Layugan vs.

IAC; Torts- vicarious liability of owner of a truck the court that in the selection and in the supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability for the incident, the
7/15/2013 private respondent stresses that the negligence of his employee has already been adequately overcome by his
driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used to instruct him to
0 Comments be careful in driving.

We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it is clear that the driver did
not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he
G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988 did he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have repaired it
and thus the accident could have been avoided. Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the private respondent
Facts:
used to intruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that while at Baretbet, Bagabag,
Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along record of any accident, as found by the respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence
the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial. The private respondent or his mechanic, who
plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized where he incurred and will incur more expenses as must be competent, should have conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to
he recuperates from said injuries; Plaintiff's right leg was amputated and that because of said injuries he would be drive it.
deprived of a lifetime income.
To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro [owner] and Serrano [driver] averred that he knows his
In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of a
responsibilities as a driver and further contends that it was the negligence of plaintiff that was the proximate
good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from solidary liability with
cause of the accident. They alleged that plaintiff parked his truck in a manner which occupied a part of the
his driver to the petitioner. But even if we concede that the diligence of a good father of a family was observed
highway and he did not even put a warning sign.
by Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record of the observance by Isidro
of the same quantum of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would be directly in charge in
Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against his insurer, the Travellers Multi
maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. There is paucity of proof that Isidro
Indemnity Corporation; that the third-party plaintiff [Isidro], without admitting his liability to the plaintiff, claimed
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the
that the third-party defendant [Travellers] is liable to the former for contribution, indemnity and subrogation by
selection of his mechanic, if any, in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to
virtue of their insurance contract which covers the insurer's liability for damages arising from death, bodily
others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil
injuries and damage to property. The Insurance company argued that it is only liable for the amount agreed in
Code has not ceased.
the policy and the complaint was premature since no claim was made to it.
Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs CA
The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA reversed the decision, stating that it is the petitioners who
were negligent since they did not exercise caution by putting warning signs that their truck is park on the
Facts: On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose or "carbonera" of Plymouth
shoulder of the highway.
No. 12, a cargo train of the petitioner, when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. He and his companion
jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell on its side, caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He
Issue: was declared dead on the spot.
Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of Serrano.
Petitioner denied death and other benefits, and Famoso’s widow filed a suit in the RTC Baguio.
Ruling:
Yes!
RTC ruled in her favor but deducted 25% from the total damages awarded due to decedent’s contributory
negligence.
The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It was proven that the petitioner placed a
warning sign within 3 to 4 meters from their truck in the form of a lighted kerosene lamp. The existence of this
Widow and petitioner appealed; widow claimed that deductions were illegal, petitioner that it was not negligent
warning sings was corroborated by Serrano, respondent's driver, and further stated that when he saw a parked
and therefore not liable at all.
truck, he kept on stepping on the brake pedal but it did not function. Thus despite this warning signs, the truck
recklessly driven by Serrano and owned by Respondent Isidro bumped the truck of petitioner.
CA sustained RTC except as to deceased’s contributory negligence and disallowed the deductions protested by
the private respondent.
The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code. In the
latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption
of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or Petitioner contends that there is contributory negligence on the part of Famoso as he was not at his assigned
station when the train was derailed; that he would not have been injured if he had stayed in the front car rather
employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or both. Such presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de
than at the back; and that he had been killed because he chose to ride in the caboose
jure and consequently, may be rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DECEDENT CAN BE HELD GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE.
HELD: NO.
Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or omission amounting
to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring
with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause ofthe injury. “It has
been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must
be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard
of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body."
There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly
dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger.
Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment was caused by protruding rails which had come loose
as they were not connected and fixed in place by fishplates (which could only be removed thru the use of special
tools). The same fishplates could not be found at the scene of the accident.
SC applied the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur: the absence of the fish plates –whatever the case or reason-is by
itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner.
Petitioner is liable because it was lax in requiring its employees to exercise the necessary vigilance in maintaining
the rails in good condition to prevent the derailments that sometimes happened “every hour”.
Africa vs. Caltex, Boquiren and the CA G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966
FACTS:
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank
truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving truck where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted The fire then spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and
effects inside them. The owners of the houses, among them petitioners here, sued Caltex (owner of the station)
and Boquiren (agent in charge of operation).
Trial court and CA found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due
care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. Both courts refused to apply the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on the grounds that “as to its applicability xxx in the Philippines, there seems to be
nothing definite,” and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, “in the case at bar,
however, we find no practical use for such
docrtrine.”
ISSUE:
W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply as to
presume negligence on the part of the appellees.
RULE:
Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that “where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to
be under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in absence of explanation of defendant, that the incident happened because of want of care.
The aforesaid principle enunciated in Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. is applicable in this case. The
gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire
occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The person who knew or could have known
how the fire started were the appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever.
It is fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care. The report by the police
officer regarding the fire, as well as the statement of the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who was transferring
the contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out, strengthen the presumption of
negligence. Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy district and pedestrians often pass through or mill around the
premises; (2) the area is used as a car barn for around 10 taxicabs owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where people
hang out and possibly smoke cigarettes is located one meter from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) the
concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only 2 . meters high at most and
cannot prevent the flames from leaping over it in case of fire.
Decision REVERSED. Caltex liable.
Cebu Shipyard v William G.R. No. 132607. May 5, 1999
J. Purisima
Facts:
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. repaired marine vessels while the Prudential is in the non-life
insurance business. William Lines, Inc., the owner of M/V Manila City, a luxury passenger-cargo vessel, which
caught fire and sank. At the time of the incident, subject vessel was insured with Prudential for P45M for hull and
machinery. CSEW was insured for only Php 10 million for the shiprepairer’s liability policy. They entered into a
contract where negligence was the only factor that could make CSEW liable for damages. Moreover, liability of
CSEW was limited to only Php 1million for damages. The Hull Policy included an “Additional Perils
(INCHMAREE)” Clause covering loss of or damage to the vessel through the negligence of, among others, ship
repairmen.
William brought Manila City to the dry dock of CSEW for repairs. The officers and cabin crew stayed at the ship
while it was being repaired. After the vessel was transferred to the docking quay, it caught fire and sank,
resulting to its total loss.
William brought suit against CSEW alleging that it was through the latter’s negligence that the ship caught fire
and sank. Prudential was impleaded as co-plaintiff after it had paid the value of insured items. It was subrogated
to 45 million, or the value it claimed to indemnify.
The trial court brought judgment against CSEW 45 million for the ship indemnity, 65 million for loss of income,
and more than 13 million in other damages. The CA affirmed the TC decision.
CSEW contended that the cause of the fire was due to William’s hotworks on the said portion of the ship which
they didn’t ask CSEW permission for.
Prudential, on the other hand, blamed the negligence of the CSEW workers in the instance when they didn’t
mind rubber insulation wire coming out of the air-conditioning unit that was already burning.
Hence this MFR.
Issue:
1. WON CSEW had “management and supervisory control“ of the ship at the time the fire broke out
2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies against the crew
3. WON Prudential has the right of subrogation against its own insured
4. WON the provisions limiting CSEW’s liability for negligence to a maximum of Php 1 million are valid
Held: Yes. Yes. Yes. No. Petition denied.
Ratio:
1. The that factual findings by the CA are conclusive on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. They
are entitled to great weight and respect when the CA affirmed the factual findings arrived at by the trial court.
The CA and the Cebu RTC are agreed that the fire which caused the total loss of subject M/V Manila City was
due to the negligence of the employees and workers of CSEW.
Furthermore, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put into issue. Questions of fact
cannot be entertained.
2. For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the following conditions must concur: (1)
the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; and (2) that the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence.
The facts and evidence reveal the presence of these conditions. First, the fire would not have happened in the
ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligence had been exercised.
Second, the agency charged with negligence, as found by the trial court and the CA and as shown by the
records, is CSEW, which had control over subject vessel when it was docked for annual repairs.
What is more, in the present case the trial court found direct evidence to prove that the workers didn’t
exercise due diligencein the care of subject vessel. The direct evidence substantiates the conclusion that CSEW
was really negligent even without applying such doctrine.
3. Petitioner contends that Prudential is not entitled to be subrogated to the rights of William Lines, Inc.,
theorizing that (1) the fire which gutted M/V Manila City was an excluded risk and (2) it is a co-assured under
the Marine Hull Insurance Policy. This was wrong. The one who caused the fire has already been adjudicated by
the courts as CSEW.
Upon proof of payment by Prudential to William Lines, Inc., the former was subrogated to the right of the latter
to indemnification from CSEW. As aptly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the law says:
Art. 2207. If the plaintiff’s property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company
for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall
be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If
the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be
entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.
When Prudential paid the latter the total amount covered by its insurance policy, it was subrogated to the right
of the latter to recover the insured loss from the liable party, CSEW.
Petitioner theorizes further that there can be no right of subrogation as it is deemed a co-assured under the
subject insurance policy with reliance on Clause 20 of the Work Order which states:
20. The insurance on the vessel should be maintained by the customer and/or owner of the vessel during the
period the contract is in effect.
Clause 20 of the Work Order in question is clear in the sense that it requires William Lines to maintain
insurance on the vessel during the period of dry-docking or repair. However, the fact that CSEW benefits from
the said stipulation does not automatically make it as a co-assured of William Lines. The intention of the parties
to make each other a co-assured under an insurance policy is to be read from the insurance contract or policy
itself and not from any other contract or agreement because the insurance policy denominates the beneficiaries
of the insurance. The hull and machinery insurance procured by William Lines, Inc. from Prudential named only
“William Lines, Inc.” as the assured. There was no manifestation of any intention of William Lines, Inc. to
constitute CSEW as a co-assured under subject policy. The claim of CSEW that it is a co-assured is unfounded.
Then too, in the Additional Perils Clause of the same Marine Insurance Policy, it is provided that this insurance
also covers loss of or damage to vessel directly caused by the negligence of charterers and repairers who are
not assured.
As correctly pointed out by respondent Prudential, if CSEW were deemed a co-assured under the policy, it
would nullify any claim of William Lines, Inc. from Prudential for any loss or damage caused by the negligence of
CSEW. Certainly, no shipowner would agree to make a shiprepairer a co-assured under such insurance policy;
otherwise, any claim for loss or damage under the policy would be invalidated.  1988: Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. through its branch manager Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a

contract of lease of the first door beside the Matsushita office

4. Although in this jurisdiction, contracts of adhesion have been consistently upheld as valid per se; as binding as
an ordinary contract, the Court recognizes instances when reliance on such contracts cannot be favored  It was converted into a two door so he had a garage where he parked a company car 1981 model 4-door
especially where the facts and circumstances warrant that subject stipulations be disregarded. Thus, in ruling on
Ford Cortina which he used to supervise different towns
the validity and applicability of the stipulation limiting the liability of CSEW for negligence to P1M only, the facts
and circumstances vis-a-vis the nature of the provision sought to be enforced should be considered, bearing in  July 7, 1988: Pascual went to San Fernando, Pampanga leaving the car
mind the principles of equity and fair play.
 3 days later: When he returned and warmed up the car, it made an odd sound. On the second try, there
It is worthy to note that M/V Manila City was insured with Prudential for P45M. Upon thorough investigation by was again an odd sound and a small flames came out of its engine so he was startled, stopped the car, went
its hull surveyor, M/V Manila City was found to be beyond economical salvage and repair. The evaluation of the
average adjusteralso reported a constructive total loss. The said claim of William Lines, Inc., was then found to out and pushed it out of the garage
be valid and compensable such that Prudential paid the latter the total value of its insurance claim. Furthermore,  Soon, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and burned the whole garage where he was trapped so he
it was ascertained that the replacement cost of the vessel, amounts to P55M.
suffered burns in the face, legs and arms
Considering the circumstances, it would unfair to limit the liability of petitioner to One Million Pesos only. To  The spouses were busy atching TV when they heard 2 loud explosions, smelt of gasoline and fire burned all
allow CSEW to limit its liability to P1M notwithstanding the fact that the total loss suffered by the assured and
paid for by Prudential amounted to P45M would sanction the exercise of a degree of diligence short of what is their belongings
ordinarily required because, then, it would not be difficult for petitioner to escape liability by the simple
 city fire marshall investigated and concluded that the fire was accidental
expedient of paying an amount very much lower than the actual damage suffered by William.
 Spouses filed a complaint against Pascual for gross negligence and Perla for lacking the required diligence in

the selection and supervision of its employee.

Perla Compania De Seguros, Inc., Et Al. V. Sps. Gaudencio And Primitiva Sarangaya (2005)
 RTC: Pascual and Perla liable jointly and solidarily

 Pascual was held liable under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005
 CA: affirmed but modified the amount of damages

Lessons Applicable: Res Ipsa Loquitur (Torts and Damages) ISSUE:

1. W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable - YES

2. W/N Perla lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee. - NO

FACTS:

 1986: Spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and Primitiva Sarangaya erected Super A Building, a semi-concrete,

semi-narra, one-storey commercial building fronting the provincial road of Santiago, Isabela
HELD: DENIED
 It has three doors which were leased out

 The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second and third doors of the building

 On the left side of the commercial building stood the office of the Matsushita Electric Philippine

Corporation (Matsushita)
1. YES.
 Res ipsa loquitur  (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner -

 Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. Spouses had no access nor obligation for the maintenance

 It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s  (d) the person tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any course of conduct that

prima facie case aggravated the accident

 The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption 2. YES.

 facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of
 Perla did not include any rule or regulation that Pascual should have observed in performing his functions
negligence when direct evidence is lacking
 There was no guidelines for the maintenance and upkeep of company property like the vehicle that caught
 based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity
fire
of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in general
 Did not require periodic reports on or inventories of its properties
terms
 Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their
 plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish negligence
employees. The liability is imposed on all those who by their industry, profession or other enterprise have
 provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to
other persons in their service or supervision
explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of
 Nowhere does it state that the liability is limited to employers in the transportation business.
 defendant’s responsibility to show that there was no negligence on his part Labels: 2005, Case Digest, G.R. No. 147746, Juris Doctor, October 25, Perla Compania De Seguros v Sps Gaudencio, Res
Ipsa Loquitur, res ipso loquitor, torts and damages, torts and damages case digest
 Requisites of Res Ipsa Loquitur

 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent

 “Ordinary” refers to the usual course of events

 Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does

an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved.

 Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked -

negligence

 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and

 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the Topic: /Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision of the affirming the DecisionÏ‚rνll

person injured. of RTC of Makati City in Civil Case, dismissing for lack of merit Dr. Genevieve L. Huang’s Complaint for

 When there is caso fortuito: Damages. Assailed as well is the Court of Appeals Resolutiondenying for lack of merit petitioners Motion for

 (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was independent of the human will Reconsideration. 05. DR. HUANG v. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC. G.R. No. 180440; December 5, 2012

 human agency must be entirely excluded as the proximate cause or contributory cause of the injury or Second Division FACTS: A Complaint for Damages was filed by Dr. Huang against Dusit Hotel alleging

loss -Not because car not maintained negligence of t Hotel’s staff, in the untimely putting out all the lights within the hotel’s swimming pool area as

 (b) it was impossible to foresee the event which constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it well as the locking of the main entrance door of the area, prompting petitioner to grope for a way out. While

was impossible to avoid - NOT under the control of pascual doing so, a folding wooden counter top, which she lifted as she reached for a hotel phone, fell on her head

causing her serious brain injury. The trial court ruled that Huang’s own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of her injury, she cannot recover damages. Huang elevated the matter to the CA which
 As there was no adverse reaction, Dr. Blanes administered 500 mg of the antibiotic. Another dose was
affirmed the decision of trial court. Huang on Appeal contended that an implied contract existed between them
given 3 hours later.
in view of the fact that the hotel guest status extends to all those who avail of its service sits patrons and

invitees. It follows then that all those who patronize the hotel and its facilities, including those who are invited to  Subsequently, Jorge Reyes developed high fever and experienced vomiting and convulsions. He then

partake of those facilities, like her, are generally regarded as guests of the hotel. As such, Dusit Hotel is
turned blue due to deficiency in oxygen – cyanosis – and died. The cause of death was stated to be
responsible by implied contract for the safety and welfare of Huang while the latter was inside their premises by
“ventricular arrhythmia secondary to hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.”
exercising due care, which they failed to do. She argues that a person who goes in a hotel without a "bukol" or

hematoma and comes out of it with a "bukol" or hematoma is a clear case of res ipsa loquitur. ISSUE: 1.  The heirs of Reyes filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against Sisters of Mercy, Sister Rose

Whether or not the complaint is one for violation of an Implied Contract so that res ipsa loquitur is applicable in Palacio, Dr. Blanes, Dr. Rico and Mercy Community Clinic contending that the death of Jorge was due to
this case? 2. Whether or not respondents are liable for the injury sustained by the petitioner based on the
the wrongful administration of chloromycetin. (NOTE: Petitioner’s action is for medical malpractice.)
theory of quasi-delict? Ruling: 1. No. The allegations in Huang’s Complaint constitute a cause of action for quasi-

delict, which under the New Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes damage to another, there  RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Hence, this appeal.

being fault or negligence. 2. Huang utterly failed to prove the alleged negligence of Dusit Hotel. Her own  Petitioners contend that:
Complaint affirmed that Dusit Hotel afforded medical assistance to her after she met the unfortunate accident
 Dr. Marlyn Rico hastily and erroneously relied upon the Widal test, diagnosed Jorge’s illness as
inside the hotel’s swimming pool facility. It was established that petitioner stayed in the hotel’s swimming pool

facility beyond its closing hours; she lifted the folding counter top that eventually hit her head; and Dusi Hotelt typhoid fever, and immediately prescribed the administration of the antibiotic chloromycetin

extended medical assistance to her. As such, no negligence can be attributed to the respondents or to their staff.  Dr. Marvie Blanes erred in ordering the administration of the second dose of 500 milligrams of

Reyes Vs. Sisters Of Mercy

chloromycetin barely 3 hours after the first was given.
Socialize Us
 Testimony presented: That of Dr. Apolinar Vacalares, (Chief Pathologist of the Northern Mindanao
Facts:
Training Hospital) who performed an autopsy on the body – Dr. Vacalares testified that Reyes did not

 Jorge Reyes has been suffering from recurring fever with chills for around days.
die of typhoid fever but of shock undetermined, which could be due to allergic reaction or

 Home medication afforded him no relief so he went to Mercy Community Clinic. He was then attended
chloromycetin overdose.

by Dr. Marlyn Rico.

 Since typhoid fever was common at that time, the Widal test was performed and he was found positive

for typhoid.

 Thereafter, Dr. Marlyn Rico indorse Jorge Reyes to Dr. Marvie Blanes.

 Suspecting that that Jorge had typhoid fever, Dr. Marvie Blanes ordered that Jorge be tested for Issue: WON there was medical malpractice. NO

compatibility with chloromycetin, an antibiotic. Such test was conducted by Nurse Pagente.
 impression would also be that the patient was suffering from typhoid fever. As to the treatment of the disease,

he stated that chloromycetin was the drug of choice. He also explained that despite the measures taken by
Held:
respondent doctors and the intravenous administration of two doses of chloromycetin, complications of the

disease could not be discounted.

Dr. Apolinar Vacalares is not a specialist of typhoid fever and he is thus not qualified to prove that

Dr. Marlyn Rico erred in her diagnosis.

Respondents also presented the testimony of Dr. Ibarra T. Panopio who is a member of the Philippine and

While petitioners presented Dr. Apolinar Vacalares as an expert witness, we do not find him to be so as he is American Board of Pathology, an examiner of the Philippine Board of Pathology, and chief pathologist at the

not a specialist on infectious diseases like typhoid fever. Furthermore, although he may have had extensive MetroCebu Community Hospital, Perpetual Succor Hospital, and the Andres Soriano Jr. Memorial Medical

experience in performing autopsies, he admitted that he had yet to do one on the body of a typhoid victim at Center.

the time he conducted the postmortem on Jorge Reyes. It is also plain from his testimony that he has treated

only about three cases of typhoid fever.

He stated that, as a clinical pathologist, he recognized that the Widal test is used for typhoid patients, although

he did not encourage its use because a single test would only give a presumption necessitating that the test be

The two doctors presented by respondents clearly were experts on the subject repeated, becoming more conclusive at the second and third weeks of the disease.

They vouched for the correctness of Dr. Marlyn Rico’s diagnosis. Dr. Peter Gotiong, a diplomate whose

specialization is infectious diseases and microbiology and an associate professor at the Southwestern University
He corroborated Dr. Gotiong’s testimony that the danger with typhoid fever is really the possible complications
College of Medicine and the Gullas College of Medicine, testified that he has already treated over a thousand
which could develop like perforation, hemorrhage, as well as liver and cerebral complications.
cases of typhoid fever.

Dr. Rico was not negligent in administering the 2 doses of 500 g of chloromycetin
According to him, when a case of typhoid fever is suspected, the Widal test is normally used, and if the 1:320

results of the Widal test on Jorge Reyes had been presented to him along with the patient’s history, his
The chloromycetin was likewise a proper prescription is best established by medical authority. Even if the There are thus four elements involved in medical negligence cases, namely: duty, breach, injury,

deceased suffered from an anaphylactic shock, this, of itself, would not yet establish the negligence of the and proximate causation

appellee-physicians for all that the law requires of them is that they perform the standard tests and perform
Petitioner’s action is for medical malpractice. This is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure
standard procedures. The law cannot require them to predict every possible reaction to all drugs administered.
of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily

employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances.

The practice of medicine requires the highest degree of diligence

The practice of medicine is a profession engaged in only by qualified individuals. It is a right earned through years In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to

of education, training, and by first obtaining a license from the state through professional board examinations. do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done, or that he or she did

Such license may, at any time and for cause, be revoked by the government. In addition to state regulation, the something that a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or action

conduct of doctors is also strictly governed by the Hippocratic Oath, an ancient code of discipline and ethical caused injury to the patient.

rules which doctors have imposed upon themselves in recognition and acceptance of their great responsibility to

society. Given these safeguards, there is no need to expressly require of doctors the observance of

“extraordinary” diligence. The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor is not applicable in this case.

As it is now, the practice of medicine is already conditioned upon the highest degree of diligence. And, as we Was there a physician-patient relationship between the respondent doctors and Jorge Reyes? Yes.

have already noted, the standard contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable average merit among
Respondents were thus duty-bound to use at least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor
ordinarily good physicians. That is reasonable diligence for doctors or, as the Court of Appeals called it, the
would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is breach of this duty which constitutes
reasonable “skill and competence . . . that a physician in the same or similar locality . . . should apply.”
actionable malpractice.
As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach

thereof, expert testimony is essential. Inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are
There is nothing unusual about the death of Jorge Reyes (absence of 1st requisite that the
determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent)
necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.

In this case, while it is true that the patient died just a few hours after professional medical assistance was

rendered, there is really nothing unusual or extraordinary about his death.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is not applicable in the case at bar

Though expert testimony is usually needed to prove malpractice, where common knowledge and experience
Prior to his admission, the patient already had recurring fevers and chills for five days unrelieved by the analgesic,
teach that the injury would not have occurred if due care had been exercised, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
antipyretic, and antibiotics given him by his wife. This shows that he had been suffering from a serious illness and
can be invoked to establish negligence.
professional medical help came too late for him.

Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon
It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or
proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of
a surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not
common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience
required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific
teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference
treatment did not produce the desired result.
of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical

evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred.

When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or
omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant
without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care.
Alfredo Mallari, Sr. and Alfredo Mallari, Jr. v. CA and Bulletin Publishing Corp.
G.R. No. 128607 January 31, 2000
Bellossillo, J.
FACTS:
 The passenger jeepney driven by Mallari Jr. and owned by Mallari Sr. collided with the delivery van of Bulletin
along the National Highway in Brgy. San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan. Mallari Jr. testified that he went to the left
lane of the highway and overtook a Fiera which had stopped on the right lane. Before he passed by the Fiera,
 he saw the van of Bulletin coming from the opposite direction. It was driven by one Felix Angeles. The
collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the highway. The impact
caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom
was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries.
 Claudia Reyes, the widow of Israel Reyes, filed a complaint for damages against Mallari Sr. and Mallari Jr., and
also against Bulletin, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands Insurance Co. The complaint alleged
that the collision which resulted in the death of Israel was caused by the fault and negligence of both drivers
of the passenger jeepney and the Bulletin Isuzu delivery van.
ISSUE: WON Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. are liable for the death of Israel
HELD: Yes.
 The collision occurred immediately after Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it while traversing a curve
on the highway. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as
amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code. A driver abandoning his proper
lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the
road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or
rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not
have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching
from the opposite direction comes into view.
 Mallari Jr. already saw that the Bulletin delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and failing to
consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning mindlessly occupied the left
lane and overtook 2 vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the
collision resulting in the death of Israel was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, Mallari
Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules.
Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving
a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. Mallaris
failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.
 The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding against Mallari Sr., who
admittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier, considering the fact that in
an action based on contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on
the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment of damages sought by the passenger.
(See Arts. 1755, 1756 and 1759 for the rationale of common carrier’s liability.)
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC.,
- versus -
UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC.
G.R. No. 162267
(July 4, 2008)
FACTS:
A Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by UCPB, insured with UCPB General Insurance Co., was traversing the Laurel
Highway, Barangay Balintawak, LipaCity. It was driven by Flaviano Isaac with Conrado Geronimo (Asst. Manager of said bank), was
hit and bumped by an 18-wheeler Fuso Tanker Truck, owned by defendants-appellants PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. allegedly leased to
and operated by defendant-appellant Superior Gas & Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO) and driven by its employee, defendant
appellant Renato Gonzaga. The impact caused heavy damage to the Mitsubishi Lancer car resulting in an explosion of the rear part of
the car. The driver and passenger suffered physical injuries. However, the driver defendant-appellant Gonzaga continued on its way
to its destination and did not bother to bring his victims to the hospital.
As the 18-wheeler truck is registered under the name of PCI Leasing, repeated demands were made by plaintiff-
appellee for the payment of the aforesaid amounts. However, no payment was made. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., (petitioner)
interposed the defense that it could not be held liable for the collision, since the driver, Gonzaga, was not its employee, but that of its
co-defendant SUGECO. In fact, it was SUGECO, that was the actual operator of the truck, pursuant to a Contract of Lease signed
by petitioner and SUGECO. Petitioner, however, admitted that it was the owner of the truck in question. RTC rendered judgment
in favour of UCPB General Insurance and ordered PCI Leasing and Gonzaga, to pay jointly and severally the former. CA affirmed
with the lower court’s decision.
ISSUES:
1) Whether petitioner, as registered owner of a motor vehicle that figured in a quasi-delict may be held liable, jointly and severally,
with the driver thereof, for the damages caused to third parties.
2) Whether petitioner, as a financing company, is absolved from liability by the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8556, or the
Financing Company Act of 1998.
RULING:
1) YES. The principle of holding the registered owner of a vehicle liable for quasi-delicts resulting from its use is well-established in
jurisprudence. As explained in the case of Erezo v. Jepte, thus:
Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is
transferred, as in land registration cases, because the administrative proceeding of registration does not
bear any essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael and Verdaguer,
39 Phil. 888), but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway (section 5 [a], Act
No. 3992, as amended.) The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous
where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles
without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to
forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle
registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages
or injuries caused on public highways.
2) NO. The new law, R.A. No. 8556, notwithstanding developments in foreign jurisdictions, do not supersede or repeal the law on
compulsory motor vehicle registration. No part of the law expressly repeals Section 5(a) and (e) of R.A. No. 4136, as amended,
otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Thus, the rule remains the same: a sale, lease, or financial lease, for
that matter, that is not registered with the Land Transportation Office, still does not bind third persons who are aggrieved
in tortious incidents, for the latter need only to rely on the public registration of a motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of
ownership. A lease such as the one involved in the instant case is an encumbrance in contemplation of law, which needs to be
registered in order for it to bind third parties. Under this policy, the evil sought to be avoided is the exacerbation of the suffering of
victims of tragic vehicular accidents in not being able to identify a guilty party. A contrary ruling will not serve the ends of justice. The
failure to register a lease, sale, transfer or encumbrance, should not benefit the parties responsible, to the prejudice of innocent
victims.
JONAS AÑONUEVO, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA,
respondent Tinga, J. FACTS Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing
the opposite lane was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s
brother. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred.
Villagracia sustained serious injuries and had to undergo four operations. Villagracia instituted an action for
damages against P&G Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint against
Añonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the
criminal charge. Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle
or install safety gadgets. He posits that Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by analogy. Article 2185. Unless
there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the
time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation. 1. W/N Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply

to non-motorized vehicles, making Villagracia presumptively negligent --> N There is pertinent basis for

segregating between motorized and non-motorized vehicles. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations

in physical exertion. is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same

time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or

collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its

relative greater bulk of mass, and greater combustibility due to the use of fuel. 2. W/N Villagracia was negligent

for failure to comply with traffic regulations --> N The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined

by the personal judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what would

be reckless or negligent. Añonuevo asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had transgressed traffic

regulations. However, Añonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn, and such negligent act was the

proximate cause of the accident. Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle

was not equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty

to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn. 3. W/N Villagracia is guilty of contributory negligence -->

N As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Añonuevo as solely responsible for the

accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the

same result would not have occurred even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment.