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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
Gaspar V. Tagalo for private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products.
Today is Friday, August 27, 2010
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NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY EMPLOYEES UNION, ITS OFFICERS
AND MEMBERS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB CARUNCHO,
COMMANDING OFFICER, ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC, AFP, and ZAMBOANGA WOOD
PRODUCTS, respondents.
This Court is confronted once again with the question of whether or not it is a court or a labor arbiter
that can pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer, here private respondent Zamboanga Wood
Products. Respondent Judge Carlito A. Eisma 1 then of the Court of First Instance, now of the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga City, was of the view that it is a court and denied a motion to dismiss filed by
petitioners National Federation of labor and Zambowood Monthly Employees Union, its officers and
members. It was such an order dated July 20, 1982 that led to the filing of this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding. In the order assailed, it was required that the officers and members of petitioner union
appear before the court to show cause why a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued against
them and in the meanwhile such persons as well as any other persons acting under their command and
on their behalf were "temporarily restrained and ordered to desist and refrain from further obstructing,
impeding and impairing plaintiff's use of its property and free ingress to or egress from plaintiff's
Manufacturing Division facilities at Lumbayao, Zamboanga City and on its road right of way leading to
and from said plaintiff's facilities, pending the determination of the litigation, and unless a contrary order
is issued by this Court." 2
The record discloses that petitioner National Federation of Labor, on March 5, 1982, filed with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment, Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct
certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of
the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao, Zamboanga
City. 3 Such employees, on April 17, 1982 charged respondent firm before the same office of the Ministry
of Labor for underpayment of monthly living allowances. 4 Then came, on May 3, 1982, from petitioner
union, a notice of strike against private respondent, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca,
president of the said local union; unfair labor practice, non-payment of living allowances; and
"employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. 5 It was followed by
the union submitting the minutes of the declaration of strike, "including the ninety (90) ballots, of which
79 voted for yes and three voted for no." 6 The strike began on May 23, 1982. 7 On July 9, 1982, private
respondent Zambowood filed a complaint with respondent Judge against the officers and members of
petitioners union, for "damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order." 8 It was alleged that defendants, now petitioners, blockaded the road leading
to its manufacturing division, thus preventing customers and suppliers free ingress to or egress from
such premises. 9 Six days later, there was a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the
restraining order and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners.
It was contended that the acts complained of were incidents of picketing by defendants then on strike
against private respondent, and that therefore the exclusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, not to a court of first instance. 10 There was, as noted earlier, a
motion to dismiss, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.
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8/27/2010G.R. No. L-61236 Four days after such petition was filed, on August 3, 1982, this Court
required respondents to answer and set the plea for a preliminary injunction to be heard on Thursday,
August 5, 1982. 11 After such hearing, a temporary restraining order was issued, "directing respondent
Judge and the commanding officer in Zamboanga and his agents from enforcing the ex-parte order of
injunction dated July 20, 1982; and to restrain the respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of
the until otherwise case effective as of [that] date and continuing ordered by [the] Court. In the exercise
of the right to peaceful picketing, petitioner unions must abide strictly with Batas Pambansa Blg. 227,
specifically Section 6 thereof, amending Article 265 of the Labor Code, which now reads: '(e) No person
engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free
ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.'
" 12
On August 13, 1982, the answer of private respondent was filed sustaining the original jurisdiction of
respondent Judge and maintaining that the order complained of was not in excess of such jurisdiction, or
issued with grave abuse of discretion. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 13 on the other hand,
instead of filing an answer, submitted a Manifestation in lieu thereof. He met squarely the issue of
whether or not respondent Judge had jurisdiction, and answered in the negative. He (i)ncluded that "the
instant petition has merit and should be given due course."
He traced the changes undergone by the Labor Code, citing at the same time the decisions issued by this
Court after each of such changes. As pointed out, the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor
arbiters with jurisdictional. 14 So it was applied by this Court in Garcia v. Martinez 15 and in Bengzon v.
Inciong. 16 On May 1, 1978, however, Presidential Decree No. 1367 was issued, amending Article 217,
and provided "that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims
for moral and other forms of damages." 17 The ordinary courts were thus vested with jurisdiction to
award actual and moral damages in the case of illegal dismissal of employees. 18 That is not, as pointed
out by the Solicitor General, the end of the story, for on May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1691 was
issued, further amending Article 217, returning the original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, thus
enabling them to decide "3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or
underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or
appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits; [and] (5) All other claims arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly
excluded by tills Code." 19 An equally conclusive manifestation of the lack of jurisdiction of a court of
first instance then, a regional trial court now, is Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending Article 217 of the
Labor Code. It took effect on August 21, 1981. Subparagraph 2, paragraph (a) is now worded thus: "(2)
those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment." 20 This is to be
compared with the former phraseology "(2) unresolved issue in collective bargaining, including those
that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment." 21 It is to be noted
that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-
employee relations.
Nothing becomes clearer, therefore, than the meritorious character of this petition. certiorari and
prohibition lie, respondent Judge being devoid of jurisdiction to act on the matter.

1. Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is
therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a
regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law
when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. That was
squarely within the express terms of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated. So it has been
the constant ruling of this Court even prior to Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 22 a 1913 decision. The
ringing words of the ponencia of Justice Moreland still call for obedience. Thus, "The first and
fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come
only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." 23 It is
so even after the lapse of sixty years. 24
2. On the precise question at issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has spoken in three
decisions. They all reflect the utmost fidelity to the plain command of the law that it is a labor arbiter,
not a court, that ossesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from
picketing or a strike. In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez, 25 the issue was set forth in the opening
paragraph, in the ponencia of Justice Escolin: "This petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
raises anew the legal question often brought to this Court: Which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over
an action filed by an employee against his employer for recovery of unpaid salaries, separation benefits
and damages — the court of general jurisdiction or the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations
Commission [NLRC]?" 26 It was categorically held: "We rule that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive
jurisdiction over the case." 27 Then came this portion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over the subject
matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is
given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit
of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of
the forum, the issue before us should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute now in force. We find
that law in presidential Decree 1691
lawphil.net/…/gr_l61236_1984.html2/5
8/27/2010G.R. No. L-61236 which took effect on May 1, 1980, Section 3 of which reads as follows: ...
Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural: ... 3. All money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment
or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law
or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5. All other claims arising from employer-
employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code." 28 That same month, two other cases were
similarly decided, Ebon v. De Guzman 29 and Aguda v. Vallejos. 30
3. It is regrettable that the ruling in the above three decisions, decided in March of 1982, was not
followed by private respondent when it filed the complaint for damages on July 9, 1982, more than four
months later. 31 On this point, reference may be made to our decision in National Federation of Labor,
et al. v. The Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment, 32 promulgated on September 15, 1983. In
that case, the question involved was the failure of the same private respondent, Zamboanga Wood
Products, Inc., to admit the striking petitioners, eighty-one in number, back to work after an order of
Minister Blas F. Ople certifying to the National Labor Relations Commission the labor dispute for
compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. It was noted in
the first paragraph of our opinion in that case: "On the face of it, it seems difficult to explain why private
respondent would not comply with such order considering that the request for compulsory arbitration
came from it. It ignored this notification by the presidents of the labor unions involved to its resident
2
manager that the striking employees would lift their picket line and start returning to work on August 20,
1982. Then, too, Minister Ople denied a partial motion for reconsideration insofar as the return-to-work
aspect is concerned which reads: 'We find no merit in the said Motion for Reconsideration. The Labor
code, as amended, specifically Article 264 (g), mandates that whenever a labor dispute is certified by the
Minister of Labor and Employment to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory
arbitration and a strike has already taken place at the time of certification, "all striking employees shall
immediately return to work and the employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike." ' " 33 No valid distinction can
be made between the exercise of compulsory arbitration vested in the Ministry of Labor and the
jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass over claims for damages in the light of the express provision of the
Labor Code as set forth in Article 217. In both cases, it is the Ministry, not a court of justice, that is vested
by law with competence to act on the matter.
4. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made
clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor
arbiters. It can be affirmed that even if they were not that explicit, history has vindicated the view that in
the appraisal of what was referred to by Philippine American Management & Financing Co., Inc. v.
Management & Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co., Inc. 34
as "the rather thorny question as to where in labor matters the dividing line is to be drawn" 35 between
the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to
the former. Thus: "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks
clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on [an administrative agency]." 36 Certainly, the present
Labor Code is even more committed to the view that on policy grounds, and equally so in the interest of
greater promptness in the disposition of labor matters, a court is spared the often onerous task of
determining what essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that may be incurred by either
labor or management as a result of disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of July 20, 1982, issued by respondent Judge,
is nullified and set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted and respondent Judge, or whoever
acts in his behalf in the Regional Trial Court to which this case is assigned, is enjoin from taking any
further action on Civil Case No. 716 (2751), except for the purpose of dismissing it. The temporary
restraining order of August 5, 1982 is hereby made permanent.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.
De Castro, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-11555 January 6, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABINO SOLIMAN, defendant-appellant.
Francisco Sevilla for appellant. Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
CARSON, J. :
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
In the case of United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil. Rep., 241), we held as follows:
A question does arise, however, as to the penalty which should be impose upon the convict.
Today is Friday, July 30, 2010
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The evidence of record conclusively discloses that the defendant and appellant in this case, Gabino
Soliman, testifying in his on behalf in the course of another criminal case in which he, with several
others, was charged with estafa, swore falsely to certain material allegations of fact.
On that occasion he testified falsely that a sworn statement offered in evidence in support of the charge
of estafa, which was in effect an extrajudicial confession of his guilt, had not been executed voluntarily,
and that its execution had not been procured by the police by the use of force, intimidation and
prolonged torture.
The trial judge who presided in the former case acquitted the accused on the ground that there was
room for reasonable doubt as to whether the extrajudicial confession had been made voluntarily, and his
action in this regard clearly establishes the materiality of the false testimony submitted in that case;
moreover, the materiality of the evidence is manifest without considering the judgment in the case in
which it was submitted, since, if accepted as true, this false testimony necessarily had the effect of
rendering wholly incompetent the evidence as to the extrajudicial confession which otherwise would
almost conclusively sustain and necessitate a conviction. (U. S. vs. Estraña, 16 Phil. Rep., 520.)
There can be no doubt that the accused was guilty of the crime of perjury as defined and penalized in
section 3 of Act No. 1697 and that the sentence of six months' imprisonment and P300 fine imposed by
the trial judge was correctly imposed under the provisions of that statute.
It appears however that since judgment was entered in this case on November 23, 1915, section 3 of Act
No. 1697 has been expressly repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code, which became
effective on July 1, 1916, and it has been suggested that the judgment convicting and sentencing the
accused under the provisions of that statute should not be sustained, and that the repeal of the statute
should be held to have the effect of remitting and extinguishing the criminal responsibility of the accused
3
incurred under the provisions of the repealed law prior to the enactment of the Administrative Code. We
cannot agree with the proposition thus stated.
The rule of interpretation of English and American common law, by virtue of which the repeal of a law
prescribing penalties is held to have the effect of remitting or extinguishing any penalty, loss of rights or
responsibility incurred under such law, as to all persons who have not been convicted and sentenced
under the provisions of such law prior to the enactment of the repealing law, is not and has not been the
accepted doctrine in these Islands.
Where an Act of the Commission or of the Philippine Legislature which penalizes an offense, such repeal
does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence
offenders charged with violations of the old law prior to its repeal.
If the repealing statute provides or has the effect of providing new penalties for the commission of the
acts penalized under the repealed statute, should the penalty be imposed in accordance with the old or
the new lawphil.net/…/gr_l-11555_1917.html1/8
7/30/2010G.R. No. L-11555 statute?Article 1 of the Penal Code in force in these Islands defines crimes
and misdemeanors as voluntary acts or omissions penalized by law; and complementary to this
provision, article 21 provides that no crime or misdemeanor shall be punished with a penalty which has
not been prescribed by law prior to its commission. In accordance with these provisions the question
whether an act is punishable or not depends upon the question whether or not at the time of its
commission, there was a law in force which penalized it; this rule being modified, however, by article 22
of the same code, which provides that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor
persons convicted of a crime or misdemeanor.
The courts of Spain and the learned commentators on Spanish law have construed these provisions to
mean that such penal laws are to be given a retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the defendant
charged with a crime or a misdemeanor, and that, when a penal law is enacted repealing a prior law,
such repeal does not have the effect of relieving an offender in whole or in part of penalties already
incurred under the old law, unless the new law favors the defendant by diminishing the penalty or doing
away with it altogether, and then only to the extent to which the new law is favorable to the offender. In
other words, that the enactment of new penal laws, notwithstanding the fact that they contain general
repealing clauses, doe not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged
with violations of the old law prior to the date when the repealing law goes into effect, unless the new
law wholly fails to penalties the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed
law.
Thus Pacheco, commenting upon the new Penal Code of 1848-1850, of which article 506 provided that
all general penal laws were repealed by its publication, says:
At this time when the Penal Code is being put into effect and given force, we have in fact two criminal
laws in Spain, and close attention is necessary to apply them properly. There may be prosecutions which
it is necessary to dismiss, as, for example, those for sodomy; others which it may be necessary to decide
in conformity with the provisions of the new codes, as, for example, those for carrying concealed
weapons; and others which must be judged in accordance with the old provisions, as, for example. many
cases of robbery. The rules of procedure in one or other manner being furnished us by the former article
(article 19 of the Penal Code of Spain identical with article 21 of the Penal Code of the Philippines), and
the present article (article 20 of the Penal Code of Spain and article 22 of the Philippine Code). Has the

code increased the penalty? Then it is not applicable to crimes committed prior to its enactment. Has it
extinguished or diminished them? Then it is clearly applicable to them. (1 Pacheco, 296.)
And a similar construction was placed upon the provisions of the Penal Code of 1870 by the supreme
court of Spain. Article 626 of this code (which is substantially identical with article 506 of the Penal Code
of 1848 and article 611 of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands) repealed all general penal laws prior
to its promulgation, but the court held that, where a crime was committed prior to the publication of the
reformed code, the penalty prescribed by the code of 1850 (the code prior to that of 1870) being more
favorable to the accused, that must be applied. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, 17th of January,
1873.)
We conclude therefore that in any case in which a statute prescribing a penalty for the commission of a
specific offense is repealed, and in which the new statute provides new and distinct penalties for the
commission of such offense, the penalty which must be imposed on one who committed the offense
prior to the enactment of the repealing statute is that one which is more favorable to the convict. (U. S.
vs. Cuna, 12 Phil. Rep., 241.)
It seems important, then, to determine whether the repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the
enactment of the Administrative Code had the effect of providing new and distinct penalties for the
commission of the crime of perjury, and whether the new penalties are or are not more favorable to the
convict in the case at bar than those imposed by the trial judge.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697, which defined and penalized the crime of perjury, repealed the provisions of
the Penal Code defining and penalizing the crime of perjury, not expressly, but by implication, and we
are of opinion that the repeal of Act No. 1697 revived those provisions of the code. (U. S. vs. Concepcion,
13 Phil. Rep., 424; U. S. vs. Estraña, 16 Phil. Rep., 520.)
In the absence of the most express language to the contrary it will not be presumed that it was the
intention of the legislator to let false swearing as to a material matter in a court of justice go unpunished,
and such would be the effect of the repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697, unless we held that the repeal
had the effect of reviving the old statute.
At the common law the repeal of a repealing act revived the former act (6 Co., 199; 1 Gray, 163; 7 W. &
S., 263; 2 Blackstone, 32; 54 N. J. L. J., 175); and the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
repeal of a repealing law has this effect, unless the language of the repealing statute or some general
statute provides otherwise. (U. S. vs. Otis, 120 U. S., 52 [115].)
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7/30/2010G.R. No. L-11555 Manifestly, with this rule in mind, section 12 of the Administrative Code (Act
No. 2657) which is found in Article III, [Chapter I] dealing with the form and effect of laws in general,
provides that "when a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed the law first repealed
shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided." From which it may fairly be inferred that the
old rule continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, it
itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the
language of the repealing statute provides otherwise.
4
Applying this rule, we conclude that the express repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of
the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) revived the provisions of the Penal Code touching perjury, which
were themselves repealed, not expressly but by implication, by the enactment of Act No. 1697.
A comparison of the penalties prescribed in the Penal Code for the commission of the acts of which the
accused in the case at bar was convicted, giving him as we should the benefit of the provisions of Act No.
2142, discloses that the penalty prescribed therein is less than that imposed upon the appellant under
the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1697, and we conclude from what has been said already that the
penalty imposed by the court below should be revoked and that in lieu thereof the penalty prescribed in
the Penal Code should be imposed upon the convict.
A question has been raised as to whether, admitting that the provisions of the Penal Code touching
perjury have been revived, the accused can be convicted and penalized thereunder, it appearing that at
the time when he testified falsely he was testifying in his own behalf in a criminal case in which he
himself was the accused, on trial for the commission of a grave offense.
In the case of United States vs. Gutierrez (12 Phil. Rep., 529), we said, speaking through Chief Justice
Arellano, that, "Perjury committed by a party in his own cause would not be punishable under Spanish
legislation, because in said legislation no one was a witness in his own cause, and could not therefore
become guilty of giving false testimony in a civil cause in which he was either the plaintiff or the
defendant; but under the procedure in force by virtue of Act No. 190, a party to a suit may testify in his
own behalf, and if he declares falsely under oath as a witness in his own cause, like any other witness, he
incurs the penalty by which false testimony in civil matters is repressed and punished. This court has so
held, it being a settled rule, that the false testimony given by a litigant as a witness constitutes the crime
of giving false testimony inasmuch as such a declaration, according to the new laws in force, may
determine a judgment in his favor and to the prejudice of the adverse party, and that a litigant who, in
sworn testimony given by him as a witness in a civil cause, shall pervert the truth and give false
testimony, incurs as such witness the penalties imposed by article 321 of the Penal Code."
Analogous reasoning leads to a like conclusion as to the criminal liability for perjury of a defendant in a
criminal case testifying falsely in his own behalf. Under the provisions of General Orders No. 58 an
accused person may, if he so desires, testify under oath in his own behalf, and in that event, "if he
declares falsely as a witness in his own cause, like any other witness, he incurs the penalty by which false
testimony" in criminal matters "is repressed and punished."
It has been suggested that such a ruling will have a tendency to expose accused persons to vexatious
criminal prosecutions by prosecuting officers, who, having failed to secure a conviction on the original
charge, may be disposed to institute criminal prosecutions for perjury from a vindictive unwillingness to
let the defendant escape scot free from the meshes of the law. It is said also that the fear of subsequent
prosecution for perjury will tend to embarrass accused persons in their efforts to defend themselves by
testifying in their own behalf. But similar objections may be advanced against the prosecution of any of
the witnesses called for the defense on charges of perjury, and it must not be forgotten that the right of
an accused person to testify under oath in his own behalf is secured to him, not that he may be enabled
to introduce false testimony into the record, but to enable him to spread upon the record the truth as to
any matter within his knowledge which will tend to establish his innocence.
Of course much must be left to the good sense and sound judgment of the prosecuting officer in
determining whether a prosecution for perjury should be instituted against an accused person whose
testimony in his own behalf would seem to be perjured.
 5

Due regard for the situation in which an accused person finds himself when testifying in his own behalf in
a criminal proceeding will restrain a prudent prosecuting officer from the filing of charges of perjury in
every case in which he may have reason to believe that the accused has not adhered strictly to the truth,
in his anxiety to shield himself from punishment. But when, as in the case at bar, an accused person
voluntarily goes upon the witness stand and falsely imputes some other person the commission of a
grave offense, it would seem to be highly proper that he should be called to account in a criminal action
for perjury upon the complaint of the person against whom such false charges are made.

Article 319 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Any person who shall give false testimony in favor of a defendant in a criminal case shall suffer a penalty
ranging from arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correccional in its medium degree and a
fine of lawphil.net/…/gr_l-11555_1917.html3/8

7/30/2010G.R. No. L-11555 not less than three hundred and seventy-five and not more than three
thousand seven hundred and fifty pesetas, if the case were for a felony, and the penalty of arresto
mayor if it were for a misdemeanor.

We conclude that the judgment of conviction entered in the court below should be affirmed but that the
sentence imposed therein should be reversed, and that giving the accused the benefit of the provisions
of Act No. 2142, a penalty of 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor and a fine of P75 with subsidiary
imprisonment as prescribed by law should be imposed upon him in lieu of that imposed by the trial
judge, with the costs of this instance de officio. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur.