Guidance On Investigating and Analysing Human and Organisational Factors Aspects of Incidents and Accidents PDF

GUIDANCE ON INVESTIGATING AND ANALYSING HUMAN AND
ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS ASPECTS OF INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS
May 2008
Published by
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GUIDANCE ON INVESTIGATING AND ANALYSING HUMAN AND ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS ASPECTS OF INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS
CONTENTS
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
1 Introduction, scope and application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Purpose and scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Human factors, safety management and safety culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2.1 An overview of human performance management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Human failure types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 A useful failure model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5 The 'just' culture – workforce and management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.6 Information processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3 Lifecycle of an incident or accident investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3.1 Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3 Making recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4 Assigning, tracking and closing out actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.5 Sharing information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4 Key factors influencing human failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Annex A Selecting an appropriate method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Annex B Method descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Annex C References and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Annex D Glossary and abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
iii
FOREWORD
Simply attributing incidents/accidents to human error is not adequate; human factors aspects should
be investigated such that lessons are learned to prevent recurrence. Each incident or accident is a
learning opportunity, but one that can be wasted unless the effort put into investigating and
analysing it focuses on discovering its true underlying causes rather than on the people directly
involved and the immediate causes of their failure.
Whilst many petroleum and allied industry businesses investigate and analyse both incidents and
accidents – whether with major hazards or occupational potential – human and organisational factors
aspects are rarely addressed enough. This is particularly true for non-engineering aspects of HSE’s
priority human factors issues, such as supervision and organisational culture.
The problem is compounded by the volume of tools available to investigate and analyse incidents,
many of which have some good points; however, none of them presents an ideal solution.
This guidance document has been developed following an extensive review of the literature on
accident investigation, as well as from interviews and discussion with users and developers of these
investigation and analysis methods. Some of the interviewees provided worked examples or case
studies illustrating how the methods are used in practice.
This publication is aimed at anyone who is involved in an incident/accident investigation or analysis

either as the lead investigator or part of the supporting team. The guidance has been devised for use
by the experienced or novice user although it should be of most value to those who have experience
in health and safety issues.
Further information and resources on accident investigation and human factors can be found on the
Energy Institute’s Human and Organisational Factors Working Group webpage:
www.energyinst.org.uk/humanfactors
The information contained within this publication is provided as guidance only. While every
reasonable care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of its contents, the EI, and the technical
representatives listed in the acknowledgements, cannot accept any responsibility for any action taken
or not taken, on the basis of this information. The EI shall not be liable to any person for any loss or
damage which may arise from the use of any of the information contained in any of its publications.
The above disclaimer is not intended to restrict or exclude liability for death or personal injury caused
by own negligence.
Suggested revisions are invited and should be submitted to Technical Department, Energy Institute,
61 New Cavendish Street, London, W1G 7AR.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This project was carried out by Bill Gall of Kingsley Management Services and was commissioned by
the Energy Institute’s Human and Organisational Factors Working Group, which comprised during
the project:
Fiona Brindley Health and Safety Executive

Dr Robin Bryden Shell International Exploration and Production B.V
Bill Gall Kingsley Management Services
Kerry Hoad EI
Pete Jefferies ConocoPhillips
Rob Miles Health and Safety Executive
Graham Reeves BP plc
Dr Mark Scanlon EI
Dr John Symonds ExxonMobil Corporation
John Wilkinson Hazardous Installations Directorate (HID) - HSE
Mark Williamson Schlumberger Oilfield Services
The Energy Institute gratefully acknowledges the valuable contributions that the following individuals
and companies made to this project:
Dr Kathryn Mearns Aberdeen University

Prof Rhona Flin Aberdeen University
Lee Vanden Heuvel ABS Consulting
Denise McCafferty American Bureau of Shipping
Andrew Livingston Atkins Global
John McCollom BAe Systems
Prof Graham Braithwaite Cranfield University
Les Smith DNV
Dominique van Damme Eurocontrol
Dr Barry Kirwan Eurocontrol
Rachael Gordon Eurocontrol
Peter Ackroyd Greenstreet Berman
John Chappelow Human Factors Investigations
Dr Claire Blackett Human Reliability
Euan Dyer Kelvin Top-Set
Ronny Lardner Keil Centre
Richard Scaife Keil Centre
Prof Trevor Kletz Loughborough University
Stuart Withington Marine Accident Investigation Branch
Rainer Miller Mensch-Technik Organisation
Louise Farrell National Grid
Chris Mostyn National Grid
Dr Steve Shorrock NATS
Rudolf Frei Noordwijk Risk Foundation
Prof Ann Mills RSSB
Declan Kielty Pfizer
Gerry Gibb Safetywise Solutions
Mark Paradies System Improvements Inc
v
Tjerk van der Schaaf Technical University Eindhoven

Gerard van der Graaf Tripod Foundation
Dr Linda Bellamy White Queen BV
Step Change in Safety Organisation
The Energy Institute would also like to acknowledge the HSE for their financial contribution to the
development and dissemination of this publication.
Project coordination and technical editing were carried out by Kerry Hoad and Mark Scanlon.
Formatting by Joanna Stephen.
vi
1 INTRODUCTION, SCOPE AND APPLICATION
This section introduces the key issues with current incident and accident investigation
methods. It emphasises the importance of searching below the surface of an incident to
identify root causes. It provides a case study and worked examples to illustrate the depth of
analysis required in order to understand the human performance issues in an incident or
accident.
"To err is human, to forgive divine" – Alexander Pope, an Essay on Criticism (1711) [1]
1.1 BACKGROUND
Many petroleum and allied industry businesses investigate both incidents and accidents
whether these have process safety/major hazards potential or occupational safety potential
only. However, in these investigations, human factors issues are typically not well addressed.
As an example, one company’s accident report form includes a section for the
investigator to describe the root causes of the accident. The section includes items such as
'lack of competence', 'inadequate procedures', 'inadequate tools or equipment'. To a
human factors analyst, however, these are not root causes: the root cause in those cases
would be the system deficiencies that led to poor competence, procedures and equipment.
In another company’s report form, there is a blank space for entering root causes
and example entries from real investigations include weather conditions, fatigue and even
'human error' as root causes identified by the analyst. Again, these are not root causes.
These investigations should have probed further than this to explain the organisation’s
failure to deal with, for example, 'weather conditions' or 'fatigue'. These are, to a human
factors analyst, performance-shaping factors, not root causes of error.
1.1.1 Making the most of incidents and accidents
Experience has shown that accidents are rarely simple and almost never result from a
single cause. [2]
Each incident or accident is a learning opportunity, but one that could be wasted unless the
effort put into analysing it focuses on discovering the true underlying causes of the incident
rather than focusing on the people directly involved and the immediate causes of their
failure.
Incident investigation is one of the tools for improving control over hazards in the
working environment. It is a retrospective tool – applied once the flaws in our systems
have drawn attention to themselves via an incident. Any modern organisation may also have
in place proactive methods of observation, inspection and audit as complementary methods
for improving hazard control. However, in using incident investigation methods,
investigators should be aware that:
— Incidents often arise because of a highly unusual combination of underlying

problems. The investigation may therefore deal with only that combination, and
other factors that could have been identified in the investigation are left unchanged.
— High probability but low consequence (HPLC) incidents – 'everyday' mishaps that
do not cause major harm – can become the main focus of an organisation’s
Page 1
attention. HPLCs are very visible, typically less complex and thus easier to deal with
than low probability high consequence (LPHC) events – disasters.
— Organisations can be deluded into believing that everything is under control but,
in fact, the focus on these more easily managed problems can divert attention from
more serious deficiencies. Organisations need to be sure that they are equally aware
and in control of the factors that affect process safety and personal safety.
One possible cause of confusion between the types of incident is the concept of 'accident
triangles' (or 'accident pyramids') developed from analysis of accident statistics. One of
these, devised by HSE, is cited in Ref. [2]. It shows that, for every 189 non-injury accidents
('near-misses'), there should be around seven minor injuries and one major or over-three-day
lost time injury. The key point made in Ref. [1], however, is that, 'not all near misses…should
involve risks which might have caused fatal or serious injury.'
For example, a cleaner working in the accommodation block on an oil platform
slipped on a mat that she had not noticed was wet underneath. She sustained bruising and
minor cuts from impacting the edge of a doorframe.
This was purely an occupational accident with no major hazard implication. Any
measures taken to prevent further similar incidents may not have any impact on major
hazard incidents, for two reasons: first, HPLC incidents stem from different underlying
causes – in the example, failure to use non-slip mats – and secondly, the remedies
introduced are likely to focus on slips and trips in the accommodation block and on cleaning
staff and not on operators or maintenance crew working more closely with very hazardous
materials outside. The non-injury and minor injuries parts of the accident triangle may,
however, diminish.
In effect, major hazard and occupational hazard incidents have separate 'triangles',
though in some cases, these may overlap, for example, a dropped object, such as a heavy
grinding tool, could strike a person, causing serious injury or death, or it could impact
vulnerable pipework below causing a major leak of oil or gas with the potential for extensive
plant damage, injury and loss of life. Protecting against the impact of dropped objects, then,
may have an impact on both occupational and major hazard incidents. The key to
understanding where the different triangles overlap and where they do not is, risk
assessment – identifying hazards and the potential targets that could be affected by those
hazards then devising suitable measures for controlling the specific hazards.
1.1.2 The importance of investigating incidents and accidents
"It has been estimated that up to 90% of all workplace accidents have human error as a
cause" [3]
The above is one estimate of the contribution of human error to accidents (and refers to
errors and violations). The term 'human failure' is used in this guide to refer to errors and
violations: newspaper headlines tend to use 'human error' as a blanket term for both.
Whether the true figure is 90 % or some other higher or lower figure, it is clear
from a wide range of sources of information that human failures make a significant
contribution to incidents and accidents. An example of a recent study [4] for the maritime
industry (which included UK data), found that:
'…approximately 50% of maritime accidents are initiated by human error, while another
30% of maritime accidents occur due to failures of humans to avoid an accident. In other
words, in 30% of maritime accidents, conditions that should have been adequately
countered by humans were not.' [4]
Page 2
It should be noted that the remaining accidents causes were attributed to mechanical
failures (up to 10 %) and it is almost certain that human error – for example in installing or
servicing equipment – contributed to those failures.
1.1.3 Human failure in incidents and accidents
It is unfortunate that the phrase, 'human error' has become virtually meaningless through
over-use and that it is usually interpreted to mean that the person 'at the sharp end' was at
fault by committing some form of error or 'violation'.
It is easy to be misled and to believe that human errors arise because of
carelessness, inattention, incompetence or reckless rule breaking by the workforce.
However, the guidance in this publication should show that human errors occur because the
systems for preventing them failed in some way. An incident, then, is not a person failure
but a system failure and, to prevent further incidents, it is important to understand those
systems: what they are, how they are intended to work and how, in specific cases, they have
failed.
1.1.4 A human failure case study
The following case study and examples illustrate why it is important to seek out root causes
of incidents and accidents. See Box 1.
Human error caused blackout, says Transco

(Headline, Daily Telegraph, 10/09/03; reproduced by permission)
National Grid Transco yesterday admitted "human error" had caused the London blackout of August 28,
but denied suggestions it had been negligent or faced a fine.
An incorrectly installed fuse in a substation in Wimbledon, London, was cited as the cause of the power
failure, which lasted just 37 minutes but left thousands of commuters stranded.
National Grid's official report on the failure said the fuse, installed by sub-contractors two years ago, had
been too small to handle a power surge that occurred when another part of its transmission network
failed. The power cut left 410,000 electricity customers without power.
Box 1
What should the company’s reaction be to this event?

— Find the contractor responsible and take disciplinary action for negligence?
— Inform the contracting company that their staff are to be assessed and re-trained
before they are allowed to work for the company again?
As indicated earlier, in order to identify the most effective course of action, the company
should go deeper than this superficial reactive level to understand the true underlying
human and organisational factors that caused the event. In this case, Transco took
immediate action to examine all other similar relays in their system.
There were around 40 000 relays and none of them was found to be faulty. This
suggests that, in replacing relays, there is a very low probability of error in performing the
task.
Nevertheless, the error had significant consequences and without a full
investigation, the company could not be certain that it has solved the underlying problem.
It is worth noting that, although the newspaper article highlighted 'human error'
as the cause, this phrase was never used in the official report on the incident.
Page 3
Detailed investigation of the above incident led to the conclusion that it was a contractor
error. But since this was an error 'lying in wait' (a 'latent failure') for two years before it
revealed itself, it was impossible to ascertain what sort of failure it was ('error' or 'violation',
'slip', 'lapse', 'mistake') let alone the underlying causes.
The company found that the engineers involved in the commissioning of the
equipment had the appropriate training, authorisation, experience and skills to undertake
the task. Competence, then, did not seem to be the issue. It would be possible, but not
worthwhile so long after the event, to speculate on the range of influences on the task, but
it should be noted that one finding from their detailed report indicated that:
'…the rating of the automatic protection equipment that is included on the documentation
used for commissioning could have been more clearly visible to the commissioning
engineers.'
In other words, there was a problem in the documentation/procedures used.

This simple problem surely then has a simple solution: correct the documentation
to improve the information provided. It is not clear whether an independent check is done
following the fitting of these critical components but, again, this would help. The
independent check, though, should not use the same documentation used by the fitter.
However, to gain more from the investigation, investigators should understand
why there was a problem with the documentation. What was the deficiency in the system
for producing procedures that led to this incident and could the same deficiency have
affected other procedures?
1.1.5 Incident causes and solutions
Table 1 describes three incidents alongside the investigation findings and solutions
proposed. The last column of the table describes why the investigations and thus the
solutions are inadequate.
Page 4
Table 1: Example incident investigations
Incident Cause of human Proposed solution Comment

error
1. A road tanker The driver did not Discipline the driver The investigation did not explore
driver refuelling comply with and warn others. underlying causes of the violation
their vehicle left it company procedures Consider removing such as:
unattended; diesel for refuelling; they the locking trigger – the driver needed urgent
spilled onto the had left their vehicle mechanism on filler information from his colleague
forecourt of the unattended to speak nozzles or add an – they were under time pressure
refuelling bay, to a colleague automatic cut-off (real or imagined)
requiring clean-up Regarding the proposed
and causing delay solutions:
to other drivers – removing the locking trigger
could encourage drivers to
improvise a locking
mechanism (though installing
a cut-off mechanism would
prevent spillage)
The issue of 'culture' is not
explored - the role of his
colleague and other observers in
discouraging this behaviour
2. A control room Two pushbuttons- Rearrange the The investigation did not explore
operator heated up one to increase and controls; include a why the controls were laid out
a vessel too rapidly; one to decrease the clear warning in that way. It could be due to
liquid boiled off and flow in the heating procedures about system procurement procedures,
ignited coils were laid out in the controls and culture (why not reported or if
a non-standard and regarding heating reported acted upon before it led
confusing rates to an incident?) A systematic
arrangement - upper review of other critical controls
button = decrease, may be required
lower button =
increase The existing layout is poor, but
people are used to it. The change
may lead to more errors.
For the immediate fix, a better
solution would be to replace the
buttons with a more appropriate
slider, rotary knob or other
device
3. A maintenance The fitter had Issue a reminder The cause for the error may be
fitter omitted to worked on similar notice to fitters resourcing: for example, using
remove a blanking vent lines but using regarding isolations; less experienced personnel may
plate from a relief in-line block valves improve fitter’s be seen as a necessary short cut
line: the line leaked rather than blanking training on the to get the job done. Lack of
inside the plant plates. A supervisor plant; brief all resource could also explain why
when it came under signed off the maintenance supervisors are rushed and
pressure worksheet but did supervisors on the unable to properly supervise
not query each of the importance of
completed 'tick closely monitoring
boxes' critical tasks and to
check work
thoroughly
Page 5
The more 'levels' of analysis that are applied to an investigation should produce better
results in terms of the findings they generated regarding the underlying problem and thus
the solutions required. This is essentially the process of continuing to ask, 'why?' and not
stopping at the 'level 1 or 2' answers.
Table 2: Levels of analysis of an investigation
Incident description: an operator using a new pipe cutting machine trapped and badly injured their hand
whilst reaching in to retrieve the pipe
Poor Analysis Better

Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
Operator is to Operator believed Operator had The machine was The machine was
blame for that lifting the already received not tested before needed quickly; the
reaching into guard would training; the being put to use procurement
the machine disable the machine used in process did not
whilst still machine training is identify that the
switched on interlocked machine purchased
did not have a
safety interlock
Response
Discipline the Re-train the Train on same Review and Review and consider
operator operator in all machine as used consider amending amending the
aspects of on site the procedure for procurement
operating the introducing new procedure to include
machine equipment into the a more thorough
workplace risk assessment
The investigation methods described in this publication (see Annex C) do no more than
guide the user through a process of thinking through a problem to a root cause level. They
do this by describing tested approaches and providing, in some cases, flowcharts and
checklists to make the analysis easier to carry out and to try to ensure that the user reaches
'level 5' in their analysis of incidents.
1.2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
This document has been prepared as a guide to good human and organisational factors
analysis in incident and accident investigations and should:
— help the reader to learn more about the true system and organisational root causes
of incidents and accidents;
— describe the elements of a good human and organisational factors investigation of
an incident or accident, and
— describe available incident and accident investigation methods that can identify
human and organisational elements of incidents whether occupational or major
hazards.
Page 6
1.3 APPLICATION
The publication has been derived partly from interviews with users and developers of the
methods described. Interviewees have strongly suggested that, to succeed in finding the
human and organisational root causes of an incident the analyst should have at least a basic
level of competence in human and organisational factors. This competence can be acquired
through formal training, focused background reading or through the experience of
conducting accident investigations. For this reason, section 2 describes the basic concepts
underlying many of the methods described. This on its own may not be sufficient to produce
the level of competence required but should make it clear to readers whether or not they
need further training or experience in order to carry out successful analyses.
The approach taken to incident investigation should be a holistic one rather than
the human factors issues being investigated only as 'a last resort' once engineering-type
immediate causes have been eliminated. To facilitate this, the investigation team should
have human factors expertise from the outset.
This publication is aimed at anyone who is involved in an incident investigation or
analysis either as the lead investigator or part of the supporting team. The guidance has
been devised for use by the experienced or novice user although it should be of most value
to those who have experience in health and safety issues.
Page 7
2 HUMAN FACTORS, SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY

CULTURE
This section describes the basic concepts that have been used in developing the investigation
and analysis methods reviewed. It is essential reading for anyone not familiar with human
factors, safety management, safety culture or related issues. It is not a substitute for in-depth
knowledge but should enable the reader to determine their level of knowledge and from
that to judge whether they require further training or competent assistance.
2.1 AN OVERVIEW OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
Human factors is concerned with optimising human performance in all tasks and, in
major hazard organisations, the primary intention is to achieve safe performance. These
organisations should have conducted risk assessments and put in place a range of controls
to prevent major accidents but should also focus on human performance issues to eliminate
or reduce human failures.
An organisation’s safety management system (SMS) can be thought of as the
organisation’s integrated set of processes that support human performance. The SMS does
this through implementing policies, organising resources and measuring performance. Safety
culture affects the way management and workforce approach safety and has a direct
influence on the success of the SMS.
A good starting point for developing an understanding of human factors, safety
management and safety culture issues is the EI’s Human factors briefing notes [5] and HSE
Managing human performance briefing notes which are aimed at lower tier COMAH sites
and covering the key issues [6].
A very brief overview of these topic areas is provided below in Table 3.
There is a clear link between the three topics listed in Table 3; all are concerned
with optimising human performance. For example, a key influence on task performance is
personnel competence. The SMS should include all of the selection, training, assessment and
development processes necessary to ensure competence. The organisation’s safety culture
has a direct influence on the effective functioning of the SMS in that, if management regard
training as simply a means for meeting legal requirements for competence, then the system
would not work as well as if there were a more positive attitude to staff development.
2.2 HUMAN FAILURE TYPES
To make sense of the information gathered in an incident investigation and in particular, to

develop appropriate recommendations for improvement, at least the basics of human error
should be understood. This section provides an outline only of the principles involved. If
more in-depth analysis of these issues is required, further information should be read or a
human factors specialist consulted.
The basics are:
— there are different recognisable types of human error, and
— there are numerous factors that affect human error.
Page 8
Table 3: Key human factors topics
Topic Brief definition Example issues

Human factors [7] Environmental, organisational and job A drilling company reviewed working
factors, also human and individual conditions for all its critical tasks
factors that influence behaviour in a way including:
that can affect safety – Environmental – temperature,
humidity, lighting, noise
– Job – task demands (physical and
mental), provision and suitability of
tools, equipment and procedures
– Individual/personnel – team selection
and organisation, competence,
personality
Safety The HSE advocate the POPMAR Petroleum spirit is the main hazard at a
management [2] framework for successful health and depot. Management have made all
safety management. This means: set arrangements for controlling the hazard
effective health and safety policy. by introducing various
Put in place the organisation necessary to 'barriers'/safeguards. Some are physical
implement the policy; involve everyone in engineered barriers, others are
contributing to health and safety so as to 'administrative' e.g. procedures/safe
foster a good safety culture. systems of work. There is also a near-
Use hazard and risk assessment methods miss reporting system for use by all
to plan and put in place controls against staff.
identified hazards.
Measure performance proactively
through self monitoring systems against
specific standards
Use independent audit and self
monitoring Review findings to assess and
continually improve performance.
[8]
Safety culture Organisational attitudes, beliefs and ways In the example in the row above,
of working that place high emphasis on although the reporting system is known
safety to everyone and available, it is not used
because the workforce fear
management sanctions if they report
incidents for which they could be
blamed.
These basic facts are important in making improvements. For example, if an incident
occurred because someone took a reading from the wrong gauge and this resulted from
confusion because the gauge was next to the one that he should have read, retraining the
person in reading these devices would be less effective than re-designing or repositioning
the gauge. This illustrates that different types of human failure require different responses
to secure improvements and that solutions from higher up the 'hierarchy of control' need
to be considered. This would entail asking:
— Can the hazard be removed?
— Can the human element be eliminated, e.g. by automation?
— Can the consequences of the human failure be prevented, e.g. by additional
barriers in the system?
— Can human performance be assured by using interlocks or other engineered
means?
— Can the performance shaping factors be changed to be more positive?
Page 9
HSE’s document, HSG 48: Reducing error: Influencing behaviour [7] describes the well-
known categories of human error: 'slips', 'lapses' and 'mistakes'. A simplified version of this
description is given in Table 4.
Note also that violations fall into several categories from deliberate sabotage (which
is rare) to 'routine' everyday breaches of procedure. Further information on this can be
found in the 'Hearts and Minds' material on the Energy Institute’s website at:
http://www.energyinst.org.uk/heartsandminds/rule.cfm
Page 10
Table 4: Definition and examples of human error types
Error type Description Examples Potential error recovery mechanisms

Slip When a person does i) Plant operator pressed the start button for 'pump A' instead of i) Alarms would sound in response to the wrong pump being
something but not what they 'pump B' started; other plant indications would alert the operator to the error,
meant to do other plant operators might notice that the expected flow is absent
ii) Petroleum blender keyed in the wrong proportion of benzene
to produce a batch of fuel ii) In checking progress of the blending process, the blender may
notice their error; laboratory samples taken at intervals should
iii) Welder ground off too much material when finishing a weld identify the error
iii) The welder should check the quality of the weld; for high integrity
welds, a senior supervisor should check; final testing of the system
before putting into service may show flaws in the weld
Lapse When a person forgets to do iv) A tanker driver forgets to set the blend indicator on their iv) The driver may check their docket before starting the delivery and
something due to a failure of tanker and fills the compartment intended for LRP with unleaded realise their error: this is an example of an error where recovery may
11
attention/concentration or not occur
memory v) Control room operator misses a step in a plant start-up
sequence after taking a phone call mid task v) Normal alarms are likely to be disabled for start-up and the error
may be unrecovered; plant indications or colleague/supervisor checks
(if planned into the start-up) may act as a cue to the operator that
they are at the wrong stage in the start-up process; interlocks may
stop the process from proceeding further following the error
Mistake When a person does what vi) A busy fitter investigating a leaking water pipe 'nips up' the vi) This may not be recovered before a more serious failure occurs as
(also known they meant to do, but should flange and notices that the leak stops. He thus diagnoses the a result of damaging the seal further or over-tightening the flange
as a have done something else. problem as an incorrectly tightened flange but the real problem studs
'cognitive' This is not necessarily a is a poorly fitting seal (the leak worsens later)
error) 'violation' (see below) but vii) Difficult to recover from quickly as people have a tendency to
part of the action taken could vii) A power operated relief valve has stuck open; the operator make evidence fit their existing conclusion; it may be recovered by
involve rule-breaking or does not know this since the panel shows that power is off to plant operators noticing materials venting to atmosphere or
similar non-compliances that valve; believing the valve is closed leads to the conclusion monitoring other plant variables such as pressure controller valve
that the pressure and level drop is due to a pipe break opening
Table 4 continued.
As well as errors, personnel can also commit violations:
Error type Description Examples Potential error recovery mechanisms

Violation When a person decided to act viii) The first mate of a tank barge crew viii) Violations are difficult to recover from; fitness for duty procedures (if in
without complying with a known reports for duty knowing that he has already place and enforced) may pick up the mate’s fatigued state
rule, procedure or good practice exceeded his working hours for the day
ix) Alarms fitted to the tank may indicate that the tank is unexpectedly filling (or
ix) Plant operators open a by-pass valve to emptying)
speed up filling of a tank but forget to close it
again
It is important during the course of an investigation to establish whether the human failures in an incident were errors or violations: the remedies for errors may be quite different from those
appropriate to violations and even between different sorts of errors – slips, lapses, mistakes – the solutions vary.
12
In general, errors of the above types result in either:
An error of omission Something is not done that needs to be done

An error of commission Something is done but is done incorrectly
In addition, it should be noted that an error of commission such as operating the wrong device would
also involve an error of omission because the device that should have been operated is not operated.
A distinction is also often made between 'active' failures – those that have an immediate and
usually visible effect; and 'latent' failures – those that 'lie in wait' in the system, as in the National Grid
Transco example given in section 1.1.4, sometimes for many months before causing a problem.
Generally, any safety critical system* intended for human use should be designed to provide
multiple defences. This is sometimes referred to as a 'forgiving' system. In such a system, a single
human error should not lead to a serious incident. In the examples given in Table 2, several
opportunities or 'mechanisms' for recovery from the error are given; in some cases, there would be
no effective recovery.
* For the purposes of this guidance document, a safety-critical system is any part of an
installation whose failure could contribute substantially to a major accident or whose purpose is to
prevent or limit the effects of such accidents. This definition is adapted from that of 'safety critical
elements' in the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 [9].
An important tool in proactively reducing human errors is risk assessment. According to
HSE’s document, 'Five Steps to Risk Assessment', "a risk assessment is nothing more than a careful
examination of what, in your work, could cause harm to people, so that you can weigh up whether
you have taken enough precautions or should do more to prevent harm." An effective risk assessment
should determine which tasks are the most critical and require additional or more effective barriers.
By contrast, incident investigation seeks to retrospectively identify where barriers have failed and make
improvements based on the experience gained.
2.3 A USEFUL FAILURE MODEL
Table 5 is based on the work of James Reason [10]. It illustrates how a human-machine system can fail
and introduces the main ideas about human errors that would be useful in understanding the origins
of incidents and accidents. These ideas feature in a wide range of the methods described in this
publication. In this context a human-machine system is one in which technology and human beings
have specific functions but work together towards common goals.
Any accident can be thought of in terms of a 'hazard' having a harmful effect on a 'target'.
Example hazards are: toxic chemicals, heavy objects, sparks or flames, high pressure in some form of
containment. Example targets are: plant and equipment, people, products, the environment.
Table 5: Origins of incidents and accidents
Organisational Latent Psychological Unsafe/sub- Operational Accident Consequences

decisions failures precursors standard act disturbance
barriers
barriers
Working from right to left in Table 5:
Consequences: the damage caused to the target by the hazard e.g. crude oil is accidentally
spilled into the sea killing marine life. In the case of a near miss, the concern is for the
potential consequence (e.g. a fitter working up a ladder drops a 2 kg hammer that narrowly
misses a small bore fuel line).
Page 13
Barriers: may be physical barriers: fences, guards, bunds, protective clothing, safety devices
or 'administrative' barriers – checking procedures, permits-to-work, supervision. E.g. A pipe
is depressurised and drained prior to removing a pump. A drip tray is placed under the pipe
in case of leaks, also, the permit-to-work requires a second fitter to ensure that the pipe is
isolated and drained and to sign the permit-to-work when he has completed the check.
From the above, it is clear that there are two types of barriers: those designed to prevent
incidents and accidents and those designed to counteract or reduce the consequences of
an accident. See 2.4 for a further discussion of barriers.
Accident: the event itself.
Operational disturbances: these are events where an action (or inaction) by the person
reduces the level of control over a task; such a disturbance could result in an incident or
accident. E.g. a small pump was being lifted by a sling attached to an eyebolt on the pump.
This was a 'blind lift' and the load snagged causing the eyebolt to fail and the pump to drop
several feet. The decision to use the eyebolt to lift the pump and the decision to conduct a
blind lift were both 'sub-standards acts' leading to the operational disturbance of lifting the
load in this manner. An incident may not have occurred in this instance but did.
Unsafe/sub-standard acts: these are the human behaviours that lead to the operational
disturbance. In the original human error model derived by Reason, there is no intermediary
stage 'operational disturbance': an unsafe act can lead to a challenge to a barrier. If the
barrier is ineffective, then an accident or incident ensues.
Psychological precursors: the state of mind of the person would determine the type of
unsafe/sub-standard act carried out. It is not possible to know their state of mind at any
given time but certain factors could affect a person’s state of mind more than others: time
pressure, lack of competence etc.
Latent failures: in contrast to active failures that lead to an immediate consequence, latent
failures can remain dormant in a system until some later event reveals them. An example is
the Transco incident cited earlier in which a faulty fuse was fitted into a system – this was
a human failure – but this led to a consequence only when a demand was made on that
fuse some months later. More deep-rooted latent failures are those that stem from faulty
organisational decisions (see below). These can create the conditions from which errors later
emerge. Such conditions include: poor selection or design of plant and equipment,
inadequate training of personnel, ineffective supervisory practices, inaccurate
communications, poor team structuring etc.
Organisational decisions: within this model, decisions made within the organisation
about how to manage all the tasks carried out are the ultimate root cause of incident and
accidents at the 'sharp end'. The ultimate root causes may thus be the factors that affect
those management decisions, but this is a level of complexity that we do not need to touch
on here.
2.4 BARRIERS
From 2.3, it follows that an incident can be thought of as the end result of a number of
failures in various types of barrier ('risk control systems'). Those barriers – also referred to
as safeguards or defences, could be physical barriers or procedures that act as a barrier
against sub-standard human performance.
Page 14
A popular model describing the failure of barriers, and one that is referred to in
several incident analysis methods, is the 'Swiss cheese' model (see Figure 1) [10]. Swiss cheese
is the type that has holes in it when sliced through. Similarly, any barrier can be thought of
as having 'holes' in it that make it less than perfect. A guard, for example, might literally
have a hole in it that swarf from a cutting tool could be ejected from; a permit-to-work may
be poorly worded or laid out so that it is not used correctly, i.e. the permit-to-work system
has 'holes' in it. Against most hazards, there should be several barriers. They can be
imagined as slices of Swiss cheese between the hazard and a possible 'target'. The hazard
could pass through all the barriers and hit the target if all the holes in barriers happen to line
up.
Hazards
Losses
Figure 1: 'Swiss cheese' model
2.5 THE 'JUST' CULTURE – WORKFORCE AND MANAGEMENT
Aware that incidents and accidents are so rich a resource for identifying management and
organisational problems, UK industry is maturing in its approach to 'blame' and no longer
seeks to identify the person at fault in an incident. The idea of a 'no blame' culture,
however, has been largely replaced by the idea of the 'just' culture; meaning that blame
should be assigned only to those who have been reckless or clearly negligent in their work,
i.e. the 'just' culture does not remove individuals’ accountability.
It is almost inevitable that a thorough root cause analysis of an incident would very
often lead back to management and organisational deficiencies, that is, it is likely that
management decisions would be the underlying cause of most 'sharp end' error. A
consequence of this that has been noted in some reviews of incident investigation systems
is reluctance on the part of management to delve too deeply into incidents in case this
reflects badly on the arrangements that they have put in place. However, the 'just' culture
principle should be applied at all working levels in an organisation: pressures on
management, similar to those of the workforce, should be recognised and accounted for.
It is possible that safety management systems (SMS) need to be changed not only to reduce
failures at the shopfloor level, but also at the management level.
Page 15
2.6 INFORMATION PROCESSING
Several human factors-oriented incident investigation methods are based on models of

human information processing – frameworks for describing 'how humans think'. On a basic
level, the frameworks are similar:
Input – Processing – Output
The frameworks show the 'sub-processes' at each stage; that is, how information is input
into the system (via our senses); how memory is involved in comparing stored information
with new information or with storing new information; how information is processed and
how this leads to the right or wrong output/action.
These are useful in investigations by pinpointing where the information processing
system 'broke down'; the investigator could consider each element of the information
processing model to determine, for example, if there was a breakdown at the input stage:
what information was available, was it in the correct form, was it presented in the correct
sequence, was it presented to the right person etc? This type of investigation would then
provide useful pointers towards solutions that focus on the specific breakdown in the
information processing task.
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3 LIFECYCLE OF AN INCIDENT OR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
This section describes the key stages of an investigation and the elements at each stage
required in order to ensure that human and organisational factors are appropriately
addressed in the investigation.
The information that follows describes the various stages of incident investigation
and should enable organisations to determine whether they have suitable arrangements in
place at each stage to gain maximum value from their investigations.
The lifecycle of an incident investigation begins with detecting and reporting the
incident and ends with the close-out of the remedial actions identified by the investigation
and analysis process. The stages are described below with (in italics) a number of tips and
cautions for each stage.
3.1 REPORTING
When an incident or accident is detected, it should be formally reported and recorded.

Organisations use various means of reporting incidents: this may be via a paper
form or using an on-line system. Serious incidents should also be reported externally to
regulators. Note that a system that includes near misses, plant damage incidents and other
events short of actual accidents would be more valuable than one that deals only with
accidents.
Reporting should be rapid to ensure that an investigation is begun as soon as
possible after the incident: people have a tendency to forget things, 'reinvent' history or
unduly influence each other by discussing an incident before it can be properly investigated.
Care should be taken to preserve evidence at the scene.
All employees should be familiar with the system and encouraged to use incident (near
miss) reporting systems. A culture of mutual trust between workforce and management
is required. The system should be a 'just' system (see section 2.5) where the blame for
incidents is not automatically assigned to the person involved in the incident but is based
on a fair system.
Confidential reporting may be considered where the culture of trust and fairness is not
established. Employees and contractors are able to submit anonymous reports of
incidents or unsafe acts. Management should decide whether to investigate based on the
information provided.
3.2 INVESTIGATION
Once an incident has been reported, the next logical step in the examination of the incident
is typically the initiation of the investigation.
The 'level' of an investigation is usually determined by the severity or possible
severity of the consequences of an incident. For the more serious incidents:
— the investigation is more likely to commence sooner;
— the investigation team should be better resourced (more extensive in numbers and
competencies – both investigation and human factors/safety management and
safety culture competencies) and include more senior members of the organisation,
and
— there should be rapid feedback and remedial actions.
Page 17
Various investigation methods may be deployed. HSE Investigating Accidents and

Incidents[11] provides a good overview of the investigation stage and the need to establish:
— what happened;
— who or what was affected and to what extent;
— what were the conditions like;
— what was the chain of events (what happened just before the event and just before
that);
— what was going on at the time, and
— was there anything unusual/different in the working conditions etc?
Investigators should look more widely than the immediate 'actors' in the incident and
determine, for example, how other shifts conduct the task of interest, whether they have
experienced problems such as near misses etc.
Many of the specific methods described in Annex B of this publication contain more
detailed guidance but the HSE guide is a useful starting point. Chapter 5 of HSE guide [2] also
contains some simple useful guidance on this and section 8.3.5 of the American Institute of
Chemical Engineering’s guide provides some specific guidelines on interviewing witnesses.
(See Source materials after References (Annex C))
Regarding team competencies – all investigation teams should have at least a basic level
of competence in human factors. This should be sufficient to recognise where additional
help is required on human factors issues. This is difficult on the basis that, 'you don’t
know what you don’t know', but this publication should help investigation teams to
determine if they have sufficient knowledge of human factors to make this decision.
Investigation processes should be clear, open and objective to avoid 'contaminating' the
evidence or following false trails, for example by:
— making assumptions;
— asking leading questions;
— causing concern or suspicion among witnesses, and
— failing to use systematic methods or using checklists or aids that could be
misleading.
It is to be expected that evidence may not be readily available or necessarily clear-cut and
may be: incomplete, inconsistent/contradictory, ambiguous, misleading or false. A useful
rule of thumb is to accept evidence as a conclusive finding if it is supported from at least
two independent sources. This is not always possible and the analyst should have to
decide whether to use a single finding as 'evidence'. This is usually based on the
importance of the finding e.g. if it suggests a serious deficiency in an organisation’s SMS;
single findings can be 'tested' by asking those involved in the incident if they agree or
disagree with it. In general, where any assumptions are made, these should be explicitly
stated in the investigation report.
Management should be committed to the investigation process and the organisation as a

whole should show a clear willingness to learn from incidents. This should entail
supporting analysts in investigating to the level of management and organisational
factors involved in an incident. Analysts must resist any perceived or actual pressure to
restrict their investigation.
Page 18
3.3 MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the evidence gathered from the investigation, the investigating team should make
recommendations for improvement.
Recommendations should naturally follow from the findings of the investigation;
that is, it should be clear what to do. If the findings go to the necessary depth, that is, to the
real underlying causes, then the recommendations should be well focused.
It should be ensured that the team making recommendations has an understanding of

human factors, human error, safety management and safety culture concepts. Without
this, it is possible that recommendations may not be correctly targeted. If the basic
knowledge and skills in these topic areas is missing from the investigation team, make
use of methods that contain appropriate checklists or guidance or seek assistance from
an expert.
The investigation should lead to 'SMART' – (Specific measurable achievable relevant and
timebound) – recommendations. Recommendations should aim, ultimately, to strengthen
the safety management system.
3.4 ASSIGNING, TRACKING AND CLOSING OUT ACTIONS
The recommendations generated in 3.3 should be turned into practical measurable actions.
Action should be based on what would be the most effective. Superficial to more
deep-rooted issues e.g. fix an immediate problem, check on equivalent problems but also
look at the meaning of the problem – what does the problem suggest might be wrong
about how things are currently controlled and what needs to be done to fix these underlying
problems. Consider the 'hierarchy of controls’ that can be applied (see section 2.2).
Actions should be very specific even if the recommendation is 'examine this further'.
Terms of reference for any further investigation should be set out and clear objectives
determined.
Actions would succeed best in an environment in which the systems available, the
culture and management support are focused on supporting them; they may actually fail
entirely without this support
Actions should be assigned to a specific person or group who should own the action
until it is resolved. Even where groups are responsible for undertaking the action, one
person should be ultimately accountable to make sure this happens.
Actions should be time-bound with a specific end-date for completion and for any
interim stages.
It should be clear when an action is complete. Specific criteria may be set and evidence
provided to demonstrate that the criteria have been met. Further criteria and measures
should be set to demonstrate that actions have been effective. This is likely to be difficult
and the measures may be long-term. Audits may be required to determine whether the
remedial actions and recommendations continue to be followed.
Page 19
3.5 SHARING INFORMATION
An organisation should share lessons learned across sites on lessons learnt from incidents
and accidents and may wish to share information with other organisations.
Some systems have a facility for sharing information in the form of forums or alerts that
can be posted on intranet or internet sites. Bulletins may be issued by email or on notice
boards. Toolbox talks and safety meeting presentations may also be used to disseminate
learning experiences.
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4 KEY FACTORS INFLUENCING HUMAN FAILURE

This section provides a brief checklist of factors that have been identified as having a
significant effect on human performance. It can be used as a preliminary guide to help
identify some of the underlying causes of incidents; however, there should be a more
thorough analysis.
The list of factors in Table 6 below has been extracted and summarised from the
investigation methods reviewed: these factors have the most significant effect on human
performance. The table can be used as a high-level checklist in an investigation to ensure
that key human and organisational factors are considered.
Some factors should be long-term conditions – for example, poor lighting in a work
area that eventually contributes to an incident. Others should be short-term/short-lived
factors that affected performance on the day of the incident – for example, the state of
health of a team member on a particular shift.
The following factors set out below:

— workplace;
— task;
— personnel, and
— organisational,
can be combined with the usual six questions:
— where;
— when;
— what;
— how;
— why, and
— who,
to produce the initial lines of enquiry in an incident investigation/analysis. 'Where did the
incident take place?', 'What features of the workplace contributed to the incident?' etc.
Table 6: Factors affecting human performance
Workplace factors
– Workspace unsuitable for the job – too small, workstations widely spread out or in wrong place,
excessive stretching or reaching required
– Housekeeping – untidy, hazardous conditions, poorly maintained
– Equipment/tools/materials unsuitable or used incorrectly
– Systems not resilient to failure – few or no recovery opportunities
– Interfaces sub-standard – displays unclear or confusing, too much information or too little, alarms
inadequate
– Environment poor – temperature, lighting, noise, weather etc.
Task factors
– Tasks poorly designed – unstimulating, not matched to personnel competencies – rely unrealistically
on sustained detailed attention to the task, perceptual skills, vigilance, memory, problem solving,
judgement, decision making or timely correct action
– Workload too high/too low, time pressure, many interruptions/distractions
– Job hazard assessment not done or poorly communicated
– Emergency tasks – not well-prepared or practised
– Teamwork problems – poor communications/coordination, poor allocation of tasks, team decisions
poorly supported
– Procedures or safe systems of work – not available, unclear, out of date, not used
Page 21
Table 6 continued.
Personnel factors
– Competence – lack of aptitudes, training, experience
– Health and fitness of personnel
– Fatigue
– Stress
– Motivation/job satisfaction low
– Use of prescription or recreational drugs including alcohol
Organisational factors
– Supervision inadequate, poor leadership
– SMS inadequate – procedures and processes, proactive and reactive systems, auditing and
improvement
– Safety culture poor – attitudes, beliefs, behaviours
– Change management poor – new equipment, methods, training, organisational structures not
introduced adequately
Page 22
ANNEX A
SELECTING AN APPROPRIATE METHOD
GENERAL CAUTIONS AND GUIDANCE
Extracting useful information from incidents is done in two main stages:
— Investigation – gathering information that should allow time-lining, event sequencing or other
means of reconstructing the incident.
— Analysis – thorough and systematic review of the structured information in order, ultimately, to
identify the root causes of the incident.
From the research of methods included in this publication, it is clear that incident investigation and
analysis is not as easy a process as it may appear. Many investigators do not use any specific methods
to analyse human factors issues. They often rely only on their own extensive experience and expertise
either in investigations or in human factors/safety management. This equips them to ask the
appropriate questions, develop a clear understanding of the factors that caused an incident and
identify the best approach to preventing further incidents with the same root cause. It appears that
the methods used are to some extent secondary to the expertise – and particularly the familiarity with
human and organisational factors – of the team using them.
If an investigation team is confident that it has sufficient expertise in human factors, then the
most basic method – a wallchart and pens/yellow stick-on notes – should be adequate, perhaps
supported by the checklists and flow diagrams contained in some of the methods set out in Annex
B. Note, however, that certain methods with extensive supporting materials may still require a good
level of human factors knowledge to understand and use them. Most of these are proprietary
commercially available methods, however, and are provided on the basis that the buyer undertakes
the necessary training.
The two key cautions to observe, then, are related to expertise/competence in human factors and
in analytical methods (see Table A1):
Table A1: Expertise/competence in human factors and analytical methods

Caution Problem Recommendation
Expertise Insufficient skills or Be honest about the level of expertise in the investigation team.
experience to use This should include expertise in the human performance elements
very simple or very of the tasks being investigated (those being conducted when the
technical methods. incident occurred). Workforce representatives can bring valuable
Loss of skills/practice expertise in this respect.
Make time for self-training or
Attend training course provided by suppliers of methods
Use the methods and keep up to date with developments. Practice
on 'old' incidents or on normal operations e.g. to explore barriers,
possible human errors etc.
If all else fails, seek help from a professional investigator/analyst; if
possible, use their expertise as a learning opportunity for internal
staff.
Checklists Checklists of factors Be aware of the problem. Use checklists as an initial prompt or
or root causes can aide-memoire. Seek additional help. Use a variety of checklists or
tunnel the analyst’s expert help to provide guidance on issues to explore.
thinking down
certain tracks.
Checklists may be
incomplete
Page 23
Table A2 should be of help in the selection of the most appropriate method for an investigation.
From reading the earlier sections of this publication and the cautions set out in Table A1, it should
be possible to decide on the type of method that the team needs and is able to use. The criteria are
not detailed but are intended to steer the reader towards finding out more about a particular method
before making a final selection. Note that a simple method may be better during the early stages of
investigating a complex incident, moving to a more complex method when the investigation team
has developed initial insights into the incident.
Table A2 has been populated with the most accurate information made available during the
course of this research on the methods described. The developers of the method described were all
invited to provide their view of the features and most of them supplied information. The authors of
this publication document have reviewed all ratings provided and determined whether they can be
supported. Whilst that information should provide a good indication of the key attributes of each
method, this cannot be guaranteed and the reader’s attention is drawn to the last paragraph of the
Foreword.
Table A2 should be used as an initial filter in selecting a suitable method. The reader should
obtain further information on the methods. To assist with this, the method descriptions in Annex B
include references to further useful information.
The features described are those that should be most useful to the user, but there are some
notable omissions, for example, cost. Cost is a difficult feature to rate fairly and objectively in that
some methods may be free but require expensive training; others appear expensive but make more
efficient use of analysts’ time. For this reason, cost as a feature of the methods has been excluded.
Users should explore costs when researching methods further.
The attributes of the methods listed in Table A2 are defined as follows:
Training required: the method provider requires the user to undergo training in using the method
or training would be required by a novice user in order to use the method effectively. In some cases,
novice users would have to familiarise themselves thoroughly with the method before using it and
may decide that they need more formal training or briefing from an expert in the method.
Paper or software based: the method is available as a document only or as a software tool only,
some are available in both forms.
Retrospective analysis of incident reports: the method has been designed specifically in order
to examine existing incident reports rather than assist in a new investigation or analysis: many of the
methods could be used in this way. Moreover, most of the methods could be used proactively as a
risk assessment method. This feature is highlighted where the method seems particularly useful in
the retrospective analysis of past incidents.
Used in the petroleum industry: indicates where there is clear evidence that the method has been
used in the petroleum or allied industries. Comments are provided in the table where a method has
been devised specifically for another industry, for example, aviation.
Generates graphical content: the method requires the development of a timeline or similar
pictorial representation of the incident and describes how to prepare this. The graphics may be
paper or screen based (software systems).
Forms a complete method for incident analysis: some methods are 'stand alone', whereas others
require the user to employ additional tools to complete the analysis. Several methods have been
developed on this basis and include modules from other methods.
Provides solutions: the method provides 'ready-made' solutions in the form of notes or checklists
of corrective actions against specific problems found from the analysis. Note that, since accident
Page 24
investigation is essentially the reverse of risk assessment, then the same 'hierarchy of controls'
approach (see section 2.2) is applicable to solutions generated here i.e. can the hazard be removed,
can the human element be eliminated? etc. The methods do not do this; users need to determine
for themselves how these apply to their critical tasks at their sites).
Includes checklists or flowcharts: the method has decision making aids to guide the user through
the analysis; some may be simple prompts or memory joggers to explore specific topics.
Comments: this column in the table is used to provide further explanation or detail as needed.
Page 25
Table A2: Analysis methods features
Training Paper-based or Retrospective Used in Generates Complete Provides Includes checklists Comments
required software analysis of petroleum graphical content method for solutions or flow diagrams
incident reports industry (e.g. timeline) incident analysis
Paper Software
1. ARCA - APOLLO Root Cause T T T T T T T T Described as a general problem solving
Analysis method
2. Black Bow Ties T T T T
3. DORI – Defining Operational T Not an analysis method – describes how to
Readiness to Investigate conduct an investigation
4. ECFA – Events and Causal T T Part of the MORT method but is often used
Analysis (Charting) and as a charting method in an
ECFA+ - Events and investigation/analysis to provide graphical
Conditional Factors Analysis depiction of incident
5. Fishbone diagram T T T Purely a method for graphically presenting
results; software systems available to help
draw
6. HERA – Human Error T T T
Repository and Analysis
System
26
7. HERA-JANUS – Human Error T T T T T T
Reduction In ATM (Air Traffic
Management)
8. HFACS – The Human Factors T T T Classification system only – aviation based,
Analysis and Classification would need to adapt
System
9. HFAT – Human Factors T T T T T T T T T Can be applied to any type of behaviour and
Analysis Tools has been used as a proactive method in risk
assessment
10. HFIT – Human Factors T T T T T T
Investigation Tool
11. HSYS - Human System T T T T T Can be used for proactive analysis in risk
Interactions assessment
12. ICAM - Incident Cause T T T T T T T T T
Analysis Method
13. MEDA – the Maintenance T T T T T T T Maintenance error; contains basic solutions
Error Decision Aid but relies on the user to identify definitive
improvements. There are examples, however
the user/interviewee needs to really come up
with the definitive improvements; use other
tools with MEDA e.g. timeline, police
interview methods
Table A2 continued.
Training Paper-based or Retrospective Used in Generates Complete Provides Includes checklists Comments
required software analysis of petroleum graphical content method for solutions or flow diagrams
incident reports industry (e.g. timeline) incident analysis
Paper Software
14. MORT – Management T T T T T T T T
Oversight and Risk Tree
15. PEAT – the Procedural Event T T T T Flight crew error – can be adapted
Analysis Tool
16. PRISMA – Prevention and T T T T T T T T Was designed for retrospective analysis and
Recovery Information System to collect and structure data on incidents
for Monitoring and Analysis
17. SCAT® – Systematic Cause T T T T T T T Provides an indication of 'areas for corrective
Analysis Technique action’ rather than ready-made solutions
18. SOL – Safety through T T T T T T T The software version, Sol-VE includes a
Organisational Learning module for identifying corrective actions
19. SOURCE™ – Seeking Out T T T T T T Does not provide solutions but includes a
the Underlying Root Causes checklist to help develop solutions. Does not
of Events generate graphical content, but recommends
the use of fault trees or causal analysis
charting
27
20. Step T T T T
21. Storybuilder T T T T T Training useful but not essential. Specifically
for occupational incidents. Designed for use
in all industries
22. TapRooT® T T T T T T T T T Solutions module available soon. Method
includes advanced interviewing techniques
for investigation
23. Kelvin Top-Set® T T T T T T T
24. TRACEr – Technique for T T T T Forms part of the HFAT methodology
Retrospective and Predictive
Analysis of Cognitive Errors
25. Tripod Beta T T T T T T T Does not provide ready-made solutions but
leads the analysis back to basic risk factors
that form the key elements of improvements
26. WBA – Why Because T T T
Analysis
27. 5 Whys T T A simple method for exploring issues
28. Why tree T T
ANNEX B
BRIEF DESCRIPTIONS OF METHODS
All of the following methods can help an incident investigator/analyst to identify the human factors
aspects of an incident. They have been chosen for inclusion in this Annex because they:
— were cited by interviewees who contributed to this guide as a method they had successfully
used;
— feature prominently in incident investigation literature, or
— offer a sound approach to identifying human factors aspects in incident analyses.
The methods are:
B1. ARCA – APOLLO Root Cause Analysis

B2. Black Bow Ties
B3. DORI – Defining Operational Readiness To Investigate
B4. ECFA – Events and Causal Analysis (Charting) and ECFA+ - Events and Conditional Factors
Analysis
B5. Fishbone diagram
B6. HERA – Human Error Repository and Analysis System
B7. HERA-JANUS – Human Error Reduction in ATM (Air Traffic Management)
B8. HFACS – The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
B9. HFAT – Human Factors Analysis Tools
B10. HFIT – Human Factors Investigation Tool
B11. HSYS – Human System Interactions
B12. ICAM – Incident Cause Analysis Method
B13. MEDA – Maintenance Error Decision Aid
B14. MORT – Management Oversight and Risk Tree
B15. PEAT – Procedural Event Analysis Tool
B16. PRISMA – Prevention and Recovery Information System for Monitoring and Analysis
B17. SCAT® – Systematic Cause Analysis Technique
B18. SOL – Safety through Organisational Learning
B19. SOURCE™ – Seeking Out the Underlying Root Causes of Events
B20. STEP Sequentially Timed Events Plotting
B21. Storybuilder
B22. TapRooT®
B23. (Kelvin) Top-Set®
B24. TRACEr – Technique for Retrospective and Predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors
B25. Tripod Beta
B26. WBA – Why-Because Analysis
B27. 5 Whys
B28. Why Tree
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B1. ARCA - APOLLO ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
Apollo is a general problem solving method that can be applied to accident investigation. It does this
by helping the analyst to identify the relationships between causes and effects noting that an effect
of one event can be the cause of another. One of Apollo’s basic principles is that an 'effect' has at
least two causes in the form of an 'action' and a 'condition'. The analyst uses the evidence gathered
about an event to build a picture of causes and effects using the 'Realitychart'™ software.
Action
Condition
Foot on
gas ?
Moving Caused Driver statement
Condition truck by Condition
Car Saw it Driving
Primary STOP STOP
existed Police report to work
effect
Caused Observation Driver statement
Car
wrecked by
Action Action Condition
Caused Caused
Car
struck by
Truck
swerved by
Angry
driver ?
Police report Police report Yelling insults
Observation
Condition
Narrow
road
WHEN: 09/05/03 Condition
Caused Observation
WHERE: Old River Road Car Driver statement
in path by
SIGNIFICANCE: Potential Action
injury, $9,000 property Heard sound
damage, gasoline spill,
missed two days' work.
Poorly
parked ?
Police report
Figure B1: Example Apollo cause and effect chart
An example Apollo cause and effect chart is shown in Figure B1. This is an example of a car accident.
Actions and conditions are described in boxes with the source of evidence for the condition or action
described below each box. The chart forms a description of the incident leading to underlying causes
that the analyst can use to identify solutions. The basic steps in the problem-solving process are:
— Define the problem – identify the event that you wish to prevent.
— Analyse cause and effect relationships – using the charting method to show causes and
interactions between causes.
— Identify solutions – the method does not offer solutions; the analyst has to devise them based
on the evidence.
— Implement solutions.
The developers provide a two-day seminar to train users in the method. Shorter introductory and
manager focused seminars are also provided. Public courses are held regularly in the US and
internationally.
Page 29
Useful reference information

Gano, DL (1999) Apollo root cause analysis - A new way of thinking, Apollo Associated Service Inc.,
USA. ISBN: 1-883677-01-7
http://www.realitycharting.com/#start
http://www.apollorca.com/
B2. BLACK BOW TIES
The method is not an investigation method in itself but a means of representing Tripod Beta models
in the 'bow tie' format used in some risk assessments. Figure B2 shows the general format of a bow
tie diagram. As an accident investigation tool i.e. ignoring its use in risk assessment, building the bow
tie comprises seven steps:
1. Describe the hazardous event – what occurred and what hazard was released?
2. Identify the 'threats' – anything that could have led to or contributed to the hazardous event.
Threats include design faults, possible human errors, corrosion etc.
3. Identify consequences – what happened as a result of the incident? This might be a chain of
consequences with one event leading to another and can be complicated. The analyst may wish
to record only the ultimate consequence or else split consequence descriptions across several
bow tie diagrams.
4. Identify the threat barriers – what was in place to prevent this accident? What activities were
needed to keep those barriers in place and who was responsible for those activities?
5. Identify recovery measures – contingency methods in place to recover from the accident and
reduce consequences, including technical, operational and organisational measures.
6. Optional: identify 'escalation factors' – factors that could reduce the effectiveness of controls
such as abnormal operating conditions or human errors.
7. Identify escalation factor controls - any additional controls specifically to manage these factors.
Tripod analyses can be mapped onto bow-tie diagrams to indicate possible active failures,
preconditions and latent failures (see Tripod Beta description (No.B25)) that could have adversely
affected control measures.
Prevention Recovery
Threat Consequence
Threat Hazardous Consequence
event
Threat Consequence
Control measures Loss of control Recovery measures
Potential causes Potential outcome

Active
failure
Precondition
Latent
failure
(BRF)
Figure B2: Bow-tie diagram
Page 30
Multiple incidents can be mapped in a bow tie model and layered onto an existing risk assessment
to build up a more complete picture of the underlying risk factors and potentially filling any gaps in
the risk assessment.
Black Bow Ties is available as a software package – 'Black BowTie XP'. In addition, a software tool
'Black Box' is available that provides a complete investigation tool by linking the TopSet®
methodology with the Black Bow Ties modelling method.
The developers of the method suggest that it is a sophisticated approach that may not be acceptable
within organisations that have not reached a high level of maturity in their approach to risk.

http://www.bowtiexp.com/
B3. DORI – DEFINING OPERATIONAL READINESS TO INVESTIGATE
This is not an investigation method but sets out ideas about what an organisation needs in place in
order to investigate incidents effectively. An interim 'white paper' was published in 2005 – available
from the Noordwijk Risk Initiative Foundation website. This was prepared in collaboration with RoSPA
(The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents) and provides ideas that organisations can use to
develop their strategies for investigation; it encourages them to determine:
— The range or 'levels' of incidents that the organisation should be prepared for.
— The tasks that need to be done – the paper provides a checklist of 34 possible investigation
tasks.
— How those tasks are to be carried out depending on the level of the incident.
— Resources required in order to carry out the tasks – people, plant and equipment, procedures
and management controls.

Kingston, J, Frei, R, Koomneef, F and Schallier, P (2005) Defining operational readiness to investigate
– DORI. Noordwijk Risk Initiative Foundation, Netherlands.
http://nri.eu.com/toppage4.htm
B4. ECFA – EVENTS AND CAUSAL ANALYSIS (CHARTING) AND ECFA+ - EVENTS AND
CONDITIONAL FACTORS ANALYSIS
ECFA is part of the MORT method (See No.B14). ECFA+ is a later variation of the method. The
description that follows encompasses both methods.
The core element of ECFA is the Events and Causal Factors (ECF) chart. This is the 'picture' that the
investigator constructs from the information gathered in their investigation. The chart shows 'events'
– what happened – in rectangles – and 'conditions' in ovals. Event boxes are linked by arrows
showing the sequence of the incident. Conditions that affected the event are also linked to the boxes
by arrows.
Analysts using ECFA should typically use a paper wall chart and draw on event boxes. They should
start with the incident itself, then work backwards putting in further boxes to describe the sequence
that led up to the event. They should also work forward describing what happened after the event.
The main event sequence should be shown in the middle of the chart with any contributory or
Page 31
secondary events shown in separate sequences above or below this. Stick on notes are often used
to allow the analysts to change the sequence or add elements quickly.
Various conventions are observed in using ECFA:

— Each event description should indicate:
– the 'actor' – the person involved e.g. maintenance fitter;
– their action – in the present tense e.g. drops;
– the 'object' involved – e.g. 5lb hammer.
— Where the analyst is unsure about an event or a condition, for example, through lack of solid
evidence, they depict the event or condition in a box or oval with a dotted borders.
— The analyst should check event logic – for example, that one event does necessarily follow from
another.
The rules for structuring an ECFA chart should be followed to ensure that the analysis is clear and
complete. Buys and Clarke set out the conventions clearly and provide examples.
The method does not identify root causes and should be used in conjunction with other methods
that do so.
The method is not complex and a team should be able to construct ECF charts with minimal training
although considerable resource may be needed to analyse complex incidents and some users have
been reluctant to apply ECFA in these cases.

Buys, R.J. and Clark, J.L. (1978). Events and Causal Factors Charting. DOE 76-45/14, (SSDC-14)
Revision 1. Idaho Falls, ID: System Safety Development Center, Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory.
ECFA+ - Noordwijk Risk Initiative Foundation http://www.nri.eu.com/
B5. FISHBONE DIAGRAM
A fishbone diagram is a general problem-solving method that has been used to record and make
sense of incident events. Using a large sheet of paper, the analyst writes down a brief description of
the event. A horizontal line is then drawn from the description towards the left hand side of the
paper. The analyst then adds 'ribs' to this 'backbone' where each rib is a factor thought to have
influenced the incident. Further ribs can be added as the analysis proceeds. From that point, the
method is similar to the 'five whys' method of asking why each factor is thought to have contributed
to the incident.
In the example, a tanker driver has delivered the wrong product into a storage tank. Using the HSE’s
model of human and organisational factors: job, person, organisation, these factors form the main
ribs of the diagram. Across the ribs, causal factors have been added in each category. For example,
under, 'Job' the factors contributing to the incident are poor lighting in the delivery access chamber
making it difficult to see the product labels. The torch carried as part of the driver’s toolkit is missing.
Under 'Person', they are rushing as it is close to the end of their shift.
Page 32
Organisation Person
No support from site

personnel Rushing (end
of shift)
No supervision/checking
Wrong product
put into storage
tank
Missing equipment (torch)
Poor labelling
Poor lighting
All connections identical
Job
Figure B3: Fishbone diagram
Each of these causes can be explored down to their root causes using the 'why' process. The diagram
(Figure B3) provides an overview of ideas and helps the analyst to identify any gaps and to focus on
key issues.

http://www.isixsigma.com/library/content/t000827.asp
B6. HERA – HUMAN ERROR REPOSITORY AND ANALYSIS SYSTEM
Note that this method is not related to HERA-JANUS described in B7.
HERA was devised for the US nuclear industry as a method for collecting data on incidents in a
systematic format for entry into a software database. Its value as an analysis tool is in the
'worksheets' it provides. These are used to examine and structure the information collected.
Worksheet A has three sections:
1. Plant and event overview – sources of information used for the analysis, type of event, type of
plant, overall event description.
2. Event summary and abstracts – brief summary of the event – may be copied from the original
source material (e.g. an existing report).
3. Index of sub events – specific successes and failures of equipment and personnel actions.
Worksheet B has seven sections:
1. Personnel involved in sub event.

2. Contributory plant conditions – that contributed to the event or to personnel actions/decisions.
3. Positive Contributory Factors/PSFs - factors that assisted performance.
4. Negative Contributory Factors/PSFs – factors that contributed to the sub event.
5. PSFs - HERA describes 11 PSFs. The user can obtain information on PSFs from the source material
Page 33
on the incident or infer what they were. Negative PSFs are based partly on the factors described
in HSYS.
6. Error type – error or omission/error of commission; slip, lapse, mistake, circumvention or
sabotage.
7. Sub event comments – for additional information.
The method is aimed at analysts with existing knowledge of probabilistic risk assessment or human
reliability analysis. The novice user would find it useful as a checklist of items to consider in an
analysis and as a useful tool for examining the human factors content of events that have already
been reported. The user would have to become familiar with human reliability terminology and read
the HERA reports thoroughly to develop their understanding of the method. HERA is not, however,
a complete method.
It is not known whether the software tool is available publicly to those outside the nuclear industry
and the US, but NUREG/CR-6903B is available to the public via US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s
website.

Hallbert, B et al (2006). Human Event Repository and Analysis (HERA) System, Overview, NUREG/CR-
6903B. USNRC, Washington DC.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract/cr6903/
B7. HERA-JANUS
The method is a combination of the Human Error Reduction in Air Traffic Management (HERA)
method and HFACS. It was devised as a method for retrospective analysis of air traffic control
incident reports but has proven useful as an investigation tool. It is intended to be used by safety
specialists, accident investigators, human factors analysts and others. The method is oriented towards
air traffic controllers and the terminology used reflects that application though it could prove useful
to others by suitably altering the wording. It should be noted that information on air traffic incidents
is generally plentiful since all controller actions and conversations with pilots are recorded – this has
made it easier to develop a comprehensive method for that industry and to identify an exhaustive
list of specific error causes.
The method is used in several stages each supported by checklists and flowcharts based on human
factors research regarding human failure types and information processing models:
1. Describe the error - error type – e.g. timing errors, action errors, communication errors.
2. Describe error detail (ED) – based on the information processing stage that failed, whether a
perception/vigilance; memory; planning/decision-making or response execution error.
3. For each ED, identify the error mechanism (EM) – e.g. for a memory error, EMs could include:
forget to monitor the situation; mis-recall information.
4. For each EM, described how the information processing (IP) level failed – e.g. for EMs related to
memory, associated IPs include: distraction, memory overload, failed learning. IPs are the most
difficult to classify.
Each step above is supported by flowcharts and checklists to guide the user through the process of
identifying errors/violations, defining types of task and equipment used at the time of the incident
and identifying underlying causes of failure. There are flowcharts and extensive lists of 'contextual
conditions' - factors that could have provoked the incident such as: training and experience, weather
conditions, procedures, actions of others.
Page 34
Error recovery or reduction strategies are developed by the analyst based on the information
generated concerning the origin of the particular failure.
The method is described fully in the references below. Some customisation would be required for use
in other industries.

Isaac, A et al(2003) The human error in ATM technique (HERA-JANUS), EATMP Infocentre,
Eurocontrol, Brussels.
http://www.eurocontrol.int/humanfactors/gallery/content/public/docs/DELIVERABLES/HF37-HRS-HSP-
002-REP-04withsig.pdf
B8. HFACS – THE HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
HFACS is based on James Reason’s ideas of 'latent failures' and the 'Swiss cheese' model. Reason’s
model suggests that any incident is preceded by:
— An unsafe act – an error or violation, which is encouraged by…

— Preconditions for unsafe acts – substandard conditions or substandard practices. These in turn
are not prevented or corrected due to…
— Unsafe supervision –planned (but) inappropriate operations; failure to correct known problems;
supervisory violations; and underlying all of this are…
— Organisational influences - poor resource management; organisational climate; organisational
processes.
The authors of HFACS believed that Reason’s model was useful: it described the idea that there could
be 'holes in the cheese' but did not describe what those holes might be. HFACS provides descriptions
of preconditions, unsafe supervisory practices and organisational influences in the form of checklists.
These have been derived from investigations of naval aviation accidents and supplemented by data
from the army and the transport and civil aviation industries.
The available literature on HFACS is well written and clear. It is, however, a classification system, not
an investigation method but could be used by experienced investigators as a tool to supplement their
analysis. Other users with limited human factors or investigation experience may find it difficult to
apply.
HFACS provides a set of checklists for incident analysis. It also includes descriptions of types of
human error: skill based errors, decision and perceptual errors and two forms of violation: routine
and exceptional. As with all checklist methods, it is not clear if every conceivable underlying factor
has been captured, but the checklists are extensive and based on real events. Users in the petroleum
and allied industries may need to adapt the checklists to their own use by, for example, changing
some of the terminology, which is based on aviation ('aircrew', 'altitude' etc). It should produce
reasonably consistent results across different analysts as the analysis should be based principally on
the checklists provided. HFACS would have to be supplemented by another method such as ECFA
(see No. B4) to provide input information.
HFACS provides examples of the types of deficiencies associated with the four levels of failure from
Reason’s model, and therefore lends itself to the identification of causes and recommendations,
although they would be generated by the analyst.
HFACS has been available since 2003 and has been applied in a range of industries, including:
Page 35
marine, military, commercial, and general aviation sectors. In the literature consulted for the present
review, it is regarded as a successful and useful method and has been noted as a useful method for
the petroleum industry.
HFACS can be used to examine the content of accident databases retrospectively to determine
underlying causes that may not have been disclosed previously. The success of this is wholly
dependent on the quality of the information contained in the database.
The method is described fully in Wiegmann and Shappell (2003). Some further training by those who
have used it may be required.

Wiegmann, DA, Shappell, SA (2003). Human error approach to aviation accident analysis: The human
factors analysis and classification system. Ashgate, London, ISBN-13 978-0-7546-1873-7
http://www.ashgate.com/index.htm
B9. HFAT – HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS TOOLS
HFAT was developed for a petroleum industry client but has been used in other industries. HFAT is
applied when the incident investigator has collected information about the critical factors and causes
of an incident and wishes to explore the human factors elements in more detail. HFAT supports the
analyst in examining incident findings in order to identify the human behaviours of interest and to
classify the behaviours as either errors or violations. Errors are then analysed using one module in the
toolkit; whereas violations are analysed using another module.
The method is based on two existing methods:
1. 'ABC' analysis (Antecedents, Behaviours and Consequences) – Antecedents are prompts or

triggers for 'behaviours' and 'consequences' are the result of the behaviours. ABC allows the
analyst to explore the motivations for violation behaviour. (Komaki et al).
2. TRACEr – Technique for Retrospective Analysis of Cognitive Error which is in turn based on the
information-processing model of Wickens. The model describes human behaviours as:
— Perceiving information.
— Using memory (to store and retrieve information).
— Making decisions.
— Taking actions.
TRACEr allows the analyst to establish where in this process the behaviour went wrong. Note that
it was developed for air traffic control applications and has a strong bias towards information
processing activities though it has been used recently for more industrial tasks.
HFAT can be used as a stand-alone method to analyse any human failure but in order to identify root
causes, is best integrated with a root cause analysis method. Analysis begins by applying the
'behaviour extraction' module. This allows the investigator to identify the actions of interest in the
incident being examined and to determine whether the behaviour was intentional (a violation) or
unintentional (an error). ABC or the human error analysis module is then applied as appropriate.
A two-day training course is required in order to use HFAT. Candidate trainees should ideally be
interested in human factors and have experience of incident investigation methods.
HFAT does not contain any ready-made incident-specific solutions but the HFAT analysis does:
Page 36
identify specific deficiencies in the systems and conditions for controlling human performance;
contain generic guidance on developing effective recommendations for shaping and influencing
behaviour.
HFAT is relatively new and following feedback from trials and applications, the method continues to
be developed.

Komaki, J Coombs, T, Redding, Jr, TP and Schepman, S (2000) A rich and rigorous examination of
applied behaviour analysis research in the world of work, International Review of Industrial and
Organisational Psychology, 15: 265–367
Wickens, CD (1992). Engineering psychology and human performance 2nd Edition. New York: Harper
Collins.
Shorrock, ST and Kirwan, B (1999). TRACEr: a technique for the retrospective analysis of cognitive
errors in ATM. In D. Harris (Ed.) Engineering psychology and cognitive ergonomics: Volume 3 –
Transportation systems, medical ergonomics and training. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
The Keil Centre Edinburgh http://www.keilcentre.co.uk/index.htm
B10. HFIT – HUMAN FACTORS INVESTIGATION TOOL
HFIT is based on a model of how accidents are caused which is in turn derived from a wide range of
different models derived from research. The model is shown in Figure B4.
Direction of causation
THREATS
Procedures SITUATION ACTION ERROR
Work preparation AWARENESS Omission
Job factors Attention Timing
Person factors Detection and Sequence
perception Quality
Competence and training ACCIDENT
Memory Selection
Team work
Interpretation Communication
Supervision
Decision making errors
Organisational/Safety culture
Assumption Rule violations
Work environment Response execution
Human-machine interface
Tools and equipment
ERROR RECOVERY
NEAR MISS
Behavioural response and detection cues
Direction of analysis
Figure B4: HFIT model
The model suggests that accidents occur when a person makes an 'action error', for example, omits
to carry out a critical task. Action errors occur because of some fault in the person’s information
processing sequence – lack of attention, failure to detect information, failure of memory etc. There
can be opportunities to recover situation awareness or the action error itself by detecting and
correcting the problem. If this is successful, the outcome is a near miss rather than an accident.
Page 37
Problems with situation awareness arise because of threats such as poor procedures, competence,
communication, supervision, safety culture or other factors.
HFIT analysis is based then on a four-step process working through each of those four elements in
an incident scenario. At each stage, the analysis is supported by checklists and flowcharts. The
analysis is applied to information gathered from the incident investigation and recorded, for example,
on a timeline. The checklists can be used also as interview prompts.
Paper and software-based versions of the tool are available. The four steps are:
1. Identify action errors.

2. Identify possible recovery mechanisms from those errors.
3. Identify the elements of the information processing sequence that failed.
4. Identify threats that contributed to the incident at any stage in its evolution.
Users without human factors experience would require some basic training to use HFIT. A one-day
training course is available (overview of human factors concepts; how to use the HFIT tool and
practical exercises).
HFIT does not generate ready-made solutions to the problems identified, but the information
gathered should help the analyst to make improvements.

The HFIT figure was published in Safety Science, Vol. 43, Gordon R, Flin R & Mearns K (2005).
Designing and evaluating a human factors investigation tool (HFIT) for accident analysis. Pg.150.
Copyright Elsevier (2005).
http://www.abdn.ac.uk/iprc/papers%20reports/Designing%20and%20Evaluating%20a%20hum
an%20factors%20investigation%20tool.pdf
B11. HSYS - HUMAN SYSTEM INTERACTIONS
The method was developed in the Idaho National Engineering Laboratories in the US in the early
1990s. It is no longer maintained by the developers but versions of the HSYS manual or software may
still be available within some organisations
HSYS is based on a model of human performance devised by its developers called 'the Input Action
model'. The model describes human performance in five stages:
1. Input detection
2. Input understanding
3. Action selection
4. Action planning and
5. Action execution
For each stage of the model, e.g. 'input detection', HSYS provides a 'tree' in a similar way to MORT
(see No. B14). The trees are used to identify which aspects of human performance were 'less than
adequate' (LTA) in the incident. For example, input detection may have been LTA because the person
involved in the incident was not paying sufficient attention to their work ('attention LTA'). The tree
then refers the analyst to a set of flowcharts to explore why attention may have been LTA. At the end
of the flowchart is either a reference to another flowchart or the expression 'explain reasons why'
which is the prompt for the analyst to ask about root causes.
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HSYS is used by interviewing those involved in the incident. The interviews are structured around the
flowcharts.
HSYS was made available in the form of a paper-based manual and a software tool. At the time of
writing, it is to be superseded by a new method known as the Human Event Repository and Analysis
System. HERA is not a direct replacement for HSYS and has different objectives (see No. B6)
The input action model is based on human performance models developed in the 1970s and 1980s.
It is less sophisticated than currently available models but includes the main features of human
information processing and action.
In trials, users of the method reported that the flowcharts and hierarchical trees were easy to use.
It is not clear if these users had prior human factors knowledge or experience of investigating
accidents. The review performed in developing this publication suggests that the flowcharts would
be straightforward to use for an experienced human factors analyst or incident investigator, but some
of the terminology might be difficult for a novice user.
As with all such methods, the use of flowcharts can introduce a high level of consistency. The
underlying model should help to ensure that failures at key human performance stages are
considered. There is a tree diagram for each stage each supported by flowcharts. The full range of
flowcharts and questions were not available for review but it is clear that a large amount of
information is provided suggesting that the method is capable of comprehensively analysing an
incident.
The HSYS system does not generate recommendations but provides the basis for the analysts to
develop solutions to the problems disclosed.
The approach has been validated by using HSYS to study accident reports but development of the
system does not appear to have progressed since the early 1990s. It has been used to consider
accidents in offshore drilling incidents and for human performance military aviation tactical
command. The US Federal Aviation Administration lists the method on their website.
HSYS can be used as an investigation tool and as an analytical tool to determine, prior to an incident,
whether systems in place to control human performance are 'adequate' or not.

Hill, SG, Harbour, JL, Sullivan, C, Hallbert BP (1990), Examining human system interactions: the HSYS
methodology. Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 34th Annual Meeting. 1990
http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/6307928-GUQW83/
US Federal Aviation Administration

http://www2.hf.faa.gov/workbenchtools/default.aspx?rPage=Tooldetails&toolID=122 but with a
note that it has yet to be proven in practice.
B12. ICAM - INCIDENT CAUSE ANALYSIS METHOD
ICAM is based on the research of James Reason. This is illustrated in Figure B5 where errors or
violations occur as a result of poor organisational control over, for example selection, training,
procedures and equipment selection and also due to adverse task and environmental conditions
including time pressure, task complexity and workload. If the consequence of the error or violation
is not trapped by any of the available defences, the result is an incident or accident.
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Safety net
Sound Produce Reduce Redundancy Safe and successful
organisational favourable errors and Risk management task completion
factors conditions violations Error traps
Error mitigation
Task /
Organisational Individual / Absent / failed
environmental
factors team actions defences
conditions
Interlocks
Staff selection Working conditions Isolation
Training Time pressures Guards
Errors Accident
Procedures Resources Barriers
Equip. selection and Incident
Tool availability SOPs
Equip. design violations Near miss
Job access JSAs
Ops. vs. safety goals Equip. failure
Task complexity Awareness
Mtce. mgt. Fitness for work Supervision
Contractor mgt. Workload Emerg. response
Mgt. of change Task planning PPE
Figure B5: ICAM diagram

Figure reproduced with kind permission of Safety Wise Solutions Pty. Ltd
An incident investigation using ICAM seeks to identify the absent or failed defences, then the actions
that led to the incident, the task and environmental conditions as they affected those actions and
the underlying organisational factors that contributed to the incident.
ICAM can be used as a proactive tool for examining organisational factors. In this respect, it is similar
to Tripod (see No. B25) and the organisational factors cited in ICAM are almost identical to Tripod
basic risk factors.

http://hsecreport.bhpbilliton.com/2006/
http://www.safetywisesolutions.com/productsicam.html
B13. MEDA – THE MAINTENANCE ERROR DECISION AID
MEDA was developed by Boeing as a method for investigating maintenance errors. It is related to the
PEAT method (see No. B15).
The method was developed taking into account human error research and the concepts of slips,
lapses, mistakes, violations, PSF etc, but presents a simplified view of them. Errors are described in
more specific terms than 'slips' etc, for example: 'tool left in housing'; part not installed'; 'part
installed incorrectly'; 'failed to lubricate after servicing'.
The underlying philosophy of MEDA contends that no-one sets out to commit an error and that
management have control over 80 to 90% of the factors that contribute to errors, with maintenance
technicians or their supervisors having control over the remaining 10 to 20%.
The simple model of incident and accident 'events' is that various 'contributing factors' – akin to PSFs
– increase the probability that an error should occur and an error increases the probability of an
event. Contributing factors include: competence and other attributes of the mechanic, the working
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environment in the broadest sense including weather conditions and factors such as time pressure
and team work, supervision, and 'organisational philosophy' – policies, procedures and processes.
Following an event that the organisation considers, from a preliminary assessment, may have
originated from maintenance errors, a MEDA investigation is applied as mainly to investigate – mainly
by interviewing the technician and any other involved in the event. The investigator should use the
'MEDA results form' as a prompt list and to record information. The form is divided into six sections:
1. General information – facts about the event including: aircraft type, where it occurred,
interviewer name, reference to previous event number etc.
2. Event – short list of aviation-related events including: flight delay, in-flight shutdown, diversion,
aircraft damage, personal injury.
3. Maintenance error - checklist of error types and specific errors including: installation error, repair
error, isolation/test/inspection error, personal injury, servicing error with space for specific free-
text description.
4. Contributing factor checklist – 11 factors with prompts as to what the problem may have been
with that factor and space for a free text description of how specifically the factor contributed
to the error, for example, 'information' could be – not understandable, unavailable/ inaccessible,
incorrect, conflicting or not used. The remaining ten factors are:
— equipment/tools/safety equipment;
— aircraft design/configuration/parts;
— job/task;
— technical knowledge/skills;
— individual factors – such as time constraints, peer pressure, distractions;
— environment/facilities;
— organisational factors such as quality of support, staffing/resources, procedures;
leadership/supervision;
— communication, and
— other.
The Boeing MEDA User’s guide elaborates on these checklists and provides specific examples of
possible specific contributing factors e.g. equipment unsafe could mean sharp edges, lock out
systems not working, electrical sources not labelled.
5. Error prevention strategies – asks the question 'what current existing organisational procedures,
processes and/or policies are intended to prevent the incident but did not?' Suggestions are:
policies or processes, inspection or functional check, documentation and 'other'. The section
includes space for recording recommendations listed alongside the contributing factor it is
intended to address. The person involved in the incident is asked to contribute to this section.
6. Summary of contributing factors, error, event – free text description summing up the basic
findings
The User guide elaborates on all the sections of the form and provides advice on interviewing
strategies and the use of precise language in filling out the form.

Boeing (2001) Maintenance error decision aid (MEDA) user’s guide
http://www.tc.gc.ca/CivilAviation/general/Flttrain/SMS/Toolkit/MEDA/MEDA.pdf
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B14. MORT – MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND RISK TREE
MORT was developed in the early 1970s for the nuclear industry. Investigators used fault trees as a
means of presenting information on major accidents. They noticed that the same causal factors
appeared in many of the fault trees developed for different accidents and this led them to develop
a number of generic trees describing system faults that can lead to incidents. The current form of the
system, developed via funding from a petroleum industry company and presented in the MORT User
Manual, has question sets instead of 'trees' to explore whether controls that should have been in
place to prevent an incident were adequate or not.
There are eight ready-made 'trees' or question sets covering 98 generic problems and 200 basic
causes of 'losses'. Figure B6 shows the overall logic of MORT. 'Losses' are caused by either
oversights/omissions or 'assumed risks'. The latter are risks that have been assessed and accepted (in
practice, losses could be due to a combination of both).
Future
Damage to undesired
people or assets LOSSES events
T 2
Oversights
and Assumed
ommissions risks
SM 2 R 46
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
Specific Management
control factors system factors
LTA LTA
S 2 M 33
Stabilisation Implementation Risk assessment

Incident and restoration Policy and control system
LTA of policy LTA
LTA LTA
SA1 2 SA2 30 MA1 31 MA2 33 MA3 35
Potentially Vulnerable Controls and

hamful energy people barriers LTA
flow or condition or objects
SB1 3 SB2 5 SB3 6
Figure B6: MORT diagram

Diagram reproduced with kind permission of Nordwijk Risk Initiative Foundation
Oversights and omissions occur because control factors or management system factors are 'less than
adequate' (LTA). Control factors relate to the incident itself (failures that led to) or to events after the
incident (that failed to control it and thus led to losses). The question sets are concerned with:
SA1 – describing the incident itself using barrier analysis

SA2 – stabilisation and restoration (following the incident)
SB1 – potentially harmful energy flows or environmental conditions
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SB2 – vulnerable people or objects

SB3 – barriers and controls (broken down into sub-sections e.g. information systems, operational
readiness, inspection, maintenance
MA1 – policy
MA2 – implementation of policy
MA3 – risk assessment and control system
There is also a question set for assessing assumed risk. Numbers in Figure B6 are the relevant page
numbers in the MORT User’s manual.
The questions are applied to specific 'episodes' of interest in an incident: these are identified using
'barrier analysis' – see below. The users (ideally in a team of two) work through the trees/question
sets identifying whether any of the causes described in MORT are applicable to the incident. Usually,
they should mark the trees with coloured pens to code problem areas; those that are well covered
and those where there is insufficient information to judge.
Barrier analysis is an essential step prior to conducting a MORT analysis. There are three concepts in
this analysis: energy; targets; and barriers. Energy is the harmful agent that can affect a target
(person or thing) but not necessarily damage it (this would be a near miss). Barriers are any means
for protecting the target from energies. The analysis consists of identifying: targets (people or things
that were harmed or threatened in the incident), then energy flows that were directed at the target
then the barriers or controls that should have prevented the energy flows from reaching the target.
No specific human factors model is mentioned in MORT. The barrier analysis concept is very similar
to the 'Swiss cheese' model described in section 2.4. The technical language and specific terminology
used in MORT may prove difficult for the novice user, but, with practice, it should be possible for
anyone who wishes to use the system to do so from a thorough reading of the MORT User’s manual
and, if necessary, by obtaining supplementary advice from the Noordwijk Risk Initiative Foundation
(NRI) – the present custodians of MORT.
MORT covers a wide range of root causes of incidents and should prompt the user to consider the
majority of possible contributors to an incident. The method does not provide ready-made
recommendations for improvement but these can be developed from the findings indicating which
elements of the current system are less than adequate.
MORT is a well-established method and has been used in a wide range of industries. It is a
comprehensive method and can be used with a minimal knowledge of human factors. Many of the
questions are supported by text describing examples of 'adequacy'.
Koornneef and Hale at Delft University of Technology have developed a software version of MORT
known as the Intelligent Safety Assistant (ISA). Little information is available on ISA – except in
Koorneef (2000). Contact Delft University for further information.

Frei, R et al (2002) NRI MORT User’s Manual. ISBN 90-77284-01-X Available from:
http://www.nri.eu.com/serv01.htm
Koornneef, F. (2000). Organisational learning from small-scale incidents. Delft University Press,
Netherlands. ISBN 90-407-2092-4
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B15. PEAT – THE PROCEDURAL EVENT ANALYSIS TOOL
PEAT was developed by Boeing and, as with MEDA (see No. B13), is a checklist-based tool for
examining deviations from procedures by interviewing those involved. The focus of PEAT, however,
is flight crew rather than maintenance.
The overall PEAT process is to identify deviations from procedures; identify the contributing factors
that led to those deviations and make recommendations that should address those factors. The steps
in a PEAT analysis are:
1. The investigator reviews any preliminary information gathered about the event and compiles a
list of possible crew errors but does not speculate on contributory factors.
2. In an interview, they ask those involved in the event for their recommendations to reduce future
similar events: what the company could do and what flight crew could do. Doing this at the start
encourages the crew to think about how their recommendation would address a particular
contributory factor.
3. Organise the list of contributory factors into groups according to the part of the decision-making
process they affected.
PEAT prompts the user to consider possible contributory causes including:
— equipment factors;
— environmental factors;
— procedures;
— crew factors;
— situation awareness factors – vigilance, attention etc;
— factors affecting individual performance – fatigue, workload etc;
— personal and corporate stressors, management or peer pressure etc;
— crew coordination/communication, and
— technical knowledge/skills/experience.
PEAT is available as a training package. Boeing Flight Technical Services deliver the three-day course
required to qualify for using the software.

Moodi, M and Kimball, (2004) Example application of procedural event analysis tool. GAIN Working
Group B, Analytical Methods and Tools. Boeing Company, Seattle, WA.
https://www.flightsafety.org/gain/PEAT_application.pdf
B16. PRISMA – PREVENTION AND RECOVERY INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR MONITORING

AND ANALYSIS
PRISMA comprises three steps:
1. Build a 'causal tree' – akin to a fault tree – describing the incident

2. Identify causes – using the 'Eindhoven Classification Model'
3. Identify solutions to the problems disclosed – using guidance provided within the method
Thus:
1. The analyst creates a causal tree to set out the events leading to an incident. Typically, the earlier
events are placed on the left hand side of the tree and the later events to the right hand side.
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Unlike conventional fault trees, the branches of the tree are linked by gates only.
2. The analyst then examines the tree using the classification model. The model is based on analysis
of the causes of incident in the petrochemical industries. Different versions exist for different
industries. For the petroleum and allied industries, the model is arranged such that the analyst
should consider the cause of each event as either technical, organisational or human behaviour
based.
— Technical – engineering, construction or materials
— Organisational – operating procedures or management priorities (some versions include
safety culture in this category)
— Behavioural – knowledge, rule or skill based, all of which are further broken down.
3. Using the PRISMA 'classification/action' matrix, the analyst should be able to identify specific
solutions to the root cause problems identified in step 2. For example, if knowledge transfer is
the problem, solutions are focused on training and coaching; if management priorities are the
problem, solutions are concerned with bottom-up communications.

van der Schaaf, TW (1996). PRISMA: A risk management tool based on incident analysis. In
International Workshop on Process Safety Management and Inherently Safer Processes. Orlando,
Florida, USA, 8-11October 1996.
B17. SCAT® SYSTEMATIC CAUSE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE
SCAT® was originally developed by the International Loss Control Institute (ILCI) and is currently a
proprietary method of Det Norske Veritas. SCAT® is based on the International Safety Rating System
(ISRS). ISRS is a method for assessing the adequacy of loss control management in an organisation
by examining the organisation’s approach to safety management system elements such as:
leadership, risk evaluation, project management, training and competence, communication,
emergency preparedness and risk monitoring. SCAT® allows the user to examine an incident and
from that determine whether any of these elements are adequate or less than adequate. The
method is available on paper or as a software package (ESCAT).
An analyst would use the software system as follows, to describe:
1. The accident (date, time, what happened).

2. The 'loss potential' which comprises the following factors:
— loss severity potential - i.e. how bad could it have been?
— probability of reoccurrence – e.g. 'moderate' - a similar problem could arise until measures
are taken to remove the causes.
— frequency of exposure – e.g. 'moderate' – the task being carried out when the incident
occurred is a common task.
3. Type of contact - SCAT® provides various choices. In the example, the contact is, 'with heat'
(other choices are with: cold; radiation; caustics; noise; electricity etc.).
From lists, the user then selects the immediate causes (ICs) - substandard acts or substandard
conditions. These include:
'failure to follow procedure/policy/practice' and 'failure to check/monitor'. These were both
causes of the fire in the example.
4. Basic causes (selected from options given by the software) – Basic underlying causes (BCs) are
split into 'personal factors' and 'job factors'. The analyst may choose to see only the most
probable BCs that apply to the ICs chosen in the last step. BCs include: 'abuse or misuse' which
Page 45
can be described as 'improper conduct that is not condoned'. or, 'improper motivation' which
leads to 'improper attempt to save time or effort'.
From the ICs and BCs identified, SCAT® should suggest a number of 'control actions needed'
(CANs). These are based on ISRS elements and are aimed at removing or reducing the impact of the
underlying causes of the accident. CANs include 'task observation' - the need for a scheme to carry
out 'spot checks' on tasks; 'rules and work permits' - review of how compliance with rules is
achieved; and 'general promotion' (of safety) - promotion of critical task safety and promotion of
housekeeping systems.

International Loss Control Institute (1990). SCAT® – Systematic Cause Analysis Technique, Loganville,
GA.
Det Norske Veritas. Place House, Cathedral Street, London SE1 9DE
B18. SOL – SAFETY THROUGH ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING
SOL was devised for the nuclear power industry and is based on the 'Swiss cheese' model idea of
accident causes in which barriers in place to prevent incidents are breached because of various
indirect and direct causes. An incident is the end point in a chain of other single events. The direct
and indirect causes are concerned with: technology, the individual, the working group, the
organisation and the organisational environment. The authors of the method are not concerned if
the true root causes are disclosed but more interested in using incidents as a stimulus for discussing
improvements to systems, focusing on these five elements. The method requires some creativity on
the part of the analyst and is thus applicable to a wide range of industries. It includes two aids to
help the incident analyst to:
1. Describe the event

The cues for describing the event are the five classic questions: when, where, who, what and how?
Using these prompts, the analyst should identify: when the event started/finished, where it took place
(and other locations involved), who was involved directly and indirectly, what type of work was being
carried out at the time, what procedures were being used, how were teams organised and allocated
their tasks, how did they communicate with each other, did environmental conditions have an effect?
etc.
The overall event is graphically depicted as a series of 'event building blocks' showing what each
'actor' in the event was doing at a particular time.
2. Identify the contributing factors

The analyst should next consult a list of six possible directly contributing factors: information,
communication, working conditions, personal performance, violation, or technical components. The
list suggests up to 19 possible indirectly contributing factors for each of these six. For example, if
violation is a possible direct cause, the indirect cause could be lack of supervision. Indirectly
contributing causes include the first five of the six directly contributing causes and others such as:
group influence:
— rules;
— procedures and documents;
— training;
— feedback of experience, and
— quality management and maintenance.
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The method does not provide solutions but the information generated at step 2 provides the means
for developing solutions. A software version of the method known as SOL-VE is also available and
helps the analyst to conduct further steps for producing corrective actions, documenting the analysis
and providing input to the company reporting system and event database.

MTO (Mensch-Technik-Organisation) in Berlin. Website:
http://www.mensch-technik-organisation.de/e/mto_home.html
Safety through Organizational Learning (SOL)- an in-depth event analysis methodology

http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/Bieleschweig/first/Fahlbruch_Miller_SOL-Handout.pdf
B19. SOURCE™ – SEEKING OUT THE UNDERLYING ROOT CAUSES OF EVENTS
SOURCE™ is based on a number of methods that are already available in industry supported by some
of ABS Consulting’s own methods. The methods it draws upon include: event and condition
charging, cause and effect tree analysis, change analysis and 5 Whys and ABS’s 'Root Cause Map'.
SOURCE™ is taught in a workshop setting and those who attend the workshop are then able to use
the SOURCE™ methodology licence-free. Most of the checklists and guides are contained in the
handbook obtained by attending the course.
The method provides checklists and helpful guides for:

1. Preparing the investigation – securing the site, forming the team etc.
2. Data to gather and data gathering methods – photos, physical evidence, records, witnesses, via
interview.
3. Data analysis – fault tree, timelines, causal factors charting.
4. Root cause identification – procedure for and a 'root cause map'.
5. Generating recommendations – checklist provided to assist.
6. Communicating results of the analysis – report writing.
7. Miscellaneous – e.g. entering information in data-tracking system.

Vanden Heuvel, L et al (2005). Root Cause Analysis Handbook: A Guide to Effective Incident
Investigation. Published by Rothstein Associates Inc.
ISBN 1-931332-30-4
SOURCE™ investigator’s toolkit
http://www.absconsulting.com/resources/RCAresources.zip
B20. STEP–SEQUENTIALLY TIMED EVENTS PLOTTING
STEP is similar in some respects to SOL (see No. B18); events that took place within an incident are
shown graphically alongside each 'actor' involved in those events. The analysis should normally begin
by completing a series of STEP cards for each event. The analyst should record the following
information on those cards:
— the actor involved – this could be a person or a 'thing';
— the action they took – what the person or thing did;
— the time that the event started;
— the duration of the event;
— sources of information and evidence;
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— the location of the event, and

— a description of the event.
The information is then plotted on a graph – see Figure B7.
Time
Actors
Actor 1 Event Event
Actor 2 Event Event
. . . Event
Actor n Event
Figure B7: STEP graph
The analysts describe each actor on the left hand side of the graph and show all events in which they
were involved, in their correct sequence along the time axis of the graph in line with the description
of the actor. The analysts then determine links between events and show these links using arrowed
lines joining different events. The logic used is that of assessing necessary and sufficient conditions:
if one event was sufficient to cause the next event, then it is linked to that event. If an event is
necessary (must occur) before the following event can logically occur, then the two events are linked.
Several events may have to occur for a subsequent event to occur; all those events are shown as
influencing the subsequent event by arrowed lines showing the direction of influence. Where a
causal relationship cannot be established, but one event preceded another, the analyst can insert a
broken arrow with a question mark to denote this.
Conditions that may influence events are deliberately excluded from STEP. They are considered to
introduce information that can obscure the real reasons for events and, in any case, are usually
outcomes from previous actions. STEP’s supporters suggest that ignoring conditions allows them to
focus purely on event relationships and avoid any confusion or ambiguity that could ensue from
considering conditions. They also argue that conditions are often simply outcomes from events. As
an example, an operator fails to input a set point on a fuel delivery system correctly. This – it could
be said – was caused by poor environmental conditions: cold, bright weather affecting manual
dexterity and the operator’s view of the setting. STEP could include this in several ways; for example,
by including the event of the operator entering that environment or the event of failing to adequately
check the setting.
There are no specific rules in STEP for identifying root causes. Analysts should inspect the event
information presented and determine from inspection which of these could be root cause.

Hendrick, K and Benner, L. (1987). Investigating accidents with Sequentially Timed and Events
Plotting (STEP). Marcel Decker, New York, USA.
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B21. STORYBUILDER
Storybuilder is a recently developed software tool for analysing existing industrial incident reports.
The method has been devised on behalf of the Dutch government and is intended to help in
identifying the dominant causes of occupational accidents. Those causes should be tackled first.
The method is based on the bow-tie model of accidents (see No. B2).
Storybuilder is used to analyse specific classes of occupational accidents. As an example, 715

accidents involving falls from ladders were analysed. Of these, 482 failures were attributed to 'ladder
stability' as the primary safety barrier that failed. 417 of these resulted from incorrect placement by
the user. In turn, half of these failures were caused by the user selecting the wrong type of ladder.
Storybuilder contains a large number of ready-constructed bow-ties for different accident classes.
These can be used to analyse further accidents by matching them to the appropriate story.
The method could be used by anyone wishing to examine existing occupational incidents in order
to identify trends and underlying causes.

Oh, J (2007). The use of Storybuilder as an incident analysis tool. Presented at OECD/CCA Workshop
on Human Factors in Chemical Accidents and Incidents. 8-9 May 2007, Potsdam, Germany
http://www.storybuilder.eu/
B22. TAPROOT®
An incident investigation using TapRooT® is conducted in the following steps, each supported by
tools provided by the method:
1. Determine sequence of events – from evidence gathered in the incident investigation. TapRooT®
provides a number of tools to help in this including: change analysis, barrier analysis and Critical
Human Action Profile (CHAP – which helps to characterise critical tasks). The sequence of events
is represented on a timeline akin to an ECFA chart known as a SnapCharT®.
2. Define causal factors – from further investigation, the analyst adds further sequences and causal
factors to the chart. A causal factor may be the failure of a specific item of equipment. A causal
factor is anything that, if absent from the sequence of events, would have prevented the event
occurring or made its consequences less severe.
4. Analyse each causal factor’s root cause – TapRooT® provides a tool for the analyst to identify
whether the root cause was either:
— a 'human performance difficulty';
— an 'equipment difficulty';
— a natural disaster or sabotage, or
— 'other'.
5. Analyse each root cause's generic cause – having determined in the previous step the root cause,
the method provides a 'troubleshooting guide' in the form of question sets that direct the analyst
to explore a deeper level of causes.
For example, a fitter forgets to close a valve following a maintenance task. This is found,
using the tools provided, to be a 'human performance difficulty'. The 'basic cause' of this is then
found to be 'human engineering'. Exploring this category, the analyst determines that the cause
of the 'human engineering' problem is that the system is too complex (this is a 'near root cause').
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The root cause is found to be that the fitter was attending to too many items at once.
6. Develop and evaluate corrective actions – the method suggests corrective actions based on the
causes found in the incident analysis.
7. Report and implement corrective actions – in the software version of the tool, the report is
generated automatically.

Paradies, M and Unger, L (2000). TapRooT® - The system for root cause analysis, problem
investigation, and proactive improvement, Knoxville, TN: System Improvements, Inc.
www.taproot.com
B23. KELVIN TOP-SET®
Kelvin Top-Set is a method for investigating and analysing incidents. The name is derived from the
issues that the method developers believe should be investigated, namely: Time, Organisation,
People, Similar Events, Environment and Technical.
The method is available as a paper-based or software tool. The information below is based on the
'Investigator' software. This is identical in function to the paper-based version of Top-Set. Using this,
the analyst conducts an investigation in nine steps:
1. File an initial incident report – logs the incident and basic details about it.
2. Terms of reference – these are generated automatically following step 1 and can be edited.
3. Report introduction – free text area for the analyst to set out relevant details for the report.
4. Plan the investigation – shows the Top-Set 'indicator card' outlining the areas for investigation
and sub-areas, for example, 'People' has sub-set areas 'activities and tasks' and 'skills and
training'. Clicking on any sub-set topic produces a 'planning issues' pro-forma. This provides a
prompt for taking action on a particular topic as part of the investigation.
5. Develop the storyboard – a timeline is already partially completed from the information provided
already but can be edited and re-arranged. In appearance, the storyboard resembles a wallchart
with 'yellow stick on notes' attached.
6. Identify immediate causes – in this section, the immediate and underlying causes are identified
and explored via prompts from the system. The inputs made to this part of the method are
shown in the 'root cause diagram' described in step 7.
7. Draw a root cause diagram – the input from the above produces an initial root-cause diagram
that can be edited. The yellow boxes are shown with lines attached indicating why particular
events or conditions occurred.
8. Make recommendations – the method does not provide ready-made solutions. In this section,
the analyst should make recommendations for improvement. The method encourages the
recommendations to be 'SMART'.
9. Generate a final report – automatically generates a report from the information provided up to
this point.
The method providers offer various levels of training courses to support the use of the tool. It is
unlikely that an untrained user would be able to generate appropriate information without training.
Top-Set appears to have been based on the expertise of its developers. The topic areas covered are
relevant to human factors.

http://www.kelvintopset.com/
Page 50
B24. TRACEr – TECHNIQUE FOR RETROSPECTIVE AND PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS OF

COGNITIVE ERRORS
TRACEr is an error identification and analysis tool developed for the aviation industry, in particular,
air traffic control, but has been used in other industries. This usually entails no more than changing
some of the terminology used, e.g. from 'aircraft' to 'ship' or 'locomotive'.
The model that forms the basis of TRACEr (see HFAT (see No. B9)), describes four elements of
information processing. TRACEr describes the errors that could be associated with each of these
elements, for example:
1. Perception – errors in seeing, hearing or otherwise detecting information.

2. Memory – forgetting information or recalling it incorrectly; forgetting an action just carried out
or forgetting to perform an action in the future.
3. Judgement – errors in planning, decision-making and judgement .
4. Action execution – actions that do not achieve the intended aim (errors of commission).
TRACEr supports the analyst in examining incident data in order to establish:

— The 'external error modes' i.e. the type of error such as 'action omitted', 'action on wrong
object', 'action too early/late', 'information not sought/obtained', 'wrong information
transmitted' etc.
— The 'internal error modes' i.e. the underlying error with perception, memory etc. that could have
contributed to the external error, such as: late detection (of information); forget information or
forget to carry out an action; misjudge (e.g. distance) or make an incorrect decision; overshoot
or overdo an action, give out incorrect information.
— The 'psychological error modes' influencing the internal error modes i.e. underlying failures in
information processing such as: making assumptions; becoming confused or distracted; having
a memory block etc.
— The PSF influencing the errors such as the working environment, procedures, training and
experience.
As an example, a plant operator failed to close a valve to stop a leak. They had detected the leak and
knew what to do, thus it was not a perception error but an action error – in this case, 'action too
late' – since they closed the valve but could have done so more quickly. The internal error mode was
a judgement error – they believed they had more time to react and carried out other actions first.
Several psychological error modes drove the internal error, including 'prioritisation failure' and
'incorrect knowledge'. A key PSF was the stress of the incident.
The method is used as an aid to interviewing those involved in incidents although it may be possible
to derive some useful information from written records of incidents depending on the detail in those
records.
The concepts in TRACEr may be new to the untrained user and may require existing expertise in
human reliability terminology. The flowcharts and checklists provided are easy to use. The analyst
should need to interpret the material for their own industry, but the method provides the stimulus
for exploring incidents.

Kirwan, B and Shorrock S (2002). Development and application of a human error identification tool
for air traffic control. Applied Ergonomics 33 (2002) 319–336
Page 51
B25. TRIPOD BETA
Tripod Beta is based on the research work of James Reason, Jop Groeneweg and others. It describes
incidents in terms of 'objects' e.g. people, equipment being changed by 'agents' (of change i.e.
anything with the potential to change an object). Tripod Beta also models 'barriers' showing them
as, for example, effective, failed or inadequate barriers.
Tripod Beta provides a format and rules for modeling the event and linking each element together
and working back ultimately to the underlying causes.
In Tripod, the underlying causes - 'latent failures' - 'are known as Basic Risk Factors (BRFs). BRFs are
associated with:
— design;
— hardware;
— maintenance management;
— error inducing conditions;
— housekeeping;
— incompatible goals;
— procedures;
— communication;
— training, and
— organisation.
A twelfth BRF, 'Defences' is equivalent to the idea of 'barriers'. The example below illustrates the
method. The incident under investigation is a vehicle rollover seriously injuring a driver.
In Figure B8 (numbers added for purposes of illustration)
(1) The red box describes the event in terms of its outcome – permanent disability. The box above
this (2) with the red and yellow/black border is a combination of an object (3 – the driver) undergoing
change (back injury) as a result of another set of events and condition combinations leading to (4 –
vehicle rollover). The driver would not have suffered permanent disability had he been moved
expertly by his company’s search team. Failed barriers (5 and 6) are shown as black blocks that
allowed an agent (7 – incorrect extraction of driver) to make this change. Factors causing the barriers
to fail are modelled as 'preconditions' (8, 9 and 10 – blue boxes) that in turn originated in several
BRFs (yellow boxes), in this case, organisational failure (11) incompatible goals (12) and a failed
defence (13).
Tripod Beta is a software-based tool and should be used only by trained analysts. The practitioner
training takes four days; shorter courses for other types of user are also avaliable. The training
introduces the philosophy underlying the method.

Groeneweg, J. (2002). Controlling the controllable, the management of safety. Fifth edition. Global
Safety Group, Leiden University ISBN 90 6695 140 0 / ISSN 0928 8058;29)
http://www.tripodsolutions.net/
Page 52
Driver does not Driver

know how to steer over-steers
out of trouble vehicle
Tyres hit shoulder

of road 4
Alert and correct Correct reaction on Roll-over of
steering hitting shoulder of road vehicle
Vehicle stability 2
Driver with
Local culture back injury
simulates
"Macho driving"
Driver refuses to
Drivers consider
wear seatbelt
use of seabelts as
childish
Vehicle on the
road
Management
does not enforce 3
use of seatbelts
Driver
1
8 Passenger
11 Use of seatbelts disability from

Shortage of Control room spinal injury
operators due operator charged
to cost-cutting with outdoor
drive duties
Emergency team
mobilises after
75 minutes
Management
9 Emergency room
12 does not enforce

duty procedures
team not on call
due to company
party
10
13
Ineffective Search team not Search team
tracking system sure about actual makes detour
for road incident site before finding
transport crashed vehicle
5 6
7 (Potential for)
incorrect
extraction of
driver
Effective search Rapid mobilisation of
search team
Figure B8: Tripod Beta diagram
Page 53
B26. WBA – WHY BECAUSE ANALYSIS
Why Because Analysis (see Figure B9) comprises the following key steps:
1. Gather and assess information about the incident – thoroughly review all witness and
documentary evidence to determine the basic facts about the incident. Then, using this
information, do either step 2 or 3.
2. Create a 'list of facts' – literally, a list of all items of information gathered. Give each fact a
unique number, describe the fact briefly and note down where the fact came from (witness
name, document reference, photograph etc.).
3. Construct a 'why-because list' – this is a list of pairs of effect-cause facts. E.g. Fact A = 'The
Titanic’s hull was holed below the waterline' [why? because] Fact B = 'the Titanic collided with
an iceberg'.
4. (Optional step) Apply a 'counterfactual test' to the pairs of facts, and correct as necessary. This
is purely a logic test; the analyst questions whether, if B had not occurred, A would have still
have occurred? If the answer is yes, then the two facts are not logically linked.
5. (Optional step) Create an auxiliary list of facts – if the list of facts or 'why because list' fails to
produce a clear picture of the events that took place, the facts can be re-arranged into groups
according to, for example, the time they occurred or the person involved. (Using this
classification can help produce a timeline or other supplementary model of the events and
conditions that contributed to the incident.)
6. Construct a why-because graph as follows:
— Determine the 'mishap' – the event that was most responsible for the incident. Make this
the top node in the graph e.g. 1 500 people died [why?because] the Titanic sank.
— Identify the 'necessary causal factors':
– If why-because pairs have been used, these should already be paired logically.
– If the list of facts is used, start with the 'mishap' and identify which facts in the list of
facts pass the logic test in Step 4
— Continue until a detailed breakdown of the facts is represented on the graph e.g. 'bow
section divided from stern' [why?because] 'stern section lifted out of the water'
[why?because] etc.
7. Quality check the analysis for completeness and accuracy – change the graph as necessary.
The graph itself can be produced using yellow 'stick on notes' and paper with the nodes joined by
arrowed lines showing the logical relationships between facts.

http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/research/WBA/
Page 54
1 500
passengers
died
Titanic sank
Evacuation
incomplete
before vessel Bow section
sank split from
stern
Etc.
Stern section
raised out of the
water as bow
sank
Forward vessel
buoyancy lost
Watertight
compartments
breached
Vessel Poor quality

impacted steel used in
iceberg construction
Figure B9: WBA diagram
B27. 5 WHYS
The basic approach is to gather information on an incident and form a team. The team then asks why
(the incident occurred), referring to the information available to answer the question. The team
should reach a point when asking why no longer makes sense either because a root cause has been
found or there is insufficient information to answer the question. This can take more or less than five
'whys'; questions may also be phrased in other ways, 'how is it that', 'what affected this'. It is a
simple method for novice users, but they should need some knowledge of root causes in order to
know whether they have reached the appropriate level of detail in their analysis.
The method is often used by drawing a timeline on a large sheet of paper stuck onto a meeting room
wall. The team can then trace back the events leading up to the incident and write on the reasons
that they believe each event occurred (or use yellow 'stick on notes' to make changes more easily).

Information freely available on the Internet for example
http://www.isixsigma.com/library/content/c020610a.asp
Page 55
B28. WHY TREE
Why Tree analysis is a means of assembling information on an incident in a logic diagram. It is

sometimes known as 'Causal Factors Tree Analysis'. The diagram looks like a fault tree but is a means
of structuring information about a problem. A tree is illustrated in Figure B10 and shows how a
person was injured at work. Below this event, the four main causes are shown. Each cause should
be necessary or sufficient for the event to happen; otherwise they do not belong in the diagram.
Below the events boxes, key factors are shown. Again, these should be necessary or sufficient to have
caused the event above. Finally, corrective actions are determined and shown on the diagram against
the factor they are intended to address. This is not, in this form, a root cause analysis method as
there are unanswered questions as to why the conditions noted existed.
WHY TREE ANALYSIS

Crew member injury;
finger laceration
Crew member lacerated finger
in the engine room
Communication Crew member didn't Crew member was Finger struck by piece Intentionally put
was inadequate follow instructions cleaning generator of rotating machinery finger in machinery
containment
C/E verbally provided

specific instructions for Routine PMS on unit is Unit #2 (Aft Unit) in Finger struck by
crew member to clean He was cleaning a to clean containment normal operating mode machinery in
the forward unit. Crew generator unit other and started by engineer unguarded area
member was injured than the unit
cleaning the after unit.
JHA identified cleaning
the forward #1 unit. Unit #1 tagged out Unguarded area
Ambitious to get more
for cleaning. Unit #2 unattended under
work done, hard worker
in normal operating normal operations
Contain dirty drains other mode no

Crew member acknowledged the units from engineroom during work scheduled
orders to clean the unit but there normal operations and requires
was no confirmation of periodic cleaning
understanding
Managing ambitious
workers
Engineer to make Improve training
Develop better on machine
means to ensure visual check of
generator pre-start guarding
instructions are and situational
understood up
awareness
Provide more
direction and
improve
communication
Why tree symbols
Hypothesis or Untested or not fully Hypotheses that are Corrective

observation proven hypothesis unproven Key factor action
Figure B10: Why tree diagram

Nelms, RC (1996). The Go Book. ISBN 1886118205
http://www.failsafe-network.com/
Page 56
FURTHER METHODS:
Some further methods cited in the literature are also briefly described. They are not in Annex B as
they did not seem to be mainstream techniques used by petroleum or allied industry users. They do
seem to have the potential for application in these industries however (see below):
CALM – Combined Accident anaLysis Method

A combination of SOL and simplified Why Because Analysis. The method helps the analyst to
develop: a situational description; a list of facts – which are then organised into - Event Building
Blocks (EBBs) and from those, it is possible to build a Time-Actor Diagram (TAD) – i.e. a timeline. A
checklist of factors then helps the analyst to identify 'active failures' and 'latent conditions' and the
analyst then builds the EBBs in to a Why-Because graph to determine causes.
For further information see:

Blackett, C. (2005). PhD Thesis, Combining accident analysis techniques for organisational safety.
National University of Ireland, Faculty of Science, School of Computer Science and Informatics. Dublin
http://www.claireblackett.com/papers/ISSC05.pdf
ISIM Integrated Safety Investigation Method

ISIM is the method that inspectors in the Transportation Safety Board of Canada use to investigate
accidents. It is a software tool based on Reason’s 'Swiss cheese' model and the 'SHELL' model. SHELL
is an acronym to remind the user that incidents originate in the interaction between 'Liveware'
(people), 'Software' (including manuals etc), 'Hardware' (tools and equipment), 'Environment' and
other 'Liveware'.
PROACT®
PROACT® is a software package that allows the user to identify the root causes of incidents. It assists
the user in building a logic tree (akin to a fault tree) to assemble and analyse the information
collected. Causes of incidents are described in terms of '5Ps': parts - items that failed in the incident;
position – taking photographs of the scene; paper – manuals, and other relevant material such as
inspection reports, job safety analyses etc; people – those involved in the incident or present when
it occurred; paradigms – 'mind-set' or false beliefs about any aspect of the job.
SACA – Systematic Accident Cause Analysis

Used to generate statistics on causes of incidents. Based on the UK Health and Safety at Work Act
as a means of determining responsibility for remedial action. Includes checklists of causes:
— persons;
— equipment;
— place of work;
— systems of work, and
— outside local control.
Each of these is divided into sub-categories.

Waldram I, (1988), What really causes accidents?, The Safety Practitioner
Health and Safety Executive (2001). Root causes analysis: Literature review. Contract Research Report
325/2001. HSE Books. ISBN 0 7176 1966 4
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/crr_pdf/2001/crr01325.pdf
STAMP Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling and Process

STAMP is a method that requires the analyst to model the system that people work within and then
determine how various identified hazards affect the system. Incidents result from failings in the
Page 57
system.
This method differs from the timeline-based methods: it could be difficult to use and to ensure
that the model developed is complete. STAMP can be used proactively to analyse potential system
weaknesses by examining how the system would react in various scenarios.

Blackett, C. (2005). PhD Thesis, Combining accident analysis techniques for organisational
safety. National University of Ireland, Faculty of Science, School of Computer Science and Informatics.
Dublin
TOR – Technique of Operations Review

A method that provides worksheets allowing a group or individual to investigate the root causes of
accidents. The worksheets probe the following elements: training, responsibility, decision and
direction, supervision, work groups, control, personality traits, and, management.

Waldram I, (1988), What really causes accidents?, The Safety Practitioner
Health and Safety Executive (2001). Root causes analysis: Literature review. Contract Research Report
325/2001. HSE Books. ISBN 0 7176 1966 4
Page 58
ANNEX C
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
C1 REFERENCES
[1] Buys, R.J. and Clark, J.L. (1978). Events and causal factors charting. DOE 76-45/14, (SSDC-14)
Revision 1. Idaho Falls, ID: System Safety Development Center, Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory.
[2] Health and Safety Executive (1997). Successful health and safety management. HSG65. HSE
Books, Sudbury, Suffolk. ISBN 0 7176 1276 7
[3] Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (2001) POST Note 156
(www.parliament.uk/post/pn156.pdf) quoting Feyer, A.M. and Shouldiamson, A.M. (1998):
Human factors in accident modelling. In: Stellman, J.M. (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Occupational
Health and Safety, Fourth Edition. Geneva: International Labour Organisation
[4] Baker, CC and Seah, AK(2004). Maritime accidents and human performance: the statistical trail.
American Bureau of Shipping. Presented at MARTECH 2004, Singapore, 22-24 September, 2004
[5] Energy Institute (2003). Human factors briefing notes.
http://www.energyinst.org.uk/humanfactors/bn
[6] Health and Safety Executive (2004). Managing human performance – briefing notes.
http://www.hse.gov.uk/humanfactors/comah/briefingnotes.htm
[7] Health and Safety Executive (1999). Reducing error and influencing behaviour. HSG48. 2nd
Edition. HSE Books, Sudbury, Suffolk. ISBN 0 7176 2452 8
[8] IAEA (1991). Safety Culture: A report by the international nuclear safety advisory group. Safety
Series No 75-INSAG 41991. IAEA, Vienna.
[9] SI No. 205/3117 The Offshore Installations (safety case) Regulations 2005, ISBN 0110736109.
The Stationery Office.
[10] Reason, J (1990). Human error. New York: Cambridge University Press.
[11] Health and Safety Executive (2005). Investigating accidents and incidents. HSG245. HSE Books.
ISBN 0 7176 2827 2 (http://www.hsebooks.com)Health and Safety Executive (1997).
[12] Successful health and safety management. HSG65. HSE Books, Sudbury, Suffolk.
ISBN 0 7176 1276 7
The key references used in order to develop this publication are cited below. Detailed information
on most of the incident/accident investigation methods can be found in these references.
Source material for the methods described in Annex B may be found alongside each item in
Annex B.
— American Institute of Chemical Engineers (2003). Investigating chemical process incidents. 2nd
Edition. AIChemE, Park Avenue, New York 10016-5991. ISBN 0-8169-0897-4
— American Bureau of Shipping (2005). Guidance notes on the investigation of marine accidents.
ABS, Houston.
— Blackett, C. (2005). PhD Thesis, Combining accident analysis techniques for organisational safety.
National University of Ireland, Faculty of Science, School of Computer Science and Informatics.
Dublin. http://www.claireblackett.com/papers/ISSC05.pdf
— Health and Safety Executive (2001). Root causes analysis: Literature review. Contract Research
Report 325/2001. HSE Books. ISBN 0 7176 1966 4
— Johnson, CW (2003). Failure in safety-critical systems: a handbook of accident and incident
reporting. University of Glasgow Press, Glasgow, Scotland. ISBN 0-85261-784-4
http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/johnson/book/
Page 59
— Johnson, CW (2002) Ed.. Workshop on the investigation and reporting of incidents and accidents
(IRIA 2002). Department of Computing Science. University of Glasgow.
— Rail Safety and Standards Board (2004). Technical Report 09/T122/ENGE/003/TRT. Data to be
collected for investigations of railway accidents. RSSB, London.
C2 BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following websites were also consulted in the preparation of this publication but are not
specifically referenced:
— Australian Transport Safety Bureau. http://www.atsb.gov.au/

— Failsafe Network Inc. http://www.failsafe-network.com/index.htm
— Federal Aviation Administration. http://www.faa.gov/
— Major Accidents Hazards Bureau. http://mahbsrv.jrc.it/
— Marine Accident Investigation Branch. http://www.maib.dft.gov.uk/home/index.cfm
— National Transportation Safety Board. http://www.ntsb.gov/
— Rail Accident Investigation Branch. http://www.raib.gov.uk/home/index.cfm
— Root Cause Live. http://www.rootcauselive.com/
Page 60
ANNEX D
GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS
accident: any unplanned event that results in injury or ill-health to people, or damages equipment,
property or materials but where there was a risk of harm.
active failure: a human error or violation the effects of which become evident almost immediately.
barrier: any measure taken to protect people or property from hazards, including physical guards
but also administrative measures such as rules and procedures. Sometimes referred to as safeguards,
defences or risk control systems.
circumvention: see violation.
cognitive error: see mistake.
hazard: anything with the potential for human injury or adverse health, damage to assets or
environmental impact. See risk and risk assessment.
HPLC (event): high probability, low consequence (event). Also see LPHC.
human error: system failures attributable to people but not including violations.
human failure: a term used to collectively refer to both errors and violations.
human-machine system: a system in which technology and human beings have specific functions
but work together towards common goals.
immediate cause (of an incident): the most obvious reason why the incident occurred e.g. the
guard is missing, the employee slips etc. There may be several immediate causes identified in one
adverse event.
incident: an unplanned or uncontrolled event or sequence of events that has the potential to cause
injury, ill-health or damage. Also referred to as a near miss.
lapse: when a person forgets to do something due to a failure of attention/concentration or

memory.
latent failure (or latent error): a human error or violation whose effects can lie dormant in a
system for a long time.
LPHC (event): low probability, high consequence (event).
major accident hazard: hazards with the potential for major accident consequences, e.g. ship
collisions, dropped objects, helicopter crashes as well as process safety hazards. Major accidents are
potentially catastrophic and can result in multiple injuries and fatalities, as well as substantial
economic, property, and environmental damage.
mistake (synonymous with 'cognitive error'): when a person does what they meant to do, but
should have done something else. This is not necessarily a violation but part of the action taken could
Page 61
involve rule-breaking or similar non-compliances.
near miss: see incident.
non-compliance: see violation.
occupational safety hazard: personal or occupational safety hazards give rise to incidents – such
as slips, falls, and vehicle accidents – that primarily affect one individual worker for each occurrence
(noting, of course, that they could affect many people). They contrast with process safety hazards
and major accident hazards in that the latter have the potential to affect a very large number of
people including those off-site.
performance shaping factor (PSF): any factor that can affect human performance; PSFs can exert
a positive or negative influence.
personal safety hazards: see occupational safety hazard.
POPMAR: policy, organising planning measuring (performance) auditing and reviewing

(performance) – the SMS model used in HSE’s Successful health and safety management.
process safety hazards: hazards that can give rise to major accidents involving the unplanned
release of potentially dangerous substances, pressure, energy (such as fires and explosions) etc.
risk: the level of risk is determined from a combination of the likelihood of a specific undesirable
event occurring and the severity of the consequences (i.e. how often is it likely to happen, how many
people could be affected and how bad would the likely injuries or ill health effects be?).
The likelihood of human injury or adverse health, damage to assets or environmental impact
from a specified hazard. Note that other risk definitions include a reference to the severity of the
consequences – injury, damage etc. See hazard and risk assessment.
risk assessment: the process of assessing the risk of exposure to a particular hazard in a specified
activity. See hazards and risk.
root cause (of an incident): an initiating event or failing from which all other causes or failings
spring. Root causes are generally management, planning or organisational failings.
safety critical system: any part of an installation whose failure could contribute substantially to a
major accident or whose purpose is to prevent or limit the effects of such accidents.
slip: when a person does something but not what they meant to do.
SMART: specific, measurable, achievable (and assigned to someone), relevant and timebound (with
a specific deadline for completion).
SMS: safety management system.
underlying cause (of an incident): the less obvious 'system' or 'organisational' reason for an
incident e.g. pre-start-up machine checks are not carried out, the hazard has not been adequately
considered via a suitable and sufficient risk assessment, production pressures too great etc.
violation (synonymous with 'circumvention'): a type of human failure when a person decided
to act without complying with a known rule, procedure or good practice. The word may have
Page 62
connotations of wrongdoing and alternatives such as non-compliance or circumvention are also used.
Note: organisations differ widely in their use of some of the above terms, for example, the words
'incident' and 'accident' are often used to mean the same type of event. The above definitions are
used in this publication.
Note: that for the purposes of brevity, where the word 'incident' is used on its own, unless otherwise
stated, it should be taken to refer to an incident or an accident.
Page 63

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GUIDANCE ON INVESTIGATING AND ANALYSING HUMAN AND

ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS ASPECTS OF INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS

For further information, please visit http://www.energyinst.org.uk

BG Group Maersk Oil North Sea UK Limited

Copyright © 2008 by the Energy Institute, London:

ISBN 978 0 85293 521 7

Published by the Energy Institute

Further copies can be obtained from

Electronic access to EI and IP publications is available via our website, www.energyinstpubs.org.uk.

1 Introduction, scope and application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2 Human factors, safety management and safety culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

3 Lifecycle of an incident or accident investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

4 Key factors influencing human failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Annex A Selecting an appropriate method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

This publication is aimed at anyone who is involved in an incident/accident investigation or analysis

Fiona Brindley Health and Safety Executive

Dr Kathryn Mearns Aberdeen University

Tjerk van der Schaaf Technical University Eindhoven

1 INTRODUCTION, SCOPE AND APPLICATION

1.1.1 Making the most of incidents and accidents

— Incidents often arise because of a highly unusual combination of underlying

1.1.2 The importance of investigating incidents and accidents

1.1.3 Human failure in incidents and accidents

1.1.4 A human failure case study

Human error caused blackout, says Transco

What should the company’s reaction be to this event?

In other words, there was a problem in the documentation/procedures used.

1.1.5 Incident causes and solutions

Table 1: Example incident investigations

Incident Cause of human Proposed solution Comment

Table 2: Levels of analysis of an investigation

Poor Analysis Better

1.2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

2 HUMAN FACTORS, SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY

2.1 AN OVERVIEW OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

2.2 HUMAN FAILURE TYPES

To make sense of the information gathered in an incident investigation and in particular, to

Table 3: Key human factors topics

Topic Brief definition Example issues

Error type Description Examples Potential error recovery mechanisms

As well as errors, personnel can also commit violations:

Error type Description Examples Potential error recovery mechanisms

In general, errors of the above types result in either:

An error of omission Something is not done that needs to be done

2.3 A USEFUL FAILURE MODEL

Table 5: Origins of incidents and accidents

Organisational Latent Psychological Unsafe/sub- Operational Accident Consequences

Working from right to left in Table 5:

Accident: the event itself.

Figure 1: 'Swiss cheese' model

2.5 THE 'JUST' CULTURE – WORKFORCE AND MANAGEMENT

2.6 INFORMATION PROCESSING

Several human factors-oriented incident investigation methods are based on models of

Input – Processing – Output

3 LIFECYCLE OF AN INCIDENT OR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

When an incident or accident is detected, it should be formally reported and recorded.

Various investigation methods may be deployed. HSE Investigating Accidents and

Management should be committed to the investigation process and the organisation as a

3.3 MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS

It should be ensured that the team making recommendations has an understanding of

3.4 ASSIGNING, TRACKING AND CLOSING OUT ACTIONS

3.5 SHARING INFORMATION

4 KEY FACTORS INFLUENCING HUMAN FAILURE