Running head: FAILURE OF THE 2004 ANNAN PEACE PLAN IN CYPRUS

Failure of the 2004 Annan Peace Plan in Cyprus

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FAILURE OF THE 2004 ANNAN PEACE PLAN IN CYPRUS

Introduction: The Annan Plan

The 2004 Annan Peace Plan was an attempt by the United Nations to help the

state of Cyprus to settle the severe dispute between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot

communities. The Annan plan aimed at resolving the enthnonational conflict in a

manner that would leave Cyprus a two state federation – the Turkish Cypriot community

in the north and the Greek Cypriot community in the south. In a referendum conducted

on 24 April 2004, 69.91% of the Turkish Cypriots accepted the peace plan. However,

75% of the Greek Cypriots strongly rejected the peace proposal to partition Cyprus into

a federal state.

The Republic of Cyprus is an island country strategically located in the Eastern

Mediterranean sea. The republic attained independence back in 1960 from Great

Britain. In a period of over four decades, Cyprus has experienced unending

intercommunal violence between the Greek – and Turkish Cypriot Communities. The

first intercommunal clashes between the two Cypriot communities took place in 1963, a

phenomenon that led to the intervention of the UN as a peace mediator in a move to

reunify the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Since the start of the conflicts, five successive

United Nations’ secretary-generals have attempted to resolve the intercommunal

violence in the island. The Annan plan is the most recent and the most significant peace

plan in the face of the Cypriot civil society.

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The Failure of the Peace Plan

The providence of the Annan Plan attracted international anticipation on the 24

April 2004 referendum. It was one of the most elaborate and complex peace plans in

the history of Cyprus socio-political instability. Nevertheless, despite the seriousness of

Annan peace plan and support by the Turkish Cypriots, to avert future impasse in

Cyprus the Greek Cypriots voted it down owing to claims that it was unfavorable and

flawed. Many of them said it did not adhere to the international law and had no respect

for human rights (Kaymak, 2012).

Failure to Consult with Cypriot Leaders and Communities

This was perhaps the greatest strategic mistake made by Kofi Annan in the

formulation of the Cyprus peace plan. The document was the sole knowledge of foreign

consultants and the UN’s Secretary General. Annan, as a third party, did not consider

the efforts of the Cypriot civil leaders and communities. Though the intentions of the

plan were going to make a positive impact towards solving the long-standing conflict, it

remained foreign because it lacked the creativeness of the Greek – and Turkish Cypriot

communities (Amani, 2013). According to Ladini and Gianfabrizio (2009), mediation

studies attest that mediators use communication, formulation and manipulation as

mediation modes in order to be effective. The conflict involving the two Cypriot

communities prevented them from getting into contact with each other (International

Crisis Group, 2014). Annan, as the mediator, did not serve as a communicative tool

between the two conflicting parties in a view of seeking further information that could

have assisted him in drafting the peace plan. This mode is entirely passive and does not

considerably involve the mediator in the talks. In the second mode of mediation, the
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mediator partially participates in the reconciliation discussions. The mediator helps the

conflicting parties formulate and conceptualize terms of reconciliation hence arriving to

a common understanding of the cause of the dispute. In the third mode, the mediator is

fully active in the discussions manipulating the opinions of the other parties and driving

them towards a resolution. Sozen (2004) makes it clear that Annan did not deploy the

three modes of mediation during the time of the rejected peace plan. He entirely played

the role of a formulator. This led to very important decisions left out. Though the plan

underwent through a number of revisions before it passed for the referendum, the

Cypriots remained suspicious about the foreign crafted plan.

Neglect of the psychological barriers between the Turkish – and Greek Cypriot

Communities

Neglect of psychological barriers was another mistake that Annan committed

while analyzing the Cyprian interethnic conflict. The mediator needlessly required in-

depth knowledge concerning the originality of the long time dispute. The Cypriot

Republic came into being in the year 1960 contrary to the demands by the Cypriots

(Vural, 2012). Furthermore, the declaration of the state occurred during a struggle

between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot civil societies. As a result, there was no

mutual consent between the two parties by the time of creation of the republic (Patrick

1968). Up-to-date, only the Greek and Turkish can seek identity roots on the Cyprus

Island. These differences between the Cypriot communities have denied the formation

of a unified state and thus it would be quite hectic for the United Nation to hasten the

parties to reach an immediate resolution (Mehmet, 2008). With its complexity, the

Cypriots could not comprehensively understand the Annan peace plan within an
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analysis schedule of three weeks. Despite the fact that the Annan plan claim to

acknowledge the identity of each of the compatriot communities, Cypriots felt that it

lacked the basis of information on the roots of the Turkish – and Greek Cypriot

communities. This led to inclusion of some strategic mistakes as evidenced in the plan

before its successive revisions prior to the referendum. As a result, fears reined the

majority Greek Cypriots and hence, the developments of doubts in a dilemma that the

document would omit some crucial regulations on the settlement plan (Mirghaberi,

2006).

Fear of Instability

The greatest feeling of the Cypriots that led to the rejection of the plan by

majority of the Greek Cypriots was instability. According to Ladini and Gianfabrizio

(2009), the proposed peace plan would have planted instability in the Cypriot civil

society. This would have worsened the prevailing situation in the island. In a live speech

made by the Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos, he criticized Annan plan for

encouraging the partition of the republic. He proceeded to say that the plan did not aim

at promoting unity amongst the conflicting parties and in no way it could produce a

sustainable centralized solution. This was very evident in the plan since its resolution for

peace was to create a federation of two states. In the event that the document passed

the referendum, the Cypriot State would be divided amongst the Turkish – and Greek

Cypriot societies. The president’s speech fueled the Greek Cypriots’ ridiculous plans to

vote down the peace plan in the referendum (Mehmet, 2008). In addition, partition of the

island into two distinctive states would lead into instability of the Greek Cypriote society

since Annan plan seemed to favor the minority Turkish Cypriote society on the North of
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Cyprus. The proposal does not accommodate sound plans for maneuvering effective

control of vital government regulations over key areas of interest. Furthermore,

geographical division of the island requires an analysis of the population trends of the

two ethnic groups. Generally, the Greek Cypriots are the majority in the island, while the

Turkish Cypriotes form the minority group. In the event of partition of the republic, the

Annan plan did not outline protocol to ensure equality in the allocation of political

boundaries. Furthermore, the plan did not include provisions for security of the Greek

Cypriots. In its place, it had outlined that Turkish troops would be contained in the island

for some time. This led to dissatisfaction of the Greek Cypriots, thereby developing a

negative attitude in claims that the document advantaged their counterpart ethnic

community (Mirbagheri, 2010).

Tariff free trade between European Union and North Cyprus

Annan peace plan had a provision for ensuring that free trade prevailed between

the European Union and North Cyprus. This regulation was in accordance with earlier

negotiations in 1994 in regard with the originality of the Greek Cypriot’s state

certificates. In addition, the regulation based its argument behind Article 133 of the

European Union Treaty that regulates trade with third party territories (Sozen, 2005).

Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriots maintained that the regulation distorted the original

intention of the commission. This claim held that the Accession Treaty contained the

regulation under protocol 10. Basing argument on the protocol, this could mean

suspension of the Greek Cypriots from the north (Michael, 2013). The presidencies of

the United Kingdom and German worked very hard to convince the Cypriots to support

the Annan peace plan since there was no mutual agreement between the Turkish and
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Greet Cypriots concerning the regulation. The situation led to disconnection of trade

between the two divided communities. For instance, air links between north Cyprus and

other countries could not establish – with an exception of Turkey. This was because the

Greek Cypriot had been perceived as representative of the republic of Cyprus (Sozen,

2004), a situation which put the European Union in a socio-political limbo; while the

European Union geared towards fulfilling its promise to the Turkish Cypriots, it was

highly restricted by the legal framework and the Greek Cypriots (International Crisis

Group, 2014).

Freedom

Although the article addressing such as democratic principles, individual human

rights and fundamental freedom as well as cultural, religious, political, social and

political aspects was well outlines, allegations put forth by the republics president and

some Cypriots indicated that the Annan peace plan did not adequately address vital

aspects human rights and respect for democracy (Sozen, 2005). Democrats from the

republic argued that the external pressure to accept the Annan plan from the European

Union, the Bush Administration and the British parliament was not democratic. Some of

the Greek Cypriots were still objective to the peace plan arguing that it did not support

three basic freedoms: freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the right to

own property. The plan would leave Cyprus a bi-zonal and a bi-communal federation

(Amani, 2013). Particularly, the movement of the Greek Cypriots particularly would be

restricted within their own land. Further criticism of the freedom clause by the Greek

Cypriots led to the rejection of the document.

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Pressure from the International Community

The best resolution for the conflict between the Turkish – and Greek Cypriots

would be an intercommunal negotiation amongst the two parties. However, a

negotiation between the parties has never materialized. It is no doubt that the need for

intervention of the international community was the next relevant step towards peace

reconciliation in the republic of Cyprus (Evriviades, 1992). The Cypriot community felt

that the international community was putting excessive pressure towards the settlement

plan in Cyprus. The peace process that was supposed to be led majorly by the Cypriots

was now following an internationalized approach towards peace reconciliation.

According to Evriviades (1992), the results of such an approach are highly

unpredictable and any mistrust created within the formulation process greatly affects the

response of the targeted group. In this essence, the Greek Cypriots had started doubts

in the peace plan and claimed that it favored the Turkish Cypriots. Majority of the

Turkish Cypriotes supported the federation of two states while the Greek Cypriots

wanted the end resolution to be a unitary state. As a result, they mobilize a substantial

“no” vote during the referendum. In separate reports submitted by Cypriot scholars,

there are claims that internalization of the peace negotiations might never lead to

mutually acceptable agreement between the two compatriot communities (Evriviades,

1992).

Political alignment

Lastly, political inclination of the Greek Cypriotes largely contributed the failure of

the plan. It is not news that the same Greek Cypriot politicians who promise to deliver a

democratic and amicable solution to the conflicts between their community and their
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Turkish Cypriot counterparts still have a great influence on the political arena of the

south. The political leaders of the two states have voices of their own, with the south

winning most of the peace debates (Nasuh, 2003). It is evident that leaders politically

led their respective communities to follow their own interests during the referendum.

Perhaps, the Greek Cypriots’ president misled the larger group on the opinions

regarding the passage of the peace plan leading to its rejection. Papadopoulos made

sure that the Greek Cypriots stood against the voting in of Annan peace plan. Reports

on the referendum indicate that the Greek Cypriots were for the idea that the two-states

remain as a unitary state after the settlement. This ideology created fear amongst the

Turkish Cypriots that the Greek Cypriot community could dominate in the referendum.

The presentation of the peace plan in the referendum should have been guided by the

political influence of each of the communities, accompanied by one-on-one

communication and manipulation of the opinions of the two ethnic parties. Perhaps, this

approach could change the attitude of the majority Greek Cypriots towards the passage

of the document.

Own Opinion

The failure of the Annan plan can greatly attribute to inadequate consultation. As

a representative of the international community, the mediator did not respect the

knowledge of the Greek – and Turkish Cypriot community regarding the causes that led

to the long-lived struggle between them. Perhaps, that was the major reason behind the

rejection of the peace plan. Annan, together with his foreign aides, compiled the peace

plan without prior consultation with the political leaders of the Cypriot communities. The

plan, therefore, remained a foreign document meant to disintegrate the two compatriot
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communities. Probably, he could not have thought of concluding a two-state federal

state as stipulated in the plan. However, the predictability of the Greek – and Turkish

civil communities coming into an agreement is actually a nightmare. In spite of the

continued attempts to resolve the conflict, the two civil societies have shown little efforts

in support of the peace mediators since Turkish invasion in 1974. In my own opinion,

the attempts restore peace are highly influenced by the republic’s politics especially

form the majority group – the Greek Cypriot. The Greek Cypriots lie in the opposition.

Consequently, their numbers would vote down any peace plan that they fail to offer

support.

Conclusion

The enthnonational crisis that has prevailed in the republic of Cyprus for nearly

four decades remains a stalemate for the two compatriot communities – Turkish – and

Greek Cypriots. As a result, there have been a number of attempts to bring the separate

compatriot groups into an amicable reconciliation to end the ethnic conflict, which has

left a poor economic state since the country’s independence in 1960. Seemingly, efforts

to resolve the conflict issues have never materialized since the start of the ethnic

differences. The most recent attempt was the Annan Plan for the creation of two federal

states in a view of separating the two communities.

Despite the failed attempts towards reconciliation of the Turkish – and Greek Cypriots,

both sides remain vulnerable to a state of federalism. With continued mistrust between

the compatriot communities, there is a possibility that the peace negotiations will once

resolve into a two-state federation. This resolution will definitely experience enormous

pressure especially from the Greek Cypriot community, as it would seem as a

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legitimatization of the Turkish. Nevertheless, unless federalism is the resolution, Cyprus

will most likely remain in an impasse of a worsened social-political state.

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References

AHMET SÖZEN (2004), “A Model of Power-Sharing in Cyprus: From the 1959 London-

Zurich Agreements to the Annan Plan”, Turkish Studies, 5:1, 61-77

Ahmet Sözen (2005), “The Turkish Cypriot Legislative Election of February 2005: The

Rise of CTP/BG, South European Society and Politics”, 10:3, 465-475

Aslan Amani (2013), “Peace in Cyprus: It is more likely today than it was in 2004?”

Retrieved from http://www.opendemocracy.net

Bardakci Mehmet (2008), “Turkey and the European Union: Challenges Lying Ahead”

Southeast Europe. Journal of Politics and Society Retrieved from

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Erol Kaymak (2012), “If At First You Don't Succeed, Try, Try Again: (Re) Designing

Referenda to Ratify a Peace Treaty in Cyprus, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics”,

18:1, 88-112

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Problem”, vol. 22:2

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FAILURE OF THE 2004 ANNAN PEACE PLAN IN CYPRUS 13

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p37-61 Retrieved from Cyprus Review: http://web.b.ebscohost.com

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The Turkish-Cypriot case (2004 -2009) pg. 406 – 430. Retrieved from

http://www.tandfonline.com