Darren Kanjie K.

Tujan
201411914
PALE

1.) A.C. 5900, Re: Anonymous complaint against Atty. Cresencio P. Co Untian,
Jr., April 10, 2019
(Sexual harassment cases, whether this can be a ground for disbarment)
Justice Reyes, Jr.

FACTS: The May 14, 2002 Complaint requested the Court to investigate the
alleged sexual harassments that respondent had committed against students of Xavier,
particularly Antoinette Toyco (Toyco), Christina Sagarbarria (Sagarbarria) and Lea Dal
(Dal). The complaint was written in the local dialect and made by an individual
identifying himself or herself only as "law practitioner." In a September 26, 2002
Letter, the "law practitioner" sent copies of the complaint-affidavits of the victims of
sexual harassment and the Resolution of the Committee on Decorum and Investigation
(Committee on Decorum).

Toyco claimed that respondent initially expressed amorous interest when he sent
her flowers anonymously through another law student. She stated that thereafter,
respondent would often text her through the phone of another law student. Toyco noted
eventually that respondent texted her through his own phone where he would send
romantic messages, poems, love notes and sweet nothings. She said that respondent
also invited her to go to Camiguin with another law student but she turned it down.
Toyco explained that while she was never sexually assaulted, respondent's unwelcome
advances made her feel degraded as she could not easily ignore respondent for fear of
reprisal.

Sagarbarria narrated that respondent showed her a photograph revealing only

the face of a woman and asked her if she knew who the woman in the picture was. After
she realized that the woman in the picture looked like her, respondent revealed the
entire photograph revealing a naked woman and teased her within hearing distance of
other law students. Sagarbarria denied that she was the woman because she had a
distinctive mark on her back for the past six years. She averred that the incident caused
her depression, fearing what other law students may think of her. Sagarbarria
highlighted that she was unable to participate in a scheduled moot court competition
because she broke down in the middle of practice and cried uncontrollably.

Dal recounted that in one of her recitations during respondent's class, she
clarified a question propounded to her saying "Sir, come again?" Respondent retorted
"What? You want me to come again? I have not come the first time and don't you know
that it took me five minutes to come, and you want me to come again?" She later
learned that respondent would narrate the said incident to almost all of his classes. Dal
felt offended that she was subjected to such sexually charged language and the fact
that her embarrassment was retold in other classes.

In its September 5, 2002 Resolution, the Committee on Decorum recommended that

respondent's teaching contract not be renewed on account of the accusations of sexual
harassment against him. It explained that respondent was guilty of violating Xavier's
anti-sexual harassment guidelines. The Committee on Decorum noted that respondent's
unwanted sexual advances or innuendos caused distress to the complaining students
as it created a hostile or offensive environment.

Respondent's Position

Respondent lamented that the complaints for sexual harassment was made by
disgruntled students who failed their classes for the 2001-2002 school year as
manifested by the fact that the incidents happened years apart but the complaints were
made all at the same time.

Respondent denied sending flowers and text messages with romantic undertones to
Toyco. He highlighted that it was in fact her who gave him gifts during Valentine's Day in
2002. Respondent added that he texting "luv u" and "miss u" are friendly text messages
sent without malice especially considering that they were misspelled.

As to Sagarbarria's allegations, respondent countered that he confiscated the

photograph from another student and jokingly showed it to her in the spirit of their open
and uninhibited relationship. He noted that Sagarbarria is his niece and they were
previously close as they would oftentimes exchange discussions on sensitive and
mature matters as adults without any malice. Respondent claimed that she was never
humiliated when he showed her the photograph because she even gamely lowered
down her pants to prove that it was not her in the photograph because unlike her, the
naked woman did not have any tattoo.

On the other hand, respondent explained that Dal answered disrespectfully when she
was called for recitation uttering "Come again?" He posited that to inject humor during
class, he responded "Never use slang language in my class because you might be
misinterpreted. What do you mean by 'come again?' It takes me several minutes before
I come again." Respondent expounded that the joke was directed at himself and that
Dal never showed any resentment or showed any sign of humiliation as she even
laughed at the joke and continued to sit in front of the class.

IBP Proceedings

January 19, 2009, Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag (recommended that respondent

be suspended from the practice of law for two years. Commissioner Hababag reminded
that lawyers must be of good moral character and must continue to possess it so long
as he is part of the legal profession.
In its Resolution dated April 16, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board of
Governors (IBP-BOG) affirmed with modification the recommendation of Commissioner
Hababag. It resolved to disbar respondent on the ground of gross immoral conduct.

Respondent moved for reconsideration. The IBP-BOG partially granted his motion for
reconsideration. It reduced the penalty to two years suspension and directed the
Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline to prepare an extended resolution
explaining its actions.

In his June 9, 2017 Extended Resolution, Director Ramon S. Esguerra (Director

Esguerra) explained that respondent was not guilty of sexual harassment as defined
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7877 or the "Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995." He
noted that there was no evidence to show that respondent demanded or requested
sexual favors from Toyco, Sagarbarria and Dal. Nevertheless, Director Esguerra
expounded that while respondent's actions do not constitute sexual harassment as
defined by law, the way he interacted with his students were unbecoming of a member
of the legal profession. He stressed that being a law professor, respondent should be
worthy of emulation and should not have used his position and stature to make
offensive sexual insults on his students. Director Esguerra postulated that the penalty of
two years suspension is a sufficient sanction to protect the public and the legal
profession.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Atty. Cresencio P. Co Untian, Jr. constitute
sexual harassment and should he be disciplined?

HELD: Yes, Atty. Cresencio P. Co Untian, Jr. committed sexual harassment. R.A.
No. 7877 defines education related sexual harassment as sexual harassment
committed by a teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainer or any other person who,
having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in an education
environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the same is accepted by the object of the act. In particular, it is
committed:

1. Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender; 
2. Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to
the offender; 
3. When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade, or
the granting of honors and scholarships or the payment of a stipend, allowance
or other benefits, privileges or considerations; or
4. When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the student, trainee or apprentice.

R.A. No. 7877 does not require that the victim had acceded to the sexual desires of the
abuser. Further, it is not necessary that a demand or request for sexual favor is
articulated in a categorical manner as it may be discerned from the acts of the
offender. In addition, sexual harassment is also committed in an educational
environment when the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment. In short, it is not necessary that there was an offer for sex for there to be
sexual harassment as a superior's conduct with sexual underpinnings, which offends
the victim or creates a hostile environment would suffice.

In Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation v. National Labor Relations

Commission, the Court explained that the essence of sexual harassment is not the
violation of the victim's sexuality but the abuse of power by the offender. In other words,
what the law aims to punish is the undue exercise of power and authority manifested
through sexually charged conduct or one filled with sexual undertones. In Domingo v.
Rayala, the Court clarified that R.A. No. 7877 speaks of the criminal infraction of sexual
harassment and without prejudice to any administrative charge which may be filed
against one who sexually harasses another.

The Civil Service Commission (CSC) in CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 defined the
administrative offense of sexual harassment in an educational environment as existing
when:

SEC. 3 (b)

1. submission to or rejection of the act or series of acts is used as a basis for any
decision affecting the complainant, including, but not limited to, the giving of a
grade the granting of honors or a scholarship, the payment of a stipend or
allowance, or the giving of any benefit, privilege or consideration.
2. the act or series of acts have the purpose or effect of interfering with the
performance, or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive academic
environment of the complainant; or
3. the act or series of acts might reasonably be expected to cause discrimination,
insecurity, discomfort, offense or humiliation to a complainant who may be a
trainee, apprentice, intern, tutee or ward of the person complained of.

In addition, CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 provides examples of sexual harassment, to

wit:

SEC. 5. The following are illustrative forms of sexual harassment:

(a) Physical

i.MaliciousTouching
ii. Overt sexual advances
iii. Gestures with lewd insinuation

(b) Verbal, such as but not limited to, requests or demands for sexual favors, and lurid
remarks
(c) Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or [written] notes with sexual
underpinnings

(d) Other forms analogous to the [foregoing].

Respondent's actions towards the students concerned definitely constitute sexual

harassment as defined by R.A. No. 7877 and the pertinent rules and regulation.

A reading of respondent's Answer would show that he substantially admitted the

accusations against him, although providing a justification for them. Respondent's
conduct towards Sagarbarria, Dal and Toyco created a hostile and offensive
environment which has no place in a learning institution.

Clearly, respondent abused the power and authority he possessed over the
complainants. His sexually laced conduct had created a hostile and offensive
environment which deeply prejudiced his students. In what was supposed to be a safe
place for them to learn and develop, they were instead subjected to unwarranted sexual
advances.

What makes respondent's act of sexual harassment even more reprehensible is the fact
that he is both a professor and a member of the legal profession.

Lawyers carry the burden of living up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility because public confidence in law
and in lawyers may be tainted by the irresponsible and improper conduct of members of
the Bar. Those privileged to practice the legal profession are expected to maintain not
only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality considering that they are
always under the watchful public eye scrutinizing them both in their public and private
lives. 

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides that a lawyer shall
not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. On the other hand,
Canon 7 mandates that lawyers shall, at all times, uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. Further, Rule 7.03 of the CPR commands lawyers not to engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, or behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit, the Court
emphasized on the primacy of maintaining a high sense of morality and decorum
among lawyers, to wit:

As this Court often reminds members of the bar, the requirement of good moral
character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned,
than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to
maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral
character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character
expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve
not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because "vast interests
are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he
deals with his client's property, reputation, his life, his all."

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character
but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. 

Respondent's responsibilities and expectations are even more heightened because he

is a law professor. He should be a beacon of righteous and conscientious conduct.
Respondent, as a molder of minds of soon-to-be lawyers, should guide his students to
behave and act in a manner consistent with the lofty standards of the legal profession.
Instead, he abused his position of authority creating an offensive and uncomfortable
atmosphere in school. Again, what should be a place of learning and growth had
become a place of fear and distrust for the affected students.

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years and ten (10) years from
teaching law in any school effective upon the finality of this Resolution, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

2.) A.C. 11641, Marilu C. Turla vs Atty. Jose M. Caringal, March 12, 2019
(case for MCLE requirements)
Justice Hernando

FACTS: This administrative case arose from a verified Complaint dated October 8,

2010 filed by Marilu C. Turla (Turla) against the respondent, Atty. Jose Mangaser
Caringal (Caringal), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Turla is the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. Q09-
64479 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 222, wherein Atty.
Caringal is the counsel for the oppositor.

In July 2010, Turla discovered that Atty. Caringal had not attended the required
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars for the Second (MCLE II) and
Third (MCLE III) Compliance Periods, which were from April 15, 2004 to April 14, 2007
and April 25, 2007 to April 14, 2010 respectively. Yet, Atty. Caringal signed the
pleadings and motions in several cases on which he indicated the following information
after his signature and other personal details: "MCLE Exemption II & III Rec. No.
000659126 Pasig 8.10.10.

Consequently, in her Complaint, Turla charged Atty. Caringal with (1) failure to take the
MCLE seminars for the MCLE II and III compliance periods as required under Bar
Matter (BM) No. 850; and (2) violation of his lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood. She
further alleged that even if Atty. Caringal was already confronted with his deception, he
continued to flaunt such duplicity since he still filed pleadings with the courts afterwards.
Turla contended that under Section 2, Rule 13 of BM No. 850, Atty. Caringal's non-
compliance resulted in his being listed as a delinquent member. She likewise argued
that Atty. Caringal violated Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court.

Although Turla admitted that Atty. Caringal had already complied with the MCLE
requirement as of March 10, 2011, she asserted that he had already committed a gross
infraction, and hence should be sanctioned accordingly. All the same, Turla averred that
she did not file the instant complaint in order to harass Atty. Caringal since Special
Proceedings No. Q09-64479 had nothing to do with the latter's violation of the MCLE
requirement.

Atty. Caringal, in his Answer, countered that Turla's Complaint was a form of

harassment since as the counsel for the oppositor in Special Proceedings No. Q09-
64479, the Investigating Commissioner of the CBD held that Turla's motives are
unimportant to a disbarment case since the issue is mainly to determine the fitness of a
lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court. He found that there was no question
that Atty. Caringal failed to complete the MCLE requirements for the MCLE II and III
compliance periods, but noted that Atty. Caringal paid the non-compliance fee of
PhP2,000.00, evidenced by Official Receipt No. 0659126, pursuant to Rule 13, Section
1 of BM No. 850, which then served as his penalty for said infraction.

The Investigating Commissioner added that according to Rule 13, Section 2 of BM No.
850 (on listing as a delinquent member), the sixty (60)-day period for compliance only
begins to run once notice of non-compliance is sent. Yet, Turla did not allege the date of
receipt by Atty. Caringal of such notice, nor did she present any certification from the
MCLE Office attesting to Atty. Caringal's non-compliance even after due notice. In any
case, he noted that Atty. Caringal had already complied with the MCLE requirements as
of March 11, 2011, thereby making the issue of his supposed status as a delinquent
member moot.

As to Turla's contention that Atty. Caringal should still be penalized because he had
already committed the infraction, the Investigating Commissioner stated that
"[c]omplainant only proved that Respondent failed to comply with the MCLE
requirements within the Second and Third Compliance Periods. Respondent was
already penalized for the same pursuant to B.M. 850, Rule 13, Section 1."

Still, the Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Caringa breached his oath to do no
falsehood by stating that he was exempted from complying with the MCLE requirements
when what he really paid for was the non-compliance fee and not any exemption fee.
Ultimately, the Investigating Commissioner made the following findings and
recommendations:

1. Respondent failed to comply with the MCLE Requirements in a timely manner;

 2. Respondent falsely asserted he had an exemption from the MCLE requirement;
and
3. Respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that repetition of same or
similar acts or conduct shall be dealt with more severely.

In a Resolution dated April 18, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve the foregoing Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
with modification that Atty. Caringal be suspended from the practice of law for three
years due to his failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and because of his
misrepresentation that he had an MCLE exemption.

Atty. Caringal asked for a reconsideration but was denied. Discontented, Atty. Caringal
filed a Petition for Review by Certiorari before the Court. In its Resolution dated August
1, 2017, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
evaluation, report, and recommendation.

The OBC, in its Report and Recommendation dated October 29, 2018, determined that
Atty. Caringal's Petition for Review was a mere rehash of the matters already passed
upon by the Investigating Commissioner in his Report. It highlighted that Atty. Caringal
wrongfully stated that he was exempt from complying with the MCLE requirements in 11
different pleadings. The significant number of pleadings which he signed indicating such
wrong details completely negated any defense of good faith since it demonstrated
negligence in the performance of his duties towards his client and the courts. Hence,
the OBC agreed with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to impose a
three-year suspension on Atty. Caringal from the practice of law.

Atty. Caringal's Petition for Review is without merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Caringal should be subjected to disciplinary action?

HELD: Yes. The directive to comply with the MCLE requirements is essential for
the legal profession, as enshrined in BM No. 850. The purpose is "to ensure that
throughout [the IBP members'] career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence,
maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law."

Turla was able to secure a Certification dated August 2, 2010 from the MCLE Office that
Atty. Caringal, as of said date, had not yet complied with the requirements for MCLE II
and III compliance periods. Despite being confronted with such Certification by Turla,
Atty. Caringal continued to sign and submit pleadings and motions before various courts
in several cases, indicating therein that he was "exempt" from the MCLE requirements
and referring to the Official Receipt for his payment of the non-compliance fees.

In case a lawyer fails to comply with the MCLE requirements within the compliance
period, Rule 13 of BM No. 850 lays down the following consequences:
SEC. 1. Non-compliance fee. - A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-
compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.

SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. - A member who fails to comply with the
requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed
as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee.
The investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be conducted by the IBP's
Commission on Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.
Section 12(c) to (e) of the MCLE Implementing Rules further provide as follows:

SEC. 12. Compliance Procedures

c. If a lawyer fails to comply with any requirement

under the Rules, the Committee will send him/her a
notice of non-compliance on any of the following
deficiencies:
1) Failure to complete the
education requirement within
the compliance period;
2) Failure to provide attestation of
compliance or exemption;
3) Failure to provide satisfactory
evidence of compliance
(including evidence of exempt
status) within the prescribed
period;
4) Failure to satisfy the education
requirement and furnish
evidence of such compliance
within sixty (60) days from
receipt of a non-compliance
notice; and
5) Any other act or mission
analogous to any of the
foregoing or intended to
circumvent or evade
compliance with the MCLE
requirements.
d. A member failing to comply with the continuing
legal education requirement will receive a Non-
Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency
and will be given sixty (60) days from the receipt of
the notification to explain the deficiency or
 otherwise show compliance with the requirements.
Such notice shall be written in capital letters as
follows:
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE
JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR
PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM
RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE, SHALL BE A CAUSE
FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER
AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE
LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF
OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE.
The member may use the 60-day period to
complete his compliance with the MCLE
requirement. Credit units earned during this period
may only be counted toward compliance with the
prior compliance period requirement unless units in
excess of the requirement are earned, in which
case the excess may be counted toward meeting
the current compliance period requirement.
e. A member who is in non-compliance at the end of
the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance
fee of P1,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent
member of the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors
upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee,
in which case Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
shall apply.
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions, which are simply and clearly worded, that a
non-compliant lawyer must pay a non-compliance fee of PhP 1,000.00 and still comply
with the MCLE requirements within a sixty (60)-day period, otherwise, he/she will be
listed as a delinquent IBP member after investigation by the IBP-CBD and
recommendation by the MCLE Committee. The non-compliance fee is a mere penalty
imposed on the lawyer who fails to comply with the MCLE requirements within the
compliance period and is in no way a grant of exemption from compliance to the lawyer
who thus paid.

It is worthy to note that Atty. Caringal could not be declared a delinquent member as the
sixty (60)-day period for compliance did not commence to run. There was no showing
that he was ever issued and that he had actually received a Non-Compliance.

Nevertheless, Atty. Caringal is being held liable for knowingly and willfully
misrepresenting in the pleadings he had signed and submitted to the courts that he was
exempted from MCLE II and III.
 BM No. 1922, issued on June 3, 2008, required the practicing members of the IBP to
indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and
date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as
may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period. It also explicitly
stated that "[f]ailure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of
the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records." In a Resolution dated
January 14, 2014, in BM No. 1922, the Court amended the rules for non-disclosure of
current MCLE compliance/exemption number in the pleadings, to wit:

(a) AMEND the June 3, 2008 resolution by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the
required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required
information would subject, the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action";
and

(b) PRESCRIBE the following rules for non-disclosure of current MCLE

compliance/exemption number in the pleadings:

(i) The lawyer shall be imposed a fine of P2,000.00 for the first offense, P3,000.00 for
the second offense and P4,000.00 for the third offense;
(ii) In addition to the fine, counsel may be listed as a delinquent member of the Bar
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of Bar Matter No. 850 and its implementing rules and
regulations; and
(iii) The non-compliant lawyer shall be discharged from the case and the client/s shall
be allowed to secure the services of a new counsel with the concomitant right to
demand the return of fees already paid to the non-compliant lawyer.
Prior to its amendment on January 14, 2014, BM No. 1922 imposed a stiff penalty for a
practicing lawyer's failure to indicate the details of his/her MCLE Compliance/Exemption
in the pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, i.e., the dismissal of the
case and expunction of the pleadings from the records, which, in effect, ultimately
penalized said lawyer's clients, too. Atty. Caringal, in this case, not only failed to indicate
the necessary MCLE details in his pleadings and motions, but purposely stated therein
the false information that he was exempted from MCLE II and III. As he had filed the
subject pleadings in 2010, prior to the amendment of BM No. 1922 on January 14,
2014, he risked the dismissal of the cases and expunction of the pleadings and motions
by the courts, to his clients' detriment. In fact, as Turla mentioned, the pleadings which
Atty. Caringal filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 59, in Civil Case No. 09-269,
were indeed expunged from the records per the Order dated March 4, 2013 because of
the false MCLE information he indicated therein.

Considering the foregoing, Atty. Caringal violated his sworn oath as a lawyer to "do no
falsehood" as well as the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE

SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

When Atty. Caringal indicated that he was MCLE-exempt in the pleadings and motions
he filed, although in fact he was not, he engaged in dishonest conduct which was also
disrespectful of the courts. He undoubtedly placed his clients at risk, given that
pleadings with such false information produce no legal effect and can result in the
expunction of the same. Undeniably, he did not stay true to the cause of his clients and
actually violated his duty to serve his clients with competence and diligence.

The Court had previously pronounced that "[t]he appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer
depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts." Considering Atty. Caringal's willful statement of false MCLE details in his
pleadings to the prejudice of his clients, aggravate, by his lack of diligence in fully and
promptly complying with the MCLE requirements within the compliance period, and his
seemingly defiant and unremorseful attitude, the Court deems it apt to adopt the
recommendations of both the IBP Board of Governors and the OBC, and imposes upon
Atty. Caringal the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three years.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal

is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.

3.) A.C. 12457 (formerly CBD Case No. 16-5128) Rev. Fr. Jose P. Zafra III vs.
Atty. Renato B. Pagatpatan, April 2, 2019
Per curiam
(simple misconduct and willful disobedience of an order suspension of the
court)

FACTS: This administrative complaint arose from a criminal suit for estafa filed by

complainant Reverend Father Jose P. Zafra III (Fr. Zafra) against Jojo R. Buniel (Buniel)
and Anna Liza M. Guirnalda (Guirnalda) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tandag
City, Surigao Del Sur, Branch 40. Attorney Renato B. Pagatpatan (Atty. Pagatpatan) is
the counsel on record of Buniel and Guirnalda.

While the criminal case was pending against Atty. Pagatpatan's clients, said lawyer
wrote a letter to the Bishop of the Diocese of Tandag, Surigao Del Sur requesting an
investigation of Fr. Zafra for his activities, particularly, concocting stories against his
clients, Buniel and Guirnalda, who were charged by Fr. Zafra of estafa; that such action
"was not only a sin but a MORTAL SIN."

Fr. Zafra was embarrassed because of the "malicious" letter sent by Atty. Pagatpatan.
He was eventually investigated by the Board of Consultors with the Bishop, where he
was able to clear his name.

Thereafter, Fr. Zafra filed a complaint against Atty. Pagatpatan with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP). He posits that Atty. Pagatpatan's action is a clear violation of
Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "(a) lawyer
shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system." Fr. Zafra claims that instead of Atty. Pagatpatan
defending his clients' case in court, the latter instigated them to stir controversies by
making libelous and untruthful accusations. Fr. Zafra asserts that Atty. Pagatpatan's act
of writing and sending out the letter to the Bishop of the Diocese of Tandag, Surigao Del
Sur "was not from a sense of duty but to certainly gratify the personal vendetta and
animosity of his clients, who were arrested for the crime Estafa" that Fr. Zafra filed with
the RTC. Atty. Pagatpatan "failed to live up to the standard of his profession as a lawyer
who should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise rather than an
instigator of controversy."

Fr. Zafra also argues that Atty. Pagatpatan is engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law. He learned that, in 2005, Atty. Pagatpatan had been suspended by this Court from
the practice of law for two (2) years in a decided case entitled Daniel Mortera, et al. v.
Atty. Renato B. Pagatpatanwith docket number A.C. No. 4562. Upon further inquiry on
said case from the Supreme Court-Public Information Office, he also learned that the
order of suspension of Pagatpatan in the foregoing case had not yet been lifted by the
Court. Notwithstanding the failure to lift the order of suspension, Pagatpatan continued
to practice law by representing party litigants in other cases before four (4) branches of
RTC Davao.

Atty. Pagatpatan, for his part, asserts that there was nothing unethical in writing a letter
for the investigation of Fr. Zafra. Atty. Pagatpatan does not deny in engaging in the
practice of law despite this Court's order of suspension in 2005. He reasoned out that
he needed to continue working in order to maintain and sustain the needs of his family,
especially since his wife was ill and eventually passed away in December 12, 2010.
Pagatpatan claims that he has no intention to defy the order of suspension, and
manifests withdrawing his appearances in the cases that he is handling, including
the estafa case against Buniel and Guirnalda.
Proceedings before the IBP ensued. In the Report and Recommendation dated June
13, 2018, the IBP, through the investigating commissioner, did not find Pagatpatan
administratively liable in writing the letter-complaint against Fr. Zafra. Anent Atty.
Pagatpatan's continuous practice of law despite his suspension, the IBP held that Atty.
Pagatpatan "has no discretion, no option and can neither run or hide from the harsh
effects of being suspended from the practice of law." In this case, Atty. Pagatpatan was
ordered suspended from the practice of law on June 15, 2005, and there is no order to
lift the suspension of Atty. Pagatpatan. Yet despite this he has continued practicing law
for over thirteen (13) years, which tantamounts to willful disobedience. Thus, the IBP
recommended Atty. Pagatpatan's suspension for three (3) years with a warning that a
repetition of the same will warrant a more severe penalty.

In a resolution dated July 12, 2018, the Board of Governors of the IBP modified the
recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
years, after serving his previous suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Pagatpatan violated the code of professional

responsibility?

HELD: Yes. This Court cannot subscribe to Atty. Pagatpatan's claims that he is
merely espousing his clients' cause in writing the letter-request for investigation of Fr.
Zafra. On record, We find that Atty. Pagatpatan admits to writing the letter to the Bishop
of the Diocese of Tandag, Surigao Del Sur in order to resolve the  estafa case since
settlement proceedings with the regular courts proved to be futile. To Our mind, Atty.
Pagatpatan's letter-request was not based on a sincere purpose to discipline Fr. Zafra
for his actions, but mainly to bring threat to Fr. Zafra and force him to settle
the estafa case filed against his clients. Atty. Pagatpatan did not want the estafa case
to proceed to a full-blown trial. On many occasions, this Court has reminded that
lawyers are duty-bound "to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice
of the cause with which he is charged." This is in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession. It is of no consequence that the letter of Atty. Pagatpatan is filed with the
Bishop of Diocese of Tandag, Surigao Del Sur. Pagatpatan, as a member of the bar, is
an "oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics." This Court finds that Atty. Pagatpatan was motivated by
malice in writing said letter. However, disbarment, as prayed for by Fr. Zafra, is a
penalty too severe for said action considering the facts show that Atty. Pagatpatan is
only guilty of simple misconduct.

The more pressing issue to be tackled in this case is the fact that Atty. Pagatpatan has
been practicing law despite the issuance of a suspension order by this Court on June
15, 2005. There were no records showing that he served said suspension or moved to
lift said order because Atty. Pagatpatan, himself, admits that he continued practicing the
legal profession notwithstanding said order.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore.

- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis Ours)

On record, Atty. Pagatpatan had been representing party litigants in court from 2005
until the instant case was filed before the IBP in 2016. Atty. Pagatpatan has made a
mockery of this Court's authority by defying this Court's suspension order for over
eleven (11) years. If Fr. Zafra had not filed the instant case, Atty. Pagatpatan would
have continued disregarding the suspension order of this Court. His actions clearly
constitute gross misconduct as defined under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, which is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.

This Court emphasizes that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege and, as
such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. Whenever it is made to appear that
an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the
public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme Court, which
made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to
withdraw that privilege.

The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. Atty.
Pagatpatan's acts in wantonly disobeying his duties as an officer of the court show utter
disrespect for the Court and the legal profession. Therefore, his disbarment is
warranted.

premises considered, respondent Attorney Renato B. Pagatpatan is:

1) GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and FINEDP5,000.00 for his unethical behavior

in writing a letter to the Bishop of the Diocese of Tandag, Surigao Del Sur against
complainant Reverend Father Jose P. Zafra III; and
2) DISBARRED from the practice of law effective immediately upon receipt of this
Resolution.