Negotiations 4

Page 1 of 1
From: John McGarry <john.mcgarry@queensu.ca>

To: bachmanns@un.org
cc: sabra@un.org, Wlodek Cibor <cibor@un.org>
Date: Friday, February 20, 2009 01:00AM

Subject: Documents
History: This message has been forwarded.
Dear Sonja and Yasser,
Here are the two short reports I wrote this week, one on my meetings
on Monday, and the second on the effects of the '20% rule'. Please
distribute them as you think appropriate but see Wlodek and Taye get
a copy in advance of my meeting with them at 5pm Friday.
All the best,
John
Attachments:
Report on meetings with GCs and TCS -
The 20% rule.doc
16 Feb 09.doc
ReportonmeetingswithGCsandTCSͲ16Feb09.doc
JohnMcGarry’smeetingswithGCandTCAdvisersonGovernance,Monday16thofFebruary2009
17February2009
ThecurrentpositionsofGreekCypriotsandTurkishCypriotsre:thefederalexecutive
GreekCypriotshaveproposedastrongpresidency(oneGCandoneTC)directlyelectedinacommon
ticketacrosstheisland,onthebasisofconcurrentmajoritiesor,failingthat,onamajoritarianbasis,
withTurkishCypriotvotesweightedat30%.
TurkishCypriotshaveproposedanindirectlyelectedexecutivecouncil,withelectionrequiring
concurrentmajoritiesintheSenate.
IsentapapertobothpartiesinDecember2008,the‘BridgingOptions’paper,whichoutlinedthe
followingthreealternatives:i)ThecurrentGreekCypriotproposal,withtheTurkishCypriotvote
weightedhigherthan30%;ii)atworoundpresidentialelection,withthefirstroundinvolvingseparate
electionsandthesecondroundinvolvingajointelectioninwhichthewinnerwouldbeelectedona
majoritarianbasis,withTurkishvotesweightedatmorethan30%;ahybridarrangementcombininga
directlyelectedpresidentwithanindirectlyelectedCouncilofMinisters.
MymeetingswiththeGCandTCadvisersallowedmetodiscusstheirreactionstotheseoptions.
I. TheGreekCypriotResponse
IwaswelcomedbybothToumazosTseliepisandAndreasMavromattis.Istartedbymakingitclearthat
myrolewasthatofadvisertoMr.Downer,andIwasseekingtoinformhimofthethinkingofboth
partiesonthequestionofthefederalexecutive.IassuredthemthatIwasnottheretopresent
proposalsfromtheUNoranyoneelse,ortomediate.Theythankedmeformyintroductorycomments
andtoldmethattheywerereassuredbythem,andthattheyhadfoundmy‘BridgingOptions’paperto
behelpful.
Bothadvisershadcarefullyreadthepaper.Theyexplainedthattheyfoundoptioni)andaqualified
formofoptionii)tobeacceptable.Thequalificationtooption2wasthatinsteadofholdinganentirely
separateelectioninthefirstround,GreekCypriotsshouldbeallowedtovotefortheTurkishCypriot
candidates,withtheGCvoteweightedat20%ofthetotalTurkishCypriotvote.1TurkishCypriotsvoters
wouldhaveareciprocalrightintheGreekCypriotelection.Thesecondroundwouldthentakeplaceas
currentlyenvisagedinoptionii)(seeabove).

1
IformedtheimpressionthatGCswerenotfirmlyweddedtothefigureof20%andmaybeopentoreducingit.
1

Theadvantageofthisqualification,intheGreekCypriotview,istwofold.First,itintroducesan
importantincentiveformoderation,asnoGCvoterisgoingtosupportaTChardliner(andviceversa).
The‘20%rule’,therefore,wouldfacilitate,withoutguaranteeing,acooperativepresidency,satisfying
GreekCypriots’emphasison‘functionality’.Second,itmaintainstheprincipleofan‘allͲisland’election
inwhicheachvoterisallowedtovoteforbothTurkishandGreekCypriotpoliticians,andthelattermust
competeforvotesacrossCyprus.ThisaspectsatisfiestheGreekCypriotinsistencethatasettlement
shouldnotadvanceseparationor‘partition’.
ThetwoGCadviserspointedoutthatthisnewideahadnotyetbeensanctionedbyPresidentChristofias
TheGCadvisersdidnotsupportoptioniii)ofthe‘BridgingOptions’paper,thehybridpresidentialͲ
parliamentaryarrangement,butconcededthatthisoption,particularlythe‘French’variantofitinwhich
areasonablystrongpresidentwouldbeabletotakedecisionsonforeignpolicyandEuropeanUnion
matters,wasnotunthinkable.Theytoldmethatthisoptioncouldresultfroma‘giveandtake’roundin
whichGCsreceivedconcessiononothermatters,suchasproperty,territoryandsecurity
IalsodiscussedafourthoptionwiththeGCadvisers,onethatwasnotincludedinthe‘BridgingOptions’
paper,i.e.,anindirectlyelectedstrongpresidentwithresponsibilityforselectingthecabinet(theSouth
Africamodel).Ithoughtitusefultopointouttothemthattheywereincorrectwhentheyarguedin
theirsubmissiontotheWorkingGrouponGovernancethattherewasnosuchthingasastrong
indirectlyelectedpresident.TheGCadvisersdidnotfindthisoptionattractive,andarguedthatan
indirectlyelectedpresidentwouldeitherhavetobeelectedbysomecrossͲvotingrule,whichwouldnot
guaranteearesult(i.e.nocandidatemightpasstheelectoralthreshold,inwhichcasetherewouldbeno
presidency),orbyseparateindirectelections,whichwouldguaranteearesult,butwhichwas
objectionableonthegroundsthatanycandidateselectedinthiswaywouldbeunlikelytocooperate.
II. TheTurkishCypriotresponse
FollowingthemeetingwiththeGCadvisers,ImettheTCadviser,TufanErhurman,andwasreceived
warmly.
Predictably,Erhurmanrejectedoptioni)pointingout,ironically,thatitwouldbeunpopularamongthe
GreekCypriotpublicandthereforeunstable.IthinkthereisapossibilitythatTCscouldbepersuadedto
reͲexaminethisoptionifGCswerepreparedtoweighttheirvoteat50%orthereabouts,butthisdoes
notappearverylikely(IthinkGCsareconsideringaweightingofTCvotesthatwouldfallconsiderably
shortof50%,butI’mnotcertainofthis).
Erhurman’spreferred(i.e,numberone)optionwasthefourthoneIdiscussedwithGCs–theSouth
Africanmodelofanindirectlyelectedstrongpresidentwithpowertoappointministers.Wedidnot
discussexactlyhowsuchapresidentwouldbeindirectlyelected,butpresumablyErhurmanenvisages
thattheelectionmethodwouldbethesameasthatcontainedinthecurrentTCproposalforan
2

‘ExecutiveCouncil’i.e.,concurrentmajoritiesintheSenate.Thiswould,ofcourse,bedifferentfromthe
SouthAfricanmodel,inwhichthePresidentisselectedbythelowerhouse.
Erhurman’ssecondandthirdpreferenceswere,respectively,twoversionsofoptioniii)–thehybrid
modelwhichcombinesadirectlyelectedpresidentwithindirectlyelectedministers.Hissecond
preferencewasfora‘semiͲhybrid’versionwithasymbolicpresident(theIrishmodel)2,andhisthird
preferencewasfora‘fullͲhybrid’versionwithastrongerpresidentexercisingsomeexecutivepowers
(theFrenchmodel).
Duringadiscussiononhowthepresidentialteamshouldbeelected,IintroducedErhurmantotheGC
‘20%proposal’,withoutdisclosingitsorigins.Heimmediatelyexclaimedaninterest,evena‘strong’
interest,althoughhewantedtowhittledownthenumberfrom20%anditwasclearthatheenvisaged
this‘20%(orlower)rule’beingusedtoqualifyseparateelectionsbutwithoutaneedforafurther
roundofelectionsinvolvingajointticketelectedacrosstheislandwithTurkishvotesweightedbetween
30and50%.Hesaidthathewoulddiscussthe‘20%(orlower)rule’withTalat.AsI’vesaidorally,I
thinkthisispotentiallysignificant,forreasonstobeexplainedbelow.
Mydiscussionswithbothsideswerefocusedon‘macroͲoptions’.Ididnotgointoimportantdetails
suchashowtoshareorrotatetheprimeͲministershipina‘hybrid’arrangement.
AnalysisandConclusion:
AlthoughbothsidesmaybeabletoconvergeontheGC‘20%rule’,potentiallysignificantdivergences
remain.Thus,TCswilli)probablywanttoreducethenumberfrom20%;ii)insistthattherebeno
furtherroundwithjointticketsandanelectoralsystemthatfavoursGCs;andiii)preferthatthisrulebe
usedtoelectapresidencyaspartofahybridarrangementratherthana‘full’executivepresidency(a
presidencythatcontrolstheappointmentofministers).
GCs,ontheotherhand,i)mayresistreducingthenumberfrom20%,orreducingitbyanysignificant
margin;ii)appeartoseethe‘20%rule’asapplicabletoafirstround‘separate’election,whichmustbe
followedbyasecondroundinwhichjointticketswouldcompeteunderamajoritarianelectoralrule
(withappropriateweightingofTCvotes);andiii)preferthattheendresultisafullexecutivepresidency
ratherthananyhybridmodel.
Inspiteofthesecontinuingdivergences,theconvergenceonthe‘20%(orlower)rule)ispotentially
significantforthefollowingreasons:
Ͳ ItindicatesthatGreekCypriotsareawarethattheircurrentofficialproposal,whichgivesGCsa
significantroleintheelectionofTCleaders,isseriouslyproblematic;

2
ErhurmanwasawarethatyouhaddiscussedthisoptionwithNamiinpreviousdays.
3

Ͳ Relatedly,itsuggeststhatGreekCypriotsareseriousaboutfindingaproposalforthefederal
executivethathasachanceofbeingacceptedi.e.theyareseriousaboutasuccessfuloverall
outcome;
Ͳ ItsuggeststhatTCsarepreparedtomoveawayfromtheirpreference/insistencethatanydirect
electionsshouldbeentirelyseparate
Ͳ Relatedly,itsuggeststhatTCsarepreparedtoembracetheideaofapoliticalsystemwhichhas
atleastsomeallͲislanddimensions,i.e.theyarenotcommitted,astheGCpressconstantly
alleges,topartitionism,ortousingasettlementasatransitiontosuch.
Ͳ ItsuggeststhatTCsareopentoprovidingincentivesthathelpmoderateparties,inspiteoftheir
traditionalarguments,usedinthecontextoftheircurrentofficialproposalforan‘Executive
Council’,thatanexecutiveshouldbe‘inclusive’andopentomoderateandradicalparties.3
Theissuenowishowtoexpandonthisconvergence,assumingitsurvivessecondthoughtsby
Erhurman,andissupportedbytheprincipalsoneitherside.Anumberofpossibilitiesexist.
1. AFullExecutivePresidencywithseparate(direct)electionsqualifiedbythe‘20%rule’
TheGreekCypriotscoulddecidetoacceptafullexecutivepresidency(1GCand1TCmember,
rotating)electedinseparateelections,qualifiedbythe‘20%rule’.Toacceptthisoption,GCs
wouldhavetoabandonthatpartofOptionIIoftheBridgingOptionspaperthatprovidesfora
furtherroundofelectionsinwhichjointticketswouldcompete,andinwhichthewinnerwould
beelectedbyamajoritarianrulewithTCvotesweightedat30%(orhigher).
ThisoptionwouldrequiretheTurkishCypriotstoembracetheideaofadirectlyelected,full
executivepresidency,ratherthantheirpreferenceforahybridarrangementwhichcombinesa
weakerdirectlyelected4presidentwithaparliamentary(indirectlyelected)executive.
2. Hybrid(presidentialͲparliamentary)Executiveinwhichthepresidentisdirectlyelectedin
separateelectionsqualifiedbythe‘20%rule’
ThisisanoptionthatMr.Erhurmanappearstosupportasoneofhistoppreferences.Itwould
requiretheGreekCypriotstomaketwomoves,first,tosupporttheideaofseparateelections

3
Ithinkthatthisargumentaboutaninclusiveparliamentaryexecutive,i.e.onewhichincludesdifferentpartieson
eachsidehasconsiderablemerit.However,ifbothpartiesinCypruscanagreetoanarrangementthathelps
moderates,thisiscertainlypreferabletonoagreement.
4
NotethatMr.Erhurmanappearstohavenodifficultywithafullexecutivepresidencythatisindirectlyelected
4

qualifiedbythe20%rulewithnofurtherroundinwhichjointticketscompete,andsecond,to
embracetheideaofahybridexecutive.
Notethatashybridexecutivesalmostalwaysincludeaprimeministeraswellasapresident,
therewillhavetobe,asTayepointedoutonMonday,agreementonthesharingorrotationof
theofficeofprimeminister.5
3. AnIndirectlyelectedexecutivepresidentoranindirectlyelectedExecutiveCouncil
Neitherofthesetwooptionsrequiresdirectelectionsand,asaconsequence,the20%ruledoes
notapply.BothoptionsaresupportedbytheTurkishCypriots.Theyareonlylikelytobe
acceptedbyGCs,Isuspect,inreturnforsignificanttradeͲoffsduringthegiveandtakeround.
4. ThecurrentGreekCypriotproposalmodifiedineitherofthetwowaysthatGreekCypriots
appearwillingtoconsider.
ThecurrentGreekCypriotproposaliscomplicated.ItseeksaFullExecutivePresidencyelected
onajointticketinoneroundbyconcurrentmajorities.Ifnoticketwinsconcurrentmajorities
inthefirstround,thevotesofeachticketarethenreͲweightedona70:30GC/TCbasisandif
thereareonlytwotickets,themorepopularonewins.Iftherearemorethantwotickets,the
twomostpopularticketsgotoasecondroundwhichiswonbytheticketwithaconcurrent
majorityor,failingthat,thelargestnumberofvoteswiththevotesweightedona70:30GC/TC
basis.
Asitstands,thisproposalhasnochanceofbeingacceptedbyTCsasitclearlyallowsthe
presidencytobeelectedbyGCs.
However,thisproposalwouldbecomemoreattractivetoTCs,althoughperhapsnotattractive
enough,ifmodifiedinoneofthetwowaysthathavebeensuggestedbyGCs:eitheri)ifthe
TCvoteisweightedmoreheavilythan30%atsomewherecloserto50%,orii)ifthereisatwo
roundelectioninwhichthereareseparateelectionsinthefirstround,qualifiedbythe‘20%
rule’,followedbyafurtherroundofelectionsinwhichthetwomostpopularcandidatesfrom
eachpartwouldeachhavetoformjointGCͲTCtickets,withthewinningticketthatwitha
majorityofvoteswiththeTCvoteweightedmoreheavilythan30%atsomewherecloserto
50%.

5
Inanyconceivableexecutive,ofcourse,whetheritcomprisesafullpresidentialexecutive,ahybridcombination
ofparliamentaryandpresidentialexecutives,oranexclusivelyparliamentaryexecutive,therewillhavetobe
agreementonthenumbersofcabinetpositions/ministriesthatwillgotoeachofthetwocommunities.
5

MyviewisthatitwouldbedifficulttoselleitherofthesetwomodifiedGCproposalstoTurkish
Cypriots,butImightbewrong,andIprovidetheoptionshereforthesakeofbeingcomplete.
NextfewDays
AsIsaidthismorning,MrMavromatisexpressedsomesurprisethatIwantedtoseethem‘thisearly’
andsuggestedthattherewasnoobviousneedformetoengagewiththemagainuntilthe‘giveand
take’round,particularlyastheywerenotfocusingongovernanceatthistime.BothheandTseliepis
emphasized,ontheotherhand,thatI‘should’comebackatthattime,astheywouldfindthatvery
helpful.
Tseliepisalsosuggested,however,thathewouldliketohearfrommeinthenextfewdaysif,after
meetingwiththeTCadviser,IthoughttheTCsmightbereceptivetotheidea.Thatprovidesanopening
formetocontactthemagainduringthisvisit,shouldyouthinkthatagoodidea.
IsuspectthatMrErhurmanisopentoseeingmewheneverIwant.
Theremaybesomepoint,therefore,inrevisitingbothbriefly.Erhurmancouldbeaskedif,onsecond
thoughts,heisstillsupportiveofthe‘20%(orlower)rule’,andifMr.Talatalsosupportsit.TheGC
adviserscouldthen,dependingontheanswer,betoldthattheTCsarepreparedtoconsiderthatidea.
Thereareanumberofotherquestionsthatcouldbeasked,e.g.theTCscouldalsobeaskedtoclarifyif
theywouldrejectthecurrentGCproposaleveniftheTCvotewasweightedat50%;theGCscouldbe
askediftheywouldconsiderapresidentialelectioninwhichthewinnerwasdecidedbyseparate
electionsqualifiedbythe20%rule,withouttheneedforasecondround,etc.
6

The20%rule.doc
The ‘20% Rule’ in a Future ‘United Cyprus’ Presidential Election
The exact wording of the new Greek Cypriot proposal is: ‘Both candidates shall be elected
separately by universal suffrage, the G/C voters however voting for the T/C candidate being
weighted so that they form the same percentage of the total vote as the T/C voters in the election
of the G/C candidate’. It was made clear to me orally that the percentage they favoured was
20%.
It appears that the Greek Cypriots have floated a proposal like this before, in 1980 and in 1990-1.
Predicting the exact effects of the 20% rule in a future election is a problematic exercise, as any
prediction is subject to multiple assumptions, which may be faulty. However, the following very
tentative paper gives a broad outline of the likely effects.
1. The Effects of the 20% Rule in Southern Cyprus
1.1 Assumptions underlying my calculations.
Assumption 1: Who competes?

For southern Cyprus, I have assumed that the top three parties (AKEL, DIKO and DISY) will be
the only parties who put forward candidates for the GC member of the President/Vice-President.
These 3 parties monopolized over 98% of the vote in the last presidential election, so omitting
smaller parties from the calculations makes no appreciable difference.
Assumption 2: How many GC voters will turnout?

The assumed turnout in this future election is based on the 1st and 2nd round results from the 2008
ROC Presidential election (1st round = 444,261; 2nd round = 450,799).
Assumption 3: What number is a 20% weighting for TC voters in Southern Cyprus equivalent
to?
This is 20% of the total number of the combined total of GC and TC voters (see assumption 2),
i.e. 111,065 in the 1st round and 112,699 in the 2nd round.
Assumption 4: Which parties will GC voters vote for?

I have assumed that GC voters will vote exactly as they did in 2008.
Assumption 5: Which GC parties will the TCs vote for?

This is the most problematic of the 5 assumptions. My figures are based on an average, derived
from speaking to several knowledgeable people. The assumption is that AKEL will win 58% of
the TC vote, DISY 35%, and DIKO 7%. This assumption is based on the current three leading
parties receiving 100% of the vote. However, it is possible that if the ‘20% rule’ was adopted,
new ‘pan-Cypriot’ parties might form in South Cyprus to take advantage of the new rule (such
parties could not hope to win, but they could become kingmakers and might affect the
distribution of the TC vote in the 1st round).
1
The20%rule.doc
Result of 1st round of Future GC Election (before TC votes are added)

1. DISY = 150,996
2. AKEL = 150,016
3. DIKO = 143,249
Result of 1st round of Future GC Election (after TC votes are added)

1. AKEL = 214,433 (150,016 GC votes plus 64,417 TC votes)
2. DISY = 189,868 (150,996 GC votes plus 38,872 TC votes)
3. DIKO = 151,023 (143,249 GC votes plus 7,774 TC votes)
DIKO candidate is eliminated
Result of 2nd Round of GC Elections*

1. AKEL = 305,969 (240,604 GC votes plus 65,365 TC votes)
2. DISY = 249,639 (210,195 GC votes plus 39,444 TC votes)
* Here, we have to calculate which parties the supporters of the eliminated DIKO opt for. The
GC supporters of DIKO have been allocated to the parties they supported in the 2nd round in
2008. I’ve assumed, very roughly, that the 10% of TC voters (11,106) that voted DIKO in 1st
round abstained or split evenly among AKEL and DISY. The small number of voters involved
in this latter calculation does not affect the result.
Analysis of the effects of the 20% Rule in Southern Cyprus:
x Adding roughly 100,000+ plus TC votes to the GC electorate would give a substantial
boost to both AKEL and DISY, especially the former, over DIKO (unless DIKO
succeeded in polarizing GC electorate and in taking GC votes from AKEL and DIKO by
accusing them of being soft on TCs)
x The 20% rule would create incentives for GC parties to reach out to TCs, but these
parties would still have to be careful to protect their more important GC base. There
would be little point, after all, in succeeded in winning 100,000 TC votes if it meant
losing 400,000 GC votes, or an appreciable portion thereof.
x The TC votes would lift AKEL from 2nd place to 1st place in the 1st round of the GC
presidential elections and would widen its eventual 2nd round margin of victory from
around 30,000 to over 55,000.
2
The20%rule.doc
x The boost provided by the 20% rule in Southern Cyprus to AKEL would be less
significant than the boost provided by the same rule in Northern Cyprus to the CTP (see
below).
x As DIKO and even DISY would lose out under the 20% rule, we can expect both parties,
and particularly the former, to oppose it. When weighing how to vote in a referendum,
the 20% rule would presumably be counted in the negative column by both parties.
II. The Effects of the 20% Rule in Northern Cyprus
Assumption 1: Who Competes?

Again, I’ve assumed that the elections will be contested by the three largest parties, in this case,
the CTP, UBP and DP. Note, however, that some smaller moderate parties might also contest at
least the 1st round of presidential elections in Northern Cyprus hoping to gain from the 20% rule
and to emerge as kingmakers (e.g. the New Cyprus Party and the United Cyprus Party).
Assumption 2: How many TC voters will turnout?

The assumed turnout is based on the actual turnout in the presidential election in Northern
Cyprus in 2005 (100,625 votes).
Assumption 3: Which parties will TC voters vote for?

As public opinion has shifted in N. Cyprus since the last election in 2005, I have based voting
behaviour during the future election roughly on current polls in N. Cyprus (40% for UBP; 35%
for CTP; 7% for DP)
Assumption 4: What number is a 20% weighting for GC voters in Northern Cyprus equivalent
to?
The number of GC votes under the 20% rule is 25,125, or 20% of the total TC-GC vote of
125,781.
Assumption 5: Which TC parties will the GCs vote for?

Again, this is the most difficult assumption to make. My figures are based on inquiries with
locals on the likely breakdown: CTP = 65%; UBP = 10%; DP = 25% (I’m told some people hold
the view that it would be a decade before a single TC could vote for a GC party). As noted under
Assumption 1, there is a prospect that smaller parties such as the NCP and UCP might also win
support from GC voters in the 1st round, but not in the 2nd.
Assumption 6: How does the vote of the defeated party in the 1st round get redistributed in the
2nd round? It is difficult to answer this, partly because there was no 2nd round in the last
presidential election in Northern Cyprus. Here I’ve assumed that the eliminated DP’s TC voters
will transfer to the UBP and its GC voters to the CTP. This is a risky assumption but probably
not far off the mark.
3
The20%rule.doc
Result of 1st round of TC Election (before GC votes are added)
1. UBP candidate = 40,250

2. CTP candidate = 35,218
3. DP candidate = 7,043
Result of 1st round of TC Election (after GC votes are added)
1. CTP candidate = 51,549 (35,218 TC votes + 16,331 GC votes)

2. UBP candidate = 42,762 (40,250 TC votes + 2,512 GC votes)
3. DP candidate = 13,323 (7,043 TC votes + 6281 GC votes)
DP candidate is eliminated
Result of 2nd Round of TC Elections
1. CTP candidate = 57830 (35,218 TC votes + 16,331 GC votes + 6281 GC voters from DP)
2. UBP candidate = 49805 (40,250 TC votes + 2512 GC votes + 7043 voters from DP)
Analysis of 20% Rule in Northern Cyprus
x The introduction of a 20% GC vote for the election of the TC member of the Cyprus
Presidency would give a very significant boost to the CTP. It would convert them from a
distant 2nd party into 1st place. The CTP would be advantaged in the North even more
than AKEL in the South, primarily because the CTP is likely to win a much larger
percentage of the 20% GC vote (this is because the CTP does not have significant rivals
for the GC vote, while Akel does - i.e. DISY).
x The advantage of the 20% rule to the CTP would be significantly reduced if the UBP was
able to polarize the TC electorate and successfully accuse the CTP of selling out TC
interests by appealing to GCs.
x The UBP would be very likely to resist the acceptance of the 20% rule. Putting such a
rule into a settlement would make it even more likely that the UBP would campaign
against a settlement in a referendum.
4
Page 1 of 1
From: Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO

To: zerihount@comcast.net, timalchin@hotmail.com
Date: Friday, February 20, 2009 04:59PM

Subject: Fw: Documents
I gave hardcopy to Tim, here as promised the email format.
Sonja Bachmann
Special Assistant to SASG Downer
UN Department of Political Affairs
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
email: bachmanns@un.org
-----Forwarded by Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO on 02/20/2009 04:58PM -----
Date: 02/20/2009 01:00AM
cc: sabra@un.org, Wlodek Cibor <cibor@un.org>
Subject: Documents
Dear Sonja and Yasser,
Here are the two short reports I wrote this week, one on my meetings
on Monday, and the second on the effects of the '20% rule'. Please
distribute them as you think appropriate but see Wlodek and Taye get
a copy in advance of my meeting with them at 5pm Friday.
All the best,
John
Attachments:
Report on meetings with GCs and TCS -
The 20% rule.doc
16 Feb 09.doc
Page 1 of 2
From: Fiona Mullen/UNFICYP

To: Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ
cc: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP
Date: Tuesday, February 24, 2009 02:31PM

Subject: the orig email re conference
History: This message has been replied to.
Dear Sonja
Further to our conversation this morning (NY time), I am sending you the email from the guys
who have the Economist Conferences franchise in Greece and Cyprus, as well their draft
programme and my reply. As I mentioned to you, I was in touch with them last summer, when I
didn't think I would be involved with the UN much longer, about a possible conference in Cyprus
in February focused on settlement issues. The idea was to have both leaders appear at the
opening event as well as someone like the SG or SASG, then international experts to discuss the
main chapters. After many delicate negotiations, mainly by an associate of mine, the TkCyps
were on board (subject to many provisos that might never have been accepted by the GkCyps)
but we couldn't even get the GkCyps to talk about it.
Unfortunately the Greece office, which as I mentioned is a bit of an anomaly as far as Economist
Conferences are concerned, seems to have forgotten all of this and according to the programme
has gone ahead and invited Mr Christofias and the SASG to a different, annual conference which
they hold in Athens each year, not realising that it is unlikely Mr Talat would accept the
invitation. The bottom line: if only the SASG and Mr Christofias speak it will look like the UN has
collaborated with the Economist Conferences to snub the TkCyps, even though they were the
ones who had been more willing to deal with the Economist last time.
In the meantime, PRIO have confirmed that they would not be involved in funding something in
which Cyprus is only a small slot.
Here is the exchange of emails:
Hope this e-mail finds you well, attached you will find a copy of the agenda for the forthcoming 13th
Government Roundtable Summit whereby we have invited H.E. Demetrios Christofias to address on the panel
entitled "The Cyprus Question: Back to the negotiating table. Who do you think we should have from the
Turkish side? Can you look into H.E. Mehmet Ali Talat for us, maybe you could chair this session also. Do
you think the PRIO people would like to get involved and speak on this session? Do they have any money for
sponsorship?
My reply
Dear Nectaria
I just spoke to Mary on the phone. As I mentioned to you, I am a fully fledged UN staff member from March 1st
so it wouldn’t be appropriate for me to be involved, especially as regards chasing Mr Talat. My hunch from the
many hours spent getting his assent in principle last time is that if you have already invited one as President of
the Republic (as opposed to the H.E. titles they are given when negotiating under UN auspices) the other will
not come. Perhaps you can invite a prominent member of Turkish Cypriot society instead. PRIO may have
some ideas, so my recommendation is to speak directly to Arne Strand at PRIO: prio.arne@cytanet.com.cy .
+357 22 456 554.
As for chairing a session my suspicion is that my UN bosses will say no, but I will at least ask about that next
Page 2 of 2
week. Before I do that, could you let me know if you have confirmed Mr Downer’s attendance?
Best regards
Fiona
Fiona Mullen
UNSG Good Offices, Cyprus
Tel +357 99 338 224
mullenf@un.org
Attachments:
Economist Government Roundtable Athens.pdf
Page 1 of 2
From: Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP

To: alexander.downer@adelaide.edu.au
cc: Taye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja
Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: misc
Dear Alexander,
I was invited for a coffee this morning by the Counsellor in the Turkish "Embassy" in the north. I
have known him for some time, so there was nothing extraordinary in that.
However he did have something specific to pass on, and having spoken with Taye, I now pass
this on to you.
1.
Following your remarks to Apakan when you were in Ankara on the importance of having regular
contacts with him, they would like to make a proposal.
Option one (preferred)
z You could use a private plane, not registered in the RoC, to leave SBAs and fly directly to
Ankara. Turkey would cover all related costs . I made no comment on this (problematic)
proposal.
Option two (less preferred)
z You could meet in a third country. He did not specify where would be convenient from a
point of view of time.
Option three (which I proposed but he did not like, though did not rule out)
z Meet in the north. I was not sure if the above offers (1 and 2) came in reaction to this
suggestion on our part or not, so I floated it anyway.
2.
Further, they would like that you bring "legal specialists" for the next time that you and he meet
to share ideas.
My comment : recall that Apakan has made his career on Cyprus, and it may be difficult to take
the desk officer out of him on this one. Also, recall his parting words [ in my view of dubious
veracity ] to you in September on the steps of the MFA that the majority of the Annan Plan was
written their help. Some might say this offer seems to be a little bit over involved on his part,
and perhaps a little bit overbearing, and not particularly in sync with the approach this time
around. On the other hand of course, Turkey has to be on board...
FYI, I asked about Apakan's mooted moving to NY, he did not want to comment except saying
Page 2 of 2
that "it was up in the air".
3.
The new "Ambassador" Fakili in the north has now settled in, and would like to meet you when
convenient. My comment: this is recommended, although as it has an element of sensitivity to it,
we should not overly advertise it. I attach the CVs of Apakan and Fakili for your interest, where
you see that the two have worked together in Cyprus already.
I hope this mail finds you well,

All the best,
Tim
Tim Alchin
Office of the SRSG/Chief of Mission
Tel: +357 22 61 4405
Tel: +90 392 601 4405
Mobile: +357 99 523 980
email: alchin@un.org
Attachments:
New Turkish Ambassador Fakili.doc Apakan CV.doc
New Turkish Ambassador Fakili.doc
New Turkish “Ambassador” Sakir Fakili
BorninGaziantepin1953.GraduatedfromGaziantepHighSchoolandthenAnkara
UniversityDepartmentofPoliticalScience.
1977Ͳ78:MinistryofTradeͲassistantrapporteur
1978Ͳ79:MilitaryService
1979Ͳ80:MFAͲcandidateofficerinthePersonnelDepartment
1980Ͳ81:MFAͲcandidateofficerinInternationalEconomicOrganizationsBureau.
1981Ͳ83:SecondsecretaryattheEmbassyinTripoli
1983Ͳ87:DeputyconsulandthenConsulattheHannoverConsulate
1987Ͳ89:MFAͲFirstsecretaryandthenBureauChiefatEasternEurope–AsiaDG
1989Ͳ92:UndersecretaryatEmbassyinNicosia
1992Ͳ93:ConsulgeneralatConsulateinBatumi
1993Ͳ95:MFAͲBureauchiefatthePersonnelDepartment
1995Ͳ99:ConsulgeneralatConsulateinNurnberg
1999Ͳ01:MFA–DepartmentChiefatAdministrativeandFinancialAffairsDepartment
2001Ͳ04:MFA–AmbassadorAssistantDeputyChiefandthenDeputyChiefofBilateral
EconomicAffairsDG
2004Ͳ09:AmbassadortoKuwait
2009:AmbassadortoNicosia
SpeaksEnglishandGerman.MarriedtoBehiyeFakili.Fatheroftwo.
Apakan CV.doc
Turkish MFA Under-Secretary Ertugrul Apakan.
Ertugrul Apakan is known in Turkey as the most important authority of issues concerning
Cyprus and Greece.
In recent years Apakan has become one of Turkey’s indispensable diplomats regarding
issues concerning the USA and the EU.
Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan is a graduate of Izmir College. In 1969, 61 year old

Apakan finished the Civil Service Diplomatic Office (Political Science Faculty). 1971 he
was an assistant at 9 September University Department of Economics where he
completed a masters degree. In 1971 he entered the Turkish Foreign Ministry and served
in Vienna, Kuwait, and Geneva. During his years at headquarters he became an expert in
international economic problems and the Middle East.
In 1989 at the age of 42, a new career period started for Apakan when he was
appointed number two, at Turkey’s Nicosia Embassy. When he returned to HQ he
became head of the Cyprus office and was later promoted to general director of the
same office.
In 1996 for the first time he was given the title of ambassador and returned to
Nicosia. On his returned to HQ in 2000, he became general direct of affairs
concerning Cyprus and Greece.
In 2004 he was promoted to assistant undersecretary at the same department. During this
time, he was responsible for affairs concerning Cyprus and USA.
In 2006 he was appointed as undersecretary.
During Turkey’s EU negotiation period and the Cyprus negotiations process Apakan
spent 2002, 03, 04 at HQ. He played a key role behind the scenes during the period
involving the five changes to the Annan plan. He once again was a key actor, and was
present at the summit in Burgenstock Switzerland, when the final changes to the plan was
made.
Apakan was part of the Turkish delegation when on 17 January 2004 the EU agreed to
start negotiations with Turkey.
Apakan spent 22 years of his 37 year career, involved with affairs concerning Cyprus and
Greece
Note: Apakan was number 2 here in 1989-92, then came back in 1996 as Ambassador.
So he worked for three years with new Ambassador Fakili.
Page 1 of 4

To: Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP@UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICS BASE@UN-MAILHUB
cc: Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Taye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, alexander.downer@adelaide.edu.au

Subject: Re: Fw: misc
Dear Tim,
thanks for below. Here the latest as I just talked to Helene from Rehn's cabinet this morning:
Peter Sorensen occupied the Solana/Belgrade post for the last three years and the official
announcement you refer to below, was more for internal reasons to confirm him on that post. If
Sorensen, however, after being interviewed by Barroso and Alexander, is selected as the liaison
officer, it is understood that he would give up that post.
The next steps, as discussed between Olli Rehn and Alexander, is that Mr. Barroso would
interview Sorensen (this is to happen this week I was told this morning) and then Alexander
would interview him. It was confirmed again this morning to me that the person would be
appointed only after our agreement on his/her feasibility for the job.
ES will meet David Harland for lunch on thursday and probe him some more on Mr. Sorensen.
Will get back to you all with the read-out.
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Timothy ToSonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP ccYasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Donatella Giubilaro
24/02/2009 11:10 AM UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
SubjectFw: misc
Hi,
on another matter, Peter Sorensen from the EC. He has just been made officially yesterday
Solana's personal representative in Belgrade and according to my EC sources (not least in
Kosovo) doubt he would give up such a position. He is supposed to bring some order in the
Belgrade-EU relations, particular on the Kosovo issue...
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=942&lang=EN
Page 2 of 4
On this basis, I spoke to the senior desk officer in DG Enlargement, and he told me that Rehn's
remark came after it was decided that Sorensen would get this other post. So I do not now know
the status of the nomination to us. The EC colleague also said, although he admitted that he was
not responsible for the matter but the cabinet (Helene) was, that he was under the impression
that the name was put to us for our consideration and that we had to reply. Only Alexander
could know this...
For my penny's worth, if I may. We are really looking for some one not so 'high', more
technical/legal, and certainly not a political role. Further, Sorensen is a Council person not EC,
where the expertise is. This would result in him being a post box, and DG Elarg being the contact
in the EC. This begs the question - what is the point of him? There is a danger of someone of the
status of Solana's personal representative becoming something more than just a "liaison officer"
(which is really the desired role of this person). Him playing a political role risks cutting across
our efforts.
On a side matter, my sources have been less than complimentary about him (perhaps we should
ask David Harland?), and we would not want to get the EC's cast-offs.
If his hat is till in the ring, perhaps we should reflect on his nomination - are we to reply now?
If he is no longer to be considered, perhaps this gives us an opportunity to redefine the kind of
person we are looking for.
As agreed with Taye, I pass this on to you.

I wonder what the best way to follow up on this would be.
Best,
Tim
----- Forwarded by Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP on 24/02/2009 16:52 -----

Cc: Taye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja
Date: 24/02/2009 16:24
Subject: misc
[attachment "New Turkish Ambassador Fakili.doc" deleted by Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP]

[attachment "Apakan CV.doc" deleted by Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP]
Dear Alexander,
I was invited for a coffee this morning by the Counsellor in the Turkish "Embassy" in the north. I
Page 3 of 4
have known him for some time, so there was nothing extraordinary in that.
However he did have something specific to pass on, and having spoken with Taye, I now pass
this on to you.
1.
Following your remarks to Apakan when you were in Ankara on the importance of having regular
contacts with him, they would like to make a proposal.
Option one (preferred)
z You could use a private plane, not registered in the RoC, to leave SBAs and fly directly to
Ankara. Turkey would cover all related costs . I made no comment on this (problematic)
proposal.
Option two (less preferred)
z You could meet in a third country. He did not specify where would be convenient from a
point of view of time.
Option three (which I proposed but he did not like, though did not rule out)
z Meet in the north. I was not sure if the above offers (1 and 2) came in reaction to this
suggestion on our part or not, so I floated it anyway.
2.
Further, they would like that you bring "legal specialists" for the next time that you and he meet
to share ideas.
My comment : recall that Apakan has made his career on Cyprus, and it may be difficult to take
the desk officer out of him on this one. Also, recall his parting words [ in my view of dubious
veracity ] to you in September on the steps of the MFA that the majority of the Annan Plan was
written their help. Some might say this offer seems to be a little bit over involved on his part,
and perhaps a little bit overbearing, and not particularly in sync with the approach this time
around. On the other hand of course, Turkey has to be on board...
FYI, I asked about Apakan's mooted moving to NY, he did not want to comment except saying
that "it was up in the air".
3.
The new "Ambassador" Fakili in the north has now settled in, and would like to meet you when
convenient. My comment: this is recommended, although as it has an element of sensitivity to it,
we should not overly advertise it. I attach the CVs of Apakan and Fakili for your interest, where
you see that the two have worked together in Cyprus already.
I hope this mail finds you well,

All the best,
Tim
Page 4 of 4
Tim Alchin
Office of the SRSG/Chief of Mission
Tel: +357 22 61 4405
Tel: +90 392 601 4405
Mobile: +357 99 523 980
email: alchin@un.org
Page 1 of 2

To: Fiona Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP@UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICS BASE@UN-MAILHUB
cc: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP

Subject: Re: the orig email re conference
Dear Fiona,
many thanks for alerting us. As I mentioned this morning, it seems to me that AD never got an
invitation to this event. We should run it over with him in March when he will be back on the
island (the conference is only in May), and I agree with you for sure we do not want it to be a
problem.
cheers, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Fiona Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Fiona ToSonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP ccYasser Sabra/UNFICYP
Subjectthe orig email re conference
24/02/2009 07:31 AM
Dear Sonja
Further to our conversation this morning (NY time), I am sending you the email from the guys
who have the Economist Conferences franchise in Greece and Cyprus, as well their draft
programme and my reply. As I mentioned to you, I was in touch with them last summer, when I
didn't think I would be involved with the UN much longer, about a possible conference in Cyprus
in February focused on settlement issues. The idea was to have both leaders appear at the
opening event as well as someone like the SG or SASG, then international experts to discuss the
main chapters. After many delicate negotiations, mainly by an associate of mine, the TkCyps
were on board (subject to many provisos that might never have been accepted by the GkCyps)
but we couldn't even get the GkCyps to talk about it.
Unfortunately the Greece office, which as I mentioned is a bit of an anomaly as far as Economist
Conferences are concerned, seems to have forgotten all of this and according to the programme
has gone ahead and invited Mr Christofias and the SASG to a different, annual conference which
they hold in Athens each year, not realising that it is unlikely Mr Talat would accept the
invitation. The bottom line: if only the SASG and Mr Christofias speak it will look like the UN has
collaborated with the Economist Conferences to snub the TkCyps, even though they were the
ones who had been more willing to deal with the Economist last time.
In the meantime, PRIO have confirmed that they would not be involved in funding something in
Page 2 of 2
which Cyprus is only a small slot.
Here is the exchange of emails:
Hope this e-mail finds you well, attached you will find a copy of the agenda for the forthcoming 13th
Government Roundtable Summit whereby we have invited H.E. Demetrios Christofias to address on the panel
entitled "The Cyprus Question: Back to the negotiating table. Who do you think we should have from the Turkish
side? Can you look into H.E. Mehmet Ali Talat for us, maybe you could chair this session also. Do you think the
PRIO people would like to get involved and speak on this session? Do they have any money for sponsorship?
My reply
Dear Nectaria
I just spoke to Mary on the phone. As I mentioned to you, I am a fully fledged UN staff member from March 1st
so it wouldn’t be appropriate for me to be involved, especially as regards chasing Mr Talat. My hunch from the
many hours spent getting his assent in principle last time is that if you have already invited one as President of
the Republic (as opposed to the H.E. titles they are given when negotiating under UN auspices) the other will
not come. Perhaps you can invite a prominent member of Turkish Cypriot society instead. PRIO may have
some ideas, so my recommendation is to speak directly to Arne Strand at PRIO: prio.arne@cytanet.com.cy .
+357 22 456 554.
As for chairing a session my suspicion is that my UN bosses will say no, but I will at least ask about that next
week. Before I do that, could you let me know if you have confirmed Mr Downer’s attendance?
Best regards
Fiona
Fiona Mullen
UNSG Good Offices, Cyprus
Tel +357 99 338 224
mullenf@un.org [attachment "Economist Government Roundtable Athens.pdf" deleted by Sonja
Bachmann/NY/UNO]
Page 1 of 1
From: Steven Bourke/UNFICYP

cc: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Date: Wednesday, February 25, 2009 03:22PM

Subject: 25 February bullet point update - cable to follow
History: This message has been replied to and forwarded.
Meeting of leaders 25 February (morning):
This was the fourth meeting of the leaders on property.
The tête-à-tête at the beginning of the meeting was particularly long (1 hour, 45 minutes)
They read responses to papers on criteria. Rights of original owners versus current users
remains an obstacle. GCs are insisting that the first criteria should be the right of the original owner to
decide. TCs disagree.
Nonetheless late in the meeting GCs affirmed that TC recognition of original owner’s
rights could facilitate GC compromise vis-à-vis the exercise of these rights.
TCs presented a paper on the structure and composition of a possible property commission.
The GCs replied that they will study the proposal and respond.
The leaders have decided that at their next meeting they will discuss Property. After that
they will discuss EU matters, instead of Economic matters as previously decided.
Next meeting of the leaders has been scheduled for Thursday, 5 March (morning). No
meetings of representatives scheduled.
Steven Jay Bourke

Good Offices
United Nations Department of Political Affairs
P.O. Box 21642
1590 Nicosia
Cyprus
Work: + 357 22 614 133

Mobile: + 357 99 207 321
Email: bourkes@un.org
Page 1 of 1

To: Alexander DOWNER/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, alexander.downer@adelaide.edu.au, Taye-
Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
cc: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Donatella
Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP

Subject: Proposed/Possible Schedule for the visit of Professor Van Heutte
Attached please find a list of possible advisers, experts and academics for Professor Hans Van
Heutte (HvH) to meet. It is anticipated that Monday, 9 March will be an orientation day for
Professor HvH and that Mr. HvH will have the weekend to summarize initial impressions. The
proposed schedule is optimal. It is left to the discretion of Mr. Downer and Mr. Zerihoun to
determine what would be most practical.
Steven Jay Bourke

Good Offices
P.O. Box 21642
1590 Nicosia
Cyprus
Work: + 357 22 614 133

Mobile: + 357 99 207 321
Attachments:
Proposed Schedule of Meetings for Professor Hans Van Houtte.doc
ProposedScheduleofMeetingsforProfessorHansVanHoutte.doc
Proposed/Possible Schedule of Meetings for Professor Hans Van Houtte

9 March to 16 March, 2009
Proposed/Possible GkCyp Meetings
10 March TBC Morning

Mr. Toumazos Tsielepis (Leader’s Adviser) AND Ms. Erato Markoullis (Team Leader Property
Working Group, Former Permanent Secretary, Member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Mr. Symeon Matsis (Expert on Annan Plan Property Proposals, Former Permanent Secretary,
Founding Member Bureau of Planning and Development)
11 March TBC Afternoon

Mr. Achilleas Demetreiades (Lawyer, architect of Louzidou and other ECHR precedents)
11 March TBC Early Evening

Mr. Costas Apostolides (Expert on Annan Plan Property Proposals)

Academics: Panos Pashardes (University of Cyprus, Director of Economics Research Center);
Sophronis Clerides (University of Cyprus); Luis Christofides (University of Cyprus, Dean,
Faculty of Economics and Management)
Proposed/Possible TkCyp Meetings

Mr. Kudret Özersay (Leader’s Adviser) AND Mr. Hasan Findik (Team Leader Property Working
Group, Director of Housing, north Cyprus “Ministry of Interior”)

Ms. Ayla Gürel (Expert on Annan Plan Property Proposals, Prio Researcher)

Mr. Serden Hoça (Expert on Annan Plan Property Proposals, UBP party member, Property
developer) AND Mr. Tamer Gazioglu (Leader’s Adviser during Annan Process, former
Ambassador, DP party member)
12 March TBC Early Evening

Ms. Emine Erk (Lawyer, Director of north Cyprus human rights institute, wife of Presidential
Adviser, Kutlay Erk)

Academics: Erol Kaymak (EMU, Department of International Affairs); Mustafa Besim (EMU,
Department of Economics); Yenal Süreç (EMU, Department of Economics)

Page 1 of 2
From: "Menelaos Menelaou" <mmenelaou@mfa.gov.cy>

To: "'Sonja Bachmann'" <bachmanns@un.org>, <bourkes@un.org>, "'Timothy Alchin'"
<alchin@un.org>, <cibor@un.org>, <sabra@un.org>, <giubilaro@un.org>
Date: Thursday, February 26, 2009 06:09AM

Subject:
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Page 2 of 2
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Attachments:
RESPONSE OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE.doc
RESPONSE OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE.doc
RESPONSE OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE ON THE TURKISH

CYPRIOT PAPER ON THE CRITERIA
The GC side finds the TC paper on criteria problematical for the

same reasons that we have outlined in our paper on Principles.
Property rights are individual rights protected by Article 1 of
Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As such,
these rights cannot be compromised or violated, except under the
conditions and the safeguards provided in the Convention.
Furthermore, under the law of fundamental human rights to
property, the presumptive relief in case of expropriation is
restitutio in integrum and not compensation. The right to
compensation is a second order remedy.
Both UN Human Rights Covenants1, as well as the European

Convention on Human Rights2, prohibit discrimination. The TC
criteria discriminate against the GC dispossessed owners in the
ways that will be described below.
Rule 1 of TC Paper: We reiterate our position that the choice of

the dispossessed owner, has priority over any wish expressed by
the current user or any other person. For the reasons we have
1
Article 2, common in both Covenants reads: “The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised
without discrimination of any kind as to race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”
2
Article 14 of the Convention reads “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,
color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with
a national minority, property, birth or other status”
2
analyzed in our paper entitled “Greek Cypriot position on the

property issue” dated 28 January 2009, any other position is
contrary to the established principles of international law and
human rights.
Rule 2 of TC Paper: It is evident that the Turkish Cypriot side

emphasizes compensation and exchange as preferred remedies,
as opposed to reinstatement. Our position, which is grounded on
international law, is that compensation should be used only when
the remedy of restitution is not factually possible (when affected
property is damaged or destroyed) and the dispossessed owner
knowingly and voluntarily accepts compensation in lieu of
restitution. Exchange of property should also be voluntary.
“ A- Compensation:”
a) We do not disagree that compensation should be an

option for the dispossessed owner, but it has to be made clear
that reinstatement is the first priority. Our position is that there
will be only one Property Authority or Property Commission which
will decide on all issues concerning affected properties. The
existence of only one such Body, in which both Communities will
participate equally, will safeguard its impartiality, consistency of
decisions, speed and efficiency, as it will deal with all affected
properties, and all claims through a centralized, computerized
data system. We also propose a property court.
b) The specific rule is acceptable only if the dispossessed

owner voluntarily rejects reinstatement and/or exchange.
3
c) The idea that if a current user has “substantially

developed” an affected property he should have priority over the
owner “to receive title” to the property takes a contrasting
approach to the European Court of Human Rights, which in the
Cyprus related case law insisted on the reinstatement of
properties to their lawful owner. We have, however, accepted, in
a spirit of compromise and as a matter of equity, that a)
properties developed for purposes of public benefit will be
compensated and b) that in all other cases, where the current
user has incurred expenses on the property, he will be entitled to
compensation by the owner for the value of the development, in
case the latter chooses the reinstatement of his property.
d) The distinction being made in the TC paper between

affected properties owned by natural persons and those owned by
institutions constitutes a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the
ECHR which clearly protects the property rights of both natural
and legal persons.3
e) We have already agreed at the Working Group level that

affected properties used for genuine purposes of public benefit,
after an objective inquiry made by the Property Commission, will
not be reinstated but will be compensated. We do not accept that
public benefit includes “military purposes” as we aim at the
demilitarization of Cyprus. We also do not agree that such
properties will be expropriated only by the federated units in
3
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions”.
4
which they are located. The Federal government, local authorities

and any other authority having by Law the authority to
compulsorily acquire property, should also be included.
e) We understand the reference to “any purchaser, or his/her

successor in title, of an affected property” who “may apply to
receive title to that property” as implying the person who paid
money to the current user of an affected property in order to
secure the use of the property. We do not consider these persons
as “purchasers” of the property, but only as users. Based on the
Cyprus related ECHR case law the dispossessed owner of property
retains the legal title to the said properties and, therefore, he
should have the priority to decide/choose about the fate of the
said properties.
A- Exchange:
We reiterate that for our side it is a matter of principle that the

owner’s choice has priority over the wish of the current user. The
formulation on “Exchange”, in order to be compatible with
international law should be amended as follows: “A dispossessed
owner, who is also current user of other affected property, may
apply to the Property Commission to receive title to such property
he is using, in exchange for title to his affected property,
provided the owner of the property which the applicant uses,
does not choose the reinstatement of his property and that the
properties to be exchanged are of equal value.”
5
B- Reinstatement:
It is obvious that for the Turkish Cypriot side reinstatement is the

last option and applies (under very strict criteria) only if the
affected properties do not fall under the categories for
compensation and exchange. International law demands that
reinstatements be pursued as the ideal proprietary remedy. This
is why, in the GC side’s criteria reinstatement is the first option
and the options of compensation and exchange shall be available
in lieu of reinstatement, at the choice of the owner.
a. We cannot accept any artificial “ceilings” or “specified

percentages” for reinstatement as any such idea is contrary to
the principles of international law and human rights.
b. Priority in reinstatement of dwellings as included in the TC

paper relates and is restricted to reinstatement as an exception,
after the rules for compensation and exchange are first applied.
In reality, taking into account the restricted scope of
reinstatement, such priority makes no real difference.
1- “Reinstatement of a Dwelling:”
i. Any limitation to the right of reinstatement by reference to a

dwelling “of which he/she was dispossessed and in which he/she
was living at the time of dispossession” as well as to “persons
who are full-share owners” or “dwellings not being eligible for
reinstatement” or to any other reason is problematic, because
such limitation is contrary to international law, and in particular
6
to the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as the case

law of the ECHR. Imposing alternative land and compensation in
lieu of restitution on displaced persons and dispossessed owners
is an unacceptable remedy.
ii. Any limitations on the “maximum size of the plot” of the

dwelling to be reinstated are contrary to international law.
2- “Reinstatement of Small Business Premises:”
i. Any arbitrary limitation to the right of reinstatement by

reference to “natural persons”, or “full-share owners” or of the
number of businesses that may be reinstated is contrary to
international law.
ii. Any arbitrary limitations on “the size of the land” area of the
property in question based on the requirements for the operation
of the said business, are also contrary to international law.
iii. We cannot accept the idea that businesses shall be treated

in a different way, depending on their size. That would be
contrary to Article 1 of Protocol 1 which protects the right to
enjoyment of possessions to both natural and legal persons
3- “Reinstatement of Land”
i. We reiterate that any limitations by reference to “full-share

owners” “natural persons” “part of the land” “maximum” number
of plots, or “maximum” area of land, are contrary to international
law.
7
ii. The idea of imposing an alternative piece of land in lieu of

reinstatement to a dispossessed owner violates the basic rule of
prioritizing the right to restitution.
“Rule 3:” This “Rule” obviously refers to the case of

dispossessed Turkish Cypriots who were “allocated” properties
owned by dispossessed Greek Cypriots “in exchange” for their
affected properties and who (the Turkish Cypriots) subsequently
sold their affected properties to third parties. Our side wants to
emphatically state that a) Such “allocation” or “exchange” of
properties is illegal and therefore null and void, b) the Turkish
Cypriot owners of affected properties are still the legal owners of
their properties in spite of this so called “allocation” or
“exchange”, c) any sales of affected properties made voluntarily
and approved by the Guardian of Turkish Cypriot properties is
valid and d) the Greek Cypriot owner of the affected property
which such Turkish Cypriot is using retains also fully his title to
the affected property.
“Rule 4:” Definitions
- ‘Current user’: The GC side’s definition of the term “current

user” as proposed at the Working Group level is “a person who is
currently using a home or other affected property of a
dispossessed owner, who has fled and lost use and control of the
said home or affected property” . Any definition attempting to
8
accord any form of “right” to any such current user of affected

property is not acceptable.
- ‘Affected property’:
The GC side’s definition of “Affected property” as proposed at the

Working Group level is as follows:
” – immovable property in Cyprus which the owner, being a

natural or legal person, left or of which s/he lost use and control
as a consequence of intercommunal strife, military action or the
unresolved division of the island between December 1963 and
entry into force of the Agreement, and which has not since been
reinstated to the owner (or his/her heir, personal representative
or successor in title), and over which s/he has not regained use
and control. Affected property shall not include any property
which was voluntarily sold, transferred or otherwise permanently
disposed of by the owner, to a natural or legal person who was
able to gain effective control over the property, or for which
compensation due to compulsory acquisition has been accepted.
The onus of proof of any such voluntary transfer or lawful
expropriation shall lie with the transferee or his/her successor in
title. In the absence of evidence to the contrary for the individual
case in question, dispossession shall be presumed to have been
unlawful and/or involuntary. People who are successors in title of
dispossessed owners and have not been able to gain effective
control over the relevant affected property shall be treated in the
same manner as the dispossessed owners themselves would be”.
9
For the reasons outlined in our previous papers, there must be no

exclusion from the definition of “affected property” of any
property for which “compensation (in the form of alternative
property or monetary compensation)” was arranged by the so
called “Immovable Property Commission”.
Finally, for the reasons explained in our earlier papers, we

maintain there are no disputed “Evkaf properties” and therefore
we do not accept the exclusion of any such invented cases from
the definition of “affected property”.
- ‘Substantial improvement’: We reiterate our position that, as a

matter of equity, we are prepared to accept that the current user
who has carried out any development or improvement on affected
property is entitled to receive compensation from the owner for
the value of such development or improvement, in case the latter
chooses the reinstatement of his property. This rule should apply
in all cases, irrespective of the extent or cost of such
development or improvement.
- ‘Dispossessed owner’: It should me made clear that the

definition includes all the successors in title of the original owner,
e.g. purchasers.
- ‘Small Business’: There can be no distinction between “small”

and “big” businesses, therefore this definition is unnecessary.
10
- ‘Institutions’ Again, as explained earlier, there can be no

distinction between the property rights of natural persons and of
legal persons, therefore this definition is also unnecessary.
In conclusion we would like to stress the following: The right to

property is an individual right well protected by International Law
and in particular by the First Protocol to the European Convention
of Human Rights. This right cannot be denied directly or
indirectly, but can only be regulated in so far as its exercise is
concerned. Such regulation should be done individually and in
accordance with the aforesaid Protocol. Any general provisions
such as percentages and restrictive practices are not only
contrary to the aforesaid Protocol but are also random, arbitrary
and discriminatory. As such, they are null and void, being also
contrary to Articles 2, 4 and 26 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. A single individual petition to the
European Court of Human Rights or to any other judicial or quasi
judicial Human Rights Treaty Body would render null and void any
arrangement that is contrary to the abovementioned. For this
reason, the TC proposals for the solution of the property issue
could not be upheld in any European Court of law. The Turkish
Cypriot proposals for the solution of the property issue are
contrary to both the Protocol and the Covenant and should not be
accepted.
23 February 2009
Page 1 of 1


Subject: visit by david harland and other
Dear Alexander,
as discussed with you last time, I had a coffee with Florian, the DPKO desk officer and he
mentioned to me that Gerard's comments on the Tk troops went unnoticed in NY. To the
contrary, they really appreciate Gerard's professionalism. So, good for that one. I called Gerard
and let him know. It is good to disseminate good vibes.
I was also told that the Director of Europe division in Peacekeeping David Harland (NZ) (he is ES
counterpart) will be visiting the island from 10 - 13 March to start contingency planning for
UNFICYP in case of a settlement. I asked Yasser to fix a meeting with you.
Van Houtte is ready and will be arriving on the 9th leaving on Monday 16th. Steven is in touch
with him.
I saw TA email on Tk, not sure it is the most sensible approach to put such thoughts in writing....
BLP: his assistant told me once again, he is happy with our work and cables, communication etc.
As per your March flights, can you confirm

- leaving Adelaide for Cyprus on Saturday 7 March evening and leaving the island on Saturday 14
March?
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 1

To: Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP

Subject: Fw: Proposed/Possible Schedule for the visit of Professor Van Heutte
here it is.
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
----- Forwarded by Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO on 25/02/2009 03:34 PM -----
Steven ToAlexander
Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP DOWNER/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
alexander.downer@adelaide.edu.au
25/02/2009 09:58 AM Taye-Brook
Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
ccYasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ,
Donatella Giubilaro
UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
SubjectProposed/Possible Schedule for the
visit of Professor Van Heutte
Attached please find a list of possible advisers, experts and academics for Professor Hans Van
Heutte (HvH) to meet. It is anticipated that Monday, 9 March will be an orientation day for
Professor HvH and that Mr. HvH will have the weekend to summarize initial impressions. The
proposed schedule is optimal. It is left to the discretion of Mr. Downer and Mr. Zerihoun to
determine what would be most practical.
Steven Jay Bourke

Good Offices
P.O. Box 21642
1590 Nicosia
Cyprus
Work: + 357 22 614 133

Mobile: + 357 99 207 321
Attachments:
Proposed Schedule of Meetings for Professor Hans Van Houtte.doc
Page 1 of 2
From: Alexander Downer <adowner@bespokeapproach.com>

To: <bachmanns@un.org>

Subject: Re: visit by david harland and other
All good. Iike the idea of a charter to Ankara paid by Turks. Gerard could advise.
Definately leave Adelaide on Saturday 7th but will decide return later. Need to be in Sydney by
pm 17th
How did the talks go this week. No word from the carrozza letti!
----- Original Message -----

From: Sonja Bachmann <bachmanns@un.org>
To: alexander.downer@adelaide.edu.au <alexander.downer@adelaide.edu.au>
Sent: Thu Feb 26 03:18:23 2009
Dear Alexander,
with him.

March?
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Page 2 of 2

Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 1

To: zerihount@comcast.net, ysabra@msn.com, timalchin@hotmail.com
Date: Thursday, February 26, 2009 01:49AM

Subject: Notes of meeting with Mr. Talat
Dear all,
pls. find attached the notes of our last meeting with Talat. Thanks Tim for the CD one.
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Attachments:
Meeting with H.E. Talat February 2009.doc
Confidential
Note of SASG Downer’s Meeting with Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat

Turkish Cypriot Leader
Held in Nicosia
on Monday 16 February 2009 at 12.00 pm
Present:
SASG Alexander Downer Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat
SRSG Taye-Brook Zerihoun Mr. Ozdil Nami, Representative
Mr. Yasser Sabra Mr. Resat Cagler, Special Political Adviser
Mr. Tim Alchin Mr. Mehmet Dana (note taker)
Ms. Sonja Bachmann (note taker)
Summary of discussion:
1. Mr. Downer mentioned his weekend excursion to the Karpas peninsula.

Mr. Talat explained that people from Kokkina were evacuated to the Karpas. The CTP
still enjoyed support in the Karpas. He also mentioned that Mr. Eroglu had announced
that he would continue to distribute properties which “would be a disaster”, although he
would not “dare to do anything directly opposing the negotiations”. He might, however,
try to create problems when the CTP briefed the Government. Mr. Downer said that the
proposed joint meeting of Mr. Christofias and Mr. Talat with the chambers of commerce
was a good idea. The more both leaders could do together, the better.
2. Mr. Talat mentioned that it would be helpful if the UN indicated that it preferred the
pro-solution forces to continue. Mr. Rehn said it clearly, he added. Answering
Mr. Downer’s question on the relative importance of the media, he said that the TkCyp
press was less important than television. Mr. Cagler agreed that people preferred to watch
television. Asked for his assessment of the negotiations, Mr. Talat said that the leaders
agreed to end the discussion on property this week. President Christofias, he opined,
appreciated the importance of the elections in the North and would try to help to achieve
a good outcome.
3. Mr. Downer mentioned that both sides worried about the economy and that it was a
good idea to finish property in order to allow technical people to deal with the details.
There was a need to come to an understanding on the criteria. TkCyp priority seemed to
be the issue of settlers and the maintenance of a TkCyp majority in the TkCyp constituent
state. The GkCyp political requirement, on the other hand, was that people needed to
believe that they had a choice as to what to do with their properties. GkCyps estimates
were that about 20 % would return. It was clear to the GkCyps, Mr. Downer said, that
there would not be a situation where 75 % of the property was owned by GkCyps in the
North. It had to be seen how policies could be implemented in practice. Mr. Zerihoun
added that there “was a meeting of minds” on some areas of the criteria. Mr. Downer
emphasized that property was a complex issue which needed to be looked at by experts. It
was important that the momentum kept going.
4. Mr. Downer mentioned that the governance expert John McGarry was in town and
would continue his discussions with the experts on both sides. The EC Enlargement
Commissioner had offered a liaison officer who would not be part of the GO staff but
would assist in advising on various aspects of EC law. He reiterated that the UN was not
in the business of writing up a “big plan”.
5. Mr. Talat said that the context of territorial adjustment, as mentioned by the
GkCyps, was even more sensitive than the property issue. Mr. Downer mentioned that
under territorial adjustments foreseen by the Annan Plan, about 32 % of the GkCyps
claims were satisfied. The GkCyps implied that they would be more conciliatory on the
property issue the more territory they would get, i.e. they would accept de facto ceilings
without writing it down. Mr. Zerihoun added that there was need to push a little more on
the numbers. It was quite clear from a joint dinner with Mr. Iacovou that their idea of
application was different from the general principles. Experts needed to be given more
guidance.
6. Mr. Downer reiterated the need to keep momentum instead of sticking to

timetables. He floated the idea with the GkCyps to finish the first reading by 19 April,
however they thought this might be difficult. On economy and EU matters there seemed
to be more convergence. Security issues would most probably only be dealt with at the
end. Mr. Talat mentioned that in all previous processes the Treaties of Alliance and
Guarantee “were kept intact” and that there was not much room for manoeuvre.
Mr. Downer said that the Turkish position on this issue was quite clear. Mr. Talat added
that whereas Mr. Christofias did not make an issue of it in the past, now he acted
differently.
Sonja Bachmann
DPA/GO
25 February 2009
Page 1 of 1

Date: Thursday, February 26, 2009 01:28PM

Subject: Papers presented by both side on 25 February
Four papers attached: (1) GkCyp response to TkCyp criteria; (2) TkCyp response to GkCyp
criteria; (3) TkCyp proposal for a property commission; (4) TkCyp response to GkCyp comments
on TkyCp response to GkCyp paper on principles.
Steven Jay Bourke

Good Offices
P.O. Box 21642
1590 Nicosia
Cyprus
Work: + 357 22 614 133

Mobile: + 357 99 207 321
Attachments:
RESPONSE OF THE GR
TC response to GC crit property commissions. TC response to GC res
EEK CYPRIOT SIDE.do
eria paper-final.doc doc ponse-final.doc
c
TCresponsetoGCresponseͲfinal.doc
THE RESPONSE OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE TO THE GREEK

CYPRIOT PAPER DATED 12 FEBRUARY 2009 COMMENTING ON
THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PAPER OF 4 FEBRUARY 2009
As for the Greek Cypriot paper dated 12 February 2009 commenting on the
Turkish Cypriot paper of 4 February 2009, I feel obliged to make a few remarks
here at the meeting, without going into detail, as our response to it will be conveyed
to you in writing.
First of all, I need to stress that the tone and the wording of the paper in
question is provocative and it rather resembles a propaganda pamphlet than an
explanatory paper on one’s position. Such an approach has no use other than
resulting in futile discussions, costing invaluable time and energy which could
otherwise be utilized for meaningful negotiations. The terminology used in the
paper in question with reference to Turkish Cypriot positions, such as “lack of
knowledge”, “arbitrary interpretations” or “intentional effort to seriously distort”
can only be considered as being disrespectful to your counterpart with whom you
are trying to renew your partnership.
At the same time, using remarks that are known to be trigger words for the
Turkish Cypriot side such as “invasion” and “occupation” is not conducive to a
positive climate in the process. It is not difficult for the Turkish Cypriot side as well
to mention the war crimes, including gross violations of human rights and
massacres that were committed against Turkish Cypriot civilians between 1963-
1974 in Cyprus, but we refrain from doing so in order not to jeopardize the
process. We expect a similar sensitivity from the Greek Cypriot side.
We believe that mutual respect and courtesy that prevailed so far in the
negotiations and in the papers prepared should be upheld irrespective of the
sensitivity of the subject matter in question.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As for the content of the said paper, we would like to make a few comments
on certain issues raised and not to go into a legal debate about what is the “correct”
reading of a particular document or a legal case, or whether all the documents
referred to in the Greek Cypriot paper have relevance to the property problem in
Cyprus, which has its own settlement parameters that came into existence in four
decades of negotiations.
We would like to state, at the outset, that none of the decisions taken in the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in relation to a Greek Cypriot

2
dispossessed owner calls for the restitution of the property in question. Thus,
ECtHR decisions do not support the Greek Cypriot position that the dispossessed
owners cannot be denied under any circumstances the right to restitution.
It was stated in the Greek Cypriot paper that as the negotiations are not
conducted on the basis of the Ghali Set of Ideas, certain principles of the Ideas, i.e.
clear majority principle, cannot be isolated and “twisted” in a manner meeting the
demands of the Turkish Cypriot side. It is true that the interpretation of bi-zonality
(the clear majority principle) was endorsed by the Security Council during the
negotiations on the Ghali Set of Ideas. Nevertheless, it would be very wrong to
assume that the interpretation of the principle of bi-zonality by the Council in
particular or the international community in general had changed or was
“abandoned” with the collapse of the negotiations on the Ghali Set of Ideas. The
fact that the relevant provisions of different versions of the Annan Plan also
envisaged a settlement which respected the “clear majority” principle is yet another
proof that this principle is a well-established UN parameter and not connected only
to the Ghali Set of Ideas.
Despite the claim in the paper, we do not envisage two communities living
separately as practically homogenous ethnic groups. Otherwise, we would not have
accepted the Annan Plan which also included the return of thousands of Greek
Cypriot refugees to the North. We cannot, however, accept a property regime
which will not guarantee Turkish Cypriots the clear majority of land ownership and
property in their respective Constituent State; a property regime, in other words,
which will make us minority both in terms of population and land ownership in our
own Constituent State. The Turkish Cypriots cannot accept such a property regime,
not because of the fact that the clear majority principle is endorsed by the Security
Council, but because it defies all the overriding settlement parameters such as bi-
zonality, bi-communality and political equality. It is incomprehensible that in both
Constituent States to be established with a settlement, the Greek Cypriots will have
the majority of population and land ownership regardless of the fact that one will
be called as the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State.
We also noted with disappointment that the provocative terminology

“invasion” and “occupation” was used for the first time by the Greek Cypriot side
in its papers in this negotiating process when it was referred to the “abnormal”
situation in Cyprus and claimed that this is a result of “Turkey’s invasion and
continuing military occupation”. Such provocative terminology is not in line with
the positive atmosphere currently prevailing in the negotiations. The term
“abnormal” was in fact used in our paper to describe the conditions in the island
prevailing since 1963, when the Turkish Cypriots were ousted from the
government, more than a hundred articles of the constitution were suspended,

3
Turkish Cypriots were persecuted, killed, their property plundered and forced to
live in ghettos corresponding to a mere 3% of the island’s territory and UNFICYP
was deployed in 1964 to prevent further inter-communal strife. Furthermore, the
Greek Cypriot “Supreme Court”, which was unconstitutionally established in 1964
by the Greek Cypriot side and comprising only Greek Cypriot judges, also referred
numerous times to the abnormal situation in Cyprus in its judgment the Attorney
General of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim and Others (1964, Cyprus Law Reports 195).
In the light of these undeniable facts, pretending as if everything was “normal” in
Cyprus until 1974, to say the least, is not very convincing.
As for the claims of “deportation or forcible transfer of population”, the
efforts to absolve the Greek Cypriot side and Greece from the responsibility of the
events that had befallen the island between 1963-74 in the name of Enosis, which
led to the physical separation of two communities long before 1974, cannot change
the historical facts of the island.
In its paper, the Greek Cypriot side gives examples from Guatemala,
Mozambique and Cambodia. It is well-known that the agreements referred with
respect to these conflicts are signed just after or in some cases even before the end
of civil wars or inter-communal strives. The Guatemala Agreement on
Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict was
signed in 1994, but the civil war ended in 1996. The Mozambique General Peace
Agreement was signed in 1992 immediately after the end of the civil war. Finally,
violence stopped in Cambodia in 1991 and the agreement was signed in the same
year.
However in Cyprus, the inter-communal strife (violence) started in 1963 and

ended in 1974. After this date, the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots used and
developed the properties left by the dispossessed owners for 35 years in line with
the laws in force in their respective territories. It is clear that the agreements signed
just after or before the violence ended cannot be compared with the
comprehensive settlement agreement that shall be signed in Cyprus after 35 years.
The legal status of the current users in Cyprus (who have been using these
properties in accordance with the law in force in the area where these properties are
located) is not the same with the status of the de-facto current users in Cambodia,
Guatemala or Mozambique prior to settlement.
Moreover, it is also important to note that the document called

“Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict” which
was referred to in the Greek Cypriot paper about Guatemala did not only provide
“guarantees to returning populations especially concerning the issue of land rights”.
Article 9, Chapter II of this agreement entitled “Guarantees for the Resettlement of
Uprooted Population Groups” includes the following provision: “In the particular

4
case of abandonment of land as a result of armed conflict, the Government

undertakes to revise and promote legal provisions to ensure that such an act is not
considered to be voluntary abandonment, and to ratify the inalienable nature of
landholding rights. In this context, it shall promote the return of land to the
original holders and/or shall seek adequate compensatory solutions”.
It is the considered view of the Turkish Cypriot side that there has to be a
property regime designed for Cyprus taking into consideration its peculiar
conditions. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that the Greek Cypriot side
conveniently overlooked other peace agreements concluded during the same years,
i.e. Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the
Rwandese Patriotic Front (Arusha Agreement-1993). Despite it was concluded
immediately after the end of three years-long civil war in Rwanda, this agreement
did not provide reinstatement as the only redress. The Article 3 of this agreement
states that “For purposes of settling returnees, the Rwandese Government shall
make lands available, upon their identification by the “Commission for
Repatriation” so long as they are not currently occupied by individuals...” In
Article 4, despite the recognition of the right to property and right of refugees to
repossess their property on return, it is also stated that the parties agreed “that in
order to promote social harmony and national reconciliation, refugees who left
the country more than 10 years ago should not reclaim their properties, which
might have been occupied by other people. The Government shall compensate
them by putting land at their disposal and shall help them to resettle. As for
estates which have been occupied by the Government, the returnee shall have the
right for an equitable compensation by the Government.”
The Turkish Cypriot side is of the view that it would not be appropriate to
consider either Bosnia and Herzegovina or any of the above-mentioned countries
as an example for the unique case of Cyprus. It is clear that the property provisions
in the Ghali Set of Ideas and the Annan Plan were designed by the UN taking into
consideration this sui generis situation of the island.
Regarding the claim that “Cyprus is not a sui generis case”, we would like to
remind our Greek Cypriot counterparts that when references are made by the
Turkish Cypriot side during the negotiations to relevant examples from around the
world, we have been continuously warned that we are looking for a settlement in
Cyprus that will fit to the case of Cyprus, in other words, to the sui generis
conditions of Cyprus.
As regards the Greek Cypriot reference to the Security Council resolution

(S/RES/1674(2006)), it should be noted that this resolution is related to

5
“protection of civilians in armed conflicts” and is therefore irrelevant for the case
of Cyprus where the armed conflict ended 35 years ago. The Security Council has
started to outline the principles regarding the rights of displaced persons at the end
of 1990’s, long before 2006. The Annan Plan, which was finalized by the UN in
2004 and supported by the international community as a whole, was no doubt
prepared in line with these principles. It is also important to note, at this point, that
the relevant European Union institutions declared during the time of the Annan
Plan negotiations their readiness to accommodate the terms of this settlement plan.
Thus, without any doubt, the property regime envisaged in the Plan, which also
forms the basis of the current Turkish Cypriot proposals on affected properties, is
consistent with the rights of displaced persons in particular and human rights in
general.
25 February 2009

TCresponsetoGCcriteriapaperͲfinal.doc
TURKISH CYPRIOT RESPONSE TO THE GREEK

CYPRIOT PAPER ON CRITERIA FOR AFFECTED PROPERTIES
The paper submitted by the Greek Cypriot side on this matter does not
attempt to design reasonable criteria for the regulation of the exercise of property
rights with respect to affected properties. This is because of the fact that it puts the
choice of dispossessed owner above everything else, including the criteria. It is only
in two very limited cases, namely in case of public benefit and factual impossibility
of reinstatement of a building, where the Greek Cypriot side accepts the choice of
the dispossessed owner to be overlooked unless it is a choice of compensation.
These exceptions, however, are valid in any legal system, where there are normal
conditions, which is not the case in Cyprus. In our view, if the choice of the
dispossessed owner or of the current user can override the criteria, this would in
effect render the criteria meaningless.
It is understood from this paper of the Greek Cypriot side that there is an
intention to protect only the rights of dispossessed owners and to neglect the rights
of current users. However, it is generally accepted by the consistent UN practice on
Cyprus issue that for a viable and durable solution in our island, we should take
into consideration the competing rights and interests of both dispossessed owners
and current users. As clearly explained in our property paper on principles, not only
the dispossessed owners but also the current users have certain rights connected to
affected properties and particularly to homes they have been using for decades. It is
obvious that the delicate balance between the two was ignored in the Greek
Cypriot paper on criteria as can be seen in section A (para. 6): “The wish of the
owner of an affected property has priority over the wish of the current user, or any
other person.” A sensible approach cannot be built on the idea of priority of the
wishes of one category of persons over the wishes of the other. Different factors
regarding affected property and persons related to that property (such as legal
certainty and predictability, time factor, emotional link, socio-economic
consequences of new displacements and dispossessions) must be considered in
determining whether the choice of dispossessed owner or current user or
sometimes the need of the society in general shall prevail.
In fact, the main philosophy of the Greek Cypriot paper can be summarized
in one sentence: “Wishes of dispossessed owners shall have priority almost in all
cases.” This philosophy will create a serious risk and possibly hamper chances of a
successful referenda. In such a case, any current user of an affected property shall
be unable to foresee or envisage the future status of that property at the moment of
voting in the referendum. Moreover, it shall result in sacrificing, in many cases, the
wishes as well as the rights and interests of many current users for the sake of one
dispossessed owner. For example, in the case of three blocks of apartments built
on a piece of affected property, the fate of almost twenty homes of different
1
current users (and the fate of these families in general) will be dependent on the
choice and financial capacity of a dispossessed owner. It is impossible for any
political leadership to encourage his/her people to support a regime which will
include such an uncertainty.
Potential uncertainty as a result of this “priority to the wishes of the

dispossessed owner” approach will also emerge at the communal level. As can be
seen from the Greek Cypriot paper, the very essence of the principle of bi-zonality
which is defined as ‘clear majority of population and of land ownership’ shall be
completely destroyed. A regime for affected properties without a ceiling or
proportion as regards reinstatement in one Constituent State is not reasonable and
would undermine the well-established UN practice on bi-zonality.
Another worrying approach in the paper of the Greek Cypriot side is related
to options provided for different categories of owners. It is not rational to provide
same options to both natural and legal persons who are dispossessed owners. In
designing possible redresses, one should bear in mind the emotional link between
the affected property and the dispossessed owner/current user. This is particularly
relevant in the case of natural persons and properties they used as dwellings prior
to dispossession. Similarly, in the case of current user who is a natural person, there
is a same kind of emotional link between these persons and the affected properties
they are currently using as dwellings. Established socio-economic structure should
also be taken into consideration. These factors do not exist in the case of legal
persons. Therefore, for the exercise of the right to property by the dispossessed
owners who are legal persons, it is more appropriate to offer different options
which may not include reinstatement. Turkish Cypriot side proposes a regime along
the lines of this approach.
In the Greek Cypriot paper (para. 24) it is stated that: “All the above criteria
applicable to natural and legal persons will apply to any other immovable property
owned by the autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus, Evkaf and any
other religious institutions in Cyprus.” This approach is unreasonable and causes
concern. Reinstatement option can be made available to these institutions for their
affected properties which were used as religious sites in 1963 or 1974. One may add
certain amount of property adjacent to such religious sites for their functions to be
performed properly.
Given the fact that Turkish Cypriot representatives were not part of the
administration which was controlling the land registry records between 1963 and
1974, it is not possible to accept land registers and records of 1974 as the basis for
ascertaining owner status of individuals. Therefore, in ascertaining owner status,
land registers and records of December 1963 should be taken as the basis. This is
2
not valid for the disputed properties (such as Evkaf property), since a special
commission shall be established to inquire their ownership.
As regards affected properties used for public benefit, owners of such

affected properties shall have the right to exchange title to these properties with the
affected property s/he is currently using or other affected properties in lieu of
receiving compensation for expropriation.
The regime proposed by the Greek Cypriot side for affected properties is
built on the presumption that there are normal conditions in Cyprus and
dispossessed owners shall be able to exercise their property rights without any
restriction. However, the fact that there has been an abnormal situation in Cyprus
since 1963 cannot be ignored. The way the property rights will be exercised cannot
be based on the hypothesis that the developments since 1963 had not taken place.
If reinstatement of a property entails a burden out of all proportion to the benefit
emanating from this reinstatement, it may be excluded as an option due to the
abnormal situation for the sake of public interest.
It is difficult to understand the reference made to Turkey in the Greek

Cypriot paper with regard to financial support required for the implementation of
the relevant provisions of the settlement plan while no reference has been made to
Greece in this regard. Indeed, all the parties interested in the solution of the
problem, the European Union in particular and the international community in
general, as well as the international financial institutions are all expected to
contribute financially to a comprehensive settlement. Furthermore, as also
envisaged in the past, an international donors conference should be organized for
the same purpose.
A current user who is required to vacate an affected property in accordance

with the provisions of the comprehensive settlement shall not be required to do so
until an adequate alternative accommodation in appropriate locations where
adequate livelihoods may be earned has been made available by the Federal
Government.
25 February 2009
3
propertycommissions.doc
TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSAL ON

PROPERTY COMMISSION AND SUB-COMMISSIONS
1. A Property Commission with two sub-commissions shall be established.
2. The Property Commission and the sub-commissions shall be independent

and impartial.
3. The owners of affected properties which are not disputed properties

according to the law in force in 1963 will be ascertained by the Property
Commission and sub commissions by examining the authentic original land
registers and records of 1963.
4. The Property Commission and the sub-commissions shall comprise equal

number of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot members.
5. The members of the sub-commissions shall be appointed by the federal

executive among the candidates designated by the relevant Constituent State.
6. The members of the Property Commission shall be appointed directly by the

federal executive.
7. Each sub-commission shall have the authority to deal with claims and
petitions (applications) about the affected properties located in the territory
of the relevant Constituent State.
8. The federal government and the governments of the Constituent States shall
be obliged to supply any information or document needed by the Property
Commission and the sub-commissions.
9. The sub-commission authorized to deal with the petitions about the affected
properties located in the territory of the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State
shall be presided by a Turkish Cypriot member and the sub-commission
authorized to deal with the petitions about the affected properties located in
the territory of the Greek Cypriot Constituent State shall be presided by a
Greek Cypriot member.
10.The decisions in the sub-commissions shall be taken with simple majority.

The presidents of the sub-commissions shall have the right of casting vote in
case of a deadlock.
11.The Property Commission shall deal with the applications against the
decisions of the sub-commissions. The petitions regarding the affected

propertycommissions.doc
properties located in the areas subject to territorial adjustments will be taken

up by the Property Commission.
12.In case of a deadlock, a foreign member shall be added to the members of

the Property Commission.
13.The Property Commission and the sub-commissions shall take decisions in

accordance with the agreed principles and criteria about the property issue.
14.A Property Court shall be established for dealing with appeals against
decisions of the Property Commission.
15.The Property Court shall comprise equal number of Turkish Cypriot and
Greek Cypriot members. In case of a deadlock, the deadlock-resolving
mechanism devised for judiciary will apply.

Page 1 of 2

To: "Alexander Downer" <adowner@bespokeapproach.com>

Does not sound too good does it? Btw ES mentioned to me yesterday as well if we tried
everything with re to reviving CBMs. I told her we tried some shuttling with you but that it got
stuck on limnitis.
From: Alexander Downer [adowner@bespokeapproach.com]

Sent: 26/02/2009 20:16 ZE10B
To: Sonja Bachmann
Spoke to the carrozza letti. Done nothing about limnitis at all. Nothing. Just wringing their hands
waiting for me to come back. Cross that I went on a cruise as a lecturer when I should have been
holding their hands. They're like children.

Sent: Thu Feb 26 03:18:23 2009
Dear Alexander,
with him.

March?
Page 2 of 2
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 1
From: <bachmanns@un.org>

Subject: DPA Digital Sender S-3350
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Please open the attached document.

This document was sent to you using an HP Digital Sender.
Sent by: <bachmanns@un.org>

Number of pages: 4
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Attachments:
DPA_Digi.pdf
Page 1 of 3

Date: Saturday, February 28, 2009 12:25AM

Subject: various issues
Dear Alexander,
planning ahead in my function as (german) sonja:
- I thought to meet my Russian and Chinese counterpart here at the mission next week to
enquire about dates to visit both places, as we discussed at the last P-5 lunch in Cyprus.
- what is your sense of your programme in April? Orthodox Easter holidays will be the week from
11th to 18th and nothing much will be moving in Cyprus. Given that the meeting with BLP will
now take place at a later stage, would you consider to be on the island the week from 30th March
to 10th April and do Moscow during that time? What are your engagements in Australia in April? I
know abt your daughter's wedding on the 25th.
- China could be tagged on at some point when you return to Adelaide as we discussed
previously. My Russian colleague here covers China and shared below attached bios with me.
- I had a coffee with the GkCyp representative today here and he was full of praise for your
balanced role against any notion of mediating, arbitrating etc. He saw openings and flexibility on
property, but was very concerned about the security issue where he did not sense any flexibility
and foresees problems.
- I also had a coffee with my Turkish colleague who is close to Apakan and he reiterated their
preference for you to meet him in Ankara taking a plane (UN or other) from the SBAs. This
because meeting him in the North was deemed politically not good for Apakan and also for you
he mentioned to me. I told him we are already looking into possibilities and you hope to meet
Apakan soon. Also, he said that you needed to be convincing, in order to dissipate fears on the
Tk and TkCyp side that the EC liaison officer would be low level and mainly have a letterbox
function. They would not have problems with that approach but that needed to be made clear
again. He was pretty negative abt Talat (he is kind of a hardliner) and predicted the UBP would
win 30 % and end up in a UBP and DP government coalition leaving Talat in a very weak
negotiating position.
Talked to Donatella today, they are working on the programme: meeting with the chambers of
commerce, publishers, experts from the working groups on property and EU matters, van Houtte
etc. I asked her anything on Limnitis but she said no TBZ wanted to wait to see Nami and
Iacovou on the 5th of march meeting to discuss with them again. Lets see hm?
Hope you are doing well!

ciao, and bon weekend!
Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Page 2 of 3
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Samuel ToSonja Bachmann

Martell/NY/UNO cc
SubjectPRC FM Profile as well as Assistant FM
27/02/2009 04:36
PM
As requested
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyjl/whben/
Wu Hongbo, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs
Area of responsibilities: Europe, information, consular affairs
Born in Shandong Province in May 1952. University graduate.
1976-1978 Staff Member, Beijing Service Bureau for Diplomatic Missions
1978-1980 Completed advanced studies at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
1980-1981 Staff Member, Chinese Embassy in New Zealand
1981-1983 Staff Member, Beijing Service Bureau for Diplomatic Missions
1983-1987 Third Secretary, Department of Translation and Interpretation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
1987-1988 Second Secretary, Deputy Office Director of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, MFA
1988-1991 Second Secretary, Sino-British Joint Liaison Group
1991-1995 First Secretary and office director of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Page 3 of 3
1995-1997 Chinese Representative (Counselor Rank), Sino-British Joint Liaison Group
1997-1998 Counselor, Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region
1998-1999 Senior Chinese Representative (Ambassadorial Rank), Sino-British Joint Liaison Group
1999-2000 Deputy Director-General, Department of Western European Affairs, MFA
2000-2002 Director-General, Department of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Affairs, MFA
2002-2003 Deputy Commissioner, Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Macao
Special Administrative Region
2003-2005 Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of China to the Republic of the Philippines
2005-2007 Director-General, General Office, MFA
2007- Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs
Married with a daughter.
Samuel A. Martell
Department of Political Affairs
Asia and the Pacific Division
United Nations Rm. S-3341J
T: 212.963.2407 (Internal: 3.2407)
Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail

Attachments:
PROFILE - FM JIECHI (10Jun'08).doc
Page 1 of 1
From: "Alexander Downer" <Alexander.downer@bigpond.com>

cc: "Tatyana Volkova" <volkova@un.org>

Subject: This and that
Hi Sonija
A couple of things
My working days for February were 11th until 22nd inclusive plus 3rd, 9th and 27th. That makes
a total of 15. Could you please arrange for me to be paid for those days?
Secondly, can I get an advance for my DSA for March? I owe a lot of rent!
Thirdly, and more importantly, I really want some diplomacy over the next week on Limnitis.
Taye should get a clear understanding of where the two parties are at from the Representatives
and try to build some bridges - he's welcome to contact me. I'm writing to him about it. I'm very
unhappy that nothing's been done over the last week. A real waste of time and time is of the
essence.
Finally, I might stay here until 3 April given I can't go to NYC and go to Beijing at Latin Easter
time - you don't need to come if you want to be with your Mummy and Daddy! That will give me
a solid fortnight in Cyprus before Easter and then I'll go back via NYC after the wedding (which is
the 25th). I think that will work.
All the best
Alexander
Honourable Alexander Downer MP

Box 719
Bridgewater
South Australia 5155
Australia
Telephone +61 883708783

Page 1 of 1
From: "Alexander Downer" <Alexander.downer@bigpond.com>

To: <zerihoun@un.org>
cc: <sabra@un.org>, <bachmanns@un.org>

Subject: CBMs
Dear Taye
I remain pretty concerned about the complete deadlock on the CBMs.This is hindering the peace
process. My limited experience of Cyprus tells me that unless we try to intervene and broker a
deal through some shuttle diplomacy then nothing will happen.
I wonder if you could speak to the two Representatives on Monday (by phone would be fine) to
establish exactly what their two positions are on Limnitis according to their latest narratives.
They still seem to be waiting for each other to respond which is absurd. Weeks are passing and
nothing's happening. Having done that, let me know and I'll think about calling them myself on
Tuesday but I don't want to do that until I am absolutely au fait with their positions.
Frankly, we need a bit more progress at this stage and just turning to EU matters says it all. That
is in a sense the least important issue. They've handled the property question pretty poorly and
need to engage much more in negotiations not sterile positioning. If I also discuss this with the
Representatives before the meeting that may - or may not - help.
Hope golf went well at the weekend and that your shoulder is better.
All the best
Alexander
Honourable Alexander Downer MP

Box 719
Bridgewater
South Australia 5155
Australia
Telephone +61 883708783

Page 1 of 6

Date: Sunday, March 01, 2009 03:15AM

Subject: Fw: meeting in Cyrpus
This for the diary

From: David Hill <davidhill04@optusnet.com.au>
To: Alexander Downer
Sent: Wed Feb 25 07:26:28 2009
Subject: Re: meeting in Cyrpus
Terrific. Can I suggest I pick you up at about 1 p.m. from wherever you are staying in Nicosia on
Sunday March 8 and take you to lunch. Prior to lunch it would be good if you would agree to a
very short meeting with Antony Melas, the President of the Ayia Marina Association. He is very
impressive and you were briefly introduced to him in January. Lunch will be kleftikos and very
informal. There need be no speeches but your hosts will want to give you a momento of the
occasion. (definitely not an embarrassing gift). Can Nicky come? Also if you have any
colleagues/staff that are able to come I have been asked to extend a warm welcome to them too.
Looking forward to seeing you

regards
David

From: Alexander Downer < mailto:adowner@bespokeapproach.com >
To: davidhill04@optusnet.com.au
Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 9:23 AM
Perfect

Sent: Mon Feb 23 07:13:58 2009
I totally understand and would not want to put you in an awkward position. How about
meeting on March 8 in Nicosia and then having lunch?
regards
David

Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 7:27 AM
Page 2 of 6
Happy to catch up on the 8th but my position is very sensitive and I don't want to
take any risks so let's keep it to nicosia. I've seen the village from the road anyway. I can't solve
this problem by campaigning.

Sent: Sun Feb 22 20:48:00 2009
Sunday March 8 sounds good. If you like, we can go and look at Ayia Marina from the
outside of the military base. I did that with a group of British MP's and Lords last November and
there was no problem. It is only 20 minutes from Nicosia. Also the ancient church and monastery
of Elias is a few minutes drive around the back of the hillside from Ayia Marina and I'm told there
is no restriction on visiting the site. How much time have you got available on March ?
regards
David

Sent: Sunday, February 22, 2009 8:47 PM
Thanks for your message. I'm likeky to r back on the morning of the 8th ie the
Sunday so can catch up that day. Ayia marina is a military camp so not too keen to visit even if
it's possible.
All the best
Alexander

Sent: Sun Feb 22 17:26:05 2009
Subject: meeting in Cyrpus
I am delighted we will be able to meet up in Nicosia sometime around March 7.

Can you indicate where/when? ( I will be flying to Nicosia on the evening of March 6 and
departing on the evening of March 8)
Will you have time to visit the ancient church and monastery of Elias and the
village of Ayia Marina over the weekend?
Also the Maronites of Ayia Marina would dearly love to host a Kleftikos dinner for
you. Can you make it?
regards
Page 3 of 6
David

Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2009 12:44 PM
Subject: Re: The threat of collapse of the church and monastrty near Ayia
Marina
I'll be in Cyprus from about the 7th so that would be fine

Sent: Wed Feb 11 22:18:38 2009
Subject: Re: The threat of collapse of the church and monastrty near Ayia
Marina
Dear Alexander,
I am going to be in Athens for a few days at the beginning of March. Is it

possible for me to catch up with you in Cyprus at the end of the week,
from
Friday March 6 or sometime over the weekend?
regards
David
From: "Alexander Downer" <adowner@bespokeapproach.com>
To: "David Hill" <davidhill04@optusnet.com.au>
Sent: Friday, January 30, 2009 4:15 PM
Subject: RE: The threat of collapse of the church and monastrty near Ayia
Marina
> Dear David

>
> At some stage I may be able to but I have to keep focussing on a
> settlement in Cyprus - if that happens, as it may, then these problems
> will evaporate, if it doesn't they won't. I have to be careful not to
> appear to be excessively concerned with the welfare of non-Orthodox
> Christians given my background. Having said that, I'm happy to go back
> to the villages before long. I had a look at Ayia Marina and understand
> the point about the church - the place is a military camp.
>
> All the best
>
> Alexander
>
> Hon. Alexander Downer
> PO Box 7223
> Hutt Street
> Adelaide SA 5000
Page 4 of 6
> Australia
>
> Telephone: +61 884192888
> Mobile: +61 418847451
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: David Hill [ mailto:davidhill04@optusnet.com.au ]
> Sent: Friday, 30 January 2009 1:22 PM
> To: Alexander Downer
> Subject: Fw: The threat of collapse of the church and monastrty near
> Ayia Marina
>
> Dear Alexander,
>
> The Maronite community of the village of AYIA MARINA have asked me
again
> to
> find out if you are able to join them for an informal dinner. I would be
>
> happy to join you if that works out. Are you able to suggest any
> suitable
> dates?
>
> Also, can I be sold bold as to point out that the village of AYIA MARINA
> is
> the only village where the Maronites are denied access to worship in
> their
> church. In the other three Maronite villages of KORMAKITIS (which you
> visited), KARPASHIA and ASOMOTOS, they are allowed access to
worship in
> their church.
>
> The village ASOMOTOS, like AYIA MARINA, is a military base but the
> Maronites
> are allowed access to their church for worship there for a few hours
> each
> Sunday..
>
> It would be a terrific gesture of goodwill if the Turkish side were able
> to
> extend the same access to the villagers of AYIA MARINA.
>
> regards
> David
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "David Hill" <davidhill04@optusnet.com.au>
> To: "Alexander Downer" <adowner@bespokeapproach.com>
> Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2008 8:59 AM
> Subject: The threat of collapse of the church and monastrty near Ayia
> Marina
Page 5 of 6
>
>
>> Dear Alexander
>>
>> We are delighted you might be able to informally meet with members
of
> the
>> Association of Displaced Persons of Ayia Marina in January.
>>
>> Do you want me to email you again about possible dates early in the
> new
>> year?
>>
>> The UN allocated funding two years ago for the protection of the
> church
>> and monastery of Elias near Ayia Marina BUT no maintanance or
> structural
>> works have commenced. I am advised that the Turkish authorities are
>> objecting to the works as the site is a sensitive (military) area and
> only
>> some 'cleaning, fencing and preparatory works' are permitted, which
> the
>> abbot believes will not protect the church from collapsing. The
> buildings
>> continue to be used to house sheep.
>>
>> The 500 year old church (AD 1508) and the nearly 300 year old
> monastery
>> (AD 1735) belong to the Maronite monks of Cyprus. They are outside
the
>
>> village of Ayia Marina and a special permit is required for each
> visit,
>> such as Elias name day on 20 July. The village of Ayia Marina, which
> has
>> its own two churches, is separate and is totally closed both to the
>> Maronites and Turkish Cypriots who lived there as it has been taken
> over
>> as a military base. I will shortly send you a summary of the status of
>
>> each of the Maronite villages, which are all very different from each
>
>> other - with Ayia Marina the worst case.
>>
>> All the best wishes for Christmas and the New Year.
>>
>> Regards
>> David Hill
>
>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 6 of 6
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5:57 PM
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Page 1 of 1

Date: Tuesday, March 03, 2009 12:32AM

Subject: Re: Question(s)
Yes fine. But van hutte?

Sent: Tue Mar 03 08:05:42 2009
Subject: Question(s)
Hi Alexander,
had a short talk with Georg, a German colleague from the EC enlargement desk.
- On the upcoming EC progress report on Turkey (under Swedish Presidency) he feels there will
be strong political pressures to wait the report out as - the negotiations are ongoing.
- On the Orams case, he said that a decision is expected for June, but same thing, the judges
might just decide not to come to a decision during negotiations. He mentioned that the EC in its
submission to the European Court of Justice, was very clear to point out the fact that the
European Court of Human Rights had a moratorium on all cases during the Annan Plan
negotiations..... he also agreed it would not be a good idea to interfere with the court. Nami in
his recent visit to the Commission apparently was worried about it and Georg told him that a
Belgian high level official allegedly had to step down recently being accused of interference in a
similar case, so these issues are sensitive...
- Talked to Helene from the Rehn Cabinet this morning and she mentioned our candidate is finally
being interviewed by Barroso on Wednesday and that if we need a person earlier they could think
of sending somebody two or three weeks to our office in order to assist us with any questions
arising out now during the discussion on EU matters, as a stop gap measure. Would you agree to
that?
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 4


Subject: Re: van Houtte back after March - pls. advise
No but the gcs say he was. This is urgent. Not sure what happened to my email. My fault no
doubt

Sent: Tue Mar 03 09:11:17 2009
ok I will ring him tomorrow - so what should I find out , what was his involvement with Annan?
He never told us actually....
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Alexander Downer <adowner@bespokeapproach.com>
02/03/2009 05:43 PM
To
<bachmanns@un.org>
cc
Subject
Re: van Houtte back after March - pls. advise
His involvement with Annan

Page 2 of 4
Sent: Tue Mar 03 09:07:10 2009

which email?
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
02/03/2009 05:24 PM
To
<bachmanns@un.org>
cc
Subject
Have you ring van hutte re my email?

Sent: Tue Mar 03 07:54:58 2009
Subject: van Houtte back after March - pls. advise
can we give him an indication????
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324

Page 3 of 4
"Hans Van Houtte" <hans.vanhoutte@law.kuleuven.be>
02/03/2009 04:04 PM
To
"'Sonja Bachmann'" <bachmanns@un.org>
cc
Subject
RE: Phone numbers exchange
I am arranging my time schedule for the next weeks. If I would have to return to Cyprus after 6-
16 March, when would that best be ?[ I need to go to Washington in April]
HvH
________________________________
From: Sonja Bachmann [ mailto:bachmanns@un.org < mailto:bachmanns@un.org > <

mailto:bachmanns@un.org > > ]
Sent: maandag 2 maart 2009 17:06
To: Hans Van Houtte
Cc: john.mcgarry@queensu.ca
Subject: Phone numbers exchange
Dear John and Mr. Van Houtte,
as promised here the respective phone numbers for you to get in touch. John, Mr. Van Houtte will
arrive on Monday 16 march to the island. Hope you made it well back to Canada.
John McGarry 1-613-483-6237

Mr. Van Houtte: 0032-47833-0807
Best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Disclaimer: http://www.kuleuven.be/cwis/email_disclaimer.htm <

http://www.kuleuven.be/cwis/email_disclaimer.htm > <
Page 4 of 4
http://www.kuleuven.be/cwis/email_disclaimer.htm > > <

http://www.kuleuven.be/cwis/email_disclaimer.htm > > for more information.
< http://www.kuleuven.be/cwis/email_disclaimer.htm >

Page 1 of 4

To: Alexander Downer <adowner@bespokeapproach.com>@UN-MAILHUB

ok I will ring him right away tomorrow morning. Yes, beyond reasonable doubt! :)
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Alexander Downer To<bachmanns@un.org>

<adowner@bespokeapproach.com> cc
SubjectRe: van Houtte back
02/03/2009 05:51 PM after March - pls. advise
No but the gcs say he was. This is urgent. Not sure what happened to my email. My fault no
doubt

Sent: Tue Mar 03 09:11:17 2009
ok I will ring him tomorrow - so what should I find out , what was his involvement with Annan?
He never told us actually....
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
02/03/2009 05:43 PM
Page 2 of 4
To
<bachmanns@un.org>
cc
Subject
His involvement with Annan

Sent: Tue Mar 03 09:07:10 2009
which email?
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
02/03/2009 05:24 PM
To
<bachmanns@un.org>
cc
Subject
Have you ring van hutte re my email?

Page 3 of 4

Sent: Tue Mar 03 07:54:58 2009
Subject: van Houtte back after March - pls. advise
can we give him an indication????
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
"Hans Van Houtte" <hans.vanhoutte@law.kuleuven.be>
02/03/2009 04:04 PM
To
"'Sonja Bachmann'" <bachmanns@un.org>
cc
Subject
RE: Phone numbers exchange
I am arranging my time schedule for the next weeks. If I would have to return to Cyprus after 6-
16 March, when would that best be ?[ I need to go to Washington in April]
HvH
________________________________
From: Sonja Bachmann [ mailto:bachmanns@un.org < mailto:bachmanns@un.org > <

mailto:bachmanns@un.org > > ]
Sent: maandag 2 maart 2009 17:06
To: Hans Van Houtte
Cc: john.mcgarry@queensu.ca
Subject: Phone numbers exchange
Dear John and Mr. Van Houtte,
as promised here the respective phone numbers for you to get in touch. John, Mr. Van Houtte will
arrive on Monday 16 march to the island. Hope you made it well back to Canada.
Page 4 of 4
John McGarry 1-613-483-6237

Mr. Van Houtte: 0032-47833-0807
Best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Disclaimer: http://www.kuleuven.be/cwis/email_disclaimer.htm <

http://www.kuleuven.be/cwis/email_disclaimer.htm > <
http://www.kuleuven.be/cwis/email_disclaimer.htm > > <
http://www.kuleuven.be/cwis/email_disclaimer.htm > > for more information.
< http://www.kuleuven.be/cwis/email_disclaimer.htm >

Page 1 of 1

To: zerihount@comcast.net, ysabra@msn.com, timalchin@hotmail.com,
dgiubilaro@hotmail.com

Subject: O. Rehn notes and update from the EC
Dear Taye and all,
pls. find attached the notes of our dinner with O. Rehn during the last SASG visit for your files.
I have also followed-up with O. Rehn's cabinet today referring to the urgency of an EU liaison in
terms of the beginning of discussions of the EU chapter. I was told that the interview date with
Barroso has now been set for this Wednesday!
all the best to a hopefully not too rainy Cyprus from a freezing and snowy NY!
Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Attachments:
Meeting with O. Rehn February 2009.doc
Confidential
Note of SASG Downer’s Meeting with Mr. Olli Rehn

EC Enlargement Commissioner
Held in Nicosia
on Thursday, 12 February 2009 at 20.30 pm
Present:
SASG Alexander Downer Mr. Olli Rehn, EC Commissioner
SRSG Taye-Brook Zerihoun Mr. Leigh, Senior Enlargement Official
Mr. Yasser Sabra Ms. Martinez, Barroso Cabinet official
Ms. Sonja Bachmann Ms. Holm-Pedersen, Rehn Cabinet official
Summary of discussion:
1. Mr. Rehn underlined the EC’s political support to the Cyprus negotiations including
the provision of legal and technical expertise. Mr. Barroso, he mentioned, was personally
engaged and might visit the island in the upcoming months. Mr. Downer underscored that
the leaders were committed to the process and that quite a wide measure of agreement
had been reached. Disagreement however still existed on the executive. The parties views
on property, were still “miles apart”, he mentioned. Issues included concerns on the costs
of a property settlement with projections ranging from 10 to 20 bn Euros. In addition, the
current cases at the European Court of Human Rights including the Orams case at the
European Court of Justice would play into the property discussion. The property issue
needed to be looked at by “technical people”. The upcoming elections in the North could
be problematic and the leaders are likely to take up either the economy or EU matters as
next topic of discussion.
2. The TkCyps while regarding the EC as important, however also saw it as “biased”,
he added. Asked about the role of Turkey, Mr. Downer said that while there was a
discussion on how many Turkish troops were on the island, he did not think that the
Turkish Government focused on all the details of the negotiations. Turkey was mainly
focused on maintaining the Treaty of Guarantee. In addition, it supported the “TRNC”
annually with more than 500 million USD, which was an “expensive deal”. Asked about
timelines, Mr. Downer said that he hoped that a first reading of the chapters would be
possible by April. The upcoming elections could impact the degree of flexibility
Mr. Talat has in the negotiations. Whereas there was strong support for a settlement in
the North and South, still scepticism existed as to when it would happen. In addition, the
media were damaging the process.
3. Mr. Rehn mentioned that the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan met with Mr. Barroso
and reiterated his support of the negotiation process. Mr. Downer mentioned that a
settlement was in the interest of Turkey and their strong self-interest in joining the
European Union. The issue of Cyprus clouded their relations with the EU, although they
seem to think that membership would not happen any time soon. Mr. Rehn added that it
was important to “keep the process going”. There were some positive signs with regard to
minority rights, Mr. Leigh added and that the military went along a settlement last time. It
was a long and painful process. Mr. Downer said that he met General Zorlu who
previously had been working in a command position in ISAF/Afghanistan, and that he
felt that the military was on-side. Mr. Rehn raised the issue of Turkey’s review of
accession at the end of 2009 and its compliance with the Ankara Protocol [this in
accordance with a clause in the 2006 EU Council decisions that compliance would be
reviewed in the “future years”.] Currently, eight chapters out of thirty-five were frozen.
4. Mr. Downer said that a referendum should most probably take place towards the
end of the year because of “Presidential elections” in the North. The Greek Government,
he added, although not a significant player was very helpful. Foreign Minister
Bakoyannis supported the Annan Plan, however seemed more hardline now. The
opposition leader, Mr. Papandreou, seemed to be more interventionist, in a positive sense.
No Guarantor Power had been a problem. Mr. Leigh added that they had not been an
incentive either. Mr. Downer said that the Turkish perception of the EU was that they
thought the EU needed them as desperately as they needed the EU. It was a different
“Weltanschauung” of the “legal-liberal international” vs. a “balance of power” view by
Turkey. Mr. Leigh added that more than 60 % trade of Turkey was with the EU.
5. Mr. Downer said that the positive approach by the EC needed to be continued. It
was understood that they could not control member states. Mr. Rehn mentioned that the
French Presidency tried to improve EU-Turkey relations and opened two chapters.
Germany (the CDU/CSU in particular) was against Turkey’s membership. Mr. Leigh said
that it was working both ways, because the French President on the other side also
catered to the 500,000 Armenians in France, the Armenian vote. He saw the EU
accession process as an anchor of economic stability for Prime Minister Erdogan and the
middle class. Mr. Downer added that if the EU turned hostile to Turkey, it would be a
disaster from the Cyprus point of view. Mr. Rehn said that the idea was to move slow but
steadily in the accession negotiations. There might be no appetite for another “battle” in
the Council. Mr. Downer added that Turkey’s priority were the elections at the end of
March. He emphasized that it was useful that Mr. Rehn saw Mr. Talat and Mr. Soyer and
that the United Nations tried to encourage such visits to Mr. Talat.
6. Mr. Rehn ended the discussion by referring to the offer of an EC liaison officer for
the United Nations Good Offices who would facilitate the provision of legal and
technical advice and expertise. Mr. Downer mentioned he was very much in favour of it
and it would be helpful to get the European angle of every issue. He needed somebody
“to make calls” to the relevant offices in the EC, for example the legal service etc.
Eventually, the EU had to keep the settlement “alive”, once it was agreed upon.
Sonja Bachmann
GO/DPA
28 February 2009
Page 1 of 2
From: <Andrew.RASBASH@ec.europa.eu>
cc: <alchin@un.org>, <Georg.ZIEGLER@ec.europa.eu>,
<Alain.BOTHOREL@ec.europa.eu>

Subject: RE: Text on EU dimension of a future settlement
Sonja
I'll be there on Tuesday and Wednesday. Alain Bothorel (head of our programme team in Cyprus whom I think
you have met) is arranging my programme and I'd ask him to contact your office directly.
Best regaards
Andrew
-----Original Message-----
From: Sonja Bachmann [mailto:bachmanns@un.org]
Sent: lundi 2 mars 2009 18:53
To: RASBASH Andrew (ELARG)
Cc: alchin@un.org; ZIEGLER Georg (ELARG)
Dear Andrew,
request for courtesy meeting is noted. Which days exactly are you there?
cheers, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
<Andrew.RASBASH@ec.europa.eu> To <bachmanns@un.org>, <alchin@un.org>

cc <Georg.ZIEGLER@ec.europa.eu>
02/03/2009 12:32 PM Subject RE: Text on EU dimension of a future settlement
Sonja, Tim
Page 2 of 2
I will be in Cyprus next week and will ask for a courtesy call to Mr Downer.
I'll be happy to go over any of the issues in Georg's excellent paper - but would appreciate advance
warning….
Best regards
Andrew Rasbash
From: ZIEGLER Georg (ELARG)
To: 'Sonja Bachmann'
Cc: 'Timothy Alchin'; RASBASH Andrew (ELARG)
Subject: Text on EU dimension of a future settlement
<< File: 080327 ziegler (2).doc >> Dear Sonja,
Further to our talk I am sending you a text based on a public speech in Cyprus. It dates back to 2007.
The text has been published - so no secrets. As said in the disclaimer it does not necessarily represent
the view of the Commission but reflects my personal views.
In the annex you find the famous "Act of Adaptation" as well as Protocol 10 and excerpts from European
Council conclusions on Cyprus before 2004.
The text may help deepening the understanding of some of the issues reappearing in the current
negotiations.
Georg
PS Tim, as far as I remember you have got the text, but just in case I re-send it.
080327 ziegler (2).doc
Georg Ziegler, European Commission (Brussels)1
The EU-dimension of a future

comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem
I. INTRODUCTION
On 1 May 2004 the EU imported the Cyprus problem. The EU tried hard to avoid this by
giving political and technical support to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the team
of Alvaro de Soto on the island in their efforts to reach a comprehensive and lasting
settlement. The European Commission detached a number of experts to strengthen the UN
team. Commissioner Verheugen became personally engaged in the negotiations in Nicosia
and Bürgenstock. In the end, things did not work out.
Willingness to seriously negotiate on the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot side came too late and
when it finally came the Greek Cypriot side pursued a “less flexible policy”2 and opposed the
Annan Plan as can be seen by the TV-speech of President Papadopoulos before the
referendum which undoubtedly had a major impact on how the Greek Cypriot community
voted in the referendum. Therefore the non-solution of the Cyprus problem before the
accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU threw a shadow on the 1 May 2004
celebrations.
The EU has every interest to see the Cyprus problem solved, for many reasons.
Commissioner Olli Rehn has summed up his experiences recently in the following way:
"I have worked on the Cyprus issue now with five consecutive Presidencies, since 2004. In
these two and half years, we have not been able to make progress either on the trade
regulation or on the ports issue. One could say “Sapienti sat” – or “enough for a wise man”.
The essential conclusion we must draw is that a comprehensive settlement is the best way to
solve the problems. It is in the EU’s interest to see a reunification of the island and the end of
a conflict on European soil that is now more than 40 years old. Such division is unacceptable
within our European Union, which is founded on the principles of peace, reconciliation and
human rights. Recalling these basics is all the more justified as we approach the 50th
anniversary of the Treaty of Rome."3
The EU is aware that time is running against a settlement. Every day of non-solution deepens
the division of the island. It seems that the "No"-campaign in 2004 overlooked the time factor.
Rejecting or delaying a specific plan for a solution on the table is an easy thing to do.
However, it makes it much more difficult to develop another plan and agree on it in the future.
We can see this clearly these days. Both leaders agreed on 8th July 2006 in principle that "the
status quo is unacceptable and that its prolongation would have negative consequences for the
Turkish and Greek Cypriots". They agreed furthermore that "a comprehensive settlement is
1
The author is Deputy Head of the Taskforce Turkish Cypriot community in the Directorate-General
Enlargement in the European Commission in Brussels. The views expressed in this presentation are the personal
views of the author and do not necessarily express the views of the European Commission.
2
Formulation taken from the Report of the UN-Secretary-General of 28 May 2004 on his mission of good
offices in Cyprus, S/2004/437, § 79.
3
Lecture at Helsinki University on 27 November 2006 under the title "Turkey's accession process to the EU",
see: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/speeches/speeches_2006_en.htm
both desirable and possible, and should not be further delayed"4. However, 10 months later
the process towards a new settlement has still not started.
Despite what you hear in some quarters, the EU is not in a position to act as neutral broker of
a future comprehensive settlement. The leader of the Greek Cypriot community in the
negotiations on a comprehensive settlement under UN auspices is at the same time the Head
of State and Government of the Republic of Cyprus as a Member State of the European
Union. By this fact alone the EU is inherently biased, if one likes it or not. Therefore the EU's
role is mainly to support the UN in reaching a settlement and to make sure that the settlement
is reconcilable with EU membership. This brings me to the main topic of my presentation.
II.
IMPLICATIONS RESULTING FROM EU-MEMBERSHIP FOR THE CONTENT OF
A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT5
Any future comprehensive settlement needs to take Cyprus' EU membership into account.
What does this mean, and what does this not mean?
It means three things
a) Cyprus has to be able to speak with one voice
b) Cyprus must have the ability to implement and enforce the acquis
c) The Cyprus settlement needs to be in line with the principles on which the EU is founded
It does, however, not mean

d) that a Cyprus settlement needs to be 100% in line with the acquis from day one of its
implementation. Transition periods are a proven tool to provide for accommodation of a
settlement.
Ad a) Ability to speak with one voice
A future Cyprus settlement must ensure that the Member State Cyprus can speak with one
voice at the EU level. What does this mean in practice?
At the level of the European Council it means that Cyprus needs to be represented by the
Head of State or Head of Government. The Annan Plan provided for a Presidential Council
acting as a collective Head of State. This complies with EU-requirements as long as this
Presidential Council designates one of its Members who can represent this Council as a
whole.
As concerns the decision making process in the EU institutions, it means that Cyprus must
send to the Council "a representative at ministerial level, authorised to commit the
government" as it is phrased in Article 203 of the EC Treaty. It is, thus, not explicitly
stipulated that such representative needs to belong to the central level of Government.
Regional representation in the Council is not totally uncommon in the EU depending on the
4
Full text of agreement available on the website of the Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus
(http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.)
5
The following remarks are based to a large degree on the book of my colleague Frank Hoffmeister "Legal
aspects of the Cyprus problem - – Annan Plan and EU accession", Leiden 2006
constitutional system and the split of competences in particular Member States. Belgium is
practicing this on a regular basis for issues falling exclusively into the regional competence,
while Germany does so in exceptional cases. Austria could do it according to its state
structure, but has not done it yet. The fact that a regional representative can act in the Council
does not, however, solve the issue of, which region sends its representative. In Belgium, there
is a system of rotation. In Germany, the Bundesrat as the Council of Regions (Länder) decides
which Region (Land) is representing the regions as a whole.
The Annan Plan was very clear on this point: according to Article 19 (3) of the proposed
constitution of the United Cyprus Republic (UCR) the Federal government represents Cyprus
"in areas of competence or where a matter predominantly concerns an area of its
competence." However, "where a matter falls predominantly or exclusively into an area of
competence of the constituent states, Cyprus may be represented either by the federal
government or a constituent state, provided the latter is able to commit Cyprus". The latter
representatives had to express one common Cypriot position, previously established in a
consultation between constituent states.
There is another important aspect of this issue. How can it be ensured that Cyprus participates
constructively in EU affairs, that it does not block the entire EU for the reason of not finding
internal agreement between the constituent states or between constituent states and the federal
government? What would be the consequences of such lack of agreement on specific issues,
not to mention the nightmare of permanent deadlock? The immediate consequence would be
that Cyprus would have to abstain from voting. Unanimity voting applies, for instance, in the
Common Foreign and Security Policy or in some areas of Justice and Home Affairs.
What does abstention mean in the (EU-) Council? The answer depends on the Council voting
modalities provided for the issue at stake. If an issue is governed by a legal basis requiring
unanimity – which is rather the exception than the rule - abstention in Council would not be
harmful for the EU as a whole, if all remaining Member States are in agreement. To take a
decision by unanimity does not require all Member States to vote in favour. An abstention
does not destroy unanimity, it is neutral. It condemns Cyprus, however, to staying at the
sidelines of the match, not to be involved in the traditional bargaining linked to decisions
based on unanimity.
However, if the legal basis requires a qualified majority vote – which is the rule rather than
the exception – then abstention may well be harmful for the decision making process as it
amounts to the same as voting against. Why is that? Qualified majority voting requires 73.9 %
positive votes (255 out of 345); abstentions do not count and have thus the same effect as a
negative vote. As mentioned, in almost all cases of voting on Community legislation (the EU's
so called first pillar) the qualified majority regime is applied. The draft constitution of the EU
would have further extended the use of this regime.6
This means, that an internal disagreement in Cyprus leading to an abstention could be harmful
both for Cyprus and the EU as a whole. In principle, of course, negative votes are perfectly
acceptable. It is the right of Member States, to block decisions if they wish. However, in this
case, Cyprus would not express its political will on the issue at stake in the Council. Instead, it
6
At the European Council in Brussels (21/22 June 2007) a mandate for an Inter Governmental Conference was
agreed to draw up a "Reform Treaty" amending the existing EU and EC treaties. The current majority voting
system will stay into force until 2014. There will be more policy areas in which qualified majority voting is to be
applied.
would be condemned to blocking things solely due to the lack of agreement back home, an
attitude which does not make friends in Brussels and in other EU Member States' capitals.
Cyprus would not be in a position to use its votes in a positive way, to make things happen.
This assessment should be incentive enough to avoid internal disagreement in Cyprus
resulting in abstention in Brussels. No doubt, a re-united Cyprus will have to undergo a
painful learning process and to start thinking in terms of the overall interest of Cyprus rather
than only the particular interests of either community.
Ad b) Ability to implement and enforce the acquis
This requirement has various aspects. Firstly, it means that EU law must enjoy supremacy
over national law. In the Annan Plan this was indeed ensured in Article 19 (8) of the UCR
constitution, a formulation based on the Irish constitution:
"No provision of this Constitution shall invalidate laws, acts or measures by the federal
government or the constituent states required by the obligations of European Union
membership, or prevent laws, acts or measures by the European Union, or institutions
thereof, from having the force of law throughout Cyprus."
There are many other possible formulations to this end but any settlement will have to be
clear on this point.
The second aspect of this issue is the distribution of powers between the central and the
regional level. On this issue the EU is not totally neutral. The State should be organised in
such a way that all EU obligations are effectively met. In some areas, this means that there
can only be one institution at the central level, e.g. one central bank. Community law does not
allow for two or more central banks in a Member State. The same is true for other institutions
such as National Regulatory Authorities in the field of postal services or telecommunications.
In other cases, it is up to the Member State provided that EU law is applied effectively. If it is
not, the Commission can launch an infringement procedure and the European Court of Justice
may impose penalties because of the delays. What is needed, therefore, is a central default
power that would step in if a constituent state authority would fail to meet its obligations
under the acquis communautaire.
The Annan Plan provided for the following split of competences:
Federal competences were inter alia

- external relations, including conclusion of international treaties and defence policy
- relations with the European Union
- central bank functions
- federal finances, including budget and all indirect taxation, customs
-natural resources, including water resources
- certain issues in JHA (immigration, border control, visa policy, fight against terrorism, drug
trafficking money laundering, organised crime, general principles of criminal law, asylum,
extradition, European arrest warrant, citizenship)
- communications (including postal, electronic and telecommunications)
Constituent state competences were inter alia

- agriculture
- environment (except for natural resources)
- fisheries
- judiciary (except for two Courts at federal state level)
- social policy and employment
- education and training
- consumer and health protection
- energy (with some exceptions)
- statistics
The competences as listed in the Annan Plan certainly met the minimum requirements of the
EU. This, of course, does not yet guarantee that the system would work well in practice; as in
any political system, this depends on the good will of the political actors, their assumption of
responsibility. In other words: the practical viability hinges upon the quality of the political
culture. In my view, it should be seriously considered whether on such a small island it makes
sense to have so many competences at constituent state level which also implies a duplication
of efforts, institutions, further stretching scarce resources. Just to give an example: to
implement the Common Agricultural Policy in Cyprus, a paying agency needs to be
established which is a complex and costly exercise. Would it be not more rational to have a
single paying agency at the federal level in which both Greek and Turkish Cypriots are
working together? Does it really make sense to manage fisheries at the constituent state level?
It seems that the Annan Plan in this respect is based on the Belgian model which itself is the
result of decades of gradual state reforms. It works in Belgium where all stakeholders have
got used to it. Whether it would work in Cyprus depends crucially on whether political actors
use the system in a responsible way, as already mentioned above.
In any case, a flexible system should be established allowing for adaptations, if, after a while,
it turns out that the distribution of competences is not workable and the responsible leaders in
both constituent states agree on this. The distribution of competences should not be set in
stone. My home country is a point in case. The German Constitution was amended in 2006 as
there were too many practical difficulties with the distribution of competences existing until
then.7 It must be possible to draw institutional conclusions from lessons learnt. This is true for
the EU as a whole which had to adjust its institutional system permanently to new challenges
over the period of the last five decades – including on the split of competences between the
EU and Member States. Indeed, discussions are taking place at this very moment. This will
hold all the more for a re-united Cyprus which needs a system that it is at the same time stable
and flexible, a kind of "flexicurity"-system, to borrow a term from the field of employment
and social policy.
Finally, the Annan Plan also provided for a central default power which I mentioned earlier.
Article 18 (5) of the draft UCR Constitution reads:
"If a constituent state fails to fulfil obligations of the UCR vis-à-vis the European Union
within its area of competence and the UCR may be held responsible by the Union, the federal
government shall, after notification of no less than 90 days take necessary measures in lieu of
7
The reform was adopted on 30 June 2006 by the Bundestag and on 7th July 2006 by the Bundesrat. Before the
reform, the Bundesrat (Council of Regions/Länder) could co-decide on about 60% of all legislation. This was
now cut down to about 40%. In exchange, the Länder received some additional competences, inter alia in the
field of secondary education, penitentiary, remuneration and social security of civil servants at regional and local
level.
the defaulting constituent state, to be in force until such time as the constituent state
discharges its responsibilities."
An identical or similar provision will be needed in any future solution.
Ad c) Cyprus settlement needs to be in line with the principles on which the EU is

founded
Many European Council Presidency conclusions state that a settlement can be accommodated
as long as it is in line with the principles on which the EU is founded.8 The EU will insist on
the compliance with such principles in case of any future settlement. Therefore it is crucial to
have a closer look at these principles. Which principles are meant? The response becomes
clear, when reading Article 6 (1) of the EU treaty:
"The European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the
Member States."
The Annan Plan was criticised for neglecting some of these principles. A closer look shows
that this criticism is not justified9. I would like to touch on some aspects of this issue:
Democracy
The critics regard it as undemocratic that three foreign judges would have formed part of the
Supreme Court. However, these judges would have been elected by the Cypriot Parliament
which gives them a democratic legitimisation. Furthermore, they would only vote if the six
Cypriot judges were not able to agree on a judgement in case they are evenly split. Finally, the
statute of the Supreme Court could be changed by an ordinary law once the presence of the
foreign judges is considered obsolete. A similar provision in a future settlement would not
constitute a particular problem in terms of EU requirements.
Rule of Law
Some critics state that the role of the Supreme Court in the deadlock resolving mechanisms
provided for in the proposed UCR Constitution violates the principle of the separation of
powers. Against this background, one must not forget that the absence of a deadlock resolving
mechanism was one of the reasons for the collapse of the bi-communal system in 1963/64.
The question is whether there is any other institution that would have been better equipped for
this job? Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci10 had proposed to entrust an international High
Commissioner with such task. It is doubtful, whether this is less problematic. As long as the
Judiciary does not replace the executive and only acts upon formal request of another state
institution the role of the Supreme Court as provided for in the Annan Plan does not constitute
as a violation of the Rule of Law. A functioning deadlock resolving mechanism is of
paramount importance.
Human Rights
Protection of Property Rights as stipulated by Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights
8
A compilation of European Council Conclusions on Cyprus is attached to this presentation as annex 1
9
See in detail Frank Hoffmeister, Legal aspects of the Cyprus problem, loc.cit. (note 5), p. 137-141; 189-191.
10
M. Emerson/N. Tocci, Cyprus as Lighthouse of the East Mediterranean, Shaping Re-unification and EU
accession together, Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels 2002
The property issue is one of the key issues of the Cyprus settlement. The Annan Plan provided
for either reinstatement or full and effective compensation depending on various factors
including the interest of the current users. Without going into details, some interference with
property rights which these schemes imply are justifiable for reasons of public interest - the
public interest being a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem after 40 years of conflict.
Right to free internal movement and residence based on Article 2 of the Fourth Protocol to
the European Convention on Human Rights
The restrictions in the Annan Plan serve reasons of public policy and are proportionate
because they are temporary restrictions. Thus, it is extremely important not to have any
interference with the right to free movement and residence on a permanent basis which would
constitute a disproportionate and thus unjustifiable interference.
Ad d) Does the Cyprus settlement have to be 100% in line with the acquis?
The EU-dimension does not mean that a settlement needs to be 100% in line with the entire
acquis communautaire from day one of its enforcement. It does not mean, for instance, that it
has to be in full compliance with the four freedoms of the internal market.11 These freedoms
are often confused with the principles on which the EU is founded. The EU has declared
many times its readiness to accommodate the terms of such a comprehensive settlement as
long as it is in line with the principles on which the EU is founded. This formulation was used
for the first time by the Seville European Council in June 2002 and repeated by the six
European Councils until March 2004 in Brussels, during the final phase of the negotiations on
the Annan Plan.12
This formulation meant that the EU anticipated certain provisions of the Annan Plan not to be
in line with EU-law, therefore requiring such "accommodation". In other words: no one
should have been surprised about the non-compliance of some provisions of the Annan Plan
with EU-law. A future settlement is likely to require temporary derogations in the fields of
free movement of capital or the right of residence. Generally, EU policy aims to keep such
derogations limited in time and scope, but if they are the only way to achieve a lasting
settlement of a conflict lasting more than 40 years, they can be temporarily accepted. This was
the case when the EU dealt with the Annan Plan and is likely to be the case in the future.
What does accommodation mean? In which way is accommodation achieved?
Protocol 10 to the 2003Act of Accession answers to this question. Article 4 reads:
"In the event of a settlement, the Council, acting unanimously on the basis of a proposal from
the Commission, shall decide on the adaptations to the terms concerning the accession of
Cyprus to the European Union with regard to the Turkish Cypriot Community."13
This means amending the Accession Treaty for Cyprus. The main content of any Accession
Treaty are the transition periods granted to a new Member State. A transition period allows a
temporary non-compliance with the acquis on special grounds. This well proven method of
11
These are: the free movement of goods, the free movement of workers, the right of establishment and freedom
to provide services and, finally, the free movement of capital.
12
See footnote 8
13
OJ 2003, L 236, p. 955 – attached to this presentation as Annex 3
transition periods was to be the tool for the accommodation of certain provisions of the
settlement plan. The Commission adopted on 7 April 2004 a proposal to the Council called
the "Act of Adaptation"14. The title is obviously inspired by the wording of Article 4 of
Protocol 10. This draft "Act of Adaptation" could have also been called the "Act of
Accommodation" of Annan V. This Act would have given the temporary "blessing" to those
provisions of the Annan Plan that were not in compliance with the acquis. Once adopted by
the Council, this Act would have had the quality of primary law, even without ratification by
the Member States. In view of the overwhelming No-Vote in the referendum in the Greek
Cypriot community and the subsequent failure of the Annan Plan, this Act was never tabled in
the Council. It is now a piece of history, but a piece to which the European Commission will
certainly have to come back when the next (and hopefully last) settlement plan will have to be
accommodated. It seems illusionary to assume that there could be a settlement without any
temporary deviations from the acquis.
Issues to be accommodated
It is hard to predict precisely if the issues to be accommodated in a future settlement will be
the same as in previous comprehensive settlement plan. In any case, the Annan Plan offers,
however, a good indication of which issues might be relevant in this context.
- Restrictions on the purchase of immovable property in the TC constituent state (TCCS)

Annan V15 provided the possibility of restrictions on the purchase of immovable property in
the TCCS for fifteen years or for as long as the gross domestic product per capita in that
constituent state does not reach 85% of the gross domestic product per capita in the Greek
Cypriot state, whichever is the earlier. This would affect natural persons who have not been
permanent residents for at least three years in the TCCS. It should be underlined that legal
persons were not covered by these restrictions.
It was Commissioner Verheugen himself who succeeded to cut down the transition period to a
maximum of 15 years during negotiations in Bürgenstock (Switzerland).
In this context, I would like to recall that Poland received a 12 year transition period on the
purchase of certain categories of immovable property in some regions of the country.16 This
was done to accommodate fears based on historical experiences with Poland's western
neighbour Germany. If one considers the geographical scope of this transition period, one will
realise that this 12 year period applies grosso modo to the former German territories of today's
Poland. The Poles feared that the Germans could regain control over their former eastern
territories by buying property, in addition at relatively low prices. If the EU was ready to
accommodate such fears stemming from Second World War experiences (which were
objectively rather unfounded 60 years after the end of WW II), why should it not accept
14
The proposal of the Commission for such "Act of Adaptation" is attached to this presentation as annex 2
15
There are five versions of the Annan Plan: Annan I of 11 November 2002, Annan II of 10 December 2002,
Annan III of 26 February 2003, Annan IV of 30 March 2004 and Annan V of 31 March 2004. Annan III formed
the basis for the unsuccessful negotiations at the The Hague summit of 11 March 2003 and the negotiations
following the February 2004 New York agreement brokered by the then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. It
provided for the power of the UNSG to finalise the plan in case the two communities, assisted in a second step
by Greece and Turkey, would be unable to agree on a text Annan IV was presented by the UN towards the end of
the negotiations in Bürgenstock (Switzerland) indicating how the UNSG intended to finalise the plan, but still
mentioning a few outstanding issues. Annan V is the final version of the plan, presented by Kofi Annan in the
late hours of 31 March 2004 in Bürgenstock.
16
OJ 2003, L 236, p. 878/879
temporary deviations in the field of free capital movements in a situation where there is still
an ongoing, unsolved conflict, with little trust between the communities.
In other words: the 15 year transition period regarding restrictions on purchase of immovable
property in the Annan Plan is not something uncommon in the EU and, taking the context into
account, seems well justifiable. It reflects the respect the EU attaches to certain historical
sensitivities, even though the associated fears may seem to be exaggerated from the objective
point of view.
- Residence Rights
1) Cypriot citizens
Annan V provided for the possibility of restrictions on the right of residence of a Cypriot
citizen in a constituent state of which he does not hold the internal constituent state
citizenship. For the first five years, there could have been a complete moratorium. In the
following years – up to a maximum of 19 years – the possibility of restrictions was linked to
the percentages of persons resident in a municipality or village in one constituent state
originating from the other constituent state. The maximum in years 15–19 after the enactment
of the settlement was 18% of the total population of a constituent state. In simple terms: once
18% of the population in one constituent state originated from the other constituent state,
restrictions were allowed.
In case of Turkey's accession to the EU before the expiry of the 19 year period, the possibility
of restrictions on residence rights would end earlier (with the date of Turkey's accession).
Excursus: Differences between Annan III and Annan V17

This provision of the Annan Plan on residence rights met substantial criticism of violating one
of the basic rights of EU citizens. However, Annan V differs substantially from Annan III.
The EU was not able to accept the provision in Annan III conditioning the lifting of the
restrictions only to Turkey's EU accession. For the EU it was imperative to have a precisely
defined maximum transition period. The date of Turkey's accession does not meet this
criterion as long as it is not known. Therefore, the Commission insisted on a precise length of
the envisaged temporary deviation from the acquis. In the end, a period of 19 years was
inserted into the Plan. The still remaining reference to Turkey's accession in the relevant
provision could only shorten, but never prolong the transition period in this area. The
provisions of Annan V were thus essentially decoupled from Turkey's EU-accession.18 This
example shows, that the EU, more precisely: the European Commission, intervened with the
UN and the negotiating parties to amend the Plan in a way acceptable to the EU. This shows
once more that the EU was not ready to give its blessing to each and every deviation from EU
law for the sake of a settlement. On the contrary, the EU used its influence to prevent
permanent derogations from happening and to shorten transition periods. Overall, Annan III
was much less acceptable in terms of EU requirements than Annan V. Against this
background, the persisting criticism that the European Commission assessed only Annan I and
did not check the acquis-compatibility of later versions of the Annan Plan, is unfounded.
Still, the reproach that the EU was allegedly ready to compromise the fundamental right of
free movement and residence of EU citizens necessitates some further remarks. Originally,
this freedom was linked to the free movement of workers and the freedom to provide services.
17
See footnote 14.
18
This remarkable fact seems to have been ignored by the opponents of the Annan Plan. It is uncertain whether
ever again a Cyprus settlement will be achievable without linking it directly with Turkey's EU accession.
In other words, it was part of the four freedoms of the internal market. A national of a EU
Member State could draw on these rights only in a cross border context, when moving to
another Member State. A Member State was allowed to discriminate its own citizens without
violating EU law. If we look at the restrictions in question from this angle, there is no problem
of compatibility with the freedoms of the internal market. Citizens of a re-united Cyprus
would have been able to benefit from these rights of movement and residence to any other
Member State of the EU. However, since the introduction of the EU citizenship as the
"fundamental status of nationals of the Member States"19, the right of movement and
residence has been de-coupled from carrying out cross border economic activities in the
internal market. This makes it more difficult to justify restrictions by a Member State, even on
its own citizens in this area. As shown above, the latter was prevented through the active
involvement of the European Commission in the final phase of the talks. The up to 19 years of
restrictions to reside in specific parts of Cyprus remaining in the Plan are a significant
problem from the angle of EU citizenship. However, they were the price for reaching a
solution to the Cyprus problem. Was the price too high? The European Commission found the
restrictions as included in Annan V justifiable. Can the transition period be cut down in a
future settlement? I am convinced, the European Commission would welcome this. Whether it
is politically feasible, remains to be seen in future settlement talks.
One should recall that we are speaking here of a possibility of restrictions. It is not clear
whether there actually would have been restrictions for the entire period of 19 years. The
Annan Plan (and subsequently the Act of Adaptation) provides a legal empowerment, rather
than a prescription. Once the United Cyprus Republic actually would have been a EU
Member State, the fears and distrust between the two communities could have disappeared
eventually – and maybe much faster than only after 19 years - by working and living together
in one Cypriot state integrated into the European Union. These possible dynamics should be
taken into account when assessing the temporary deviations from EU-law.
In this context I would like to draw a parallel to a transition period which the old Member
States managed to negotiate during the accession negotiations with the eight new Member
States in Central Europe as well as with Bulgaria and Romania. This transitional arrangement
concerning the free movement of workers (one of the four freedoms of the internal market)
may last up to seven years. Not all Member States make use of this transition period. It grants
a possibility but does not predetermine the actual use of it, at least not at full length.20
The possibility of safeguard measures mentioned in the relevant provision in the Annan Plan
does not essentially alter the legal assessment as according to Community law the possibilities
to apply safeguard measures are very limited, particularly if they are to be applied for a longer
period of time.
2) Greek and Turkish citizens

Annan V allowed for restrictions on the right of residence of Greek and Turkish citizens for a
maximum period of 19 years. If the number of Greek or Turkish nationals would exceed 5%
of the number of Cypriot citizens in the respective constituent state, restrictions could be
applied. Again, the transition period would be shortened in case of Turkey's EU accession
earlier than the 19 years period.
19
ECJ, Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R/secretary of State for the Home Department, 2002-I-0000, paragraph 82
20
It could be added that also this transition period has been granted rather on the basis of fears than facts.
After this period, the United Cyprus Republic could, after consulting the Commission have
applied safeguard measures to ensure that the demographic ratio between Cyprus’ permanent
residents speaking either Greek or Turkish as mother tongue is not substantially altered.
Safeguard clauses are put into many treaties but are actually very rarely applied. If applied,
safeguard measures need to be proportional and limited in time. In any case, such a safeguard
clause cannot be compared to a permanent derogation.
This completes the list of temporary deviations from the acquis accommodated by transition
periods. There are only three issues (apart from the Schengen issue which was to be solved in
separate negotiations after the entry into force of the new state of affairs). The list is not
particular long. Some new Member States had much longer lists of transition periods in the
accession treaty. I acknowledge, however, that the possible restrictions concern important
issues; in particular one of the four freedoms of the internal market and Union citizenship.
Also, the duration of the transition periods is still very long. Certainly the EU would welcome
shorter transition periods if this would be politically feasible. The ones accepted by the
European Commission in its proposal for an Act of Adaptation can be regarded in my
personal view as coming quite close to an absolute limit of what could be possibly
accommodated in a future settlement.
III. CONCLUSION
Any future Cyprus settlement will have an EU-dimension. Very specific requirements have to
be met to ensure that a reunited Cyprus fulfils its obligations and benefits from its rights as an
EU Member State. This implies that the EU, in particular the European Commission, will
have to be closely involved when it comes to drafting those parts of a future settlement
concerned. It is likely that a future settlement will also need some kind of accommodation in a
few areas. The European Commission is interested in keeping the number of areas and the
duration of the transitional arrangements as limited as possible. The idea of a 100%-compliant
settlement without any temporary transition period amounts, however, to wishful thinking and
does not meet the reality test. The EU was ready to pay this price of accommodation in 2004,
expecting a lasting and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem in exchange. This readiness
remains in place as the EU and its Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus, are
bound by the legal commitment inserted in Protocol 10 to accommodate a future settlement as
long as it is in line with the principles on which the EU is founded. The fact that the Republic
of Cyprus is a Member State of the European Union should thus not have any impact on this
readiness to accommodate a settlement. However, it is advisable that the entire text of the
future settlement is negotiated between the parties without the possibility of filling the gaps
by the UN Secretary General which existed in 2004 as ultima ratio. This seems to be indeed a
necessity for a future settlement, as the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
communities will only credibly convince the citizens in the run up to a referendum, once they
are personally committed to it by their own signature.
ANNEX 1
THEȱCYPRUSȱISSUEȱINȱEUROPEANȱCOUNCILȱCONCLUSIONSȱ
FromȱSevillaȱ(Juneȱ2002)ȱuntilȱBrusselsȱ(Marchȱ2004)ȱ
Sevilleȱ 22Ȭ6Ȭ2002.ȱ Theȱ Europeanȱ Unionȇsȱ preferenceȱ isȱ stillȱ forȱ theȱ accessionȱ ofȱ aȱ
reunitedȱ island.ȱ Theȱ Europeanȱ Councilȱ fullyȱ supportsȱ theȱ effortsȱ ofȱ theȱ SecretaryȬ
Generalȱ ofȱ theȱ Unitedȱ Nationsȱ andȱcallsȱ uponȱ theȱ leadersȱ ofȱ theȱGreekȱCypriotȱ andȱ
Turkishȱ Cypriotȱ communitiesȱ toȱ intensifyȱ andȱ expediteȱ theirȱ talksȱ inȱ orderȱ toȱ seizeȱ
thisȱuniqueȱwindowȱofȱopportunityȱforȱaȱcomprehensiveȱsettlement,ȱconsistentȱwithȱ
theȱrelevantȱUNȱSecurityȱCouncilȱresolutions,ȱitȱisȱtoȱbeȱhopedȱbeforeȱtheȱconclusionȱ
ofȱ theȱ negotiations.ȱ Theȱ Europeanȱ Unionȱ wouldȱ accommodateȱ theȱ termsȱ ofȱ suchȱ aȱ
comprehensiveȱ settlementȱ inȱ theȱ Treatyȱ ofȱ Accessionȱ inȱ lineȱ withȱ theȱ principlesȱ onȱ
whichȱtheȱEuropeanȱUnionȱisȱfounded:ȱasȱaȱMemberȱState,ȱCyprusȱwillȱhaveȱtoȱspeakȱ
withȱ aȱ singleȱ voiceȱ andȱ ensureȱ properȱ applicationȱ ofȱ Europeanȱ Unionȱ law.ȱ Theȱ
Europeanȱ Unionȱ wouldȱ makeȱ aȱ substantialȱ financialȱ contributionȱ inȱ supportȱ ofȱ theȱ
developmentȱofȱtheȱnorthernȱpartȱofȱaȱreunitedȱisland.ȱ
Brusselsȱ26Ȭ11Ȭ2002:ȱTheȱUnionȱreiteratesȱitsȱpreferenceȱforȱaȱreunitedȱCyprusȱtoȱjoinȱ
theȱ Europeanȱ Unionȱ onȱ theȱ basisȱ ofȱ aȱ comprehensiveȱ settlement,ȱ andȱ urgesȱ theȱ
leadersȱ ofȱ theȱ Greekȱ Cypriotȱ andȱ Turkishȱ Cypriotȱ communitiesȱ toȱ seizeȱ theȱ
opportunityȱandȱreachȱanȱagreementȱbeforeȱtheȱendȱofȱtheȱaccessionȱnegotiationsȱthisȱ
year.ȱTheȱUnionȱwillȱcontinueȱtoȱfullyȱsupportȱtheȱsubstantialȱeffortsȱofȱtheȱSecretaryȬ
GeneralȱofȱtheȱUnitedȱNationsȱforȱreachingȱaȱsettlement,ȱconsistentȱwithȱtheȱrelevantȱ
UNȱSecurityȱCouncilȱresolutions.ȱTheȱEuropeanȱUnionȱwillȱaccommodateȱtheȱtermsȱ
ofȱ suchȱ aȱ comprehensiveȱ settlementȱ inȱ theȱ Treatyȱ ofȱ Accessionȱ inȱ lineȱ withȱ theȱ
principlesȱonȱwhichȱtheȱEuropeanȱUnionȱisȱfounded.ȱInȱtheȱabsenceȱofȱaȱsettlement,ȱ
theȱdecisionsȱtoȱbeȱtakenȱinȱDecemberȱbyȱtheȱCopenhagenȱEuropeanȱCouncilȱwillȱbeȱ
basedȱonȱtheȱconclusionsȱsetȱoutȱbyȱtheȱHelsinkiȱEuropeanȱCouncilȱinȱ1999.ȱ
Copenhagenȱ 16Ȭ12Ȭ2002:ȱ Asȱ theȱ accessionȱ negotiationsȱ haveȱ beenȱ completedȱ withȱ
Cyprus,ȱ Cyprusȱ willȱ beȱ admittedȱ asȱ aȱ newȱ Memberȱ Stateȱ toȱ theȱ Europeanȱ Union.ȱ
NeverthelessȱtheȱEuropeanȱCouncilȱconfirmsȱitsȱstrongȱpreferenceȱforȱaccessionȱtoȱtheȱ
EuropeanȱUnionȱbyȱaȱunitedȱCyprus.ȱInȱthisȱcontextȱitȱwelcomesȱtheȱcommitmentȱofȱ
theȱ Greekȱ Cypriotsȱ andȱ theȱ Turkishȱ Cypriotsȱ toȱ continueȱ toȱ negotiateȱ withȱ theȱ
objectiveȱ ofȱ concludingȱ aȱ comprehensiveȱ settlementȱ ofȱ theȱ Cyprusȱ problemȱ byȱ 28ȱ
Februaryȱ2003ȱonȱtheȱbasisȱofȱtheȱUNSG4sȱproposals.ȱTheȱEuropeanȱCouncilȱbelievesȱ
thatȱtheseȱproposalsȱofferȱaȱuniqueȱopportunityȱtoȱreachȱaȱsettlementȱinȱtheȱcomingȱ
weeksȱandȱurgesȱtheȱleadersȱofȱtheȱGreekȱCypriotȱandȱTurkishȱCypriotȱcommunitiesȱ
toȱseizeȱthisȱopportunity.ȱȱ
ȱ
Theȱ Unionȱ recallsȱ itsȱ willingnessȱ toȱ accommodateȱ theȱ termsȱ ofȱ aȱ settlementȱ inȱ theȱ
TreatyȱofȱAccessionȱinȱlineȱwithȱtheȱprinciplesȱonȱwhichȱtheȱEUȱisȱfounded.ȱInȱcaseȱofȱ
aȱ settlement,ȱ theȱ Council,ȱ actingȱ byȱ unanimityȱ onȱ theȱ basisȱ ofȱ proposalsȱ byȱ theȱ
Commission,ȱshallȱdecideȱuponȱadaptationsȱofȱtheȱtermsȱconcerningȱtheȱaccessionȱofȱ
Cyprusȱ toȱ theȱ EUȱ withȱ regardȱ toȱ theȱ Turkishȱ Cypriotȱ community.ȱ
Theȱ Europeanȱ Councilȱ hasȱ decidedȱ that,ȱ inȱ theȱ absenceȱ ofȱ aȱ settlement,ȱ theȱ
applicationȱonȱtheȱacquisȱtoȱtheȱnorthernȱpartȱofȱtheȱislandȱshallȱbeȱsuspended,ȱuntilȱ
theȱ Councilȱ decidesȱ unanimouslyȱ otherwise,ȱ onȱ theȱ basisȱ ofȱ aȱ proposalȱ byȱ theȱ
Commission.ȱ Meanwhile,ȱ theȱ Councilȱ invitesȱ theȱ Commission,ȱ inȱ consultationȱ withȱ
theȱgovernmentȱofȱCyprus,ȱtoȱconsiderȱwaysȱofȱpromotingȱeconomicȱdevelopmentȱofȱ
theȱnorthernȱpartȱofȱCyprusȱandȱbringingȱitȱcloserȱtoȱtheȱUnion.ȱ
Brusselsȱ 21Ȭ03Ȭ2003:ȱ Theȱ Europeanȱ Councilȱ regretsȱ thatȱ theȱ effortsȱ ofȱ theȱ Unitedȱ
NationsȱSecretaryȱGeneralȱtoȱfindȱaȱcomprehensiveȱsettlementȱofȱtheȱCyprusȱproblemȱ
haveȱ failed.ȱ Theȱ EUȱ stronglyȱ supportsȱ theȱ continuationȱ ofȱ theȱ Secretaryȱ Generalȇsȱ
missionȱofȱgoodȱofficesȱandȱofȱnegotiationsȱonȱtheȱbasisȱofȱhisȱproposals.ȱItȱurgesȱallȱ
partiesȱconcernedȱtoȱspareȱnoȱeffortȱtowardsȱaȱjust,ȱviableȱandȱfunctionalȱsettlementȱ
and,ȱ inȱ particular,ȱ theȱ Turkishȱ Cypriotȱ leadershipȱ toȱ reconsiderȱ itsȱ position.ȱ Theȱ
Europeanȱ Councilȱ reaffirmsȱ itsȱ decisionsȱ takenȱ atȱ Copenhagenȱ withȱ regardȱ toȱ
CyprusȇȱaccessionȱtoȱtheȱEU.ȱ
ȱ
Thessaloniki,ȱ Juneȱ 2003:ȱ Cyprusȇȱ accessionȱ toȱ ourȱ Unionȱ isȱ alreadyȱ creatingȱ
favourableȱconditionsȱforȱtheȱtwoȱcommunitiesȱtoȱreachȱaȱcomprehensiveȱsettlementȱ
ofȱtheȱCyprusȱproblem.ȱToȱthisȱend,ȱourȱUnionȱstronglyȱsupportsȱtheȱcontinuationȱofȱ
theȱ UNȱ Secretaryȱ Generalȇsȱ missionȱ ofȱ goodȱ officesȱ inȱ accordanceȱ withȱ theȱ relevantȱ
UNȱ Securityȱ Councilȱ Resolutionsȱ includingȱ 1475/2003.ȱ Theȱ recentȱ easingȱ ofȱ
restrictionsȱinȱcontactsȱandȱcommunicationȱbetweenȱGreekȱandȱTurkishȱCypriotsȱhasȱ
beenȱpositiveȱandȱhasȱdemonstratedȱthatȱtheȱtwoȱcommunitiesȱcanȱliveȱtogetherȱinȱaȱ
reunitedȱ islandȱ withinȱ theȱ Union.ȱ Atȱ theȱ sameȱ time,ȱ however,ȱ ourȱ Unionȱ doesȱ notȱ
considerȱthisȱasȱaȱsubstituteȱforȱaȱcomprehensiveȱsettlement.ȱTheȱEuropeanȱCouncil,ȱ
therefore,ȱ urgesȱ allȱ partiesȱ concerned,ȱ andȱ inȱ particularȱ Turkeyȱ andȱ theȱ Turkishȱ
Cypriotȱ leadership,ȱ toȱ stronglyȱ supportȱ theȱ UNȱ Secretaryȱ Generalȇsȱ efforts,ȱ and,ȱ inȱ
thisȱcontext,ȱcallsȱforȱanȱearlyȱresumptionȱofȱtheȱtalksȱonȱtheȱbasisȱofȱhisȱproposals.ȱToȱ
thisȱ end,ȱ theȱ Europeanȱ Unionȱ isȱ toȱ furtherȱ contributeȱ towardsȱ aȱ just,ȱ viableȱ andȱ
functionalȱ settlementȱ ofȱ theȱ Cyprusȱ problemȱ consistentȱ withȱ theȱ relevantȱ UNȱ
Securityȱ Councilȱ resolutions.ȱ Ourȱ Unionȱ recallsȱ itsȱ willingnessȱ toȱ accommodateȱ theȱ
termsȱofȱaȱsettlementȱinȱlineȱwithȱtheȱprinciplesȱonȱwhichȱtheȱEUȱisȱfounded.ȱInȱthisȱ
context,ȱ theȱ Europeanȱ Councilȱ welcomesȱ theȱ Commissionȇsȱ willingnessȱ toȱ offerȱ
assistanceȱforȱaȱspeedyȱsolutionȱwithinȱtheȱframeworkȱofȱtheȱacquis.ȱItȱalsoȱwelcomesȱ
theȱ Commissionȇsȱ Communicationȱ onȱ promotingȱ economicȱ developmentȱ inȱ theȱ
northernȱpartȱofȱCyprusȱandȱlooksȱforwardȱtoȱtheȱimplementationȱofȱtheseȱmeasuresȱ
inȱ accordanceȱ withȱ theȱ Copenhagenȱ Europeanȱ Councilȱ Conclusionsȱ andȱ inȱ
consultationȱwithȱtheȱGovernmentȱofȱCyprus.ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
Brussels,ȱDecemberȱ2003:ȱInȱlineȱwithȱitsȱrelevantȱconclusions,ȱtheȱEuropeanȱCouncilȱ
reiteratesȱ itsȱ preferenceȱ forȱ aȱ reunitedȱ Cyprusȱ toȱ joinȱ theȱ Unionȱ onȱ 1ȱ Mayȱ 2004,ȱ inȱ
orderȱtoȱallowȱallȱCypriotsȱtoȱenjoyȱaȱsecureȱandȱprosperousȱfutureȱandȱtheȱbenefitsȱ
ofȱ EUȱ accession.ȱ Itȱ considersȱ thatȱthereȱ isȱ aȱ goodȱ prospectȱ ofȱ reachingȱaȱjust,ȱ viableȱ
andȱ functionalȱ settlementȱ byȱ 1ȱ Mayȱ 2004,ȱ consistentȱ withȱ theȱ relevantȱ UNȱ Securityȱ
Councilȱ resolutions.ȱ Theȱ Europeanȱ Councilȱ thereforeȱ againȱ urgesȱ allȱ partiesȱ
concerned,ȱandȱinȱparticularȱTurkeyȱandȱtheȱTurkishȱCypriotȱleadership,ȱtoȱsupportȱ
theȱ UNȱ Secretaryȱ Generalȇsȱ effortsȱ stronglyȱ and,ȱ inȱ thisȱ context,ȱ callsȱ forȱ anȱ
immediateȱresumptionȱofȱtheȱtalksȱonȱtheȱbasisȱofȱhisȱproposals.ȱTheȱUnionȱreiteratesȱ
itsȱwillingnessȱtoȱaccommodateȱtheȱtermsȱofȱaȱsettlementȱinȱlineȱwithȱtheȱprinciplesȱ
onȱ whichȱ theȱ EUȱ isȱ founded.ȱ Inȱ thisȱ context,ȱ theȱ Europeanȱ Councilȱ welcomesȱ theȱ
Commissionȇsȱ willingnessȱ toȱ offerȱ assistanceȱ forȱ aȱ speedyȱ solutionȱ withinȱ theȱ
frameworkȱ ofȱ theȱ acquis.ȱ Followingȱ aȱ settlement,ȱ theȱ Unionȱ isȱ readyȱ toȱ provideȱ
financialȱ assistanceȱ forȱ theȱ developmentȱ ofȱ theȱ northernȱ partȱ ofȱ Cyprusȱ andȱ theȱ
Commissionȱ wouldȱ beȱ calledȱ uponȱ toȱ prepareȱ allȱ necessaryȱ stepsȱ forȱ liftingȱ theȱ
suspensionȱofȱtheȱacquis,ȱinȱaccordanceȱwithȱProtocolȱ10ȱtoȱtheȱActȱofȱAccession.ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
Brussels,ȱ Marchȱ 2004:ȱ Theȱ Europeanȱ Councilȱ emphasisesȱ itsȱ continuingȱ strongȱ
supportȱforȱtheȱeffortsȱofȱUNȬSecretaryȱGeneralȱAnnanȱtoȱhelpȱtheȱpartiesȱseizeȱthisȱ
historicȱ opportunityȱ toȱ bringȱ aboutȱ aȱ comprehensiveȱ settlementȱ ofȱ theȱ Cyprusȱ
problemȱconsistentȱwithȱtheȱrelevantȱUNȱSecurityȱCouncilȱResolutions.ȱItȱwelcomesȱ
theȱ Commissionȇsȱ continuedȱ willingnessȱ toȱ offerȱ assistanceȱ forȱ aȱ speedyȱ solutionȱ
withinȱ theȱ frameworkȱ ofȱ theȱ acquis.ȱ Itȱ alsoȱ welcomesȱ theȱ Commissionȇsȱ offerȱ toȱ
organiseȱ aȱ highȬlevelȱ internationalȱ conferenceȱ inȱ Brusselsȱ onȱ 15ȱ Aprilȱ toȱ prepareȱ aȱ
donorsȱconference.ȱTheȱEuropeanȱCouncilȱremainsȱconvincedȱthatȱaȱjust,ȱviableȱandȱ
functionalȱ settlementȱ isȱ achievableȱ byȱ 1ȱ May.ȱ Itȱ urgesȱ allȱ partiesȱ toȱ maintainȱ aȱ firmȱ
commitmentȱ toȱ aȱ successfulȱ outcomeȱ toȱ theȱ negotiatingȱ processȱ withȱ theȱ
collaborationȱofȱtheȱgovernmentsȱofȱGreeceȱandȱTurkey.ȱ
ȱ
Theȱ Europeanȱ Councilȱ reaffirmsȱ itsȱ strongȱ preferenceȱ forȱ theȱ accessionȱ ofȱ aȱ unitedȱ
CyprusȱtoȱheȱEuropeanȱUnionȱandȱreiteratesȱitsȱreadinessȱtoȱaccommodateȱtheȱtermsȱ
ofȱsuchȱaȱsettlementȱinȱlineȱwithȱtheȱprinciplesȱonȱwhichȱtheȱUnionȱisȱfounded.ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ANNEXȱ2ȱ
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Brussels, 7.4.2004
COM(2004) 189 final
Proposal for an
ACT OF ADAPTATION
OF THE TERMS OF ACCESSION OF THE UNITED CYPRUS REPUBLIC

TO THE EUROPEAN UNION
(presented by the Commission)

Proposal for an
ACT OF ADAPTATION
OF THE TERMS OF ACCESSION OF THE UNITED CYPRUS REPUBLIC

TO THE EUROPEAN UNION
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Having regard to Protocol No. 10 of the Act of Accession 2003, and in particular Article 4
thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
(1) Taking into account the approval of the Foundation Agreement by the Greek Cypriots and
the Turkish Cypriots on 24 April 2004,
(2) Taking into account the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, the Additional Protocol
thereto, and the Treaty of Establishment,
(3) Bearing in mind and respecting the demilitarisation of Cyprus,
(4) Considering that the Act of Accession shall not prevent the implementation of the
Foundation Agreement, and shall accommodate its terms in line with the principles on
which the European Union is founded,
(5) Recalling that the European Union’s mission is peaceful cooperation of states and
citizens, founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member
States and which have found their expression in the Foundation Agreement which
introduces a new state of affairs in Cyprus and allows its peaceful integration into the
Union,
(6) Underlining that the political equality of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, the equal
status of the two constituent states, and the prohibition on any unilateral change to the
state of affairs established by the Foundation Agreement, fall within the terms of Article
6(1) of the Treaty of the European Union,
(7) Recognizing the particular national identity of Cyprus, and the need to protect the balance
between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, the bi-zonal character of the
United Cyprus Republic and the distinct identity and integrity of the constituent states,
which require certain safeguards and temporary restrictions on the right of residence of
Cypriot citizens as well as citizens of Greece and Turkey,
(8) Considering that the main articles of the Foundation Agreement form part of the national
identity of the United Cyprus Republic, which the European Union shall respect,
(9) Bearing in mind that the United Cyprus Republic shall take all appropriate measures,
whether in general or in particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising out
of European Union membership, in line with the specifications of the Act of Accession
and this Act
(10) Underlining that accession to the European Union shall benefit Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots alike and promote development to help reduce economic disparities,
(11) Recalling that, in accordance with the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European
Council of 12 December 2003, the Union is ready to provide financial assistance for the
development of the northern part of Cyprus following a settlement,
(12) Being convinced that the economic disparities between the Turkish Cypriot constituent
state and European Union Member States as well as between the two constituent states
necessitate authorisation procedures for the acquisition of property in the Turkish Cypriot
constituent state in order to avoid unacceptable sudden price increases and large scale
buy-out of land,
(13) Being further convinced that the economic situation in the Turkish Cypriot constituent
state may also necessitate the adoption of special safeguard measures for a limited period
of time in order to protect certain sectors of its economy,
(14) Taking into account the special relations and strong ties of Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots with Greece and Turkey respectively,
(15) Bearing in mind that, as a European Union Member State, Cyprus shall fulfil its
obligations arising from the Association Agreement between Turkey and the European
Communities of 1963, its additional Protocol and the decisions taken by the Association
organs including the decision establishing a Customs Union between Turkey and the
European Union, thereby according European Union treatment to Turkey in the fields
where this is provided for,
(16) Wishing to accord, to the extent possible with the European Union membership of
Cyprus, similar rights to Greek and Turkish nationals vis-à-vis Cyprus,
(17) Considering that the Foundation Agreement foresees equivalent entry and resident rights
for Greek and Turkish nationals vis-à-vis Cyprus. The implementation of this principle
requires derogations from Community law in the case of Cyprus. Unlimited immigration
can, however, not be accorded to either Greek or Turkish nationals in the interest of the
internal balance of population in Cyprus,
(18) Underlining that all necessary preparations should start immediately so that Turkish shall
become and operate as an official and working language of the European Union as soon as
possible
HAS ADOPTED THIS ACT OF ADAPTATION OF THE TERMS OF ACCESSION:
Article 1
Property
1. Notwithstanding existing provisions of Community law, the application of restrictions,

on a non-discriminatory basis, on the right of natural persons who have not been
permanent residents for at least three years in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, and
of legal persons, to purchase immovable property in the Turkish Cypriot constituent
state without permission of the competent authority of that constituent state, for fifteen
years or for as long as the gross domestic product per capita in that constituent state does
not reach the level of 85% of the gross domestic product per capita in the Greek Cypriot
state, whichever is the earlier, shall not be precluded.
2. The authorisation procedure for the acquisition of immovable property applied by the
competent authorities of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state shall be based on
published, objective, stable and transparent criteria and shall be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner.
3. The Commission shall report every five years to the European Parliament and the
Council on the application of the provisions of paragraphs 1-2. The Commission may at
that time recommend to the Turkish Cypriot constituent state to abolish in total or in part
the restrictions, if it considers that the political, economic and social conditions in
Cyprus so allow.
Article 2
Residence of Cypriot citizens

on a non-discriminatory basis, on the right of a Cypriot citizen to reside in a constituent
state of which he does not hold the internal constituent state citizenship status shall not
be precluded,
a) in the form of a moratorium, during the first five years following the date of the
entry into force of this Act;
b) if the percentage of such residents of the total population of a municipality or

village has reached 6% between the 6th and 9th years and 12% between the 10th and
14th years following the date of entry into force of this Act; and
c) if the percentage of such residents of the total population of a constituent state has
reached 18 % for a period of up to nineteen years following the entry into force of
this Act or until Turkey joins the European Union, whichever is the earlier.
2. Thereafter, either constituent state may, with a view to protecting its identity, take
safeguard measures to ensure that no less than two-thirds of its Cypriot permanent
residents speak its official language as their mother tongue.
Article 3
Residence of Greek and Turkish nationals

on a non-discriminatory basis, on:
a) the right of Greek nationals to reside in Cyprus, if the number of resident Greek
nationals has reached 5% of the number of resident Cypriot citizens who hold the
internal constituent state citizenship status of the Greek Cypriot constituent State
and who are not dual nationals;
b) the right of Turkish nationals to reside in Cyprus, if the number of resident Turkish
nationals has reached 5% of the number of resident Cypriot citizens who hold the
internal constituent citizenship status of the Turkish Cypriot constituent State and
who are not dual nationals;
c) shall not be precluded for a transitional period of up to 19 years after the entry into
force of this Act or until Turkey joins the European Union, whichever is the
earlier.
2. Thereafter, the United Cyprus Republic, in consultation with the Commission, may take
safeguard measures to ensure that the demographic ratio between Cyprus’s permanent
residents speaking either Greek or Turkish as mother tongue is not substantially altered.
Article 4
Safeguard measures
1. Without prejudice to Articles 37 and 38 of the Act of Accession, if until the end of a
period of up to six years after the entry into force of this Act, the operation of the
European Union’s internal market causes, or threatens to cause, difficulties which are
serious and likely to persist in any sector of the economy, or which could bring a serious
deterioration in the economic situation in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, the
competent Cypriot authorities may take appropriate safeguard measures which shall be
applicable for a period of three months. These measures shall be proportional and shall
not constitute disguised restrictions on trade and shall take account of the interests of all
parties concerned.
2. On request, the Commission may prolong these measures, in total or in part, or adopt
different measures of which it shall determine the time of application within the six
years period set out in paragraph 1.
Article 5
Equivalent rights of Greek and Turkish nationals
Without prejudice to the restrictions applied under Articles 1-3 and rules applying to entry and
residency rights of Turkish nationals in other Member States, Cyprus is authorised to accord to
Turkish nationals equivalent treatment with Greek nationals regarding entry and residency rights.
Rules of implementation for such entry and residency rights for Turkish citizens, compatible with
the above principles and the participation of Cyprus in the Schengen area, shall be negotiated
between the European Community and Turkey within six months.
Article 6
The European Security and Defence Policy
The participation of Cyprus in the European Security and Defence Policy shall fully respect the
provisions of the Foundation Agreement and the provisions of the Treaties of Guarantee and
Alliance and the Additional Protocols thereto, and in no sense undermine those provisions.
Article 7
Representation in the European Parliament
Cyprus will be represented in the European Parliament according to proportional representation,
provided that each constituent state is attributed no less than one third of the Cypriot seats in the
European Parliament.
Article 8
Turkish as official language of the European Union
1. Turkish shall be an official and working language of the institutions of the European
Union.
2. The Council shall decide on the effective application of paragraph 1 upon fulfilment of
the necessary personnel and technical requirements. In the period preceding this
decision, the Turkish language may be used in European Council and Council meetings.
3. The texts of the acts of the institutions and the European Central Bank, adopted before
paragraph 1 takes effect, and drawn by the Council, the Commission or the European
Central Bank, in Turkish shall, from that date be authentic under the same conditions as
the texts drawn in the other official languages. They shall be published in the Official
Journal of the European Union if the texts in the other official languages were so
published.
Article 9
Application
This Act shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union and become applicable
the same day.
Done at Brussels, […]
For the Council

The President
[…]
ANNEXȱ3ȱ
Protocol No 10 on Cyprus (annexed to the Act of Accession 2003)
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,
REAFFIRMING their commitment to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem,

consistent with relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and their strong support
for the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General to that end,
CONSIDERING that such a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem has not yet been
reached,
CONSIDERING that it is, therefore, necessary to provide for the suspension of the application of
the acquis in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of
Cyprus does not exercise effective control,
CONSIDERING that, in the event of a solution to the Cyprus problem this suspension shall be
lifted,
CONSIDERING that the European Union is ready to accommodate the terms of such a
settlement in line with the principles on which the EU is founded,
CONSIDERING that it is necessary to provide for the terms under which the relevant provisions
of EU law will apply to the line between the abovementioned areas and both those areas in
which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus exercises effective control and the Eastern
Sovereign Base Area of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
DESIRING that the accession of Cyprus to the European Union shall benefit all Cypriot citizens
and promote civil peace and reconciliation,
CONSIDERING, therefore, that nothing in this Protocol shall preclude measures with this end in
view,
CONSIDERING that such measures shall not affect the application of the acquis under the
conditions set out in the Accession Treaty in any other part of the Republic of Cyprus,
HAVE AGREED UPON THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS:
Article 1
1. The application of the acquis shall be suspended in those
areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of
the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.
2. The Council, acting unanimously on the basis of a
proposal from the Commission, shall decide on the withdrawal
of the suspension referred to in paragraph 1.
Article 2
1. The Council, acting unanimously on the basis of a
proposal from the Commission, shall define the terms under
which the provisions of EU law shall apply to the line between
those areas referred to in Article 1 and the areas in which the
Government of the Republic of Cyprus exercises effective
control.
2. The boundary between the Eastern Sovereign Base Area
and those areas referred to in Article 1 shall be treated as part
of the external borders of the Sovereign Base Areas for the
purpose of Part IV of the Annex to the Protocol on the
Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland in Cyprus for the duration of the
suspension of the application of the acquis according to
Article 1.
Article 3
1. Nothing in this Protocol shall preclude measures with a
view to promoting the economic development of the areas
referred to in Article 1.
2. Such measures shall not affect the application of the
acquis under the conditions set out in the Accession Treaty
in any other part of the Republic of Cyprus.
Article 4
In the event of a settlement, the Council, acting unanimously
on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, shall decide
on the adaptations to the terms concerning the accession of
Cyprus to the European Union with regard to the Turkish
Cypriot Community.
23.9.2003 EN Official Journal of the European Union 2003, L 236, page 955
ȱ
ȱ
Page 1 of 2


Subject: Fw: Text on EU dimension of a future settlement
Hi,
this paper is far more detailed than the discussion I had with Ziegler in October 08, which I
summarised in a note to SASG with my comments, and which was distributed to DPA at the time.
His attachment below (which he did not give me at the time) is in much more detail, particularly
on the minimum requirements for a solution, and accommodation issues, which are hotly
contested. Similarly interesting are his views on whether the settlement has to be 100% in line
or not with the acquis.
On process , note that this is DG Enlargement trying to put itself square and middle of the
process, before and irrespective of the eventual nomination of a "liaison officer". If the liaison
officer is a political type person, he/she would need to have a focal point in the EC, and the
colleagues below are trying to ensure that they play that central [backstopping] role, as they did
in 2004. This is what Rasbash's wish to discuss these matters with AD is basically about.
This is important to the extent that you can see the basic thinking from the EC side would
basically be the same as in 2004.The GkCyp want it out of the hands of ELARG to try and bring a
different legal viewpoint. My comment : the TkCyps will insist on the EU arrangements of 2004
and as in the paper, while the GkCyps may seek 'improvements' but have not prioritized it since
then as a major problem.
Tim
From: <Georg.ZIEGLER@ec.europa.eu>
Cc: <alchin@un.org>, <Andrew.RASBASH@ec.europa.eu>
Date: 02/03/2009 19:42
<<080327 ziegler (2).doc>> Dear Sonja,
Further to our talk I am sending you a text based on a public speech in Cyprus. It dates back to 2007. The text
has been published - so no secrets. As said in the disclaimer it does not necessarily represent the view of the
Commission but reflects my personal views.
The text may help deepening the understanding of some of the issues reappearing in the current negotiations.
Georg
Page 2 of 2
Attachments:
Page 1 of 2

To: Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP@UNFICYP@UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICS
BASE@UN-MAILHUB
Date: Tuesday, March 03, 2009 02:19PM

Subject: Re: Text on EU dimension of a future settlement
Dear Tim,
Many thanks for all this background, very interesting. I have to look for your note here.
Timothy Alchin

From: Timothy Alchin
Sent: 03/03/2009 11:30 ZE2
To: Sonja Bachmann
Hi,
Tim
Date: 02/03/2009 19:42

Page 2 of 2
Georg
[attachment "080327 ziegler (2).doc" deleted by Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO]

Page 1 of 2

To: Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP@UNFICYP@UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICS
BASE@UN-MAILHUB

Subject: Re: Text on EU dimension of a future settlement
Don't know Rasbash but Laura asked me to call Ziegler bec he knows the institutional
arrangements we had with the EC before on the liaison officer. He told me there were actually
several EC people at that time.
Here the view is we need a simple MoU which our legal services told me Fabio could draw up with
their help.
Timothy Alchin

From: Timothy Alchin
Sent: 03/03/2009 11:31 ZE2
To: Sonja Bachmann
How did you come into contact with Ziegler/Rasbash?
I thought we had decided to divide the contacts of you and the cabinet, and me talking to the
services...?

Date: 03/03/2009 11:30
Hi,
Page 2 of 2
Tim
Date: 02/03/2009 19:42
Georg
[attachment "080327 ziegler (2).doc" deleted by Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO]

Page 1 of 1
From: Julie Jimenez Lopez/UNFICYP

To: Alexander DOWNER/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Taye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ@UN-MAILHUB@UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICS BASE,
cc: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Steven Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP

Subject: Notes of Leaders Meeting on Property
Dear All,
Please find attached notes of Leaders meeting on property 12 February 2009.
Best regards,
Julie
Office:22614116
Mobile:99065495
Attachments:
Summary notes of Leaders Meeting 12 February 2009.doc
Summary note of meeting of Mssrs. Christofias and Talat

Hosted by SASG Downer at UNDP compound (UNPA)
Wednesday, 12 February 2009
Present:
H.E. Mr. Dimitris Christofias H.E. Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat

Mr. George Iacovou, Representative Mr. Ozdil Nami, Representative
Mr. Andreas Mavrommatis (expert) Mr. Kudret Ozersay (expert)
Mr. Toumazos Tsielepis (expert) Mr. Tufan Erhurman (expert)
Ms. Erato Markoullis (expert) Mr. Hasan Findik (expert)
Mr. Andreas Symeou (expert) Mr. Serden Hoça (expert)
Mr. Menelaos Menelaou (note taker) Mr. Mehmet Dana (note taker)
Mr. Nikos Moudouros (interpreter) Ms. Asli Erkmen (note taker)
SASG Alexander Downer

SRSG Taye-Brook Zerihoun
Ms. Sonja Bachmann, Good Offices
Mr. Steven Bourke, Good Offices (note taker)
Mr. Tim Alchin, UNFICYP
Summary of discussion
The Leaders agreed not to present but to exchange written comments on the 4 February
written responses to the 28 January papers on principles. The Leaders presented papers on
criteria governing a property settlement. The discussion focused on TkCyp requests for
clarification of the criteria submitted by GkCyps. The leaders agreed to meet again on 19
February to assess possible convergence on criteria and evaluate the possibility of closing
the chapter on property and moving the discussion to another chapter.
Details
1. The Leaders had a one hour and fifteen minute tête-à-tête.
2. The Leaders agreed to respond in writing to the response papers of 4 February and to
begin the discussion on possible criteria governing a property settlement. Nami read out the
TkCyp paper on criteria (see attached). During the reading, Christofias sought two points of
clarification. He asked if the use of the phrase “relevant property authority” implied that there
might be more than one property authority envisioned. Talat responded in the affirmative.
Christofias inquired as to what the term “military” in the paper on criteria referred. Talat
responded that the term was included to cover any future possible military needs.
3. Iacovou read the GkCyp paper on criteria (see attached). Talat sought clarification on a
number of points. Regarding qualifications on restitution, Talat sought an explanation of the
intended GkCyp meaning for the phrase “factually impossible.” Markoullis explained that,
within the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the factual
1
impossibility of restitution applied to cases of destruction. A building could not be restituted if it

had been demolished. A property or land could not be restituted if that property or land had been
lost due to a natural disaster.
4. Regarding good faith purchases of property, Talat sought clarification as to the intended
GkCyp meaning of “good faith.” Mavromatis stated that good faith, bona fides, was the legal
opposite of fraud. Markoullis indicated that the term had been employed to cover cases in which
a current user, potentially a TkCyp displaced person, sold a property to another individual. In
such a case, if the second individual acted in good faith that person would be entitled to
compensation subsequent to the restitution of the property to the original owner. The
compensation would be paid by the initial current user who sold the property to the second.
Christofias suggested that discussion be deferred to a future meeting, pending an internal
examination of the papers on criteria. Talat sought further clarification as to whether an
individual buying a new property in the north, in, for example, an apartment complex, could, on
the face of it, be considered to have acted in good faith, i.e. without fraudulent intent. Christofias
inquired as to whether Talat had in mind the Orams case, pending before the European Court of
Justice, and pointed out that individuals purchasing properties in the north were aware that their
actions violated Republic of Cyprus laws. Mavromatis said that the distinction between good and
bad faith was a matter for a court and not a detail on which either side should presently focus.
5. Christofias indicated that the important consideration was to establish a common registry
of properties. In the meantime, principles and criteria must be established. Talat asked whether it
was really rational to give all decision making power to the disposed owner. Christofias stated
that as the owner of 5 Skalis of land in Dhikomo upon which an apartment block had been built,
he would not seek to have the building demolished but would seek compensation, but that the
important point would be that he would have that choice. If he was a millionaire, he should have
the option to compensate the current users and have the land restituted. Talat turned attention to
the rights of current users. Christofias indicated that current users would have rights, but first the
right of the original owner had to be recognized. Talat stated that not knowing whether an
original owner might seek restitution or compensation would create uncertainty for a current
user. Christofias offered assurances that no current user would be left without a roof over his or
her head. Erhurman clarified that the point about uncertainty referred to the fact that a current
user would not know his or her fate prior to the functioning of a property commission and would
therefore be uncertain as to his or her fate at the time of a referendum.
6. An exchange took place regarding the events of 63 and 74. The de facto realities of
TkCyp resettlement were pitted against the de jure property claims of GkCyps. Christofias
indicated that negotiation on the basis of a Turkish military fait accompli was not an appropriate
basis for a negotiation. Ozersay inquired as to the meaning of the GkCyp criteria on Turkish
contributions to compensation. Christofias stated that as he was unable to request compensation
from Denktash he would seek it from Turkey. Talat stated that the TkCyps had needed the
Turkish “intervention.”
7. Christofias again sought to conclude the discussion. He indicated that a internal review of
the papers on criteria should be made. As a “demonstration” of his understanding of Talat’s
2
current circumstances, Christofias stated that he would be willing to move from the current
chapter to a reading of an “easier” chapter.
Next Steps
10. The Leaders agreed to meet again on Thursday, 19 February at 10:00.
Steven Bourke
17 February 2008
3
PAPER OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE ON PROPERTY ISSUE:

CRITERIA ON THE REGULATION OF
EXERCISE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
This paper of the Turkish Cypriot side regarding the criteria on the regulation of exercise of
property rights aims at solving the property question in Cyprus in accordance with the principles
outlined in our paper dated 28 January 2009.
The scope of this paper is limited to affected properties located outside the areas that will be
subject to territorial arrangement under a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus. In this paper, we
describe the applicable criteria regarding the regulation of exercise of property rights in general within
the context of the regime we propose for affected properties.
Rule 1: Dispossessed owners and current users shall have various choices regarding their claims to
affected properties. The exercise of any such choice shall be subject to certain criteria which are
outlined below.
Rule 2: The different choices shall include: compensation, exchange and reinstatement.
A- Compensation:
a) Any dispossessed owner may apply to receive compensation in exchange for transfer of
title to his/her affected property to the relevant property authority.
b) Any dispossessed owner whose affected property is not reinstated or exchanged with an
alternative property shall be entitled to receive compensation.
c) If an affected property is substantially developed, the current user may apply to receive
title to that property in exchange for payment of the value of that property without any
development.
d) Title to affected properties owned by institutions shall be transferred to the relevant
property authority in exchange for compensation.
e) Affected properties used for public purposes or required for military purposes shall be
expropriated by the Constituent State in which it is located in exchange for payment of
compensation.
f) Any purchaser, or his/her successor in title, of an affected property may apply to receive
title to that property. The dispossessed owner of such affected property shall be
compensated.
B- Exchange:
4
Current users of affected properties who are themselves dispossessed owners may apply to
the relevant property authority to receive title to such properties in exchange for title to the
affected properties of which they were dispossessed.
C- Reinstatement:
Affected properties which do not fall into the above categories (compensation and
exchange) shall be eligible for reinstatement. The following rules shall apply for such choice
of reinstatement to be exercised:
a. There shall be a ceiling for reinstatement. In either Constituent State, and in any
given municipality or village, affected properties eligible for reinstatement shall
be reinstated provided that specified percentages of the total land area and
number of residences are not exceeded.
b. Priority shall be given to applications for the reinstatement of dwellings.
Subject to the rules above (C-a and C-b), the choice of reinstatement can be
exercised in the following three different ways:
1- Reinstatement of a Dwelling:
i. A dispossessed owner, or his/her successor in title, shall be
entitled to reinstatement of a dwelling of which he/she was
dispossessed and in which he/she was living at the time of
dispossession. Right to reinstatement of a dwelling applies only in
case of those persons who are full-share owners. If such a
dwelling cannot be reinstated due to that dwelling not being
eligible for reinstatement, the dispossessed owner of that dwelling
shall be entitled to an alternative land of same size and value and
he/she shall be compensated for the building.
ii. Maximum size of the plot of the dwelling to be reinstated shall be
determined in accordance with provisions on plot size of the
development plan of the concerned area.
2- Reinstatement of Small Business Premises:

i. A dispossessed owner who is a natural person, or his/her
successor in title, shall be entitled to obtain reinstatement of
premises of one small business which he/she owned and
operated at the time of dispossession. Right to reinstatement of
small business premises applies only in case of those persons who
are full-share owners.
ii. Size of the land area of the property in question shall be limited
to what is required for the operation of the said business.
5
iii. Premises of businesses other than small businesses shall be dealt

with by a committee in the light of their particular qualities and
economic life.
3- Reinstatement of Land
i. A full-share dispossessed owner who is a natural person shall be
entitled to the reinstatement of a part of the entire original land of
which he/she was dispossessed as specified by the options below.
Implementation of this entitlement shall be restricted to the
following options1:
- maximum 1 plot of land or;
- maximum 2 donums of developmental
land or;
- maximum 3 donums of plantation land or;
- maximum 3 donums of irrigated land or;
- maximum 15 donums of dry land
ii. If a dispossessed owner cannot be reinstated such land of his/her
choice he/she is entitled to under provision (i) above due to that
land not being eligible for reinstatement, he/she shall be
reinstated an alternative piece of similar type of land, if possible,
within the administrative boundaries of the same village or
municipality.
Rule 3: If a dispossessed owner who has been allocated a property or a legal benefit by any
authority in Cyprus in exchange for title to his/her affected property, causes an unjust enrichment
by selling his/her affected property to a third person prior to the settlement, he/she shall be
obligated to compensate the purchaser after the settlement according to the law of the federation.
Rule 4: For the purposes of this paper;

- ‘Current user’ means a person who has been granted a form of right to use or occupy an affected
property by an authority under a legal or administrative process or any member of his/her family
who has a derivative right to use or occupy such property or his/her heir or successor in title;
- ‘Affected property’ means immovable property in Cyprus of which the owner, being a natural or legal
person, left or lost use and control as a consequence of inter-communal strife or military actions
taken place after 1963 and which has not since been reinstated to the dispossessed owner (or his/her
heirs). Affected property shall not include any property which was voluntarily sold, transferred or
1
Each Constituent State shall classify lands located in its territory on the basis of mutually agreed list of
criteria and spot them on a map.
6
otherwise permanently disposed of by the owner or by his/her heirs to a natural or legal person, or
for which compensation (in the form of alternative property or monetary compensation) in lieu of
property has been accepted (i.e. the cases settled by the Immovable Property Commission). It shall
not include disputed property either (such as Evkaf property).
- ‘Substantial improvement’ means any improvement (including any new construction on vacant land) to
an affected property which has the value of _______ specifically calculated unit.
- ‘Dispossessed owner’ means a natural or legal person who, at the time of dispossession, held a legal
interest in the affected property as owner or part owner, his/her legal heir, personal representative or
successor in title, including by gift.
- ‘Small Business’ means pastry shop, coffee shop, tailor, drapery, workshop, butcher, small shop,
restaurant, millinery, bakery, shoemaker, pension house (motel), grocery, furniture maker, carpenter,
various repair, and production workshops, offices used for various purposes, stores and similar
places.
- ‘Institutions’ means entities other than natural persons, including privately or publicly-owned or
controlled bodies, such as public or private trusts, religious institutions and companies.
7
RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP AND CRITERIA

FOR THE HANDLING OF AFFECTED PROPERTIES
A. Criteria
1. The right of ownership of all affected properties since 1963 is fully

recognized, as agreed in the working group on property.
2. The owners of affected properties, both natural and legal persons,

including their personal relatives or successors in title, by inheritance, gift,
purchase or any other legal ground, will be entitled to decide freely the
preferred remedy for their properties.
3. The options of the owners of affected properties will be a) reinstatement,

b) compensation (monetary or of any other form and c) exchange.
4. If the owner of an affected property consciously, voluntarily and freely

decides that he/she wishes to have his/her property fully or partially
reinstated, he/she will be able to exercise this option.
5. In the case of reinstatement the owner may choose either a) both the
legal and physical reinstatement, i.e. possession of the property in which
case he/she may use it for his/her own purposes, sell it, transfer it as a
donation, inheritance or any other way, or b) the legal reinstatement and
the leasing of the property for a fixed period of time.
6. The wish of the owner of an affected property has priority over the wish of
the current user, or any other person.
7. If the owner of an affected property opts for full reinstatement but wishes
to sell the property, to lease it, or rent it, then the current user will have
first priority for the purchase, lease, or rent of the affected property.
8. If the owner of an affected property knowingly and voluntarily chooses

the full or partial compensation instead of reinstatement of his/her property,
he/she will be able to exercise this option.
9. If the owner of an affected property concludes voluntarily and freely that

he/she chooses compensation, he/she will be fully and effectively
compensated in accordance with international standards, in exchange for the
transfer of title to the affected property to the Property Commission.
10. If the owner of an affected property chooses compensation and the

Property Commission goes ahead with the sale of the said property, the
8
current user, who is himself/herself a dispossessed owner, has the right of

first option for the purchase of the property.
11. If the owner of an affected property concludes freely and voluntarily that
he/she chooses to fully or partially exchange his/her property with another
property, he/she will be able to exercise that option.
12. Measures should be taken to protect current users, from arbitrary and
unlawful action.
13. In case the owner of an affected property chooses its legal and natural
reinstatement, the relocation of the current user will be carried out in a
manner that is compatible with international law and the relevant
international principles, such that the current users are afforded safeguards
of due process, including an opportunity for genuine consultation, adequate
and reasonable notice and the provision of legal remedies.
14. In case of reinstatement of an affected property and if the relocation of

the current user is considered unavoidable and justified and he/she does not
have the means to access any other adequate housing, then an alternative
accommodation will be identified and provided to such current user as a
means of facilitating the timely restitution of the property rights of the
owner. The above procedures shall be completed as soon as possible, within
a time period to be agreed.
15. If in the affected property there was a building at the time of

dispossession which has been subsequently demolished and the building’s
reinstatement is thus factually impossible, then the owner, if he/she so
wishes, will ask for reinstatement of the land on which the building was
erected and compensation for the value of the demolished building, or for
compensation for both.
16. If an affected property was an unimproved property when seized by the

current user and the latter improved it by building on it a house or other
building, then the dispossessed owner will be entitled to either a) have the
property reinstated to him/her, provided he/she pays to the current user the
value of the improvements or b) be paid appropriate compensation for the
property (as an unimproved property). In the latter case the current user
would have the first option to take ownership of the property provided that
he/she pays the compensation to the owner.
17. If the affected property had a building on it when occupied by the

current user, who subsequently demolished the original building and built a
new one on it, then the original owner of the property may a) request that
9
such property be reinstated to him/her after paying for the new building,
less the value of the old demolished building, or b) may request that the
current user acquire the property, provided that the latter pays
compensation for the value of the property, including the value of the
demolished building.
18. In case the affected property has been sold by the former current user
to a third party who is not a dispossessed owner (other current user), then
the dispossessed owner could either a) request that the property be
reinstated to him/her or b) request compensation for the value of the
property. I he/she chooses option a) then the third party would be entitled
to compensation for the value of the property, if he/she acted in good faith.
The compensation will be paid by the person who sold the property (the
former current user).
19. Any alleged confiscation, compulsory acquisition or requisition of

affected property is null and void, except compulsory acquisitions carried out
lawfully and for which provision was made for the payment of fair
compensation to the owner.
20. Affected properties which are used for genuine purposes of public
benefit, as it will be ascertained after an objective inquiry made by the
Property Commission, will not be reinstated but will be compensated, on the
basis of the current value of the property and valuation rules to be agreed.
The compensation is paid by the Federal Government, the federated unit, or
any other authority which has by law the power to compulsorily acquire
immovable property and in the name of which the property is transferred.
21. It is understood that Turkey will be expected to contribute a substantial

part of the compensation to be paid.
22. All churches, chapels, monasteries and other shrines as well as

cemeteries belonging to the Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church, as well
as to any other religious institution, which based on the territorial
adjustments to be agreed will be situated in the Turkish Cypriot federated
unit, shall be fully reinstated to their legitimate owners.
23. All mosques, tekke and other shrines as well as cemeteries belonging to
the foundation of the Vakf, which based on the territorial adjustments to be
agreed will be situated in the Greek Cypriot federated unit, shall be fully
reinstated to their legitimate owners.
10
24. All the above criteria applicable to natural and legal persons will apply to
any other immovable property owned by the autocephalous Greek Orthodox
Church of Cyprus, Evkaf and any other religious institutions in Cyprus.
B. Further guidelines for the handling of affected properties
1. Problematic properties: Special criteria will be agreed for properties the

tenure of which is problematic, due to their small size and/or the existence
of a large number of co-owners or for any other similar reason.
2. Unclaimed properties: Special criteria will be agreed for properties which

are not claimed by any owner, within an agreed time frame from the
establishment of the Property Commission or, if claimed, no ownership rights
have been established.
C. Procedural matters
1. A Property Commission will be established, in which both sides will

participate equally, which will decide on the handling of affected properties,
according to the agreed principles and criteria.
2. The owners of affected properties will be ascertained by the Commission

by examining the authentic original land registers and records of 1974.
These original authentic registers of 1974 constitute conclusive evidence of
ownership. Any alterations made to them, after 1974, will not be taken into
account.
3. A Property Court will be established for dealing, inter alia, with appeals
against decisions of the Property Commission.
12/2/2009
11
Page 1 of 2
From: Obinna Okamgba/NY/UNO


Subject: Fw: Cyprus Ambassador's comments to the advance copy of the Cyprus report
----- Forwarded by Obinna Okamgba/NY/UNO on 03/03/2009 09:56 AM -----
Frederike ToObinna
Jansonius/UNCHR/UN@UNCHR Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ
ccMargaret
24/02/2009 01:23 PM Nicholson/UNCHR/UN@UNCHR,
Agnes
Picod/UNCHR/UN@UNCHR,
Richard
Lapper/UNCHR/UN@UNCHR
SubjectCyprus Ambassador's
comments to the advance copy
of the Cyprus report
Dear Obinna,
Many thanks for returning my call. As I mentioned on the phone, the advance copy of the Cyprus report
was shared yesterday with the Turkish and Cypriot missions in Geneva (as per normal procedure). This
morning, we received a call from the Cyprus Ambassador, who objected to a particular sentence in the
report, in paragraph 6.
This paragraph describes the institutional environment of CSOs operating in the North (in particular
mentioning a "TRNC" law governing CSOs). The relevant sentence reads: "Furthermore, the relevant
law governing CSOs prohibits those who are not citizens of the northern part of Cyprus from becoming
members." The Ambassador has asked that the word "citizens" be removed.
As such, we would suggest that the sentence be re-phrased as following: "Furthermore, the relevant law
governing CSOs prohibits those who are not considered by the de facto authorities to be citizens of
the northern part of Cyprus from becoming members." We would be most grateful for DPA's guidance
on the matter. The report is currently on hold (it is with the document processing unit), but there is some
urgency considering that the Human Rights Council session begins next week.
Please find attached the advance copy of the report, as shared with the missions, as well as a copy of the
report, as cleared by the EOSG.
Page 2 of 2
With many thanks for your assistance, and please don't hesitate to call if you need any additional
information.
Frederike Jansonius
Associate Human Rights Officer
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Tel: +41 (0) 22 928 9691
Fax:+41 (0) 22 928 9005
fjansonius@ohchr.org
Attachments:
Advance copy shared with the Missions, 23 Feb
Report cleared on behalf of the SG.pdf
2009.doc
Advance copy shared with the Missions, 23 Feb 2009.doc
UNITED ADVANCE EDITED VERSION

NATIONS A
General Assembly Distr.
GENERAL
A/HRC/10/37
20 February 2009
Original: ENGLISH
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

Tenth session
Agenda item 2
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER

FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND REPORTS OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the question
of human rights in Cyprus
Note by the Secretary-General*
In its decision 2/102, the Human Rights Council requested the Secretary-General and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to “continue with the fulfilment of their
activities, in accordance with all previous decisions adopted by the Commission on Human
Rights and to update the relevant reports and studies”. The Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) understands decision 2/102 to preserve the previous
annual reporting cycle in respect of this issue until otherwise decided by the Council. On the
question of human rights in Cyprus, a comprehensive annual report (A/HRC/7/46) was submitted
to the Council at its seventh session in March 2008.
*
Late submission.
A/HRC/10/37
page 2
The annex to the present report, prepared by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, is herewith transmitted to the Council. It covers the period up
to 20 December 2008 and provides an overview of human rights issues in Cyprus based on such
information as is available. For the purpose of this report, in the absence of an OHCHR field
presence in Cyprus, or of any specific monitoring mechanism, OHCHR relied on a variety of
sources with particular knowledge of the human rights situation on the island.
A/HRC/10/37
page 3
Annex
REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE QUESTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CYPRUS
I. Overview
1. As of December 2008, Cyprus remains divided, with a buffer zone maintained by the
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The UNFICYP mandate, which
dates back to 1964, has been extended by successive Security Council resolutions. In resolution
1847 (2008), the Security Council decided to extend the mandate for a further period ending 15
June 2009.
II. Human rights concerns
2. The persisting division of Cyprus has consequences in relation to a number of human

rights issues on the whole island, including freedom of movement, property rights, human
rights pertaining to the question of missing persons, discrimination, freedom of religion, the
right to education, human trafficking, and economic rights.
3. With regard to freedom of movement, UNFICYP has recorded approximately 16.5

million crossings since the opening of the four crossing points in 2003.1 The highly symbolic
opening of the Ledra Street crossing point on 3 April 2008 has translated into an important
confidence-building factor which has had a significant positive impact on contacts between the
two communities, as illustrated by the increased number of crossings since its opening.2 In the
context of the new process aimed at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem,
although no agreement has yet been reached on the opening of additional crossing points, the
leaders of the two communities, Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, requested their
respective representatives to consider opening Limnitis/Yeúilirmak and other crossing points
during a meeting on 25 July 2008.3
1
This refers to the Ledra, Pergamos, Strovilia and Ayios Dometios/Metehan crossing points that were opened in April and
May 2003, as noted in the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/2003/572), para. 9.
The figure does not include crossings in Pergamos since 1 September 2006, when the Turkish Cypriot side discontinued
sharing statistics on the movement of people at that crossing.
2
S/2008/353, paras. 15 and 24.
3
S/2008/744, paras. 7 and 8.
A/HRC/10/37
page 4
4. Restrictions on freedom of movement persist, in particular with regard to a number of
villages located in the military zones in the northern part of the island. Since the last reporting
period, there has been no positive change in relation to increased access to the Maronite
villages of Ayia Marina and Asomatos. Restrictions of movement imposed upon UNFICYP by
the Turkish forces reportedly have a negative impact on the delivery of its mandated
humanitarian tasks in the northern part of the island.4
5. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including grass-roots organizations, continue

to lead the organization and implementation of bicommunal activities, often with the support of
donor organizations. They are also playing an important role in the renewed peace process,
with representatives of civil society from both communities appointed to a number of the
technical committees which seek to find immediate solutions to everyday problems arising
from the division of the island. In an effort to reduce the bureaucratic obstacles hampering the
work of NGOs, as noted by Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Thomas
Hammarberg in a report on his recent visit to the Republic of Cyprus, the Government of the
Republic of Cyprus has engaged in a process to explore the reform of the legal framework in
which NGOs operate.5 Although a process still to be completed, this has involved learning
from the good practices of other countries, promoting capacity building for civil servants and
civil society organizations (CSOs), and creating dialogue amongst interested stakeholders on
the reforms that need to take place. A Joint Cross-sector Advisory/Working Group has also
been established, which has met regularly during the year under the auspices of the Planning
Bureau, with representatives from both the Government and CSOs/NGOs.6
6. With regard to CSOs operating in the north of the island, although the procedure for
establishing civil society organizations is reportedly simple and inexpensive, registration is not
voluntary, and all categories of such organizations are obliged to register themselves.
Furthermore, the relevant law governing CSOs prohibits those who are not citizens of the
northern part of Cyprus from becoming members.7 Having encountered difficulties in forming
registered legal platforms and networks due to the lack of necessary legal infrastructure, civil
4
Ibid., paras. 21 and 46.
5
Council of Europe, CommDH(2008)36, para. 54.
6
Information received from the United Nations Development Programme, Action for Cooperation and Trust in Cyprus.
7
Civil society organizations in the northern part of Cyprus are governed by the “Law on unions and associations of the
Turkish Communal Chamber (No 6/1961)”, which was amended on 22 January 1991 by the “Amendment on the Law on
unions and associations of the Turkish Communal Chamber.” Article 1 reads: “All types of unions, associations and such
organizations that are formed by members who are citizens of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, for a purpose other
than profit making, are subject to this law.” (Information received from the Management Centre of the Mediterranean.)
A/HRC/10/37
page 5
society organizations in the north have themselves submitted a new draft law for associations,
in an attempt to bring the current regulation in line with international standards and best
practices. The European Union (EU) has also launched its Cypriot Civil Society in Action II
programme, a grant scheme which aims to strengthen and develop a more vibrant civil society
in the Turkish Cypriot community and to foster trust, dialogue and cooperation between the
two communities.
7. In the context of law enforcement, particularly in relation to trafficking in human

beings, the Political Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe notes that organized criminals involved in these activities are able to benefit from the
lack of contact and cooperation between the law enforcement agencies from both sides.8 There
is some concern about trafficking in human beings, in particular trafficking of women for
sexual exploitation, as was noted by Mr. Hammarberg in his report.9
8. With regard to complaints of discrimination made by the Turkish Cypriot community in

Limassol reported last year and principally related to the lack of social services, adequate
housing and the difficulty in obtaining identity documents, a committee comprising
representatives from different local authorities, including welfare, municipal, education and
housing offices, has meanwhile been established in order to improve the coordination of
welfare action directed to Turkish Cypriots in the south.10 The bicommunal social centre
established by the municipality of Limassol to address some of these concerns continues to
function. Members of the Turkish Cypriot community living in the south, among them Roma,
particularly in Limassol and Paphos, have however continued to seek UNFICYP facilitation in
obtaining identity documents, housing, welfare services, medical care, and employment.11
9. As in previous years, property rights remain an issue of concern, and property disputes
continue to be brought before the European Court of Human Rights (the Court). Meanwhile,
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe continues to supervise execution of the
judgments of the landmark property cases brought before the Court. On 4 December 2008, the
Committee adopted an interim resolution on Xenides-Arestis v Turkey, the pilot case dealing
8
Report on the situation in Cyprus, Political Affairs Committee, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, 12 September
2008, doc 11699, para. 48.
9
CommDH(2008)36, paras. 32-33.
10
A/HRC/7/46, para. 8.
11
S/2008/744, para. 30.
A/HRC/10/37
page 6
with the issue of displaced persons and violation of their property rights in the north.12
Concerning the payment of just satisfaction, the Committee of Ministers strongly insisted that
Turkey pay the applicant the sums awarded in the judgment of the European Court of 7
December 2006. Also in relation to the issue of the property rights of displaced persons, and in
reference to the Cyprus v Turkey (2001) case, the Committee reiterated their insistent invitation
to the Turkish authorities to reply to their questions relating to the execution of the judgment of
the Court.13
10. Regarding the Cyprus v Turkey (2001) case, the Committee further noted with
satisfaction that according to the explanations given by the Turkish authorities, the restrictions
regarding the property rights of the Greek Cypriots departing definitively from the northern
part of Cyprus, as well as the inheritance rights of persons living in the southern part in respect
of property of deceased Greek Cypriots in the northern part, had been limited. In particular, the
Turkish authorities have indicated that the obligation for heirs to start the procedure for
administration of their estates situated in the north within a time limit of a year from the date of
the death of their relative has been abolished.14
11. In the case of Loizidou v Turkey (1996), where the Court ruled that the applicant
remained the legal owner of her property situated in the north of Cyprus, despite having lost
control thereof due to lack of access, the Committee of Ministers noted that a first reading of
the additional information provided by the Turkish authorities about the offer made to the
applicant with regard to her property showed that this offer is in compliance with “law No.
67/2005 for the compensation, exchange or restitution of immovable property.” This law
established a compensation and restitution mechanism in the northern part of Cyprus following
the judgment of the European Court of 22 December 2005 in the case of Xenides-Arestis v
Turkey. Recalling that all the relevant issues of the effectiveness of this mechanism had not
been addressed in detail by the European Court so far, the Committee decided to resume
consideration of this case at the latest at its June 2009 meeting.15
12
Interim resolution CM/ResDH(2008)99.
13
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Ministers’ Deputies’ decisions, 1043rd (DH) meeting, 2-4 December 2008.
14
Regarding cases of definitive departure from the north, according to information received by the Committee of Ministers, a
new decision was adopted by the Turkish Cypriot authorities which stipulates that Greek Cypriots who reside in Karpas
would continue to enjoy their property after their departure, as long as they maintain “minimal contacts with their property/or
ties with the Karpas society.” The Committee of Ministers is awaiting further information and clarification on this matter,
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Ministers’ Deputies’ decisions, 1043rd (DH) meeting, 2-4 December 2008,
public notes on the Cyprus v Turkey case, 25781/94.
15
See footnote 13.
A/HRC/10/37
page 7
12. As for the Orams v Apostolides case, which was referred to the European Court of
Justice for a preliminary ruling on 13 September 2007, both parties have presented their cases
and are now awaiting the judgment of the Court.
13. Considering the need to ensure respect of ownership rights, also in cases where
properties remain unoccupied, reports regarding the ongoing demolition of Greek Cypriot
houses in the north raise concern. These include demolitions carried out in the village of
Kondemenos in Kyrenia without the consent of the Greek Cypriot owners of the properties.16
With regard to the demolition since April 2007 of several houses situated in the Karpas region
belonging to displaced persons, and taking into account the reply received from the Turkish
authorities that such measures are aimed at ensuring public security, the Committee of
Ministers is seeking clarification on the procedure followed by the Turkish authorities and the
concrete remedies available to owners wishing to challenge demolition and to obtain
compensation, if appropriate.17 Concerns continue to be received from the Government of the
Republic of Cyprus regarding the trend towards increased construction on the Turkish Cypriot
side, as reported last year.18 The situation in Varosha remains unchanged.
14. Concerning Turkish Cypriot property south of the buffer zone, the applicable law
continues to place constraints on the return or compensation of the property of any Turkish
Cypriots whose “usual residence” is outside the Republic of Cyprus.19
15. The Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) has continued to work on its project on the
exhumation, identification and return of remains of missing persons. As of November 2008,
the remains of 455 individuals had been exhumed from sites on both sides of the buffer zone
by the Committee’s bicommunal teams of scientists. The remains of more than 292 missing
persons have undergone examination at the Committee’s bicommunal anthropological
laboratory in the United Nations Protected Area in Nicosia. Following DNA genetic analysis,
the remains of 105 individuals have been returned to their respective families. In October 2008,
following a training period which lasted more than two years, full operational responsibility for
running the Committee’s anthropological laboratory was handed over to a bicommunal team of
16
S/2008/353, para. 27.
17
See footnote 14 above.
18
A/HRC/7/46, para. 12.
19
Law including interim provisions with regard to the administration of Turkish Cypriot properties in the Republic and other
related issues.
A/HRC/10/37
page 8
Cypriot scientists. This was the culmination of the capacity-building and local ownership
dimension of the Committee’s project.20
16. The Committee will resume further investigations into the fate of the missing persons
as soon as it is in a position to do so. The Secretary-General has noted his gratitude that the
CMP continues its humanitarian work unhindered and in a depoliticized manner, and urged all
parties concerned to take every possible action in order to speed up the exhumation process.21
17. In relation to the Cyprus v Turkey case, the Committee of Ministers reiterated its
evident interest for the work of the CMP, reaffirmed the need for the Turkish authorities to take
additional measures to ensure that the effective investigations required by the judgment are
carried out, and urged them to provide without further delay information on the concrete means
envisaged to achieve this result.22 In the case of Varnava and others v Turkey of 10 January
2008, the Court recalled its previous finding that, whatever its humanitarian usefulness, the
CMP did not provide procedures sufficient to meet the standard of an effective investigation
into the fate of nine of the applicants who disappeared in life-threatening circumstances, as
required by article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. While the remains of one
of the applicants, Savvas Hadjipanteli, had recently been discovered, that did not demonstrate
that the CMP had been able to take any meaningful steps beyond the belated location and
identification of remains. This judgment is not final, as the case has been referred to the Grand
Chamber, where it is currently pending.
18. History books used both in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot education systems
remain, although to varying degrees, focused on their respective ethnic identity and history. A
publication on the comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot schoolbooks by the
International Peace Research Institute notes that although some general weaknesses remain, the
publication of three new Turkish Cypriot history textbooks in 2004 (revised in 2005) has led to
a significant convergence with the principles set out in the Council of Europe Recommendation
(2001) 15 on history teaching in twenty-first century Europe. An additional four history
textbooks have since been published for secondary schools. History textbooks used by the
Republic of Cyprus have yet to be revised in accordance with the principles therein.23 The
20
S/2008/744, para. 39 and 40.
21
S/2008/353, para. 37 and S/2008/744, para. 41.
22
See footnote 13 above.
23
Yiannis Papadakis, “Narrative, memory and history education in divided Cyprus. A comparison of schoolbooks on the
"History of Cyprus”, History and Memory, vol. 20, No. 2 (2008), p. 128.
A/HRC/10/37
page 9
Education Minister of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has stated that the revision of
history books and history education is one of his main priorities within the wider reform of the
Greek Cypriot education system.24
19. In relation to the right to education of Greek Cypriots living in the north, the
elementary and secondary Greek Cypriot schools in Rizokarpaso continue to function, ensuring
full elementary and secondary education for Greek Cypriot children. There are some concerns
regarding the appointment procedures of academic staff. In his report of November 2008, the
Secretary-General noted that UNFICYP continues to facilitate the appointment of teachers to
both schools, and that of the fourteen teachers and other academic staff appointed for the
current academic year, eight have been denied permission to teach. No reason was provided by
the Turkish Cypriot side for the denial of the appointments.25
20. Turkish Cypriot students still face a lack of access to EU exchange and educational
programmes due to the non-recognition by the Republic of Cyprus of the universities in the
north. While facilitation by the Cypriot National Youth Agency continues to allow for the
participation of a very small number of Turkish Cypriots in the European Union Youth
Programme, students do not have access to the Lifelong Learning Programme of the EU. The
European Commission has unsuccessfully urged the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to
take a more flexible approach to the issue of the participation of Turkish Cypriots in this
programme. To compensate for the lack of mobility that would be offered by the Erasmus
programme, the Commission has, under the EU aid programme, set up a community
scholarship scheme for the Turkish Cypriot community, allowing students and teachers to
spend one year abroad at an EU university or higher education institution.26
21. There have been no further developments on the establishment of a Turkish-language

primary school in Limassol, to which the Greek Cypriot side had committed in March 2005.
On 26 March 2008, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Cyprus rejected the lawsuit filed by
the Cyprus Turkish Teachers’ Trade Union, arguing that the Republic of Cyprus had made
adequate provisions for the education of Turkish-speaking children through the existing school
system and citing the lack of interest from the Turkish-speaking community in Limassol.27
24
Circular distributed to all state schools on 27 August 2008, entitled “Targets for School Year 2008-2009.”
25
S/2008/744, para. 29.
26
Information received from the Task Force for the Turkish Cypriot Community, Directorate-General for Enlargement,
European Commission.
27
S/2008/353, para. 28 and S/2008/744, para. 31.
A/HRC/10/37
page 10
22. The preservation, protection and physical restoration of the cultural heritage on the
island is being discussed within the framework of the ongoing negotiations towards a
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. With regard to freedom of movement and
worship, the two sides have yet to agree on the modalities to allow free access to sites and
icons of religious and cultural significance. They continue to seek UNFICYP facilitation.
Concerns remain over obstruction to access to religious sites and commemorative events, as
was the case in September 2008, when the Turkish Cypriot side denied use of the
Limnits/Yeúilirmak crossing point to members of the Greek Cpyriot community of Kato
Pyrgos who wished to attend the planned annual prayers at Ayios Mamas church.28
23. There continue to be issues between the two communities in the area of economic
rights. Although the EU aid programme for the Turkish Cypriot community, which seeks to
encourage economic development in the northern part of the island, has continued, its
implementation faces challenges, inter alia in relation to cooperation between the Turkish
Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities.29 The regulation proposed by the European
Commission on special conditions for trade with those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in
which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control (the
“direct trade regulation”) is still pending adoption in the Council of Ministers of the European
Union.
III. Conclusion
24. The persisting de facto partition of the island of Cyprus continues to constitute an
obstacle to the enjoyment of human rights. It is hoped that the new momentum to achieve a
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem will provide avenues to improve the human
rights situation on the island, and that relevant stakeholders will actively contribute to
achieving enhanced human rights protection and promotion.
-----
28
S/2008/744, paras. 34 and 35.
29
Second Annual Report 2007 on the implementation of Community assistance under Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006
of 27 February 2006 establishing an instrument of financial support for encouraging the economic development of the
Turkish Cypriot community. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2008)
551 final.
Page 1 of 3


Subject: Fw: Cyprus Ambassador's comments to the advance copy of the Cyprus report
Fyi
-----Forwarded by Kendra Collins/NY/UNO on 02/25/2009 08:48PM -----
To: Frederike Jansonius/UNCHR/UN@UNCHR

From: Kendra Collins/NY/UNO
Date: 02/25/2009 06:37PM
cc: Elizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Kayoko
Gotoh/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Astrid Melchner/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Alexandra
Pichler/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Margaret Nicholson/UNCHR/UN@UNCHR, Agnes
Picod/UNCHR/UN@UNCHR, Richard Lapper/UNCHR/UN@UNCHR
Subject: Re: Fw: Cyprus Ambassador's comments to the advance copy of the
Cyprus report
Dear Frederike,
Further to your request for advice, we would recommend that the sentence in question be
amended to the following:
" Furthermore, the law applied to CSOs in the northern part of Cyprus would appear to restrict
membership in such organizations".
We note that the report has already been cleared by the EOSG but, in the interest of time, are
sending this suggestion directly to you, with a copy to EOSG for their attention.
With best regards

Kendra
Kendra Collins
Senior Political Affairs Officer
Americas and Europe Division
United Nations
Tel: (917) 367 5469
Page 2 of 3
e-mail: collinsk@un.org
Obinna Okamgba/NY/UNO
----- Forwarded by Obinna Okamgba/NY/UNO on 25/02/2009 05:57 PM -----

Frederike To
Jansonius/UNCHR/UN@UNCHR Obinna
Okamg
24/02/2009 01:23 PM cc
Margare
Nichols
Agnes
Picod/U
Richard
Lapper/
Subject
Cyprus
comme
of the C
Dear Obinna,
Many thanks for returning my call. As I mentioned on the phone, the advance copy of the Cyprus
report was shared yesterday with the Turkish and Cypriot missions in Geneva (as per normal
procedure). This morning, we received a call from the Cyprus Ambassador, who objected to a
particular sentence in the report, in paragraph 6.
This paragraph describes the institutional environment of CSOs operating in the North (in particular
mentioning a "TRNC" law governing CSOs). The relevant sentence reads: "Furthermore, the relevant
law governing CSOs prohibits those who are not citizens of the northern part of Cyprus from
becoming members." The Ambassador has asked that the word "citizens" be removed.
As such, we would suggest that the sentence be re-phrased as following: "Furthermore, the relevant
law governing CSOs prohibits those who are not considered by the de facto authorities to be
citizens of the northern part of Cyprus from becoming members." We would be most grateful for
DPA's guidance on the matter. The report is currently on hold (it is with the document processing
unit), but there is some urgency considering that the Human Rights Council session begins next week.
Please find attached the advance copy of the report, as shared with the missions, as well as a copy of
the report, as cleared by the EOSG.
With many thanks for your assistance, and please don't hesitate to call if you need any additional
information.
Frederike Jansonius
Associate Human Rights Officer
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Tel: +41 (0) 22 928 9691
Page 3 of 3
Fax:+41 (0) 22 928 9005

fjansonius@ohchr.org
Attachments:
Advance copy shared with the Missions, 23 Feb
Report cleared on behalf of the SG.pdf
2009.doc
Page 1 of 1


Subject: Mr HvH and Annan Plan
Dear Alexander,
I had a phone conversation with Mr. Van Houtte, who explained that during the Annan Plan phase
he was contacted by a Dutch official to enquire if he was available to be one of the candidates to
the proposed constitutional court or the property claims commission. He pointed out that he had
no written evidence of being on a short list and that he heard nothing anymore about this since
the Annan Plan failed.
He also mentioned that he went to Antalya once on a conference to give a talk on the Bosnian
experience of property restitution.
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 1
From: Donatella Giubilaro/NY/UNO

To: mcgarryj@queensu.ca
cc: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: From GCexperts
John,
The two GkCyp experts, Mavrommatis and Tsielepis, approached me while the leaders where in
their tête-à-tête. The two experts gave me (dictated) the attached text. It is the same scenario
discussed in the meeting with you but they said they wished to clarify and confirm it, stressing
that the scenario must have two rounds. I confirmed that the two-rounds scenario was your
understanding of what discussed.
It might good if you send Mavrommatis and Tsielepis a message acknowledging the text. I
beleive their demarche is a good way to keep the contact open.
Mavrommatis and Tsielepis did not add any information. So I could not understand if they wanted
to clarify the two-rounds scenario as follow-up to the meeting with you or as feedback of the
meetings you had with Claire Palley or at University of Nicosia.
The text is attached. Donatella
Attachments:
Given by Mavrommatis and Tsielepis.doc
Given by Mavrommatis and Tsielepis
Voting for the executive. Possible scenario: Two rounds
1st round
Both candidates shall be elected separately by universal suffrage, the GkCyp voters,
however, voting for the TkCyp candidate being weight so that they form the same
percentage of the total vote as the TkCyp voters in the election of the GkCyp candidate.
2nd round
A 2nd round election should follow exactly as Prof. John McGarry proposed in his second
option. The top two candidates from each community shall enter a second round in which
they would each have to find a partner from the other community (a joint ticket). The
winning ticket would be that which won a concurrent majority in both federated
units/constituent states or, failing that, the ticket that won a majority of the voters with
the TkCyp vote weight at the 30% (or whatever other amount is agreed).
Page 1 of 3

To: <Andrew.RASBASH@ec.europa.eu>@UN-MAILHUB

Yes, we meet with Alain and his team. Very much looking forward to meeting you.
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
<Andrew.RASBASH@ec.europa.eu>
<Andrew.RASBASH@ec.europa.eu> To<bachmanns@un.org>
cc<alchin@un.org>,
03/03/2009 03:44 AM <Georg.ZIEGLER@ec.euro
<Alain.BOTHOREL@ec.eur
SubjectRE: Text on EU dimension
future settlement
Sonja
I'll be there on Tuesday and Wednesday. Alain Bothorel (head of our programme team in Cyprus whom I think you
met) is arranging my programme and I'd ask him to contact your office directly.
Best regaards
Andrew
To: RASBASH Andrew (ELARG)
Cc: alchin@un.org; ZIEGLER Georg (ELARG)
Dear Andrew,
request for courtesy meeting is noted. Which days exactly are you there?
cheers, Sonja
Page 2 of 3
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
<Andrew.RASBASH@ec.europa.eu> To
<bachmanns@un.org>, <alchin@un.org>
cc
<Georg.ZIEGLER@ec.europa.eu>
02/03/2009 12:32 PM SubjectRE: Text on EU dimension of a future settlemen
Sonja, Tim
I will be in Cyprus next week and will ask for a courtesy call to Mr Downer.
I'll be happy to go over any of the issues in Georg's excellent paper - but would appreciate
advance warning….
Best regards
Andrew Rasbash
From: ZIEGLER Georg (ELARG)
To: 'Sonja Bachmann'
Cc: 'Timothy Alchin'; RASBASH Andrew (ELARG)
<< File: 080327 ziegler (2).doc >> Dear Sonja,
Further to our talk I am sending you a text based on a public speech in Cyprus. It dates back to
2007. The text has been published - so no secrets. As said in the disclaimer it does not
necessarily represent the view of the Commission but reflects my personal views.
In the annex you find the famous "Act of Adaptation" as well as Protocol 10 and excerpts from
European Council conclusions on Cyprus before 2004.
The text may help deepening the understanding of some of the issues reappearing in the current
negotiations.
Georg
Page 3 of 3
Page 1 of 1

To: alexander.downer@adelaide.edu, zerihount@comcast.net, Elizabeth
Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Kendra
Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Obinna Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ, ysabra@msn.com
Date: Wednesday, March 04, 2009 12:48AM

Subject: Meeting read-out with the Tk representative
Huseyin M. from the Tk mission came to see us today and raised following issues:
- Amb. Ilkin spoke to BLP voicing concern about any UN presence at the CEPS conference in
Brussels on 6/7 April. He reiterated the Tk position on the Guarantees as a sine qua non. LV
mentioned that it was an 'academic' meeting. The UN had attended such meetings in the past.
Their concerns, however, would be conveyed to the UN participants. Huseyin underlined that it
would be important to be in 'listening mode' and he hoped that the discussions would remain
academic and not be 'blessed' by the UN.
- He mentioned the recent leak of negotiating positions, despite assurances by the parties to
keep confidentiality. He also mentioned an article by G. Iacovou (attached) which also appeared
in the Lebanon "Daily Star" and questioned the timing of the appearance of the article.
- He voiced Tk reservations on the EC liaison officer as a person paid "indirectly" by the GkCyps.
LV reiterated the position of the EU that they would "accomodate a settlement" and that the GO
needed a person knowledgeable about EC law. The person would be advising Mr. Downer and
serve as a liaison officer, as required.
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Attachments:
SDOC7754.pdf
Page 1 of 1

To: Celine Moyroud <celine.moyroud@undp.org>@UN-MAILHUB
cc: "collinsk@un.org" <collinsk@un.org>, Jaco Cilliers <jaco.cilliers@undp.org>, Parviz
Fartash <parviz.fartash@undp.org>, Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja

Subject: Re: draft terms of reference - Cyprus
Dear Colleagues,
Please find attached the draft ToRs for the proposed PDA for Cyprus. The attached draft includes
some comments from OSASG and the Cyprus desk here in NYC.
Best
Obinna
Celine Moyroud <celine.moyroud@undp.org>
Celine Moyroud To"collinsk@un.org" <collinsk@un.o

<celine.moyroud@undp.org> Fartash <parviz.fartash@undp.org
Medina
28/01/2009 12:50 PM <claire.medina@undp.org>, "bac
<bachmanns@un.org>, "okamgb
<okamgba@un.org>
ccJaco Cilliers <jaco.cilliers@undp.o
Kumar <chetan.kumar@undp.org
Subjectdraft terms of reference - Cyprus
Dear Colleagues,
As discussed yesterday.
With best wishes,

Celine[attachment "Peace and Development Advisor Draft - Cyprus 280108 (2).doc" deleted by Obinna
Okamgba/NY/UNO]
Attachments:
Peace and Development Advisor Draft - Cyprus ( incorp. OSASG and ED suggestions).doc
Page 1 of 1

To: Alexander DOWNER/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Taye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ@UN-MAILHUB@UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICS BASE,
cc: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Steven Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Date: Wednesday, March 04, 2009 04:55PM

Subject: Notes of Leaders meeting on property 25 February 2009
Dear All,
Please find attached notes of Leaders meeting on property 25 February 2009.
Best regards,
Julie
Attachments:
Note on mtg Leaders 25-02-09.doc
Summary note of meeting of Mssrs. Christofias and Talat

Hosted by SRSG Zerihoun at UNDP compound (UNPA)
Wednesday, 25 February 2009
Present:
H.E. Mr. Dimitris Christofias H.E. Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat

Mr. George Iacovou, Representative Mr. Ozdil Nami, Representative
Mr. Andreas Mavrommatis (expert) Mr. Kudret Ozersay (expert)
Mr. Toumazos Tsielepis (expert) Mr. Tufan Erhurman (expert)
Ms. Erato Kozakou Marcoullis (expert) Mr. Hasan Findik (expert)
Mr. Andreas Symeou (expert) Mr. Serden Hoça (expert)
Mr. Menelaos Menelaou (note taker) Mr. Mehmet Dana (note taker)
Mr. Nikos Moudouros (interpreter) Ms. Asli Erkmen (note taker)
SRSG Taye-Brook Zerihoun

Mr. Yasser Sabra, Good Offices
Mr. Steven Bourke, Good Offices (note taker)
Mr. Tim Alchin, UNFICYP
Summary of discussion
The Leaders presented response papers to the papers on Criteria presented on 12

February. The discussion focused on whether the rights of the original owner would
trump those of the user to have the last say (GkCyp position) versus the rights of
current users being safeguarded for the sake of social stability and redistributive
justice (TkCyp). GkCyp experts distinguished between the recognition of rights and
the regulation of the exercise of those rights. The leaders agreed to meet again on 5
March to have a final discussion on property for the time being, moving on to EU
matters thereafter.
Details
1. The Leaders had a one hour and forty-five minute tête-à-tête.
2. Upon their return, Iacovou read the GkCyp response paper to the TkCyp paper on
criteria (attached). Talat observed that the GkCyp response paper fully rejected all TkCyp
points on criteria. Christofias stated that GkCyps were upholding principles. Talat
inquired whether a GkCyp compensated by the Immoveable Property Commission (IPC)
in the north would be compensated again under a new property regime and thereby be
paid twice. Christofias indicated that he did not recognize the IPC. Talat stated that the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) viewed the situation differently, referring to
test cases pending before the ECHR. He stated that Christofias’ understanding of
international law was at variance with the ECHR’s. He also stated that the negotiations
were “political” and that Christofias’ legalism ran counter to the spirit of a political
negotiation. Christofias maintained that he was presenting valid counter-proposals to
those of the TkCyps. UN previous plans were not valid and that starting from affected
properties in 1963 a new approach to a property settlement was required. The fait
accompli of Turkish intervention and the subsequent distribution of GkCyp properties
could not be accepted as a basis for negotiating a settlement.
3. Erhurman, asked if the approach being taken in the GkCyp response paper
considered the sui generis and exceptional status of the Cyrpus situation, or whether
GkCyps would approach a settlement on the grounds that Cyprus was a “normal”
country. Christofias insisted that he could not accept a fait accompli. The original owner
had to be able to express a choice. Talat stated that the original owner would be able to
express a preference but that it should fall to a property board to decide. Mavrommatis
distinguished between the validation or restoration of violated rights, and the regulation
of the exercise of individual rights. Marcoullis stressed the the rights of the original
owner, but noted that GkCyps were conceding in cases of properties which were
compulsorily acquired for educational, infrastructural and medical purposes. There was a
need to uphold rights and then work out the form of redress.
4. Talat inquired into the GkCyp rejection of the TkCyp distinction between “real”
and “legal” persons. The emotional ties between individual and corporate or institutional
ownership were different. Christofias rejected the distinction. Talat stated that many
mistakes had been made in the past. The granting of title under Denktash however had
been necessary as only the collateral of property would allow TkCyps to engage in
economic activity. Christofias stated that Denktash’s actions were “criminal.” Talat again
stated that the negotiations at hand were political. An exchange ensued regarding the
relevance of past UN proposals, on the one hand, and the need for UN precedent and a
recognized framework, on the other. In response, Talat stated that Makarios had
confiscated TkCyp properties in 1963 and 1964 for GkCyp “military purposes.”
Christofias said he would revert. Nami stated that a middle ground was needed.
Christofias stated that a legal view of of bi-zonality was required, rather than TkCyp
interpretation. Nami stated that if TkCyps were told that GkCyps had the primary right to
decide on the restitution of properties, the TkCyps would vote no in a referendum.
5. Nami read the TkCyp response paper to the GkCyp paper on criteria (attached).
An exchange followed during which Talat implied that Christofias appeared to be on a
path of “religious conversion.” Christofias stated that GkCyps had ties to the Church and
that the properties of the Church were consequently a high priority. Talat pointed to the
fact that TkCyps had agreed to the restitution of places of religious worship [note: but
limited return of land around]. Christofias indicated that there was more than the church
building at stake.
6. Stating that he wished to qualify a position made during the previous meeting,
Christofias stated that not only Turkey needed to pay, but others were also culpable.
Greece, through the coup of 15 July 1974, had brought Turkey to Cyprus. Therefore
Greece should also pay. Others had also interfered in the internal affairs of Cyprus.
“Many must pay.” An international donor conference would be of high priority.
7. Nami read a TkCyp proposal for a property commission (attached). Nami

indicated that it was a bridging proposal in that the two property boards for each
constituent state under a federal property commission could operate at a federal level.
Christofias stated that he did not understand the need for the subdivision. Talat stated that
the need derived from the particularity of the realities found in both communities, but that
the aim was also primarily a pragmatic one, namely to lead to a more expeditious
process. Ozersay also stressed that the boards would, while established at the federal
level, be fully independent. Marcoullis stated that the core question was the location of
the decision-making power. It was key, from her perspective, that the decision-making be
centralized. [note: the TkCyp proposal foresees that a TkCyp would retain a casting vote
to rule on cases of dispute in its constituent state, and vice versa.] Symeou gave instances
where without centralization the process would prove too disorganized.
8. Marcoullis and Mavrommatis indicated again that a full TkCyp recognition of

individual rights would enable GkCyps to adopt a more flexible approach to the
regulation of the exercise of individual rights.
9. Talat read an excerpt from a response paper to the GkCyp comments on the
TkCyp response to the GkCyp paper on principles (attached). Christofias’ initial reaction
regarding Talat’s objections to “trigger words” such as “invasion” and occupation” was
to reaffirm that there had indeed been an invasion and TkCyps were today basing their
positions on property on a fait accompli. Talat asked Christofias to read the GkCyp paper
to which he was responding, and to note that in tone and vocabulary, the paper differed
from other GkCyp papers. Talat did not want the new tone and vocabulary to set a
precedent.
Next Steps
10. The Leaders agreed to meet again on Thursday, 5 March at 10:00 to discuss once
more the property matter. The leaders also agreed that thereafter EU matters would be the
next chapter to be opened, rather than economic matters, as previously agreed.
Steven Bourke
26 February 2008
RESPONSE OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE ON THE TURKISH

CYPRIOT PAPER ON THE CRITERIA
The GC side finds the TC paper on criteria problematical for the same
reasons that we have outlined in our paper on Principles. Property
rights are individual rights protected by Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. As such, these rights cannot
be compromised or violated, except under the conditions and the
safeguards provided in the Convention. Furthermore, under the law of
fundamental human rights to property, the presumptive relief in case
of expropriation is restitutio in integrum and not compensation. The
right to compensation is a second order remedy.
Both UN Human Rights Covenants1, as well as the European

Convention on Human Rights2, prohibit discrimination. The TC criteria
discriminate against the GC dispossessed owners in the ways that will
be described below.
Rule 1 of TC Paper: We reiterate our position that the choice of the

dispossessed owner, has priority over any wish expressed by the
current user or any other person. For the reasons we have analyzed in
our paper entitled “Greek Cypriot position on the property issue” dated
28 January 2009, any other position is contrary to the established
principles of international law and human rights.
1
Article 2, common in both Covenants reads: “The States Parties to the present
Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant
will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, color, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status”
2
Article 14 of the Convention reads “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such
as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”
Rule 2 of TC Paper: It is evident that the Turkish Cypriot side

emphasizes compensation and exchange as preferred remedies, as
opposed to reinstatement. Our position, which is grounded on
international law, is that compensation should be used only when the
remedy of restitution is not factually possible (when affected property
is damaged or destroyed) and the dispossessed owner knowingly and
voluntarily accepts compensation in lieu of restitution. Exchange of
property should also be voluntary.
“ A- Compensation:”
a) We do not disagree that compensation should be an option for

the dispossessed owner, but it has to be made clear that
reinstatement is the first priority. Our position is that there will be only
one Property Authority or Property Commission which will decide on all
issues concerning affected properties. The existence of only one such
Body, in which both Communities will participate equally, will
safeguard its impartiality, consistency of decisions, speed and
efficiency, as it will deal with all affected properties, and all claims
through a centralized, computerized data system. We also propose a
property court.
b) The specific rule is acceptable only if the dispossessed owner

voluntarily rejects reinstatement and/or exchange.
c) The idea that if a current user has “substantially developed”

an affected property he should have priority over the owner “to receive
title” to the property takes a contrasting approach to the European
Court of Human Rights, which in the Cyprus related case law insisted
on the reinstatement of properties to their lawful owner. We have,
however, accepted, in a spirit of compromise and as a matter of
equity, that a) properties developed for purposes of public benefit will
be compensated and b) that in all other cases, where the current user
has incurred expenses on the property, he will be entitled to
compensation by the owner for the value of the development, in case
the latter chooses the reinstatement of his property.
d) The distinction being made in the TC paper between affected

properties owned by natural persons and those owned by institutions
constitutes a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR which
clearly protects the property rights of both natural and legal persons.3
e) We have already agreed at the Working Group level that

affected properties used for genuine purposes of public benefit, after
an objective inquiry made by the Property Commission, will not be
reinstated but will be compensated. We do not accept that public
benefit includes “military purposes” as we aim at the demilitarization
of Cyprus. We also do not agree that such properties will be
expropriated only by the federated units in which they are located. The
Federal government, local authorities and any other authority having
by Law the authority to compulsorily acquire property, should also be
included.
e) We understand the reference to “any purchaser, or his/her

successor in title, of an affected property” who “may apply to receive
title to that property” as implying the person who paid money to the
current user of an affected property in order to secure the use of the
property. We do not consider these persons as “purchasers” of the
property, but only as users. Based on the Cyprus related ECHR case
law the dispossessed owner of property retains the legal title to the
3
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions”.
said properties and, therefore, he should have the priority to

decide/choose about the fate of the said properties.
A- Exchange:
We reiterate that for our side it is a matter of principle that the

owner’s choice has priority over the wish of the current user. The
formulation on “Exchange”, in order to be compatible with
international law should be amended as follows: “A dispossessed
owner, who is also current user of other affected property, may apply
to the Property Commission to receive title to such property he is
using, in exchange for title to his affected property, provided the
owner of the property which the applicant uses, does not choose the
reinstatement of his property and that the properties to be exchanged
are of equal value.”
B- Reinstatement:
It is obvious that for the Turkish Cypriot side reinstatement is the last
option and applies (under very strict criteria) only if the affected
properties do not fall under the categories for compensation and
exchange. International law demands that reinstatements be pursued
as the ideal proprietary remedy. This is why, in the GC side’s criteria
reinstatement is the first option and the options of compensation and
exchange shall be available in lieu of reinstatement, at the choice of
the owner.
a. We cannot accept any artificial “ceilings” or “specified

percentages” for reinstatement as any such idea is contrary to the
principles of international law and human rights.
b. Priority in reinstatement of dwellings as included in the TC paper

relates and is restricted to reinstatement as an exception, after the
rules for compensation and exchange are first applied. In reality,

taking into account the restricted scope of reinstatement, such priority
makes no real difference.
1- “Reinstatement of a Dwelling:”
i. Any limitation to the right of reinstatement by reference to a

dwelling “of which he/she was dispossessed and in which he/she was
living at the time of dispossession” as well as to “persons who are full-
share owners” or “dwellings not being eligible for reinstatement” or to
any other reason is problematic, because such limitation is contrary to
international law, and in particular to the European Convention on
Human Rights, as well as the case law of the ECHR. Imposing
alternative land and compensation in lieu of restitution on displaced
persons and dispossessed owners is an unacceptable remedy.
ii. Any limitations on the “maximum size of the plot” of the dwelling
to be reinstated are contrary to international law.
2- “Reinstatement of Small Business Premises:”
i. Any arbitrary limitation to the right of reinstatement by

reference to “natural persons”, or “full-share owners” or of the number
of businesses that may be reinstated is contrary to international law.
ii. Any arbitrary limitations on “the size of the land” area of the
property in question based on the requirements for the operation of
the said business, are also contrary to international law.
iii. We cannot accept the idea that businesses shall be treated in a

different way, depending on their size. That would be contrary to
Article 1 of Protocol 1 which protects the right to enjoyment of
possessions to both natural and legal persons
3- “Reinstatement of Land”
i. We reiterate that any limitations by reference to “full-share

owners” “natural persons” “part of the land” “maximum” number of
plots, or “maximum” area of land, are contrary to international law.
ii. The idea of imposing an alternative piece of land in lieu of

reinstatement to a dispossessed owner violates the basic rule of
prioritizing the right to restitution.
“Rule 3:” This “Rule” obviously refers to the case of dispossessed

Turkish Cypriots who were “allocated” properties owned by
dispossessed Greek Cypriots “in exchange” for their affected properties
and who (the Turkish Cypriots) subsequently sold their affected
properties to third parties. Our side wants to emphatically state that a)
Such “allocation” or “exchange” of properties is illegal and therefore
null and void, b) the Turkish Cypriot owners of affected properties are
still the legal owners of their properties in spite of this so called
“allocation” or “exchange”, c) any sales of affected properties made
voluntarily and approved by the Guardian of Turkish Cypriot properties
is valid and d) the Greek Cypriot owner of the affected property which
such Turkish Cypriot is using retains also fully his title to the affected
property.
“Rule 4:” Definitions
- ‘Current user’: The GC side’s definition of the term “current user” as

proposed at the Working Group level is “a person who is currently
using a home or other affected property of a dispossessed owner, who
has fled and lost use and control of the said home or affected
property” . Any definition attempting to accord any form of “right” to
any such current user of affected property is not acceptable.
- ‘Affected property’:
The GC side’s definition of “Affected property” as proposed at the

Working Group level is as follows:
” – immovable property in Cyprus which the owner, being a natural or

legal person, left or of which s/he lost use and control as a
consequence of intercommunal strife, military action or the unresolved
division of the island between December 1963 and entry into force of
the Agreement, and which has not since been reinstated to the owner
(or his/her heir, personal representative or successor in title), and
over which s/he has not regained use and control. Affected property
shall not include any property which was voluntarily sold, transferred
or otherwise permanently disposed of by the owner, to a natural or
legal person who was able to gain effective control over the property,
or for which compensation due to compulsory acquisition has been
accepted. The onus of proof of any such voluntary transfer or lawful
expropriation shall lie with the transferee or his/her successor in title.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary for the individual case in
question, dispossession shall be presumed to have been unlawful
and/or involuntary. People who are successors in title of dispossessed
owners and have not been able to gain effective control over the
relevant affected property shall be treated in the same manner as the
dispossessed owners themselves would be”.
For the reasons outlined in our previous papers, there must be no
exclusion from the definition of “affected property” of any property for
which “compensation (in the form of alternative property or monetary
compensation)” was arranged by the so called “Immovable Property
Commission”.
Finally, for the reasons explained in our earlier papers, we maintain

there are no disputed “Evkaf properties” and therefore we do not
accept the exclusion of any such invented cases from the definition of
“affected property”.
- ‘Substantial improvement’: We reiterate our position that, as a

matter of equity, we are prepared to accept that the current user who
has carried out any development or improvement on affected property
is entitled to receive compensation from the owner for the value of
such development or improvement, in case the latter chooses the
reinstatement of his property. This rule should apply in all cases,
irrespective of the extent or cost of such development or
improvement.
- ‘Dispossessed owner’: It should me made clear that the definition

includes all the successors in title of the original owner, e.g.
purchasers.
- ‘Small Business’: There can be no distinction between “small” and

“big” businesses, therefore this definition is unnecessary.
- ‘Institutions’ Again, as explained earlier, there can be no distinction

between the property rights of natural persons and of legal persons,
therefore this definition is also unnecessary.
In conclusion we would like to stress the following: The right to

property is an individual right well protected by International Law and
in particular by the First Protocol to the European Convention of
Human Rights. This right cannot be denied directly or indirectly, but
can only be regulated in so far as its exercise is concerned. Such
regulation should be done individually and in accordance with the
aforesaid Protocol. Any general provisions such as percentages and
restrictive practices are not only contrary to the aforesaid Protocol but
are also random, arbitrary and discriminatory. As such, they are null
and void, being also contrary to Articles 2, 4 and 26 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. A single individual

petition to the European Court of Human Rights or to any other judicial
or quasi judicial Human Rights Treaty Body would render null and void
any arrangement that is contrary to the abovementioned. For this
reason, the TC proposals for the solution of the property issue could
not be upheld in any European Court of law. The Turkish Cypriot
proposals for the solution of the property issue are contrary to both
the Protocol and the Covenant and should not be accepted.
23 February 2009
TURKISH CYPRIOT RESPONSE TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT

PAPER ON CRITERIA FOR AFFECTED PROPERTIES
The paper submitted by the Greek Cypriot side on this matter does not attempt to
design reasonable criteria for the regulation of the exercise of property rights with respect to
affected properties. This is because of the fact that it puts the choice of dispossessed owner
above everything else, including the criteria. It is only in two very limited cases, namely in
case of public benefit and factual impossibility of reinstatement of a building, where the
Greek Cypriot side accepts the choice of the dispossessed owner to be overlooked unless it
is a choice of compensation. These exceptions, however, are valid in any legal system, where
there are normal conditions, which is not the case in Cyprus. In our view, if the choice of the
dispossessed owner or of the current user can override the criteria, this would in effect
render the criteria meaningless.
It is understood from this paper of the Greek Cypriot side that there is an intention
to protect only the rights of dispossessed owners and to neglect the rights of current users.
However, it is generally accepted by the consistent UN practice on Cyprus issue that for a
viable and durable solution in our island, we should take into consideration the competing
rights and interests of both dispossessed owners and current users. As clearly explained in
our property paper on principles, not only the dispossessed owners but also the current
users have certain rights connected to affected properties and particularly to homes they
have been using for decades. It is obvious that the delicate balance between the two was
ignored in the Greek Cypriot paper on criteria as can be seen in section A (para. 6): “The
wish of the owner of an affected property has priority over the wish of the current user, or
any other person.” A sensible approach cannot be built on the idea of priority of the wishes
of one category of persons over the wishes of the other. Different factors regarding affected
property and persons related to that property (such as legal certainty and predictability, time
factor, emotional link, socio-economic consequences of new displacements and
dispossessions) must be considered in determining whether the choice of dispossessed
owner or current user or sometimes the need of the society in general shall prevail.
In fact, the main philosophy of the Greek Cypriot paper can be summarized in one
sentence: “Wishes of dispossessed owners shall have priority almost in all cases.” This
philosophy will create a serious risk and possibly hamper chances of a successful referenda.
In such a case, any current user of an affected property shall be unable to foresee or envisage
the future status of that property at the moment of voting in the referendum. Moreover, it
shall result in sacrificing, in many cases, the wishes as well as the rights and interests of many
current users for the sake of one dispossessed owner. For example, in the case of three
blocks of apartments built on a piece of affected property, the fate of almost twenty homes
of different current users (and the fate of these families in general) will be dependent on the
choice and financial capacity of a dispossessed owner. It is impossible for any political
leadership to encourage his/her people to support a regime which will include such an
uncertainty.
Potential uncertainty as a result of this “priority to the wishes of the dispossessed

owner” approach will also emerge at the communal level. As can be seen from the Greek
Cypriot paper, the very essence of the principle of bi-zonality which is defined as ‘clear
majority of population and of land ownership’ shall be completely destroyed. A regime for
affected properties without a ceiling or proportion as regards reinstatement in one
Constituent State is not reasonable and would undermine the well-established UN practice
on bi-zonality.
Another worrying approach in the paper of the Greek Cypriot side is related to
options provided for different categories of owners. It is not rational to provide same
options to both natural and legal persons who are dispossessed owners. In designing
possible redresses, one should bear in mind the emotional link between the affected property
and the dispossessed owner/current user. This is particularly relevant in the case of natural
persons and properties they used as dwellings prior to dispossession. Similarly, in the case of
current user who is a natural person, there is a same kind of emotional link between these
persons and the affected properties they are currently using as dwellings. Established socio-
economic structure should also be taken into consideration. These factors do not exist in the
case of legal persons. Therefore, for the exercise of the right to property by the dispossessed
owners who are legal persons, it is more appropriate to offer different options which may
not include reinstatement. Turkish Cypriot side proposes a regime along the lines of this
approach.
In the Greek Cypriot paper (para. 24) it is stated that: “All the above criteria
applicable to natural and legal persons will apply to any other immovable property owned by
the autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus, Evkaf and any other religious
institutions in Cyprus.” This approach is unreasonable and causes concern. Reinstatement
option can be made available to these institutions for their affected properties which were
used as religious sites in 1963 or 1974. One may add certain amount of property adjacent to
such religious sites for their functions to be performed properly.
Given the fact that Turkish Cypriot representatives were not part of the
administration which was controlling the land registry records between 1963 and 1974, it is
not possible to accept land registers and records of 1974 as the basis for ascertaining owner
status of individuals. Therefore, in ascertaining owner status, land registers and records of
December 1963 should be taken as the basis. This is not valid for the disputed properties
(such as Evkaf property), since a special commission shall be established to inquire their
ownership.
As regards affected properties used for public benefit, owners of such affected
properties shall have the right to exchange title to these properties with the affected property
s/he is currently using or other affected properties in lieu of receiving compensation for
expropriation.
The regime proposed by the Greek Cypriot side for affected properties is built on the
presumption that there are normal conditions in Cyprus and dispossessed owners shall be
able to exercise their property rights without any restriction. However, the fact that there has
been an abnormal situation in Cyprus since 1963 cannot be ignored. The way the property
rights will be exercised cannot be based on the hypothesis that the developments since 1963
had not taken place. If reinstatement of a property entails a burden out of all proportion to
the benefit emanating from this reinstatement, it may be excluded as an option due to the
abnormal situation for the sake of public interest.
It is difficult to understand the reference made to Turkey in the Greek Cypriot paper
with regard to financial support required for the implementation of the relevant provisions
of the settlement plan while no reference has been made to Greece in this regard. Indeed, all
the parties interested in the solution of the problem, the European Union in particular and
the international community in general, as well as the international financial institutions are
all expected to contribute financially to a comprehensive settlement. Furthermore, as also
envisaged in the past, an international donors conference should be organized for the same
purpose.
A current user who is required to vacate an affected property in accordance with the
provisions of the comprehensive settlement shall not be required to do so until an adequate
alternative accommodation in appropriate locations where adequate livelihoods may be
earned has been made available by the Federal Government.
25 February 2009
TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSAL ON

PROPERTY COMMISSION AND SUB-COMMISSIONS
1. A Property Commission with two sub-commissions shall be established.
2. The Property Commission and the sub-commissions shall be independent and

impartial.
3. The owners of affected properties which are not disputed properties according to the
law in force in 1963 will be ascertained by the Property Commission and sub
commissions by examining the authentic original land registers and records of 1963.
4. The Property Commission and the sub-commissions shall comprise equal number of
Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot members.
5. The members of the sub-commissions shall be appointed by the federal executive

among the candidates designated by the relevant Constituent State.
6. The members of the Property Commission shall be appointed directly by the federal
executive.
7. Each sub-commission shall have the authority to deal with claims and petitions
(applications) about the affected properties located in the territory of the relevant
Constituent State.
8. The federal government and the governments of the Constituent States shall be
obliged to supply any information or document needed by the Property Commission
and the sub-commissions.
9. The sub-commission authorized to deal with the petitions about the affected
properties located in the territory of the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State shall be
presided by a Turkish Cypriot member and the sub-commission authorized to deal
with the petitions about the affected properties located in the territory of the Greek
Cypriot Constituent State shall be presided by a Greek Cypriot member.
10. The decisions in the sub-commissions shall be taken with simple majority. The
presidents of the sub-commissions shall have the right of casting vote in case of a
deadlock.
11. The Property Commission shall deal with the applications against the decisions of
the sub-commissions. The petitions regarding the affected properties located in the
areas subject to territorial adjustments will be taken up by the Property Commission.
12. In case of a deadlock, a foreign member shall be added to the members of the
Property Commission.
13. The Property Commission and the sub-commissions shall take decisions in
accordance with the agreed principles and criteria about the property issue.
14. A Property Court shall be established for dealing with appeals against decisions of
the Property Commission.
15. The Property Court shall comprise equal number of Turkish Cypriot and Greek
Cypriot members. In case of a deadlock, the deadlock-resolving mechanism devised
for judiciary will apply.
THE RESPONSE OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE TO THE GREEK

CYPRIOT PAPER DATED 12 FEBRUARY 2009 COMMENTING ON THE
TURKISH CYPRIOT PAPER OF 4 FEBRUARY 2009
As for the Greek Cypriot paper dated 12 February 2009 commenting on the Turkish
Cypriot paper of 4 February 2009, I feel obliged to make a few remarks here at the meeting,
without going into detail, as our response to it will be conveyed to you in writing.
First of all, I need to stress that the tone and the wording of the paper in question is
provocative and it rather resembles a propaganda pamphlet than an explanatory paper on
one’s position. Such an approach has no use other than resulting in futile discussions,
costing invaluable time and energy which could otherwise be utilized for meaningful
negotiations. The terminology used in the paper in question with reference to Turkish
Cypriot positions, such as “lack of knowledge”, “arbitrary interpretations” or “intentional
effort to seriously distort” can only be considered as being disrespectful to your counterpart
with whom you are trying to renew your partnership.
At the same time, using remarks that are known to be trigger words for the Turkish
Cypriot side such as “invasion” and “occupation” is not conducive to a positive climate in
the process. It is not difficult for the Turkish Cypriot side as well to mention the war crimes,
including gross violations of human rights and massacres that were committed against
Turkish Cypriot civilians between 1963-1974 in Cyprus, but we refrain from doing so in
order not to jeopardize the process. We expect a similar sensitivity from the Greek Cypriot
side.
We believe that mutual respect and courtesy that prevailed so far in the negotiations
and in the papers prepared should be upheld irrespective of the sensitivity of the subject
matter in question.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As for the content of the said paper, we would like to make a few comments on
certain issues raised and not to go into a legal debate about what is the “correct” reading of a
particular document or a legal case, or whether all the documents referred to in the Greek
Cypriot paper have relevance to the property problem in Cyprus, which has its own
settlement parameters that came into existence in four decades of negotiations.
We would like to state, at the outset, that none of the decisions taken in the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in relation to a Greek Cypriot dispossessed
owner calls for the restitution of the property in question. Thus, ECtHR decisions do not
support the Greek Cypriot position that the dispossessed owners cannot be denied under
any circumstances the right to restitution.
It was stated in the Greek Cypriot paper that as the negotiations are not conducted
on the basis of the Ghali Set of Ideas, certain principles of the Ideas, i.e. clear majority
principle, cannot be isolated and “twisted” in a manner meeting the demands of the Turkish
Cypriot side. It is true that the interpretation of bi-zonality (the clear majority principle) was
endorsed by the Security Council during the negotiations on the Ghali Set of Ideas.
Nevertheless, it would be very wrong to assume that the interpretation of the principle of bi-
zonality by the Council in particular or the international community in general had changed
or was “abandoned” with the collapse of the negotiations on the Ghali Set of Ideas. The fact
that the relevant provisions of different versions of the Annan Plan also envisaged a
settlement which respected the “clear majority” principle is yet another proof that this
principle is a well-established UN parameter and not connected only to the Ghali Set of
Ideas.
Despite the claim in the paper, we do not envisage two communities living separately
as practically homogenous ethnic groups. Otherwise, we would not have accepted the Annan
Plan which also included the return of thousands of Greek Cypriot refugees to the North.
We cannot, however, accept a property regime which will not guarantee Turkish Cypriots the
clear majority of land ownership and property in their respective Constituent State; a
property regime, in other words, which will make us minority both in terms of population
and land ownership in our own Constituent State. The Turkish Cypriots cannot accept such
a property regime, not because of the fact that the clear majority principle is endorsed by the
Security Council, but because it defies all the overriding settlement parameters such as bi-
zonality, bi-communality and political equality. It is incomprehensible that in both
Constituent States to be established with a settlement, the Greek Cypriots will have the
majority of population and land ownership regardless of the fact that one will be called as
the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State.
We also noted with disappointment that the provocative terminology “invasion” and
“occupation” was used for the first time by the Greek Cypriot side in its papers in this
negotiating process when it was referred to the “abnormal” situation in Cyprus and claimed
that this is a result of “Turkey’s invasion and continuing military occupation”. Such
provocative terminology is not in line with the positive atmosphere currently prevailing in
the negotiations. The term “abnormal” was in fact used in our paper to describe the
conditions in the island prevailing since 1963, when the Turkish Cypriots were ousted from
the government, more than a hundred articles of the constitution were suspended, Turkish
Cypriots were persecuted, killed, their property plundered and forced to live in ghettos
corresponding to a mere 3% of the island’s territory and UNFICYP was deployed in 1964 to
prevent further inter-communal strife. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot “Supreme Court”,
which was unconstitutionally established in 1964 by the Greek Cypriot side and comprising
only Greek Cypriot judges, also referred numerous times to the abnormal situation in Cyprus
in its judgment the Attorney General of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim and Others (1964, Cyprus
Law Reports 195). In the light of these undeniable facts, pretending as if everything was
“normal” in Cyprus until 1974, to say the least, is not very convincing.
As for the claims of “deportation or forcible transfer of population”, the efforts to
absolve the Greek Cypriot side and Greece from the responsibility of the events that had
befallen the island between 1963-74 in the name of Enosis, which led to the physical
separation of two communities long before 1974, cannot change the historical facts of the
island.
In its paper, the Greek Cypriot side gives examples from Guatemala, Mozambique
and Cambodia. It is well-known that the agreements referred with respect to these conflicts
are signed just after or in some cases even before the end of civil wars or inter-communal
strives. The Guatemala Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by
the Armed Conflict was signed in 1994, but the civil war ended in 1996. The Mozambique
General Peace Agreement was signed in 1992 immediately after the end of the civil war.
Finally, violence stopped in Cambodia in 1991 and the agreement was signed in the same
year.
However in Cyprus, the inter-communal strife (violence) started in 1963 and ended
in 1974. After this date, the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots used and developed the
properties left by the dispossessed owners for 35 years in line with the laws in force in their
respective territories. It is clear that the agreements signed just after or before the violence
ended cannot be compared with the comprehensive settlement agreement that shall be
signed in Cyprus after 35 years. The legal status of the current users in Cyprus (who have
been using these properties in accordance with the law in force in the area where these
properties are located) is not the same with the status of the de-facto current users in
Cambodia, Guatemala or Mozambique prior to settlement.
Moreover, it is also important to note that the document called “Resettlement of the
Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict” which was referred to in the Greek
Cypriot paper about Guatemala did not only provide “guarantees to returning populations
especially concerning the issue of land rights”. Article 9, Chapter II of this agreement
entitled “Guarantees for the Resettlement of Uprooted Population Groups” includes the
following provision: “In the particular case of abandonment of land as a result of armed
conflict, the Government undertakes to revise and promote legal provisions to ensure that
such an act is not considered to be voluntary abandonment, and to ratify the inalienable
nature of landholding rights. In this context, it shall promote the return of land to the
original holders and/or shall seek adequate compensatory solutions”.
It is the considered view of the Turkish Cypriot side that there has to be a property
regime designed for Cyprus taking into consideration its peculiar conditions. Nevertheless, it
is interesting to observe that the Greek Cypriot side conveniently overlooked other peace
agreements concluded during the same years, i.e. Peace Agreement between the Government
of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (Arusha Agreement-1993).
Despite it was concluded immediately after the end of three years-long civil war in Rwanda,
this agreement did not provide reinstatement as the only redress. The Article 3 of this
agreement states that “For purposes of settling returnees, the Rwandese Government shall
make lands available, upon their identification by the “Commission for Repatriation” so
long as they are not currently occupied by individuals...” In Article 4, despite the
recognition of the right to property and right of refugees to repossess their property on
return, it is also stated that the parties agreed “that in order to promote social harmony
and national reconciliation, refugees who left the country more than 10 years ago should
not reclaim their properties, which might have been occupied by other people. The
Government shall compensate them by putting land at their disposal and shall help
them to resettle. As for estates which have been occupied by the Government, the returnee
shall have the right for an equitable compensation by the Government.”
The Turkish Cypriot side is of the view that it would not be appropriate to consider
either Bosnia and Herzegovina or any of the above-mentioned countries as an example for
the unique case of Cyprus. It is clear that the property provisions in the Ghali Set of Ideas
and the Annan Plan were designed by the UN taking into consideration this sui generis
situation of the island.
Regarding the claim that “Cyprus is not a sui generis case”, we would like to remind
our Greek Cypriot counterparts that when references are made by the Turkish Cypriot side
during the negotiations to relevant examples from around the world, we have been
continuously warned that we are looking for a settlement in Cyprus that will fit to the case of
Cyprus, in other words, to the sui generis conditions of Cyprus.
As regards the Greek Cypriot reference to the Security Council resolution

(S/RES/1674(2006)), it should be noted that this resolution is related to “protection of
civilians in armed conflicts” and is therefore irrelevant for the case of Cyprus where the
armed conflict ended 35 years ago. The Security Council has started to outline the principles
regarding the rights of displaced persons at the end of 1990’s, long before 2006. The Annan
Plan, which was finalized by the UN in 2004 and supported by the international community
as a whole, was no doubt prepared in line with these principles. It is also important to note,
at this point, that the relevant European Union institutions declared during the time of the
Annan Plan negotiations their readiness to accommodate the terms of this settlement plan.
Thus, without any doubt, the property regime envisaged in the Plan, which also forms the
basis of the current Turkish Cypriot proposals on affected properties, is consistent with the
rights of displaced persons in particular and human rights in general.
25 February 2009
Page 1 of 1

To: Sonja Bachmann <bachmanns@un.org>
cc: Donatella Giubilaro <giubilaro@un.org>

Subject: Re: Fw: Iacovou article
Sonja,
Thanks for this. I note that Iacovou makes the point that the curent TC proposal could cause a
crisis, as under its provisions, 12 Senators from either side could prevent a government from
being formed. The new TC proposal, which I describe in the attached report for AD (sent to him
2 days ago), does not have this weakness. However, that doesn't necessarily mean that the GCs
will accept it.
John
At 11:27 AM 04/03/2009, Sonja Bachmann wrote:
Hi John/Donatella,
fyi.
Donatella: AD has not responded yet on the programme, take it as meaning no

objections.
look forward to seeing you.
Sonja
----- Forwarded by Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO on 04/03/2009 11:26 AM -----
Annie Mazaud/NY/UNO
03/03/2009 05:33 PM
To
Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ
cc
Subject
Iacovou article
Attachments:
Report for AD - March 09.doc
An Update on Options for a Federal Executive in Cyprus
By John McGarry (March 2, 2009)
1. The Evolution of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Positions on the Federal Executive
The current official Greek Cypriot proposal is for a two-person strong executive presidency elected on
a single (joint) ticket by concurrent majorities in both parts of Cyprus, and if concurrent majorities are
unavailable, by a majority vote on an all-island basis with Turkish Cypriot votes weighted at 30%.
The current official Turkish Cypriot proposal is for a 7 person Executive Council, indirectly elected by
concurrent majorities of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Senators, and in which Turkish Cypriots
would have 3 of 7 positions.
Neither of these proposals seems acceptable to the other side. In response, both sides have begun,
tentatively, to suggest new options.
The Greek Cypriot advisers have indicated that they are prepared to modify their current proposal by
weighting Turkish Cypriot votes at more than 30%.
More interestingly, the Greek Cypriots have suggested an additional, alternative, proposal for electing
an executive presidency, which I have termed the ‘20% rule’. Here, the 1st round of presidential
elections would be separate, qualified by a rule that would permit Greek Cypriots to vote for Turkish
Cypriot candidates and vice versa, but with Greek Cypriot votes weighted at 20% in N. Cyprus and
Turkish Cypriot votes weighted at 20% in S. Cyprus. Each of the two most popular candidates in one
part of Cyprus would then have to form joint tickets with their counterparts in the other part to compete
in a 2nd round all-island election. This second round would be decided on an all-island majoritarian
basis, with Turkish Cypriot votes weighted at 30% or higher.
The Turkish Cypriot adviser has suggested three alternatives to his side’s current official proposal for
an indirectly elected Executive Council. These alternatives are, in order of preference:
i) An indirectly elected strong executive presidency (a version of the South African model). This
was expressed as a clear 1st preference;
ii) A split-executive combining a directly elected symbolic presidency with an indirectly elected
parliamentary executive (the Irish model);
iii) A split-executive combining a directly elected executive presidency with an indirectly elected
parliamentary executive (the French model).
The rest of this report analyzes the Greek Cypriot proposal for an executive presidency directly elected
by the ‘20% rule’, and the Turkish Cypriot proposal for an indirectly elected executive presidency. It
first explains these options in brief detail, then discusses their pros and cons, and then briefly outlines
how each of the new proposals could be amended to make them more attractive to the other side. The
report concludes with a short analysis of a third option, based on a split (presidential-parliamentary)
executive, which might yet emerge as a compromise acceptable to both sides.
1
2. The Greek Cypriot proposal for an executive presidency directly elected by the 20% rule:
The 20% rule is a response to one of the options presented in my ‘Bridging Options’ paper of
December 2008. There I suggested that the first round of presidential elections could be entirely
separate, with the top two candidates in each of North and South Cyprus going forward to a second
round in which they would have to form inter-ethnic joint tickets to compete. The Greek Cypriots
responded somewhat positively to this option, but asked that Greek Cypriots be allowed to vote for
Turkish Cypriot candidates in the first round of the presidential election, with their votes counting at
20% (with a reciprocal right for Turkish Cypriot voters to vote for Greek Cypriot candidates).
The 20% rule is seen by Greek Cypriots as having two significant positive effects. First, Greek
Cypriots think it will enhance the prospect of moderate politicians from each side winning the
presidency. This is because few Greek Cypriots are likely to vote for a radical Turkish Cypriot, while
few Turkish Cypriots will vote for a radical Greek Cypriot. In turn these moderates, it is thought, are
likely to support whatever settlement has been agreed to, and likely to cooperate in government.1
Second, the 20% rule introduces an all-island, or cross-community, element into what would otherwise
be separate elections. Greek Cypriots have traditionally emphasized the need for such an ‘integrative’
election, to construct a Cypriot identity and to combat the Turkish Cypriot preference for ‘separate’,
‘bicommunal’, ‘partitionist’ or ‘confederal’ thinking.2
Potential advantages of the Greek Cypriot 20% rule proposal
x It should give a boost to moderates (although this might not quite work as intended. See
‘potential shortcomings’ below);
x It is likely to be less objectionable to Turkish Cypriots than the current official Greek Cypriot
proposal. The latter requires single (joint) tickets in the 1st round of presidential elections, and
allows the 1st round winners, if concurrent majorities are unavailable, to be picked by an all-
island majority in which Greek Cypriots would have 70% of the votes. The 20% rule, by
contrast, would permit separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot candidacies in the 1st round
of elections, and it would mean that in the 1st round, the two Turkish Cypriot candidates who
would go forth to the second round would be selected by an electorate that was 80% Turkish
Cypriot and only 20% Greek Cypriot. This aspect of the Greek Cypriot proposal explains why
Tufan Erhurman, the Turkish Cypriot adviser, was quite receptive to it when I first explained it
to him.
Potential shortcomings of the Greek Cypriot 20% rule proposal
1
From a more partisan perspective, the 20% rule, by favouring moderates, gives a boost to the two parties that are
conducting the negotiations: AKEL in S. Cyprus and the CTP in N. Cyprus.
2
. Comparatively, such integrative electoral systems are usually proposed by majorities rather than by minorities.
2
x The 20% rule discriminates against radical parties on either side. It is therefore likely to be
opposed by them, particularly by the UBP in N. Cyprus.3 Opposition from the UBP,
currently the most popular party in N. Cyprus, would make it more difficult to secure an
affirmative vote in a referendum;
x I’ve been told that Turkey, or elements within Turkey with close connections with N.
Cyprus’s radical nationalists, would oppose any measure that seeks to marginalize the UBP;
x Mr. Talat, the Turkish Cypriot leader, has emphasized the need for an inclusive settlement,
which includes radical parties (the current official Turkish Cypriot proposal for a 7 person
Executive Council is inclusive, as it is likely that it would result in the UBP receiving at
least one seat in government). As the leader of a small minority, Talat appears to put a
premium on maintaining his community’s ‘unity’ in negotiations with Greek Cypriots. As
long as Talat remains wedded to this inclusive approach, it would seem to preclude
acceptance of the 20% rule.
x The logic of the 20% rule, which suggests a boost for moderates and for a cooperative,
functional government, may be faulty, and for two reasons. First, if the UBP calculates its
electoral prospects are damaged by the 20% rule (as it surely would calculate), it would
have an incentive to radicalize the Turkish Cypriot electorate (e.g. by claiming that the 20%
rule constitutes interference in Turkish Cypriots right to elect their own representatives). As
Turkish Cypriots would constitute 80% of the electorate in N. Cyprus, such radicalization
could deliver victory to the UBP. This result would be in spite of, and even because of, the
20% rule. Second, if the 20% rule did succeed in denying an election victory to the UBP, it
could still potentially destabilize matters from outside, ironically making it difficult for
moderates inside government to cooperate with each other.
Making the 20% rule more palatable to Turkish Cypriots

The 20% rule would become more palatable, though not necessarily acceptable, to the Turkish Cypriots
if the following changes were made:
¾ if the 20% rule became a 10% rule;
¾ if the 20% (or 10%) rule was used to qualify separate and final elections for the presidency,
thereby forgoing the need for an additional round in which a joint ticket would be formed and
the winning ticket would be picked by an all-island weighted majority.
There may be some utility, therefore, in exploring whether or not Greek Cypriots would be prepared to
revise their ‘20% rule’ proposal in either of, or preferably both of, these ways. The prospects that they
might are reasonable (the Greek Cypriot advisers I spoke with did not appear firmly fixed on the figure
of 20%, and Greek Cypriots appear to have put forward something like the 20% rule in the past without
3
The UBP is more likely than radical Greek Cypriot parties to oppose the 20% rule for two reasons: i) Turkish Cypriots are
traditionally more insistent on separate elections than are the Greek Cypriots; ii) the UBP is probably less likely to win
Greek Cypriot votes than its main Greek Cypriot counterparts are to win Turkish Cypriot votes.
3
insisting that it be followed by a subsequent round with joint tickets and an all-island majoritarian
election).4
2. The Turkish Cypriot proposal for a strong indirectly elected presidency (a tailored ‘South
African model’)
The Turkish Cypriots are now prepared to accept as their first preference a strong presidency based on
certain prominent features of the South African model. The features of the South African presidency
that are most relevant here are an indirectly elected strong president who is both Head of State and
Head of Government; who directly exercises a number of important executive functions; and who can
appoint all cabinet ministers and preside over cabinet meetings.
Of course, the Cypriot presidency, as envisaged by Turkish Cypriots, would be different from the
South African model in the following vital respects. First, while the South African presidency is a
single-person presidency, the Cypriot presidency proposed by Turkish Cypriots would be dual in
character, comprising one Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, rotating on a 3:2 basis. Second, while
the South African president is free to appoint ministers regardless of race or ethnicity, the Cypriot
presidency would have to allocate positions to Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots on a 4:3 ratio.
Third, while the South African parliament has the unusual capacity to be able to force the president to
resign on a motion of non-confidence, the Cypriot presidency, like virtually all presidencies, would
have a fixed term (5 years), one that could not be prematurely ended by legislative vote (outside of the
extraordinary circumstances of impeachment).5
Fourth, while South Africa’s president is elected by a majority of the lower house, in the Turkish
Cypriot proposal the Cypriot presidency would be elected on a single ticket by a majority of the upper
house (Senate), including a concurrent majority of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Senators. This
is the same electoral mechanism that is proposed in Turkish Cypriots current official (tabled) proposal
for an Executive Council.
If this mechanism (Rule 1), does not produce a result (i.e. if no ticket wins an overall majority of the
Senate, including concurrent majorities of GCs and TCs), the Turkish Cypriot adviser has suggested a
couple of default rules (Rules 2 and 3). Rule 2 would involve lowering the threshold necessary to elect
the presidency to a majority of the Senate, including 40% of both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot
Senators.
If Rule 2 did not deliver a result, Rule 3 would involve the automatic allocation of the Turkish Cypriot
and Greek Cypriot presidential positions to the candidates of the largest Turkish Cypriot and Greek
Cypriot parties in the Senate, respectively.6
4
I’m currently checking this last point.
5
The South African `president` is officially called a `president` because he is the Head of State as well as the Head of
Government. However, in strict political science terms, he is really a `prime-minister` because he can be forced to resign
by a majority of the legislature on a motion of non-confidence . ‘Proper’ Presidents have fixed terms in office, which can
only be cut short by ‘impeachment’, and not simply by a motion of non-confidence. Impeachment requires evidence that
the President has been involved in wrongdoing, and it invariably requires some sort of legislative super-majority to pass. A
motion of non-confidence, by contrast, merely requires the legislature to disagree with the policies of the head of
government, and usually requires a simple majority of the legislature.
6
Presumably, Turkish Cypriots would also be open to permitting election by separate caucuses of Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot Senators. In this case, the winners on each side would be those who win majority support in their
respective caucuses, with weak candidates being eliminated until such a result is produced..
4
The Turkish Cypriot adviser also suggested that incentives could be put in place to enhance the
prospects of the presidential positions being elected by Rule 1 or 2, both of which involve cross-
voting, rather than by Rule 3, which does not. In the event of Rule 3 being resorted to, he suggested
that new elections for the Senate could be mandated in one year. The idea behind this is that Senators,
newly elected to a 5 year term, would be reluctant to jeopardize their positions so soon, and would
therefore strive to elect a presidency under Rules 1 or 2.
Potential advantages of the Turkish Cypriot proposal for an indirectly elected strong presidency
The Turkish Cypriot proposal has a number of features that are likely to make it more attractive to
Greek Cypriots than the current official Turkish Cypriot proposal for an Executive Council.
x It creates a strong presidency. Greek Cypriots should like this, as it is what they have now, and
it is what they have proposed for a re-united Cyprus;
x It creates a clearly recognizable Head of State. Greek Cypriots should find this attractive as
they have traditionally criticised the Swiss model, when it has been proposed by Turkish
Cypriots, on the basis that it rotates the presidency among 7 politicians on an annual basis, and
thus lacks a clearly recognisable Head of State;
x It is substantially different from the Annan plan, which went down to a landslide defeat among
Greek Cypriots. The Annan plan called for an indirectly elected Executive Council, which
would then appoint a 2 person presidency (this is also the current official Turkish Cypriot
proposal). The new Turkish Cypriot proposal reverses Annan by calling for an indirectly
elected 2-person strong presidency which would then appoint the Executive Council. Looking
different from Annan will constitute a plus among Greek Cypriots
x Under the new Turkish Cypriot proposal, the rules for electing the presidency provide, at least
in the first instance, for cross-voting. This should appeal to Greek Cypriots (although it will not
be decisive - the current official Turkish Cypriot proposal for an Executive Council also calls
for cross voting, and this feature has not been enough to persuade Greek Cypriots to accept it);
x The new Turkish Cypriot proposal guarantees a result, i.e. that executive formation will take
place, and take place without undue delay. This is because the new proposal has a default rule
which ensures the automatic election of the president and vice-president, while the current
Turkish Cypriot proposal lacks such a rule. This addresses a Greek Cypriot criticism of the
current official Turkish Cypriot proposal, expressed in the Working Group on Governance
Report, namely that it lacks a rule that would guarantee executive formation.
Potential shortcomings of the Turkish Cypriot proposal for a indirectly elected strong presidency
x The major flaw in the new Turkish Cypriot proposal from the Greek Cypriot perspective is that
the president is indirectly elected rather than directly elected. Greek Cypriots prefer a directly
elected president because it is what they know and it has served them very well. By contrast,
when they think of indirectly elected (parliamentary) executives, they think of Greece, which
has a much more chaotic politics than Cyprus. It is not absolutely clear, however, that direct
elections are a Greek Cypriot redline. It is possible that a form of indirect election could be
found that would satisfy Greek Cypriots.
5
x Greek Cypriots are also likely to have concerns not just about indirect election of the presidency
but about the precise method of indirect election. They are likely to question giving the right to
elect the presidency to the Senate, a body in which Turkish Cypriots have numerical equality, in
spite of being just 20% of the island’s population.
x Greek Cypriots are likely to note that while the first two rules proposed by Turkish Cypriots for
electing the presidency involve cross-voting, the third rule permits separate elections,
something Greek Cypriots usually object to. Moreover, Greek Cypriots may fear that the third
rule is the one that will be used to elect the presidency in practice;
x Greek Cypriots are also likely to object to some of the important details of the Turkish Cypriot
proposal, including the rotation of the presidency on a 3:2 GC/TC basis and the composition of
the council of ministers on a 4:3 GC/TC basis.
Making an indirectly elected presidency more palatable to Greek Cypriots

GCs may find an indirectly elected presidency more palatable if:
¾ it is elected by the lower house (or by a joint sitting of both houses). To become acceptable to
Turkish Cypriots, however, any such electoral formula would have to ensure that the presidency
could not be elected without substantial support (40% ) from Turkish Cypriot legislators. In
the absence of this proportion of Turkish Cypriot support for a joint ticket, there would likely
have to be provisions that allowed Turkish Cypriots to elect their presidential nominee
separately;
¾ the position of president is rotated between its Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot member on a
2:1 basis rather than a 3:2 basis;
¾ the cabinet is appointed on a 6:3 (or 4:2) GC/TC basis rather than a 4:3 basis
3. The Option of a Split (Presidential-Parliamentary) Executive

This paper has focused on two options: the new Greek Cypriot proposal for an executive president
directly elected by the 20% rule and the new Turkish Cypriot proposal for an indirectly elected strong
president. However, there is a third option that should not be discarded. This is the option of a ‘split
executive’, i.e. a directly elected president with either symbolic or executive powers, combined with
an indirectly elected parliamentary executive.
Neither side has ruled out the idea of a split executive. The Greek Cypriot advisers told me that it was
possible they would accept a split executive, as a result of the ‘give and take’ round. The Turkish
Cypriot adviser, as noted above, has explicitly endorsed a split executive with a directly elected
symbolic presidency, and a split executive with a directly elected executive presidency as the 2nd and 3rd
preferences of Turkish Cypriots, respectively.
A split executive would split the difference between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots by giving the
former their preferred directly elected presidency and the latter their preferred indirectly elected
executive. The issue of how the president of a split executive would be directly elected would still be
6
an important issue, but Turkish Cypriots may be slightly more open to the 20% rule being used to
directly elect the president of a split executive than to directly elect an exclusively presidential
executive.
Conclusion
My view of the new Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot proposals is that they narrow the gap between
the two sides, without closing it completely. The next steps might usefully involve exploring with the
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot advisers the points that have been raised here under the headings
‘Making the 20% rule more palatable to Turkish Cypriots’ on p. 3 and ‘Making an indirectly elected
presidency more palatable to Greek Cypriots’ on p.6.
It is likely, however, that agreement on the executive, if it happens, will not take place until the ‘give
and take’ round predicted for May/June or thereabouts. Greek Cypriots, as they’ve hinted, are likely to
be more willing to concede on the executive, if they get concessions on property, territory, and security.
Turkish Cypriots may be more willing to compromise on the federal executive, in return for Greek
Cypriot concessions on the powers of the constituent states.
7
Page 1 of 2

To: Elizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: Re: good offices
Dear Elizabeth,
Donatella Giubilaro : has extensive experience with the United Nations in New York with the
Department of Political Affairs and in the field in Ethiopia, where she worked with the UN
Commission for Africa for four years. Before Cyprus, she has been working as the desk officer for
UNOWA, the United Nations Nations Office for West Africa in the UN Department of Political
Affairs.
Steven Bourke : has a background in political analysis and conflict resolution. He previously
worked as Director of Research at the University Center for international conflict resolution at
Columbia University. He focused on peace-building initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as
in the Middle East.
Fiona Mullen : has a background as a researcher and economic analyst for various publications
including the Economic Intelligence Unit. She has written extensively on the economy in Cyprus
and has written several publications on the economic costs of a settlement with PRIO.
do you think this would be enough?

I got a question on this also by the Gk mission. Alexis told me that Steven was apparently in the
GkCyp news as the new property guru on AD's team and I told Yasser it is better for him to keep
a bit of a lower profile and to present himself as facilitator to the parties, which is effectively his
job.
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Elizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO
Elizabeth ToSonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Spehar/NY/UNO cc
Subjectgood offices
04/03/2009 04:07
PM
Dear Sonja,
Page 2 of 2
Do we have short bios on the three facilitators now confirmed for the G.O? Some Missions have
been asking...
Thanks,
E.
Page 1 of 1

Date: Thursday, March 05, 2009 12:08AM

Subject: Fwd: Clarification of your position
FYI
John
>Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2009 17:06:17 -0500

>To: avmavro@cytanet.com.cy
>From: John McGarry <john.mcgarry@queensu.ca>
>Subject: Clarification of your position
>Cc: ttsielepis@presidency.gov.cy
>
>Dear Andreas and Toumazos,
>
>I hope the two of you are well.
>
>I received the attached summary of your position on the election of
>the presidency from Donatella Giubilaro yesterday. Your position is
>exactly as I understood it after our meeting in mid-February. Both
>of you were very clear on this, including the point that the
>presidential elections should involve two rounds, with the 2nd round
>taking place as I had outlined in my paper.
>
>The position that you put forward at our meeting (and have confirmed
>in the attachment) is the one that I conveyed to SASG Downer, both
>orally and in writing.
>
>I very much look forward to future engagements with both of you. In
>the meantime, please do not hesitate to get in touch with me
>directly if you have any questions or concerns.
>
>
>Best wishes,
>
>
>John McGarry
>
>
>.
Attachments:
Page 1 of 1

cc: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Date: Thursday, March 05, 2009 01:43PM

Subject: 5 March 2009 Leaders Meeting
Leaders Meeting 5 March 2009
· The leaders had a tête-à-tête (1h30)
· GkCyps presented a response to the TkCyp property commission proposal and then
presented a counter proposal, rejecting sub-commissions in which TkCyp, or GkCyp would
have a casting vote and emphasizing the centralization of decision making powers.
· Both sides were open to considering all proposals on the grounds that the process be
streamlined, retain a fully bi-communal character and be capable of disentangling past, complex
and local transfers, sales and bequests.
· Next meeting of the leaders will be on Wednesday, 11 March at 10:00 am. They will discuss
EU matters (agenda to be discussed by representatives before the meeting).
· Next meeting of the representatives will be on Thursday, 12 March at 3:00 PM. They will
discuss property (criteria), governance (finalization of joint papers) and, with renewed
commitment, CBMs.
Steven Jay Bourke

Good Offices
P.O. Box 21642
1590 Nicosia
Cyprus
Work: + 357 22 614 133

Mobile: + 357 99 207 321
Page 1 of 1

To: <cibor@un.org>, "'Timothy Alchin'" <alchin@un.org>, <giubilaro@un.org>,
<sabra@un.org>, <bourkes@un.org>, "'Sonja Bachmann'" <bachmanns@un.org>
Date: Friday, March 06, 2009 04:08AM

Subject:
From: Menelaos Menelaou [mailto:mmenelaou@mfa.gov.cy]

Sent: Friday, March 06, 2009 4:05 AM
To: 'mehmet.dana@kktcb.eu'
Subject:
Our papers
Attachments:
GREEK CYPRIOT POSITION PROPERTY BOARD. GREEK CYPRIOT RESPONSE ON THE TC PROPO
doc SAL ON PROPERTY.27 2 09.doc
GREEK CYPRIOT POSITION PROPERTY BOARD.doc
GREEK CYPRIOT PROPOSAL ON THE CYPRUS PROPERTY
COMMISSION (CPC) AND THE PROPERTY COURT
The Agreement on the property issue will be implemented by a

mechanism consisting of one Cyprus Property Commission (CPC) and
one Property Court.
1.1. The CPC Structure.
(1) An Independent and Impartial body the CPC will be established
soon after the signing of the Agreement, mandated to resolve property
claims as per the agreed principles and criteria.
(2) The CPC will have its headquarters in Nicosia.
(3) The CPC will be composed of an equal number of GC and TC
members, who must be of recognized high moral standing and
professionally qualified.
(4) All the decisions of the Property Commission will be taken by
simple majority and will be subject to appeal to the Property Court,
under terms and conditions to be agreed.
(5) The CPC will have an Executive Secretariat responsible for
receiving, registering and replying to claims, notifying parties and
processing claims for the consideration of the CPC. With a view to
expediting the whole process, the Executive Secretariat will establish
District Offices in each federated unit, as well Sub-Offices,
especially where large numbers of displaced persons reside.
(6) The District Offices as well as the Sub-Offices will be staffed by
the professionals of the Executive Secretariat and other local staff and
2
will be empowered to provide information to claimants on
procedures for submitting a property claim.
(7) Claims received by the District and Sub Office personnel are
researched and verified and the complete file is forwarded to the Head
Office of the Executive Secretariat.
(8) In order to facilitate the greatest access to those affected, it
should be possible to submit claims by post or by proxy, as well as in
person.
1.2. Powers of the Cyprus Property Commission
1. The CPC will have the following powers:
a) To receive claims by natural and legal persons who claim to be the
owners of affected properties, substantiating their claim and stating
what their wishes are regarding the concerned property.
b) To decide whether the applicants are actually the owners of the
specific property and to issue a Certificate of Ownership.
c) To investigate about the current status of the properties concerned
by receiving information from the current users regarding details of
the use of the property, as well as of the extend and the value of any
improvements effected on the property.
d) To take decisions on the appropriate remedy regarding any affected
property on the basis of the expressed wish of the owner and the
agreed principles and criteria.
e) To address the practical problems to be faced by current users and
to plan for the solution of the problems in an appropriate manner.
f) To effect any transactions necessary to transfer or assign title,
mortgage, lease, or otherwise dispose of property with respect to
which a claim is made, or which is determined to be abandoned.
3
g) To notify its decisions to the owners and to the current users.

h) To establish a Centralized Computerized Property Data Bank for all
affected properties in which all basic information about these
properties and all the relevant decisions of the Commission will be
entered.
i) To refer any question arising in respect of an affected property to
the Property Court for an opinion, or to any other competent authority
for consultation and for finalization of any decision.
j) To decide within its competence on any matter relating to the
implementation of the new property regime.
1.3. General Conditions of Process
(1)It should be ensured that all aspects of the Property Claims
Process, including appeals procedures, are just, timely, accessible, free
of charge, and are age and gender sensitive.
(2) Claim Forms should be developed that are simple and easy to
understand and use and make them available in Greek, Turkish and
English.
(3)Upon receipt of a Claim, the CPC shall determine the lawful owner
of the property with respect to which the claim is made and the value
of that property.
(4) Subject to conditions to be agreed, the CPC decisions shall be
subject to review or appeal by the Property Court.
(5) The decisions of the Property Court shall be final and conclusive.
4
(6) Failure to cooperate with the CPC shall not prevent it from
taking its decision.
1.4. Procedure for submitting Claims
1. Within one year from the establishment of the CPC, all

dispossessed owners may submit a claim to any of the CPC Offices
(Headquarters, District, Sub-Offices).
2. “Claim Forms” will be available to all persons who claim to be the
owners of affected properties. “Declaration Forms” of persons claiming
to be the current users of affected properties will also be available.
3. On the Claim Forms and on the Declaration Forms the particulars of
the property or properties concerned must be provided and any
relevant documentation must be attached. The claimants should also
state on the Claim Forms what remedy they choose for their property.
4. All relevant data of the Claim Forms and the Declarations will be
entered into the Centralized Property Data Bank and all claims will
then be collected at the Headquarters and forwarded to the District
Office where the property is situated.
5. The District Office will then a) make the necessary inquiries as to
whether the claimant is actually the owner (or co-owner) of the
affected property b) what was the condition and value of the property
at the time of dispossession and c) what is the current condition of the
property, its current use and current value.
6. The District Office will prepare a report and will return the
application to Headquarters.
5
1.5. Property Court
1. The Property Court will be established soon after the signing of the
Agreement and will have its seat in Nicosia.
2. The Property Court is mandated to undertake an independent
review of the decisions of the CPC.
3. The Property Court shall be composed of an equal number of
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Judges of recognized high moral
standing and professionally qualified, to be nominated by the Federal
Executive.
4. The Property Court shall take its decisions by a majority vote. A
federal law shall provide for the competences and the procedure of the
Property Court.
26 February 2009
GREEK CYPRIOT RESPONSE ON THE TC PROPOSAL ON PROPERTY.27 2
09.doc
GREEK CYPRIOT RESPONSE ON THE “TURKISH CYPRIOT
PROPOSAL ON PROPERTY COMMISSION
AND SUB-COMMISSIONS”
The Greek Cypriot side is reiterating its position in favour of
a property claims mechanism consisting of only one decision
making body responsible for deciding claims in the first instance,
the Cyprus Property Commission, and one decision making body
responsible for deciding appeals, the Property Court.
In general terms the Greek Cypriot side agrees with the
Turkish Cypriot side’s proposal on the composition and functions
of the Property Court, as outlined in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the
Turkish Cypriot paper. However, we cannot agree with the
Turkish Cypriot proposal envisaging three decision-making
bodies i.e. one Property Commission and two Sub-Commissions.
Despite the pronouncement of the Turkish Cypriot side that its
proposal is a bridging one, we find no real difference between the
proposal submitted at the Working Group level and the one
submitted during the negotiations. Both envisage three decision
making bodies and in particular they envisage a separate decision
making body in the first instance for each federated unit deciding
on property claims regarding “affected properties located in the
territory of the relevant constituent state”.
Our preference for a centralized decision making body is
grounded in the following considerations:
a) A single decision-making body deciding on all claims would
strengthen the independent and impartial nature of the
Commission, as well as the consistency of decisions. On the
contrary, the nature of the proposed Sub-Commissions, with
2
members nominated by the federated units and especially with

the casting vote of the President, who would hold such position
on ethnic grounds, not only does not secure the independence
and impartiality of the whole process but it firmly entrenches
communal bias, more so because of the casting vote of the
president.
b) The long standing mistrust between the two communities
would necessitate a single body deciding on all claims irrespective
of the location of the affected property and the ethnic background
of the claimant. The Greek Cypriot proposal envisages Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot claims being dealt by a single
decision making body, thus ensuring consistency. On the
contrary, the Turkish Cypriot proposal envisages that the Greek
Cypriot claimants would submit their claims to the Sub-
Commission presided by a Turkish Cypriot member and the
Turkish Cypriot claimants would submit their claims to the Sub-
Commission presided by the Greek Cypriot member.
Undoubtedly, such arrangements based on ethnic background,
are divisive and do not support unity and consistency.
c) The small size of Cyprus and the relatively small number of
claims compared to other countries that have set up property
claims mechanisms would favor a centralized decision making
body.
d) What remains of utmost importance are the principles and
the criteria to be agreed, as well as the necessary preparatory
work in respect of each particular claim before it reaches the
decision making level. For this reason the Greek Cypriot side
3
proposed principles and criteria that will be applied uniformly

throughout Cyprus.
e) The Greek Cypriot side’s proposal envisages two stages of
decision making, one in the first instance, i.e. decisions of the
CPC and one to consider the appeals against the decisions of the
CPC. The Turkish Cypriot proposal envisages three stages of
decision making, i.e. one in the first instance by the Sub-
Commissions, a second by the Property Commission dealing with
appeals against the decisions of the Sub-Commission and a third
one, by the Property Court dealing with appeals against the
Property Commission decisions. We strongly feel that such
complicated structures will overload the whole claims programme
with unnecessary intermediary appeal processes which will
greatly prolong the final settlement of the property issue. A two
stage decision making, on the other hand, by single body decision
making bodies would safeguard and enhance efficiency,
independence, impartiality and a faster resolution of the property
issue.
f) A Computerised Property Data Bank, which will be
established soon after the establishment of the CPC, will help the
Executive Secretariat and its District and Sub-Offices to
adequately prepare the file of each particular claim so that
decision making by the CPC will be facilitated.
Page 1 of 4
From: Arnaud Amouroux/NY/UNO

To: Annick Hiensch/NY/UNO@UNHQ
cc: DPA-Europe, Roselyn Akombe/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: Re: Fw: TP request -- Working Luncheon with the P-5 hosted by H.E. Sir John Sawers
(PR, UNITED KINGDOM), Followed by bilateral meeting with Amb. Sawers on 6 March
Hi Annick,
Please find the first batch of TPs (for the SG's meeting with the UK Ambassador), as
cleared by the Director.
The rest will reach you as soon as we get the pending Somalia's input.
Cheers,
Arnaud
Annick Hiensch/NY/UNO
Annick ToObinna Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Hiensch/NY/UNO ccDPA-Europe, Erwan
Pouchous/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Kamal
04/03/2009 11:47 Amakrane/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Mari
AM Yamashita/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Renata
Dwan/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Ejeviome
Otobo/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Tamrat
Samuel/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Axel
Wennmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Christopher
Coleman/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Michele
Griffin/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Anne-Laure
Sans/United Nations@UNHQ-DPKO, Andrew
Cox/OCHA/NY@OCHA, Shani
Harris/OCHA/NY@OCHA, Teresa
Lenzi/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Juwang
Zhu/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Roselyn
Akombe/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Venessa
Blair/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Lee
O'Brien/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Michael
Contet/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Kiyoshi
Matsukawa/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Mamadi
Toure/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Horst
Heitmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Melanie
Page 2 of 4
Redondo/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Steven
Siqueira/NY/UNO@UNHQ
SubjectFw: TP request -- Working Luncheon with
the P-5 hosted by H.E. Sir John Sawers (PR,
UNITED KINGDOM), Followed by bilateral
meeting with Amb. Sawers on 6 March
Dear Obinna,
Further to our discussion, please see below the topics for the P5 lunch, and the expanded list of
topics for the bilateral with Ambassador Sawers.
Departments/divisions listed in bold below who have not already sent inputs, please send your
inputs to Mr Obinna Okamgba by 4 p.m. today, Wednesday 4 March.
Obi, please send the cleared TPs to OUSG by 10 a.m. tomorrow, Thursday 5 March.
P5 Luncheon hosted by UK Ambassador (6 March):
- SG's impressions on the prospects of progress from his trip to the ME (DPA Ms Lee
O'Brien)
- Issues in the SECCO during the next few months:
+ Peacebuilding (Somalia and the DRC) (PBSO Ms Renata Dwan and DPKO Ms
Anne-Laure Sans)
+ Sudan (DPKO Ms Anne-Laure Sans)
+ Prospects for the intergovernmental negotiations on Sec Co Reform (DPA Mr
Horst Heitmann)
Meeting with the UK Ambassador (6 March):
- Burma (DPA Mr Erwan Pouchous)

- Post-conflict Peacebuilding (PBSO Ms Renata Dwan)
- Sudan (DPKO Ms Anne Laure Sans)
Sincerely,
Annick
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Annick Hiensch
Office of the Under-Secretary-General
United Nations, New York
Tel. 917.367.9613
Fax. 212.963.5065
hiensch@un.org
__________________
Dear Obinna,
Please see below the request for talking points for the SG's bilateral with Ambassador Sawers
(UK) after the Working Luncheon with the P-5 hosted by Sawers, scheduled for Friday, 6 March.
The topics for the bilateral with Amb Sawers are Myanmar and post-conflict peacebuilding. The
Page 3 of 4
topics for the Working Lunch are forthcoming.
Departments and divisions, please send your inputs for both of these meetings to Mr Obinna
Okamgba by c.o.b. on Tuesday, 3 March.
Obi, please send the two sets of TPs to OUSG (Sascha, Roselyn, and me) by c.o.b. on
Wednesday, 4 March.
Sincerely,
Annick
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Annick Hiensch
Tel. 917.367.9613
Fax. 212.963.5065
hiensch@un.org
----- Forwarded by Annick Hiensch/NY/UNO on 25/02/2009 12:33 PM -----
Kaori ToAlexandra Pichler/NY/UNO

Minami/NY/UNO ccAnne-Laure Sans/United Nations@UNHQ-
DPKO@UN-MAILHUB, Annick
25/02/2009 12:31 Hiensch/NY/UNO, Roselyn Akombe/NY/UNO,
PM Juwang Zhu/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Teresa
Lenzi/NY/UNO, Andrew Cox/OCHA/NY, Shani
Harris/OCHA/NY@OCHA@UN-MAILHUB,
Renata Dwan/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Yeocheol
Yoon/NY/UNO, Sebastien Lawson/NY/UNO,
Celine Varin/NY/UNO
SubjectRequest fro Talking points -- Working
Luncheon with the P-5 hosted by H.E. Sir
John Sawers (PR, UNITED KINGDOM),
Followed by bilateral meeting with Amb.
Sawers on 6 March
Dear Sascha --
We are expecting the topics for the P5 Lunch to come in by Friday, but we do have the topics for
the bilat
with Ambassador Sawers on 6 March.
It would be appreciated if DPA could take the lead and send talking points for both the
luncheon and the bilateral meeting by Thursday 5 March 2009 - noon . (PBSO is also copied
on
this email)
Please send them to me (cc. Celine Varin).
Thank you
Page 4 of 4
Kaori Minami
EOSG
Date: 25-02-09
To: DPA
cc: Other concerned depts, relevant EOSG Director
(s), Office of the CdC, SOSG staff
From: The Scheduling Office of the
Secretary-General
Request for talking points for the
Secretary-General
Name of Interlocutor: Bilateral with UK Ambassador Sawers
Date and duration of 6 March 3 pm
meeting with SG:
Due in EOSG: 5 March (noon)
Purpose of meeting/ issues to be MYANMAR
discussed: POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING
Other departments to be
consulted:
It is the responsibility of the

lead department to consult
other departments and
offices, as appropriate, even
if not explicitly mentioned in
this request.
Remarks:
Attachments:
Background Note SG - PR UK (6 March 09).doc TPs SG - UK PR (6 March 09).doc
TPs SG - UK PR (6 March 09).doc
Talking Points for the Secretary-General’ s meeting with

H.E. John Sawers, Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom to the United Nations
(New York, 6 March at 3 p.m.)
Myanmar
x Following my Special Adviser’s latest visit to

Myanmar, my good offices remain the only accepted
channel with access to the Government and the
Opposition. I am personally committed to build on our
efforts so far.
x The UN is not in a position to endorse or reject any

particular process. Our course has always been one of
dialogue and your support is key to enable us to
mediate, to find a mutually acceptable way forward.
x Regarding my possible visit to Myanmar, I am

grateful for the support of Member States in order to
ensure a well-prepared and timely “return-visit”.
x Concerted efforts are needed to translate the support

for my good offices into a single approach, including a
“toolbox” to support our engagement.
x I appreciate the leadership role the UK has played in

humanitarian efforts. I count on your continued
support, especially for the Post-Nargis Recovery and
Preparedness Plan and for extending the Tripartite
Core Group beyond June 2009.
1
Post-conflict peacebuilding
Objective: To discuss the forthcoming report of the Secretary-

General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict
x I am grateful to the UK for its leadership on

strengthening the international community’s
response immediately after conflict and for its
support to the Peacebuilding Support Office.
x A fast and effective UN response to post-conflict

contexts is essential. We cannot afford to have
protracted, expensive operations. I intend to make
the forthcoming report practical and forward-looking
and to address the gaps identified by the UK and
others in the Security Council last May.
x I am determined to continue UN management reform.

I share your view that clear designation of
responsibilities within the system is critical for the
development of the necessary expertise and the
provision of rapid and high quality support in
peacebuilding.
x This demands an integrated approach and the smooth

transition from one part of the UN system to another.
2
x We are making good progress in humanitarian and

peacekeeping areas. But we still have a way to go and
we need to focus on improving the response of UN
development and peacebuilding actors so as to
become faster and more predictable.
x Equally critical is the need to ensure that the UN is

equipped with the authority and resources to play the
international coordination role it is sometimes
assigned at Headquarters and in the field.
x I look to continued UK leadership to ensure that

Member States, particularly donors, are behind this
effort to make the UN system more coherent and
effective.
Somalia
x AMISOM is extremely vulnerable to Improvised

Explosive Devices (IEDs). Would the UK consider
providing basic counter IED training for AMISOM
engineers?
x We are grateful to the UK for providing the services of

Brigadier Davidson-Houston, who co-chairs (with the
AU) the Somali Joint Security Committee (JSC). The
JSC is expected to take a decision soon concerning
the training of the Somali joint military force,
comprising 5,000 military personnel.
3
x The UK has an impressive experience in training

military forces in Africa. The International Military
Assistance Training Team (IMATT) model used in
Sierra Leone has been a remarkable success. Could
you help the Somali Government in a similar manner?
You could also assist in encouraging other partners
such as Italy, the US, and France to help in this
regard, including through the payment of allowances
for the forces.
Sudan (to be sent separately)
4
Background Note SG - PR UK (6 March 09).docConfidential
Background Note for the Secretary-General’ s meeting

with H.E. John Sawers, Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom to the United Nations
(New York, 6 March at 3 p.m.)
Myanmar
The UK welcomed the Special Adviser’s latest visit to Myanmar as

“much better” in terms of process and has invited him to London for
further consultations. However, the UK remains highly critical of
Myanmar’s lack of cooperation and of the Government’s Roadmap
process. The UK continues to advocate for an early return-visit by the
Secretary-General “without preconditions”, contrary to the US,
France and others who support a “well-prepared and timely visit”.
The UK, the US and France recently seemed to be adopting a more
constructive tone, including a willingness to work with partners in the
region. The UK has doubled its bilateral humanitarian aid to
Myanmar and remains the largest contributor both to the UN relief
appeal for Cyclone Nargis and to the Three Diseases Fund.
Meanwhile, the ASEAN Summit on 1 March endorsed the planned
2010 election and called on Myanmar to cooperate with the UN good
offices as the primary channel of international engagement.
SG Report on Post-conflict Peacebuilding
A major concern of the UN is that many countries relapse into conflict

after an initial period of stabilization. The post-conflict situation
provides a window of opportunity to address the needs of the most
vulnerable and (re)build more efficient and equitable resource
management and distribution mechanisms. Experience has
demonstrated that an integrated multi-dimensional approach to early
recovery and peacebuilding is crucial to assist countries in their path
towards sustainable development and lasting peace.
In S/PRST/2008/16, the Security Council requested the Secretary-

General to provide advice on how the UN system might better
support countries in recovering from conflict. The UK identified three
critical gaps of the international community at the early phase -
strategy and leadership, financing and deployable civilian expertise.
Background Note SG - PR UK (6 March 09).docConfidential
The Peacebuilding Support Office was tasked to draft the SG’s report.
Wide consultations have been held in the UN and with Member
States. A first draft has been distributed to UN entities for review by
the Policy Committee on 31 March. The report is scheduled to be
released to the Security Council and the General Assembly in late
May.
The UK sees this report as an important opportunity to pursue UN

reform, the delivery of a ‘One UN’ and to strengthen the UN’s
peacebuilding approach and instruments. The UK may suggest that
the Secretary-General become an active champion for a faster and
more predictable UN response and, in this context, encourage the
earlier engagement of UN instruments in peacebuilding contexts.
The draft report addresses issues of the early establishment of a

common peacebuilding strategy; improved UN capacities to rapidly
deploy civilian experts; UN leadership and coordination of an
international response, faster funding and national capacity building.
The report will underscore the importance of UN-World Bank
cooperation and the importance of building on the post-crises
partnership agreement signed in December 2008 by the Secretary-
General and President Zoellick.
The UK places considerable importance on stronger partnership

between the UN and the World Bank in post-conflict contexts. It
believes that a more effective UN response requires clearly designated
roles and responsibilities within the UN system to provide rapid and
predictable assistance, including rapidly deployable civilian
capacities.
The Secretary-General may wish to assure the UK that he will

continue the ongoing exercise, through the Policy Committee, of
clearly designating roles and responsibilities in priority areas of early
peacebuilding. He may further wish to indicate that he will introduce
regular monitoring of the implementation of an integrated UN
approach in post-conflict contexts.
Page 1 of 2

To: Alexander Downer <adowner@bespokeapproach.com>@UN-MAILHUB

Subject: Re: US Institute of Peace and MAT
yep so we are moving forward, insciallah. Steven, yes, what a character, ES told me today there
should be no other 'guru' than you in the press! She would like to talk to you on a regular basis,
ie. every two weeks.
my colleague in the UK mission approached me today and told me that Iacovou also told the UK
High Commissioner about his concerns with re to HvH. I mentioned to him that he seemed 'clean'
to us and he also said that they would always find something so better moving ahead. On the
upcoming UNFICYP report they (SECCO) are still not clear if it will be in June under the Tk
Presidency or anticipated to May under the Russian Presidency. It seems to the Uk that the Tks
would vote against though....
I talked to the Russian mission here and they will give me a couple of dates when Lavrov is
available. I also called the Chinese but he did not call me back yet (probably still checking with
the central committee....)
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Alexander Downer To<bachmanns@un.org>

<adowner@bespokeapproach.com> cc
SubjectRe: US Institute of
05/03/2009 04:44 PM Peace and MAT
No I don't think so.

Stephen got a big run in the media!
But a good day yesterday on property. Taye did well on CBMs ie he did what a asked and it
worked somewhat.

Sent: Fri Mar 06 02:54:19 2009
Subject: US Institute of Peace and MAT
Hi Alexander,
Page 2 of 2
a friend of mine working with the US Institute of Peace will be organizing a panel with Mr. Talat in
Washington on 31st March and he asked me if there were any messages he could mention which
would help us on the process? I told him the usual, importance of steady progress in the talks
and confidence building measures, bicommunal trust building etc. Anything you would like to
raise?
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 1


Subject: cable on today's meeting
fyi.
Attachments:
DPA_Digi.pdf
Page 1 of 2

To: "'Sonja Bachmann'" <bachmanns@un.org>
Date: Friday, March 06, 2009 09:41PM

Subject: RE:
Hi Sonja,
It was really a constructive one compared to the previous. At least we have closed the chapter with some
prospect for convergence on the Property Commission which is a good step at this stage of the negotiations.
When are you coming back?
M.

Sent: Thursday, March 05, 2009 5:18 PM
To: mmenelaou@mfa.gov.cy
Subject: Re:
Dear Menelaos,
many thanks for this. I heard it was a constructive ending of property in the meantime. Will be seeing you soon.
best wishes,
Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus : 357.99207324
Page 2 of 2
"Menelaos Menelaou" < mmenelaou@mfa.gov.cy > To <cibor@un.org>, "'Timothy Alchin'" <alchin@un.org>, < giubilaro@un.org >, <
sabra@un.org >, < bourkes@un.org >, "'Sonja Bachmann'"
<bachmanns@un.org>
cc
05/03/2009 09:08 PM
Subject
From: Menelaos Menelaou [mailto: mmenelaou@mfa.gov.cy ]

Sent: Friday, March 06, 2009 4:05 AM
To: ' mehmet.dana@kktcb.eu '
Subject:
Our papers [attachment "GREEK CYPRIOT POSITION PROPERTY BOARD.doc" deleted by Sonja
Bachmann/NY/UNO] [attachment "GREEK CYPRIOT RESPONSE ON THE TC PROPOSAL ON
PROPERTY.27 2 09.doc" deleted by Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO]
--
This message has been scanned for viruses and
dangerous content by MailScanner on as01.gov.cy, and is
believed to be clean.
Page 1 of 3

To: Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ@UN-MAILHUB@UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICS BASE

Subject: Re: Fw: Greek Cypriot Press Headlines – Thursday, March 5, 2008
Dear Sonja:
Please find attached the article by Mete and Rebecca which I showed you before regarding the
historic “Jasmine Revolution.” The “Jasmine Movement” is the aftermath of the events therein
described. Presently, the “Jasmine Movement” is joining with the UNITED CYPRUS PARTY (BKP),
purportedly Marxist, “north Cyprus branch of AKEL,” to develop a platform for the upcoming
elections. The Secretary-General of BKP is øzzet ø ZCAN. Some prominent members are ùENER
LEVENT,ÜLKER FAHRø,TURGUT AVùAROö LU. Additional aligned figures include the
supporters of MUSTAFA AKINCI who are disenchanted with new Communal Democratic Party
(TDP) leadership (Mehmet Chacici), primarily HASAN KAHVECøOöLU. There are also some
intellectuals and academicians affiliated with the movement, primarily ZEKø BEùøKTEPELø . They
support peace at any cost! T hey mainly identify themselves as CYPRø OTS. They think PERSONAL
FREE CHOøCE is a solution to property issue. They are all loved by Greek TVs and media. Their
differences with the NEW CYPRUS PARTY are personal. They do not accept ALPAY DURDURAN,
who you met, as their political “guru.”
Steven Jay Bourke

Good Offices
P.O. Box 21642
1590 Nicosia
Cyprus
Work: + 357 22 614 133

Mobile: + 357 99 207 321
Sonja Bachmann---05/03/2009 16:55:14---do you know who is part of the "yasmine

movement"? - noticed it in the recent press clippings. Sonj
From: Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ

To: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Steven Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Donatella
Giubilaro/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Fiona
Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Obinna
Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ
Date: 05/03/2009 16:55
Subject: Fw: Greek Cypriot Press Headlines – Thursday, March 5, 2008
Page 2 of 3
do you know who is part of the "yasmine movement"? - noticed it in the recent press clippings.
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Neophytos To
Evdokiou/UNFICYP@UNFICYP cc
SubjectGreek Cypriot Press Headlines –
05/03/2009 02:42 AM Thursday, March 5, 2008
Greek Cypriot Press Headlines – Thursday, March 5, 2008
Phileleftheros
xBell tolls for Ankara – Rehn: Abandon gunboat diplomacy

x“Van Rijn very dangerous”, former honorary consul in Hague Tasoula Hadjitofi says – Ex-associate of Turkish
antiquities smuggler Dikmen knows whereabouts of Ap. Andrew mosaic
xChange of guard at NG – List of candidates for new commander next week – Greece insists on appointment
of Greek chief of staff
xTurkish colonel describes Akin’s claims as groundless – “To kill someone with stones and clubs constitutes
savage murder”
xNegative assessment of government’s handling – AKEL first, DISY close behind [in ANT1 poll]
xOlgac claims that murder was… script
xHe sees agreement in 2009 – Talat requests intensification of process from the five
x“Jasmine Movement” stands in pseudo-elections – Wants withdrawal from Turkey but also trizonal solution
Politis
xSponsorship for private clinics increases – New bill reinforces patients who are sent away from hospital –
Patients themselves will have a say on where they are treated
xEverything black – Every yesterday was better, T/Cs say on economy – CTP questions poll findings – No to
sale of G/C properties from 63,5% of respondents
xScent of jasmine – Participation in “elections” from Jasmine Movement
xHe points to give-and-take – Talat’s promises and demands vis-à-vis the UN 5
xHe insists it was a script – Attila Olgac tells state attorney: “I did not kill any G/C”
xWe will sell grace from occupied areas – Development ratio will be allowed to be transferred to free areas
Alithia
xCrucial hour for social security system – Key is with DIKO – It will table amendment and if accepted, it will
vote for bill
x“Elections” in the occupied areas: Behold the new deadline
xT/Cs for shopping, G/Cs for casinos – Use of Visa cards on either side of the line
xFinal split in Diko – Leading cadres accuse Nicolas Papadopoulos of provoking conflict with his candidacy
xEUROKO: Christofias government damaging on Cyprus problem
Page 3 of 3
xANT1 poll: DISY closes the gap

xLeak brought clashes – Will be to the fore at next meeting of National Council
xCompletion of property issue – New Christofias-Talat meeting today
xKyrenia gets its own English School – School, which is being funded by Kibris media group, belongs to family
of Asil Nadir’s sister – Will be built on road to Bellapais and take up 11.000 sq metres
Haravgi
xProtagonists for Cyprus – Left Group in European Parliament
xOur society has become more just – AKEL replies to DISY’s nihilistic policy with facts
xIrresponsibility towards National Council – AKEL rejects insulting aspersions from Perdikis
xGround breaking event at Kition gymnasium for a peaceful and free united country
Simerini
xResponsibility for the murder – Aspersions concerning inertia from government services – It could have been
avoided, police says
xProperty issue “closes” today – DIKO and EUROKO concerned about course of talks
xSerious aspersions from Giorgos Perdikis and… ball in Presidential Palace’s court – Issue of leaks will be
tabled in National Council
x“Leave Rizokarpasso gymnasium in peace” – Teachers’ movement Allagi says
xAkin’s gun was in firing position – Statements from retired Turkish colonel
xTurgay Avci: “Not even one soldier will leave”
Machi
x“He beat us and I wanted to kill him” – Horror behind murder of Antonis Antoniades
xCurtain falls on property issue – Joint decision of Christofias and Talat to move on
xConflict in occupied areas over Solomou’s murder
xCypriots negative on everything – Fourth Cypriot barometer from ANTENNA
xGovernment monitoring so-called elections
Attachments:
Hatay & Bryant - Jasmine.pdf
The Jasmine Scent of Nicosia:
Of Returns, Revolutions, and the
Longing for Forbidden Pasts
Mete Hatay and Rebecca Bryant
Abstract
In the past decade in Cyprus, the jasmine flower has become the symbol of
Nicosia, the island’s divided capital, and subsequently of a revolution within
the Turkish-Cypriot community. As symbol of Nicosia, the jasmine flower evoked
a purer time when the city had not yet been “tainted” by an influx of poor
workers from Turkey into areas of the walled city that had been abandoned by
Turkish-Cypriots. As such, the flower also came to stand for Turkey’s purported
colonization of the island and Turkish-Cypriots’ rebellion against it. And
because the jasmine came to represent a city that had once been multicultural
and a call for a re-valuing of the local, it was easy enough for the Jasmine
Revolution to be translated into a semblance of bicommunalism. But as we
show here, rather than a multicultural nostalgia, the nostalgia expressed by the
symbol of the jasmine is for a period when Turkish-Cypriots lived in enclaves,
a period of deprivation but also of solidarity.
Who can forget the scent of jasmine? Modest,

limpid, deliciously fragrant jasmine flowers. . . .
There were always jasmine flowers even in the
butcher’s shop, and on my red bicycle. They’re
the truest witness to our pain. Jasmine is the true
peace flower which didn’t wilt even in the heat
of war, the friend who is always present at our
bedside even in the worst of days.1
Jasmine seems to be a flower made for nostalgia. It grows in doorways

and winds over arches, linking it to the intimacy of home. It begins to
bloom as the days become hotter, and it releases its scent at the hour
when tables are set in the garden or in narrow lanes. It is associated
with the melancholy of dusk and the conviviality of summer evenings.
Its fragrance permeates the air, making it both a background for and
Journal of Modern Greek Studies 26 (2008) 423–449 © 2008 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
423
424 Mete Hatay and Rebecca Bryant
participant in scenes of love and liberation, of youth and its loss. And
its scent lingers, clinging to hands and clothes and giving it the tone
of longing.
Over the past decade in Cyprus, this flower of nostalgia has been
associated first with a city, then with a common past, and finally with
a moment of historical change that sparked a revolution. For Greek-
Cypriots, the folk song, Το Γιασεμί Μου, (My Jasmine) with its theme of
intercommunal love, gained popularity as part of the rising importance
of local identities that coincided with a movement for reunification of the
island. Both the song and the flower became associated with a longing
for a simpler village life that presumably was bicommunal. But the flower
became especially important to a new Turkish-Cypriot opposition move-
ment that promoted the possibilities for a common future and named
its rebellion the Yasemin Devrimi, the Jasmine Revolution.
Jasmine and its scent have played an important role in the culture
and contradictions of a movement for social change. Its white, untainted
petals, and the association of the scent with a city and with youth, made
the flower a potent symbol for a generation of journalists, poets, and
left-wing and liberal politicians as they gathered the momentum to rebel
against a present that they saw as aged and corrupt. The flower and its
scent appeared to represent a new valuing of the local and its multicul-
tural pasts in the context of globalized economies and a transnational
European community where the provincial nationalisms to which Cypriot
political leaders clung no longer seemed salient. The nostalgic associa-
tions evoked by the flower also contradicted its multicultural tint, since
the flower is linked in stories, poetry, and common conversation to a
particular period of the Turkish-Cypriot past that excluded their Greek
neighbors.
The Jasmine Revolution, then, used nostalgia as a form of cultural
politics and cultural resistance. When İl Adalı, daughter of murdered
journalist Kutlu Adalı, wrote “Give me back my jasmine flowers,” her
cryptic demand viscerally evoked not only the loss of hope and a purer
past, but also a sense that these had been absconded.2 “I want my jasmine
flowers back,” she wrote.
In the name of my father, in the name of my mother, in the name of my
friends, in the name of all the islanders. The wonderful days that were lived
must not remain in memory; we must speak of the future by stubbornly
living and creating and multiplying in the narrow streets of Nicosia. We
must walk again in the cool scent of the bazaar that smells of freshness. We
must shop again in our grandfathers’ butcher shops. We must buy cloth
from Arasta and take it to the local tailor, and we must drink a coffee. We
must listen, laughingly, to the future read in our coffee cups. In this tiny
The Jasmine Scent of Nicosia 425
island laughter suits us. We must not have nostalgia for wars, instead we
must eliminate them and greet the future with jasmine flowers. Give us
back our jasmine flowers. This game does not at all resemble the games
of my childhood. I’m sick of playing hide-and-seek.3
For any Turkish-Cypriot reader of this piece, it is clear that the demand
for return of “our jasmine flowers” is a call for resistance to a perceived
colonization of northern Cyprus by Turkey, which many saw as having
destroyed the Cypriot character of the island. This was especially appar-
ent in Nicosia, the site of Adalı’s nostalgia, because of an influx of poor
workers from Turkey to the areas of old Nicosia that had been aban-
doned by Turkish-Cypriots in the 1980s. The importance of Nicosia in
the Turkish-Cypriot communal past, and the radical change in its human
landscape, gave rise to new forms of cultural identity first expressed as
nostalgia for a purer past. The Jasmine Revolution that arose from this
new movement expressed resistance to the corruptions of a nationalist
politics that had linked a Turkish-Cypriot future closely to the economic
and political fate of “motherland” Turkey.
The Jasmine Revolution opposed traditional nationalist leaders in
its call to negotiate reunification with their Greek partners on the basis
of a proposed United Nations plan (popularly known as the Annan Plan)
and thereby to ensure Turkish-Cypriots’ entry into the European Union.
Within this framework, jasmine came to represent a city that before its
division had been multicultural, as well as a call for a re-valuing of local
identities in the face of the divisive nationalisms of the “motherlands.” It
was, then, easy enough for the Jasmine Revolution to be translated into a
semblance of bicommunalism. But the demand for reunification of the
island, to which the symbolism of the jasmine came to be linked, actually
contradicted the forms of embodied memory evoked by the flower. For
even in İl Adalı’s demand to be given back her jasmine, it is clear that
what she actually wants to regain is a form of communal past specific to
the Turkish-Cypriot community. The call to create and multiply is one
directed at Turkish-Cypriots, as are the sites of memory that she evokes.
Rather than a multicultural nostalgia, this is instead a nostalgia for a
period when Turkish-Cypriots lived in enclaves, a period of deprivation
but also of solidarity. And because it was that specific past that gave the
flower its evocative power as a unifying symbol, subsequent events have
shown that even the jasmine may have its thorns.
Neoliberal nostalgia
Both nostalgia and revolution are forms of return, ways of interpreting
the political present as a decline or loss. The term nostalgia is a neologism
of the late eighteenth century, used to refer to the algos, or longing, for
nostos, or return, specifically to the homeland (Boyer 2006; cf. Seremeta-
kis 1996). Revolution, similarly, “means both cyclical repetition and the
radical break” (Boym 2001:19; also Arendt 1963). Even the ruptures of
revolution call for a “return” to a purported truth, whether a more just
world or the “truth” of our political being. Moreover, both the “illness”
of nostalgia and the promise of revolution came into being as we know
them today with the rise of the nation-state, which led to a change in
the meaning of history itself (Koselleck 1985; Latour 1993). Ironically,
the understanding of history as time that arose in the late eighteenth
century made history unique and unrepeatable, giving to revolution an
orientation to the future and making nostalgia its only possible return to
the past. And if there is always an element of self-deception in nostalgia,
it also creates a simulacrum of return that itself becomes a force in the
revolutionary reorientation of the present.
For more than a decade, the eastern Mediterranean has been
affected by a wave of multicultural nostalgia, a longing for times per-
ceived as more cosmopolitan and peaceful (Abou Ghaida and al Zougbi
2005; Della Dora 2006). Remembering the Alexandrias or Jaffas or
Smyrnas (Izmirs) of the early twentieth century also allows one to wag
a finger at the intolerance of nationalism, which cleansed those places
of their minorities. In Turkey, one form that this has taken is that of
a neo-Ottoman revival (Bora 1999; Çınar 2001), including a new style
that might be described as retro-Oriental: the revival of the narghile in
funky cafes with cushions on the floor, belly-dance classes for middle-class
professionals (Potuoglu-Cook 2006), and international fashion designers
who revive Ottoman styles. Another form it has taken is a longing for a
Levantine cosmopolitanism, one that included Christians, Jews, and vari-
ous Europeans and so seems appropriate for a globalized age (Komins
2002; Robins and Aksoy 1995). The latter trend includes the revival of
the music, food, and writings of the Ottoman religious minorities.
These various forms of neo-Ottomanism meet at the point where
they express a form of cultural self-confidence, a supposed comfort with
a past that was already global, and one in which the empire was not
Europe’s petitioner but its equal. At the same time, they express a Muslim
cultural hegemony that emphasizes the multiculturalism of the empire
when religious minorities lived under Muslim rule. Conveniently, the
same minorities whose cultures are now celebrated today number only
in the thousands and thus present no internal threat. At the same time,
this multiculturalism for the most part excludes ethnic minorities such
as Kurds, Arabs, and Africans, who are assimilated as part of the Otto-
man past’s Muslim majority. Ironically, then, this form of nostalgia has
been used both by those who long for a more “European,” multicultural
Turkey less affected by the homogenization of Kemalist nationalism, and
by Kemalists themselves, the individualization of whose memories makes
space both for a more heterogeneous past as well as for a “nostalgia for
the modern” (Özyürek 2005).
In Cyprus, too, a wave of nostalgia was churned up by neoliberal
reforms that increased inequalities and appeared to destroy the com-
munalist dreams of early nationalisms. For Turkish-Cypriots, post–World
War II nationalism had taken the form of a resistance movement, the
Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (Turkish Defense Organization), or TMT, which
demanded division of the island in response to Greek-Cypriot calls to
unite the island with Greece.4 By the time of the island’s independence
in 1960, the TMT was already well-organized throughout the island, if
less well-armed than Greek-Cypriot paramilitary forces also in operation
there. Fighting broke out during the last few days of 1963 and in the
first few months of 1964 in response to struggles over power-sharing
arrangements in the new constitution.
Most independent reports and first-person accounts suggest that
this fighting primarily took the form of Greek paramilitary attacks on
Turkish-Cypriots, some of whom were targeted for their involvement with
TMT.5 Certainly, as a minority, Turkish-Cypriots felt threatened, and many
fled their homes and retreated into enclaves. These were usually Turkish-
Cypriot villages to which Turkish-Cypriots from neighboring mixed villages
retreated, and some were Turkish-Cypriot neighborhoods that could
be easily guarded. But the largest enclaved space in the island was in
the capital of Nicosia, whose division had already in some fashion been
cemented since 1956.6 By early 1964, the Turkish-Cypriot areas of Nicosia
were soon crowded with newcomers, many of whom had been displaced
from surrounding villages or who had relatives in the capital.
This is a period of Turkish-Cypriot history that remains obscure
and largely unwritten. It is certainly clear that conditions in the enclaves
varied, depending on their location. Turks from Lapithos (a town in
the Kyrenia district in the north), interviewed by Bryant, emphasized
repeatedly their dependence on Turkey for foodstuffs and salaries. It
was clear, for instance, that those who lived in the Bogaz camp between
Nicosia and Kyrenia had worse conditions than those who managed to
find space in the cities. But in all cases discussions of the decade between
1964 and 1974 would slip into wistfulness; even though conditions were
hard, they were hard for everyone, people would say; there was equality,
and everyone worked together.
In Nicosia there was even more than that. The decade of their
enclavement gave Turkish-Cypriots their first professional theater, their
first radio station, and their first pop music groups. Girls wore mini-skirts,
and boys grew their hair long in keeping with the fashions of metropolitan
centers. Rock bands with names like “The Squares” played Beatles songs,
then disbanded as members took up their rifles for guard duty. It was the
Turkish-Cypriots’ first experience of having their own space, and it was
a space that most believed would eventually become their own country,
with Turkey’s intervention and support. It was a time of hardship and
hope, when everyone had the same duties and everyone pulled together.
Although it was a period of abjection, it was also a period when Turkish-
Cypriots refused to accept their abjection, instead recreating the very
social order that had cast them off.7 And the enclave was also a space
that they vigorously protected, so that even during the easing of tensions
after 1968, Turkish-Cypriot fighters refused to allow Greek-Cypriots to
enter the areas under their control (Volkan 1979:101–105).
After 1968, when restrictions on movement were eased, some
Turkish-Cypriot youth went to study in Turkey on mücahit bursları (fighters’
scholarships) and many were incorporated into the leftist movements
then gaining strength in the universities there. They returned from
Turkey to unemployment in the enclaves, where they joined others who
had participated in the first years of the struggle, but were increasingly
dissatisfied with the direction that the Turkish-Cypriot administration was
taking. Richard Patrick, writing of this period in some detail, notes that
there was increasing resistance to TMT’s control in a period of relative
calm, and that many Turkish-Cypriots wished to see more power in the
hands of the civilian, rather than the military, authorities (1976:156–165).
Although the growing power of political leader Rauf Denktas remained
relatively unchallenged during this period, fractures were beginning to
appear in the political structure.8
The growth of alternative political possibilities was interrupted when
a Greek-sponsored coup overthrew President Makarios in July 1974, pro-
voking Turkey’s long-awaited military intervention. As Greek-Cypriots fled
the northern part of the island, Turkish-Cypriots moved in and took over
their abandoned properties, creating new hierarchies from the spoils of
war. Some grew rich from the war, while others were unable to do so for
nepotistic or political reasons; still others refused to do so on principle.
Large numbers of immigrants arrived from Turkey and were granted
Greek-Cypriot land and houses in an attempt to prevent their owners’
return.9 Amidst the euphoria of a military victory and the founding of a
new state, the inequalities between those who benefited from the spoils
of war and those who had not, or between Turkish-Cypriot villagers and
the new immigrants, seemed minimally important. But they would grow
important later, beginning in the late 1980s, by which time it had become
clear that the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would

not be recognized by any country besides Turkey and that the north of
Cyprus would remain economically and politically isolated.
The result of that isolation has been twofold. Economic and political
isolation has tied northern Cyprus to Turkey in ways that no independent
state would be bound. As during the period of the enclaves, large sums
of money are allocated by the Turkish government to support what has
come to be recognized by the European Court of Human Rights as its
“subordinate authority” in Cyprus. Much of this money ultimately goes
to a swollen bureaucracy that has ballooned to fulfill Turkish-Cypriots’
dreams of becoming civil servants.10 Turkey also stations an estimated
30,000 troops on the island, and the border between Turkey and northern
Cyprus has remained porous, resulting in an influx of migrant workers
in recent years that has changed the human landscape.
At the same time, that isolation caused a sense of being cut off
from the world, of languishing in another time. Turkish-Cypriots could
travel to very few places with their TRNC passports and so for many years
accepted Turkey’s offer of Turkish passports. Economic ties to other
countries were tenuous and difficult to negotiate, a situation made worse
by a 1994 European Court of Justice decision to require the Republic
of Cyprus’s stamp on all exports from Cyprus.11 As a result, the sense of
being enclaved continued, and this sense was encouraged by long-time
Turkish-Cypriot leader and president Rauf Denktas, who continued to
behave as though Turkish-Cypriots were under siege.
The Republic’s 1997 application to enter the European Union and
a major economic crisis in Turkey in 2001, following on the heels of a
Turkish-Cypriot banking crisis, provoked considerable unrest in northern
Cyprus. At the same time, Turkey was engaged with Greece in a lessening
of tensions that was also part and parcel of an emerging neo-Ottoman
nostalgia. The renewal of Greek-Turkish relations came to be known as
“earthquake diplomacy,” since it followed the countries’ mutual aid in
the wake of two earthquakes in 1999 that killed more than 20,000 people
in Turkey and about 2,000 in Greece.
Television clips of Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and Greek
Foreign Minister Yiorgos Papandreou dancing the sirtaki (a lively Greek
dance) on the Greek island of Samos astonished many in Cyprus, who
still had not comprehended the changed climate in Turkey. One author
wrote of that surprise in a memoir completed during the period of the
Jasmine Revolution:
One day while we were on holiday, I was in Istanbul with my husband walking
from Taksim Square to Beyoglu when we noticed a voice emanating from
one of the music shops. What we heard was a song in Greek. As we were
walking, on every side [from all the music shops] we heard songs in Greek.
They say “Music has no country.” In any case these Greek songs played at
high volume weren’t unfamiliar to us. But to play even one of the songs
being played and enjoyed in Istanbul would have been objectionable in
Cyprus! (Konuloglu 2005:292)
These changes, along with the dissatisfaction of a youth that now used the
internet to understand their isolation more clearly, resulted in a call for
change that Denktas and other nationalist leaders refused to hear. And
they refused to hear that call even when Turkish-Cypriots were presented
with a United Nations plan that would have led to their integration into
the European Union as part of a new member state.
Soon it was common to hear Turkish-Cypriots complain that they
lived in an “open-air prison” whose guardians were the Turkish generals
who were supposedly there to protect them. These criticisms intensified
following the murder of journalist Kutlu Adalı in 1996 and, four years
later, the arrest of newspaper publisher Sener Levent and several members
of his staff on charges of treason and spying for the Republic. Levent was
publisher of the newspaper Avrupa (Europe), whose name later changed
to Afrika, and a fierce opponent of Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktas. When
an estimated 30,000 Turkish-Cypriots from across the political spectrum
gathered in Nicosia to protest Levent’s arrest, it was an expression of their
discontent with the sense that the fate of Turkish-Cypriots was hostage
to the whim of Turkey’s generals.
It was at this historical conjuncture that nostalgia for yasemin kokulu
Lefkoşa ( jasmine-scented Nicosia), the Nicosia of a youthful communal
past, came to represent the lost hopes of a community whose struggle
for self-determination appeared to have been hijacked by those sent to
save them. The reference to Nicosia’s narrow streets, to specific shops
and the scent of coffee, to the simple pleasures of life together, was also
a longing for a different sort of isolation, one of an interdependence
that was lost through dependence on Turkey. In that sense, it appropri-
ated themes from the multicultural nostalgia then prevalent in Turkey,
which included references to a de-politicized past intimacy and a longing
for the homely signs of difference—the food and music of minorities,
and a recognition of their influence on contemporary Turkish culture.
In Turkey, this included best-selling memoirs of the 1923 population
exchange between Turkey and Greece and nostalgic trips to Greece for
the mübadiller, the Muslims exchanged in that period. It also included
films such as Kayıkçı (The Boatman), about a Turkish-Greek love affair,
and Πολιτική Κουζίνα (translated into English as A Touch of Spice), about
the longing for Istanbul by Greeks now living in Athens. This passion of
difference culminated in the success of a television series, Yabancı Damat
(The Foreign Groom), that began its run in late 2004 and showed the diffi-
culties of and prejudices engendered by a Greek-Turkish marriage.
The majority of these nostalgic cultural productions suggest that
the antidote to the heavy hand of nationalism is the intimacy of romance.
Esra Özyürek insightfully discusses the way that Kemalists in Turkey have
commodified the nationalist past in the form of memoirs, photographs,
and scenes of the private lives of the early Republican period, thus creating
“a new set of everyday practices, affective expressions, and ideological
imaginaries that define themselves in the private, but are also intimately
connected to the formal political field” (2006:279). This privatization of
the political appears to reduce social relations to a form of preference
and the political field to a matter of individual choice.
Kıbrıslılık, or Cypriotism, was an idea with roots in the island’s work-
ers’ movements, whose members came from all Cypriot communities and
which always contained an element that saw the nationalisms of Greece
and Turkey as imperialist. In the critiques of the left, those nationalisms
and their manifestations in Cyprus were bourgeois movements aimed at
the protection of class interests. Although Cypriotism gained consider-
able support among Greek-Cypriots in the middle of the last century, it
always had only a handful of supporters in the Turkish-Cypriot minor-
ity, whose own political identity developed in large part from a sense of
being under threat. Ironically, it was only at the turn of the millennium,
with the support of nationalists who favored self-determination and
a growing bourgeoisie, that Kıbrıslılık gained popular currency in the
Turkish-Cypriot community.
Cypriotism was the form taken by a cultural resistance to the per-
ceived colonization of the island by Turkey.12 This came to be expressed
especially in the longing for Nicosia, the capital and center of Turkish-
Cypriot cultural life that also presented the visual proof of Turkey’s
intrusion. What was deceptive about this form of nostalgia, however, is
that although in some manifestations it bore the signs of other forms
of cosmopolitan nostalgia, including memoirs of mixed neighborhoods
and life with Greek-Cypriot neighbors (e.g. Gürkan 2006, Hikmetagalar
1996), it was not for most people a nostalgia aimed at reunification, and
Kıbrıslılık did not necessarily imply a common identity for the entire island.
Rather, Kıbrıslılık implied the resurgence of Turkish-Cypriot demands
for self-determination, this time posed in opposition to the domination
of Turkey. One of the primary slogans of the period (and the name of
a platform of parties and other organizations) was Bu Memleket Bizim
(This Country is Ours), while demands to recover their own political
will were metaphorically expressed as the right of Cypriots to “take back
their jasmine.”
Jasmine, then, became a reference to a perceived time of purity, a

purity that appeared to have been soiled by Turkey’s intervention and
whose loss could be most viscerally experienced inside the walls of old
Nicosia. Although the movement based itself in local identity politics, at
the same time those who most vociferously proclaimed the loss of a culture
were also those most closely tied to a movement for self-determination.
Hence, the call to “take back our jasmine” was also a call to become once
again bu memleketin efendisi (this country’s master). The longing for a past
when they were “this country’s master” was also a longing for a specific
period of Turkish-Cypriot history defined by isolation in enclaves, the
struggles of the mücahitler, the masculine swagger of youth, and a new
sense of dedication to the land for which they fought.
The jasmine of revolution
Beginning in 2002, the revolution’s most visible sign came to be mass

meetings held in the central squares of old Nicosia, areas near the pre-
sidential palace where Denktas had long kept a hold on power. These
protest meetings began at the end of that year, when UN Secretary Gene-
ral Kofi Annan presented a reunification plan that both sides declined
to accept. By mid-December, the European Union invited the Cypriot
Republic to join the Union even without its Turkish-Cypriot partners,
leading Turkish-Cypriots to spill into the streets in protest against the
perceived intransigence of their own leadership. These repeated protests
led to significant and lasting changes: the opening of the checkpoints
that divide the island on 23 April 2003, the election of long-time oppo-
sition leader Mehmet Ali Talat to the post of Prime Minister of the
Turkish-Cypriot state in January 2004, a referendum on a reunification
plan that was supported by Turkish-Cypriots but rejected on the Greek-
Cypriots, and the 2005 replacement of Denktas by Talat as President of
the unrecognized state.
The slogans of the revolution divided the populus not into left
and right, but into those who were considered statükocular (supporters
of the status quo) and those who wanted a solution. The leaders of the
revolution claimed that Turkish-Cypriots would become “masters of this
country,” and they attracted the growing Turkish-Cypriot bourgeoisie,
historically quite conservative, with promises that dünyaya baglanacagız
(we will be tied to the world). Among the new parties, coalitions, and
platforms that emerged during this period was the Çözüm ve Avrupa
Birligi Partisi (Solution and European Union Party), which held its own
rally in Nicosia before the December 2003 elections that would ultima-
tely lead to the replacement of Denktas. Party leader and businessman
Ali Erel13 addressed the crowds with a by-then familiar summary of the
state of affairs:
We Turkish Cypriots are in distress. We’ve been left with no choice but to
live under embargo. We’ve been isolated from the world. We’ve been left
unemployed. We’ve been separated from sources of production. We’ve been
forced to emigrate. We’ve been separated from our children. Mothers cried
and still cry. But the most important thing is that we haven’t been the ones
with a say in our own future (kendi gelecegimizde söz sahibi olamadık). They
even see a referendum as too much for us. (Kıbrıs 2003)14
Significantly, all of Erel’s proclamations about the state of the Turkish-

Cypriot community are cast in the passive tense, a common way of
expressing the sense that Turkish-Cypriots have been victims of a regime
too closely tied to Turkey, and especially to elements of its deep state.
The revolution was cast as a way of gaining a voice and asserting one’s
political will, or as the party’s candidate for Nicosia parliamentary rep-
resentative, Dogan Harman, proclaimed, “They call democratic people’s
movements velvet revolutions, but we here in Cyprus will realize a jasmine
revolution” (2003).
In speeches from the period, it was repeatedly stressed that the
statüko (the status quo) would not ultimately lead to recognition of their
state’s independence, as the statükocular insisted, but only to closer and
closer ties to Turkey. At another rally before the December 2003 elections,
Mustafa Akıncı, leader of Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi (Peace and Democ-
racy Movement ) and a long-time opponent of Denktas, emphasized
that Turkish-Cypriots wanted neither to be a minority in a unitary state
controlled by Greek-Cypriots nor subject to Turkey’s military and political
bureaucracy. While Denktas and the statükocular opposed a unification
plan because they believed it would destroy the TRNC’s supposed sov-
ereignty, Akıncı emphasized that the only road to true sovereignty was
a solution and European Union membership. “Which sovereignty are
they talking about?” he asked. “Now the money isn’t ours, if anything
happens in Turkey our people become poorer by half overnight.” He
emphasized that overthrowing the statükocular “will ensure that the Turk
of Cyprus will be the master in his own house” (Ortam Gazetesi 2003).
Significantly, in his speeches Akıncı repeatedly stressed that “the season
[of jasmine] has come.”
Jasmine, then, became the symbol of the people taking back their
voice, becoming again “the masters of this land.” And in both implicit
and explicit ways, jasmine was tied to a Nicosia that had come to rep-
resent Cypriots’ loss of their own culture. The old city walls encompass
a palimpsest of Venetian, Ottoman, and British colonial housing, but
by the early 1980s Turkish-Cypriots, like their Greek-Cypriot neighbors

across the divide, began to desire something more “modern.” With the
passage of a law impeding new construction inside the city walls, Cypri-
ots began to move into new neighborhoods on the outskirts of the city.
One author comments,
Every day the known faces of the men who wander the neighborhoods with
their handcarts selling fruits and vegetables began to see fewer of their
old customers, the ones who would sit in front of their freshly scrubbed
doors and gossip in loud voices with their neighbors: Everyone had started
to move into the outskirts of the city, into the apartment buildings and
council housing with its tiny gardens and orderly, cookie-cutter houses.
(Bizden 1997: 82)
These new neighborhoods sprang up to meet the needs of a new Turkish-

Cypriot middle-class, one that had fought for self-determination only to
find its bourgeois dreams stopped by city walls. The apartment blocks
and identical council housing gave momentum to a construction sector
that would gain speed as the millennium approached, when northern
Cyprus experienced a boom in property sales to foreigners.
This construction boom intersected with the growing refusal of
Cypriots to work as unskilled laborers and so created a labor gap that
would be filled by workers from Turkey, especially from poorer areas in
the south and southeast. Although many of these workers initially were
housed on the construction sites, the construction boom of the 1990s
and early 2000s soon made that untenable. Many of the old houses of
Nicosia’s walled city were turned by their owners into hostels for these
“guest workers,” further accelerating Cypriots’ move into the suburbs and
their distancing from the historical city center. It increased, as well, both
the decay of the walled city and a discourse around that decay, as former
Ottoman mansions were left unrepaired and used as slum housing for
a cheap labor force that the new economy required, even as Cypriots
complained that the walled city has been “colonized.”15
This increasing distance from the historic center of Turkish-Cypriot
cultural life, as well as the sense that it had been unrecognizably trans-
formed, made it an appropriate symbol for a movement that saw itself
as culturally and politically “under siege.” This was exacerbated by the
growing confusion between workers and “settlers,” those Turks who had
arrived from Turkey following the 1974 war and been granted citizenship
and Greek properties. For most Turkish-Cypriots, there was no distinction
between “settlers,” who had the right to vote and whom most Turkish-
Cypriots believed used that vote to impede the island’s reunification,
and persons who migrated temporarily because they could not find
work in their home regions.16 In these circumstances, the growth in the

walled city’s Turkish immigrant population seemed to present visible
and tangible proof that Turkish-Cypriot culture was under siege and
that Turkish-Cypriots’ political will was being taken from them. As one
academic who lives in Nicosia recently remarked, “I have no problem with
my housekeeper, who’s worked for me for 20 years, or with the neighbor
with whom I play backgammon. My problem is when they interfere with
my political will.” This was also cast as a problem of “being in exile in
one’s own homeland,” making the reclamation of “our jasmine” a return
to a past uncontaminated by Turkish interference.17
In common parlance, the purity and whiteness of jasmine, with
its roots in Cypriot soil and its association with a nostalgic Nicosia, was
contrasted with fica, a Turkish-Cypriot word for seaweed that is among
several slang words used to refer to the immigrants from Turkey who
have “washed up” on Cyprus’ shores. Seaweed arrives with the tide, cov-
ers the beaches, and clings to swimmers’ skin. The word expresses quite
neatly the sense that the poor workers, many of Kurdish or Arab origin,
constitute an unwanted invasion that spoils the landscape as seaweed
litters a pristine beach. In contrast, jasmine is an indigenous flower that
one plants and carefully tends, and its pure, fresh whiteness contrasts
with the dirty brown of dead fica washed on the shore. It connotes the
lost innocence of summer evenings when young men would buy neck-
laces made of the flower for their sweethearts, and in that sense it also
connotes the lost innocence of the city.
Following İl Adalı’s proclamation that demands her jasmine flow-
ers, numerous writers began to engage in Nicosia nostalgia as a way of
talking about the political present. The trend began with several colum-
nists for Kıbrıs (Cyprus), the only newspaper in the Turkish-Cypriot north
with no party affiliation and which, for that reason, also has the largest
circulation. Nicosia was described as a place from which they had been
alienated, “the final state of a lover who has taken the wrong road [i.e.,
become a prostitute].” It had been transformed from a place of familiar
faces, familiar sights and sounds, to one in which the wanderer through
its narrow streets hears accents and languages that she doesn’t recognize,
sees the faces of dark men who are unfamiliar to her.
The bazaar is no longer traversed by peddlers with their handcarts
selling muhallebi (milk pudding) sprinkled with rosewater, and the side
streets are no longer filled with the odor of familiar Cypriot foods. “The
scent of pots just beginning to boil emerges from the houses. There’s
definitely no scent of molohiya or kolokas!”18 one opines. “The new resi-
dents of old Nicosia have not yet become accustomed to these authentic
foods.” Although the author proclaims that, “they’ll become Cypriot
and they’ll become accustomed” (Tolgay 2003), other writers contrast

the familiar scents of the past with the odor of lahmacun, a spicy pizza
from the southeast of Turkey whose aroma permeates certain of Nicosia’s
backstreets. The scent of lahmacun that invaded the nostrils of those who
wandered Nicosia’s side streets came to represent an unwanted intrusion,
one that was cast as Eastern, backward, and unfamiliar. And so just as
the dirty fica contrasts with the jasmine’s purity, so the heavy aroma of
lahmacun in the streets is compared with the heady scent of the jasmine.
The odor of lahmacun becomes a sign of the city’s corruption, like the
scent of a prostitute at the end of a long night.
Indeed, Nicosia is often cast in these writings as a woman who has
been sullied:
While passing the whitewashed houses, the odors that emanated from
them told us what was being cooked that day. The whitewashed houses
were this city’s symbol. At one time they were like the white, flawless face
of a woman. In all the clean innocence of the jasmine scent that soothes
the soul . . . (Dogrusöz 2002:102)
The same author goes on to remark that the white face was soon
flawed:
First shadows began to appear on her face, then black spots. With time
the black spots multiplied. According to some they were just a few unim-
portant pimples, while according to others they were an illness that had
no cure. Those who said it was an unimportant illness soon realized that
they had been wrong. The black spots multiplied even more. . . . The pure
white face had lost its magic. Both the face and the tongue were gradually
obscured. (2002:102)
Dogrusöz later explains the black spots as “an occupation by persons

with different languages and different skin” (2002:103).
Another author who has written about the use of the symbolism of
Nicosia comments on this feminization of the city:
The Nicosia of symbolism is a living, breathing lover; Nicosia is a motherly
city who always forgives, whose fragility, irritability, betrayal and unhappiness
are always temporary. The city inside the walls is one, in these images, that
never ostracized its own people or sent them to live in the new neighbor-
hoods outside its walls. . . . Instead, the walled city that has now lost its
squares, its fairgrounds, its coffeehouse culture, its bazaar area has been
‘duped.’ Hopeless and silent, the walled city’s eyes have been bound with
black tape. . . . Nicosia’s walled city is a lover whose ears are deaf, whose
eyes are blind, and who cannot make a sound.s (Bizden 2006: 69–70)
In Bizden’s ironic summary, the old Nicosia of Turkish-Cypriot writers’

imagination is the tarnished lover led down the wrong path, now indiffer-
ent to her future. And as Bizden also remarks, the images of Nicosia as the
helpless, dishonored lover not only served to mobilize a Turkish-Cypriot
community that also felt that it had been duped and corrupted, but to
do so while demonizing the sights, sounds, and smells of an other.
Soon it became common to personify places and things that, like
the Turkish-Cypriot community itself, appeared to have lost the purity of
their past because they had been duped by false promises. In one such
portrayal, written on the day of the first election that shook the status
quo of Turkish-Cypriot politics, people and place join together in the
effort to rid the island of its oppressors:
14 December 2003, Sunday . . .
06.50: I’m watching the Besparmak Mountains. . . . The Besparmak Moun-
tains are Troubled. . . . It is as though they want to rise from their place and
stretch towards Nicosia. . . . As though the carob and olive trees are going
to fly from the earth . . . In the mountains there is an election excitement,
the excitement of salvation. . . .
11.30: I go to vote. . . . At the polling station everyone I meet, both people
I know and those I don’t know, says “insallah we’ll win”. . . . The Cyprus
Turk has taken his fate in his hands. . . . Who can stop him . . .
12.00: I return home. . . . The jasmine in the doorway has reared itself. . . .
As though it wants to give the message, “I’m here”. . . . The jasmine that I
pass by without noticing every time I enter the house wants to make itself
known. . . . And the mountains continue to watch us . . .
15.00: The radio is playing Onur Akın. . . . Onur Akın is singing, “I think
of leaving here without even a jacket”. . . . I say to myself, “No”. . . . “We
won’t go”. . . . We won’t go anywhere and leave the jasmine, the Besparmak
Mountains. . . . We will realize the Jasmine Revolution. . . . Because we are
of this place . . .” (Ergüçlü 2004)
What is significant here is not only the personification of the landscape,

which joins in their struggle, but also the reiterated claim that “we are
of this place.”
This sense of Cyprus as a Turkish-Cypriot patrie, a homeland, was
one that came rather late to the community, which for so long had par-
ticipated in a nationalism that saw Turkey as the “motherland.” It was
only in the period of the enclaves, the period when Turkish-Cypriots were
under siege and began to defend their community and the places where
they lived, that Turkish-Cypriots began to develop such an attachment.
Prior to this, Kıbrıslı Türk (Turkish-Cypriots) had called themselves Kıbrıs
Türkü (the Turks of Cyprus), indicating an only contingent relationship

to place. Turkish-Cypriots easily emigrated to the Turkish mainland, and
one of the greatest fears of Turkish nationalists in Cyprus was that the
Turkish-Cypriot community, once under siege, would abandon the island
entirely. As one sociologist eloquently puts it, “It would not only require
many deaths to identify Cyprus as the patrie for the Turkish Cypriots
but also the realization that the Turkish Cypriots died for Cyprus, and
for specific places in Cyprus. It was at the juncture of killing and dying
for Cyprus that the Turks of Cyprus became Turkish Cypriots” (Akay
1998:35).
Hence, personifying particular places and things and making them
participants in a Turkish-Cypriot future is a metaphorical strategy that
has roots in a specific moment of the Turkish-Cypriot past, one in which
they fought for existence and in the process also learned that they were
fighting to become “masters of this land.” Not coincidentally, the walled
city of Nicosia was the center of that struggle, the site where a community
recreated itself, declaring its independence from Greek-Cypriots at the
same time that they declared their ties to the island. And so the nostalgia
for a lost city evokes a time—another time—when Turkish-Cypriots were
under siege and when, in the face of that, they declared their ties to the
island and determination to remain there. The reference to a “jasmine-
scented Nicosia,” then, not only evokes a purer past in contrast to the
corrupted present but also calls for memories of resistance.
The jasmine of memory

Why is it that we always feel a great desire for the old, for past times? . . .
Was there no pain or worry then, and if there was, why were people more
comfortable, happy, and content? . . . The women sweeping and washing the
front steps of their houses was the first sign that the breezy, jasmine-scented,
fun-filled summer nights of Nicosia were about to begin. While the men
were heading to the coffeeshop, the women would gather in front of the
houses, and while one strung jasmine flowers on a palm branch or a string,
the others would sort muluhiya.19 After that, both men and women would
make their way to Çaglayan, where the summer [open-air] cinemas were.
In the cinemas, Sunday was the last day not to miss the new Turkish films
that would begin their showings on Wednesdays. In the summer months,
there would be a festival air in Çaglayan. The People’s Garden next to the
People’s Cinema, a little further on the Çaglayan Bar; or a little further
than that the Crystal Cinema and beside it the Lights garden were all full
to overflowing . . . (Eminoglu 2007)
In most photographs and films of Turkish Nicosia of the 1960’s, one

sees only misery: women cry, children sniffle, and men defiantly face
the cameras with their outdated rifles. And indeed, it was a time when
Turkish-Cypriots were subjected to indignities at Greek-Cypriot check-
points, when they had little access to supplies or even to fresh fruits and
vegetables, and when as a result they were highly militarized and depen-
dent on both the local Turkish-Cypriot administration and the Turkish
“motherland.” Extended families crowded into small houses as relatives
fled their villages; supplies from the villages had to pass through Greek-
Cypriot checkpoints, where they were often confiscated or left to spoil;
and children of both sexes were trained at very early ages to participate
in the defense that became the primary occupation of the community.
And yet existing alongside this real suffering (as well as its represen-
tation) was something else: a world apart, in which the exceptional life
lived in the enclaves was normalized and where, indeed, their isolation
produced a certain form of enjoyment. The first serious intercommunal
fighting and flight from villages occurred after 21 December 1963; by
January 1964, Turkish-Cypriots had not only begun the organization of
a state within a state but had even set up a post office and produced
the first postage stamp of the separatist administration. Those who were
children in the Nicosia enclave recall that life went on for them without
much change, apart from the influx of unwanted refugees from the villa-
ges. As one local businesswoman recalled, speaking of a horrifying event
in her own enclave when all the women and girls were on the verge of
suicide to avoid the threat of rape, “It’s strange to look back on it now
and realize that I wasn’t really afraid. Because we were all together.”
Not only were they “all together,” but social and economic dif-
ferences were flattened, as everyone was subject to the rulings of the
administration and the needs of community defense. Every man and boy
able to hold a rifle was a mücahit, while women stitched uniforms and
girls cleaned and loaded guns. Boys as young as 12 would go to school
in the day and take up guard duty in the evening, destroying many of
the traditional hierarchies between younger and older men. Everyone
who was not able to continue in his profession—especially men displa-
ced from the countryside—was made a professional soldier and given a
small salary. And so in the face of a threat to the community’s existence,
Turkish-Cypriots were “all together” not simply as a group that had been
randomly forced together, but as a body that would work together as
one. Their lives were given purpose and meaning as a whole, as a group
under threat, and for more than a decade Turkish-Cypriots dedicated
themselves fully to this common goal.
The “breezy, jasmine-scented, fun-filled nights of Nicosia” that the
author above remembers were from precisely this time. It was at this
time that Turkish-Cypriots founded their first state theater, created at the
command of the Turkish military commander then in charge of Nicosia

and tied to the Department of Education (Ersoy 1998:73–74). There
were beauty contests, bicycle races, and an abundance of sports teams.
Stadiums filled equally for soccer matches and pole-vaulting contests.
Cinemas showed the latest Turkish films, and famous artists came from
Turkey to boost Turkish-Cypriots’ morale. They also performed in the
cinemas, which became the center of Turkish-Cypriot social life, along
with mücahit gazinoları (fighters’ clubs). Both the cinemas and fighters’
clubs became the stages for rock bands with names like the Signals, the
Storms, and Flag Quartet, all comprising young men who let their hair
grow in imitation of the Beatles and the Monkees, but who also took
up rifles when they were not entertaining with their guitars (Adanır
2001). Although the songs that these groups sang were taken from the
popular repertoire of the period and spoke to freedom and love, some
of these groups took their names from the code-names of their military
commanders.
Even in 1968, when restrictions on movement eased, Turkish-
Cypriots remained in their enclaves and refused to allow entry to their
Greek neighbors. Psychoanalyst Vamık Volkan, who had emigrated to
the United States in the 1950s, described his return to the island to visit
relatives in 1968 and Turkish-Cypriots’ reaction to the opening of the
barriers: “The first taste of freedom,” he notes, “paradoxically evoked
symptoms like those of depression” (1979:102). He goes on to observe
that “[t]heir confinement had given them out of a situation of great
discomfort and some danger a world shared with their compatriots. . . .
This world was now gone, and its inhabitants were faced with the
humiliating recognition that a prosperous Greek life-style surrounded
them on every hand” (1979:103). He remarks that this damaged sense
of self-worth was relieved in part by continuing to deny Greek-Cypriots
entry to the enclaves and so maintaining a certain secrecy about, and
therefore control over, their lives.
The enclaves, therefore, constituted not only a state within a state
but also a world apart and self-contained, where Turkish-Cypriots main-
tained some form of control and therefore had a sense of determining
their destiny. Nicosia became the site where this was most vividly realized,
as a completely Turkish social and cultural life flourished in a way that
it never had before. Everyone was in some way involved in the struggle,
but men and boys especially benefited from their participation in the
defense, which gave new meaning to traditional values of manhood. At
the same time, it was, in the cities, also a period of modernization that
followed closely developments in Turkey, tying Turkish-Cypriots’ social
and cultural development to that of the new state that they hoped to
found.
This was, then, a period of suffering and struggle whose orienta-
tion towards a better, independent future gave it the character of hope
and whose communitarianism made it also a form of enjoyment. It was
this combination of struggle and hope, or suffering and enjoyment, that
makes the period suitable for a nostalgia that calls for the same in the
future. Moreover, as Akay notes above, this was the period in which the
struggle descended from the realm of abstract ideology into the daily
lives of persons who fought and died for the right not only to exist in
the island, but to have some form of control over their future there.
Hence, the “jasmine scent of Nicosia” carries with it not only a longing
for a presumably better past, but specifically for a past characterized by
an egalitarian struggle for an independent future.
Some final petals
The revolution that overtook northern Cyprus after the turn of the
century was one that had some base in the leftist movements with
bicommunal roots that had for decades supported reunification under
a federal government. But those groups and parties had long remained
marginalized, unable to gain a hold on power. What gave the Jasmine
Revolution a mass base was the growing sense that those who had been
in power for so long were unable to adapt to the changes brought by
globalization, including changes in Turkish politics and the promises of
the European Union. They remained bound by a nationalist politics that
no longer seemed fit for the present, and especially not for the demands
of increasing numbers of educated youth to be “tied to the world.” As
both the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey drew closer to Europe, northern
Cyprus remained on the outside, and many people expressed fears that
“the last train is about to leave the station.”
In this context, the scent of jasmine evoked a period of hope and
struggle, but also ties to a place and a past that in the enclave period
acquired an explicitly and exclusively Turkish character. The longing
for the scents and sights of Nicosia’s walled city and its backstreets was
also the longing for a period when self-determination seemed on the
horizon and when deprivation was accompanied by enjoyment because
it was shared by all. It was a longing for a period and a place where
for the first time Turkish-Cypriots developed a life separate from their
Greek-Cypriot neighbors and where they enjoyed some form of control,
including the ability to prevent entry into their neighborhoods. It was
a world unto itself, where “[t]hose who lived together inside developed
a world of their own, one in which the reality of hope was tinged with
magic and illusion” (Volkan 1979: 83).
It was also a world that had become “Turkified” through music
and theater, and especially through the cinema that became the primary
distraction and source of hope and inspiration for a community under
siege.20 The attractive, white-skinned actors in Turkish films represented
models of an alternative modernization, one that both resisted the West
and accepted Westernization. It was only after 1974, when Turkish-Cypriots
encountered both the Turkish state and its less privileged citizens in their
daily lives, that this dream of a Turkish modernity began to collapse. In
this sense, the growing Kıbrıslılık that emphasized local foods, dialects,
and habits, and the nostalgia that accompanied them, might be seen in
parallel with East German Ostalgie, which, as Daphne Berdahl remarks,
came “to symbolize the loss of an illusion of the ‘Golden West.’” As in
East Germany, where “the loss if this illusion has been one of the most
formative and disorienting aspects of re-unification,” Turkish-Cypriots’
increasing incorporation in the culture of Turkey brought them face to
face with a Turkey that was poorer, darker, and more complex than the
Turkey of their earlier imagination (1999:177).
Paradoxically, though, this nostalgic return to a period before “the
Fall” also brought about and so coincided with another Fall, namely,
that of the ceasefire line that divides the island. And that line has come
to symbolize yet another Fall—the Fall from the grace of coexistence
with one’s Greek-speaking neighbors. Indeed, insofar as Nicosia nostal-
gia is a form of “structural” (Herzfeld 1997) or “restorative” nostalgia
(Boym 2001), one aimed at lamenting a communal fall from grace or
even restoring the community to its origins, it is also one that makes
explicit nostalgia’s obsession with boundaries and their maintenance,
with the purity of an unsullied past or the innocence of ignorance.21 In
this case, the fall from faith in a Turkish modernity recalls the fall from
grace of a peaceful, intercommunal past. What makes it different from
other forms of structural nostalgia, however, is that it points to a fall that
also produced a form of resistance and therefore explicitly calls for a
remembrance that is revolutionary.
Of course, nostalgia is never neat, and its meanings are both poly-
valent and contested. Lamenting this fall from grace has also infused
Turkish-Cypriot nostalgia with a seeming cosmopolitanism, or longing
for a multi-cultural past. But while the invocation of “jasmine-scented
Nicosia” may be another instance of the re-emergence of the local in
the global, the structure of feeling that this nostalgia evokes is far from
cosmopolitanism. By recalling a time when Turkish-Cypriots worked
together despite class or status differences, it calls for resistance to Turkey’s

control over Turkish-Cypriots’ fates. But at the same time, it gives that
moment of collective history a particularly local character, represented
by the jasmine, and casts those who live now in Nicosia’s side streets as
intruders, persons to be opposed and resisted. Nostalgia contrasts the
jasmine’s purity to the dirtiness of the fica, its sweet scent to the odor
of lahmacun. In this sense, through nostalgia, “revolution” reacquires its
original meaning of “return,” creating political desires that link purity
to exclusiveness and self-determination to a longing for the local.
Mete Hatay
INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, OSLO-CYPRUS CENTRE
Rebecca Bryant
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY AND INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, OSLO-CYPRUS CENTRE
NOTES
1
The short essay in which this passage appears is entitled “Yaseminlerimi geri verin,”
“Give me back my jasmine flowers” (Adalı 2006:129).
2
Kutlu Adalı was a journalist who was murdered for his opposition writings but who
began his literary career as the publisher of the most staunchly nationalist Turkish-Cypriot
newspaper, Nacak. Born in Cyprus, Adalı’s family immigrated to Turkey when he was three,
and he finished his secondary education there before returning to take a place in the grow-
ing Turkish-Cypriot opposition to Greek-Cypriot demands for union with Greece. He was
at Rauf Denktas’s side as an advisor until 1972, and after the establishment of a separate
state in the north became first the director of the Population Office then served in other
posts in the civil service. Although he wrote articles critical of the government in the early
1980’s, it was after his retirement from the civil service in 1985 that he began openly to
write in Ortam and Yeni Düzen newspapers, criticizing the regime in the north. His 1996
murder remains unsolved, and in 2004 his family won a judgment in the European Court
of Human Rights against Turkey for insufficiently investigating the case.
3
In a fascinating and pertinent overlap with Adalı’s call, Svetlana Boym notes that
many writers have mastered the art of intimation with regard to the past. She notes, “Play-
ing the game of hide-and-seek with memories and hopes, just as one did with friends in
one’s distant and half-forgotten childhood, seems to be the only way to reflect the past
without becoming a pillar of salt” (2001:252).
4
Although Turkish nationalism had existed in Cyprus from the early twentieth cen-
tury, and especially after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, it was in the
middle of the century that it became organized in opposition to the growing nationalist
demands of the Greek-Cypriot majority. In 1955, when Greek-Cypriots began an armed

struggle to free the island from colonial rule and unite it with Greece, Turkish-Cypriots
began to organize their own struggle in opposition to it. By the late 1950’s this struggle
was organized under the administration and command of TMT.
5
The most thorough research about population movement in the period was conducted
by geographer Richard Patrick, who observed the fighting as a Canadian officer of the
United Nations Peace-Keeping Force. Patrick observes that although “[t]he official Greek-
Cypriot position is that the major portion of the Turkish-Cypriot refugee movement was both
initiated and directed by Turkish-Cypriot leaders in accordance with a contingency plan to
facilitate the partition of Cyprus. . . . The author’s investigations reveal to his satisfaction that
the overwhelming majority of Turkish-Cypriot refugees moved only after Turkish-Cypriots
had been killed, abducted or harassed within their village, quarter, or in the local vicinity”
(1976:344). Bryant’s extensive interviews with Turkish-Cypriots originally from or now living
in the Kyrenia district confirm that most attempted to remain in their villages, but decided
to leave when Turkish-Cypriots were attacked or killed in the vicinity.
6
It was during this period that the first barbed wire was erected to divide Greek and
Turkish neighborhoods. This was known as the “Mason-Dixon Line,” and it ultimately
became the basis for the militarized division of the city. More conflict over the possible
establishment of separate municipalities cemented this division in 1958. In 1963, when
intercommunal violence erupted, United Nations peacekeeping forces were called in to
guard what came to be known as the Green Line, a division that separated Greek- and
Turkish-Cypriots in Nicosia and elsewhere and formed the basis for the line that today
divides the island. For more on this issue, see Papadakis (2006) and Markides (1998).
7
And insofar as the state-within-a-state was defined by the collapse of constitutional
order, the space that Turkish-Cypriots occupied perfectly fits Agamben’s definition of the
camp: “The camp is the space that opens up when the state of exception starts to become
the rule” (2000:38).
8
Rauf Denktas was a successful lawyer, as well as one of the founders of TMT in 1958.
He was elected president of the Cemaat Meclisi, or communal chamber, in 1960 but was
not allowed to return to the island for four years after 1964, when he went without official
sanction to the United Nations. He returned in 1968 to take up his former post, then
replaced Dr. Fazıl Küçük in 1973 as leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community and vice-
president of the Republic of Cyprus. After the island’s division, he emerged as leader of
the new administration, in its various guises. With the declaration of the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus in 1983, he became its first president and remained in office until
2005, when he chose not to run against opponent Mehmet Ali Talat, who was elected in
that same year.
9
According to Mete Hatay’s research, this facilitated immigration ended in 1979, to
be followed by waves of migration for work but without the privileges of citizenship and
property granted to the first immigrants (2007; also Ioannides 1991).
10
The common perception is that being a memur (civil servant) is a safe position, and
it provides a guaranteed retirement, in the past at a very early age. In the past, one needed
to work for only ten years to receive a government pension, and gradual increases in the
retirement age have proven the source of much dissatisfaction in the community. The
working period was increased to 15 years in 1986 and has gradually risen to 25 years. Many
Turkish-Cypriots retain a preference for government jobs over jobs in the private sector,
expressed even in a preference for families to marry their daughters to civil servants. On
this preference for civil service positions, see Navaro-Yashin (2006b).
11
Throughout this article, we will use the “Republic of Cyprus” or simply “the Republic”
to refer to the independent, bicommunal state structure established in 1960, which after
1963 took on an entirely Greek character. Any references to “the Republic” for the period
after 1974 refer to the Greek-controlled areas of the island’s south, the only recognized
government of the island.
12
This is a subject that is well known in Cyprus but has received little academic attention.
One anthropological attempt to investigate the formation of a “Cypriot” identity in reaction
against both the politics of Turkey and the presence of Turkish immigrants unfortunately
provides little critical reflection on the politics of such identity production and so ultimately
reproduces this form of differentiation as a new type of “political conflict” (Navaro-Yashin
2006a). For a more complex and historically situated account of such reactionary forms
of identity and their social and political ambivalence, see Ramm (2006).
13
Ali Erel is an important figure because, as the president of the Chamber of Com-
merce, he drew a significant portion of the center-right into a movement for reunification.
This movement, called Ortak Vizyon (Common Vision), incorporated more than 90 civil
society organizations from across the political spectrum. It also drew the support of former
supporters of the Denktas regime, includıng Dogan Harman, quoted below, who served as
Denktas’s advisor until 2001. Harman is also the editor of Kıbrıslı newspaper and after 2002
became the host of a popular television program that draw a large phone-in audience and
became an important forum for advocacy of the United Nations reunification plan.
14
The call for a referendum on the future of the island became one of the most insistent
demands of the movement, which saw it as the best way to regain their political will.
15
In a peculiar and, for these authors, disturbing article, Yael Navaro-Yashin (2003)
so generalizes this discourse of decay that she describes all of north Nicosia, including its
busy shopping and entertainment district, indeed all of north Cyprus, including the lively
port town of Girne (Kyrenia), as “deserted,” “abjected,” a “no man’s land” that is “between
life and death.” While metaphorically and rhetorically these descriptions may capture part
of the sense of living in an unrecognized state, they certainly do not exhaust that sense,
which—as we plan to argue elsewhere, in an extension of the current argument—also
contains an element of enjoyment.
16
For an analysis of the broad spectrum of political alliances of Turkish-born persons
settled in Cyprus, see Hatay (2005).
17
For an analysis of this same period that focuses more on this sense of exile, see
Derya (2007).
18
Molohiya, a type of wild green, and kolokas, a type of root similar to a potato, are
both important elements of Turkish-Cypriot cuisine. Although kolokas (in Greek, κολοκάσι)
is also an integral part of Greek-Cypriot cuisine, molohiya is generally not known to
Greek-Cypriots.
19
An alternative spelling for molohiya. See note 18.
20
One author remarks that in a garage that had been turned into a cinema, “we
watched one English and one Turkish film at every showing. We followed these films with
such pleasure that we didn’t even notice how much the half-broken cane chairs were hurt-
ing ours rumps” (Balıkçıoglu nd:9)
21
One can see this, as well, in anthropology’s disciplinary melancholy for “lost” cul-
tures spoiled by outside intrusion (Bissell 2005), and in social theory’s mourning for the
pre-modern (Turner 1987; also, Pickering and Keightley 2006).
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Newspaper), 25 April.
Ersoy, Yasar
1998 Kıbrıs Türk Tiyatro Hareketi: Toplumsal ve Siyasal Olaylarla İçiçe (The Turkish Cypriot
Theater Movement: In the Context of Communal and Political Events). Nicosia: Peyak
Kültür Yayınları (Peyak Culture Publishers)
Gürkan, Hasmet Muzaffer
2006 (1989) Dünkü ve Bugünkü Lefkosa (Nicosia Yesterday and Today). Nicosia: Galeri
Kültür Yayınları (Gallery Culture Publishers).
Hatay, Mete
2005 Beyond Numbers: An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the Turkish ‘Settlers’ in
Northern Cyprus. PRIO Report 4/2005. Oslo: International Peace Research
Institute.
2007 Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking? An Overview of the Ethno-Demography
of Cyprus in the Light of the Preliminary Results of the 2006 Turkish-Cypriot Census.
PRIO Report 2/2007. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute.
Herzfeld, Michael
1997 Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State. New York: Routledge.
Hikmetagalar, Hizber
1996 Eski Lefkosa’da Semtler ve Anılar (Neighborhoods and Memories in Old Nicosia).
Istanbul: Marifet Yayınları.
Ioannides, P. Christos
1991 In Turkey’s Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province.
New York: Aristide D. Caratsas.
Kıbrıs
2003 “Statüko bitsin, hos gitsin” (“The status quo should end, and good riddance”).
13 December.
Komins, Bentin Jay
2002 “Depopulated Cosmopolitanism: The Cultures of Integration, Concealment,
and Evacuation in Istanbul.” Comparative Literature Studies 39, 4:360–385.
Konuloglu, Çagla
2005 Anılarla Kıbrıs’ta Yasam: 30 Yıl Kuzeyde (A Life with Memories in Cyprus: 30 Years
in the North). Nicosia: Ates Matbaacılık.
Koselleck, Reinhard
1985 Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. Cambridge: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Press.
Latour, Bruno
1993 We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University
Press.
Markides, Diana
1998 “The Issues of Separate Municipalities in Cyprus, 1957–1963: An Overview.”
Journal of Mediterranean Studies 8, 2:177–204.
Navaro-Yashin, Yael
2003 “‘Life is dead here: Sensing the political in ‘no man’s land.’” Anthropological
Theory 3,1:107–125.
2006a “De-Ethnicizing the Ethnography of Cyprus: Political and Social Conflict
between Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey.” In Divided Cyprus: Modern,
History, and an Island in Conflict, edited. Y. Papadakis, N. Peristianis, and G.
Welz, 84–99. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
2006b “Affect in the Civil Service: A Study of a Modern State-System.” Postcolonial
Studies 9, 3:281–294.
Ortam Gazetesi (Milieu Newspaper)
2003 “Akıncı: ‘Koltuk yarısı degil, bayrak yarısı’” (“Akıncı: ‘It’s not a race for a
seat, it’s a race for a flag’”). 27 October.
Özyürek, Esra
2006 Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Papadakis, Yiannis
2006 “Nicosia after 1960: A River, a Bridge, and a Dead Zone.” Global Media Journal:
Mediterranean Edition 1, 1:1–16.
Pickering, Michael, and Emily Keightley
2006 “The Modalities of Nostalgia.” Current Sociology 54, 6:919–941.
Patrick, Richard A.
1976 Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963–1971. Edited by James H. Bater
and Richard Preston. Waterloo: University of Waterloo (Department of Geog-
raphy, Publication Series No. 4).
Potuoglu-Cook, Öykü
2006 “Beyond the Glitter: Belly Dance and Neoliberal Gentrification in Istanbul.”
Cultural Anthropology 21, 4:633–660.
Ramm, Christoph
2006 “Assessing Transnational Renegotiation in the Post–1974 Cypriot Community:
‘Cyprus Donkeys,’ ‘Black Beards,’ and the ‘EU Carrot’.” Southeast European and
Black Sea Studies 6, 4:523–542.
Robins, Kevin, and Asu Aksoy
1995 “Istanbul Rising: Returning the Repressed to the Urban Culture.” European
Urban and Regional Studies 2, 3:223–235.
Seremetakis, C. Nadia
1996 “The Memory of the Senses, Part I: Marks of the Transitory.” In The Senses
Still: Perception and Memory as Material Culture in Modernity, edited by C. Nadia
Seremetakis, 1–18. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Tolgay, Ahmet
2003 “Efkarlıyım dostlar, Lefkosa’yı gezdim” (“I’m filled with anxiety, my friends,
because I’ve walked around Nicosia”). Kıbrıs 13 December.
Turner, Bryan
1987 “A Note on Nostalgia.” Theory, Culture, and Society 4:147–156.
Volkan, Vamık D.
1979 Cyprus—War and Adaptation: A Psychoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in
Conflict. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
Page 1 of 1

To: Marylene Smeets/NY/UNO@UNHQ
cc: Elizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Kendra
Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Obinna Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: Cyprus input for SG meeting with Pres. Obama
Dear Marylene,
pls. find attached the Cyprus input, as cleared by the Director of Europe Division.
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Attachments:
TPs for Obama.doc
TPs for Obama.doc

President Obama
Cyprus
x The Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are making

steady progress in their talks which take place under
UN auspices. My Special Adviser, Mr. Downer, is now
in Cyprus to chair the current round of meetings.
x We appreciate the support of your Government to the

negotiations which so far have been marked by a
spirit of cooperation and compromise. Still, difficult
issues such as security, lie ahead. Mr. Downer had a
productive meeting with Senator Durbin during his
last visit in February.
x The continuing support of regional powers, such as

Greece and Turkey is important. I will be visiting
Turkey in early April and intend to encourage the
Turkish Government to maintain flexibility and
continued support in moving the negotiations
forward.
If asked:
x [Several months ago the US raised the idea of appointing an

Envoy to Cyprus. Mr. Downer mentioned to Sen. Durbin that
this was not necessary. At this time, it was important for all
concerned to maintain a low-profile approach].
1
Page 1 of 1


Subject: Fw: screening of documentary film
movie time.
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Jose ToTaye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,

DIAZ/UNFICYP@UNFICYP Mario Sanchez D./UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Yasser
Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Wlodek
06/03/2009 05:11 AM Cibor/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Timothy
Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Donatella
Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Steven Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Fiona
Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja
ccJuana Clough/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Julie
Jimenez Lopez/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Subjectscreening of documentary film
Dear colleagues, I have a DVD of a documentary film made by respected Greek Cypriot journalist Makarios
Droushiotis that, as he puts it, "examines how the Cyprus issue was handled politically by Tassos
Papadopoulos, from his election ... in February 2003, until the referendum of April 24th 2004. The author's
investigation focuses on how Greek Cypriot society was besieged by the mass media, and how its
consciousness was poisoned with insecurity and fear."
The hour-long film, which some of you may have already seen, is titled "Poison", and it's very informative
and instructive. I'm proposing to screen it in the main briefing room here, perhaps Monday at the the end
of the day? Let me know. Best,
jl
José Luis Díaz

Spokesperson, UNFICYP
+357 2261 4408
+357 9961 6197 (mobile)
+90 392 601 4408
diaz14@un.org
www.unficyp.org
Page 1 of 1

To: Fiona Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP@UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICS BASE@UN-MAILHUB

Subject: Re: SASG meeting notes: economy
thank you very much Fiona. Very useful.

see you soon.
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Fiona ToAlexander
Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP DOWNER/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Taye-Brook
06/03/2009 07:58 AM Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Wlodek Cibor/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Timothy
Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Donatella Giubilaro
UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Steven
Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ,
cc
SubjectSASG meeting notes: economy
Dear all
Please find attached meeting notes for the SASG's meetings with three Cypriot economists during
his last visit. These are also on the Z drive under Programme Notes.
Best regards
Fiona
Fiona Mullen
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary General (OSASG), Cyprus
Tel +357 99 338 224
Tel +357 22 614 136
mullenf@un.org [attachment "09.02.16 Alexander Downer and Necdet Ergun.doc" deleted by
Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO] [attachment "09.02.17 Alexander Downer and Salih Cosar.doc"
deleted by Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO] [attachment "09.02.17 Alexander Downer and Stelios
Platis.doc" deleted by Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO]
09.02.17 Alexander Downer and Stelios Platis.doc
Alexander Downer meeting with Stelios Platis (Gk Cyp economist)
17 February 2009 at 17:00hrs
GO Complex
Present:
Steven Bourke
Fiona Mullen
Key points of interest:

¾ Turkish Cypriot property prices are 60% of Greek Cypriot property prices.
¾ In the urban areas only around 40% of houses were owner-occupied in 1974. (Later SB
clarified that it was in fact 21.4% for the whole island).
¾ There are GkCyp refugees who have been given land by the government and soft loans to
build on land, and they may have only land and no house in the north. They would have
no basis to return.
¾ After meeting said that “current value” (as per Annan Plan) is the best system for property
compensation. “Annan 5 was perfect in that respect.”
¾ A good double taxation agreement and ‘no questions asked’ policy keeps Russian money
in Cyprus.
Other general remarks:

x Economic structure: the economy is a mixture of strong international flows (tourism,
foreign bank deposits) and a socialist system that redistributes money. There is a big
public sector (c.20%), construction and real estate (20%), finance (7%).
x Current property market: price for an IT, price of new houses affected. There is no
surplus except in Paphos and Protaras. Banks don’t seize assets so they are no forced sales,
which supports prices. The risk to prices comes from competing markets.
x Financial sector: Cypriot banks were sitting on a lot of cash, which made them a target
for takeover. A defensive strategy was to send it abroad, where they can earn very high
interest rates on loans in, for example, Ukraine and Russia. Some Russians have lost 80%
of their assets.
x Settlement economics: his research showed that Annan 3 would work but would lead to
big deficits. The answer is to spread the distribution of payments over time. (FM note:
Annan 5 cut compensation costs and spread payments over a longer period). There could
be an over-liquidity problem. Bonds could be sold at a huge discount as some people will
doubt that property prices will increase in the north.
x Who pays? The TkCyps took all occupied land, nationalised it, gave it to settlers martyrs,
etc and sold it. Therefore the TkCyp state is liable for property compensation.
Fiona Mullen
6 March 2009
cc: Mr. Downer, Mr. Zerihoun, Mr. Sabra, Mr. Cibor, Ms. Bachmann, Ms. Collins, Ms
Giubilaro, Mr. Alchin, Mr. Bourke
09.02.17 Alexander Downer and Salih Cosar.doc
Alexander Downer meeting with Salih Coúar (former TkCyp finance minister)
17 February 2009 at 15:45hrs.
GO Complex
Present:
Sonja Bachmann
Steven Bourke
Fiona Mullen

¾ UBP and CTP need to come together in order to carry out reforms, otherwise “we won’t
be able to pay salaries in a few years’ time”.
¾ Turkey provides 30% of the budget: circa half grants, half credit (which he admitted is a
debt that is not serviced).
¾ Turkey has been giving money to TkCyps since 1950 (education and culture), so will
continue that at least, possibly also infrastructure.

x The market: strongly favours a single market with no restrictions (contrary to official
TkCyp position in the WG).
x Regulation: did not favour a central bank branch in the TkCyp constituent state (official
TkCyp position). There was no branch in 1960.
x Social security system: Social security system is a huge problem. Military pensions (for
the 1960s period of inter-communal fighting) are very high. Favours a unified social
security system post-settlement.
x Public finances: Revenue is around 36% of GNP. However, expenditure is higher. The
size of the public sector is very large. Around 70% of income comes from indirect taxes.
The top rate of income tax is more than 40%. Reform is needed. Turkey asks for reform
every year.
x Taxation: Favours indirect taxes at federal level (agreed GkCyp and TkCyp position).
Redistribution according to population (official TkCyp position).
x Financing: The Turkish Cypriot development bank (which he founded) makes a profit. It
has a strong relationship with Turkey.
Fiona Mullen
6 March 2009
09.02.16 Alexander Downer and Necdet Ergun.doc
Alexander Downer meeting with Necdet Ergun (TkCyp economist)
16 February 2009 at 09:30 hrs
GO Complex
Present:
Yasser Sabra
Tim Alchin
Sonja Bachmann
Steven Bourke
Donatella Giubilaro
Fiona Mullen

¾ There are (at least) three property prices in the north: “Turkish title” (pre-1974 Turkish
Cypriot title) at the most expensive (100%), TkCyp refugee title is 79%, Greek Cypriot
title is 30%.
¾ 75% of private property is Greek Cypriot land. Would not be drawn on how much GkCyp
property is developed.
¾ The five categories of property are: 1) agriculture, 2) vacant, 3) improved 4) inhabited by
refugees, 5) inhabited by non-refugees (settlers).
¾ After the meeting he told FM and SB that banks will not take GkCyp title as collateral – in
sharp contrast to the claims made by the TkCyp WG.

x Macroeconomy: Growth was strong after 2003 but is now negative. In the property
market, currently supply outstrips demand. 30% of savings go to Turkey.
x Public finances: need reform: but it is unpopular. The TkCyp administration is seen as a
free for all.
x The property market: The Annan plan is already priced into property, any changes to the
Annan plan will have a destabilising effect on property prices, which may also filter to the
south. The government is using Republic of Cyprus public land, not nationalised Greek
Cypriot land, to give to young couples in Morphou.
x The property regime: Property criteria should be objective and transparent. Need for
“creative criteria and filters”. Timetable must be fast. Prices should work in the market.
His “black sheep” idea: the final user, who got a discount for buying GkCyp land, should
pay. Individuals should be responsible for their wealth transfer. The government handed
over land for nothing. There is no tax consciousness in Cyprus. It is very important that
compensation bonds can be used as collateral and be tradeable. The constituent states
should be responsible for dealing with claims. There’s a lack of trust.
x Property regime finances: The financial responsibility of the property board and all
disputed land should be federal as the bonds will be possessed mainly by GkCyps.
Suggests a property account unit, similar to the point system in the north, to value the
property.
Fiona Mullen
6 March 2009
Page 1 of 2

To: awilliams@usip.org
bcc: Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO

Subject: Re: Letter
Dear Abi,
seems fine to me. Amongst the issues which would be helpful is to
acknowledge the ongoing negotiations between the two leaders under UN auspices, the need to
maintain steady progress and to encourage bicommunal contacts, events and trust-building
bottom-up. Also, emphasis on ownership is important, it is their process and they can make a
reunification happen!
The US government and the P-5s are very supportive.
I am off to the island tomorrow for a week and probably back around 18 March, so we can talk
again.
Bon chance and hope to come to visit you soon!
big hug,
Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Abiodun Williams <awilliams@usip.org>
Abiodun Williams To<bachmanns@un.org>

<awilliams@usip.org> cc
SubjectLetter
05/03/2009 01:37 PM
Dear Sonja,
Could you please review the draft invitation letter to Mr. Talat? I would welcome
your suggestions on two specific points: 1) a title for his presentation; and 2)
specific areas where his views would be particularly helpful.
Thanks,
Abi
[attachment "Mehmet Ali Talat Invitation.doc" deleted by Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO]
Abiodun Williams, Ph.D.

Vice President
Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention
Mehmet Ali Talat Invitation.doc
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
. . .
An independent institution established by Congress to strengthen the nation’s capacity
to promote peaceful resolution to international conflicts
March 5, 2009
His Excellency Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat

Cyprus
Your Excellency:
I am writing to invite you to give a presentation on------- at the United States

Institute of Peace on Tuesday, March 31 2009, during your upcoming trip to
Washington, DC.
Your presentation would provide you an opportunity to outline your views

on….. This event would attract representation from policy makers, the
diplomatic community, scholars and non-governmental officials. We would
hope for an on-the-record presentation.
The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution

established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve
violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development,
and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital
worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge,
skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts
around the globe.
I appreciate your consideration of this letter and hope that we will be able to host
you at the Institute. I look forward to hearing from your office.
Sincerely,
1200 – 17TH STREET NW, WASHINGTON, DC 20036-3011

TEL 202-457-1700 • FAX 202-429-6063 • TDD 202-457-1719 • WEB www.usip.org
Dr. Abiodun Williams
Vice President
Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention
Page 2 of 2
United States Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036-3011
Tel: 202-429-4772
awilliams@usip.org
Page 1 of 2


Subject: Re: Dates of facilitators in the GOs
The WGs are defunct for the moment, whereas some TCs such as health and environment are
still meeting sporadically mainly to continue to thrash out the CBMs which they then present to
the representatives (who after a long hiatus finally will meet again next week to take them
forward).
Currently, the facilitators mainly focus on the leaders' meetings on governance, property and
economy/EU matters, take notes in the meetings, keep in touch with the respective WG/TC
people and participate in ad hoc meetings of the experts in their respective fields. Good thing is
that the experts are still meeting, as directed by the leaders to continue to work out
convergences for the joint documents.
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Elizabeth ToSonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Spehar/NY/UNO cc
SubjectRe: Dates of facilitators in the GOs
06/03/2009 03:11
PM
Thanks, Sonja. Are they still working with specific WGs and TCs? (I'm not even sure which ones
are still functioning at this stage...)
E.
Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO
Sonja ToElizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Bachmann/NY/UNO cc
SubjectDates of facilitators in the GOs
06/03/2009 11:00 AM
Dear Elizabeth,
here the dates when the facilitators started working with the GO:
Fiona: 17 April
Page 2 of 2
Steven: 9 May 2008

Donatella: 12 June 2008
best, Sonja
Page 1 of 1

To: Donatella Giubilaro/NY/UNO@UNHQ
Date: Saturday, March 07, 2009 12:04AM

Dear Donatella,
FYI. I got this from Georg in the EC, who based it on a public speech in Cyprus. It also includes
the draft act of adaptation and prot. 10.
This might be helpful to see the EC position on various issues, although it was written in 2007.
Since we do not want to prejudge anything for this times' negotiations, pls. keep to yourself for
the moment.
best, Sonja
Attachments:
Page 1 of 2
From: Elizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO

cc: Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Obinna
Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ
Date: Saturday, March 07, 2009 12:17AM

Subject: Re: Fw: screening of documentary film
As discussed, if you can get a "bootleg" copy in Cyprus, I would be happy to try to screen it
here....
E.
Sonja ToElizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Laura

Bachmann/NY/UNO Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Obinna
Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Kendra
06/03/2009 04:53 PM Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ
cc
SubjectFw: screening of documentary film
valuable to see here as well.
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Jose ToTaye-Brook
DIAZ/UNFICYP@UNFICYP Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Mario Sanchez
06/03/2009 05:11 AM D./UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Yasser
Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Wlodek
Cibor/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Timothy
Donatella Giubilaro
Steven Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Fiona Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
ccJuana Clough/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Julie Jimenez
Lopez/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Subjectscreening of documentary film
Dear colleagues, I have a DVD of a documentary film made by respected Greek Cypriot journalist
Page 2 of 2
Makarios Droushiotis that, as he puts it, "examines how the Cyprus issue was handled politically
by Tassos Papadopoulos, from his election ... in February 2003, until the referendum of April
24th 2004. The author's investigation focuses on how Greek Cypriot society was besieged by the
mass media, and how its consciousness was poisoned with insecurity and fear."
The hour-long film, which some of you may have already seen, is titled "Poison", and it's very
informative and instructive. I'm proposing to screen it in the main briefing room here, perhaps
Monday at the the end of the day? Let me know. Best,
jl
José Luis Díaz

+357 2261 4408
+357 9961 6197 (mobile)
+90 392 601 4408
diaz14@un.org
www.unficyp.org
Page 1 of 1
From: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP

To: Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Steven Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Fiona Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Date: Monday, March 09, 2009 07:04PM

Subject:
Attachments:
Nami.Iacovou.doc
Nami.Iacovou.doc
Lunch with Iacovou
x Follow up on governance and power sharing + property issues

¾ As a follow-up to leaders’ meetings, representatives should meet more regularly
(rationalization of process)
x Expert on Governance (John McGarry)
x Expert on property (Van Houtte)
x SASG’s meeting with Heads of Working Groups – Property/EU matters
x CBMs
¾ Opening of crossings, including Limnitis
¾ Issue of Ledra phase 2
¾ “Quick impact” confidence-building measures (technical committees)

UNDP is providing additional 500 000 US dollars for financing CBM activities.
Technical Committees’ measures close to completion subject to support of the
Representatives.
- Print the road safety leaflet
- Identification of 3 dumping sites for rehabilitation in the buffer zone
- Launch of the fire prevention task force
Nami.Iacovou.doc
Dinner with Nami
x SASG’s meeting with Head of Working Groups – Property/EU matters
x Expert on Governance (John McGarry)
x Follow up on governance and power sharing + property issues

¾ to follow-up on leaders’ meetings representatives should meet more regularly
x Expert on property (Van Houtte)
x SASG’s meeting with Head of Working Groups – Property/EU matters
x CBMs
¾ Opening of crossings, including Limnitis
¾ Issue of Ledra phase 2
¾ “Quick impact” confidence-building measures (technical committees)

UNDP is providing additional 500 000 US dollars for financing CBM activities.
Technical Committees’ measures close to completion subject to support of the
Representatives.
- Print the road safety leaflet
- Identification of 3 dumping sites for rehabilitation in the buffer zone
- Launch of the fire prevention task force
x Maronites (Ayia Marina) are requesting
¾ To be able to have a mass in the old church of Ayia Marina (which has an access
road on the left side of the village).
¾ To try to relocate the animals and the shepherd/s from the Monastery of prophet
Elias so the conversation works under UNDP-ACT can continue.
¾ To try to recover the icon of Saint Marina that is located in a museum in Myrtou.
x Mention of Economist Conference in Athens

Page 1 of 1
From: Florian Von Koenig/United Nations

To: Taye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
cc: Wlodek Cibor/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, David
Harland/United Nations@UNHQ-DPKO, Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: Turkish question: Limnitis/Kokkina`
Dear Taye,
this afternoon, I was contacted by the Turkish Mission's counsellor who inquired about this
headquarters' position on Limnitis/Kokkina.
According to him, on 5 March, you told Nami and Iacovou, that you were under pressure from NY
to urge the sides to find agreement on Limnitis. Moreover, he claimed that Downer had let the
parties know that the UN was working on proposals on how to resolve the access to Kokkina
issue as part of the Limnitis question.
We would of course like to avoid that we take positions different from yours on such matters,
which is why I have told the Turks to wait for a reply from me.
I would be grateful if you could provide us with a short update on where negotiations on the
Limnitis/Kokkina matter are, what positions you and Downer have taken on the matter and what
position, if any, we could usefully convey to the Turks on this. Ideally, I would like to get back to
the Turks tomorrow as they seem to pursue this issue quite aggressively, which is rather
unusual, given that they usually take a fairly low profile here.
Looking forward to seeing you next week!
Florian
Page 1 of 1

To: zerihoun@un.org, alchin@un.org

Subject: Fw: Turkish question: Limnitis/Kokkina`
Dear Taye,
Showed AD the message below and he said, as previously discussed, that a solution to Limnitis is
key from a symbolic perspective to unblock the other CBMs.
Best wishes,
Sonja
Florian Von Koenig

From: Florian Von Koenig
Sent: 09/03/2009 15:29 EDT
To: Taye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Cc: Wlodek Cibor/UNFICYP@UNFICYP; Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP; David
Harland/United Nations@UNHQ-DPKO; Sonja Bachmann
Subject: Turkish question: Limnitis/Kokkina`
Dear Taye,
this afternoon, I was contacted by the Turkish Mission's counsellor who inquired about this
headquarters' position on Limnitis/Kokkina.
According to him, on 5 March, you told Nami and Iacovou, that you were under pressure from NY
to urge the sides to find agreement on Limnitis. Moreover, he claimed that Downer had let the
parties know that the UN was working on proposals on how to resolve the access to Kokkina
issue as part of the Limnitis question.
We would of course like to avoid that we take positions different from yours on such matters,
which is why I have told the Turks to wait for a reply from me.
I would be grateful if you could provide us with a short update on where negotiations on the
Limnitis/Kokkina matter are, what positions you and Downer have taken on the matter and what
position, if any, we could usefully convey to the Turks on this. Ideally, I would like to get back to
the Turks tomorrow as they seem to pursue this issue quite aggressively, which is rather
unusual, given that they usually take a fairly low profile here.
Looking forward to seeing you next week!
Florian
Page 1 of 1

To: Elizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Obinna
Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Yasser
Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP

Subject: Dates
Dear all,
On the issue of dates for the proposed brainstorming, I checked with Mr. Pascoe's office and he is
free the whole week of 4-8 May currently. I have tentatively booked a time for AD to meet with
Mr. Pascoe on Tuesday morning (5 May) just to be able to tie down a time. This can however
obviously be changed according to what would be most convenient for AD as well.
On a related issue, I spoke to Nick Williams of the UK mission about the possible issue of Mr.
Downer's visit. His view was that AD should definitely brief the P5 informally but should only
consider briefing the Security Council if he has something specific to say as putting his briefing on
the agenda will raise expectations.
There is however another issue related to the above - there is still a push by the Greek-Cypriots
to have the UNFICYP report discussed in May rather than June, when Turkey will be chairing the
Council. Nick does not know where these discussions will go but will update us as information
becomes available. I said that we would need a minimum of one-months notice to prepare the
report so we should be told by the beginning of April whether this is going to happen or not.
However, Nick also added that if the report is to be discussed in May, it would make more sense
for AD to brief the Council then.
Kendra
Page 1 of 1

To: spehare@un.org, .vaccari@un.org, .collinsk@un.org, .okamgba@un.org

Subject: Fw: screening of "Poison"
Fyi
Jose DIAZ

From: Jose DIAZ
Sent: 10/03/2009 11:29 ZE2
To: Taye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP; Mario Sanchez D./UNFICYP@UNFICYP;
Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP; Wlodek Cibor/UNFICYP@UNFICYP; Timothy
Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP; Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP; Steven
Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP; fiona.mullen@sapientaeconomics.com; Sonja Bachmann
Cc: Juana Clough/UNFICYP@UNFICYP; Julie Jimenez Lopez/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Subject: screening of "Poison"
Deal all,
The documentary film we had scheduled to screen yesterday evening is also available on the
web: http://www.makarios.ws/cgibin/hweb?-A=2924,printer.html&-V=makarios. Best,
jl
José Luis Díaz

+357 2261 4408
+357 9961 6197 (mobile)
+90 392 601 4408
diaz14@un.org
www.unficyp.org
Page 1 of 2

To: Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP, Steven Bourke/UNFICYP, Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP,
Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP, Wlodek Cibor/UNFICYP, Jose DIAZ/UNFICYP, Sonja
Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, jaco.cillers@undp.org, nicolas.jarraud@undp.org,
christopher.louise@undp.org

Subject: Fw: [Fwd: Investment agency]
I was asked by the head of the Turkish Cypriot Investment Promotion Agency (YAGA)
to inform my colleagues of their sudden 'disinvite' from membership of the World
Association of Investment Promotion Agencies. They have been fully paid up
members for a year (the WAIPA says any country or territory involved in
investment promotion can be a member) but on their application to renew this year
they were asked for a letter of recognition 'from the government of Cyprus',
which YAGA maintains is against WAIPA's charter.
Full saga attached if interested.
Best regards
Fiona
Fiona Mullen
Tel +357 99 338 224
Tel +357 22 614 136
mullenf@un.org
-----Forwarded by Fiona Mullen/UNFICYP on 03/10/2009 12:22PM -----
To: mullenf@un.org
From: fiona.mullen@sapientaeconomics.com
Date: 03/09/2009 10:16PM
Subject: [Fwd: Investment agency]
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Investment agency
From: "ayse donmezer" <ayse_donmezer@yahoo.com>
Date: Mon, March 9, 2009 7:16 pm
To: "Fiona Mullen Sapienta Economics"
<fiona.mullen@sapientaeconomics.com>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dear Fiona
I hope your are OK. You remembered that we talked about
CIPA at the competitiveness comference.
Please find attached the letter from the World Associations of Invesment
Promotion
Agencies that we were member. After 7 months they asked recognition letter!
Is it fair!
regards
Page 2 of 2
Ayse Donmezer,
email: ayse_donmezer@yahoo.com
Phone: (m) +90.533.862.0004
Fiona Mullen
Sapienta Economics Ltd
www.sapientaeconomics.com
fiona.mullen@sapientaeconomics.com
mullen@cytanet.com.cy
Mob +357 99 338 224
Tel +357 22 346 149
Attachments:
WaipaFirstletterFeb.03 YAGAletterattachment
untitled-1.2 Waipa2.letter
.doc sFeb.17.tif
YAGALettertoWaipa17t
hFeb.09.tif
WaipaFirstletterFeb.03.doc

Geneva, 3 February 2009
Mrs. Dönmezer
Director
Cyprus Turkish Development Investment Agency - YAGA
Bedreddin Demirel Caddesi No 111, Floor 5
Kumsa, Nicosia
Dear Mrs. Dönmezer,
In order to be considered as a WAIPA member and before your payment of the WAIPA membership fee
for 2009, we at WAIPA need a formal letter of recognition of YAGA from the governement of Cyprus.
Would you please accept , Dear Mrs. Dönmezer, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Alessandro Teixeira
WAIPA President

Dear Fiona
I hope your are OK. You remembered that we talked about
CIPA at the competitiveness comference.
Please find attached the letter from the World Associations of Invesment Promotion
Agencies that we were member. After 7 months they asked recognition letter!
Is it fair!
regards
Ayse Donmezer,
email: ayse_donmezer@yahoo.com
Phone: (m) +90.533.862.0004
Page 1 of 1

To: spehare@un.org, vaccari@un.org, collinsk@un.org, okamgba@un.org, pichlera@un.org

Subject: for morning meeting: short read-out of leaders' meeting today
The leaders had their longest tete a tete so far today from 10 am - 1200 noon and then met for
another 45 minutes having a first discussion on EU matters.
Both leaders commended the EU Working Group's work and the great degree of convergence
reached. After that, the GkCyps read out their positions on EU matters followed by the TkCyp
response. Main issues included the issue of 'possible' derogations from the acquis (as put by ex
President Vassilou), the need for efficient decision-making in the Council under time constraints
vs. 'effective participation' asked by the TkCyps as well as the TkCyp need for legal certainty of
any settlement. The main concern from the TkCyp side, as put by Mr. Talat, was to ensure that
the settlement would remain unchallenged in any Courts. To assuage the TkCyps concerns, the
Gkcyps raised the possibility of a joint request for advice on this matter to the EC and the EU
Council legal services. The TkCyp were non committal to this proposal.
The urgent need for an EC liasion officer was confirmed during discussions again today. I called
O. Rehn's cabinet today once again underlining that point and AD will call O. Rehn separately
today as well.
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 1

To: deke@mfa.gov.tr
bcc: Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO

Subject: Message for Amb. Apakan
Dear Deniz,
pls. find attached the message from Mr. Downer to Ambassador Apakan.
Many thanks for forwarding and all the best,
Sonja
FOR AMBASSADOR APAKAN FROM MR. DOWNER
Dear Ambassador,
it was good to talk to you last night and I appreciate the continuing contact between us. I will do
my best to get to Ankara before too long and am working on the transport challenges.
I think the talks are going well, albeit more slowly than we might all hope. Ideally, the first
reading of all the issues should be complete by the end of April, but that timetable looks as if it
could slip into May.
On the Yesilirmak crossing, the two sides may be ready to agree to open the crossing subject to
the Greek Cypriots connecting Erenkoy to the electricity system and the Turkish Cypriots having
enough fuel for their generators in the event of a contingency.
We urgently need some progress on confidence-building measures to inspire a little more public
confidence into the process. Of course there is always an argument against anything but both
parties have to rise above that if they are to make real progress.
Very best wishes,

Alexander Downer
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 1

To: "'Sonja Bachmann'" <bachmanns@un.org>, <sabra@un.org>, <giubilaro@un.org>,
"'Timothy Alchin'" <alchin@un.org>

Subject:
Attachments:
090303-en.doc
090303-en.docSECRET
G/C Community
Speaking notes
EUROPEAN UNION MATTERS

General Introduction
We are starting today the discussion on an important Chapter which

symbolises the common future of all Cypriots in a reunited country within a
united Europe. To make Cyprus a successful member state of the
European Union is the element which, more than any other, can give a
common goal and a common hope to all the citizens of this country. We
believe that Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots have by and large
common interests in the European context and that this should allow us to
make rapid and substantial progress in our discussions, which will
concretely show our will to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the
Cyprus problem. This community of interests, allowed the Working Group
on European Union Matters that we set up together last spring, to achieve
convergence and common understanding on a large number of issues.
In our view, this Chapter will have to deal with two main issues: First,
the application of the acquis communautaire in the whole of Cyprus
following the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem and,
second, the organization of the State, which will allow a federal Cyprus to
deal efficiently with matters relating to the European Union. Let us examine
briefly each one of these issues.

2
SECRET G/C Community

The first one relates to the modalities of application of the acquis after
the comprehensive settlement. Cyprus is already a member state. This is
an enormous advantage, because without having to undergo any lengthy
accession process and without needing the individual agreement of every
member state, it will be possible to apply the acquis communautaire
throughout the island within a short period of time.
The legal mechanism for the extension of the acquis to the whole
island already exists and it is part of the primary law of the European Union:
it is provided by Protocol No 10 to the Act of Accession of Cyprus and nine
other countries to the European Union. Under Article 1, paragraph 1, of the
said Protocol, the application of the acquis is suspended in the areas of the
Republic of Cyprus where the Government does not exercise effective
control. However, under paragraph 2 of the same Article, the Council of the
European Union, acting unanimously on the basis of a proposal from the
Commission, can decide on the withdrawal of the suspension. It is uniformly
accepted among both Cypriot and EU officials that the lifting of the
suspension does not need, from a legal point of view, to be carried out
simultaneously for all the areas of the acquis. In other words, through this
mechanism, it is possible to provide for limited transitional periods for short
durations, which will allow the T/C community to adapt to the new situation
before the acquis actually becomes applicable in a given area.
When dealing with this issue, we must always have in mind the
importance of the acquis for all Cypriots in the context of a comprehensive
settlement. The acquis is not only a very strong unifying factor for our

3

country, but also a factor of modernization which helps create healthy
structures in our economy, favours competitivity, protects the consumer and
promotes sustainable development. Particularly for the T/C, the application
of the acquis in the areas which will be under their administration will allow
free movement of goods and services with the rest of the European Union
and access to the Union´s structural funds, all these being elements which
should result in rapid economic growth. However, our common aim should
be to achieve the implementation of the largest part of the acquis in the
whole of Cyprus on the date of entry into force of the comprehensive
settlement.
We understand that the prospect of applying all of the Union´ s acquis

in a short period of time may be seen as an enormous and difficult task. We
are willing to help our T/C compatriots to prepare to face the challenge.
In this matter, the interests of both communities of Cyprus will have to

be taken into account, as well as the interests of the European Union as a
whole. Let me simply remind that the term “acquis communautaire” was
invented more than 30 years ago by the then European Communities in
order to make clear that European Community rules are an indivisible whole
which has to be accepted by all member states, without the possibility of
choosing some of these rules and rejecting others. This principle forged in
the 1970´s and applied since, is still very much valid today and protects the
European Union from being diluted in what came to be known as “Europe à
la carte”.

4

The second issue to be discussed in this Chapter relates to the
institutional and procedural arrangements which will have to be put in place
for the handling of European Union issues by the Cyprus State after the
comprehensive settlement. Flexible institutions and procedures which are
as simple and effective as possible is what we should aim at in this field.
The capacity of taking decisions quickly, particularly in order to determine
the positions of Cyprus within the EU Council and its preparatory bodies, is
extremely important, given that Cyprus is only one of the 27 member states
and that the procedures within the European Union carry on at their own
pace without waiting for every single member state to make up its mind on
any given issue. Therefore, if it is not able to determine its positions quickly
and efficiently, Cyprus will lose every influence as a member state.
The aims of flexibility, simplicity and efficiency in the organizational

field should be common to G/C and T/C, given that in 99% of cases our
interests within the European Union will be identical. We should therefore
have simple and quick decision-making procedures, even though clear
safeguards should be provided for the case where one of the federated
units will feel the need to use them. In most cases, only the competent
technocrats should be involved in the determination of the position that
Cyprus will be defending in Brussels, their decision simply being endorsed
at a higher level. However, a wider and more formal consultation and
coordination must be automatically applied as soon as one of those
involved asks for it. What we must avoid is that lengthy and formal
coordination procedures be legally required in every single case.

5

Organizational issues and, more particularly, the procedure for
determining the positions that Cyprus will defend in the Council of the EU
and its preparatory bodies, were discussed at length by the Working Group
a few months ago. The joint convergence paper prepared by the Working
Group does not fully achieve the objectives of flexibility, simplicity and
efficiency. However, we can consider that it achieves them to an acceptable
degree, given that in many cases lengthy coordination procedures will not
automatically be followed, even though they will be available if any one of
the federated units or of the ministries involved asks for it.
Good work has been done by the Working Group. We should build on
this work in the next few meetings.
Ȁȁ/090303-ǻȚĮʌȡ.İȖȖȡ.-speakingnotes(3)/ȆȆ

Page 1 of 1

To: giubilaro@un.org, bachmanns@un.org

Subject: Memo plane
Note to Mr. Pascoe
1. The negotiations in Cyprus are moving at a steady pace and are likely to intensify in the coming
months after the completion of a first reading beginning of May. At the same time, my efforts to
keep regional stakeholders, especially Greece and Turkey , appraised of the negotiation process
during the crucial discussions on Security and Guarantees, will have to be
reinforced.Unfortunately, the regional capitals are poorly linked with one another in terms of air
transportation. Traveling to Ankara takes up a whole day with an obligatory overnight stay due
to the flight connections through Athens . This involves hours of unproductive waiting at
airports and the extension, often by as much as a whole day, of what could otherwise be very
short missions saving time for engaging in the substantive discussions on the island.
1. I believe that the possibility of chartering a fixed-wing aircraft every six weeks and fly from the
Sovereign Base Area to Ankara would constitute a more efficient and timesaving alternative
option. The Good Offices budget foresees about 32 million USD for reimbursing UNFICYP
for fuel and useage of helicopters, which however cannot be used to reach Ankara . These
monies could be used to cover the costs of renting a fixed-wing aircraft.
3. I would be grateful if you could assist in facilitating the chartering of a fixed-wing aircraft for
the upcoming months to ideally undertake a first flight in April, with a second trip envisaged for
June/July at what we believe will be a highly intense and sensitive give-and-take period.
Alexander Downer
UN Special Adviser for Cyprus
13 March 2009
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 1


Subject:
Message from Mr. Downer to Mr. Rehn:
Dear Commissioner,
I tried to call you but without success. I would help liaise between the Commission and the UN if
we could make easy telephone contact. (We are all busy but this is an important problem to solve
especially for Europe.)
You will recall our meeting of last October in Brussels and more recently in Cyprus in February
when you offered to send an official from the EC to assist our mission here. It would have been
particularly useful to have had someone to help us for this phase of the negotiations ( but sadly
that was not to be).
I would be grateful if you let me know at your earliest convenience what your current plans are in
relation to this position so that we are in a position to consider alternative options at this late
stage. (Alternatively, we will endeavour to negotiate a contract with a consultant ourselves.)
Yours sincerely,
Alexander Downer
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 2

To: spehare@un.org, vaccari@un.org, collinsk@un.org, okamgba@un.org

Subject: short read-out of today
Dear all,
following the highlights of a very intense day:
a) In a meeting this morning, Pres. Christofias mentioned he would not like it if we used the
sovereign bases to fly to the region (mentioning the previous De Soto approach). AD wants to go
ahead at least with the memo requesting a plane and I will send it to you after he signs it
tomorrow.
b) The representatives met long this afternoon to discuss CBMs, they specifically mentioned the
ambulances, road safety, environment and Limnitis. They both stated that they were open to
continue discussions. AD and TBZ invested a lot this week in shuttling back and forth to
encourage progress on the CBMs.
c) Separately, the EU experts met today to align the EU convergence paper with the governance
and power-sharing one. They will continue their meeting on Monday to present the outcome of
their discussions to the leaders meeting on Tuesday.
d) The next leaders meeting will take place on Tuesday and the representatives will meet on
Wednesday.
e) Next tuesday, also, the joint meeting of Christofias and Talat with the Chambers of Commerce
will take place.
f) Hans van Houtte has done a good job and will leave on Monday after the first exploratory
meetings on property. He has met with experts of both parties.
g) EC liaison: after some messages back and forth to Brussels, the EC will send us a legal expert
to work as a liaison (after the other one fell through) to arrive on Monday.
h) In a discussion with ES, AD confirmed that 30th April and /or 1st May would be ok for him to
come to NY. He cannot do it later during the first week of May. Not sure BLP will be there though.
i) We are visiting Paphos tomorrow to meet with local officials and then AD will fly out on Sunday
evening. I will fly out morning back to NY.
j) I got a copy of Poison which I will take with me to NY. Excellent but depressing movie.
Hope you are all doing well and looking forward to seeing you on tuesday morning!
best, Sonja
Page 2 of 2
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 1


Subject: URGENT journalist question of your press interview after CD meeting today
Tried to call you but you do not pick up. Jose wants to urgently talk to you, he was approached
by a journalist from Philelefteros who alleged you told him in an interview after your CD meeting
today that the 1960 Constitution "disintegrated" and mentioned that with this comment you
delegitimized the existence of the RoC.
anyway, pls. call Jose.
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 1

To: Elizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ
cc: Obinna Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Yasser

Subject: Report
Dear all,
Just for your information, I had a conversation with Florian today on the SG Report on Cyprus.
Apparently, the Turkish mission recently told DPKO that there had been no decision as yet as to
whether the report would be presented to the SC in June, as scheduled, or one month earlier in
May. DPKO is therefore still working on the assumption that the report should be ready for June,
as per the original schedule.
On the one or two report question, it is apparently DPKO's understanding that there will be only
one report, unless told otherwise.
Kendra
Page 1 of 1
From: Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP


Subject: CBMs update
Attachments:
Update on measures agreed.doc
Updateonmeasuresagreed.doc
12.3.2009
MEASURES AGREED IN TECHNICAL COMMITTEES
(Approved by the Leaders on 20 June and 25 July 2008)

Name of Technical Committee Measure Status of Implementation

(TC)
CRIME AND CRIMINAL Agreement on Road Safety Started: No
MATTERS The TC agreed that content of information leaflets was finalized and ready for
printing. It fell off the agenda after the TC ran into differences over other
matters.
Recommendation on Exchanging Started: No
Information and Intelligence on Crime and Premises selected (to be refurbished) and temporary premises offered in UNPA
Criminal Matters (Committee on Names of members of Committee provided (TkCyps 4, GkCys 5). GkCys
Communications and Liaison between objected to one TkCyp name on the grounds the person is of mainland Turkish
north and south police). origin. TkCyps said two members initially proposed resigned.
GkCyps wait for Iacovou’s approval before the Committee can meet for the first
informal encounter. Iacovou said they are not ready to implement the measure.
TC decided work should start with training of members.
ECONOMIC & COMMERCIAL None
MATTERS
CULTURAL HERITAGE (see also Establishment of the “Advisory Board for Started: No
next page) the Preservation, Physical Protection and Measure approved by the Leaders (28 January 2009).
Restoration of Immovable Cultural The TC is considering the Advisory Board’s work plan. GkCyp submitted a draft
Heritage of Cyprus.” general strategy (three main axes: restoration of religious and secular sites,
documentation of historical sites and fund raising). TkCyps agreed in principle.
GkCyps presented names of designated members. TkCyps are waiting for Talat’s
approval of recommended members.
Compilation of the entire list of Started: Yes
immovable cultural heritage of Cyprus Subsidiary working group established.
Agreed to establish a framework for common inventory.
Decision on two restoration pilot projects Started: Yes
(Arnavut Mosque and Archangelos Experts have established technical requirements for the implementation of these
Church) projects (and cost estimates)
Agreed to exchange information to determine cost estimation
Preliminary discussions on-going for tender process


(TC)
CULTURAL HERITAGE Agreement on Educational Programs in Started: Yes
Connection with Cultural Heritage Subsidiary working group established.
Decided to create an interactive educational programme website.
Guidelines to the ad-hoc working group EU Commission offered financial support for the programme
for the development of an interactive
educational computer program
Not approved yet by leaders: Joint visits undertaken to sites, on both sides, where cultural artifacts are kept.
Measure on Smuggling of Movable GkCyps submitted draft measure on common inventory to prevent smuggling
Antiquities and Objects of Art. and retrieve artifacts been smuggled. TkCyps insists that inventory of movable
cultural heritage should be considered only after the one of immovable cultural
heritage is completed.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT Mechanisms for cooperation in crisis Started: No
situation
HUMANITARIAN MATTERS None Nami asked (representatives’ meeting, 3 Dec.) to consider and approve measures
discussed by Technical Committee:
i) Sporting events between students from the north and south;
ii) Academic exchange and collaboration between academics in the north and the
south.
HEALTH MATTERS Agreement on the Crossing of Ambulances Started: No

in Emergency Cases Information on ambulances shared.
TkCyps provided names of drivers (and asked for GkCyps names).
GkCyps asked for use of Limnitis crossing point. TkCyps referred matter to
representative.
GkCyps not yet provided ambulances with insurances valid in the north
(problem of recognition of authority). Iacovou suggested that a solution could
be to use ambulances from a private hospital or from the Red Cross.
Agreement on Cyprus Joint Committee on Started: Yes
Health Two Committees ( Public Health / Veterinary) established and meetings held


(TC)
ENVIRONMENT (see also next Cooperation for the elimination of illegal Started: Yes
page) dumping sites and the rehabilitation of the Task Force on Waste management created.
affected areas within the buffer zone Plan of action defined
Mapping of dumping sites in preparation.
Field visits to illegal dumping sites in the buffer zone undertaken.
Three symbolic sites identified for rehabilitation to show quick success.
Project proposal for the implementation expected in two weeks.
Awareness raising measures for water Started: Yes
saving Task Force on Water created in December 2008.
Project proposal for implementation finalized (subject to feedback from TkCyp).
Procurement expected to take place in March and implementation to begin in
April.
Cooperation for the prevention of wildfires Started: Yes
A Task Force on Fire Prevention established.
Project proposal for implementation expected by April.
Cooperation for exchange of experience Started: Yes but suspended
and information between environmental Task Force created.
experts Work stopped because of GkCyps issues on procedure at crossing points.
Waste management – treatment-recycling Started: No UNDP running recycling feasibility study
Agreement on Cooperation for Island-wide Started: No

Assessment of All Major Waste Streams Task force on Waste management created.
qualitatively and quantitatively (Baseline
Study)
Cooperation for the establishment of a Started: No
common approach on mining and
quarrying activities in Cyprus
Agreement on Environmental Education Started: No


(TC)
ENVIRONMENT Biodiversity and nature protection Started: No
Marine and maritime pollution Started: No
management and control
Chemical pollution management and Started: No
control
Asbestos pollution management and Started: No
control
Historical pollution management and Started: No
control

Page 1 of 1

To: Alexander DOWNER/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, alexander.downer@adelaide.edu.au
cc: Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,

Subject: Quick UPDATE
A cable is being prepared and will be sent shortly on today's Leaders' meeting.
Very briefly:
z Experts met yesterday (am) but did not make much progress. While the intention was to
clarify a number of issues where they thought there was convergence, experts ended up
with more points of divergence. For example, GCs complained that TCs have been trying
lately to extend the scope of decisions taken by consensus.
z During today's leaders' meeting on EU matters discussions showed disagreement on a
number of key issues, such as: protocol 10, decision-making, etc. On a more positive note,
the leaders instructed the representatives and experts to meet tomorrow and Thursday to
try to narrow differences ahead of the next leaders' meeting.
z Next Meetings: a) Representatives + experts: Wednesday, 18 March (pm) + Thursday 19
March (pm); topics: EU, governance and also CBMs (on CBMs the rep. will follow-up on
their last week discussion); b) Leaders will meet on Tuesday, 24 March (am); topic: EU
z The EU Commission expert is currently in Nicosia as planned (Taye informed the two
representatives).
Tried to call today without success. Will call tomorrow.

Page 1 of 1

To: Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Obinna Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ
cc: Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: Fw: meeting today
fyi.
Meeting of leaders 17 March (morning)
The leaders discussed EU matters.
Discussions focused mainly on Protocol 10 on Cyprus (annexed to the 2003 Act of accession).
Divergence is confirmed. TC asks for a new act as primary law. GC’s position is that a new act is not
necessary since a settlement can be accommodated within Protocol 10.
Leaders considered also issues related to determination and coordination of Cyprus’ positions on EU
maters. The interpretation of the two mechanisms (by consensus or a less formal procedure) identified
at the level of the WG has been reopened for discussion since it is not clear what would be the rule and
what the exception. Divergence confirmed also on what to do in case of lack of consensus. (Cyprus
would abstain or a deadlock resolving mechanism should be established).
Next meetings will be:
Representatives: Wednesday, 18 March at 4:00

Thursday, 19 March at 3:00
Representatives will discuss issues related to EU matters, Governance and CBMs.
Leaders: Tuesday, 24 March, at 10:30

The leaders will continue discussions on EU matters
Page 1 of 2
From: Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO

To: Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Obinna
Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ
cc: Tatyana Volkova/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: Fw: visit of Mr. Talat
fyi
----- Forwarded by Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO on 17/03/2009 10:38 AM -----
Elizabeth ToJared Kotler/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Spehar/NY/UNO ccvaccari@un.org
SubjectRe: Fw: visit of Mr. Talat
17/03/2009 10:32
AM
Thanks, Jared. Please keep me posted on any response and let me know if there's anything we
can do. As I said, we had contacted the Turks and TkCyps in NY last week, and they seemed to
have no knowledge of this.
Best,
Elizabeth
Jared Kotler/NY/UNO To
Elizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ
cc
SubjectFw: visit of Mr. Talat
17/03/2009 10:07 AM
ES, as discussed. The email to which this refers proposes queries about potential dates during
the last week of March. I have not received any reply.
best,
Jared
=======================================
Jared Kotler
Office of the Under-Secretary General
Room S-3780 B, New York, NY 10017
Tel:1-917-367-5264, Mobile: 646-496-6075
----- Forwarded by Jared Kotler/NY/UNO on 17/03/2009 10:06 AM -----
Page 2 of 2
Jared Kotler/NY/UNO To
bjacobs@spectrumgrp.com
cc
Subjectvisit of Mr. Talat
16/03/2009 11:36 AM
Dear Mr. Jacobs,
Lynn Pascoe asked me to get back to you on the question of dates for a possible meeting with
the Secretary-General, in followup to your e-mail of March 10.
I've checked with the scheduling office this morning and was told the Secretary-General will be
away in Europe from 13 days beginning on March 25.
He will be in town on the 23rd and 24th, but those will be very hectic days, given he will be
leaving town the next day for two weeks.
best regards,
Jared Kotler
=======================================
Jared Kotler
Office of the Under-Secretary General
Room S-3780 B, New York, NY 10017
Tel:1-917-367-5264, Mobile: 646-496-6075
Page 1 of 1

To: Elizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Kendra

Subject: CBMs summary
Dear all,
our last visit was focused on reviving the CBMs. Pls. find attached a summary and status of
implementation of the CBMs prepared by the GOs.
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Attachments:
Update on measures agreed.doc
Page 1 of 1


Subject: Re: Visit to Moscow
I'd like to see the FM as I knew him as FM myself. Also de Soto was a bureaucrat not a former
minister!

Sent: Wed Mar 18 07:57:05 2009
Subject: Visit to Moscow
Dear Alexander,
talked to the Deputy of the Russian Mission here who got feedback from Moscow to the effect
that it will be difficult to meet with the FM but that the VM Titov for European Affairs and the
Special Representive on Cyprus, Mr. Alexeyev, are ready to see you. De Soto previously has not
met with the FM either actually.
They would be ready first or second week of April, if that works for you.
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 1

To: Obinna Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ
cc: Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: Re: Note
voila.
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Obinna ToSonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Okamgba/NY/UNO ccKendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ
SubjectNote
17/03/2009 05:34
PM
Dear Sonja,
As discussed, please find attached the note. I have indicated in track changes where your inputs
would be greatly appreciated!
Best
OO
[attachment "note to sg on Talat visit (March 2009).doc" deleted by Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO]
Attachments:
SG note on Talat visit (March 2009).doc
Strictly Confidential
Note to the Secretary-General
Cyprus: Visit of Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat to New York
1. This note is in relation to the upcoming visit of Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat, the leader of
the Turkish Cypriot Community, to New York. My office has recently been approached
by representatives of Mr. Talat who have requested a meeting for the Turkish Cypriot
leader with the Secretary-General on 24 March. I would strongly advise the Secretary-
General to grant Mr. Talat an audience and meet with him on the suggested date in New
York.
2. The talks between the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Christofias and Mr. Talat are
currently at a critical stage. Although the strong relationship between the two leaders
remains the bedrock of the negotiation process, their bond alone will not be sufficient to
reach a comprehensive settlement. The meetings between the two sides thus far have
already exposed a plethora of issues on which divergent views persist and where the
flexibility of the two leaders will be required for a settlement to be reached. In addition,
the current domestic political environment is hardening with Mr. Christofias’ coalition
partners DIKO and EDEK increasingly questioning his approach towards the
negotiations. Mr. Talat’s party on the other hand, is likely to suffer a substantial electoral
defeat by the opposition National Unity Party (UBP) at the upcoming 19th April elections, Formatted: Superscript
thus narrowing his scope for negotiating. The meeting with Mr. Talat would offer the
UN an opportunity to pass on, at the highest level, some vital messages to the Turkish
Cypriot leader in that regard, including the need to maintain momentum in the talks and
send joint positive messages to a public which is increasingly losing confidence in the
process..
3. Turkish officials have indicated that Mr. Talat would seek a meeting with the
Secretary-General, on the margins of the Alliance of Civilization in Istanbul between 6-7
April, should the Secretary-General be unable to meet with Mr. Talat in New York this
time around. Given your busy schedule during your stay in Istanbul, I would advise
against such a course of action. Also, there is a strong likelihood that such a meeting
may reflect poorly on Mr. Talat, as the Greek Cypriot media would depict a meeting on
Turkish soil as confirming their long-held view that Mr. Talat lacks independence and is
merely Ankara’s puppet.
4. It should also be noted that it is established practice for the Greek Cypriot and/or
Turkish Cypriot leader to meet with the Secretary-General when in New York. Failure to
meet Mr. Talat would certainly be perceived by the Turkish Cypriot community and
particular its media, as a “snub”. Given, the current political climate in the north of
Cyprus, where Mr. Talat’s pro-solution party faces the electorate in “parliamentary
elections” on 19 April, such a perception should be avoided, as it could be detrimental to
Mr. Talat’s pivotal position in the negotiation process.
5. For your information, the Secretary-General last met with Mr. Talat on the margins of
his state visit to Germany, in Berlin on 15 July 2008. On the other hand, The Secretary-
General met with Mr. Christofias on two occasions over the past year, namely on 14 July
and 21 September 2008.
B. Lynn Pascoe
18 March 2009
Page 1 of 1

To: "'Sonja Bachmann'" <bachmanns@un.org>, <sabra@un.org>, "'Timothy Alchin'"
<alchin@un.org>, <giubilaro@un.org>, <cibor@un.org>
Date: Thursday, March 19, 2009 02:09AM

Subject:
OUR PAPER ON EU MATTERS

Attachments:
Speaking notes.doc
Speakingnotes.doc
Speaking notes
Direct Talks - Meeting of 17 March 2009
During our previous meeting, we gave instructions to our

experts to meet and adapt, as appropriate, the Joint Convergence
Paper on EU Matters of the 22nd of July 2008, to the results of our
work carried under the Governance and Power Sharing Chapter.
Two meetings at experts level were carried out, where the

Greek Cypriot side tried to put forward minimal suggestions, in order
to arrive rapidly to a text which could be commonly agreed and would
also be in line with our work on governance.
Unfortunately, I must convey to you our disappointment that the

same was not done by the Turkish Cypriot side. Particularly on the
issue of the procedure to be followed in order to determine the
positions to be defended by Cyprus within the EU Council and its
preparatory bodies, the T/C side presented proposals which
reopened settled matters and, in essence, altered the agreement
reached at the level of the Working Group. We do not consider that
this method of reopening in these direct talks compromise packages
that have been agreed in the Working Groups is helpful if we are to
make progress in our negotiations.
However, given that disagreements in the approach are now

very clear, let me express our views on the essence of what should

Speakingnotes.doc
be aimed at, in this chapter. Cyprus is only one of the “27” member
states and as we all know it is further handicapped by its small size.
In order to function efficiently within the EU and defend its interests in
the best possible way it must able to take rapid decisions, without
lengthy procedures and without the existence at every single stage of
blocking powers of representatives of the one or the other
community. The proposals now put forward by the TC side undermine
what should be our common goal. We should try to create a public
service, the members of which will have in mind the interest of
Cyprus as a whole and not to oblige them, through the procedures
that we will set up, to think and to act as representatives of one of the
two communities.
Let me refer to some specific points:
- The Working Group had reached a compromise, whereby,
for matters of exclusive or predominant federal competence
discussed in the EU Council’s Working Parties, the positions
of Cyprus would be decided, as a matter of principle, after an
informal coordination carried out by the Federal Ministry for
EU Affairs. However, a formal coordination within the
Coordination Group would automatically take place if any
one of the Ministries involved were to ask for it. The T/C
proposals reflected in the text that we have in front of us
today, aim at reversing this solution and requiring a formal
coordination within the Coordination Group in all or nearly all
cases. We are convinced that this would be a cumbersome
and unnecessary solution, which would make it very difficult
for Cyprus to finish in time its internal coordination

Speakingnotes.doc
procedures and send instructions to its representatives in the

Council Working Parties.
- Another issue is the requirement that the coordination bodies
that will be set up (i.e. the Coordination Group and the
Coordination Committee) will always take decisions by
consensus. Making the decisions on the positions to be
defended in Brussels always dependent on the good will of
every single man present, means that whoever wants to
block the decision possibly for legitimate, but also possibly
for illegitimate reasons, can do so. In any case, it has not
been decided what will happen when the coordination bodies
are not able to reach consensus. In that case, we strongly
believe that we must set up a deadlock breaking mechanism
which will allow a decision to be taken on the position to be
defended by Cyprus in Brussels. The option of abstaining
within the EU Council is a seemingly easy solution which can
only weaken the position of Cyprus as a member state.
- A third issue regarding the organization of the state, with
regard to the handling of EU Matters, is that of the
Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the EU and of his
deputy. The TC side suggests that these should have a
horizontal relationship, that the Permanent Representative
should not be able to give instructions to his deputy in any
matters of substance but also that none of them should be
able to decide on anything alone and that they should reach
all decisions by consensus. Such a setup, which cannot be
found in any other Member State, has in our view elements

Speakingnotes.doc
of a confederal rather than of a federal nature. In any case it

does not help in providing Cyprus with a coherent and
efficient representation in Brussels.
In order to touch upon other open issues of this chapter, we would

like to note that the allocation of high posts in the EU institutions was
not discussed by our experts. Our position as expressed also during
the discussions on the chapter of Governance is that, the allocation of
posts must be discussed globally as a package.
Finally, with regard to the Turkish Cypriot demand for derogations

from the application of the acquis, we wish to reiterate that
derogations are not acceptable to our side. It is, however, in our view
possible to provide for limited transitional periods of a short duration,
which will allow the T/C community to adapt to the new situation
before the acquis actually becomes fully applicable.
17 March 2009

Page 1 of 1


Subject: Fw: cable
----- Forwarded by Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP on 18/03/2009 15:05 -----

To: Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Cc: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Date: 18/03/2009 10:24
Subject: cable
for your consideration.

t
Attachments:
Latest developments - csy 16-03-2009.doc
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

OUTGOING CODE CABLE
TO: PASCOE, UNATIONS, NEW YORK ONLY
DOWNER, UNATIONS, NICOSIA ONLY
INFO: LE ROY, UNATIONS, NEW YORK ONLY
FROM: ZERIHOUN, UNFICYP, NICOSIA
DATE: 17 March 2009
NUMBER: UNFICYP – CSY –
SUBJECT: Cyprus talks
1. The Leaders yesterday had a second discussion on EU

matters, following the usual tête-à-tête, touching on both
broad aspects of this chapter. Firstly, the mechanisms
required for decision making at EU level, which would best
coordinate community interests. Secondly, the rolling out of
the acquis in the north, and the corollary issue of how the
settlement may be accommodated by the EU. They will meet again
next Tuesday 24 March, most likely to close the issue at their
level and move on to Economic matters.
2. The experts already met twice on Friday 13 March and

Monday 16 March to update the earlier work done at working
level on the governance aspects. From this, it is apparent
that the earlier convergence paper, no doubt for well meaning
political reasons at the time, had papered over different
views on how the communities should be consulted before Cyprus
takes a position in Brussels. It is no surprise then that the
experts are carrying out the necessary work of teasing out
these differences in more detail. Positively, the EU working
group experts have been joined by those from the Governance
working group. They will meet again this week to try to
further bridge differences.
3. One subject unlikely to be addressed by the experts

unfortunately is the main substance once again of yesterday’s
meeting, namely the larger question of whether or not Protocol
10 annexed to the RoC’s treaty of Accession, would provide
legal certainty to an eventual solution. The lawyers locked
horns along familiar lines though in good faith and frank,
albeit for the time being unfruitful, exchanges: the TkCyp
side probed as to the legal possibilities of whether an
amended, or new, protocol might satisfy their concerns; the
GkCyp insisted on the protocol as the dedicated instrument for
this purpose, explicitly stating that one political objective
was to reaffirm thereby the continuity of the RoC.
4. In a pragmatic spirit and in line with our broad strategy

of taking the politics out of the discussion by moving issues
to the technical experts, Vassiliou suggested looking
practically at where the TkCyps might seek transitional
periods before fully implementing the acquis, or indeed
permanent derogations – i.e. the concrete areas which may face
legal challenges. The politics of how this might be
accommodated could be addressed later. While Talat appeared
amenable to this, regrettably, Christofias insisted that the
use of protocol 10 should be agreed first. For the time being,
the subject will likely remain in basket three of red line
issues.
5. Having now broached the EU chapter, some welcome
developments are worthy of note. First, EU issues will not be
solvable in isolation, but in conjunction with governance and
no doubt also economic matters, and vice-versa. As a
consequence, the parties are naturally adapting the process in
recognition of these linkages in a clear effort to bring some
coherence to these cross-cutting issues. The good dynamic of
the merged working group bodes well, and in our view, is
capable of overcoming the differences on the governance side.
6. As a side effect of this flurry of meetings, Iacovou and

Nami’s will be meeting twice again this week, to chaperone the
discussions on EU, but also to revisit again the outstanding
aspects on governance. Iacovou in particular has been the
hesitant party, which explains the regrettably few meetings at
the level of the Representatives. We will encourage them to
maintain the momentum of regular meetings to address the
growing list of agenda items.
7. Indeed, on a separate track and building on their meeting

last Friday 13 March, the Representatives will meet on
Thursday 19 March to consider again the package of confidence
building measures, as they were tasked by the leaders on 5
March (see csy 023). At last Friday’s meeting, Nami gave the
green light for the first phase of the necessary works in
Ledra Street; and provided very detailed information
specifically on the TkCyps’ demands for fuel provision to
Kokkina. It is expected that Iacovou will reply this week.
Best regards.
[Contact: OSRSG]
Transcript of Remarks by Special Representative of the Secretary-General Tayé-

Brook Zerihoun following the meeting of Cyprus leaders, United Nations Protected
Area, Nicosia, 17 March 2009
Good Afternoon. As is customary, the two leaders met privately for over an hour-and-a-
half. Following this tête-à-tête, for the next two hours or so they had discussions on EU
matters on the basis of the work done by the experts last week, towards the end of the week
and early this week. The leaders have agreed to meet again next Tuesday in the morning of
the 24th of March to continue the discussions on EU matters. Before that, there will be two
back-to-back meetings, tomorrow in the afternoon at 3 o’clock and then on Thursday at 4
o’clock, a meeting of the representatives and the experts to prepare the ground for the
meeting of the leaders next Tuesday.
Question: What is your impression on the talks concerning EU matters?
Answer: Well, it’s been a good discussion. As you know, EU matters was one of the issues on
which there has been quite a lot of convergence and on which there was a joint paper from the
working group. So the discussion, as I said, was thorough and substantive, and it’s an engaged
process.
Question: How long do you envisage these discussions on EU matters to continue?
Answer: I don’t know, frankly, but certainly they have agreed to meet next week on this issue.
They could decide to suspend discussions and allow the experts and the representatives to
continue to narrow the gaps as they have done with governance and move on to economic matters
the following week or following meeting. It’s possible that may well be the case.
Question: On the property issue, are they going to come back to that?
Answer: Yes, eventually they will come back to that. But it is now left at the level of experts and
the representatives. Indeed this is the process, it is a rolling start, not everything should be or
could be taken up by the leaders, so they deal with issues and then they refer them back to the
working groups and representatives with guidance and to bring options to them for final decision.
*****
Page 1 of 1

To: alexander.downer@adelaide.edu.au, zerihount@comcast.net, ysabra@msn.com,
timalchin@hotmail.com

Subject: Note on meeting in NY
fyi. as cleared by ES.

best, Sonja
Attachments:
DPA_Digi.pdf
Page 1 of 1

To: Steven Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Alexander
DOWNER/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Wlodek
Cibor/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Jose DIAZ/UNFICYP@UNFICYP

Subject: Orams decision on April 28th?
From Tuesday's British High Commission summary of the GkCyp press. Interesting that if this is
correct it will come after the TkCyp election
PHIELELFTHEROS reports that the Court of Justice of the European Communities (EJC) has made a
decision regarding the preliminary judicial inquiries of a British Court on the Orams case. The
decision will be announced on 28 April because it has to be translated in the EU official languages
and because of the Easter break. If the court follows the opinion of the Advocate General Julianne
Kokott then justice will be served for GC refugee Apostolides and Cyprus will have a strong card to
play regarding the exploitation of GC properties in the north non-government controlled areas.
Best regards
Fiona
Fiona Mullen
Tel +357 99 338 224
Tel +357 22 614 136
mullenf@un.org
Page 1 of 1


Subject: meeting today
Meeting representatives 18 March
The representatives with experts on EU matters and governance took into consideration two draft joint
papers on EU matters covering the following items of the joint paper on EU matters:
¾ Ministry of EU affairs
¾ Permanent representation of Cyprus to the EU
No further convergences were identified.

Main divergences:
¾ “Horizontal relationship” between Permanent Representative and Deputy Permanent

Representative (this was a convergence at the level of the working group but it was based on
constructive ambiguity. It is now clear that the interpretation of the term differs. TkCyp’s
position is to maintain the ambiguity. GkCyp’s position is now to be clear about their roles and
hierarchical positions.)
¾ “Constituent states representation in the Permanent Representation of Cyprus to the
EU in their areas of competence. They would be placed on the diplomatic list of Cyprus.” This
is a TC proposal based on a convergence on the chapter of governance. GC does not agree and
may cause reopening this item also for governance.
Next meeting will be
¾ Representatives: Thursday, 19 March at 3:00 (EU matters);

¾ Representatives: Friday, 20 March at 4:00 (maybe EU matters or, if discussions
concluded, Governance and CBMs).
¾ Leaders: Tuesday, 24 March, at 10:30 (EU matters)
Page 1 of 3


Subject: Fw: Questions re secondment of EU expert to the UN Good Offices
guess you will be his direct supervisor or YS?
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Fabio ToFiona
Buonomo/UNFICYP@UNFICYP Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
ccWlodek
19/03/2009 09:52 AM Cibor/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Yasser
Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Sonja
Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ,
Donatella Giubilaro
Timothy
Husein
Moussa/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
SubjectRe: Fw: Questions re
secondment of EU expert to
the UN Good Offices
Dear Fiona,
Thank you for your communication and the information provided. I will include it in the draft MoU
I am working on.
Regarding the duration of the secondment, I understand that " UN-OSASG is requesting a long-term
secondment. However, as this is not organised for the moment ". Therefore I will leave open the ad hoc
clause in the MoU. However, I would really appreciate if you could keep me posted on any
development on this matter.
finally, apart the title and the job description, please let me also know who will be his direct
supervisor within the O/SASG, as well as the equipment he will need us to provide
Best regards,
Fabio
Page 2 of 3
---------------------------
Fabio Buonomo
Legal Adviser
UNFICYP
+357 2261 4559
Fiona Mullen---18/03/2009 17:38:14---Dear Fabio This is what we have so far. We'll draft a
title and job description this week.

To: Fabio Buonomo/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Cc: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Donatella Giubilaro
UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ
Date: 18/03/2009 17:38
Subject: Fw: Questions re secondment of EU expert to the UN Good Offices
Dear Fabio
This is what we have so far. We'll draft a title and job description this week.
Best regards
Fiona
Fiona Mullen
Tel +357 99 338 224
Tel +357 22 614 136
mullenf@un.org
----- Forwarded by Fiona Mullen/UNFICYP on 18/03/2009 17:34 -----
From: <Pieter.Van-Nuffel@ec.europa.eu>
To: <mullenf@un.org>
Cc: <sabra@un.org>, <giubilarounficyp@un.org>, <bachmanns@un.org>
Date: 18/03/2009 14:42
Subject: RE: Questions re secondment of EU expert to the UN Good Offices
Some answers:
a) I am seconded by the European Commission
I suppose that the Representative of the European Commission in Cyprus (Ms. Kaminara) can sign. But I will
check in Brussels
b) yes : the European Commission pays everything ( salary, allowances, sickness insurance, travel to Cyprus,
hotel etc)
c) the duration still has to be decided. UN-OSASG is requesting a long-term secondment. However, as this is
not organised for the moment, I have been seconded by the European Commission to the OSASG, as interim
Page 3 of 3
solution up to +/- Eastern, on the understanding that I would be not present in Cyprus all the time, but can come
and go, in particular taking into account the presence of Mr. Downer in Cyprus
d) question for UN-OSASG. For info : my title in the European Commission is 'Legal Advisor'. I work in the Legal
Service of the European Commission.
e) ok
Pieter Van Nuffel
From: Fiona Mullen [ mailto:mullenf@un.org ]

Sent: Tue 17/03/2009 09:15
To: VAN NUFFEL Pieter (SJ)
Cc: Yasser Sabra; Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP; Sonja Bachmann
Subject: Questions re secondment of EU expert to the UN Good Offices
Dear Pieter
As discussed, here are the key questions from our lawyer.
a)Whichentityissecondingtheexpert?IsittheEUortheEuropeanCommission?Whatisthename
andtitleoftherepresentativewhowillsignthedocument.
b)Whoisgoingtopayfortheexpert'ssalaryandallowances?[Weunderstandthatthiswillbepaid
bytheEuropeanCommission.]
c)Whatwouldbethedurationofthesecondment?[Thismaybesomethingtobediscussedwiththe
GoodOfficesCoordinator,YasserSabra,copiedhere,Tel+35722614139]
d)Whatwouldbetheexacttitleoftheexpert?Copiesoftheconcernedjobdescriptionandwork
planarealsorequired.[JobdescriptionandworkplanwillbecoordinatedwiththeUN].
e)Asnoted,theUNwillprovideyouwithofficefacilitiesbutisunabletoprovideyouwithacar.You
willbeabletotravelinaUNvehicleuponsigningawaiver.
Best regards
Fiona
Fiona Mullen
Tel +357 99 338 224
Tel +357 22 614 136
mullenf@un.org
Page 1 of 1

To: Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ
cc: ysabra@msn.com, Obinna Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: Suggestions for MAT TPs
Dear Kendra,
given the short time, as discussed, here a couple of suggestions for the TPs for MAT. Ongoing
flexibility for the negotiations and the implementation of key CBMs (YS can give further input on
that aspect, which we pushed during our discussions in the recent weeks) seem to be key points.
Furthermore, the SG needs to be ready to reply to their likely request for a more active UN role.
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Attachments:
TPs suggestions for MAT.doc

MAT
[The talks between the two leaders are currently at a critical stage. Although the strong
relationship between them remains the bedrock of the negotiation process, their bond
alone will not be sufficient to reach a comprehensive settlement. The meetings thus far
have already exposed a plethora of divergent views and the flexibility of the two leaders
will be required for a settlement to be reached. At the same time, the political
environment on the island seems to be hardening. Mr. Christofias’ coalition partners are
increasingly questioning his approach to the negotiations and Mr. Talat’s party is likely
to suffer electoral defeat in the upcoming “Parliamentary” elections on 19th April by the
opposition National Unity Party. This will narrow Mr. Talat’s scope for negotiating.
Whereas the Turkish Cypriots are requesting a more active UN involvement, the Greek
Cypriots are adamantly excluding any arbitration role of the UN. Mr. Downer repeatedly
assured both parties that the UN’s role was to “help” and not to arbitrate or mediate.].
Cyprus
x I understand that you are making steady progress in

your talks under UN auspices. My Special Adviser, Mr.
Downer, informed that the negotiations so far have
been marked by a spirit of cooperation and
compromise. Still, difficult issues, such as security, lie
ahead.
x I appreciate your commitment to reaching a

comprehensive settlement. Flexibility on both sides
will be key in the upcoming months.
1
x Joint positive messages such as those you gave with

Mr. Christofias at the recent joint meeting of the
Chambers of Commerce will help to increase public
confidence in the process. The implementation of
further confidence-building measures would also be
helpful.
x I will be visiting Turkey in early April and intend to

encourage the Turkish Government to maintain
continued support in moving the negotiations
forward.
2
Page 1 of 1


Subject: Today meeting
Meeting representatives 19 March (San Giuseppe)
The representatives with experts on EU matters and governance took into consideration two draft joint
papers on EU matters related to “Determination and coordination of Cyprus’ position on EU matters”
at the two levels: i. for areas of competence of the federal government; ii. for areas of competence of
the constituent states.
No further convergences were identified but some bridging proposals tabled by the sides.
Main divergences:
¾ A more or less formal procedure to be followed for the determination of the position of
Cyprus on EU matters (a less formal procedure to be used as the norm or as exception).
¾ There was a convergence that that decisions would be taken by consensus. Divergence
remained on the procedure in case of disagreement. TkCyps: Cyprus should abstain. GkCyps; a
mechanism should be established for Cyprus to have a position.
Before Monday the experts will exchange via e-mail the updated joint papers on EU Matters (four so
far). Next Monday the representatives and experts will consider, but only on broad terms, the pending
issues from the EU Matters agenda:
1. Implementation of the EU acquis
2. Infringements
3. Participation/Representation of Cyprus at EU institutions on equal footing and through rotation
4. Legal certainty of the settlement to be achieved
Next meetings will be

Representatives: Friday, 20 March at 3:30 (Governance and maybe CBMs)
Monday, 23 March at 4:00 (EU matters)
Leaders: Tuesday, 24 March, at 10:30 (EU matters)
Page 1 of 2


Subject: Re: Fw: Meeting with President Talat
thanks!
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Kendra Collins/NY/UNO
Kendra ToSonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Collins/NY/UNO cc
SubjectFw: Meeting with President Talat
19/03/2009
04:56 PM
----- Forwarded by Kendra Collins/NY/UNO on 19/03/2009 04:56 PM -----
Elizabeth Tovaccari@un.org, Kendra

Spehar/NY/UNO Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ, okamgba@un.org
cc
19/03/2009 04:54 SubjectFw: Meeting with President Talat
PM
FYI
----- Forwarded by Elizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO on 19/03/2009 04:54 PM -----
Yeocheol To"Lynn Pascoe" <pascoebl@un.org>

Yoon/NY/UNO ccElizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ, "Linda
Taylor" <taylor17@un.org>, Toni
19/03/2009 Gallagher/NY/UNO, "Kaori Minami"
04:17 PM <minami@un.org>
SubjectFw: Meeting with President Talat
Dear Lynn,
Despite your advice in the note SG's meeting with Talat will not materialize in New York.
We may need to arrange something in Istanbul after all.
Thanks.
Yeocheol
Page 2 of 2
----- Forwarded by Yeocheol Yoon/NY/UNO on 19/03/2009 꿙쁹03:41 -----
Toni ToYeocheol Yoon/NY/UNO

Gallagher/NY/UNO ccIsabelle Kim/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Kaori
Minami/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Marvin
19/03/2009 꿙쁹 Cardenas/NY/UNO@UNHQ
03:37 SubjectMeeting with President Talat
Dear Mr. Yoon,
Unfortunately, the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, H.E. Mr. Mehmet Ali
Talat, will not be able to meet with the SG on Monday, 23 March.
He does not plan on being in New York until maybe around the middle or end of next week
since he is scheduled to meet with US Secretary of State Clinton on the 30th of March.
The office is suggesting that perhaps a meeting could be set up the next time Mr. Talat visits
New York, maybe late April/early May. However, they are not sure of the dates at this point.
- Toni -
Antoinette F. Gallagher
Office of the Secretary-General
United Nations
New York, NY
(212) 963-5012
gallaghert@un.org
Page 1 of 1
From: Donicia Sylvan/United Nations

To: Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ@UN-MAILHUB

Subject: Re: Meeting with Mr. Chambord
Dear Sonja,
Mr. Devaulx de Chambord looks forward to meeting with Ms. Spehar, and scheduled a meeting
for Thursday, 26 March at 12pm.
Regards,
Donicia Sylvan
Office of the Director

LSD/DFS
(917) 367-2215, Fax (212) 963-0383
Room DC1-1060
Sonja ToDonicia Sylvan/United

Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ Nations@UNHQ-DPKO
cc
18/03/2009 06:02 PM SubjectMeeting with Mr. Chambord
Dear Donicia,
I would like to kindly request an appointment with Mr. Chambord to meet with the Director of
Europe division in DPA, Ms. Spehar, who would like to discuss air support for the Cyprus Good
Office mission.
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 1

To: Michael Contet/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: Hi M do you have Robert Dann's number in Jerusalem, wanted to ask him couple of
questions on Cyprus (he was involved in the 2004 efforts...) thanks much, sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 1

To: alexander.downer@adelaide.edu.au, Alexander DOWNER/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
cc: Taye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Donatella
Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Fiona Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Steven
Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP

Subject: MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES -- GOVERNANCE
The representatives met this afternoon for two hours and went back to the issue of governance:
z There was good convergence on the issue of federal police
z They made good progress on the relationship between the Federal Government and the
constituent states. They are almost in agreement except for para . 1
> The GC continue to reject the TC proposal (in para. 1) which talks about "no domination, no
supremacy, no hierarchy between the Federal Government and the constituent states";
> The GC consider that any agreement reached today on this item is conditional on the
withdrawal of para. 1 by the TC.
> Nami agrees with this approach and will revert after consulting Talat.
z On hierarchy of norms what remains outstanding is the hierarchy between federal laws and
constituent state laws.
Overall by Tuesday the representatives and the leaders would have met 4 times and twice in one
week, respectively.
Page 1 of 1

To: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ@UN-
MAILHUB@UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICS BASE
Date: Monday, March 23, 2009 10:42AM

Subject: For Mr. Downers Attention
Dear All,
Please find attached a letter of response from the Thai Embassy in Rome for Mr. Downers
attention.
Best regards,
Julie
Attachments:
Letter of response from Royal Thai Embassy In Rome.pdf
Page 1 of 1


Subject: Today's meeting
Meeting representatives, 23 March 2009
¾ EU matters
The representatives discussed EU matters. They worked on the following draft joint papers:
x Implementation of the EU acquis
x Derogations
x Financial support for the unification
x Infringements (partly covered today)
x Participation/Representation of Cyprus at EU institutions (not covered today)
Divergences regarding derogations were confirmed. On the other items bridging proposals were tabled
by both sides and some convergences identified.
¾ Governance: Joint paper on the relationship between the federal government and the
constituent states
Through e-mail message, TkCyps accepted to delete the first paragraph of the joint paper “There shall
be no domination, no supremacy, no hierarchy between the federal government and the constituent
states.” This deletion was put by GkCyps as condition for accepting that joint paper as amended on 20
March.
¾ Next steps
Tomorrow the leaders will discuss EU matters. During their tête-à-tête, the representatives will
continue considerations of draft joint papers.
Page 1 of 5
From: Arnaud Amouroux/NY/UNO

To: Roselyn Akombe/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Annick Hiensch/NY/UNO@UNHQ
cc: DPA-Europe

Subject: Re: Fw: Request for talking points, briefing material , etc for the next trip 28 March -
6 April -- ADDITIONAL REQUESTS (adding TPs for the Netherlands)
Dear Annick,
Enclosed please find the 5 TPs (PM, FM, Queen, Defence and Cooperation Ministers) + 2
Background Notes for the SG meetings in The Hague, as cleared by Ms. Spehar.
The bio of Princess Maxima will reach you shortly.
Arnaud
Roselyn Akombe/NY/UNO
Roselyn ToArnaud Amouroux/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Isabelle

Akombe/NY/UNO De Ruyt/NY/UNO@UNHQ
ccHiroko Miyamura/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Craig
10/03/2009 05:34 Jenness/NY/UNO@UNHQ, DPA-Africa 1
PM Division, DPA-ASIA Division, DPA-Europe
and AMERICAS Division, DPA-PPU, DPA-
OUSG
SubjectFw: Request for talking points, briefing
material , etc for the next trip 28 March - 6
April -- ADDITIONAL REQUESTS (adding TPs
for the Netherlands)
Dear Arnaud and Isabelle,
The SG will participate in a conference on Afghanistan on 31 March in the Netherlands. Grateful if

you could prepare TPs and provide a profile for his Meeting with the Prime Minister of the
Netherlands.
Grateful if EAD could send talking points for the Meeting with the President of Afghanistan to
DPKO counterparts as soon as possible.
Approved Tps should be sent to OUSG (Roselyn, Annick and Venessa) by COB 24 March 2009.
Thanks
Roselyn
***********************************
Page 2 of 5
Roselyn Akombe
Political Affairs Officer
United Nations
Room S-3780D
Tel: 917-367-4372
----- Forwarded by Roselyn Akombe/NY/UNO on 10/03/2009 05:16 PM -----
Kaori ToRoselyn Akombe/NY/UNO, Annick

Minami/NY/UNO Hiensch/NY/UNO, Anne-Laure Sans/United
Nations@UNHQ-DPKO@UN-MAILHUB, Juwang
10/03/2009 04:49 Zhu/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Teresa Lenzi/NY/UNO,
PM Paul Ladd/NY/UNO, Masumi Ono/NY/UNO,
Andrew Cox/OCHA/NY, Shani
Harris/OCHA/NY@OCHA@UN-MAILHUB, Lee
O'Brien/NY/UNO, Markus Pallek/NY/UNO,
Emmanuel Kattan/NY/UNO, Janos
Pasztor/NY/UNO, Gelila Terrefe/NY/UNO,
Mohammad Reza Salamat/NY/UNO
ccLinda Taylor/NY/UNO, Sebastien
Lawson/NY/UNO, Celine Varin/NY/UNO
April -- ADDITIONAL REQUESTS (adding TPs
for the Netherlands)
Dear colleagues --
As you may know already, the SG will participate in a conference on Afghanistan on 31 March in
the Netherlands.
We would therefore, like to add two requests for TPs/profiles for the following:
- Meeting with President of Afghanistan

- Meeting with the Prime Minister of the Netherlands
Thank you
Kaori
----- Forwarded by Kaori Minami/NY/UNO on 10/03/2009 04:43 PM -----

Minami/NY/UNO Hiensch/NY/UNO, Anne-Laure Sans, Juwang
Zhu/NY/UNO, Teresa Lenzi/NY/UNO, Paul
10/03/2009 11:59 Ladd/NY/UNO, Masumi Ono/NY/UNO, Andrew
AM Cox/OCHA/NY, Shani
Page 3 of 5
O'Brien, Markus Pallek/NY/UNO, Emmanuel

Kattan, Frederique Morice-Walker/NY/UNO
ccLinda Taylor/NY/UNO, Sebastien
Lawson/NY/UNO, Celine Varin/NY/UNO
April -- ADDITIONAL REQUESTS
Please note that we will need talking points for meetings in Paris with both Francois FILLON and
Bernard KOUCHNER.
(They are both for working dinners.)
Thank you
Kaori
----- Forwarded by Kaori Minami/NY/UNO on 10/03/2009 11:55 AM -----

Minami/NY/UNO Hiensch/NY/UNO, Steven Siqueira, Anne-
Laure Sans, Juwang Zhu/NY/UNO, Teresa
09/03/2009 12:48 Lenzi/NY/UNO, Paul Ladd/NY/UNO, Masumi
PM Ono/NY/UNO, Andrew Cox/OCHA/NY, Shani
ccRichard Amdur/NY/UNO, Ruxandra
Ferascu/NY/UNO, Brenden
Varma/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Linda
Taylor/NY/UNO, Sebastien Lawson/NY/UNO,
Celine Varin/NY/UNO
April
Dear colleagues --
Further to my email below, may I please request for talking points, briefing materials,
backgrounders, profiles (including country profiles)
for possible bilateral meetings with Heads of State of the following countries? (As usual, we can
expect more to be added in the coming days
as the programmes develop.)
For the LAS Summit:
[DPA's lead]
EGYPT
ERITREA
JORDAN
Page 4 of 5
LAS (Moussa)
LIBYA
PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
QATAR
SAUDI ARABIA
SOMALIA
UAE
For the G20 Summit:
[DESA's Lead: Topics should focus on Sudan, Somalia and Gaza, in addition to the
financial crisis.]
UK (Brown)
ROK (Lee)
Italy (Berlusconi)
For the Alliance of Civilizations Conference:
[DPA's lead]
SPAIN
TURKEY
President Sampaio
As we have done for the precious trip to Africa, it be very useful to limit bilat TPs to 1-2 pages
per country,
and to use generic TPs as much as possible.
I hope the focal points can send me a list of suggested generic talking points
for this trip as soon as possible.
As indicated in my email below, the due date for all requested materials is 25 March (noon).
Please send them to me (cc. Celine Varin).
Thank you
Kaori Minami
EOSG
----- Forwarded by Kaori Minami/NY/UNO on 09/03/2009 12:15 PM -----

Minami/NY/UNO Hiensch/NY/UNO, Anne-Laure Sans, Juwang
Zhu/NY/UNO, Teresa Lenzi/NY/UNO, Paul
04/03/2009 12:17 Ladd/NY/UNO, Masumi Ono/NY/UNO, Andrew
PM Cox/OCHA/NY, Shani
Page 5 of 5
ccLinda Taylor/NY/UNO, Yeocheol

Yoon/NY/UNO, Sebastien Lawson/NY/UNO,
Celine Varin/NY/UNO, Richard
Amdur/NY/UNO, Ruxandra Ferascu/NY/UNO
SubjectRequest for talking points, briefing material ,
etc for the trip during end March - beginning
April
Dear Focal Points --
At the outset, I should thank you for all of your help in the preparations
for the Africa trip. You may be receiving feedback from Tuvako and Joshua later,
but as for Egypt, the TPs for all bilats were very useful, as usual.
And now -- Here is a heads-up for the trip coming up the end of this month please.
As I trust that you will handle this information with discretion until it has been formally
announced.
Any questions on the trip should be directed to EOSG please.
The VIP is expected to visit the following places:
Doha: 28 March-1 April (LAS SUMMIT)

London: 1-3 April (G20)
Paris: 3-5 April (CEB)
Istanbul: 5-6 April (Alliance of Civilizations Meeting)
There will be a coordination meeting led by the trip coordinator, Ms. Linda Taylor, this week
where we can discuss the possible bilats and other events to take place during the trip.
In the meantime, please note that the deadline for talking points and other material for this trip
will be Wed 25 March.
Thank you
Kaori Minami
EOSG
Attachments:
BN SG meting with Mi BN SG meting with PM
TPs SG Bert Koenders
TPs SG Queen Beatrix. nister for Development Netherlands AND OTH
Development Minister
doc Cooperation Koenders ER DUTCH OFFICIALS
31 March 2009.kc.doc
March 09.kc.doc March 09.kc.doc
TPs SG FM Verhagen N TPs SG Minister of Def TPs SG PM Balkenende

ED.kc.doc ence NED.kc.doc 31 March 2009.kc.doc
TPs SG Queen Beatrix.docConfidential
Talking Points for the Secretary-General’s audience with

Her Majesty Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands
(31 March 2009)
x It is my great pleasure to see you again after our last

meeting in January 2007.
x I value the Netherlands’ unwavering commitment to

the promotion of peace and development in the
world. I am grateful for the continuous political and
financial support that your country provides to the
United Nations.
x I would like to express my deep appreciation for the

Dutch Government’s initiative to host the
International Conference on Afghanistan for which I
am present today.
x I am also grateful to the Netherlands for hosting the

international tribunals, including the newly opened
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which constitute the
centrepiece of a truly universal system of justice.
1
TPs SG PM Balkenende 31 March 2009.kc.docConfidential
Talking Points for the Secretary-General’s meeting with

H.E. Mr. Jan Peter Balkenende, Prime Minister of the
Netherlands
(31 March 2009)
x Afghanistan
x Burundi
x Somalia
x Special Tribunal for Lebanon
x Middle East
Afghanistan
[See generic talking points on Afghanistan.]
x I would like to express my deep appreciation for your

Government’s initiative in hosting the International
Conference on Afghanistan.
x The event is an opportunity to give a new dynamism

to our efforts in Afghanistan, and to renew support
for my Special Representative, Kai Eide, and his role
as coordinator of the international community’s
civilian efforts in Afghanistan.
x To my mind, such broad-based discussions are a

tangible expression of the fact that the situation in
Afghanistan is a subject of global concern, and that it
is important to consider the regional context.
1
Burundi
Objective of meeting: To press the Government of Burundi and
Forces Nationales de Liberation to make the necessary compromises
for the expeditious implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire
Agreement.
x The peace process in Burundi has made progress but

is also facing serious delays and challenges.
x I welcome the start of the assembly process of some

3,400 FNL combatants at Rubira Assembly Area.
x Given the expected withdrawal of the African Union

Special Task Force from 1 April, how can we further
combine our efforts to ensure the full implementation
of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement as soon
as possible?
Somalia
Objective of meeting: To update and seek support from Dutch senior
officials on the implementation of SCR 1863 (2009), including the
provision of the support package to AMISOM and assistance in
building the Somali security and rule of law institutions.
[See generic talking points on Somalia]
x We are preparing to convene a donors’ conference in

April, to seek contributions to the Trust Funds for
support to AMISOM and for the building of Somali
security and rule of law institutions.
2
x We count on the Netherlands to provide a generous

contribution to the Trust Funds.
Special Tribunal for Lebanon
x I was very pleased that the launch ceremony of the

Special Tribunal went smoothly on 1 March.
x Thank you for the excellent cooperation of your

authorities in all aspects of the establishment and
commencement of the Special Tribunal.
x Security of the judges, particularly the Lebanese

judges, is a serious concern, of course, and I am
grateful for the excellent cooperation that we enjoy
with your security services for their protection in the
Netherlands.
x I am happy to consider attending the opening of the

courtroom later this year, depending upon my other
commitments at that time.
IF RAISED:
x We are advised that the detainees, if released by the

Special Tribunal, would be likely to return
immediately to Lebanon.
3
x To cover the contingency of attempts by the released

detainees to remain in the Netherlands, the Registrar
of the Special Tribunal is in contact with a number of
States who may be willing to accept the relocation of
these individuals.
Middle East
[See generic talking points on Middle East.]
4
TPs SG Minister of Defence NED.kc.docConfidential

Mr. Eimert van Middelkoop, Minister of Defence of the
Netherlands
(31 March 2009)
x Afghanistan
x Burundi
x Somalia
Afghanistan


x To my mind, such broad-based discussions are a

1
TPs SG Minister of Defence NED.kc.docConfidential
Burundi
Agreement.

also is facing serious delays and challenges.


as possible?
Somalia


2
TPs SG FM Verhagen NED.kc.docConfidential

H.E. Maxime Verhagen, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Netherlands
(31 March 2009)
x Afghanistan
x Burundi
x Somalia
x Special Tribunal for Lebanon
x Middle East
Afghanistan


x In my view, such broad-based discussions are a

1
Burundi
Agreement.



as possible?
Somalia


2



Netherlands.

IF RAISED:

3

these individuals.
Middle East
[See generic talking points on Middle East.]
4
TPs SG Bert Koenders Development Minister 31 March 2009.kc.docConfidential

H.E. Mr. Bert Koenders, Minister of Development
Cooperation, Kingdom of the Netherlands
(31 March 2009)
x Financial crisis
x ODA
x Development Cooperation Forum
Objective of meeting: To urge the Netherlands to play an active role at the

G20 by highlighting the social dimensions of the financial and economic
crisis and to invite the Netherlands to participate actively in ECOSOC’s
Development Cooperation Forum.
Financial crisis
x Given its global dimension, the financial crisis

requires global solutions. No one country can resolve
this crisis alone or insulate itself from its
repercussions without assistance.
x I count on your continued efforts in helping to ensure
a globally coordinated policy response to the crisis.
x I hope that the Netherlands will join me at the G20 in
calling for concrete efforts to prevent the rise of
protectionism, and to ensure that development and a
Global Green Deal are included in the agenda for
discussion and action.
1
x I also hope that the Netherlands will highlight the

social dimensions of the financial and economic crisis
and urge the development partners at G20 to take
concrete action to assist developing countries in
tackling the social impacts of the crisis.
x I would be interested in hearing your views on the
progress made by the Stiglitz Commission and on how
we could ensure that the results will see a proper
translation into concrete policies.
x I will look to the Netherlands to play an active role in
proposing creative solutions to address questions of
voting power and voice on the Bretton Woods
Executive Boards. I would be grateful for your views
on the subject matter, as well as on the
establishment of a Global Economic Council.
ODA
x I am deeply concerned that the current crisis could
lead to significant reductions in development aid. I
count on the Dutch leadership to convince other
member states to maintain their commitments.
x The future of aid will depend on whether

commitments are honoured, resource allocations are
based on sound principles, development priorities and
needs; and on how the use and impact of aid is
monitored and assessed.
2
Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) [Phase II, 2009-

2010]
x I appreciate the Netherland’s focus on improving aid

quantity and quality, on strengthening accountability,
and your long-term commitment to promoting
cooperation and policy coherence.
x ECOSOC is central to efforts to promote coherence

and coordination of the UN Development Agenda. As
recognized in Doha and Accra (2008), the DCF is
poised to play a pivotal role in promoting
international dialogue and accountability, in
particular while facing multiple crises.
x Preparations for the 2010 High-level DCF will

therefore focus on inclusive and balanced North-
South consultations in order to lead to tangible
outcomes in the areas of: (i) mutual accountability
and aid transparency; (ii) South-South and triangular
cooperation; and (iii) aid policy coherence.
x I count on your continuous support and engagement

with ECOSOC processes and on your active
participation in the DCF and its preparatory activities
so that expected outcomes are achieved.
3
BN SG meting with PM Netherlands AND OTHER DUTCH OFFICIALS March
09.kc.docConfidential
Background information for the Secretary-General’s meeting
with H.E. Jan Peter Balkenende, Prime Minister of the
Netherlands, and other Dutch officials
The Hague, March 2009
Financial crisis
The impact of the global economic crisis on the Dutch economy could
extend into the medium term, with output levels remaining low for some
time to come, the Dutch Bureau for Economic Analysis (CPB) announced
on 17 March.
Because of Dutch dependence on exports and the sharp decline in world

trade, the CPB expects the economy -- which shrank by 0.6% year-on-year
in the last quarter of 2008 (the worst performance since the early 1980s) --
to contract by 3.5% in 2009, its biggest fall since 1931 (except for the war
years). The budget is likely to go into deficit by 2.8% of GDP, after small
surpluses in 2007-08. The unemployment rate is expected to rise to 5.5%
from 4.0% in 2008, business investment is to drop by 11% thanks to lower
domestic and foreign demand and tighter credit, with exports also expected
to fall by 11%.
The governing coalition is looking shaky, with its three constituent parties
divided over proposals for deep cuts in government expenditure as the
crisis worsens.
The Prime Minister is likely to raise the commencement of the Special

Tribunal for Lebanon on 1 March 2009. The Legal Counsel, on behalf of the
Secretary-General, attended the successful low-key launch event of the
Special Tribunal on 1 March. The Netherlands was represented at
Ambassadorial level, as was Lebanon. The Prosecutor and Registrar also
attended.
The Special Tribunal was established by the Security Council on 10 June

2007 to prosecute those responsible for the assassination of former Prime
Minister, Rafiq Hariri, on 14 February 2005, and certain other related
BN SG meting with PM Netherlands AND OTHER DUTCH OFFICIALS March
attacks. The investigation of the assassination and attacks was, until 28
February 2009, conducted by the International Independent Investigation
Commission (IIIC). The former Commissioner, Daniel Bellemare, is now
the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal. The Prime Minister might reiterate
the invitation made by the Dutch Permanent Representative to the
Secretary-General to attend the opening ceremony of the courtroom of the
Special Tribunal planned for later this year.
The Prosecutor has stated that he will request soon the transfer of the
detainees held by the Lebanese authorities. In the event that, as we expect,
they are rapidly released by the Tribunal, we anticipate that they will return
immediately to Lebanon. However, to cover the contingency of any of them
attempting to remain in the Netherlands, the Registrar of the Special
Tribunal is in contact with a number of States who may be willing to accept
relocation of these individuals to their territory.
Burundi
The deadlines set out in the 17 January Bujumbura Agreement have not
been met, including the 30 January deadline for the start of the DDR of
Forces Nationales de Liberation (FNL) combatants and the release of all
children associated with the FNL. The DDR process has not yet started and
the FNL is yet to be integrated into State institutions and the security
forces. On a positive note, the rebel group formally changed its name to
FNL on 9 January, and submitted its application to register as a political
party on 30 January. The Interior Minister has 60 days to make a decision
on the application.
After a long period of absence, on 12 March, Facilitator Nqakula travelled to

Burundi with a view to unblock the peace process. He impressed upon the
parties that the DDR process must be completed by the 31 March deadline
as the African Union Special Task Force would start withdrawing by 1 April.
In this respect, he informed that he would probably dispatch General
Mgwebi, former ONUB force commander, to head a high-level special
committee to monitor the implementation of the DDR process and
participate in the meetings of the Political Directorate.
The Netherlands has been playing a lead role supporting national security
sector reform (SSR) efforts in Burundi.
BN SG meting with Minister for Development Cooperation Koenders March
with Mr. Bert Koenders, Minister for Development Cooperation
of the Netherlands
The Hague, March 2009
Financial Crisis
The world economy is now mired in the most severe financial crisis since
the Great Depression. World gross product is expected to grow only by 1.0
per cent in 2009, a sharp deceleration from the 2.5 per cent growth
estimated for 2008. Given world population growth of 1.2 per cent, this
means income per capita for the world as a whole is expected to decline in
2009. Developed economies are leading the global downturn, with
developing countries being increasingly affected through weakening trade
and more difficult financing conditions.
In the wake of the crisis, unemployment rates are increasing, creating

additional pressure on fiscal budgets through rising social spending and
leading to a growing potential for social unrest. The ILO estimates that as
many as 50 million jobs may be lost in developing countries in 2009 and
the UN’s recent global forecast sees negative per capita income growth in
Africa and Latin America for the year, putting the livelihoods of many
millions at stake. The World Bank estimates that some 53 million people
have been driven back into extreme poverty by the crisis.
Major economies, including some developing countries have put together

fiscal stimulus packages totalling (as per mid-February 2009) about $2
trillion (about 3% of world gross product, WGP) to be spent over a number
of years. Yet, despite rhetoric by world leaders that these packages should
be implemented in a coordinated fashion, little such coordination has
taken place in practice. If one also considers monetary stimulus efforts, the
total size of the combined packages is much larger (DESA estimates $11
trillion), but this still falls short of what is needed.
Most importantly, developing countries lack the capacity to respond in

ways similar to the developed countries and will need vast amounts of
compensatory financing and development assistance to avoid this crisis
from turning into a human disaster.
BN SG meting with Minister for Development Cooperation Koenders March
As the crisis is one of systemic failure, there is also a need for more
fundamental changes to the international financial architecture and global
economic governance. This relates to the future role, the governance
structure and institutional setup of organizations like the IMF and the
World Bank as well as proposals for new entities such as a Global
Economic Council, proposed by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel.
The Minister for Development Cooperation of the Netherlands recently

attended the second meeting of the Stiglitz Commission that advices the
PGA on these matters.
Development Cooperation Forum
The inaugural Development Cooperation Forum was held on 30th June

and 1st of July 2008 during the High-level Segment of ECOSOC. The UN
will hold its second Development Cooperation Forum in 2010.
Page 1 of 1

To: Elizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Kendra

Subject: Today's meeting of representatives
Today, the representatives met again on EU matters and worked on draft joint papers.
Divergences regarding derogations were confirmed.
They also discussed a joint paper on governance with regard to the relationship between the
federal government and the constituent states. The TkCyps accepted to delete the first para of
the joint paper "There shall be no domination, no supremacy, no hierarchy between the federal
government and the constituent states". This was one of the conditions put by the GkCyps for
accepting the joint paper as amended.
Next steps:
Tomorrow the leaders will discuss EU matters.
In general, the work programme has intensified over the last weeks with many meetings taking
place of the representatives including experts on EU matters and governance, still. Apparently
President Christofias wants to accelerate even further.
best, Sonja
Page 1 of 1


Subject: BLP remarks at Security Council retreat
fyi
----- Forwarded by Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO on 23/03/2009 10:39 AM -----
Michele ToDPA Management

Griffin/NY/UNO cc
SubjectBLP remarks at Security Council retreat
23/03/2009
10:25 AM
Dear colleagues
Please find attached the remarks that Under-Secretary-General Pascoe made at the Security
Council retreat in Greentree this weekend.
thanks
Michele
Michèle Griffin
Senior Political Affairs Officer
S-3780
United Nations
Tel: 212-963-4812
Fax: 212-963-5065
E-mail: griffinm@un.org
Attachments:
March 2009 Security Council Retreat final BLP remarks.doc
March2009SecurityCouncilRetreatfinalBLPremarks.doc
March 2009 Security Council Retreat: DPA Intervention
Each time I reread the basic UN documents on Conflict Prevention and

Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, I am struck by the contrast between our
clear understanding of the continuum of how we should deal with the peace and security
issues we face and our difficulties in carrying it out in practice.
I was asked to start off this morning by setting the scene on ways to deal with our
problems other than immediately going into a large, expensive peacekeeping operations.
The issue, it seems to me, is not either/or, but how we as an organization use all the tools
we have to cope with and hopefully resolve conflicts. Unfortunately, the problems we
face have the real possibility of getting worse in the months ahead as the effects of the
global economic crisis are felt in some of the more unstable regions of the world.
The basic political tools for crisis prevention have been around since the United
Nations was founded. We all know that Article 33 of the Charter speaks of settling
conflicts by “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means.”
Today, we are actively using these tools from Cyprus to Somalia, from
Madagascar to Fiji. As you know, we have underway a very active program of
strengthening our ability to carry out these efforts effectively by moving rapidly with
well-trained people to resolve conflicts at an early stage. At the same time, we are
continuing to try to help local actors reach agreements that would have been in
everyone’s interests years or decades ago. As the Brahimi Panel noted nine years ago,
these methods are clearly the preferred and less costly tools available to UN. The report
also notes wryly: “Preventive actions, by definition, is a low-profile activity; when
successful, it may even go unnoticed altogether.”
Often, of course, we can make a real difference by sending only one or two people
to a hot spot to assess the situation, begin discussions, and look for ways to resolve or
ameliorate the conflict. While the field is sometimes crowded as private or regional
mediators also appear, we have found that the UN tends to be given the lead because of
its reputation for impartiality (Madagascar). Otherwise, we can usually support another
person or group as leader (Kenya). Of course, if someone else can resolve the problem or
for some reason we are not welcome, we can easily turn our attention elsewhere. There
are times it makes sense from the very first to provide our expertise to another group
leading the effort such as the AU in the Comoros or for Secretary General Annan in
Kenya.

We have actually made considerable progress with the setting up of the mediation
unit in DPA. The Council will soon receive the SG’s first report on mediation, which
will lay out the challenges but also the real opportunities of a more responsive and
credible mediation effort. The essential point is that we need to be more creative,
responsive and open to taking some political risks to nip a crisis in the bud. Often, a
quick and quiet diplomatic effort can help parties to resolve their dispute before they
cross the Rubicon into violent and devastating conflict.
I should point out here that these efforts, though stemming directly from the
Charter, are less and less supported by assessed budget contributions. In the 2010-2011
budget we will actually get only 25% of our current actual travel costs from the regular
budget and our most innovative mediation efforts are all financed by extra-budgetary
donations.
Sometimes we can be more effective with a regional presence on the ground. Our
West African regional office (UNOWA) has been invaluable in dealing with the coups in
Guinea and Mauritania as well as managing the transfer of the Bakassi Peninsula and
focusing international attention on the growing scourge of the drug trade in West Africa.
We will be coming to the Council in the next few months for a small similar office that
would cover Central Africa and the Great Lakes region after President Obasanjo’s
mission is completed. Our office in Central Asia is doing excellent work helping the
Central Asian states move toward resolution of some of the problems that have caused
conflicts since independence.
We have also found our joint effort with UNDP to place “peace and development”
advisers under Resident Coordinators in potentially troubled countries an important force
multiplier in the early warning and crisis prevention area. We have worked to make the
leadership of our country teams more active in the political area and established the ties
necessary to ensure that our political help can be brought into situations in a timely way.
One area where the excellent theory of a seamless effort runs up against
bureaucratic realities is in financing our efforts. The member states have seen fit to make
a distinction in funding and conditions between Special Political Missions and
Peacekeeping Missions when in fact our field missions should be part of the peace and
security continuum of the UN. I understand making a distinction between which
Department should take the lead based on whether or not the missions have formed
military or police units, but the fact is that the political missions which may run from
peacemaking (UNPOS, UNMIL, or UNAMI) to peacebuilding (Sierra Leone or
UNOGBIS) should be viewed in the same terms as the peacekeeping operations.

The establishment of DFS is a major step forward in resolving administrative

anomalies as are the new human resources rules that take effect this summer. However,
we need to have, at least, a political mission budget that parallels the peacekeeping
mechanisms rather than keeping these missions on the regular budget.
Where a larger security presence is needed as an essential part of our peacemaking

or peacebuilding efforts, we should look carefully at what is really appropriate and avoid
the expensive “one size fits all” approach. There will be other situations similar to Nepal
where the right response is a limited number of police or military observers, not a full-
blown UN military or police presence, to back up the political process or Guatemala a
few years back where the UN military presence lasted only a few months to provide
stability in the demobilization phase. Where there are others providing military
stabilization (Iraq or Afghanistan), obviously our role will only be on the
peacemaking/mediation and peacebuilding side, including, of course, its humanitarian,
development and human rights components.
In the future, if the African Union peacekeeping efforts can be made effective
(Somalia), we may find that the UN will want to support them as the peacekeepers while
we provide much of the peacemaking/peacebuilding role. We work closely with regional
organizations now in the peacemaking area as well as with peacekeeping, sometimes in
parallel and sometime supporting their efforts. We are also working to build the capacity
of regional organizations such as the African Union so they can make their own
mediation efforts more effective.
Finally, I would like to say a few words on peacebuilding. Again, the theory
makes a lot of sense. The integrated missions that DPKO has used successfully and DPA
is now instituting are clearly the primary building blocks of peacebuilding because they
bring together the peace and security, humanitarian, and development efforts of the UN
to concentrate on what, after all, is the aim of the entire effort – to get countries stabilized
and on a sustainable path to recovery. We have completely reworked the UNIPSIL
mission to concentrate on peacebuilding and DPKO has done similar work in BINUB.
We are, unfortunately, far from having a real consensus on how to bring together (nine
years after the Brahimi report) a coherent peacebuilding effort here in New York that
strengthens our peace and security efforts and puts countries on that path of sustained
stability and development. I also sense that powerful interests are moving us away from
the closely integrated approach to peacebuilding advocated in the Brahimi report. We
need to work hard with you to get this right.
Thankyou.

Page 1 of 2
From: Philippe Baudin-Auliac/NY/UNO

To: Roselyn Akombe/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Annick Hiensch/NY/UNO@UNHQ
cc: DPA-Europe, Elizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Venessa Blair/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: Re: Updated list of bilaterals during the SG's Moscow - Doha - The Hague - London -
Paris - Istanbul trip
Dear Roselyn and Annick,
As requested, please find attached: (i) a country profile on Russia; (2) a briefing note on Russian
Foreign Policy; (3) TPs for the SG's meeting with Russia's President, Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister; (4) Bios of relevant Russian officials.
Thank you,
Philippe
---------------------------------
Philippe Baudin-Auliac
Political Affairs Officer
Americas and Europe Division
Room S-3380 D
United Nations
New York
1-917-367-3649
baudin-auliac@un.org
Annick Hiensch/NY/UNO
Annick ToDPA-Europe, DPA-Americas, DPA-ASIA

Hiensch/NY/UNO Division, DPA-Africa 1 Division, DPA-Africa 2
Division, Craig Jenness/NY/UNO@UNHQ
23/03/2009 05:14 ccDPA-OUSG, B. Lynn Pascoe/NY/UNO@UNHQ
PM SubjectUpdated list of bilaterals during the SG's
Moscow - Doha - The Hague - London -
Paris - Istanbul trip
Dear DPA,
Page 2 of 2
Please see attached the most up-to-date list of the SG's likely bilaterals during his upcoming trip
to Moscow, Doha, The Hague, London, Paris,and Istanbul.
[attachment "SG bilaterals TRIP March April 2009.doc" deleted by Philippe Baudin-
Auliac/NY/UNO]
Sincerely,
Annick
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Annick Hiensch
Tel. 917.367.9613
Fax. 212.963.5065
hiensch@un.org
Attachments:
Russian Country profil BN SG trip to Moscow TP for Medvedev 23 m TP for Putin 23 march
e 23 March09.doc 23 March2009.doc arch 2009.doc 2009.doc
TP for Lavrov 23 marc profile Pres Medvedev PROFILE PM Putin 09.d PROFILE Lavrov Mar 0
h 2009.doc 2009.doc oc 9.doc
TP for Putin 23 march 2009.docConfidential

H.E. Mr. Vladimir Putin, Chairman of the Government of
the Russian Federation
(Moscow, 27 March 2009)
Topics
x Financial crisis
x Climate Change
x Afghanistan
x Middle East Peace Process
x Iran
x Iraq
x Georgia
x Kosovo
Financial crisis
[See generics]
Climate change
[also refer to generics]
x To strike a Copenhagen deal, the world needs Russia.
As a P5 member and global power, Russia’s support,
starting at the Head of State/Government level, is
crucial to bringing others on board.
x I urge your personal engagement and leadership in the

overall process leading to Copenhagen. It is important
for Russia to set its mid-term targets, like all other
developed countries would have done by the June
session of the negotiations.
1
x A Copenhagen agreement would offer Russia a chance

to diversity its commodities-based export economy.
Building on its scientific prowess, Russia could capture
a competitive advantage in renewables and energy
efficiency.
Afghanistan
x I thank you for convening the regional Conference on

Afghanistan under the aegis of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation. This event is an opportunity
to give a new dynamism to our efforts in Afghanistan,
in a regional context.
x Such broad-based discussions are a tangible

expression that the situation in Afghanistan is a
subject of global concern.
x The topics addressed at the Conference are areas

where practical cooperation between Afghanistan, its
neighbours, and other strategic partners in the region
can make advances.
2
x On counter-narcotics, the Conference identified

important regional efforts that need to be
strengthened. We also need to help Afghans
consolidate the gains that have been made, reward
poppy-free provinces and focus on alternative-
livelihood programmes.
x For the United Nations, any reconciliation effort must

be Afghan-led, be in line with the Constitution and
have the consensus of key national and international
actors.
x While these preconditions do not exist yet, I think that

the challenges facing Afghanistan can not be
addressed by military means alone and that an
inclusive political process is needed. I would like your
views on this matter.
Middle East Peace process

x We face a very uncertain period ahead. We need a
common international strategy and we must insist
that progress is made regarding both Gaza and the
West Bank.
x It is regrettable that Palestinian unity talks have not

so far succeeded. We need to keep supporting the
Egyptian effort.
3
x We need a new strategy for Gaza. The siege is

unacceptable in humanitarian terms and undermines
efforts to strengthen the PA. Israel must allow in
materials required to rebuild damaged houses and
restore the economy
x We need to see a real change on the ground in the

West Bank. The PA has done a good job there. A new
Israeli Government should act seriously on freezing
settlements, lifting closures, and ceasing incursions. I
am disappointed that house demolitions and evictions
are being pursued in Jerusalem.
x If we fail to open the crossings, the impact on the

people of Gaza will be considerable. Any worsened
humanitarian situation can only worsen the chances
of a successful peace process.
x We should all make clear to the new Israeli

Government that we will judge them by their actions.
Both sides committed last year to continue talks on all
final status issues and to implement the roadmap.
x I am encouraged by the early engagement of the new

US Administration. I hope Quartet Principals can meet
soon to grapple with the many challenges.
4
x We need a comprehensive approach to the search for

peace. I support the convening of a Moscow
Conference, and all efforts to carry forward the Arab
Peace Initiative.
Iran [See generics]
Iraq
x While I am encouraged by the progress that has been
made, the situation in Iraq remains fragile. Further
steps need to be taken to promote national dialogue.
x Key issues still need to be resolved, including

federalism, oil sharing and disputed internal
boundaries. The UN is working to promote dialogue on
these issues. I am also committed to expanding the UN
presence in Iraq, security permitting.
Georgia
x While the new realities on the ground need to be
taken into account, the establishment of international
mechanisms agreeable to all are required to
effectively stabilize the region, including around the
Georgia/Abkhazia conflict zone.
x Such stabilization should involve an agreement on a

“revised” security regime, as called for by Security
Council Resolution 1866.
5
x Ensuring that the rights of vulnerable groups are

respected, providing the conditions for eventual
returns and restoring a measure of trust between the
sides constitute key objectives for the UN.
x The recommendations I will submit to the Security

Council by 15 May will be based on these
considerations.
x My Special Representative will continue to closely

consult with Russia in that regard.
x In the meantime, I would welcome your views on the

future of the UN mandate.
6
Kosovo [If raised]

x The UN will continue its status-neutral engagement in
Kosovo within the framework of resolution 1244. As far
as UNMIK reconfiguration is concerned, it is
proceeding in accordance with the parameters
contained in my reports to the Security Council. The
assumption of an operational role by EULEX has
allowed UNMIK to accelerate its reconfiguration.
x There is a need for the Security Council, and for other

international actors, to continue supporting the role of
a reconfigured UNMIK in Kosovo.
x UNMIK is bringing forward the discussions on the

practical arrangements on the six points through
technical meetings in Belgrade. Given the growing
importance of the EU role in Kosovo, I have welcomed
the participation of EU representatives is such
meetings.
7
TP for Medvedev 23 march 2009.docConfidential

H.E. Mr. Dmitri Medvedev,
President of the Russian Federation
Topics:
x Financial Crisis
x Climate Change
x Afghanistan
x Middle East
Iran
x Iraq
x Georgia
x MINURCAT
x Sudan
Financial crisis
[See generics]
Climate change
(also refer to generics)

overall process leading to Copenhagen. It is important
for Russia to set its mid-term targets, like all other
1
x A Copenhagen agreement would offer Russia a chance

to diversity its commodities-based export economy.
Building on its scientific prowess, Russia could capture
a competitive advantage in renewable and energy
efficiency.
Afghanistan

Cooperation Organisation. This event is an opportunity
to give a new dynamism to our efforts in Afghanistan,
in a regional context.

subject of global concern.

can make advances.
2

strengthened. We also need to help Afghans
consolidate the gains that have been made, reward
poppy-free provinces and focus on alternative-
livelihood programmes.

actors.
x While these preconditions do not exist yet, the

challenges facing Afghanistan can not be addressed by
military means alone and an inclusive political process
is needed. I would like your views on this matter.

x We face a very uncertain period ahead. We need a
common international strategy and we must insist
that progress is made regarding both Gaza and the
West Bank.

Egyptian effort.
3
x We need a new strategy for Gaza. The siege is

restore the economy




4

Peace Initiative.
Iran
(See generics)
Iraq
made, the situation in Iraq remains fragile. Further

boundaries. The UN is working to promote dialogue on
these issues. I am also committed to expanding the UN
presence in Iraq, security permitting.
Georgia (if raised)

5



considerations.


6
MINURCAT
x I wish to thank your government for its support to
MINURCAT and its contributions including four
helicopters, a support unit, an engineer unit and a
Level II Hospital.
Sudan
x I would like to thank Russia for its efforts to end the
conflict in Darfur and commend the work of Special
Envoy Mikhail Margelov.
7
TP for Lavrov 23 march 2009.docConfidential
Talking Points for the Secretary-General’s dinner with

H.E. Mr Sergei Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation
Topics:
x Afghanistan
x Korean Peninsula
x Somalia
x Middle East Peace Process
x Lebanon
x Georgia
x DRC
x Sudan
x Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
Afghanistan
x I thank you for convening the Conference on
Cooperation Organisation. This provides an important
opportunity to give a new dynamism to our efforts in
Afghanistan, in a regional context.
x The topics addressed at the Conference are areas where

practical cooperation between Afghanistan, its
can make advances.
1

important regional efforts that need to be strengthened.
We also need to help Afghans consolidate the gains that
have been made, reward poppy-free provinces and
focus on alternative-livelihood programmes.
x For the UN, any reconciliation effort must be Afghan-led,

be in line with the Constitution and have the consensus
of key national and international actors.

military means alone and an inclusive political process is
needed.
Korean Peninsula
x I am worried about the recent rise in tensions on the
Korean Peninsula.
x I commend Russia’s consistent efforts to foster

durable peace and security on the Peninsula and to
resolve the nuclear issue through negotiations and
regional cooperation. How can I help the process?
x Hopefully the new US administration will breathe new

life into the six-party talks. What are your views on
how to break the stalemate?
2
Somalia
x The present situation in Somalia offers us a rare
window of opportunity. The next 100 days will be
crucial for the Government and will be decisive for the
continued success of the Djibouti Agreement.
x The international community must work to support

the Government in implementing the Djibouti
Agreement, which shall remain the basis for further
reconciliation.
x I would be grateful for Russia’s continued support for

the peace process, especially in the Security Council.
x Any support Russia can provide to the new Somali

Government, especially in the security sector and in
capacity building will be very much appreciated.
x Somalia would also need support in reconstruction

and development as a means of consolidating peace
and restoring stability. A reconstruction conference is
being planned for the summer. Russia can make an
important effort in supporting this initiative.
x The security situation in Somalia is not only a threat

to its own people but also to the region and the
international community. We need to urgently
address this issue and provide immediate assistance
to AMISOM and the Somali Joint Security Forces.
3
x I will be convening a donor conference in April to

seek long-term financial support for AMISOM as well
as the Somali Joint Security Force and police.
x In the interim, there will be a need for continued

funding to AMISOM to bridge the gap until the
logistics package is approved and delivered. In
addition, immediate funding will be required to pay
the existing Joint Somali Security Forces.
x Any support from your Government to address these

immediate needs will be appreciated.
Middle East peace process

x We face a very uncertain period ahead. We need
international unity behind a common strategy and we
must insist that progress is made regarding both
Gaza and the West Bank.

Egyptian effort.
x I am disappointed that Hamas has not moved further.

I signalled when I went to Gaza that the UN would
engage a unity Government. Unity is so important to
allow relief and reconstruction for Gaza. We need to
persuade Hamas of this.
4
x Whatever happens with unity, we need a new

strategy for Gaza. The siege is unacceptable in
humanitarian terms and undermines efforts to
strengthen the Palestinian Authority (PA).
x Israel must allow in materials required to rebuild

damaged houses and restore the economy. This will
also allow us to support the PA’s early recovery
efforts. Otherwise, the promises made at Sharm will
not be delivered.



5

US Administration. I want to see the Quartet Envoys
more engaged on the ground in crisis management
and common messaging. I hope Quartet Principals
can meet soon to grapple with the many challenges.

Peace Initiative.
x Please update me on your efforts and on how the UN

can help.
x [IF ASKED: BOARD OF INQUIRY] I have established

the UN Board of Inquiry into several specific incidents
in Gaza. The Board has just submitted its report to
me. I need some time to study it and then decide if
any further steps are required.
x [IF ASKED: ACOUNTABILITY] The President of the

Human Rights Council is preparing a fact-finding
mission, as mandated by the Council, and with the
support of the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights. I am following this matter carefully.
6
Lebanon
x I am encouraged that preparations for the 7 June
parliamentary elections in Lebanon are on track. It is
important that they take place as scheduled.
x It will be very important to maintain a secure and

calm atmosphere as the electoral period approaches.
I very much welcome the Lebanese parties’
commitment to reject the use of violence or
intimidation in their political campaigns.
x The Lebanese National Dialogue on a national defence

strategy is a very important process. Lebanese
leaders must be encouraged to sustain this dialogue
and to make progress in addressing the core issues.
x I am satisfied by the overall calm that Southern

Lebanon continues to enjoy. UNIFIL, in cooperation
with the Lebanese Armed Forces, does outstanding
work, contributing greatly to stability in Lebanon and
the region.
x Despite this relative calm, violations of SCR 1701 by

both parties are of concern. The continuous Israeli
violations of Lebanese air space are violations of 1701
and threaten stability in the region. They must cease.
7
x The Lebanese Government has started a process to

control its borders, supported by the international
community. However, progress has been quite limited
and Lebanon’s borders remain porous.
x I am encouraged by recent developments regarding a

process for the withdrawal of the IDF from the
northern part of the village of Ghajar and adjacent
areas. I hope that this can be achieved shortly after
the formation of the new Government in Israel.
x I regret the lack of progress on the issue of the

Sheb’a farms. So far, the United Nations’ efforts have
not led to positive results. However, I will continue
my efforts aimed at a resolution of the issue.
x I welcome the steps taken by Lebanon and Syria to

normalise their relations. There is more however that
Syria can do, such as appointing its Ambassador,
addressing border delimitation and control, and
dismantling the Palestinian bases close to the border.
8
x [IF ASKED: TRIBUNAL] The start of the Special

Tribunal for Lebanon on 1 March 2009 in The Hague,
is a decisive milestone in the joint efforts of the
Lebanese and the international community to uncover
the truth, bring those responsible for this and related
crimes to justice and end impunity. This will not be
easy. It will take time but I reiterate my support to
the Tribunal and I call upon all Members States to
fully support and cooperate with this new
independent institution.
Georgia


9

considerations.


Democratic Republic of the Congo

[So far, we have accepted from Bangladesh: one battalion, one
engineer unit and one formed police unit (FPU); from Egypt: one
battalion, one Special Forces company and one FPU; from Jordan:
one Special Forces company; from Belgium: one C-130 aircraft.]
x The Security Council approved 3,000 additional

troops for the MONUC. While there has been some
progress with regard to the generation of these
additional military capacities we are still missing
critical capabilities.
x We have not yet received any pledges for the 18

utility helicopters, the 200 trainers, and the
intelligence equipment.
x All of these assets are critical to our operations, and

air and intelligence assets will allow MONUC to
enhance the mobility of its troops and better protect
civilians.
10
x Would Russia consider providing some of these

resources?
MINURCAT
Level II Hospital.
Sudan
Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

x I place the utmost importance on the reinvigoration
of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.
x I am encouraged by the commitment of the Russian

Federation and the United States to earnestly engage
in a verifiable follow-up to the START Treaty.
x The Russian Federation’s commitment to working for

a successful 2010 NPT Review Conference in light of
its NPT obligations and to reaching the goal of a world
free of nuclear weapons is most welcome.
11
x I am also encouraged by recent indications by the

Russian Federation and the United States that a
solution may be found to the issue concerning the
Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense System in
Europe.
x It is important that the multilateral disarmament

machinery, especially the Conference on
Disarmament, starts working again.
x Negotiations must begin on a verifiable treaty

banning the production of fissile materials. I also
value Russian efforts in the CD on a draft
international Treaty on the Prevention of the
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT).
x As the demand for the peaceful uses of nuclear

energy increases worldwide, it is important that a
secure and reliable supply of nuclear fuel be made
available to all States which are in compliance with
their safeguards obligations.
x I appreciate Russia’s efforts to move discussions on

the multilateral nuclear fuel cycle forward.
x The nuclear non-proliferation regime continues to

face a number of challenges.
12
x Your continued engagement in the Six-party talks on

the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and in
the efforts to find a workable diplomatic solution to
the concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear
programme is most welcome.
x Today, the world faces the threat of nuclear

terrorism. I welcome Russia’s contributions to the
international community’s efforts to reduce this risk,
such as the Global Initiative to Combat Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism, and encourage you to keep
engaging other States in these efforts.
13
Russian Country profile 23 March09.doc
COUNTRY PROFILE: RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Official Name: Russian Federation

Form of Government: Federal presidential republic
Head of State: President Dmitriy Medvedev inaugurated on 7 May 2008
Head of Government: Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, appointed in May 2008
Constitution: 12 December 1993
Capital City/ Seat of Government: Moscow
Area: 17,075,200 sq km
Population: 141,377,752 (Russian 79.8%, Tatar 3.8%, Ukrainian 2%, Bashkir 1.2%,
Chuvash 1.1%, other or unspecified 12.1%; 2002 census)
GNI per capita: US $5,780
Religions: Russian Orthodox 15-20%, Muslim 10-15%, other Christian 2%, 2006 est.
Official Language: Russian
A. Political structure
Executive: Russia is comprised of a dual executive, consisting of a President and a Prime

Minister, with the President as the dominant figure. The President sets priorities in domestic
and foreign policy and makes key decisions on forming the executive. The Prime Minister
plays an administrative role in implementing policy, particularly in the field of the economy.
The President is elected by popular vote to a four-year term. The same person cannot be
elected to more than two consecutive terms.
Legislative: The bicameral Federal Assembly consists of the Federation Council (168 members
appointed by the top executive and legislative officials in each of the 84 federal administrative
units to serve four-year terms) and the State Duma (450 members elected by a popular vote to
serve four-year terms).
Main political parties: In the 2 December 2008 parliamentary elections the pro-president centrist
United Russia Party, led by the Duma speaker Mr. Gryzlov, received a 315 seat majority in the
Duma. It was followed by the Communist Party (Mr. Zuganov) with 57 seats, Mr. Zhirinovsky’s
Liberal Democratic Party (40 seats) and Fair Russia, led by the Speaker of the Federation Council,
Mironov (38 seats). United Russia is a relatively new party founded in 2001. It has no independent
political agenda and sees its role in supporting the President’s policies (Putin’s Plan). Its success
in both federal and local elections was a result of Mr. Putin’s popularity and his direct support and
the backing of the state apparatus. Most public officials are members of the United Russia Party.
The Communist Party’s role as the largest opposition force has been diminished since it lost almost
half of its voters between the 1999 and the 2003 parliamentary elections. Although it still upholds
communist symbols and rhetoric, the party is shifting to a social democratic agenda. The pseudo-
nationalist Liberal Democratic Party and centre-left Fair Russia have little political weight and
support the President’s policy. Other parties, liberal and radical, have lately been marginalized,
are not represented in the Parliament and play no significant role.
B. Current domestic political situation
President Putin’s legacy: Russia is a highly centralized state. The governance pyramid built in
recent years gave real power to several influential groups at the expense of state institutions whose
authority has been weakened. The Government, never too powerful, became an administrative
body which implements strategies designed elsewhere. The judicial system remains under the
strong influence of the authorities and the parliament is a clearing house for the Government’s and
the President’s decisions. Corruption and the lack of the rule of law are recognized as major
problems.
During President Putin’s tenure, Russia recovered from the political and economic turmoil of
the 1990s and ended an open armed conflict in Chechnya. Although the economic recovery
was a result of high energy prices, many Russians associated the improvement of their well
being mostly with Mr. Putin’s leadership. Aspiring for stability and prosperity, the majority of
the population remained indifferent to restrictions imposed on the media and on democratic
freedoms. The government, skillfully exploiting the bitter recollections of the misery and
anarchy of the 1990s, put most media under the control of the state, abolished the election of
governors and imposed limitations on the electoral system (strict conditions for the registration
of political parties and entities, abolishment of political blocks and non-party candidates,
increase in the threshold for the elections to the Parliament).
Current political situation: Many observers believe that PM Putin remains in full control with
President Medvedev so far playing a supportive role. This may change, however, as economic
challenges and social tension mount. Meanwhile, in the past few months, the Kremlin further
consolidated political control over the society. “Corrections” to the Constitution that included the
extension of Presidential and Duma terms and changes in the appointment of governors and
members of the upper house (Council of the Federation) have been hastily rubberstamped by
Parliament without any serious discussion. In the economy, the state regained control of the most
lucrative enterprises and high state officials sit on the board of directors of Russia’s largest
monopolies. Mr. Putin has described the Russian economy as “state capitalism.” The Government
used the financial crisis to further increase its control over the industrial and banking sectors.
Financial Crisis: Russia has spent large amounts of reserve finances to head off a large-scale
devaluation of the ruble and has implemented a gradual reduction of its value. The currency
has lost one-fifth of its value since November 2008. The government fears that a large,
immediate devaluation would result in public panic, a banking crisis and capital flight, further
exacerbating the financial crisis in Russia, which is expected to have a growth rate of -2.0% in
2009. Such a policy has cost Russia: the country’s reserves fell 34 percent from $598.1 billion
over the period from August to January. The ruble fell 29 percent against the dollar over the
same period. Due to the government’s dependence on oil exports to boost reserves, low oil
prices have hurt this process. There are currently 2.13 million registered unemployed people
(6.4 million including the unregistered) in Russia which may grow to 15 million people by the
end of 2009. There has been a slight increase in unrest though demonstrations have been
limited in scope compared with those in other European countries. Protests in Russia have been
met with a heavy-handed response by police.
Northern Caucasus: The Northern Caucasus remains a tinderbox with occasional outbursts of
violence and terrorist acts in various parts of the region. Most recently, violence shifted from
Chechnya to neighboring republics, particularly Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria,
2
where attacks on security forces and government officials occur on a daily basis. Russia allocated
$881.5 million to the region in January to improve socio-economic conditions and to fight rebels
amidst criticism that the government’s heavy-handed responses in the past were the reason for
their increased activity.
Military Restructuring: Medvedev has reaffirmed his commitment to push through a plan which
would see the most dramatic restructuring of the military since World War II, despite economic
hardship and opposition from within the military. The plan would cut nearly 200,000 troops
(mostly officers), thus reducing Russia’s standing army by more than half, shifting the military
structure from a concept aimed at mobilizing a large army for a major war to a more slender army
designed for rapid-response to localized conflicts. Opponents, including many retired generals and
officers worried about cuts, argue that such a restructuring would leave Russia vulnerable to
potential threats from China and NATO. The upturn in military spending and major restructuring is
not slated to begin until 2011.
23 March 2009
Europe Division, DPA
3
profile Pres Medvedev 2009.doc
MR. DMITRY MEDVEDEV
PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
i Mr. Medvedev was inaugurated on 7 May 2008, succeeding Vladimir Putin who
sworn in as Prime Minister the following day. The latter, according to the
Constitution, could not run for the third presidential term. Thus, in December
2007, Mr. Medvedev was informally endorsed as a candidate for the forthcoming
presidential elections by the largest Russian political party, United Russia as well
as other pro-presidential parties and won the election with 70% of votes in March
2008.
i He has served as the First Deputy Prime Minister since November 2005.
i From 2003 until 2005, he occupied the position of the Chef de Cabinet of the
President where he served as Deputy since 1999.
i From 2000 to 2002, Mr. Medvedev served alternatively as Chairman and Vice-
Chairman of the Board of Directors of “Gazprom”.
i From 1990 to 1999 he was a lecturer at the St. Petersbourg (Leningrad) State
University. During that time, until 1995, he also served as a councilor and advisor
on external relations to the Chairman of the Municipal Council of Leningrad
(St. Petersbourg), headed at that time by Vladimir Putin.
i In 1990, Mr. Medvedev graduated from the State University of Leningrad

(St. Petersbourg) with a PhD in Law.
i Born on 14 September 1965 in Leningrad (St. Petersbourg), he is married and has

one son.
March 2009
PROFILE PM Putin 09.doc
MR. VLADIMIR PUTIN
PRIME MINISTER OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
i Mr. Vladimir Putin stepped down as President of Russia on 8 May 2008, and sworn in as Prime
Minister the same day. As President, he served two consecutive terms, winning elections in March
2000 and March 2004. He became acting President upon the resignation of Boris Yeltsin in
December 1999. Mr. Putin is also the chairman of a political party, United Russia and Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of the Union of Russia and Belarus.
i His first appointment as Prime Minister was in August 1999. While not formally associated with
any political party, Mr. Putin pledged his support to the Unity Party, which claimed 23% in the
December 1999 legislative elections and supported his presidential candidacy in turn.
i In July 1998, President Yeltsin appointed him Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the
KGB’s successor organization. Mr. Putin served in that position until August 1999, when he
became Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, in control of the coordinating body of the
country’s security and intelligence ministries.
i In August 1996, Mr. Putin joined President Boris Yeltsin’s staff, serving first as deputy chief of the
Presidential Budget and Management Office (1996-1997) and later as deputy head of the
Presidential Administration (1997-1998).
i From 1991 to 1996, he was chairman of the Committee for External Relations in St. Petersburg
Mayor's Office under Mayor Anatoly Sobchak. During this period, he also served as Vice-Mayor
between 1992 and 1994 and First Vice-Mayor of St. Petersburg from 1994 to 1996.
i From 1990 to 1991, Mr. Putin served as adviser to the chairman of the Leningrad (St. Petersburg)
City Council.
i In 1989, he left the KGB to take up a position at the Leningrad State University, where he
developed a close relationship with key reformist Anatoly Sobchak, who became Mayor in 1991.
i In 1975, immediately after his graduation, Mr. Putin joined the KGB and worked in the First Chief
Directorate (PGU), an elite division in charge of intelligence abroad, where he was assigned to
service in Eastern Germany. In the mid-1980s, he worked for over three years as deputy director of
the House of Soviet Science and Technology in Leipzig.
i He graduated from Leningrad State University law faculty in 1975, specializing in international
law. In 1996, he received a Ph.D. in Economics from the St. Petersburg Mining Academy.
i Born on 7 October 1952, Mr. Putin is married and has two daughters. His paternal grandfather is
claimed to have been Vladimir Lenin's and Joseph Stalin's cook.
March 2009
PROFILE Lavrov Mar 09.doc
MR. SERGEY LAVROV
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
i On 9 March 2004, then President Vladimir Putin appointed Mr. Lavrov as Minister of
Foreign Affairs, succeeding Igor Ivanov.
i From 1994 to 2004, Mr. Lavrov served as the Permanent Representative of the Russian
Federation to the United Nations.
i From 1992 to 1994, he was Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation.
i From 1988 to 1990, Mr. Lavrov served as deputy head of the Department of International
Economic Relations and from 1990 to 1992 as Director of the Department of
International Organizations and Global Problems in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation.
i From 1981 to 1988, he was First Secretary at the Permanent Representation of the Soviet
Union to the United Nations in New York.
i Between 1976 and 1981, Mr. Lavrov worked in the Department of International
Organizations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
i He began his diplomatic career in the Soviet diplomatic service with a four-year posting
in Sri Lanka.
i In 1972, he graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and is
fluent in English, French and Sinhala.
i Mr. Lavrov was born on 21 March 1950 in Moscow. He is married and has a daughter.
He has Armenian-Russian ethnic background; his father was an Armenian from Tbilisi.
March 2009
BN SG trip to Moscow 23 March2009.doc
Briefing note on Russia’s foreign policy issues
Financial crisis
Although Moscow initially denied that the financial crisis would affect Russia, today it
already feels the pain. The drop in oil prices seriously affects Russia’s options, as its
two-year budget was based on the oil price of $95 a barrel. The Government has already
corrected the state budget on the assumption of an oil price of $41. The national currency
is also in trouble: since July 2008, the rouble has lost 41% of its value, despite
interventions by the Central Bank. The authorities expect that 2009 may become a
difficult year for the Russian economy. GDP growth is expected to be between 0 and 2
percent and inflation around 13%. The widely publicised “national projects” in
education, healthcare, affordable housing, etc. have been effectively put on hold. Social
tension may increase next year due to the economic slowdown. Despite the financial
difficulties, Russia does not hesitate to offer significant politically motivated loans to its
neighbours, including Ukraine and Central States. On 16 March, the Kremlin published
Russia’s proposals to the G-20 Summit in London. Although its own economy,
(including the industrial and agricultural sectors) is in trouble, Moscow’s proposals are
focused on the reform of the international financial system. In particular, Russia
proposed:
x to adopt international standards on macroeconomic and budget policy;
x stimulation of internal demand should not provoke inflation, budget deficit and
internal debt;
x adoption of an international agreement on Standard Universal Regulatory
Framework (SURF);
x reform of the international monetary system, i.e., diversification of reserve
currencies and the adoption of a new super-national reserve currency;
x reform of international financial institutions, including the redistribution of
quotas and votes;
x protection of consumers’ rights;
x post-crisis period should be based on the concept of “energy effective growth.”
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)

Since its inception, the CERF has received over $1.5 billion from 105 Member States (as
well as the Holy See). Russia, with the 7th largest overall GDP in the world, has never
contributed to the CERF. Russia is also the only country among the G-8 and the
Permanent Members of the Security Council that has yet to contribute to the Fund.
Afghanistan
Russia continues to be concerned about the level of instability, opium production and
trafficking in Afghanistan. Russia is opposed to any peace deals with the Taliban. It may,
however, support reconciliation efforts between the Afghan Government and non-
ideologically motivated insurgents. Russia is keen to see more engagement with
Afghanistan’s neighbours. While recognizing that coalition forces fighting the Taliban
are actually defending Russia’s interests, Moscow makes things difficult for ISAF. In
particular, it encouraged Kyrgyzstan to close the US airbase at Manas. Russia also uses
the transit of ISAF goods through its territory as leverage in its relations with NATO and
the US.
Kosovo
In January, Serbia demarched the UN insisting that UNMIK should maintain its authority
over the Kosovo Property Agency and complained that the UN was “backing off” from
its commitments to continue engaging Belgrade in the 6-point dialogue. The Serbs hinted
that they may ask Russia to call a Security Council meeting on this matter. On 19
January, President Tadiü of Serbia characterized the announced formation of Kosovo
security forces (in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan) “unacceptable” and insisted on the
demilitarization of Kosovo. Russia appears to be fairly comfortable with the
reconfiguration of UNMIK as long as the screen of status neutrality and UN umbrella
remain in place. Deterioration of the situation on the ground, such as ongoing protests by
Kosovo Serbs against power cuts, and/or attempts by the Kosovo Government and the
EU to push UNMIK out, may prompt Russia to resume its criticism of the UN
Secretariat.
Georgia
The situation around the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflict zones remains volatile. As
requested by Resolution 1866, the Secretary-General will need to submit
recommendations for a future UN mandate by 15 May. The Council intends to “outline
the elements of a future UN presence in the region” by 15 June. The “Geneva
International Discussions” have so far yielded little results. The next round may take
place in June. SRSG Verbeke traveled to Moscow on 19 March for consultations with
Russian officials. Moscow is not keen on maintaining a UN presence. It insists on the
establishment of a rather asymmetrical security regime (i.e. on the Georgian side mainly)
as well as on a mandate taking into account the “independence” of Abkhazia, a red line
for Georgia and the West.

In his statement to the Conference on Disarmament on 7 March 2009, Foreign Minister
Lavrov made clear that Russia is ready to engage with the United States to conclude a
new legally binding treaty on strategic offensive arms as a follow-up to the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which expires in December 2009. President
Medvedev underlined that Russia is fully committed, in accordance with its obligations
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to reaching the goal of a world free
from nuclear weapons and is open to dialogue with the US Administration to negotiate a
forward-looking, legally binding instrument, limiting not only warheads but also strategic
delivery vehicles, and excluding the possible deployment of strategic offensive arms
outside national territories.
Relations with the UN

On 5 November 2008 President Medvedev, in his first State of the Nation Address,
underlined the need to strengthen the central role and the efficiency of the UN in
response to new challenges. The same day, Russia and the EU signed an agreement on
Russian participation in the peace-keeping operation in Chad. Russia dispatched 4
helicopters and 200 personnel for 12 months. This contingent has been re-hatted now.
Despite verbal support, and participation in UN peace-keeping, Russia does not have
special interests or its own theme on the UN or Security Council agenda, like other major
powers. It prefers to deal with most issues of national interest on a bilateral basis.
Europe Division, DPA

23 March 2009
SG bilaterals TRIP March April 2009.doc23 March 2009
SG TRIP TO MOSCOW, DOHA, THE HAGUE, LONDON, PARIS, AND ISTANBUL
27 March to 6 April
MOSCOW Shanghai Cooperation Organization conference on Afghanistan - 27 March

Russia: Medvedev, Putin, and Dinner with Lavrov (Mr Philippe Baudin-Auliac COMPILING)
China FM (Mr Aleksandr Ilitchev)
Afghanistan FM Spanta (DPKO)
Iran FM Mottaki (Mr Valery Marusin)
Pakistan FM (Ms Alma Saliu)
Five Central Asian States FMs (Mr Brian Vitunic)
DOHA League of Arab States Summit - 30 March

Egypt (Mr Mamadi Toure)
Eritrea (Mr Mamadi Toure)
Jordan (Mr Michael Contet)
Palestinian Authority (Mr Michael Contet)
UAE (Mr Victor Poliakov COMPILING)
Qatar (Mr Victor Poliakov)
Saudi Arabia (Mr Victor Poliakov)
LAS Moussa (Mr Victor Poliakov)
Libya (Mr Maciej Janczak)
Somalia (Mr Kiyoshi Matsukawa)
Lebanon (Mr Michael Contet)
THE HAGUE conference on Afghanistan - 31 March

Netherlands: PM Meeting/Dinner, meetings with Foreign, Development and Defense Ministers,
and Queen Beatrix (Mr Arnaud Amouroux COMPILING)
SG of NATO (Mr Arnaud Amouroux)
Afghanistan President; FM of Canada (DPKO)
LONDON G-20 Summit - 2 April (OUSG COMPILING)

ROK (Mr Aleksandr Ilitchev)
China - President Hu Jintao (Mr Aleksandr Ilitchev)
Japan (Mr Aleksandr Ilitchev)
Italy (Ms Kendra Collins)
Brazil (Mr Andres Salazar)
Indonesia (Ms Anne Marie Ibanez/ Ms Yunseon Heo)
P5 Foreign Ministers (Mr Obinna Okamgba)
UK Miliband (Mr Obinna Okamgba)
PARIS Chief Executives Board 3-4 April (Ms Kendra Collins COMPILING)
France PM, FM
President Chirac
Head of UNESCO
ISTANBUL Alliance of Civilizations - 6 April

President Obama (Ms Marylene Smeets)
Spain (Mr Arnaud Amouroux)
Turkey and High Rep Sampaio (Ms Kendra Collins COMPILING)
Slovenia (Mr Philippe Baudin-Auliac)
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (Mr Kristofer Carlin/ Mr Philippe Baudin-Auliac)
1
SG bilaterals TRIP March April 2009.doc23 March 2009
SG TRIP TO MOSCOW, DOHA, THE HAGUE, LONDON, PARIS, AND ISTANBUL
27 March to 6 April
Generics:
x Somalia (Mr Kiyoshi Matsukawa/ Ms Olla Hassan/ Mr Mamadi Toure)
x Middle East (Ms Lee O’Brien)
x Myanmar (Mr Erwan Pouchous)
x Madagascar (Mr Qais Sultan)
x Nuclear proliferation (DDA Mr Ioan Tudor)
x Sudan (DPKO Ms Anne-Laure Sans)
x Chad (DPKO Ms Anne-Laure Sans)
x DRC (DPKO Ms Anne-Laure Sans)
x Afghanistan (DPKO Ms Anne-Laure Sans)
x Financial crisis (including political/security fallout) (DESA Ms Teresa Lenzi)
x Climate change (CCST Ms Gelila Terrefe)
DEADLINES
19 MARCH (Thursday) cob

x THE HAGUE TPs due to Ms Kendra Collins
x MOSCOW Russia TPs due to Mr Oleksandr Matsuka and Central Asian Republics TPs due to Mr
Brian Vitunic
x DOHA TPs due to Mr Victor Poliakov
x LONDON TPs due to OUSG (Roselyn Akombe, Annick Hiensch, and Venessa Blair)
x Inputs to GENERIC TPs due to listed desk officers (see above).
23 MARCH (Monday) cob

x MOSCOW, DOHA, and THE HAGUE TPs due to OUSG (Roselyn Akombe, Annick Hiensch,
and Venessa Blair)
x All GENERIC TPs due to OUSG
x PARIS and ISTANBUL TPs due to Ms Kendra Collins
25 March (Wednesday) cob

x PARIS and ISTANBUL TPs due to OUSG (Roselyn Akombe, Annick Hiensch, and Venessa
Blair)
2
Page 1 of 1
From: Yasser Sabra <ysabra@msn.com>

To: <alexander.downer@adelaide.edu.au>
cc: <bachmanns@un.org>

Subject:
This is an email David Harland sent me yesterday. I believe that the suggestion in the last para. is worth
pursuing. I briefed Taye and he concurs.
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
Yasser,
As discussed, we have a good source on the internal dynamics of the Turkish situation. He has been stressing
how important it is that Obama's meeting with Erdogan hit the right note on Cyprus. His assessment is that
Erdogan is broadly on board with Downer's process, but would certainly like some affirmation of that from
Obama, and some indications that the Americans will work with the Europeans to make sure that the
Europeans are saying and doing positive things as Erdogan spends some political capital to be helpful on
Cyprus.
And, of course, he was suggesting that Downer might find it useful to be in contact with the people staffing the
visit on the Obama team.
I pass this on for what it is worth. I'm sure AD is well aware of the point, too.
d
Page 1 of 4
From: Jose DIAZ/UNFICYP

To: Fiona Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
cc: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Steven Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Timothy
Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Wlodek Cibor/UNFICYP@UNFICYP

Subject: Re: Hwo to answer questions
Thanks, Fiona. I've added some more questions and revised a couple of others.
jl
Messaging on Good Offices

Overarching message:
This is a Cypriot-led and –owned process.
Subsidiary messages:
x UN playing a supporting role, facilitating the process and providing assistance at the
parties’ request. SG: “support of the United Nations for the process will remain
unwavering under the leadership of my Special Adviser”.
x Commitment shown by two leaders makes current process best hope for
comprehensive settlement in a generation
x We remain cautiously optimistic about chances for peace, despite obstacles and hard
work ahead
POSSIBLE QUESTIONS
How do you assess the process so far?
Broadly speaking we believe that the process has achieved a fair amount of momentum. It is essential
to maintain that momentum. We remain cautiously optimistic. We have also maintained all along,
however, that this is a complex and difficult process. There is still a lot of work to be done, so it’s
important that the leaders have the space they need to carry out the negotiations. We have to keep in
mind that this is a process; we have to always remember to put things in context, not get too caught up
with occasional or isolated events, or to issue final-sounding verdicts after every negative – or
positive, for that matter – development.
How long do you expect the process to last?

It is impossible to predict how long the talks will last. That depends on what happens at the
negotiating table. There is no timeline, and we don’t think it would be helpful to impose one. What
Page 2 of 4
is important is that the leaders continue to make progress gradually but surely. Naturally, everyone
wants to see progress sooner rather than later: after so many years dealing with the issue, there is a
measure of “Cyprus problem fatigue”, internationally, but especially among Cypriots themselves.
How many experts do you have and what are they for? If you are not taking an active role why
do you have experts?
We currently have three thematic experts whom we use on an “as needed” basis. The governance and
property experts come from academia and are highly respected in their field. As you may have heard
the EU expert is a lawyer appointed by the European Commission. The remit of the thematic experts is
to advise Mr Downer and the Good Offices team on technical aspects of the issues that are being
discussed so that we can understand the issues at stake. This also requires that they occasionally speak
to the parties, if they agree, in order to hear directly from them what their positions are.
What do the facilitators do? How many are there?
The facilitators are the core of the Good Offices team. During the preparatory phase in April to July
they facilitated the meetings of the Working Groups and Technical Committees, with each facilitator
taking responsibility for certain portfolios. There are currently three full-time facilitators, we are
recruiting more, and UNFICYP and UNDP also provide facilitators for a number of technical
committees. Since Mr Downer was appointed in July, they have been advising him on a whole array of
issues, from the six chapters being covered during the negotiations, to other matters relating to Cyprus,
such as political parties, confidence-building measures and public opinion. They participate in the
meetings of the leaders and Representatives in accordance with their portfolio. For example, when EU
issues are being discussed, the in-house expert/focal point on EU matters will accompany Mr Downer
in the meetings. They also have other administrative tasks.
What is the role of Turkey/America/Britain/Greece?

All the major international players have consistently expressed full support for the peace process, and
we have no reason to doubt them. We don’t believe it’s in anybody’s interest to see the process fail.
The major players have also stated clearly that ultimately this is a matter for Cypriots to decide. This
is a very wise approach: as history will tell you, an imposed solution is no solution at all, but a recipe
for future trouble.
Do you think Turkey will ever budge?
[see above]. We should stop constantly looking for reasons for the process to fail. Turkey (
substitute here any other country or institution ) has said it wants a solution. They and the others
should be held to their word. The process itself will judge whether they are sincere or not. In the
end, Cypriots will have the last word. But one has to let the process play out. We have to give it a
fair chance.
What is happening with CBMs?
As you probably know the Leaders announced 22 confidence-building measures in July and another
one later. We believe the two sides recognize the need to implement these measures, which have been
left to the side for a long time. This is why they have put the issue back on the agenda.
Page 3 of 4
What about Limnitis/Ledra?
This has proved to be a very complex question. The two sides are discussing how to make these
happen, namely open a crossing at Limnitis and go ahead with the work in and around Ledra Street.
Is the UN worried about any specific aspect of the process?

This is a Cypriot process, so it’s not so much what worries the UN that’s important at this point. What
counts is how the parties themselves overcome difficulties. The leaders have demonstrated that they
are committed to the process, and that is indispensable.
You keep saying this is a Cypriot process. Does that means the UN will not make any proposals as
the talks move forward?
As the Secretary-General has said, the support of the United Nations for the process is
unwavering. He has appointed Mr. Downer as his Special Adviser to lead the UN effort to assist and
facilitate the process and he has emphasized that he is fully prepared to offer more assistance if the
parties request it. And that is the key: the parties themselves will determine this.
If talks reach a dead end, is the UN prepared to revise its role?

Again, what role the UN plays is determined first of all by the parties themselves, including if – and
we all fervently hope that does not happen – the talks stall.
What is going to happen when the first round of the talks on all important matters ends?
Broadly speaking, when the parties have finished the task of determining what they agree on, what
matters are still open, and what they disagree on, they will move to the actual give and take, or trade
offs. This is an integral part of any negotiation process.
Do you think that the European Union could contribute to the process?
The EU has also pledged its full support to the peace process. That support is indispensable to the
success of the process and to the succesful implementation of any agreement reached. As Cyprus is a
member of the institution, the EU is legitimately interested in efforts to reunify the island.
Do you think the April elections in the north are going to affect the process?
The elections and what if any effect they will have on the process are a matter for the Turkish Cypriots
to determine.
José Luis Díaz

+357 2261 4408
+357 9961 6197 (mobile)
+90 392 601 4408
diaz14@un.org
www.unficyp.org
-----Fiona Mullen/UNFICYP wrote: -----
To: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Steven

Page 4 of 4
Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Timothy

Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Wlodek Cibor/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Jose DIAZ/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Date: 03/20/2009 06:02PM
Subject: Hwo to answer questions
Dear "GO+"
You may remember that the SASG asked us last time if we could put together some common
messages to convey to the general public we can use if we get asked about the negotiations.
Attached is a first draft based on questions I have been asked plus questions I have heard
others ask one of you. I'd be grateful for your comments
The replies are based on what I have heard either you or the SASG/SRSG say with the
exception of the bits in yellow.
They are a bit of ad-libbing on my part, so please pay particular attention to those.
Many thanks
Best regards
Fiona
Fiona Mullen
Tel +357 99 338 224
Tel +357 22 614 136
mullenf@un.org
[attachment "MessageToPublicFM.doc" removed by Jose DIAZ/UNFICYP]

Page 1 of 1


Subject: Today's meeting
Meeting of leaders, 24 March
The tête-à-tête was shorter than usual (30 minutes).
The leaders discussed EU matters. GCs read a position paper indicating that substantial divergence
remained and that derogations could not be contemplated.
TCs were disappointed that, instead of focusing on joint papers, on which progress were made over the
last week, GCs had come up with a red-lines position paper.
Despite the mood, some additional areas of convergence on EU matters were identified.
The leaders had some hard exchanges on matters related to governance (number of years for each side
in the rotation system of executive) and property (possible limitation/derogation of GC property rights
in the north) linked to the principles of effective participation and bi-zonality.
Next meeting, still on EU matters, will be on Thursday, 2 April (morning). The representatives will
meet on Friday, 27 March and on Monday, 30 or Tuesday, 31 March (still to be decided).
Page 1 of 1

To: "'Sonja Bachmann'" <bachmanns@un.org>, <sabra@un.org>, "'Timothy Alchin'"
<alchin@un.org>, <cibor@un.org>, <giubilaro@un.org>

Subject:
Attachments:
Speaking Notes - EU Matters - 24.3.2009.doc
Speaking Notes - EU Matters - 24.3.2009.doc
Speaking Notes
Direct Talks - Meeting of 24th March 2009
Since last week, our experts had 3 meetings on EU

matters. They discussed the convergence paper of the 22nd
of July 2008 as sub-divided in 9 parts and as substantially
amended by the Turkish Cypriot side. Four papers were
initially submitted by the Turkish Cypriot side and discussed
on the following issues:-
I. Ministry of EU affairs
II. Permanent Representation of united Cyprus to the
E.U.
III. Determination and coordination of united Cyprus's
positions for issues that fall exclusively or
predominately into an area of competence of the
Federal Government.
IV. Determination and coordination of united Cyprus's
positions for issues that fall exclusively or
predominately into an area of competence of the
federated units.
2
Yesterday afternoon, the Turkish Cypriot side put forward

five additional papers which were briefly discussed. They
concern:
V. Implementation of the acquis

VI. What the Turkish Cypriot side calls "derogations"
VII. Financial support for unification
VIII. Infringements
IX. Participation/representation of united Cyprus at EU
Institutions.
During the discussions that took place, some progress

was achieved but substantial divergences remain.
It is difficult to give any definite position on the last five

papers, which were still discussed by the experts this
morning. I would simply like to repeat, without in any
way being exhaustive, that we clearly exclude any
derogations from the acquis and that we are only ready to
discuss, when the appropriate time comes, a limited
number of short transitional periods, which may be
required before the acquis applies in full. As for financial
support for unification, we should all be aware that very
large sums may be necessary and that we should all work
together in order to maximize the funds that can be
3
obtained from abroad. The issue of financial support for

the full implementation of the acquis, which is singled-out
as part of sub-title VII in the documents discussed, is only
one, potentially relatively small, aspect of the financial
assistance that will be needed overall to support the
implementation of the comprehensive settlement.
Coming to sub-titles I to IV, the Turkish Cypriot side has

added to the convergence paper of the 22nd of July a
number of demands. In that respect, I would like to
stress that the paper of the 22nd of July already contained
very important innovations in the direction of the bi-
communal character of the State and of political equality,
which can be found in no other member of the EU. In
particular, the existence of an autonomous Federal
Ministry of EU Affairs which will be equal, and not
subordinated to, the Federal Ministry of External Relations
will be a unique case within the EU. Let me remind that
these two Ministries will have Ministers coming each one
from a different federated unit.
In addition, Cyprus will be the only member state to
also provide that the Permanent Representative and the
Deputy Permanent Representative to the EU will be
coming from different federated units.
4
It is a fact that these are already major concessions in

the direction of political equality. Despite this the Turkish
Cypriot side seeks to build on them, by demanding that
the Federal Ministry of EU Affairs and the Federal Ministry
of External Relations be both involved in every single
decision for the determination of positions to be defended
by Cyprus in the EU Council and its preparatory bodies.
Further, the TC side demands that the Permanent
Representative and the Deputy Permanent Representative
have both ambassadorial status and have a horizontal
relationship, thus giving the impression that there will be
two permanent representatives in Brussels, one Greek
Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot. We consider that these
demands ignore the importance of the concessions
already made and go a step too far in a direction which
may give a wrong impression as to the unity of Cyprus as
a member of the EU and which makes the functioning of
Cyprus as a member state more difficult.
In addition, the Turkish Cypriot side also puts forward a

demand regarding the possibility to include in the
Permanent Representation of Cyprus to the EU,
representatives of the federated units, potentially in all
the fields of competence of the said units. This demand
comes over and above another major innovation and
5
concession included in the Working Group's convergence

paper, namely that the Permanent Representation will
comprise, among others, public officers seconded from
the federated units, acting within the Permanent
Representation, as representatives of Cyprus as a whole.
Thus, the demand for the right of the federated units to
send their own representatives will lead to the said units
having a double representation.
No federal state member of the European Union has
anything similar. Germany and Spain have no
representatives of their länder or their autonomous regions
within their Permanent Representations. The German länder
and the Spanish autonomous regions all have offices in
Brussels, but without any diplomatic status and without any
particular access to EU Institutions. The Austrian länder
have representatives within the Permanent Representation,
but their presence is justified by the fact that Austria is
officially represented in all the Council Working Parties by
officials of the Federal Government. Therefore, the
representatives of the länder are there as observers. They
accompany the representative of Austria in certain Working
Parties and sit in the back in order to listen and take notes.
Only in the case of Belgium, do the representatives of

the regions have an active role. They are part of the
6
Permanent Representation and represent Belgium in the

Council Working Parties on a rotational basis. Instead of
this, however, it has already been agreed that in the case
of federal Cyprus we shall have officials of the federated
units seconded to the Permanent Representation and, as
such, representing Cyprus in the Council Working Parties.
There is, therefore, no need for any additional
representatives of the federated units. This double
representation of the federated units exists in no federal
member state. We should avoid introducing it in the case
of Cyprus.
These were some comments on issues that remain

open and on which we consider that the Turkish Cypriot
side should further reflect. Overall, we consider that
further discussions are needed on this Chapter on EU
matters.
_____
Page 1 of 1


Subject: March Editorial - Erato Markoullis
Steven Jay Bourke

Office of the Special Advisor of the Secretary General
P.O. Box 21642
1590 Nicosia
Cyprus
Work: + 357 22 614 133

Mobile: + 357 99 207 321
Attachments:
Erato Markoullis - March, 2009.pdf
Page 1 of 1


Subject: Monday, 16 February Meeting - Mr. Downer & Ferdi Sabit Soyer
Dear Sonja: One of the things on my to do list, from the new Good Offices "name and shame"
list, is a meeting note for the Monday, 16 February meeting between Mr. Downer and Ferdi Sabit
Soyer. Unfortunately, this was the day I was prevented from crossing and consequently, I have
no note, did you prepare a meeting note on that occasion? With all my very best wishes,
Steven Jay Bourke

Office of the Special Advisor of the Secretary General
P.O. Box 21642
1590 Nicosia
Cyprus
Work: + 357 22 614 133

Mobile: + 357 99 207 321
Page 1 of 1
From: <bachmanns@un.org>

Subject: DPA Digital Sender S-3350
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Please open the attached document.

This document was sent to you using an HP Digital Sender.
Sent by: <bachmanns@un.org>

Number of pages: 1
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For free copy of the Acrobat reader please visit:
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DPA_Digi.pdf
Page 1 of 1

cc: Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: note on MAT visit
Dear Kendra and Sonja,
As requested earlier.
Best
OO
Attachments:
SG note on Talat visit (March 2009 - final).doc
SG note on Talat visit (March 2009 - final).doc
Strictly Confidential
Note to the Secretary-General
Cyprus: Visit of Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat to New York
1. This note is in relation to the upcoming visit of Mr. Talat, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot
Community, to New York. My office has recently been approached by representatives of Mr.
Talat who have requested a meeting for the Turkish Cypriot leader with the Secretary-General on
23 or 24 March. I would strongly advise the Secretary-General to grant Mr. Talat an audience on
one of the suggested dates in New York.
2. The talks between the two leaders are currently at a critical stage. Although the strong
relationship between them remains the bedrock of the negotiation process, their bond alone will
not be sufficient to reach a comprehensive settlement. The meetings thus far have already
exposed a plethora of divergent views where the flexibility of the two leaders will be required for
a settlement to be reached. However, this is a time where the political environment on the island
seems to be hardening. Whilst Mr. Christofias’ coalition partners are increasingly questioning his
approach toward the negotiations and thus forcing him to adopt a more cautious approach in the
talks, Mr. Talat faces problems of his own. His party is likely to suffer electoral defeat in the
upcoming “Parliamentary” elections on 19 April. The hard-line opposition National Unity Party
(UBP) is expected to unseat Mr. Soyer of the CTP, the current “Prime Minister”. This will
narrow Mr. Talat’s scope for negotiating. The meeting with Mr. Talat would offer an
opportunity to pass on, at the highest level, some messages to the Turkish Cypriot leader
including the need to remain committed to reaching a comprehensive settlement and send
positive signals to a public which is increasingly losing confidence in the process.
3. Turkish officials have indicated that Mr. Talat would seek a meeting with the Secretary-
General, on the margins of the Alliance of Civilizations meeting in Istanbul between 6-7 April,
should the Secretary-General be unable to meet with Mr. Talat in New York this time around. I
would reiterate that both for scheduling and for optical reasons, it would be preferable for the
meeting to take place at UN Headquarters.
4. It should also be noted that it is established practice for the Greek Cypriot and/or Turkish
Cypriot leader to meet with the Secretary-General when in New York. Failure to meet Mr. Talat
would certainly be perceived by the Turkish Cypriot community and in particular its media, as a
“snub”. Such a perception should be avoided, as it could further undermine Mr. Talat’s pivotal
position in the negotiations.
5. For your information, the Secretary-General last met with Mr. Talat in Berlin on 15 July
2008. On the other hand, the Secretary-General met with Mr. Christofias on two occasions over
the past year, namely on 14 July and 21 September 2008.
B. Lynn Pascoe
18 March 2009
Page 1 of 2


Subject: Re: phone contacts and Talat issues
Interesting

Sent: Wed Mar 25 07:33:48 2009
Subject: Re: phone contacts and Talat issues
btw, BLP is in regular contact with Daniel Freid below.
We had a meeting with BLP this afternoon on priorities in the Europe division and he mentioned
Cyprus as one particular area where we need to devote more time and resources to help you on
your mission, including effective messaging with the European leaders when they see BLP and/or
the SG. Btw, ES will be going to Brussels in June to establish relations with the Commission and
the Council Secretariat and BLP voiced interest for a follow-up visit as well. They can carry
messages for us in terms of friendly engagement of Turkey.
ps. talked to YS this morning and Talat seemed a bit annoyed during today's leaders meeting at
the efforts of the Gk cyp lobby to cancel a meeting with Hillary, although a friend told me that
she will be attending the The Hague Afghanistan conference on 31st March, so dont' know how
she can see Talat on the 30th March....
BLP will be most likely on the SG's trip to Istanbul together with SG and you can email him to
emphasize the importance of an SG meeting with Talat there. His email is pascoebl@un.org.
cheers, Sonja
24/03/2009 01:15 PM
To
alexander.downer@adelaide.edu.au
cc
Subject
phone contacts
Page 2 of 2
if needed for phone diplomacy before Obama's visit to Tky
William Burns (Undersecretary of State for Pol. Affairs) do you have it? Otherwise I will find out.
Daniel Freid (Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasion Affairs): 202.647.9626 (he
is likely to be changed the US mission told me here.)
Biography
Daniel Fried
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Term of Appointment: 05/05/2005 to present
Daniel Fried took the oath of office as Assistant Secretary of State on May 5, 2005. Before taking
the helm of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Ambassador Fried served as Special
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Eurasian Affairs at the National
Security Council since January 22, 2001.
Ambassador Fried was Principal Deputy Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the New
Independent States from May 2000 until January 2001. He was Ambassador to Poland from
November 1997 until May 2000.
Daniel Fried, of Washington, DC, began his career with the Foreign Service in 1977. He served in
the Economic Bureau of the State Department from 1977 to 1979; at the U.S. Consulate General
in then-Leningrad from 1980 to 1981; as Political Officer in the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade from
1982 to 1985; and in the Office of Soviet Affairs at the State Department from 1985 to 1987.
Ambassador Fried was Polish Desk Officer at the State Department from 1987 to 1989 as
democracy returned to Poland and Central Europe. He served as Political Counselor in the U.S.
Embassy in Warsaw from 1990 to 1993.
Ambassador Fried served on the staff of the National Security Council from 1993 until 1997, first
as a Director and then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Central and
Eastern Europe. At the White House, he was active in designing U.S. policy on Euroatlantic
security, including NATO enlargement and the Russia-NATO relationship.

Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 1

To: Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Obinna
Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: Re: meeting
Hi Laura,
I understood (but may be wrong) that the event should take place not on the island but in NY. If
we want to do it when AD is here we need to aim at dates around 30 april or 1st May. Amongst
the invitees from the last efforts I talked to Robert Dunn today who will be in NY only around mid
May and might be a good person to talk to. The other thing is that AD mentioned last time again
that he wanted to meet with de Soto when he will be in NY next time so we should enquire
possible dates/time slots with him as well. Could you find out if he would be available on those
dates?
Cheers, Sonja
Laura Vaccari

From: Laura Vaccari
Sent: 24/03/2009 10:54 EDT
To: Kendra Collins; Sonja Bachmann; Obinna Okamgba
Subject: meeting
Dear all,
Last week, the Director mentioned the possibility of organizing a half day informal meeting on the
island at the end of April.
This could be organized by the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum - (CPPF) which has organized
a number of events for the UN already (Georgia among others).
Let's discuss tomorrow when the TPs are done - but meanwhile Sonja could perhaps give some
thoughts about the dates and format and invitees.
Thank you,
LV
Page 1 of 2

cc: Taye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Sonja
Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Fiona Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP

Subject: US-Turkey
Elizabeth,
The US Amb in Cyprus is coming to see Taye this afternoon. Taye intends to convey a number of
messages on Cyprus that Obama could raise with Erdogan:
a) reiterate support to UN process;

b) encourage Turkey, as a key regional country and peace broker, to continue to support the
process and contribute positively to the resolution of the conflict;
c) Christofias' and Talat's tenures represent a window of opportunity that needs to be seized (it
may not last)...etc.
AD might have a telephone conversation with US National Security Advisor or his Deputy next
week (this was conveyed to US Amb who said that there should not be a problem).
Any suggestions/comments regarding messages. In particular, any views on the suggestion

below: "some indications that the Americans will work with the Europeans to make sure that the
Europeans are saying and doing positive things as Erdogan spends some political capital to be
helpful on Cyprus"?
Best
Yasser
----- Forwarded by Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP on 25/03/2009 11:30 -----

To: David Harland/United Nations@UNHQ-DPKO@UN-MAILHUB@UNITED NATIONS
LOGISTICS BASE
Cc: Elizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ, vonkoenig@un.org
Date: 24/03/2009 14:57
Subject: Re: Downer: US-Erdogan
Many thanks David. This is very useful. Will convey it to AD.
David Harland---24/03/2009 00:18:14---Yasser, As discussed, we have a good source on the

internal dynamics of the Turkish situation. He h
From: David Harland/United Nations@UNHQ-DPKO

To: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Date: 24/03/2009 00:18
Page 2 of 2
Subject: Downer: US-Erdogan
Yasser,
As discussed, we have a good source on the internal dynamics of the Turkish situation. He has
been stressing how important it is that Obama's meeting with Erdogan hit the right note on
Cyprus. His assessment is that Erdogan is broadly on board with Downer's process, but would
certainly like some affirmation of that from Obama, and some indications that the Americans will
work with the Europeans to make sure that the Europeans are saying and doing positive things
as Erdogan spends some political capital to be helpful on Cyprus.
And, of course, he was suggesting that Downer might find it useful to be in contact with the
people staffing the visit on the Obama team.
d
Page 1 of 2

To: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Steven Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Timothy
Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Wlodek Cibor/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Jose
DIAZ/UNFICYP@UNFICYP

Subject: Briefing by Turkey specialist next week
Dear GO+
James Ker-Lindsay, a Turkey + region specialist at LSE who is always particularly

useful on the military, is visiting Cyprus next week. After discussions with Yasser
we would like to invite him here to give a briefing on Turkey, including SRSG if
he is interested. Unfortunately James leaves for Brussels the day SASG arrives.
I’ll get a proper bio from him this week, as his LSE appointment is fairly recent
and I don’t remember the title, but before that he was senior research fellow and
Director of the MSc programmes in International Conflict and International
Relations at Kingston University. He has published plenty of books on the Cyprus
question (see list below), is well regarded (he is a speaker at the Brussels event,
for example), was a key player in establishing the Turkey-Greece forum so
knows lots of Greeks, Turks and Cypriots involved in the process. I got to know
him when he lived here in Cyprus in his capacity as the politics contributor for
the EIU Country Report. At that time I was just covering economics.
Please let us know if Taye is also interested and I'll ask Julie to arrange a
convenient time.
Publications
*Kosovo : The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans (forthcoming July

2009), IB Tauris
*Crisis and Conciliation : A Year of Rapprochement Between Greece and Turkey ,

December 2007, IB Tauris
*EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus, April 2006, Palgrave Macmillan
*Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963-1964, January 2004, Bibliopolis
*The Work of the U.N. in Cyprus : Promoting Peace and Development (ed), June
2001, Palgrave Macmillian
Page 2 of 2
Best regards
Fiona
Fiona Mullen
Tel +357 99 338 224
Tel +357 22 614 136
mullenf@un.org
Page 1 of 3
From: Elizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO

To: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP@UNFICYP@UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICS BASE@UN-
MAILHUB
cc: Taye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Sonja

Subject: Re: US-Turkey
Dear Yasser,
I think that all points, including the last one, are valid. Regarding the latter point, we are indeed
facing a difficult period in Europe with the effects of the financial crisis and the mood of even
Turkey's friends may turn if not tended to. There appears to be less and less appetite for furrther
enlargement in the Union (Merkel has been drawing the line at Croatia, for many years to come).
The signals emanating from Turkey's next review will be important.
At the same time, I would like to reiterate a point which I discussed yesterday with Sonja.
Without underestimating the pivotal role of Turkey in all this, what are we doing about the other
side? Even under the present circumstances, one can more readily point to incentives for both
Turkey and the TkCyps to play along, but what are the hard incentives for a settlement on the
other side? I am aware of the points made for the GkCypriots to want a settlement, but are they
as compelling to the population of that side, especially to the ypung side? And what about the
role of Europe again? We are where we are on this matter in large part because Cyprus entered
the EU un-united. What can the US and Europe also do for that side of the equationan which I am
increasingly concerned about? (That is, the narrowing of the political space not only in the north
but also in the south). I frankly think we need to put some more attention to this aspect as well.
Best regards,
Elizabeth
Yasser Sabra

From: Yasser Sabra
Sent: 25/03/2009 13:54 ZE2
To: Elizabeth Spehar
Cc: Taye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP; Kendra Collins; Sonja Bachmann;
Subject: US-Turkey
Elizabeth,

Page 2 of 3

helpful on Cyprus"?
Best
Yasser

LOGISTICS BASE
Date: 24/03/2009 14:57


Date: 24/03/2009 00:18
Yasser,
Page 3 of 3
d
Page 1 of 2

To: Obinna Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Arnaud Amouroux/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: Re:
Hi Obi/Arnaud,
Here my suggestions, I would not be too negative (suggest taking the euphoria point out since
we talk already abt challenges in the process).
cheers, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Obinna ToSonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Okamgba/NY/UNO ccKendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ
Subject
25/03/2009 10:47
AM
Dear Sonja,
As discussed, greatful for your inputs. In light of BLP's messgages yesterday, I am very mindful
of keeping the TPs short and to the point (as you will see).
[attachment "Tps for SG's meeting with Turkish Officials in Istanbul ( April 2008).doc" deleted by
Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO]
Thanks
OO
Tps for SG's meeting with Turkish Officials in Istanbul ( April 2008).doc

Turkish Officials (Istanbul April 2009)
Ankara’s official position on the ongoing talks is positive. It supports the UN backed
peace efforts and publicly states that it will not stand in the way of a deal, as long as the
negotiated settlement provides for a bizonal, bicommunal federation based on political
equality. However, it is believed that the military, - often considered the ultimate arbiter
of power in Turkey, with regard to the Cyprus issue - remains skeptical about the peace
process. (maybe you want to add that recently UNFICYP/GO faced increased restrictions
of movement). Mr. Downer has met with FM Babacan and Under-Secretary Apakan last
December and since then has been in close touch with Ankara. Currently CBMs agreed
by the leaders on XXX which could impact the negotiation environment positively, are
stalled. Turkey should be encouraged . to send positive messages to implement those
CBMs..
Cyprus
x My Special Adviser, Mr. Downer, informs me that the

negotiations thus far have been going reasonably
well. I appreciate your continued support to the
negotiations.
x However, I realise difficult issues remain to be

resolved, including issues within the governance and
property chapters. as well as the upcoming security
chapter.
xThe euphoria that once surrounded the early stages of

the negotiation process has naturally also been
difficult to maintain.
1
x Amid these challenges, it is encouraging to hear that

the talks between Messrs. Christofias and Talat
continue to be marked by a spirit of compromise and
cooperation.
x Success in the current negotiation process lies in

continued committed and decisive leadership to show
flexibility and move the process forward..
xI therefore appeal to both leaders, and other

interested parties to continue to move this process
forward and to show the necessary flexibility and/or
support.
x Positive messages by both leaders will certainly help

to increase public confidence in the process.
x The implementation of further confidence-building

measures would also be helpful.
x I would be interested in your views on the ongoing

process thus far.
2
Page 2 of 2
Attachments:
Page 1 of 1

cc: Taye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja

Subject: US Ambassador Frank Urbancic
Dear Alexander,
Taye has asked me to update you on the meeting with US Ambassador Frank Urbancic just
minutes ago.
On President Obama's upcoming meeting with PM Erdogan, Taye passed on the possible
messages you wanted to be passed on, namely
- US fully supports the peace process as led by the Leaders

- US fully supports the UN and your efforts
- Turkey should continue to support the peace process and Talat in particular.
If there are further messages you wish to convey or other issues to discuss, including directly to
NSA General Jones as you mentioned, Ambassador Urbancic would appreciate a call from you so
he can prepare the NSA. Hope this finds you well, best,
Tim
Page 1 of 1


Subject: last cc on leaders' meeting
fyi.
best, Sonja
Attachments:
DPA_Digi.pdf
Page 1 of 1

cc: Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: Re: MAT meeting
I have them, will forward.
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Obinna ToLaura Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Okamgba/NY/UNO ccKendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Sonja
25/03/2009 02:06 SubjectMAT meeting
PM
Dear Laura,
The Director just informed me that she received a phone call from Linda Taylor (EOSG),
requesting the contact details for Mr. Talat. It appears that EOSG wants to set up a meeting with
him in Istanbul. Do you suggest that I contact the TKCyp mission or the field for these details.
Grateful for your advice
OO
Page 1 of 1
From: Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO


Subject: Fw: Truth Now
as discussed
----- Forwarded by Laura Vaccari/NY/UNO on 25/03/2009 03:27 PM -----
Christophe ToLaura Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ,

Girod/UNFICYP@UNFICYP Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ,
Obinna Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ
25/03/2009 10:57 AM ccJennifer Wright
<wright12@un.org>
SubjectTruth Now
Dear colleagues,
FYI copy of a letter sent by Achilleas Demetriades to the Minister of Justice of Cyprus with regard
to the ratification, by Cyprus, of the Convention for the Protection of All Persons From Enforced
Disappearance adopted by the UNAG in 2006.
Truth Now is the NGO founded by Achilleas Demetriades under which he conducts his HR
activities related to the issue of persons unaccounted for and campaigns in favour of a Truth
Commission in Cyprus.
Best regards,
Christophe Girod
Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus
www.cmp-cyprus.org
T +357 22 614-362
F +357 22 614-361
M +357 99 665-627
+90 533 839-5011
** Printing e-mails is usually a waste**

Attachments:
Truth Now, March09.pdf
Page 1 of 1


Subject: question for OLA
A colleague from OLA told me today (informally) that

- the Council routinely welcomes/endorses peace agreements (Nepal, Somalia, Iraq,
Burundi/Darfur), with the specific wording depending on each circumstance, sometimes calling on
the parties to implement it or, such as with the Abuja Agreement on Darfur, call for its
implementation and threatening sanctions under chapter VII for non-compliance.
- chapter VII language is less common in general and depends also on the history of UN
involvement in a country (in the case of Cyprus there has never been a chapter VII resolution),
and is mostly done when there is a specific risk for non-implementation such as with Arusha
Accords/Burundi or Sudan/Darfur (in Sudan the agreement unravelled after SECCO endorsement
anyway because one party was not included and then everything fell apart).
- in the case of the Iraq boundary agreement, the Council "guaranteed" the boundaries (res.
678).
- chapter VII would supersede EC law/Rome treaties law.
this is just a preliminary overview - we are going to meet Ms. Shraga from the legal counsel in
the UN still who is dealing with Cyprus and get more details.
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 2
From: Florian Von Koenig/United Nations

To: "Sonja Bachmann" <bachmanns@un.org>

Subject: Fw: Thanks
From: David Harland

Sent: 23/03/2009 11:03 EDT
Cc: Florian Von Koenig; Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ; Obinna Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ
Subject: Fw: Thanks
Elizabeth,
Florian and I are just back from the Island of Venus.
Attached is the note that I have sent to my betters about how it all seems from the DPKO/HQ angle. It may be
quite wrong, given that we were only there a few days.
Florian is working on a cable to follow up. He will consult with Kendra and Obinna before it is finalized, of
course.
David
----- Forwarded by David Harland/United Nations on 23/03/2009 10:59 AM -----

David Harland/United Nations To Taye-Brook Zerihoun
23/03/2009 10:59 AM
cc Cyprus Desk-ELAD, Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Yasser
Subject Thanks
Taye,
Many thanks, again, for having hosted Florian and me during our few days on the ground.
I know that all such notes appear very naive to people who really know what they are talking about, but I have
to tell my superiors what I was up to in Cyprus, and what I think is going on. So, with some trepidation, I pass
you a back-channel copy of the note that I have sent to my bosses. (Just so you know what misconceptions you
have to correct when you next see them!)
With best wishes,
David
Page 2 of 2
Attachments:
Document.pdf
Page 1 of 2


Subject: Fw: Thanks
fyi. you might have seen below already. Florian (DPKO) was with David H. on the island for the
first cut in contingency planning. They were in touch with Yasser, Taye etc. He told me today that
from their perspective (and they are dealing with UNFICYP in HQ), the FC will have another talk
with Recep on the restrictions of movement and then DPKO is thinking of calling in Amb. Ilkin to
raise this issue.
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
From: David Harland

Sent: 23/03/2009 11:03 EDT
Cc: Florian Von Koenig; Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ; Obinna Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ
Subject: Fw: Thanks
Elizabeth,
Florian and I are just back from the Island of Venus.
Attached is the note that I have sent to my betters about how it all seems from the DPKO/HQ
angle. It may be quite wrong, given that we were only there a few days.
Florian is working on a cable to follow up. He will consult with Kendra and Obinna before it is
finalized, of course.
David
----- Forwarded by David Harland/United Nations on 23/03/2009 10:59 AM -----

David Harland/United To
Taye-Brook Zerihoun
Nations
ccCyprus Desk-ELAD, Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Yasser
23/03/2009 10:59 AM SubjectThanks
Page 2 of 2
Taye,
Many thanks, again, for having hosted Florian and me during our few days on the ground.
I know that all such notes appear very naive to people who really know what they are talking
about, but I have to tell my superiors what I was up to in Cyprus, and what I think is going on.
So, with some trepidation, I pass you a back-channel copy of the note that I have sent to my
bosses. (Just so you know what misconceptions you have to correct when you next see them!)
With best wishes,
David
Attachments:
Document.pdf
Page 1 of 1
From: ozdil nami <ozdilnami@yahoo.com>


Subject: Re: Mr. Talat's contacts
Hi Sonja!,
All is well thanx, too much to do as usual! Election campaign is picking up pace and it is
hard to keep up with everything but I hope it will be well worth the effort that we are
putting in.
I can confirm that those are in fact the contact details to reach the President, if there is
a problem pls feel free to contact me again.
All the best,

ozdil
P.S send our sunshine back! its all clouds and rain over here :)

To: ozdilnami@yahoo.com
Cc: alexander.downer@adelaide.edu.au
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2009 8:50:08 PM
Subject: Mr. Talat's contacts
Dear Ozdil,
hope you are doing well. The SG office wanted to get Mr. Talat's contact details and I believe they are trying to set up a
meeting. Can you confirm the ones below are correct?
Mr. Talat
00392 229 1764 (office)
Asst. Guliz Onkal: guliz.onkal@kktcb.eu
best wishes from a sunny NY and see you soon.

Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Page 1 of 4
From: Wlodek Cibor/UNFICYP

cc: Donatella Giubilaro UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Jose DIAZ/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja
Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Steven Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Timothy
Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP

Subject: Re: Access to Oxford Analytica and EIU
Thanks, Fiona. This is extremely useful.

I couldn't help checking the latest Cyprus report in the Country Profile section and was surprised to
concerning the origin of the buffer zone. In the following paragraph you'll see they confuse the initi
divided Nicosia into two parts and the buffer zone, which was established across the island as a res
EU adopted the term Green Line to depict the whole of buffer zone, but only since 2004.
"Who to blame for what happened from 1960 onwards is hotly contested to this da
power-sharing arrangements broke down, leading to inter-communal violence and
enclaves of Turkish Cypriots, who subsequently suffered a sharp drop in incomes. T
Line) was created in 1963 and the first troops of the United Nations Force in Cy
remains to this day, were dispatched in 1964. Uncomfortable with the military dicta
74), the president, Archbishop Makarios, shifted his goal from enosis, but on July 1
overthrown by a coup backed by the Greek military government. Turkey, claiming
intervention under the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee, occupied the northern third of th
Greek Cypriots fled to the south and some 48,000 Turkish Cypriots moved north. T
defining moment for today's political situation on the island."
Cheers,
Wlodek
Fiona Mullen---26/03/2009 15:56:27---Thanks Yujun, I am copying in colleagues here who migh

Fiona

To: Yujun Pian/United Nations@UNHQ-DPKO@UN-MAILHUB@UNITED NATIONS
LOGISTICS BASE
Cc: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Donatella Giubilaro
UNFICYP/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Steven Bourke/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Sonja
Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Wlodek
Cibor/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Jose DIAZ/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Date: 26/03/2009 15:56
Thanks Yujun, I am copying in colleagues here who might be interested.
Best regards
Page 2 of 4
Fiona
Fiona Mullen
Tel +357 99 338 224
Tel +357 22 614 136
mullenf@un.org
Yujun Pian---26/03/2009 15:53:51---Dear Fiona, The HQ subscription to those e-resources

are not available to field staff. Peacekeeping
From: Yujun Pian/United Nations@UNHQ-DPKO

Date: 26/03/2009 15:53
Dear Fiona,
The HQ subscription to those e-resources are not available to field staff. Peacekeeping IMU
(Information Management Unit) in HQ/ DPKO has negotiated a mission specific subscription, call
Peacekeeping E-Research Tools Package, for all field staff. The package includes Oxford Analytica
and EIU. However, each mission has mission-specific passwords to access them. To know more
about the package, you can read http://intranet.dpko.un.org/dpko/pages/WebPageDetail.aspx?
pageid=329 .
Below are the passwords for your mission to access all fee-based titles in the package. Please
don't hesitate to contact me if you have more questions.
Page 3 of 4
Best,
Yujun
_______________________________________
(Ms.) Yujun Pian
Peacekeeping Information Management Unit
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
United Nations Headquarters
Room: DC1-1537A
Telephone: 212-963-0513
e-mail: pian@un.org
Intranet: http://intranet.dpko.un.org
Unseiac/NY/UNO@UNHQ
Unseiac/NY/UNO@UNHQ ToYujun Pian/United Nations@UNHQ-

DPKO
26/03/2009 09:36 AM cc
SubjectRe: Access to Oxford Analytica and
EIU
.
Page 4 of 4
Fiona Tounseiac@un.org
Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP cc
SubjectAccess to Oxford Analytica and
26/03/2009 06:27 AM EIU
Dear colleague
I would like to be able to access Oxford Analytica and www.eiu.com from here at the Good
Offices mission in Cyprus for a report due tomorrow (Friday). FYI our IT services, domain
addresses etc are run by Unficyp.
I tried clicking on the link in here http://iseek.un.org/webpgdept913_3.asp?dept=913#alphaE
to reach the EIU site. I did at one stage get a message saying "Welcome United Nations" but I
couldn't find my way into the site (I used to work for the EIU so I know what's in there!). I
seemed to reach a brick wall that said it was a site for registered users but without prompting me
to put in any password or anything.
I'd be grateful for your help.
Many thanks
Best regards
Fiona
Fiona Mullen
Tel +357 99 338 224
Tel +357 22 614 136
mullenf@un.org
Page 1 of 2
From: "Macris
To: "Sonja Bachmann" <bachmanns@un.org>

Subject: RE: greetings
Thanks,Sonja.FYI–IwillbeescortingagroupofCypriotMPstoWashingtonandNewYorkonApril20–24.I
hopetodosomeUNconsultationsonCyprusonthe24th.Willyouand/ortheCyprusDeskOfficerbe
available?OrperhapsappropriateinterlocutorsinDPKO?gm

Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2009 4:50 PM
To: Macris, Gregory P
Subject: Re: greetings
Dear Greg,
just to touch base again. Am still in NY, and am heading back to Cyprus with AD on Monday 6th. We are still
trying to schedule a meeting with the SG and 'you know whom' for the upcoming weeks. I saw all the news
coverage on the HC meeting, not easy hm? I let AD know your Amb. is trying to reach him to talk before his
phone conversation with Gen. Jones. F YI. AD's cell in Australia is 614.18847451, he just got back to Australia
and he is usually available early morning.
see you soon.

Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
"Macris, Gregory P" <MacrisGP@state.gov> To <bachmanns@un.org>

cc
Subject greetings
13/03/2009 01:56 AM
Page 2 of 2
Sonia,

ItwasverynicetoseeyouandMr.Downerlastnight,andIlookforwardtocontinuedcooperationinthemonthsto
come.AsImentionedtoyoulastnight,agroupofCypriotMPsfromtheForeignAffairscommittee(ledbychairAverof
Neophytou)willbetravelingtotheUnitedStatesbetweenApril20and26.TheywillspendApril25inNewYorkandare
lookingformeetingswithtopͲrankingUNstaffaswellasmanyofthePͲ5permreps.Wehopeyoumightbeabletohelp
securethemeetingswiththeSecretariatstaff.IwillsharemoreinformationwithyouasIgetit.

Onanothernote,canyoutellmehowlongMr.DownerwillbehereinCyprusonthiscurrentvisit,andwhenhewill
return?Manythanks.

GregoryMacris
PoliticalSectionChief
USEmbassyNicosia
Page 1 of 6


Subject: Re: Fw: US-Turkey
Dear Obi,
looks good - I would just structure it differently:
a) political context and way forward (next six months)

AD on the political challenges for the upcoming six months etc.
b) engagement of international actors to meet the objectives over the next six months
c) engagment of domestic institutional actors such as media and church to meet above objectives
d)) Admin/resources support to the way forward
best, Sonja
Sonja Bachmann
Ext. 73528
cell. 917.882.3634
Cyprus: 357.99207324
Obinna ToKendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Okamgba/NY/UNO ccSonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ
SubjectRe: Fw: US-Turkey
26/03/2009 11:17
AM
Dear Kendra,
As requested, please find attached a very rough first draft of an agenda! SB grateful for your
suggestions.
[attachment "Agenda Planning meeting.doc" deleted by Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO]
Best
OO
Page 2 of 6
Kendra Collins/NY/UNO
Kendra ToObinna Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Collins/NY/UNO cc
SubjectFw: US-Turkey
26/03/2009
10:09 AM
Obi - could you share with me what you have until now?
Thanks
Kendra
----- Forwarded by Kendra Collins/NY/UNO on 26/03/2009 10:09 AM -----
Elizabeth ToKendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Spehar/NY/UNO ccObinna Okamgba/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Sonja
Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Laura
26/03/2009 10:09 Vaccari/NY/UNO@UNHQ
AM SubjectRe: US-Turkey
Absolutely. Thanks.
E.
Kendra Collins

From: Kendra Collins
Sent: 26/03/2009 08:59 EDT
Cc: Obinna Okamgba; Sonja Bachmann; Laura Vaccari
Dear Elizabeth,
We have put together some points for the agenda here. We'll share them with you today and if
you agree, we can send to Yasser for him to incorporate.
Kendra
Page 3 of 6
Elizabeth ToYasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP@UNITED

Spehar/NY/UNO NATIONS LOGISTICS BASE@UN-MAILHUB
ccFiona Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Kendra
26/03/2009 08:56 Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Sonja
AM Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Taye-Brook
Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Timothy
Alchin/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
SubjectRe: US-Turkey
Thanks for your response, Yasser. You make some good points that definitely merit further
analysis. In that vein, one avenue I think we should explore vis-a-vis the good offices is precisely
how to strengthen the team to focus more on such issues, garnering further information and
strengthening our analytical capability. We need to focus increasingly on identifying and
understanding the nuances of different positions and possible responses to them, since of course,
there is no monolithic view on either side.
Regarding an annotated agenda, I believe this will be very important for guiding our discussions
and getting the most out of the meeting. If the G.O. in Nicosia could try a first draft of this, we
can review and supplement, as necessary, from here.
Best,
Elizabeth
Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP
Yasser ToElizabeth
Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ@UN-
MAILHUB@UNITED NATIONS
26/03/2009 06:34 AM LOGISTICS BASE
ccFiona Mullen/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ,
Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ,
Taye-Brook
Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP,
SubjectRe: US-Turkey
Thanks Elizabeth. Your point and questions regarding "the other side" are well noted and deserve
more thinking. This is the type of questions that could perhaps be raised at the upcoming
brainstorming session in New York. In this connection, the Good offices could put together an
annotated agenda spelling out the main issues to be addressed
Going back to your questions below, a few quick thoughts about possible ways of appealing to
public in South:
- CBMs are important incentives - - but perhaps not sufficient (efforts to reactivate Limnitis and
Ledra 2 as well as some quick wins have not yielded many results so far);
- we need to explore new/additional avenues (think through the role of US - Europe... as you
suggest);
- also, Turkey would reassure GkCyp public by sending clear messages that it is positioning itself
Page 4 of 6
as a regional peace broker and hinting at its longer term interest in seeing this problem solved.
Most GkCyp point to Turkey when talking about a settlement. Such messages may not be totally
new, but reiterating them unequivocally may be important for the public in the South (even if this
is more easily said than done in view of the power struggle within Turkey). The US, EU may have
a role to play (Turkey is chairing the Council in June which coincides with the renewal of
UNFICYP's mandate...).
- there is a need perhaps to highlight more the economic benefits of unity....and that the status
quo has a price in the long term.
Look forward to further discussion
Yasser
Elizabeth Spehar---25/03/2009 15:00:04---Dear Yasser, I think that all points, including the
last one, are valid. Regarding the latter point,
From: Elizabeth Spehar/NY/UNO@UNHQ

To: Yasser Sabra/UNFICYP@UNFICYP@UNFICYP@UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICS
BASE@UN-MAILHUB
Cc: Taye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP, Kendra Collins/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Sonja
Date: 25/03/2009 15:00
Dear Yasser,
I think that all points, including the last one, are valid. Regarding the latter point, we are indeed
facing a difficult period in Europe with the effects of the financial crisis and the mood of even
Turkey's friends may turn if not tended to. There appears to be less and less appetite for furrther
enlargement in the Union (Merkel has been drawing the line at Croatia, for many years to come).
The signals emanating from Turkey's next review will be important.
At the same time, I would like to reiterate a point which I discussed yesterday with Sonja.
Without underestimating the pivotal role of Turkey in all this, what are we doing about the other
side? Even under the present circumstances, one can more readily point to incentives for both
Turkey and the TkCyps to play along, but what are the hard incentives for a settlement on the
other side? I am aware of the points made for the GkCypriots to want a settlement, but are they
as compelling to the population of that side, especially to the ypung side? And what about the
role of Europe again? We are where we are on this matter in large part because Cyprus entered
the EU un-united. What can the US and Europe also do for that side of the equationan which I am
increasingly concerned about? (That is, the narrowing of the political space not only in the north
but also in the south). I frankly think we need to put some more attention to this aspect as well.
Best regards,
Elizabeth
Yasser Sabra
Page 5 of 6

From: Yasser Sabra
Sent: 25/03/2009 13:54 ZE2
Cc: Taye-Brook Zerihoun/UNFICYP@UNFICYP; Kendra Collins; Sonja Bachmann;
Subject: US-Turkey
Elizabeth,


helpful on Cyprus"?
Best
Yasser

LOGISTICS BASE
Date: 24/03/2009 14:57


Date: 24/03/2009 00:18
Page 6 of 6
Yasser,
d
Page 1 of 3
From: Annick Hiensch/NY/UNO

To: DPA-Europe, DPA-ASIA Division, DPA-Americas, DPA-Africa 2 Division, DPA-Africa 1
Division
cc: Roselyn Akombe/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Venessa Blair/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Subject: Updating TPs
Dear colleagues,
In case of updates, please find below the Moscow, The Hague, Doha, and generics TPs. Please
send updates to OUSG (Roselyn, Venessa, and me).
Sincerely,
Annick
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Annick Hiensch
Tel. 917.367.9613
Fax. 212.963.5065
hiensch@un.org
MOSCOW
THE HAGUE
DOHA
GENERICS
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Annick Hiensch
Tel. 917.367.9613
Fax. 212.963.5065
hiensch@un.org
Attachments:
Page 2 of 3
UN future presence_no
n- Afghanistan FM Spanta Afghanistan FM Spanta Central Asia FMs BN .d
paper security regime TPs CARDS.doc TPs.doc oc
_elements_Rev.doc
Moscow - SG- Moscow - SG-

Central Asia FMs TPs C Central Asia FMs TPs.d Russian officials on UN Russian officials on UN
ARDS.doc oc regime in Georgia TPs regime in Georgia TPs
CARDS.doc .doc
RIA NOVOSTI.intervie
Pakistan FM TPs CARD Russia Climate Change
Pakistan FM TPs.doc w. Russia today TV ch
S.doc Country Profile.doc
annel.doc
Russia FM Lavrov TPs Russia FM Lavrov TPs Russia PM Putin TPs- Russia PM Putin TPs-
(with Pol revisions) TP (with Pol revisions) TP with Pol revisions TPs with Pol revisions TPs.
s CARDS.doc s.doc CARDS.doc doc
Russia President Medv Russia President Medv

Russia President Medv
Russia post- edev TPs - edev TPs -
edev BN on Climate Ch
2012Korppoo.BN.doc with Pol revisions TPs with Pol revisions TPs.
ange.doc
CARDS.doc doc
Russia's role post-

Russian Officials TPs C Russian Officials TPs.d Netherlans Queen Bea
2012 Climate Change f
ARDS.doc oc trix TPs.doc
rom A. Korppoo.doc
Afghanistan President Afghanistan President Canada FM Cannon TP Canada FM Cannon TP

Karzai TPs CARDS.doc Karzai TPs.doc s CARDS.doc s.doc
International Courts Br International Courts Br International Courts Br

Country Profile of the
eakfast meeting BN.do eakfast meeting TPs c eakfast meeting TPs.d
Netherlands.doc
c ARDS.doc oc
NATO SG de Hoop Sch

Iran FM Mottaki TPs C Iran FM Mottaki TPs.do NATO SG de Hoop Sch
efrer (with Pol revision
ARDS.doc c effer BN.doc
s) TPs CARDS.doc
NATO SG de Hoop Sch Netherlands Defense Netherlands Defense Netherlands Dev Minis
efrer (with Pol revision Minister van Middelkoo Minister van Middelkoo ter Koenders TPs (CAR
s) TPs.doc p TPs CARDS.doc p TPs.doc DS).doc
Netherlands PM Balken
Netherlands Dev Minis Netherlands FM Verha Netherlands FM Verha
ende and other official
ter Koenders TPs.doc gen TPs (CARDS).doc gen TPs.doc
s BN.doc
Netherlands PM Balken Netherlands PM Balken Netherlans Queen Bea

UAE TPs.doc
ende TPs (CARDS).doc ende TPs.doc trix TPs (CARDS).doc
Egypt President Mubar Egypt President Mubar Jordan Officials TPs CA Jordan Officials TPs.do
ak TPs CARDS.doc ak TPs.doc RDS.doc c
Lebanon President Slei

LAS SG Moussa TPs C LAS SG Moussa TPs.do Lebanon President Slei
man TPs (rev1) CARD
ARDS.doc c man TPs (rev1).doc
S.doc
Libya Leader Gaddafi T Libya Leader Gaddafi T OIC Doha TPs CARDS.
OIC Doha TPs.doc
Ps CARDS.doc Ps.doc doc
Page 3 of 3
Palestinian Authority P Palestinian Authority P

Qatar Emir TPs CARDS
resident Abbas TPs CA resident Abbas TPs.do Qatar Emir TPs.doc
.doc
RDS.doc c
Somalia President Shei

Saudi Arabia King or F Saudi Arabia King or F Saudi Arabia King or F
k Ahmed TPs CARDS.d
M BN.doc M TPs CARDS.doc M TPs.doc
oc
Somalia President Shei Syria President Assad Syria President Assad

UAE TPs CARDS.doc
k Ahmed TPs.doc TPs (rev1) CARDS.doc TPs (rev1).doc
Generic background o Generics Afghanistan - Generics Afghanistan -

Generics Sudan March
n Afghanistan (rev).do post Hague conferenc post Hague conferenc
09 REV240309.doc
c e (rev) (CARDS).doc e (rev).doc
Generics Afghanistan -
Generics Afghanistan -
pre Hague conference Generics Chad March 0 Generics Chad March 0
pre Hague conference
March (rev) (CARDS). 9 (CARDS).doc 9.doc
March (rev).doc
doc
Generics Climate Chan Generics Climate Chan Generics DRC March 0 Generics DRC March 0
ge (CARDS).doc ge.doc 9 (CARDS).doc 9.doc
Generics G20 and Eco

Generics G20 and Eco
nomic Crisis REVISED Generics Haiti March 0 Generics Haiti March 0
nomic Crisis REVISED
on 25.03.09 CARDS.do 9 (CARDS).doc 9.doc
on 25.03.09.doc
c
Generics Middle East A

Generics Madagascar ( Generics Madagascar ( Generics Middle East A
rabs rev1 (CARDS).do
rev) (CARDS).doc rev).doc rabs rev1.doc
c
Generics Middle East f Generics Middle East f Generics Middle East r Generics Middle East r
or Russia (CARDS).doc or Russia.doc ev1 (CARDS).doc ev1.doc
Generics Myanmar (CA Generics Somalia (CAR

Generics Myanmar.doc Generics Somalia.doc
RDS).doc DS).doc
Generics Sudan March

09 REV240309 (CARD
S).doc
UAE TPs.docConfidential
Talking Points for the Secretary General’s meeting with

His Highness Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan,
President of the United Arab Emirates
or
His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashed Al Maktoum,
Prime Minister and Vice President of the UAE
or
His Highness Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the UAE
LAS Summit, Doha, 30 March 2009 (time TBC)
Middle East 1
Iraq 3
UAE Support for Mine Action in South Lebanon 3
Somalia 4
UNRWA and Nahr El Bared Camp 5
Iran – if raised 6
UAE - Iran Territorial Dispute – if raised 6
Middle East

Egyptian effort. We should not give up.
x Arab countries with influence over Hamas should

encourage the movement to show flexibility and
pragmatism.
1
x I would like to thank Arab States for their generous

contributions to the Gaza Flash Appeal. We will need
your support for years to come.
x I hope we can strengthen the humanitarian

partnership between LAS countries and the
international humanitarian organisations working in
the occupied Palestinian territory, particularly UN
agencies.
x I have been encouraged by efforts within the Arab

world for countries to come together. How do you see
this progressing?


Peace Initiative.
2
Iraq
x The situation in Iraq has been improving, but it
remains difficult. The potential for violence and
political instability remains. How do you see the
current situation?
x The provincial elections in January were another step

towards political progress and the UN provided strong
technical assistance to help the Iraqi people hold
credible elections.
x Prime Minister Maliki has increased his efforts at

national reconciliation including reaching out to many
political actors who have not participated in the
political process until now. It would be a good time
to increase engagement with Iraq and support these
efforts.
UAE Support for Mine Action in South Lebanon

x I would like to express my appreciation for the UAE’s
generous support to mine action activities in south
Lebanon.
x UAE’s contributions have greatly helped in the

clearance of mined areas and approximately 150,000
sub-munitions that threatened the lives and
livelihoods of the local population.
3
x The UN Mine Action Coordination Centre in south

Lebanon was awarded the 2008 UNHCR Nansen
Award for its activities after the 2006 conflict. UAE’s
contribution is the one which made this possible.
Somalia
x The current situation in Somalia presents us with a

rare window of opportunity. The next 100 days will
be crucial and the new Government of Sheikh Sharif
will require immediate support.

the new government in implementing the Djibouti
Agreement which shall remain the basis for further
reconciliation.

x Any support from your Government towards this end

will be appreciated to address these immediate
needs.
4

and restoring stability. We are planning to have a
conference on reconstruction in the summer. The
United Arab Emirates’ support in this area would be
critical.

x We count on the UAE to provide a generous

UNRWA and Nahr El Bared Camp

x In my conversation with Sheikh Abdullah, UAE
Minister for Foreign Affairs, last September, I noted
that due to a shortage of funds, UNRWA was facing
difficulties in providing services to the 27,000
displaced persons of the Nahr El Bared camp.
x I appealed to the UAE to make a contribution to

UNRWA. The Minister promised to raise this with the
President of UAE. Has the Government taken a
decision?
5
Iran – if raised
x I share the concern over the non-resolution of the
Iranian nuclear issue expressed by regional countries
on various occasions.
x I have continuously called on Iran to fully comply

with the relevant Security Council resolutions and
urged Iran to increase its cooperation with the IAEA
in this matter.
x I will continue to appeal to all the parties to work

with determination to achieve a diplomatic solution
and I stand ready to play a complementary role in
achieving this objective.
x From the UN Secretariat’s side, we intend to expand

our dialogue and engagement with Iran to include
such regional security issues as Iraq and Afghanistan.
Iran-UAE Territorial Dispute – if raised

[The long-standing dispute between the UAE and Iran over three
islands claimed by both countries in the Gulf – the Greater Tumb,
the Lesser Tumb and Abu Musa - intensified in August 2008 after
Iran opened two government offices on Abu Musa, the only one
which is inhabited. The UAE, which is supported by members of
the LAS and the Gulf Cooperation Council, calls on Iran to find a
solution either through direct negotiations or through recourse to
the ICJ. Every year the UAE addresses a letter to the Secretary-
General requesting that the issue is retained on the agenda of the
Security Council. In the past when this subject was raised by
UAE, the SG offered his good offices.]
6
x I believe that this issue should be resolved

peacefully. As in the past, my good offices are
available, if both parties agree.
7
UAE TPs CARDS.docConfidential
Talking Points for the Secretary General’s meeting with His
Highness Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan,
President of the United Arab Emirates
or
His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashed Al Maktoum,
Prime Minister and Vice President of the UAE
or
His Highness Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the UAE
1
Middle East 3
Iraq 7
UAE Support for Mine Action in South Lebanon 9
Somalia 11
UNRWA and Nahr El Bared Camp 15
UAE - Iran Territorial Dispute – if raised 18
2
Middle East
must insist that progress is made regarding both Gaza
and the West Bank.
x It is regrettable that Palestinian unity talks have not so

far succeeded. We need to keep supporting the Egyptian
effort. We should not give up.
3
pragmatism.

contributions to the Gaza Flash Appeal. We will need your
support for years to come.
x I hope we can strengthen the humanitarian partnership

between LAS countries and the international
humanitarian organisations working in the occupied
Palestinian territory, particularly UN agencies.
4
x I have been encouraged by efforts within the Arab world
for countries to come together. How do you see this
progressing?
x I am encouraged by the early engagement of the new US

Administration. I want to see the Quartet Envoys more
engaged on the ground in crisis management and
common messaging. I hope Quartet Principals can meet
5
peace. I support the convening of a Moscow Conference,
and all efforts to carry forward the Arab Peace Initiative.
Iraq
x The situation in Iraq has been improving, but it remains
difficult. The potential for violence and political instability
remains. How do you see the current situation?
6
technical assistance to help the Iraqi people hold credible
elections.
x Prime Minister Maliki has increased his efforts at national

reconciliation including reaching out to many political
actors who have not participated in the political process
until now. It would be a good time to increase
engagement with Iraq and support these efforts.
7
UAE Support for Mine Action in South Lebanon
x I would like to express my appreciation for the UAE’s
generous support to mine action activities in south
Lebanon.
x UAE’s contributions have greatly helped in the clearance

of mined areas and approximately 150,000 sub-
munitions that threatened the lives and livelihoods of the
local population.
8
x The UN Mine Action Coordination Centre in south
Lebanon was awarded the 2008 UNHCR Nansen Award
for its activities after the 2006 conflict. UAE’s
contribution is the one which made this possible.
9
Somalia
x The current situation in Somalia presents us with a rare

window of opportunity. The next 100 days will be crucial
and the new Government of Sheikh Sharif will require
immediate support.
x The international community must work to support the

new government in implementing the Djibouti Agreement
which shall remain the basis for further reconciliation.
10
x The security situation in Somalia is not only a threat to
its own people but also to the region and the
international community. We need to urgently address
this issue and provide immediate assistance to AMISOM
and the Somali Joint Security Forces.
x Any support from your Government towards this end will

be appreciated to address these immediate needs.
11
x Somalia would also need support in reconstruction and
development as a means of consolidating peace and
restoring stability. We are planning to have a conference
on reconstruction in the summer. The United Arab
Emirates’ support in this area would be critical.

April, to seek contributions to the Trust Funds for support
to AMISOM and for the building of Somali security and
rule of law institutions.
12
x We count on the UAE to provide a generous contribution
to the Trust Funds.
13
UNRWA and Nahr El Bared Camp
x In my conversation with Sheikh Abdullah, UAE Minister
for Foreign Affairs, last September, I noted that due to a
shortage of funds, UNRWA was facing difficulties in
providing services to the 27,000 displaced persons of the
Nahr El Bared camp.
x I appealed to the UAE to make a contribution to UNRWA.

The Minister promised to raise this with the President of
UAE. Has the Government taken a decision?
Iran – if raised
14
x I share the concern over the non-resolution of the
Iranian nuclear issue expressed by regional countries on
various occasions.
x I have continuously called on Iran to fully comply with

the relevant Security Council resolutions and urged Iran
to increase its cooperation with the IAEA in this matter.
x I will continue to appeal to all the parties to work with

determination to achieve a diplomatic solution and I
stand ready to play a complementary role in achieving
this objective.
15
x From the UN Secretariat’s side, we intend to expand our
dialogue and engagement with Iran to include such
regional security issues as Iraq and Afghanistan.
16
Iran-UAE Territorial Dispute – if raised
[The long-standing dispute between the UAE and Iran over three
islands claimed by both countries in the Gulf – the Greater Tumb, the
Lesser Tumb and Abu Musa - intensified in August 2008 after Iran
opened two government offices on Abu Musa, the only one which is
inhabited. The UAE, which is supported by members of the LAS and
the Gulf Cooperation Council, calls on Iran to find a solution either
through direct negotiations or through recourse to the ICJ. Every
year the UAE addresses a letter to the Secretary-General requesting
that the issue is retained on the agenda of the Security Council. In
the past when this subject was raised by UAE, the SG offered his good
offices.]
x I believe that this issue should be resolved peacefully. As in

the past, my good offices are available, if both parties agree.
17
Syria President Assad TPs (rev1).docConfidential
Talking Points for the Secretary-General’s meeting

with H.E. Mr. Bashar al-Assad,
President of Syria
Middle East peace process 1

Lebanon - Resolutions 1559, 1680 and 1701 2
Lebanon - Domestic Politics and Tribunal 4
x I am encouraged that Syria is active on regional

reconciliation. Your own efforts are especially
welcome. I am confident that strengthened ties in
the Arab world will have positive impact in several
instances, including the Palestinian and Lebanese
domestic political scenes.
x Please see generic talking points for Arab

interlocutors.
x I am disappointed that Hamas and Fatah have not

moved further on Palestinian unity. I have tried to
encourage both parties and I signalled when I went
to Gaza that the UN would engage a unity
government. We need your help to persuade Hamas
of the importance of unity. Your role in this regard is
very important.
1
x I hope that the circumstances will allow for a

resumption of discussions with Israel either directly
or indirectly. What prospects do you see, if indeed
Benyamin Netanyahu is appointed as Prime Minister?
x The new US Administration is bringing energy and

commitment to the region and a sense of the
possibility of change. This is an opportunity to be
seized by all to work towards a comprehensive peace.
Lebanon - Resolutions 1559, 1701 and UNIFIL
x My new report to the Security Council on the

implementation of SCR 1559 will be released at the
end of April. Since the adoption of that resolution,
many significant provisions of the resolution have
been implemented, most notably the withdrawal of
Syrian forces. I want to commend you once again for
your important contribution to that end.
x I would like to be able to report on further progress

next month.
x I am glad that the establishment of diplomatic

relations between Syria and Lebanon is almost
completed pursuant to resolution 1680. I welcome
your appointment of a Syrian Ambassador to
Lebanon. This is a significant and timely gesture.
2
x Turning to SCR 1701, I am satisfied by the overall

calm that Southern Lebanon continues to enjoy.
x Despite this relative calm, violations of 1701 are of

concern. All parties need to do more to consolidate
stability and move towards a permanent ceasefire
and a long-term solution.
x With regard to the control of Lebanon’s borders, the

Lebanese Government has started a process,
supported by the international community. However,
progress has been quite limited and Lebanon’s
borders remain porous, which presents a continuous
challenge regarding the implementation of the arms
embargo. I count on Syria’s cooperation in this
regard.

Sheb’a farms. Israel has not shown a willingness to
engage. So far, the United Nations’ efforts have not
led to positive results. However, I will continue my
efforts aimed at a resolution of the issue.
x I have yet to receive an official response from Syria

or Israel on the provisional definition of the area as
produced by the UN cartographer. Can we expect
comments from your Government?
3
x I note that Syria maintains close ties with a series of

Palestinian groups headquartered in Damascus, such
as Fatah al-Intifada and PFLP-GC, as well as
Hizbullah.
x For the sake of peace and stability in the region,

I would urge you to encourage these groups to abide
by Security Council resolutions and the decisions of
the Government of Lebanon. All relevant parties
should assist in achieving the disarming and
disbanding of all remaining Lebanese and non-
Lebanese militias through a Lebanese-led political
process.
Lebanon - domestic politics and Tribunal

important that these elections take place as
scheduled and in a peaceful atmosphere.

strategy is a very important process. Lebanon’s
political leaders need to be encouraged to sustain this
dialogue and to make progress in addressing the core
issues.
4
x [IF ASKED] Although the Special Tribunal will be

entirely independent and will not be formally part of
the UN, I will continue to support the institution in
months and years to come.
x [IF ASKED] Matters regarding the detainees will be a

matter for the Tribunal and the Lebanese judicial
authorities to decide. They will be handled in
accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the
Tribunal. It falls to the Prosecutor to decide whether
to initiate a request for transfer of any of the
detainees.
5
Syria President Assad TPs (rev1) CARDS.doc Confidential
with H.E. Mr. Bashar al-Assad,
President of Syria

Lebanon - Resolutions 1559, 1680 and 1701 5
Lebanon - Domestic Politics and Tribunal 11
1
x I am encouraged that Syria is active on regional
reconciliation. Your own efforts are especially welcome.
I am confident that strengthened ties in the Arab world
will have positive impact in several instances, including
the Palestinian and Lebanese domestic political scenes.
2
x Please see generic talking points for Arab interlocutors.
x I am disappointed that Hamas and Fatah have not moved

further on Palestinian unity. I have tried to encourage
both parties and I signalled when I went to Gaza that the
UN would engage a unity government. We need your
help to persuade Hamas of the importance of unity. Your
role in this regard is very important.
3
x I hope that the circumstances will allow for a resumption
of discussions with Israel either directly or indirectly.
What prospects do you see, if indeed Benyamin
Netanyahu is appointed as Prime Minister?
x The new US Administration is bringing energy and

commitment to the region and a sense of the possibility
of change. This is an opportunity to be seized by all to
work towards a comprehensive peace.
4
Lebanon - Resolutions 1559, 1701 and UNIFIL
x My new report to the Security Council on the

implementation of SCR 1559 will be released at the end
of April. Since the adoption of that resolution, many
significant provisions of the resolution have been
implemented, most notably the withdrawal of Syrian
forces. I want to commend you once again for your
important contribution to that end.
x I would like to be able to report on further progress next

month.
5
x I am glad that the establishment of diplomatic relations
between Syria and Lebanon is almost completed
pursuant to resolution 1680. I welcome your
appointment of a Syrian Ambassador to Lebanon. This is
a significant and timely gesture.
x Turning to SCR 1701, I am satisfied by the overall calm

that Southern Lebanon continues to enjoy.
6
x Despite this relative calm, violations of 1701 are of
stability and move towards a permanent ceasefire and a
long-term solution.
Lebanese Government has started a process, supported
by the international community. However, progress has
been quite limited and Lebanon’s borders remain porous,
which presents a continuous challenge regarding the
implementation of the arms embargo. I count on Syria’s
cooperation in this regard.
7
x I regret the lack of progress on the issue of the Sheb’a
farms. Israel has not shown a willingness to engage. So
far, the United Nations’ efforts have not led to positive
results. However, I will continue my efforts aimed at a
resolution of the issue.
x I have yet to receive an official response from Syria or

Israel on the provisional definition of the area as
produced by the UN cartographer. Can we expect
comments from your Government?
8
x I note that Syria maintains close ties with a series of
Palestinian groups headquartered in Damascus, such as
Fatah al-Intifada and PFLP-GC, as well as Hizbullah.
x For the sake of peace and stability in the region,
I would urge you to encourage these groups to abide by
Security Council resolutions and the decisions of the
Government of Lebanon. All relevant parties should assist
in achieving the disarming and disbanding of all
remaining Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias through a
Lebanese-led political process.
9
Lebanon - domestic politics and Tribunal

important that these elections take place as scheduled
and in a peaceful atmosphere.

strategy is a very important process. Lebanon’s political
leaders need to be encouraged to sustain this dialogue
10
x [IF ASKED] Although the Special Tribunal will be entirely
independent and will not be formally part of the UN, I will
continue to support the institution in months and years
to come.
matter for the Tribunal and the Lebanese judicial
authorities to decide. They will be handled in accordance
with the provisions of the Statute of the Tribunal. It falls
to the Prosecutor to decide whether to initiate a request
for transfer of any of the detainees.
11
Somalia President Sheik Ahmed TPs.docCleared by Political Unit Confidenti

H.E. Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed,
President of Somalia,
Objective of meeting: to highlight the continuing importance of the

Djibouti peace process.
Somalia
x I congratulate your Government’s achievements
and the continuing commitment to implement the
Djibouti Agreement.
x I commend your efforts to relocate the Government

and the parliament to Mogadishu. This is a
significant development for the Somali people.

crucial for your Government.
x It is very important that the Somali people see you

operating as an effective, functioning government
with the capacity to deliver basic services. In this
regard, we are trying to coordinate support for your
government in terms of institutional support,
governance, capacity building and security.
1
x I am also aware of the immense security challenges

and will be convening a donor conference in April to
seek financial support for the AMISOM force as well
as your Joint Security Force and police.
x While the United Nations and AMISOM will train the

Somali police, building on the work already being
done by UNDP, Somalia will need the assistance of
bilateral partners, not only to equip the police and
build the police infrastructure, but also to train,
equip and sustain the 5,000-strong joint security
force.
x I would appreciate if you could share with me your

plans regarding the establishment of the Somali
security forces and police as foreseen in the Djibouti
Agreement.
x The Security Council has yet to take a decision on a

peacekeeping operation (PKO). I will present
a report in April, based on which the Security
Council will consider the issue in June.
x In addition, we are also coordinating support to

Somalia on the reconstruction and development
side.
2
x I would encourage you to continue your efforts

towards reconciliation in line with the Djibouti
process in order to bring on board those who still
remain outside the process.
x I remain deeply concerned about the dire

humanitarian situation as well as the drastic
reduction of humanitarian space and the direct
targeting of aid workers.
x The Government’s support to facilitate humanitarian

access the safety of aid workers and the protection
of civilian populations is crucial to effective
humanitarian action.
3
Somalia President Sheik Ahmed TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit
with H.E. Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed,
President of Somalia,
Objective of meeting: to highlight the continuing importance of the

Djibouti peace process.
Somalia
x I congratulate your Government’s achievements and
the continuing commitment to implement the Djibouti
Agreement.
1
x I commend your efforts to relocate the Government
and the parliament to Mogadishu. This is a significant
development for the Somali people.

crucial for your Government.
2
x It is very important that the Somali people see you
operating as an effective, functioning government with
the capacity to deliver basic services. In this regard, we
are trying to coordinate support for your government in
terms of institutional support, governance, capacity
building and security.
x I am also aware of the immense security challenges

and will be convening a donor conference in April to
seek financial support for the AMISOM force as well as
your Joint Security Force and police.
3
x While the United Nations and AMISOM will train the
Somali police, building on the work already being done
by UNDP, Somalia will need the assistance of bilateral
partners, not only to equip the police and build the
police infrastructure, but also to train, equip and
sustain the 5,000-strong joint security force.
x I would appreciate if you could share with me your

plans regarding the establishment of the Somali
security forces and police as foreseen in the Djibouti
Agreement.
4
x The Security Council has yet to take a decision on a
peacekeeping operation (PKO). I will present
a report in April, based on which the Security Council
will consider the issue in June.
x In addition, we are also coordinating support to

Somalia on the reconstruction and development side.
x I would encourage you to continue your efforts

towards reconciliation in line with the Djibouti process
in order to bring on board those who still remain
outside the process.
5
x I remain deeply concerned about the dire humanitarian
situation as well as the drastic reduction of
humanitarian space and the direct targeting of aid
workers.
x The Government’s support to facilitate humanitarian

access the safety of aid workers and the protection of
civilian populations is crucial to effective humanitarian
action.
6
Saudi Arabia King or FM TPs.docConfidential

The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques
King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
or
His Royal Highness Prince Saud Al-Faisal
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Middle East 1
Iraq 3
Lebanon 4
Special Tribunal for Lebanon 5
Somalia 5
Saudi Reform – Internal 7
Counterterrorism 7
Middle East

yet succeeded. We need to keep supporting the

engage a unity Government. Unity is important to
1

Israeli Government needs to act seriously on freezing
settlements, lifting closures, and ceasing incursions.
It is unacceptable that house demolitions and
evictions are being pursued in Jerusalem.
x There is understandable concern in the international

community about the positions that a new Israeli
Government may adopt. We should all make clear to
the new Government that we will judge them by their
actions. Both sides committed last year to continue
negotiations on all final status issues and to
implement the roadmap.


Peace Initiative.
2
x I have established the UN Board of Inquiry into

several specific incidents in Gaza. The Board will
soon submit its report. I need some time to study it
and then decide if any further steps are required.
Iraq
x While I am encouraged by the progress being made
in Iraq, the situation remains difficult. The potential
for violence and political instability remains. How do
you see the current situation?

credible elections. It is encouraging that Sunni voters
participated at a much high rate than in 2005.

efforts.
3
Lebanon




normalise their relations.
4
x The start of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on 1

March 2009 in The Hague, is a decisive milestone in
the joint efforts of the Lebanese and the international
community to uncover the truth, bring those
responsible for this and related crimes to justice and
end impunity. This will not be easy. It will take time
but I reiterate my support to the Tribunal and I call
upon all Members States to fully support and
cooperate with this new independent institution.
Somalia
x The positive developments we are seeing in Somalia
are in part a result of the commitment shown by Your
Majesty and your Government.

be crucial and the new Government of Shiekh Sharif

5
x These Somali security forces will require immediate

support for the first 6 months.

needs.
x The Somalis have always looked to Saudi Arabia for

moral leadership. Somalia will also continue to need
support in reconstruction and development as a
means of consolidating peace and restoring stability.
We are planning to have a conference on
reconstruction in the summer. Your Kingdom’s
support in this area would be critical.
Somalia: Humanitarian Situation

x The on-going conflict continues to cause civilian
casualties, widespread displacement and growing
humanitarian needs.
x The humanitarian community is working on new

modalities to increase the delivery of assistance
under extremely difficult circumstances.
x Safeguarding humanitarian space in the new security

framework will be critical and continued support from
the Kingdom is needed now more than ever for the
vulnerable Somali population.
6
Saudi Reform – Internal

x I have been told that the Custodian of the Two Holy
Mosques has recently reshuffled the Cabinet. A
woman has become a Deputy Education Minister,
which is probably for the first time in the Kingdom.
How would you describe the direction of these
changes?
Counter-terrorism
x Countering terrorism is one of the global challenges

that hold the key to our common future. The U.N.
Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force is
advancing this mission by supporting Member States
in implementing the U.N. Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy. We will appreciate assistance of Saudi
Arabia in supporting the work of the Task Force, as
outlined in a proposal that Mr. Lynn Pascoe, Under-
Secretary-General of the U.N. Department of Political
Affairs, submitted to [Prince Saud Al-Faisal]/[you]
last October. A positive response to the funding
proposal will also allow the U.N. to move forward
expeditiously in developing practical, results-oriented
cooperation with Saudi Arabia on counter-terrorism.
7
Saudi Arabia King or FM TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit Conf
or
His Royal Highness Prince Saud Al-Faisal
Middle East 2
Iraq 8
Lebanon 10
Somalia 13
Saudi Reform – Internal 18
Counterterrorism 19
1
Middle East
and the West Bank.
x It is regrettable that Palestinian unity talks have not yet

succeeded. We need to keep supporting the Egyptian
2
engage a unity Government. Unity is important to allow
relief and reconstruction for Gaza. We need to persuade
Hamas of this.
x We need to see a real change on the ground in the West
Bank. The PA has done a good job there. A new Israeli
Government needs to act seriously on freezing
settlements, lifting closures, and ceasing incursions. It is
unacceptable that house demolitions and evictions are
being pursued in Jerusalem.
3
Government may adopt. We should all make clear to the
new Government that we will judge them by their
negotiations on all final status issues and to implement
the roadmap.
4
more engaged on the ground in crisis management and

5
x I have established the UN Board of Inquiry into several
specific incidents in Gaza. The Board will soon submit its
report. I need some time to study it and then decide if
any further steps are required.
6
Iraq
x While I am encouraged by the progress being made in
Iraq, the situation remains difficult. The potential for
violence and political instability remains. How do you see
the current situation?
elections. It is encouraging that Sunni voters
participated at a much high rate than in 2005.
7
8
Lebanon

x It will be very important to maintain a secure and calm

atmosphere as the electoral period approaches. I very
much welcome the Lebanese parties’ commitment to
reject the use of violence or intimidation in their political
campaigns.
9
strategy is a very important process. Lebanese leaders
must be encouraged to sustain this dialogue and to make
progress in addressing the core issues.

normalise their relations.
10
x The start of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on 1 March

2009 in The Hague, is a decisive milestone in the joint
efforts of the Lebanese and the international community
to uncover the truth, bring those responsible for this and
related crimes to justice and end impunity. This will not
be easy. It will take time but I reiterate my support to
the Tribunal and I call upon all Members States to fully
support and cooperate with this new independent
institution.
Somalia
11
x The positive developments we are seeing in Somalia are
in part a result of the commitment shown by Your
Majesty and your Government.

and the new Government of Shiekh Sharif will require
immediate support.
12
x These Somali security forces will require immediate

support for the first 6 months.

13
x The Somalis have always looked to Saudi Arabia for
moral leadership. Somalia will also continue to need
support in reconstruction and development as a means of
consolidating peace and restoring stability. We are
planning to have a conference on reconstruction in the
summer. Your Kingdom’s support in this area would be
critical.
Somalia: Humanitarian Situation
14
humanitarian needs.

modalities to increase the delivery of assistance under
extremely difficult circumstances.

framework will be critical and continued support from the
Kingdom is needed now more than ever for the
15
Saudi Reform – Internal
x I have been told that the Custodian of the Two Holy
Mosques has recently reshuffled the Cabinet. A woman
has become a Deputy Education Minister, which is
probably for the first time in the Kingdom. How would
you describe the direction of these changes?
Counter-terrorism
16
x Countering terrorism is one of the global challenges that
hold the key to our common future. The U.N. Counter-
Terrorism Implementation Task Force is advancing this
mission by supporting Member States in implementing
the U.N. Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
[bullet point continues on next page]
17
We will appreciate assistance of Saudi Arabia in supporting
the work of the Task Force, as outlined in a proposal that
Mr. Lynn Pascoe, Under-Secretary-General of the U.N.
Department of Political Affairs, submitted to [Prince Saud
Al-Faisal]/[you] last October. A positive response to the
funding proposal will also allow the U.N. to move forward
expeditiously in developing practical, results-oriented
cooperation with Saudi Arabia on counter-terrorism.
18
Saudi Arabia King or FM BN.docConfidential
Background information for the Secretary-General’s

meeting with
or
His Royal Highness Prince Saud Al-Faisal,
(LAS Summit, Doha, 30 March 2009, time TBC)
Saudi reform
The cabinet reshuffle of February 2009 signals that Saudi Arabia

appears to be moving towards its own reform. King Abdullah placed
reformers in charge of the ministries of justice, education,
information, and health. These appointments could indicate a greater
willingness to confront the propagation of extremist and sectarian
ideologies within the education system and the information sector.
The appointment of the country's first female minister, albeit as a
deputy to the male education minister, is a big leap forward within
Saudi Arabia’s conservative society, which does not permit women to
drive automobiles or to travel without a family member or chaperone.
Another announcement in the same list of cabinet changes was

warmly greeted by wide sections of the population - dismissal of the
fanatical Wahhabi chief of the so-called "religious police", officially
called the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of
Vice. His is a militia of volunteers armed with wood and leather sticks
who, with minimal training and no interest in preventing ordinary
law-breaking, monitor compliance with Wahhabi doctrinal practice.
Although King Abdullah has given indications of a dedication to

reform, he has so far been prevented from simply decreeing a
modernization. He is obstructed by powerful groups in his own
family, as well as in the government and religious structures, who
cleave to Wahhabi domination as a guarantee of the status quo.
1
Russia's role post-2012 Climate Change from A. Korppoo.doc
The Role of Russia in the Post-2012 Climate Politics
Policy briefing
Submitted 13 June 2008
Updated 22 September 2008
by
Dr Anna Korppoo1
the Finnish Institute of International Affairs
1
Email: anna.korppoo@upi-fiia.fi
Contents
ABSTRACT 3
1. BACKGROUND 4
2. HOW IS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

PROCEEDING IN RUSSIA? 5
2.1 COMPLIANCE 5
2.2 THE KYOTO MECHANISMS 6
2.3 DOMESTIC POLICIES AND MEASURES 6
3. STRONG TRENDS INFLUENCING RUSSIAN POST-2012 POSITION 8
3.1 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMISSIONS 8

3.2 PARTICIPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES 9
3.3 THE ROLE OF RUSSIA AS A GLOBAL PLAYER 9
3.4 IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 10
3.5 THE PUBLIC OPINION AND SCEPTICISM OF CLIMATE SCIENCE 11
3.6 ‘HOT AIR’ AS A CUSHION 13
4. WEAK TRENDS INFLUENCING RUSSIAN POST-2012 POSITION 13
4.1 RUSSIAN ROLE AS A FOSSIL FUEL EXPORTER 13

4.2. EXPERIENCES OF KYOTO IMPLEMENTATION AND PAMS 13
5. LATEST DISCUSSION 14
6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15
REFERENCE 19
2
Abstract
The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Russia was not based on environmental concern.
Unrelated benefits such as support to country’s WTO membership as well as other political
benefits were available, and no emission cuts were required until 2012. Under the post-Kyoto
agreement it seems likely that as an industrialised country Russia would be expected to
participate by accepting emission reduction commitments. This would be a dramatically
different world for Russia when compared to the Kyoto Protocol which offered a range of
benefits.
The Russian economy is growing fast and as a result also greenhouse gas emissions are
increasing. Economic growth is a political goal and financing emission reduction policies
could slow it down. There is no public pressure to join the global effort to combat climate
change as ‘climate hype’ experienced in Europe and the US has not reached Russia yet, and
many Russians believe that the country could benefit from climate change. Indeed, also the
IPCC is predicting various positive effects for the Russian territory during the early phase of
climate change but also negative impacts are forecast. However, also partly due to the climate
sceptical views in the Russian scientific community the benefits of climate change dominate
the Russian debate. As a result, it is not always fruitful to focus on the environmental
messages when discussing post-Kyoto pacts with Russia.
The Russians would like to see the country regain an important and credible role in world
politics and climate policy could be one arena. Also the participation of other countries in the
future pact is crucial; it is unlikely that Russia would join any agreement without the US and
the major developing countries participating as well. G8 could probably persuade Russia to
join a new pact if there was a consensus amongst the other members, however, Russia is
likely to join any opposition to binding targets inside G8. For Russia it will be important to be
able to transfer unused emission allowances for future use. This may be a useful tool to
persuade Russia to take commitments to reduce emissions as it cushions a significant amount
of future growth in emissions.
There is no official Russian position on post-2012 climate policy. Many of the points of
discussion currently relevant to Russian post-2012 debate were already raised during the
Kyoto ratification debate. Based on the current evidence, Russia is likely to be a reluctant
negotiation partner. The country may well sign up to a post-Kyoto deal if the others key
players commit themselves but is likely to join opposition to binding targets. Reluctance to
implement domestic policies and measures has been expressed, however, some business-as-
usual policies on the energy sector could deliver emission cuts.
Acknowledgements
This report was funded by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The author would also like
to acknowledge the following colleagues: Alexey Kokorin, WWF Russia, Oleg Pluzhnikov,
the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Sergey Tulinov, Roshydromet,
Michael Yulkin, CAMCO International, Arild Moe, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Nina
Tynkkynen, FIIA, Marja Koskela, Finnish Embassy in Moscow, and Matti Anttonen, the
Ambassador of Finland in Moscow. Thank you also to colleagues from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Finland and the Ministry of Environment of Finland for their comments on
the draft text.
3
1. Background
Russia is a key player in global climate politics both as an emitter of greenhouse gases as well
as a consumer and exporter of fossil fuels. The country has been in a position to gain from
international climate politics thus far as it was allocated a significant amount of surplus
emitting allowances for the first commitment period. This surplus can be sold either in the
international emissions trading market or through the Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism by
linking the allowances to emission reduction projects. Despite of these obvious gains
president Putin’s administration also required additional benefits from the ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol. The country was in a decisive position as after the withdrawal of the US from
the pact it would have been impossible to bring together the required 55% of the
industrialised country emissions without Russia. The EU support to the Russian WTO
membership finally persuaded Russia to ratify. However, these benefits seemed minor from
the Russian point of view as the potential main buyer of AAUs, the US, withdrew from the
pact and JI has proved to be bureaucratically too challenging for the Russian administration as
yet. Environmental concerns had little to do with the ratification2.
Thus far Russian climate politics have been driven by expected economic and political gains.
Due to the surplus allowances the country was not required to cut emissions and thus has had
no incentive to introduce any serious mitigation policies. The Russian emissions have been
growing since 1998 and in 2006 they were some 15% above the 1998 level in 2006. As a
result the emerging post-Kyoto regime with significant emission reduction commitments for
developed countries will be a dramatically different environment for Russia compared to the
first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. However, even though the growing trend in
the 2000s is clear, the Russian emissions remained 27% below 1990 level in 2006.3
There is very little knowledge of the Russian thinking on the post-2012 regime. At Bali, there
was no clear national position. However, an outline of the early Russian views was provided
by Alexandr Bedritsky, Head of the Roshydromet, in the Informal High-Level Event on
Climate Change and the United Nations in New York, 24 September 2007. Bedritsky argues
that the world has changed since the beginning of the early 1990s when the Kyoto Protocol
was negotiated, and that this should be reflected in the post-2012 regime. The efforts of the
countries with commitment under Kyoto would not be meaningful beyond 2012 without the
participation of other countries. He judges the prolongation of the Kyoto Protocol as
ineffective as the pact is imperfect. The national conditions of countries and their stage of
development should be taken into account when agreeing on quantitative commitments for
the post-2012 regime.4
Russia initiated a debate on voluntary commitments under both the Kyoto Protocol and the
Framework Convention in COP-12 in 2006. The aim is to allow countries which are keen to
take commitments, such as Belarus, to join the common effort easier as the current procedure
is bureaucratic. This proposal was also mentioned by Dr Bedritsky in his speech at the UN5
and it may reappear in the post-2012 discussions with Russia.
The current Russian debate in newspapers focuses more on which positions other countries
may be taking on the forthcoming regime but the options for Russia have not been discussed
2
For an overview of the arguments against ratification, see for instance Nikonov, Vyacheslav (2003).
The Kyoto Protocol: A Skeptic’s Opinion. Available at http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/3695-
kyotoprotocol-0. Accessed 10 June 2008.
3
Data from www.unfccc.int; Doyle, Alistair and Wynn, Gerard, G8 greenhouse gases down in 2006,
Reuters 23 May 2008. Available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSL2343063320080523. Accessed 12 June 2008.
4
Bedritsky, Alexandr (2007). Statement on behalf of the Russian Federation at the Informal High-
Level Event on Climate Change at the United Nations, New York, 24 September 2007.
5
Ibid.
4
much thus far. Climate related debates are focused on the delays and lost potential of JI
projects as well as on the Russian energy saving potential.
This paper analyses the current trends which are likely to influence Russian post-2012
position. The analysis is based on interviews with four Russian key experts in May 2008 as
well as a literature review and the background of the ratification debate. This paper seeks to
provide advice on how the post-Kyoto world looks like from the Russian point of view. The
main questions explored include the following:
x How is the implementation of the Protocol proceeding including the Kyoto
mechanisms?
x Which issues are defining the Russian post-2012 position?
x Do the Russians expect to continue without introducing any mitigation policies or are
there plans to accept emission reduction commitments beyond 2012?
x How does the Russian government picture itself in relation to the other negotiation
parties and interest groups in the post-2012 negotiations?
x How would Russian participation in international climate politics fit in its role as a
major fossil fuel exporter?
x How do the impacts of climate change influence the Russian position?
x What could be done to bring Russia into a post-2012 deal?
First, the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in Russia thus far is outlined. Second, the
strong trends influencing the Russian post-2012 position are outlined followed by the weaker
trends. Before concluding the very latest debate in Russia is summarised. The conclusion
provides a summary of the trends as well as policy recommendations on how to negotiate
with Russia on a post-2012 regime. Also further suggestions for bilateral cooperation with
Russia as well as topics of research are recommended.
2. How is the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol proceeding in Russia?
2.1 Compliance
For a long time development of Russian compliance institutions was extremely slow6 gaining
speed since 2006. In its National Report on the Kyoto commitments, Russia calculated its
Assigned Amount and described the process as required, including information on the
selection of sinks to be included. In 2007, Russia submitted its greenhouse gas (GHG)
inventory for years 1990-2004 in the Common Reporting Format and the National Inventory
Report, and since data has been submitted annually as required by the UN. The 2006 emission
data was submitted in May 2008. A greenhouse gas registry was prepared based on the 2006
law7 and Russia connected its registry to the UN International Transaction Log in April 2008
as the fourth country in the world8. Russia achieved full eligibility in June 2008.9 The Russian
6
See for instance Korppoo, Anna (2004). Russia and compliance under Kyoto: institutional approach.
Briefing Paper. Sustainable Development Programme, the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
7
Ɋɚɫɩɨɪɹɠɟɧɢɟ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɚ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɨɬ 20.02.2006 ʋ215-ɪ "Ɉ ɫɨɡɞɚɧɢɢ
ɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɝɨ ɪɟɟɫɬɪɚ ɭɝɥɟɪɨɞɧɵɯ ɟɞɢɧɢɰ".
8
Russian GHG registry’s website. Available at http://www.carbonunitsregistry.ru/news.htm. Accessed
9 June 2008.
5
government has also prepared a JI approval system as well as appointed Independent Entities
allowed to determine Russian projects under the Track 2 procedure of the UN.
2.2 The Kyoto mechanisms
Of the three Kyoto mechanisms, JI is the most relevant one for Russia. JI has not started in
Russia yet in the sense that no projects have been approved by the Russian government even
though Russia dominates the Track 2 project portfolio by providing some 70% of the
projects10.
The process of establishing JI project approval system which is a prerequisite for the issuance
of emission reduction units has been prolonged. The task was established by the National
Action Plan in September 2004. The main framework for project approval was adopted in
May 2007, however, major gaps still remained in this legislation, and further legal
development was required.11 The project submission service was launched in March 2008,
however, no projects have been officially approved. Nor is it clear when the actual approvals
will be issued as it recently appeared the composition of the project approval commission is
influenced by the recent change of government. The delay with the establishment of the
Russian JI approval system has certainly already led to a reduced use of the Russian JI
potential due to the lack of trust by many project developers. Due to the growing revenues
from oil and gas exports, revenue through JI is obviously not a political priority for Russia.
International emissions trading was the great hope for Russia to earn from the Kyoto Protocol,
however, the market has not started properly as yet, and in the absence of the US the windfall
status of Russian surplus makes it unlikely that the other Annex I countries would like to buy
it. It can be argued, however, that this may change when governments start realising that they
will fail to comply with Kyoto without the Russian surplus allowance also called ‘hot air’.
The idea of a Green Investment Scheme (GIS) was launched by the Russian government in
COP-6 when Russia stated that it would be willing to reinvest revenues from emissions
trading to further emission reduction projects. However, the main problem with GIS is the
lack of trust by the potential buyers that Russian would actually reinvest the money as agreed.
The lack of transparency of the Russian governmental activities adds to this dilemma, and the
suggested GIS systems seem so bureaucratic that it would be unlikely that the Russian
government would be interested in them or even able to implement them institutionally. Also
the diplomatic relations with other countries have hindered international emissions trading;
the Japanese government initiated negotiations with the Russian government on a transaction
under a GIS arrangement early 2008 but no common view on how to do this was established
between the countries.
2.3 Domestic policies and measures
Beyond the institutional requirements to establish the compliance instrument, the Russian
surplus allowances ensure that the country does not necessarily need any domestic policies
and measures (PAMs) to comply with Kyoto. The Russian PAMs have been modest in
9
Point Carbon, 24 June 2008, Russia eligible to earn carbon credits.
10
Korppoo, Anna and Gassan-zade, Olga (forthcoming). Joint Implementation: Looking back and
forward. Climate Strategies synthesis report.
11
Korppoo, Anna and Moe, Arild (2007). Russian JI procedures: More problems than solutions?
Climate Strategies briefing paper, June 2007. Available at http://www.climate-
strategies.org/uploads/Russian_JI_procedures.pdf. Accessed 5 June 2008.
6
practice and the country has experienced problems with implementation of various planned
policies, for instance those aiming at improving the level of energy efficiency.12
The Progress Report on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol by Russia presents the
PAMs put in practice by 2006. 13 Macroeconomic policies are flagged as a set of policies
which influence the Russian emissions through the reduction of energy and carbon intensities
due to modernisation and restructuring of the economy. The energy sector is the most
significant carbon emitter and therefore also the main sector to cut emissions. The
governmental ‘Energy efficiency economy’ programme is reported as one of the main PAMs
implemented. According to the Progress Report, during the period 2002-2005 the programme
resulted to a reduction of emissions by some 50-60 Mt of CO2e per year. The share of the
reductions from the energy sector was on average some 50%. Improvements of technology in
electricity and heat production and restructuring of gas compressor stations on the gas sector
are mentioned as PAMs, however, no policy tools such as incentive structures how these
results were achieved have been specified. The housing sector is reported to have cut
emissions by some 8-9 Mt CO2e annually during 2002-2005 by for instance increasing energy
metering and switching to bio fuels. Also PAMs on transport, forestry and agricultural sectors
are discussed. It is difficult to see how the reported reduction of emissions by 50-60 Mt
annually during 2002-2005 corresponds to the dynamics of the Russian emissions which have
grown by some 130 Mt during this period (see Graph 1). Perhaps the emissions avoided may
be in question.
Russian GHG emissions

Mt
3200
3000
2800
2600
2400
2200
2000
1800
1600
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Graph 1. The development of Russian greenhouse gas emissions in 1990-2006.

Source of data: www.unfccc.int
12
Korppoo, Anna (2007). Drivers and Barriers to Energy Efficiency in the Russian Pulp and Paper
Industry. PhD Thesis, Imperial College London.
13
Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɚɹ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɹ (2006). Ⱦɨɤɥɚɞ ɨɛ ɨɱɟɜɢɞɧɨɦ ɩɪɨɝɪɟɫɫɟ ɜ ɜɵɩɨɥɧɟɧɢɢ ɨɛɹɡɚɬɟɥɶɫɬɜ
ɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ ɮɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɩɨ Ʉɢɨɬɫɤɨɦɭ ɩɪɨɬɨɤɨɥɭ. Ɇɢɧɢɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɨ ɗɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ Ɋɚɡɜɢɬɢɹ ɢ
Ɍɨɪɝɨɜɥɢ.
7
3. Strong trends influencing Russian post-2012 position
3.1 Economic growth and emissions
The goal of doubling the gross domestic product (GDP) by 2010 which was set by president
Putin in 2000 may hinder accepting emission reduction commitments as many Russian
decision-makers fear that limiting the consumption of fossil fuels in order to cut emissions
would reduce the GDP growth. Similar argumentation was already used by Andrey Illarionov,
the advisor of president Putin, in the Kyoto ratification debate14. However, at the time many
Russian experts disagreed with Illarionov and argued that Kyoto would not limit Russian
emissions during the first commitment period.15 But based on the interviews, many Russian
experts now fear that emissions are indeed growing at a speed which would require the
Russian government to allocate funds for reducing emissions should Russia accept an
emission reduction target.
A negative attitude can also be observed in the public opinion as 45% of the public do not
agree with spending government money on cutting emissions while 28% believe that only
limited resources could be used for tackling global warming (for further details on the
division see Section 3.5)16.
There are several reasons why emissions may grow. Power generation, which now accounts
for 31 % of emissions, is of particular significance. The consumption of electricity is
increasing due to the improving standard of living of the population. Since generation
capacity is fully utilized already the increased demand leads to the reintroduction of old
inefficient electricity generation capacity which was closed when the electricity consumption
collapsed in the early 1990s. In addition, especially small generators may switch from gas to
the more carbon intensive coal as the price of the latter is expected to remain lower. There
have also been calls for a large scale replacement of gas by coal in power generation in the
longer term due to the expected problems with balancing supply and demand for gas. In
addition, it was argued in the interviews that the efficiency of energy use and reduction of
energy intensity of the economy which was expected to take place ‘automatically’ due to the
development of the economy through modernisation and restructuring of the economy17 has
not happened in Russia thus far.
Some Russian experts refer to the peaking of emissions at a certain point of development of
each economy. The reason why Russia should be allowed to increase its emissions beyond
2012 is that the country has not reached this peak as yet and needs to develop further. This
view would not support accepting emission reduction commitments. Indeed, some Russian
experts emphasised the changes that have taken place in the world since the Kyoto Protocol
was negotiated in the early 1990s, especially referring to the development of transition
economies as well as the Asian emerging economies, and called for differentiated
14
Hopkins, Philip (2004). Kyoto kills growth says Putin’s chief economist, the Age, 9 December 2004.
Available at http://www.theage.com.au/news/Business/Kyoto-kills-growth-says-Putin-chief-
economist/2004/12/08/1102182359957.html. Accessed 5 June 2008.
15
For a review of Russian experts disagreeing with Illarionov’s point see Muller, Benito (2004). The
Kyoto Protocol: Russian Opportunities, Briefing Note, the Royal Institute of International Affairs,
March 2004, p.2-6.
16
ȼɫɟɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɣ ɰɟɧɬɪ ɢɡɭɱɟɧɢɹ ɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɝɨ ɦɧɟɧɢɹ, ɝɥɨɛɚɥɶɧɨɟ ɩɨɬɟɩɥɟɧɢɟ: ɦɢɮ ɢɥɢ
ɪɟɚɥɶɧɨɫɬɶ?, Press release, 4 April 2007. Available at http://wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-
vypusk/single/4339.html. Accessed 11 June 2008.
17
More about the basics of the impact of economic developments to GHG emissions see for instance
IPCC (2007). Fourth Assessment Report: Mitigation of Climate Change, p.177.
8
responsibilities for countries based on their circumstances. This was also recognised as one of
the issues G8 countries agree on in the Japan meeting in March 2008. 18 Due to this, the
country groups under the Kyoto Protocol should be revised to allow for the changing levels of
development. It may be difficult to place Russia into any group. It was suggested by an
interview that the best way could be to establish clear criteria for dividing countries between
groups based on their ability to act such as GDP/capita.
3.2 Participation of other countries
Participation of the other key emitters is a prerequisite for the Russian government to join a
post-Kyoto pact due to political reasons but also because the Kyoto Protocol is not regarded
as an effective pact in Russia. This is because the impact of the Kyoto commitments to the
global emissions is minimal as the US and developing countries continue to increase their
emissions. These views are linked to the previous debates in Russia as during the Kyoto
ratification discussion Russian Kyoto opponents often referred to the absence of the US and
China from the pact as a reason not to ratify.
Especially the participation of the US and the large developing countries is important. It
would be difficult for Russia to accept emission cuts if the lack of action by the US which has
much higher standard of living than Russia continued. The US is also seen as an equal partner
for Russia in foreign policy.
The Group of eight (G8) is a key actor to encourage Russia to join a post-2012 pact. In this
group Russia sees itself in the company of other significant powers in the world. The EU
countries are trying to use G8 as a forum to lobby the other, potentially difficult members of
the group to join a post-Kyoto pact. However, Japan and the US are sceptical about a Kyoto-
type burden sharing based sanctioned system. As a result, Russia could easily support these
views in order to avoid binding targets. However, if the other G8 members can pull a deal
together, it would be very difficult for Russia to oppose and break the G8 consensus. Some
basic principles on post-Kyoto regime were already agreed on amongst G8. 19 One of the
advantages of Russia participating in G8 is that the government has to present a position
based on credible background research in order not to lose face in front of G8 which
encourages the preparatory work of the Russian administration.
The participation of other key countries could either encourage or discourage Russia to join
depending on how the global dialogue develops. Also the views of the new US president may
influence the Russian approach.
3.3 The Role of Russia as a Global Player
Also the prestige of Russia as an international player is extremely important in the climate
arena. As the Russian leadership is seeking to regain status as a world power, Russia may
want to play a more serious, and independent, role in the climate negotiations. This is the
position the Russian government and president Putin have been trying to reach in the 2000s in
order to make up for the loss of the super power status due to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Membership of G8 is seen to add to the prestige of Russia as it is recognised as an important
player in the world20.
18
Gleneagles-Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development, 4th
Ministerial Meeting, Chairs' Conclusions, Chiba, Japan, 14-16 March 2008. Available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/warm/cop/dialogue0803.html. Accessed 12 June 2008.
19
Ibid.
20
For a wider discussion on the topic see for instance Tynkkynen, Nina (2008). Russia, a Great
ecological Power in global climate policy? Framing climate change as a policy problem in Russian
9
Such an approach was clearly observable already during the Kyoto ratification discussion as
president Putin wanted to see Russia as the main facilitator of the Kyoto Protocol in the
international arena.21 It was also emphasised by many Russian experts during the Russian
ratification debate that it was important that the Russian decision was seen as a well-informed
one and rational. This was partly due to the institutional chaos in the last days of the Soviet
Union and the early years of post-Soviet Russia when officials often gave statements which
could not be regarded as the official view of the Russian government. As a result, the Russian
views were undermined in the international media and debate. This was seen to reduce the
credibility of the whole country in the international arena, and therefore, undesirable.
The role of Russia as an important global actor and a constructive partner for other major
players such as the members of G8 will without a doubt be an important element which could
bring Russia into the post-Kyoto deal. The fact that the Russian government does not want to
be stamped as a ‘rogue state’ in climate terms may allow political pressure to persuade Russia
to join. Russia wants to be seen as a responsible global player doing its bit.
Based on the G8 Summit in Japan in July 2008, it seems like there might be some opposition
to a post-Kyoto deal in the G8 as the declaration on climate change was weak and the US led
by president Bush continued to oppose a meaningful deal. For instance, no base year on the
suggested emission cuts by 50% was agreed on.22
3.4 Impacts of climate change
The impacts of climate change are not regarded only as negative in Russia. One interviewee
argued that even though based on science the impacts of climate change in the Russian
territory were expected to be 70% negative and only 30% beneficial, many people in Russia
still believe that the ratio is rather 50%-50% respectively.
The fourth assessment report of the IPCC does not predict just doom for Russia either. One of
the main gains is the increase of winter temperatures, most significant projected to take place
in the North of Russia. This leads to a decreased need for space heating which reduces energy
consumption. Agricultural production potential could increase in higher latitudes, however,
the conditions in the currently most fertile agricultural land in Central Asia would suffer from
more frequent droughts. The boreal forest will shift northwards but in case of Russia there is
space in the north for the forest to shift.23
There are negative impacts also. The frequency and extent of forest fires and fires of Siberia
peat lands is projected to increase. This could lead to significant economic losses and cause
pollution dangerous to human health. Another hazard to human health are spreading diseases
as natural habitats of vector-borne and water-borne diseases such as malaria are likely to
public discussion, in Tynkkynen, Nina (2008). Constructing the Environmental Regime between
Russia and Europe. Academic Dissertation, Acta Universitatis Tamperensis 1301.
21
Korppoo, Anna and Moe, Arild (2007). Russian Climate Politics: Light at the End of the Tunnel?
Climate Strategies Briefing Paper, April 2007. Available at http://www.climate-
strategies.org/uploads/Russia_politics_bp.pdf. Accessed 5 June 2008.
22
Main Points of the Outputs of the G8 Environment Ministers Meeting 2008; Telegraph.co.uk, 9 July
2008, Divisions emerge over G8 climate change goals. Available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/main.jhtml?xml=/earth/2008/07/09/eag8109.xml; Telegraph.co.uk, 8
July 2008 Climate Change Deal Agreed by G8 Nations. Available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/main.jhtml?xml=/earth/2008/07/08/eag8climate208.xml.
23
IPCC (2007). Climate Change 2007. Impacts, Adaptation and Variability. Working Group II Report.
Chapters 10 and 12.
10
expand towards north. Floods and increased runoff of rivers due to melting permafrost has
already caused serious problems in the banks of river Lena. Melting permafrost will also
cause landslides and degeneration of forest ecosystems as well as change of strength and
bearing capacity of the ground which has negative impacts on settlements built on permafrost.
Sea-level rise is made worse by erosion in the Arctic coasts as declining sea ice will allow
higher waves and storm surges to hit the shore causing an annual coastal recession up to 4-6
meters. The most vulnerable sector taking a hit by climate change in the Russian territory is
likely to be biodiversity.24
Also a group of Russian experts agree that the Russian economy is likely to benefit from the
impacts of climate change in the format of higher agricultural yields caused by a longer
growth season and carbon fertilisation effect, lower human mortality at wintertime due to
warmer winters, lower heating costs as well as potential boost of tourism. Opening of the
Northern sea routes will provide new opportunities for shipping as well as gas and oil
exploration and transportation. They conclude that regions on low latitudes are more
vulnerable while the losers of climate change are local livelihoods and biodiversity. But they
also refer to the expected damage to roads, buildings and oil and gas mining facilities located
on the melting permafrost. Melting permafrost and related floods may increase the costs of
pipeline construction. Negative consequences of the warmer winters have also been already
experienced in Archangelsk region where the snowy season when it is easier to transport logs
from forests has shortened. The cultures of indigenous peoples are also estimated to be at risk
due to the impacts of climate change in the Arctic. However, the impacts of climate change
on the Arctic part of Russia seem less relevant as the population density in this area is very
low.25 Some negative impacts such as the melting permafrost are also seen as a technical, and
therefore, manageable problem by some Russian scientists.26
However, gaining benefits from climate change in practice is likely to require adaptation
activities, for instance a new agricultural policy. At the same time the negative impacts of
climate change in the Russian territory may cause much more damage if no planning,
management and adaptation measures are adopted.27 In practice, the institutional weaknesses
of the Russian administration which lead to the lack and slowness of response could cause
more climate change related damage in the Russian territory than is expected.
Even if the impacts of climate change were not flagged as an important element influencing
the Russian position on post-Kyoto, the fact that benefits are projected underlines that
environmental impacts may not be the most fruitful way of framing climate change when
negotiating a post-Kyoto regime.
3.5 The public opinion and scepticism of climate science
24
Ibid.
25
Perelet, Renat, Pegov, Serguey and Yulkin, Michael (2007). Human Development Report 2007/2008.
Climate Change: Russia Country Paper, December 2007.
26
See for instance professor Oleg Anisimov’s interview in SciencePoles, 19 April 2007. Future
Impacts of Climate Change in the Arctic. Available at
http://www.sciencepoles.org/index.php?articles/future_impacts_climate_change_the_arctic&s=2&rs=h
ome&uid=949&lg=en. Accessed 10 June 2008.
27
11
During the Kyoto ratification there was hardly any public pressure expressing concern of
climate change while environmental issues were not important in the election either.28 The
sceptics also contributed to the Kyoto ratification debate in Russia29.
Many Russian scientists remain sceptical of human induced climate change as many of them
believe that the cause is rather a natural phenomenon or that the human induced problem can
be solved by technology. Especially professor Yuri Izrael has given a voice to the climate
sceptics. For instance in April 2007 he was stating that ‘[T]he panic over the global warming
is totally unjustified. There is no serious threat to the climate.’ He recognises that climate
change is happening but questions how we should react on it and suggesting an aerosol
spreading based technique instead of emission reductions. 30 There are also various other
sceptical views on climate science.31
The official line of the Russian government in the interviews was that the administration
supports the findings of the IPCC32 but still the Russian administration experiences hardly any
pressure from the public to take on commitments. The Russian Centre for the Research of the
Public Opinion conducted a poll on global warming by asking 1600 Russians around the
country about their views in March 2007. 62% of Russians believe that global warming is a
real threat. 45% believe that global warming is already happening while 17% think that it will
start happening soon. Only 6% argue that global warming will not happen at all. 45% believe
that global warming will cause catastrophic effect, and 29% think that climate gets somewhat
worse. 10% expect climate to improve on some regions. 59% believe that the impacts of
climate change are negative against 18% who believe that they are positive. 23% have no
opinion. Respondents in the cold regions are more positive about the impacts of climate
change than those in the hot areas. 17% agree that as much money as is needed should be
used for mitigation while 28% believe that limited resources could be used. 24% of
respondents think that government revenue would be better spent on social programmes and
other things rather than mitigating climate change. 21% believe that it would be impossible to
prevent climate change from happening.33 These results are quite encouraging and may show
an increasing awareness of the problem of climate change. However, the experts interviewed
agreed that climate change is not really in the public agenda like in Europe, and that the
‘climate hype’ has not reached Russia yet.
It could be argued that the newly found climate awareness has not politicized the issue of
climate change as yet. In practice, people focus on more acute problems such as social
welfare and local pollution problems rather climate change. Also the sceptical views by the
Russian scientists blur the picture. In addition, the lack of civil society and democracy
significantly limit the importance of public opinion to climate politics in Russia.
28
Kotov, Vladimir (2004). The EU-Russia ratification deal: the risks and advantages of an informal
agreement, International Review for Environmental Strategies, 5 (1), pp. 157-65.
29
Korppoo, Anna, Karas, Jacqueline and Grubb, Michael (2006), Russia and the Kyoto Protocol:
Opportunities and Challenges. Chatham House / Brookings.pp. 12-13.
30
Izrael, Yuri (2007). Climate: putting panic in perspective, RIA Novosti, 18 Aril 2007. Available at
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070418/63856919.html. Accessed 22 May 2008.
31
For an overview see Zamolodchikov, Dmitry (2007). The Heated Debate on Climate Change.
Available at http://www.boloji.com/environment/130.htm. Accessed 10 June 2008.
32
See for instance Submission from the Russian Federation, 24 August 2007, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address
climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention.
33
12
3.6 ‘Hot air’ as a cushion
The Russian surplus allowances under Kyoto have been seen as an element which could
undermine the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol. When it comes to joining a
post-Kyoto pact, the Russian surplus could play an important role allowing Russia to accept
emission reduction commitments which seem difficult to accept due to the dynamics of the
economic development and GHG emissions. As the unused allowances can be banked to the
next commitment period under Kyoto it could be feasible that Russia would use its surplus
allowance to even out its further commitments beyond 2012. Russia received further surplus
allowances recently as a result of the revision of 1990 data34.
But it could be argued that the Kyoto allowances may not be directly, or even indirectly,
transferred to the post-Kyoto regime especially should the basic approach of the new pact
dramatically differ from the Kyoto Protocol. In this case Russia would most probably argue
that the surplus should be allowed to the new system but this may be difficult for developing
countries to approve. Denying the use of the Russian surplus on the next period would
without a doubt be experienced as a betrayal and may distort negotiations with Russia.
However, allowing Russia to transfer its ‘hot air’ under the post-Kyoto pact would without a
doubt be politically a highly sensitive issue.
4. Weak trends influencing Russian post-2012 position
4.1 Russian role as a fossil fuel exporter
Russia’s role as a fossil fuel exporter is not linked to climate change pacts as climate policy is
a marginal policy area which has no impact on a major policy such a fuel exports. There are
no signs of the demand for oil and gas reducing globally and Russia has enough demand for
its fuels so climate policy does not seem to be an issue. The Russian policy-makers may not
regard for instance EU climate policies and targets as relevant to Russian exports partly
because they are either not familiar with them or do not believe that the targets will be
achieved in such extent that the demand for fossil fuels would decrease. In addition, the
Chinese demand for oil and gas could replace that of the EU.
Based on this evidence, it seems unlikely that Russia would take a similar stance to climate
diplomacy as for instance Saudi-Arabia which demands compensation for lost revenues from
oil exports in the future due to international climate policies. The Russian fossil fuel
industries have not expressed much interest in the national climate change policies thus far
which may be a sign of the issues not being linked very closely.
In addition, officially Russia is not seen as a long-term fossil fuel exporter due to increasing
domestic demand, and as a result the impacts by climate policies on fuel exports on longer
term are not considered relevant.
4.2. Experiences of Kyoto implementation and PAMs
34
Doyle, Alistair and Wynn, Gerard, Russia wins new greenhouse gas emissions rights, Reuters 29
May 2008. Available at http://in.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idINL2325303220080529. Accessed 11
June 2008.
13
Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol has experienced mainly institutional problems in
Russia. It took a long time to establish a domestic compliance system and the JI approval
system which at the time of writing is still not functional. It seems already now that the scope
of JI in Russia during the first commitment period is much less significant due to the
institutional problems than the available potential of projects. The failure of JI could have a
negative impact on the Russian post-2012 position as this may cause a disappointment; the
Kyoto Protocol is seen as a representative of the west and if policy-makers in Russia feel that
the mechanism has not delivered what was promised, it may be ignored that the Russian
institutional problems were to blame. It is difficult to judge at this point when JI will have
conclusively failed and there is still a chance that Russia will manage to approve a significant
amount of projects during the first commitment period. It would be a bad sign though if
Russia had not approved any JI projects by the end of 2008.
PAMs have not been central for Russian climate policy so far. However, some business-as-
usual policies which are aiming at boosting the Russian economic growth may deliver
emission reductions in the future if implemented properly. According to Russian sources,
Vsevolod Gavrilov from the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade referred to such
policies in his presentation 29 April 2008 when arguing that Russia will need to continue
developing; his comments were reported in the western media as a statement against future
carbon caps 35 . Such policies include increasing energy prices and new energy efficiency
policies. Russian domestic gas prices have been increasing significantly the last few years. In
2007 they rose by 15%, and from 2008 a further 25%.36 The official plan is to reach a level in
2011 where profitability of exports and deliveries to the domestic market is the same
(adjusted for extra transportation costs and export taxes etc.).37 The energy efficiency package
announced by the new president in June 200838 was also mentioned in the interviews as a
serious attempt to tackle the low efficiency of energy use by using more advanced policies
which establish incentives for businesses and consumers to save energy. Even though the
track record of implementing energy efficiency policies in Russian is poor39, the fact that
domestic energy prices have been increasing according to the established policies during the
last two years suggests that there might also be momentum for implementing energy
efficiency policies.
Perhaps the best way to demonstrate Russia that it would be possible to accept emission cuts
would be to support the implementation of the above mentioned PAMs.
5. Latest discussion
The Russian government had planned to officially consider the Russian post-2012 position
during the first half of 2008 but due to the reshuffle of the government the meeting was
postponed to July 2008. It is yet to be seen whether the debate by the government will kick-
start an active domestic debate in Russia on the post-2012 regime.
35
Reuters 29 April 2008, Russia says has no plans to cap carbon emissions. Available at
http://in.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idINL2872408920080428. Accessed 11 June 2008.
36
BBC 4 December 2007, Russia increases local gas prices. Available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7127073.stm. Accessed 29 January 2008.
37
Federal Tariff Service (2005). Information letter of the Federal Tariff Service, 28 June 2005, No ɋɇ-
3923/9. Available at http://www.fstrf.ru/press/info/1. Accessed 29 January 2008.
38
Prime-TASS, 4 June 2008, Russia's Medvedev inks decree on increasing energy efficiency. Available at
http://www.prime-tass.com/news/print.asp?id=439469&topicid=68. Accessed 11 June 2008.
39
14
The preparations for the next COP are under way as an inter-agency group is drafting
background material, including emission scenarios, for the decision-makers to decide on a
position for Poznan. Also an economic policy is under preparation to cover development until
2020. These policies will establish a framework for Russian future climate policy, however,
Russian programmes tend to have a blue-skies approach and lack realistic plans and PAMs.
This can make it more difficult to decide what post-2012 commitment would be possible for
Russia to achieve in the future.
Public debate started when Mr Gavrilov of the Ministry of Development and Trade claimed
that Russia has no plans to cap emissions. As a reaction the speaker of the Upper House of the
Federal Assembly, The Federation Council, Sergei Mironov, argued that the Russian GHG
emissions should be limited. However, in 2007 Mr Mironov had still argued that climate
change is not taking place which may discredit his recent position. Also the Deputy Minister
of Natural Resources, Semyon Levi, has presented his view by saying that Russia is willing to
continue talks about a two-fold emission cuts by 2050 but added that such regime should not
be legally binding 40 . These views cannot be seen to represent the official position of the
government as the government has not decided on its position as yet. Such views by
government officials and policy-makers are very typical and dominated for instance the
ratification debate.
The G8 meeting in Japan in July 2008 was the first one for president Dmitry Medvedev. In
his press conference following the summit, the president mentioned climate change but did
not emphasise it. He stated that every country has to take its economic circumstances into
account which is in line with the findings of this study. However, his focus on energy
efficiency as a separate policy was encouraging, and supports the argument that it would be
better to focus on other elements than the environment when discussing climate change with
Russia. Energy efficiency could be a useful and mutually relevant topic.41
6. Conclusion and recommendations
The Russian position on post-2012 is still a moving target to study as it remains under
development. This may be the case until the Copenhagen meeting in 2009 and in perhaps
even beyond. Waiting to establish a position may be a rational option for Russia as it would
be easier to evaluate the Russian options against more concrete proposals of the post-Kyoto
regime. However, Alexandr Bedritsky raised the main elements in his UN speech; many of
these views were also confirmed by the interviewees.
The Russian government will emphasise the differentiated responsibilities and change of
world since Kyoto was negotiated referring to the need for Russia to continue development
and emit more. As a result, Russia will be a reluctant negotiation party as a post-Kyoto pact as
beneficial for Russia as the Kyoto Protocol would be an unrealistic expectation. If, as many
believe, the Russian emissions will grow in tandem with economic growth during the post-
Kyoto period, the country will face an entirely new situation; the climate world will be
requiring emission cuts which it did not expect before at the same time when the domestic
circumstances seem to become less favourable for this. It would be politically difficult for the
Russian government to accept measures that could be seen to limit economic growth, and thus,
welfare.
40
ITAR TASS, 27 May 2008. Russia ready to consider twofold greenhouse gas emission reduction.
Available at http://enews.mcot.net/view.php?id=4454. Accessed 27 May 2008.
41
Press conference by Dmitry Medvedev 9 July 2008 following the G8 Summit in Toyako, Japan.
Available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-130-36.cfm.
15
The Russian government does not have any strong internal incentive to join a post-Kyoto pact
as the Russian territory is expected to initially gain from climate change and there is no public
pressure to join the pact. As a result, the pressure to join should come from the governments
of other key emitters including the US and the EU. Climate cooperation could thus become
more desirable as Russia wants to regain its status as a key international actor. G8 could be a
useful arena for the larger EU member states to lobby Russia to seriously participate in the
negotiations. However, if there will be other countries opposing a meaningful post-Kyoto pact
within G8 Russia could well join the opposition even though the Russian government would
not be willing to break a G8 consensus on its own.
The Kyoto Protocol is not seen as an environmental pact in Russia but rather as a tool for
wealth redistribution as demonstrated by the country seeking to gain from its ratification.
Given the hopes to benefit from climate change as well as the lack of domestic pressure to
join a post-Kyoto pact, it would not be fruitful to approach a post-Kyoto pact as an
environmental issue with Russia. More useful ways to address it could be the mutual goals of
the Russian government on economy and the post-Kyoto pact on emissions; further
modernisation of the economy could help to sustain the growth of the economy whilst the
emissions would decline. There are some promising policies in the energy sector that could be
used as examples, however, it would be difficult to argue against the logic of emissions
growing in tandem with the economy per se.
The surplus allowances - ‘hot air’ - could facilitate Russia joining the pact as it could cushion
the expected Russian emission reduction target. However, utilising the banked surplus outside
Kyoto is not a self-evident issue and thus is open for negotiations.
Many of the above issues were already raised during the Kyoto ratification debate which
demonstrates that the Russian attitudes have probably not changed much since. As a result, it
is possible that also unrelated benefits will be sought against joining the pact. It is impossible
to predict what this could be.
Table 1 outlines the main trends influencing the Russian post-2012 position. The strong
trends are highlighted.
16
Trend Positive Negative
Economic growth and thus Expected to improve energy Need to develop requires
growing emissions efficiency ‘automatically’ but space for increased emissions
little sign of it in Russia and excludes accepting
commitments to cut emissions
Participation of others If other key countries reach a If other key countries oppose a
consensus on a post-Kyoto regime with binding
regime, especially in G8, commitments Russia is likely to
Russia is likely to join for join the opposition
political reasons
Public pressure The public is gaining awareness The public awareness of the
of the negative impacts of dangers of climate change is
climate change and the need to still too low to generate public
react in Russia pressure in Russia to join
post-Kyoto, other issues are
more important. No ‘climate
hype’.
Russian role as a global player Russia could gain political N/A

points and status as a global
actor by participating a post-
Kyoto regime.
‘Hot air’ If surplus allowances can be It remains unclear whether

banked it could cushion banked surplus allowances can
Russian emission reduction be used under the new pact,
commitments and make them especially, should it be separate
more acceptable. from the current Kyoto regime.
Denying banking would be
regarded as a betrayal.
Impacts of climate change in Some consequences of climate The impacts of climate change
Russian territory change already experienced are expected to be initially
locally which may support positive by both the Russian
joining. public and the IPCC. This
makes it less important to
combat climate change.
Experiences of Kyoto Many recently introduced Should the implementation of

implementation and PAMs Russian business-as-usual the Kyoto mechanisms fail in
policies on the energy sector Russia (no success with JI so
could reduce emissions, and far), the disappointment may
therefore, could deliver reflect negatively on the debate
emission cuts required under a concerning a new regime.
new regime.
Russia role as a fossil fuel Lack of link between climate In theory climate policies could
exporter change and energy exports: no reduce the demand for Russian
negative impacts are expected fossil fuels.
due to global climate politics
Table 1. Summary of trends.
17
The main policy recommendations for the other major participants including the EU:
x When negotiating with Russia it would be fruitful to focus on other aspects of climate
change than the environment as environmental concern cannot drive the Russian
approach. It may be more useful to focus on the Russian interest in being recognised
as an international actor or some concrete policies such as energy efficiency which
carry economic interest;
x Consensus within G8 on post-Kyoto would be difficult for Russian to break. This
could be a way forward with Russia, especially for the large EU member states
participating in the work of the G8;
x Russian policy-makers should be engaged in a long-term dialogue and be invited to
participate in talks behind the closed doors on the future of global climate policy.
This is something concrete the EU could do to involve Russia in the negotiation
process;
x ‘Hot air’ cushion can be a useful tool when negotiating with Russia and its status
should be recognised when defining the strategy to bring Russia into the pact;
x Analyses by foreign researchers are not credible in Russia, and their influence should
not be overestimated. If the Russian scientists are distributing incorrect information,
the views of the public cannot be changed by providing counterarguments by foreign
researchers. Whenever possible it is best to involve Russian experts in key roles in
research projects to gain credibility or try to demonstrate the message indirectly, for
instance, by supporting Russian domestic emission reduction policies.
This study only provides a short overview the Russian debate on post-Kyoto politics and the
impacts of climate change on the Russian territory. Further research is required, especially as
the Russian post-Kyoto debate is only emerging. Also regional or local estimates of the
impacts of climate change may help to demonstrate the expected impacts of climate change in
more concrete terms. It may also be useful to publicize the negative impacts of climate
change on the Russian territory such as the devastating impacts of the melting permafrost at
the banks of river Lena42.
It would be beneficial to engage Russia into bilateral cooperation with Finland to build
climate related relations outside the negotiation process. Some potential foci of such
cooperation could include developing regional adaptation plans, cooperation on the forest
sector and energy efficiency related measures in Russia as well as research cooperation on
economic modelling for estimating the impacts of joining a post-Kyoto pact. Finland has
relevant experience for developing adaptation plans in the northern regions. Forestry sector in
Russia suffers from forest fires as well as difficulties with logging on mild winters due to the
lack of forest roads. The experiences of the Finnish forestry sector may be applicable to
Russia on these issues. The emerging energy efficiency policy as well as the increasing
energy prices in Russia are very promising trends which may reduce emissions in the future.
It could be useful to provide support to the implementation of these policies on practical level
as this has been the Russian weak point in the past. Finland has a lot of useful experience of,
for instance, energy efficiency policies and their implementation.
42
Konttinen, Jussi (2008). Ikirouta sulaa siperialaiskylän alta. Helsingin Sanomat, 1 June 2008.
18
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ȼɫɟɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɣ ɰɟɧɬɪ ɢɡɭɱɟɧɢɹ ɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɝɨ ɦɧɟɧɢɹ, ɝɥɨɛɚɥɶɧɨɟ ɩɨɬɟɩɥɟɧɢɟ: ɦɢɮ

ɢɥɢ ɪɟɚɥɶɧɨɫɬɶ?, Press release, 4 April 2007. Available at http://wciom.ru/novosti/press-
vypuski/press-vypusk/single/4339.html. Accessed 11 June 2008.
Ɋɚɫɩɨɪɹɠɟɧɢɟ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɚ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɨɬ 20.02.2006 ʋ215-ɪ "Ɉ

ɫɨɡɞɚɧɢɢ ɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɝɨ ɪɟɟɫɬɪɚ ɭɝɥɟɪɨɞɧɵɯ ɟɞɢɧɢɰ".
Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɚɹ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɹ (2006). Ⱦɨɤɥɚɞ ɨɛ ɨɱɟɜɢɞɧɨɦ ɩɪɨɝɪɟɫɫɟ ɜ ɜɵɩɨɥɧɟɧɢɢ

ɨɛɹɡɚɬɟɥɶɫɬɜ ɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ ɮɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɩɨ Ʉɢɨɬɫɤɨɦɭ ɩɪɨɬɨɤɨɥɭ. Ɇɢɧɢɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɨ
ɗɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ Ɋɚɡɜɢɬɢɹ ɢ Ɍɨɪɝɨɜɥɢ.
21
Russian Officials TPs.docCleared by Political Unit Confidenti
Talking Points for the Secretary-General’s meetings

with Russian Officials
Moscow, 26-28 March 2009
Appointment of UNMIK Chief of Staff
[In recent conversations with SRSG Zannier and with DPKO the
Russian Federation has expressed its displeasure about the
appointment of Mr. Sorenson, a US national, as UNMIK’s Chief of
Staff. In June of 2008 Russia expressed the view that, as incoming
SRSG Zannier was a national of a country that had recognized
Kosovo, his deputy should be from a non-recognizing country. In
a recent meeting with SRSG Zannier, PR Churkin indicated that he
would raise this matter with PR Rice. In a recent telecon with
Mr. Mulet, DPR Dolgov indicated that Russian officials would raise
this issue with the Secretary-General in the context of his upcoming
trip to Moscow. Mr. Sorenson paid a courtesy visit to PR Churkin
today. Mr. Churkin recalled the actions undertaken by former
PDSRSG Rossin with regard to the Mitrovica courthouse in
March 2008, which he believed were not in accordance with
instructions from Headquarters but followed indications from
Washington. Mr. Churkin underlined Russia’s expectation that
Mr. Sorenson will perform his duties as an international civil
servant fully in accordance with United Nations rules and standards
of conduct.]
x I take note of your views on this matter. The decision

to appoint Mr. Sorenson was taken after careful
deliberation. It was based on his track record in the
region, including in Kosovo.
x At a time of change for UNMIK, SRSG Zannier

requires a competent and experienced Chief of Staff
to support him. We believe that Mr. Sorenson has the
right profile for the job.
Russian Officials TPs.docCleared by Political Unit Confidenti
x I am confident that Mr. Sorenson will perform his

duties fully in accordance with the rules governing
international civil servants and the standards
expected of UN staff members.
Background information on Russia’s contribution to UN

Peacekeeping
[Russia is among the top 40 TCCS and contributes a total of

347 military and police deployed in 11 peacekeeping missions. The
largest contributions are to UNMIS with 122 troops, 16 police and
12 military observers; and to MINURCAT with 99 troops.
The Russian contribution to MINURCAT includes one Utility
Helicopter Unit (i.e. four MI-8 helicopters) and 98 troops which
re-hatted from EUFOR in March 2009. Russia also contributes one
colonel as a Staff Political Adviser. The helicopters are not currently
flying pending either a technical agreement with the UN.]
Russian Officials TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit
Talking Points for the Secretary-General’s meetings
with Russian Officials
Appointment of UNMIK Chief of Staff
[In recent conversations with SRSG Zannier and with DPKO the Russian
Federation has expressed its displeasure about the appointment of Mr.
Sorenson, a US national, as UNMIK’s Chief of Staff. In June of 2008
Russia expressed the view that, as incoming SRSG Zannier was a
national of a country that had recognized Kosovo, his deputy should be
from a non-recognizing country. In a recent meeting with SRSG Zannier,
PR Churkin indicated that he would raise this matter with PR Rice. In a
recent telecon with Mr. Mulet, DPR Dolgov indicated that Russian
officials would raise this issue with the Secretary-General in the context
1
of his upcoming trip to Moscow. Mr. Sorenson paid a courtesy visit to PR
Churkin today. Mr. Churkin recalled the actions undertaken by former
PDSRSG Rossin with regard to the Mitrovica courthouse in
March 2008, which he believed were not in accordance with instructions
from Headquarters but followed indications from Washington.
Mr. Churkin underlined Russia’s expectation that Mr. Sorenson will
perform his duties as an international civil servant fully in accordance
with United Nations rules and standards of conduct.]
x I take note of your views on this matter. The decision to

appoint Mr. Sorenson was taken after careful
deliberation. It was based on his track record in the
region, including in Kosovo.
2
x At a time of change for UNMIK, SRSG Zannier requires a
competent and experienced Chief of Staff to support him.
We believe that Mr. Sorenson has the right profile for the
job.
x I am confident that Mr. Sorenson will perform his duties

fully in accordance with the rules governing international
civil servants and the standards expected of UN staff
members.
3
Background information on Russia’s contribution to UN
Peacekeeping
[Russia is among the top 40 TCCS and contributes a total of

347 military and police deployed in 11 peacekeeping missions. The largest
contributions are to UNMIS with 122 troops, 16 police and
12 military observers; and to MINURCAT with 99 troops.
The Russian contribution to MINURCAT includes one Utility Helicopter
Unit (i.e. four MI-8 helicopters) and 98 troops which
re-hatted from EUFOR in March 2009. Russia also contributes one
colonel as a Staff Political Adviser. The helicopters are not currently
flying pending either a technical agreement with the UN.]
4
Russia President Medvedev TPs -with Pol revisions TPs.docCleared by political unit 24-
03-09 Confidential

H.E. Mr. Dmitry Medvedev,
President of the Russian Federation,
Moscow, 27 March 2009, 1:00pm
Introduction 1
Financial Crisis [see generics] 2
Afghanistan 3
Middle East [see generics] 3
Iran [see generics] 3
Iraq 3
Georgia (if raised) 4
MINURCAT 5
Sudan 5
Climate Change 5
[see attached TPs/backgrounder]
Introduction
x I want to assure you of my desire to work closely
with Russia as we seek to deal with the many global
problems that confront us. Russia is a critical player
on the world stage, and of course as a Permanent
Member of the Security Council, is one of the most
important countries guiding our efforts at the UN.
x We need your engagement on the whole range of

global issues, from climate change to the economic
and food crises, to disarmament and dealing with a
seemingly unending list of peace and security
problems. We at the UN, and I myself, can only be
successful if we have your full backing.
1
03-09 Confidential
Financial crisis
[See generics]
Afghanistan
Cooperation Organisation. This event is an
opportunity to give a new dynamism to our support to

subject of not only regional but also global concern.

can make advances.

strengthened. We also need to help the Afghans
consolidate the gains that have been made, including
by rewarding poppy-free provinces and focusing on
alternative-livelihood programmes.
2
03-09 Confidential

actors.

challenges facing Afghanistan can not be addressed
by military means alone and an inclusive political
process is needed. I would like your views on this
matter.

[See generics]
Iran
[See generics]
Iraq
made, the situation in Iraq remains difficult. Further

boundaries. The UN is working to promote dialogue
on these issues. I am also committed to expanding
the UN presence in Iraq, security permitting.
3
03-09 Confidential
Georgia (if raised)

x The establishment of international mechanisms
agreeable to all are required to effectively stabilize
the region, including around the Georgia/Abkhazia
conflict zone.



considerations.


4
03-09 Confidential
MINURCAT
Level II Hospital.
Sudan
Climate Change (please see attached talking points)
5
Russia President Medvedev TPs -with Pol revisions TPs CARDS.docCleared by political unit 24-
03-09 Confidential
H.E. Mr. Dmitry Medvedev,
President of the Russian Federation,
Moscow, 27 March 2009, 1:00pm
Introduction 2
Financial Crisis [see generics] 3
Afghanistan 4
Middle East [see generics] 6
Iran [see generics] 7
Iraq 7
Georgia (if raised) 9
MINURCAT 11
Sudan 12
Climate Change 12
1
03-09 Confidential
[see attached TPs/backgrounder]
Introduction
x I want to assure you of my desire to work closely with
Russia as we seek to deal with the many global problems
that confront us. Russia is a critical player on the world
stage, and of course as a Permanent Member of the
Security Council, is one of the most important countries
guiding our efforts at the UN.
2
03-09 Confidential
x We need your engagement on the whole range of global
issues, from climate change to the economic and food
crises, to disarmament and dealing with a seemingly
unending list of peace and security problems. We at the
UN, and I myself, can only be successful if we have your
full backing.
Financial crisis
[See generics]
3
03-09 Confidential
Afghanistan
Afghanistan under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation. This event is an opportunity to give a new
dynamism to our support to Afghanistan, in a regional
context.
x Such broad-based discussions are a tangible expression

that the situation in Afghanistan is a subject of not only
regional but also global concern.
4
03-09 Confidential
can make advances.
We also need to help the Afghans consolidate the gains
that have been made, including by rewarding poppy-free
provinces and focusing on alternative-livelihood
programmes.
5
03-09 Confidential
x For the United Nations, any reconciliation effort must be
Afghan-led, be in line with the Constitution and have the
consensus of key national and international actors.

needed. I would like your views on this matter.

[See generics]
6
03-09 Confidential
Iran
[See generics]
Iraq
7
03-09 Confidential
x Key issues still need to be resolved, including federalism,
oil sharing and disputed internal boundaries. The UN is
working to promote dialogue on these issues. I am also
committed to expanding the UN presence in Iraq,
security permitting.
8
03-09 Confidential
Georgia (if raised)
agreeable to all are required to effectively stabilize the
region, including around the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict
zone.

9
03-09 Confidential
respected, providing the conditions for eventual returns
and restoring a measure of trust between the sides
constitute key objectives for the UN.

Council by 15 May will be based on these considerations.
x My Special Representative will continue to closely consult

with Russia in that regard.
10
03-09 Confidential
MINURCAT
helicopters, a support unit, an engineer unit and a Level
II Hospital.
11
03-09 Confidential
Sudan
Climate Change (please see attached talking points)
12
Russia President Medvedev BN on Climate Change.doc Con

meeting with H.E. Mr. Dmitry Medvedev,
President of the Russian Federation
(Moscow, 27 March 2009, 1:00pm)
Climate Change
Russia’s General Positions
x Climate change is not a priority but Russia will take its share of
responsibility in accordance with national interests
x Russia’s GHG emissions are already significantly below 1990 levels
whereas some countries who demand further cuts have not
reduced emissions so far
x US must participate in a global agreement on climate change.
x Developing countries like China and India must also participate
with commitments. Russia does not view China as a developing
country, noting that it has huge foreign currency reserves.
x Major concern is having the forest issue fully incorporated in any
agreement.
x Russian economy not diversified enough. It is looking for
opportunities to assist in this diversification.
Russia’s Positions in UNFCCC Negotiations
Shared Vision for Long-Term Co-operative Action
Russia believes that:-

x 50% reductions of global GHG emissions by 2050 should be the
goal of the shared vision
x Contributions from all major economies, consistent with the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is key to
attaining this global goal
x The long term goal should be aspirational and should not be used
to distribute GHG emission reduction commitments among
countries
x Further focus should be given to determining the definitions for
‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries. Russia views the Annex I
1
Russia President Medvedev BN on Climate Change.doc Con
and non-Annex I terminology as obsolete and irrelevant to

present-day realities
x Differentiation of countries is required to develop long term co-
operative measures under the Convention, using parameters such
as GDP per capita, and other standard criteria describing social
and economic distinctions between countries
x Differentiation of countries should take into account those
countries whose economies are dependent on fossil fuels and
associated energy intensive products and who have serious
difficulties switching to alternatives
Mitigation
Russia believes that:-

x Mid-term targets should be based on national initiatives and
sectoral measures which are subject to international verification
x It is unreasonable to set a collective range for reduction of
emissions for a group of countries ,
x A range of 25 – 40% emissions reductions by 2020 in comparison
to 1990 levels by developed countries is just one of possible IPCC
scenarios and cannot be imposed
x Setting new legally binding commitments for the post-2012 regime
will be possible only under the following conditions:-
o The regime should not be punitive, enforcement means
should be carefully considered
o It should envisage effective incentives for participants to
fulfil their commitments
o It should contain procedures and mechanisms allowing, if
necessary, the adjustment of these commitments during
implementation
x Participation of developing countries in climate change mitigation
actions is crucial and can be ensured through the existing
Convention means. Kyoto rules make taking voluntary targets
difficult even for those who wish to do so. This was the focus of the
“Russian Proposal’ which was submitted at COP 11 in 2005,
considered later on but did not produce results
NB: Russia has not expressed a position on the issues of adaptation,

finance or governance in the UNFCCC Negotiations to date
2
Russia post-2012Korppoo.BN.doc
The Role of Russia in the Post-2012 Climate Politics
Policy briefing
Submitted 13 June 2008
Updated 22 September 2008
by
Dr Anna Korppoo1
the Finnish Institute of International Affairs
1
Email: anna.korppoo@upi-fiia.fi
Contents
ABSTRACT 3
1. BACKGROUND 4
2. HOW IS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

PROCEEDING IN RUSSIA? 5
2.1 COMPLIANCE 5
2.2 THE KYOTO MECHANISMS 6
2.3 DOMESTIC POLICIES AND MEASURES 6
3. STRONG TRENDS INFLUENCING RUSSIAN POST-2012 POSITION 8
3.1 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMISSIONS 8

3.2 PARTICIPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES 9
3.3 THE ROLE OF RUSSIA AS A GLOBAL PLAYER 9
3.4 IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 10
3.5 THE PUBLIC OPINION AND SCEPTICISM OF CLIMATE SCIENCE 11
3.6 ‘HOT AIR’ AS A CUSHION 13
4. WEAK TRENDS INFLUENCING RUSSIAN POST-2012 POSITION 13
4.1 RUSSIAN ROLE AS A FOSSIL FUEL EXPORTER 13

4.2. EXPERIENCES OF KYOTO IMPLEMENTATION AND PAMS 13
5. LATEST DISCUSSION 14
6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15
REFERENCE 19
2
Abstract
The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Russia was not based on environmental concern.
Unrelated benefits such as support to country’s WTO membership as well as other political
benefits were available, and no emission cuts were required until 2012. Under the post-Kyoto
agreement it seems likely that as an industrialised country Russia would be expected to
participate by accepting emission reduction commitments. This would be a dramatically
different world for Russia when compared to the Kyoto Protocol which offered a range of
benefits.
The Russian economy is growing fast and as a result also greenhouse gas emissions are
increasing. Economic growth is a political goal and financing emission reduction policies
could slow it down. There is no public pressure to join the global effort to combat climate
change as ‘climate hype’ experienced in Europe and the US has not reached Russia yet, and
many Russians believe that the country could benefit from climate change. Indeed, also the
IPCC is predicting various positive effects for the Russian territory during the early phase of
climate change but also negative impacts are forecast. However, also partly due to the climate
sceptical views in the Russian scientific community the benefits of climate change dominate
the Russian debate. As a result, it is not always fruitful to focus on the environmental
messages when discussing post-Kyoto pacts with Russia.
The Russians would like to see the country regain an important and credible role in world
politics and climate policy could be one arena. Also the participation of other countries in the
future pact is crucial; it is unlikely that Russia would join any agreement without the US and
the major developing countries participating as well. G8 could probably persuade Russia to
join a new pact if there was a consensus amongst the other members, however, Russia is
likely to join any opposition to binding targets inside G8. For Russia it will be important to be
able to transfer unused emission allowances for future use. This may be a useful tool to
persuade Russia to take commitments to reduce emissions as it cushions a significant amount
of future growth in emissions.
There is no official Russian position on post-2012 climate policy. Many of the points of
discussion currently relevant to Russian post-2012 debate were already raised during the
Kyoto ratification debate. Based on the current evidence, Russia is likely to be a reluctant
negotiation partner. The country may well sign up to a post-Kyoto deal if the others key
players commit themselves but is likely to join opposition to binding targets. Reluctance to
implement domestic policies and measures has been expressed, however, some business-as-
usual policies on the energy sector could deliver emission cuts.
Acknowledgements
This report was funded by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The author would also like
to acknowledge the following colleagues: Alexey Kokorin, WWF Russia, Oleg Pluzhnikov,
the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Sergey Tulinov, Roshydromet,
Michael Yulkin, CAMCO International, Arild Moe, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Nina
Tynkkynen, FIIA, Marja Koskela, Finnish Embassy in Moscow, and Matti Anttonen, the
Ambassador of Finland in Moscow. Thank you also to colleagues from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Finland and the Ministry of Environment of Finland for their comments on
the draft text.
3
1. Background
Russia is a key player in global climate politics both as an emitter of greenhouse gases as well
as a consumer and exporter of fossil fuels. The country has been in a position to gain from
international climate politics thus far as it was allocated a significant amount of surplus
emitting allowances for the first commitment period. This surplus can be sold either in the
international emissions trading market or through the Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism by
linking the allowances to emission reduction projects. Despite of these obvious gains
president Putin’s administration also required additional benefits from the ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol. The country was in a decisive position as after the withdrawal of the US from
the pact it would have been impossible to bring together the required 55% of the
industrialised country emissions without Russia. The EU support to the Russian WTO
membership finally persuaded Russia to ratify. However, these benefits seemed minor from
the Russian point of view as the potential main buyer of AAUs, the US, withdrew from the
pact and JI has proved to be bureaucratically too challenging for the Russian administration as
yet. Environmental concerns had little to do with the ratification2.
Thus far Russian climate politics have been driven by expected economic and political gains.
Due to the surplus allowances the country was not required to cut emissions and thus has had
no incentive to introduce any serious mitigation policies. The Russian emissions have been
growing since 1998 and in 2006 they were some 15% above the 1998 level in 2006. As a
result the emerging post-Kyoto regime with significant emission reduction commitments for
developed countries will be a dramatically different environment for Russia compared to the
first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. However, even though the growing trend in
the 2000s is clear, the Russian emissions remained 27% below 1990 level in 2006.3
There is very little knowledge of the Russian thinking on the post-2012 regime. At Bali, there
was no clear national position. However, an outline of the early Russian views was provided
by Alexandr Bedritsky, Head of the Roshydromet, in the Informal High-Level Event on
Climate Change and the United Nations in New York, 24 September 2007. Bedritsky argues
that the world has changed since the beginning of the early 1990s when the Kyoto Protocol
was negotiated, and that this should be reflected in the post-2012 regime. The efforts of the
countries with commitment under Kyoto would not be meaningful beyond 2012 without the
participation of other countries. He judges the prolongation of the Kyoto Protocol as
ineffective as the pact is imperfect. The national conditions of countries and their stage of
development should be taken into account when agreeing on quantitative commitments for
the post-2012 regime.4
Russia initiated a debate on voluntary commitments under both the Kyoto Protocol and the
Framework Convention in COP-12 in 2006. The aim is to allow countries which are keen to
take commitments, such as Belarus, to join the common effort easier as the current procedure
is bureaucratic. This proposal was also mentioned by Dr Bedritsky in his speech at the UN5
and it may reappear in the post-2012 discussions with Russia.
The current Russian debate in newspapers focuses more on which positions other countries
may be taking on the forthcoming regime but the options for Russia have not been discussed
2
For an overview of the arguments against ratification, see for instance Nikonov, Vyacheslav (2003).
The Kyoto Protocol: A Skeptic’s Opinion. Available at http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/3695-
kyotoprotocol-0. Accessed 10 June 2008.
3
Data from www.unfccc.int; Doyle, Alistair and Wynn, Gerard, G8 greenhouse gases down in 2006,
Reuters 23 May 2008. Available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSL2343063320080523. Accessed 12 June 2008.
4
Bedritsky, Alexandr (2007). Statement on behalf of the Russian Federation at the Informal High-
Level Event on Climate Change at the United Nations, New York, 24 September 2007.
5
Ibid.
4
much thus far. Climate related debates are focused on the delays and lost potential of JI
projects as well as on the Russian energy saving potential.
This paper analyses the current trends which are likely to influence Russian post-2012
position. The analysis is based on interviews with four Russian key experts in May 2008 as
well as a literature review and the background of the ratification debate. This paper seeks to
provide advice on how the post-Kyoto world looks like from the Russian point of view. The
main questions explored include the following:
x How is the implementation of the Protocol proceeding including the Kyoto
mechanisms?
x Which issues are defining the Russian post-2012 position?
x Do the Russians expect to continue without introducing any mitigation policies or are
there plans to accept emission reduction commitments beyond 2012?
x How does the Russian government picture itself in relation to the other negotiation
parties and interest groups in the post-2012 negotiations?
x How would Russian participation in international climate politics fit in its role as a
major fossil fuel exporter?
x How do the impacts of climate change influence the Russian position?
x What could be done to bring Russia into a post-2012 deal?
First, the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in Russia thus far is outlined. Second, the
strong trends influencing the Russian post-2012 position are outlined followed by the weaker
trends. Before concluding the very latest debate in Russia is summarised. The conclusion
provides a summary of the trends as well as policy recommendations on how to negotiate
with Russia on a post-2012 regime. Also further suggestions for bilateral cooperation with
Russia as well as topics of research are recommended.
2. How is the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol proceeding in Russia?
2.1 Compliance
For a long time development of Russian compliance institutions was extremely slow6 gaining
speed since 2006. In its National Report on the Kyoto commitments, Russia calculated its
Assigned Amount and described the process as required, including information on the
selection of sinks to be included. In 2007, Russia submitted its greenhouse gas (GHG)
inventory for years 1990-2004 in the Common Reporting Format and the National Inventory
Report, and since data has been submitted annually as required by the UN. The 2006 emission
data was submitted in May 2008. A greenhouse gas registry was prepared based on the 2006
law7 and Russia connected its registry to the UN International Transaction Log in April 2008
as the fourth country in the world8. Russia achieved full eligibility in June 2008.9 The Russian
6
See for instance Korppoo, Anna (2004). Russia and compliance under Kyoto: institutional approach.
Briefing Paper. Sustainable Development Programme, the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
7
Ɋɚɫɩɨɪɹɠɟɧɢɟ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɚ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɨɬ 20.02.2006 ʋ215-ɪ "Ɉ ɫɨɡɞɚɧɢɢ
ɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɝɨ ɪɟɟɫɬɪɚ ɭɝɥɟɪɨɞɧɵɯ ɟɞɢɧɢɰ".
8
Russian GHG registry’s website. Available at http://www.carbonunitsregistry.ru/news.htm. Accessed
9 June 2008.
5
government has also prepared a JI approval system as well as appointed Independent Entities
allowed to determine Russian projects under the Track 2 procedure of the UN.
2.2 The Kyoto mechanisms
Of the three Kyoto mechanisms, JI is the most relevant one for Russia. JI has not started in
Russia yet in the sense that no projects have been approved by the Russian government even
though Russia dominates the Track 2 project portfolio by providing some 70% of the
projects10.
The process of establishing JI project approval system which is a prerequisite for the issuance
of emission reduction units has been prolonged. The task was established by the National
Action Plan in September 2004. The main framework for project approval was adopted in
May 2007, however, major gaps still remained in this legislation, and further legal
development was required.11 The project submission service was launched in March 2008,
however, no projects have been officially approved. Nor is it clear when the actual approvals
will be issued as it recently appeared the composition of the project approval commission is
influenced by the recent change of government. The delay with the establishment of the
Russian JI approval system has certainly already led to a reduced use of the Russian JI
potential due to the lack of trust by many project developers. Due to the growing revenues
from oil and gas exports, revenue through JI is obviously not a political priority for Russia.
International emissions trading was the great hope for Russia to earn from the Kyoto Protocol,
however, the market has not started properly as yet, and in the absence of the US the windfall
status of Russian surplus makes it unlikely that the other Annex I countries would like to buy
it. It can be argued, however, that this may change when governments start realising that they
will fail to comply with Kyoto without the Russian surplus allowance also called ‘hot air’.
The idea of a Green Investment Scheme (GIS) was launched by the Russian government in
COP-6 when Russia stated that it would be willing to reinvest revenues from emissions
trading to further emission reduction projects. However, the main problem with GIS is the
lack of trust by the potential buyers that Russian would actually reinvest the money as agreed.
The lack of transparency of the Russian governmental activities adds to this dilemma, and the
suggested GIS systems seem so bureaucratic that it would be unlikely that the Russian
government would be interested in them or even able to implement them institutionally. Also
the diplomatic relations with other countries have hindered international emissions trading;
the Japanese government initiated negotiations with the Russian government on a transaction
under a GIS arrangement early 2008 but no common view on how to do this was established
between the countries.
2.3 Domestic policies and measures
Beyond the institutional requirements to establish the compliance instrument, the Russian
surplus allowances ensure that the country does not necessarily need any domestic policies
and measures (PAMs) to comply with Kyoto. The Russian PAMs have been modest in
9
10
Korppoo, Anna and Gassan-zade, Olga (forthcoming). Joint Implementation: Looking back and
forward. Climate Strategies synthesis report.
11
6
practice and the country has experienced problems with implementation of various planned
policies, for instance those aiming at improving the level of energy efficiency.12
The Progress Report on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol by Russia presents the
PAMs put in practice by 2006. 13 Macroeconomic policies are flagged as a set of policies
which influence the Russian emissions through the reduction of energy and carbon intensities
due to modernisation and restructuring of the economy. The energy sector is the most
significant carbon emitter and therefore also the main sector to cut emissions. The
governmental ‘Energy efficiency economy’ programme is reported as one of the main PAMs
implemented. According to the Progress Report, during the period 2002-2005 the programme
resulted to a reduction of emissions by some 50-60 Mt of CO2e per year. The share of the
reductions from the energy sector was on average some 50%. Improvements of technology in
electricity and heat production and restructuring of gas compressor stations on the gas sector
are mentioned as PAMs, however, no policy tools such as incentive structures how these
results were achieved have been specified. The housing sector is reported to have cut
emissions by some 8-9 Mt CO2e annually during 2002-2005 by for instance increasing energy
metering and switching to bio fuels. Also PAMs on transport, forestry and agricultural sectors
are discussed. It is difficult to see how the reported reduction of emissions by 50-60 Mt
annually during 2002-2005 corresponds to the dynamics of the Russian emissions which have
grown by some 130 Mt during this period (see Graph 1). Perhaps the emissions avoided may
be in question.
Russian GHG emissions

Mt
3200
3000
2800
2600
2400
2200
2000
1800
1600
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Graph 1. The development of Russian greenhouse gas emissions in 1990-2006.

Source of data: www.unfccc.int
12
13
Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɚɹ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɹ (2006). Ⱦɨɤɥɚɞ ɨɛ ɨɱɟɜɢɞɧɨɦ ɩɪɨɝɪɟɫɫɟ ɜ ɜɵɩɨɥɧɟɧɢɢ ɨɛɹɡɚɬɟɥɶɫɬɜ
ɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ ɮɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɩɨ Ʉɢɨɬɫɤɨɦɭ ɩɪɨɬɨɤɨɥɭ. Ɇɢɧɢɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɨ ɗɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ Ɋɚɡɜɢɬɢɹ ɢ
Ɍɨɪɝɨɜɥɢ.
7
3. Strong trends influencing Russian post-2012 position
3.1 Economic growth and emissions
The goal of doubling the gross domestic product (GDP) by 2010 which was set by president
Putin in 2000 may hinder accepting emission reduction commitments as many Russian
decision-makers fear that limiting the consumption of fossil fuels in order to cut emissions
would reduce the GDP growth. Similar argumentation was already used by Andrey Illarionov,
the advisor of president Putin, in the Kyoto ratification debate14. However, at the time many
Russian experts disagreed with Illarionov and argued that Kyoto would not limit Russian
emissions during the first commitment period.15 But based on the interviews, many Russian
experts now fear that emissions are indeed growing at a speed which would require the
Russian government to allocate funds for reducing emissions should Russia accept an
emission reduction target.
A negative attitude can also be observed in the public opinion as 45% of the public do not
agree with spending government money on cutting emissions while 28% believe that only
limited resources could be used for tackling global warming (for further details on the
division see Section 3.5)16.
There are several reasons why emissions may grow. Power generation, which now accounts
for 31 % of emissions, is of particular significance. The consumption of electricity is
increasing due to the improving standard of living of the population. Since generation
capacity is fully utilized already the increased demand leads to the reintroduction of old
inefficient electricity generation capacity which was closed when the electricity consumption
collapsed in the early 1990s. In addition, especially small generators may switch from gas to
the more carbon intensive coal as the price of the latter is expected to remain lower. There
have also been calls for a large scale replacement of gas by coal in power generation in the
longer term due to the expected problems with balancing supply and demand for gas. In
addition, it was argued in the interviews that the efficiency of energy use and reduction of
energy intensity of the economy which was expected to take place ‘automatically’ due to the
development of the economy through modernisation and restructuring of the economy17 has
not happened in Russia thus far.
Some Russian experts refer to the peaking of emissions at a certain point of development of
each economy. The reason why Russia should be allowed to increase its emissions beyond
2012 is that the country has not reached this peak as yet and needs to develop further. This
view would not support accepting emission reduction commitments. Indeed, some Russian
experts emphasised the changes that have taken place in the world since the Kyoto Protocol
was negotiated in the early 1990s, especially referring to the development of transition
economies as well as the Asian emerging economies, and called for differentiated
14
Hopkins, Philip (2004). Kyoto kills growth says Putin’s chief economist, the Age, 9 December 2004.
Available at http://www.theage.com.au/news/Business/Kyoto-kills-growth-says-Putin-chief-
economist/2004/12/08/1102182359957.html. Accessed 5 June 2008.
15
For a review of Russian experts disagreeing with Illarionov’s point see Muller, Benito (2004). The
Kyoto Protocol: Russian Opportunities, Briefing Note, the Royal Institute of International Affairs,
March 2004, p.2-6.
16
17
More about the basics of the impact of economic developments to GHG emissions see for instance
IPCC (2007). Fourth Assessment Report: Mitigation of Climate Change, p.177.
8
responsibilities for countries based on their circumstances. This was also recognised as one of
the issues G8 countries agree on in the Japan meeting in March 2008. 18 Due to this, the
country groups under the Kyoto Protocol should be revised to allow for the changing levels of
development. It may be difficult to place Russia into any group. It was suggested by an
interview that the best way could be to establish clear criteria for dividing countries between
groups based on their ability to act such as GDP/capita.
3.2 Participation of other countries
Participation of the other key emitters is a prerequisite for the Russian government to join a
post-Kyoto pact due to political reasons but also because the Kyoto Protocol is not regarded
as an effective pact in Russia. This is because the impact of the Kyoto commitments to the
global emissions is minimal as the US and developing countries continue to increase their
emissions. These views are linked to the previous debates in Russia as during the Kyoto
ratification discussion Russian Kyoto opponents often referred to the absence of the US and
China from the pact as a reason not to ratify.
Especially the participation of the US and the large developing countries is important. It
would be difficult for Russia to accept emission cuts if the lack of action by the US which has
much higher standard of living than Russia continued. The US is also seen as an equal partner
for Russia in foreign policy.
The Group of eight (G8) is a key actor to encourage Russia to join a post-2012 pact. In this
group Russia sees itself in the company of other significant powers in the world. The EU
countries are trying to use G8 as a forum to lobby the other, potentially difficult members of
the group to join a post-Kyoto pact. However, Japan and the US are sceptical about a Kyoto-
type burden sharing based sanctioned system. As a result, Russia could easily support these
views in order to avoid binding targets. However, if the other G8 members can pull a deal
together, it would be very difficult for Russia to oppose and break the G8 consensus. Some
basic principles on post-Kyoto regime were already agreed on amongst G8. 19 One of the
advantages of Russia participating in G8 is that the government has to present a position
based on credible background research in order not to lose face in front of G8 which
encourages the preparatory work of the Russian administration.
The participation of other key countries could either encourage or discourage Russia to join
depending on how the global dialogue develops. Also the views of the new US president may
influence the Russian approach.
3.3 The Role of Russia as a Global Player
Also the prestige of Russia as an international player is extremely important in the climate
arena. As the Russian leadership is seeking to regain status as a world power, Russia may
want to play a more serious, and independent, role in the climate negotiations. This is the
position the Russian government and president Putin have been trying to reach in the 2000s in
order to make up for the loss of the super power status due to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Membership of G8 is seen to add to the prestige of Russia as it is recognised as an important
player in the world20.
18
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/warm/cop/dialogue0803.html. Accessed 12 June 2008.
19
Ibid.
20
For a wider discussion on the topic see for instance Tynkkynen, Nina (2008). Russia, a Great
ecological Power in global climate policy? Framing climate change as a policy problem in Russian
9
Such an approach was clearly observable already during the Kyoto ratification discussion as
president Putin wanted to see Russia as the main facilitator of the Kyoto Protocol in the
international arena.21 It was also emphasised by many Russian experts during the Russian
ratification debate that it was important that the Russian decision was seen as a well-informed
one and rational. This was partly due to the institutional chaos in the last days of the Soviet
Union and the early years of post-Soviet Russia when officials often gave statements which
could not be regarded as the official view of the Russian government. As a result, the Russian
views were undermined in the international media and debate. This was seen to reduce the
credibility of the whole country in the international arena, and therefore, undesirable.
The role of Russia as an important global actor and a constructive partner for other major
players such as the members of G8 will without a doubt be an important element which could
bring Russia into the post-Kyoto deal. The fact that the Russian government does not want to
be stamped as a ‘rogue state’ in climate terms may allow political pressure to persuade Russia
to join. Russia wants to be seen as a responsible global player doing its bit.
Based on the G8 Summit in Japan in July 2008, it seems like there might be some opposition
to a post-Kyoto deal in the G8 as the declaration on climate change was weak and the US led
by president Bush continued to oppose a meaningful deal. For instance, no base year on the
suggested emission cuts by 50% was agreed on.22
3.4 Impacts of climate change
The impacts of climate change are not regarded only as negative in Russia. One interviewee
argued that even though based on science the impacts of climate change in the Russian
territory were expected to be 70% negative and only 30% beneficial, many people in Russia
still believe that the ratio is rather 50%-50% respectively.
The fourth assessment report of the IPCC does not predict just doom for Russia either. One of
the main gains is the increase of winter temperatures, most significant projected to take place
in the North of Russia. This leads to a decreased need for space heating which reduces energy
consumption. Agricultural production potential could increase in higher latitudes, however,
the conditions in the currently most fertile agricultural land in Central Asia would suffer from
more frequent droughts. The boreal forest will shift northwards but in case of Russia there is
space in the north for the forest to shift.23
There are negative impacts also. The frequency and extent of forest fires and fires of Siberia
peat lands is projected to increase. This could lead to significant economic losses and cause
pollution dangerous to human health. Another hazard to human health are spreading diseases
as natural habitats of vector-borne and water-borne diseases such as malaria are likely to
public discussion, in Tynkkynen, Nina (2008). Constructing the Environmental Regime between
Russia and Europe. Academic Dissertation, Acta Universitatis Tamperensis 1301.
21
Korppoo, Anna and Moe, Arild (2007). Russian Climate Politics: Light at the End of the Tunnel?
Climate Strategies Briefing Paper, April 2007. Available at http://www.climate-
22
Main Points of the Outputs of the G8 Environment Ministers Meeting 2008; Telegraph.co.uk, 9 July
2008, Divisions emerge over G8 climate change goals. Available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/main.jhtml?xml=/earth/2008/07/09/eag8109.xml; Telegraph.co.uk, 8
July 2008 Climate Change Deal Agreed by G8 Nations. Available at
23
IPCC (2007). Climate Change 2007. Impacts, Adaptation and Variability. Working Group II Report.
Chapters 10 and 12.
10
expand towards north. Floods and increased runoff of rivers due to melting permafrost has
already caused serious problems in the banks of river Lena. Melting permafrost will also
cause landslides and degeneration of forest ecosystems as well as change of strength and
bearing capacity of the ground which has negative impacts on settlements built on permafrost.
Sea-level rise is made worse by erosion in the Arctic coasts as declining sea ice will allow
higher waves and storm surges to hit the shore causing an annual coastal recession up to 4-6
meters. The most vulnerable sector taking a hit by climate change in the Russian territory is
likely to be biodiversity.24
Also a group of Russian experts agree that the Russian economy is likely to benefit from the
impacts of climate change in the format of higher agricultural yields caused by a longer
growth season and carbon fertilisation effect, lower human mortality at wintertime due to
warmer winters, lower heating costs as well as potential boost of tourism. Opening of the
Northern sea routes will provide new opportunities for shipping as well as gas and oil
exploration and transportation. They conclude that regions on low latitudes are more
vulnerable while the losers of climate change are local livelihoods and biodiversity. But they
also refer to the expected damage to roads, buildings and oil and gas mining facilities located
on the melting permafrost. Melting permafrost and related floods may increase the costs of
pipeline construction. Negative consequences of the warmer winters have also been already
experienced in Archangelsk region where the snowy season when it is easier to transport logs
from forests has shortened. The cultures of indigenous peoples are also estimated to be at risk
due to the impacts of climate change in the Arctic. However, the impacts of climate change
on the Arctic part of Russia seem less relevant as the population density in this area is very
low.25 Some negative impacts such as the melting permafrost are also seen as a technical, and
therefore, manageable problem by some Russian scientists.26
However, gaining benefits from climate change in practice is likely to require adaptation
activities, for instance a new agricultural policy. At the same time the negative impacts of
climate change in the Russian territory may cause much more damage if no planning,
management and adaptation measures are adopted.27 In practice, the institutional weaknesses
of the Russian administration which lead to the lack and slowness of response could cause
more climate change related damage in the Russian territory than is expected.
Even if the impacts of climate change were not flagged as an important element influencing
the Russian position on post-Kyoto, the fact that benefits are projected underlines that
environmental impacts may not be the most fruitful way of framing climate change when
negotiating a post-Kyoto regime.
3.5 The public opinion and scepticism of climate science
24
Ibid.
25
26
See for instance professor Oleg Anisimov’s interview in SciencePoles, 19 April 2007. Future
Impacts of Climate Change in the Arctic. Available at
http://www.sciencepoles.org/index.php?articles/future_impacts_climate_change_the_arctic&s=2&rs=h
ome&uid=949&lg=en. Accessed 10 June 2008.
27
11
During the Kyoto ratification there was hardly any public pressure expressing concern of
climate change while environmental issues were not important in the election either.28 The
sceptics also contributed to the Kyoto ratification debate in Russia29.
Many Russian scientists remain sceptical of human induced climate change as many of them
believe that the cause is rather a natural phenomenon or that the human induced problem can
be solved by technology. Especially professor Yuri Izrael has given a voice to the climate
sceptics. For instance in April 2007 he was stating that ‘[T]he panic over the global warming
is totally unjustified. There is no serious threat to the climate.’ He recognises that climate
change is happening but questions how we should react on it and suggesting an aerosol
spreading based technique instead of emission reductions. 30 There are also various other
sceptical views on climate science.31
The official line of the Russian government in the interviews was that the administration
supports the findings of the IPCC32 but still the Russian administration experiences hardly any
pressure from the public to take on commitments. The Russian Centre for the Research of the
Public Opinion conducted a poll on global warming by asking 1600 Russians around the
country about their views in March 2007. 62% of Russians believe that global warming is a
real threat. 45% believe that global warming is already happening while 17% think that it will
start happening soon. Only 6% argue that global warming will not happen at all. 45% believe
that global warming will cause catastrophic effect, and 29% think that climate gets somewhat
worse. 10% expect climate to improve on some regions. 59% believe that the impacts of
climate change are negative against 18% who believe that they are positive. 23% have no
opinion. Respondents in the cold regions are more positive about the impacts of climate
change than those in the hot areas. 17% agree that as much money as is needed should be
used for mitigation while 28% believe that limited resources could be used. 24% of
respondents think that government revenue would be better spent on social programmes and
other things rather than mitigating climate change. 21% believe that it would be impossible to
prevent climate change from happening.33 These results are quite encouraging and may show
an increasing awareness of the problem of climate change. However, the experts interviewed
agreed that climate change is not really in the public agenda like in Europe, and that the
‘climate hype’ has not reached Russia yet.
It could be argued that the newly found climate awareness has not politicized the issue of
climate change as yet. In practice, people focus on more acute problems such as social
welfare and local pollution problems rather climate change. Also the sceptical views by the
Russian scientists blur the picture. In addition, the lack of civil society and democracy
significantly limit the importance of public opinion to climate politics in Russia.
28
Kotov, Vladimir (2004). The EU-Russia ratification deal: the risks and advantages of an informal
agreement, International Review for Environmental Strategies, 5 (1), pp. 157-65.
29
Korppoo, Anna, Karas, Jacqueline and Grubb, Michael (2006), Russia and the Kyoto Protocol:
Opportunities and Challenges. Chatham House / Brookings.pp. 12-13.
30
Izrael, Yuri (2007). Climate: putting panic in perspective, RIA Novosti, 18 Aril 2007. Available at
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070418/63856919.html. Accessed 22 May 2008.
31
For an overview see Zamolodchikov, Dmitry (2007). The Heated Debate on Climate Change.
Available at http://www.boloji.com/environment/130.htm. Accessed 10 June 2008.
32
See for instance Submission from the Russian Federation, 24 August 2007, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address
climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention.
33
12
3.6 ‘Hot air’ as a cushion
The Russian surplus allowances under Kyoto have been seen as an element which could
undermine the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol. When it comes to joining a
post-Kyoto pact, the Russian surplus could play an important role allowing Russia to accept
emission reduction commitments which seem difficult to accept due to the dynamics of the
economic development and GHG emissions. As the unused allowances can be banked to the
next commitment period under Kyoto it could be feasible that Russia would use its surplus
allowance to even out its further commitments beyond 2012. Russia received further surplus
allowances recently as a result of the revision of 1990 data34.
But it could be argued that the Kyoto allowances may not be directly, or even indirectly,
transferred to the post-Kyoto regime especially should the basic approach of the new pact
dramatically differ from the Kyoto Protocol. In this case Russia would most probably argue
that the surplus should be allowed to the new system but this may be difficult for developing
countries to approve. Denying the use of the Russian surplus on the next period would
without a doubt be experienced as a betrayal and may distort negotiations with Russia.
However, allowing Russia to transfer its ‘hot air’ under the post-Kyoto pact would without a
doubt be politically a highly sensitive issue.
4. Weak trends influencing Russian post-2012 position
4.1 Russian role as a fossil fuel exporter
Russia’s role as a fossil fuel exporter is not linked to climate change pacts as climate policy is
a marginal policy area which has no impact on a major policy such a fuel exports. There are
no signs of the demand for oil and gas reducing globally and Russia has enough demand for
its fuels so climate policy does not seem to be an issue. The Russian policy-makers may not
regard for instance EU climate policies and targets as relevant to Russian exports partly
because they are either not familiar with them or do not believe that the targets will be
achieved in such extent that the demand for fossil fuels would decrease. In addition, the
Chinese demand for oil and gas could replace that of the EU.
Based on this evidence, it seems unlikely that Russia would take a similar stance to climate
diplomacy as for instance Saudi-Arabia which demands compensation for lost revenues from
oil exports in the future due to international climate policies. The Russian fossil fuel
industries have not expressed much interest in the national climate change policies thus far
which may be a sign of the issues not being linked very closely.
In addition, officially Russia is not seen as a long-term fossil fuel exporter due to increasing
domestic demand, and as a result the impacts by climate policies on fuel exports on longer
term are not considered relevant.
4.2. Experiences of Kyoto implementation and PAMs
34
Doyle, Alistair and Wynn, Gerard, Russia wins new greenhouse gas emissions rights, Reuters 29
May 2008. Available at http://in.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idINL2325303220080529. Accessed 11
June 2008.
13
Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol has experienced mainly institutional problems in
Russia. It took a long time to establish a domestic compliance system and the JI approval
system which at the time of writing is still not functional. It seems already now that the scope
of JI in Russia during the first commitment period is much less significant due to the
institutional problems than the available potential of projects. The failure of JI could have a
negative impact on the Russian post-2012 position as this may cause a disappointment; the
Kyoto Protocol is seen as a representative of the west and if policy-makers in Russia feel that
the mechanism has not delivered what was promised, it may be ignored that the Russian
institutional problems were to blame. It is difficult to judge at this point when JI will have
conclusively failed and there is still a chance that Russia will manage to approve a significant
amount of projects during the first commitment period. It would be a bad sign though if
Russia had not approved any JI projects by the end of 2008.
PAMs have not been central for Russian climate policy so far. However, some business-as-
usual policies which are aiming at boosting the Russian economic growth may deliver
emission reductions in the future if implemented properly. According to Russian sources,
Vsevolod Gavrilov from the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade referred to such
policies in his presentation 29 April 2008 when arguing that Russia will need to continue
developing; his comments were reported in the western media as a statement against future
carbon caps 35 . Such policies include increasing energy prices and new energy efficiency
policies. Russian domestic gas prices have been increasing significantly the last few years. In
2007 they rose by 15%, and from 2008 a further 25%.36 The official plan is to reach a level in
2011 where profitability of exports and deliveries to the domestic market is the same
(adjusted for extra transportation costs and export taxes etc.).37 The energy efficiency package
announced by the new president in June 200838 was also mentioned in the interviews as a
serious attempt to tackle the low efficiency of energy use by using more advanced policies
which establish incentives for businesses and consumers to save energy. Even though the
track record of implementing energy efficiency policies in Russian is poor39, the fact that
domestic energy prices have been increasing according to the established policies during the
last two years suggests that there might also be momentum for implementing energy
efficiency policies.
Perhaps the best way to demonstrate Russia that it would be possible to accept emission cuts
would be to support the implementation of the above mentioned PAMs.
5. Latest discussion
The Russian government had planned to officially consider the Russian post-2012 position
during the first half of 2008 but due to the reshuffle of the government the meeting was
postponed to July 2008. It is yet to be seen whether the debate by the government will kick-
start an active domestic debate in Russia on the post-2012 regime.
35
http://in.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idINL2872408920080428. Accessed 11 June 2008.
36
37
Federal Tariff Service (2005). Information letter of the Federal Tariff Service, 28 June 2005, No ɋɇ-
3923/9. Available at http://www.fstrf.ru/press/info/1. Accessed 29 January 2008.
38
Prime-TASS, 4 June 2008, Russia's Medvedev inks decree on increasing energy efficiency. Available at
http://www.prime-tass.com/news/print.asp?id=439469&topicid=68. Accessed 11 June 2008.
39
14
The preparations for the next COP are under way as an inter-agency group is drafting
background material, including emission scenarios, for the decision-makers to decide on a
position for Poznan. Also an economic policy is under preparation to cover development until
2020. These policies will establish a framework for Russian future climate policy, however,
Russian programmes tend to have a blue-skies approach and lack realistic plans and PAMs.
This can make it more difficult to decide what post-2012 commitment would be possible for
Russia to achieve in the future.
Public debate started when Mr Gavrilov of the Ministry of Development and Trade claimed
that Russia has no plans to cap emissions. As a reaction the speaker of the Upper House of the
Federal Assembly, The Federation Council, Sergei Mironov, argued that the Russian GHG
emissions should be limited. However, in 2007 Mr Mironov had still argued that climate
change is not taking place which may discredit his recent position. Also the Deputy Minister
of Natural Resources, Semyon Levi, has presented his view by saying that Russia is willing to
continue talks about a two-fold emission cuts by 2050 but added that such regime should not
be legally binding 40 . These views cannot be seen to represent the official position of the
government as the government has not decided on its position as yet. Such views by
government officials and policy-makers are very typical and dominated for instance the
ratification debate.
The G8 meeting in Japan in July 2008 was the first one for president Dmitry Medvedev. In
his press conference following the summit, the president mentioned climate change but did
not emphasise it. He stated that every country has to take its economic circumstances into
account which is in line with the findings of this study. However, his focus on energy
efficiency as a separate policy was encouraging, and supports the argument that it would be
better to focus on other elements than the environment when discussing climate change with
Russia. Energy efficiency could be a useful and mutually relevant topic.41
6. Conclusion and recommendations
The Russian position on post-2012 is still a moving target to study as it remains under
development. This may be the case until the Copenhagen meeting in 2009 and in perhaps
even beyond. Waiting to establish a position may be a rational option for Russia as it would
be easier to evaluate the Russian options against more concrete proposals of the post-Kyoto
regime. However, Alexandr Bedritsky raised the main elements in his UN speech; many of
these views were also confirmed by the interviewees.
The Russian government will emphasise the differentiated responsibilities and change of
world since Kyoto was negotiated referring to the need for Russia to continue development
and emit more. As a result, Russia will be a reluctant negotiation party as a post-Kyoto pact as
beneficial for Russia as the Kyoto Protocol would be an unrealistic expectation. If, as many
believe, the Russian emissions will grow in tandem with economic growth during the post-
Kyoto period, the country will face an entirely new situation; the climate world will be
requiring emission cuts which it did not expect before at the same time when the domestic
circumstances seem to become less favourable for this. It would be politically difficult for the
Russian government to accept measures that could be seen to limit economic growth, and thus,
welfare.
40
ITAR TASS, 27 May 2008. Russia ready to consider twofold greenhouse gas emission reduction.
Available at http://enews.mcot.net/view.php?id=4454. Accessed 27 May 2008.
41
Press conference by Dmitry Medvedev 9 July 2008 following the G8 Summit in Toyako, Japan.
Available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-130-36.cfm.
15
The Russian government does not have any strong internal incentive to join a post-Kyoto pact
as the Russian territory is expected to initially gain from climate change and there is no public
pressure to join the pact. As a result, the pressure to join should come from the governments
of other key emitters including the US and the EU. Climate cooperation could thus become
more desirable as Russia wants to regain its status as a key international actor. G8 could be a
useful arena for the larger EU member states to lobby Russia to seriously participate in the
negotiations. However, if there will be other countries opposing a meaningful post-Kyoto pact
within G8 Russia could well join the opposition even though the Russian government would
not be willing to break a G8 consensus on its own.
The Kyoto Protocol is not seen as an environmental pact in Russia but rather as a tool for
wealth redistribution as demonstrated by the country seeking to gain from its ratification.
Given the hopes to benefit from climate change as well as the lack of domestic pressure to
join a post-Kyoto pact, it would not be fruitful to approach a post-Kyoto pact as an
environmental issue with Russia. More useful ways to address it could be the mutual goals of
the Russian government on economy and the post-Kyoto pact on emissions; further
modernisation of the economy could help to sustain the growth of the economy whilst the
emissions would decline. There are some promising policies in the energy sector that could be
used as examples, however, it would be difficult to argue against the logic of emissions
growing in tandem with the economy per se.
The surplus allowances - ‘hot air’ - could facilitate Russia joining the pact as it could cushion
the expected Russian emission reduction target. However, utilising the banked surplus outside
Kyoto is not a self-evident issue and thus is open for negotiations.
Many of the above issues were already raised during the Kyoto ratification debate which
demonstrates that the Russian attitudes have probably not changed much since. As a result, it
is possible that also unrelated benefits will be sought against joining the pact. It is impossible
to predict what this could be.
Table 1 outlines the main trends influencing the Russian post-2012 position. The strong
trends are highlighted.
16
Trend Positive Negative
Economic growth and thus Expected to improve energy Need to develop requires
growing emissions efficiency ‘automatically’ but space for increased emissions
little sign of it in Russia and excludes accepting
commitments to cut emissions
Participation of others If other key countries reach a If other key countries oppose a
consensus on a post-Kyoto regime with binding
regime, especially in G8, commitments Russia is likely to
Russia is likely to join for join the opposition
political reasons
Public pressure The public is gaining awareness The public awareness of the
of the negative impacts of dangers of climate change is
climate change and the need to still too low to generate public
react in Russia pressure in Russia to join
post-Kyoto, other issues are
more important. No ‘climate
hype’.
Russian role as a global player Russia could gain political N/A

points and status as a global
actor by participating a post-
Kyoto regime.
‘Hot air’ If surplus allowances can be It remains unclear whether

banked it could cushion banked surplus allowances can
Russian emission reduction be used under the new pact,
commitments and make them especially, should it be separate
more acceptable. from the current Kyoto regime.
Denying banking would be
regarded as a betrayal.
Impacts of climate change in Some consequences of climate The impacts of climate change
Russian territory change already experienced are expected to be initially
locally which may support positive by both the Russian
joining. public and the IPCC. This
makes it less important to
combat climate change.
Experiences of Kyoto Many recently introduced Should the implementation of

implementation and PAMs Russian business-as-usual the Kyoto mechanisms fail in
policies on the energy sector Russia (no success with JI so
could reduce emissions, and far), the disappointment may
therefore, could deliver reflect negatively on the debate
emission cuts required under a concerning a new regime.
new regime.
Russia role as a fossil fuel Lack of link between climate In theory climate policies could
exporter change and energy exports: no reduce the demand for Russian
negative impacts are expected fossil fuels.
due to global climate politics
Table 1. Summary of trends.
17
The main policy recommendations for the other major participants including the EU:
x When negotiating with Russia it would be fruitful to focus on other aspects of climate
change than the environment as environmental concern cannot drive the Russian
approach. It may be more useful to focus on the Russian interest in being recognised
as an international actor or some concrete policies such as energy efficiency which
carry economic interest;
x Consensus within G8 on post-Kyoto would be difficult for Russian to break. This
could be a way forward with Russia, especially for the large EU member states
participating in the work of the G8;
x Russian policy-makers should be engaged in a long-term dialogue and be invited to
participate in talks behind the closed doors on the future of global climate policy.
This is something concrete the EU could do to involve Russia in the negotiation
process;
x ‘Hot air’ cushion can be a useful tool when negotiating with Russia and its status
should be recognised when defining the strategy to bring Russia into the pact;
x Analyses by foreign researchers are not credible in Russia, and their influence should
not be overestimated. If the Russian scientists are distributing incorrect information,
the views of the public cannot be changed by providing counterarguments by foreign
researchers. Whenever possible it is best to involve Russian experts in key roles in
research projects to gain credibility or try to demonstrate the message indirectly, for
instance, by supporting Russian domestic emission reduction policies.
This study only provides a short overview the Russian debate on post-Kyoto politics and the
impacts of climate change on the Russian territory. Further research is required, especially as
the Russian post-Kyoto debate is only emerging. Also regional or local estimates of the
impacts of climate change may help to demonstrate the expected impacts of climate change in
more concrete terms. It may also be useful to publicize the negative impacts of climate
change on the Russian territory such as the devastating impacts of the melting permafrost at
the banks of river Lena42.
It would be beneficial to engage Russia into bilateral cooperation with Finland to build
climate related relations outside the negotiation process. Some potential foci of such
cooperation could include developing regional adaptation plans, cooperation on the forest
sector and energy efficiency related measures in Russia as well as research cooperation on
economic modelling for estimating the impacts of joining a post-Kyoto pact. Finland has
relevant experience for developing adaptation plans in the northern regions. Forestry sector in
Russia suffers from forest fires as well as difficulties with logging on mild winters due to the
lack of forest roads. The experiences of the Finnish forestry sector may be applicable to
Russia on these issues. The emerging energy efficiency policy as well as the increasing
energy prices in Russia are very promising trends which may reduce emissions in the future.
It could be useful to provide support to the implementation of these policies on practical level
as this has been the Russian weak point in the past. Finland has a lot of useful experience of,
for instance, energy efficiency policies and their implementation.
42
18
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Korppoo, Anna (2004). Russia and compliance under Kyoto: institutional approach. Briefing
Paper. Sustainable Development Programme, the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Korppoo, Anna (2007). Drivers and Barriers to Energy Efficiency in the Russian Pulp and
Paper Industry. PhD Thesis, Imperial College London.
Korppoo, Anna and Gassan-zade, Olga (forthcoming). Joint Implementation: Looking back
and forward. Climate Strategies synthesis report.
Korppoo, Anna and Moe, Arild (2007). Russian Climate Politics: Light at the End of the
Tunnel? Climate Strategies Briefing Paper, April 2007. Available at http://www.climate-
19
Korppoo, Anna, Karas, Jacqueline and Grubb, Michael (eds.) (2006). Russia and the Kyoto
Protocol: Opportunities and Challenges. Chatham House / Brookings.
Kotov, Vladimir (2004). The EU-Russia ratification deal: the risks and advantages of an
informal agreement, International Review for Environmental Strategies, 5 (1), pp. 157-65.
List of the status of eligibility of Annex I countries under Articles 6, 12 and 17, 11 May 2008.
Available at
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/compliance/enforcement_branch/application/pdf/eligibil
ity_list_080511.pdf. Accessed 9 June 2008.
Main Points of the Outputs of the G8 Environment Ministers Meeting 2008.
Muller, Benito (2004). The Kyoto Protocol: Russian Opportunities, Briefing Note, the Royal
Institute of International Affairs, march 2004, p.2-6.
Nikonov, Vyacheslav (2003). The Kyoto Protocol: A Skeptic’s Opinion. Available at

http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/3695-kyotoprotocol-0. Accessed 10 June 2008.
Perelet, Renat, Pegov, Serguey and Yulkin, Michael (2007). Human Development Report
2007/2008. Climate Change: Russia Country Paper, December 2007.
PointCarbon (2007), JI Track 1/Track 2 eligibility in Eastern Europe.
Press conference by Dmitry Medvedev 9 July 2008 following the G8 Summit in Toyako,
Japan. Available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-130-36.cfm. Accessed 22
September 2008.
Prime-TASS, 4 June 2008, Russia's Medvedev inks decree on increasing energy efficiency.
Available at http://www.prime-tass.com/news/print.asp?id=439469&topicid=68. Accessed 11
June 2008.
http://in.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idINL2872408920080428. Accessed 11 June
2008.
Russian GHG registry’s website. Available at http://www.carbonunitsregistry.ru/news.htm.

SciencePoles, 19 April 2007. Future Impacts of Climate Change in the Arctic. Available at
http://www.sciencepoles.org/index.php?articles/future_impacts_climate_change_the_arctic&s
=2&rs=home&uid=949&lg=en. Accessed 10 June 2008.
Submission from the Russian Federation, 24 August 2007, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate
change by enhancing implementation of the Convention.
Telegraph.co.uk, 8 July 2008 Climate Change Deal Agreed by G8 Nations. Available at

Accessed 22 September 2008.
20
Telegraph.co.uk, 9 July 2008, Divisions emerge over G8 climate change goals. Available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/main.jhtml?xml=/earth/2008/07/09/eag8109.xml. Accessed
22 September 2008.
Tynkkynen, Nina (2008). Russia, a Great ecological Power in global climate policy? Framing
climate change as a policy problem in Russian public discussion, in Tynkkynen, Nina (2008).
Constructing the Environmental Regime between Russia and Europe. Academic Dissertation,
Acta Universitatis Tamperensis 1301.
Zamolodchikov, Dmitry (2007). The Heated Debate on Climate Change. Available at

http://www.boloji.com/environment/130.htm. Accessed 10 June 2008.
ȼɫɟɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɢɣ ɰɟɧɬɪ ɢɡɭɱɟɧɢɹ ɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɨɝɨ ɦɧɟɧɢɹ, ɝɥɨɛɚɥɶɧɨɟ ɩɨɬɟɩɥɟɧɢɟ: ɦɢɮ

ɢɥɢ ɪɟɚɥɶɧɨɫɬɶ?, Press release, 4 April 2007. Available at http://wciom.ru/novosti/press-
vypuski/press-vypusk/single/4339.html. Accessed 11 June 2008.
Ɋɚɫɩɨɪɹɠɟɧɢɟ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɚ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɨɬ 20.02.2006 ʋ215-ɪ "Ɉ

ɫɨɡɞɚɧɢɢ ɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɝɨ ɪɟɟɫɬɪɚ ɭɝɥɟɪɨɞɧɵɯ ɟɞɢɧɢɰ".
Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɚɹ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɹ (2006). Ⱦɨɤɥɚɞ ɨɛ ɨɱɟɜɢɞɧɨɦ ɩɪɨɝɪɟɫɫɟ ɜ ɜɵɩɨɥɧɟɧɢɢ

ɨɛɹɡɚɬɟɥɶɫɬɜ ɪɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ ɮɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ ɩɨ Ʉɢɨɬɫɤɨɦɭ ɩɪɨɬɨɤɨɥɭ. Ɇɢɧɢɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɨ
ɗɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɨɝɨ Ɋɚɡɜɢɬɢɹ ɢ Ɍɨɪɝɨɜɥɢ.
21
Russia PM Putin TPs-with Pol revisions TPs.docCleared by Political Unit 25-03-09
Confidential

H.E. Mr. Vladimir Putin,
Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation
Moscow, 27 March 2009 (time TBC)
Financial crisis [see generics] 1

Climate Change [also see generics] 1
Afghanistan 2
Middle East Peace Process [see generics] 3
Iran 3
Iraq 3
Georgia 4
Kosovo 5
Financial crisis
[See generics]
Climate change
x I urge your personal engagement and leadership in

the overall process leading to Copenhagen. It is
important for Russia to set its mid-term targets, like
all other developed countries would have done by the
June session of the negotiations.
1
Confidential
x A Copenhagen agreement would offer Russia a

chance to diversity its commodities-based export
economy. Building on its scientific prowess, Russia
could capture a competitive advantage in renewables
and energy efficiency.
Afghanistan
opportunity to give a new dynamism to our support to


can make advances.

2
Confidential

actors.

matter.
Middle East peace process [See generics]
Iran [See generics]
Iraq

boundaries. The UN is working to promote dialogue
on these issues. I am also committed to expanding
the UN presence in Iraq, security permitting.
3
Confidential
Georgia
conflict zone.


x The recommendations I will submit to the

Security Council by 15 May will be based on these
considerations.


4
Confidential
Kosovo [If raised]
Kosovo within the framework of resolution 1244. As
far as UNMIK reconfiguration is concerned, it is

international actors, to continue supporting the role
of a reconfigured UNMIK in Kosovo.
x I had a good discussion on these issues with

President Tadiü earlier this week.

meetings.
5
Russia PM Putin TPs-with Pol revisions TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit 25-03-09
Confidential
H.E. Mr. Vladimir Putin,
Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

Climate Change [also see generics] 2
Afghanistan 4
Iran 7
Iraq 7
Georgia 9
Kosovo 12
1
Confidential
Financial crisis
[See generics]
Climate change
x To strike a Copenhagen deal, the world needs Russia. As
a P5 member and global power, Russia’s support,
starting at the Head of State/Government level, is crucial
to bringing others on board.
2
Confidential
overall process leading to Copenhagen. It is important for
Russia to set its mid-term targets, like all other
x A Copenhagen agreement would offer Russia a chance to
diversity its commodities-based export economy.
Building on its scientific prowess, Russia could capture a
competitive advantage in renewables and energy
efficiency.
3
Confidential
Afghanistan
context.

4
Confidential
can make advances.
programmes.
5
Confidential

6
Confidential
Middle East peace process [See generics]
Iran [See generics]
Iraq
7
Confidential
x Key issues still need to be resolved, including federalism,
oil sharing and disputed internal boundaries. The UN is
working to promote dialogue on these issues. I am also
committed to expanding the UN presence in Iraq,
security permitting.
Georgia
zone.
8
Confidential

x The recommendations I will submit to the

Security Council by 15 May will be based on these
considerations.
9
Confidential

10
Confidential
Kosovo [If raised]
as UNMIK reconfiguration is concerned, it is proceeding
in accordance with the parameters contained in my
reports to the Security Council. The assumption of an
operational role by EULEX has allowed UNMIK to
accelerate its reconfiguration.
11
Confidential
international actors, to continue supporting the role of a
reconfigured UNMIK in Kosovo.
x I had a good discussion on these issues with President

Tadiü earlier this week.

the participation of EU representatives is such meetings.
12
Confidential
13
Russia FM Lavrov TPs (with Pol revisions) TPs.docCleared by Political Unit – 24-03-09
Confidential

H.E. Mr. Sergei Lavrov,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
Afghanistan 1
Korean Peninsula 2
Somalia 3
Lebanon 5
Georgia 7
DRC 8
MINURCAT 9
Sudan 9
Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation 9
Kosovo 11
Afghanistan
opportunity to give a new dynamism to our support
to Afghanistan, in a regional context.

1
Confidential

can make advances.


actors.

matter.
Korean Peninsula
Korean Peninsula.
2
Confidential
x I commend Russia’s consistent efforts to foster

durable peace and security on the Peninsula and to
resolve the nuclear issue through negotiations and
regional cooperation. How can I help the process?

life into the six-party talks. What are your views on
how to break the stalemate?
Somalia

the Government in implementing the Djibouti
Agreement, which shall remain the basis for further
reconciliation.
x I would be grateful for Russia’s continued support for

the peace process, especially in the Security Council.

3
Confidential

and restoring stability. A reconstruction conference is
being planned for the summer. Russia can make an
important effort in supporting this initiative.


seek long-term financial support for AMISOM as well
x In the interim, there will be a need for continued

logistics package is approved and delivered. In
addition, immediate funding will be required to pay

Middle East peace process [see generics]
4
Confidential
Lebanon



the region.

5
Confidential


process for the withdrawal of the IDF from the
northern part of the village of Ghajar and adjacent

Sheb’a farms. So far, the United Nations’ efforts have
not led to positive results. However, I will continue
my efforts aimed at a resolution of the issue.

normalise their relations. Syria’s appointment of an
Ambassador to Lebanon is a welcome and timely
development.
6
Confidential
x [IF ASKED: TRIBUNAL] The start of the Special

Tribunal for Lebanon on 1 March 2009 in The Hague,
is a decisive milestone in the joint efforts of the
Lebanese and the international community to uncover
the truth, bring those responsible for this and related
crimes to justice and end impunity. This will not be
easy. It will take time but I reiterate my support to
the Tribunal and I call upon all Members States to
fully support and cooperate with this new
independent institution.
Georgia
conflict zone.


7
Confidential

considerations.



[So far, we have accepted from Bangladesh: one battalion, one
engineer unit and one formed police unit (FPU); from Egypt: one
battalion, one Special Forces company and one FPU; from Jordan:
one Special Forces company; from Belgium: one C-130 aircraft.]
x The Security Council approved 3,000 additional

troops for the MONUC. While there has been some
progress with regard to the generation of these
additional military capacities we are still missing
critical capabilities.
x We have not yet received any pledges for the 18

utility helicopters, the 200 trainers, and the
intelligence equipment.
x All of these assets are critical to our operations, and

air and intelligence assets will allow MONUC to
enhance the mobility of its troops and better protect
civilians.
8
Confidential

resources?
MINURCAT
Level II Hospital.
Sudan

x I place the utmost importance on the reinvigoration
of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

Federation and the United States to earnestly engage
in a verifiable follow-up to the START Treaty.
x The Russian Federation’s commitment to working for

a successful 2010 NPT Review Conference in light of
its NPT obligations and to reaching the goal of a world
free of nuclear weapons is most welcome.
9
Confidential

Russian Federation and the United States that a
solution may be found to the issue concerning the
Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense System in
Europe.

machinery, especially the Conference on
Disarmament, starts working again.
x Negotiations must begin on a verifiable treaty

banning the production of fissile materials. I also
value Russian efforts in the CD on a draft
international Treaty on the Prevention of the
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT).
x As the demand for the peaceful uses of nuclear

energy increases worldwide, it is important that a
secure and reliable supply of nuclear fuel be made
available to all States which are in compliance with
their safeguards obligations.
x I appreciate Russia’s efforts to move discussions on

the multilateral nuclear fuel cycle forward.
x The nuclear non-proliferation regime continues to

face a number of challenges.
10
Confidential
x Your continued engagement in the Six-party talks on

the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and in
the efforts to find a workable diplomatic solution to
the concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear
programme is most welcome.
x Today, the world faces the threat of nuclear

terrorism. I welcome Russia’s contributions to the
international community’s efforts to reduce this risk,
such as the Global Initiative to Combat Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism, and encourage you to keep
engaging other States in these efforts.
Kosovo [If raised]

Kosovo within the framework of resolution 1244. As
far as UNMIK reconfiguration is concerned, it is

international actors, to continue supporting the role
of a reconfigured UNMIK in Kosovo.
11
Confidential
x I had a good discussion on these issues with

President Tadiü earlier this week.

meetings.
12
Russia FM Lavrov TPs (with Pol revisions) TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit – 24-03-09
Confidential

H.E. Mr. Sergei Lavrov,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
1
Confidential
Afghanistan 3
Korean Peninsula 6
Somalia 8
Lebanon 12
Georgia 18
DRC 21
MINURCAT 23
Sudan 23
Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation 24
Kosovo 30
2
Confidential
Afghanistan
context.

3
Confidential
can make advances.
programmes.
4
Confidential

Korean Peninsula
Korean Peninsula.
5
Confidential
x I commend Russia’s consistent efforts to foster durable
peace and security on the Peninsula and to resolve the
nuclear issue through negotiations and regional
cooperation. How can I help the process?

life into the six-party talks. What are your views on how
to break the stalemate?
6
Confidential
Somalia
x The present situation in Somalia offers us a rare window
of opportunity. The next 100 days will be crucial for the
Government and will be decisive for the continued
success of the Djibouti Agreement.

Government in implementing the Djibouti Agreement,
x I would be grateful for Russia’s continued support for the

peace process, especially in the Security Council.
7
Confidential
restoring stability. A reconstruction conference is being
planned for the summer. Russia can make an important
effort in supporting this initiative.
8
Confidential
x I will be convening a donor conference in April to seek

long-term financial support for AMISOM as well as the
Somali Joint Security Force and police.
9
Confidential
x In the interim, there will be a need for continued funding
to AMISOM to bridge the gap until the logistics package is
approved and delivered. In addition, immediate funding
will be required to pay the existing Joint Somali Security
Forces.

Middle East peace process [see generics]
10
Confidential
Lebanon

campaigns.
11
Confidential
x I am satisfied by the overall calm that Southern Lebanon

continues to enjoy. UNIFIL, in cooperation with the
Lebanese Armed Forces, does outstanding work,
contributing greatly to stability in Lebanon and the
region.
12
Confidential
x Despite this relative calm, violations of SCR 1701 by both
parties are of concern. The continuous Israeli violations
of Lebanese air space are violations of 1701 and threaten
stability in the region. They must cease.

13
Confidential
process for the withdrawal of the IDF from the northern
part of the village of Ghajar and adjacent areas. I hope
that this can be achieved shortly after the formation of
the new Government in Israel.

farms. So far, the United Nations’ efforts have not led to
positive results. However, I will continue my efforts
aimed at a resolution of the issue.
14
Confidential
normalise their relations. Syria’s appointment of an
development.
15
Confidential
x [IF ASKED: TRIBUNAL] The start of the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon on 1 March 2009 in The Hague, is a decisive
milestone in the joint efforts of the Lebanese and the
international community to uncover the truth, bring
those responsible for this and related crimes to justice
and end impunity. This will not be easy. It will take time
but I reiterate my support to the Tribunal and I call upon
all Members States to fully support and cooperate with
this new independent institution.
16
Confidential
Georgia
zone.

17
Confidential

Council by 15 May will be based on these considerations.

18
Confidential
19
Confidential
[So far, we have accepted from Bangladesh: one battalion, one engineer
unit and one formed police unit (FPU); from Egypt: one battalion, one
Special Forces company and one FPU; from Jordan: one Special Forces
company; from Belgium: one C-130 aircraft.]
x The Security Council approved 3,000 additional troops for

the MONUC. While there has been some progress with
regard to the generation of these additional military
capacities we are still missing critical capabilities.
20
Confidential
x We have not yet received any pledges for the 18 utility
helicopters, the 200 trainers, and the intelligence
equipment.
x All of these assets are critical to our operations, and air

and intelligence assets will allow MONUC to enhance the
mobility of its troops and better protect civilians.

resources?
21
Confidential
MINURCAT
helicopters, a support unit, an engineer unit and a Level
II Hospital.
Sudan
22
Confidential
x I place the utmost importance on the reinvigoration of
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

Federation and the United States to earnestly engage in a
verifiable follow-up to the START Treaty.
x The Russian Federation’s commitment to working for a

successful 2010 NPT Review Conference in light of its
NPT obligations and to reaching the goal of a world free
of nuclear weapons is most welcome.
23
Confidential
Russian Federation and the United States that a solution
may be found to the issue concerning the Long-Range
Ballistic Missile Defense System in Europe.

machinery, especially the Conference on Disarmament,
starts working again.
24
Confidential
x Negotiations must begin on a verifiable treaty banning
the production of fissile materials. I also value Russian
efforts in the CD on a draft international Treaty on the
Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space
(PPWT).
x As the demand for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

increases worldwide, it is important that a secure and
reliable supply of nuclear fuel be made available to all
States which are in compliance with their safeguards
obligations.
25
Confidential
x I appreciate Russia’s efforts to move discussions on the
multilateral nuclear fuel cycle forward.
x The nuclear non-proliferation regime continues to face a

number of challenges.
x Your continued engagement in the Six-party talks on the

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and in the
efforts to find a workable diplomatic solution to the
concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear programme is
most welcome.
26
Confidential
x Today, the world faces the threat of nuclear terrorism. I
welcome Russia’s contributions to the international
community’s efforts to reduce this risk, such as the
Global Initiative to Combat Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,
and encourage you to keep engaging other States in
these efforts.
27
Confidential
Kosovo [If raised]
as UNMIK reconfiguration is concerned, it is proceeding
in accordance with the parameters contained in my
reports to the Security Council. The assumption of an
operational role by EULEX has allowed UNMIK to
accelerate its reconfiguration.
28
Confidential
international actors, to continue supporting the role of a
reconfigured UNMIK in Kosovo.
x I had a good discussion on these issues with President
Tadiü earlier this week.
the participation of EU representatives is such meetings.
29
RussiaClimateChangeCountryProfile.doc
ClimateChangeCountryProfile
Russia
1. KeyCountryData

x 17.1millionsquarekm;142.8millionpopulation;naturalresourcesincludemajor
depositsofoil,naturalgas,minerals,coalandtimber.
x Vulnerability/riskprofile:Politicalriskisincreasingthisyear.Theeconomiccrisiscould
potentiallybreedfurtherpopulardiscontent.Theeconomy,highlydependentonfossil
fuelenergyexports,isvulnerabletofurtherdropsinoilpricesforecastedfor2009.Bank
indebtednessisrising.Theriskofsteeprubledevaluationisthemainthreatto
macroeconomicstability.

2. CurrentEconomicStatus

x Therearecurrently2.13millionregisteredunemployedpeople(6.4millionincludingthe
unregistered).Thisnumbermaygrowto15millionpeoplebytheendof2009.
x Theexternaldebtofthefederalgovernmentislow($32.5billioninSeptember2008,or
2%ofGDP).Butcompaniesinwhichthestateholdsstakesofover50%mayhavean
additional$146billioninforeigndebt,oranother9%ofGDP.
x Currencyvalue:TheRussianCentralBank,determinedtopreventamassiveruble
devaluation,hasledaseriesofgradualdevaluationsandincreasedinterestratesin
Februarytolimitspeculation.Therublelostaround29%ofitsvalueagainstthedollar
betweenAugust2008andJanuary2009.
x TheRCBinjectedconsiderableliquidityintheeconomylatelastyear,thankstosizeable
internationalreserves.However,thesereserves(alreadydownby34%fromJanuary
fromtheirpeakof$598.1billioninAugust2008)arelikelytodecreasefurtherin2009as
thegovernmentcontinuestocoveragrowingbudgetdeficit(forecastedat5%to8%of
GDPfor2009,dependingonsources).
x Duetothegovernment’sdependenceonoilexportstoboostreserves,lowoilprices
havehurtthisprocess.
x TheWorldBanksaiditexpectedtheRussianeconomytogrow3%in2009,halfits2008
growthrate.TheEconomist(andtheDPA)forecasteda2%contractionoftherealGDP
in2009andamodest3%growthrecoveryin2010.
x Foodsecurity:Good.PrimeMinisterPutinhasprovidedforcontinuedagricultural
subsidiesinhis2009economicpackage.

3. PoliticalandDomesticEvents

x PresidentDmitryMedvedev,formerGazpromchairmanoftheboard,succeeded
VladimirPutininpresidentialelectionslastyearforafourͲyearͲterm,butPutinremains
asprimeminister.ManyobserversbelievethatMr.Putinremainsinfullcontrol,with
Mr.Medvedevsofarplayingasupportiverole.Thismaychange,however,aseconomic
challengesandsocialtensionmount.Observershavesaidtheeconomiccrisishasalso
igniteddiscordamongcompetingfactionsinthegovernment,namely,thesiloviki
factioninfavorofadministrativemethodstostabilizetheeconomyandamoremarketͲ
orientedgroup.
x Inthepastfewmonths,theKremlinhasfurtherconsolidatedpoliticalcontrolover
society.“Corrections”totheConstitutionthatincludedtheextensionofPresidential
CountryProfile•Russia•March2009•Page

andStateDuma(lowerhouseofparliament)termsaswellaschangesinthe
appointmentofgovernorsandmembersoftheupperhouse(CounciloftheFederation)
havebeenquicklyrubberͲstampedbyParliamentwithoutanyseriousdiscussion.United
Russia,aproͲpresidentcentristparty,hasa315seatmajorityinthe450seatState
Duma.MostpublicofficialsaremembersoftheUnitedRussiaParty.Ithasno
independentpoliticalagendaandseesitsroleassupportingthe(former)President’s
policies(Putin’sPlan).
x Theinfluenceofbusinessoligarchs(Khodorkovsky,etc.)andregionalleaderswas
curtailedunderMr.Putin’spresidency(regionalgovernorsarenownominatedbythe
president,notelected,forinstance).PoliticaloppositiontotheproͲKremlinpartyUnited
Russiahasbeenmarginalized.AllmediaarestateͲcontrolled.Corruptionandweakrule
oflawarerecognizedasmajorproblems.
x Mr.PutinhasdescribedtheRussianeconomyas“statecapitalism.”Thestateregained
controlofthemostlucrativeenterprisesandhighstateofficialssitontheboardof
directorsofRussia’slargestmonopolies.TheGovernmentusedthefinancialcrisisto
furtherincreaseitscontrolovertheindustrialandbankingsectors.
x Therehavebeenscatteredprotestsoverimporttariffsonusedcars,organizedbythe
CommunistParty,andtheyhavebeenmetwithaheavyͲhandedresponsebypolice.
x Keydomesticeventsin2009:Obama/MedvedevmeetinginApril(Longerterm:2014
WinterOlympicsintheBlackSearesortcityofSochi).
x Topinternationalgoals:1)Russiahasbeentryingforadecadetobecomeamemberof
theWorldTradeOrganization,andisthelargestworldeconomytoremainoutsidethe
organization.Obstaclesincludetariffsontimberexports,carsimports,aswellasthe
2008RussianconflictwithGeorgia.However,anewU.S.administrationmaygive
negotiationsanewmomentum;2)RussiaopposesNATOexpansiontoUkraineand
Georgia,aswellasU.S.missileplansinEurope,andretainsastronginterestinthe
futurefateofKosovo;3)Russiawantstoconsolidatesovereignty,inparticularinregards
toits“nearabroad”ͲAfghanistan,CentralAsia,Georgia;4)Therevampingof
Russian/U.S.

4. EnergySecurity

x Energymix:Naturalgas(55%,upfrom49%in1992);Oil(19%);Coal(16%);
Hydroelectricpower(6%);Nuclear(5%).
x Russiaistheworld’sleadingnetenergyexporter.Theoilandgassectorsrepresented
64%ofRussia’sexportrevenuesin2007and30%offoreigndirectinvestment.State
involvementinthenaturalgasmonopoly,Gazprom,andtheoilcompanyRosneft,
continuestobesignificant.

5. GreennessofEconomyandStimulusPackage

x Energyefficiency:ArecentreportbytheInternationalFinanceCorporationandthe
WTOfoundthatRussiacouldsave45%oftotalprimaryenergyconsumption.Russia’s
EnergyStrategyto2020makesenergyefficiencyapriority,mainlybycuttingwasteful
practicesthroughpriceincrease,inordertocontinuemeetinggrowingdemand.Climate
changeisnotadrivingfactorforenergypolicyanddevelopingsustainableresourcesis
notafocus.

x Thegreenenergysectorlackssupportfromthegovernment(Russia’sEnergyPolicycalls
foronly1%ofenergytobegeneratedbyrenewableresourcesby20201),isunregulated
(abillispendingtothateffect)andismodestinsize.
x Inlate2008,Russiaannounceda$200billioneconomicpackage.Mr.Putinsaidin
March2009thatgovernmentspendingtocombattheeconomiccrisiswouldreach12%
ofGDPin2009.Thefinancialassistancehasgonetostabilizingtheruble,directcash
payments(unemployment),helpingbanks,constructionprojectsandtaxcuts,among
others.Theredoesnotappeartobeanyearmarksforgreenprojects.

1
InJanuary,Mr.Putinsignedanordertoincreasetherateto4.5%;
http://www.government.ru/content/governmentactivity/rfgovernmentdecisions/archive/2009/01/08/1528437.ht
m.

UNFCCCBRIEFONRUSSIA
GeneralPositions
x ClimatechangeisnotaprioritybutRussiawilltakeitsshareofresponsibilityinaccordancewith
nationalinterests
x Russia’sGHGemissionsarealreadysignificantlybelow1990levelswhereassomecountrieswho
demandfurthercutshavenotreducedemissionssofar
x USmustparticipateinaglobalagreementonclimatechange.
x DevelopingcountrieslikeChinaandIndiamustalsoparticipatewithcommitments.Donotview
Chinaasadevelopingcountry,notingthatithashugeforeigncurrencyreserves.
x Majorconcernishavingtheforestissuefullyincorporatedinanyagreement.
x Russianeconomynotdiversifiedenough.Lookingforopportunitiestoassistinthis
diversification
PositionsinUNFCCCNegotiations
SharedVisionforLongͲTermCoͲoperativeAction
Russiabelievesthat:Ͳ
x SharedvisionshouldbebasedonArticle2oftheConventionwhichoutlinestheultimate
objectiveoftheConvention
x 50%reductionsofglobalGHGemissionsby2050shouldbethegoalofthesharedvision
x Contributionsfromallmajoreconomies,consistentwiththeprincipleofcommonbut
differentiatedresponsibilitiesiskeytoattainingthisglobalgoal
x ThelongtermgoalshouldbeaspirationalandshouldnotbeusedtodistributeGHGemission
reductioncommitmentsamongcountries
x Furtherfocusshouldbegiventodeterminingthedefinitionsfor‘developed’and‘developing’
countries.ViewstheAnnexIandnonͲAnnexIterminologyasobsoleteandirrelevantto
presentͲdayrealities
x DifferentiationofcountriesisrequiredtodeveloplongtermcoͲoperativemeasuresunderthe
Convention,usingparameterssuchasGDPpercapita,andotherstandardcriteriadescribing
socialandeconomicdistinctionsbetweencountries
x Differentiationofcountriesshouldtakeintoaccountthosecountrieswhoseeconomiesare
dependentonfossilfuelsandassociatedenergyintensiveproductsandwhohaveserious
difficultiesswitchingtoalternatives
Mitigation
Russiabelievesthat:Ͳ
x MidͲtermtargetsshouldbebasedonnationalinitiativesandsectoralmeasureswhichare
subjecttointernationalverification
x Itisunreasonabletosetacollectiverangeforreductionofemissionsforagroupofcountries,
x Arangeof25–40%emissionsreductionsby2020incomparisonto1990levelsbydeveloped
countriesisjustoneofpossibleIPCCscenariosandcannotbeimposed

x SettingnewlegallybindingcommitmentsforthepostͲ2012regimewillbepossibleonlyunder
thefollowingconditions:Ͳ
o Theregimeshouldnotbepunitive,enforcementmeansshouldbecarefullyconsidered
o Itshouldenvisageeffectiveincentivesforparticipantstofulfiltheircommitments
o Itshouldcontainproceduresandmechanismsallowing,ifnecessary,theadjustmentof
thesecommitmentsduringimplementation
x Participationofdevelopingcountriesinclimatechangemitigationactionsiscrucialandcanbe
ensuredthroughtheexistingConventionmeans.Kyotorulesmaketakingvoluntarytargets
difficultevenforthosewhowishtodoso.Thiswasthefocusofthe“RussianProposal’which
wassubmittedatCOP11in2005,consideredlateronbutdidnotproduceresults
NB:Russiahasnotexpressedapositionontheissuesofadaptation,financeorgovernanceinthe
UNFCCCNegotiationstodate


ANNEX:ͲCountryProfile
A.NationalCircumstancesandkeyCountryData
Table 1. Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol

Ratification of the UNFCCC 28 December 1994
Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 18 November 2004
Latest submission of national communication 12 October 2006 (resubmission on 2 November 2006) (NC4)
Latest in-depth review of national 10 July 2004 (FCCC/IDR.3/RUS)
communication
Latest submission of GHG inventory 15 April 2008
Latest individual review of GHG inventory:
x report publication date 15 April 2008
x review type In-country review
x document symbol FCCC/ARR/2006/RUS
Table 2. National general, macroeconomic and GHG data

Area (thousands, square km) 17,098.2
World ranking by UNDP human development index 67
(2005)
World ranking by population (2007) 9
World ranking by GDP size (2007) 11 (based on exchange rates); 6 (based on PPPs)
GDP structure (2007) agriculture: 5%, industry: 39%, services: 57%
exports/GDP = 30%; imports/GDP = 22%

Change Growthrate Change

1990–
1990 2005 2006 2006 1990–2006 2005–2006
(%) (%/year) (%)
148.29 143.15 142.50 Ͳ3.90 Ͳ0.25 Ͳ0.45

Population (millions)
1523.63 1380.98 1473.50 Ͳ3.29 Ͳ0.21 6.70
GDP (billions USD 2000 PPP)
878.90 656.43 676.20 Ͳ23.06 Ͳ1.63 3.01
TPES (Mtoe)
10.27 9.65 10.34 0.68 0.04 7.15
GDP per capita (thousands USD 2000 PPP)
5.93 4.59 4.75 Ͳ19.90 Ͳ1.38 3.49
TPES per capita (kgoe)
2497.02 1520.74 1577.69 Ͳ36.82 Ͳ2.83 3.74
CO2 emissions without LULUCF (Tg)

3326.40 2119.77 2190.24 Ͳ34.16 Ͳ2.58 3.32
GHG emissions without LULUCF (Tg CO2 eq)
GHG emissions/removals by LULUCF (Tg 180.01 159.20 287.79 59.87 2.98 80.77
CO2 eq)
3506.41 2278.97 2478.03 Ͳ29.33 Ͳ2.15 8.73
GHG emissions with LULUCF (Tg CO2 eq)
16.84 10.62 11.07 Ͳ34.26 Ͳ2.59 4.24
CO2 / capita (Mg)
1.64 1.10 1.07 Ͳ34.76 Ͳ2.63 Ͳ2.73
CO2 / GDP (kg per USD 2000 PPP)
22.43 14.81 15.37 Ͳ31.48 Ͳ2.34 3.78
GHG / capita (Mg CO2 eq)
2.18 1.53 1.49 Ͳ31.65 Ͳ2.37 Ͳ2.61
GHG / GDP (kg CO2 eq per USD 2000 PPP)

B:HistoricalandProjectedTrendsinGHGEmissions
Figure 1. Trends in GHG emissions

GHG emissions trend, 1990 - 2006 Changes relative to the 1990 level
4000 0
0.0
3500 3506.4
3326.4 -10
Tg CO2 equivalent
3000
2500 2497.0 2478.0 -20
2190.2 -26.1
2000
%
-30 -29.3
-34.2
1500 1577.7 -36.8
-40
1000 829.4
500 612.5 -50
0 -60
1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005
CO2 (without LULUCF) GHG total with LULUCF CO2 (without LULUCF) GHG total with LULUCF
non-CO2 (without LULUCF) GHG total without LULUCF non-CO2 (without LULUCF) GHG total without LULUCF
GHG by sector (2006) 1990-2006 change in GHGs by sector (%)
Energy -34.0
Agriculture Energy industries -23.1
Solvents Waste
6.0%
0.0% Energy use in industries -44.1
3.3%
Industrial Energy use in other sectors-67.0
processes Energy
industries Transport -46.9
9.1%
41.3% Fugitive emissions -6.9
Industrial processes -18.9
Fugitive
Solvents -5.3
emissions
18.1% Agriculture -57.5
Energy use in
Transport
Energy use in industries LULUCF 59.9
8.7%
other sectors 5.5% 13.1
Waste
8.0%
-80 -40 0 40 80

Figure 2. GHG projections

3500
Actual GHGs 3323.4
3326.4
(inve ntory data)
3000
Tg CO2 equivalent
Kyoto targe t (no change 2823.0

from bas e ye ar le ve l) 2563.0
2500 2329.0
2187.1
2123.42190.2
2038.2
2000
Proje ction "w ith
m e as ure s "
1500
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Note: The historical GHG emissions and projections do not include GHG emissions/removals by
LULUCF. The Kyoto target is calculated using the total GHG emissions in the base year (as
recorded in the compilation and accounting database) and the commitment inscribed in Annex B
to the Kyoto Protocol.
C:ClimateRelatedPoliciesandMeasures
Table 3. Summary information on climate-related policies and measures

Majorpoliciesandmeasures Examples/comments
FrameworkpoliciesandcrossͲsectoralmeasures
Integrated climate programme “Comprehensive action plan for the implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol in the Russian Federation” (2005)
Supportofresearchand Federalprogramme“Nationaltechnologicalbasis”
development
Other “Energy strategy of Russia for the period until 2020”, Federal
programme “Ecology and natural resources of Russia”; preparation
for the use of flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol,
including TASIS project “Administrative support to the process of
fulfilling Russia’s obligations under the Kyoto Protocol”; regional
plans and activities
Energysector
Energysectorliberalization “Energy strategy of Russia for the period until 2020”, Decree 526
on the reform of the power generation sector (2001)
Renewable energy sources “Energy strategy of Russia for the period until 2020”
Energy efficiency improvements “Energy strategy of Russia for the period until 2020”; Federal
programme “Energy-efficient economy”; measures to decrease
specific fuel consumption at power and CHP plants by “RAO EES
Rossiyi”; federal programme “House 2002-2010”
Other Measures to increase efficiency of gas transport and decrease losses

Majorpoliciesandmeasures Examples/comments
by “Gazprom”
Transport Federal programme “Modernization of the transport system of
Russia”
Agriculture Federal programme “Increasing the productivity of Russian soils”;
measures to increase energy use efficiency in agriculture
Forestry “Comprehensive action plan for the implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol in the Russian Federation” (2005)

RIA NOVOSTI.interview. Russia today TV channel.doc
UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
SECRETARY-GENERAL INTERVIEW
WITH RIA NOVOSTI/ RUSSIA TODAY TV CHANNEL
Media Organization: RIA NOVOSTI/ RUSSIA TODAY TV CHANNEL
Date & Time: Saturday, 28 March 2009, 11 a.m.
Location: President Hotel
Broadcast Date: For publication in RIA NOVOSTI and for broadcast on Russia Today
TV Channel immediately following the interview
Format: 20-minute one-on-one interview
Topics: (Q&A to follow shortly)

1. The conferences in Moscow and The Hague on Afghanistan
2. North Korea’s plan to launch a rocket into space
3. UN-Russia relations regarding peacekeeping
3. Situation in Georgia
4. G20 Summit in London
Interviewer: Ivan Zakharchenko, Analyst, International Affairs. RIA NOVOSTI

- Born in Orsk, Russia
- Graduated from the Institute for Asian and African Studies at the Moscow State
University in 1985
- Prior to RIA NOVOSTI, worked as ITAR-TASS correspondent in Pyongyang, Seoul
and Sydney from 1985-2001
Camera-crew: Grishina Olga Alexandrovna (video producer), Grachev Dmitry

Sergeyevich (cameraman), Fedorenko Vladimir Fedorovich (photographer), Pyatakov
Sergey Vladimirovich (backup photographer)
***
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
Qatar Emir TPs.docCleared by Political Unit Confidenti

His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani,
Emir of the State of Qatar,
Darfur Peace Process 1

Somalia 1
Middle East 3
Lebanon 3
Iraq 4
Afghanistan 5
International Conference on Financing for Development 6
Darfur Peace Process
[See Generic talking points on Sudan]
x Congratulations on the Doha agreement and thank

you for your support to Mr. Bassolé’s efforts. It is
important to build on the momentum and open up the
process to other key stakeholders.
x What do you view as the next steps in this process?
Somalia

1

reconciliation.


needs.

conference on reconstruction in the summer. Qatar’s
support in this area would be critical.
2
Middle East
[See also generic talking points on the Middle East for Arab
countries.]
x You have an important role as a donor to the

Palestinians and also as host of the Arab Summit. I
appreciate the efforts you are making. I would
encourage Arab support to the Palestinians to be
channeled as much as possible through the PA or the
United Nations. Otherwise we are in danger of
sowing separation between Gaza and the West Bank.
Lebanon
x I want to once again stress my appreciation for the
invaluable role that Qatar played to end the violence
in Lebanon last May.


3

Iraq
remains fragile. The potential for violence and
political instability remains. How do you see the
current situation?

credible elections.

efforts.
4
Afghanistan
[See also generic talking points on Afghanistan.]
x With the support of the United Nations, the Mine

Action Programme is working throughout
Afghanistan, including in the volatile south and east,
through community-based initiatives.
x Funding in the amount of US$50 million is urgently

needed to support clearance operations, to meet the
goals of the Afghanistan Compact. I hope I can count
on your support to the Programme.
Iran – if raised
x As regards the nuclear issue, I have continuously
called on Iran to fully comply with the relevant
Security Council resolutions and urged Iran to
increase its cooperation with the IAEA in this matter.
x I will continue to appeal to all the parties to work

with determination to achieve a diplomatic solution
and I stand ready to play a complementary role in
x From the UN Secretariat’s side, we intend to expand

our dialogue and engagement with Iran to include
such regional security issues as Iraq and Afghanistan.
5
International Conference on Financing for Development
x I am very pleased about the positive outcome of the

Follow-up International Conference on Financing for
Development (Doha, 29 November-
2 December 2008). The outcome Declaration added
significant value to what we achieved in Monterrey.
x In particular, developed countries expressed a strong

commitment to maintain their ODA targets despite
the financial crisis. Also, Member States recognised
that the UN has a vital role to play in addressing new
challenges and emerging issues in financing for
development, such as climate change and food and
energy prices.
6
Qatar Emir TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit
Talking Points for the Secretary General’s meeting
with His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani,
Emir of the State of Qatar,

Somalia 3
Middle East 6
Lebanon 7
Iraq 9
Afghanistan 11
International Conference on Financing for Development 14
1
[See Generic talking points on Sudan]
x Congratulations on the Doha agreement and thank you

for your support to Mr. Bassolé’s efforts. It is important
to build on the momentum and open up the process to
other key stakeholders.
x What do you view as the next steps in this process?
2
Somalia

and the new Government of Sheikh Sharif will require
immediate support.

3

4
on reconstruction in the summer. Qatar’s support in this
area would be critical.
5
Middle East
[See also generic talking points on the Middle East for Arab countries.]
x You have an important role as a donor to the Palestinians

and also as host of the Arab Summit. I appreciate the
efforts you are making. I would encourage Arab support
to the Palestinians to be channeled as much as possible
through the PA or the United Nations. Otherwise we are
in danger of sowing separation between Gaza and the
West Bank.
6
Lebanon
x I want to once again stress my appreciation for the
invaluable role that Qatar played to end the violence in
Lebanon last May.

7
campaigns.

8
Iraq
fragile. The potential for violence and political instability
remains. How do you see the current situation?

elections.
9
10
Afghanistan
[See also generic talking points on Afghanistan.]

x With the support of the United Nations, the Mine Action
Programme is working throughout Afghanistan, including
in the volatile south and east, through community-based
initiatives.
x Funding in the amount of US$50 million is urgently

needed to support clearance operations, to meet the
goals of the Afghanistan Compact. I hope I can count on
your support to the Programme.
11
Iran – if raised
x As regards the nuclear issue, I have continuously called
on Iran to fully comply with the relevant Security Council
resolutions and urged Iran to increase its cooperation
with the IAEA in this matter.
x I will continue to appeal to all the parties to work with

determination to achieve a diplomatic solution and
I stand ready to play a complementary role in achieving
this objective.
12
x From the UN Secretariat’s side, we intend to expand our
dialogue and engagement with Iran to include such
regional security issues as Iraq and Afghanistan.
13
International Conference on Financing for Development
x I am very pleased about the positive outcome of the
Follow-up International Conference on Financing for
Development (Doha, 29 November-
2 December 2008). The outcome Declaration added
significant value to what we achieved in Monterrey.
14
x In particular, developed countries expressed a strong
commitment to maintain their ODA targets despite the
financial crisis. Also, Member States recognised that the
UN has a vital role to play in addressing new challenges
and emerging issues in financing for development, such
as climate change and food and energy prices.
15
Palestinian Authority President Abbas TPs.doc Cleared by Political Unit Con

with H.E. Mahmoud Abbas,
President of the Palestinian Authority,
Doha, 30 March 2009 (time TBC)


succeeded.
x What is the latest on efforts to overcome the internal

divisions? How do you see the next Palestinian
government being formed?
x Whatever happens with unity, we need a different

and more positive strategy for Gaza. The continued
closure of the crossings is unacceptable in
humanitarian terms and undermines efforts to
strengthen the PA. The UN is working very closely
with the PA on how to address the recovery and
reconstruction needs.
1

damaged houses and restore the economy.
Otherwise, the promises made at Sharm will not be
delivered.
x We also need to see a real change on the ground in

the West Bank. The PA has done a good job there. A
new Israeli Government needs to act seriously on
freezing settlements, lifting closures, and ceasing
incursions. I am disappointed that house demolitions
and evictions are being pursued in Jerusalem.
x Do you believe the new US administration will be able

to deliver something positive with the Israelis
regarding a settlement freeze?

the new Israeli Government that we will judge them
by their actions.
x What are your assessments of the new Israeli

Government? What are the prospects for a
resumption of final status negotiations?
2


Peace Initiative.

in Gaza. The Board will soon submit its report to me.
I need some time to study it and then decide if any
further steps are required.

3
Palestinian Authority President Abbas TPs CARDS.doc Cleared by Political
with H.E. Mahmoud Abbas,
President of the Palestinian Authority,

and the West Bank.

succeeded.
1
x What is the latest on efforts to overcome the internal
divisions? How do you see the next Palestinian
government being formed?
x Whatever happens with unity, we need a different and

more positive strategy for Gaza. The continued closure of
the crossings is unacceptable in humanitarian terms and
undermines efforts to strengthen the PA. The UN is
working very closely with the PA on how to address the
recovery and reconstruction needs.
2
damaged houses and restore the economy. Otherwise,
the promises made at Sharm will not be delivered.
x We also need to see a real change on the ground in the

I am disappointed that house demolitions and evictions
3
x Do you believe the new US administration will be able to
deliver something positive with the Israelis regarding
a settlement freeze?

new Israeli Government that we will judge them by their
actions.
4
x What are your assessments of the new Israeli
Government? What are the prospects for a resumption of
final status negotiations?

more engaged on the ground in crisis management and
5
x [IF ASKED: BOARD OF INQUIRY] I have established the

UN Board of Inquiry into several specific incidents in
Gaza. The Board will soon submit its report to me.
6
Human Rights Council is preparing a fact-finding mission,
as mandated by the Council, and with the support of the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. I am
following this matter carefully.
7
Pakistan FM TPs.docCleared by Political Unit Confidenti

H. E. Mr. Qureshi,
Foreign Minister of Pakistan,
Political support 1
The Bhutto Commission of Inquiry 2
Afghanistan 2
India 4
Staff Security 4
Political Support
x I am pleased that the political crisis last month was
averted. Pakistan faces many formidable challenges
and real threats and the major democratic players
must join forces to counter them effectively.
x What is your assessment of the current security and

political situations in Pakistan?
x The UN stands by the Pakistani people in their efforts

to build a better future and wants to do all it can to
assist them in advancing good governance and
democracy.
1
The Bhutto Commission of Inquiry
x I am in the process of establishing the Bhutto

Commission of Inquiry. A Technical Assessment
Mission will visit Pakistan imminently and will finalize
a Concept of Operations for the Commission. This
would be the basis for the work of the Commission
towards determining the facts and circumstances of
the Bhutto assassination.
Afghanistan
x I welcome your support to stabilization and

development efforts in Afghanistan.
x With violence spreading beyond the southern and

eastern provinces of Afghanistan, the country faces
serious security issues, particularly in view of the
forthcoming elections and the need to deliver tangible
improvements on the ground.
x Addressing these challenges is the role of Afghan and

international military forces; but their cross border
dimension is equally crucial. In this respect I
welcome the efforts to enhance cooperation between
the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
2
x The visits by Pakistani officials to Afghanistan and the

signing of the bilateral declaration, the ongoing Jirga
process, and the resumption of the Tripartite
Commission meetings are all tangible signs of this
spirit of cooperation.
x I also welcome the various initiatives to foster

regional cooperation, such as the December
conference in Paris, and the forthcoming Conference
of the Regional Economic Cooperation Council, which
will be held in Islamabad.
x SRSG Eide places great importance on supporting

regional cooperation, particularly in practical areas,
such as economic development and counter-narcotics
efforts. I would be interested to learn your views on
what areas and practical initiatives are in need of
attention and the role that the United Nations can
play.
x I am aware of the strains that continue to be placed

on Pakistan by large numbers of Afghan refugees and
I welcome Pakistan’s demonstrated respect for the
principle of voluntary and gradual repatriation.
3
x There is no purely military solution to the problems of

Afghanistan. But reconciliation efforts cannot be a
short-cut to peace, or a substitute for development
and institution-building efforts. Reconciliation efforts
must respect the Constitution and be conducted from
a position of political and military strength. I would
like your views on this.
India
x Could you give me an update on Indo-Pakistani

relations? How has the cooperation with India
developed on the Mumbai attacks?
x I hope that Pakistan and India will continue their

composite dialogue and bilateral cooperation in the
interest of stability and economic development of
South Asian region.
Staff Security
x I am concerned about the hostage situation involving

John Solecki, the head of UNHCR office in Quetta. We
need to continue our cooperation to bring back John
safely to his family.
4
x During my visit to Islamabad in February, I raised

with President Zardari the need for the UN to be
granted a larger plot of land within the Diplomatic
Enclave, in order to be able to accommodate all the
Agencies. At the same time, we asked for your
assistance in allocating appropriate plots of land in
Peshawar, Lahore, Quetta and Karachi. What
progress has been made in this regard?
5
Pakistan FM TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit
H. E. Mr. Qureshi,
Foreign Minister of Pakistan,
Political support 2
The Bhutto Commission of Inquiry 3
Afghanistan 4
India 9
Staff Security 10
1
Political Support
x I am pleased that the political crisis last month was
averted. Pakistan faces many formidable challenges and
real threats and the major democratic players must join
forces to counter them effectively.
x What is your assessment of the current security and
political situations in Pakistan?
x The UN stands by the Pakistani people in their efforts to
build a better future and wants to do all it can to assist
them in advancing good governance and democracy.
2
The Bhutto Commission of Inquiry
x I am in the process of establishing the Bhutto

Commission of Inquiry. A Technical Assessment Mission
will visit Pakistan imminently and will finalize a Concept
of Operations for the Commission. This would be the
basis for the work of the Commission towards
determining the facts and circumstances of the Bhutto
assassination.
Afghanistan
3
x I welcome your support to stabilization and development
efforts in Afghanistan.
x With violence spreading beyond the southern and eastern

provinces of Afghanistan, the country faces serious
security issues, particularly in view of the forthcoming
elections and the need to deliver tangible improvements
on the ground.
4
x Addressing these challenges is the role of Afghan and
international military forces; but their cross border
dimension is equally crucial. In this respect I welcome
the efforts to enhance cooperation between the
governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
x The visits by Pakistani officials to Afghanistan and the
signing of the bilateral declaration, the ongoing Jirga
process, and the resumption of the Tripartite Commission
meetings are all tangible signs of this spirit of
cooperation.
5
x I also welcome the various initiatives to foster regional
cooperation, such as the December conference in Paris,
and the forthcoming Conference of the Regional
Economic Cooperation Council, which will be held in
Islamabad.
x SRSG Eide places great importance on supporting
regional cooperation, particularly in practical areas, such
as economic development and counter-narcotics efforts.
I would be interested to learn your views on what areas
and practical initiatives are in need of attention and the
role that the United Nations can play.
6
x I am aware of the strains that continue to be placed on
Pakistan by large numbers of Afghan refugees and I
welcome Pakistan’s demonstrated respect for the
principle of voluntary and gradual repatriation.
x There is no purely military solution to the problems of

Afghanistan. But reconciliation efforts cannot be a short-
cut to peace, or a substitute for development and
institution-building efforts. Reconciliation efforts must
respect the Constitution and be conducted from a
position of political and military strength. I would like
your views on this.
7
India
x Could you give me an update on Indo-Pakistani relations?

How has the cooperation with India developed on the
Mumbai attacks?
x I hope that Pakistan and India will continue their

composite dialogue and bilateral cooperation in the
interest of stability and economic development of South
Asian region.
8
Staff Security
x I am concerned about the hostage situation involving

John Solecki, the head of UNHCR office in Quetta. We
need to continue our cooperation to bring back John
safely to his family.
9
x During my visit to Islamabad in February, I raised with
President Zardari the need for the UN to be granted a
larger plot of land within the Diplomatic Enclave, in order
to be able to accommodate all the Agencies. At the same
time, we asked for your assistance in allocating
appropriate plots of land in Peshawar, Lahore, Quetta
and Karachi. What progress has been made in this
regard?
10
OIC Doha TPs.docCleared by Political Unit Confidenti

H.E. Dr. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu,
Secretary-General
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
UN-OIC Cooperation 1
Iraq 2
Middle East 2
Somalia 3
Afghanistan 5
UN-OIC cooperation
[Cooperation between the two organizations is proceeding in a
satisfactory manner. Various joint activities are being carried
out in the fields of technology, trade, development, MDGs, food
security, environment, health and population, arts and crafts,
etc. There is interaction in the political field, including with
regard to Somalia. The general meeting between the UN system
and the OIC was held in July 2008 at UNOG. It reviewed and
appraised the cooperation.]
x The OIC is a reliable partner. We value dealing with
you. I am glad that both Organizations are enhancing
practical cooperation and building complementarity.
x I welcome the establishment of institutional linkages

between the two Secretariats as agreed upon by the
general Geneva meeting.
x Follow-up mechanisms and regular contacts will

facilitate an exchange of expertise and lessons
learned. They will be particularly helpful to conflict
prevention efforts being undertaken by the UN and
OIC.
1
Iraq
x I understand that the OIC has deployed an
international observer mission to monitor the Iraqi
provincial elections. What is your assessment?
x The situation in Iraq remains difficult and further

How do you see the political situation and efforts to
promote national reconciliation?
x I am encouraged by the number of regional countries

sending their ambassadors to Iraq to address issues
of mutual concern.
x I believe that regional organizations such as the OIC

can play a role in promoting dialogue. How do you see
the OIC’s role in Iraq?
Middle East

2



Somalia
x I commend OIC’s efforts in support of peace and
stability in Somalia.
3

be crucial and the new Government of Shiekh Sharif

reconciliation. We expect continued support from the
OIC in helping the Government advance its
programme of national reconciliation and political
development.

x The OIC can perhaps help in providing financial and

material support for the 5000 strong Joint Somalia
Security Force.

conference on reconstruction in the summer. The
OIC’s support in this area would be critical.
4

your Organization is needed now more than ever for
the vulnerable Somali population.
Afghanistan
x One of the major challenges in Afghanistan is
coordination of international efforts. In this respect it
is vital that any OIC efforts in Afghanistan are carried
out in close consultation with the Joint Coordination
and Monitoring Board (JCMB) and SRSG Eide.
x The Afghanistan Conferences in Moscow and the

Hague are an opportunity to discuss and chart the
joint approach with regard to Afghanistan.
5
OIC Doha TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit
H.E. Dr. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu,
Secretary-General
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
UN-OIC Cooperation 2
Iraq 4
Middle East 6
Somalia 10
Afghanistan 14
1
UN-OIC cooperation
[Cooperation between the two organizations is proceeding in a
satisfactory manner. Various joint activities are being carried out in
the fields of technology, trade, development, MDGs, food security,
environment, health and population, arts and crafts, etc. There is
interaction in the political field, including with regard to Somalia.
The general meeting between the UN system and the OIC was held in
July 2008 at UNOG. It reviewed and appraised the cooperation.]
x The OIC is a reliable partner. We value dealing with you.
I am glad that both Organizations are enhancing practical
cooperation and building complementarity.
2
x I welcome the establishment of institutional linkages
between the two Secretariats as agreed upon by the
general Geneva meeting.
x Follow-up mechanisms and regular contacts will facilitate

an exchange of expertise and lessons learned. They will
be particularly helpful to conflict prevention efforts being
undertaken by the UN and OIC.
Iraq
3
x I understand that the OIC has deployed an international
observer mission to monitor the Iraqi provincial
elections. What is your assessment?
x The situation in Iraq remains difficult and further steps

need to be taken to promote national dialogue. How do
you see the political situation and efforts to promote
national reconciliation?
x I am encouraged by the number of regional countries

sending their ambassadors to Iraq to address issues of
mutual concern.
4
x I believe that regional organizations such as the OIC can
play a role in promoting dialogue. How do you see the
OIC’s role in Iraq?
Middle East
and the West Bank.
5
x It is regrettable that Palestinian unity talks have not so
far succeeded. We need to keep supporting the Egyptian

Hamas of this.
6
the roadmap.
7
Somalia
8
x I commend OIC’s efforts in support of peace and stability
in Somalia.

and the new Government of Shiekh Sharif will require
immediate support.
9
We expect continued support from the OIC in helping the
Government advance its programme of national
reconciliation and political development.

10
x The OIC can perhaps help in providing financial and
material support for the 5000 strong Joint Somalia
Security Force.

on reconstruction in the summer. The OIC’s support in
this area would be critical.
11
your Organization is needed now more than ever for the
Afghanistan
x One of the major challenges in Afghanistan is
coordination of international efforts. In this respect it is
vital that any OIC efforts in Afghanistan are carried out in
close consultation with the Joint Coordination and
Monitoring Board (JCMB) and SRSG Eide.
12
x The Afghanistan Conferences in Moscow and the Hague
are an opportunity to discuss and chart the joint
approach with regard to Afghanistan.
13
Netherlans Queen Beatrix TPs.docCleared by Political Unit 24-03-09
Confidential
Talking Points for the Secretary-General’s audience with

Her Majesty Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands
31 March 2009 (time TBC)

x I value the Netherlands’ unwavering commitment to

the promotion of peace and development in the
world. I am grateful for the political and financial
support that your country continues to provide to the
United Nations.

Dutch Government’s initiative to host the
International Conference on Afghanistan for which
I am present today.

Special Tribunal for Lebanon. They constitute the
1
Netherlans Queen Beatrix TPs (CARDS).docCleared by Political Unit 24-03-09
Confidential
Talking Points for the Secretary-General’s audience with Her
Majesty Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands

1
Confidential
x I value the Netherlands’ unwavering commitment to the
promotion of peace and development in the world. I am
grateful for the political and financial support that your
country continues to provide to the United Nations.

Dutch Government’s initiative to host the International
Conference on Afghanistan for which
I am present today.
2
Confidential
Special Tribunal for Lebanon. They constitute the
3
Netherlands PM Balkenende TPs.docCleared by Political Unit Confidenti

H.E. Mr. Jan Peter Balkenende,
Prime Minister of the Netherlands,
Afghanistan – see also generics 1

Burundi 2
Somalia – see also generics 2
Middle East – see generics 4
Afghanistan – see also generics

Government’s initiative to host the International

to international support in Afghanistan, and to renew
support for my Special Representative, Kai Eide, and
his role as coordinator of the international
community’s civilian efforts in Afghanistan.
x To my mind, the conference, attended by so many

countries, including from the region, reflects the fact
that the situation in Afghanistan is a subject of global
concern, and that it is important to consider the
regional context.
1
Burundi
[Objective of meeting: 1) Netherlands to keep pressure on the
Government of Burundi and Forces Nationales de Libération to
make the necessary compromises for the expeditious
implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement;
2) to encourage the Netherlands to pressure South Africa to continue
its support for the AU Task Force.]

x I welcome the continuing support and important role

played by the Netherlands in the Burundian peace
process. Continued pressure on both parties remains
necessary to bring the peace process to a successful
point.

as possible? Do you think the South Africans could be
convinced to remain engaged in the Task Force?
Somalia – see also generics

2





Netherlands.

3
IF RAISED:


these individuals.
Middle East – see generics
4
Netherlands PM Balkenende TPs (CARDS).doc Cleared by Political Unit Confi
H.E. Mr. Jan Peter Balkenende,

1
x The event is an opportunity to give a new dynamism to

international support in Afghanistan, and to renew
support for my Special Representative, Kai Eide, and his
role as coordinator of the international community’s
2

countries, including from the region, reflects the fact that
the situation in Afghanistan is a subject of global
concern, and that it is important to consider the regional
context.
3
Burundi
Government of Burundi and Forces Nationales de Libération to make the
necessary compromises for the expeditious implementation of the
Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement; 2) to encourage the Netherlands to
pressure South Africa to continue its support for the AU Task Force.]
x The peace process in Burundi has made progress but is

also facing serious delays and challenges.
4
point.
5
combine our efforts to ensure the full implementation of
the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement as soon as
possible? Do you think the South Africans could be
6
provision of the support package to AMISOM and assistance in building
the Somali security and rule of law institutions.

7


8
x Security of the judges, particularly the Lebanese judges,
is a serious concern, of course, and I am grateful for the
excellent cooperation that we enjoy with your security
services for their protection in the Netherlands.

9
IF RAISED:

Special Tribunal, would be likely to return immediately to
Lebanon.

detainees to remain in the Netherlands, the Registrar of
the Special Tribunal is in contact with a number of States
who may be willing to accept the relocation of these
individuals.
10
11
Netherlands PM Balkenende and other officials BN.docConfidential

with H.E. Jan Peter Balkenende,
and other Dutch officials
(The Hague, 31 March 2009)
Financial crisis
The impact of the global economic crisis on the Dutch economy could
extend into the medium term, with output levels remaining low for some
time to come, the Dutch Bureau for Economic Analysis (CPB) announced
on 17 March.
Because of Dutch dependence on exports and the sharp decline in world

trade, the CPB expects the economy -- which shrank by 0.6% year-on-year
in the last quarter of 2008 (the worst performance since the early 1980s) --
to contract by 3.5% in 2009, its biggest fall since 1931 (except for the war
years). The budget is likely to go into deficit by 2.8% of GDP, after small
surpluses in 2007-08. The unemployment rate is expected to rise to 5.5%
from 4.0% in 2008, business investment is to drop by 11% thanks to lower
domestic and foreign demand and tighter credit, with exports also expected
to fall by 11%.
The governing coalition is looking shaky, with its three constituent parties
divided over proposals for deep cuts in government expenditure as the
crisis worsens.

The Prime Minister is likely to raise the commencement of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon on 1 March 2009. The Legal Counsel, on behalf of the
Secretary-General, attended the successful low-key launch event of the
Special Tribunal on 1 March. The Netherlands was represented at
Ambassadorial level, as was Lebanon. The Prosecutor and Registrar also
attended.
The Special Tribunal was established by the Security Council on 10 June

2007 to prosecute those responsible for the assassination of former Prime
Minister, Rafiq Hariri, on 14 February 2005, and certain other related
attacks. The investigation of the assassination and attacks was, until 28
Netherlands PM Balkenende and other officials BN.docConfidential
February 2009, conducted by the International Independent Investigation

Commission (IIIC). The former Commissioner, Daniel Bellemare, is now
the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal. The Prime Minister might reiterate
the invitation made by the Dutch Permanent Representative to the
Secretary-General to attend the opening ceremony of the courtroom of the
Special Tribunal planned for later this year.
The Prosecutor has stated that he will request soon the transfer of the
detainees held by the Lebanese authorities. In the event that, as we expect,
they are rapidly released by the Tribunal, we anticipate that they will return
immediately to Lebanon. However, to cover the contingency of any of them
attempting to remain in the Netherlands, the Registrar of the Special
Tribunal is in contact with a number of States who may be willing to accept
relocation of these individuals to their territory.
Burundi
The deadlines set out in the 17 January Bujumbura Agreement have not
been met, including the 30 January deadline for the start of the DDR of
Forces Nationales de Liberation (FNL) combatants and the release of all
children associated with the FNL. The DDR process has not yet started and
the FNL is yet to be integrated into State institutions and the security
forces. On a positive note, the rebel group formally changed its name to
FNL on 9 January, and submitted its application to register as a political
party on 30 January. The Interior Minister has 60 days to make a decision
on the application.
After a long period of absence, on 12 March, Facilitator Nqakula travelled to

Burundi with a view to unblock the peace process. He impressed upon the
parties that the DDR process must be completed by the 31 March deadline
as the African Union Special Task Force would start withdrawing by 1 April.
In this respect, he informed that he would probably dispatch General
Mgwebi, former ONUB force commander, to head a high-level special
committee to monitor the implementation of the DDR process and
participate in the meetings of the Political Directorate.
The Netherlands has been playing a lead role supporting national security
sector reform (SSR) efforts in Burundi.
Netherlands FM Verhagen TPs.docCleared by Political Unit
Confidential

H.E. Maxime Verhagen,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,

Burundi 2


x In my view, the conference, attended by so many

countries, including from the region, reflect such
broad-based discussions are a tangible expression of
the fact that the situation in Afghanistan is a subject
of global concern, and that it is important to consider
the regional context.
1
Confidential
Burundi
Government of Burundi and Forces Nationales de Liberation to


point.


[Objective of meeting: To update and seek support from Dutch
senior officials on the implementation of SCR 1863 (2009), including
the provision of the support package to AMISOM and assistance in
building the Somali security and rule of law institutions.]
2
Confidential





Netherlands.

3
Confidential
IF RAISED:


these individuals.
4
Netherlands FM Verhagen TPs (CARDS).docCleared by Political Unit
Confidential
with H.E. Maxime Verhagen,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,

x I would like to express my deep appreciation for
your Government’s initiative to host the
International Conference on Afghanistan.
1
Confidential
2
Confidential
x The event is an opportunity to give a new
dynamism to international support in
Afghanistan, and to renew support for my
Special Representative, Kai Eide, and his role as
coordinator of the international community’s
3
Confidential
x In my view, the conference, attended by so
many countries, including from the region,
reflect such broad-based discussions are a
tangible expression of the fact that the situation
in Afghanistan is a subject of global concern, and
that it is important to consider the regional
context.
4
Confidential
Burundi
Government of Burundi and Forces Nationales de Liberation
to make the necessary compromises for the expeditious
2) to encourage the Netherlands to pressure South Africa to
continue its support for the AU Task Force.]
x The peace process in Burundi has made progress

but is also facing serious delays and challenges.
5
Confidential
x I welcome the continuing support and important

role played by the Netherlands in the Burundian
peace process. Continued pressure on both
parties remains necessary to bring the peace
process to a successful point.
6
Confidential
7
Confidential
x Given the expected withdrawal of the African
Union Special Task Force from 1 April, how can
we further combine our efforts to ensure the full
implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire
Agreement as soon as possible? Do you think
the South Africans could be convinced to remain
engaged in the Task Force?
8
Confidential

senior officials on the implementation of SCR 1863 (2009),
including the provision of the support package to AMISOM
and assistance in building the Somali security and rule of law
institutions.]
9
Confidential
x We are preparing to convene a donors’

conference in April, to seek contributions to the
Trust Funds for support to AMISOM and for the
building of Somali security and rule of law
institutions.
10
Confidential
x We count on the Netherlands to provide a
generous contribution to the Trust Funds.

x I was very pleased that the launch ceremony of
the Special Tribunal went smoothly on 1 March.
11
Confidential
authorities in all aspects of the establishment
and commencement of the Special Tribunal.
12
Confidential
grateful for the excellent cooperation that we
enjoy with your security services for their
protection in the Netherlands.
13
Confidential
x I am happy to consider attending the opening of
the courtroom later this year, depending upon
my other commitments at that time.
IF RAISED:
14
Confidential
x We are advised that the detainees, if released by
the Special Tribunal, would be likely to return
15
Confidential
x To cover the contingency of attempts by the
released detainees to remain in the Netherlands,
the Registrar of the Special Tribunal is in contact
with a number of States who may be willing to
accept the relocation of these individuals.
16
Netherlands Dev Minister Koenders TPs.docCleared by ODSG and P. Ladd on 24-03-09
Confidential

H.E. Mr. Bert Koenders,
Minister of Development Cooperation
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Financial crisis 1
ODA 2
Development Cooperation Forum 3
Somalia - see also generics 4
[Objective of meeting: To urge the Netherlands to play an active role at the

G20 by highlighting the social dimensions of the financial and economic
crisis and to invite the Netherlands to participate actively in ECOSOC’s
Development Cooperation Forum.]
Financial crisis and the G20

[The Minister for Development Cooperation of the Netherlands recently
attended the second meeting of the Stiglitz Commission.]
x Given its global dimension, the financial crisis
requires global solutions. No one country can resolve
this crisis alone or insulate itself from its
repercussions without assistance.
x I count on your continued efforts in helping to ensure

a globally coordinated policy response to the crisis.
I hope that the Netherlands will highlight the social
dimensions of the financial and economic crisis and
urge the development partners at G20 to take
concrete action to assist developing countries in
tackling the social impacts of the crisis.
1
Confidential
x I also hope that the Netherlands will join me at the

G20 in calling for concrete efforts to prevent the rise
of protectionism, and to ensure that development and
a Global Green Deal are included in the agenda for
voting power and voice on the Bretton Woods
Executive Boards.
translation into concrete policies. What is your view
of the proposal for a Global Economic Council?
ODA
x I am deeply concerned that the current crisis could
lead to significant reductions in development aid.
I count on the Dutch leadership to convince other
x The future of aid will depend on whether
commitments are honoured, resource allocations are
based on sound principles, development priorities and
needs; and on how the use and impact of aid is
monitored and assessed.
2
Confidential
x At the September 2008 High-Level Event on the

MDGs, I proposed a conference in 2010 to galvanize
action around the next 5-year review of the MDGs.
With only 5 years remaining before the 2015
deadline, we must focus on financing and
implementing tried and true policies, programs and
projects. The MDG Africa Steering Group’s
recommendations provide a clear plan to speed
achievement of the MDGs in Africa. I would urge the
Netherlands to take on part of this agenda.
x Progress on the resolution for the conference needs
to be accelerated and I would appreciate efforts by
the Netherlands on this front. Moreover, I would
encourage the Netherlands to begin planning now to
provide a substantive contribution to the review
conference.
Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) [Phase II, 2009-

2010]
[The inaugural Development Cooperation Forum was held on 30th June and
1st of July 2008 during the High-level Segment of ECOSOC. The UN will
hold its second Development Cooperation Forum in 2010.]
3
Confidential
x ECOSOC is central to efforts to promote coherence

and coordination of the UN Development Agenda. As
recognized in Doha and Accra (2008), the DCF is
poised to play a pivotal role in promoting
international dialogue and accountability, in
particular while facing multiple crises.
x Preparations for the 2010 High-level DCF will

therefore focus on inclusive and balanced
North-South consultations in order to lead to tangible
outcomes in the areas of: (i) mutual accountability
and aid transparency; (ii) South-South and triangular

with ECOSOC processes and on your active
participation in the DCF and its preparatory activities
so that expected outcomes are achieved.
Somalia –see also generics

4
Confidential


5
Netherlands Dev Minister Koenders TPs (CARDS).docCleared by ODSG and P.
Ladd on 24-03-09 Confidential
H.E. Mr. Bert Koenders,
Minister of Development Cooperation
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
[Objective of meeting: To urge the Netherlands to play an active role at the G20
by highlighting the social dimensions of the financial and economic crisis and to
invite the Netherlands to participate actively in ECOSOC’s Development
Cooperation Forum.]
1
Financial crisis and the G20
[The Minister for Development Cooperation of the Netherlands recently attended
the second meeting of the Stiglitz Commission.]
x Given its global dimension, the financial crisis requires
global solutions. No one country can resolve this crisis
alone or insulate itself from its repercussions without
assistance.
2
x I count on your continued efforts in helping to ensure a
globally coordinated policy response to the crisis.
I hope that the Netherlands will highlight the social
dimensions of the financial and economic crisis and urge
the development partners at G20 to take concrete action
to assist developing countries in tackling the social
impacts of the crisis.
3
x I also hope that the Netherlands will join me at the G20
in calling for concrete efforts to prevent the rise of
protectionism, and to ensure that development and a
Global Green Deal are included in the agenda for
voting power and voice on the Bretton Woods Executive
Boards.
4
translation into concrete policies. What is your view of
the proposal for a Global Economic Council?
5
ODA
x I am deeply concerned that the current crisis could lead
to significant reductions in development aid.
I count on the Dutch leadership to convince other
x The future of aid will depend on whether commitments
are honoured, resource allocations are based on sound
principles, development priorities and needs; and on how
the use and impact of aid is monitored and assessed.
6
x At the September 2008 High-Level Event on the MDGs, I
proposed a conference in 2010 to galvanize action
around the next 5-year review of the MDGs. With only 5
years remaining before the 2015 deadline, we must focus
on financing and implementing tried and true policies,
programs and projects. The MDG Africa Steering Group’s
recommendations provide a clear plan to speed
achievement of the MDGs in Africa. I would urge the
Netherlands to take on part of this agenda.
7
x Progress on the resolution for the conference needs to be
accelerated and I would appreciate efforts by the
Netherlands on this front. Moreover, I would encourage
the Netherlands to begin planning now to provide a
substantive contribution to the review conference.
8
Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) [Phase II, 2009-2010]
[The inaugural Development Cooperation Forum was held on 30th June and 1st
of July 2008 during the High-level Segment of ECOSOC. The UN will hold its
second Development Cooperation Forum in 2010.]
9
x ECOSOC is central to efforts to promote coherence and
coordination of the UN Development Agenda. As
recognized in Doha and Accra (2008), the DCF is poised
to play a pivotal role in promoting international dialogue
and accountability, in particular while facing multiple
crises.
10
x Preparations for the 2010 High-level DCF will therefore
focus on inclusive and balanced
North-South consultations in order to lead to tangible
outcomes in the areas of: (i) mutual accountability and
aid transparency; (ii) South-South and triangular
11
with ECOSOC processes and on your active participation
in the DCF and its preparatory activities so that expected
outcomes are achieved.
12
Somalia –see also generics
[Objective of meeting: To update and seek support from Dutch senior
the Somali security and rule of law institutions.]
13
Netherlands Defense Minister van Middelkoop TPs.docCleared by Political Unit
Confidential

Mr. Eimert van Middelkoop,
Minister of Defence of the Netherlands,

Burundi 2



countries, including from the region, reflects the fact
that the situation in Afghanistan is a subject of global
concern, and that it is important to consider the
regional context.
1
Confidential
Burundi
Government of Burundi and Forces Nationales de Liberation to


point.


2
Confidential


3
Netherlands Defense Minister van Middelkoop TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit
Confidential
Mr. Eimert van Middelkoop,
Minister of Defence of the Netherlands,

Burundi 4
1
Confidential
x The event is an opportunity to give a new dynamism to

international support in Afghanistan, and to renew
support for my Special Representative, Kai Eide, and his
role as coordinator of the international community’s
2
Confidential
countries, including from the region, reflects the fact that
the situation in Afghanistan is a subject of global
concern, and that it is important to consider the regional
context.
3
Confidential
Burundi
Government of Burundi and Forces Nationales de Liberation to make the
necessary compromises for the expeditious implementation of the
Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement; 2) to encourage the Netherlands to
pressure South Africa to continue its support for the AU Task Force.]
x The peace process in Burundi has made progress but is
also facing serious delays and challenges.
4
Confidential
point.
5
Confidential
combine our efforts to ensure the full implementation of
the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement as soon as
possible? Do you think the South Africans could be
6
Confidential
[Objective of meeting: To update and seek support from Dutch senior
the Somali security and rule of law institutions.]

7
NATO SG de Hoop Schefrer (with Pol revisions) TPs.docCleared by Political Unit 24-
03-09 Confidential

with H. E. Mr. de Hoop Scheffer,
Secretary-General of NATO,
The Hague, 31 March 2009, 3:45pm (time TBC)
NATO/UN Relations 1
Somalia 1
Afghanistan 2
Kosovo 3
NATO/UN relations
x NATO is an important partner for the United Nations.
Coordination between the two organizations is critical
in the contexts where we jointly operate, in particular
in Kosovo and Afghanistan.
x I welcome the upcoming UN-NATO staff level talks on

5 May in New York which will focus on issues of
practical importance for our cooperation.
Somalia
x Thank you for resuming counter piracy operations off
the coast of Somalia. International efforts to deter
and disrupt pirate activities are crucial for the safe
delivery of humanitarian aid and commercial trade.
x We appreciate the efforts of NATO to share

information with us on your anti-piracy efforts, as
requested by the Security Council.
1
Afghanistan
Objective of meeting: Welcome UNAMA-ISAF cooperation, and steps
taken to minimize civilian casualties; enquire about prospective
security developments in 2009, as well as expected outcomes of the
upcoming NATO Summit.
x I welcome NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan, including its

assistance to Afghan national security forces on voter
registration and electoral security.
x In terms of engagement in Afghanistan, what are the

expected outcomes of the NATO Summit in a few
days, particularly with regard to creating a secure
environment ahead of the elections?
x Addressing the country’s security is the role of

Afghan and international military forces. But, we also
need to ensure that civilian and military efforts are
coherent. In this connection, I am pleased with
General McKiernan’s cooperation with my
Special Representative, Kai Eide.
x I welcome the steps ISAF has taken to prevent

civilian casualties, and to improve coordination
between Afghan and international forces. I also
appreciate your invitation to the Afghan Government
to send a delegation to NATO to discuss these issues.
2
x Coherent civilian efforts are crucial to bringing real
improvements on the ground. I would be grateful if
you could lend your voice in encouraging PRTs to
better coordinate their programmes and activities
under the guidance of SRSG Eide.
x We all agree on the need for a political process; there

is no pure military solution for Afghanistan. But
reconciliation efforts must not be a shortcut to peace;
they must respect the Constitution, and be conducted
from a position of political and military strength.
x Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan appear

to be improving, and we should support this bilateral
rapport. How do you see developments in Pakistan’s
tribal areas affecting security in Afghanistan?
Kosovo
x I welcome the smooth process of assumption of
operational responsibilities in the rule of law sector
by EULEX since 9 December. I am also encouraged by
the absence of strong resistance to EULEX by the
Kosovo Serb community in northern Kosovo.
3
x It is important that EULEX send a strong message
that it is committed and capable of dealing with
potentially destabilizing situations in the area. What
is your assessment of EULEX’s capacity and
willingness to do so?
x It is also important that KFOR remain well-resourced

during this period of transition, especially while
EULEX is consolidating its presence in Kosovo.
x I understand that KFOR is in charge of overseeing the

establishment and operations of the Kosovo Security
Force (KSF). I hope that KFOR’s engagement with the
KSF will not affect its positive relations with all
communities in Kosovo.
x UNMIK is being reconfigured in accordance with the

parameters contained in my reports to the Security
Council. The ongoing support of the Security Council,
the EU, NATO and the broader international
community for a reconfigured UNMIK will be crucial.
4
NATO SG de Hoop Schefrer (with Pol revisions) TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit 24-03-
09 Confidential
with H. E. Mr. de Hoop Scheffer,
Secretary-General of NATO,
NATO/UN Relations 2
Somalia 3
Afghanistan 4
Kosovo 8
1
NATO/UN relations
x NATO is an important partner for the United Nations.
Coordination between the two organizations is critical in
the contexts where we jointly operate, in particular in
Kosovo and Afghanistan.
x I welcome the upcoming UN-NATO staff level talks on

5 May in New York which will focus on issues of practical
importance for our cooperation.
2
Somalia
x Thank you for resuming counter piracy operations off the
coast of Somalia. International efforts to deter and
disrupt pirate activities are crucial for the safe delivery of
humanitarian aid and commercial trade.
x We appreciate the efforts of NATO to share information

with us on your anti-piracy efforts, as requested by the
Security Council.
3
Afghanistan
Objective of meeting: Welcome UNAMA-ISAF cooperation, and steps

taken to minimize civilian casualties; enquire about prospective security
developments in 2009, as well as expected outcomes of the upcoming
NATO Summit.
x I welcome NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan, including its

assistance to Afghan national security forces on voter
registration and electoral security.
4
x In terms of engagement in Afghanistan, what are the
expected outcomes of the NATO Summit in a few days,
particularly with regard to creating a secure environment
ahead of the elections?
x Addressing the country’s security is the role of Afghan

and international military forces. But, we also need to
ensure that civilian and military efforts are coherent. In
this connection, I am pleased with General McKiernan’s
cooperation with my Special Representative, Kai Eide.
5
x I welcome the steps ISAF has taken to prevent civilian
casualties, and to improve coordination between Afghan
and international forces. I also appreciate your invitation
to the Afghan Government to send a delegation to NATO
to discuss these issues.
x Coherent civilian efforts are crucial to bringing real

improvements on the ground. I would be grateful if you
could lend your voice in encouraging PRTs to better
coordinate their programmes and activities under the
guidance of SRSG Eide.
6
x We all agree on the need for a political process; there is
no pure military solution for Afghanistan. But
reconciliation efforts must not be a shortcut to peace;
they must respect the Constitution, and be conducted
from a position of political and military strength.
x Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan appear to be

improving, and we should support this bilateral rapport.
How do you see developments in Pakistan’s tribal areas
affecting security in Afghanistan?
7
Kosovo
x I welcome the smooth process of assumption of
operational responsibilities in the rule of law sector by
EULEX since 9 December. I am also encouraged by the
absence of strong resistance to EULEX by the Kosovo
Serb community in northern Kosovo.
x It is important that EULEX send a strong message that it

is committed and capable of dealing with potentially
destabilizing situations in the area. What is your
assessment of EULEX’s capacity and willingness to do so?
8
x It is also important that KFOR remain well-resourced
during this period of transition, especially while EULEX is
consolidating its presence in Kosovo.
x I understand that KFOR is in charge of overseeing the

establishment and operations of the Kosovo Security
Force (KSF). I hope that KFOR’s engagement with the
KSF will not affect its positive relations with all
communities in Kosovo.
9
x UNMIK is being reconfigured in accordance with the
parameters contained in my reports to the Security
Council. The ongoing support of the Security Council, the
EU, NATO and the broader international community for a
reconfigured UNMIK will be crucial.
10
NATO SG de Hoop Scheffer BN.doc
Background Note for the Secretary-General’s meeting with

H. E. Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,
Secretary-General of NATO
(The Hague, 31 March 2009, 3:45pm –time TBC)
General
The term of Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer as Secretary-General of NATO
is scheduled to end on 31 July 2009. The current front-runner to
assume the position is the Danish Prime Minister,
Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Mr. Rasmussen’s candidacy is supported
by the United States, France, UK and Germany, among others.
Concerns have however been raised by other members, including
Turkey. This relates to the fact that Prime Minister Rasmussen
refused to apologise for the “cartoon” incident in 2006, when Danish
newspapers depicted the Prophet Muhammed with a bomb in his
turban. Given that 80 percent of NATO’s out-of-area operations are
in Muslim-dominated countries, there is concern that
Mr. Rasmussen’s name may revive similar reactions.
At their Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl, 2-5 April 2009, NATO will
celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Alliance. At the NATO summit
in Bucharest in April 2008, Albania and Croatia were officially invited
to start accession talks with the alliance, and signed the accession
protocols on July 9, 2008. These countries are now expected to
formally join the alliance in April 2009. While the US administration
is likely to continue supporting membership for Georgia and Ukraine,
it seems that most in Europe anticipate a more cautious approach to
further enlargement following events in August 2008, that will see
Membership Action Plans (MAPs) delayed for a few years.
NATO-UN Cooperation
Some Member States (Russia, Syria and NAM countries) of the UN
had expressed concern that the Joint Declaration on UN-NATO
Secretariat Cooperation was signed by the Secretariat without
adequate consultation with them, and had stressed that as a military
alliance NATO does not fall under Chapter VIII of the Charter. These
concerns have to a certain extent lessened in recent months, but
nonetheless remain strong. As a counterbalance to these concerns
DPKO has expressed to Member States an openness to explore
enhanced cooperation with other regional arrangements, such as, for
example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), in
peacekeeping.
Following the signing of the Declaration, NATO is keen to move

forward with practical action to enhance its partnership with the UN
through the ‘Comprehensive Approach”, including coordinated
planning, lessons learned and joint training. The Comprehensive
Approach (CA): The general thrust of the CA is to bring NATO in line
with international community efforts in crisis management, under
a UN “umbrella” or mandate. There are two main policy components.
Internally, the goal of the CA is to sensitize NATO structures to
civilian aspects of crisis management, and bring operational planning
and conduct of NATO operations into line to support civilian-led (UN,
EU etc) crisis management operations. Externally, NATO believes
that the CA will improve cooperation with external actors and, most
importantly, legitimize its role.
Somalia
From 24 October to 12 December 2008, NATO provided naval escorts

for the safe delivery of approximately 30,000 tons of humanitarian
aid to Somalia, including escorting supplies for AMISOM. NATO will
resume counter piracy operations off the Horn of Africa later this
month, sending five NATO ships to the region.
2
Moscow - SG-Russian officials on UN regime in Georgia TPs.docConfidential

Russian officials,
Abkhazia/Georgia: UN security regime proposal
x The Security Council has asked me to make

recommendations on the future arrangements in
Abkhazia very soon. To meet the deadline of 15 May,
there will have to be an agreement about the way
forward by the end of April.
x We have spoken to the main stakeholders, and have

developed this proposal. We believe that it would be
in the interests of all. It is a sort of “Cyprus solution”.
It stabilizes the situation around the new realities,
without speaking about final status or about an
eventual resolution of the issue.
x We see the signatories - or the parties to the

agreement, however it is concluded - as being the
Abkhazian and the Georgians. But the provisions
would apply to all, of course.
x It isn't easy for anyone to accept this, but the Council

has agreed that we need to take into account the
developments on the ground, and that is what we
have done.
1
Moscow - SG-Russian officials on UN regime in Georgia TPs.docConfidential
x I would be grateful if you could give this your

consideration, and get back to us in the coming days.
x If it can be agreed, I think it will allow everyone to

get on with their lives and their business in safety and
security -- and help calm down a major international
flash-point.
2
Moscow - SG-Russian officials on UN regime in Georgia TPs CARDS.docConfidential
with Russian officials,
Abkhazia/Georgia: UN security regime proposal

x The Security Council has asked me to make
recommendations on the future arrangements in
Abkhazia very soon. To meet the deadline of 15 May,
there will have to be an agreement about the way
forward by the end of April.
1
x We have spoken to the main stakeholders, and have
developed this proposal. We believe that it would be in
the interests of all. It is a sort of “Cyprus solution”. It
stabilizes the situation around the new realities, without
speaking about final status or about an eventual
x We see the signatories - or the parties to the agreement,

however it is concluded - as being the Abkhazian and the
Georgians. But the provisions would apply to all, of
course.
2
x It isn't easy for anyone to accept this, but the Council has
agreed that we need to take into account the
developments on the ground, and that is what we have
done.
x I would be grateful if you could give this your

consideration, and get back to us in the coming days.
x If it can be agreed, I think it will allow everyone to get

on with their lives and their business in safety and
security -- and help calm down a major international
flash-point.
3
4
Libya Leader Gaddafi TPs.docCleared by Political Unit 24-03-09
Confidential

with Libyan Leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi
at the Summit of the League of Arab States in Doha,
Governance 1
Central African Republic 3
Chad 4
Somalia 5
G20 Summit (see generics) 6
Governance
[Libyan Leader Colonel Gaddafi was elected Chairman of the
African Union at the last summit in Addis Ababa, in February.
Following his assumption of the rotating chairmanship of the AU
appointment, he has visited a number of African countries
including Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Niger. Colonel Gaddafi
has been trying to mediate between the junta and other political
stakeholders in Mauritania. However his efforts so far have not
yielded the desired results. On the contrary, for instance in the
efforts to resolve the problems in the particular case of
Mauritania, he was accused by the opposition of siding with the
junta.
The AU imposed sanctions on Mauritania in February, including
a travel ban and a freeze of bank assets on the members of the
military junta to press for an immediate return to constitutional
order. In Guinea-Bissau, Colonel Gaddafi felt that the 60-day
timescale specified under the constitution may not be sufficient to
organize presidential elections and that an extension may be
necessary. He announced that the AU and the Community of
Sahel-Saharan States would send election observers to Guinea-
Bissau and launch their own inquiries into the killings of
President Vieira and General Tagme. In Niger, where there is
speculation that President Tandja may amend the constitution to
allow him to stand for a third term, Colonel Gaddafi declared
that he was opposed to presidential term limits in Africa.]
1
Confidential
x I would like to commend the effort you are making

as the new Chairman of the African Union to promote
peace and prevent conflicts in Africa. The
United Nations values greatly its partnership with the
AU. In this regard, I would value your views on the
Prodi report which specifically examined
strengthened UN/AU collaboration.
x I am very concerned about recent developments in

countries such as Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania
and Madagascar. Like the AU, the United Nations
would like to see orderly transitions in these
countries in the shortest possible time.
x I commend you for your recent initiatives aimed at

helping these countries return to constitutional
governance in the shortest possible time.
x Following your recent visits, what is your assessment

on the way forward especially in Guinea-Bissau and
Mauritania, and how can we best work together to
promote security and stability as well as national
reconciliation in these countries?
x I would like your views on how to deal with the

possible humanitarian crisis in Darfur following the
expulsion of the 13 NGOs.
2
Confidential
Central African Republic

[Despite progress achieved since the December 2008
political dialogue, the overall situation in CAR continues to
deteriorate. A new Cabinet, appointed in accordance with the
dialogue recommendations, is not viewed as sufficiently
inclusive. As a result, the trust that the rebels had placed in
President Bozizé has been undermined. Some rebel leaders,
allegedly supported by Libya, have denounced the peace process
altogether. Rebel attacks in northern CAR have resulted in the
displacement of up to 10,000 civilians, and the DDR process has
slowed down. The Government’s attempts to divert the grant of
USD 16 million from the sub-regional body CEMAC, pledged for
the DDR process, are rejected by CAR’s partners. On 10 March,
CAR requested UN electoral assistance for the 2010 legislative
and presidential elections.]
x I am concerned about the deteriorating situation in
the Central African Republic. Following the all
inclusive national dialogue held in December 2008,
some rebel elements have resumed attacks to protest
against what they view is the Government’s
reluctance to fully implement the dialogue
recommendations.
x The UN is in the process of strengthening its presence

in the CAR in order to better support the new
dispensation of the humanitarian assistance. We
continue to count on the cooperation of the CAR’s
partners, including Libya.
x In this respect, as Chairman of the AU and as the

CAR’s long-standing friend, we count on your support
to help sustain and consolidate the peace process.
3
Confidential

x Peace in Darfur cannot be achieved without stable
and good neighbourly relations between Sudan and
Chad. Given your past efforts to normalize the
relations between the two countries, I count on your
continuing support to help the two countries.
x I also count on your leadership to garner full support

to the Joint UN-AU Chief Mediator, Mr. Bassolé, and to
the Doha process, particularly in seeking to bring
other rebel groups to the negotiating table.
Chad
x I am grateful for Libya’s support for the deployment
of MINURCAT in eastern Chad and the north-eastern
part of the Central African Republic.
x Libya has played an important role in the quest for

a peaceful settlement of the conflict between the
Government of Chad and armed opposition groups.
What do you see as the prospects for the long-
overdue implementation of the Sirte Agreement?
4
Confidential
Somalia
x The current situation in Somalia presents us with
a rare window of opportunity. The next 100 days will

Agreement which still remains a viable basis for
national reconciliation.

to its own people but also to the region and to the
x Somalia will also need support for its reconstruction

and development efforts. We see in such efforts,
a strong potential for consolidating peace and
restoring stability in the country. We are also
planning a conference on reconstruction in the
summer. Libya’s financial support for this initiative
would be critical.
5
Confidential

humanitarian needs. The humanitarian community is
working on new modalities to increase the delivery of
assistance under extremely difficult circumstances.

the African Union is critical for safeguarding the well-
being of the vulnerable Somali population. Are there
any areas that we should be jointly focusing on?
G20 Summit
See generic TPs.
6
Libya Leader Gaddafi TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit 24-03-09
Confidential

with Libyan Leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi
at the Summit of the League of Arab States in Doha,
Governance 2
Central African Republic 7
Chad 4 11
Somalia 12
G20 Summit (see generics) 16
1
Confidential
Governance
[Libyan Leader Colonel Gaddafi was elected Chairman of the African
Union at the last summit in Addis Ababa, in February. Following his
assumption of the rotating chairmanship of the AU appointment, he
has visited a number of African countries including Guinea-Bissau,
Mauritania and Niger. Colonel Gaddafi has been trying to mediate
between the junta and other political stakeholders in Mauritania.
However his efforts so far have not yielded the desired results. On the
contrary, for instance in the efforts to resolve the problems in the
particular case of Mauritania, he was accused by the opposition of
siding with the junta.
2
Confidential
The AU imposed sanctions on Mauritania in February, including a

travel ban and a freeze of bank assets on the members of the military
junta to press for an immediate return to constitutional order. In
Guinea-Bissau, Colonel Gaddafi felt that the 60-day timescale
specified under the constitution may not be sufficient to organize
presidential elections and that an extension may be necessary. He
announced that the AU and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States
would send election observers to Guinea-Bissau and launch their
own inquiries into the killings of President Vieira and General
Tagme. In Niger, where there is speculation that President Tandja
may amend the constitution to allow him to stand for a third term,
Colonel Gaddafi declared that he was opposed to presidential term
limits in Africa.]
3
Confidential
x I would like to commend the effort you are making as the

new Chairman of the African Union to promote peace and
prevent conflicts in Africa. The United Nations values
greatly its partnership with the AU. In this regard,
I would value your views on the Prodi report which
specifically examined strengthened UN/AU collaboration.
4
Confidential
x I am very concerned about recent developments in

countries such as Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and
Madagascar. Like the AU, the United Nations would like
to see orderly transitions in these countries in the
shortest possible time.
x I commend you for your recent initiatives aimed at

helping these countries return to constitutional
governance in the shortest possible time.
5
Confidential
x Following your recent visits, what is your assessment on

the way forward especially in Guinea-Bissau and
Mauritania, and how can we best work together to
promote security and stability as well as national
reconciliation in these countries?
x I would like your views on how to deal with the possible

humanitarian crisis in Darfur following the expulsion of
the 13 NGOs.
6
Confidential
Central African Republic

[Despite progress achieved since the December 2008 political
dialogue, the overall situation in CAR continues to deteriorate. A new
Cabinet, appointed in accordance with the dialogue
recommendations, is not viewed as sufficiently inclusive. As a result,
the trust that the rebels had placed in President Bozizé has been
undermined. Some rebel leaders, allegedly supported by Libya, have
denounced the peace process altogether. Rebel attacks in northern
CAR have resulted in the displacement of up to 10,000 civilians, and
the DDR process has slowed down. The Government’s attempts to
divert the grant of USD 16 million from the sub-regional body
CEMAC, pledged for the DDR process, are rejected by CAR’s
partners. On 10 March, CAR requested UN electoral assistance for
the 2010 legislative and presidential elections.]
7
Confidential
x I am concerned about the deteriorating situation in the

Central African Republic. Following the all inclusive
national dialogue held in December 2008, some rebel
elements have resumed attacks to protest against what
they view is the Government’s reluctance to fully
implement the dialogue recommendations.
8
Confidential
x The UN is in the process of strengthening its presence in

the CAR in order to better support the new dispensation
of the humanitarian assistance. We continue to count on
the cooperation of the CAR’s partners, including Libya.
x In this respect, as Chairman of the AU and as the CAR’s

long-standing friend, we count on your support to help
sustain and consolidate the peace process.

9
Confidential
x Peace in Darfur cannot be achieved without stable and good

neighbourly relations between Sudan and Chad. Given your
past efforts to normalize the relations between the two
countries, I count on your continuing support to help the two
countries.
x I also count on your leadership to garner full support to the
Joint UN-AU Chief Mediator, Mr. Bassolé, and to the Doha
process, particularly in seeking to bring other rebel groups to
the negotiating table.
Chad
10
Confidential
x I am grateful for Libya’s support for the deployment of

MINURCAT in eastern Chad and the north-eastern part of
the Central African Republic.
x Libya has played an important role in the quest for
a peaceful settlement of the conflict between the
Government of Chad and armed opposition groups. What
do you see as the prospects for the long-overdue
implementation of the Sirte Agreement?
Somalia
11
Confidential

a rare window of opportunity. The next 100 days will be
crucial and the new Government of Sheikh Sharif will
require immediate support.
which still remains a viable basis for national
reconciliation.
12
Confidential

its own people but also to the region and to the
13
Confidential
x Somalia will also need support for its reconstruction and

development efforts. We see in such efforts,
a strong potential for consolidating peace and restoring
stability in the country. We are also planning a
conference on reconstruction in the summer. Libya’s
financial support for this initiative would be critical.
14
Confidential

humanitarian needs. The humanitarian community is
working on new modalities to increase the delivery of
assistance under extremely difficult circumstances.
15
Confidential

African Union is critical for safeguarding the well-being of
the vulnerable Somali population. Are there any areas
that we should be jointly focusing on?
G20 Summit
See generic TPs.
16
Lebanon President Sleiman TPs (rev1).docCleared by Political Unit Confidentia

with H.E. Gen. Michel Sleiman,
President of Lebanon,
LAS Summit, Doha, 30 March 2009 (time TBc)
Lebanese Domestic Politics 1

Resolutions 1559, 1701 and UNIFIL 2
Palestinians in Lebanon 5
Lebanese domestic politics

important that these elections take place as
scheduled.

intimidation in their political campaigns [at the
National Dialogue on 2 March].
x The Lebanese National Dialogue you have convened

on a national defence strategy is a very important
process. Lebanon’s political leaders need to be
encouraged to sustain this dialogue and to make
1
x For the sake of peace and stability in the region, it is

essential to encourage armed groups to abide by
Security Council resolutions and the decisions of the
Government of Lebanon, through a Lebanese-led
political process.
x I am mindful of the regional ramifications of this

issue and have urged all relevant parties to assist in
achieving the disarming and disbanding of all
remaining Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.
x I condemned the killing of the PLO deputy head in

Lebanon. I stated that such actions must not be
allowed to endanger the climate of calm that
currently prevails in Lebanon.
Resolutions 1559, 1701 and UNIFIL

x I am in the process of compiling my report to the
Security Council on the implementation of SCR 1559,
that I will release at the end of April. Since its
adoption, many significant provisions of the
resolution have been implemented. I want to
commend you once again for your important
contribution to that end.
2

the region.
x Despite this relative calm, violations of SCR 1701 are

of concern. All parties need to do more to consolidate
stability and move towards a permanent ceasefire
and a long-term solution.
x The continuous violations of Lebanese air space by

the Israeli Defence Forces are violations of 1701 and
threaten stability in the region. They must cease.

Lebanese Government has started a process,
supported by the international community. However,
progress has been quite limited and Lebanon’s
borders remain porous, which presents a continuous
challenge regarding the implementation of the arms
embargo.
3

process for the withdrawal of the Israeli Defence
Forces from the northern part of the village of Ghajar
and adjacent areas. It is imperative that these
positive developments translate into the actual
withdrawal of the Israeli forces, and I hope that this
can be achieved shortly after the formation of the
new government in Israel.

Sheb’a farms. Israel has not shown a willingness to
engage. So far, the United Nations’ efforts have not
led to positive results. However, I will continue my

normalise their relations, including the establishment
of embassies in both countries. Syria’s appointment
of an Ambassador to Lebanon is a welcome and
timely development.
x This improvement needs to translate into concrete

achievements, including the delimitation and
demarcation of the border, including Sheb’a,
increased cooperation for the control of the joint
border, the dismantlement of the Palestinian bases
close to the border as well as the return of Lebanese
persons who are missing in Syria.
4

x I am very pleased that the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon was launched. This is the result of a long
process of collaboration between Lebanon and the UN
in order to bring to justice those responsible for the
assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri.
x Although the Special Tribunal will be entirely

independent and will not be formally part of the UN, I
give you my strongest assurance that I will continue
to support the institution in any way I can in months
and years to come as it embarks on its important
work.

matter for the Tribunal and your judicial authorities to
decide. They will be handled in accordance with the
provisions of the Statute of the Tribunal. It falls to
the Prosecutor to decide whether to initiate a request
for transfer of any of the detainees.
Palestinians in Lebanon
x I am encouraged by the visible progress made
regarding the reconstruction of Nahr el-Bared refugee
camp. I am actively pursuing additional funding to
ensure the completion of the process.
5
x Meanwhile, I wish to encourage you to continue

taking measures to improve the condition of
Palestinian refugees in the country.

interlocutors.
6
Lebanon President Sleiman TPs (rev1) CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit
with H.E. Gen. Michel Sleiman,
President of Lebanon,
LAS Summit, Doha, 30 March 2009 (time TBc)
Lebanese Domestic Politics 2

Resolutions 1559, 1701 and UNIFIL 5
Palestinians in Lebanon 14
Lebanese domestic politics

1
important that these elections take place as scheduled.

campaigns [at the National Dialogue on 2 March].
2
x The Lebanese National Dialogue you have convened on a
national defence strategy is a very important process.
Lebanon’s political leaders need to be encouraged to
sustain this dialogue and to make progress in addressing
the core issues.
x For the sake of peace and stability in the region, it is

essential to encourage armed groups to abide by Security
Council resolutions and the decisions of the Government
of Lebanon, through a Lebanese-led political process.
3
x I am mindful of the regional ramifications of this issue
and have urged all relevant parties to assist in achieving
the disarming and disbanding of all remaining Lebanese
and non-Lebanese militias.
x I condemned the killing of the PLO deputy head in

Lebanon. I stated that such actions must not be allowed
to endanger the climate of calm that currently prevails in
Lebanon.
Resolutions 1559, 1701 and UNIFIL

4
x I am in the process of compiling my report to the
Security Council on the implementation of SCR 1559, that
I will release at the end of April. Since its adoption,
many significant provisions of the resolution have been
implemented. I want to commend you once again for
your important contribution to that end.

region.
5
x Despite this relative calm, violations of SCR 1701 are of
stability and move towards a permanent ceasefire and a
long-term solution.
x The continuous violations of Lebanese air space by the

Israeli Defence Forces are violations of 1701 and
threaten stability in the region. They must cease.
6
Lebanese Government has started a process, supported
by the international community. However, progress has
been quite limited and Lebanon’s borders remain porous,
which presents a continuous challenge regarding the
implementation of the arms embargo.
7
process for the withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Forces
from the northern part of the village of Ghajar and
adjacent areas. It is imperative that these positive
developments translate into the actual withdrawal of the
Israeli forces, and I hope that this can be achieved
shortly after the formation of the new government in
Israel.
8
farms. Israel has not shown a willingness to engage. So
far, the United Nations’ efforts have not led to positive
results. However, I will continue my efforts aimed at a
normalise their relations, including the establishment of
embassies in both countries. Syria’s appointment of an
development.
9
x This improvement needs to translate into concrete
achievements, including the delimitation and
demarcation of the border, including Sheb’a, increased
cooperation for the control of the joint border, the
dismantlement of the Palestinian bases close to the
border as well as the return of Lebanese persons who are
missing in Syria.

10
x I am very pleased that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
was launched. This is the result of a long process of
collaboration between Lebanon and the UN in order to
bring to justice those responsible for the assassination of
former Prime Minister Hariri.
x Although the Special Tribunal will be entirely
independent and will not be formally part of the UN, I
give you my strongest assurance that I will continue to
support the institution in any way I can in months and
years to come as it embarks on its important work.
11
matter for the Tribunal and your judicial authorities to
decide. They will be handled in accordance with the
provisions of the Statute of the Tribunal. It falls to the
Prosecutor to decide whether to initiate a request for
transfer of any of the detainees.
12
Palestinians in Lebanon
x I am encouraged by the visible progress made regarding
the reconstruction of Nahr el-Bared refugee camp. I am
actively pursuing additional funding to ensure the
completion of the process.
x Meanwhile, I wish to encourage you to continue taking

measures to improve the condition of Palestinian
refugees in the country.

13
LAS SG Moussa TPs.docCleared by Political Unit Confidenti

H. E. Mr. Amre Moussa,
Secretary-General of the League of Arab States,
LAS Summit, Doha, 30 March 2009, 8:00am

Iraq 1
Darfur 2
Somalia 3
UN-LAS 5
Middle East - see generics
Board of Inquiry [see also Middle East generics]
x I understand that the LAS has established its own

Board or Commission of inquiry. How is it
progressing?
Iraq
x The Arab League has deployed an international
observer mission to monitor the Iraqi provincial
elections. The UN welcomes cooperation with the
Arab League on electoral and other matters.
x The situation remains difficult and further steps will

need to be taken to promote national dialogue. It was
a positive sign to see larger Sunni Arab participation
during the provincial elections.
1
x I understand that you recently visited Baghdad and

discussed issues of national reconciliation. How do
you see the situation and the Arab League’s role in
Iraq?
x I welcome the fact that the number of Arab countries

that have sent their ambassadors to Iraq have
increased. It is a good example of the interaction
between Iraq and the neighbouring states.
Darfur
[Sudan has rejected Egypt’s proposal to convene an international

conference on Sudan, refusing to “sit with P3 members” at such
a conference, but similar proposals may be put forward by Egypt or
other countries in the region. We need to think carefully about
concrete objectives of such initiatives and how they will fit the
ongoing AU/UN-led mediation efforts.]
x I appreciate the League of Arab States’ continued
engagement in seeking a solution to the Darfur crisis.
x In my view, the Sudanese already know what they

have to do — build gradually on the Doha process
towards an inclusive peace process and the cessation
of hostilities, cooperation with UNAMID, and promote
justice in the country.
x Will the LAS and AU delegation come to New York to

discuss the ICC indictment?
2
Somalia
a rare window of opportunity. The next 100 days will
x The challenge now for all of us is to focus collectively

on addressing security on the ground, building
governance and recovery issues in support of the
Government.
x We are now preparing for the upcoming donor

conference on support for AMISOM and the Somali
security forces. Providing financial support will be
crucial to achieve further gains in the peace process
and to improve security in Somalia.
x I am particularly pleased with the commitment of the

LAS to strengthen the peace process. The
announcement recently made in Addis Ababa by your
Director for the Horn of Africa for financial support to
the Joint Security Forces is encouraging.
3
x The new leaders have stated their determination to

engage with all stakeholders, including national,
regional and international partners. Those of us who
have influence on the groups remaining outside of the
peace process should call on them to join for the sake
of national reconciliation.
Humanitarian Situation

humanitarian needs.


the League of Arab States is needed now more than
ever for the vulnerable Somali population.
4
UN-LAS
x The UN needs partners such as the LAS and other

regional organizations, whose experience and
knowledge complement its reach and legitimacy. Your
support is crucial to our long-term success.
x The general meeting on cooperation between our two

organizations in Geneva was useful. It contributed to
building institutional linkages between our two
Secretariats.
x The meeting agreed on follow-up mechanisms and

regular contacts to facilitate exchange of expertise
and lessons learned. These will be particularly helpful
to conflict prevention efforts being undertaken by the
UN and LAS.
5
LAS SG Moussa TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit
H. E. Mr. Amre Moussa,
Secretary-General of the League of Arab States,
LAS Summit, Doha, 30 March 2009, 8:00am

Iraq 2
Darfur 5
Somalia 7
UN-LAS 12
1
Middle East - see generics
Board of Inquiry [see also Middle East generics]
x I understand that the LAS has established its own Board
or Commission of inquiry. How is it progressing?
Iraq
x The Arab League has deployed an international observer
mission to monitor the Iraqi provincial elections. The UN
welcomes cooperation with the Arab League on electoral
and other matters.
2
x The situation remains difficult and further steps will need
to be taken to promote national dialogue. It was a
positive sign to see larger Sunni Arab participation during
the provincial elections.
x I understand that you recently visited Baghdad and

discussed issues of national reconciliation. How do you
see the situation and the Arab League’s role in Iraq?
3
x I welcome the fact that the number of Arab countries
that have sent their ambassadors to Iraq have increased.
It is a good example of the interaction between Iraq and
the neighbouring states.
Darfur
4
[Sudan has rejected Egypt’s proposal to convene an international
conference on Sudan, refusing to “sit with P3 members” at such
a conference, but similar proposals may be put forward by Egypt or
other countries in the region. We need to think carefully about concrete
objectives of such initiatives and how they will fit the ongoing AU/UN-led
mediation efforts.]
x I appreciate the League of Arab States’ continued
engagement in seeking a solution to the Darfur crisis.
x In my view, the Sudanese already know what they have

to do — build gradually on the Doha process towards an
inclusive peace process and the cessation of hostilities,
cooperation with UNAMID, and promote justice in the
country.
5
x Will the LAS and AU delegation come to New York to
discuss the ICC indictment?
Somalia
a rare window of opportunity. The next 100 days will be
crucial and the new Government of Sheikh Sharif will
require immediate support.
6
x The challenge now for all of us is to focus collectively on
addressing security on the ground, building governance
and recovery issues in support of the Government.
x We are now preparing for the upcoming donor

conference on support for AMISOM and the Somali
security forces. Providing financial support will be crucial
to achieve further gains in the peace process and to
improve security in Somalia.
7
x I am particularly pleased with the commitment of the
LAS to strengthen the peace process. The announcement
recently made in Addis Ababa by your Director for the
Horn of Africa for financial support to the Joint Security
Forces is encouraging.

engage with all stakeholders, including national, regional
and international partners. Those of us who have
influence on the groups remaining outside of the peace
process should call on them to join for the sake of
national reconciliation.
8
Humanitarian Situation
humanitarian needs.

9
League of Arab States is needed now more than ever for
UN-LAS
10
x The UN needs partners such as the LAS and other
regional organizations, whose experience and knowledge
complement its reach and legitimacy. Your support is
crucial to our long-term success.
x The general meeting on cooperation between our two

organizations in Geneva was useful. It contributed to
building institutional linkages between our two
Secretariats.
11
x The meeting agreed on follow-up mechanisms and
regular contacts to facilitate exchange of expertise and
lessons learned. These will be particularly helpful to
conflict prevention efforts being undertaken by the UN
and LAS.
12
Jordan Officials TPs.docCleared by Political Unit 24-03-09
Confidential

with Jordanian officials,

CERF 1
Iraq 2
Lebanon 2

interlocutors.
x The CERF is a valuable tool in ensuring immediate and

effective response following humanitarian disasters.
The Fund has provided over $4.5 million to
humanitarian partners in Jordan for relief activities
supporting Iraqi refugees.
x The Fund has also provided over $8 million to relief

agencies operating in Gaza within days following the
conflict in December/January.
1
Jordan Officials TPs.docCleared by Political Unit 24-03-09
Confidential
x I would be grateful if your Government would

consider making a multi-year contribution to the CERF
in line with its economic capacity.
Iraq
x I would like to express my appreciation for Jordan’s

ongoing support of the UN, particularly in hosting
UNAMI and UN agencies.

remains fragile. Provincial elections last January was
an important step forward in Iraq’s political progress.
How do you see the current situation?
x I am also grateful to Jordan for hosting one of the

largest numbers of Iraqi refugees. The UN is
committed to assisting your Government. How do you
see the situation and how best can the UN assist?
x I am pleased that Jordan and other neighbouring

states are beginning to take steps to improve their
bilateral relations with Iraq. How do you see the
prospects for greater regional cooperation?
Lebanon

interlocutors.
2
Jordan Officials TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit 24-03-09
Confidential
with Jordanian officials,

CERF 2
Iraq 4
Lebanon 5
1
Confidential
x The CERF is a valuable tool in ensuring immediate and

effective response following humanitarian disasters. The
Fund has provided over $4.5 million to humanitarian
partners in Jordan for relief activities supporting Iraqi
refugees.
x The Fund has also provided over $8 million to relief

agencies operating in Gaza within days following the
conflict in December/January.
2
Confidential
I would be grateful if your Government would consider
making a multi-year contribution to the CERF in line with
its economic capacity.
Iraq
x I would like to express my appreciation for Jordan’s

ongoing support of the UN, particularly in hosting UNAMI
and UN agencies.
3
Confidential
fragile. Provincial elections last January was an
important step forward in Iraq’s political progress. How
do you see the current situation?
x I am also grateful to Jordan for hosting one of the largest

numbers of Iraqi refugees. The UN is committed to
assisting your Government. How do you see the situation
and how best can the UN assist?
4
Confidential
x I am pleased that Jordan and other neighbouring states
are beginning to take steps to improve their bilateral
relations with Iraq. How do you see the prospects for
greater regional cooperation?
Lebanon
5
Iran FM Mottaki TPs.docCleared by Political Unit Confidenti

H.E. Manouchehr Mottaki,
of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
The Hague, 31 March 2009 (time TBC)
UN-Iran cooperation 1
Afghanistan 2
Iraq 3
Middle East 4
Nuclear Issue 4
UN-Iran cooperation
[Iran has played an active role in the activities of various UN
agencies and programmes. It is a member of the executive board
of UNDP, as well as the governing boards of UNFPA,
UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNEP, the Global Environmental Facility,
based in Washington, WMO, FAO and a member of the UN
Disarmament Conference in Geneva]
x I highly value Iran’s contribution to various UN
programmes and activities. Iran and the UN have
closely cooperated on such important issues as
refugees, drug control and counter-terrorism.
x I look forward to building on our positive experience

of past cooperation with a view to expanding that
interaction at Headquarters and in the region.
x The UN recognizes that Iran plays an important role

in the region especially with regard to the situation in
Iraq, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf and the Middle
East.
1
x In light of many areas of common interest and

concern, it would be helpful for us to develop
a framework of comprehensive dialogue between the
UN and Iran which would aim at developing
a common agenda of UN – Iran exchanges in those
areas.
x I hope that the upcoming visit to Teheran of

Mr. Pascoe will further clarify how best we should
proceed in our quest for peace, stability and
cooperation in the region.
x It is also my intention to visit Iran at a mutually

agreeable time.
Afghanistan
x I welcome your Government’s efforts in Afghanistan

and commend the support of the Islamic Republic
provided to the activities of UNAMA, in particular the
hosting of its liaison office in Teheran.
x The conferences in Moscow and the Hague are an

opportunity to discuss and chart a joint approach to
Afghanistan. Iran’s active participation in these
events is an important contribution.
2
x Consensus on reconciliation is needed amongst

international and Afghan stakeholders. Any
reconciliation process must be Afghan-led, respect
the Constitution, and be from a position of strength.
What are your views on this?
Iraq
x I would like to express my gratitude for your
Government’s agreement to host a UNAMI liaison
office in Teheran. I expect the head of this office to be
selected shortly. This office will further strengthen
UN-Iranian cooperation.
x While I welcome the progress that has been made in

Iraq, including in the provincial elections, the onus is
now on Iraqi leaders to engage in a political dialogue
and work towards achieving national reconciliation.
How do you see the current political situation?
x I welcome the continuing dialogue between Iran and

Iraq to address issues of mutual concern, including
de-mining. I am pleased that UNAMI is providing its
technical expertise to support de-mining efforts along
the border. What are the prospects for greater
cooperation with Iraq?
3
Middle East
x We face a very uncertain period ahead. It is
regrettable that Palestinian unity talks have not yet
effort. Unity is important to allow relief and
reconstruction for Gaza. We need to persuade Hamas
of this.
x The new Israeli Government will be judged by its


Nuclear Issue
x As regards the nuclear issue, I will continue to appeal
to all the parties, including Iran, to work with
determination to achieve a diplomatic solution and
I stand ready to play a complementary role in
x What are your views on the prospects for a successful

solution of this issue?
4
Iran FM Mottaki TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit
H.E. Manouchehr Mottaki,
of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
The Hague, 31 March 2009 (time TBC)
UN-Iran cooperation 2
Afghanistan 6
Iraq 8
Middle East 11
Nuclear Issue 13
UN-Iran cooperation
1
[Iran has played an active role in the activities of various UN
agencies and programmes. It is a member of the executive board of
UNDP, as well as the governing boards of UNFPA,
UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNEP, the Global Environmental Facility,
based in Washington, WMO, FAO and a member of the UN
Disarmament Conference in Geneva]
x I highly value Iran’s contribution to various UN
programmes and activities. Iran and the UN have closely
cooperated on such important issues as refugees, drug
control and counter-terrorism.
2
x I look forward to building on our positive experience of
past cooperation with a view to expanding that
interaction at Headquarters and in the region.
x The UN recognizes that Iran plays an important role in

the region especially with regard to the situation in Iraq,
Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.
3
x In light of many areas of common interest and concern, it
would be helpful for us to develop a framework of
comprehensive dialogue between the UN and Iran which
would aim at developing a common agenda of UN – Iran
exchanges in those areas.
x I hope that the upcoming visit to Teheran of

Mr. Pascoe will further clarify how best we should
proceed in our quest for peace, stability and cooperation
in the region.
4
x It is also my intention to visit Iran at a mutually
agreeable time.
Afghanistan
5
x I welcome your Government’s efforts in Afghanistan and
commend the support of the Islamic Republic provided to
the activities of UNAMA, in particular the hosting of its
liaison office in Teheran.
x The conferences in Moscow and the Hague are an

opportunity to discuss and chart a joint approach to
Afghanistan. Iran’s active participation in these events is
an important contribution.
6
x Consensus on reconciliation is needed amongst
international and Afghan stakeholders. Any
reconciliation process must be Afghan-led, respect the
Constitution, and be from a position of strength. What
are your views on this?
Iraq
7
x I would like to express my gratitude for your
Government’s agreement to host a UNAMI liaison office
in Teheran. I expect the head of this office to be selected
shortly. This office will further strengthen UN-Iranian
cooperation.
x While I welcome the progress that has been made in
Iraq, including in the provincial elections, the onus is
now on Iraqi leaders to engage in a political dialogue and
work towards achieving national reconciliation. How do
you see the current political situation?
8
x I welcome the continuing dialogue between Iran and
Iraq to address issues of mutual concern, including
de-mining. I am pleased that UNAMI is providing its
technical expertise to support de-mining efforts along the
border. What are the prospects for greater cooperation
with Iraq?
Middle East
9
x We face a very uncertain period ahead. It is regrettable
that Palestinian unity talks have not yet succeeded. We
need to keep supporting the Egyptian effort. Unity is
important to allow relief and reconstruction for Gaza. We
need to persuade Hamas of this.
x The new Israeli Government will be judged by its actions.

Both sides committed last year to continue negotiations
on all final status issues and to implement the roadmap.
10
Administration. I hope Quartet Principals can meet soon
to grapple with the many challenges.
Nuclear Issue
11
x As regards the nuclear issue, I will continue to appeal to
all the parties, including Iran, to work with determination
to achieve a diplomatic solution and
I stand ready to play a complementary role in achieving
this objective.
x What are your views on the prospects for a successful

solution of this issue?
12
International Courts Breakfast meeting TPs.docCleared by Political Unit Confidenti
Talking Points for the Secretary-General’s breakfast

meeting with Principals of International Courts,
The Hague, 1 April 2009, 7:45am
International Court of Justice 2

International Criminal Court 3
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 4
Special Court for Sierra Leone 6
Objective of meeting: [To discuss current issues before the

International Courts].
General Comments
x I want to thank you for the work of your institutions
in the peaceful resolution of disputes amongst states
and your contribution to the efforts to end impunity.
x You are on the front line of the international

community’s efforts to address some of the most
terrible crimes of recent times. You have achieved
real successes in the fight against impunity.
1
International Court of Justice
x I met last week with newly elected President Owada

of the ICJ. We had a very fruitful discussion, during
which the President alerted me to some of the Court’s
administrative and budgetary concerns.
x In January, the Secretariat submitted to the Court a

Dossier concerning the General Assembly’s request
for an advisory opinion on the unilateral declaration
of independence of Kosovo. I hope that the
information contained in the Dossier will be useful to
the Members of the Court.
x I am aware that the deadline for the submission of

written statements is 17 April 2009. Considering the
political sensitivity of the matter, and in order to be
status neutral, the United Nations has decided not to
submit a written statement.
2
International Criminal Court
x As Secretary-General, I support the rule of law and,

with it, the cause of international criminal justice in
general and the work of the ICC in particular. The
rule of law is one of the major purposes of the
Charter, along with the maintenance of peace and
security and the promotion of human rights.
Combating impunity is therefore a goal to which the
United Nations is fully committed.
x It would be inappropriate for me to discuss with you

the specifics of the Bashir case, other than to
reiterate what I have said publicly about the need to
respect the independence, integrity and importance
of the Court, within the system of accountability
through international law institutions.
More specific statement of support
x The United Nations has provided extensive

cooperation to the Prosecutor and to the Court more
generally, in accordance with the 2004 Relationship
Agreement. I can assure you that this cooperation
will continue and that we will do what we can to help
the Court succeed.
3
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
Staff retention
x The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

is to be congratulated for the progress made and to
be near the completion of its work.
x I understand the importance of the issue of staff

retention in meeting the completion strategy which is
also closely linked to staff morale.
x The Department of Management is looking at ways in

which to help the Tribunals’ staff secure employment
opportunities within the United Nations system.
x We are also now considering your request to submit a

proposal to the Dutch authorities to allow some non-
European Tribunal staff members to continue to
reside in The Netherlands after the conclusion of their
contracts.
Judges
x My Legal Counsel has commenced the process of
finding replacements for the two permanent judges
who will be resigning soon.
4
x Once we receive suitable nominations from the

respective States, I will proceed with the
appointment of the replacement judges upon
consultation with the Presidents of the Security
Council and the General Assembly.
Legacy and Residual Issues
x With OLA’s assistance, the Security Council Working

Group has been discussing elements of a possible
residual mechanism to replace the ICTY and ICTR
following completion of their work. The discussions
are progressing very well so far.
x OLA is preparing a report on the administrative and

budgetary aspects of the options for possible
locations for the Tribunals’ archives and the seat of
the residual mechanism.
x The report will be issued at the end of April, and

a draft has been sent to ICTR and ICTY for comments.
I am very grateful for the contributions that the
Tribunals are making to this report.
5
Special Court for Sierra Leone
Completion Strategy and Residual Issues
x The Special Court for Sierra Leone deserves great

credit for being in a position to complete its activities
by October 2010, in the event that the fugitive Johnny
Paul Koroma is not arrested before then.
x It will be a landmark success for the Court if it can

reach this target.
Judges
x I am grateful to the judges of the Special Court who

are willing to sacrifice their recess in July and August
to make up for the time that will be lost due to the
unavailability of the ICC courtroom later in the year.
x As to the replacement judge in the Appeals Chamber,

I will proceed with that appointment as soon as I
receive the views of the Government of Sierra Leone
on the matter.
6
Financing
x As you are aware, on 19 March I sent a letter to
Member States asking them to provide funding to the
Special Court as a matter of urgency and requesting a
response by 15 April.
x In light of the present recession and the strong

competition for funding with the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court
of Cambodia it is imperative that the Special Court
completes its work within the current projected time
frame.
x The commencement of functioning of the Special

Tribunal for Lebanon was marked with a low-key
launch ceremony that took place at the premises of
the Tribunal on 1 March.
x The judges, the Prosecutor, the Registrar and the

Head of the Defence Office have been sworn in, and
the President, Judge Cassese, who is with us this
morning, has been elected.
7
x The commencement of functioning of the Tribunal is a

decisive milestone in the efforts by the people of
Lebanon and the international community to uncover
the truth, bring those responsible for the
assassination of former Prime Minster Hariri, and
related crimes, to justice, and end impunity.
8
International Courts Breakfast meeting TPs cARDS.docCleared by Political Unit
Talking Points for the Secretary-General’s breakfast meeting
with Principals of International Courts,
The Hague, 1 April 2009, 7:45am
International Court of Justice 3

International Criminal Court 6
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 9
Special Court for Sierra Leone 14
Objective of meeting: [To discuss current issues before the International

Courts].
1
General Comments
x I want to thank you for the work of your institutions in
the peaceful resolution of disputes amongst states and
your contribution to the efforts to end impunity.
x You are on the front line of the international community’s

efforts to address some of the most terrible crimes of
recent times. You have achieved real successes in the
fight against impunity.
2
International Court of Justice
x I met last week with newly elected President Owada of
the ICJ. We had a very fruitful discussion, during which
the President alerted me to some of the Court’s
administrative and budgetary concerns.
x In January, the Secretariat submitted to the Court a

Dossier concerning the General Assembly’s request for an
advisory opinion on the unilateral declaration of
independence of Kosovo. I hope that the information
contained in the Dossier will be useful to the Members of
the Court.
3
x I am aware that the deadline for the submission of
written statements is 17 April 2009. Considering the
political sensitivity of the matter, and in order to be
status neutral, the United Nations has decided not to
submit a written statement.
4
International Criminal Court
x As Secretary-General, I support the rule of law and, with

it, the cause of international criminal justice in general
and the work of the ICC in particular. The rule of law is
one of the major purposes of the Charter, along with the
maintenance of peace and security and the promotion of
human rights. Combating impunity is therefore a goal to
which the United Nations is fully committed.
5
x It would be inappropriate for me to discuss with you the
specifics of the Bashir case, other than to reiterate what I
have said publicly about the need to respect the
independence, integrity and importance of the Court,
within the system of accountability through international
law institutions.
More specific statement of support

6
x The United Nations has provided extensive cooperation
to the Prosecutor and to the Court more generally, in
accordance with the 2004 Relationship Agreement. I can
assure you that this cooperation will continue and that
we will do what we can to help the Court succeed.
7
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
Staff retention
x The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is to
be congratulated for the progress made and to be near
the completion of its work.
x I understand the importance of the issue of staff

retention in meeting the completion strategy which is
also closely linked to staff morale.
8
x The Department of Management is looking at ways in
which to help the Tribunals’ staff secure employment
opportunities within the United Nations system.
x We are also now considering your request to submit a

proposal to the Dutch authorities to allow some non-
European Tribunal staff members to continue to reside in
The Netherlands after the conclusion of their contracts.
9
Judges
x My Legal Counsel has commenced the process of finding
replacements for the two permanent judges who will be
resigning soon.
x Once we receive suitable nominations from the

respective States, I will proceed with the appointment of
the replacement judges upon consultation with the
Presidents of the Security Council and the General
Assembly.
10
x With OLA’s assistance, the Security Council Working

Group has been discussing elements of a possible
residual mechanism to replace the ICTY and ICTR
following completion of their work. The discussions are
progressing very well so far.
x OLA is preparing a report on the administrative and

budgetary aspects of the options for possible locations
for the Tribunals’ archives and the seat of the residual
mechanism.
11
x The report will be issued at the end of April, and
a draft has been sent to ICTR and ICTY for comments. I
am very grateful for the contributions that the Tribunals
are making to this report.
Special Court for Sierra Leone
12
Completion Strategy and Residual Issues
x The Special Court for Sierra Leone deserves great credit

for being in a position to complete its activities by
October 2010, in the event that the fugitive Johnny Paul
Koroma is not arrested before then.
x It will be a landmark success for the Court if it can reach

this target.
13
Judges
x I am grateful to the judges of the Special Court who are

willing to sacrifice their recess in July and August to
make up for the time that will be lost due to the
unavailability of the ICC courtroom later in the year.
x As to the replacement judge in the Appeals Chamber, I

will proceed with that appointment as soon as I receive
the views of the Government of Sierra Leone on the
matter.
Financing
14
x As you are aware, on 19 March I sent a letter to Member
States asking them to provide funding to the Special
Court as a matter of urgency and requesting a response
by 15 April.
x In light of the present recession and the strong
competition for funding with the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of
Cambodia it is imperative that the Special Court
completes its work within the current projected time
frame.
15
x The commencement of functioning of the Special Tribunal

for Lebanon was marked with a low-key launch ceremony
that took place at the premises of the Tribunal on
1 March.
x The judges, the Prosecutor, the Registrar and the Head of

the Defence Office have been sworn in, and the
President, Judge Cassese, who is with us this morning,
has been elected.
16
x The commencement of functioning of the Tribunal is a
decisive milestone in the efforts by the people of Lebanon
and the international community to uncover the truth,
bring those responsible for the assassination of former
Prime Minster Hariri, and related crimes, to justice, and
end impunity.
17
International Courts Breakfast meeting BN.doc

breakfast meeting with Principals of International Courts
The Hague, 1 April 2009
The Secretary-General will meet with the Principals of the

International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, the Special Court for
Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
In the absence of President Owada and Vice-President Tomka, Judges

Shi Jiuyong (China) and Abdul Koroma will represent the ICJ.
President Owada made a courtesy visit to Headquarters in his new

capacity as President of the Court. During his visit, Mr. Owada had
a meeting with the Secretary-General on 23 March, during which they
discussed various administrative and budgetary concerns of the
Court, amongst other matters. In particular, due to the Court’s rapidly
increasing workload, President Owada explained that the support of
additional law clerks is essential to the efficient functioning of the
Court.
The Court has 15 contentious cases pending, and 1 request for

an advisory opinion concerning the unilateral declaration of
the independence of Kosovo. Belgium has submitted a case against
Senegal concerning the extradition of the former President of Chad,
Mr. Hissène Habré, and the Court will soon make an Order on
the provisional measures requested in this case.
In January, the Secretariat submitted to the Court a Dossier

concerning the General Assembly’s request for an advisory opinion on
the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo. The Secretariat
hopes that the information contained in the Dossier will be useful to
the Members of the Court.
The Secretariat is aware that the deadline for the submission of

written statements is 17 April 2009. Considering the political
1
sensitivity of the matter, and in order to be status neutral,

the United Nations has decided not to submit a written statement.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
General
The ICC is an independent judicial institution. It is not part of
the United Nations. There is a Relationship Agreement between
the United Nations and the Court. It was approved by
the General Assembly, acting by consensus, and was signed by the
then Secretary-General on 4 October 2004. It provides for
cooperation between the Organization and the Court in a number of
fields, including logistics and legal assistance. The Organization’s
obligation to cooperate with the Court under the Agreement is not
absolute. It is qualified by a number of factors, most especially, the
Charter and the Organization’s rules, including resolutions
establishing the mandates of its peacekeeping operations and other
bodies.
Darfur
On 31 March 2005, the Security Council referred the situation in
Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the ICC. In that
resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, the
Security Council decided that the Government of Sudan and all other
parties to the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate fully with the Court
and the Prosecutor. Pursuant to that resolution, the United Nations
is required to cooperate with the Prosecutor and Court. Cooperation
takes place within the framework of the Relationship Agreement.
UNMIS has provided some limited information to the Prosecutor.
Offices, programmes and funds have also provided information. This
cooperation is conducted in a discreet manner and, in certain cases,
on condition that its very existence must be kept confidential.
The ICC has so far issued three arrest warrants in respect of the
situation in Darfur: for Ahmad Muhammad Harun (Minister of State
for Humanitarian Affairs), Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman
(“Ali Kushayb”, an alleged Janjaweed leader) and President Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir. The Prosecutor is also seeking the issuance
2
of warrants for the arrest of three rebel leaders for their involvement
in an attack on AMIS peacekeepers at Haskanita on 29 September
2007.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

The Government of the DRC itself referred the situation in
the country since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor. With the active
consent of the Government, MONUC cooperates with the Prosecutor,
in accordance with its mandate in Security Council resolution 1856
(2008). MONUC has provided extensive logistic support for
the Prosecutor. It has also provided large quantities of documentary
evidence. A number of MONUC personnel have been interviewed by
the Prosecutor and one has testified in the confirmation hearings in
the Lubanga case and will testify again in his trial.
The trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, an Ituri warlord, began in

January 2009. It is the ICC’s first trial. Charges have also been
confirmed against German Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, two
other armed group leaders from Ituri, and their trials will start soon.
A warrant has also been issue for the arrest of Bosco Ntaganda, yet
another armed group leader from Ituri. The Prosecutor has indicated
that he will soon start investigating crimes committed in the Kivus.
Central African Republic (CAR)

The Government of the CAR itself referred the situation in the
country since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor. Jean-Pierre Bemba,
President of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC),
has been arrested and transferred to the Court. Proceedings to
confirm the charges against him are currently under way.
Northern Uganda
The Government of Uganda itself referred the situation concerning
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC. The Court has issued
warrants for the arrest of 5 LRA leaders, one of whom has since died.
The other four remain at large.
3
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Registrar
The Secretary-General is now considering the recommendation of the
Selection Panel for the position of Registrar. It is hoped to finalize
the appointment as soon as possible.
Staff retention
Staff retention during the completion strategy is a highly important
issue for the ad hoc tribunals. President Robinson recently wrote to
the Secretary-General on this issue asking him to assist Tribunal staff
members in finding job opportunities within the UN system.
President Robinson also asked the Secretary-General to request the
Dutch authorities to consider adopting measures which allow non-
European Tribunal staff members to remain in The Netherlands for a
period following the conclusion of their contracts. This is particularly
important for those staff members who originate from the countries
of the former Yugoslavia and who fear negative reactions in their
countries because of their association with the ICTY.
Judges
President Robinson informed us of the need to find replacements for
permanent judges Shahabuddeen and Van Den Wyngaert who will be
soon resigning. Judge Van Den Wyngaert has been elected judge with
the International Criminal Court (ICC). Judge Shahabuddeen will not
join the ICC but still intends to resign from the ICTY.
Registrar
The selection panel composed of the Legal Counsel, the ICTY
Prosecutor and the ICTY Vice-President has conducted interviews of
candidates for the position of Registrar on 25 and 26 February 2009.
The Selection Panel informed the Secretary-General of its
recommendation on 3 March 2009.
4

The Security Council Informal Working Group on Tribunals, with the
Office of Legal Affairs providing advice and acting as the Secretariat,
is well advanced in its consideration of a residual mechanism. A first
report to the Security Council will be submitted at the end of April
2009.
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

The trial of RUF members has been completed at the end of February.
It is likely that there will be an appeal, which would be completed in
August 2009. The trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor is
underway before Trial Chamber II in The Hague. The most recent
projections are that the judgment would be rendered in March 2010;
sentencing, if necessary, would be made in April 2010; and an appeal,
if necessary, would be completed by October 2010.
The Prosecutor has been following leads that the sole fugitive, Johnny
Paul Koroma, is deceased. If Johnny Paul Koroma is deceased, the
Prosecutor probably will withdraw the indictment. If the fugitive is
still alive and is arrested before the closure of the Special Court in
2010, the Prosecutor may proceed with a scaled down indictment that
has already been prepared. This would most likely result in an
extension of the completion date of the Special Court.
The residual mechanism consultant presented her report on the

Special Court’s residual issues on 16 December 2008. The report
recommends the establishment of a stand-alone residual mechanism
to perform the 10 critical residual functions. The report was discussed
by the Management Committee but no decisions were taken on its
content. The Management Committee agreed to share the report with
the Security Council Informal Working Group on Tribunals (which is
considering the residual mechanism(s) of the ICTY and ICTR) and the
International Criminal Court with a view to holding informal
discussions.] Such discussions were held with the Informal Working
Group on 24 March 2009.]
5
Judges
The selection panel composed of the Legal Counsel, the Director of
the Codification Division of the Office for Legal Affairs and Judge
Antonio Cassese interviewed candidates for the position of judge for
the Appeals Chamber on 5 February 2009. The selection Panel
forwarded its recommendation to the Secretary-General on the same
date. The Secretary-General approved of the recommendation and is
now awaiting the views of the Government of Sierra Leone before
proceeding with the appointment.
Financing
Despite tireless fundraising efforts, the Special Court still needs to
raise USD 31 million to complete its activities. The President,
Prosecutor and Registrar have written jointly to the Legal Counsel
expressing their deep concerns about the financial situation. They
have indicated that some Member States would contribute if they
received a letter from the Secretary-General inviting them to do so.
This has been confirmed by some members of the Management
Committee. The Secretary-General has sent a letter to Member Stated
asking for urgent contributions to the Special Court.
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
Commencement of functioning of the Special Tribunal

On 1 March, the Special Tribunal commenced functioning following
the completion of a coordinated transition of the International
Independent Investigation Commission (IIIC) from Beirut to The
Hague on 28 February 2009. On that occasion, a small launch event
was held at the premises of the Tribunal in Leidschendam, the
Netherlands.
Daniel Bellemare, the former IIIC Commissioner, has taken up Office

as the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal on 1 March.
The judges, the Prosecutor, the Registrar and the Head of the Defence
Office have been sworn in by the Assistant Secretary-General for
Legal Affairs, on behalf of the Secretary-General, and a President has
been elected (Judge Cassese).
6
President Cassese has requested the Secretary-General in his letter of

11 March 2009, to determine that the Vice-President elected by the
judges of the Tribunal will take up office on 1 June 2009. Since the
Vice-President taking up office on 1 June 2009 would have financial
implications, the Management Committee is currently considering
this request. If the Management Committee of this request, OLA will
prepare a letter for the Secretary-General determining that the
designated Vice-President will take up office on 1 June 2009.
Even though there has been speculation in the press, the advice from
DSS is that the identities of the Lebanese judges, including the elected
Vice-President, should remain confidential for the time being for
security reasons.
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence and other legal documents
relevant for the operational and judicial functioning of the
Special Tribunal have been adopted.
The Prosecutor is likely to continue investigating the Hariri

assassination and related attacks for some time. Although we cannot
be certain, trial activity is not likely to start during 2009.
Detainees
Over the last weeks, the press has been speculating on the issue of the
detainees (four Generals) held by the Lebanese authorities.
In accordance with Article 4(2) of the Statute, within two months of

the Prosecutor taking up office, the Special Tribunal must request the
Lebanese authorities to defer competence over the case of the attack
against former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others.
We anticipate that the Special Tribunal will make such a request to

the Lebanese Government soon. The process that follows from that
request is a matter of prosecutorial and judicial independence for the
Tribunal.
7
Generics Sudan March 09 REV240309.docCleared by CdC Confidenti
Generic Talking Points on Sudan

for the Secretary-General’s trip
to Moscow-Doha-The Hague-London-Paris-Istanbul,
March-April 2009
Sudan
x The situation in Sudan is dominated by ICC
developments.
x The Security Council remains divided on the request

from the AU and the LAS to consider Article 16.
x My position on this issue is clear. Peace and justice

must be complementary, but the ICC is an
independent institution and it is up to the Security
Council to decide on Article 16.
x I am concerned by the Government's decision to

expel 13 key international NGOs and suspend three
national NGOs that provide life-sustaining services for
over one million people.
x The joint UN/ Government of Sudan assessment

report on the effects of the NGO expulsions and
suspensions has been released.
x We appreciate the Government’s cooperation in

finalising this report.
1
x The assessment shows that new gaps in aid delivery

threaten to worsen already dire conditions. It also
found that, despite the efforts of Sudanese line
Ministries, UN agencies and the remaining NGOs, gaps
cannot be filled with existing capacities.
The Government agrees there are gaps.
x I have been in direct contact with a number of

leaders to encourage them to try to convince
the Sudanese to reverse the decision. I would greatly
appreciate if you would join me in urging
the Government to reconsider.
x It is critical that humanitarian assistance continues

without interruption, and that the safety and security
of aid workers and UN personnel in Sudan is
guaranteed. This will require close cooperation from
the Government.
x The UN will continue to work with the Government to

address critical humanitarian needs facing millions of
people in North Sudan.
x While we focus on addressing the current crisis,

the solution to the long-term stability of Sudan and
the region will come only from the Darfur and CPA
peace processes.
2
Darfur political process

x The parties must illustrate their commitment to the
peace process – the rebels cannot use the ICC as an
excuse to abstain, and the Government must deliver
concretely on its commitments.
x The Doha agreement between GoS and JEM was an

important first step. We must work hard to pressure
JEM to accept the inclusion of other movements.
x To succeed, Joint Chief Mediator Bassolé must

continue to receive regional and international
support.
Sudan – CPA
x Support for the CPA must remain a central tenet since
the CPA defines the national framework for wealth
and power sharing in Sudan.
x In 2011, the South and people of Abyei will exercise

their right of self-determination and vote for unity or
secession. The parties need to recognize that
the referendum is not a zero-sum game. They must
address issues of mutual interest (border,
wealth-sharing) and build mechanisms for living
together (transmigration, economic systems),
regardless of their choice to remain united or to
co-exist as peaceful neighbours.
3
Generics Sudan March 09 REV240309 (CARDS).doc Cleared by CdC Confiden
Generic Talking Points on Sudan

March-April 2009
Sudan
x The situation in Sudan is dominated by ICC
developments.
x The Security Council remains divided on the request from

the AU and the LAS to consider Article 16.
1
x My position on this issue is clear. Peace and justice must

be complementary, but the ICC is an independent
institution and it is up to the Security Council to decide
on Article 16.
x I am concerned by the Government's decision to expel

13 key international NGOs and suspend three national
NGOs that provide life-sustaining services for over one
million people.
2
x The joint UN/ Government of Sudan assessment report

on the effects of the NGO expulsions and suspensions
has been released.
x We appreciate the Government’s cooperation in finalising

this report.
3
x The assessment shows that new gaps in aid delivery

threaten to worsen already dire conditions. It also found
that, despite the efforts of Sudanese line Ministries, UN
agencies and the remaining NGOs, gaps cannot be filled
with existing capacities. The Government agrees there
are gaps.
4
x I have been in direct contact with a number of leaders to

encourage them to try to convince the Sudanese to
reverse the decision. I would greatly appreciate if you
would join me in urging the Government to reconsider.
x It is critical that humanitarian assistance continues

without interruption, and that the safety and security of
aid workers and UN personnel in Sudan is guaranteed.
This will require close cooperation from the Government.
5
x The UN will continue to work with the Government to

address critical humanitarian needs facing millions of
people in North Sudan.
x While we focus on addressing the current crisis,

the solution to the long-term stability of Sudan and the
region will come only from the Darfur and CPA peace
processes.
6
Darfur political process

x The parties must illustrate their commitment to the
peace process – the rebels cannot use the ICC as an
excuse to abstain, and the Government must deliver
concretely on its commitments.
x The Doha agreement between GoS and JEM was an

important first step. We must work hard to pressure JEM
to accept the inclusion of other movements.
7
x To succeed, Joint Chief Mediator Bassolé must continue

to receive regional and international support.
Sudan – CPA
x Support for the CPA must remain a central tenet since
the CPA defines the national framework for wealth and
power sharing in Sudan.
8
x In 2011, the South and people of Abyei will exercise their

right of self-determination and vote for unity or
secession. The parties need to recognize that
the referendum is not a zero-sum game. They must
address issues of mutual interest (border,
wealth-sharing) and build mechanisms for living together
(transmigration, economic systems), regardless of their
choice to remain united or to co-exist as peaceful
neighbours.
9
Generics Somalia.docCleared by CdC on 24.03.09 Confidenti
Generic Talking Points on Somalia

March-April 2009
[Objective: To request financial support to address the immediate

needs of AMISOM and the Somali security forces; to highlight
the dire humanitarian situation.]

crucial for the Government and will be decisive for
the continued success of the Djibouti Agreement.


seek long term financial support for the AMISOM
force as well as the Somali Joint Security Force and
police.
1
Generics Somalia.docCleared by CdC on 24.03.09 Confidenti
x But in the interim there will be a need for continued

logistics package is approved and delivered.
In addition, immediate funding will be required to pay

needs.

engage with all stakeholders, including national,
regional and international partners. Those of us who
have influence on the groups remaining outside of
the peace process should call on them to join for the
sake of national reconciliation.

humanitarian needs.


your Government is needed now more than ever for
2
Generics Somalia (CARDS).docCleared by CdC on 24.03.09 Confidential
Generic Talking Points on Somalia

March-April 2009
[Objective: To request financial support to address the immediate needs

of AMISOM and the Somali security forces; to highlight
the dire humanitarian situation.]
1


2
x I will be convening a donor conference in April to seek

long term financial support for the AMISOM force as well
x But in the interim there will be a need for continued

funding to AMISOM to bridge the gap until the logistics
package is approved and delivered. In addition,
immediate funding will be required to pay the existing
Joint Somali Security Forces.
3


engage with all stakeholders, including national, regional
and international partners. Those of us who have
influence on the groups remaining outside of
the peace process should call on them to join for the sake
of national reconciliation.
4

humanitarian needs.

5

your Government is needed now more than ever for the
6
Generics Myanmar.docCleared by CdC on 24.03.09
Confidential
Generic Talking Points on Myanmar

to Moscow-Doha-the Hague-London-Paris-Istanbul,
March-April 2009
Myanmar
x The Government of Myanmar has not made the real
democratic concessions the world expects of it, but
we must keep pushing for an opening.
x My Special Adviser has remained engaged and made

several visits. I remain personally committed to
pursuing my political efforts including through
a possible return visit at the right time.
x My good offices remain the only channel with access

to both the Government and the Opposition, including
Aung San Suu Kyi. At this juncture, unity of support
by the international community for my good offices
needs to translate into unity of its approach through
concerted diplomacy and the development of a
“toolbox” of engagement. Your support is of key
importance in helping develop an effective toolbox in
order to encourage both sides to find a mutually
acceptable way forward.
1
Generics Myanmar.docCleared by CdC on 24.03.09
Confidential
x We have repeatedly cautioned Myanmar about the

risks of pushing forward with its political process
without taking into account the concerns of all
stakeholders.
x Equally important for the prospects of durable peace

and democracy is the need to address the country’s
humanitarian and development challenges.
2
Generics Myanmar (CARDS).docCleared by CdC on 24.03.09
Confidential
Generic Talking Points on Myanmar
to Moscow-Doha-the Hague-London-Paris-Istanbul,
March-April 2009
Myanmar
x The Government of Myanmar has not made the real
democratic concessions the world expects of it, but we
must keep pushing for an opening.
1
Confidential
x My Special Adviser has remained engaged and made

several visits. I remain personally committed to pursuing
my political efforts including through
a possible return visit at the right time.
2
Confidential
x My good offices remain the only channel with access to

both the Government and the Opposition, including
Aung San Suu Kyi. At this juncture, unity of support by
the international community for my good offices needs to
translate into unity of its approach through concerted
diplomacy and the development of a “toolbox” of
engagement. Your support is of key importance in
helping develop an effective toolbox in order to
encourage both sides to find a mutually acceptable way
forward.
3
Confidential
x We have repeatedly cautioned Myanmar about the risks

of pushing forward with its political process without
taking into account the concerns of all stakeholders.
x Equally important for the prospects of durable peace and

democracy is the need to address the country’s
humanitarian and development challenges.
4
Generics Middle East rev1.docCleared by CdC Confidentia
Generic Talking Points on the Middle East

March-April 2009



strategy for Gaza. The continued closure of the
crossing is unacceptable in humanitarian terms and
undermines efforts to strengthen the PA. Israel must
allow in materials required to rebuild damaged
houses and restore the economy. This will also allow
us to support the PA’s early recovery efforts.
delivered.
1

I am disappointed that house demolitions and
x If we fail to open the crossings, the impact on

the people of Gaza will be considerable. The
humanitarian situation can only hurt the chances of
a successful peace process.
x The role of the international community is central to

any effort with the Israelis and the Palestinian parties
to open the crossings. I count on your support.

Both sides committed last year to continue

2

Peace Initiative.

x [IF ASKED: ACCOUNTABILITY] The President of

the Human Rights Council is preparing a fact-finding
Lebanon


3


the region.

both parties are of concern. Both parties need to do
more to consolidate stability and move towards
a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution.
x The continuous Israeli violations of Lebanese air

space are violations of 1701 and threaten stability in
the region. They must cease.

and Lebanon’s borders remain porous, which presents
a continuous challenge regarding the implementation
of the arms embargo. The sustained support of
the international community at technical as well as
political level is required in this regard.
4
x I am encouraged by recent developments regarding

a process for the withdrawal of the IDF from
the northern part of the village of Ghajar and adjacent
x I regret the lack of progress on the issue of

the Sheb’a farms. So far, the United Nations’ efforts
have not led to positive results. However, I will
continue my efforts aimed at a resolution of the issue.

normalise their relations. Syria’s appointment of
an Ambassador to Lebanon is a welcome and timely
development. There is more however that Syria can
do, such as addressing border delimitation and
control, and dismantling the Palestinian bases close
to the border.
x I am encouraged by the visible progress made

regarding the reconstruction of Nahr el-Bared refugee
camp. However, additional funds are needed to
ensure the completion of the process. Meanwhile,
Lebanon needs to be encouraged to continue taking
measures to generally improve the condition of
Palestinian refugees in the country.
5
Tribunal
x The start of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on

1 March 2009 in The Hague, is a decisive milestone in
but I strongly support the Tribunal and I continue to
call upon all Members States to fully support and
6
Generics Middle East rev1 (CARDS).docCleared by CdC Confidential
March-April 2009

and the West Bank.
1
x Whatever happens with unity, we need a new strategy

for Gaza. The continued closure of the crossing is
restore the economy. This will also allow us to support
the PA’s early recovery efforts. Otherwise, the promises
made at Sharm will not be delivered.
2
I am disappointed that house demolitions and evictions
the people of Gaza will be considerable.
The humanitarian situation can only hurt the chances of
3
x The role of the international community is central to any

effort with the Israelis and the Palestinian parties to
open the crossings. I count on your support.
x We should all make clear to the new Israeli Government

that we will judge them by their actions. Both sides
committed last year to continue negotiations on all final
status issues and to implement the roadmap.
4


5

6
x [IF ASKED: ACCOUNTABILITY] The President of
the Human Rights Council is preparing a fact-finding
Lebanon

7
campaigns.

8
region.

parties are of concern. Both parties need to do more to
consolidate stability and move towards
a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution.
9
x The continuous Israeli violations of Lebanese air space
are violations of 1701 and threaten stability in the
region. They must cease.
and Lebanon’s borders remain porous, which presents a
continuous challenge regarding the implementation of
the arms embargo. The sustained support of
the international community at technical as well as
political level is required in this regard.
10
areas. I hope that this can be achieved shortly after the
formation of the new Government in Israel.

the Sheb’a farms. So far, the United Nations’ efforts have
not led to positive results. However, I will continue my
11

development. There is more however that Syria can do,
such as addressing border delimitation and control, and
dismantling the Palestinian bases close to the border.
12
x I am encouraged by the visible progress made regarding

the reconstruction of Nahr el-Bared refugee camp.
However, additional funds are needed to ensure the
completion of the process. Meanwhile, Lebanon needs to
be encouraged to continue taking measures to generally
improve the condition of Palestinian refugees in the
country.
13
Tribunal
x The start of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on 1 March
2009 in The Hague, is a decisive milestone in the joint
efforts of the Lebanese and the international community
to uncover the truth, bring those responsible for this and
related crimes to justice and end impunity. This will not
be easy. It will take time but I strongly support the
Tribunal and I continue to call upon all Members States
to fully support and cooperate with this new independent
institution.
14
Generics Middle East for Russia.docCleared by CdC Confidentia

for the Secretary-General’s meetings
with Russian officials
Moscow, 27 March 2009


yet succeeded. We need to keep supporting
the Egyptian effort. We should not give up.


strategy for Gaza. The continued closure of crossings
is unacceptable in humanitarian terms and
undermines efforts to strengthen the PA.
1

damaged houses and restore the economy. This will
also allow us to support the PA’s early recovery
efforts. Otherwise, the promises made at Sharm will
not be delivered.


the people of Gaza will be considerable. The
humanitarian situation can only hurt the chances of

Both sides committed last year to continue
2


Conference, and all efforts to carry forward
the Arab Peace Initiative.
x Please update me on your efforts and on how the UN

can help.

x [IF ASKED: ACCOUNTABILITY] The President of the

3
Generics Middle East for Russia (CARDS).docCleared by CdC
with Russian officials
Moscow, 27 March 2009

and the West Bank.
1

succeeded. We need to keep supporting
the Egyptian effort. We should not give up.

Hamas of this.
2
for Gaza. The continued closure of crossings is
efforts to strengthen the PA.

damaged houses and restore the economy. This will also
allow us to support the PA’s early recovery efforts.
delivered.
3

settlements, lifting closures, and ceasing incursions. It is
unacceptable that house demolitions and evictions are
being pursued in Jerusalem.
4

the people of Gaza will be considerable.
The humanitarian situation can only hurt the chances of
x We should all make clear to the new Israeli Government

that we will judge them by their actions. Both sides
committed last year to continue negotiations on all final
status issues and to implement the roadmap.
5

and all efforts to carry forward
the Arab Peace Initiative.
6
x Please update me on your efforts and on how the UN can

help.

7

8
Generics Middle East Arabs rev1.docCleared by CdC Confidentia

with Arab interlocutors
Doha, 29-30 March 2009




pragmatism. Similarly we need to work with all
donors to ensure once a unity government is formed,
they will engage.
1

strategy for Gaza. The continued closure of the
crossings is unacceptable in humanitarian terms and
undermines efforts to strengthen the PA. Israel must
allow in materials required to rebuild damaged
houses and restore the economy. This will also allow
us to support the PA’s early recovery efforts.
delivered.

contributions to the Gaza Flash Appeal. We will need
your support for years to come.
x I hope we can strengthen the humanitarian

partnership between LAS countries and the
international humanitarian organisations working in
the occupied Palestinian territory, particularly UN
agencies.
x We also need to see a real change on the ground in

the West Bank. The PA has done a good job there.
A new Government needs to act seriously on freezing
2

x I have been encouraged by efforts within the Arab

world for countries to come together, especially on
the persistent problems in the Middle East. How do
you see this progressing?


Peace Initiative.
3


Lebanon



4

the region.


and Lebanon’s borders remain porous. The sustained
support of the international community at technical
as well as political level is required in this regard.


the Sheb’a farms. So far, the United Nations’ efforts
have not led to positive results. However, I will
continue my efforts aimed at a resolution of the issue.
5

development.
Tribunal

1 March 2009 in The Hague, is a decisive milestone in
but I strongly support the Tribunal and I continue to
call upon all Members States to fully support and
6
Generics Middle East Arabs rev1 (CARDS).docCleared by CdC Confidential
with Arab interlocutors
Doha, 29-30 March 2009

and the West Bank.
1


Hamas of this.
2

pragmatism. Similarly we need to work with all donors
to ensure once a unity government is formed, they will
engage.
3

for Gaza. The continued closure of the crossings is
restore the economy. This will also allow us to support
the PA’s early recovery efforts. Otherwise, the promises
made at Sharm will not be delivered.
4

contributions to the Gaza Flash Appeal. We will need your
support for years to come.
x I hope we can strengthen the humanitarian partnership

between LAS countries and the international
humanitarian organisations working in the occupied
Palestinian territory, particularly UN agencies.
5
x We also need to see a real change on the ground in the

West Bank. The PA has done a good job there.
A new Government needs to act seriously on freezing
It is unacceptable that house demolitions and evictions
6

the roadmap.
7
x I have been encouraged by efforts within the Arab world
for countries to come together, especially on the
persistent problems in the Middle East. How do you see
this progressing?

8


9
Lebanon

10
campaigns.

11
region.

parties are of concern. The continuous Israeli violations
of Lebanese air space are violations of 1701 and threaten
stability in the region. They must cease.
12

and Lebanon’s borders remain porous. The sustained
support of the international community at technical as
well as political level is required in this regard.
13
areas. I hope that this can be achieved shortly after the
formation of the new Government in Israel.

the Sheb’a farms. So far, the United Nations’ efforts have
not led to positive results. However, I will continue my
14

development.
15
Tribunal
1 March 2009 in The Hague, is a decisive milestone in the
joint efforts of the Lebanese and the international
community to uncover the truth, bring those responsible
for this and related crimes to justice and end impunity.
This will not be easy. It will take time but I strongly
support the Tribunal and I continue to call upon all
Members States to fully support and cooperate with this
new independent institution.
16
Generics Madagascar (rev).docCleared by CdC Confidentia
Generic talking points on Madagascar

March-April 2009
x We have been working on the Madagascar issue since

the violent protests broke out in December and
January;
x I deployed ASG Menkerios, Senior Adviser Dramé and

other DPA staff to work closely with the parties
towards a peaceful solution to the stand off between
President Ravalomanana and Mayor Andry Rajoelina.
x These efforts however stalled after

President Ravolamanana’s resignation on 17 March
and Andry Rajoelina’s installation as President.
x I have noted the widespread international

condemnation of the extra-Constitutional takeover of
power in Madagascar.
x A peaceful transitional arrangement that would enjoy

widespread support can only be arrived at through
a process that reflects the consensus of the views of
the Malagasy people.
1
Generics Madagascar (rev).docCleared by CdC Confidentia
x We must insist on an inclusive dialogue process that

would address the root causes of the conflict in
Madagascar if we are to overcome the cyclical acts of
violence and political disruption.
x The United Nations is ready to remain engaged and

work with all other partners to help achieve
a peaceful, consensual solution in Madagascar.
2
Generics Madagascar (rev) (CARDS).docCleared by CdC Confidential
Generic talking points on Madagascar
March-April 2009
x We have been working on the Madagascar issue since

the violent protests broke out in December and January;
x I deployed ASG Menkerios, Senior Adviser Dramé and
other DPA staff to work closely with the parties towards
a peaceful solution to the stand off between President
Ravalomanana and Mayor Andry Rajoelina.
1
x These efforts however stalled after President

Ravolamanana’s resignation on 17 March and Andry
Rajoelina’s installation as President.
x I have noted the widespread international condemnation

of the extra-Constitutional takeover of power in
Madagascar.
2
x A peaceful transitional arrangement that would enjoy

widespread support can only be arrived at through
a process that reflects the consensus of the views of the
Malagasy people.
x We must insist on an inclusive dialogue process that

would address the root causes of the conflict in
Madagascar if we are to overcome the cyclical acts of
violence and political disruption.
3
x The United Nations is ready to remain engaged and work

with all other partners to help achieve
a peaceful, consensual solution in Madagascar.
4
Generics Haiti March 09.docCleared by CdC Confidenti
Generic Talking Points on Haiti

to Moscow-Doha-The Hague-London-Paris-Istanbul
March – April 2009
x I visited Haiti with former US President Bill Clinton

a few weeks ago in advance of the Security Council’s
trip. People are living in desperate poverty and
the country is struggling to recover from the multiple
crises of 2008. The situation remains fragile, and
our role in maintaining security continues to be
essential.
x But, we also found encouraging grounds for hope

and optimism that Haiti can lift out of its downward
spiral. This will require increased external assistance
to address immediate humanitarian needs, reduce
the risk of natural disasters and lay the foundations
for sustainable economic growth and development.
It will also require strengthening the government’s
capacity. But, international aid alone will not be
enough to provide economic security.
1
x I asked Professor Paul Collier to present some ideas

for Haiti’s economic recovery. Critical support is
building for his ideas, including taking advantage of
preferential trade agreements to create jobs.
President Préval, Prime Minister Pierre Louis,
WB President Zoellick, former President Clinton and
key Haitian interlocutors, among others, have
expressed their support. I have also spoken with
President Obama about Haiti, who has expressed his
enthusiasm.
x I have urged the Haitian government to present

a focused, prioritized national plan for reducing
poverty and spurring economic development for the
upcoming donor conference. Key elements would
include job creation, access to basic services, food
security and environmental protection. Their plan
must capture the imagination of international donors
and the private sector alike, with a view to fostering
public – private partnership. I had a very frank,
useful discussion with President Préval about the
need for the government to identify and remove
obstacles to private sector growth.
2
x While I had hoped to personally attend the donor

conference, it will not be possible. Nonetheless, I am
committed to doing what I can in order to mobilize
support including outreach to donors. Your continued
engagement is very much needed to rally
the Haitians and the international community around
this initiative for Haiti’s economic recovery. I wish
to enlist your support to make a special effort for this
endeavor, including strong participation at the donor
conference.
3
Generics Haiti March 09 (CARDS).docCleared by CdC Confidential
Generic Talking Points on Haiti

March – April 2009
x I visited Haiti with former US President Bill Clinton

a few weeks ago in advance of the Security Council’s
trip. People are living in desperate poverty and
the country is struggling to recover from the multiple
crises of 2008. The situation remains fragile, and our
role in maintaining security continues to be essential.
1
x But, we also found encouraging grounds for hope and

optimism that Haiti can lift out of its downward spiral.
This will require increased external assistance to
address immediate humanitarian needs, reduce the risk
of natural disasters and lay the foundations for
sustainable economic growth and development. It will
also require strengthening the government’s capacity.
But, international aid alone will not be enough to
provide economic security.
2
x I asked Professor Paul Collier to present some ideas for

Haiti’s economic recovery. Critical support is building
for his ideas, including taking advantage of preferential
trade agreements to create jobs. President Préval,
Prime Minister Pierre Louis, WB President Zoellick,
former President Clinton and key Haitian interlocutors,
among others, have expressed their support. I have
also spoken with President Obama about Haiti, who has
expressed his enthusiasm.
3
x I have urged the Haitian government to present

a focused, prioritized national plan for reducing poverty
and spurring economic development for the upcoming
donor conference. Key elements would include job
creation, access to basic services, food security and
environmental protection. Their plan must capture the
imagination of international donors and the private
sector alike, with a view to fostering public – private
partnership. I had a very frank, useful discussion with
President Préval about the need for the government to
identify and remove obstacles to private sector growth.
4
x While I had hoped to personally attend the donor

conference, it will not be possible. Nonetheless, I am
committed to doing what I can in order to mobilize
support including outreach to donors. Your continued
engagement is very much needed to rally the Haitians
and the international community around this initiative
for Haiti’s economic recovery. I wish to enlist your
support to make a special effort for this endeavor,
including strong participation at the donor conference.
5
Generics G20 and Economic Crisis REVISED on 25.03.09.docCleared by CdC on
24.03.09 Confidential
Generic Talking Points on the Economic Crisis

and the G20 London Summit
March-April 2009
The economic crisis threatens to become a human crisis
x I am concerned about the political implications of the

global financial crisis that have been felt in all corners
of the world. There is a continuing risk that social
discontent with the economic effects of the crisis will
translate into decreasing popular support for
governments, social unrest and, in certain cases, an
increased potential for violence.
x The global economy will shrink this year, trade and

employment will fall, and we risk losing years of
hard-fought progress towards the MDGs.
x You have recognized that the world needs effective

economic policy coordination at the international
level, especially in light of the large stimulus
packages being put in place.
x In addition, I believe that your leadership is needed

in four areas:
1
First, financial support for developing countries
x We need a truly global stimulus package that meets

the needs of all developing countries. Financial flows
to developing countries have fallen precipitously, and
few have the resources to put in place counter-
cyclical policies to protect jobs and vulnerable people.
x The United Nations has estimated that developing

countries will need around $1 trillion [disclosure of
the amount, depends on outcome of meeting with
Gordon Brown.] for 2009 and 2010, half of which
would be used for covering short term financing
needs, with the other half required for long term
development lending and assistance.
x We have consulted on this approach with outside

experts. I believe that this is a realistic and
achievable sum that can be delivered through existing
institutions and within existing commitments.
Moreover, it would send a strong signal of solidarity
to developing countries that they will be supported
through the crisis.
x At least $250 billion over 2 years is needed to protect

the poorest and most vulnerable, and could be
delivered from within the existing commitments on
ODA. Aid is roughly $100 billion a year now.
2
x Aid should continue to be delivered directly to poor

countries, and also through funding the development
work of the United Nations, World Bank, and existing
vehicles such as the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and
Malaria. I also urge you to establish an additional
mechanism to tackle food insecurity.
x Another $250 billion is needed so that countries can

borrow long-term for critical investments in
infrastructure and adapting to climate change.
The bulk of these funds could come from expanding
World Bank and multilateral development bank
lending.
x Finally, at least $500 billion over 2 years is needed to

bridge liquidity gaps and keep trade flowing, avoiding
conditionality that would reinforce the negative
economic and social impacts of the crisis. This could
be generated by augmenting the resources of the IMF
by various means, including issuing and redistributing
additional Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).
3
x Mobilizing these resources through the channels

mentioned above is both necessary and feasible.
I believe that there is a moral obligation to assist
developing countries. But in doing so, you will also
help to underpin your own growth and secure global
stability.
x Countries dependent on commodity exports, in

particular those undergoing peace processes and
post-transitional periods, will require sustained
attention and support from the international
community.
Second, resisting protectionism and furthering trade
x We must avoid erecting new barriers that could slow

the economic recovery. Trade represents a powerful
stimulus to the global economy.
x We must avoid introducing protectionist measures,

including through the stimulus or bailout packages
that are being putting in place. We should set up
a mechanism to monitor and challenge new
protectionist measures. Lastly, we should
reinvigorate the Doha Trade Round so that it brings
real benefits to developing countries.
4
x Besides trade, the picture for migration increasingly

illustrates the grave consequences of the crisis. Many
migrants are now returning home, effectively
exporting unemployment and capping a lifeline for
many communities due to vanishing remittances.
Third, we must set a course for sustainable growth
x The stimulus packages offer a great opportunity to

set our economies and our planet on an
environmentally sustainable path by new, large-scale
investments in energy efficiency, clean energy and
green jobs.
x However, such commitments alone will not be

enough. They need to be backed by the adoption of
a new climate framework that would provide a crucial
signal to business and governments to unleash
innovation and investment in green technologies.
x With this in mind, I urge you to reiterate your

commitment to sealing an ambitious, fair and
effective deal at the climate conference in
Copenhagen in December.
Fourth, reforming the international financial and

economic architecture
5
x A lasting solution of the crisis requires deeper

changes and reform measures of the international
financial and economic architecture.
x This includes a better system of international

financial regulation, reviewing the international
reserve system, fundamental reforms of the
governance of the Bretton Woods Institutions, and
continued reform of the United Nations.
x Meaningful progress on IFI reform is needed so that

emerging economies and other developing countries
feel able to channel extra resources through
the institutions. We also need better financial
surveillance mechanisms. These would also serve as
an early-warning system to identify any future crisis
in advance.
x Beyond financial surveillance, we need an early

warning for the human impacts of this and future
crises. I have asked the agencies of the
United Nations to explore how we can put in place
a Global Vulnerability Monitor that will collect
information in real-time on the impacts of crises,
especially on poor people and crises.
6
x The United Nations offers a unique platform to ensure

that the policy coordination and financial reform
agenda will be aligned with policy objectives in
the area of economic recovery, climate change,
development and peace and security.
7
Generics G20 and Economic Crisis REVISED on 25.03.09 CARDS.docCleared by CdC on
Generic Talking Points on the Economic Crisis
and the G20 London Summit
March-April 2009
1
The economic crisis threatens to become a human crisis
x I am concerned about the political implications of the

global financial crisis that have been felt in all corners of
the world. There is a continuing risk that social
discontent with the economic effects of the crisis will
translate into decreasing popular support for
governments, social unrest and, in certain cases, an
increased potential for violence.
2
x The global economy will shrink this year, trade and
employment will fall, and we risk losing years of hard-
fought progress towards the MDGs.
x You have recognized that the world needs effective

economic policy coordination at the international level,
especially in light of the large stimulus packages being
put in place.
x In addition, I believe that your leadership is needed in

four areas:
3
First, financial support for developing countries
x We need a truly global stimulus package that meets the

needs of all developing countries. Financial flows to
developing countries have fallen precipitously, and few
have the resources to put in place counter-cyclical
policies to protect jobs and vulnerable people.
4
x The United Nations has estimated that developing
countries will need around $1 trillion [disclosure of the
amount, depends on outcome of meeting with Gordon
Brown.] for 2009 and 2010, half of which would be used
for covering short term financing needs, with the other
half required for long term development lending and
assistance.
5
x We have consulted on this approach with outside
experts. I believe that this is a realistic and achievable
sum that can be delivered through existing institutions
and within existing commitments. Moreover, it would
send a strong signal of solidarity to developing countries
that they will be supported through the crisis.
x At least $250 billion over 2 years is needed to protect the

poorest and most vulnerable, and could be delivered from
within the existing commitments on ODA. Aid is roughly
$100 billion a year now.
6
x Aid should continue to be delivered directly to poor
countries, and also through funding the development
work of the United Nations, World Bank, and existing
vehicles such as the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and
Malaria. I also urge you to establish an additional
mechanism to tackle food insecurity.
7
x Another $250 billion is needed so that countries can
borrow long-term for critical investments in
infrastructure and adapting to climate change.
The bulk of these funds could come from expanding
World Bank and multilateral development bank lending.
8
x Finally, at least $500 billion over 2 years is needed to
bridge liquidity gaps and keep trade flowing, avoiding
conditionality that would reinforce the negative economic
and social impacts of the crisis. This could be generated
by augmenting the resources of the IMF by various
means, including issuing and redistributing additional
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).
9
x Mobilizing these resources through the channels
mentioned above is both necessary and feasible.
I believe that there is a moral obligation to assist
developing countries. But in doing so, you will also help
to underpin your own growth and secure global stability.
x Countries dependent on commodity exports, in particular

those undergoing peace processes and post-transitional
periods, will require sustained attention and support
from the international community.
Second, resisting protectionism and furthering trade

10
x We must avoid erecting new barriers that could slow the
economic recovery. Trade represents a powerful stimulus
to the global economy.
x We must avoid introducing protectionist measures,

including through the stimulus or bailout packages that
are being putting in place. We should set up
a mechanism to monitor and challenge new protectionist
measures. Lastly, we should reinvigorate the Doha Trade
Round so that it brings real benefits to developing
countries.
11
x Besides trade, the picture for migration increasingly
illustrates the grave consequences of the crisis. Many
migrants are now returning home, effectively exporting
unemployment and capping a lifeline for many
communities due to vanishing remittances.
Third, we must set a course for sustainable growth
12
x The stimulus packages offer a great opportunity to set
our economies and our planet on an environmentally
sustainable path by new, large-scale investments in
energy efficiency, clean energy and green jobs.
x However, such commitments alone will not be enough.

They need to be backed by the adoption of
a new climate framework that would provide a crucial
signal to business and governments to unleash
innovation and investment in green technologies.
13
x With this in mind, I urge you to reiterate your
commitment to sealing an ambitious, fair and effective
deal at the climate conference in Copenhagen in
December.
Fourth, reforming the international financial and economic

architecture
x A lasting solution of the crisis requires deeper changes
and reform measures of the international financial and
economic architecture.
14
x This includes a better system of international financial
regulation, reviewing the international reserve system,
fundamental reforms of the governance of the Bretton
Woods Institutions, and continued reform of the United
Nations.
15
x Meaningful progress on IFI reform is needed so that
emerging economies and other developing countries feel
able to channel extra resources through
the institutions. We also need better financial
surveillance mechanisms. These would also serve as an
early-warning system to identify any future crisis in
advance.
16
x Beyond financial surveillance, we need an early warning
for the human impacts of this and future crises. I have
asked the agencies of the United Nations to explore how
we can put in place a Global Vulnerability Monitor that
will collect information in real-time on the impacts of
crises, especially on poor people and crises.
17
x The United Nations offers a unique platform to ensure
that the policy coordination and financial reform agenda
will be aligned with policy objectives in the area of
economic recovery, climate change, development and
peace and security.
18
Generics DRC March 09.docCleared by CdC Confidenti
Generic Talking Points on DRC

March-April 2009
Objective of meeting: To share the steps being taken towards the

establishment of good neighborly relations in the Great Lakes
region.
Situation in the Kivus

x As you know, I visited the DRC and Rwanda from
28 February to 1 March, to get directly a sense of
the new realities on the ground. I had very fruitful
discussions with Presidents Kabila and Kagame.
x The United Nations fully supports the steps taken by

the Government of the DRC to address jointly, with
Rwanda and Uganda counterparts, the threat from
foreign and Congolese armed groups in eastern DRC.
x We believe that the United Nations and other

international partners can use the unique
opportunities opened by this new situation to assist
the Government of the DRC to establish and
consolidate lasting peace and security in the east of
the country.
1
x We see an opportunity to help in the following key

areas: establishing effective State authority in areas
formerly controlled by the armed groups; building
a credible and professional security sector and rule of
law institutions, especially the armed forces and
police; suppressing the illegal exploitation of natural
resources that has fuelled the conflict, and building
a legitimate economy; strengthening measures to
protect the civilian population, and meeting the needs
of the victims of the conflict, including addressing
the scourge of sexual and gender-based violence.
x My Special Envoy, President Obasanjo and his

co-Facilitator, former President Mkapa of Tanzania,
continues to help in facilitating a comprehensive
solution that addresses all the remaining armed
groups as well as the root causes of the conflict.
Humanitarian situation
x I remain concerned by initial reports about possible
reprisals by the FDLR against civilian in North Kivu.
We are following up and will continue our efforts
aiming at protecting civilians.
2
x I further count on your support to provide the

necessary financial contribution to the United Nations
to meet the substantial humanitarian needs in DRC.
Situation in LRA-affected areas

x I remain deeply troubled by the LRA’s violent attacks
along the DRC-Southern Sudan border. MONUC and
the United Nations system will continue to support
action to protect civilians in Province Orientale to
the extent of their capacities.
Sexual and gender-based violence

x In Goma, I was truly moved by the stories of
the victims of sexual violence with whom I met.
The magnitude of this phenomenon requires vigorous
efforts, backed by a strong political will at the highest
level. MONUC has been strengthening its efforts to
prevent and respond to sexual violence, including
through training for the Congolese security forces in
accordance with its mandate.
3
Generics DRC March 09 (CARDS).docCleared by CdC Confidential
Generic Talking Points on DRC
March-April 2009
Objective of meeting: To share the steps being taken towards the

establishment of good neighborly relations in the Great Lakes region.
1
Situation in the Kivus
x As you know, I visited the DRC and Rwanda from
28 February to 1 March, to get directly a sense of
the new realities on the ground. I had very fruitful
discussions with Presidents Kabila and Kagame.
x The United Nations fully supports the steps taken by the

Government of the DRC to address jointly, with Rwanda
and Uganda counterparts, the threat from foreign and
Congolese armed groups in eastern DRC.
2
x We believe that the United Nations and other

international partners can use the unique opportunities
opened by this new situation to assist the Government of
the DRC to establish and consolidate lasting peace and
security in the east of the country.
3
x We see an opportunity to help in the following key areas:
establishing effective State authority in areas formerly
controlled by the armed groups; building a credible and
professional security sector and rule of law institutions,
especially the armed forces and police; suppressing the
illegal exploitation of natural resources that has fuelled
the conflict, and building a legitimate economy;
strengthening measures to protect the civilian
population, and meeting the needs of the victims of the
conflict, including addressing
the scourge of sexual and gender-based violence.
4
x My Special Envoy, President Obasanjo and his

co-Facilitator, former President Mkapa of Tanzania,
continues to help in facilitating a comprehensive solution
that addresses all the remaining armed groups as well as
the root causes of the conflict.
5
x I remain concerned by initial reports about possible
reprisals by the FDLR against civilian in North Kivu. We
are following up and will continue our efforts aiming at
protecting civilians.
x I further count on your support to provide the necessary

financial contribution to the United Nations to meet the
substantial humanitarian needs in DRC.
6
Situation in LRA-affected areas

x I remain deeply troubled by the LRA’s violent attacks
along the DRC-Southern Sudan border. MONUC and the
United Nations system will continue to support action to
protect civilians in Province Orientale to
the extent of their capacities.
7
Sexual and gender-based violence

x In Goma, I was truly moved by the stories of
the victims of sexual violence with whom I met.
The magnitude of this phenomenon requires vigorous
efforts, backed by a strong political will at the highest
level. MONUC has been strengthening its efforts to
prevent and respond to sexual violence, including
through training for the Congolese security forces in
accordance with its mandate.
8
Generics Climate Change.docCleared by CdC on 24.03.09 Confidenti
Generic Talking Points on Climate Change

March-April 2009
Objective of meeting 1) maintain sense of urgency of achieving

a successful outcome in Copenhagen, also in view of economic crisis;
2) build common understanding and gather views on the political
essentials of a Copenhagen outcome; 3) create support for
convening a small group of HoS/G representing all key stake holder
countries in the climate change negotiations
Climate Change
x Recent signals coming from the scientific community
show that the situation is rapidly getting worse.
We must never lose sight of the urgency of the
situation and the need to take bold action now.
Copenhagen has to deliver an agreement on climate
change. We must seal the deal there!
x The current economic /financial crisis is an

opportunity to set global economic growth on
a low-emissions path, instead of locking the economy
in the wrong infrastructures and investments.
x I am very encouraged to see the determination across

the world to reach a successful outcome in
Copenhagen; 2009 will rightly be the year of climate
change.
1
x It seems to me that we must solve four major

political issues to enable success in Copenhagen:
1) mid-term mitigation targets for industrialized
countries; 2) mitigation actions by developing
countries;
x 3) clarity on financing; and 4) governance structures

and institutional arrangements for
financial/technological cooperation.
x What are your expectations for Copenhagen? What do

you think are the key political issues and how do you
think they could be resolved to reach an agreement?
x Engagement of leaders at the highest political level is

critical to securing a deal in Copenhagen; therefore
I am personally committed to facilitating such
engagement.
x I will convene a High Level Event on 22 September on

the margins of the General Assembly and I am also
exploring other options to engage leaders throughout
the year.
x It is my understanding that the US is keen on

revitalise the Major Economies Meetings (MEM)
process and I will support this process as much as
I can.
2
x While the MEM can be useful forum for the large

emitters to get together and identify ways to raise
the ambition level for mitigation, I believe it is also
important to have informal high-level consultations
among a more representative group of countries
including smaller developing countries, SIDS and
LDC’s.
x Such a group could also tackle the broader set of

issues essential for Copenhagen like adaptation,
finance and governance.
x I am still considering the option of convening a small

informal meeting of HoS/G of representative
countries. Such a group may need to be ready to
engage prior to the Copenhagen Conference when
negotiations have entered the final stages to facilitate
solutions for any of the issues which remain
contentious and unresolved at that time.
x I would be very interested to hear your views on my

plans.
3
Generics Climate Change (CARDS).docCleared by CdC on 24.03.09 Confiden
Generic Talking Points on Climate Change

to Moscow-Doha-The Hague-London-Paris-Istanbul March-
April 2009
Objective of meeting 1) maintain sense of urgency of achieving

a successful outcome in Copenhagen, also in view of economic crisis; 2)
build common understanding and gather views on the political essentials
of a Copenhagen outcome; 3) create support for convening a small group
of HoS/G representing all key stake holder countries in the climate
change negotiations
1
Climate Change
x Recent signals coming from the scientific community
show that the situation is rapidly getting worse.
We must never lose sight of the urgency of the situation
and the need to take bold action now. Copenhagen has
to deliver an agreement on climate change. We must
seal the deal there!
2
x The current economic /financial crisis is an opportunity

to set global economic growth on
a low-emissions path, instead of locking the economy in
the wrong infrastructures and investments.
x I am very encouraged to see the determination across

the world to reach a successful outcome in Copenhagen;
2009 will rightly be the year of climate change.
3
x It seems to me that we must solve four major political

issues to enable success in Copenhagen:
1) mid-term mitigation targets for industrialized
countries; 2) mitigation actions by developing countries;
x 3) clarity on financing; and 4) governance structures and

institutional arrangements for financial/technological
cooperation.
4
x What are your expectations for Copenhagen? What do

you think are the key political issues and how do you
think they could be resolved to reach an agreement?
x Engagement of leaders at the highest political level is

critical to securing a deal in Copenhagen; therefore
I am personally committed to facilitating such
engagement.
5
x I will convene a High Level Event on 22 September on

the margins of the General Assembly and I am also
exploring other options to engage leaders throughout the
year.
x It is my understanding that the US is keen on revitalise

the Major Economies Meetings (MEM) process and I will
support this process as much as
I can.
6
x While the MEM can be useful forum for the large emitters
to get together and identify ways to raise
the ambition level for mitigation, I believe it is also
important to have informal high-level consultations
among a more representative group of countries
including smaller developing countries, SIDS and LDC’s.
x Such a group could also tackle the broader set of issues

essential for Copenhagen like adaptation, finance and
governance.
7
x I am still considering the option of convening a small

informal meeting of HoS/G of representative countries.
Such a group may need to be ready to engage prior to
the Copenhagen Conference when negotiations have
entered the final stages to facilitate solutions for any of
the issues which remain contentious and unresolved at
that time.
x I would be very interested to hear your views on my

plans.
8
Generics Chad March 09.docCleared by CdC Confidenti
Generic Talking Points on Chad

March-April 2009
MINURCAT
x In accordance with Security Council resolution 1861
(14 January 2009), the UN took over EUFOR’s
military/security responsibilities on 15 March.
A majority of EUFOR TCCs re-hatted, and new TCCs,
including from Africa and Asia, are also deploying.
Over 2,085 troops are now on the ground.
x The ongoing support of Member States will be

necessary to ensure that MINURCAT has full and
unimpeded freedom of movement, as well as
cooperation from the Government in the
implementation of its police, rule of law and human
rights mandates.
x The UN supported Chadian police element known as

the Détachement Intégré de Securité has now
deployed throughout eastern Chad to provide
community policing in refugee camps, IDP sites and
surrounding areas.
1
Generics Chad March 09.docCleared by CdC Confidenti
x I would like to invite your Government to support

MINURCAT’s activities and the DIS through the
provision of a contribution to the MINURCAT Trust
Fund.
Chad-Sudan relations
x I am concerned by recent reports of the militarisation
of the Chad – Sudan border, as well as heightened
rhetoric from both sides.
x The Dakar process needs to be supported as a forum

for addressing Chad – Sudan relations. We could see
increased displacement into eastern Chad with
security implications. This would stretch
humanitarian aid agencies beyond their limit.
2
Generics Chad March 09 (CARDS).doc Cleared by CdC
Generic Talking Points on Chad
March-April 2009
MINURCAT
x In accordance with Security Council resolution 1861
(14 January 2009), the UN took over EUFOR’s
military/security responsibilities on 15 March.
A majority of EUFOR TCCs re-hatted, and new TCCs,
including from Africa and Asia, are also deploying. Over
2,085 troops are now on the ground.
1
x The ongoing support of Member States will be necessary
to ensure that MINURCAT has full and unimpeded
freedom of movement, as well as cooperation from the
Government in the implementation of its police, rule of
law and human rights mandates.
x The UN supported Chadian police element known as the

Détachement Intégré de Securité has now deployed
throughout eastern Chad to provide community policing in
refugee camps, IDP sites and surrounding areas.
2
x I would like to invite your Government to support

MINURCAT’s activities and the DIS through the provision
of a contribution to the MINURCAT Trust Fund.
Chad-Sudan relations
x I am concerned by recent reports of the militarisation of
the Chad – Sudan border, as well as heightened rhetoric
from both sides.
3
x The Dakar process needs to be supported as a forum for

addressing Chad – Sudan relations. We could see
increased displacement into eastern Chad with security
implications. This would stretch humanitarian aid
agencies beyond their limit.
4
Generics Afghanistan - pre Hague conference March (rev).docCleared by CdC on
Generic Talking Points on Afghanistan

(pre Hague meetings, i.e. before 31 March 2009)
Objectives of the meeting: share United Nations’ position on current

developments in Afghanistan; seek support in implementing
the Paris Agenda and coordination for aid-effectiveness in particular.
Elections
x A number of political issues remain unresolved,
including the controversy over the President’s
mandate after the expiration of his term in May and
the vetting process of candidates.
x It is critical that the Afghan political factions and

voters find the elections to be sufficiently credible
and that the results are broadly accepted.
x The international community should continue to

maintain a neutral line, while encouraging consensus-
building among Afghan political leaders.
My Special Representative is working to reduce
tensions and increase the political will of the Afghans
to find a viable solution.
x We must all do our utmost to ensure that

the elections are as transparent and credible as
possible.
1
x The United Nations provides technical assistance to

the Independent Electoral Commission in charge of
the conduct of these elections, which are estimated to
cost $224 million. Despite a number of contributions
and pledges, there still is a funding gap close to USD
80 million.
Aid coordination
x There also continue to be challenges on longer-term
issues like donor coordination and aid-effectiveness.
UNAMA has a coordination mandate, but
aid-effectiveness is a shared responsibility with
donors and the Afghan Government.
x The objective of our efforts should be impact,

cost-effectiveness and capacity-building. We must
avoid a donor-generated fragmentation of
Afghanistan. Finally, without transparency in funding,
we could not know how resources are being spent,
and coordination would be difficult.
x I will open The Hague Conference on Afghanistan on

31 March. I will also attend the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization’s conference on Afghanistan on
27 March in Moscow. These events will present
an opportunity to give a new dynamism to our efforts
in Afghanistan.
2
x I believe that the international community must now

focus on areas where tangible progress is possible.
Often, even small changes in our policies can have
a significant impact on the ground.
x We need to continue to pursue a coordinated

strategy, which should help to restore the confidence
of the Afghan public in the processes we have
underwritten.
x There is potential for progress on police reform.

The Government’s security ministers are working
together more effectively and so too are economy
ministers. We may see a decrease in poppy
production; and Afghanistan has an Agriculture
Minister who is revitalizing this neglected sector.
x UNAMA and ISAF are intensifying cooperation to

balance security requirements with other forms of
assistance, always taking into account local needs.
We also have to continue working to avoid and
prevent civilian casualties.
3
x I am concerned about the humanitarian situation in
Afghanistan. The 2009 Humanitarian Action Plan
aims at ensuring a coherent, multi-sector response to
the immediate needs.
x I am also deeply concerned about the escalation of

the armed conflict and the number of civilian
casualties. We need to make every effort to ensure
that the safety of civilians comes first and that
the military surge supports the goal of improving
the quality of life of the Afghans.
4
Generics Afghanistan - post Hague conference (rev).docCleared by CdC on 24.03.09 Confidenti
Generic Talking Points on Afghanistan for the

Secretary-General’s trip
(post Hague meetings, i.e. after 31 March 2009)
Objectives of the meeting: share United Nations position on current

developments in Afghanistan; seek support in implementing the Paris
Agenda and aid coordination to improve its effectiveness in particular.
Elections
x A number of political issues remain unresolved,
including the controversy over the President’s
mandate after the expiration of his term in May and
the vetting process of candidates.
x It is critical that the Afghan political factions and

voters find the elections to be sufficiently credible
and that the results are broadly accepted.
x The international community should continue to

maintain a neutral line, while encouraging consensus-
building among Afghan political leaders.
My Special Representative is working to reduce
tensions and increase the political will of the Afghans
to find a viable solution.
x We must all do our utmost to ensure that the

elections are as transparent and credible as possible.
1
x The United Nations provides technical assistance to

the Independent Electoral Commission in charge of
the conduct of these elections, which are estimated to
cost $224 million. Despite a number of contributions
and pledges, there still is a funding gap close to
USD 80 million.
Aid coordination
issues, like donor coordination and aid-effectiveness.
UNAMA has a coordination mandate, but aid-
effectiveness is a shared responsibility with donors
and the Afghan Government.
x The objective of our efforts should be impact, cost-

effectiveness and capacity-building. We must avoid a
donor-generated fragmentation of Afghanistan.
Finally, without transparency in funding, aid
coordination would be difficult.
x I attended The Hague Conference on Afghanistan on

31 March. I also attended the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization conference on Afghanistan on 27 March
in Moscow. These events presented an opportunity to
give a new dynamism to our efforts in Afghanistan.
2
x I believe the international community must now

focus on areas where tangible progress is possible.
Often, even small changes in our policies can have a
significant impact on the ground.
x We need to continue to pursue a coordinated

strategy, which should help to restore the confidence
of the Afghan public in the processes we have
underwritten.

ministers. We may see a decrease in poppy
production; and Afghanistan has an Agriculture
Minister who is revitalizing this neglected sector.
x UNAMA and ISAF are intensifying cooperation to

balance security requirements with other forms of
assistance, always taking into account local needs.
We also have to continue working to avoid and
prevent civilian casualties.
3
Afghanistan. The 2009 Humanitarian Action Plan
aims at ensuring a coherent, multi-sector response to
the immediate needs. I encourage donors to urgently
commit additional resources.
x I am also deeply concerned about the rising number

of civilian casualties. We need to make every effort to
make sure that the safety of civilians comes first and
that the military surge supports the goal of improving
the quality of life of Afghans.
4
Generics Afghanistan - post Hague conference (rev) (CARDS).docCleared by
CdC on 24.03.09 Confidential
Generic Talking Points on Afghanistan for the
Secretary-General’s trip
(post Hague meetings, i.e. after 31 March 2009)
Objectives of the meeting: share United Nations position on current

developments in Afghanistan; seek support in implementing the Paris Agenda
and aid coordination to improve its effectiveness in particular.
1
Elections
x A number of political issues remain unresolved, including
the controversy over the President’s mandate after the
expiration of his term in May and the vetting process of
candidates.
x It is critical that the Afghan political factions and voters

find the elections to be sufficiently credible and that the
results are broadly accepted.
2
x The international community should continue to maintain
a neutral line, while encouraging consensus-building
among Afghan political leaders. My Special
Representative is working to reduce tensions and
increase the political will of the Afghans to find a viable
solution.
x We must all do our utmost to ensure that the elections

are as transparent and credible as possible.
3
x The United Nations provides technical assistance to the

Independent Electoral Commission in charge of the
conduct of these elections, which are estimated to cost
$224 million. Despite a number of contributions and
pledges, there still is a funding gap close to
USD 80 million.
4
Aid coordination
issues, like donor coordination and aid-effectiveness.
UNAMA has a coordination mandate, but aid-
effectiveness is a shared responsibility with donors and
the Afghan Government.
5
x The objective of our efforts should be impact,

cost-effectiveness and capacity-building. We must avoid
a donor-generated fragmentation of Afghanistan. Finally,
without transparency in funding, aid coordination would
be difficult.
6
x I attended The Hague Conference on Afghanistan on
31 March. I also attended the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization conference on Afghanistan on 27 March in
Moscow. These events presented an opportunity to give
a new dynamism to our efforts in Afghanistan.
x I believe the international community must now focus on

areas where tangible progress is possible. Often, even
small changes in our policies can have a significant
impact on the ground.
7
x We need to continue to pursue a coordinated strategy,
which should help to restore the confidence of the
Afghan public in the processes we have underwritten.

ministers. We may see a decrease in poppy production;
and Afghanistan has an Agriculture Minister who is
revitalizing this neglected sector.
8
x UNAMA and ISAF are intensifying cooperation to balance
security requirements with other forms of assistance,
always taking into account local needs. We also have to
continue working to avoid and prevent civilian casualties.
9
Afghanistan. The 2009 Humanitarian Action Plan aims at
ensuring a coherent, multi-sector response to the
immediate needs. I encourage donors to urgently commit
additional resources.
10
x I am also deeply concerned about the rising number of

civilian casualties. We need to make every effort to make
sure that the safety of civilians comes first and that the
military surge supports the goal of improving the quality
of life of Afghans.
11
Generic background on Afghanistan (rev).docConfidential
Background information on Afghanistan

March-April 2009
Afghanistan
The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) has confirmed
20 August as the date for elections. President Karzai accepted this
decision in a press conference on 7 March. SRSG Eide issued
a statement welcoming the IEC’s decision, noting that this date
provides the necessary time to make logistical preparations for
candidates to campaign and for Afghan and international forces to
provide security. The settlement of the elections date controversy has
not solved the controversy over the President’s legitimacy after the
expiration of his term (21 May) under the Constitution. The SRSG is
working with Afghan political leaders to achieve consensus on the way
forward. A solution has to be decided upon by Afghans, if it is to ensure
political stability. The issue of the credibility of elections is often
raised, in particular amongst the international community. It is
important to manage expectations as these elections will be more
difficult than the last and will not be perfect. Candidate registration is
due to start at the end of April and will include the vetting of
candidates with links to armed groups as it happened in the previous
elections (2004-05). The IEC will rely on data complied by the
Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups Secretariat (DIAG) to vet
candidates.
The United Nations is providing technical assistance to the IEC in

preparing the elections. The budget for the 2009 elections has just
been released: it amounts to $ 224 million. Despite a number of
contributions and pledges, close to $ 80 million are still missing.
The Netherlands will host a Conference on Afghanistan on 31 March.

The Secretary-General will open the event, which will be chaired by the
SRSG with the Dutch and Afghan foreign ministers. Invitees include
Afghanistan’s neighbours and countries in the region, ISAF partners,
major donors and relevant international organizations.
At the Hague Conference, the US may unveil elements of its ongoing

strategic review, which could include troop surges, a political process
with the more moderate elements of the insurgency, a priority focus on
1
Generic background on Afghanistan (rev).docConfidential
Pakistan, and closer relations with countries in the region.

The strategic review has been the focus of much attention, and it is
hoped that the announced troop surge will be accompanied by a
political surge.
Following the appointment of Ambassador Holbrooke as

the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, other
Member States have also appointed Special Envoys or Representatives
for Pakistan and Afghanistan (e.g. UK, Italy, Japan, France, Germany,
and Sweden).
Despite the need for reconciliation advocated by President Karzai, little

consensus exists among Afghan political figures or between members
of the international community on how to undertake it. SRSG Eide
believes that any such initiatives should be Afghan-led, respect the
Constitutional order, enjoy a degree of consensus, and be pursued
from a position of military and political strength.
Afghan officials acknowledge that relations with the Government of

Pakistan are improving, but they point out that this is not affecting
the cross-border dimension of the insurgency, which they believe is
fuelled by elements of the Pakistani security agencies. Some Afghan
officials indicate that progress depends on the involvement of other
powers with interests in the region, such as China. Many of
Afghanistan’s international partners are supporting regional
cooperation in practical areas. Afghan counterparts are eager that such
initiatives be coordinated and results-oriented.
SRSG Eide is working on improving aid coordination and

effectiveness, emphasising the need for donor transparency, and
encouraging investment in key priority areas (e.g. agriculture and
energy). He is advocating a more disciplined implementation of
existing strategies, i.e. the Afghan National Development Strategy
(ANDS) and the Paris Agenda. It is important for major donors to
change some of their policies, to improve the effectiveness of aid.
2
Egypt President Mubarak TPs.docCleared by Political Unit Confidenti

H.E. Mr. Hosni Mubarak,
President of Egypt,
Middle East peace process [see also generics] 1

Somalia 1
Sudan [see generics] 2
Middle East peace process [see also generics]
x I would like to commend Egypt for its tireless efforts

on a ceasefire, a prisoner exchange and Palestinian
unity. The UN supports your work and stands ready
to assist.
Somalia
[Objective: To continue receiving on-going support for the Djibouti
process.]
x I commend your Government’s support to peace and
stability in Somalia. Egypt has always been a friend
of Somalia

1
Egypt President Mubarak TPs.docCleared by Political Unit Confidenti

address this issue. Egypt can perhaps help in
providing some training or other support for the Joint
Security Force that is being created, as well as for the
Somali police.
x I have tasked the office of my Special Representative

for Somalia to coordinate the UN support on issues
related to piracy and I would like to take this
opportunity to call on Egypt to closely work with my
Special Representative for a collective approach.
x I take this opportunity to commend Egypt and

encourage its efforts in support of peace and stability
in Somalia.
Sudan [see generics]
Financial crisis [see generics]
2
Egypt President Mubarak TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit
H.E. Mr. Hosni Mubarak,
President of Egypt,
Middle East peace process [see also generics] 2

Somalia 2
Sudan [see generics] 4
1
Middle East peace process [see also generics]
x I would like to commend Egypt for its tireless efforts on
a ceasefire, a prisoner exchange and Palestinian unity.
The UN supports your work and stands ready to assist.
Somalia
[Objective: To continue receiving on-going support for the Djibouti
process.]
x I commend your Government’s support to peace and
stability in Somalia. Egypt has always been a friend of
Somalia
2
x The security situation in Somalia is not only a threat to its

own people but also to the region and the international
community. We need to urgently address this issue.
Egypt can perhaps help in providing some training or
other support for the Joint Security Force that is being
created, as well as for the Somali police.
3
x I have tasked the office of my Special Representative for
Somalia to coordinate the UN support on issues related to
piracy and I would like to take this opportunity to call on
Egypt to closely work with my Special Representative for
a collective approach.
x I take this opportunity to commend Egypt and encourage

its efforts in support of peace and stability in Somalia.
Sudan [see generics]
Financial crisis [see generics]
4
Country Profile of the Netherlands.docConfidential
Country Background Note

The Netherlands
Domestic Political and Economical Situation
The governing coalition is showing cohesion and competence in addressing the financial
crisis and economic slowdown, but an inquiry into Dutch political support for the Iraq
war is dividing the two main parties. The prime minister has reversed his earlier refusal to
call an inquiry into the reasons for Dutch political support for the Iraq war in 2003, by
establishing an independent commission, which will report by November 2009.
The next election is due by early 2011. Until that time, the two right-wing opposition
parties, the Freedom Party and Proud of the Netherlands, are expected to continue to put
the government on the defensive on immigration. Anti-immigration sentiments in the
Netherlands remain strong and the financial crisis may increase negative sentiments
towards immigrants and migrant workers.
GDP growth was 2.0% in 2008 and is expected to fall below zero in 2009, unbalancing
the budget and bringing the country into recession. Domestic housing prices have held
pretty steady, though the housing crisis in the US strained the Dutch bank ING, forcing
government intervention. The government has taken control of ABN AMRO and Fortis
(Netherlands) while support has been offered to all Dutch banks. The government will
enact €2.5 billion in tax cuts in 2009 and delay its plan for an increase in theVAT.
Foreign Policy Priorities
The foreign policy of the Netherlands is based on four basic commitments: Atlantic
cooperation, European integration, international development and international law.
The Netherlands was a founding member of the UN, NATO, the European Communities
(now the European Union), the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the
West European Union. As a relatively small country with a globally-oriented economy,
the Netherlands attaches great importance to a well-structured world order.
Dutch foreign policy focuses on establishing stability in several priority regions:

Afghanistan, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes and the Balkans.
Afghanistan
The Netherlands contributes actively to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, authorized by
the Security Council, by deploying military personnel and providing financial assistance
to humanitarian programmes and general reconstruction since 2001. The 'Dutch approach'
in Afghanistan, with a focus on 'bottom-up' provision of security through reconstruction,
has garnered international attention as an effective way of engaging the local population
while improving the security situation in the country.
Page 1 of 3
Middle East
Mr. Robert Serry, a Dutch national, is the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process and the SG Personal Representative to the Palestine Liberation
Organization and the Palestinian Authority.
In January 2009, the Dutch government made €3 million available for humanitarian aid in
Gaza: €2 million was made available to UNRWA and €1 million for the Red Crescent for
the purchase of food, blankets and medicine. The Dutch donation of $64 million to the
2008 UN emergency relief fund was the second-largest donation of the 81 member states
that contributed to it.
Development Cooperation
Development policy is an important part of Dutch foreign policy. It is the responsibility
of the Minister for Development Cooperation, based at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Most of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ budget goes to development cooperation:
development spending is fixed at 0.8% of gross national product, amounting to more than
4 billion euros. This makes the Netherlands a major donor of aid. The Netherlands also
scores higher than the OECD average on the various policy fields of development
cooperation.
The Dutch Minister of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, H.E. Ms. Gerda Verburg, is
the chairperson of the 17th Session of the Commission for Sustainable Development.
Peace building commission and responsibility to protect

The active membership of the Netherlands in the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)
shows their conviction that the development of post-conflict societies is a crucial factor in
the prevention of a relapse into conflict. The Netherlands chairs the Sierra Leone
configuration of the PBC and believes the work of the commission provides a unique
opportunity to make a difference on the ground.
The Netherlands firmly believes peace and development are intertwined and underscores
the importance of the central role of the UN in managing post-conflict and fragile states.
In addition, the further development and implementation of the concept of Responsibility
to Protect (R2P) is one of the main Dutch concerns.
Human rights
Apart from contributing to international stability, the Netherlands attaches great
importance to the defense and promotion of human rights and the establishment of a
functioning international legal order. It plays an active role within the Human Rights
Council in Geneva and the Third Committee of the General Assembly in New York, and
makes an effort to integrate human rights into all UN activities.
Page 2 of 3
Netherlands and the United Nations
Contribution to the UN Budget: The Netherlands is one of the main financial

contributors to the activities of the United Nations. For example in 2006, the Netherlands,
a country of 16 million inhabitants, contributed almost 400 million dollars to the three
main UN funds and programmes: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA). These donations are just below the contributions of countries like the United
States and Japan. When it comes to the regular UN budget, the Netherlands is ranked as
the 12th largest contributor.
UN peacekeeping missions: The Netherlands has been an active player with regards to
Peacekeeping Operations ever since the United Nations was established. At present
(November 2008), over 2,100 Dutch troops are active around the world, participating in
UN Peacekeeping Operations and UN Mandated Operations.
International justice: The Hague - seat of the Dutch government - hosts the
International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Court and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The
trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor in the framework of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone is also being conducted in The Hague.
Permanent Mission: Mr. Frank Majoor currently serves as the Permanent Representative
of the Netherlands the United Nations in New York.
ED/DPA – March 2009
Page 3 of 3
Central Asia FMs TPs.doc Confidential

with Ministers for Foreign Affairs:
H. E. Mr. Rashid Meredov, Turkmenistan
H.E. Mr. Vladimir Norov, Uzbekistan
H.E. Mr. Kadyrbek Sarbaev, Kyrgyzstan
H.E. Mr. Marat Tazhin, Kazakhstan
H.E. Mr. Hamrokhon Zarifi, Tajikistan
Moscow, 28 March 2009, 10:00 am
Introduction 1
Water and Energy Issues 1
Regional Initiatives 2
Regional Security and Afghanistan 3
Conclusion 3
Introduction
x I regret that my visit to Central Asia has been delayed

due to scheduling conflicts. It is my intention to visit
the region in the fall, probably November, if this is
convenient for you.
x In the meantime, SRSG Jenþa is in close consultation

with you on possible measures to strengthen
cooperation on shared challenges in the region.
Water and Energy Issues
x I was encouraged by the meeting of your Presidents

in October last year and the important
understandings reached on water and energy issues.
1
x The UN Regional Centre is ready to assist your

Governments in finding durable solutions in this area.
x I encourage the active participation of your

delegations in the meeting convened by the Regional
Centre on 20-21 April on international water laws and
negotiation of mutually beneficial water agreements.
x I also wish you success with the upcoming Summit of

Member States of the International Fund For Saving
the Aral Sea. The Regional Centre is at your disposal
to assist in the preparation of this important event.
Regional Initiatives
x I would like to congratulate you on the entry into

force on 21 March 2009 of the Treaty establishing a
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia.
x It is also positive that the Agreement establishing the

Regional Information and Coordination Centre,
supported by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, has
entered into force.
x Dialogue and consensus are powerful tools. I

encourage you to make use of the Regional Centre as
a platform for discussions and building consensus on
further initiatives, which can contribute to peace and
stability in the region.
2
Regional Security and Afghanistan
x I welcome the contributions of your countries to the

stabilization and international efforts in Afghanistan.
x The countries of Central Asia are on the front lines of

such issues as drug trafficking, organized crime,
terrorism, and extremism. We are committed to
assisting you with finding joint solutions to these
cross border challenges, stemming from Afghanistan.
x In addition, trade and investment from your countries

can contribute to stability in Afghanistan and long
term economic growth in the region.
x I know that SRSG Jenca has been in active discussion

with you on both of these topics, which will be the
focus of initiatives by the Regional Centre.
x What is your assessment of the situation in

Afghanistan and its impact in Central Asia? How can
the Regional Centre assist?
Conclusion
x We at the UN need your help on the critical issues of

the day, from the economic crisis, to climate change,
to the challenges to peace and security. I would very
much like to hear your views.
3
Central Asia FMs TPs CARDS.doc
Confidential
Ministers for Foreign Affairs:
Moscow, 28 March 2009, 10:00 am
Introduction 2
Water and Energy Issues 3
Regional Initiatives 5
Regional Security and Afghanistan 7
Conclusion 9
1
Confidential
Introduction
x I regret that my visit to Central Asia has been delayed

due to scheduling conflicts. It is my intention to visit the
region in the fall, probably November, if this is
convenient for you.
x In the meantime, SRSG Jenþa is in close consultation

with you on possible measures to strengthen cooperation
on shared challenges in the region.
2
Confidential
x I was encouraged by the meeting of your Presidents in

October last year and the important understandings
reached on water and energy issues.
x The UN Regional Centre is ready to assist your

Governments in finding durable solutions in this area.
3
Confidential
x I encourage the active participation of your delegations
in the meeting convened by the Regional Centre on 20-21
April on international water laws and negotiation of
mutually beneficial water agreements.
x I also wish you success with the upcoming Summit of

Member States of the International Fund For Saving the
Aral Sea. The Regional Centre is at your disposal to assist
in the preparation of this important event.
4
Confidential
Regional Initiatives
x I would like to congratulate you on the entry into force

on 21 March 2009 of the Treaty establishing a Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia.
x It is also positive that the Agreement establishing the

Regional Information and Coordination Centre, supported
by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, has entered into
force.
5
Confidential
x Dialogue and consensus are powerful tools. I encourage
you to make use of the Regional Centre as a platform for
discussions and building consensus on further initiatives,
which can contribute to peace and stability in the region.
6
Confidential
Regional Security and Afghanistan
x I welcome the contributions of your countries to the

stabilization and international efforts in Afghanistan.
x The countries of Central Asia are on the front lines of

such issues as drug trafficking, organized crime,
terrorism, and extremism. We are committed to assisting
you with finding joint solutions to these cross border
challenges, stemming from Afghanistan.
7
Confidential
x In addition, trade and investment from your countries
can contribute to stability in Afghanistan and long term
economic growth in the region.
x I know that SRSG Jenca has been in active discussion

with you on both of these topics, which will be the focus
of initiatives by the Regional Centre.
x What is your assessment of the situation in Afghanistan

and its impact in Central Asia? How can the Regional
Centre assist?
8
Confidential
Conclusion
x We at the UN need your help on the critical issues of the

day, from the economic crisis, to climate change, to the
challenges to peace and security. I would very much like
to hear your views.
9
Central Asia FMs BN .docConfidential

meeting with Ministers for Foreign Affairs:
(Moscow, 28 March 2009, 10:00am)
Central Asia and Afghanistan
The five countries of Central Asia consider drug trafficking, organized

crime, and extremism stemming from the situation in Afghanistan to
be serious threats to their peace and stability. They have proposed
several political initiatives to support stabilization in the country.
Uzbekistan advocates for “6 + 3” discussions among Afghanistan’s
neighbours (China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan) and the United States, Russia, and NATO. Kyrgyzstan
has proposed hosting a high level summit with participation of all
parties involved in the Afghan conflict. Kazakhstan seeks to address
the situation in Afghanistan within the framework of the Conference
on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA).
The five countries support coalition operations in Afghanistan and

allow the transit of non-military cargo through their territories. They
also provide humanitarian assistance and participate in infrastructure
projects to support Afghanistan, including the provision of electricity
from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to northern Afghanistan;
humanitarian supplies from Kazakhstan; and a cross-border bridge
from Tajikistan to promote trade. The countries seek to be included
in international reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. The Central
Asian countries are expected to participate in the Regional Economic
Cooperation Conference on 1-2 April in Islamabad.
Disputes between upstream and downstream countries in Central

Asia remain a major challenge to regional stability and cooperation.
1
Central Asia FMs BN .docConfidential
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (upstream) seek energy security, while

Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan (downstream) seek a
reliable supply of water. Despite a meeting of the five Central Asian
Presidents on the issue in October 2008, attended by SRSG Jenca, no
durable solution has been found. In April 2009, the five Central
Asian Presidents are expected to meet for the Summit of Member
States of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea.
UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central

Asia (UNRCCA)
UNRCCA will organize a regional conference on international water

law and negotiations on 20-21 April 2009. It plans to convene a
regional meeting in June 2009 on facilitating the role of the Central
Asian countries in stabilizing Afghanistan. UNRCCA is carrying out
activities on the basis of its Program of Action, developed in
consultation with the countries of the region.
Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ)
The Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty

was ratified by the last of the five signatories, Kazakhstan, on 11
December 2008, and entered into force on 21 March 2009. It is the
first nuclear-weapon-free zone to be established in the northern
hemisphere and in an area where nuclear weapons previously existed.
The US, UK, and France are critical of the Treaty for the concern that
it does not supersede existing security arrangements in the region.
Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Centre
The goal of CARICC is to facilitate regional cooperation in the fight

against drug trafficking and organized crime. Based in Almaty,
Kazakhstan, CARICC is a large scale project of the UN Office on
Drugs and Crime. The Agreement on its establishment was ratified
by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan
and entered into force on 22 March 2009. It remains for Uzbekistan
to ratify and Russia to sign and ratify the Agreement.
2
Canada FM Cannon TPs.docCleared by Political Unit Confidenti
Talking Points on Afghanistan

for the Secretary-General’s meeting
with H. E. Mr. Lawrence Cannon,
Foreign Minister of Canada,
The Hague, 31 March 2009, 10:00am (time TBC)
Objectives of the meeting: exchange views on the electoral process in

Afghanistan; seek support for UNAMA’s efforts in improving donor
coordination and aid-effectiveness.
Elections
x The controversy over President Karzai’s mandate

after 22 May still remains unresolved.
x The option of a Loya Jirga now appears to have been

excluded, while the Supreme Court remains reluctant
to take a stand. There are concerns that a weak
caretaker Government could undermine security
efforts.
x In order to ensure political stability, the Afghans must

identify a political solution; that enjoys broad-based
consensus. My Special Representative is working to
help the Afghans generate the political will to find a
viable solution.
1
x We must all do our best to ensure that they are as

transparent and credible as possible, if not perfect.
The United Nations and UNDP are providing technical
assistance for the preparation of these elections,
which will cost US $224 million. The funding gap of
approximately $116 million still remains to be filled.
UNAMA’s role
x SRSG Eide has gained the trust of his Afghan

interlocutors. UNAMA has worked with Afghan and
international interlocutors to streamline coordination
mechanisms, identify priorities and develop concrete
strategies behind which donors must align their
efforts. The messaging of the international
community is more coherent than it was a year ago.
x UNAMA has stressed the need to avoid a donor-

generated fragmentation of Afghanistan, as well as
the need to increase transparency of funding so that
we and the Afghans can know how resources are
being spent. We have identified the areas that need
priority attention.
2
x The success of these efforts depends on donors

changing their policies, and on having solid Afghan
Ministries to work with – which requires efforts to
improve governance and capacity-building.
x UNAMA’s coordination mandate was reaffirmed by the

Security Council just over a week ago, but ultimately
UNAMA’s role is one of persuasion. Aid-effectiveness
is a shared responsibility with donors and the Afghan
Government.
Support to UNAMA
x I am grateful for the strong support to UNAMA shown

by the international community . With the approval of
the new budget, UNAMA has the resources it needs to
carry out its mandate. New offices have been opened
and soon UNAMA will have 80 percent of its budgeted
staff. We are also working to strengthen existing
offices.
x The support UNAMA and the SRSG need now is

political in nature, including for their efforts on aid
effectiveness.
3
Humanitarian Coordination
x Operationally, humanitarian coordination in

Afghanistan is entrusted to OCHA’s office, which is
aligned with the objectives of the integrated United
Nations presence under my Special Representative.
x OCHA is already present in Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif,

Herat and Jalalabad, and is planning to establish
a presence in the South in early April.
x The priority for OCHA is the implementation of the

2009 Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) developed with
the Government and other partners.
x The HAP has a requirement of US$648 million. In this

context, I welcome Canada’s commitment of
CA$ 23 million to the Plan.
4
Canada FM Cannon TPs CARDS.docCleared by Political Unit
Talking Points on Afghanistan
for the Secretary-General’s meeting
with H. E. Mr. Lawrence Cannon,
Foreign Minister of Canada,
The Hague, 31 March 2009, 10:00am (time TBC)
Objectives of the meeting: exchange views on the electoral process in

Afghanistan; seek support for UNAMA’s efforts in improving donor
coordination and aid-effectiveness.
1
Elections
x The controversy over President Karzai’s mandate after
22 May still remains unresolved.
x The option of a Loya Jirga now appears to have been

excluded, while the Supreme Court remains reluctant to
take a stand. There are concerns that a weak caretaker
Government could undermine security efforts.
x In order to ensure political stability, the Afghans must

2
identify a political solution; that enjoys broad-based
consensus. My Special Representative is working to help
the Afghans generate the political will to find a viable
solution.
x We must all do our best to ensure that they are as
transparent and credible as possible, if not perfect. The
United Nations and UNDP are providing technical
assistance for the preparation of these elections, which
will cost US $224 million. The funding gap of
approximately $116 million still remains to be filled.
UNAMA’s role
3
x SRSG Eide has gained the trust of his Afghan
interlocutors. UNAMA has worked with Afghan and
international interlocutors to streamline coordination
mechanisms, identify priorities and develop concrete
strategies behind which donors must align their efforts.
The messaging of the international community is more
coherent than it was a year ago.
x UNAMA has stressed the need to avoid a donor-generated

fragmentation of Afghanistan, as well as the need to
increase transparency of funding so that we and the
Afghans can know how resources are being spent. We
4
have identified the areas that need priority attention.
x The success of these efforts depends on donors changing

their policies, and on having solid Afghan Ministries to
work with – which requires efforts to improve
governance and capacity-building.
x UNAMA’s coordination mandate was reaffirmed by the

Security Council just over a week ago, but ultimately
UNAMA’s role is one of persuasion. Aid-effectiveness is
a shared responsibility with donors and the Afghan
Government.
5
Support to UNAMA
6
x I am grateful for the strong support to UNAMA shown by
the international community . With the approval of the
new budget, UNAMA has the resources it needs to carry
out its mandate. New offices have been opened and soon
UNAMA will have 80 percent of its budgeted staff. We are
also working to strengthen existing offices.
x The support UNAMA and the SRSG need now is political in

nature, including for their efforts on aid effectiveness.
Humanitarian Coordination
7
x Operationally, humanitarian coordination in Afghanistan
is entrusted to OCHA’s office, which is aligned with the
objectives of the integrated United Nations presence
under my Special Representative.
x OCHA is already present in Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat

and Jalalabad, and is planning to establish
a presence in the South in early April.
x The priority for OCHA is the implementation of the 2009

Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) developed with the
Government and other partners.
8
x The HAP has a requirement of US$648 million. In this
context, I welcome Canada’s commitment of
CA$ 23 million to the Plan.
9
Afghanistan President Karzai TPs.docCleared by Political Unit 24-03-09 Confidenti

with H. E. Mr. Hâmid Karzai,
President of Afghanistan,
[Objective of meeting: Encourage resolution of the constitutional debate;

encourage further improvements on governance.]
x The international community’s generosity towards

Afghanistan has been tremendous. I welcome the
increased attention Afghanistan’s key allies are
devoting to it, as demonstrated by the recent
high-level events on Afghanistan.
x I would like your views on the outcome of the

International Conference on Afghanistan at
The Hague. In my view, the event was an opportunity
to inject a new dynamism into our support to
Afghanistan.
x At the same time, I am reminding Afghanistan’s key

partners that we need to ensure that all this new
dynamism and resources are used effectively.
Elections
x We continue to face several challenges, and this year

is all the more crucial because it is an election year.
1
x I welcome the Independent Electoral Commission’s

confirmation of 20 August as the election day. My
electoral experts advised that it would have been
impossible to hold elections before then.
x The controversy over the interim arrangement after

21 May remains unresolved. The Afghans have to find
a solution based on a broad consensus, so as to
ensure political stability. I hope that there will be
the political will to agree soon on a viable interim
solution.
x The United Nations continues to provide technical

support for the preparations for these elections. I am
asking donors to provide adequate and timely
resources for the process.
New Strategies
x We have often discussed the importance of

implementing the ANDS and the Paris Agenda.
I believe that these strategies remain valid and that
we now need to see their impact on the ground.
2
x The appointment of numerous envoys on Afghanistan

and Pakistan signals a renewed international
attention to Afghanistan, and also an
acknowledgment of the importance of the regional
dimension. What are your views on this?
x There have been some results-oriented initiatives to

minimize the effects of military tactics that alienate
the population. At the same time, troop surges may
lead to more violence. I would like your views on the
prospect of increases of foreign troops.
x I believe that troop increases should focus on

securing population centres, improving security
ahead of the elections and should focus on training
Afghan security forces. Troop surges will also have to
be matched by what my Special Representative calls
a “political surge”.
Reconciliation
x As you know, our position is that a political process is

necessary and that the current situation cannot be
addressed by military means alone. Reconciliation
could be a part of such a political process.
3
x In my view, any reconciliation process needs to be

Afghan-led, have the consensus of key Afghan and
international stakeholders, must respect the
Constitution and be from a position of military and
political strength. What are your views on this?
Regional dimension
x Your relations with President Zardari are positive,

and there have been several initiatives to support
this relationship and wider regional cooperation.
What more do you think is needed to tackle the
cross-border dimension of the insurgency?
Development and Governance
x Mr. Eide has identified areas that require policy

adjustments by donors, such as avoiding province-
focused aid and foreign procurement, and investing
in agriculture, employment generation, and energy.
I am also pressing these points with relevant
Governments.
4
x If donors change the way they provide assistance to

Afghanistan, we could see a noticeable effect on the
ground. At the same time, good governance is also of
critical importance. I have welcomed your Cabinet
reshuffles and your attention to the Office of
Oversight. What other steps do you foresee taking to
further improve governance?

Negotiations 4

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Page 1 of 1

From: John McGarry <john.mcgarry@queensu.ca>

Date: Friday, February 20, 2009 01:00AM

History: This message has been forwarded.

Dear Sonja and Yasser,

All the best,

The ‘20% Rule’ in a Future ‘United Cyprus’ Presidential Election

1. The Effects of the 20% Rule in Southern Cyprus

1.1 Assumptions underlying my calculations.

Assumption 1: Who competes?

Assumption 2: How many GC voters will turnout?

Assumption 4: Which parties will GC voters vote for?

Assumption 5: Which GC parties will the TCs vote for?

Result of 1st round of Future GC Election (before TC votes are added)

Result of 1st round of Future GC Election (after TC votes are added)

Result of 2nd Round of GC Elections*

Analysis of the effects of the 20% Rule in Southern Cyprus:

II. The Effects of the 20% Rule in Northern Cyprus

Assumption 1: Who Competes?

Assumption 2: How many TC voters will turnout?

Assumption 3: Which parties will TC voters vote for?

Assumption 5: Which TC parties will the GCs vote for?

Result of 1st round of TC Election (before GC votes are added)

1. UBP candidate = 40,250

Result of 1st round of TC Election (after GC votes are added)

1. CTP candidate = 51,549 (35,218 TC votes + 16,331 GC votes)

Result of 2nd Round of TC Elections

Analysis of 20% Rule in Northern Cyprus

From: Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO

Date: Friday, February 20, 2009 04:59PM

I gave hardcopy to Tim, here as promised the email format.

-----Forwarded by Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO on 02/20/2009 04:58PM -----

Dear Sonja and Yasser,

All the best,

From: Fiona Mullen/UNFICYP

Date: Tuesday, February 24, 2009 02:31PM

History: This message has been replied to.

Here is the exchange of emails:

From: Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP

Date: Tuesday, February 24, 2009 04:24PM

Option one (preferred)

Option two (less preferred)

that "it was up in the air".

I hope this mail finds you well,

New Turkish “Ambassador” Sakir Fakili

Turkish MFA Under-Secretary Ertugrul Apakan.

Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan is a graduate of Izmir College. In 1969, 61 year old

In 2006 he was appointed as undersecretary.

From: Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO

Date: Tuesday, February 24, 2009 08:06PM

Timothy ToSonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ

As agreed with Taye, I pass this on to you.

----- Forwarded by Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP on 24/02/2009 16:52 -----

From: Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP

[attachment "New Turkish Ambassador Fakili.doc" deleted by Timothy Alchin/UNFICYP]

Option one (preferred)

Option two (less preferred)

I hope this mail finds you well,

From: Sonja Bachmann/NY/UNO

Date: Tuesday, February 24, 2009 10:57PM

Fiona ToSonja Bachmann/NY/UNO@UNHQ

which Cyprus is only a small slot.

Here is the exchange of emails:

This was the fourth meeting of the leaders on property.