Report Cap5 Causation

Causes of the Collapse & Findings
Chapter 5 – CAUSES OF THE COLLAPSE &

FINDINGS
THE CAUSES OF THE COLLAPSE
TERMS OF REFERENCE
Inquire into and ascertain the causes and circumstances of the incident at the
MRT Circle Line worksite that led to the collapse of the Nicoll Highway on 20 April
2004.
1. The Committee has deliberated at length the various hypotheses and theories
put forward by the experts for the various parties. We have carefully reviewed
the eyewitness’ accounts, the post collapse investigations, physical tests,
numerical simulations and all the evidence presented in the course of the
Inquiry.
2. We find that the collapse was rooted in two critical design errors in the
temporary retaining wall system. These are:
(i) The under-design of the diaphragm wall using Method A
The use of Method A in the C824 project to model the undrained

behaviour of soft marine clays was wrong. The method over-
predicted the undrained shear strength; underestimated the wall
bending moment and deflection, and resulted in the under-design of
the diaphragm wall.
Method B should have been used in this circumstance. The use of

Method A instead of Method B resulted in an underestimation of the
predicted bending moments and deflections by about 50% or a
factor of 2 for the original design in M3.
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(ii) The under-design of the waler connection in two ways:
(a) NLCJV’s estimation of load on the waler connection for

double struts assumed that the splays would absorb one
third of the load in the struts: in the event where splays were
omitted, this resulted in a design load on the waler
connection which was only about 70% of the load in the
strut, when the full 100% should have been used.
(b) NLCJV’s design of the waler connection with C-channels

relied on a stiff bearing length (b1) of 400 mm instead of
approximately 65 mm in accordance with BS5950, and on an
effective length of 0.7 of the net web depth, where a figure
close to 1.2 for unrestrained conditions would have been
more appropriate; as a result, the axial design capacity was
about 70% of the assumed design load for the connection.
3. Where splays were not used, these 2 factors were compounded, so that the
design capacity of the connections was one-half the required design strength.
4. Splays were omitted at several of the connections at level 9 in M3 area. These

were at struts S333/South, S334, S335, S337, S338, S339/North and
S340/South. These included the connections which were observed to have
failed first on the morning of 20 April 2004 at Struts 338 and 335.
5. The under-design of the waler connection caused the failure of the 9th level
strut-waler connections at the Type M3 area during the excavation to the 10th
level. This was the initiating failure of the collapse.
6. The failure of the 9th level waler connection caused the transfer of loads to the
8th level struts leading to the failure of the 8th level strutting system and the
subsequent collapse of the Type M3 area. The collapse then propagated
westward to the Type M2 area.
7. Essentially, we therefore find that the causes of the Nicoll Highway collapse in
the C824 project were due to the two critical design errors by the builder. These
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design errors in the event resulted in the failure of the 9th level strut-waler
system together with the inability of the overall temporary retaining wall system
to resist the redistributed loads as the 9th level strutting failed. This turned into a
catastrophic collapse.
8. The failure of the Nicoll Highway collapse falls squarely on the main builder
NLCJV. The culpability of the builder and its officers will be discussed in the
subsequent chapter on Criminal Liability in this Report.
9. We will elaborate on these causes in the succeeding parts of this chapter.
10. We will also set out the chain of events that contributed to the collapse. The
collapse did not develop suddenly. These contributory factors are technical and
administrative in nature. From the early stages of the C824 project through to
final collapse, there were failures to demonstrate the necessary level of care
and serious errors were made. Warnings of the approaching collapse were
present from an early stage but these were not recognized. A multiplicity of
events led to the position where design, construction and management and
organizational systems used by the builder and their sub-builders failed. They
did not adequately deal with insidious warning signs, need for proper design
reviews, and contingency and remedial measures. There were undoubtedly
human errors. There were failures in defensive systems.
11. The administrative errors are:
(a) not learning the right lesson from numerous warning signs and incidents
in the C824 site going back to the middle of 2003. Many of these
incidents were critical failures with severe potential consequences. The
Launch Shaft 2 incident was one such failure.
(b) lack of proper design expertise and experience of the design personnel;
(c) failure to institute a regular and close monitoring regime;
(d) the systematic pattern of the builder’s scant respect and callous
approach to the use of the results of each back analysis.
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(e) inadequate implementation of the hazard and consequence analysis;
(f) inadequate risk assessment for new or unfamiliar technologies and

impact on public safety;
(g) lack of safety management system;
(h) unresponsive organization and human factors;
(i) inadequate safety culture;
(j) unsafe acts and practices;
(k) production pressures to complete schedule regardless of safety

concerns;
(l) poor teamwork and communication;
(m) poor engineering judgment in critical areas;
(n) untimely remedial work;
12. The technical factors included the following which resulted in the inability of the
system to take the re-distributed loads.-
(a) Insufficient toe-penetration of the diaphragm walls;
(b) The occurrence of a plastic hinge in the diaphragm wall approximately 3

weeks before the collapse;
(c) Peculiar conditions at the M3 area which are:
(i) the presence of deep buried channel

(ii) the presence of 66 kV cable crossing
(iii) curved diaphragm wall (on plan)
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(d) The instrumentation and monitoring system was ineffective;
(e) The hacking of Tunnel Eyes at the TSA Shaft caused an increase in the
time required for the installation of the 10th level struts at the M3 area;
(f) Large spans of excavation remained unsupported for extended period;
(g) Lack of quality during construction; and
13. Some of these factors as well as other additional contributory factors are
elaborated in the remaining portion of this chapter and elsewhere in the Report.
5.1 THE UNDER-DESIGN OF THE DIAPHRAGM WALL USING METHOD A
14. In order to appreciate the impact of Method A on the temporary retaining wall
system, it would be necessary for us to set out not only the background in
respect of the design of the temporary retaining wall system, but also to set out
in sufficient detail an understanding of the Plaxis Program (“Plaxis”).
15. A user with a sound understanding of the theoretical basis of the Mohr-Coulomb
model and soft soil behaviour would realize that Method A could not model the
stress-strain response of soft clays correctly. For soft, normally to lightly over-
consolidated clays, the use of effective stress parameters in a Mohr Coulomb
model with undrained material setting will lead inevitably to the over-prediction
of undrained shear strength. The problem inherent in Method A is therefore a
fundamental issue in constitutive modelling.
Background
16. When NLCJV tendered for contract at C824, the tender design was produced
using the program Kasetsu 5X together with empirical earth pressure correlated
to SPT N-values. LTA’s Design Criteria stipulated that the temporary retaining
system should be analysed using the finite difference method or the finite
element method.
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17. However, LTA indicated that it was prepared to accept the use of Kasetsu 5X
provided theoretical earth pressure criteria were used. After numerous
discussions and negotiations, LTA and NLCJV accepted the use of the program
Plaxis. The Plaxis program could be use to conduct two-dimensional analysis
on the geotechnical and structural aspects of the design (including modelling of
excavation, preloading and backfilling).
18. NLCJV subsequently engaged Maunsell, and one of Maunsell’s roles in respect
of temporary works design was to use the Plaxis program to analyse and check
the adequacy of the retaining wall system, which had been designed based on
the Kasetsu 5X program.
19. NLCJV had relied on Maunsell to provide technical service in the use of Plaxis.
In this regard, the person from Maunsell whom NLCJV primarily dealt with was
Dr Lai Woei Tong (‘Dr Lai’), who has a Ph.D degree in Civil Engineering
(Geotechnical). However, Dr Lai testified that he did not see himself as an
expert, but rather he was “just a user” of Plaxis.
20. At that time, neither NLCJV nor LTA had personnel who were experienced and
well trained in the use of the said software. NLCJV only bought the Plaxis
program in early September 2001. It did not give enough consideration and
regard to the potential problems and pitfalls of not having a sufficient number of
its personnel adequately conversant with Plaxis.
Plaxis Program (‘Plaxis’)
21. Plaxis is a commercial finite element program which was first developed in 1987
at the Technical University of Delft. Since 1993, development and marketing of
the program has been carried out by a company named Plaxis BV. Updated
versions of Plaxis with enhanced features are released at intervals. C824 used
the Plaxis Version 7.
22. Plaxis is designed to perform numerical analyses of deformation and stability of

geotechnical problems. It contains a number of features to handle aspects of
geotechnical engineering that are often specific to this field of application. In
particular, the consideration of soil as a multi-phase material leads to the
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provision of special procedures for dealing with the modelling of in-situ stress
state, simulation of fill placement and excavation, and the generation and
modification of pore water pressures in the soil.
Drained versus Undrained Soil Behaviour
23. In geotechnical engineering, the response of a saturated soil to changes in

loading condition is divided broadly into undrained behaviour and drained
behaviour.
24. When a saturated soil of low permeability is loaded quickly such that water has
no time to escape from the pore spaces, the pressure in the pore fluid will
change. Since the amounts of solids and water do not change during the
loading process, the volume change in undrained loading is nearly zero. The
rate of loading for which the soil behaviour may be considered undrained is a
function of its permeability and drainage condition.
25. When a saturated soils has a high permeability or when it is loaded sufficiently
slowly, so that water can flow and escape from the voids such that no additional
pore pressures are generated, then the condition is considered drained. The
flow of water in and out of the pore spaces will induce volume change in the soil
mass.
Material Types In Plaxis
26. Plaxis used the terms Drained and Undrained to define the material type. The
drained and undrained material setting should be distinguished from the drained
and undrained condition described above. In particular, Plaxis allowed a
Drained material to be used to perform the analysis of an undrained condition.
This may cause confusion if the two different usages of the terms drained and
undrained are not clearly differentiated.
27. Apart from the drained and undrained material types, Plaxis also include a third
material type termed Non-porous.
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Drained material type
28. For Drained type, it is assumed that no excess pore water pressures are
generated in the soil during loading stages. A loading stage refers to any
change to the external conditions, for example placement of surcharge,
excavation, pre-loading of a prop or a change in the boundary conditions.
Undrained material type
29. For Undrained material type, the volumetric change is zero during any loading
stages. Plaxis simulates this by setting the Poisson’s ratio to be close to 0.5,
resulting in the soil having a very high bulk modulus thereby exhibiting very
small volumetric strain. Associated with this small change in volumetric strain,
the program calculates the change in the mean effective stress in the soil in
accordance with the stress strain relationships for the particular soil model. The
difference between the calculated change in mean total stress applied to the
ground and the change in the mean effective stress generated in the soil is
treated as a change in excess pore water pressure.
Non-porous Material Type
30. The Non-porous material type is considered impermeable and does not include
any assessment of pore water pressure. Inclusion of this material type in a
model results in a zone in the model through which water cannot flow. By
default the material is treated in terms of total stresses.
Material models in Plaxis
31. Plaxis provides several material models of varying complexities to model the
behaviour of soils. Each material model provides a mathematical representation
of the stress-strain and strength characteristics of the soil. The choice of soil
model controls the way in which pore water pressures are calculated during the
undrained loading stages.
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32. Maunsell adopted the Mohr-Coulomb model for all the soil strata and the JGP in
the C824 project. The Mohr-Coulomb model is probably the most widely used
soil model in engineering practice worldwide. Its popularity is in part due to its
simplicity and because it uses soil parameters that are routinely determined as
part of the soil investigation programme.
Mohr Coulomb Soil Model
33. The Mohr-Coulomb model assumes the material exhibits isotropic linear
elasticity until it reaches yield. Changes in the shear stresses applied to a Mohr-
Coulomb model generate shear strains but no volumetric strain. Changes in the
mean effective stress in a Mohr-Coulomb model generate volumetric strains but
no shear strain.
34. In the Mohr-Coulomb model, there will be no volumetric strain due to shear. As
a consequence, the soil must follow a constant p’ stress path in response to
undrained loading. Failure of the soil will occur at a point where the initial
effective mean stress p’ at the start of loading sequence meets the Mohr-
Coulomb failure line in the p-q space (see Figure 5.1).
35. Most real soils undergo some volumetric change as a result of shearing under
drained conditions. In particular, it is well established that soft, normally
consolidated or lightly over-consolidated clays tend to contract as a result of
drained shearing. In undrained loading in which the soil matrix is prevented from
contracting, this contractive tendency will be manifested as positive pore water
pressure within the soft clay. As a result, the soft clay follows an effective stress
path that curves back from the constant p’ line, thus reducing the mean effective
stress during the loading stage, as illustrated in the Figure 5.1.
36. As a result of the contractive nature of the soft clay, the undrained strength is
less than the drained strength. Since the Mohr-Coulomb model does not model
this contractive effect, it cannot model the stress path followed by the soft clay
as it is sheared. The Mohr-Coulomb model using effective stress strength
parameters will therefore over-estimates the strength of soft normally
consolidated clay in undrained condition.
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q
Mohr-coulomb
failure line
cu A A’
(Method A)
cu D B C
(Methods B,
C, D)
Ø’
Confining Stress p’, p
Source : E17.1 Pg 170
Mohr-coulomb failure model : undrained shear strengths derived from

Figure 5.1
Methods A, B, C and D used in the C824 project.
37. When conducting analyses in which the results are particularly sensitive to the
strength of the soft clay, it is possible to adopt the undrained strength directly
into the Mohr-Coulomb model. In this case, c′ is replaced by cu and φ′ is
assumed to be zero. Although this approach will give the correct undrained
strength, it cannot model correctly the stress path followed by soft clay. The use
of the undrained strength in a Mohr-Coulomb model is referred to as Method B
in this Inquiry. It can be regarded as a modelling method that prevents the
Mohr-Coulomb model from over-estimating the strength of soft clay in undrained
condition.
38. The pore water pressure generated by the Mohr-Coulomb model will not be
representative of those generated in-situ under an undrained loading condition.
This is true regardless of whether the effective stress parameters (Method A) or
the undrained parameters (Method B) are used.
Guidance in Plaxis Manual
39. The Plaxis user manual (version 7) includes the following comments relating to
the selection of the strength parameters for undrained conditions when using
the Mohr-Coulomb model.
“In Plaxis, it is possible to specify undrained behaviour in an effective

stress analysis using effective stress parameter.”
“This special option to model undrained material behaviour on the basis of

effective model parameters is available for all material models in Plaxis.
This enables undrained calculations to be executed with effective input
parameters, with explicit distinction between effective stresses and
(excess) pore pressures.”
“In general, an effective stress analysis using the Undrained option in

Plaxis to simulate undrained behaviour is preferable over a total stress
analysis.”
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40. The Plaxis manual thus appears to be recommending the use of effective stress
parameters to simulate undrained behaviour.
41. However, in the section of the Plaxis manual dealing with Material Model
Manual, it is stated that:
“The reduction of mean effective stress during undrained loading is a

known phenomenon in soil engineering. This phenomenon has a negative
influence on the strength and stability of the soil structure. When using
simple soil models, like the Mohr Coulomb model, this effect is not taken
into account and leads to an over-prediction of the stability when using the
effective stress strength properties. In such cases, it is better to use
undrained strength properties in the Mohr Coulomb Model (c=cu, φ’=0).”
Method A v. Method B.
42. Plaxis allows the user to select different material types (“Drained”, “Undrained”
and non-porous) and different material models (Mohr-Coulomb, Soft Soil etc.).
When using the Mohr-Coulomb model, it is possible to input either effective
stress parameters (c’ and φ′) or the undrained strength parameters (c’=cu, φ′=0)
into the Mohr-Coulomb model.
43. In the inquiry, the use of a Mohr Coulomb soil model with effective stress
strength parameters in combination with an Undrained material type has been
referred to as Method A. Method B refers to the use of Mohr Coulomb soil
model with undrained strength parameters in combination with Undrained
material type.
44. The parameters used for the various methods are tabulated in Table 5.1 below:
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Table 5.1 Definitions of Methods A, B, C and D
Undrained Behaviour
Plaxis Parameters
Material Computed
Method Material
Model Strength Stiffness stresses
setting
Mohr- c’, φ’ E’,ν’ Effective stress and
A Undrained
Coulomb (effective) (effective) pore pressure
Mohr- cu, φu E’, ν’ Effective stress and

B Undrained
Coulomb (total) (effective) pore pressure
cu, φu
Mohr- Eu, νu=0.495
C Non-porous (total) Total stress
Coulomb (total)
D As in Method A, for other soil models
45. The definition of Methods A, B, C and D were first coined by Dr. Andrew Pickles
in his technical presentation in respect of another LTA tunnelling contract, C825.
It does not correspond to the terminology used in the Plaxis Manual.
Calculation types in Plaxis
46. There are two calculation types available in Plaxis, referred to as Plastic and
Consolidation analyses (a third type referred to as Phi(φ)-c reduction is not
considered in this report).
47. The Plastic calculation type is the non-linear computation carried out for loading
stage such as surcharge placement or excavation for which the applied loads
are changing. Plastic calculation does not consider time dependent
phenomenon such as consolidation or pore pressure dissipation.
48. The consolidation calculation type refers to a stage involving consolidation or

seepage in which excess pore water pressure will change with time. For the
consolidation type of calculation, the Plaxis program calculates the groundwater
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flow and the volumetric consolidation or swelling of the ground caused by

changes in the mean effective stress.
49. The Plaxis analyses for the various wall types in C824 did not make use of the
seepage and consolidation capabilities in Plaxis. Only Plastic analysis were
used in modelling all the construction stages, with no seepage or consolidation.
The seepage analyses for various wall sections were carried out separately
using the program Seep/W. An assessment of the likely consolidation
settlement of the marine clay outside the excavation arising from changes in
ground water had also been done.
Pore Water Pressure Distribution
50. Instead of determining the groundwater pressure distribution by seepage and

consolidation analyses, it is possible to input the groundwater pressure profile
directly into Plaxis. An approximate and simple method is to assume that the
groundwater is hydrostatic below a pre-defined water table. This is the method
adopted by Maunsell when preparing the initial Plaxis input files. Maunsell
assumed that the groundwater table outside the excavation was at the ground
surface. Inside the excavation, the groundwater table was assumed to coincide
with the base of the excavation and is changed in tandem with the excavation
stages.
51. Specifying the water profile in this manner is a major simplification of the real
groundwater pressure regime resulting from the excavation. It has the following
shortcomings.
(1) At and directly below the toe of the diaphragm wall there is a step
change in the water pressure profile. On the excavation side, the water
pressure is hydrostatic from the excavation surface whilst on the
retained side of the wall, the water pressure is hydrostatic from the
original ground water table. This step change in pressure can never
occur in the real situation.
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(2) The method cannot be used to study the effect of an increasing pore
pressure beneath of the excavation as a result of seepage and
consolidation process.
Material settings used in Plaxis for C824
52. Maunsell recommended Method A to NLCJV. For the strata that were
considered to behave as undrained, Method A was adopted for the Estuarine
clay, Marine (upper and lower) clays and Fluvial clays; and Method B was used
for the clayey Old Alluvium.
53. Maunsell justified the choice of Method A for the marine clay in the report
entitled: “C824 – Effective shear strength parameters of marine clay” as follows:
“The application of undrained analysis with effective parameters is the

recommended approach to simulate the undrained behaviour of clay in
Plaxis (see Section 2.3 and 2.4 – Material Model Manual)”
54. The design of the walls and strutting system for each wall type was based on
the computed forces obtained from a finite element analysis of each wall type.
The initial Plaxis analyses were prepared and carried out by Maunsell on behalf
of NLCJV based on a plan of the wall, strutting and JGP slab layout provided by
NLCJV.
55. In the meeting of 12 December 2001 between NLCJV and LTA to resolve
outstanding design issues, the use of Method A appeared to have been
concluded. Among the critical design issues recorded in the Minutes of Meeting
as agreed between LTA and NLCJV was the following:
“Item 7.1 - only effective stress parameters and c’ and phi’ should be
used in Plaxis for both drained and undrained analysis.”
56. On the basis of this agreement, NLCJV proceeded to analyse all diaphragm wall
sections using Method A. The concern over the use of Method A was not raised
again until the Launch Shaft 2 incident in August 2003.
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Implication of the use of Method A v. Method B on diaphragm wall design
57. The implication of using Method A instead of Method B at wall Type M3 became
a focus of investigation by various parties involved in the Inquiry. Several
parties, including the experts for NLCJV, LTA, Aviva, Maunsell and State, had
carried out a baseline comparative study for the M3 wall section using both
Method A and Method B. More specifically, Method A used the effective
parameters (c’, φ’) for the Marine clays, Estuarine and Fluvial Clays), and
Method B used undrained parameters (cu) for the same soil strata. All other
parameters were kept constant.
58. The maximum predicted strut load at each level during the excavation sequence
using Method B is given in Table 5.2 and is compared to the unfactored design
strut load. NLCJV adopted the maximum strut load during the entire excavation
process as the design strut load. For the majority of the struts (Levels 1 to 8),
the predicted load during backfilling is greater than that during the excavation
stage.
59. Table 5.2 shows that the strut loads predicted by Method B and the design
(unfactored) strut loads using Method A fall within a range of 60% to 110% of
the original design value. For level 9, Method A has resulted in the strut design
being under-estimated by about 10% in comparison to Method B.
Table 5.2 Comparative study of Method A and Method B for Strut Loads at Type M3
Predicted Strut Load Design Strut Load

Ratio Method B to
Strut Row Using Method B (unfactored)
Design Strut Load
(kN/m) Using Method A (kN/m)
1 379 568 67%
2 991 1018 97%
3 1615 1816 89%
4 1606 1635 98%
5 1446 1458 99%
6 1418 1322 107%
7 1581 2130 74%
8 1578 2632 60%
9 2383 2173 110%
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60. Figure 5.2 presents a comparison of the predicted wall displacements for wall
Type M3. The predicted displacements using Method B are more than 100%
greater than the Method A prediction.
61. Figure 5.3 shows a comparison of the predicted wall bending moment profiles
for wall Type M3. The figure also includes the as-built moment capacity. The
unfactored bending moments predicted using Method B exceeded the as-built
moment capacity of the wall by more than 100% at several locations.
62. It is clear from the results that Method A under-predicted both bending moments
and displacements of the diaphragm wall. The retaining wall system designed
on the basis of the results of a Method A analysis was therefore severely under-
designed.
63. The experts have given their views on the implication of the use of Method A as
opposed to Method B in the 2JSE. The COI accepts these views. The most
salient portion is reproduced below:
“Although it may not be the intention of the author of the Plaxis manual
to recommend the use of Method A for undrained analysis, a user
without an in-depth knowledge of soil behaviour could be misled by the
Plaxis manual into using Method A for undrained analysis of soft clays.
In C824, the Builder had adopted Method A in the Plaxis analysis for the
design. The use of Method A, without checking the undrained shear
strength it implied, was not appropriate. When Mohr Coulumb was
chosen as the soil model, it would have been more appropriate to use
Method B in the analysis.
For C824, the use of Method A, instead of Method B, would result in an

underestimation of the predicted bending moments and deflections by
about 50%, or a factor of 2 for the original design in M3.
When the Type M3 design wall section was analysed by adopting

Method B for the lower soft clay layers and without making any changes
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Source : NLC ER Figure 3.2.13(a) & 3.2.13(b)
M3 – predicted wall displacement profiles using Method A and

Figure 5.2
Method B.
Source : NLC ER Figure 3.2.12(a) & 3.2.12(b)
M3 – predicted bending moment distribution profiles using Method A

Figure 5.3
and Method B.
to other parameters, the calculated strut load at level 9 were no more

than 10% greater than that computed using Method A.”
Use of Method A led to incorrect predictions as to the lower JGP layer.
64. In NLCJV’s design calculations using Method A, the lower JGP design load
capacity was not to be fully mobilized until excavation to the 10th level struts.
Using Method B, the design capacity of the lower JGP layer was fully mobilized
at a much earlier stage, possibly upon excavation to the 7th level struts as
illustrated in Figure 5.4.
Development of a Plastic Hinge in the Diaphragm Wall prior to collapse
65. The under-design of the diaphragm led to the exceedance of the wall moment
capacity and the formation of plastic hinges as the excavation reached deeper
levels. All the experts, except for the experts for NLCJV, agreed the diaphragm
wall’s elastic limit of 2500 kNm/m at M3 had been exceeded by 17 April 2004.
The deflection profile of the inclinometer I-104 (Figure 5.5) indicated that a
plastic hinge could have been formed in the South diaphragm wall by 17 April
2004.
Deficiencies in Toe-In level / Penetration of the Diaphragm Wall in Old Alluvium at M3
66. The use of Method B would result in diaphragm wall design with thicker wall
section and deeper penetration into the competent Old Alluvium. The toe-in
criteria based on Method A was inadequate. Moreover, several diaphragm wall
panels in the M3 area as constructed did not meet this less than adequate toe-
in requirement designed on the basis of Method A analysis. The experts had
agreed on the details of the penetration achieved for M3 wall panels compared
to various requirements agreed upon by NLCJV in C824. Table 5.3 shows that
all wall panels between M301 to M310 failed to fulfil at least one, and in several
instance both, of the requirements.
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Source : LTA EP Slide 53
Figure 5.4 Mobilization of JGP predicted using Method A and Method B.

Source : L&M Presentation Slide 24
Figure 5.5 Inclinometers I-104 & I-65 profiles on 17 April 2004.

Table 5.3 Comparison of the as-built Toe-levels of diaphragm wall panels at M3 against
design requirements.
As Penetration
Top of Estimated Estimated
built Top of Estimated Top of into OA
Panel OA Penetration Penetration
Toe OA Penetration OA N>60 based on
No. N>30 into OA into OA
Level (mRL) into OA (m) (mRL) construction
(mRL) N>30 (m) N>60 (m)
(mRL) drawing
M301 63.9 68.5 4.6 66.8 2.9 65.0 1.1 4.4

M302 63.8 67.0 3.2 66.4 2.6 63.5 -0.3 3.2
M303 62.6 65.4 2.8 65.0 2.4 61.7 -0.9 3.2
M304 60.8 62.6 1.8 61.7 0.9 59.0 -1.8 3.2
M305 59.1 61.5 2.4 60.5 1.4 57.9 -1.2 3.0
M306 61.9 66.9 5.0 64.2 2.3 63.4 1.5 4.4
M307 61.1 65.8 4.7 63.5 2.4 62.8 1.7 4.4
M308 60.5 64.6 4.1 62.8 2.3 62.3 1.8 4.6
M309 60.3 63.6 3.3 62.1 1.8 60.6 0.3 4.1
M310 60.8 62.8 2.0 61.9 1.1 59.9 -0.9 3.3
67. We therefore conclude that:
The use of Method A in the C824 project to model the undrained behaviour of
soft marine clays was wrong. The method over-predicted the undrained shear
strength; underestimated the wall bending moment and deflection, and resulted
in the under-design of the diaphragm wall.
It would have been more appropriate to use Method B. The use of Method A
instead of Method B resulted in an underestimation of the predicted bending
moments and deflections by about 50% or a factor of 2 for the original design in
M3.
68. Only the experts for NLCJV disagreed with this. We will be dealing with this in a
subsequent section of this chapter.
5.2 UNDER DESIGN OF STRUT-WALER CONNECTION
69. In the original design for the strutting works, NLCJV used a spreadsheet
developed by DP Mundo based on the requirement of BS5950. In checking the
buckling load of the waler web, NLCJV used a wrong value of 400 mm for the
Page 105
stiff bearing length (Figure 5.6). The correct value in a strict interpretation of
BS5950 would be 65 mm.
70. Stiff bearing length has a direct correlation with the capacity of the waler
system. The longer the stiff bearing length, the higher would be the calculated
buckling resistance of the waler web. In spite of the error, it was found that the
buckling resistance Pw was still less than the strut load bearing on the waler
(Pbr). For H-400, which was used at the 9th level strutting system at the M3
area, Pbr (Figure 5.7) was 3543 kN while Pw was 2218 kN. This meant that the
web could not, on its own, be able to withstand the forces acting on it and
therefore, stiffeners were required. Stiffeners were designed to increase the
capacity of the connection against buckling.
71. The design error in the stiff bearing length, although not in accordance with
BS5950, did not contribute materially to the capacity of the original stiffener
design using plates because the wrong waler web buckling capacity Pw was not
used in the calculation. The capacity of the H-400 waler section stiffened with a
plate on each side of the web was calculated correctly as 2424 kN in
accordance with BS5950.
72. The stiffener plates were crucial components of the strut-waler connection. As
was admitted by NLCJV, the strut and waler/web connection could only be as
strong as its weakest link. The ability of the entire strut/waler connection to bear
the forces acting upon it was dependent on the strength of the stiffened section.
The integrity of the entire strutting system could be affected by the lack of
adequate capacity in the strut-waler connection to withstand the load. It was
therefore critical that the design and any design changes of the stiffeners would
have to be carefully reviewed to ensure its adequacy and robustness.
Design calculation for waler connection with C-channel inherited the error in stiff
bearing length
73. Around February 2004, several instances of stiffener plate buckling as well as
the buckling of a waler were reported at the Nicoll Highway Station (Figure 5.8).
Shimizu said in evidence that he thought the stiffener plates buckled because
more strut load was being transferred to the waler through the flanges of the
Page 106
Source : E72 Pg 74-10
Design calculations for waler connection showing the error in stiff

Figure 5.6
bearing length (extract from E72).
Source : E72 Pg 74-1
Figure 5.7 Design calculation for waler connections (extract from E72).
Figure 5.8(a) Photographs showing waler buckling.
Figure 5.8(b) Photographs showing waler and stiffener buckling.
strut. Shimizu therefore proposed replacing the stiffener plates by C-channel in

an attempt to improve the performance of the connection. The C-channel was
installed with its web aligned with the edges of the waler as shown in Figure 5.9
74. The Design Change Notification (“DCN”) dated 18 February 2004 in respect of
this change was prepared by Shimizu (Figure 5.10). Ishibashi did the design
calculation in support of the change from stiffener plate to C-Channels. Ishibashi
had no prior experience in the design of connection using C-Channels.
75. In fact, no one in the construction and design teams of NLCJV had any direct
experience with the use of the C-channels as stiffeners. Furthermore, BS5950
did not directly consider members stiffened with C-channels. The design
calculation by Ishibashi assumed a simple distribution of the strut load to the
web and C-channels (Figure 5.11). The load transmitted to the waler web was
checked against the waler web buckling resistance, Pw, which had been
wrongly calculated in the original design. If the correct stiff bearing length had
been used in the calculations, it would have revealed that the load required to
be borne by the C-channel stiffener would be higher and would have exceeded
its design load bearing capacity calculated under BS5950.
76. Neither Shimada, the design manager, nor Broome, the temporary work PE
carried out any design check. Nonetheless, they both endorsed the DCN.
77. The experts found, and we agree, that the correct design code capacity of the
9th level strut-waler connection should be 2551 kN (compared to code capacity
of 2424 kN for the plate stiffener connection).
78. The replacement of double stiffener plates with C-channels provided only minor
improvement to the design in terms of axial load bearing capacity for the waler
connections, but this came at the expense of ductility. The change worsened
the design and rendered it more susceptible to the brittle “sway” failure mode.
This is clearly seen in results of the post collapse finite element analyses and
physical tests which will be dealt with in a later section of this chapter.
Page 107
Source : Aviva ER Fig 19
Figure 5.9 The arrangement of strutting system at S3359 including the arrangement of the C-channel in the waler.
Source : Maunsell ER Pg 82
Temporary Works – Drawing Change Notification for change from

Figure 5.10
stiffener plates to C-channel.
Design calculations for C-channel connection in Drawing Change

Figure 5.11(a)
Notification.
Design calculations for C-channel connection in Drawing Change

Figure 5.11(b)
Notification.
The under-capacity of the waler connection due to omission of splays
79. The strut to waler connection detail adopted one of three possible arrangements
depending on whether it was a single or double strut and whether splays would
be used. NLCJV’s estimation of load on the waler connection for double struts
assumed that the splays would absorb one third of the load in the struts (see
Figure 5.7)
80. In respect of double struts at the 9th level at the M3 area, NLCJV had calculated
a maximum strut force of 5314 kN per H-section. On the assumption that splays
would be included, the design load at the strut-waler connection was 3543 kN.
All the strut-waler connections on the 9th level of Type M3 were therefore
designed to withstand a load of 3543 kN .
81. In the M3 area, a number of struts on the 9th level were not provided with
splays. The strut waler connection would have to sustain the entire strut load of
5314 kN; far in excess of the 3543 kN they had been designed for. Therefore,
the connection as designed did not have the capacity to cope with the
anticipated load.
82. It was mentioned earlier that the 9th level C-channel strut-waler connection was
structurally inadequate because it was under-designed. This was the direct
result of errors in respect of the stiff bearing length and the effective length of
the waler web. The absence of splays in the strut to waler connection
compounded the under-capacity. This has major ramifications. For the walers
connection without splays, the combined effects of the design errors and the
omission of splays will result in the design capacity of the connections being
only one-half of the required design strength.
83. The gross under-design of the temporary works, particularly in respect of the
strut-waler connection, rendered the temporary works in Type M3, as a whole,
unsafe.
84. Although NLCJV’s temporary works design had included a consideration of

factors of safety, this would not be enough to compensate for the severe under-
design of the system. The redundancy in a system is a fundamental tenet of
Page 108
safe design, and is not meant as an insurance against design errors. It is

appropriate to note here the comments made by the experts for NLCJV on
design code calculations for capacity of the connections:
“Design code calculations are necessarily conservative and are usually

formulated in such a manner as to ensure that the overall behaviour
remains essentially elastic. It is extremely likely that calculations of the
capacity of a structural connection carried out using design codes will
under-predict the actual strength of a connection as a failure to do so
would lead to an unsafe design.”
85. This statement means that structural components designed based on code
calculations would have inherent redundancies built into them. This redundancy
in terms of their load bearing capacity is over and above the various factors of
safety applied in calculations of the capacity by the designer. This robustness is
a necessary and essential element of safety and stability in any proper design.
C-channel Connection is susceptible to Sway Failure Mode
86. In the course of the inquiry, NLCJV’S experts had commissioned ARUP to
model the 9th level strut waler connection with C-channel stiffeners using
OASYS. Figure 5.12 shows the Base Case finite element model of the structural
elements at the 9th connection and half the length of the actual strut. The model
consists of:
(a) A 9 m long Grade 50, 400x400x13x21 strut;
(b) A 20 mm thick, Grade 43 strut end plate;
(c) A 1 m long, Grade 50, 400x400x13x21 waler beam;
(d) 2 Nos 200x80x7.5x11, Grade 43 channel stiffeners;
(e) A Grade 43, 65x65x6 angle bracket, which extends 450 mm down
the retaining wall and 650 under the connection; and
(f) A 200 mm layer of concrete fills the gap between the waler beam
and the retaining wall.
Page 109
Source : NLC SR Fig 8.1.1
Finite element model of a C-channel connection using OASYS (Base

Figure 5.12
Case Model).
Source : NLC SR
Figure 5.13 Load - displacement curve of the C-channel connection (CHAN01-2-7).

87. The Base Case model was used in a series of finite element calculations in
which the loading conditions and material properties were changed. The
analysis labelled CHAN01-2-7 modelled the direct compression of the waler
connection that also took into gravity effect. A failure stress of 470 N/mm2 and
550 N/mm2 was assumed for the Grade 43 and Grade 50 steel, respectively.
The computed load-displacement curve of the connection is shown in Figure
5.13. The computed connection capacity was about 3630 kN. The load-
displacement curve showed significant and abrupt strain softening when the
strut-mid-point had been displaced by about 24 mm. At failure, the waler flange
was displaced downward, despite the presence of the support bracket under the
waler. The commentary accompanying the numerical simulation contains the
following extract:
“The axial loads in the top and bottom channels peak at a strut load of
about 3.58 MN and strut–mid-point axial displacement of 10.3 mm. At
this point the channels are almost fully plastic.”
“The peak strut load of 3.63 MN occurs at a strut-mid-point of about

11.0 mm. At this point the strut-end-plate has displaced about 1.0 mm
downwards. As the strut-mid-point axial displacement is increased, the
channel axial loads reduce, while the waler-web axial load continues to
increase, resulting in the strut load remaining relatively constant.”
”At a strut-mid-point displacement of about 19.6 mm the top bracket bolt

fails and the connection begins to collapse downwards.”
88. Similar downward movement of waler flange at failure was observed in all the
finite element simulations conducted by ARUP on behalf of NLCJV’S experts
when gravity effect was included. The buckling of the waler connections at the
9th level strutting system in the M3 area on 20 April 2004 also involved the
downward displacement of waler flanges.
Page 110
C-channel connection is more brittle than plate stiffener connection
89. Experts for LTA, NLCJV and Aviva had also carried out comparative studies on
the behaviours of C-channel connection and plate stiffener connection under
direct axial compression. Figure 5.14 shows two typical finite element models.
90. The load displacement curves obtained from the finite element analyses are
shown in Figure 5.15. The initial load compression for both connections was
linear and elastic until the onset of yielding at the channels and the waler web.
The extent of the yielded zones increased as the load was increased, leading to
a progressive reduction in stiffness until the maximum load capacity was
reached. After reaching the maximum load capacity, the connection continued
to deform at a relatively constant load (referred to as "the plateau" in this
Report). The load then reduced rapidly as the channels buckled.
91. The finite element calculations showed that in the elastic range, the C-channels
attracted about 70% of the axial strut load. This caused the yielding of the C-
channels before the web reached its full capacity. Once the C-channel had
yielded completely, a fundamental change in the behaviour of the connection
occurred. The resistance of the waler flanges to relative displacement (i.e.
lateral sway) was reduced. As the axial compression continued, local crushing
of the web occurred. At that point, there was little resistance to rotation and
lateral displacement on the outer (towards the excavation, away from the wall)
waler flange. The results demonstrated clearly that the connection was
susceptible to sway failure under direct compression.
92. Post peak, the C-channel connection displayed a very brittle response, resulting
in rapid loss in capacity on continued compression. The plate stiffeners
connection, in contrast, was significantly more ductile.
93. The experts agreed that under direct compression force:-
(a) the failure load / peak capacity of waler with C-channel stiffeners is about
equal to that with double plate stiffeners; and that
Page 111
(a)
Slide 28
(b)
Slide 29
Source : Aviva EP Slide 28 & 29
Figure 5.14 Finite element model for (a) double plate stiffeners (b) C-channels.
Source : Aviva EP Slide 27
Figure 5.15 Load displacement curves for waler connections fitted with double plate stiffeners and C-channels.
(b) the post-peak unrestrained ductility of waler with C-channel stiffeners is

significantly lower than that with double plate stiffeners. The mode of failure
was sway accompanied by a reduction in capacity on further compression
beyond the peak capacity. The experts agreed to use the term “brittle” to
describe this reduction in capacity.
Capacity of connections from laboratory tests
94. In addition to numerical simulations, NLCJV, LTA and MOM had also carried out
an extensive series of laboratory tests on the two types of connections. The
results of the tests done by MOM on plate and C-channel connections are
summarized in Table 5.4. These results are quite representative of the tests
conducted by other parties.
95. Figure 5.16 showed the typical load-displacement curves of the C-channel
connection and the plate stiffener connection obtained in the laboratory tests.
The two connections exhibited similar pre-peak behaviour with the C-channel
giving a slightly higher peak load. The tests yielded a maximum capacity of
4260 kN for the C-channel connection, and a capacity of 4131 kN for the
connection with double plate stiffeners.
96. Post peak, the C-channel connection shows a rapid reduction in load carrying
capacity. The plate stiffener connection, in contrast, shows only minor decrease
in capacity on continued straining. These laboratory tests confirmed the
brittleness of the C-channel connections.
Table 5.4 Laboratory test results on waler connection conducted for MOM
Load Test B
Load Test A
Strut force (kN) at
Specimen type (Maximum Load, kN)
base plate rotation of
with
Base plate Tilt Base plate Tilt
1° 2° 3°
Angle = 0° Angle = 2°
No stiffener N1 = 2471 -- -- -- --
Single plate stiffeners P1 = 3417 P2 = 3277 1733 1619 1450
Channel stiffeners C1 = 4260 C2 =3469 1848 1780 1696

Double plate
D1 = 4131 -- 1744 1767 1739
stiffeners
Page 112
5000
4500 D1- Waler with double

plate stiffeners
4000 D1, Stroke
3500
Axial Load (kN)
3000 12mm
Waler Channel
Stiffener
2500
2000
C1, Stroke
1500
C1, Stroke
1000 D1, Stroke
C1 – Waler with
channel stiffeners
500
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Axial Displacement (mm)
Source : MOM EP Slide 65
Typical load-displacement curves of the C-channel connection and

Figure 5.16 the double plate stiffener connection from laboratory tests conducted
for MOM.
97. The experts had reviewed the laboratory tests and finite element analyses. We
accept the findings of the experts:
(a) “The axial failure load of the connection from the post-collapse
laboratory test data ranged from 4030 to 4260 kN per beam (for G50
walers). The materials used in these tests were between 15 and 30%
stronger than the minimum yield strength required by the standard. Mill
tests of the materials supplied to site showed material strength between
4 and 30% higher than the minimum required by the standard. The test
capacities of these connections with C-channels are greater than the
2551 kN determined on the basis of the design code.
(b) The axial failure loads derived by finite element analysis (FEA) tabled at
the experts’ meeting are presented below (Table 5.5) as functions of the
yield stress taken: the minimum for the relevant grades of steel, the
minimum plus 15%, or the yield stress derived from test coupons. LTA’s
calibration test results are also presented.”
98. The experts also agreed, and we accept, that under direct compression force:
“(a) The failure load/peak capacity of waler with C-channel stiffeners is

about equal to that with double plate stiffeners.
(b) The post-peak unrestrained ductility of waler with C-channel stiffeners is

significantly lower than that with double plate stiffeners. The mode of
failure was sway accompanied by a reduction in capacity on further
compression beyond the peak capacity.”
99. The C-channel change was erroneous and fundamentally flawed. It weakened
the strutting system. The change to C-channels accentuated the problem
associated with the under-design of the waler connections because it introduced
the sway mode of failure into the strutting system. This means that when the C-
channel was compressed beyond the peak capacity, there was a rapid and
sudden release of load, resulting in a large reduction of the capacity of the C-
channel beyond yield.
Page 113
Table 5.5 Finite Element Analyses and Calibration Tests for Strut-Waler Connection
(with C- channel stiffeners)
Waler Channels Axial Test

Level 9 failure
Grade 50 Grade 43 results
H400 waler load
Grade 50 waler Yield stress Yield stress by FEA
MPa MPa kN kN
LTA minimum 355 275 3210
test
LTA 399 339 3650 4030
coupons
Aviva minimum 355 275 3170
Aviva min. + 15% 408 316 3560
NLCJV minimum 345 265 ~3100
test
NLCJV 415 328 3640
coupons
Axial
Level 9
Waler Channels failure Test
H400 waler
Grade 43 Grade 43 load results
Grade 43 waler
by FEA
test
LTA 321 329 ~3400 3522
coupons
100. The change from plate stiffeners to C-channels from 7th level downwards was a
major contributing factor to the failure of the temporary retaining wall system on
20 April 2004. If only the plate stiffeners have been used throughout, the failure
would probably have been localised and slower.
The connection failed because the load in the strut exceeded the connection
capacity
101. NLCJV original design calculation based on Method A showed that the Level 9
strut would be subjected to a load of 4275 kN per H-section. Numerical
analyses carried out by experts from the various parties have shown that the
loads in the 9th level strut rose to about 4000 kN on average (according to
NLCJV’s experts (JSE2, para 9.3.9 (c)).
Page 114
102. Both NLCJV’s design calculation and the post collapse investigation showed
that the expected loads were considerably higher than the code capacity, and
most probably higher than the actual capacity of the connections on site.
103. The experts views on the state of the walers at S335 prior to collapse are
summarised in Table 5.6.
104. With respect to the walers on the Level 9 strut, all experts agreed that the
walers may have yielded during preloading. Thereafter, it would behave
elastically until it yielded on the night of 17 April 2004.
Table 5.6 View of Experts on the State of Walers at S335 prior to the collapse
7th Level 8th Level 9th Level
MOM Possible yielding during Yielded during preload Yielded during preload
preload on 5 March 04 and yielded after 17 April
04
LTA Possible yielding during Elastic till time of collapse Yielded after the night of
preload on 5 March 04 on 20 April 04 17 April 4
NLC Minor yielding during Elastic till time of collapse Minor yielding during
preload on 5 March 04. on 20 April 04 preloading. Elastic
Then elastic after thereafter until yielding on
preloading of strut 8 the night of 17 April 04
MCS Yielding during preload Yielded during preload. Yielded during preload
then elastic, but could After preload elastic till and yielded after 17 April
be yielding afterwards time of collapse on 20 04
because of convergence April 04
of the walls.
L&M No comments
AVIVA Possible yielding during After preload elastic till Yielded after 17 April 04,
preload on 5 March 04 time of collapse on 20 though there may have
April 04 been yielding during
preloading
105. Excavation and other construction activities were in progress in and around the
M3 area right up to the day of collapse on 20 April 2004. The 9th level waler,
having yielded on the night of 17 April 2004, would continue to come under
increased compression in response to the inward movement of the diaphragm
wall. As both the laboratory tests and numerical modelling had clearly shown,
Page 115
the continued compression of a yielded waler would ultimately lead to its failure
in a brittle sway failure mode.
106. The connection failed because it did not have the required capacity to withstand
the load imposed on it by the strut.
107. We therefore find that the waler connection was under-designed in two ways:
(a) NLCJV’s estimation of load on the waler connection for double struts
assumed that the splays would absorb one third of the load in the struts:
in the event where splays were omitted, this resulted in a design load on
the waler connection which is only about 70% of the load in the strut,
when the full 100% should have been used.
(b) NLCJV’s design of the waler connection with C-channels relied on a stiff
bearing length (b1) of 400 mm instead of approximately 65 mm in
accordance with BS5950, and on an effective length of 0.7 of the net
web depth, where a figure close to 1.2 for unrestrained conditions would
have been more appropriate; as a result, the axial design capacity was
about 70% of the assumed design load for the connection.
108. Where splays were not used, these 2 factors were compounded, so that the
design capacity of the connections was one-half the required design strength.
NLCJV’S contention that “The design errors did not cause the collapse”
109. All the experts, save for NLCJV, agree, and we have found, that the diaphragm
wall was under-designed using Method A. NLCJV alone takes a different view
which says “the design error did not cause the collapse as it turned out the
actual capacity of the connection (from the physical tests) was close to the
design intention and the collapse occurred because of relative vertical
displacement.”
110. In this part, we set out our view why the NLCJV’s hypothesis is unlikely as there
is no evidence to support it.
Page 116
NLCJV’S Hypothesis that a Trigger was necessary for the Collapse
111. NLCJV’s experts argued that a trigger for the collapse was necessary. This was
on two bases: (a) the monitoring strain gauge data which showed no significant
change in the loads in struts S335-8 and S335-9 in the two days prior to the
collapse; and (b) the absence of construction activities directly beneath strut
S335-9.
112. NLCJV’s experts’ trigger for the collapse is “the upward movement of the centre
of the struts relative to their ends (as a result of the upward movement of the
kingpost supporting the mid-point of the struts and the downward movement of
the diaphragm walls against which the ends of the struts were bearing through
the walers). This relative vertical displacement produced a forced sway failure
mechanism of the connection, increasing its brittleness and reducing its
capacity below that for direct axial loading.”
113. The evidence relied on by the NLCJV’s experts in support for the forced sway
failure mechanism (“FSFM”) is as follows:
(1) The near concurrent failure of S335-9(S) and S338-9(N);
(2) That failure occurred even though there was no measured build-up or
increase in loads over the preceding two days;
(3) That all the connections were observed to have failed in a downward
direction; and
(4) That the walers at both ends of Strut 335-9 failed in a downward direction.
114. NLCJV’s experts offered an additional reason for their forced sway failure
mechanism. They carried out a series of coupled consolidation analyses to
study the variation of the behaviour of the temporary retaining wall system over
a time period commencing from 9.30 am on 20 April 2004. One of these
analyses matched the 6 to 6.5 hours time taken for the collapse on 20 April
2004. A particular feature of the mechanism is “that the extreme brittleness
associated with the forced sway failure caused the failure to develop in a very
Page 117
short time”. This particular analysis, they say, gives support to the forced sway
failure mechanism.
115. Based on this analysis, they deduced that the speed at which the collapse
occurred supported the significance of the FSFM. In its absence, the collapse
would not have occurred within a period of the order of 6 hours, but would have
taken a number of days or possibly a few weeks (depending on the reduction in
brittleness). This longer time is crucial as it would have enabled the stabilising
measures being put in place by NLCJV to complete and avert the collapse.
Inability of the system to redistribute loads
116. NLCJV’s experts in further support of their hypothesis contend that a braced
excavation is not ordinarily designed to survive the loss of a row of struts.
117. NLCJV accepted that if the design had adopted Method B prior to construction,
it is reasonably possible that a thicker wall would have been the result. This
would have increased the capacity of the wall to carry bending moments and
redistribute loads.
118. NLCJV’s experts claimed that they have demonstrated, by rigorous analysis, a
plausible mechanism that fits the four principal observed features of the
collapse. They said that no other parties had put forward alternative that could
explain the absence of measured load build-up, the concurrency of failure of
structurally unconnected struts, the downward direction of failure, the uniform
downward failure at both ends of the same strut and the time within which the
collapse developed.
Page 118
Our views on NLCJV’S Hypothesis
The forced sway failure mechanism (“FSFM”) requires yielded connections as a

precondition
119. The forced sway failure mechanism is an innovative hypothesis. Several experts
had openly and generously acknowledged the technical ingenuity of this
mechanism but disagreed that it was a necessary trigger for the collapse.
120. NLCJV put forward the FSFM to explain the significant observations on site
preceding the total collapse at 3:30 pm on 20 April 2004. FSFM required the
strut to be at or on the verge of buckling as a precondition. If the ends of the 18
m strut at the 9th level were fixed, the theoretical buckling load would be in the
order of 14000 kN; far greater than any strut loads measured on site. If the strut
was pin-ended, the buckling load would be around 4000 kN, which would bring
it to within the predicted range of strut loads for Level 9; and also within the
maximum capacity of 4260 kN obtained in MOM’s post-collapse laboratory test.
121. NLCJV’s experts claimed that the actual buckling load for the strut on site would
be even smaller if plastic hinges, locked-in stresses and out of straightness of
the strut were considered. Since strut buckling is a cornerstone of the FSFM,
the experts for NLCJV accepted that the load in the strut was close to the 4000
kN as is evident from the following exchange:
Q: For the forced sway failure mechanism, the fact that the strut is
loaded to close to its capacity is an important factor; am I correct?
Mr Marchand: The strut is not loaded to its peak capacity. It is the joint.
The strut has to be loaded to close to its theoretical – no it’s buckling
capacities over the 18 metre span.
122. For the strut to buckle at a load close to 4000 kN, the connection at the two
ends of the strut must be at or close to yield, as admitted by NLCJV’s experts:
Q: Just to understand the theory. Since it is a combination of – you said

the axial load and the buckling capacity of the strut. Do I understand
Page 119
that if you have a waler connection capacity that is greater than, say
4,200, this thing would not have collapsed?
Dr Pickles: I do not think we can answer that question fully, because we

have not completed our studies yet. We know that preconditions for
causing the forced sway failure, that the channel sections must be
at or close to yield, and that we must have downward shear on the
connection. We do not yet know what the minimum force that we can –
in the strut, what minimum force we can actually cause the connection
to fail. [emphasis added]
123. Theoretically, in order for the connection to be considered a pin-end, it must

have zero rotational fixity. A connection which had developed only minor
yielding did not satisfy the condition of a pin-end as it would still possess a finite
capacity to resist moment. Finite rotational restraint in the connection would
increase the buckling load beyond the theoretical value of 4180 kN for an 18 m
long pin-ended strut.
124. It is clear that for FSFM to be operative, the connection at both ends of the strut
must have yielded completely. Such connections would have no capacity to
resist additional compression, shear and bending moment. In the context of the
present investigation, we find the distinction between a failed connection and
one that has completely yielded contrived.
Does NLCJV’S hypothesis explain the rapid collapse in 6 hours?
125. NLCJV’s experts had not carried out any analysis to demonstrate the relative
vertical movements between kingpost and diaphragm wall had triggered the
collapse. Instead, the purported forcing action of a buckling strut proposed in
the FSFM was deduced from their finite element calculations in which the
phenomenon of the rapid strain softening of the connection was prescribed as
input. These analyses did not model the structural elements that made up the
strut and waler connection. The softening of the 9th level waler connection was
introduced at 9am on 20 April 2004 in the finite element modelling. The
predicted 6 to 6.5 hours period of the collapse was obtained in an analysis that
assumed very rapid strain softening at the strut ends.
Page 120
126. Further, NLCJV’s experts’ finite element analyses included the modelling of the
consolidation process. Such analyses depended critically on the permeability
and hydraulic connectivity of the Old Alluvium. There were major uncertainties
in these parameters and despite meeting over two expert conferences, the
experts could not agree on the hydraulic connectivity in the Old Alluvium and
the appropriate permeability values. NLCJV’s experts had offered no convincing
evidence to substantiate the choice of their input parameters.
Is NLCJV’s hypothesis the only explanation of the 4 principal observed features?
S335-9(N) and S338-9(S) failed at the same time
127. The first feature raised by NLCJV’s experts was that the connections at S335-
9(S) and S338-9(N) failed concurrently (at about 9 to 9:30 am). They postulated
that as these two connections shared the same king post KP128, the relative
movement between the king post and the diaphragm wall would explain the
concurrent failure of these two connections which were otherwise not connected
structurally.
128. We note that there was no evidence of heave of king posts apart from
inferences drawn from finite element analysis and measurements during back-
filling at other locations in C824. The measurements showed both upward and
downward relative movements. NLCJV’s experts had not provided any concrete
estimate of the magnitude of displacement after the installation of the 9th level
strut needed to trigger the FSFM; and how this would be affected by the load in
the strut.
No build up of loads as measured by strain gauges
129. NLCJV’s experts noted that the strain gauges had not indicated any build-up in
load over the two days preceding the collapse. Although all the experts agreed
that the trends indicated by the strain gauges were broadly correct, no expert
(including NLCJV’s experts) could provide a satisfactory explanation for the
measured trend. NLCJV’s experts accepted this as an observed fact and had
incorporated the measured trend as input in their 2-D finite element modeling.
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Simultaneous failure of both ends of Strut S335-9
130. NLCJV’s experts claimed that only FSFM could explain the simultaneous failure
of the two ends of S335-9. We note that there was no evidence the two ends of
the same H-section failed concurrently.
131. We find that FSFM could not explain the failures of both ends of the same H-
section if they in fact did not fail at the same time.
Waler flanges displaced downward at failure
132. NLCJV’s experts invoked the FSFM to explain the downward movement of all
the inner flanges of the walers. We note that the downward displacement of the
waler flange at failure was a common feature in all the finite element analyses
that modelled the direct compression of the waler connection when self-weight
effect was taken into account. The finite element analyses on full length strut-
waler connection, carried out by ARUP using the program OASYS on behalf of
NLCJV’s experts, displayed the same failure feature. These analyses did not
involve the forced sway failure mechanism.
Forced sway failure mechanism unsupportable on the evidence
133. The FSFM requires the complete yielding of connections at the two strut ends
as a precursor. We find the differentiation of complete yielding of the connection
and failure of the connection strained; and is not in accord with sound
engineering understanding or safe practice.
134. The invocation of the trigger by relative movement between the king post and
the diaphragm wall was selective. Both the finite element analyses and physical
tests showed that brittle sway failure was the inevitable outcome when the C-
channel connection was loaded beyond its capacity. The rapid collapse was
consistent with a system that had inadequate capacity because of the gross
under-design, and had been subjected to larger than anticipated loadings from
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the soil pressures because the undrained strength of the marine clays was over-
estimated by Method A.
135. We therefore find that there is no evidence that FSFM is the operative trigger.
NLCJV’s hypothesis is therefore unsupportable on the evidence.
136. The experts representing the State, LTA, and Aviva disagree with NLCJV’s
hypothesis. They are of the view that the cause of the collapse was the under-
design of the temporary retaining wall system. We now set out the essence of
their respective views with which we agree.
Views of the Experts for State
137. The State experts submitted that the key element in causing the collapse is the
under-design of the temporary works in general, and the strut-waler connections
in particular.
Views of the Experts for LTA
138. The experts for LTA noted that NLCJV’s design was based on an analysis
which under-predicted loads and forces. The system was under-designed and
consequently became overloaded and overstressed as excavation progressed
to the deeper levels of marine clay. The following consequences occurred:
(1) The diaphragm walls were subjected to significantly greater bending

moment than originally predicted by NLCJV due to excessive deflection.
(2) The capacities of the upper and lower JGP layers were fully mobilised at a
much earlier stage than predicted using Method A.
(3) With the strength of the JGP fully mobilised and the plastic hinge having
developed in the diaphragm wall probably by 17 April 2004, no load could
be redistributed to either of these elements. Hence, the struts were the only
elements that were left to carry additional load;
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(4) The removal of the upper JGP layer started on early April 2004 and
continued until the collapse. This work removed one of the key elements
holding the system up;
(5) When the ninth level strut-waler connections failed, no load or no significant
part of the load carried by those struts before failure, could be redistributed
to the elements below the 9th level. These additional loads were transmitted
to the remaining strutting elements above the 9th level. The strutting system
then failed.
(6) The collapse ultimately was a consequence of a system designed to take

loads and stresses of the order of half what were actually sustained.
Views of the Experts for Aviva
139. The experts for Aviva are of the view that the cause of the collapse was initiated
by the failure of the 9th level strut-waler connection and the collapse was
inextricably linked to the inability of the system to resist the redistributed loads
as the 9th level struts failed.
140. These experts are also of the view that the collapse was not caused by a single,
unforeseen “triggering” event. The connections were loaded to their capacity
and failed and the system was not able to take the re-distributed load. The
reason for the system’s inability to redistribute loads was due to a number of
separate factors relating to design and construction.
Capacity of Strut Waler Connection
141. In the opinion of the experts for AVIVA, the main reasons the capacity of the
strut-waler connections were not adequate were:
(1) The absence of splays, assumed in the original design, meant that the
loads on the individual strut/waler connection were higher than anticipated
in the design;
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(2) There was an error in the assumption of the appropriate stiff bearing
length to be used; and
(3) The change to a C-channel stiffener changed the mode of failure from that
of a ductile failure to a brittle failure.
Inability of the system to take the re-distributed loads
142. The main issues which resulted in the inability of the system to take the re-
distributed loads are:
(1) The use of Method A results in under-prediction of soil loads;
(2) The earlier mobilization of JGP capacity due to use of Method A;
(3) The JGP was likely to be weaker and thinner than designed;
(4) Insufficient toe-penetration of the diaphragm walls; and
(5) A plastic hinge had in the diaphragm wall approximately 3 weeks before the
collapse.
143. This part is only concerned with the issue of the under-design of the temporary
retaining wall system. The under-design of the waler connection has been
agreed by all the parties including NLCJV’s experts. The views of all these
experts on these two issues are in Volume 2.
5.3 CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE: BACK ANALYSIS IN C824
144. A significant contributory cause to the collapse revolves around back analyses
in the C824 contract.
145. Several back analyses were undertaken by NLCJV in the execution of C824.
These included the back analyses for Type M3 area in which the collapse
occurred. A back analysis is a critical and defining process. This is because of
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the significant contingent event and its expected value. A back analysis arises
whenever the deflection of the diaphragm wall reached or exceeded the
predetermined trigger and design levels. Essentially the back analysis is to
assess whether it is safe to continue with excavation works. The back analysis
is therefore a crucial process. The back analysis also determines the need to
change the design of the entire temporary wall system or its elements, the
design levels, with consequential amendments to the construction drawings and
project schedules for continuing construction. The approach, methodology,
content and interpretation of the back analysis are significant.
146. In this Inquiry, there was evidence of five material back analyses: one in launch
shaft 2, two in Type K, and two in Type M3. A back analysis of a design section
ought to be a reassessment of that section as constructed, taking into account
all relevant information. The back analyses were done by NLCJV through the
use of Plaxis. The process basically involved running an iterative series of
Plaxis analyses by varying input parameters such as, inter alia, JGP stiffness,
friction angle of the soft clays, wall stiffness. The builder’s general approach to
the back analyses was to vary the inputs until there was a reasonable match
between the computed and measured deflection profiles at the relevant stage.
Once the match was found, the new input parameters were used to give
predictions of bending moments and strut forces for the next stages of work.
147. A proper back analysis should be done with an understanding of why the design
section is not performing as originally predicted. In the back analysis for C824,
predictions were made as to the future performance of the design section. This
was to determine whether further excavation could safely proceed.
148. Fundamentally, throughout October 2003 to April 2004, NLCJV did not do a
comprehensive design reassessment for the whole of C824. Their back
analyses as presented to the LTA was primarily directed at showing that their
adopted method of analysis (Method A) and design need not be changed.
NLCJV repeatedly assured the LTA that the design was adequate and
construction could proceed. They were bent on trying to complete the project
regardless of the design flaws and at the same time to submit only minimal
changes to the original design. There is a systematic pattern of the builder’s
scant respect and callous approach to the use of the results of each back
analysis.
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Contractual Understanding on Back Analysis
149. The understanding by the parties to the C824 contract is governed essentially
by clause 6.1.4.3 and the LTA’s Particular Specifications.
150. Clause 6.1.4.3 of LTA Particular Specification sets out the actions required by
the Builder when any instrument reaches the trigger or design level. The builder
is required to “reassess the design” once design level is exceeded (Figure
5.17). It is this contractual requirement for a reassessment of the design that
has been assigned the term “back analysis” in C824.
151. As stipulated in the LTA’s Particular Specifications, back analysis would be

considered when appropriate pre-determined review levels (trigger and design
levels) are exceeded. The purposes of the back analysis are:
(a) to revisit and re-evaluate the design assumptions including

the parameters used;
(b) to develop a rational explanation for the difference between
measured performance to-date and model predictions;
(c) to make prediction of future stages to justify continuation of
construction;
(d) to assess the need for any additional (e.g. remedial or
contingency) measures to continue safe construction; and
(e) to revise review levels if appropriate.
152. We will now set out each of the five material back analyses in sufficient detail
and identify what went wrong which showed the builder’s abuse of the back
analyses.
Back Analysis No. 1: The Launch Shaft 2 incident (“BA – LS2”)
153. Boulevard Launch Shaft (BLS) is a section of the cut-and-cover tunnel located
at the eastern end of a long stretch of cut-and-cover excavation from Boulevard
Station to the junction of C823 which was used to launch the tunnelling shields.
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Source : LTA 3C Pg 875
Figure 5.17 Flow chart for monitoring control in C824 project.

154. In July 2003, I-79 located near diaphragm wall Types W2a and Y1 at the BLS
exceeded the trigger and design values. On 5 August, excessive diaphragm
wall movements occurred when the excavation approached the 7th level. The
Inclinometer I-79 in the soil next to the south wall recorded a maximum
movement of 375 mm. The excessive movement on the wall resulted in the
formation of a 20 mm wide tension crack approximately 150 m long located
about 30 m away from the south wall, it resulted in the settlement of a significant
area of the cricket field. The road adjacent to the site also experienced
significant settlement. Within the excavation, a concrete corbel on the 6th level
diagonal strut on the south wall was crushed. No visible defect was noticed on
the struts and king posts. This incident was subsequently referred to as the
Launch Shaft 2 (LS2) incident.
155. The LS2 incident was a serious incident which rightly alarmed both NLCJV and
LTA. It triggered a major reassessment of the design. Works were stopped on
site. The following remedial measures were immediately carried out:
(a) the pre-loading of the 6th struts;
(b) the installation of the 7th strut;
(c) grouting of the tension cracks;
(d) replacement of the damaged corbel;
(e) the cracks on the cricket field grouted and the settled ground backfilled;
(f) the adjacent road was checked and voids beneath filled; and
(g) the wall and adjacent ground were closely monitored.
156. A detailed investigation to ascertain the cause of the incident followed. The
investigation encompassed the following:
(a) The diaphragm wall panel records and the piling records were
reviewed and additional soil investigation conducted to determine
the stratigraphy and the strength of the soil at the LS2 area. Arising
from the review, it was established that the soft soil layers at the site
were thicker than that assumed in design.
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(b) Construction records were examined. As a result, it was believed

that the diaphragm walls were built slightly longer than specified;
over-excavation might have occurred; the preload applied was lower
than the specified value; and that heavier surcharge load (25kPa)
might have been present.
(c) Inclinometers and other monitoring data were reviewed. NLCJV

subsequently installed additional settlement monitoring, strain
gauges and plumb bob surveys to improve the control of the work.
157. Based on this review of the construction records and site condition, NLCJV
established the most probable conditions for LS2. NLCJV also took account of
the rapidly varying soil profile across the tunnel section and developed an
asymmetric Plaxis model to replace the symmetric model used in the original
design.
158. NLCJV re-analysed the offending LS2 sections, Y1 and W2a. The new data
arising from the review process were incorporated in the back analysis using
Method A. The computed wall deflections from the back analysis were
compared with the measured deflections at relevant stages of excavation in
Type Y1 and W2a. The Plaxis analysis was repeated with changes made to
input parameters until the calculated deflection profile matched the inclinometer
profile.
159. In particular, NLCJV chose to reduce the Marine Clay strength (represented by
φ’) and the flexural stiffness EI of the diaphragm wall. The reduction of EI was to
provide for crack formation in the diaphragm wall. NLCJV explained that the
reduction of the marine clay strength was to account for the reduction of soil
strength due to swelling of clay; a lesson derived from their previous experience
at the Suntec City project.
160. At this stage, we see the builder’s back analysis approach which will be
repeated throughout in the other back analyses. This is the use of a reduction in
the friction angle which has no engineering basis and has no correlation with the
reality of the soil in the excavation area. This approach is technically flawed.
The quantum of reduction is arbitrary. The Suntec City experience is not
applicable. The test results of the marine clay layers in C824 showed that based
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on tests conducted in the post tender soil investigation programme, there is no

data that indicates effective friction angle can be lower than 16 degrees. In fact
this was agreed to by NLCJV in the Inquiry.
161. The NLCJV approach at LS2 enabled a ‘most probable’ fit to the inclinometer
data to be made at a specific stage. The parameters that achieved the match of
the wall deflection was then used to calculate the probable response of the
temporary retaining system at the remaining stages of the excavation. The
calculation predicted significant increases in the wall deflections and moments
and that it was not possible to maintain a partial factor on the wall moment
because the plastic capacity would be breached. NLCJV realized that there was
an increased risk of a catastrophic failure.
162. NLCJV proposed to recover the works with the following corrective measures:
(a) the addition of a JGP layer below formation level to control

movements and to reduce the risks of toe instability;
(b) excavation in short bays with close control over strut pre-loading
and excavation; and
(c) the addition of an internal wall to Wall Type Y1.
163. Plaxis analyses which incorporated the proposed remedial measures were
carried out to reassess the wall movements and strut loads at Type W2a and
Y1. The predicted deflection was used in the revised review levels for
construction monitoring for the remaining stages of works.
164. The outcome of the back analysis for BLS was described in the NLCJV report
dated 15 October 2003. The report provided a summary of the BLS incident and
the back analysis process, and recounted the chronology and causes of the
incident. It reviewed the construction information, detailed the back analysis
process and explained the contingency plans involving jet grouting and
additional monitoring. The Plaxis predicted ‘most probable’ movements were
tabulated so that the maximum movements could be tracked for each stage.
165. LTA accepted the reduction of the friction angle on the basis that it
compensated mathematically for the over-estimation by Method A. In the final
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report to the insurer, Nick Shirlaw set out his understanding of NLCJV’s
approach to the back analyses at LS2:
“The incident has been the subject of back-analysis by both the

builder and LTA. Both parties agree that the clay was less strong
than assumed for the original computer analysis. Both also agree
that the large deflection on the diaphragm wall caused the wall to
crack; this cracking reduced the stiffness of the wall and resulted in
further movements.
The builder has based his reanalysis on the clay softening i.e. that
the strength has reduced from the initial strength, but with the
programme instructed that the clay would behave in an undrained
manner. In order to match the movements at the launch shaft area
the builder has reduced the strength of the clay on both sides of the
excavation by 30% (a friction angle of 14.4 degrees for the lower
marine clay, with zero effective cohesion). Other changes to the
analysis include ignoring the presence of a stiff clay layer (the
Fluvial Clay) between the upper and lower marine clay units, and
reducing the stiffness of the diaphragm wall, to allow for cracking”.
“In Plaxis, using the Mohr-Coulomb failure criterion, the pore

pressures derived during undrained failure do not appear to be
realistic. The result of using this method (drained
parameters/undrained behaviour/Mohr-Coulomb) of analysis is to
overstate the strength of the clay. The reduction in the friction angle
of the clay used by the builder in his back analysis would
compensate for this.”
166. Based on the LS2 experience, the following construction protocol was
established for the continuing work in the C824 project. These included:
(a) Taking action when the trigger level is exceeded rather than waiting
until the design level is exceeded. This was in accordance with the
original LTA specification.
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(b) Suitable contingency measures were identified such as adding extra

strut to existing levels, reinforcing the struts, additional strut levels,
excavation in blocks.
167. We find that this construction protocol was not followed when the inclinometers
at Wall Types K and M3 exceeded the trigger level. No effective contingency
plans were put in place at the M3 area even when the revised design levels
were exceeded in quick succession.
168. This practice of reducing the soil strength and wall stiffness would be repeated
in the back analysis done at other sites within the C824 contract. In fact, it
became the modus operandi for subsequent back analysis, but without the one
necessary and critical feature: a comprehensive review of the site condition,
construction records and processes to establish the most probable condition on
site, and the condition of the wall as constructed.
169. In essence, the builder in the back analysis was doing a mathematical curve
fitting exercise without any engineering basis.
ANALYSES IN TYPE K AREA
Use of Plaxis Method B and SAGE-CRISP in Type K
170. The first back analysis at Type K – “BA1-Type K” - was preceded in October
2003 by an analysis of the excavation area using two alternative approaches.
One was by the builder using Plaxis Method B. The other one was an internal
study by LTA using SAGE-CRISP. These will be described in some detail in the
following sections.
171. Arising from the LS2 incident, LTA’s Engineering Advisory Panel had warned
that Method A would over-predict the undrained shear strength of the soft
marine clay and led to unsafe design. LTA responded by requesting NLCJV to
reanalyze the design of the temporary retaining wall system using Method B. In
October 2003, NLCJV reluctantly agreed to carry out Method B analysis for two
critical areas with deep Marine Clay. The chosen sections were wall Type E1
and Type K.
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172. Type K was chosen because it involved the widest excavation and thickest
marine clay layer. Although neither of these two sections was involved in the
collapse, Type K subsequently became the focus of attention from Jan 2004
right up to the time of collapse because of excessive wall deflection. It was the
subject of two back analyses carried out by NLCJV; a SAGE-CRISP analysis by
LTA’s Lin KQ; and a Method B analysis by Joshua Ong. Prof Harry Tan’s
presentation on 13 April 2004, a week before the collapse, was also based on
the Type K wall section.
173. The October 2003 Method B calculations by NLCJV were similar in all aspects
to the original Method A calculation except that the effective strength
parameters of the marine clays (c’, φ’) were replaced by the total stress
parameters (cu, φu=0). The computed wall deflection profiles and the bending
moment profiles for different stages of excavation are shown in Figure 5.18.
174. A comparison of the maximum bending moment and deflection computed by

Method A and Method B is shown in Table 5.7. The maximum bending moment
computed using Method B was 5029 kNm/m as compared to 2213 kNm/m by
Method A. The maximum wall deflection computed by Method A was 222 mm
against 552 mm predicted using Method B.
Table 5.7 Comparison of maximum deflection and bending moments computed

using Method A and Method B
Max. Max Bending Moment

Deflection (kNm/m)
(mm) (+ve) (-ve)
Method A 222 2213 -1629
Method B 552 5029 -3325
175. Method B also predicted higher forces for struts on levels 1 to 7. In particular,
Method B predicted a load of 2081 kN/m for the level 5 strut, compared to 1336
kN/m by Method A. This represents a 56% increase, much higher than the 10%
increase computed by Method B for the ninth level strut at the M3 wall section.
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Source : LTA 6B Pg 692
Computed wall deflection profiles and bending moment profiles for different stages of excavation using Method B for
Figure 5.18
Type K wall.
176. The Type K wall deflections profiles using Plaxis Methods A and B for Step 7
(4th dig level) were compared with the observed deflection recorded by I-63.
The full deflection profiles are shown in Figure 5.19. Based on a comparison of
these results, NLCJV concluded that Method B overestimated wall deflections,
and that the deflection predicted using Method A appeared to agree better with
the inclinometer data at the 4th level excavation. LTA accepted this comparison
but commented that the excavation was still relatively shallow then and that the
wall deflection should be monitored closely as the excavation reached deeper
levels.
177. This shows clearly that NLCJV should have but did not adopt Method B.
178. In the course of the Inquiry, the LTA brought in evidence of correspondences at
different times between 2001 to September 2003 between NLCJV and Prof
Karube, Ken Patterson-Kane of Murray North (SEA) Pte Ltd, and Tang Sek
Kwang of CPG on concerns over the appropriateness of Method A. NLCJV’s
witnesses did not volunteer this evidence in their written statements or oral
evidence. The sum total of these correspondences showed that as at 17 Oct
2003 NLCJV had serious internal concerns over the use of Method A. NLCJV
did not disclose these correspondence and their concerns at the 17 and 27
October 2003 meetings with LTA. We find that NLCJV did not come clean with
this information in fact and in law.
LTA’s Internal Study for Type K using SAGE-CRISP
179. Whilst the first back analysis for the Type K wall was in progress in January,
Shirlaw expressed serious concern over the stability of the temporary retaining
wall system in his email of 20 January 2004 to Joshua Ong; the content
reflected the state of play:
“NLCJV are still playing with reducing E and phi’, and won’t accept
Prof. Wong’s advice on using Cu for the analysis … my big worry is
that the system, and particularly the jet grout slabs, are coming
under much more load than predicted, that there could be the
potential for a major failure.” [emphasis added]
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Source : Aviva SR S63
A comparison of predicted deflections for Type K wall using Method A

Figure 5.19
and Method B and inclinometer I-63 reading taken on 8 Oct 2003.
180. Acting on this concern, Nick Shirlaw initiated an internal LTA study on the Type-
K retaining wall. Dr Lin Kaiqiu, a geotechnical engineer of the LTA Civil
Engineering Department, conducted a study using NLCJV’s Type K wall section
geometry and soil profile. Lin carried out three separate analyses using the
SAGE-CRISP program with a total stress approach and undrained parameters.
These analyses were similar to Method B.
181. The results of the first study were presented for discussion within LTA. Shirlaw
considered the results could be too conservative because it did not include the
bored piles at the base of the excavation. The second study which included the
bored piles was then carried out. The results of the second study showed that
the wall bending moment would exceed the moment capacity at several
locations along the wall. The computed bending moment were 2539 kNm/m at
Level 5, 3504 kNm/m at Level 6, 3971 kNm/m at Level 7, 4136 kNm/m at Level
8, and 3934 kNm/m at Level 9. Since the computed bending moments had
exceeded the elastic limit of the wall, it was considered the elastic assumption
for the diaphragm wall might not give realistic estimates for wall deflection. Lin
subsequently carried out a third study that took into account the formation of
plastic hinges in the diaphragm wall.
182. The results showed that the wall would yield at 2 sections, from 18m to 28 m
and from 33m to 39m from the top of diaphragm wall. The third study also
predicted a maximum wall deflection of 430 mm. It thus appears that the SAGE-
CRISP studies broadly corroborated the results of NLCJV’s first Method A back
analysis for the Type K wall section, though there were differences in details. In
particular, the maximum wall deflection of 422 mm computed by NLCJV was, for
all practical purposes, similar to Lin’s SAGE-CRISP prediction of 430 mm.
183. Shirlaw commented that the actual deflections predicted by Lin’s analyses were
very similar to those predicted by NLCJV using Method A with reduced friction
angle. He concluded that the reduction of friction angle was compensating for
the overestimation of the shear strength of the marine clay using Method A. This
understanding was consistent with Joshua Ong’s understanding of the purpose
and effects of reducing φ’ angle in NLCJV’s back analyses.
184. Lin highlighted to Ong and Shirlaw that the JGP slabs would be subjected to
very large compressive strains of 4% to 8% when excavation reached the 9th
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level. The study thus confirmed Shirlaw’s concern over the possible
overstraining of the JGP, and the serious ramifications that might ensue.
185. Shirlaw was aware that the value of φ’ used by NLCJV in their back analyses
was artificial, i.e. it did not reflect the actual effective friction angle of the soil in
the ground. In accepting the use of a significantly lower friction angle, he did not
consider that the friction angle in reality was changed. Shirlaw thought that
Plaxis was not able to calculate pore water pressure correctly and therefore was
not calculating the correct undrained strength effectively. He had done a “quick
calculation” to satisfy himself that the reduction of friction angle was appropriate.
Such a back-of-envelop check did not justify the acceptance by LTA of the first
back analysis for Type K in view of its glaring shortcomings and blatant errors.
186. Joshua Ong’s evidence was that the SAGE-CRISP study carried out by Lin and
his own Method B analysis appeared to agree with NLCJV’s first Method A back
analysis for Type K wall. The LTA design team believed that the temporary
works design was generally adequate. Ong’s belief in the adequacy of the
temporary works design persisted up to the time of collapse.
187. LTA’s confidence in Method A seems to be out of sync with its own internal
appreciation of the appropriateness of Method A.
Back Analysis No. 2: First Back Analysis at Type K (“BA1-Type K”)
188. In early December 2003, I-63 exceeded the trigger levels. On 12 January 2004,
the maximum deflection measured by I-63 had reached 282 mm, exceeding the
design level of 222 mm. The excavation was then at the 6th level. At the
Instrumentation Meeting on 15 January 2004, it was decided that no excavation
would be allowed until the design was reviewed.
189. The back analysis done for Type K wall was different from LS2 in one crucial
aspect: the lack of a comprehensive review of the construction processes and
site condition that might explain the excessive deflection. The back analysis was
carried out using the original wall section and original design soil profile. There
was no additional soil investigation.
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190. NLCJV’s back analysis was directed towards achieving a match between the
computed wall movement and the I-63 readings for the 6th level excavation. It
involved a trial-and-error process in which the strength and stiffness of the JGP
and various soft soil layers were changed repeatedly. The results of the first
back analysis were tabled at a design meeting with LTA on 29 Jan 2004. LTA
commented that the predicted deflection was unrealistic. The back analysis was
repeated and NLCJV resubmitted the back analysis, which also included a
contingency plan, on 9 Feb 2004. The contingency plan involved the addition of
an extra layer of struts below the 7th level. The spacing between the 8th, 9th and
10th level struts was adjusted to 2.8m.
191. The results of the revised back analysis were reported in C824/DES/CA/1092.
The set of parameters which resulted in the best match with the deflection
profile of inclinometer I-63 is shown in Figure 5.20. Various input parameters
were reduced from Step 11 onward. The effective friction angle, φ′, of the lower
marine clay and fluvial clay were reduced to 14.4o and 13o, respectively. The
JGP parameters were reduced by 40%. The flexural stiffness EI of the wall was
reduced by 50% ostensibly to account for concrete cracking. However, the
reduction of EI was applied to the entire wall, not just localised to regions where
the bending moments had exceeded capacity.
192. The calculated maximum section forces and deflection were tabulated under
section 4.1 of the said report (Figure 5.21). It predicted a maximum deflection of
422 mm at the backfilling stage, compared to a value of 222 mm in the original
design. The back analysis report did not contain any check on the JGP strain.
193. The maximum positive and negative bending moments were 3163 kNm/m and
3465 kNm/m respectively, as compared to the corresponding values of 2213
kNm/m and 1629 kNm/m in the original design. The calculated bending moment
exceeded the moment capacity at several locations.
194. The computed strut forces were summarized in Section 4.2 of the report (Figure
5.22). Figure 5.22 shows “BA1-Type K” computed a force of 2434 kN/m in the
Level 5 strut, compared to the original load of 1337 kN/m. This represents an
increase of 82%. There was no one-strut failure analysis. The implication of the
increased strut load on the waler connection was not addressed.
Page 137
Back Analysis of Type K – BA 1
Deflection Moment
Case JGP (Step 1 = Final) Wall MC (Upper) MC (Lower) F2 Change Setup Step 11 Max Min
E c Ф EI (106) E Eincr Ф E Eincr Ф E Eincr Ф (mm) (kNm)

Orginal 150000 300 0 8.36 8000 640 22 8000 640 24 8000 800 22 169 2056 -1410
Step 11
90000 180 5.973 8000 640 22 4800 384 14.4 4800 480 13 onwards 295 2631 -2793
Back Analysis (40%) (40%) (50%) (40%) (40%) (40%) (40%) (40%) (40%)
Monitor Data 282
Note : Bracket denotes the percentage reduction
Source : LTA 7A Pg 365
Figure 5.20 Parameters used in first Back Analysis of Type K – (“BA 1 – Type K”) (from C824/DES/CA/1092).
First Back Analysis for Type K wall – maximum section forces and
Figure 5.21
deflection table (from C824/DES/CA/1092).
First Back Analysis for Type K wall – computed strut loads (from
Figure 5.22
C824/DES/CA/1092).
195. Our findings in respect of “BA1-Type K” are as follows:
(i) “BA1-Type K” was aimed at matching the computed and observed wall
movement at the current stage of excavation, which was then at the sixth
level. This was essentially another mathematical curve fitting exercise.
(ii) In the light of the back analysis for the LS2 incident, NLCJV should be
aware of the essential elements of a properly executed back analysis.
“BA1-Type-K” did not meet the requirements of the “re-assessment of
design” envisaged in the LTA specifications.
(iii) “BA1-Type K” predicted significant increases in bending moment and strut

loads. Such increases would severely affect the safety of the temporary
retaining wall system. No design checks were conducted to ensure that the
temporary works would remain stable on further excavation.
(iv) A reasonable comparison by the builder of “BA1-Type K” in January 2004

and the Method B calculation done earlier in October 2003 would have
revealed the errors in Method A and would have also confirmed that
Method B showed a better agreement with the observed performance of
the temporary retaining wall system.
196. However, the back analysis results, together with the proposed contingency
plan, were formally accepted by LTA on 10 March 2004.
Back Analysis No. 3: Second Back Analysis at Type K (“BA2-Type K”)
197. At the instrumentation meeting on 25 March 2004, the inclinometer I-63 at Type
K was reported to have exceeded the revised design level of 422 mm
established on the basis of “BA1-Type K” calculations. The excavation works
was then at the 7th level. The work at Type K was stopped pending the outcome
of the second back analysis.
198. “BA2-Type K” was aimed at matching the computed wall deflection and the I-63
readings for the 7th level. The input parameters were further reduced. The set of
Page 138
input parameters which resulted in a match are summarized in Figure 5.23. The
following reductions were made at various calculation steps: EI of the wall was
reduced by 50% from Step 11 and by 65% from Step 13 onwards, the JGP
parameters were adjusted downward by 40%, φ′ and E′ of the lower marine clay
were reduced by 40% from step 11, and subsequently by a further 20% from
step 13, resulting in a φ′ angle of 9.6°.
199. The set of reduced parameters was used to give forward prediction of future
construction stages. NLCJV submitted the back analysis to LTA on 19 April
2004 through the transmittal C824/DES/TR/0758A.
200. NLCJV adopted exactly the same curve matching methodology for “BA2-Type
K”. The same set of parameters for the diaphragm wall, the JGP and the lower
marine clay and fluvial clays were furthered reduced to mathematically curve fit
with the I-63 deflection profile. It was essentially a replay of “BA1-TYPE K”. The
friction angle of the lower marine clay was reduced to 9.6o, which was much
smaller than the minimum effective friction angles obtained in soil investigation
tests.
201. Figure 5.24 shows the strut forces computed in “BA2-Type K”. The results
showed that the level 5 strut force had increased from the original value of 1337
kN/m to 2553 kN/m; an increase of 91%. The level 6 strut load would increase
from the original design value of 1465 kN/m to 2282 kN/m; an increase of 56%.
The instances of high strut load were tagged with the comment “To monitor the
strut”. No check was conducted to ensure that the relevant struts and waler
connections had the capacities to resist the additional loads.
202. Figure 5.25 shows the computed shear forces, bending moment and deflection.
The maximum deflection had increased to 522 mm from 222 mm in the original
design calculation, an increase of 135%.
203. The “BA2-Type K” analysis resulted in a maximum positive moment of 3127

kNm/m and maximum negative moment of 3198 kNm/m. The corresponding
values in the original design were 2213 kNm/m and 1629 kNm/m, respectively.
The bending moment envelope was plotted together with the as-built moment
capacity (Figure 5.26). The as-built wall negative moment envelope between 83
Page 139
Back Analysis of Type K – BA 2
Deflection Moment
Case JGP (Step 1 = Final) Wall MC (Upper) MC (Lower) F2 Change Setup Step 14 Max Min
6
E c Ф EI (10 ) E Eincr Ф E Eincr Ф E Eincr Ф (mm) (kNm)
Original 150000 300 0 8.36 8000 640 22 8000 640 24 8000 800 22 169 2056 -1410
90000 180 5.973 8000 640 22 4800 384 14.4 4800 480 13 Step 11 onwards
(40%) (40%) (50%) (40%) (40%) (40%) (40%) (40%) (40%)
90000 180 4.18 8000 640 22 3200 256 9.6 Step 13 onwards 403
Back Analysis (40%) (40%) (65%) (60%) (60%) (60%)
Monitor Data 395
Note : Bracket denotes the percentage reduction
Figure 5.23 Parameters used in second Back Analysis of Type K – (“BA 2 – Type K”) (from C824/DES/CA/1092 Rev A).
Second Back Analysis for Type K wall – computed strut loads (from
Figure 5.24
C824/DES/CA/1092 Rev A).
Second Back Analysis for Type K wall – maximum section forces

Figure 5.25
deflection table (from C824/DES/CA/1092 Rev A).
Second Back Analysis for Type K wall – moment envelop against

Figure 5.26
as-built moment capacity (from C824/DES/CA/1092 Rev A).
mRL and 91.8 mRL was wrong. A correct envelope would show that the
bending moment had greatly exceeded the wall capacity. Because of this error,
no check was carried for this portion of the wall.
204. The misrepresentation of the moment capacity between 83 mRL and 91.8 mRL
had serious safety implication. It erroneously showed the moment was within
the as-built capacity when in fact it had greatly exceeded it. Such error was a
serious safety lapse. It betrayed a systematic pattern of the builder’s scant
respect and callous approach to the back analysis.
205. The unfactored bending moment around RL75 was found to have exceeded the
design ultimate moment capacity of the wall. NLCJV carried out a stress check
that included the effect of axial load. It was found that the wall would have
reached the limit of its capacity even when the load factor of 1.2 was ignored
(Figure 5.27).
Comparison of results from various analyses
206. For convenience, we now set out a comparative table in respect of the Type K
incident which include the original Method A analysis which was used in the
design of the temporary retaining wall system, the results of the two Method A
back analyses, the Method B analysis and SAGE-CRISP study (Table 5.8).
Table 5.8 Summary of results from the analyses on Type K diaphragm wall
Max
JGP
Deflection Bending Max Strut
Method Time Strain
(mm) moment Force (kN)
(%)
(kNm/m)
A Dec 2001 221 2212 1336 -
B Oct 2003 552 5030 2081 -
BA1 Feb 2004 422 3465 2434 -

SAGE-
Jan-Feb 2004 430 3971 - 4%-8%
CRISP
BA2 April 2004 522 3198 2552 -
Page 140
Second Back Analysis for Type K wall – stress check calculation

Figure 5.27
(from C824/DES/CA/1092 Rev A).
207. The NLCJV’s Plaxis results obtained using Methods A and B have also been
reviewed. The maximum deflections are plotted against the corresponding
excavation levels in Figure 5.28. In addition, the maximum deflection from I63 at
the 4th, 6th and 7th excavation levels are shown. The 4th level excavation had just
been completed when NLCJV did the Method B analysis for Type K. The 6th and
7th excavation were the two events that triggered “BA1-Type K” and “BA2-Type
K”.
208. Figure 5.28 shows the following:
(a) Method A predicted that the maximum deflection would increase by only
about 100 mm as excavation progressed from the second to the tenth
level. In contrast, Method B predicted rapid increase in wall deflection
beyond the second excavation level, and exceeding 520 mm at the
seventh level.
(b) The trend of increase in maximum wall deflection computed using

Method B correctly mirrored the trend of increase measured by
inclinometer I-63. Method A did not predict realistic deflections over the
full range of the excavation depths. Method B did.
209. Our findings in respect of BA2-Type K are as follows:
(i) NLCJV back analysis overestimated movements at earlier stages and

underestimated movements at subsequent stages. In this respect, the back
analysis model did not match the observed wall behaviour and was flawed.
(ii) Essentially, the original Method A analysis of the temporary retaining wall
system had over estimated the deflections at the 4th dig level by 33%.
However, by the 7th dig level it underestimated by 54%. The two back
analyses using Method A (“BA1-Type K” & “BA2-Type K”) are accordingly
unreliable, particularly so when unrealistic soil parameters were used purely
to achieve a mathematical curve fit. However, the Method B analysis
overestimated the maximum deflections throughout. At the 4th dig level it
Page 141
Source : Aviva SR S64
Comparison of maximum deflection using Method A and Method B

Figure 5.28
and I-63 measured movement.
overestimates by 110% and by the 7th dig level by a mere overestimation of

30%. The use of Method B is therefore safer.
(iii) There was no technical basis for a reduction in the friction angle in the
excavation of C824.
(iv) The use of Method A despite the erroneous use of a reduction in the friction
angle, could not fit the measured deflections for the entire range of
excavation depth.
(v) Method B should be used in the design of the temporary retaining wall
system.
The Incident of Excessive Wall Deflection at M3 Area
210. I-65 was installed in the diaphragm wall on the North side of the excavation at
the M3 area. The deflection on the South wall was monitored by inclinometer I-
104 installed in the soil after the Launch Shaft 2 incident. The additional
inclinometer served two purposes: it provided a closer monitoring of the
temporary retaining structures, it also helped to alert the emergence of any
major divergence in the behaviour of the North and South walls. The asymmetry
in diaphragm wall behaviour on opposite sides of the tunnel was a major lesson
learned in the LS2 incident.
211. When the excavation at the M3 areas first started, both I-65 and I-104 showed
similar deflection. From February to March of 2004, the pressure of monitoring
the large number of instrument on site began to take its toll. As a result, there
was a period of time when not all inclinometer readings were taken. The first
back analysis at M3 was triggered by I-65 exceeding the design level. Up to that
time, I-65 and I-104 still tracked each other quite closely.
Page 142
Back Analysis No. 4: First Back Analysis at Type M3 (“BA1-Type M3”)
212. On the 23 February 2004, I-65 in the North diaphragm wall recorded a reading
of 159 mm, exceeding the design level of 145 mm. The excavation was then at
the sixth level. The Method A predicted deflection for excavation to 6th level was
only 105 mm. In accordance with contract specification, NLCJV was required to
carry out a design review/reassessment.
213. NLCJV did not do a comprehensive review to determine the most probable
ground condition at the relevant wall panels. The back analysis was conducted
using the original design section and soil profile. A 3 m thick lower JGP was
adopted in the numerical model even when the construction drawing showed
the as-built JGP thickness was 2.6 m.
214. NLCJV failed to develop a Plaxis model for the most probable ground conditions
at I-104/I-65. NLCJV continued to use a JGP layer thickness of 3 m when the
construction drawing specified a 2.6 m thick lower JGP layer. The back analysis
failed to take into account the as-built condition of the temporary works.
215. The back analysis process adopted the trial-and-error process of adjusting the
wall, JGP and soil parameters so that the computed wall deflection could match
the inclinometer profile for the 6th level excavation.
216. The principal adjustment made was similar to that done in Type-K. In particular,
the effective friction angle φ’ for the lower marine clay and the fluvial clay were
repeatedly reduced, the overall stiffness EI of the diaphragm wall and the JGP
parameters were also reduced. No explanation was given to justify the
reductions. Allen Tan’s evidence indicated that the sole purpose of the back
analysis was to obtain a deflection profile which would have a maximum value
just above the maximum measured by the inclinometer. It appeared that the
primary objective of the back analysis was to secure LTA’s permission to
proceed with excavation.
217. The first back analysis for Type M3 was reported in the document
C824/DES/CA/0199, and formally submitted to LTA via transmittal
Page 143
C824/DES/TR/0773 on 8 March 2004. The back analysis was discussed at the

LTA design meeting and given in principle approval on 10 March 2004.
218. The set of input parameters used in “BA1-Type M3” is shown in Figure 5.29.
The changes made to the original design values of the input parameters were
as follow: from Step 3 onwards, the values for cu and E for the JGP, the
stiffness and strength of the F2 layer, and the modulus and φ’ of the upper
marine clay were reduced by 20%; from Step 11, the stiffness of the diaphragm
wall was reduced by 50%, the E’ and φ’ for the lower marine clay were reduced
by 50%, resulting in a φ’ of 12o for the lower marine clay. The parameters were
used in forward prediction of the remaining stages of work.
219. The computed wall deflection and section forces are summarized in Table 3.1 of
C824/DES/CA/0199, and reproduced here in Figure 5.30. “BA1-Type M3”
predicted a maximum deflection of 253 mm. This value was subsequently
adopted as the revised design level.
220. “BA1-Type M3” predicted a maximum bending moment of 2339 kNm/m. The
bending moment envelope and the wall moment capacity were as shown in
Figure 5.31. The computed bending moments exceeded the as-built wall
moment capacity at five locations. NLCJV carried out several stress checks
using unfactored bending moment. The stress check showed that the ultimate
wall capacity would be exceeded at 88 mRL. A remark “To check adequacy:
N.G., to monitor” was marked against the relevant portion of the moment
envelope. It stands to infer from the remark that NLCJV realised that wall would
not have sufficient capacity to withstand the anticipated bending moment, but it
chose to “monitor”.
221. “BA1-Type M3" also predicted major increase in strut forces for Levels 4 and 5
(Figure 5.32) and smaller load increase in Levels 8 and 9. The Level 5 strut
force was predicted to increase from the original design value of 1459 kN/m to
2224 kN/m; an increase of 52%. A note “to monitor strut load cell” was marked
the strut loads for Levels 4 and 5. No calculation was done to check the
adequacy of the strut/waler connection against the significant predicted increase
in loads.
Page 144
Back Analysis of Type M3 – BA 1
Deflection Moment
Case JGP (Step 1 = Final) Wall MC (Upper) MC (Lower) F2 Change Step Step 12 Max Min
EI
E c Φ (105) E Eincr Φ E Eincr Φ E Eincr Φ (mm) (kNm)
Original 130500 300 0 8.36 8000 640 22 8000 640 24 8000 800 24 105.3 1401.1 579.6
104400 240 0 6400 512 17.6 6400 640 19.2 Step 3 onward 171.8 1936.9 1055
(20%) (20%) (20%) (20%) (20%) (20%) (20%) (20%)
Back Analysis 104400 240 0 5.973 6400 512 17.6 4000 320 12 6400 640 19.2 Step 11 onward
(20%) (20%) (50%) (20%) (20%) (20%) (50%) (50%) (50%) (20%) (20%) (20%)
Monitor Data 159.2
Note : Brackets define the percentage reduction
Figure 5.29 Parameters used in first Back Analysis of Type M3 – (“BA 1 – Type M3”) (from C824/DES/CA/0199).
First Back Analysis for Type M3 wall - maximum section force and
Figure 5.30
deflection table (“BA 1 – Type M3”) (from C824/DES/CA/0199).
First Back Analysis for Type M3 wall – bending moment envelop

Figure 5.31
against moment capacity (from C824/DES/CA/0199).
First Back Analysis for Type M3 wall – computed strut loads (from
Figure 5.32
C824/DES/CA/0199).
222. NLCJV’s proposal to adopt the observational approach (as implied by

comments such as “to monitor the strut”) had no justifiable basis. The
observational approach must be premised on a design which was robust. The
output from the back analysis had clearly shown that key structural elements
were likely to be stretched to the limits on continued excavation. A prudent
response was to enhance the system to secure the necessary margin of safety.
This was not done.
223. “BA1-Type M3” was tabled for discussion with LTA and was formally submitted
on 8 March 2004. The QP(ST), Ng Seng Yong, forwarded the back analysis to
BCU of LTA. The BCU responded to Ng in a letter dated 15 April 2004, in which
it expressed grave concerns over the manner “BA1-Type M3” was conducted. In
particular, it highlighted the diaphragm wall would not have adequate capacity to
resist the forces predicted.
224. While the formal submission of “BA1-Type M3” was in progress, events on the
ground would soon render the process obsolete. On 1 April 2004, I-104
recorded a maximum deflection of 302.9 mm when the excavation approached
the 9th level. The reading exceeded the revised design level of 253 mm set
barely a month earlier on the basis of the results of the first back analysis. For
comparison, the original Method A prediction for the 9th level excavation was
only 108 mm.
225. The exceedance of the revised design level triggered yet another round of back
analysis.
Back Analysis No. 5: Second Back Analysis at Type M3 (“BA2-Type M3”)
226. “BA2-Type M3” adopted the same trial and error process of curve matching.
The set of parameters modified in the first back analysis, “BA1-Type M3”, were
reduced even further, aimed principally at securing a match between the Plaxis
predicted deflection and the I-104 deflection profile for 1 April 2004. The
arbitrary nature of this back analysis process is disclosed by Allen Tan Choon
Aeiong in paragraphs 28 to 35 of his statement.
Page 145
227. The second back analysis was tabled for discussion with LTA on 3 April 2004.
LTA requested a stress check on the diaphragm wall section where the bending
moment exceeded capacity. Although the parties disagreed as to whether the
second back analysis was approved in principle, LTA subsequently
acknowledge the permit to excavate on several occasions. The work at M3 did
not stop whilst “BA2-Type M3” was in progress. Increased preloading was
proposed as a contingency measure.
228. Work did not stop at site, as required under contract specification.
229. The only contingency was the introduction of additional preload to the struts. In
practice, this was not achieved.
230. The second back analysis report for Type M3 (C824/DES/CA/0199 Rev A) was
formally submitted to LTA on 19 April 2004 through transmittal
C824/DES/TR/0773A. The parameters used in “BA2-Type M3” are tabulated in
Figure 5.33. The effective friction angle φ’ of the lower marine clay was reduced
to 8.4o from Step 9 and to 6o from Step 18 onwards. For F2, the value of φ’ was
reduced to 9.9°.
231. “BA2-Type M3” predicted maximum positive bending moment of 2939 kNm/m
and maximum negative bending moment of 2763 kNm/m. The computed
moment envelope was superimposed on the as-built moment capacity (Figure
5.34). The plot shows that the bending moments would exceed wall capacities
at 75-84 mRL and at 65-68 mRL.
232. Again, NLCJV carried out stress checks taking into account the axial load in the
diaphragm wall. NCLJV had apparently carried out an onsite inspection and
found no crack on the relevant sections of the wall that had been exposed. For
the sections of wall where bending moments exceeded capacity and which
corresponded to completed stages of excavation, a 15% reduction was applied
to the unfactored bending moment. The stress check calculation also used a
yield stress of 500 MPa for the reinforcement steel. NLCJV concluded from the
stress checks that the diaphragm had the capacity to cope with the bending
moment. Relevant sections of the bending moment profile were tagged with the
comment “Event over”.
Page 146
Back Analysis of Type M3 – BA 2
Deflection
at Moment
Case JGP (Upper) JGP (Lower) Wall MC (Upper) MC (Lower) F2 E Change Step Step 17 Max Min
E c Φ E c Φ EI (105) E Eincr Φ E Eincr Φ E Eincr Φ E Eincr Φ (mm) (kNm)
Original 130500 300 0 130500 300 0 8.36 8000 640 22 8000 640 24 8000 800 24 6000 920 16
Step 3
104400 240 0 104400 240 0 5600 448 15.4 5600 560 16.6 onward
(20%) (20%) (20%) (20%) (30%) (30%) (30%) (30%) (30%) (30%)
Step 9
78300 180 0 97875 225 0 5.374 5600 448 15.4 2800 224 8.4 4800 480 14.4 onward
(40%) (40%) (25%) (25%) (45%) (30%) (30%) (30%) (65%) (65%) (65%) (40%) (40%) (40%)
Back Step 18
Analysis 78300 180 0 91350 210 0 3.583 5600 448 15.4 2000 160 6 4800 480 14.4 3300 506 9.9 onward 305
(40%) (40%) (30%) (30%) (70%) (30%) (30%) (30%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (40%) (40%) (40%) (45%) (45%) (45%)
Monitor
Data 305
Note : Brackets define the percentage reduction
Figure 5.33 Parameters used in Second Back Analysis of Type M3 – (“BA 2 – Type M3”) (from C824/DES/CA/0199 Rev A).
Second Back Analysis for Type M3 wall – bending moment envelop

Figure 5.34
against moment capacity (from C824/DES/CA/0199 Rev A).
233. The 15% reduction applied on the calculated bending moment was wrong. It
has no justifiable engineering basis.
234. The maximum deflection of 359 mm predicted in “BA2-Type M3” was adopted
as the new design level.
235. The computed strut loads are shown in Figure 5.35, which indicated load
increases at all struts except for Level 1. At Level 4, the strut load increased
from the original design value of 1635 kN/m to 2449 kN/m; an increase of nearly
50%. At the Level 9 strut, which is the focus of much attention in this Inquiry,
“BA2-Type M3” predicted a strut load of 2498 kN/m compared to 2173 kN/m in
the original design. Where the strut loads exceeded the design capacity, it was
again tagged with the comment “to monitor the strut”.
236. No one strut failure analysis was carried out. The one strut failure analysis
would indicate that the bending moments in the adjacent walls would increase
by 50%, subject to the wall not reaching its plastic hinge. Adjacent strut and
waling connection load may increase up to 30%.
237. From around mid March 2004, the readings from I-65 and I-104 began to show
major divergence. Whilst I-65 readings had remained relatively constant and
even showed a reversal in movement, the intermittent monitoring data from I-
104 showed an alarming trend of rapid increase in wall deflection (Figure 5.41).
This suggested that the symmetric assumption used in the finite element
calculation was not valid. A review of the borehole data at this stage would
indicate that an asymmetric wall should be used, as had been done at LS2.
238. I-65 and I-104 began to show major divergence in March 2004 when the second
back analysis for Type M3 was in progress. This should have alerted NLCJV
that the north and south wall were behaving differently. It should have reminded
them of the lesson learned in LS2 and adopted an asymmetric model in their
back analysis. This was not done.
239. NLCJV had not given sufficient attention to the implication of the large
deflections recorded by I-65 and I-104. The inclinometer data indicated that the
JGP layers had been subjected to large compressive strain that far exceeded
Page 147
Second Back Analysis for Type M3 wall – computed strut loads (from
Figure 5.35
C824/DES/CA/0199 Rev A).
the allowable design value of about 1.0%. NLCJV had reduced the JGP
parameters in their back analysis but had not considered the post peak
brittleness of the JGP layers and its implication on the stability of the temporary
retaining wall system.
240. The jet grout strength was reduced in the back analysis model. The horizontal
strains were large. The risk of brittle failure was not addressed in the back
analysis.
241. NLCJV did not perform any curvature analysis for the diaphragm wall when it
was carrying out the second back analysis. It had not given adequate attention
to the monitoring data. Based on the I-104 readings taken on 17 April 2004,
there was strong indication that a plastic hinge had been formed in the South
wall. “BA2-Type M3” did not consider the effect of a localised plastic hinge on
the robustness of the temporary retaining wall system. Instead, NLCJV had
applied an overall reduction on EI for the whole diaphragm wall.
242. NLCJV did not review the I-104 wall curvatures for the second back analysis
stage at M3 and did not incorporate the plastic hinge that had been formed.
Applying an overall reduction in the EI of diaphragm wall was wrong. It did not
correctly represent the actual condition of the wall.
243. At the Inquiry, Shimada gave evidence that he was aware the φ’ values adopted
in “BA2-Type M3” were unreasonable, but used them nonetheless because:
“…as long as we were using Method A, there was no other way but to
reduce phi prime. I understand that there are experts saying that this is
unrealistic, but in order to incorporate the passive side soil behaviour
into back-analysis, there was no other way but to do this, your Honour.”
244. Shimada gave evidence that only the φ’ values of the soft clays on the passive
side of the retaining walls were reduced in the back-analysis. This meant that
the overestimation of the undrained soil strength on the active side remained
uncorrected. Large reduction in φ’ values on the passive side were therefore
necessary to compensate for the errors on the active side of the wall.
Page 148
245. Shimada did not abandon Method A despite:
(a) The many doubts that had been expressed concerning Method A from
the beginning of the project when Method A was first proposed,
particularly after October 2003;
(b) His own discussions with CPG and Tokyo office concerning the
appropriateness of Method A;
(c) His awareness that the φ’ values used were physically unreasonable;
(d) His knowledge of the alternative Method B; and
(e) Instead, he persisted with the wrong method, ignoring all the warning
signs and the mounting distress signals that afflicted the temporary
retaining wall system across the entire C824 project site.
246. Commenting on the parameters used in the second back analysis at Type M3,
Professor Schweigger said:
“I think, first of all you have to do your back analysis with soil
parameters which are in the range, what you think your soil parameters
could possibly be, and they should be -- well, they should be physically
meaningful. And if you do that and you still find out that your overall
behaviour is not matched, then I think you -- well, everybody just should
just sit down and check what has gone wrong, or why the differences
are.”
247. From the evidence, we find NLCJV had summarised the inclinometer results in
the monitoring table for NCH, XOB and CC2. This table also recorded the
predicted deflections from the back analysis. The table incorporated the results
from the second M3 back analysis on the 7 April 2004. NLCJV had used this
table to track which walls types would require back analysis. The table showed
that by 31 March 2004, 70% of the inclinometers had exceeded the trigger
values and 45% had exceeded the design values. By 7 April 2004, back
analysis was in progress for 45% of the inclinometers. This shows that NLCJV
were aware of the extent of the problem. With this many inclinometers requiring
back analysis, it was clear that there was a system wide problem, not just a
localized problem due to variations in geology.
Page 149
248. In Type M3, two back analyses were conducted using Method A. These back
analyses contained all the errors which have been identified by us. The builder
gambled and lost.
249. No design check was carried out for the strut/waler connection when the back-
analyses indicate that they would be subjected to loads higher than previously
reckoned. NLCJV was aware of the risk of the struts being overloaded, and
merely proposed "to monitor the strut". The first overloading of struts identified
by these calculations was the ninth level (which is the level which showed the
earliest signs of failure on 20 April 2004), at Step 19 (excavation to 10th level,
which was the situation on 20 April 2004).
250. The NLCJV back analysis results are signalling that the temporary retaining
system is subjected to much higher stresses than originally anticipated. NLCJV
did not enhance the design to restore the factor of safety. Neither was effective
contingency plans being put in place. NLCJV seemed intent on using the back
analysis to justify that work on site should continue, and it was prepared to
sweep aside safety concern in order to continue.
251. From 3 April to 20 April 2004, NLCJV submitted 4 permits to excavate at

Section M3 on the basis that “BA2-Type M3” – which was erroneous - showed
that work could continue.
Conclusion
252. All the experts agreed that on the basis of the second back analysis for Type
M3, works should not have been allowed to proceed in that area.
253. The catastrophic collapse was the finale to mounting incidences and warnings
in the C824 project of excessive wall deflections, surging inclinometers
readings, waler beam buckling, stiffener plates buckling, ground settlement,
trespass of water and soils into the excavation through cracks in diaphragm
walls, failure of concrete corbels, wailing waler beams, falling support brackets,
plunging strain gauge readings, and the (“thung”) sounds of distress over 6
hours on 20 April 2004 from the heart of the strutting system.
254. Time took its toll. 3.30 pm 20 April 2004 – Nicoll Highway collapsed.
Page 150
5.4 CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE: INSTRUMENTATION AND MONITORING

SYSTEM IN C824
255. Another significant contributing cause to the collapse involves the

instrumentation and monitoring system in C824. We set out in this part a
detailed appreciation of the instrumentation and monitoring program, its
execution and our findings. Our findings essentially show a failure to institute a
regular, close and effective monitoring regime. There were repeated breaches
of the instrumentation levels at Type M3.
256. Our findings in respect of instrumentation and monitoring are set out in
paragraphs 300 to 317.
Instrumentation Layout
257. The instrumentation and monitoring system in the C824 project included the
following instruments:
• settlement markers, to measure vertical movement of ground and/or

structures;
• vibrating wire piezometers, to measure pore water pressures at various
depths in the retained soil and below excavations;
• inclinometers, installed in and behind the diaphragm walls to measure wall
and soil movement; and
• load cells, to measure strut loads automatically on an hourly basis, strain
gauges, to measure strut loads automatically on an hourly basis,
258. The locations of the different instruments are shown in Figure 5.36.
259. An effective instrumentation system is crucial for determining and monitoring the
performance of construction, particularly for deep excavations in soft ground.
The requirements for instrumentation are given in the LTA Design Criteria Part
C, Chapter 19. The purposes of the instruments are stated as:
• Verify the assumptions made in the design;
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Figure 5.36 Instrumentation layout around the collapse area at M2 & M3 area.
• Provide confirmation of the predicted behaviour of the support system

during excavation or tunneling;
• Assess the effects of the work on buildings, utilities and other structures;
• Provide sufficient information to determine how and why the work is
affecting buildings, structures and utilities;
• Provide a record of performance;
• Enable construction to be carried out safely and soundly at every stage; and
• Where required, enable appropriate contingency measures to be
implemented in time.
Trigger, Design and Allowable Levels & Procedure
260. Under LTA’s Particular Specifications, there were three review levels to every
instrument installed at the worksite, namely trigger, design and allowable levels
(in ascending order of criticality). The review levels were pre-determined prior to
the commencement of construction work.
• Design level: the maximum/minimum reading anticipated based on design

calculation;
• Trigger level: a predetermined level prior to design level (in C824, the trigger
level was set equal to 70% of the design level); and
• Allowable level: the maximum/minimum value consistent with the

requirements of the contract.
261. In respect of the instrumentation and monitoring regime, LTA’s Particular

Specifications had set out definite and structured procedures in the event that
instrument readings encroached or breached the various review levels.
262. If the reading reached the trigger level, NLCJV should meet up with LTA and
review the instrumentation data. If the result of the review indicated that the
design level was likely to be exceeded, NLCJV should reassess the design. If it
was considered that the allowable level could be reached or exceeded, builder
should propose and implement remedial measures to ensure that the allowable
level was not reached. In other words, the allowable level was the ultimate level
and should never be exceeded.
Page 152
263. If the reading on any instrument reached the design level, NLCJV should meet
up with LTA and review the data obtained. NLCJV should also reassess the
design. If it was considered that the allowable level could be reached or
exceeded, NLCJV should propose and implement remedial measures to ensure
that the allowable level was not reached.
264. If the reading on any instrument reached, exceeded, or could be expected to

reach the allowable level, LTA should be informed immediately. NLCJV should
immediately make the related part of the construction work safe, and then cease
work until the remedial measures have been accepted by LTA and
implemented.
265. The above procedure as indicated in LTA’s Particular Specifications for

instrumentation monitoring control was also generally depicted in a flow chart
within NLCJV’s Temporary Works Quality Management Plan (Figure 5.17)
266. Piezometers measure changes in pore water pressure; the review levels for the
piezometers were determined based on seepage analyses. In C824, the design
levels for the piezometers were set at 30 kPa below the ambient pore water
pressure. This translated into a maximum permissible groundwater drawdown of
about 3m.
267. The review levels for the inclinometers and the strut monitoring were
determined based on results from the Plaxis analyses. For the inclinometers,
the design level was set equal to the maximum deflection calculated by Plaxis
for the entire construction period - from excavation to back-filling. The design
level for strut was set equal to the maximum load computed in the Plaxis
analysis.
268. In C824, the review levels for inclinometer readings have been reduced to two
levels, i.e. trigger and design levels. The design and allowable levels for
inclinometer readings have been merged and thus, the design level stipulated
has to be regarded as the ultimate level.
Page 153
Subcontractor for instrumentation
269. Two sub-contractors were involved in collecting the instrumentation data - L&M
Geotechnic Pte Ltd (“L&M”) and Monosys (S) Pte. Ltd. (“Monosys”).
(a) L&M was the subcontractor for the bored piling and jet grouting works in
C824. In addition, it had also subcontracted to undertake the installation
and data collection for all geotechnical instruments in C824. The
instruments supplied and installed by L&M were inclinometers, vibrating
wire piezometers, tilt meters, crack meters, heave meters, settlement
markers.
(b) Monosys was the subcontractor for the real-time monitoring (Automatic
Monitoring) of the strutting system in C824. The scope of work included
the supply and installation of strain gauges. Load cells and pressure
transducers were installed on Levels 1 to 5 by NLCJV. For Levels 6 to 9,
the pressure transducers were replaced by strain gauges.
The real-time strut load monitoring system
270. The strut forces were monitored by an automated data-acquisition system. The
data logger was configured to scan the strain gauges and pressure transducers
automatically at hourly intervals. The raw data in micro-strain were stored in an
on-site data logger. A computer system installed at the LTA office automatically
retrieved the raw data from the data logger, also at hourly interval. These data
were converted into strut loads and stored on a database called Insite. The
individual readings of the struts at Insite could be accessed by both LTA and
NLCJV. In addition to the hourly automatic retrieval of data, the system at LTA
could access the data-logger by manual dial-up at any time. The system at
NLCJV did not have the manual dial-up feature.
271. Monosys would also configure each strut with the relevant trigger and design
levels. These review levels were provided by NLCJV. When the trigger levels
were breached, the system would send an alarm message to a list of NLCJV &
Page 154
LTA personnel via email. The content of the emails include the reference and
the load (in kN) for struts which had exceeded the trigger level.
272. Monosys developed a system that converted the raw data to strut loads using
simple in-cell formulae on the EXCEL spreadsheet platform. The system could
not automatically detect faulty or malfunctioning strain gauges. Faulty strain
gauges had to be detected manually. This manual detection and correction
were done once in the morning, daily. Any strain gauges that malfunctioned
after the morning inspection would not be detected, until the following day. The
system did not have automatic error detection and correction capabilities and
was not effective as a real-time monitoring system.
Competency and Qualification of Instrumentation Personnel or Subcontractors
L&M Personnel
273. The L&M instrumentation monitoring team for the C824 contract comprised a
project manager, a supervisor and three workers. The supervisor, C
Balasubramani, worked as a quantity surveyor when he first joined L&M. He
had no formal training on instrumentation, except for six months of ‘on-the-job’
training stint whilst working on a sewerage project.
274. The workers hired by L&M to take readings had no experience in

instrumentation but were trained by Balasubramani to do the job.
275. The project manager, Mr Chee Thiam Chye, William was previously a land
surveyor. He was assigned as the Project Manager for the instrumentation team
in Sept 2003 after his predecessor, Mr Robert Teoh, left the company. He had
neither expertise nor experience in instrumentation or data-processing but was
put in charge of instrumentation monitoring for two worksites, including C824.
Page 155
Monosys Personnel:
276. Mr Sarangapani Jayakumar (Jayakumar) was employed by Monosys as a

system analyst. He has a diploma in computer application but was not trained in
instrumentation and monitoring. Despite the lack of any relevant expertise, he
was put in charge of the day to day control and maintenance of the entire strut
monitoring system. The reliability of the system was critically dependent on the
proper working of the strain gauges. Jayakumar did not know how to detect and
diagnose whether the strain gauges were malfunctioning.
277. As a system analyst, Jayakumar was responsible for ensuring that the
Automatic Real Time Monitoring System installed at the two computer systems
(one each at the site offices of LTA and NLCJV) work properly. He also had a
very critical role of checking and modifying the formulae for calculating strut
loads from the strain gauge readings. His lack of understanding and knowledge
had resulted in errors in the measured strut loads.
278. Jayakumar was on leave from 27 Feb 2004 to 17 March 2004. During his
absence, his project manager, Mr Tang Chee Loong, took over his duties. Tang
has a degree in civil engineering, but had no knowledge of instrumentation. He
could not even appreciate the significance of whether the strain gauges were
installed before or after the preloading of struts. In the course of the Inquiry, it
was found that the strain gauges at strut S3357 were installed, under Tang’s
watch, after the strut had been preloaded. The strain gauges were not properly
calibrated. Three of the four strain gauges were not functioning. The
ineffectiveness of Tang during that period required Jayakumar to be recalled
from leave on 6 March to rectify the problem. This incident had contributed
significantly to the errors in the measured loads in struts S3357 and S3358.
Relevant Instrumentation Readings
279. For the purposes of this Inquiry, the most relevant instruments located at Type
M3 area are the following :
Page 156
(a) Vibrating wire piezometer GW(V)24 installed within the excavated area
but below the base of the excavation (at a depth of about 38m), and
piezometer GW(V)25 installed outside the excavated area;
(b) Inclinometer I-65, which was installed within the north diaphragm wall
panel, and inclinometer I-104 located in the ground south of the wall
panels (on the south side) and next to struts S335; and
(c) Strain gauges and load cells installed on struts S335. At the time of
accident, the strain gauge at the lowest level (10th) of S335 has not
been installed.
Ground settlement
280. The data from the ground settlement markers are presented in Figure 5.37. The
plots indicate the following:
The settlement point L111 adjacent to the collapse area exceeded the trigger
value by 28 January 2004. The 66 kV junction box, Crawford Bridge and
Merdeka Bridge exceeded the trigger values by 14 January 2004.
L111 settlement increased very rapidly beginning from early January 2004 and
reached a value of more than 250 mm by April 2004. The period of rapid ground
settlement coincided with the time when the piezometer GW(V)25 indicated
rapid drop in pore pressure.
Piezometers to monitor groundwater pressure
281. Two piezometers were installed in the area of collapse. GW(V)24 was installed
within the excavation, next to the north wall, at 64.4 mRL in the Old Alluvium. At
GW(V)25, two piezometers were installed at different depths outside the
excavation on the north side approximately 5m from the diaphragm wall at 85.4
and 72.4 mRL. The lower piezometer was at the base of the Marine Clay.
Material at this level was described as medium dense silty fine to coarse sand in
the nearest borehole ABH30. The upper piezometer was installed in the Marine
Clay or F2 clay layer.
Page 157
A plot of vertical ground settlement for settlement markers in the

Figure 5.37
vicinity of the collapse.
282. Water pressures measured in both piezometers are plotted in Figure 5.38. The
trigger value set for GW(V)25 in Upper Marine Clay was breached between the
25 December 2003 and 1 February 2004. The piezometer in the Fluvial
Sands/Old Alluvium breached the trigger level on the 16 October 2003.
283. GW(V)24, which was the only piezometer inside the excavation, hit trigger level
on 20 February 2004. It could not be monitored on 26 February 2004 due to
suspected cable damage when the excavation had reached the sixth level. This
particular piezometer was not reinstated to working condition up to the day of
collapse. The experts agreed that GW(V)24, which was installed below the base
of the excavation, had given an indication of the pore water pressures present
beneath the excavation at the Type M3 area.
Inclinometers
284. The deflection profiles of I-65 and I-104 for the entire excavation are combined
in Figure 5.39. The maximum readings for I-65 and I-104 between 23 February
2004 and 20 April 2004 are tabulated in Table 5.9 and the six deflection profiles
within the same period are shown Figure 5.40. The trend of increase in the
maximum deflection is shown in Figure 5.41. Both inclinometers had exceeded
the design levels by 20 February 2004. Up to the Level 6 excavation, both I-65
and I-104 showed similar deflection profiles.
285. For excavations below Level 7, I-65 showed very little movement, but I-104
recorded significant increases in deflection.
286. There are three distinct steps in the development of the displacement profiles in
I-104, with significant increases in horizontal displacement occurring between
the periods of 25 February to 4 March, 9 to 26 March 2004, and 17 to 20 April
2004. The last two readings taken for I-104 were on 17 April 2004 at 1456 hrs
and on 20 April 2004 at 1312 hrs. The maximum displacements were about 350
mm and 440 mm respectively.
287. The data from inclinometers I-65 and I-104 for the 10 days prior to the collapse
shows striking differences in behaviour. After 19 March 2004, the displacements
of I-65 (which reflected the deflection of panel M302) were reversed, the wall
Page 158
Figure 5.38 A plot of groundwater levels for vibrating wire piezometers GW(V)25 and GW(V)24.
Source : Fig 24a of AVIVA Supplementary Expert Report
Profile of inclinometer I-104 and I-65 showing horizontal

Figure 5.39 displacement between 8 July 2003 and 20 April 2004 and initial
trigger values.
Table 5.9 : Readings of Inclinometers I-65 and I-104 in mm from 20 Feb 2004 to 20 Apr
2004
I65 Date I104 I65 Date I104
- 20-Feb-04 - 199.74 22-Mar-04 -
151.12 21-Feb-04 156.03 199.8 23-Mar-04 -
- 22-Feb-04 158.17 200.11 24-Mar-04 -
159.2 23-Feb-04 158.49 197.6 25-Mar-04 -
161.17 24-Feb-04 163.04 201.9 26-Mar-04 281.75
160.97 25-Feb-04 164.07 - 27-Mar-04 -
165.13 26-Feb-04 - 193.66 28-Mar-04 290.62
165.02 27-Feb-04 - - 29-Mar-04 295.47
171.09 28-Feb-04 - 193.7 30-Mar-04 302.1
- 29-Feb-04 - 191.07 31-Mar-04 301.23
170.78 1-Mar-04 - 191.03 1-Apr-04 302.85
- 2-Mar-04 - 191.53 2-Apr-04 -
171.29 3-Mar-04 - 189.91 3-Apr-04 311.97
- 4-Mar-04 212.75 189.46 4-Apr-04 315.02
197.94 5-Mar-04 212.47 188.03 5-Apr-04 317.05
196.35 6-Mar-04 210.92 188.05 6-Apr-04 318.12
197.09 7-Mar-04 213.95 189.58 7-Apr-04 319.63
- 8-Mar-04 - - 8-Apr-04 322.15
197.67 9-Mar-04 214.75 - 9-Apr-04 324.27
197.65 10-Mar-04 - 183.51 10-Apr-04 325.33
198.23 11-Mar-04 - 182.62 11-Apr-04 325.41
198.77 12-Mar-04 - - 12-Apr-04 -
200.3 13-Mar-04 - - 13-Apr-04 -
- 14-Mar-04 - - 14-Apr-04 -
- 15-Mar-04 - - 15-Apr-04 325.2
204.79 16-Mar-04 - 180.87 16-Apr-04 -
204.56 17-Mar-04 - 183.96 17-Apr-04 349.81
204.37 18-Mar-04 - - 18-Apr-04 -
201.67 19-Mar-04 - 176.77 19-Apr-04 -
202.4 20-Mar-04 - 175.01 20-Apr-04 440.55
- 21-Mar-04 -
Source : Aviva EP
Source : Aviva EP
Figure 5.40(a) Inclinometers I-104 & I-65 profiles from 23 Feb 2004 to 26 Mar 2004.
Source : Aviva EP
Figure 5.40(b) Inclinometers I-104 & I-65 profiles from 6 Apr 2004 to 20 Apr 2004.
450.00
400.00 I65
359 mm
I104
350.00 Trigger values
Design values
300.00
253 mm 251 mm
250.00
200.00
177 mm
150.00
145 mm
100.00
101 mm
50.00 S6 preload S7 preload S8 preload S9 preload
Excav 7th level Excav 8th level Excav 9th level Excav 10th
0.00 l l
1-Mar-04
3-Mar-04
5-Mar-04
7-Mar-04
9-Mar-04
11-Mar-04
13-Mar-04
15-Mar-04
17-Mar-04
19-Mar-04
21-Mar-04
23-Mar-04
25-Mar-04
27-Mar-04
29-Mar-04
31-Mar-04
2-Apr-04
4-Apr-04
6-Apr-04
8-Apr-04
10-Apr-04
12-Apr-04
14-Apr-04
16-Apr-04
18-Apr-04
20-Apr-04
20-Feb-04
22-Feb-04
24-Feb-04
26-Feb-04
28-Feb-04
Source : Aviva EP
Figure 5.41 Measured maximum movements and design values for I-104 and I-65.
was being pushed back into the retained side of the ground. Prior to the
collapse, the maximum horizontal wall displacement for I-65 was less than 200
mm.
288. The experts agreed that the inclinometer I-104 gave a reasonable picture of the
movement of the diaphragm wall in the vicinity of panel number M307 (south
side) up to the time of collapse. They also agreed that the maximum
displacement recorded by the inclinometer was approximately correct, and that
the movement of the toe of the wall could be under-estimated by the
inclinometer as it was installed in the soil. The 15% reduction applied to the I-
104 reading (as adopted in the back analyses) was not appropriate for
estimating the movements of the diaphragm walls.
Strut Load Monitoring
289. At strut S335, forces were measured using load cells for Levels 1 to 5 and strain
gauges at Levels 6 to 9. The measured loads using load cells were generally
correct, but the four levels of struts using strain gauges were not reliable. Errors
in the strut loads were not detected until after the collapse.
290. The raw data of the strain gauges at S335 located in the M3 area was re-
analysed by a sub-group of expert. They proposed a revision of the initial
readings for S335 at Levels 7, 8 and 9. The re-interpreted strut load is shown in
Figure 5.42. The loads shown are for double struts, i.e. load per 4 m run of the
wall. The errors in the measured strut loads discovered in the Inquiry include:
• Strut S3356 (Level 6): Only two strain gauges instead of four were
installed. The readings were doubled to obtained the final values
• Strut S3357 (Level 7): The strain gauges were installed after the
preloading and hence the measured load would not be correct. Out of
the four strain gauges, three were faulty and the load was derived based
on only one gauge reading. The coefficient for the formula to calculate
the strut load was also wrongly entered as 2.242 instead of the correct
value of 3.028. This resulted in 25% error in the measured strut load.
Page 159
Source : Aviva EP
Figure 5.42 Measured strut load in S335 for struts at levels 7, 8 and 9.
• Strut S3358 (Level 8): One of the four strain gauges showed was not
responding but was nonetheless included in the strut load calculation.
The coefficient for calculating strut load was wrongly entered as 3.028
instead of the correct value of 2.242. Consequently, the measured strut
load was approximately one-third greater.
• Strut S3359 (Level 9): One of the four strain gauges was faulty. The
remaining three gauge readings were used to calculate the load.
After the collapse, calibration tests were conducted on a strut instrumented with
strain gauges. The load measured by the strain gauges was found to be lower
than the actual load. The difference ranges from 58% for a 30 ton force to 5.5%
for a 300 ton force
291. The experts believed that the strain gauges gave a reasonable indication of the
trend in the changes of the load. However, even after the correction, some
uncertainties remained as to the overall magnitude of load. The lack of reliability
in the strut load monitoring can be attributed to several reasons which are set
out below:
Preloading periods: the readings were taken at hourly intervals and so

might have missed the maximum applied loads.
The load recorded by the strut load monitoring system shortly after
preloading was generally much lower than the design preloads. The
reason for this was not known. Detailed analysis of the results showed
that they did not drop appreciably from the first hourly reading taken
after preloading. It therefore appears that the reason for load reduction
was not related to wall movement due to soil creep or consolidation.
The precise sequence of preloading might have had some effect on the
sustained preloads and it is possible that they varied considerably from
one strut to another.
It is believed that the strain gauges give a reasonable indication of the

trend in the changes of the load. However, some uncertainties remained
as to the overall magnitude of load.
Page 160
292. The measured load on the Strut S335 on Levels 7 to 9 on 20 April 2004 are
presented in Figure 5.43. The key points from these plots are as follows:
• The design preload for Strut S3358 was about 7400 kN. The preload
was applied on the night of 18 March 2004 but the monitoring system
only indicated a maximum value of 2400 kN. It decreased to
approximately 1500 kN the next day. The load started to increase after
24 March 2004 and reached approximately 3600 kN just before the
Level 9 strut was installed, after which it dropped down to approximately
3000 kN. Immediately before the failure, it rose rapidly to 6600 kN.
• The raw data for strain gauge at S3359 showed that the zero datum
before preloading was clearly recorded. The data appear to be a
consistent, reliable set. In the absence of other information, the data
could well give an accurate record of the force in the strut pair S3359.
• The design preload for Strut S3359 was 6100 kN. The preload was
applied on 5 April 2004. The monitoring system only showed a maximum
value of 2730 kN, which dropped to 1250 kN in the evening of the same
day.
• The force in S3359 increased rapidly as the excavation approached the

location of the strut on 17/18 April 2004. The increase then stopped and
was followed by a slight drop on 19 April 2004. This load change pattern
was different from that seen at the other strut levels, where the rapid
increase was followed by a more gradual reduction in the rate of
increase. This might indicate that S335-9 started to yield as the
excavation passed it on 17/18 April 2004. There was no data for a
critical 12 hour period from 18:00 hrs on 17 April 2004 to 06:00 hrs on 18
April 2004 when the excavation passed under the strut S335
• At about 9 a.m. on 20 April 2004, the strut load in S3359 remained at

approximately 3500 kN per double strut, significantly less than the
predicted design calculation. The strut load monitoring data recorded at
10 am on 20 April 2004 showed that the load in strut S3359 had
Page 161
Source : Aviva EP
Figure 5.43 Strut forces in S335 (levels 7, 8 & 9) on 20 April 2004.

decreased slightly (approximately 5%) when compared to the load

recorded over the previous 40 hours.
• An hour later, the strut load in strut S3359 had dropped significantly.
Over the next 4 hours, it decreased almost linearly with time until the last
recorded reading at 3pm showed that only approximately 20% of the
initial load prior to the commencement of the collapse process remained
in the strut. The excavation collapsed at approximately 3.30 pm.
• Concurrent with the load decreasing at strut S3359, the monitored load
in strut S3358, immediately above strut S3359, increased. The load
recorded in strut S3357 decreased slightly, which was consistent with
strut S3358 being loaded and the wall rotating around strut S3358. The
load increased in strut S3358 was the sum of the load loss in struts
S3359 and S3357. This implies that all the loads were shed to strut
S3358 and the JGP layer below the excavation level practically provided
no further resistance.
Reporting and Review of Monitoring Data
293. A proper interpretation of the instrumentation data in the light of design

predictions and construction performance evaluation is part of the
instrumentation and monitoring programme. Contract C824 has clear
requirements with regard to the reporting of data, clause 6.1.4.4 of the Particular
Specification states, inter alia:
“The Contractor shall review all monitoring data and check for readings
or trends of concern.
An interpretative monitoring report shall be submitted to the Engineer

weekly. The report shall summarise the results of the monitoring,
including any exceedance of review levels. The report shall also
assess whether the monitoring is confirming the design assumptions
and predictions, and whether design levels could be exceeded. Where
necessary, the report shall include recommendations for alerting the
design of the works, or the method or sequence of construction.“
Page 162
294. The cumulative volume of instrumentation in the course of construction was

enormous with excavation progressing on several fronts. It is a common
problem on major construction projects that a large amount of factual data is
generated at frequent intervals thus making the critical interpretation activity
difficult to carry out in a systematic fashion. To assist in this aspect, in C824, a
weekly instrumentation review meeting was held where the results from the
monitoring programme were presented and discussed between representatives
of NLCJV, LTA and the instrumentation monitoring sub-contractors.
295. The inaugural Instrumentation Review Meeting was held on 8 January 2002.
The last recorded meeting before the collapse of the cut and cover tunnel was
Meeting No 86, held on 16 April 2004. There were several major incidents e.g.
Launch Shaft at Boulevard Siding (BLS), Type K Wall, cracking of buildings at
Beach Road and Arab Street where the review levels were exceeded. The
parties were alerted to the incidents, they were sufficiently covered and
monitored in the Instrumentation Review Meetings but no little attention was
given to the M3 area. This is encapsulated in the Table below.
Meeting No. Observation/comments of minutes of meetings

Date
Early March • It did not record that the observed movements in the M3
2004 section were generally below design levels although the
results from the soil inclinometer I-104 were "under review".
• There was no mention of missing readings between 26

February 2004 and 3 March 2004.
• There was no sign of level of concern or urgency as the back

analysis of the M3 tunnel had been carried out by NLCJV and
was reviewed by LTA.
No 81 • LTA expressed concern with the wall deflection and ground

4 March 2004 settlement at M3 particularly near the 66 kV cable.
• The inclinometer readings for the two inclinometers were

about 200 mm on 9 March 2004 and they have exceeded the
revised trigger value (177 mm) but less than the design value
Page 163
(253 mm).
• There was no recorded comment on this fact in either the

Instrumentation or the Design Meetings held at this time.
No 83 • The only entry for the monitoring of the M3 tunnel, records

5 March 2004 that "I-65 within the revised deflection level" (sic).
• The wall movement measured I-65 remained at around 200

mm but there was no mention or concern on the I-104 when
readings were missing for 2 weeks.
• When I-104 was read on 26 March 2004, it registered 281.75

mm, an increase of about 67 mm in two weeks.
No 84 • Very similar in respect of the discussion on the data from the

1 April 2004 M2 and M3 tunnel sections. I-65 was noted as being within
the revised design level and that I-104 had exceeded the
revised design level and that the results of I-104 were being
No 85
reviewed.
8 April 2004
• It was also recorded that the deflection at JGP level was
within design, presumably basing on I-65 only.
No 86 • At this meeting prior to the collapse. The following entries are

16 April 2004 noted in the minutes: "NLCJV reported I-102 (Type M2)
deflection within revised design for 8th level" and for tunnel
section M3: “I-65 within revised deflection level ”
296. The I-104 reading for 15 April 2004 indicated a maximum lateral wall movement
of almost 325 mm. It had exceeded the revised trigger value (251 mm) but was
still less than the design value of 359 mm. Again, there was no record of the
reading at I-104 being discussed at the 86th meeting.
297. The readings obtained after the installation of the pre-load in early April 2004
appeared to be unusually low and could be indicative of potential errors in the
readings, but there was no record of any abnormal readings in the strut loads or
potential problem with strut load measurements in the M3 area being presented
or discussed at the Instrumentation Review Meetings.
Page 164
298. There was also no record of any piezometer readings from within or around the
M3 excavation being discussed in the Instrumentation Review Meetings.
299. There was no record of any discussion on the excavation in tunnel M3 being
suspended based on the readings obtained from the instrumentation and
monitoring programme. The minutes of the Instrumentation Review Meetings
contains a legend that flagged the status of any agreed actions. The legend
included an entry for "Important Issues". The minutes of meetings held in April
2004 contained no entry on instrumentation under “important issues”.
COI’s Findings on the parties’ appreciation and application of instrumentation

data
300. The instrumentation personnel did not appreciate the importance of the trigger
and design levels. Critical information such as trigger and design levels were
communicated either verbally or on handwritten scraps of paper.
301. The instrumentation team has no appreciation of the importance and meaning
of the instrumentation reading. A case in point is the strut monitoring system
where the extremely low loads were recorded soon after the preloading.
302. Erroneous instrumentation readings can have severe consequences. For

example, on the morning of 20 April 2004 when Andy Wong reported waler
buckling at M3, TB Liew checked the “real-time” strut loads. He found the strut
load readings were within design capacity. This might have lulled the people on
site to believe that the strutting system was still safe.
303. Unsatisfactory work coordination: The need to ensure that strain gauges were
installed and commissioned before the preloading of the strut was not
adequately appreciated and understood. There was only an ad hoc
arrangement between NLCJV and Monosys to coordinate strain gauge
installation. The lack of proper work procedures and diligent compliance had
resulted in occasions where gauges were installed after preloading.
304. It is not unusual for the instrumentation and monitoring programme of major
construction works to provide data that differ from the design prediction.
Page 165
However, when a large number of instruments exceeded the design levels, it

should alert the relevant parties that a fundamental re-assessment was
necessary.
305. It is now known that the form of the numerical modelling undertaken at the
design stage underestimated the magnitude of lateral wall displacements for
deep excavations in soft clay. This was quickly borne out the rapid exceedance
of inclinometer readings as excavation reached deeper levels.
306. The particular specification and TWQP required the works would be suspended
once the instrumentation readings exceeded the design levels. This was not
followed in C824.
307. From March 2004 to the day of collapse, the cracking of shop houses along
Arab Street and Bussorah Street due to ground settlement had diverted
resources and attention of all the parties to that area. Consequently, less
attention was given to the excessive deflections at the M3 area.
308. When the piezometer readings at GW(V)24 reached the trigger level on 20
February 2004, it did not appear to have triggered any action. The damage to
GM(V)24 was not attended to. This piezometer performed a very critical function
of monitoring the hydraulic pressure below the excavation. It has serious safety
implication.
309. The inclinometers I-65 and I-104 were showing dissimilar readings from 5
March 2004 till the day of collapse. This had invalidated the assumption of
symmetry adopted in the original Plaxis calculation. However, NLCJV designers
continued to carry out their back analysis assuming symmetric wall sections.
This demonstrated vividly the lack of understanding and application of the
instrumentation data. It demonstrated the under-utilization of instrumentation
data for safe monitoring of construction.
310. By 17 April 2004, the deflection profile of the inclinometer I-104 showed region
with high curvature. NLCJV did not carry out a curvature check on the
diaphragm wall to assess the possible occurrence of plastic hinges. The
existence of the plastic hinge should have been included in the back analysis.
This was not done.
Page 166
311. JGP is a highly brittle material; it would exhibit significant strain softening once
the peak strain is exceeded. The readings from both I-65 and I-104 clearly
indicated that the two JGP layers had come under tremendous compressive
strain. A simple calculation would have shown that the strain had exceeded the
permissible limits. There was no evidence that the designers had carried out
such a check. There was no evidence that the designers were alive to the
danger of over-straining of the JGP.
312. The diaphragm deflections inferred from the I-65 and I-104 inclinometer
readings would suggest that the strutting system would be subjected to
significant compression. Yet, the strut monitoring system at S335 was giving
lower than expected strut loads. The incompatibility between the
instrumentation data from the inclinometers and the strain gauges called for
careful investigation. This was not done.
COI’s Findings on integrated management of data for construction safety
313. The instrumentation and monitoring programme is not merely a contractual

obligation. It serves to verify the design assumptions and predictions. It is also
to detect alarming trends and unsafe conditions. If there is no proper
management and use of the collected data, the instrumentation and monitoring
programme will not be effective.
314. For each of the instruments, review levels should be based on the respective
stage of the construction and not on the maximum value as in C824. To verify
that the system is performing as designed, measured response should be
checked against the design predictions.
315. In C824, emphasis was placed almost entirely on individual occurrence or

individual reading. There was not enough attention paid to analyse the trend or
rate of change of the instrumental reading. Early detection and examination of
any unusual trend or sudden change could provide an early warning to
impending problems.
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316. The instrumentation monitoring effort should go hand in hand with the hazard
identification and risk management programme. This would ensure that
appropriate emphasis and actions can be accorded. All parties and their staff
particularly those on the ground should be made aware of the importance and
significance of each measuring instrument.
317. The reading from each instrument should not be read in isolation as in the case
of C824 where the performance of the temporary retaining wall was based
entirely on the inclinometer reading. There was no integration of the information
from different instruments. To have a complete understanding of the
performance, the information on diaphragm wall deflection, strut forces, pore
water pressure should be collectively considered. This would enable a better
diagnosis when deviation from design predictions on these instruments happens
and thus enabling a more accurate risk assessment.
5.5 OTHER CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS
318. We now set out, in brief, the other contributory causes. These causes have
been discussed in greater detail in other parts of the Report.
Inconsistencies between Design Criteria and BS Codes
319. There was an apparent lack of consistency between the requirements of the
contract design criteria and specification and the Codes specified. BS8002 did
not cover design using finite element or the finite difference method whereas
clause 8.17.2 of the LTA Design criteria stated that “Braced excavation shall be
analysed by finite element or finite difference method”. A series of meeting
between LTA and NLCJV were held before the matter was resolved on 2
November 2001, where the design principles decided upon were “deemed to
comply with the requirements of BS8002 and the Design Criteria”.
320. We agree with the experts for NLCJV that such inconsistencies between
contract criteria / specifications and Codes of Practice and Standards would
impaired the clarity of the design principles adopted in C824. However, in
Page 168
respect to BS8002, the experts for the other parties have pointed out that
BS8002 did state the principle of checking that the structure is in equilibrium
with the mobilization factors on the soil strength, which in this case will be a
mobilization factor of 1.5.
321. NLC did not carried out a check to ensure that the structure is in equilibrium with
the mobilization factors on the soil strength. For undrained strength, BS8002
specified a mobilization factor of 1.5. In this respect, NLCJV’s final design did
not demonstrate compliance with BS8002.
322. The inconsistencies between contract specifications and BS Codes particularly

with respect to the appropriateness of using factored parameters in finite
element analysis had led to confusion over the interpretation and application of
the relevant factors of safety. The acceptance of a factor of safety of 1.2 for
design of the structural elements was premised on the assumption that the
worst credible soil parameters would be used in the Plaxis analysis. In the
event, the most probable soil parameters were used instead. As a result, the
temporary retaining wall system did not have the degree of robustness as
anticipated in the design principles agreed upon between LTA and NLCJV on 2
November 2001.
323. The design engineers in NCLJV were not familiar with the British Standards and
Codes. The lack of experience on the part of the design engineers with the
British Standards such as BS5950 has indirectly contributed to the design error
of the strut-waler connection.
Diaphragm wall: insufficient toe-embedment to ensure hydraulic cut-off
324. Maunsell had recommended through Dr Endicott’s review memorandum on 29

November 2001 that the toe embedment of the diaphragm wall should be more
than 2 m into OA with SPT > 60 in order to achieve proper cut off. This
recommendation was not adopted. Furthermore, Maunsel’s proposal of SPT
value of 60 as the basis for demarcating OA as drained or undrained materials
in the finite element analysis was not accepted. NLCJV was resistant to
Maunsell recommendation apparently because modelling OA as a drained
material had additional costs implications of $2 million.
Page 169
325. As a consequence of insufficient toe embedment designed on the basis of

Method A analysis, there was inadequate passive resistance. The complete
hydraulic cutoff assumed in the finite element analysis was also not realized in
the completed diaphragm wall. This would lead to increased hydraulic uplift
pressure and decreased passive resistance, and ground water lowering
resulting in ground settlement outside the excavation.
326. The diaphragm wall sub-contractor Bachy had constructed strictly in accordance
to the depth specified in the construction drawings. There was no procedure in
place during construction to adjust the diaphragm wall embedment to take
account of location variation in the OA elevation.
Special geometry of the diaphragm wall in the M3 area
327. The cut and cover tunnel at the M3 took on a curved alignment at the M3 area.
The tunnel width also increased as it approached the TSA shaft. This was not
modelled in the 2-D finite element analysis. The curved alignment forced a
change in the strutting arrangement. The diverging walls also resulted in the
strut to bear against wall obliquely. The non-symmetrical strut arrangement
would have resulted in uneven loading on the diaphragm wall panels, which
would in turn introduced bending moments at the strut. These factors were not
taken into account in the waler connection design.
66KV cable crossing disrupted continuity of diaphragm wall and JGP slab
328. The 66 kV cable crossing at M3 broke the continuity in the diaphragm walls.
This presence of the 66 kV cable also contributed significantly to the
construction difficulties of the diaphragm wall. As a result, the diaphragm wall
panels adjacent to the gap were thickened to withstand additional soil pressure.
The wall gap was bridged with in-situ concrete. As a result, walers were
introduced to span the infill wall, resulting in changes in the strutting system.
329. The 66 kV cable crossing also obstructed the construction of the JGP slabs.
Inclined drilling, originally proposed to ensure overlapping of the JGP columns,
Page 170
was not carried out. As a result, there was strong possibility that the JPG
columns below the cable crossing did not achieved sufficient overlap. This could
impair the strutting function of the JGP slab as envisaged in design.
Inadequate appreciation of complex ground conditions
330. The post tender soil investigation, particularly the piezocone tests at TSA
pointed to the potential existence of very deep soft clay layer at the M3 area.
This was not fully appreciated at the design stage. Insufficient attention was
given to the pre-tender settlement monitoring data which indicated that the clays
below the reclamation fills were still undergoing consolidation.
331. The contours of the lower marine clay derived from pre-construction information
and those based on pre- and post-collapse information are shown in Figure
5.44. The contours of the top of the OA are shown in Figure 5.45. These figures
clearly showed the presence of the deep buried channel which was not reflected
in the original construction drawing.
332. Figures 5.44 and 5.45 also showed the base of the lower marine clay layer was
deeper at the south wall. Even within the excavation, the top surface of the OA
sloped steeply. The assumption of symmetry across the excavation assumed in
the original Plaxis calculation was not appropriate.
333. The presence of the buried channel at Type M3 with a deeper lower marine or
estuarine clay layer with low shear strength was not anticipated in NLCJV’s
design. The computed soil loads which ignored the presence of this thicker soft
soil layer would under-estimate the actual loading on the temporary retaining
wall system.
Inappropriate choice of permeability value and drainage condition of OA
334. The choice of geotechnical and groundwater design parameters may have
resulted in under-prediction of the soil loads acting on the retaining walls. In
particular the decision on whether to treat OA as a drained or an undrained
material seemed to be motivated by monetary, rather than engineering,
Page 171
Source : NLC SR Fig 14.10
Figure 5.44(a) Contours on base of lower marine clay – pre-construction information at the site of collapse.
Figure 5.44(b) Contours on base of lower marine clay – pre- and post-collapse information at the site of collapse.
Figure 5.45(a) Contours on top of old alluvium – pre-construction information at the site of collapse.
Figure 5.45(b) Contours on top of old alluvium – pre- and post-collapse information at the site of collapse.
considerations. For OA layer with permeability greater than 10-6 m/s, the
assumption of undrained response was not appropriate. It would under-estimate
the pore pressure beneath the excavation and would over-estimate the passive
resistance.
Cutting of Tunnel Eyes in the TSA Shaft contributed to delay in 10th level strut
installation at M3
335. At M3, the hacking of the Tunnel Eyes was done from the excavation pit. The
original plan was to hack the tunnel eyes after the tunnel box had been
constructed. This change in construction sequence had caused a delay to the
installation of the 10th level struts. The presence of the breakers in the pit
added to the congestion in the M3 area which was already crowded with other
construction plants deployed for breaking the bored piles and JGP, which
contributed to added difficulty in strut installation.
Large spans of excavation was left unstrutted for considerable period of time
336. There were several complicating factors at work in the M3 area. These include
the removal of the sacrificial JGP layer, the presence of closely spaced large
diameter bored piles, and the hacking of the overcast pile sections. The limited
space available for excavation and mucking out of the spoils slowed the
progress of construction works.
337. Just prior to the collapse, only two temporary struts had been installed. Struts
S333-S340 at the 10th level in the M3 area were not installed. A span of 8 strut
bays was left unstrutted for a considerable period. The delay in strutting would
lead to small increased wall deflection and increased loading in struts which had
already been installed.
Page 172
Loss of preload in the Level 8 and Level 9 struts
338. The strain gauges on S335 indicated that there was a substantial drop in the
preload particularly for levels 8 and 9 of S335. One possible reason was the
ineffectiveness of the shimming process used. The drop in the retained pre-load
would have resulted in a small increase in the deflection of the diaphragm wall.
The loss of retained preload could cause additional loading on both JGP layers
and the soil below the excavation level on the passive side.
No One-Strut Failure Check in Back Analysis
339. Checking for one-strut failure ensured that the failure of a single strut would not
lead to collapse, assuming that other conditions complied with the design
assumptions. Rigorous compliance with a one-strut failure criterion could also
make the structure more robust. The one-strut failure should have been
considered in the back-analyses.
Lapse of Safety – Work Did Not Stop in The Face of Warnings at Worksite
340. There were instances of major lapses of safety. In particular, the parties
involved were not alert to the potential danger of the total collapse of the wall.
Andy Wong, Ng JT, Lee YT, Shimizu and TB Liew were all of the view that the
wall would not collapse on the morning of 20 April 2004 despite the
overwhelming signs that the key structural connections were failing.
341. The two back analyses conducted by NLCJV at the M3 areas clearly showed
that the capacities of key structural elements of the temporary retaining wall
system would be exceeded. The builder did not stop work despite the dire
warning signs in the results of the back analyses and the mounting danger
signals on site.
342. All the experts agreed that in the face of the “BA2-Type M3” results,
construction should not have proceeded.
Page 173
Failure to implement risk assessment
343. The risk associated with the failure of key structural elements such as plate
stiffeners have been identified in the risk assessment. It was classified therein
as a category A risk that could lead to the loss of the strutting system and
collapse of the retaining wall. The occurrence of waler buckling should have
triggered a design review to determine the causes such structural distress.
Instead, a change in the connection detail was initiated without a
comprehensive assessment of the potential cause of the structural steel
failures.
No independent design review
344. The change from plate stiffener to C-channel was a major design change. It
should have been subject to an independent review. This was not done.
Weakness in the management of construction changes
345. The omission of splay arose because of construction changes occasioned by

the condition in the M3 area. This error was not detected due to weakness in
the system of construction change management in the C824 project.
Instrumentation Monitoring System Not Effectively Used
346. An enormous amount of instruments were installed on site for construction

monitoring. Many of these instruments were installed in the wake of the many
incidents on site. Unfortunately, the resources for monitoring and interpretation
did not keep pace with the increased number of instruments deployed. The skill
levels of personnel engaged in instrumentation and monitoring fell short. This
was further aggravated by the need for close monitoring when large numbers of
inclinometers exceeded the design level.
Page 174
5.6 NON CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS
347. We find that the following are not contributory factors:
Construction Quality of Diaphragm Wall
348. Post collapse testing on recovered specimens from the diaphragm wall panels
showed that the concrete quality, rebar and bond strength generally met the
required standards stipulated in the specifications.
Construction Quality of Steelwork
349. Minor construction defects in the steelwork were observed at the areas adjacent
to the collapse site. These imperfections were unexceptional in such a deep
excavation environment. Numerical simulations conducted by experts showed
that such imperfections were not the major contributory factors of failure.
350. Post collapse, extensive tests were carried out on steel and welding specimens
obtained from the recovered steels structural elements. The tests generally
showed that the steelwork met the material specifications. However, the welding
quality was variable and a large proportion of the tested specimens failed to
meet the expected standards in this respect. Despite such shortcomings, the
welds on the struts recovered from the collapse appeared to have performed
satisfactorily.
Base Heave
351. Base heave failure, which is commonly associated with the flow of clay beneath
the retaining walls of an excavation, was not a factor in the collapse as the
diaphragm walls were taken to the Old Alluvium.
Page 175
Hydraulic Uplift
352. In the context of C824, basal failure caused by hydraulic uplift pressure should
be a major design consideration and it was a risk that necessitated monitoring
through instrumentation. The failure to reinstate the piezometer was a major
lapse that could have serious safety implication.
353. Hydraulic uplift was not a cause of the collapse. However, the design had
underestimated the water pressure below the base of the excavation. The
design for the M3 area had assumed an effective hydraulic cut-off which was
not realized on site. This was because the permeability of the OA was higher
than the value assumed in design. There was also a shortfall in the diaphragm
wall toe embedment
354. However, it should be pointed out that the results of the numerical analysis
indicated that the risk of failure due to hydraulic uplift may be likely. The high
pore water pressure below the excavation recorded by GW(V)24 before it failed
supports this possibility.
Piles within the Excavation
355. The piles, both bored piles and the kingposts, were beneficial towards the
structural integrity of the temporary retaining wall system. The presence of
these piles would have a positive effect on the passive restraint that could
reduce the loads on the strutting system. Hence, the bored piles were not
implicated in the failure.
Quality of the Jet Grout Piling (JGP) Slab
356. On the evidence at the Inquiry, the actual state of the two JGP layers
constructed at M3 could not be conclusively determined. Our observations on
the JGP are set out in Annex D.
Page 176

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Causes of the Collapse & Findings

Chapter 5 – CAUSES OF THE COLLAPSE &

THE CAUSES OF THE COLLAPSE

(i) The under-design of the diaphragm wall using Method A

The use of Method A in the C824 project to model the undrained

Method B should have been used in this circumstance. The use of

(ii) The under-design of the waler connection in two ways:

(a) NLCJV’s estimation of load on the waler connection for

(b) NLCJV’s design of the waler connection with C-channels

4. Splays were omitted at several of the connections at level 9 in M3 area. These

9. We will elaborate on these causes in the succeeding parts of this chapter.

11. The administrative errors are:

(c) failure to institute a regular and close monitoring regime;

(e) inadequate implementation of the hazard and consequence analysis;

(f) inadequate risk assessment for new or unfamiliar technologies and

(g) lack of safety management system;

(h) unresponsive organization and human factors;

(i) inadequate safety culture;

(j) unsafe acts and practices;

(k) production pressures to complete schedule regardless of safety

(l) poor teamwork and communication;

(m) poor engineering judgment in critical areas;

(n) untimely remedial work;

(a) Insufficient toe-penetration of the diaphragm walls;

(b) The occurrence of a plastic hinge in the diaphragm wall approximately 3

(c) Peculiar conditions at the M3 area which are:

(i) the presence of deep buried channel

(d) The instrumentation and monitoring system was ineffective;

(g) Lack of quality during construction; and

5.1 THE UNDER-DESIGN OF THE DIAPHRAGM WALL USING METHOD A

Plaxis Program (‘Plaxis’)

22. Plaxis is designed to perform numerical analyses of deformation and stability of

Drained versus Undrained Soil Behaviour

23. In geotechnical engineering, the response of a saturated soil to changes in

Material Types In Plaxis

Drained material type

Undrained material type

Non-porous Material Type

Material models in Plaxis

Mohr Coulomb Soil Model

Confining Stress p’, p

Source : E17.1 Pg 170

Mohr-coulomb failure model : undrained shear strengths derived from

Guidance in Plaxis Manual

“In Plaxis, it is possible to specify undrained behaviour in an effective

“This special option to model undrained material behaviour on the basis of

“In general, an effective stress analysis using the Undrained option in

“The reduction of mean effective stress during undrained loading is a

Table 5.1 Definitions of Methods A, B, C and D

Mohr- cu, φu E’, ν’ Effective stress and

D As in Method A, for other soil models

Calculation types in Plaxis

48. The consolidation calculation type refers to a stage involving consolidation or

flow and the volumetric consolidation or swelling of the ground caused by

Pore Water Pressure Distribution

50. Instead of determining the groundwater pressure distribution by seepage and

Material settings used in Plaxis for C824

“The application of undrained analysis with effective parameters is the

Implication of the use of Method A v. Method B on diaphragm wall design

Predicted Strut Load Design Strut Load

For C824, the use of Method A, instead of Method B, would result in an

When the Type M3 design wall section was analysed by adopting

M3 – predicted wall displacement profiles using Method A and