GR No 112099 FEBRUARY 21, 1995

ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner,

vs.

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL

COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents

FACTS:

Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against respondent incumbent
Mayor and obtained favorable decision suspending the latter. Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of
the President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution in accordance
with Sec. 67(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC). The Office of the President thru the Executive
Secretary directed “stay of execution”. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was dismissed.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with
prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as having
been issued with grave abuses of discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC (1991) impliedly
repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 (1987).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18.

RULING:

NO. Petition was dismissed. “Stay of execution” applied. The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides
that an “appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory.” As worded, there is room to
construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed
decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order
a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order
No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention. An implied repeal predicates
the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior
laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law
unless an irreconciled inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.

GR NO 191002

De Castro vs JBC

Facts:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The said decision directs
the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy
created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare
the short list of nominees and submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue that the disputed
constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight
appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary, and they contended that the principle of stare decisis
is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
ISSUE (Section 4):
Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the
period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII?
RULING:
The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during
the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted
from the records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art.
VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision on nepotism.
Election ban on appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld its March 17, 2010
decision ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution against presidential
appointments immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the
outgoing president does not apply to vacancies in the Supreme Court.