Consti2Digest – Phil Blooming Mills Employment Organization Vs Phil Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

GR L-
31195 (5 June 1973)

Philippine Booming Mills Employment Organization Vs Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., GR L-31195
(5 June 1973)

Petitioners: Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization, Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio, Padrigano
Rufino, Roxas Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo
Munsod

Respondents: Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. and Court of Industrial Relations

Ponente: J. Makasiar

Facts:

1. The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners
Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances
against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

2. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang
on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the
workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts
(from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the
respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

3. The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO after learning
about the planned mass demonstration. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was
confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out by the union that the demonstration was not a strike
against the company but was in factual exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to
freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.

4. The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of
their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the
possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.

5. A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may
be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to
participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took
place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and
No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

6. The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and the officers of the PBMEO
were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. The PBMEO’s motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.

Issue:

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1. Whether or not to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as a
violation of freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of
grievances.

2. Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement is an inhibition of the rights of free expression,
free assembly and petition of the employers.

Held:

1. Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If
human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to
limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials,
of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.

The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was against alleged abuses
of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of
their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They
exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were
police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein
petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest
herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees,
so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform
more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits.

2. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith
in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for
the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of
the collective bargaining agreement, is “a potent means of inhibiting speech” and therefore inflicts a
moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition.

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the
respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the “duty … to observe regular
working hours.” The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts
deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours,
constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation.
Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the
respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for
redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in
relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right “to engage in concert activities for … mutual aid
or protection”; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three.

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The Supreme Court set aside as null and void the orders of Court of Industrial Relations. The Supreme
Court also directed the re-instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date
of their separation from the service until re-instated, minus one day’s pay and whatever earnings they
might have realized from other sources during their separation from the service.

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