Sahrip v Mitchell & Anor

The judge recognized that it is well known by the old Malay law or custom of Malacca, while
the sovereign was the owner of the soil, everyman had nevertheless the right to clear and
occupy all forest and wasted land, subject to the payment, to the sovereign, of one tenths of
the produce of the land so taken.

Abdul Latif v Mohamed Meera Lebe

It had been observed that there are 2 kinds of land, first 'living land' and second, 'dead land'.
With regard to dead land, nobody has property rights to it, when there is no sign of it being
under cultivation by someone,then certainly nobody can lay a claim to that land. If someone
cultivates it into a rice field, be it huma or ladang or sawah or bendang, no one can proceed
against him. That is what is understood as 'living land

Since the introduction of the Torrens system of titles and interest by registration,
Malaysia no longer recognises adverse possession of state land.

SECTION 48 – NO ADVERSE POSSESSION AGAINST THE STATE

SECTION 341 : “ADVERSE POSSESSION FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME… SHALL NOT
CONSTITUTE A BAR TO THE BRINGING OF ANY ACTION FOR THE RECOVERY
THEREOF BY THE PROPRIETOR…”

Sidek bin Haji Muhamad & 461 Ors v Government of Perak & Ors

In 1950, the appellants, who were from Kedah, North Perak and Selangor, came to Teluk
Anson and opened up a jungle area. The appellant were squatters. As more and more
squatters came to settle in the area, the state government re-organised the settlement which
resulted in new settlers being placed in the lands where the appellants were already in
occupation.

It was alleged by the appellants that the District Officer had promised each settler family three
acres of padi land, subject to successful interviews. There were also articles in Utusan Melayu,
quoting Bernama as the source, stating that the State Director of Land and Mines had said
that each pioneer settler family would be given five acres of padi land.

After interviews were held, the appellants were unsuccessful and were subsequently given
notice to stop work and to vacate the area. The appellants brought action seeking a court
declaration, inter alia, that they are entitled in law and in equity to be in possession of the land
originally pioneered, opened up and occupied by them. Appellants’ appeal to the FC was
dismissed on the grounds that they had no cause of action in equity or in law since they are
squatters. Federal Court also cited the offence under Section 425 of the NLC as well as rights
under Section 341 of the same code and stressed that the only way to obtain state land is by
way of making a formal application for land under the NLC

Promise of the State Director was also not binding on the State Authority.

Bohari bin Taib & Ors v Pengarah Tanah Galian Selangor

In this case, the forefathers of the appellants were pioneer settlers of agricultural lands
in Sabak Bernam, Selangor. The appellants had applied for titles to the land between 1971
and 1976 and had received information from a Selangor State Executive Council member that
their applications had been approved. However following a new
policy that land would only be given to genuine 'landless' farmers, the state government only
granted temporary occupation licences to the appellants on the understanding that separate
titles to the land would be issued to the appellants as long as they continue cultivating the
lands and remain as 'landless'.

After the expiry of the Temporary Occupation Licence (TOL) in 1984 however, the respondent
handed over the lands to the Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority
(FELCRA). The respondent then, on behalf of FELCRA brought an action in court to
summarily dispossess the appellants from the lands without even offering any sort of
compensation to the appellants for the eviction. The High Court allowed the respondent’s
application and the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.

The appellants contended that as they had fulfilled the administrative conditions imposed by
the respondent relating to the alienation of lands to them, they had a legal expectation to be
issued with land titles and that it was wrong for the respondent on behalf of the state
government to expel them away under Order 89 as trespassers pure and simple. The
appellants further contend that they are not squatters of state land in the popular and normal
sense, but are the licencees holding over or lawful occupiers of state land with the continued
consent of the State Executive Council under the approved alienation.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that the summary order of possession under
O 89 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 is only proper to be granted in respect of
squatters simpliciter who have no rights whatsoever and not against those who were lawful
occupiers with licence or consent. It was held that the appellants in this case had 'triable
issues' with regard to the continued consent of the state authority after the expiry of the TOL
based onthe earlier approval for alienation and therefore they were not squatters
simpliciter but occupiers with licence or consent. This was therefore a case not suitable to be
decided on affidavit evidence alone but should go for full trial.

Although Bohari's case may bode well for squatters of state land, one must be reminded that
it does not in any case establish any sort of legal status in respect of 'occupiers with licenceor
consent'. The decision in Bohari's case merely asserts that such occupiers cannot be
summarily dispossessed but their claim to lawful possession of such land should be litigated
in a full trial. What these occupiers have is additional time to still occupy such land pending
the granting of an order of possession after full trial, if any

Lebbey Sdn Bhd v Chong Wooi Leong & Anor

Facts: Defendants were unlawful occupiers of an alienated land and had been on the land
even when the land was owned by the Selangor State Authority before the land was alienated
to the Plaintiff.

In an action by the Plaintiff for the possession of land, the Defendant argued that although the
they(Defendants) had entered the state land without any consent or license, they had a
peaceful enjoyment and occupation on the land without any interference by the State
Authority.

It was also argued that the District Officer had allowed them to rebuild houses on the land after
fire. The committee of residents had applied for TOL based on the promises by the politicians
that they would be given the TOL. Held: This case highlight that one who seeks remedy in
equity must come with clean hands. In this case the appellants were squatters and they should
be punished under s.425 as the state authority had never been consented by the state
authority.

State authority under the Code is defined, the purposes of the State of Selangor, as the
Ruler. For practical purposes, this means the Ruler acting upon the recommendation
of the executive council (EXCO) of the state. The state government, let alone any
Minister, Exco member or politician has nothing to do with the proceedings under the
Code, which recognizes only the state authority. The district officer is unknown to the
Code. Therefore, the defendants not only entered the land without consent but had also
remained thereon without the consent of the state authority.

- Even in a case where a temporary occupation licence is issued, upon the end of
the licence, there can be no claim in equity for compensation for structures and
improvements made upon such land. The occupier makes such expenditures
upon his own accord and risk.
Nik Ibrahim Bin Abdul Rahman & Anor v Pentadbir Tanah Jajahan Gua Musang & Ors
The plaintiffs were brought into the land by Kesedar ('the third defendant') to clear up the land
and to plant oil palm. They were given two lots. Besides oil palm, the plaintiffs planted other
cash crops for their own consumption. The plaintiffs later applied to Pentadbir Tanah Jajahan
Gua Musang ('the first defendant') and were allegedly given temporary titles (Surat Hakmilik
Sementara ('SHS')) on payment of a premium for the lots that they occupy. Subsequently, the
land was alienated to the third defendant and it became the registered proprietor. The third
defendant apparently granted the land to Kesedar Perkilangan Sdn Bhd ('the fifth defendant'),
who then issued notices to the plaintiffs to vacate the land. The plaintiffs applied to be allowed
to remain and collect rubber on the land and that the fifth defendant be restrained from entering
into the land.

- The third defendant being the registered proprietor of the said land under the doctrine
of indefeasibility of title under s 340 of the National Land Code, there is no statutory
ground or other grounds of equity, to challenge the indefeasibility of the third
defendant's document of title.
- Assuming that the plaintiffs had the authority under the SHS, which is temporary in
nature, it cannot go against the registered proprietor of the said land who was issued
the document of title by the state authority. The plaintiffs were brought into the said
land lawfully, they were given SHS over their lots, but when the registered proprietor
of the said land required its land for its own purpose, no one could legally stop it. Thus,
it was fair and right to issue notices to quit to the plaintiffs. It is lawful for the notices to
be issued by the owner of the said land or its agent, unless there is evidence to the
contrary. Failing to quit the said land as requested, the plaintiffs remained on the land
at their own peril. They are trespassers. Trespassers have no right in law or in equity
against the registered proprietor, as in this case, even to collect the rubber and other
cash crops which they had once upon a time, planted and enjoyed the benefit of over
the years.

ALIENATION:

Piagamas Maju Sdn Bhd v Pengarah Tanah Galian Negeri Selangor & Anor

The State Authority approved the application of alienation of a state land to the appellant. A
portion of the land was occupied by a group of Orang Asli. It was agreed that the Orang Asli
will be relocated and compensated. The appellant was asked to pay the premium as in Form
5A on the condition that, inter alia, the issue with the Orang Asli has been resolved. The
appellant paid the amount but the issue with the Orang Asli is not resolved, so, the State
Authority revoked the approval of alienation. The Court held that, although the approval
has been made and the premium has been paid, the land is still a State land, hence,
vests in the State Authority, until the registration of title of the land. The State Authority
has the rights to revoke the approval of the alienation.

It is worthy to note that s. 80(3) states that after the approval of alienation and the payment of
land revenue has been completed, the State Authority shall proceed to prepare, issue and
register the title in respect of the land. However, the word choice of the provision, “shall”,
implies that there is no obligation for the State Authority to proceed with preparing,
issuing and registering the title for the land. The logic is that the word “shall” merely
reflects the administrative steps for the State Authority.

North East Plantation Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Daerah Dungun & Anor

The issue in this appeal concerns the power of the State Authority to revoke its earlier
approval of alienation of state land under the National Land Code (“the Code”). It is the
appellant’s argument was that the State Authority has no power to revoke its earlier approval
of alienation of state land under the NLC. Moreover, they argued that the word “shall” in section
80(3) of the Code is mandatory in nature and the respondent had no choice but to issue the
qualified titles. So, when the State Authority revoked its earlier approval of alienation of state
land to the appellant, it had in law exceeded its powers under the NLC, acted in bad faith and
disregarded of the rules of natural justice and the appellant’s legitimate expectation. But the
court held that the land shall remain state land until registration is complete. There is no doubt
that the process of alienation had not been completed. The document of titles had not been
issued to the appellant. Being state land, it is, by virtue of section 40(a) of the NLC still vested
solely in the State Authority. Section 48 of the Code makes it clear that no title to State land
shall be acquired by possession, unlawful occupation or occupation under any licence for any
period whatsoever.

Teh Bee v K. Maruthamuthu (FC)

Form 5A was issued upon approval in 1966 but the appellant only paid land revenue due to
the SA beyond the specified time period of 3 months given. She wrote to the Collector asking
that she be exempted from paying the premium and the request was referred to the Executive
Council but was turned down. In October 1967 she paid the full amount.

- HC:Taking the view that under rule 7 of the Negeri Sembilan Land Rules, 1966 the
appellant could not have more than six months within which to pay the amount the
learned judge concluded that when the appellant was registered as proprietress in April
1968 the approval of alienation of the land to her had
- already lapsed by reason of section 81(2) and therefore it was ultra vires the powers
of the state authority to alienate the land to her.
- FC: Appellant was the only applicant for the alienation of the land in question. There
was no other applicant to whom it could have been alienated after the approval to the
applicant lapsed on her failure to pay the amount $4,327.50 within the specified time.
But the State Authority did not seem to have any intention of giving or alienating the
land to anyone else other than the appellant. The fact that she was registered as
proprietress in April 1968 necessarily raised the inference that the State
Authority on the amount having been paid in October 1967 had given fresh
approval. The reason for the provision relating to the lapse of approval under section
81(2) of the Code is to enable the State Authority to give the land to someone else in
the event the approved applicant does not want the land or is unable to pay the
necessary fees under section 81(1). It was clearly not intended to impose any
restriction on the State Authority's power of disposal. Merely “directory not
mandatory”
WHAT IS LAND:
Holland v Hodgson
- 2 TEST
Goh Chong Hin v The Consolidated Malay Rubber Estate
English law of fixture applicable in Malaysia

Billing v Pill ,

The courts had to consider whether an army hut resting on a concrete foundation and secured
by bolts onto the concrete was a fixture or not. It could be dismantled and removed easily
without damaging it. The courts held that the hut was temporary used to provide sleeping
accommodation for soldiers etc. and that it could be removed without damaging the freehold
and is thusly a chattel.

Berkley v Poulett

Pictures were fixed in the recesses of panelling of two rooms of the estate of the defendant
and there was a heavy statue of a Greek athlete. The estate had been purchased by the
plaintiff, and the defendant removed the items. The plaintiff sued for compensation or delivery
of the items. Scarman LJ viewed that the pictures and the statue was much to the taste of the
occupier of the estate at that time and were not fixtures which passed to the purchaser of a
house but chattels that the vendor could remove.

Spyer v. Phillipson (tenant’s fixture)

It was held that the panelling, the chimney pieces and the fireplaces installed by the late Mr.
Philipson, the one to whom the plaintiff served as executor, were regarded as chattel. As I
pointed out Mr. Phillipson was a tenant for a term of years. It would be a little surprising if this
gentleman were to spend 5000l. in purchasing panelling and have it put in on the footing that
he would only enjoy it for eleven or thirteen years, and at the end of that time he would lose
all interest in it, and it would belong to a complete stranger, i.e., the landlord of the premises.
It might be quite a different matter if the question was one which had arisen between a tenant
for life.

Leigh v Taylor (tenant’s fixture and intention)

Madame de Falbe was the tenant for life of a mansion. She had placed some valuable
tapestries in the mansion which were stretched on to hard match board and affixed to the walls
by nails. They could be removed with slight disturbance to the walls.
On Madame de Falbe’s death, the court were required to determine whether the tapestries
had become fixtures belonging to the mansion or whether they remained chattels.

The House of Lords found the tapestries were chattels and so remained the rightful property
of Madame de Falbe’s estate. The House considered closely the degree of annexation, which
was as slight as the nature of the tapestries would permit, and the intent of the life tenant in
hanging the tapestries, which were “put up for ornamentation and for the enjoyment of the
person while occupying the house”. Therefore, the chattels remained the personal property of
Madame de Falbe.

Hulme v Brigham

The claimant leased a number of printing machines to a third-party printing company on the
basis that the company would have an option to buy the machines at the end of the lease
term. The company subsequently mortgaged its property to the defendant and ultimately failed
to maintain payments on the mortgage over the property where the machines were housed.
When possession of the property was taken, the defendant refused to return the machines to
the claimant on the basis that they were fixtures. The machines were not attached to the
property and rested entirely by their own weight. They were however, attached by a belt and
cabling to a driving mechanism which was firmly attached to the property.

The driving system could easily be removed from the printing machines and, despite their
weight, the machines easily removed from the property. The machine and the driving device
were separate devices and it would be wrong to hold that the attachment to the driving device,
which could easily be disconnected, had the effect of altering the characteristic of the printing
machine to the extent that it would be considered attached to the property.

Heavy machinery unattached to land was considered a chattel.

People’s Park Chinatown Development Pte Ltd (In Liquidation) v Schindler Lifts (S) Pte
Ltd

The escalators, although hoisted into place rested on their own weight, were
nevertheless fixtures as the circumstances were such as to show that they had been fixed
to the building in such a way as to become an integral and permanent feature of the building

Wiggins Teape (M) Sdn. Bhd. v Bahagia Trading Sdn. Bhd. & Ors
A property was charged to the bank in which an offset printing machine which was under hire
purchase scheme was affixed in that property to the floor by bolts. The chargor failed in the
loan repayment and the bank took proceedings to enforce the charge. Dispute as to whether
the machine formed part of the property is also a subject matter of the charge. Held- The
machine is a fixture and thus passes to the charge even if it were attached to the land after
concluding the charge agreement unless of course contrary was provided for in the contract.

The chargee had no prior notice or reason to believe in regarding the hpa. Things that
were attached to the land after concluding the charge agreement can be considered as
a fixtures and will regarded as part of the land when pass to the charge.

Sungei Way Leasing Sdn. Bhd. v Lian Seng Properties Sdn. Bhd. & Ors
(Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd. & Anor, Interveners)

If there is an express provision regarding the nature of the fixture and such provision has also
clearly specified the limitations imposed on the ownership of the fixture, then the tests are
inapplicable. The defendant, owner of KL Plaza had took up a loan and charged the building.
Later, a ‘custom-made’ air-conditioning unit bought under a hire-purchase agreement, was
affixed to the building. The lessor was entitled to the air conditioning because Article 11 of the
Lease Agreement prohibited the transfer of the equipment to the third party.

Esso Malaysia Bhd. v Hills Agency (M) Sdn. Bhd. [1994] 1 MLJ 740

P applied for an order to recover possession of certain land belonging to them on the ground
that the defendants were occupying the land without consent of P:

Whether plant was a fixture, therefore formed part of the land.

Held: The mere fact of physical attachment is not conclusive to deem an article a fixture,
what is of greater importance is the object of annexation. It clearly showed that the
plant was a permanent attachment to the land, thereby forming part of the land

The Shell Company of the Federation of Malaya Ltd v. Commissioner of the Federal
Capital of Kuala Lumpur

Concerning the nature of underground tanks. It was held that the tanks, when placed
underground, were intended to remain in there for as long as the filling-stations continue
in operation. They are liable to be disturbed and replaced only in case an increase of
storage capacity becomes necessary.

The manner of their removal, if it has to be done, shows how firmly the tanks are
embedded in the earth. To remove the tanks, the turf, concrete or tarmacadam is taken up,
the earth excavated, the concrete manhole boxes removed, all pipe connections unbolted
and the tank, with its concrete sinker weights can then be raised with blocks and tackle. The
tanks, when placed underground, were intended to remain there for a long time.

Thus they were fixtures.

Material Trading Pte. Ltd v DBS Finance

Plaintiffs in this case was a lessee of two plots of lands on which stood warehouses containing
overhead cranes. Following their liquidation, the defendant mortagees object to the removal
of the cranes for the new purchaser contending that the cranes were fixtures. The court stated
that the fixed overhead cranes once installed, they operate within the confine of the runways
in the warehouses. In other words, they are intended to serve, and they serve, only the
warehouses where they were installed. They are an adjunct to the warehouses; they improve
the usefulness of the warehouses and enhance their values.

Vaudeville Electric Cinema Ltd v Muriset

The seats attached to the flooring of a cinema were held to be fixtures on the ground that they
were placed there for the better enjoyment of the cinema hall. The chairs were intended for
the better enjoyment of the Hippodrome as a building, and the object and effect of their
annexation was the permanent improvement of the building as a place of public entertainment.

Re Tiambi bt Ma’amin

The existence of a custom may act as a waiver to the presumption that the thing was
intended to be permanently affixed.

Kiah bte Hanapiah v Som bte Hanapiah

A Malay traditional house built on stilts which could be easily dismantled and removed from
one place toanother is a chattel.

D'Eyncourt v Gregory (1866) LR 3 Eq 382

The court was required to determine if some tapestries, some ornamental statues of lions in
the hall, staircase and gardens, some vases resting in nitches and stone garden seats were
fixtures or chattels.

The tapestries were fixtures as they were integral to the decoration of the room where they
attached as wallpaper or frescos. The statue of lions, the garden seats and vases were also
fixtures as they formed part of the overall architectural design. Lord Romilly MR: "I think it does
not depend on whether any cement is used for fixing these articles, or whether they rest on
their own weight, but upon this--whether they are strictly and properly part of the architectural
design for the hall and staircase itself and put in there as such, as distinguishedfrom mere
ornaments to be afterwards added."
RENT:

UMBC v Pemungut Hasil Tanah, Kota Tinggi [1984] 2 MLJ 87

The courts have no jurisdiction to grant any relief against forfeiture of any alienated
land by SA, save in accordance with provisions of relevant statute -s.133, 134, 418 NLC
– x contemplate any power of court to grant equitable relief against forfeiture; s.6 CLA
prohibits application of English land law, which includes equity -unlike s.237 -Forfeiture
against RP- 2 options: 1) apply for annulment, s.133; 2) appeal, s.134(2) -no provisions
in either s.133 or s.134 to enable courts grant relief against forfeiture

Pemungut Hasil Tanah, Kota Tinggi v UMBC

Time period specified in Form 6A by LA is final, cannot be extended by courts

Khoo Cheng & Ors v Pentadbir Tanah Muar [2008] 3 CLJ 534.

Non-compliance with any mandatory provisions relating to forfeiture will vitiate any purported
forfeiture - Notwithstanding the fact that forfeiture has already been completed & land is now
State land.

TOL:

Teh Bee v K Maruthamuthu (HC)

- Appellant was TOL holder whom had been occupying the land for quite a period of
time(1954-1967). He has been renewing his license ever since however in 1968 when
he went to get his renewal he was informed that the land had been alienated to the
respondent despite the fact that he himself had submitted an application for alienation
which he had received a reply that his application was in consideration. Appellant was
hopeful that it would be alienated to him
- Appellant claimed for compensation in equity for all the improvements he had incurred
on the land.
o Although TOL holders have the right of to apply for renewal, there is no
obligation imposed on the LA to grant a renewal of the license for the
subsequent year.
o In accordance with the T&C which appear in the form of TOL license:
 License may be cancelled immediately and without compensation upon
the breach of any provision to which the license is subject but otherwise
 A subsisting license may be cancelled at any time before the date of
the expiry only upon payment of compensation by the STG which is to
be agreed in accordance with s434 of the NLC
  But in no circumstances however can a person who has occupied
a land on TOL acquire a right to be compensated by a subsequent
registered proprietor thereof for any expense that he might have
incurred over the land during the period in which he occupied it
under TOL.

- S.68 – TOL NOT CAPABLE OF BEING TRANSFERRED OR TRANSMITTED ON

DEATH
Papoo v Veeriah
- Application made by widow and administratrix of the estate of a deceased person to
transfer to her own name as sole beneficiary of the estate of the deceased, a house
which was built upon a TOL land. A purported sale of the house was made to the
respondent and the TOL was then re-issued in the respondent’s name.
o Neither land subject of a TOL nor anything attached to the land to be
transmitted by the will of a testator.
 TOL is exactly what the name implies – license to occupy nothing
more
 If a TOL holder chooses to put up a building on state land which
he occupies by virtue of that license, he takes risk of losing what
he has put up into that building.
 If people choose to deal in buildings erected on state land, if they
acquire such buildings for valuable consideration – they do so at
their own risk because they know, deem to have known or ought to have
known that such buildings cannot be subject of private transaction
unless in the absence of any contract to the contrary which STG may
be a party, such buildings are clearly the property of state.
 License is personal to the holder – dies with the holder
 If the CLR chooses to issue a fresh license to a legatee or a next
of kin that is a matter entirely in his discretion.
o Application dismissed, applicant had no right to occupy the house.

Fatimah v Moideen Kutty

- R occupied land on which was originally held by the A’s husband on a TOL. The
husband died in 1962 and when CLR heard of this he refused to renew the license.
Subsequently, A as administratrix of her late husband’s estate claimed rent for the
period of July 1964 to 28 February 1965.
 o The licence was not transmitted to the widow on the licensee's death and
he died on 10th August, 1962. Thereafter the collector renewed the licence
for the year 1963 in the deceased's name. When he knew of the deceased's
death, he refused to renew it after the end of 1963. Whatever may have been
the deceased’s or the widow's right between the deceased's death and the end
of 1963, thereafter because Government refused to renew the temporary
occupation licence in the name of the deceased or any one else, neither his
estate nor she had any right of any kind whatever to the land.
o However, it is equally clear that the shop houses which were the subject
matter of the tenancy are now under illegal occupation by the tenant.
o It must be assumed that every contract of tenancy in respect of a house
on State land contains an implied term that the tenancy is valid only for
the duration of the landlord's licence to occupy the land. On the
expiration of the landlord's licence either by effluxion of time or by the
death of the licensee, the contract of tenancy must be deemed to have
come to an end and the relationship of landlord and tenant extinguished.

Paruvathy Murgiah v Krishnan

- Appellant was the holder of a temporary occupation licence of a piece of land in
Seremban (originally issued to her late husband and was then re-issued to her). The
respondent built a house on the land and claimed that he was entitled to do so by virtue
of a document made between the appellant and himself and one Thangavelu whereby
the appellant gave "equal shares" in the land to the respondent and Thangavelu. The
appellant claimed possession of the land and house. The respondent claimed that he
had a right to stay on because of the document executed by the appellant and because
he had built the house at the request and with the consent of the appellant.
o the principle of equitable estoppel can in a proper case be invoked against the
holder of a temporary occupation licence, in this case however the document
purported to be executed by the appellant and relied on by the
respondent was void for illegality as it was in contravention of section 68
of the National Land Code, as it purported to transfer the rights and
interests of the appellant in the TOL (“equal shares”)

Hee Cheng v Krishnan

- P’s application for specific performance of a contract to sell the defendant’s rights in a
TOL land and a house built on TOL land was dismissed. Contract was an illegal
contract under s.24(e) of the Contracts Act
Cheo Lean How v Fock Fong Looi

- Too Sun husband of the appellant was the holder of the TOL. A dwelling house was
erected on the land by Cheng Yen, with the approval or without the objection of
Too Sun.
- Subsequently the dwelling house was sold to Loke Song, the father of the
respondent, since deceased. This transaction was reduced into writing and
witnessed by Too Sun. The temporary occupation licence issued to Too Sun was later
replaced by a qualified title. The respondent continued to live in the dwelling house on
the land. Subsequently the land was transferred by Too Sun to his wife, the appellant.
She gave the respondent fourteen days to vacate the dwelling house and the land.
When the respondent failed to do so, the appellant brought an action against the
respondent in the Magistrate's Court alleging that he was a trespasser.
o Hee Cheng case can be distinguished from the facts of the present case
in that Too Sun, the holder of the temporary occupation licence did not
sell the dwelling house erected on State land held under temporary
licence to Loke Seng. It was Chung Yen who sold the building to Loke
Seng. Too Sun merely signed as a witness and he was not a party to the
transaction. Besides, made it abundantly clear that the sale was in respect of
the dwelling house put up by Cheng Yun only.

Govindaraju v Krishnan

- Renting out a room on a TOL land does not amount to transfer.