those specification?

A Yes, because he sent to Boyatac some requirements of the specifications and he let me
sign it.

Q And after that, you closed the [deal] with Sudaria?

A Yes, because I sent somebody to him and we did not talk anymore.

Q And thereafter on December 31, 1995, according to your testimony before, Aniano
Latayada delivered the lumber flitches you ordered on board the passenger jeep
of Camilo Sudaria?
A When the specifications were given, we were informed that the lumber were already
there. So, it was delivered.

Q Who informed you that the lumber were already delivered?

A Boyatac.

Q And he is referring to those lumber placed alongside the Batinay Bridge.

A Yes, Sir.

Q And even without personally inspecting it, you immediately paid Latayada the
compensation for the delivery of those lumber?
A There was already an advance payment for his delivery.

Q To whom did you give the advance?

A To Latayada.

Q You have not given the amount to Camilo Sudaria?

A No, Sir.

Q In fact, the money that you paid to Latayada was specifically for the transportation of
the lumber from Tagpangi to Batinay bridge?
A Yes, Sir.

PROS. GALARRITA:
Q And at that time, you paid Latayada P2,000 as payment of the lumber?
A Yes, Sir.

COURT:
Q Did you pay Latayada?
A Yes, Sir.
 Q How much?
A P2,000.

Q And you gave this to the conductor?

A Yes, Sir.

Q You told the conductor to pay the money to Latayada?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did the conductor say?

A The conductor said that the money was for the payment for the transporting of lumber
from Tagpangi.[52] (Underscoring ours.)

Violation of Sec. 68 of Presidential

Decree No. 705, as amended, is
malum prohibitum.

As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such, criminal intent is not
an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that petitioners had the intent to possess
(animus possidendi) the timber.[53] Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also
constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the [object of the crime] is in the immediate
physical control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the [object of the
crime] is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion
and control over the place where it is found.[54]

There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the timber without the
requisite legal documents. Villarin and Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery
and storage without any license or permit issued by any competent authority. Given these and considering
that the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners contention that the possession of the illegally cut timber
was not for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential.

Corpus Delicti is the Fact of the Commission of the

Crime

Petitioners argue that their convictions were improper because the corpus delicti had not been
established. They assert that the failure to present the confiscated timber in court was fatal to the cause of
the prosecution.

We disagree. [C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the
body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered[55] or, in this case, to the seized
timber. Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a
single witness uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction
therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence.[56]

Here, the trial court and the CA held that the corpus delicti was established by the documentary
and testimonial evidence on record. The Tally Sheet, Seizure Receipts issued by the DENR and
photograph proved the existence of the timber and its confiscation. The testimonies of the petitioners
themselves stating in no uncertain terms the manner in which they consummated the offense they were
charged with were likewise crucial to their conviction.

We find no reason to deviate from these findings since it has been established that factual findings
of a trial court are binding on us, absent any showing that it overlooked or misinterpreted facts or
circumstances of weight and substance.[57] The legal precept applies to this case in which the trial courts
findings were affirmed by the appellate court.[58]

The Proper Penalty

Violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, is penalized as qualified theft under Article
310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The pertinent portions of these provisions
read:

Art. 310. Qualified Theft The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding
articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the
property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken
from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property
is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any calamity,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value
of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the
value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. x x x

The Information filed against the petitioners alleged that the 63 pieces of timber without the
requisite legal documents measuring 4,326 board feet were valued at P108,150.00. To prove this
allegation, the prosecution presented Pioquinto to testify, among others, on this amount. Tally Sheets and
Seizure Receipts were also presented to corroborate said amount. With the value of the timber
exceeding P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayorin its minimum and medium periods to be
imposed in its maximum, the range of which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten
(10) years. Since none of the qualifying circumstances in Article 310 of the RPC was alleged in the
Information, the penalty cannot be increased two degrees higher.

In determining the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 is to be deducted

from P108,150.00, which results to P86,150.00. This remainder must be divided by P10,000.00,
disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. Consequently, eight (8) years must be added to the basic
penalty. Thus the maximum imposable penalty ranges from sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty should be taken
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, without considering the modifying
circumstances. The penalty one degree lower from prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods
is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, the range of which is from two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.Thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, erroneously fixed
the minimum period of the penalty at twelve (12) years of prision mayor.

Finally, the case against Boyatac must be dismissed considering his demise even before the RTC
rendered its Judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 28, 2005 and the
Resolution dated September 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 are AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS that petitioners Crisostomo Villarin and Aniano Latayada are each sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The complaint against Cipriano Boyatac is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 86218. September 18, 1992.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELSIE

BAGISTA y BANGCO, Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; RULE. — The general rule
regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person
shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings,
or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a
lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution. Art. III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any
evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall, among
others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."cralaw
virtua1aw library

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE, AN EXCEPTION. —

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures
admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest,
a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the
seizure of evidence in plain view. With regard to the search of moving
vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE. — This in no way, however, gives the
police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped
and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been
held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — The
NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop and search all
vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the
confidential information they received from their regular informant that a
woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be
bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable cause to
search accused-appellant’s belongings since she fits the description given by
the NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the
NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained during the course of said search is
admissible against Accused-Appellant.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; FINDINGS OF

TRIAL JUDGE; RULE AND EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. — The prosecution had
shown, primarily through the positive testimony of Sgt. Parajas, that the bag
containing the dried marijuana leaves was taken from accused-appellant’s
possession. She denies this fact and contends that the bag in question was
actually taken from the luggage carrier above the passenger seats and not
from her. Indisputably, We have two opposing versions of what actually
happened at the checkpoint in Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in
the accused-appellant’s apprehension, that of the prosecution and that of
the defense. In situations like this, the matter of assigning values to the
testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts because, unlike
appellate courts, they can weigh such testimony in the light of the
demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial. The exception
is when the trial court has overlooked certain facts of substance and value
that, if considered, might affect the result, which We do not find in the
instant case.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR DISCREPANCIES; CASE AT BAR.

— As to the alleged discrepancies in the prosecution’s case, such as the color
of the stripes of the bag which contained the marijuana and whether the
items seized from accused-appellant were marijuana leaves or marijuana
fruit tops, these are minor in character and do not detract from the
prosecution’s case since it was shown by the Receipt of Property Seized,
which was signed by accused-appellant, that these were the very items
taken from her at the time of her arrest.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST

UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; RULE; SEARCH OF MOVING
VEHICLE AS AN EXCEPTION; REQUIRES PROBABLE CAUSE; NOT PRESENT
IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the
bag of the accused on the basis alone of an information they received that a
woman, 23 years of age with naturally curly hair, and 5’2" or 5’3" in height
would be transporting marijuana. The extensive search was indiscriminately
made on all the baggages of all passengers of the bus where the accused
was riding, whether male or female, and whether or not their physical
appearance answered the description of the suspect as described in the
alleged information. If there really was such an information, as claimed by
the NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing thought why they had to search the
baggages of ALL passengers, not only the bags of those who appeared to
answer the description of the woman suspected of carrying marijuana.
Moreover, the accused was not at all acting suspiciously when the NARCOM
agents searched her bag, where they allegedly found the marijuana. From
the circumstances of the case at bar, it would seem that the NARCOM agents
were only fishing for evidence when they searched the baggages of all the
passengers, including that of the accused. They had no probable cause to
reasonably believe that the accused was the woman carrying marijuana
alluded to in the information they allegedly received. Thus, the warrantless
search made on the personal effects of herein accused on the basis of mere
information, without more, is to my mind bereft of probable cause and
therefore, null and void. It follows that the marijuana seized in the course of
such warrantless search was inadmissible in evidence.

DECISION

NOCON, J.:

Appeal by accused-appellant Elsie Bagista from the decision dated

September 26, 1988 of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet,
Branch 10, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The facts of the case are as follows: On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 o’clock
in the morning, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Detachment Office
located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road, Baguio City, received
information from one of its regular informants that a certain woman, 23
years of age, with naturally curly hair, and with a height of 5’2" or 5’3",
would be transporting marijuana from up north. 1 Acting upon this piece of
information, Sgt. Oscar Parajas testified that he, Sgt. Godofredo Fider and a
civilian NARCOM agent proceeded to Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet. Upon
arriving at said location at around 11:00 o’clock that same morning, they
established a checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles, both private and
public, coming from the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying
marijuana leaves on board. 2

After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus
with Plate No. AVD 938 and body number 428, which came from Lepanto,
Benguet. Sgts. Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and thereupon Sgt.
Parajas announced to the passengers that they were NARCOM agents and
that they were going to search their baggages. Sgt. Parajas then proceeded
to the rear of the bus while Sgt. Fider began inspecting the bags in the front.
3

While at the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at
the right side (as one is facing the driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a
travelling bag with black and orange stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas
inspected the bag and discovered three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves
covered by assorted clothing. The bag and the contents thereof were
confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought to the NARCOM
office in Baguio City where she was booked and investigated. The woman
was then identified as Accused-Appellant. 5 The confiscated bundles were
subjected to laboratory examination, and found positive for marijuana. 6

Accused-appellant’s defense rests solely on denial. She claimed that she was
engaged in the buying and selling of vegetables, particularly cabbages. On
the day in question, she boarded the Dangwa Tranco bus at Abatan,
Benguet, bringing with her ten (10) sacks of cabbages which she intended to
sell to a certain Maria Opino in Baguio City. While inside the bus, she
approached the conductor for her ticket to cover the fare for her sacks of
cabbages, but was told by the latter that he would attend to her later.

When the bus reached Tublay, Benguet, it was stopped by the NARCOM
agents who boarded the same and began inspecting the baggages of the
passengers. Accused-appellant claimed that the bag containing the
marijuana was taken from the luggage carrier above the passenger seats.
When nobody admitted owning the bag, the NARCOM agent approached her,
took the shoulder bag on her lap, and asked her to come with them for
investigation as she fits the description of the would-be transporter of the
marijuana given by the NARCOM informer. She denied having anything to do
with the marijuana found on the bus.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

To corroborate her story, Accused-appellant presented the conductor of the

Dangwa Tranco bus, Nestor Yangkin. He testified that when the NARCOM
agents boarded the bus at Tublay, Benguet, one of them got a bag from the
luggage carrier, opened it, and smelled the contents. The agent then asked
the passengers who among them owned the bag; when nobody answered,
he walked to the back of the bus, all the time looking at the faces of the
passengers. When the agent approached accused-appellant, who was seated
at the rear of the bus, the former talked to her, then escorted her out of the
bus. 7

During Yangkin’s cross-examination, it came out that the 10 sacks of

vegetables that were loaded at Abatan were brought by a man who told him
that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival at the Dangwa Station in
Baguio City but that the owner of the sacks would be riding in the bus. And
yet, Yangkin did not seek out the alleged owner of the sacks. The witness
also testified that none of the passengers approached him and offered to pay
for the fare of the sacks, 8 contrary to accused-appellant’s testimony.

In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court found the testimony of Sgt.

Parajas credible. Said the court a quo:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

". . . The testimony of Sgt. Oscar Parajas was direct and straightforward as
he gave all the requisite details of the entrapment operation they conducted
based on an information provided by a coordinating individual. His testimony
reveals that the bag containing the marijuana leaves was found on the lap of
the accused. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Sgt. Parajas was
moved by any motive than simply the carrying out of his official mission or
duty. Where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal
witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the
presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to
full faith and credit (People v. Francia, L-69253, September 30, 1987, 154
SCRA 495)." 9

The trial court brushed aside the defense’s observation that there were
discrepancies between the testimony of Sgt. Parajas and the evidence
presented, such as the color of the bag allegedly taken from accused-
appellant and the kind of marijuana taken from the bag, as immaterial.
Similarly brushed aside was the defense’s contention that the evidence
against accused-appellant, such as the Receipt of Property Seized 10 and
her signature thereon, 11 and the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report 12 and
her signature thereon, 13 were inadmissible due to the absence of counsel,
since these were not confessions or extra-judicial statements.

Finally, the trial court did not give credence to the testimonies of accused-
appellant and her witness Nestor Yangkin, in view of the testimony of Sgt.
Parajas that he took the bag containing the marijuana from accused-
appellant’s lap. Moreover, the court a quo observed that there was a
discrepancy between the testimonies of accused-appellant and Yangkin on
the matter of the 10 sacks of cabbage, which led the court to conclude that
the former was in the act of transporting marijuana at the time of her arrest.

Accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the

marijuana leaves found in the bag taken from her was inadmissible in
evidence as it was the product of a warrantless search, which motion was
denied by the trial court for lack of merit on November 22,
1988.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Aggrieved, Accused-appellant filed the instant appeal, alleging that the court
a quo erred (1) in not finding the warrantless search conducted by the
NARCOM agents as illegal and unconstitutional, and (2) in admitting the
illegally obtained evidences and convicting her on the basis of said
evidences.
Accused-appellant is in error.

The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this
manner: no person shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal
effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant
or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. 14 The basis for the rule can be found
in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in
violation of the aforementioned right shall, among others, "be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures

admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest,
a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, 15 and
the seizure of evidence in plain view. 16

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle
to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. 17

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to

conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable
cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched. 18

The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop and
search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view
of the confidential information they received from their regular informant
that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant
would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable
cause to search accused-appellant’s belongings since she fits the description
given by the NARCOM informant.

Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any
evidence obtained during the course of said search is admissible
against Accused-Appellant.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

At any rate, no objection was raised by the accused-appellant in the court

below on the inadmissibility of the evidence against her on the ground that
the same was obtained in a warrantless search. This amounts to a waiver of
the objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained therefrom. 19 Amid a waiver, the court is duty bound to
admit the evidence. 20

Reviewing the evidence, We find the same sufficient to prove accused-

appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution had shown, primarily through the positive testimony of Sgt.
Parajas, that the bag containing the dried marijuana leaves was taken from
accused-appellant’s possession.

She denies this fact and contends that the bag in question was actually
taken from the luggage carrier above the passenger seats and not from her.
Indisputably, We have two opposing versions of what actually happened at
the checkpoint in Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-
appellant’s apprehension, that of the prosecution and that of the defense. In
situations like this, the matter of assigning values to the testimony of
witnesses is best performed by the trial courts because, unlike appellate
courts, they can weigh such testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct
and attitude of the witnesses at the trial. 21 The exception is when the trial
court has overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered,
might affect the result, 22 which We do not find in the instant case.

Moreover, Accused-appellant’s defense was weakened by the fact that her

witness Nestor Yangkin contradicted her on the matter of the 10 sacks of
vegetables appellant claims to have brought with her at the time of her
arrest. Appellant claims she loaded the sacks of vegetables on the bus and
tried to pay for its fare, but that conductor Yangkin, put her off. Yangkin
claims otherwise: the sacks of vegetables were loaded by a man who told
him that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival in Baguio City, and
that no one on the bus offered to pay for the same.cralawnad

In weighing contrary declarations and statements, greater weight must

generally be given to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
than the denials of the Accused-Appellant. 23

Given the discrepancy on this point, the trial court correctly disregarded the
corroborative testimony of Nestor Yangkin. The matter of the ownership of
the 10 sacks of vegetables is material since appellant’s reason for being on
the bus was to deliver these sacks to Baguio City. If the sacks of vegetables
are not hers, then the only conclusion that can be drawn is that she was on
her way to Baguio City to sell the marijuana found in her possession.

As to the alleged discrepancies in the prosecution’s case, such as the color of

the stripes of the bag which contained the marijuana and whether the items
seized from accused-appellant were marijuana leaves or marijuana fruit
tops, these are minor in character and do not detract from the prosecution’s
case since it was shown by the Receipt of Property Seized, 24 which was
signed by accused-appellant, that these were the very items taken from her
at the time of her arrest.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is

hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against Accused-Appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Melo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Although there is a similarity in the factual circumstances of the case at bar

with those of the Malmstedt case (GR No. 91107, 19 June 1991, 198 SCRA
101) where the Court upheld the validity of the warrantless search, however,
in the present case, I am of the view that the information alone received by
the NARCOM agents, without other suspicious circumstances surrounding the
accused, did not give rise to a probable cause justifying the warrantless
search made on the bag of the accused.

In the Malmstedt case, it will be recalled that no extensive search was

immediately made of the Personal effects of the accused. It was only after
the NARCOM agents noticed a bulge on the waist of the accused (causing
them to suspect that he was carrying a gun) and only after he failed or
refused to present his passport when required to do so, that a warrantless
search was made of the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the
information received by the NARCOM agents that a certain Caucasian
travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying prohibited drugs together
with the suspicious failure or refusal of the accused to present his passport,
supplied the probable cause that reasonably led the NARCOM agents to
believe that the said accused was then and there committing a crime. Thus
—

"Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared

by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the
smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or
where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee."cralaw
virtua1aw library
x x x

"The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from

Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of
the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the
NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a
probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the
personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM
officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of
the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain
hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy
bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused’s own
attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the
information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of
the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without
warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence
and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society." (198
SCRA 401).

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the bag of the accused on
the basis alone of an information they received that a woman, 23 years of
age with naturally curly hair, and 5’2" or 5’3" in height would be transporting
marijuana. The extensive search was indiscriminately made on all the
baggages of all passengers of the bus where the accused was riding,
whether male or female, and whether or not their physical appearance
answered the description of the suspect as described in the alleged
information. If there really was such an information, as claimed by the
NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing thought why they had to search the
baggages of ALL passengers, not only the bags of those who appeared to
answer the description of the woman suspected of carrying marijuana.
Moreover, the accused was not at all acting suspiciously when the NARCOM
agents searched her bag, where they allegedly found the marijuana.

From the circumstances of the case at bar, it would seem that the NARCOM
agents were only fishing for evidence when they searched the baggages of
all the passengers, including that of the accused. They had no probable
cause to reasonably believe that the accused was the woman carrying
marijuana alluded to in the information they allegedly received. Thus, the
warrantless search made on the personal effects of herein accused on the
basis of mere information, without more, is to my mind bereft of probable
cause and therefore, null and void. It follows that the marijuana seized in
the course of such warrantless search was inadmissible in evidence.