Plato's Lysis: A Socratic Treatise on

Desire and Attraction

Naomi Reshotko

I Introduction

Plato's Lysis is commonly read as an early dialogue which takes up the

question: 'What is friendship?' However, if we read the Lysis with the
sole intention of understanding Socrates's views concerning when hu-
man beings might properly be called friends to one another, we will
likely be confused and disappointed. In the Lysis, Socrates develops a
general theory of attraction to which he refers using the word φιλία.
Socrates also uses the term φιλία to refer to human friendship, because
he takes human friendship to be a special case of desire which is itself a
form of attraction. In order to appreciate what Socrates says about φιλία
between humans, we must first understand what he says about φιλία
generally. I will demonstrate that Socrates's discussion focuses on a
general theory of attraction, I will elucidate that theory, and I will show
how it is applied to human friendship. I premise my discussion on the
hypothesis that the Lysis is an early dialogue in which Plato attempts to
disclose the views of the historical Socrates.1

1 I date as early and therefore, Socratic, the Apology, Cnto, Laches, Lysis, Charmides, Ion,
Protagoras, Euthydemus, Lesser Hippias, Menexenus, Euthyphro and Republic I. I take
the Meno and the Gorgias to be transitional. This is relatively uncontroversial. See
Dodds (1959), 18-30 and Brandwood (1990), p. 252.

Brought
APEIRON a journal for ancient to youand
philosophy by science
| St. Petersburg State University
Authenticated
0003-6390/97/30011-18 $9.00 ©Academic Printing | 134.99.128.41
& Publishing
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
2 Naomi Reshotko

II Desire: A Force of Attraction

Socrates states his arguments concerning φιλία in very general terms; he
uses verbs to express species of attraction broadly rather than narrowly.
For example, he juxtaposes 'Is like friend to like?' (214b) with 'Do oppo-
sites desire one another?' (215e), thereby treating being a friend to some-
thing (φίλον) and desiring something (έπιθυμεΐν) equivalently. Socrates
also uses 'to desire' and 'to be a friend of interchangeably at 215de:
.. .for the things most opposite to one another are especially friendly
since each thing desires its opposite and not its like, (το γαρ έναντιώτοτον
τω έναντιωτάτφ είναι μάλιστα φίλον. έπιθυμείν γαρ του τοιύτου εκαστον
αλλ' ου του ομοίου.)

This same juxtaposition also suggests that the 'friend' (φίλον) in the
first clause need not represent human friends any more than the 'ορρό-
sites' (εναντίων) in the second clause need represent human opposites.
This suggestion is confirmed when we look at Socrates's examples of
opposites that might attract (hot/cold, sharp/blunt): these examples
indicate that he is not concentrating on the human-centered examples of
attraction that would constitute human friendship. Rather, Socrates is
specifying general terms that would cover all cases of attraction (not just
friendship) between all kinds of attractants (not just humans).
The generality of Socrates's discussion suggests that he takes its
subject to be one which does not obey categorial distinctions between
the natures of the various entities which make up the metaphysical
environment. Whatever is being attracted (humans, physical objects,
plants, cosmic entities), Socrates uses the same theory of attraction to
describe why one object is drawn to another. Thus, the same principles
which govern gravitational force also govern human friendship.2
Socrates's discussion of reciprocity provides another clue that Socra-
tes's use of φιλία is general and applies to a broad spectrum of relation-
ships. Although reciprocity is a criterion for friendship between human
beings at 212e-l 3d, there are many places in his discussion of φιλία where
he ignores that criterion. This suggests that if Socrates were simply

Bolotin points out (130) that this suggests that Socrates is discussing general laws
which delineate the forces which govern attraction between all of the various com-
ponents of the metaphysical environment. He says that Socrates is taking what the
wisest say about attraction in the most general way and applying it to friendship.

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
 Plato's Lysis: A Socratic Treatise on Desire and Attraction 3

analyzing human friendship, we could expect reciprocity to be a central

and necessary criterion as it is for Aristotle.3 In cases where Socrates
ignores reciprocity as a criterion, his account of friendship will strike us
as implausible if we assume that φιλία refers narrowly to human friend-
ship (215e3-16a6,216cl-3). However, our more general ideas concerning
desire and attraction do not require that the relationship be reciprocated.
People desire food, but food does not desire people. Plants are attracted
to a source of light, but the source of light is not attracted to the plant.
Thus, I suggest that the minor role which Socrates assigns to reciprocity
in his discussion of φιλία is further evidence that Socrates uses the term
broadly. Further, I recommend that we understand Socrates's use of the
term φιλία as a reference to something akin to our notions of desire and
attraction.

Ill A Friend to the Good on Account of the Bad

Careful examination of the Lysis shows that Socrates thinks that people
experience φιλία as a relation between a human being (themselves) and
the good. Where that relationship is mediated by another person, we
find instances of the relationship of human friendship. In order to see
the structure of the relationship between humans and the good, which
Socrates proposes can be mediated by a human friend, we must
examine 212a8-22d8. Here, it is assumed that a friend must be a friend
for the sake of something other than itself and, indeed, that it must be
due to some bad thing (a foe) that friend is attracted to friend. Socrates
eventually places this discussion in the same context as his discussions
of desire throughout the rest of the early dialogues — the hierarchy of
desire which is also found at Gorgias 467 and Euthydemus 279.4 This

3 Aristotle's far better received account of friendship clearly states that mutual love
and reciprocity of good wishes are a necessary (although perhaps not sufficient)
component of friendship (EN VIII2).
4 In two recent articles, Penner (1991,1994) elaborates on this hierarchy (which also
appears in Irwin [78] and Santas [224]) and how it operates. However, while
Penner's comments might suggest that our understanding of the instance of the
hierarchy which appears in the Lysis is enhanced when we assimilate it to other
instances of the hierarchy of desire in the early dialogues, I suggest that the en-
hancement actually runs in the other direction; it is the discussion in the Lysis which
forms the basis for the other instances of the hierarchy of desire.

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
4 Naomi Reshotko

invites us, once again, to view his use of φιλία as the more general
'desirous of rather than along the narrower lines of human friend-
ship.
In the hierarchy of desire, Socrates divides the world into the mutually
exhaustive categories of good, bad and neither-good-nor-bad (NGNB),
and argues that all desire is ultimately for the good and that the NGNB
things (all objects and actions) are desired only as a means to the good.
While little insight into φιλία is gained by analyzing this piece of text in
light of any notion which restricts φιλία to humans, the text is quite
understandable as an exposition of the nature of desire and attraction.
As we analyze the Lysis, we will see Socrates discuss a foundational
theory of attraction, and — ultimately — hypothesize that attraction is
deficit-based. In fact, in the Lysis we find the one instance of the hierarchy
of desire where Socrates provides an ultimate answer concerning what
he takes the origin of motivation to be. The theory proposed by the end
of the Lysis might underlie the examples of the hierarchy of desire which
are found in the other early dialogues.5

1 Like Friend to Like

The passage in the Lysis which makes it most clear that Socrates is not
simply referring to human friendship begins when Socrates debates
whether 'like is friend to like' (214b2-4) or, contrariwise, whether Oppo-
sites attract' (216a4-5). It is agreed that like cannot be friend to like, first
because bad cannot be friend to bad:

For it seems, to us at least, that the nearer a bad person approaches to,
and the more that person consorts with, a bad person, the more hateful
that person becomes; for he is unjust and there is no possible way for
the unjust and the unjustly treated to be friends. (214blO-c3)

5 This is a suggestion which I discuss in Reshotko (1990) and intend to elaborate upon
in the future. In the architecture of purposive behavior, desires must provide the
necessary link between physical motivation and intention — they must link the
cognitive structure to the physical structure that moves via some sort of cona ve
structure. Socrates's ultimate allusion to deficits as the irreducible sources of moti-
vation gives us a glimpse into how he would fill the important architectural niche
that desire occupies.

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
 Plato's Lysis: A Socratic Treatise on Desire and Attraction 5

and then, for more general reasons:

.. .when anything whatever is like anything else, what benefit does it

hold or what harm might it be able to do the one like it that it cannot
do to itself? Or what could it endure that it could not inflict upon itself?
Indeed how can such things be cherished by one another when they
hold no serve to one another? Is it possible? — No. (214e5-15a3)

Here Socrates is saying that things will not be friends to one another if
they have no need of each other — if they are not attracted to one another
through one being the source of something that the other lacks. This
notion that friends need each other conjures up the general notion of
attraction or desire because we conceive of these as unidirectional
forces. Why are plants attracted to light? — because one has something
that the other lacks. Why are animals in the desert attracted to water?
— because the water fulfills a deficit which the animals are experienc-
ing. Since the type of relationship to which Socrates alludes is one
where there is a need of one party for the other and where, in addition,
this need is not reciprocated, we return to our contemporary notions
of attraction and desire in order to make sense of what Socrates is
saying, for desire and attraction are plausibly understood as unidirec-
tional and based on need.

2 Good Friend to Good

Thus, Socrates concludes that like cannot be friend to like. Next, Socrates
tries a different approach to the hypothesis that good is friend to good:
'.. .granting that like is not friend to like, the good may still be friend to
the good insofar as he is good, not as he is like' (215a3-5). This alternative
is rejected quickly:

But what of this? Will not the good person, insofar as that person is
good, be accordingly sufficient (ικανός) for himself? — Yes. And the
sufficient one, at least, is in need (δεόμενος) of nothing due to this
sufficiency. — For how not? And not being in need of anything this
person will cherish (άγαπφη) nothing. — Presumably not. And the one
who does not cherish does not love. — It seems not. And since not
loving, is not a friend. — Evidently. Therefore, how can we say the good
are friends to the good to begin with? They neither long (ποθεινοί) for
one another when apart (for each is sufficient for itself even being

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
6 Naomi Reshotko

separate) nor do they have any need for one another when present. —
We can't. But if they do not at least set a high value on one another then
they are not friends. — True. (215a6-cl)

Here, Socrates begins by considering features of attraction generally, and

then makes a transition when he applies what he has learned about
attraction to love and human friendship. The general theory of attraction
states that things that are sufficient (in this case, good) will have no need
for anything else and so will not be attracted to anything else. Then the
application to human friendship is made: so a person who is good will
not long for, love or cherish another individual.
In fact, Socrates's entire rejection of the hypothesis that like is friend
to like comes on the basis of the general, almost physical, theory that
objects are attracted to one another due to needs: bad cannot be friend
to bad because bad things will only harm one another (increase each
others needs rather than fulfill them); NGNB-like cannot be friend to
NGNB-like because if two things are alike they do not contain the
complements to fulfill one another's needs, as they have the same assets
and deficits as one another;6 good will not be friend to anything, like or
unlike, as it is self-sufficient and has no deficits which allow it to be
attracted toward some other thing which has what it needs. The connec-
tion which Socrates draws between having needs and being capable of
being a friend foreshadows the end of the dialogue: Socrates sees defi-
cit-imposed needs as the driving force that motivates human beings
toward objects external to them. So far, Socrates has done nothing to
distinguish human friendship from other forms of attraction.
Since all possibilities of like being friend to like have been rejected,
Socrates considers the hypothesis that everything desires its opposite.
He finds this idea so implausible that he does not give it much consid-
eration. He reasons that, while it is intuitive that 'dry [desires] wet; cold,
hot; bitter, sweet; sharp, blunt and empty, fullness' (215e5-7), it is coun-
terintuitive to suppose that a hating thing could be friendly to a friendly
thing, or just to unjust, temperate to intemperate or good to bad (216b2-

6 This is refined at the end of the dialogue as I will describe in my penultimate section.

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
 Plato's Lysis: A Socratic Treatise on Desire and Attraction 7

5).7 Thus both horns of the dilemma in the original hypothesis are
destroyed:'... neither is like friend to like, nor opposite friend to opposite'
(216b9-10).

3 Neither Good Nor Bad is Friend to Good on Account of Bad

When Socrates begins anew, he makes the same division that he makes
every time he talks about the hierarchy of desire in the early dialogues
(cf. Gorgias 467, Euthydemus 279). At 216d5-7, he asserts that there are
three different kinds (γένη): good (αγαθόν), bad (κακόν) and neither
good nor bad (οΰτ' αγαθόν ούτε κακόν). Since good and bad are neither
friendly to themselves nor to one another, and nothing is friendly to
the bad,8 the two remaining alternatives are that what is NGNB is
friendly either to itself or to the good. But the NGNB can't be friendly
to itself because that would be a case of like being friend to like; so the
only alternative that has not been ruled out is for the NGNB to be
friendly to the good.
At this point Socrates gives an example to explain that the NGNB is
only a friend to the good on account of the bad: a healthy person needs
no assistance and so will not seek a doctor; only a sick person, on account
of disease, is friendly to the doctor.9 The explanation for who seeks —
and is, therefore, friendly to — the doctor, is that things which are truly

7 This appears to be a counter-example to my thesis that Socrates is taking a general

theory of attraction and applying it, specifically, to human friendship. For, here, the
physical examples seem correct to Socrates, but he can't approve the transition to
human friendship. However, there is an explanation for this anomaly given by that
which will become clear at the end of the dialogue: the physical examples are
intuitive not qua opposites which desire one another, but qua deficits which find
fulfillment in one another By contrast, in the examples concerning hating/friendly,
temperate/intemperate, just/unjust and good/bad one is simply the negation of
the other. Furthermore, Socrates reconsiders this premise at the end of the dialogue
(221dl-5).
8 This is simply Socrates's assertion that no one desires anything bad but only the
good. (See Pennerand Rowe [1994] and Reshotko [1992]). More generally this is the
claim that nothing is attracted to that which will not benefit it (make it more
self-sufficient).
9 Concerning this example, Bolotin states 'this argument, then, seems to point less to
friendship between unlikes than to a one-sided attraction based on need' (137).

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
8 Naomi Reshotko

(as opposed to superficially10) bad have no attraction to the good because

they are too corrupt to operate normally (to operate normally is to seek
the good). Those things which are already good have no need for benefit,
and so needn't seek anything. In conclusion, only something which is
NGNB, but has been superficially afflicted with bad, is attracted to the
good so that it can be NGNB once more:

For, at any rate, we might choose to consider a healthy body: it needs

neither doctoring nor benefit, for it holds its own (ίκανώς γαρ έχει), so
that no one who is healthy is friend to a doctor on account of health ....
But the sick person is, I think, because of disease. Indeed, while disease
is a bad thing, medicine is beneficial and good. And the body qua body
is, I suppose, neither good nor bad .... But the body is compelled by
disease to welcome and love medicine. Thus the neither good nor bad
becomes a friend to the good on account of the presence of bad.
(217a4-b6)

Once Socrates has obtained agreement from his interlocutors, he

distinguishes between those things that are themselves bad (having been
made bad by being too completely harmed) and those which are merely
afflicted with bad. The idea is that if something has been afflicted with
too much bad for too long (exposed to great harm) it will eventually reach
a point where it cannot be restored to NGNB. To illustrate this let's return
to Socrates's example of the body: if even a minor illness is allowed to
linger for too long, it can eventually destroy the integrity of the body, so
no amount of doctoring can restore it to health. This clarifies Socrates's
assertion that the NGNB is attracted to the good due to the presence of
bad. It also shows us why things that are truly bad are not attracted to
good, and why things that are truly NGNB, and not afflicted with bad,
have no need of good.
This part of the discussion provides further evidence that Socrates's
primary goal is not merely the exploration of some relation of mutual

10 It might even be better to say appropriately afflicted by the bad. In other words, a NGNB
thing can be afflicted by the bad in such a way that, rather than becoming bad, it is
motivated toward the good. As Socrates demonstrates (218a-b), philosophers are
afflicted by ignorance — a bad — in a way that makes them seek knowledge — the
good.

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
 Plato's Lysis: A Socratic Treatise on Desire and Attraction 9

affection between humans:11 we must really struggle to find a translation

of the attraction between the NGNB and the good that is applicable to
the realm of relations between people.12 How, for example, are we to
understand the NGNB person who is temporarily afflicted with [the] bad
[person] and therefore attracted to the good [person] in order to be
restored to NGNB? Even if we could understand this, wouldn't the
restoration to NGNB result in the dissolution of the friendship, making
all friendships temporary and short?13
In contrast, the above discussion provides an elegant explanation of
how attraction and desire work. In fact, the distinction between good,
bad, and NGNB provides an explanation of attraction and desire that is
more basic than that which is found in Socrates's discussions of desire
in the other dialogues.14 There is much sympathy between this sort of
explanation and our current explanations concerning attraction. How do
we explain why a mouse that has been lying quietly in a corner of his
cage for several hours suddenly stands and walks to get a drink of water?
How do we explain why a plant that has been facing forward for days
suddenly turns to the right? In each case we say that the organism was
in a stable (neutral) state for some time, and then, due to its internal
metabolic processes, acquired a deficit (was afflicted by bad) so that it
came to desire the good (that which would fulfill the need caused by its
deficit), and that this desire for the good motivated its behavior. This

11 Bolotin (139) also draws attention to the fact that, whenever it appears that Socrates
is stating his own views regarding friendship, he disregards 'reciprocal loving and
hardly uses the word friendship.' I would add that Socrates frequently uses the
word 'desire' (220B1-3, 217e9, 219a4). Furthermore, Bolotin points out (192) that
Socrates's final assertions concerning friendship bear no 'indication that both
friends must be living beings.'
12 Both Taylor (70) and Guthrie (147) stretch to find a way to understand this. Guthrie
is particularly perplexed at having to apply the example of the doctor and the ill
body to friendship. Neither is satisfied and both conclude that the dialogue is a
failure.
13 Further, what is the relationship between the NGNB (to which one is restored) and
the good (which one attempts to achieve)? This is a complicated issue which I
address in a paper which is currently in progress called "The Good, the Bad and the
Neither Good Nor Bad in the Gorgias, Euthydemus and Lysis.'
14 I must, therefore, disagree with Guthrie's (146) assessment that 'anything of impor-
tance in [the Lysis] can be found in other [dialogues].'

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
10 Naomi Reshotko

explanation is even viable at the more basic level of physical attraction

between inanimate objects. Why are some elements stable and others
not? Because some are completely neutral while others, due to the
organization of their electrons, are unstable and, so, are attracted to other
molecules from which they can obtain what they lack.
In what remains of the passage, Socrates continues with his discussion
of the hierarchy of desire, and reinforces the impression that he is
thinking about the general notion of desire — perhaps, even so generic
a notion that it could be identified with attraction. The sick man, he
reiterates, is a friend to the doctor because of his disease (δια νόσον) and
for the sake of health (ένεκα ήγείας). Thus the body (which is NGNB) is
a friend to medicine (good) because of disease (bad). So, once again,
Socrates applies a general, theoretical idea about attraction to health and,
in turn, to φιλία by simply replacing good and bad with friend and foe:
'the friend is a friend of its friend (the good) for the sake of its friend (the
good) and because of its foe (the bad).'

4 An Ultimate Friend

At 218e, Socrates returns to discuss two problems in his example con-

cerning the body: first, contrary to what was concluded at 214e5-15a3
above, the friend is now a friend to the friend, making like friend to like.
Second, there seems to be an infinite regress of friends: medicine is a
friend to the sick body for the sake of health; health is also a friend to the
sick body for the sake of some further thing; that further thing is a friend
to the sick body for the sake of some still further thing, etc.
These two problems have the same solution. With respect to the
infinite regress, Socrates simply elaborates the hierarchy of desire more
fully, stating, 'All exertion such as this is not exerted toward these things
— toward the things which we procure for the sake of something else —
but toward that one thing which we procure all other things for the sake
of (219e). He illustrates this insight saying that a father who prized his
son above all else would, upon learning that his son had drunk hemlock,
value wine very highly if he thought it would save his son's life. Further,
he would value the vessel that contained the wine and anything else that
was necessary or helpful to his son's ingestion of the wine. It's not the
case, of course, that the father makes no distinction in value between his
son and the wine: his concern is '... not entertained for the actual things
which are applied for the sake of something, but for that something for
whose sake all the rest are applied' (220a). So the infinite regress is

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
 Plato's Lysis: A Socratic Treatise on Desire and Attraction 11

avoided through the assumption that there is an ultimate friend (πρώτον

φίλον) for the sake of which we befriend all other friends.
Of course, the first problem is also solved as the ultimate friend is not
the same as the more proximate friend, so like is no longer friend to like.
Instead, the attraction is between neither likes nor opposites (both of
which have been disallowed) but is between simple unlikes.15 Thus, here
especially, when Socrates suddenly turns back to the term φίλον, it
strikes us as nothing more than a restatement of what has already been
said with a new cognate for 'value' substituted into the same description:
"The real friend is a friend [valued] for the sake of nothing else that is a
friend' (220b4).

IV Desires as Deficits

Now Socrates makes an additional move. He points out that, on the

current analysis, friendship is motivated only by the bad, so that if one
were to abolish bad, then no one would desire anything. But, Socrates
claims, this is not the case: even in the absence of bad we would continue
to desire those things in which we were deficient. This transition is sur-
prising to those expecting an analysis of friendship as a relation between
people, but it strengthens the present interpretation. Socrates clarifies his
objection by bringing up examples such as hunger and thirst — very
basic physiological needs — as examples of desires that would remain
even if all evil were abolished.
Thus, we see, Socrates thinks that the phenomenon which he is
investigating is found in even these very ordinary states of attraction
which are motivated by deficit reduction. Socrates concludes that his
breadth of analysis has been too narrow; whatever people desire—wine,
vessels, medicine, health, silver, gold (and certainly whatever friendship
is, if it is some derivative of desire) — analysis must begin with an
understanding of how a deficiency will cause an attraction between a
subject and the object of that subject's desire. Socrates's discussion here
makes a direct connection between an attraction and a deficit.

15 Cold and hot are opposites, dog and horse are simple unlikes.

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
12 Naomi Reshotko

The desirer desires that in which it is deficient (ενδεές) ... and the
deficient is friend to that in which it is deficient ... and it becomes
deficient in that in which it is depleted. ... indeed, it is the things
belonging to one, as it seems, that constitute the loved, desired and
befriended things (ο τε ερος και ή φιλία και ή επιθυμία τυγχάνει ούσα).
(221d6-e4)

Here, Socrates makes a direct equation between 'the things belonging

(του οικείου) to one/16 and the things natural to one: 'It appears necessary
to befriend that which is ours by nature (φύσει)' (222a5). This seems to
indicate that he is talking about the most general kind of attraction — a
desire which is basic to, and underlies, all motivation toward warmth,
water, and food — in addition to people (friends). In fact, in the name of
deficiency, Socrates could be describing physical attractions as well:
attractions between plants and sources of light, or between iron filings
and magnetic fields. In bringing the discussion to this basic level, Socra-
tes presents a foundational principle for a theory of purposive human
behavior: any human activity, no matter how complicated, originates
from an effort to satisfy some sort of primal need that the organism has
by nature. In the case of humans, this is a need for good or happiness.17

16 One might also bring to mind the image from Symposium 202e-3a of two pieces of a
whole which long for restoration to one another.
17 See Reshotko (1990) for a full argument concerning the plausibility of understanding
all desires, no matter how complex, as originating from this basic form of motiva-
tion. Bolotin (225) (and also, apparently, Pohlenz [Haden (334)]) agreed with
Socrates that basic desires and needs are necessary for friendship.
Bolotin moves to a stronger and stronger interpretation of the relationship that
Socrates asserts between desire and friendship: on p. 180 he says '[Socrates] appears
to establish ... that desire is the cause of friendship .... If we look more closely,
however, we see that Socrates's claim is probably the more limited one that desire
is a cause of friendship.' Then, on p. 225 he says, Ί conclude, then, that love (or
friendship) for the Good would be impossible in a being that was perfectly free of
wants and needs. Moreover,... this conclusion is compatible with Socrates's restate-
ment at the end of the Lysis (222d6-7) that he who is good is a friend of the Good.'
As my interpretation makes clear, I don't agree with Bolotin (180) that Socrates's
claim either is, or should be, the weaker claim that desire is merely a cause of
friendship. Desires caused by bad and desires caused by deficits are both compo-
nents of the theory Socrates is disclosing, as I show in my (1990), one is simply a
more general form of desire than the other.

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
 Plato's Lysis: A Socratic Treatise on Desire and Attraction 13

Thus, Socrates is not only discussing desire, but desire in its most basic
form. He is describing the natural — practically mechanical — result of
there being such a thing as a balanced, or NGNB, state, unique to each
kind of thing, toward which each thing automatically strives.18
To the extent that human friendship is his topic of interest, Socrates
has elucidated its nature by demonstrating that human friends are one
possible way for human beings to fulfill their desire for their ultimate
friend (πρώτον φίλον), which is their friend by nature and which is not a
person, but is the good. Socrates has, quite purposefully, described a
more generic kind of φιλία — the kind that is instantiated both by the
cosmic forces of the universe, and the philiac, or erotic, urges that attract
human beings toward one another. In doing so, he has enunciated a
compelling and fundamental theory concerning what lies at the heart of
attraction.

V The End of the Dialogue

I have argued elsewhere19 that, despite the aporetic character of the early
dialogues and the paradoxical declamations that Socrates makes therein,
they can be read to yield a coherent and plausible theory concerning the
nature of human motivation. The Lysis is no exception when it comes to
aporetic endings: in the last lines, Socrates is laughing about what fools
he and the others are to call themselves friends, when they have no idea
what a friend is.
As with other early dialogues, I believe that Plato alludes to the final
spin that he wishes to place on the view being disclosed via subtleties
and ironies contained in the final moments of the relevant passages. In
this dialogue, these passages occur at 222b-23a. The beginning of the end
comes when Socrates asks whether that which belongs to a thing (του
οικείου) is different from what is like it, or if that which it is like and that

18 In the case of the sick body, Socrates appears to describe the goal state toward which
the body strives as NGNB. Must we interpret Socrates as, either intentionally or
unintentionally, identifying the NGNB and the Good? I believe that pp. 161-2 of my
1992 point toward a resolution of this problem. I address this specifically in the
paper to which I refer in note 13 above.
19 Reshotko, 1990,1992.

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
14 Naomi Reshotko

to which it belongs are the same. Socrates admonishes that they had
better turn out to be different since the former argument has shown that
'what is like is useless to its like ....' Since they are 'drunk with the
argument' and cannot go on in earnest, they elect to resolve the issue by
definition, simply declaring that that which belongs to a thing is other
than that which is like it. The fact that this resolution is posited rather
than concluded through argument seems to imply that it shouldn't be
taken seriously.
In addition, there is a subtlety that should not escape the reader
attuned both to this argument and to the overall character of the early
dialogues. The statement quoted above is incomplete, and in the text
there is a qualification added to it which I now italicize:

... it isn't easy to reject the previous argument, which says that what is
like is useless to its like insofar as there is a likeness (ως ου το ομοιον τω
όμοίω κατά την ομοιότητα άχρηστον) and it is a mistake to agree that
what is useless is a friend. (222b8-cl)

This qualification adds depth to Socrates's account, as it places his

theory into practical dimensions. Certainly, like cannot be friend to like
(nothing desires that which it already has); but people and the other
sorts of things that Socrates's theory is designed to cover are not
unidimensional, nor are such designations as 'like' and 'unlike' unam-
biguous. So, something (or someone) might desire another thing or
person which is like it in some dimension, but that likeness will not be
the aspect of the thing desired which is the cause of that attraction. The
science of attraction will never be fully enunciated if we treat the objects
under study monolithically.
Thus, the situation has to be more complicated than the way it was
originally presented. The object of the desire is not going to be monolithic
in either its goodness or its unlikeness. Even as qualified above, the facts
about the object of desire are presented too starkly. One's desire must be
both for that which is one's own and for that from which one is different.
Socrates alludes to this sophistication next when he skips over his own
suggestion that they posit that the good belongs to everyone and invites
them to posit that what is good belongs to good, what is bad belongs to
bad, and what is NGNB belongs to what is NGNB — to which they
assent. In treating the issue of who is attracted to what starkly and
dichotomously, Socrates and his interlocutors arrive at a position which
is self refuting:

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
 Plato's Lysis: A Socratic Treatise on Desire and Attraction 15

... we have descended upon those accounts of friendship which we

initially rejected, for now the unjust will be no less a friend to the unjust,
and the bad to the bad and the good to the good. — It seems so. — But
if we posit that that which is good and that which belongs to one are
the same, we cannot avoid making the good a friend only to the good.
(222dl-5)

The subtle sophistication of Socrates's qualification 'insofar as they are

alike' has escaped his interlocutors, but Plato has brought it out for the
reader. We shouldn't suppose that the good either belongs to everyone
or belongs only to the good (with the bad and the NGNB also belonging,
each of them, only to themselves). The elements of attraction are likely
to be multi-faceted, and attraction relies on this complexity. The subject
of a unidirectional attraction or desire seeks that which is both like it and
unlike it: unlike it in that the object provides what it lacks, but like it in
that what is supplied by the object is relevant to the subject. After all, the
bad itself has been disqualified as either a subject or an object of desire,
and the good has been disqualified as a subject of desire as it is not
lacking in anything. Thus, the primary players in the game of attraction,
desire and friendship are the NGNB's, which are complex enough to
have some deficits which must be fulfilled, and some goods which can
be offered. These NGNB objects could easily fulfill our intuitions con-
cerning human friends.
Particularly in the human realm, where friendship is concerned, we
are dealing with a subject and object both of which are NGNB. As will
be seen shortly, this is where reciprocity comes in. The implication of
having two elements that are unlike one another, yet that can fulfill one
another's deficits, is that attractants are interdependent: they comple-
ment one another like a right hand and a left hand. A right hand and a
left hand work well together because they have both important similari-
ties and important differences. Socrates has intimated to us that the most
effective and long-lasting attractions are between elements that are
interdependent in that they share both similarities and differences in an
appropriate way.
Socrates has rejected one aspect of his original, simplistic view on like
being friend to like. Earlier he assumed that NGNB-like cannot be friend
to NGNB-like because two things that are alike will not complement one
another's needs (216e7). Now, Socrates is considering objects of appro-
priate complexity. Because NGNB objects are complex, they can lack one
thing while having an excess of another. Because NGNB objects are

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
16 Naomi Reshotko

varied, their lacks and excesses can complement one another. Socrates
now sees that two NGNB objects are drawn to one another if they are
both similar to, and different from, one another in just the right ways.

VI Conclusion: A Friend is a Means to the Good

In the Lysis, Socrates answers the question 'what is φιλία?' by disclosing

a theory of attraction which is the basis for the theory of desire that is
featured throughout the early dialogues. However, this does not mean
that the Lysis does not inform us about the relationship that exists
between two people who are friends. Human friendship is no different
from any other kind of attraction. Human beings, like all other beings,
are attracted to (desire) that which is theirs by nature.20 The fact that
Socrates finds the paradigm of human friendship to hold between a
person and the good, rather than between two people, can obscure our
interpretation of the Lysis is we assume that φνλία refers to some sort of
positive reciprocal relationship between two human beings. Socrates
saw φιλία as a basic form of attraction that is instantiated by physical
and cosmological entities as well as by human beings.
When it comes to human φιλία, this generic sort of attraction is
constituted by a desire; it has the following structure: human φιλία is a
relationship between a human being (who is at present NGNB) and the
good. The good is what this NGNB human being lacks, it is what he or
she needs in order to be good or happy him or herself, and it is natural
for human beings to strive for happiness and happiness alone (all desire
for actions, objects and states other than happiness is entertained for
these objects only insofar as they are a means toward happiness). Thus,
the good is the ultimate friend for a human being. However, it is not
unusual for a NGNB human being to see the state of being in a relation-
ship with another human being as a means to the good. Thus, if a human
being can supply something that another human being lacks with respect
to his or her ability to become good, then the second human being would
be well-advised to befriend the first human being. These two human

20 Which is equally the good, happiness and virtue. See Reshotko (1992) for a discus-
sion of how these three things are identified and why human beings are naturally
attracted to them.

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
 Plato's Lysis: A Socratic Treatise on Desire and Attraction 17

beings will be friends to one another even though their friendship with
each other is for the sake of the good (not really for the sake of the other)
— to which the friendship brings them closer. Neither one of them can
be a πρώτον φίλον to the other. The thesis that reciprocity is a criterion
for a successful friendship between humans can be explained by the fact
that this association between two people, where one is the means to an
end for the other, will likely to more satisfying to both parties, and will
last longer, if the need and deficit fulfillment are, somehow, mutual.
In order to understand the Lysis, it is important to understand that, on
Socrates's view, it would not be possible to describe friendship between
human beings as an isolated phenomenon. Friendship between two
people can only be understood when a general theory of attraction is in
place. Only once we have such a general theory of attraction can we begin
to isolate the good as that which human beings pursue via the hierarchy
of desire. We can only understand one human being's pursuit of another
human being through the hierarchy of desire, as well. Thus, even if we
have a special interest in human friendship, we cannot read the Lysis
successfully without the intention of coming to understand Socrates's
general theory of attraction and desire.21

Department of Philosophy
University of Denver
Denver CO 80218
nreshotk@du.edu

21 I am grateful to George Rudebusch for his helpful and insightful comments on an

earlier draft of this paper. I am grateful to Roger Shiner for his patience, and for the
caring and supportive manner in which he offered his advice. I am also lucky to
have a friend like Ruth Saunders; she is readily engaged in philosophical discus-
sions concerning whatever I happen to be working on, and is full of energy when
it comes to helping me tackle any stage of the process. I hope that our discussions
are as much a means to her happiness as they seem to be to mine.

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM
18 Naomi Reshotko

Works Cited
D. Bolotin (1979) Plato's Dialogue on Friendship (Ithaca. Cornell University Press)
L Brandwood (1990) The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues (Cambridge. Cambridge University
Press).
E.R. Dodds (1959) Gorgms (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Guthrie (1975) History of Greek Philosophy Vol. IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
J. Haden (1983) 'Friendship in Plato's Lysis' Review of Metaphysics 37 327-56.
T.H. Irwin (1977) Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
D.M. Levin (1964) 'Some Observations Concerning Plato's Lysis', reprinted in Anton and
Kustas, eds. (1971) Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press).
T.M. Penner (1987a) The Ascent From Nominalism (Dordrecht: Reidel).
. 'Socrates on the Impossibility of Belief-Relative Sciences', in Cleary, ed. (1987) Proceed-
ings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy vol. Ill (Lanhanv University
Press of America).
. 'Plato and Davidson: Parts of the Soul and Weakness of Will' Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, Suppl. Vol. 19 35-74.
. 'Power and Desire in Socrates: The Argument of Gorgias 466a-8e that Orators and
Tyrants Have no Power in the City', Apeiron 24 147-202
T.M. Penner and C.J. Rowe (1994) "The Desire for Good1 Is the Meno Inconsistent with the
Gorgias' Phronesis 39 1-25.
N. Reshotko (1990) Dretske and Socrates: The Development of the Theme That All Desire is for
the Good in a Contemporary Analysis of Desire' (Ann Arbor MI: University Microfilms).
. (1992) "The Socratic Theory of Motivation' Apeiron 25 145-70.
R. Robinson (1941) Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Cornell. Cornell University Press).
G. Santas (1979) Socrates (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
D. Sedley (1989) 'Is the Lysis a Dialogue of Definition?' Phronesis 34 107-8.
A.E. Taylor (1926) Plato: The Man and His Work (London: Metheun & Co.).
G. Vlastos (1991) Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

Brought to you by | St. Petersburg State University

Authenticated | 134.99.128.41
Download Date | 1/21/14 6:47 PM