RULE 1.

02

Chua vs. Mesina; Gross misconduct

7/25/2013

A.C. No. 4904. August 12, 2004

Facts:
Complainants Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia administratively charged
respondent Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr., for breach of professional ethics, gross
professional misconduct, and culpable malpractice.

Complainants were lessees of the property of respondent's mother. Respondent's

mother defaulted in paying a loan that she obtained in a bank, thus respondent
convinced complainants to help her mother if paying the said obligation, to which the
complainants acceded. It was agreed among that that in consideration for the act of
complainants, the property which they are leasing will be transferred to their name. The
complainants complied with the terms of the agreement. A deed of sale concerning
such property was executed.

However, to evade liability for paying capital gains tax, respondent instructed
complainants to execute another deed of sale which will be antedated 1979, wherein
the capital gains tax was not yet in effective.
Subsequently, after the execution of the deed of sale, respondents instructed his clients
[complainants] to execute a simulated deed of sale which will reflect that the property
was re-conveyed to his mother.

The cunning acts of respondent did not end there. Respondent went to the house of
complainants and got the owners certificate of title of the said property which is still
under the name of her mother. he promised to the complainants that he will process
the transfer of the property to their name. Years passed, but respondent never returned
the said title to the complainants.

Meanwhile, another lessee file a criminal case against the complainants and
respondents for falsification. He claims that was also given the promise that the
property will be offered to him before it will be sold to another, but respondents sold it
to complainants without offering to him. Because of the foregoing circumstances,
complainants filed an administrative case against respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Held:
Yes, said the Court- "This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct.

First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to

1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect
for law and legal processes, and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the law;
That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private party but the government
is aggravating.
Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a
simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants
reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.

Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses,
into turning over to him the owner’s copy of his mother’s title upon the
misrepresentation that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his
mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty.

That the signature of “Felicisima M. Melencio” in the 1985 document and that in the
1979 document are markedly different is in fact is a badge of falsification of either the
1979 or the 1985 document or even both.

A propos is this Court’s following pronouncement in Nakpil v. Valdez

As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business
transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of
good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a
much higher standard that is required in business dealings where the parties trade at
“arms length.” Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored
and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these
transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule
is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position
to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of
innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney’s favor.

Respondent having welched on his promise to cause the reconveyance of the Melencio
property to complainants, consideration of whether he should be ordered to honor such
promise should be taken up in the civil case filed for the purpose, the issue there being
one of ownership while that in the case at bar is moral fitness.

Respondent ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. is, for gross misconduct, hereby
DISBARRED.

JESUS E. SANTAYANA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ELISEO B. ALAMPAY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed by Jesus E. Santaya against Atty. Eliseo B.
Alampay for malpractice and violation of the Attorney's Oath.

Jesus E. Santayana, complainant herein, alleged in his complaint that respondent lawyer is a
member of the Board of Administrators of the National Electrification Administration (NEA), a
government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC). The laws provide that NEA shall be
represented in all judicial proceedings by the following legal counsel: (1) the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC); (2) the Chief or any lawyer of the NEA Legal Division;
and (3) the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

Under Memorandum Circular No. 9 issued by the Office of the President on August 27, 1998,
the GOCCs are barred from hiring private lawyers or law firms to represent them in law suits
and to handle their legal matters, except in exceptional circumstances with the written
conformity of the Solicitor General or Government Corporate Counsel. This conformity shall be
with the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit.

The petitioner further alleged that NEA is tasked with the implementation of the government's
foreign-funded Rural Electrification Program. One of the components of this Program is the IPB
80 Project requiring NEA to purchase, through public bidding, 60,000 pieces of wooden poles
and 20,000 pieces of cross arms to be used in the rural electric distribution network.

In 1999, NEA conducted a public bidding for the purchase of poles and cross arms. In
December 2000, Nerwin Industries Corporation (Nerwin) was declared the lowest bidder.
Hence, the NEA Board of Administrators passed Resolution No. 32 approving the award to
Nerwin of fifty percent (50%) of the IPB 80 project requirements.

However, NEA disqualified Nerwin and instead granted the award to a losing bidder. Seeking a
legal justification for its action, NEA twice asked the opinion of the OGCC. In both instances, the
OGCC pointed out that NEA's action is in violation of the law.

Respondent, despite his knowledge that NEA is represented by legal counsel specifically
provided by law, had his law firm - Alampay, Gatchalian, Mawis & Alampay - rendered a legal
opinion adverse to that of the OGCC. As a result, NEA nullified the award to Nerwin, prompting
the latter to file with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36, Manila a complaint for specific
performance, injunction, and damages against NEA, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-102000.

Respondent's law firm entered its appearance as counsel for NEA in Civil Case No. 01-10200.
Nerwin filed a motion for the disqualification of respondent's law firm as counsel for NEA. This
was opposed by respondent.

On December 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order disqualifying respondent's law firm from
appearing as counsel for NEA, thus:

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules as follows: (1) the motion to dismiss is denied, and (2)
the motion to disqualify the Alampay, Gatchalian, Mawis and Alampay Law Office is granted
thus this Court's recognition of the appearance and representation for and in behalf of NEA of
ALAMPAY, GATCHALIAN, MAWIS and ALAMPAY Law Office is discontinued and terminated.

The Chief of the Legal Division of NEA is directed to enter his appearance and to represent NEA
in this case unless NEA chooses to avail of the services of the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel or the Office of the Solicitor General.

Furnish copies of this Order to plaintiff's counsel and the lawyers of the three (3) sets of
defendants in this case.

Let copies of this Order be served likewise on NEA, The Chief of the Legal Department/Division
of the NEA, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel and the Office of the Solicitor
General.

SO ORDERED."2

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in its Order
dated February 15, 2002.

Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 70355, assailing the Orders of the trial court dated December 10, 2001 and February 15,
2002.

On September 24, 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that:
"In the absence of a written conformity from the duly mandated government lawyers appointed
by law, and a written concurrence from the Commission on Audit, the Court finds no legal basis
for the law office of Alampay, Gatchalian, Mawis, and Alampay to represent the petitioners in
this case."3

Complainant thus charged respondent with: (1) violation of Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court by usurping for himself and his law firm the authority of the legal
counsel of NEA; (2) malpractice and violation of Section 27 of Rule 138, by willfully appearing,
without lawful authority, as NEA's counsel on record in Civil Case No. 01-102000; (3)
malpractice by rendering a legal opinion for NEA without authority; and (4) violation of the
Attorney's Oath by appearing as counsel for NEA just to delay, injure, and damage the rights of
Nerwin.

In his answer, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the complaint. He claimed that
complainant did not state his interest or position in Nerwin nor his authority to file this
complaint. Furthermore, all the allegations therein are hearsay and distortions of the truth.

Respondent also averred that Resolution No. 38 dated October 11, 2001 of the NEA Board of
Administrators authorized his law firm Alampay, Gatchalian, Mawis, and Alampay to represent
NEA in Civil Case No. 01-102000 sans attorney's fees. Since the OGCC took a stance adverse to
that of NEA with respect to IBP 80 Project, the latter could engage the services of other
counsel. Moreover, the NEA Charter does not prohibit its engagement of other counsel.

On April 21, 2003, we issued a Resolution referring the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In her Report and Recommendation dated February 24, 2004, IBP Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan found that respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rule 1.02 of the same Canon and recommended that said respondent be reprimanded and
warned, thus:

"It is submitted that the above actions of respondent are in violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which reads: "A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes" and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 which
reads: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening
confidence in the legal system." Thus, it is recommended that respondent be meted the
administrative penalty of reprimand with a warning that similar actions in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.

Respectfully submitted."4

On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-223 adopting
and approving the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan.

We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:

"SEC. 10. Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. - The Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) shall act as the principal law office of all government-
owned or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate offspring and
government acquired asset corporations and shall exercise control and supervision over all
legal departments or divisions maintained separately and such powers and functions as are now
or may hereafter be provided by law. In the exercise of such control and supervision, the
Government Corporate Counsel shall promulgate rules and regulations to effectively implement
the objectives of this Office."
The above provision lays down the rule that with respect to GOCCs, their principal counsel shall
be the OGCC. Corollarily, Section 61 of Presidential Decree No. 269, the charter of the NEA,
provides:

"SEC. 61. NEA Counsel. - The Chief of the legal division or any other lawyer of the NEA
shall represent the same in all judicial proceedings. It shall be the duty of the Solicitor
General to represent NEA in any judicial proceedings if, for special reasons, the administrators
shall request his intervention."

Section 61 of the NEA Charter must be construed as an exception to the provision of the
Administrative Code quoted earlier. This is in accordance with the rule of statutory construction
that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
designed therefore specially should prevail.5

Pertinent also is Memorandum Circular No. 9 issued by the Office of the President on August 27,
1998 which reads:

"SEC. 1. All legal matters pertaining to government-owned or controlled corporations, their

subsidiaries, other corporate offspring and government acquired asset corporations (GOCCs)
shall be exclusively referred to and handled by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC).

GOCCs are hereby enjoined from referring their cases and legal matters to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) unless their respective corporate charters expressly name the Office of
the Solicitor General as their legal counsel.

However, under exceptional circumstances, the OSG may represent the GOCC
concerned, Provided: This is authorized by the President or by the Head of the office concerned
and approved by the President.

SEC. 2. All pending cases of GOCCs being handled by the OSG and all pending requests for
opinions and contract review which have been referred by said GOCCs to the OSG, may be
retained and acted upon by the OSG, but the latter shall inform the OGCC of the said pending
cases, requests for opinions and contract reviews, if any, to ensure proper monitoring and
coordination.

SEC. 3. GOCCs are likewise enjoined to refrain from hiring private lawyers or law
firms to handle their cases and legal matters. But in exceptional cases, the written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as
the case may be, and the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit shall first be secured
before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm."

From all the foregoing legal provisions, it is evident that in all judicial proceedings, NEA shall be
represented by the chief or any attorney of its Legal Division. However, for special reasons and
where the NEA Board of Administrators requests in writing, it shall be the duty of the Solicitor
General to represent NEA. NEA can hire or employ a private lawyer or law firm only in
exceptional cases with (1) the conformity and acquiescence in writing of the Solicitor General or
the OGCC; and (2) with the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit.

We carefully examined Resolution No. 38 dated October 11, 2001 of the NEA Board of
Administrators which respondent claims is the source of his authority to represent NEA in Civil
Case No. 01-102000. Nothing therein indicates that the written conformity of the Solicitor
General or the OGCC has been obtained nor is there any written concurrence by the
Commission on Audit. Indeed, Resolution No. 38 is legally infirm. Hence, there can be no other
conclusion than that respondent's law firm, including himself, willfully appeared as counsel for
NEA in the said case without authority to do so. Pertinent is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides:
"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. - A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which is he is required to take before admission to practice, for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court or for corruptly and willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice (Stress supplied)."

However, there is no indication in the records that respondent acted in bad faith. In fact, his
law firm's services for NEA were pro bono.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Eliseo B. Alampay is hereby FINED in the amount of P5,000.00 for
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so and WARNED that a
repetition of similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Court
Administrator to be distributed to all courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

IN RE: ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO

A.C. No. 932
June 21, 1940

FACTS: Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares for 9
years, sought the legal advice of the respondent for a possible second marriage.

They prepared the document. Baniquit then asked, "Would there be no trouble?" The
respondent points to his diploma and said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not
to be valid."

Hence, he contracted a second marriage.

Respondent realized that he had made a mistake for the timeline of the separation of husband
and wife, and for that reason, he immediately sent for the contracting parties to sign the deed
of cancellation of the document.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent be suspended.

RULING: Yes. The advice of the respondent and the document prepared by him as a notary
public is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. It
constitutes malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law.

In the present case, respondent was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or
carelessly negligent in giving the complainant legal advice.

RULE 1.03

BARRATRY

 A lawyer has the obligation not to encourage suits. This is so as to prevent barratry and
ambulance chasing.
  Barratry – offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law
or otherwise; Lawyer’s act of fomenting suits among individuals and offering his legal
services to one of them.

The Crime of Barratry: Criminal Responsibility for a Branch of Professional

Responsibility

When lawyers thought of spurious litigation or solicitation of clients, they thought only
of disciplinary rules and possible sanctions by a grievance committee. Such misconduct
is not, however, merely a breach of professional etiquette or a violation of disciplinary
rules. It is also a crime. Barratry, unlike most forms of professional misconduct, is
criminal. The sanctions are more serious and the procedures are often less familiar than
for other ethical lapses. Personal solicitation of prospective clients is the evil targeted by
the barratry statute.

In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Supreme Court first recognized lawyer advertising
as commercial speech subject to First Amendment protection. The Bates opinion did
not, however, decide whether, or to what extent, a state might regulate in-person
solicitation. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, direct in-person communication by
a plaintiff’s lawyer with a potential personal injury client was held to be subject to the
First Amendment but not protected from disciplinary regulation. The Supreme Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence suggest that while personal solicitation for purely
pecuniary gain might be banned, some kinds of personal solicitation, including those in
writing, cannot be completely prohibited, although they might be reasonably regulated.

In order for the criminal prosecution for solicitation of clients by attorneys to become
more commonplace in Texas, hard questions of constitutionality and statutory
construction must be addressed. The Texas ban on in-person solicitation will withstand
First Amendment scrutiny. Since the barratry offense absolutely prohibits rather than
merely regulates solicitation, there may be less constitutional ground beneath the
statute than had previously been supposed.
RULE 1.04

Topic: Not Act as Instigator of Controversy

Title: CASTANEDA vs AGO
Reference: G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975

FACTS
- Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the CFI of Manila to recover certain
machineries.
- Judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson
- SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of execution; Ago’s motion denied, levy was
made on Ago’s house and lots; sheriff advertised the sale, Ago moved to stop the auction; CA
dismissed the petition; SC ffirmed dismissal
- Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff from enforcing
the writ of execution; his motions were denied
- Sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago failed to redeem
- Sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession to the properties
- Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it
was his personal obligation and that his wife ½ share in their conjugal house could not legally
be reached by the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining
Castaneda the Registed of Deeds and the sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; the
battle on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order continued
- Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of
possession; SC dismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the
petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition
- Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which gave due course to
the petition and granted preliminary injunction.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Agos’ lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy
RULINGS
No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the
sheriff’s sale, justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the
replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty.
Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the
satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an
officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and
a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of
truth and moral justice.
A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client’s cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what the SC does not and cannot countenance is a
lawyer’s insistence despite the patent futility of his client’s position.
It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or lack of his case. If he finds
his client’s cause as defenseless, then he is his duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit
rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his
client, and temper his client’s propensity to litigate.

G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994

JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and
JON DE YSASI,respondents.

F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.

Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm administrator of
Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. He suffered various ailments and was
hospitalized on two separate occasions. He underwent fistulectomy, was confined for acute
gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis.

During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical
expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, without due notice,
private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands
for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary. Both demands, however, were not
acted upon.

Petitioner then filed an action with the NLRC for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay,
consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. Said complaint for
illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC, holding that petitioner abandoned his work. On
appeal, said decision was affirmed in toto.

ISSUE/S:
I. WON petitioner De Ysasi III abandoned his work.

II. WON respective counsel for both parties have faithfully observed their duty to
encourage amicable settlement and avoid litigation.

RULING:
I. In order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made there must be a
concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case.

Private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of returning to
work. The absence of petitioner from work was not without valid causes of which private
respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that
petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor
substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.

Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even

when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would no
longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform services directly required by his
position as farm administrator.

Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage

of his salaries and benefits, as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and
readiness to go back to work, and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.

II. The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties sorely disappoints the Court and
invites reproof. Both counsels may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to
represent their clients with
zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as
much their responsibility to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts,
preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate
consanguineous ties between their clients. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to
conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or
withholding suit. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise,
rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.

Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer
shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement." On this point, we find that both counsels herein fell short of what was
expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court.
CANON 2

Jayme v Bualan GR NO 37386 September 19 1933

Case Digest:
None at the Moment.

Real Case:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 37386 September 19, 1933
ANDRES JAYME, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BUALAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Cornelio Reta and Romualdo C. Quimpo for appellants.
Jayme and Jayme for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:

This case furnishes eloquent proof of how clients, in this instance ignorant Bagobos,
can be passed on from lawyer to lawyer in a seemingly endless treadmill of litigation
without ever reaching finally and a vindication of legal rights. The particular judgment
appealed from by the Bagobos purported to award their former attorney P15,000 for
professional services.

In 1921, Bagobo Bualan and companions secured Attorneys Juan A. Sarenas and
Domingo Braganza to represent them in a case against one Ciriaco Lizada for the
possession of land. The action was successfully maintained in the Court of First
Instance and in Supreme Court.1 Nevertheless the attorneys appear to have taken over
control of the land presumably to protect their attorney's fees. In view of this situation
Bagobo Bualan and others engaged the services of Attorney Andres Jayme to institute
another action to recover possession of their land and confirmed this in writing. Issues
were joined, but an amicable settlement was entered into by Attorney Jayme and
Attorneys Sarenas and Braganza, whereby the Bagobos were to be given the land, they
to pay to Attorneys Sarenas and Braganza the sum of P6,000, and this agreement was
judicially confirmed. In this connection it should be stated that the amount of P6,000
was apparently received from Japanese tenants to cancel the indebtedness of
Attorneys Sarenas and Braganza, but for reasons known to the attorney for the
Bagobos, the major part of this money went into his pocket instead, thus necessitating
the execution of a mortgage in order to cancel this claim. As a matter of fact, Attorney
Jayme received P1,270 as proved by the receipt Exhibit 3 and P5,750 as proved by the
receipt Exhibit 4, or a total of P7,020. About the same time, Bagobo Bualan signed by a
mark a promissory note in the amount of P15,000 in favor of Attorney Jayme. As related
to the foregoing facts, it is the contention of the appellants that the services of the
attorney are only worth P1,270 which he had received, and that he should be ordered to
return to them the sum of P5,750 which he secured as a loan and not in payment of his
fees.

The relationship of attorney and client is here evidenced by a written contract for
services which, in accordance with section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should
ordinarily control the amount of the recovery by the lawyer if found by the courts not to
be unconscionable or unreasonable. With an attorney as one party to a contract
stipulating the amount of the compensation he is to receive, and a client of ordinary
intelligence and business acumen as the other party agreeing to this amount, the courts
should give effect the contract and if the attorney has performed the task assigned for
him, should determine his compensation on the basis of the contract. But the situation is
not the same when on one side there is an attorney with professional knowledge of his
rights and of the technicalities of the law and on the other side an ignorant non-Christian
of whose rights the law takes tender care. In this instance, to do justice to Attorney
Jayme, it should be explained that he does not rely entirely on the contract between him
and the Bagobos, but is considerate enough to ask for the valuation of his services on
the basis of quantum meruit.

The elements to be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services

rendered by a lawyer are generally: (1) The importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of
the lawyer. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 29; Code of Legal Ethics, Canon No. 12;
Delgado vs. De la Rama [1922], 43 Phil., 419.) Speaking to these elements, there is
evident a wide difference of opinion as to the value of the property involved in the case
which Attorney Jayme handled, the attorney claiming that it is worth P200,000 and this
being the finding of the trial judge, and the appellants claiming that the land is worth
something like P30,000. All facts considered, probably a happy medium, or
approximately P100,000, would be a fair approximation of the total value of the land and
its improvements. As to the services rendered by Attorney Jayme, they consisted in
drafting and filing a complaint and bringing the suit to an amicable conclusion and in
drafting and acknowledging a mortgage, although this latter document may have been
unnecessary. Finally, except that it was alleged in the complaint and not denied that
Attorney Jayme has exercised the duties of his profession since 1908, and is an
attorney with sufficient business to be known to the courts, we have no other data like
expert testimony to go on. All elements considered, and it being admitted that the
attorney has already received P7,020, although the proper application of P5,750 is
challenged by appellants, we think that Attorney Jayme has been sufficiently
compensated by the receipt of these P7,020, and that the Bagobos should not be made
to pay anything more. Before concluding, may we be permitted to express the hope that
present counsel for the Bagobos, Messrs. Reta and Quimpo, will not follow in the
devious path of their predecessors, necessitating further litigation to settle their fees,
and that as counselled in the Code of Legal Ethics, "in fixing fees it should never be
forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of Justice and not a mere
money-making trade."

In consonance with the foregoing pronouncements, the judgment of the trial court will be
reversed, and the plaintiff will take nothing on his complaint and the defendants will take
nothing on their counterclaim, neither party to recover costs from the other, So ordered.

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP,

SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO".
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.”
July 30, 1979

Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975
and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying
that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who
had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the
continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name; there is no custom
or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the
name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm.

Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners
who already passed away in the name of the firm? NO

Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no
practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners
from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages
and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will
have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an
old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association
for a particular purpose. … It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or
business or of holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a nom de plume,
assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to
constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice
does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical
custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.

CANON 3

IN RE: LUIS B. TAGORDA 53 PHIL 37 3/23/29- MALPRACTICE

FACTS:The respondent Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits
that in the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which in
translation, read as follows:

“LUIS B. TAGORDA” Attoney; Notary Public; CANDIDATE FOR BOARD MEMBER, Province of
Isabela. (NOTE.- as notaty public, he can execute for a deed of sale for the purchase of land as
required by the cadastral office, can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your
application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a
lawyer he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for
or against you. Come or write to him in his town Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation,
and is willing to help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of
barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter reads as follow:

“ I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the
belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Iligan and that I would then be
disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and
I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have
my residence here in Echague, I would request your kind favor to transmit this information to
your barrio people in any of your meeting or social gatherings so that they may be informed of
my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the
people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection
with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and
would charge only three pesos for every registration.”

HELD:Application is give to se. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act NO. 2828,
providing “ The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokets, constitutes malpractice, “ and to Canon 27 and 28 of the Code
of Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippines Bar
Association in 1917, to the case of the respondent lawyer. The law is a profession and not a
business. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or
suspension.

1. Respondent Tagorda is suspended from the practice of law for 1 month.

For advertising his services in the Sunday Tribune respondent attorney is reprimanded.

The Director of Religious Affairs v. Estanislao Bayot A.C. No. L

acts:
Estanislao Bayot caused the publication of an advertisement of his services in the
Sunday Tribune, in direct violation of the provision of Section 25, Rule 127 which
imposes a prohibition on soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain either personally
or through paid agents or brokers.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice
Held:
Yes. His act of causing the publication of an advertisement constitutes malpractice. Law
is a profession and not a trade. A member of the bar degrades himself or herself in
adopting the practices of mercantilism through advertising his or her services like a
merchant advertising wares.
However, considering the fact that Bayot is a young lawyer and that he promises to
refrain from repeating the same misconduct, the Court exercised leniency. He was
merely reprimanded for his violation and he was reminded that the most effective
advertisement possible is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity as well as fidelity to trust.

TAN TEK BENG v. DAVID

A.C. No. 1261
December 29, 1983

FACTS: Tan Tek Beng and Atty. Timoteo David entered an agreement. Where in the
agreement lawyer David did not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to
an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with
the clients.

However, mutual accusations of doublecross ended such.

Hence, Tan Tek Beng denounced David to the President Assistant, Office of the Civil
Relation and to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said agreement is tantamount to malpractice.

RULING: The Court held that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to
malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers”

The practice of law is a profession and not a business.

A lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others.

The Court censures David for entering such void and unethical agreement and
discountenances his conduct, not because of the complaints, but because David should
have known better.

Pangan vs. Ramos, A.C. No. 1053, September 7, 1979

acts:
Dionisio Ramos filed a motion for postponement of an administrative case involving
Santa Pangan. Pangan then filed this motion to cite Ramos for contempt for allegedly
deceiving the court in signing his name as "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos" even if what was
registered in the Roll of Attorneys is "Dionisio D. Ramos."

For his part, Ramos claims that he uses the name Pedro D.D. Ramos because his
registered name in his birth certificate is "Pedro Dionisio Dayaw Ramos."

Issue:
Whether or not respondent should eb cited for contempt for using a name other than
that registered in the roll of attorneys

Held:
Yes. The Roll of Attorneys is the official record containing the names and signatures of
those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a
name other than that registered in the Roll of Attorneys. In using the name
"Pedro D.D. Ramos," respondent violated his oath stating that he will do no falsehood.

As an officer of the court, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness,

candor, and frankness which should characterize his or her conduct at all times. In
resorting to falsehood, he demonstrated lack of candor.