Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.

Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration
of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church
Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and
defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion,
the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon
City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage
was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to
enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the
status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said
prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia
asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and

(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.

Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted
on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari assailing the following Orders of therespondent Judge-

(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for
resolution based on "agreed facts;" and

(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in
her favor.

1
We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely
viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been
made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded
VOID under the law.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained
of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

2
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10016 February 28, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for appellee.
Prospero V. Manuel, Fernando Moncada and Antonio Abad Tornis for defendant and appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy.
The facts are not disputed and, as found by the trial court, are as follows:

On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted
marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu
(Exhibits "1" and "1-A"). While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused
under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on
August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.

The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an
employee of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a
clerk in the said office (Exhibit "A" and testimonies of Eulogio Giroy and complainant
Maria Faicol). After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in
Iloilo. As the accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he
maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea died in
Cebu City on August 5, 1939 (Exhibit "2"). After Maria Gorrea's death, and seeing that the
coast was dear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she
worked as a teacher-nurse.

It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for
it appears that in 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of
physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent
Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight.
During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C.
Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu. (See Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "F")

The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasangin Sibonga,
Cebu, on October 3, 1953, Although the accused made an attempt to deny his previous
marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court, however, believes that the attempt is futile for the fact
of the said second marriage was fully established not only by the certificate of the said

3
 marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the
sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol. (See
Exhibits "A" and "B"; t.s.n. pp. 32-33, 40, 41, hearing of April 27, 1954).

The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act
No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab
initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the
dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial
declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter. Authorities given for this
ruling are 5 Viada, 5th edition, 651; 35 American Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford
vs. Bickford, 74 N. H. 466, 69 A. 579.

Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10]
4767). In this case the majority of this Court declared:

The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal
and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity,
as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's
second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de
Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to
render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court.

We are of the very weighty reasons by Justice Alex Reyes in the dissent in the case above-quoted But
this weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of strict construction of penal
laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may not ignore, seems to justify our stand in the
above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had
the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void
marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would
or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict
interpretation already adverted to.

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage
with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage
was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for
contracting this marriage can not prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted
the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

4
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10016 February 28, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for appellee.
Prospero V. Manuel, Fernando Moncada and Antonio Abad Tornis for defendant and appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy.
The facts are not disputed and, as found by the trial court, are as follows:

On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted
marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu
(Exhibits "1" and "1-A"). While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused
under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on
August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.

The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an
employee of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a
clerk in the said office (Exhibit "A" and testimonies of Eulogio Giroy and complainant
Maria Faicol). After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in
Iloilo. As the accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he
maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea died in
Cebu City on August 5, 1939 (Exhibit "2"). After Maria Gorrea's death, and seeing that the
coast was dear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she
worked as a teacher-nurse.

It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for
it appears that in 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of
physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent
Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight.
During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C.
Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu. (See Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "F")

The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasangin Sibonga,
Cebu, on October 3, 1953, Although the accused made an attempt to deny his previous
marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court, however, believes that the attempt is futile for the fact
of the said second marriage was fully established not only by the certificate of the said

5
 marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the
sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol. (See
Exhibits "A" and "B"; t.s.n. pp. 32-33, 40, 41, hearing of April 27, 1954).

The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act
No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab
initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the
dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial
declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter. Authorities given for this
ruling are 5 Viada, 5th edition, 651; 35 American Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford
vs. Bickford, 74 N. H. 466, 69 A. 579.

Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10]
4767). In this case the majority of this Court declared:

The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal
and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity,
as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's
second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de
Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to
render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court.

We are of the very weighty reasons by Justice Alex Reyes in the dissent in the case above-quoted But
this weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of strict construction of penal
laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may not ignore, seems to justify our stand in the
above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had
the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void
marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would
or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict
interpretation already adverted to.

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage
with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage
was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for
contracting this marriage can not prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted
the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

6
 EN BANC

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992

DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent
Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second
marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained
subsisting.

The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5) attempts
to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to another, such that he could
not be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3)
years and a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service of
the complaint and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the
practice of law until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" in the instant
case. 3

On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order. In
his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon
her representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A.
Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of
their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and
that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his
marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol,
Pangasinan. 4

In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason
was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblance to
respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a
dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the
fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned
by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising by
reason of her pregnancy.

The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a Resolution
dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. 5

Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for
hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her
evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing
on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again did not appear
despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another
hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail once more

7
to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The
Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and declared the
case submitted for resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy
did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.

On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court.
The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:

Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and
respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High
School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was
single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent started
courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and respondent]
moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law student at the
Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting her, this time with
more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he
[respondent] explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her first husband
were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from
her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite her
[complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her
marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they
were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A;
tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn,
July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981,
complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from his
parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out later
that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she
then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was
subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159
(Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina
Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was found to
exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an administrative case against
respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was employed, which case however was
considered closed for being moot and academic when respondent was considered automatically
separated from the service for having gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7,
1986, pp. 28-29). 7

There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on
14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent
Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's
prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration
obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.

Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage
with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was
necessary.

The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place,
respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of respondent
Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into
believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being
allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan
Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this
Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to

8
assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we
are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid,
with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted, he
convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally single
and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law
school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had
finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and
without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.

Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not only
his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and responsibility of
his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9

In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar and to
sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:

It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as claimed
by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values. Respondent had made a mockery
of marriage, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil
Code). 11

In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he made a
dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities
while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping
his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative
of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13

We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to
contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and
supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a
second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting,
constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than
sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place.
The Court will correct this error forthwith.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the
Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar
Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be
circularized to all the courts of the land.

SO ORDERED.