Professional Documents
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v.
The trial court ably summarized the evidence presented during the
suppression hearing:
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1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1) (effective from December 24, 2012 to
December 31, 2013) and 4904(a)(1), respectively.
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31, 2013).3, 4
written statements she made during the August 14, 2013 police station
“voluntarily and of her own free will” went to the police station on August
14, 2013 and that the interview between herself and Corporal Roche on
¶¶ 8 and 15-16. However, Appellant claimed that her “verbal and written
actually committed the crime. Id. at ¶¶ 11-21. The trial court denied
at 1.
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3
At the time Appellant committed the crime, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(2)
declared: “[a] first offense under this subsection is a felony of the third
degree, and a second or subsequent offense under this subsection is a felony
of the second degree.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(2) (effective from December
24, 2012 to December 31, 2013).
4
On January 1, 2014, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1) was renumbered; the
crime of child pornography is currently located at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d).
However, the 2014 amendment did not alter the definition of the crime.
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the field of computer forensics. N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 29. Corporal Roche
State Police, Indiana Barracks to report that her husband, Matthew Woods,
had committed a crime. Id. at 30. Appellant carried her personal computer
into the barracks. Id. at 31. Corporal Roche testified that, after he and
Id.
Appellant did so. Id. As Corporal Roche testified, Appellant wrote the
Well, she started to say that her husband worked a lot and
that she was starting to feel as if she wasn’t close to him
anymore. She felt that he was not himself and that he
maybe had a girlfriend. So she took some of her phone
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5
Appellant failed to include a copy of the written statement in the certified
record to this Court.
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where she said her husband [or daughter] was depicted.” Id. at 37.
However, as Corporal Roche testified, he did not believe that any of the
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6
As Corporal Roche testified:
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Corporal Roche testified that the created date and time for
“[j]ust about all of the images” was “August 11, 2013,
between the times of about [nine] o’clock and 12 o’clock
a.m.” [Id. at 51]. He then testified that the created date
and time “is the absolute most accurate time to use of when
it was first put there.” [Id.] Corporal Roche [testified] that
“the original created date and time will always stay the
same on the host computer.” [Id. at 52]. In conclusion,
Corporal Roche [testified] that he [was] “[a]bsolutely
scientifically certain that the dates and times are that which
was when the computer was used to look at these images
and download these images depicting child pornography.”
[Id. at 56. Moreover, Corporal Roche testified that the
images of child pornography on the computer “were all
created [and] accessed on or after the period of time that
Matthew Woods left the house.”8 Id. at 69].
7
During trial, the parties stipulated that “the photos found on the computer
depicted children between the ages of [nine] to 11 engaging in a prohibited
sexual act or simulation of such an act.” N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 76.
8
Again, in her August 14, 2013 written statement to the police, Appellant
admitted that Matthew Woods “left the residence on July 23[,] 2013, and . .
. [had] not been back since.” N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 42.
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Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/15, at 6-9 (some internal citations and internal
capitalization omitted).
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computer. N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 58. Rather, Corporal Roche testified: that
the child pornography on the computer was the result of “at least [three]
hours of searching the internet for these images” and that “it [was] a fair
statement [to say] that on August 11[, 2013,] between th[e] hours of [nine]
and 11, [Appellant] went to th[e child pornography] websites.” Id. at 58-59
and 74-75.
The trial court then charged the jury. With respect to the sexual
Appellant did not object to any portion of the trial court’s jury charge.
Id. at 143.9
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9
We note that, in response to a jury question, the trial court recharged the
jury on the elements for both charges. See N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 146-147.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The jury found Appellant guilty of both sexual abuse of children and
jail term of not less than nine months nor more than two years less one day,
followed by two years of probation. The trial court denied Appellant’s timely
post-sentence motion on May 19, 2015 and Appellant filed a timely notice of
[2.] Whether the trial court erred by denying the motion for
judgment of acquittal on the conviction for child
pornography inasmuch as the information only charged such
crime for knowing possession or control of child
pornography, but not for intentional viewing of child
pornography, and the evidence did not suffice to prove
knowing possession or control of child pornography?
[3.] Whether the trial court erred by denying the motion for
judgment of acquittal on the conviction for unsworn
falsification to authorities inasmuch as the evidence did not
suffice to prove the element that [Appellant] made a written
false statement which she did not believe to be true?
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
The recharge was, for all intents and purposes, identical to the original
charge and Appellant did not object to the trial court’s recharge. Id.
10
On April 23, 2015, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion to extend the
deadline for deciding the post-sentence motion. Trial Court Order, 4/23/15,
at 1; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(b) (“[u]pon motion of the defendant
within the 120-day disposition period, for good cause shown, the judge may
grant one 30-day extension for decision on the [post-sentence] motion”).
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Appellant first claims that the trial court erred when it denied her
motion to suppress the oral and written statements she made to Corporal
Super. 2012) (en banc); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). With respect to an
appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, our Supreme Court has
declared:
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11
For ease of discussion, we have re-numbered Appellant’s claims on
appeal.
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enforcement officers must be warned that they have the right to remain
silent, that anything they say may be used against them in court, and that
they are entitled to the presence of an attorney.” In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331,
333 (Pa. 2002) (plurality); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-445. “If a person is
used against him.” In re R.H., 791 A.2d at 333; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-
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12
On October 30, 2013, our Supreme Court decided In re L.J. In L.J., our
Supreme Court held that our scope of review from a suppression ruling is
limited to the evidentiary record that was created at the suppression
hearing. In re L.J., 79 A.3d at 1087. Prior to L.J., this Court routinely held
that, when reviewing a suppression court’s ruling, our scope of review
included “the evidence presented both at the suppression hearing and at
trial.” See Commonwealth v. Charleston, 16 A.3d 505, 516 (Pa. Super.
2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Chacko, 459 A.2d 311, 317 n.5 (Pa.
1983). L.J. thus narrowed our scope of review of suppression court rulings
to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. In this case,
Appellant’s suppression hearing occurred after L.J. was decided. Therefore,
the procedural rule announced in L.J. applies to the case at bar.
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freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’” In re V.H., 788 A.2d 976, 980 (Pa.
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Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it failed to suppress
the oral and written statements that she made to Corporal Roche on August
14, 2013. As noted above, on August 14, 2013, Appellant “voluntarily and
of her own free will” appeared at the police station and then engaged in a
proffered oral and written statements that were eventually used against her
at trial.
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where the behavior of law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the
defendant’s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-
referenced in Beckwith do not exist in the case at bar. Indeed, viewing the
own free will” went to the police station on August 14, 2013 to report that
main area of [his] office,” at “a large conference table;” Appellant “was free
to leave at any time” during the interview; Corporal Roche never read
and Appellant on August 14, 2013 was “friendly;” and, Appellant left the
police station at the end of the interview. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/7/14,
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15-16.
To quote Beckwith, “the entire interview [in this case] was free of
coercion.” Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 348. As such, Appellant’s claim that the
claim fails.
following standard:
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argues that, since the Information failed to charge her with “intentionally
view[ing]” child pornography, she could not have been lawfully convicted of
this aspect of the crime. Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant then claims that
and that the evidence was thus insufficient to support her conviction for
Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury that, to find Appellant guilty of
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added); see also N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 146-147 (during the recharge to
the jury, the trial court stated: “[t]o find [Appellant] guilty of [sexual abuse
court’s jury charge. Appellant’s Brief at 15. However, she claims that she
pornography because “due process does not permit [her to be] convicted of
fails.
issue for appellate review, it is axiomatic that the issue must first be raised
in the trial court. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Indeed, with respect to erroneous jury
portions of the charge nor omissions from the charge may be assigned as
error, unless specific objections are made thereto before the jury retires to
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charge and the trial court was thus never given the opportunity to correct its
mistake. This results in waiver of the issue, notwithstanding the fact that
the error implicated Appellant’s due process rights. Certainly, when our
Supreme Court eliminated the basic and fundamental error doctrine from our
jurisprudence, our high Court anticipated that due process violations would
“abrogating the [basic and fundamental error] doctrine in the criminal area
may be even more compelling [than eliminating the doctrine from our civil
law] since any error that deprives a defendant of due process can
Matty, 619 A.2d 1383, 1386-87 (Pa. Super. 1993) (where the information
property, but where the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of
offense”).
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was logically dependent upon this Court concluding that the defect in the
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fails.
to authorities; the conviction was based upon the written statement that
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4904(a)(1).
this Court must be able to review the entire written statement that Appellant
made on August 14, 2013. Yet, Appellant has failed to include the written
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Saranchak, 675 A.2d 268, 275 (Pa. 1996) (“[i]t is appellant’s responsibility
to ensure that any relevant related matter be filed or made part of the
original record” and, where appellant fails to ensure that the certified record
is sufficient to review the claims raised on appeal, the claims are waived);
Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 868 A.2d 582, 593 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“this
Court may not consider anything that is not part of the official certified
record: [a]ny document which is not part of the official certified record is
Judgment Entered.
Date: 3/11/2016
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