4.
The scope of horizontal accountability is limited to
An analysis of the horizontal and vertical
Accountability Measures in Phil Law, 57 Ateneo
Law Journal
Public accountability- existing when there is a
relationship where an individual or body and the
performance of task and functions, by the individual or
body are subject to others oversight direction or request
that they provide information or justification for their
actions.
Concept of Political accountability- a formalized
relationship of oversight sanctions of public official by
other actors. In relationship of political accountability, a
public official gives a reckoning discharge of his public
duties to actors that formally have the capacity to demand
such accounting and or to impose sanctions on the
officials.
Types of public accountability
1. Vertical 2. Horizontal 3. Social
1. Vertical accountability – connotes the traditional
concept of public accountability. It is the means
through which citizen, mass media and civil society
seek to enforce standards of good performance and
good conduct of officials.
2. Horizontal accountability- undertaken by the state
agency with the explicit purpose of preventing,
cancelling, redressing, or punishing actions by other
state agency that are deemed unlawful, whether on
the grounds of encroachment and corruption.
4 aspects of Horizontal Accountability
1. As the case of vertical accountability, the object of
horizontal accountability are the state agents.
2. Unlike vertical accountability, the subjects of
horizontal accountability are also the state agents.
3. The means of horizontal accountability include
oversight, sanctions and impeachment.
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
actions and omissions qualified as unlawful.
3. Social accountability -the wide range of citizens
and civil organizations actions to hold the state to
account, as well as actions on the part of the
government, media and other actors that promote or
facilitate these efforts.
1. Laurel v. Desierto G.R. No. 145368 April 12,
2002
Law on Public Officers, R. A.
3019
President Joseph Estrada issued A.O. No. 35, creating an ad
hoc and independent Citizens’ Committee to investigate all the
facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial
projects.
Among the Committee’s recommendations was “the
prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Laurel, chair of
National Centennial Commission (NCC) and of Expocorp for
violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of
centennial contracts to AK Corp.; for exhibiting manifest bias in
the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct
the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract
that has caused material injury to government and for
participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the
funds infused by the government for the implementation of the
said contracts all in violation… of the anti-graft law.”
Probable cause was found to indict respondents SALVADOR H.
LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEÑA before the Sandiganbayan for
conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in
relation to Republic Act No. 1594.” The resolution also directed
that an information for violation of the said law be filed against
Laurel and Peña.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with
respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge against Peña.
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the
ground that he is not a public officer as defined by R.A. No.
3019 and that NCC was not a public office.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was a public officer.
RULING: YES.
by: Justice Merzy
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
however, defines who public officers are. A definition of public
officers cited in jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem, a
recognized authority on the subject:
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem,
include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by
law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the
position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as
an office.
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not
present in the position of NCC Chair, namely: (1) the
delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he
purportedly did not receive any compensation; and (3)
continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of
the sovereign functions of government as “[t]he most
important characteristic” in determining whether a position is a
public office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes
an office from an employment or contract is that the
creation and conferring of an office involves a
delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign
functions of government, to be exercised by him for
the benefit of the public; – that some portion of the
sovereignty of the country, either legislative,
executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to
be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers
conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a
public officer.
Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign
functions of government? Certainly, the law did not delegate
upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or
judicial.
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The
executive power “is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.”
The executive function, therefore, concerns the
implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
The NCC was precisely created to execute the policies and
objectives, to carry them into effect.
Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support
in In Re Corliss. There the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States
Centennial Commission is an “office of trust” as to disqualify its
holder as elector of the United States President and Vice-
President.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs
executive functions and is, therefore, a public office, we need
no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is
a private or a public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
is a private corporation, petitioner’s position as CEO of
Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC.
Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp must
be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC
Chair.
A “public officer,” under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2
of said law as follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms. – As used in this Act, the
term –
xxx
(b) “Public officer” includes elective and appointive
officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption
service receiving compensation, even nominal, from
the government as defined in the preceding
paragraph. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a
“public officer” is expressly limited to the application of R.A.
No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of
determining the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, as defined by the
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer
under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act involves the
appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters
that are best resolved at trial.
To illustrate, the use of the term “includes” in Section 2 (b)
indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define
“public officers.”
Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides
that a public officer is:
x x x any person who, by direct provision of law,
popular election or appointment by competent
authority, takes part in the performance of public
functions in the Government of Philippines, or
performs in said Government or in any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official, of any rank or class.
Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987, on the other hand, states:
Officer – as distinguished from “clerk” or “employee”,
refers to a person whose duties not being of a clerical
or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion
in the performance of the functions of the
government. When used with reference to a person
having authority to do a particular act or perform a
particular person in the exercise of governmental
power, “officer” includes any government employee,
by: Justice Merzy
 agent or body having authority to do the act or
exercise that function.
It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No.
6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees), one may be considered a “public
official” whether or not one receives compensation, thus:
“Public Officials” include elective and appointive
officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the career or non-career service including
military and police personnel, whether or not they
receive compensation, regardless of amount.
2. ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of
rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and
bounty hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration
of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives
invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the
people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of
rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. There is no valid basis for classification or
distinction as to why such a system should not apply to
officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates
the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a
sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c)
of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be
dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short
of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix
the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of
revenue targets has been delegated to the President without
sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President
to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss
BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional
oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine
of separation of powers. While the legislative function is
deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards
and incentives limitation to officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of
power to fix revenue targets to the President.
Rulings:
1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid
classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not
arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed
public policy is the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the
revenue- generation capability and collection of the
BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions
provided in the law should logically pertain to the said
agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR
and the BOC because they have the common distinct
primary function of generating revenues for the
national government through the collection of taxes,
customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special
function of being the instrumentalities through which the State
exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation.
Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and
intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards
to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and
the implementing agencies in carrying out the
provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said
Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following
as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and
equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and
“simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC is infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was
created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated
by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May
22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it
by: Justice Merzy
 became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence,
the issue of its alleged encroachment on the
executive function of implementing and enforcing the
law may be considered moot and academic.
G.R. No. 159813 August 9, 2006
TONY N. FIGUEROA and ROGELIO J. FLAVIANO,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
"Bangkerohan public market these days is no different from
the US Times Square. Bullies, thugs, hooligans and gyppers
roam with impunity, some using organizational clout as a ploy
to keep themselves from obvious exposure. Some leeches, like
a certain Aproniano "Rey" Rivera, our sources say, are lording
it over like the city's sprawling vegetable and meat complex
has become an apportioned bailiwick.
"Rivera, apparently a non-Visayan pseudobully flaunting with
his tag as president of a vendor's federation, has intimated a
good number of lowly hawkers. This is a confirmed fact, our
sources believe. And our independent eveasdroppers [sic] have
come with a similar perception of a man who continues to lead
a federation when, in the first place, he has no business being
in Davao or in Bankerohan.
Issue: Won Rivera is a public officer
Held: No.
The petition lacks merit.
In praying for their acquittal, petitioners attempt to pass off
the subject published article as one that portrays the condition
of the Bankerohan Public Market in general. Citing Jimenez v.
Reyes, 5 they challenge the finding of the two courts below on
the libelous or defamatory nature of the same article which, to
them, must be read and construed in its entirety. It is their
posture that the article was not directed at the private
character of complainant Aproniano Rivera but on the sorry
state of affairs at the Bankerohan Public Market.
Petitioners’ posture cannot save the day for them.
Our own reading of the entire text of the published article
convinces us of its libelous or defamatory character. While it is
true that a publication's libelous nature depends on its scope,
spirit and motive taken in their entirety, the article in question
as a whole explicitly makes mention of private complainant
Rivera all throughout. It cannot be said that the article was a
mere general commentary on the alleged existing state of
affairs at the aforementioned public market because Rivera
was not only specifically pointed out several times therein but
was even tagged with derogatory names. Indubitably, this
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
name-calling was, as correctly found by the two courts below,
directed at the very person of Rivera himself.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as follows:
Art. 353. Definition of libel. - A libel is a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means injuring a
person's character, fame or reputation through false and
malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure
reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or
confidence in the complainant or to excite derogatory feelings
or opinions about him. It is the publication of anything which is
injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends
to bring him into disrepute. 6
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer. The most important characteristic
which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract
is that the creation and conferring of an office involve a
delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions
of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country,
either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, to be
exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred
are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer. 8
Clearly, Rivera cannot be considered a public officer. Being a
member of the market committee did not vest upon him any
sovereign function of the government, be it legislative,
executive or judicial. As reasoned out by the CA, the operation
of a public market is not a governmental function but merely
an activity undertaken by the city in its private proprietary
capacity. Furthermore, Rivera's membership in the market
committee was in representation of the association of market
vendors, a non-governmental organization belonging to the
private sector.
Indeed, even if we were to pretend that Rivera was a public
officer, which he clearly is not, the subject article still would
not pass muster as Article 354(2), supra, of the Revised Penal
Code expressly requires that it be a "fair and true report, made
in good faith, without any comments or remarks." Even a mere
cursory glance at the article reveals that it is far from being
that.
Finally, petitioners assail the award by the two courts below of
moral damages and attorney's fees in favor of Rivera.
The assault must fail. Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code is
express in stating that moral damages may be recovered in
case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. From
the very publication and circulation of the subject defamatory
by: Justice Merzy
and libelous material itself, there can be no doubt as to the
resulting wounded feelings and besmirched reputation
sustained by complainant Rivera. The branding of defamatory
names against him most certainly exposed him to public
contempt and ridicule. As found by the trial court in its
judgment of conviction:
Complainant, when he read the subject publication, was
embarrass on what was written against him, made more
unpleasant on the occasion of the reunion of his son-in-law,
who just arrived from the United States for the first time, was
confronted of the above-defamatory publication. He was
worried and depressed, about the comments against him,
affecting his credibility and personality, as representative of
many market organizations in Davao City.
Having been exposed to embarrassment and ridicule
occasioned by the publication of the subject article, Rivera is
entitled to moral damages and attorney's fees.
5. JAVIER vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Javier was the private sector representative in the National
Book Development Board (NBDB), which was created by R.A.
8047, otherwise known as the “Book Publishing Industry
Development Act.” R.A. No. 8047 provided for the creation of
the NBDB, which was placed under the administration and
supervision of the Office of the President. The NBDB is
composed of eleven (11) members who are appointed by the
President, five (5) of whom come from the government, while
the remaining six (6) are chosen from the nominees of
organizations of private book publishers, printers, writers, book
industry related activities, students and the private education
sector.
Petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board for a term of
one year. During that time, she was also the President of the
Book Suppliers Association of the Philippines (BSAP). She was
on a holdover capacity in the following year. On September 14,
1998, she was again appointed to the same position and for
the same period of one year. Part of her functions as a
member of the Governing Board is to attend book fairs to
establish linkages with international book publishing bodies. On
September 29, 1997, she was issued by the Office of the
President a travel authority to attend the Madrid International
Book Fair in Spain on October 8-12, 1997. Based on her
itinerary of travel, she was paid P139,199.00 as her travelling
expenses. Unfortunately, petitioner was not able to attend the
scheduled international book fair.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Javier is a public officer.
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
HELD:
YES, Javier is a public officer.
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer.
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector
to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested her with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so
that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case,
the government aimed to enhance the book publishing
industry as it has a significant role in the national
development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the
public sector and not from the other branches or agencies of
the government does not take her position outside the
meaning of a public office.
The Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer
pursuant to the Anti Graft Law, which provides that a “public
officer” includes elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government.
Thus, pursuant to the Anti Graft Law, one is a public officer if
one has been elected or appointed to a public office. Petitioner
was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of the
NDBD.
Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code defines a “public
officer” as any person who, by direct provision of the law,
popular election or appointment by competent authority,
shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an
employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes
6. GR Nos. 208481-82, Feb 07, 2018 ]
OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. MARIA ROWENA
REGALADO
Facts:
Herein respondent Regalado was a public employee, holding
the position Immigration Officer I with the Bureau of
Immigration.[9]
In October 2006, Carmelita F. Doromal (Doromal), the owner
and administrator of St. Martha's Day Care Center and Tutorial
Center, Inc. (St. Martha's), went to the Davao Office of the
Bureau of Immigration to inquire about its letter requiring her
by: Justice Merzy
school to obtain an accreditation to admit foreign students.
There, she met Regalado, who told her that she needed to pay
P50,000.00 as "processing fee" for the accreditation. Doromal
commented that the amount was prohibitive. Regalado
responded that she could reduce the amount.[10] Citing a copy
of Office Memorandum Order No. RBR 00-57 of the Bureau of
Immigration, Regalado claimed that "the head office of the
Bureau of Immigration, through the Immigration Regulation
Division, ha[d] the authority to allow the accreditation at a
lower amount, depending on her recommendation."[11]
On April 7, 2007, Regalado called Doromal on the latter's
mobile phone asking if the school was "ready." Doromal
responded by saying that the school was ready for inspection,
but not to pay P50,000.00 as accreditation fee. Regalado
persuaded Doromal to pay P50,000.00 directly to her by
claiming that the cost of the inspection could soar as high as
P100,000.00 if it were to be don:e instead by officers coming
from the Bureau of Immigration's Manila Office, as Doromal
would still have to spend for the inspectors' plane fares,
billeting at the Marco Polo Hotel, and a special dinner on top of
the P50,000.00 "honorarium."[13] Regalado insisted on how
paying just P50,000.00 directly to her would benefit Doromal.
She explained, however, that if Doromal were to tender the
P50,000.00, only P10,000.00 would be covered by a receipt. [14]
Doromal later sent Regalado a text message, saying that she
could not pay P50,000.00. Regalado replied that it if she were
to decline paying P50,000.00, she would have to go through
the entire accreditation process all over again. Doromal replied
that she did not mind re-applying, as long she would be
relieved of having to pay P50,000.00.[
Upon finding that the contents were only P1,500.00, Regalado
blurted, "O my God."[21] Diaz asked, "Bakit po?"[22] Regalado
exclaimed, "You want me to give this amount to my boss?"
Diaz asked how much the honorarium should be. Regalado
replied that it should be at least P30,000.00. Diaz asked what
the P30,000.00 was for. Regalado retorted, "It will go to my
boss along with your accreditation papers and endorsement
letter . . . Ganyan ang system dito pag magprocess, actually na
lower na nga ang amount because the inspectors are not from
Manila, you will not book them at the Marco Polo Hotel, you
will no longer entertain them, it's cheaper." [23] Diaz asked, "Is
this under the table ma'am?"[24] Regalado brazenly replied,
"Yes, my dear, that's the system ng government."[25] Diaz
lamented, "So sad to know that."[26] Regalado scoffed, "Ganito
ang system, ano aka magmamalinis?"[27] Diaz and Tautho
underscored that the transaction was illegal and asked what
would happen if someone were to pry around. Regalado
assured them, "I'll be backing you up, walang gugulo sa inyo
In her defense, Regalado denied ever extorting money from
Doromal, Diaz, and Tautho, claiming they were merely in
league with "people who ha[d] a grudge against her."[34] She
admitted asking for P50,000.00 but cited that per Office
Memorandum Order No. RBR 00-57, this was the amount
properly due from a school accredited to admit foreign
students. She explained that, indeed, the amount due may be
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
lowered and surmised that her explanations made in good faith
to Doromal were misconstrued.[35] She claimed that she only
really wanted to help St. Martha's.[36]
In its November 5, 2008 Decision,[37] the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao found Regalado guilty, thus:
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in meting upon
respondent Maria Rowena Regalado the reduced penalty of
one (1)-year suspension without pay, in view of the mitigating
circumstances it appreciated in respondent's favor.
Held: No.
The 1987 Constitution spells out the basic ethos underlying
public office:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
No one has a vested right to public office. One can continue to
hold public office only for as long as he or she proves worthy
of public trust.
II
Consistent with the dignity of public office, our civil service
system maintains that misconduct tainted with "any of the
additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the
law or disregard of established rules"[63] is grave. This gravity
means that misconduct was committed with such depravity
that it justifies not only putting an end to an individual's
current engagement as a public servant, but also the
foreclosure of any further opportunity at occupying public
office.
Accordingly, the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (2017 RACCS)[64] consider grave misconduct as a
grave offense warranting the ultimate penalty of dismissal
from service with the accessory penalties of cancellation of
eligibility, perpetual disqualification from public office, bar from
taking civil service examinations, and forfeiture of retirement
benefits. Rule 10, Sections 50 and 57 of the 2017 RACCS
provide:
Section 50. Classification of Offenses. — Administrative
offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave,
less grave and light, depending on their gravity or depravity
and effects on the government service.
Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713, which took effect in
1989, is in addition to Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
enacted in 1960. Section 3(c) provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
by: Justice Merzy
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
....
Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or
for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in
(c)any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will
secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in
consideration for the help given or to be given, without
prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.[70]
Republic Act No. 3019 punishes violations of its Section 3 with
imprisonment, perpetual disqualification from public office, and
confiscation or forfeiture of proceeds:
Section 9. Penalties for violations. — (a) Any public officer or
private person committing any of the unlawful acts or
omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act
shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one year
nor more than ten years, perpetual disqualification from public
office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the
Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth
manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful
income.
Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal
prosecution was initiated shall, in case of conviction of the
accused, be entitled to recover in the criminal action with
priority over the forfeiture in favor of the Government, the
amount of money or the thing he may have given to the
accused, or the value of such
t is without question that respondent violated Section 7(d) of
Republic Act No. 6713. The Court of Appeals summarized her
"modus operandi," as follows:
[T]he modus operandi of [Regalado] is to present to applicants
for accreditation a fake copy of Office Memorandum Order No.
RBR 00-57 providing an accreditation fee of P50,000.00 to be
able to charge the said amount, when the actual fee required
is only P10,000.00. If the applicant cannot afford to pay such a
high amount, [Regalado], as she did in the present case, will
tell the applicant that through her efforts, she will be able to
reduce the accreditation fee to P10,000.00. However, in
return, the applicant will have to give an honorarium to
[Regalado's] boss amounting to at least P30,000.00.[74]
The matter is not a question of whether or not, as respondent
mentions in her Comment to the present Petition, she actually
received or profited from the solicitation of any amount from
the complainants, or that she solicited even after she had
completed the inspection of St. Martha's.[75] Section 7(d) of
Republic Act No. 6713 penalizes both solicitation and
acceptance. This is similar to how Section 3(c) of Republic Act
No. 3019 penalizes both the requesting and receiving of
pecuniary or material benefits. In Section 7(d), the prior or
subsequent performance of official acts is also immaterial.
It is equally without question that respondent engaged in
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
misconduct that was tainted with corruption and with willful
intent to violate the law and to disregard established rules. The
act of requesting pecuniary or material benefits is specifically
listed by. Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019 as a "corrupt
practice." Further, there is certainly nothing in the records to
suggest that respondent's actions were not products of her
own volition.
It is clear, then, that respondent's actions deserve the
supreme penalty of dismissal from service. The Court of
Appeals, however, held that certain circumstances warrant the
reduction of respondent's penalty to a year-long suspension.
The Court of Appeals was in serious error.
V
The Court of Appeals noted, as a mitigating circumstance,
"that petitioner has not been previously charged of any offense
and this is the very first time that she was found to be
administratively liable."[76]
In taking this as a mitigating circumstance, the Court of
Appeals ran afoul of the clear text of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Rule IV, Section
52(A)(3) of these Rules unqualifiedly states that dismissal shall
be meted even if it is only the first
In the appreciation thereof, the same must be invoked or
pleaded by the respondent, otherwise, said circumstances will
not be considered in the imposition of the proper penalty. The
disciplining authority, however, in the interest of substantial
justice, may take and consider these circumstances motu
proprio
G.R. Nos. 205904-06, October 17, 2018
GWENDOLYN F. GARCIA, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
Factual Antecedents
Sometime in 1970, Luis Balili (Luis) acquired free patents over
10 parcels of land situated in Naga, Cebu, measuring 247,317
square meters (sq ms), more or less. In addition to the
mentioned lots, he also made a claim over a parcel of land in
Tina-an, Naga, Cebu, with an approximate area of 1,929 sq
ms. These properties constitute the Balili Estate, more
particularly described as follow
by: Justice Merzy
On July 10, 2007, the Cebu Provincial Appraisal Committee
headed by Engr. Sususco, with Roy Salubre (Salubre) and
Eloguio Pelayre (Pelayre) as members, issued Resolution No.
23,9 pegging the base unit market value of the subject
property to P610.00 per sq m. On the basis of said resolution,
Bolo authored Resolution No. 187-200810 dated January 14,
2008, authorizing the petitioner to execute and sign, for and in
behalf of the Province of Cebu, the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) for the sale of ten parcels of land composing
the Balili Estate, with the purchase price pegged at P434.00
per sq m. He justified the acquisition in that the subject
property, which was classified under industrial/recreational
category, will provide a good opportunity for the province to
develop and cater to the needs of interested investors. 11 The
said resolution was duly attested by Vice Governor Gregorio
Sanchez, Jr. (Vice Gov. Sanchez, Jr.) and approved on April 4,
2008.
Following the controversial transaction, the Public Assistance
and Corruption Prevention Office – Visayas (PACPO-Visayas)
conducted a fact-finding investigation on the matter. On
September 2-3, 2009, representatives from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Office of
the Ombudman-Visayas (OMB-Visayas) conducted a
verification survey on the area. The team discovered that
202,456-sq m portion of the 247,317-sq m property was
classified as timberland. Further, 196,696-sq m portion thereof
was underwater.22
It was likewise discovered that the appropriation for the
purchase of the lots was classified as "Site Development and
Housing Program" but no item enumerated thereon included
site/land acquisition. Apart from this irregularity, it was learned
that there was also a question on the legality of Luis'
acquisition of ownership over the subject lots and that the
DENR proposed that they be subjected to reversion
proceedings.23
Subsequently, the OMB-Visayas, through PACPO-Visayas
initiated the filing of criminal and administrative charges
against the accountable public officials and employees
pursuant to a letter of complaint from an anonymous letter-
sender, to wit:
J. BALILI and AMPARO G. BALILI, probably guilty of violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019. We likewise found
GWENDOLYN F. GARCIA probably guilty of violation of Section
3(g) of Republic Act 3019.
The charges of Plunder (Republic Act 7080) and Violation of
Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 against the respondents are
hereby dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The charges against respondents: MARIFLOR D. VERO, PILAR
C. YBURAN, MICHELLE V. LANGUIDO, ROGER L. DUMAYAC,
VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, JULIAN DAAN, AGNES A. MAGPALE,
JOSE MARIA S. GASTARDO, WILFREDO CAMINERO, PETER
JOHN CALDERON, JOVEN MONDIGO JR., TERESITA D. CELES,
ROSEMARIE D. DURANO, WENCESLAO GAKIT, ALFRED
FRANCIS M. OUANO, AND BEA MERCEDS A. CALDERON are
hereby dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The charges
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
against GREGORIO SANCHEZ JR., on account of his death, are
hereby DISMISSED.
Let the herein appended Information for Violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act 3019 and the Information for Violation of
Section 3(g) of Republic Act 3019 against the above-named
respondents be filed before the Sandiganbayan.
expiration of the prescribed period.52
Ruling of the Court
The power to issue HDO is an inherent power belonging
to the courts
The petitioner argues that the absence of a law granting the
Sandiganbayan the express authority to issue HDOs only
translates to its lack of power to do so. She then referred to
the SC Circular No. 39-97 which grants the power to issue
HDOs to the RTCs and argues that the omission of the
Sandiganbayan in the guidelines means that it does not have
the authority to make such an issuance.
To further illustrate her point, she cites the Department of
Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 41 (DOJ Circular No. 41) which
grants the Secretary of the DOJ the authority to issue HDOs
and claims that the Sandiganbayan had not been given a
similar authority.
The petitioner's argument lacks merit.
To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a
legislative enactment which underwent the scrutiny and
concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President for
approval. It is a mere administrative issuance apparently
designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law which
the former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code
of 1987." x x x x
xxxx
The questioned circular does not come under the inherent
power of the executive department to adopt rules and
regulations as clearly the issuance of HDO and WLO is not the
DOJ' s business. As such, it is a compulsory requirement that
there be an existing law, complete and sufficient in itself,
conferring the expressed authority to the concerned agency to
promulgate rules. On its own, the DOJ cannot make rules, its
authority being confined to execution of laws. This is the
import of the terms "when expressly provided by law" or "as
may be provided by law" stated in Sections 7(4) and 7(9),
Chapter 2, Title III, Book IV of E.O. 292. The DOJ is confined
to filling in the gaps and the necessary details in carrying into
effect the law as enacted.54 Without a clear mandate of an
existing law, an administrative issuance is ultra vires.
by: Justice Merzy
Consistent with the foregoing, there must be an enabling law
from which DOJ Circular No. 41 must derive its life.
Unfortunately, all of the supposed statutory authorities relied
upon by the DOJ did not pass the completeness test and
sufficient standard test. The DOJ miserably failed to establish
the existence of the enabling law that will justify the issuance
of the questioned circular.
That DOJ Circular No. 41 was intended to aid the department
in realizing its mandate only begs the question. The purpose,
no matter how commendable, will not obliterate the lack of
authority of the DOJ to issue the said issuance. Surely, the
DOJ must have the best intentions in promulgating DOJ
Circular No. 41, but the end will not justify the means. To
sacrifice individual liberties because of a perceived good is
disastrous to democracy. x x x55
In view of the foregoing, DOJ Circular No. 41 is no longer
relevant in the present discussion.
On the other hand, SC Circular No. 39-97, admittedly, does not
mention of Sandiganbayan. Following the argument of the
petitioner, however, would mean that the issuance of HDO is a
power pertaining to the RTCs alone, to the exclusion of all
other courts. This is an inaccurate interpretation of the
guidelines.
The rationale for the issuance of SC Circular No. 39-97 was "to
avoid the indiscriminate issuance of HDO resulting in
inconvenience to the parties affected, the same being
tantamount to an infringement of the right and liberty of an
individual to travel." It is in view of the perceived unnecessary
impairment on the right to travel in certain instances that the
guidelines for the issuance of HDOs were issued. It bears
emphasis, however, that the circular was not meant to declare
the RTC as the sole and exclusive authority in the issuance of
HDOs. It only recognizes that the power exists in courts and,
at the same time, seeks to temper its breadth by excluding
criminal offenses cognizable by the first level courts, i.e.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
The Court elucidated on this point in Genuino v. De Lima,56
thus:
That the Sandiganbayan was not mentioned in the circular only
means it is given the full disposition of all the powers inherent
in all courts of justice in order to effectuate the exercise of its
jurisdiction, including the issuance of HDOs, if in its good
judgment, it finds necessary in the administration of justice. It
bears emphasizing that the Sandiganbayan is a special court
tasked to hear and decide cases against public officers and
employees and entrusted with the difficult task of policing and
ridding the government ranks of the dishonest and corrupt.
"The Constitution specifically made mention of the creation of
this court precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of
which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public
service."59 Confronted with the heavy responsibility of restoring
"public office as a public trust,"60 the Sandiganbayan will need
all means within its powers in order to hold erring public
officials accountable for their misdeeds.
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
The petitioner then proceeds to argue that the lack of a law
that specifically grants the Sandiganbayan the authority to
issue HDOs and its continued practice to do the same amounts
to an unreasonable curtailment of the right to travel. What the
petitioner misses, however, is that the right to travel, while a
fundamental right, is not absolute.
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
SEC. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within
the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, the right to travel may be impaired, if
necessary, in interest of national security, public safety or
public health. Apart from the presence of these exclusive
grounds, there is a further requirement that there must be a
law authorizing the impairment. The requirement for a law
ensures that the necessity for the impairment has undergone
the validation and deliberation of Congress before its
enactment. The strict requirement for the concurrence of these
two elements are formidable enough to serve as safeguard in
the full enjoyment of the right to travel.
In Silverio v. Court of Appeals,61 the Court explained, thus:
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be
interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be
impaired even without court order, the appropriate executive
officers or administrative authorities are not armed with
arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose
limits only on the basis of national security, public safety, or
public health and as may be provided by law, a limitive phrase
which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution,
Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263).
Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a
reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the
previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center,
which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application
of an interested party.62
The petitioner may be correct in arguing that there is no law
particularly vesting the Sandiganbayan the authority to issue
HDOs but this is precisely because the same is not necessary
for it to exercise this power.
It bears reiterating that apart from constitutional limitations,
there are also statutory and inherent limitations on the right to
travel. In Leave Division, Office of the Administrative Services
(OAS)-Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) v. Wilma
Salvacion P. Heusdens,63 the Court enumerated some of the
statutory limitations on the right to travel, to wit:
1
On the other hand, the power to issue HDO is an exercise of
the court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the
by: Justice Merzy
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of
the accused.65
Inherent powers are innate and essential faculties that are
fundamental to the constitution of an effective judicial system.
They are integral to the creation of courts. They do not require
legislative conferment or constitutional recognition; they co-
exist with the grant of judicial power.66 Broadly defined, they
"consist of all powers reasonably required to enable a court to
perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity,
independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions
effective. These powers are inherent in the sense that they
exist because the court exists."67
In other words, this authority flows from the powers possessed
by a court simply because it is a court; it is an authority that
inheres in the very nature of a judicial body and requires no
grant of power other than that which creates the court and
gives it jurisdiction.68
Verily, inherent powers are brought into existence by the grant
of judicial power to the courts to in 1 Section 1, Article 8 of the
1987 Constitution "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." As
with other jurisdictions, "[t]he Constitution does not
circumscribe the means that the courts may invoke on their
own initiative to facilitate their exercise of judicial power. Thus,
the courts may regularly apply their "inherent powers" to take
some action that has not been specifically authorized by the
Constitution, written rule, or statute."69
Necessarily included in the grant of jurisdiction is the power to
ensure that its exercise shall be effective. "When by law,
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry
it into effect may be employed by such court or officer."72
Inherent powers, in effect, facilitate and reinforce the court's
exercise of its specific powers. As vital components of
jurisdiction, they fortify the court's jurisdiction through
processes that ensure its full disposition. And, while not
enumerated in the Constitution or statute, they are considered
part and parcel of the grant of authority to courts. The power
to issue hold departure order is properly subsumed under the
inherent power of the courts because it is an implement by
which the jurisdiction of the court is preserved.
Contrary to the allegation of the petitioner, the issuance of
HDOs is not a mere practice that has ripened into a law or
rule. The Sandiganbayan issues HDO because it has the
authority to do so and this attaches from the moment it
acquired jurisdiction over the case and over the person. In this
case, jurisdiction over the case was acquired when the
Informations against the petitioner were filed with the
Sandiganbayan on July 19, 2012. Thereafter, the petitioner
voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court by
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
posting bail of P30,000.00 for each of the cases filed against
her.
Upon posting bail, the accused subjects himself to the
jurisdiction of the court and may validly be restricted in his
movement and prohibited from leaving this jurisdiction. He
cannot leave the country without the permission of the court
where his case is pending. Remember that the grant of bail
merely secures provisional or temporary liberty under
conditions set by the court. The court may recall said grant
and return the accused to detention should he violate the
conditions for his temporary liberty or when reasons for the
lifting of his bail arise. Thus, it is not entirely correct for the
petitioner to argue that the issuance of HDOs amounted to an
unreasonable restriction on her liberty of movement or right to
travel. The truth of the matter is that she was already under
restricted right to travel when she submitted to the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan by posting bail. The rule is that "a
person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released
on bail does not have an unrestricted right to travel, the
reason being that a person's right to travel is subject to the
usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of
safeguarding the system of justice."75 The issuance of the HDO
is a process complementary to the granting of bail since it puts
the Bureau of Immigration on notice that a certain person is
charged before the courts of law and must not be allowed to
leave our jurisdiction without the permission of the court. After
all, the granting of bail does not guaranty compliance by the
accused of the conditions for his temporary liberty, particularly,
his presence at every stage of the proceedings. Some, if not
all, maybe tempted to jump bail and leave the country. This is
what the HDO seeks to avoid by keeping the accused within
the territory where court processes and dispositions may be
enforced and implemented.
As to the question on the determination of the necessity of the
issuance of HDOs, it is largely dependent on the good
judgment of the Sandiganbayan. It is worth reiterating that it
is a special court tasked with a particular undertaking of
hearing and deciding "criminal and civil cases involving graft
and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by
public officers and employees, including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office.76 It
is of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possesses all
the inherent powers of a court of justice.77 Considering the
complexity of its tasks which was made even more complicated
by the fact that it is dealing with high-ranking public officials
and employees, it is given the wide latitude of resorting to the
exercise of its express and implied powers for the proper
determination of the fitting recompense for the injury done to
the government.
The indispensable necessity of the resort to the inherent power
to issue HDO was epitomized in Genuino, which led this Court
to issue A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC pertaining to the Rule on
Precautionary Hold Departure Order, a remedy formulated to
fill in the vacuum created by the declaration of nullity of DOJ
Circular No. 41, the provisions of which are quoted as follows:
Public officials and employees are a class of their own
by: Justice Merzy
Still, the petitioner laments the fact that the Sandiganbayan
issues HDO regardless of the nature and gravity of the offense
charged, the official charged and the nature of his
responsibilities. This, she argues, is unlike SC Circular No. 39-
97 which limits the issuance of HDOs to criminal cases within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs, pertaining to offenses
punishable by more than six (6) years of imprisonment.78
The implication of the petitioner's argument is that the
Sandiganbayan indiscriminately issues HDOs without
distinction as to the offense and the offender. The point is that
it is a superfluity to draw further distinction since the
Sandiganbayan is precisely constituted as a special court for
cases of graft and corruption and other cases committed by
public officials and employees. This has been recognized in the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions, which classified public officers
and employees as a class of their own from whom is required
the highest degree of responsibility and integrity. To be
specific, Section 1, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution reads:
ARTICLE XIII
Accountability of Public Officers
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and shall remain accountable
to the people.
A similar provision in Section 1 Article XI of the 1987
Constitution states, thus:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
Both constitutions mandated for the creation of a special court
that shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses
committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office.79 Thus, the Sandiganbayan was constituted by
Presidential Decree No. 1486 which, through the years, had
undergone several revisions and amendments. This only
demonstrates that public officers and employees are a class of
their own in that they are reposed with public trust and must
be accountable to the people at all times, hence, the higher
standards of conduct and integrity. In a similar way, violations
committed by public officers and employees in relation to office
are treated differently from all other offenses. After all,
betrayal of public trust, dishonesty and dereliction of official
duties are serious transgressions which should not be taken
lightly. More than that, public officials and employees are
required, at all times, "to uphold the Constitution and put
loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party."80 Thus,
there are special laws governing the (1) conduct of public
officers and employees; (2) acts and omissions that are
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
considered as misconduct in public office; and (3) penalties
that are especially imposable to erring public officials and
employees. These are based on substantial distinctions and do
not amount to an unreasonable classification or unfair
treatment.
At any rate, it bears pointing out that, notwithstanding the
issuance of HDOs, the petitioner is not absolutely prohibited
from travelling abroad. She was only restricted from leaving
the country as this would place her beyond the jurisdiction of
our courts and might render nugatory the processes and
proceedings being conducted in the cases against her.
Nonetheless, she may, at any time, request for permission to
travel abroad, citing grounds for its necessity. The
Sandiganbayan, in numerous instances, had been liberal in
granting permissions based on meritorious grounds, sometimes
even for humanitarian considerations, for as long as certain
conditions are complied with. Based on the records and
allegations of the parties, however, there has yet an instance
when the petitioner asked permission to travel from the
Sandiganbayan and was denied of it.
Meanwhile, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division), dated February 20, 1995, imposing a ban on
petitioners travel abroad without its prior approval pending the
resolution bf Criminal Case No. 22018 is, for the reasons
heretofore advanced, hereby LIFTED for a period of three
(3) months counted from the finality of this decision.
Any similar request during the pendency of said case
before the Sandiganbayan shall be addressed to that
court.82 (Emphasis ours)
The said temporary lifting of the HDO was granted after
Cojuangco had asked the permission of the court to travel and
demonstrated that there is a very lean probability that he will
not comply to the conditions that will be set by the court. On
the other hand, the petitioner had never asked for a
permission to travel abroad from the Sandiganbayan nor
alleged circumstances in her pleadings before the said court to
justify the lifting of the TRO. When she filed a motion for
reconsideration and prayed for the lifting of the HDOs, she
argued against its validity on the ground of prematurity and
that the Sandiganbayan has no authority to issue the same.
She never questioned the necessity or sufficiency of the basis
of its issuance. Being the party seeking relief, it is incumbent
upon the petitioner to prove and allege circumstances that
would warrant the granting of her prayer. This, she failed to
do.
The HDOs were not prematurely-issued
The petitioner questions the validity of the HDOs against her
on the ground that they were issued before she was able to
exhaust her legal remedies and even before there was a final
determination of probable cause against her. She asseverates
that the HDOs were issued on July 24, 2012, before the lapse
of the period when she may file a motion for reconsideration of
the finding of probable cause against her, or until July 25,
2012.83 For this reason, she argues that the HDOs were void.
The argument lacks merit.
by: Justice Merzy
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory
and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much
the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if
they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on
the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they
decide to file an information in court, or dismiss a complaint by
a private complainant.89
In the present case, the investigating prosecutor of the OMB
found probable cause to indict the petitioner for violation of
Sections 3(e) and 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 220 of the
Revise Penal Code, and his findings and recommendation to
file the corresponding informations before the Sandiganbayan
were approved by the Ombudsman. From the filing of
information, the Sandiganbayan acquires jurisdiction over the
case and the authority to control the conduct of the
proceedings until its disposition. In Ocampo, the Court
declared:
[W]hile it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the
Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it
is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which
has full control of the case so much so that the informations
may not be dismissed without the approval of the said court.90
Verily, "once jurisdiction attaches, it shall not be removed from
the court until the termination of the case."91 This was
reiterated in Fuentes v. Sandiganbayan,92 in an enumeration of
cases emphasizing this doctrine, viz.:
As early as US v. Valencia, this Court, through Justice Charles
A. Willard, ruled that once an Information has been filed in
court, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the case; and,
accordingly, it is the court, not the fiscal, which has control
over it. In US v. Barredo, this Court explained that fiscals are
not clothed with the power to dismiss or nolle prosequi
criminal actions once these have been instituted, for the power
to dismiss is solely vested in the court. The Barredo doctrine
has continuously been applied through the years. In other
words, once a court acquires jurisdiction, the same continues
until the termination of the case. The rule, therefore, in this
jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is
filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether it be
dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the
accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. The
only qualification to this exercise of the judicial prerogative is
that the substantial rights of the accused must not be impaired
nor the People be deprived of the right to due process. 93
(Emphasis ours)
From the filing of information, any disposition of the case such
as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion
of the court, which becomes the sole judge on what to do with
the case before it.96 Pursuant to said authority, the court takes
full authority over the case, including the manner of the
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
conduct of litigation and resort to processes that will ensure
the preservation of its jurisdiction. Thus, it may issue warrants
of arrest, HDOs and other processes that it deems warranted
under the circumstances.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan acted within its jurisdiction
when it issued the HDOs against the petitioner. That the
petitioner may seek reconsideration of the finding of probable
cause against her by the OMB does not undermine nor
suspend the jurisdiction already acquired by the
Sandiganbayan. There was also no denial of due process since
the petitioner was not precluded from filing a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of the OMB. In addition, the
resolution of her motion for reconsideration before the OMB
and the conduct of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan
may proceed concurrently.
All told, the Sandiganbayan did not commit abuse of discretion,
much less grave, in denying the motion for reconsideration and
the prayer for the lifting of the HDOs issued against the
petitioner. The HDOs were validly issued pursuant to its
inherent powers as a court of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
assumption in office effectively enforced the decision of the
COMELEC which reinstated him in office. It follows that all
lawful acts of the latter arising from his re-assumption in office
on October 28, 1999 are valid. Hence, no grave misconduct
was committed by him in appointing Godofredo L. Ramos and
Rodel G. Liquido as Barangay Secretary and Barangay
Treasurer, respectively, and in granting them emoluments and
renumerations for the period served.
Respondent was also charged of conniving with the other
barangay officials in crossing out the names of the petitioner
barangay councilors in the payroll. The petition alleged that as
a consequence of the striking out of the names of the
petitioner barangay officials, they were not able to receive
their salaries for the period November 8 to December 31,
1999.[39 A reading of the payroll reveals that the names of
said petitioners and their corresponding salaries are written
thereon. However, they refused to sign the payroll and
by: Justice Merzy

ELIGIBILITY, QUALIFICATION AND DISQUALIFICATION
1. G.R. No. 146875 July 14, 2003
KAGAWADS JOSE G. MENDOZA, ROSARIO B. ESPINO,
vs.
BARANGAY CAPTAIN MANUEL D. LAXINA, S
On October 27, 1999, the COMELEC issued a writ of execution
directing Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Batasan Hills. On October 28, 1999, Fermo was
served a copy of the writ of execution but refused to
acknowledge receipt thereof. He also refused to vacate the
premises of the barangay hall of Batasan Hills.4 This did not,
however, prevent respondent and his staff from discharging
their functions and from holding office at the SK-Hall of
Batasan Hills.5 On the same date, respondent appointed
Godofredo L. Ramos as Barangay Secretary6 and on November
8, 1999, he appointed Rodel G. Liquido as Barangay
Treasurer.7
On November 12, 1999, the COMELEC, acting on respondent's
motion to cite Fermo for contempt,8 issued an alias writ of
execution,9 which was likewise returned unsatisfied. Finally, on
November 16, 1999, respondent took his oath of office as
Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City before Mayor
Ismael Mathay, Jr.10 The following day, November 17, 1999,
Roque Fermo turned over to respondent all the assets and
properties of the barangay.11
On November 20, 1999, the Barangay Council of Batasan Hills
issued Resolution No. 001-S-1999 ratifying the appointment of
Godofredo L. Ramos as Barangay Secretary, effective
November 1, 199912 and Resolution No. 002-S-1999 ratifying
the appointment of Rodel G. Liquido, as Barangay Treasurer,
also effective November 1, 1999.13However, the appointees of
Roque Fermo to the same position registered objections to the
said Resolutions. In order to accommodate these appointees,
respondent agreed to grant them allowances and
renumerations for the period of November 1–7, 1999.14
In Resolution No. 017-S-99 dated December 11, 1999, the
barangay council of Batasan Hills, authorized the appropriation
of P864,326.00 for the November to December 1999 salary of
its barangay officials and employees.15Pursuant thereto, the
barangay payroll was issued on December 18, 1999,
enumerating the names of respondent and his appointed
barangay secretary and barangay treasurer as among those
entitled to compensation for services rendered for the period
November 8, 1999 to December 31, 1999.16 Petitioners Jose G.
Mendoza, Jr., Rosario E. Espino and Teresita S. Mendoza, who
were barangay councilors, refused to sign Resolution No. 017-
S-99 as well as said payroll.17
ISSUE: WON oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a
public officer.
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
Held: Yes.
We now come to the substantive issues.
To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a
public office; a prerequisite to the full investiture with the
office. It is only when the public officer has satisfied the
prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the position
becomes plenary and complete.33 However, once proclaimed
and duly sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to assume
office and to exercise the functions thereof. The pendency of
an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him from
assuming office or from discharging his functions.34 Unless his
election is annulled by a final and executory decision,35 or a
valid execution of an order unseating him pending appeal is
issued, he has the lawful right to assume and perform the
duties of the office to which he has been elected.
In the case at bar, respondent was proclaimed as the winner in
the 1997 Barangay Elections in Batasan Hills, Quezon City; he
took his oath on May 27, 1997 and thereafter assumed office.
He is therefore vested with all the rights to discharge the
functions of his office. Although in the interim, he was
unseated by virtue of a decision in an election protest decided
against him, the execution of said decision was annulled by the
COMELEC in its September 16, 1999 Resolution which,
incidentally, was sustained by this Court on March 13, 2000,
in Fermo v. Commission on Elections.36 It was held therein that
"[w]hen the COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending
appeal in favor of FERMO, the decision of the MTC proclaiming
FERMO as the winner of the election was stayed and the
'status quo' or the last actual peaceful uncontested situation
preceding the controversy was restored . . ."37The status
quo referred to the stage when respondent was occupying the
office of Barangay Captain and discharging its functions. For
purposes of determining the continuity and effectivity of the
rights arising from respondent's proclamation and oath taken
on May 27, 1997, it is as if the said writ of execution pending
appeal was not issued and he was not ousted from office. The
re-taking of his oath of office on November 16, 1999 was a
mere formality considering that his oath taken on May 27,
1997 operated as a full investiture on him of the rights of the
office. Hence, the taking anew of his oath of office as
Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City was not a
condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in
office and to the exercise of the functions thereof.
Having thus ruled out the necessity of respondent's taking
anew of the oath of office, the next question to be resolved is:
when is respondent considered to have validly re-assumed
office — from October 28, 1999, the date of service of the writ
of execution to Roque Fermo and the date respondent actually
commenced to discharge the functions of the office, or from
November 17, 1999, the date Roque Fermo turned over to
respondent the assets and properties of Barangay Batasan
Hills, Quezon City?
The records show that the COMELEC served on October 28,
1999 a writ of execution ordering Fermo to desist from
performing the function of the Office of Barangay Captain, but
the latter refused to comply therewith. His supporters
by: Justice Merzy
prevented respondent from occupying the barangay hall,
prompting the latter to move for the issuance of an alias wit of
execution, which was granted on November 12, 1999. It was
only on November 17, 1999 that the turn-over to respondent
of the assets and properties of the barangay was effected.
Undoubtedly, it was Fermo's defiance of the writ that
prevented respondent from assuming office at the barangay
hall. To reckon, therefore, the effectivity of respondent's
assumption in office on November 17, 1999, as petitioners
insist, would be to sanction dilatory maneuvers and to put a December 28, 2018
premium on disobedience of lawful orders which this Court will JOSON vs OMBUDSMAN
not countenance. It is essential to the effective administration
G.R. Nos. 210220-21
of justice that the processes of the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies be obeyed.38 Moreover, it is worthy to note that FACTS:
although the physical possession of the Office of the Barangay
Captain was not immediately relinquished by Fermo to
respondent, the latter exercised the powers and functions Petitioner Edward Thomas Jason filed a complaint before the
thereof at the SK-Hall of Batasan Hills, Quezon City starting Office of the Ombudsman against respondents Governor
October 28, 1999. His re-assumption in office effectively Aurelio Umali, Consultant Atty. Ferdinand Abesamis, and three
enforced the decision of the COMELEC which reinstated him in other provincial officials for violation of the Anti-Graft and
office. It follows that all lawful acts of the latter arising from Corrupt Practices Act, and unlawful appointment defined and
his re-assumption in office on October 28, 1999 are valid. penalized under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, no grave misconduct was committed by him in
appointing Godofredo L. Ramos and Rodel G. Liquido as
Barangay Secretary and Barangay Treasurer, respectively, and The charges stemmed from the alleged appointment of
in granting them emoluments and renumerations for the Ferdinand as Consultant - Technical Assistance in the Office of
period served. the Governor of Nueva Ecija. The first contract of consultancy
was made on July 2, 2007, and was again re-employed in the
same position under the same contract on July 28, 2008.
Respondent was also charged of conniving with the other
Furthermore, Joson claimed that Ferdinand was dismissed
barangay officials in crossing out the names of the petitioner
from the service as Senior State Prosecutor of the Department
barangay councilors in the payroll. The petition alleged that as
of Justice for "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
a consequence of the striking out of the names of the
service" and that such penalty f dismissal carried with it his
petitioner barangay officials, they were not able to receive
perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government
their salaries for the period November 8 to December 31,
service. Thus, his appointment as legal consultant was
1999.39 A reading of the payroll reveals that the names of said
unlawful, illegal, and invalid in violation of the 1987
petitioners and their corresponding salaries are written
Administrative Code and the CSC Rules and Regulations.
thereon. However, they refused to sign the payroll and to
acknowledge receipt of their salaries to manifest their
protest. Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentire. Indeed, he The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
who suffered injury through his own fault is not considered to Hence this, petition.
have suffered any damage.40 Hence, the investigative
committee correctly brushed aside this charge against
respondent. ISSUE:

The trial court therefore did not err in exonerating respondent

and pursuant to Article 68 of the Local Government Code, he Whether Atty. Ferdinand is considered employed under public
should be paid his salaries and emoluments for the period office, making respondents liable for unlawful appointment.
during which he was suspended without pay.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition
for review is DENIED. The Summary Judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-00-
No, the petition is devoid of merit.
42155, exonerating respondent Manuel D. Laxina, Sr., of the
charge of grave misconduct and ordering the payment of all
benefits due him during the period of his suspension, is
In the Joint Resolution, dated September 8, 2011, the
AFFIRMED.
Ombudsman stated that Ferdinand was not appointed to a
public office through the contracts of consultancy because of
the following factors:

Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim by: Justice Merzy

1. The rights, authority and duties of Ferdinand arose from
contract, not law;
2. Ferdinand was not vested with a portion of the sovereign
authority;
3. The consultancy contracts were for a limited duration, as
the same were valid for only six (6) months each and could be
terminated by a mere written notice given five (5) days prior;
4. Ferdinand did not enjoy the benefits given to government
employees such as PERA, COLA and RATA, but only received
honoraria for consultancy services actually rendered; and
5. The Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and other
Personnel Actions recognize that service contracts like the
subject twin contracts of consultancy were not considered
government service.
The Ombudsman concluded that there could be no legal basis
to support a finding that Governor Umali violated Article 244 of
the RPC considering that Ferdinand was not appointed to a
government office; and that, there could be no finding that the
respondents violated R.A. No. 3019 considering that the
alleged irregularity in the engagements of Ferdinand was not
shown by substantial evidence.
In Posadas v. Sandiganbayan, the Court stated that a
consultancy service is not considered government service.
Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 93-1881 dated May 25, 1993,
a contract for consultancy services is not covered by Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations because the said position is
not found in the index of position titles approved by DBM.
Accordingly, it does not need the approval of the CSC. xxx A
"consultant" is defined as one who provides professional
advice on matters within the field of his specific knowledge or
training. There is no employer-employee relationship in the
engagement of a consultant but that of client-professional
relationship.
The Court notes that Ferdinand did not take an oath of office
prior to his rendition of consultancy services for the Provincial
Government of Nueva Ecija. All public officers and employees
from the highest to the lowest rank are required to take an
oath of office which marks their assumption to duty. It is well-
settled that on oath of office is a qualifying requirement for
public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the
office.20 Ferdinand was not required to take an oath of office
because he rendered consultancy services for the provincial
government not by virtue of an appointment or election to a
specific public office or position but by a contractual
engagement. In fine, those who have rendered services with
the government, without occupying a public office or without
having been elected or appointed as a public officer evidenced
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
by a written appointment and recorded with the Civil Service
Commission, did so outside the concept of government service.
Wherefore the petition is denied.
G.R. No. 164978 October 13, 2005
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., EDGARDO J. ANGARA,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA,
JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO
S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and SERGIO R.
OSMEÑA III, Petitioners
vs.
EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR,
JOSEPH H. DURANO, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, RENE C. VILLA, and ARTHUR C. YAP,
Respondents.
Facts
The Senate and the House of Representatives ("Congress")
commenced their regular session on 26 July 2004. The
Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and
Representatives, was constituted on 25 August 2004.
Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments2 to
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments.
Respondents took their oath of office and assumed duties as
acting secretaries.
On 8 September 2004, Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. ("Senator
Pimentel"), Edgardo J. Angara ("Senator Angara"), Juan Ponce
Enrile ("Senator Enrile"), Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada ("Senator
Ejercito-Estrada"), Jinggoy E. Estrada ("Senator Estrada"),
Panfilo M. Lacson ("Senator Lacson"), Alfredo S. Lim ("Senator
Lim"), Jamby A.S. Madrigal ("Senator Madrigal"), and Sergio R.
Osmeña, III ("Senator Osmeña") ("petitioners") filed the
present petition as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines.
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September
2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments3 to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they
were previously appointed in an acting capacity. The
appointment papers are uniformly worded as follows:
Sir:
Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby
appointed SECRETARY [AD INTERIM], DEPARTMENT OF
(appropriate department).
by: Justice Merzy
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the
performance of the duties and functions of the office,
furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission with
copies of your oath of office.
(signed)
Gloria Arroyo
Issue
The petition questions the constitutionality of President
Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as acting secretaries
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while
Congress is in session.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Preliminary Matters
On the Mootness of the Petition
The Solicitor General argues that the petition is moot because
President Arroyo had extended to respondents ad interim
appointments on 23 September 2004 immediately after the
recess of Congress.
As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts
already done.4 However, as an exception to the rule on
mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is
capable of repetition yet evading review.5
In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar
its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the
President’s appointment of department secretaries in an acting
capacity while Congress is in session will arise in every such
appointment.
On the Nature of the Power to Appoint
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and
the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this
executive power except in those instances when the
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.6 Limitations on the
executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the
legislature.7 The scope of the legislature’s interference in the
executive’s power to appoint is limited to the power to
prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress
cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on
the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an
office.8
However, even if the Commission on Appointments is
composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers
is executive and not legislative. The Commission on
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to
give or withhold consent to presidential appointments. Thus:
xxx The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the
Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members
of Congress, said Commission is independent of Congress. The
powers of the Commission do not come from Congress, but
emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an
agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner
are purely executive in nature. xxx9
On Petitioners’ Standing
The Solicitor General states that the present petition is a quo
warranto proceeding because, with the exception of Secretary
Ermita, petitioners effectively seek to oust respondents for
unlawfully exercising the powers of department secretaries.
The Solicitor General further states that petitioners may not
claim standing as Senators because no power of the
Commission on Appointments has been "infringed upon or
violated by the President. xxx If at all, the Commission on
Appointments as a body (rather than individual members of
the Congress) may possess standing in this case."10
Petitioners, on the other hand, state that the Court can
exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over unconstitutional acts of
the President.11 Petitioners further contend that they possess
standing because President Arroyo’s appointment of
department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is
in session impairs the powers of Congress. Petitioners cite
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary12 as basis, thus:
To the extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is
the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In
such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the
courts.
Considering the independence of the Commission on
Appointments from Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim
standing in the present case as members of Congress.
President Arroyo’s issuance of acting appointments while
Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress. Among
the petitioners, only the following are members of the
Commission on Appointments of the 13th Congress: Senator
Enrile as Minority Floor Leader, Senator Lacson as Assistant
Minority Floor Leader, and Senator Angara, Senator Ejercito-
Estrada, and Senator Osmeña as members.
Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives of members of
the Commission on Appointments, only Senators Enrile,
Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmeña have standing
in the present petition. This is in contrast to Senators Pimentel,
Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal, who, though vigilant in protecting
by: Justice Merzy
their perceived prerogatives as members of Congress, possess
no standing in the present petition.
The Constitutionality of President Arroyo’s Issuance
of Appointments to Respondents as Acting Secretaries
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have
appointed respondents as acting secretaries because "in case
of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an
Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary."13
Petitioners base their argument on Section 10, Chapter 2, Book
IV of Executive Order No. 292 ("EO 292"),14 which enumerates
the powers and duties of the undersecretary. Paragraph 5 of
Section 10 reads:
SEC. 10. Powers and Duties of the Undersecretary. - The
Undersecretary shall:
xxx
(5) Temporarily discharge the duties of the Secretary in the
latter’s absence or inability to discharge his duties for any
cause or in case of vacancy of the said office, unless otherwise
provided by law. Where there are more than one
Undersecretary, the Secretary shall allocate the foregoing
powers and duties among them. The President shall likewise
make the temporary designation of Acting Secretary from
among them; and
xxx
Petitioners further assert that "while Congress is in session,
there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a
vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its
consent."15
In sharp contrast, respondents maintain that the President can
issue appointments in an acting capacity to department
secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments even while Congress is in session. Respondents
point to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 16 reads:
SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.
Respondents also rely on EO 292, which devotes a chapter to
the President’s power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17,
Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 read:
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. — The President shall
exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided
for in the Constitution and laws.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. — (1) The
President may temporarily designate an officer already
in the government service or any other competent
person to perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch, appointment to which is vested in
him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to
the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of
illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists
a vacancy[.]
(2) The person designated shall receive the compensation
attached to the position, unless he is already in the
government service in which case he shall receive only such
additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not
exceed the salary authorized by law for the position filled. The
compensation hereby authorized shall be paid out of the funds
appropriated for the office or agency concerned.
(3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed
one (1) year. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners and respondents maintain two diametrically
opposed lines of thought. Petitioners assert that the President
cannot issue appointments in an acting capacity to department
secretaries while Congress is in session because the law does
not give the President such power. In contrast, respondents
insist that the President can issue such appointments because
no law prohibits such appointments.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its
temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an
office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office.16 In case of vacancy in an office
occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of
a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint
an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the
obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or
permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
by: Justice Merzy
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while
Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the
alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office
must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the
very nature of the office of a department secretary, the
President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her
choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or
may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons
may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be
the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting
appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292
states that "[t]he President may temporarily designate an
officer already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office in
the executive branch." Thus, the President may even appoint
in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person
competent.
Petitioners assert that Section 17 does not apply to
appointments vested in the President by the Constitution,
because it only applies to appointments vested in the President
by law. Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only source
of law. "Law" refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of
Congress, municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued
pursuant to law, and judicial decisions.17
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in
an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to
consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as
expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III
of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent
abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to
circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
In distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments
in an acting capacity, a noted textbook writer on constitutional
law has observed:
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective
upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended
only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments
may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily
filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way
of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.18
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence
of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance
of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon
the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
G.R. No. 231643, January 15, 2019 ]
CHRISTIAN C. HALILI, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, PYRA LUCAS, AND CRISOSTOMO
GARBO, RESPONDENTS.
the Facts
Petitioner Marino P. Morales (Morales) was elected and served
as Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga from 1
July 2007 to 30 June 2010. He was elected again as mayor
during the 2010 elections. On 15 May 2012, or during Morales'
second term, Congress passed Republic Act No. (RA) 10164, [5]
converting the Municipality of Mabalacat into a component city.
Thereafter a plebiscite was held. In the 2013 elections,
Morales ran again and was elected as mayor of the new
Mabalacat City. On 8 December 2015, Morales filed his
Certificate of Candidacy[6] (COC) for the 2016 elections for the
position of mayor of Mabalacat City, as substitute candidate for
Wilfredo Feliciano of Aksyon Demokratiko Party.
On 4 January 2016, respondent Pyra Lucas (Lucas), also a
candidate for the position of mayor of Mabalacat City, filed a
Petition for Cancellation of the COC and/or Disqualification of
Morales for the Mayoral Position of Mabalacat City,[7] docketed
as SPA No. 16-001 (DC), before the COMELEC. Lucas alleged
that Morales was disqualified to run for mayor, since he was
elected and had served three consecutive terms prior to the
2016 elections. Lucas also alleged that the conversion of the
Municipality of Mabalacat into Mabalacat City did not interrupt
Morales' service for the full term for which he was elected.
.
On 10 May 2016, following the canvass of all election returns,
the City Board of Canvassers of Mabalacat City proclaimed
Morales as elected city mayor, and petitioner Christian C. Halili
(Halili) as elected city vice mayor.
On 20 May 2016, respondent Crisostomo Garbo (Garbo),
another candidate for the position of mayor of Mabalacat City,
filed a Motion for Leave To Intervene and To Admit Attached
Petition-in-Intervention[9] alleging that he was interested in the
outcome of the case, since he obtained the second highest
number of votes and he should be proclaimed as mayor of
Mabalacat City should Morales' COC be cancelled.
On 28 June 2016, Halili also filed a Verified Motion for Leave to
Intervene (as Respondent) and Admit Attached Answer-in-
Intervention[10] alleging that, as incumbent vice mayor of
by: Justice Merzy
Mabalacat City, he should be proclaimed as mayor of
Mabalacat City should Morales' COC be cancelled pursuant to
the rule on succession under Section 44 of RA 7160, or the
Local Government Code.
On 16 December 2016, Morales filed an Opposition[11] to
Garbo's Petition-in-Intervention and a Comment[12] to Halili's
Answer-in-Intervention before the COMELEC, alleging that
both pleadings are premature.
Issue:
whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: (1) in finding that
Morales committed a false material representation in his COC
when he declared that he was eligible to run as mayor of
Mabalacat City for the 2016 elections despite his violation of
the three-term limit rule; and
(2) in proclaiming Garbo as the duly elected mayor of
Mabalacat City for being the qualified candidate with the
highest number of votes.
Held:
We do not find merit in both petitions.
The three-term limit rule is embodied in Section 8, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule is not only to
abrogate the "monopolization of political power" and prevent
elected officials from breeding "proprietary interest in their
position" but also to "enhance the people's freedom of
choice."[23]
There are two conditions which must concur for the application
of the disqualification of a candidate based on violation of the
three-term limit rule:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.[24]
In the present case, Morales admits that he has been elected
and has served as mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for three
consecutive terms: (1) 2007-2010; (2) 2010-2013; and (3)
2013-2016. However, Morales insists that his second term as
mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat was interrupted by the
conversion of the municipality into a component city. Morales
claims that Mabalacat City is an entirely different political unit
from the Municipality of Mabalacat, having an increased
territory, income and population.
We are not convinced.
We have already ruled upon the same issue in the case of
Latasa v. COMELEC (Latasa),[25] where we held that the
conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an
interruption of the incumbent official's continuity of service. We
held that to be considered as interruption of service, the "law
contemplates a rest period during which the local elective
official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or
authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit."[26]
In Latasa, petitioner was elected and served as mayor of the
Municipality ofDigos, Davao del Sur for terms 1992-1995,
1995-1998, and 1998-2001. During petitioner's third term,
Digos was converted into a component city. When Latasa filed
his COC for the 2001 elections, we held that petitioner was
disqualified to run as mayor of Digos City for violation of the
three-term limit rule, with the following explanation:
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence
separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does
not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the
subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal
mayor would now be construed as a different local government
post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier,
the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as
that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the
municipality are the same as those in the city. These
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected
petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over
whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for
nine years.
x x x. In the present case, petitioner, upon ratification of the
law converting the municipality to a city, continued to hold
office as chief executive of the same territorial jurisdiction.
There were changes in the political and economic rights of
Digos as local government unit, but no substantial change
occurred as to petitioner's authority as chief executive over the
inhabitants of Digos.[27]
by: Justice Merzy
Sec. 2. Mabalacat City. - The Municipality of Mabalacat shall be
converted into a component city to be known as Mabalacat
City, hereinafter referred to as the City. The territorial
jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present
metes and bounds of the Municipality of Mabalacat,
Province of Pampanga.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the
resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of any boundary
dispute or case involving questions of territorial jurisdiction
between Mabalacat City and the adjoining local government
units.
x x x x
Sec. 52. Officials of Mabalacat City. - The present elective
officials of the Municipality of Mabalacat shall continue
to exercise their powers and functions until such time
that a new election is held and the duly-elected officials shall
have already qualified and assumed their offices. Appointive
officials and employees of the municipality shall likewise
continue exercising their duties and functions and they shall be
automatically absorbed by the city government of Mabalacat
City. (Emphasis supplied)
When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity,
there is no room for construction or interpretation, but only
application. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure. Thus,
contrary to Morales' arguments, the territorial jurisdiction of
Mabalacat City is the same as that of the Municipality
ofMabalacat. Also, the elective officials of the Municipality of
Mabalacat continued to exercise their powers and functions
until elections were held for the new city officials.
Applying our ruling in Latasa, the provisions of RA 10164 mean
that the delineation of the metes and bounds of Mabalacat City
did not change even by an inch the land area previously
covered by the Municipality of Mabalacat. Consequently, the
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected Morales
to be their mayor for three consecutive terms, and over whom
he held power and authority as their mayor. Accordingly,
Morales never ceased from acting and discharging his duties
and responsibilities as chief executive of Mabalacat, despite the
conversion of the Municipality of Mabalacat into Mabalacat
City.
Still, Morales insists that his declarations in his COC are
material representations of his honest to goodness belief that
he was eligible to run.
In Aratea v. Commission on Elections (Aratea),[31] we found
that Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility because he knew
fully well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
of San Antonio, Zambales for more than three consecutive
terms, yet, he still certified that he was eligible to run for
mayor for the next succeeding term. We held that such
misrepresentation constitutes false material representation as
to his qualification or eligibility for the office. We explained
that:
In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify
under oath his or her eligibility, and thus qualification, to the
office he [or she] seeks election. Even though the certificate of
candidacy does not specifically ask the candidate for the
number of terms elected and served in an elective position,
such fact is material in determining a candidate's eligibility, and
thus qualification for the office. Election to and service of
the same local elective position for three consecutive
terms renders a candidate ineligible from running for
the same position in the succeeding elections.[32]
(Emphasis supplied)
We do not find merit in such argument.
In the said Resolution[38] dated 14 September 2016, the
COMELEC Second Division dismissed Castro's Petition due to
the following procedural reasons: (1) the petition lacked
verification required by both provisions of the OEC and the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure; (2) Morales was not served with
a copy of the petition; and (3) Castro failed to comply with
Resolution No. 9576 requiring submission of soft copies of
pleadings in MS Word and annexes in PDF format. The
COMELEC Second Division further ruled that the petition was
"dismissible" because the records of the case were bereft of
any prior authoritative ruling that Morales already served as
mayor of Mabalacat City for three consecutive terms, pursuant
to Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections (Poe).[39]
Considering that no motion for reconsideration was filed, the
COMELEC Second Division Resolution became final on 22
December 2016,[40] and the COMELEC En Banc has nothing to
decide on Castro's Petition. Election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration
of decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC En Banc. [41]
On the other hand, we find that in arguing that the COMELEC
En Banc should consider the COMELEC Second Division
Resolution on Castro's Petition because the "Castro Case is
very similar to the instant Petition in that both are petitions
to deny due course and/or to cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy ("COC") of respondent for alleged violation of the
three-term limit rule [and] x x x both Petitions arise from the
same set of facts and both availed of the same relief from
this commission (Petition to Deny Due Course),"[42]
Morales essentially admits that Lucas' petition is properly filed
under Section 78 of the OEC, contrary to his argument that
Lucas' petition is vague and wrongly construed by the
COMELEC as a petition to deny due course.
by: Justice Merzy
 since he only served as Governor for the 2007 elections from
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petitions for lack of merit March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010.
and AFFIRM the assailed Resolution dated 3 August 2016 of
the Commission on Elections First Division and the Resolution HELD:
dated 26 May 2017 of the Commission on Elections En Banc.
We find the petition without merit.

The grounds for disqualification of a candidate are found under

Sections 12 and 68 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended,
Albania V. COMELEC otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines, as well as Section 40 of the Local Government
Code, which respectively provide:
Facts :

SEC. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared

In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, respondent
by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
Edgardo A. Tallado and Jesus O. Typoco were both candidates
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
for the position of Governor in Camarines Norte. After the
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced
counting and canvassing of votes, Typoco was proclaimed as
to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
the winner. Respondent questioned Typoco's proclamation by
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
filing with the COMELEC, a petition for correction of a manifest
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
error. The Petition was decided[3] in respondent's favor on
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
March 5, 2010 and the latter assumed the position of Governor
of Camarines Norte from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010, the
end of the 2007-2010 term. The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be
deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority
that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after
Respondent ran again in the 2010[4] and 2013[5] National and
the expiration of a period of five years from his service or
Local Elections where he won and served as Governor of
sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
Camarines Norte respectively.
disqualified.

On October 16, 2015, respondent filed his Certificate of

xxxx
Candidacy[6] as Governor of Camarines Norte in the May 9,
2016 National and Local elections.
SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a
On November 13, 2015, petitioner, a registered voter of
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
Poblacion Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, filed a petition[7] for
having (a) given money or other material consideration to
respondent's disqualification from running as Governor based
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
on Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523[8] on two
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism
grounds: (1) he violated the three term limit rule under Section
to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign
43 of RA No 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
Code of 1991 (LGC); and (2) respondent's suspension from
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections
office for one year without pay, together with its accessory
89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83,
penalties, after he was found guilty of oppression and grave
85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6,
abuse of authority in the Ombudsman's Order [9] dated October
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he
2, 2015.
has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
In his Verified Answer, respondent argued that since the shall not be qualified to run for any, elective office under this
petition was primarily based on his alleged violation of the Code, unless said person has waived his status as a permanent
three-term limit rule, the same should have been filed as a resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
candidacy under Rule 23 of COMELEC Resolution 9523, in
relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, as the
xxxx
ground cited affected a candidate's eligibility; that based on
Section 23, the petition should had been filed on November 10,
2015, but the petition was filed only on November 13, 2015, SECTION 40. Disqualifications - The following persons are
hence, the same had already prescribed and must be disqualified from running for any elective local position:
dismissed. His suspension from office is also not a ground for a
petition for disqualification. (a) Those sentence by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
Issue: On the substantive issues, he denied violating the three- more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
term limit rule as he did not fully serve three consecutive terms sentence;

Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim by: Justice Merzy

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of
allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here
or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have
acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the
same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Petitioner filed the petition for disqualification of respondent on
the grounds that he allegedly violated the three-term limit rule
provided under the Constitution and the LGC; and that he was
suspended from office as a result of an administrative case.
Notably, however, a reading of the grounds enumerated under
the above-quoted provisions for a candidate's disqualification
does not include the two grounds relied upon by petitioner.
Thus, the COMELEC Second Division was correct when it found
that the petition was not based on any of the grounds for
disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory
provisions.
Respondent's suspension from office is indeed not a ground for
a petition for disqualification as Section 40(b) clearly speaks of
removal from office as a result of an administrative offense
that would disqualify a candidate from running for any elective
local position. In fact, the penalty of suspension cannot be a
bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long
as he meets the qualifications for the office as provided under
Section 66(b) of R.A. No. 7160, to wit:
SEC. 66. Form and Notice of Decision.- x x x
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired
term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every
administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the
candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he
meets the qualifications for the office.
While the alleged violation of the three-term limit rule is not a
ground for a petition for disqualification, however, the
COMELEC Second Division found that it is an ineligibility which
is a proper ground for a petition to deny due course to or to
cancel a Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC,
hence considered the petition as such.
The Constitution has vested in the COMELEC broad power
involving not only the enforcement and administration of all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, but
also the resolution and determination of election
controversies.[15] It also granted the COMELEC the power and
authority to promulgate its rules of procedure, with the
primary objective of ensuring the expeditious disposition of
election cases.[16] Concomitant to such powers is the authority
of the COMELEC to determine the true nature of the cases filed
before it. Thus, it examines the allegations of every pleading
filed, obviously aware that in determining the nature of the
complaint or petition, its averments, rather than its
title/caption, are the proper gauges.[17]
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
Since the petition filed was a petition to deny due course to or
to cancel a certificate of candidacy, such petition must be filed
within 25 days from the time of filing of the COC, as provided
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. However, as
the COMELEC found, the petition was filed beyond the
reglementary period, and dismissed the petition for being filed
out time. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed such dismissal.
We agree.
The three-term limit rule is embodied in Section 8 of Article X
of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
which is restated in Section 43 of the Local Government Code,
thus:
Section 43. Term of Office.- (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected.
The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was to
avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power
over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a
prolonged stay in the same office.[18] After being elected and
serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official
cannot seek immediate reelection for the same office in the
next regular election because he is ineligible.[19]
Section 74 of the OEC provides that the certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy
for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said
office. The word "eligible" in Section 74 means having the right
to run for elective public office, that is, having all the
qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public
office.[20] And We had held[21] that a violation of the three-term
limit rule is an ineligibility which is a proper ground for a
petition to deny due course to or to cancel a COC under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the
person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
by: Justice Merzy
As the petition filed is indeed a petition under Section 78 of the
OEC, the filing of the same must comply with the period
prescribed therein, i.e., the filing of the same must be made
not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy.[22] In this case, respondent filed
his COC for Governor of Camarines Norte for the 2016
elections on October 16, 2015, and he had 25 days therefrom
to file the petition for denial of due course or cancellation of
COC on the ground of violation of the three-term limit rule,
which fell on November 10, 2015. However, the petition was
filed only on November 13, 2015 which was already beyond
the period to file the same; thus, find no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the COMELEC in dismissing the
petition for being filed out of time.
Petitioner's insistence that the petition filed with the COMELEC
was based on Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 which
provides:
Rule 25 - Disqualification of Candidates
Section 1. Grounds. - Any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a
competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.
We, likewise, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by
the COMELEC En Banc when it found that the petition to deny
due course to or cancel a COC will not also prosper as there
was no violation of the three term limit rule. Petitioner alleges
that since respondent had already been elected and had
served as Governor of Camarines Norte for three consecutive
terms, i.e., 2007, 2010, and 2013, he is proscribed from
running for the same position in the 2016 elections as it would
already be his fourth consecutive term.
We are not convinced.
We held that two conditions must concur for the application of
the disqualification of a candidate based on violation of the
three-term limit rule, which are: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.[23]
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which
Abundo's opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to
be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo's
continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot,
in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one
term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.
xxx
As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an
election protest grants the local elected official the right to
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was
declared the winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for
the 2004 2007 term, Abundo's full term has been substantially
reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent
(Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in
the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have
served the full 2004-2007 term.
Applying the foregoing in the instant case, since Respondent
did not serve the full 2007-2010 term, it cannot be considered
as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.
Consequently, Respondent cannot be said to have continuously
served as Governor for three consecutive terms prior to the
2016 elections.
x x x[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated
August 24, 2016 of the Commission on Elections En Banc is
hereby AFFIRMED.
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO v. COMELEC, GR No.
201716, 2013-01-08
Facts:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001,
2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied
for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board
of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres
(Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the
office of mayor.
Abundo protested
Torres' election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually
declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest,
paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9,
2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or
for a period of a little over one year... and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and
Torres again opposed each other.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy... for the
mayoralty seat
Torres lost no time in seeking the former's disqualification... to
run,... predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule.
On June 16, 2010,... COMELEC... issued a Resolution... finding
for Abundo,... accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of
Viga... private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced
by: Justice Merzy
a quo warranto... action... to unseat Abundo on essentially the Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty
same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify. office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner
who would have the legal right to assume and serve such
Issues: elective office. For... another, not having been declared winner
yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since
one cannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did
The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion
not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes,... Abundo was not
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared
entitled to the elective office until the election protest was
that Abundo has consecutively served for three terms despite
finally resolved in his favor.
the fact that he only served the remaining one year and one
month of the second... term as a result of an election protest.
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years,
consisting of a break and effective interruption of his service,
whether the service of a term less than the full three years by
until he assumed the office and served barely over a year of
an elected official arising from his being declared as the duly
the remaining term.
elected official upon an election protest is considered as full
service of the term for purposes of the... application of the
three consecutive term limit for elective local officials.

Ruling: G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009

The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND
Abundo's three successive, continuous mayorship was FERDINAND N. TALABONG, Petitioners,
effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was vs.
initially deprived of title to, and was veritably... disallowed to COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F.
serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due ASILO, Respondents.
proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful
choice of the electorate. .

To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office THE ANTECEDENTS

pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory
provisions, the following requisites must concur: The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor
of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001,
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court,
however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan’s suspension
order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his
the Court finds Abundo's case meritorious and declares that
office and finished his term.
the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was
serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption,
which effectively removed Abundo's case from the ambit of the In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for
three-term... limit rule. the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr.,
Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners)
sought to deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or
during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the
to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had
decision of the election protest in his favor,... Abundo assumed
served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term
the mayoralty post... for a period of a little over one year...
therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8,
and one month... it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was
otherwise entitled.
The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against the petitioners
and in Asilo’s favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten
reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as
months,... Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted
Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term
to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right.
because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
Neither can he assert title to the same nor... serve the
functions of the said elective office.
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second
Division’s ruling in its October 7, 2008 Resolution; hence, the
The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such
PRESENT PETITION raising the following
office and the corresponding right to assume the functions
thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election
winner. ISSUES:

Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim by: Justice Merzy

 1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local
official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule;
and
2. Whether preventive suspension is considered
involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section
43(b) of RA 7160
Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether
Asilo’s preventive suspension constituted an interruption that
allowed him to run for a 4th term.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
General Considerations
The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-
term limit provision of the Constitution, but is the first on the
effect of preventive suspension on the continuity of an elective
official’s term. To be sure, preventive suspension, as an
interruption in the term of an elective public official, has been
mentioned as an example in Borja v. Commission on
Elections.2 Doctrinally, however, Borja is not a controlling
ruling; it did not deal with preventive suspension, but with the
application of the three-term rule on the term that an elective
official acquired by succession.
a. The Three-term Limit Rule:
The Constitutional Provision Analyzed
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional
provision, and any difference in wording does not assume any
significance in this case.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local
elective office and limits an elective official’s stay in office to no
more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of
the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of
time – three years – during which an official has title to office
and can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals,3 a Resolution
promulgated on November 28, 2007, succinctly discusses what
a "term" connotes, as follows:
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and
definite period of time which the law describes that an
officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term
of office is the period during which an office may be held.
Upon expiration of the officer’s term, unless he is authorized
by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public
officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the
most and natural frequent method by which a public officer
ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which
he was elected or appointed. [Emphasis supplied].1avvphi1
A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit,4 reiterated that
"[T]he term means the time during which the officer may claim
to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the
several incumbents shall succeed one another."
The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is
expressed in the negative – "no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms." This formulation – no
more than three consecutive terms – is a clear command
suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no
exact indication of what to "serve. . . three consecutive terms"
exactly connotes, the meaning is clear – reference is to the
term, not to the service that a public official may
render.1awphi1 In other words, the limitation refers to the
term.
The second branch relates to the provision’s express initiative
to prevent any circumvention of the limitation through
voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it expressly
states that voluntary renunciation of office "shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected." This declaration
complements the term limitation mandated by the first branch.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not
textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual
interruption of service that does not affect "continuity of
service for a full term" for purposes of the three-term limit
rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of what does not serve
as an interruption of service for a full term, but the phrase
"voluntary renunciation," by itself, is not without significance in
determining constitutional intent.
The word "renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of
abandonment. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline, or
resign.5 It is an act that emanates from its author, as
contrasted to an act that operates from the outside. Read with
the definition of a "term" in mind, renunciation, as mentioned
under the second branch of the constitutional provision, cannot
but mean an act that results in cutting short the term, i.e., the
loss of title to office. The descriptive word "voluntary" linked
together with "renunciation" signifies an act of surrender based
on the surenderee’s own freely exercised will; in other words,
a loss of title to office by conscious choice. In the context of
the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not considered an
interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to
avoid the application of the term limitation.
c. Conclusion Based on Law and Jurisprudence
by: Justice Merzy
From all the above, we conclude that the "interruption" of a
term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit
rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of
title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left
his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective
interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of
Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully
served, i.e., to limit an elective official’s continuous stay in
office to no more than three consecutive terms, using
"voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what
does not constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of
law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of service
within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand,
temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions
of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term because it does
not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective
break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining
title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office
for a reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the
office holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot
be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs
during an office holder’s term when he retains title to the
office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established
by law. Of course, the term "failure to serve" cannot be used
once the right to office is lost; without the right to hold office
or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is
really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section
8, Article X – both by structure and substance – fixes an
elective official’s term of office and limits his stay in office to
three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed,
no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a
circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of
interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the full
continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective
position. The "voluntary renunciation" it speaks of refers only
to the elective official’s voluntary relinquishment of office and
loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary
"cessation of the exercise of power or authority" that may
occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension being
only one of them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec:16
Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the
local elective official steps down from office and ceases to
exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
[Emphasis supplied].
Preventive Suspension and the Three-Term Limit Rule
a. Nature of Preventive Suspension
Preventive suspension – whether under the Local Government
Code,17 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,18 or the
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
Ombudsman Act19 – is an interim remedial measure to address
the situation of an official who have been charged
administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily
indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or
liability.
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government
Code "when the evidence of guilt is strong and given the
gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence." Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information (that
requires a finding of probable cause) has been filed in court,
while under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the
judgment of the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong;
and (a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the
charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case
filed against him.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended
official is barred from performing the functions of his office and
does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate
and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that
only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates
under closely-controlled conditions and gives a premium to the
protection of the service rather than to the interests of the
individual office holder. Even then, protection of the service
goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise of
the functions of the official’s office; the official is reinstated to
the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive
suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the
exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public
official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly
happened to Asilo.
That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is
a reality that is true in the exercise of all powers and
prerogative under the Constitution and the laws. The
imposition of preventive suspension, however, is not an
unlimited power; there are limitations built into the laws20
themselves that the courts can enforce when these limitations
are transgressed, particularly when grave abuse of discretion is
present. In light of this well-defined parameters in the
imposition of preventive suspension, we should not view
preventive suspension from the extreme situation – that it can
totally deprive an elective office holder of the prerogative to
serve and is thus an effective interruption of an election
official’s term.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly
different aspects of an elective officials’ service in office and
they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive
suspension involves protection of the service and of the people
being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily
exercising the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other
hand, is triggered after an elective official has served his three
by: Justice Merzy
terms in office without any break. Its companion concept –
interruption of a term – on the other hand, requires loss of title
to office. If preventive suspension and term limitation or
interruption have any commonality at all, this common point
may be with respect to the discontinuity of service that may
occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel
to each other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by
its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render service during
an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation,
interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in
the term.
b. Preventive Suspension and the Intent of the Three-
Term Limit Rule
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule
demands that preventive suspension should not be considered
an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office
beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be
a term interruption because the suspended official continues to
stay in office although he is barred from exercising the
functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension
period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity
in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the
lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a
fourth and prohibited term is to close our eyes to this reality
and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by
equating the temporary inability to discharge the functions of
office with the interruption of term that the constitutional
provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist,
voluntary or involuntary – some of them personal and some of
them by operation of law – that may temporarily prevent an
elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office
in the way that preventive suspension does. A serious
extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the
enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some
involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from
exercising the functions of his office for a time without
forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different
because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a
term. Adopting such interruption of actual service as the
standard to determine effective interruption of term under the
three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in
implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions
when actual service may be interrupted in the course of
serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the
enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and
possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective
interruption is.
c. Preventive Suspension and Voluntary Renunciation
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of
law, does not involve a voluntary act on the part of the
suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may
have voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of
the charge against him. From this perspective, preventive
suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that
voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
element of renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely
involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that
an elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive
suspension is – by its very nature – the exact opposite of
voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and
involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the
office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by
nature, different and non-comparable.
But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures
is the more important consideration of how they affect the
three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the
total incapacity to render service, is disallowed by the
Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is
therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-
term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an
effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a
reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a
threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it
an effective interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a
preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary
renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of
office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an easily
fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon
after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense,
recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption
of a term can serve as a circumvention more potent than the
voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows
as an interruption.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, Asilo’s 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by
the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as
preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official’s
term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal command
of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due
course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth
term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty
required by no less than the Constitution and was one
undertaken outside the contemplation of law.21
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and
accordingly NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC rulings. The
private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED
to run, and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a
prohibited fourth term. Costs against private respondent Asilo.
SO ORDERED.
URBANO M. MORENO vs. COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. No. 168550. August 10, 2006
by: Justice Merzy
 later law which sets forth the qualifications and
FACTS: Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is
Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a
the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in
Arbitrary Detention. The Comelec en banc granted her petition its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute,
and disqualified Moreno. Moreno filed an answer averring that will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier
the petition states no cause of action because he was already statute.
granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v.
Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well
as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno
also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976
Mercado Vs. Manzano
(Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall
307 SCRA 630
operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a
G.R. No. 135083
result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for
May 26, 1999
any fine imposed.
Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent
However, the Comelec en banc assails Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-
Government Code which provides that those sentenced by final
Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
respondent was the winner of the said election but the
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment,
proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto
within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified
Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent.
from running for any elective local position. Since Moreno was
Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of
released from probation on December 20, 2000,
the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the
disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2)
petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a
years thence. The grant of probation to Moreno merely
dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that
suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his
provides that persons who possess dual citizenship are
disqualification from running for an elective local office.
disqualified from running any public position. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained
On his petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under
pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in
the Local Government Code applies only to those who have
the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision
served their sentence and not to probationers because the
and declared private respondent qualified to run for the
latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law
position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of
should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local
canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This
Government Code because it is a special law which applies
petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC
only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is
and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the
disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay
office of the vice mayor of Makati.
allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous
misconduct.
Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold
office as Vice-Mayor.
ISSUE: Does Moreno’s probation grant him the right to run in
public office?
Held:
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
HELD: Yes. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he
final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
application of the different laws of two or more states, a
conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted."
states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person
Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the court's
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the
finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his
principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights
doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual
lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to
citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in
him, including the right to run for public office.
San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec.
of both states.
40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution,
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty
it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the
Philippines to posses dual citizenship:
provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
running for a local elective office.
countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the
fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are
Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a
citizens of that country;

Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim by: Justice Merzy

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act
or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s
volition.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present
post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in
effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might
have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a
dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of
allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that
he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
Rodriguez v. comelec
Facts:
In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and respondent Marquez ran for
Governor of Quezon Province. Rodriguez won. Marquez
challenged Rodriguez’ victory via a Quo Warranto on the
ground that there is a charge pending against him at the Los
Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand
theft, etc. Thus, he is a fugitive from justice.
COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari to the Supreme
Court, it was held that: Fugitive from justice includes
not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment, but also those who after being charged, flee
to avoid prosecution. The case was remanded to the
COMELEC to determine WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from
justice.
In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor.
Marquez filed a Petition for Disqualification against Rodriquez
on the same ground that he is a fugitive from justice.
COMELEC then consolidated both cases and found Rodriguez
guilty based on the authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest
at LA Court and of the felony complaint.
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his
proclamation, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed
him.
Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC nullified the
proclamation. Rodriguez filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as defined by the Court in
the MARQUEZ Decision?
Held:
No. A fugitive from justice is defined as “not only those who
flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who,
after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.” This indicates
that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that makes a
person leave a particular jurisdiction, and there can only be
intent to evade prosecution or punishment when the fleeing
person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a
promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent to evade on the
part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that
there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has
already been filed, at the time of flight. This cannot be applied
in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines
on June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of the felony
complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and
of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign
court. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known
about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he
left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest
warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet at such
time.
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA,
ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P.
PAGADUAN,Respondents.
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been
born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13,
1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her
marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in
Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225
otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved and
the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on December 5, 2005.
by: Justice Merzy
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the
Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Ruling: Yes
Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27,
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino
2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their
citizen.6
Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Republic.
Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid
numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning
oath.
candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma
one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and
P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all
obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions
registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for
imposed in Section 5.
quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the
RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground
that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall
"personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign meet the qualification for holding such public office as required
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the
an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian
citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought
Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian
complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the
running for public office is a clear abandonment of her same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of
Australian citizenship. Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must
be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon
disqualified and ineligible to hold office of vice mayor of Caba The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian
La union and nullified her proclamation as the winning citizenship was invalid due to it was not oath before any public
candidate. officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of Condon
void.
After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but the
appeal was dismissed y the second division and affirmed the WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is
decision of the trial court. hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated September 6, 2011
of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an
Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no longer held
dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed
her certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections.
Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual
citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her.

JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC and ERASMO

Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective G.R. No. 191970; April 24, 2012
office due to failure to renounce her Australian Citizenship in
FACTS:
accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225

Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim by: Justice Merzy

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He
migrated to Australia when he was eight years old and
acquired Australian citizenship. In 2008, he returned to the
Philippines and lived in Zamboanga, he took an oath of
allegiance to the Philippines and was issued a certificate of
reacquisition of citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration and
he renounced his Australian citizenship.
Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay, but Private Respondent Erasmo, the barangay
(b)
captain, opposed the registration. COMELEC approved the
application and included Jalosjos in the voter's list. This
decision was affirmed at the MCTC and at the RTC.
(c)
Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010
elections. Erasmo filed a petition to cancel the COC on the
ground of failure to comply with the one year residency
requirement of the Local Government Code (LGC).
COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a
bona fide intention to establish a domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. It held that when he first moved back to the
Philippines, he was merely a guest or transient at his brother's
house in Ipil, and for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his
domicile. Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that
petitioner did not present ample proof of a bona fide intention
to establish domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
HELD:
NO. The COMELEC is incorrect. Jalosjos has successfully
proven by his acts of renouncing his Australian citizenship and
by living in Ipil, that he has changed his domicile to
Zamboanga Sibugay.
The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a resident
of the province for at least one year before the elections. For
the purposes of election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile: i.e. he must have an intention to
reside in a particulaar place, but must also have personal
presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. To
determine compliance with the residency/domicile
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
requirement, jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines:
(a) every person has a domicile or residence
somewhere;
where once established, that domicile remains until
he acquires a new one; and
a person can have but one domicile at a time.
The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin was Quezon
city. When he acquired Australian citizenship, Australia
became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. On
the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November
2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is
evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile
for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship,
and renounced his allegiance to that country and reacquired
his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live
in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there.
And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in
Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin
(Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of
law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man
must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos did not come to
settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at
his brother's house. A candidate is not required to have a
house in order to establish his residence or domicile in that
place. It is enough that he should live there even if it be in a
rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist
that the candidate own the house where he lives would make
property a qualification for public office. What matters is that
Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil
and an intention of making it his domicile.
As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-door neighbors who
testified that he was physically present in Ipil, he presented
correspondence with political leaders and local and national
party mates, furthermore, he is a registered voter by final
judgement of the RTC. The court also noted that Jalosjos has
since acquired a lot in Ipil and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga,
Zamboanga Sibugay. This, without a doubt is sufficient to
establish his intent to set his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.
by: Justice Merzy

DE FACTO OFFICER DOCRTRINE
GAMINDE vs. COA
G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000
Facts:
Thelma Gaminde was appointed by the President of the
Philippines as Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission,
ad interim and assumed office on June 22, 1993 after oath of
office. The Commission on Appointments (COA) and the
Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment on
September 7, 1993. Gaminde, on February 24, 1998, sought
the Office of the President for clarification on the expiry date of
her term of office. In response to her request, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel opined that her term office will
expire on February 2, 2000 instead of February 2, 1999.
Relying on said advisory opinion, Gaminde remained in office
after February 2, 1999. However, on February 4, 1999,
Chairman Corazon Alma de Leon wrote COA requesting opinion
whether or not Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be
paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their
appointments on February 2, 1999. The General Counsel of
COA issued an opinion on February 18, 1999 that “the term of
Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 2, 1999 as
stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional
intent.” Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident
Auditor Flovitas Felipe issued a Notice of Disallowance,
disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments of Gaminde
and her co-terminus staff effective February 2, 1999. Gaminde
appealed COA’s disallowance but it was dismissed, and
affirmed the propriety of the disallowance; and held that the
issue of Gaminde’s office term may be properly addressed by
mere reference to her appointment paper which set the
expiration date of February 2, 1999, and that the Commission
was bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not
even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the
President. Gaminde moved for reconsideration, but was denied
by COA.
Issue: Whether the term of office of Thelma Gaminde, as
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was
appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 2, 1999, as
stated in the appointment paper, or on February 2, 2000, as
claimed by her.
Held: The term of office of Thelma P. Gaminde as the CSC
Commissioner, as appointed by President Fidel V. Ramos,
expired on February 2, 1999. However, she served as de-facto
officer in good faith until February 2, 2000. The term of office
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission
is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution under Article IX-D,
Section 1 (2):
“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President withthe consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman
shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years,
and another Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.”
Therefore, COA erred in disallowing in audit such salary and
other emoluments. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff are
entitled to receive their salary and other emoluments for actual
service rendered.
National Amnesty Commission v. CA
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a
government agency created in 1994 by then President Fidel V.
Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to
receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is
composed of 7 members: a Chairperson, three regular
members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of
Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government
as ex officio members.
After personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three
ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their
representatives who were paid honoraria. However, in 1997,
NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment
of honoraria to these representatives pursuant to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038.
Meanwhile, in 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No.
2 (the new Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President
Joseph Estrada. Section 1, Rule II thereof provides that ex
officio members may designate their representatives to the
Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per
diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be
authorized by law.
Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing
before the COA the rulings of the resident auditor and the
National Government Audit Office disallowing payment of
honoraria to the ex officio members' representatives, to no
by: Justice Merzy
avail.
Issues:
1. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in
implementing COA Memorandum No. 97-038 without the
required notice and publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code
2. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of
discretion disallowing the payment of honoraria on the ground
of lack of authority of representatives to attend the NAC
meetings in behalf of the ex officio members
3. Are the representatives de facto officers and as such are
entitled to allowances?
Held:
1. No. COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not need, for
validity and effectivity, the publication required by Article 2 of
the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.
COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and
interpretative regulation or letter of instruction which does not
need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an
implementing rule or regulation of a statute but a directive
issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing
prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution on the President and his official family,
their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from
holding multiple offices and receiving double compensation.
2. No. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant
per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC
ex officio members' official representatives.
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not
by virtue of a new appointment but by mere designationfrom
the ex officio members who were themselves also designated
as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment
and designation. An appointment is the selection by the proper
authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and
functions of a given office; a designation merely connotes an
imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
already in the public service by virtue of an earlier
appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or
grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the
salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a
designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of
the position. The legal basis of an employee's right to claim the
salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved
appointment to the position, and not a mere designation.
In Civil Liberties Union, we held that cabinet secretaries,
including their deputies and assistants, who hold positions
in ex officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional
compensation because their services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to their principal
offices. Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex
officio members were not entitled to, and were in fact
prohibited from, collecting extra compensation, whether it was
called per diem, honorarium, allowance or some other
euphemism. Such additional compensation is prohibited by the
Constitution.
Furthermore, in de la Cruz vs. COA and Bitonio vs. COA, we
upheld COA's disallowance of the payment of honoraria and
per diems to the officers concerned who sat as ex officio
members or alternates. The agent, alternate or representative
cannot have a better right than his principal, the ex officio
member. The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover
the ex officio member apply with equal force to his
representative. In short, since the ex officio member is
prohibited from receiving additional compensation for a
position held in an ex officio capacity, so is his representative
likewise restricted.
3. No. The representatives cannot be considered de
facto officers because they were not appointed but were
merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not
entitled to something their own principals are prohibited from
receiving. (National Amnesty Commission vs. COA, G. R. No.
156982, September 8, 2004)
TETANGCO ET AL V. COA 2017
The Facts
by: Justice Merzy
This case stemmed from the COA's act of disallowing the
Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EMEs) of the ex
officio members of the Monetary Board (MBM), allegedly in
violation of their respective constitutional rights.
The petitioners alleged that the COA acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: (A) in disallowing
the EMEs of the ex officio MBMs: (1) because the March 23,
2010 COA Decision No. 2010-048, should not be applied since
the disallowed EMEs were incurred by the ex officio MBMs in
the years 2007, 2008 and 2009, which years are prior to the
date of finality (May 5, 2010) of the said decision; (2) since as
MBMs, they incur extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses in
the discharge of their functions, separate and distinct from the
expenses they incur in relation to their principal office; (3)
since it cannot be said that the MBMs failed to exercise the
highest degree of responsibility in approving the grant of
EMEs; (4) since it violates the equal protection clause under
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution; and (B) in
including Petitioner Favila as one of the persons solidarily liable
under ND No. 10-004 GF (2007-2008), despite the fact that he
had no participation in the approval of the EMEs covered by
the ND.
For its part, the COA countered that: Petitioners failed to show
grave abuse of discretion on the part of COA in rendering its
assailed Decision and subsequent Resolution; COA did not
gravely abuse its discretion in disallowing the EMEs of the ex
officio MBM, because the allowances were based on the
applicable laws, jurisprudence, rules and regulations; the
defense of good faith in approving the grant of EMEs to the ex
officio MBM with reliance on BSP's independence and
autonomy is unavailing; there was no violation of the equal
protection clause in the subject disallowances; and petitioner
Favila is solidarily liable with other officials of the BSP under
ND No. 10-004 GF (2007-2009) because he was a member of
the Monetary Board and also the recipient of the irregular
EMEs.
The Issue
Simply, the core issue boils down to whether or not the COA
gravely abused its discretion when it disallowed the EMEs of
the ex officio MBM.
The Ruling
We rule in the negative.
In disallowing the EMEs of the ex officio MBM, COA did not
abuse the exercise of its discretion as its denial was grounded
on the law, facts and circumstances that would warrant such
disallowance arising from the following observations:
The nature of EME, however, was not the foremost reason for
the disallowance, but the limitations imposed by law in
availing such allowance. x x x the ex officio members of the
Monetary Board are entitled to EMEs to the extent of that
appropriated in the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since the ex officio members already received their
EMEs from their respective Departments (as
appropriated in the GAA), the additional EMEs from BSP are
no longer necessary. It must be stressed that the ex
officio position is actually and, in legal contemplation,
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
part of the principal office; hence, the ex
officio member is no longer entitled to receive any form
of compensation, allowance or other euphemism from
the extended agency. x x x we quote the pertinent
discussion of the subject COA Decision: [Emphasis Supplied.]
x x x In fact, the ex officio membership of the cabinet member
in the Monetary Board does not comprise 'another office' but
rather annexed to or is required by the primary functions of his
or her official position as cabinet member. Of equal
significance, too, is that the ex officio member of the Monetary
Board already receives separate appropriations under the GAA
for EMEs, he or she being a member of the cabinet. Being
such, it is highly irregular that the said ex officio member of
the Monetary Board, who performs only additional duties by
virtue of his or her primary functions, will be provided with
additional EMEs, which in this case, appear much higher than
his or her appropriations for the same expenses under the GAA
as a cabinet member. x x x [12]
xxxx
x x x the irregularity of giving additional compensation or
allowances to ex officio members was no longer a novel issue
during the time that the subject allowances were authorized by
BSP. As early as 1991, the issue was already ruled on by the
Supreme Court in the case of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive
Secretary,[13] followed by several jurisprudence in the cases
of Dela Cruz, et. al. vs. COA,[14] and National Amnesty
Commission vs. COA,[15] to name a few.[16] (Emphasis
supplied)
Absent any showing that COA capriciously, arbitrarily or
whimsically exercised its discretion that would be tantamount
to evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty or to act at all in contemplation of law resulting to the
prejudice of the rights of the claimants, the Court finds no
reason to set aside its decision.
In the absence of grave abuse of discretion; the factual
findings of the COA, which are undoubtedly supported by the
evidence on record, must be accorded great respect and
finality. COA, as the duly authorized agency to adjudicate
money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities has acquired special knowledge and expertise
in handling matters falling under its specialized jurisdiction. [17]
Verily, the Court has sustained the decisions of administrative
authorities like the COA as a matter of general policy, not only
on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also
upon the recognition that such administrative authorities held
the expertise as to the laws they are entrusted to
enforce.[18] The Court has accorded not only respect but also
finality to their findings especially when their decisions are not
tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion.[19] Only when the COA acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court
entertain and grant a petition for certiorari brought to assail its
actions.[20] However, we find no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COA in issuing the assailed decision.
by: Justice Merzy
Anent petitioners' defense of good faith in approving the grant
of EMEs to the ex officio members of the Monetary Board, this
Court opines that said defense is unavailing.
As correctly pointed out by the COA:
This Commission finds that the Petitioners MBM, in
approving the irregular allowance, were remiss in their
duty to protect the interest of the Bank. x x x they
ought to know that the ex officio members of the
Monetary Board were already receiving the same
allowance from their respective Departments, hence,
they were no longer entitled to the additional EMEs.
It must be emphasized that the degree of diligence required
from bank employees and officials is not ordinary but
requires the highest standards of integrity and
performance. Section 2 of R.A. No. 8791, also known as the
General Banking Law of 2000, provides for the degree of
diligence expected from the industry, to wit:
Applying by analogy the above rulings, We hold the
petitioners-approving officers of the Monetary Board are liable
for the excess EMEs which they received.
As pointed out during the deliberation by Our learned
colleague, Hon. Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, the doctrine on the
non-liability of recipients of disallowed benefits based on good
faith did not extend to petitioner Favila for the following
reasons: first, there was precisely a law (the relevant GAAs)
that expressly limited the amounts of the EMEs to be received
by the ex officio members; and second, in so far as ND No. 10-
004GF (2007- 2008)[27] is concerned, his liability arose from his
receipt of the subject allowances in 2008, when he was an ex
officio member of the Board. Hence, good faith did not favor
him not only because he had failed to exercise the highest
degree of responsibility, but also because as a cabinet member
he was aware of the extent of the benefits he was entitled to.
Verily, petitioners Tetangco, Jr., Favila, Amatong, Favis-
Villafuerte, Antonio, and Bunye, who were members of the
Monetary Board were expected to keep abreast of the laws
that may affect the performance of their functions. The law,
jurisprudence and COA issuances subject of this case are of
such clearness that the concerned officials could not have
mistaken their meaning. It was incumbent upon them to
instruct Petitioners Ong, Prudencio, Reyes and Catarroja who
participated in the processing of the EMEs, to comply with
these laws. Unfortunately, they did not. Thus, they cannot find
shelter in the defense of good faith.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The Commission
or Audit's Resolution dated August 12, 2014, denying the
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration[28] and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration, affirming its Decision No. 2013-
227 dated December 23, 2013 and sustaining the Notices of
Disallowance Nos. 10-004 GF (2007-2008) and 10-004 GF
(2007-2009) both dated August 13, 2010, are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
RE: NOMINATION OF ATTY CHAGUILE
FACTS: Atty. Marlou B. Ubano, IBP Governor for Western
Visayas sought to invalidate the Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors which approved the nomination of Atty. Lynda
Chaguile as the replacement of IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon, Denis B. Habawel. He noted that on the IBP By-Laws
which considers as ipso facto resigned from his or her post any
official of the IBP who files a Certificate of Candidacy for any
elective public office. Under the amended By-Laws, the
resignation takes effect on the starting date of the official
campaign period.
Atty. Ubano alleged that the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon,
Denis B. Habawel, filed a Certificate of Candidacy to run for
the position of Provincial Governor of the Province of Ifugao.
Hence, he is considered ipso facto resigned from the IBP.
Atty. Ubano challenged the IBP Board of Governors' approval
of Atty. Chaguiles succession as IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon on two grounds: First, there was, as yet, no vacancy.
Atty. Habawel was himself present at the meeting where his
replacement was named. There was, therefore, no need to
name a replacement. Second, the right to elect the successor
of a resigned IBP Governor is vested, not in the IBP Board of
Governors, but in the delegates of the concerned region; thus,
the IBP Board of Governors approval of the nominee to
succeed Atty. Habawel is ultra vires.
In support of this second ground, Section 44 of the IBP By-
Laws provides:
Sec. 44. Removal of members. x x x x x x[x] In case of any
vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the
delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a
successor from among the members of the Chapter to which
the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for
the unexpired portion of the term.
In its Comment, the IBP Board of Governors assailed the first
ground raised by Atty. Ubano by saying that it was not
necessary for a position to be absolutely vacant before a
successor may be appointed or elected.As for the second
ground, the IBP Board of Governors argued that it has been
the "tradition"of the IBP that "where the unexpired term is
only for a very short period of time, it is usually the Board of
Governors which appoint a replacement or an officer in charge
to serve the unexpired term."
Meanwhile, Atty. Ubano filed another motion seeking to
prevent Atty. Chaguile from exercising the functions as IBP
Governor of Northern Luzon.
A.M. No. 13-05-08-SC: The second Administrative Matter
assails the conduct of the election of the IBP Executive Vice
President (EVP). In this election, Atty. Vicente M. Joyas was
elected IBP Governor for Southern Luzon.
Atty. Ubano sought to nullify the May 22, 2013 election
claiming that the IBP election of the EVP was marred by
by: Justice Merzy
inordinate haste, grave irregularities, patent hostility, manifest
bias and prejudice, as well as the presiding officers absolute
lack of independence and that the election violated Section 47
of the IBP By-Laws which requires that the EVP be elected by
a vote of at least five (5) Governors. Atty. Ubano emphasized
that Atty. Chaguiles vote in favor of Atty. Joyas was invalid, as
Atty. Chaguiles appointment as governor was itselfultra vires,
and therefore, voidab initio.
ISSUES: [1] Was the appointment of Atty. Chaguile as
Governor ultra vires, therefore restraining her to
exercise functions relative to the position?
[2] Is the election for the IBP EVP void in violation
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws and restrained Atty.
Vicente M. Joyas from discharging his duties?
HELD: As pointed out by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Compliance, "the term of Atty. Lynda Chaguile as Governor for
Northern Luzon expired on June 30, 2013."A new Governor for
Northern Luzon, Atty. Oliver Cachapero, was elected.As Atty.
Chaguile is no longer serving as IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon, the matter of ousting or restraining Atty. Chaguile from
exercising the functions of such office is no longer an available
relief.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing
controversies. The Court is not empowered to decide moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in
issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is
moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
FUNA VS AGRA (G.R. NO. 191644 FEBRUARY 19, 2013)
Funa vs Agra
G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013
Facts: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President
Gloria M. Macapagal Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting
Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary
Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat
in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo
designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent
capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity
as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced
this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent
appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited
under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that
during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino
III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor
General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and
commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010. Agra
Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim
renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents
that on January 12, 2010, he was then the Government
Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as
the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General
Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of
Justice; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated
him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary
Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in
order to run for Congress representing a district in Quezon
Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then relinquished
his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that
pending the appointment of his successor, Agra continued to
perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General.
Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the
fact that Agra has admitted to holding the two offices
concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient
for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that
petitioner raises herein.
Issue: Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is
unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct
application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
viz:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted
by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7,
paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General,
therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article
VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be
differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other
office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor
General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so
provided.
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting
or temporary capacity. The text of Section 13, supra, plainly
indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was
by: Justice Merzy
to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the
Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or
employments in the Government or in government-owned or
government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this
regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the
office, or to be in possession and administration of the office,
which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the
functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of
Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to
the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition
against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must
be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations,
whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question
that the avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent
the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To
construe differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of
circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of
officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the
Presidents power of appointment in the guise of temporary
designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government
agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled
corporations.

It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as

the Acting Solicitor General, was not covered by the stricter
prohibition under Section 13, supra, due to such position being
merely vested with a cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic
Act No. 9417, he nonetheless remained covered by the general
prohibition under Section 7, supra. Hence, his concurrent
designations were still subject to the conditions under the
latter constitutional provision. In this regard, the Court aptly
pointed out in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma:

The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987

Constitution permits an appointive official to hold more than
one office only if “allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position.” In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court
ruled that, “[t]here is no legal objection to a government
official occupying two government offices and performing the
functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility.” The
crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists
between two offices was laid out in People v. Green – whether
one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one
office has the right to interfere with the ot

Public Corp/Public Officers Case Digests Prelim by: Justice Merzy