Defending Sufficientarianism

Jeanette Albæk Henriksen

Aarhus University, Denmark

Abstract.  In the present article, I aim to defend and slightly revise the ideal of
Freedom from Duress as presented by Axelsen and Nielsen. I will argue that by
perceiving the two categories of capabilities as they are presented in the ideal,
that is capabilities related to basic needs and capabilities related to the funda-
mental interests of a human being in a social setting, as two distinct threshold-
bundles, some priority between the two is possible and this hence eliminates the
problem of threshold-fetishism in the ideal of Freedom from Duress. As in the
original formulation of the ideal, I stand by the negative thesis in its strongest
formulation, but add the distinction between justice and fairness in order to
make an intuitively adequate argument against any reformulation of the negative
thesis.

Keywords. Sufficiency, capabilities, Freedom from Duress, abundant and

scarce resources, in-life deprivation

I.  Introduction

T he debate on justice and what it requires has been somewhat domi-

nated by the egalitarian perspective focusing on promoting equality.
In recent years, however, sufficientarian theories have gained both in
number and support, and have become more dominant in the debate on
justice, which has, naturally, led to more criticism of the said positions.
In its most basic form, sufficientarianism represents the conviction that
justice requires us to ensure that people get above a certain threshold, this
being some basic capabilities, a certain level of welfare, or a specific
amount of resources. The position is often formulated by presenting two
theses: the positive thesis stressing the importance of people living above a
certain threshold, where it is assumed that they are free from deprivation,

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 24, no. 2(2017): 181-198.

© 2017 by Centre for Ethics, KU Leuven. All rights reserved. doi: 10.2143/EP.24.2.3218001
 ethical perspectives  – june 2017

and the negative thesis, which denies the relevance of any additional dis-
tributive requirements above the threshold. The placement of the thresh-
old is widely discussed and often difficult for sufficientarians to define,
and whether the placement of a non-arbitrary sufficiency-level is even
possible has been questioned (Arneson 1999, 236). I will not go into
detail on this specific critique here. Rather, I will simply point out that
even though the threshold is hard to define and even though there is
serious disagreement about its placement, neither refute the position. At
most they point to the need for strong justification of the placement of
the threshold, but this type of justification is equally required when saying
that an equal level of capabilities (or another good) is required, and hence
is a challenge facing all theories of justice.
I aim to defend a version of the sufficientarian position known as
Freedom from Duress, as formulated by David V. Axelsen and Lasse
Nielsen in their article “Sufficiency as Freedom from Duress” (2015).
Duress is understood as “[...] a situation in which one is under significant
pressure in central areas of human life, pressure that would impede any
normal human being’s ability to succeed in a similar situation” (Axelsen and
Nielsen 2015, 408). In order to say that someone has enough, which is
what we strive for in a sufficientarian position, that person needs to be
free from duress in relation to every central aspect of human life (Axelsen
and Nielsen 2015, 409). Freedom from duress thus means “[...] having
sufficient opportunities for succeeding in central areas of human life”
(2015, 409). It is somewhat debatable what aspects of a human life can
be deemed central. There is agreement, however, that some aspects are
unavoidably central to any human life and that some aspects can reason-
ably be deemed non-central (Scanlon 1975, 655-669; Nussbaum 2000,
73). The capabilities related to central aspects of any human life can be
divided into two categories: capabilities related to basic needs, such as basic
health, housing and adequate education, and capabilities related to the funda-
mental interests of all human beings in a social setting, such as rational develop-
ment, critical thought and political freedoms (Axelsen and Nielsen 2015,

— 182 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 jeanette albæk henriksen  – defending sufficientarianism

409). Freedom from Duress is a pluralist theory in the sense that the
thresholds here are understood as horizontal rather than vertical. The
central human capabilities are incommensurable, and therefore one can-
not make up for deficits in one dimension by giving a larger amount of
another (Axelsen and Nielsen 2015, 414). Throughout the present con-
tribution, I will both bolster arguments already presented in favour of the
ideal of Freedom from Duress, and make some adjustments to the theory
as it is currently presented in order to make it even more plausible.

II. The Challenging Question of Thresholds

One of the most heavily debated and critical points in sufficientarian

theories is the position and definition of the threshold(s). Setting a low
threshold highlights why sufficientarians find it critically important to
reach this level, and hence provides a good argument in favour of the
positive thesis. This, however, begs the question of why we should regard
the (possibly huge) inequalities above the threshold as irrelevant from the
point of view of justice, and hence creates a problem with the negative
thesis. Setting a high threshold minimizes the inequalities above the
threshold, and hence makes it more plausible to argue that these inequal-
ities are indeed irrelevant from the point of view of justice. This, in turn,
creates a massive space underneath the threshold level, and arguably
increases the need for prioritarian considerations below the threshold if
one wants to avoid the problem of threshold-fetishism.1 In this section,
I will discuss the definition of the threshold level(s) and address the prob-
lem of prioritarian principles. The question of inequalities above the
threshold level will be discussed later.
When adopting a pluralistic capability approach, adopting prioritarian
principles below the threshold(s) is somewhat complicated.2 Capabilities
can be defined as a set of vectors of functionings reflecting the person’s
freedom to live one type of life or another (Sen 1992, 40), and are thus
concerned with what an individual is actually able to do and be. In

— 183 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 ethical perspectives  – june 2017

c­ ontrast to other approaches, this is a multi-dimensional approach, and

focuses on several aspects of the human reality, rather than collapsing
these into just one dimension (Axelsen and Nielsen 2015, 413-414). The
multi-dimensional trait of capabilities makes it more difficult to compare
and hence prioritize between individuals with different levels of different
capabilities.
The pluralism contained in the ideal of Freedom from Duress makes
it difficult to talk about prioritizing between different capability deficits.
This is known as ‘the incomparability claim’, which states that by insisting
against collapsing different human freedoms into one dimension, one
makes it impossible to compare and measure on a unified scale, which in
turn makes it impossible to determine whom we should benefit first when
resources are scarce. However, as Axelsen and Nielsen argue, it does not
seem to make any sense to compare health and social status on the same
scale, since these are very different and distinct capabilities. To insist on
collapsing these into a single scale “[...] blurs an important distinction and
simplifies a reality that is not simple” (Axelsen and Nielsen 2015, 425;
italics original).
While I agree that one cannot make up for deficits in one central
human capability by giving more of another, and while I also agree that
you cannot collapse all these central human capabilities into one single
dimension, I still believe some prioritarian considerations are warranted. It
does seem intuitive that it is more critical when a person does not have
enough to eat, than when someone is deprived of some political free-
doms. Both are important to live a dignified life worthy of a human being,
but one is critical just for surviving. I find the two categories as character-
ized in the ideal of Freedom from Duress, that is, capabilities related to basic
needs and capabilities related to the fundamental interests of all human beings in a
social setting, to adequately (though broadly) describe the capabilities central
to any human life. As Anderson and Nussbaum rightly point out, there
must be “[...] limits to which capabilities citizens are obligated to provide
for each other” (Anderson 1999, 319) and that “[...] the core idea [behind

— 184 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 jeanette albæk henriksen  – defending sufficientarianism

the capability approach] is that of the human being as a dignified free

being who shapes his or her own life in cooperation and reciprocity with
others” (Nussbaum 2000, 72). The two categories rightly limit the scope
of justice, and at the same time capture the capabilities that most agree
are central to any human life.
Looking at these two categories of capabilities, it seems intuitive that
deficits in some of these capabilities are more critical than others. It seems
plausible to argue that any deficit in the capabilities related to basic human
needs, such as adequate nourishment, are more critical than deficits in
capabilities related to the fundamental interests of all human beings in a
social setting, such as educational level or political freedom. At the same
time, it seems that the capabilities within each category are more difficult
to compare, and hence make prioritarian considerations more trouble-
some. Is it worse to have inadequate health, than inadequate nourish-
ment? This seems to be a somewhat ridiculous question since both are
critical to human survival. I would argue, therefore, that it seems plausible
to claim that one can talk about two threshold bundles: a minimal threshold
bundle consisting of capabilities related to basic human needs, and a max-
imal threshold bundle consisting of capabilities related to the fundamental
interests of all human beings in a social setting. Deficits in capabilities
related to basic human needs are then always considered to be more
critical than deficits in capabilities related to the fundamental interests of
all human beings in a social setting, and should therefore receive priority
– that is, deficits in capabilities within the minimal threshold bundle
should receive priority over deficits in capabilities within the maximal
threshold bundle. Huseby (2009) has previously introduced an idea of two
threshold levels, and thereby highlighted the relevant difference between
securing the deficits between people who do not even have their basic
needs met and people who are deprived of some other capabilities, such
as political rights. As mentioned above, both are important for a life truly
worthy of a human being, but one nevertheless seems even more critical
than the other. While Huseby uses contentment as his indicator for the

— 185 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 ethical perspectives  – june 2017

fulfilment of justice rather than capabilities (2009, 181), the intuition

behind the division is the same.
According to Huseby’s account, however, it is argued that once you
are above his maximal threshold level, you are also above the minimal
threshold level, and hence he offers a vertical understanding of suffi-
ciency in capabilities (2009, 184-185). The bundles presented here, how-
ever, are not to be understood as vertical threshold levels, but as catego-
ries of capabilities within which there are several threshold levels (since
you cannot measure amounts of health and nourishment on a single
scale), and hence we propose a horizontal understanding of sufficiency in
capabilities. This means that one can easily have a sufficient level of polit-
ical freedoms, but be lacking in some capabilities related to basic human
needs.3 The notion of the minimal and the maximal threshold bundle is
not to be understood as vertical, the one placed above the other. They
are to be understood as two separate and distinct categorizations of capa-
bilities. Both are important, both are a matter of justice, and within each
category comparisons (and hence priorities) are immensely difficult (if not
impossible) to make in a consistent and just way. The labels of minimal
and maximal are simply used to indicate that priorities in capability deficits
can be made between the two categories; that is, that a deficit in any capa-
bility related to basic human needs, should receive priority over any defi-
cit in capabilities related to the fundamental interests of a human being
in a social setting. Take, for example, two individuals, Mary and Ann.
Mary has more than enough of every capability related to the fundamen-
tal interests of a human being in a social setting, but lacks some capabil-
ity related to basic human needs. Ann, on the other hand, has more than
enough of every capability related to basic needs, but lacks some capa-
bilities related to the fundamental interests of a human being in a social
setting. In such a situation, Mary should receive priority over Ann. If,
however, both Mary and Ann lack some capabilities related to basic
human needs, let’s say Mary lacks nourishment and Ann lacks health, we
are facing a tragic choice, which, no matter what we do, leaves someone

— 186 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 jeanette albæk henriksen  – defending sufficientarianism

under immense duress and therefore represents an injustice that will

require swift amelioration.
In summary, I find the adoption of two threshold bundles represent-
ing capabilities of basic human needs and capabilities related to the fun-
damental interests of a human being to be a plausible way to incorporate
some prioritarian principles, and hence address the problem of threshold-
fetishism, without dismissing and losing the complexity of reality, and
hence still honour the distinctness of each central human capability.

III. Scarce Resources

An argument that is often presented when showing why a sufficientarian

position is superior to both an egalitarian and a prioritarian view is the
argument of ‘scarce resources’. The argument is clearly illustrated by
Harry Frankfurt in his article “Equality as a Moral Ideal” (1987, 30-32),
with the following example. Suppose that, in a specific society, 40 units
of a vital resource exist. There are 10 individuals in the population, each
in need of at least five units of the resource to survive. Now, an equal
distribution of these resources would result in every member of the soci-
ety having four units. Four being one less unit than they need, the equal
distribution of goods would result in the entire population dying. As
Frankfurt states, it seems ‘morally grotesque’ to insist on equality in this
situation. Sufficientarians, on the other hand, would focus on ensuring
that as many as possible having enough, and hence will favour giving only
some people enough of the resource, that is, they aim to secure the survival
of as many people as possible. The tragic position in which the remaining
two members of the society are left, cannot justify giving everyone an
equal amount, resulting in all members dying.
This example, however, does not present any reasons as to why egal-
itarian considerations have no merit whatsoever when resources are scarce
(not everyone can have enough). As Casal observes, egalitarians would,
under the threshold, still do more than simply draw straws when (to put

— 187 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 ethical perspectives  – june 2017

it rather bluntly) when deciding who lives and who dies, and as such
would have some rules or guidelines when establishing priorities or mak-
ing choices on peoples’ fate. She argues that egalitarian doctors would be
“[...] required to employ a fair way of selecting [...]. Equality requires tak-
ing the patients’ age into consideration because those who are younger
have enjoyed less of the good under distribution” (2007, 307-308).
It is true that the positive thesis (and the example above) does not
provide any kinds of rules of priority when presented with scarce resources
and too many people below the threshold in need of help. The example
above does not offer any clear reasons as to why we should not deploy
such considerations when distributing our goods. Consider, however, the
following example. Two patients, one elderly and one younger man are
admitted to hospital suffering from a terminal illness. We can only save
one of them. The positive thesis states only that we should save as many
as possible, but offers no guidelines as to how we should prioritize or
choose between several individuals. Many would argue spontaneously that
we should save the younger man. As already mentioned, Casal argues that
younger people have enjoyed less of the good so far, and so should be
treated before the elderly. Others have argued that 80 years of a happy
life must be considered sufficient (e.g. Crisp 2003, 762), and hence agree
that the younger man has precedence over the older. While I acknowledge
the immediate appeal of this line of thought, I do not agree. The fact that
a person is older does not mean that he or she has less of a right to their
necessary share of the scare resources. Let us suppose that age is the only
difference between the two. The immediate appeal of saving the younger
man might be obvious when he is 20 years of age and the elderly man is
80. But what if the younger man was 40 and the older 50? Or the younger
was 70 and the older 80? When are the young young enough and the old
old enough for the principle to be plausible? Considering this, I would
argue that the immediate appeal of the argument vanishes. I find it
implausible to incorporate principles such as this consistently in a just way
and I would argue, therefore, that even though the positive thesis and

— 188 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 jeanette albæk henriksen  – defending sufficientarianism

example above do not offer any clear reasons as to why egalitarian prin-
ciples should not count below the threshold, there are reasons why this
is so. I thus argue that this does not represent a problem for the ideal of
Freedom from Duress.

IV.  Abundance of resources

Another problem facing many sufficientarian positions is the problem

resulting from the commitment to the negative thesis. As mentioned, this
states that inequalities above the threshold are irrelevant to justice. The
appeal of this position can be illustrated with the ‘Beverly Hills example’
as presented by Roger Crisp. This example exemplifies the intuitively
grotesque in claiming that justice should be concerned with the inequali-
ties between the rich and the superrich (e.g. someone driving a Daimler
or Rolls Royce; Crisp 2003, 758). However, the negative thesis does not
only dictate that we should find such ‘minor’ inequalities irrelevant.
It includes potentially enormous inequalities between those just above the
threshold-level and the super rich, i.e. (conceivably) the difference
between having two functional legs and driving a Rolls Royce.
First of all, it is not incoherent with a sufficientarian position to
believe that in order to ensure that everyone has enough of a particular
good, it can sometimes be necessary to ensure that everyone has an equal
amount of the good. Goods of this sort have been denoted ‘positional
goods’ in the literature, and refer to “[...] goods with the property that
one’s relative place in the distribution of the good affects one’s absolute
position with respect to its value” (Brighouse and Swift 2006, 472; 476;
Ypi 2012, 111). An example of a good with this trait could be ­voting rights.
If some have two votes while others have only one, it seems plausible to
claim that those who have only one vote do not have sufficient capabili-
ties in this respect, and the only reason this is so is because others have
more. The traits of positional goods, such as political freedoms and soci-
etal status, are such that the mere fact that others have a considerably

— 189 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 ethical perspectives  – june 2017

higher level of these capabilities than you do constitutes a significant pres-

sure on your ability to succeed, and thus means that you have an insuf-
ficient amount of these capabilities per the ideal of Freedom from Duress
(Axelsen and Nielsen 2015, 423). This trait of some capabilities needs to
be taken into account when determining whether everyone has a suffi-
cient level of capabilities, and hence calls for equalization in some
instances.
In order to address the problem of potentially large inequalities above
the threshold, consider this example presented by Casal. “To see why the
distribution of such benefits might matter, suppose that having provided
every patient with enough medicine, food, comfort, and so forth, a hos-
pital receives a fantastic donation, which includes spare rooms for visi-
tors, delicious meals, and the best in the world cinema. If its administra-
tors then arbitrarily decide to devote all those luxuries to just a few
fortunate beneficiaries, their decision would be unfair” (2007, 307). There
are two responses to this critique that I would like to present here.
First of all, in line with the argument presented by Axelsen and
Nielsen, I would question whether the concern here is really with inequal-
ity in non-central capabilities, rather than with the societal inequality that
sometimes follows from it. Wealth does seem to allow people to have
greater political influence and higher educational levels than the poor,
who suffer as a consequence from considerable obstacles in obtaining
these functionings (Axelsen and Nielsen 2015, 423). If this is the case, we
are talking about an inequality in positional goods, and hence the ideal of
Freedom from Duress demands an equal distribution as argued above.
Secondly, Axelsen and Nielsen argue that other inequalities between
the super rich and the rest of us would amount to differences in the abil-
ity to pursue non-central capabilities, since the ideal of Freedom from
Duress requires everyone being free from significant pressure against suc-
ceeding in each of the central aspects of human life, and hence any
inequality in a situation where freedom from duress is obtained, would
be a matter of differences in non-central capabilities, and therefore not

— 190 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 jeanette albæk henriksen  – defending sufficientarianism

of concern to justice (Axelsen and Nielsen 2015, 424). This is exemplified

by the super rich being able to buy a yacht or a mansion, while poorer
individuals cannot afford such luxuries and may only be able to rent a
modest flat. “Normally, we would not consider someone who lived in a
decent apartment, enjoyed a reasonable social standing, but was unable
to buy a yacht, unable to obtain a successful life, and, so we claim, nor
should we” (Axelsen and Nielsen 2015, 423). It might be difficult to iso-
late and eliminate the effects of material inequalities on other central
capabilities, but in such cases, the duress (and hence the injustice on the
poorer) would not be because of the material inequality in itself, but
because of the derived effect thereof on capabilities with positional
aspects – thus resulting in a claim on justice per the ideal of Freedom
from Duress.
While I agree that it seems plausible that intuitive disapproval con-
cerning inequalities above the threshold is mostly driven by the derived
effects that material inequality can have on capabilities with positional
aspects, I am not entirely convinced that this is intuitively adequate. Imag-
ine a utopian world in which everyone is free from duress. All the people
in this world have a sufficient level of all the central capabilities, there are
no derived consequences of the material inequalities onto capabilities with
positional aspects, and therefore all inequalities are a matter of non-­central
capabilities. We thus live in a fully just world. However, as we observed
above, material inequality still exists. Some are able to buy yachts, while
others cannot even buy a dinghy. Let us imagine an individual named
Paul. Paul is fortunate. His family is very wealthy and he thus has great
resources and wealth at his disposal, having made almost no effort of his
own to acquire them. Paul can afford to buy a yacht. Brian, on the other
hand, comes from a less fortunate family. He is completely free from
duress, that is, he is not under any pressure in any way in relation to any
central capabilities. Even so, it seems plausible to argue that there is
something intuitively wrong in a world where some have access to so
much more than others only because of their family ­relations. As Casal

— 191 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 ethical perspectives  – june 2017

appropriately observes, it seems “[...] deeply unfair that merely in virtue

of being born into a wealthy family some should have at their disposal all
sorts of advantages, contacts, and opportunities, while others inherit little
more than a name” (2007, 311)4, even when the inequality is only a mat-
ter of an inequality in relation to non-central capabilities.
I will question, however, whether this inequality in non-central capa-
bilities is really a matter of justice, rather than a matter of fairness. The dis-
tinction between justice and fairness can be seen as a distinction of moral
obligation. Where justice is a matter of what we are morally obligated to
do, fairness instead describes what it is morally good to do. Therefore, jus-
tice is inherently more important or more demanding than fairness (Cooke
2014, 3). I would thus argue that even though there might be something
intuitively wrong about the inequality between Paul and Brian, this is not
a matter of justice but of fairness. And hence, even though it would be a
morally good thing if Paul gave some of his excess resources to Brian, I do
not believe he is morally obligated to do so in this example.
To sum up: I stand by the negative thesis in its strong formulation,
that is, that inequalities above the thresholds are irrelevant from the point
of view of justice. It is important to note, however, that these inequalities
will always only be a matter of inequalities in non-central capabilities, and
that one should be wary of capabilities with positional traits. Also, even
though I agree that inequalities above the threshold levels are irrelevant
from the point of view of justice, I would argue that they might still be
considered to be unfair.5

V.  In-Life Deprivation

Another critique raised against sufficientarian positions is the dilemma of

in-life deprivation. This critique questions the sufficientarian positions’
ability to satisfactorily respond to periods of deprivation within lives.
How can we compensate a human being for a period of great suffering,
so that his or her life in total is still sufficiently good (Casal 2007, 314)?

— 192 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 jeanette albæk henriksen  – defending sufficientarianism

Casal offers a useful illustration of the problem as follows. Three people

need an operation to end some episode of serious deprivation from which
they currently suffer. Firstly, there is Ana who has already suffered so
much in her life overall that, despite the operation, she cannot be secured
a sufficiently good life overall. Casal concludes that since Ana’s fate is
sealed, a principle requiring the minimization of insufficiency, as the
‘pure’ sufficientarian position maintains, does not provide any reason to
operate (2007, 314). In this case, sufficientarians must incorporate pri-
oritarian considerations within their overall view to maintain their plausi-
bility – a point that Crisp (among others) recognizes (2003, 758).
This critique, however, only relates to sufficientarian positions con-
cerned only with sufficiency in life overall, and thus is not concerned with
momentary suffering. This is not the case with the ideal of Freedom from
Duress. No matter what the total sum of sufficiency in life, there is always
reason to end an episode of duress.
Also, as already argued in section II, some form of prioritarian con-
siderations should be incorporated in the position. As explained above,
deficits in capabilities related to basic human needs always receive prior-
ity over deficits in capabilities related to the fundamental interests of a
human being in a social setting. In addition, as Raz has observed, feeding
the hungry seems to matter more, the hungrier they are (1986, 235). While
I stand by the multi-dimensional understanding of capabilities, i.e. that
we cannot compare capabilities on a unified scale, we can, nevertheless,
compare different levels on the same scale. Hence, the fact that Ana’s life
overall has been bad, does not mean that we should not help her with
her current suffering – it still makes sense to move her closer to a thresh-
old level even though she might never reach it. It should be noted, how-
ever, that if it is implied in the example that Ana would not benefit from
the operation whatsoever, I do not believe that we should operate. If Ana
is in such bad shape that there is nothing we can do to help her, then we
are facing a sad and tragic situation, but we should not put her through
an operation that would do nothing to help her.

— 193 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 ethical perspectives  – june 2017

Secondly, we have Bea and Celia. Despite their present suffering,

both have enjoyed sufficiently good lives. While Bea’s life has been just
above the sufficiency threshold, Celia has enjoyed a life far above the
threshold (a life that Casal describes as ‘extremely good’ [2007, 315]).
Casal’s first point here is that given the fact that both women still have
enough, despite the deprivation that could be cured by the operation,
sufficientarianism does not seem to be able to give reasons to perform
the operation (2007, 315). This, according to Casal, seems to represent a
deficit in the sufficientarian principles.
In this example, Casal describes the women’s current situation (that is,
before the operation) as a situation of ‘serious deprivation’ (2007, 314).
If the deprivation is serious, it is hard for me to see how they can still be
positioned above any reasonable threshold. The point of the threshold (and
the positive thesis) is to make sure that people are in a situation where they
have enough to be free from such deprivations, a point Casal herself makes
earlier in her paper (2007, 297-298). Therefore, a situation involving such
serious deprivation would place both women under the threshold, and suf-
ficientarians would have every reason to provide the operation to free them
from it. The concept of Freedom from Duress certainly gives every reason
to end any episode of ‘serious deprivation’, and hence is not vulnerable to
this objection. If the deprivation is not serious enough to place them under
the threshold, it is true that there seems to be no sufficientarian reasons to
give the women the operation – which I do not consider to be problematic.
In that case, we have a situation in which two women could acquire some
benefit from an operation, a benefit that would move them higher above
the threshold (as an example, one could consider some form of cosmetic
surgery). Both women might find such an operation beneficial and consider
this operation important for them to live the lives they want to live, but
since this is a matter of a non-central capability, they do not have a claim
upon justice to have the operation performed.
The other observation made by Casal in relation to Bea and Celia
takes its starting point from the assumption that there are sufficientarian

— 194 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 jeanette albæk henriksen  – defending sufficientarianism

reasons to perform the operation (that is, they are both under the thresh-
old as a result of the deprivation). The problem that now arises comes
from the negative thesis’s claim that inequalities above the threshold are
irrelevant from the point of view of justice. Due to the indifference
towards these inequalities, Casal points out that the fact that Bea’s life has
always been far worse than Celia’s does not grant us any reason to end
her episodic deprivation in preference to Celia. Nevertheless, she consid-
ers this implication to be implausible (2007, 315). She sees it as obvious
that we should prioritize Bea since she has suffered much more during
her life compared to Celia, who has had much more than she arguably
needed.
I likewise do not consider this example to be troublesome for the
sufficientarian position I defend here. I acknowledge that Celia has prob-
ably had many benefits in her life that Bea has been without (for whatever
reason that might be), and that Bea might even have wished she had been
in Celia’s shoes. However, it does not follow from this point that Celia’s
past life should have any influence on how we prioritize between the two
in their current situation of equal deprivation. They are, at this moment,
equally badly off, and it should not matter from the point of view of
justice how well off they were before the deprivation. The lives they lived
before, when they were both above the threshold level and had access to
an adequate level of the central capabilities, should not determine how
we treat them now that they are both suffering. This argument lies some-
what in line with the point made by Elisabeth Anderson in her article
“What is the Point of Equality?” (1999) in relation to the egalitarian focus
on responsibility. Here Anderson questions the egalitarian denial of help
to victims of bad option luck, that is, they offer no help to people who
are themselves responsible for their bad situation (1999, 301). While there
are many variations of the egalitarian doctrine, there is usually an element
of desert in these theories, which Anderson finds implausible and too
harsh (known as the harshness-objection). In relation to the critique I am
here trying to address, I find it equally implausible to hold people

— 195 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 ethical perspectives  – june 2017

r­ esponsible for the lives they have created and have been born into, and
even more so to hold them responsible in a comparison between different
lives in which different choices were made.
In summary: I state once again that some prioritarian considerations
should be included in a sufficientarian position in order to avoid the
problem of threshold-fetishism (that is, leaving people at the bottom).
I  argue that the differences in the lives of Bea and Celia provide no
reasons to prioritise between the two when they are in an equally bad
situation and suffering from significant pressure on their effective free-
doms.

VI. Conclusion

I hope to have demonstrated in this article that the ideal of Freedom

from Duress stands strong against the most damning critiques raised
against sufficientarian theories. I have made some slight revisions to the
theory in order to make it even more plausible. I have argued that by
seeing two capability categories – capabilities related to basic needs and
capabilities related to the fundamental interests of a human being in a
social setting – as two threshold bundles, some priority between the two
(but not within each category) makes it possible to favour those with the
most critical deficits in central capabilities without sacrificing the horizon-
tal understanding of the thresholds. The theory thus still captures the
complexity of real life, but also accommodates the problem of threshold-
fetishism and of prioritizing between different capability deficits. There
are good reasons as to why egalitarian considerations should not be taken
into account when making priorities or choices below a threshold level,
and I therefore stand by the original formulation of Freedom from Duress
in this respect. I also stand by the negative thesis in its strongest formu-
lation, but stress, however, that these differences will only be differences
in non-central capabilities. One should be wary of positional traits in
capabilities, which require equality, and also of the difference between

— 196 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 jeanette albæk henriksen  – defending sufficientarianism

justice and fairness when considering inequalities in non-central capabili-

ties.6

Works Cited
Anderson, Elizabeth S. 1999. “What Is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109: 287-337.
Arneson, Richard J. 1999. “Egalitarianism and Responsibility.” The Journal of Ethics 3:
25-247.
Axelsen, David and Lasse Nielsen. 2015. “Sufficiency as Freedom from Duress.” Journal
of Political Philosophy 23/4: 406-426.
Benbaji, Yitzhak. 2005. “The Doctrine of Sufficiency: A Defense.” Utilitas 17/3: 310-
332.
Brighouse, Harry and Adam Swift. 2006. “Equality, Priority and Positional Goods.”
Ethics 116: 471-497.
Casal, Paula. 2007. “Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough.” Ethics 117: 296-326.
Cooke, Chris. 2014. : “What is the Difference Between Justice and Fairness? Which is
More Important?” http://www.medicina.uson.mx/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/
DIFFERENCE-BTW-JUSTICE-AND-FAIRNESS-Cook.pdf.
Crisp, Roger. 2003. “Equality, Priority, and Compassion.” Ethics 113: 745-763.
Frankfurt, Harry. 1987. “Equality as a Moral Ideal.” Ethics 98/1: 21-43.
Huseby, Robert. 2010. “Sufficiency: Restated and Defended.” The Journal of Political Phi-
losophy 18/2: 178-197.
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2000. Women and Human Development. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Raz, Joseph. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press.
Scanlon, Thomas. 1975. “Preference and Urgency.” Journal of Philosophy 72: 655-669.
Sen, Amartya. 1992. Inequality Re-Examined. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shields, Liam. 2012. “The Prospects for Sufficientarianism.” Utilitas 24/1: 101-117.
Ypi, Lea. 2012. Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.

Notes
1.  Threshold-fetishism is a term used to describe the seemingly implausible in sufficientar-
ian positions favouring lifting as many as possible above the threshold-level, while leaving the
worst-off at the bottom. A theory allowing this seems to be in conflict with most intuitions
concerning distributive justice.
2.  The ideal of Freedom from Duress is based on a pluralistic capability approach, and since
Axelsen and Nielsen have done a good job in arguing in favour of capabilities, I see no reason to
deviate from their position in this respect (Axelsen and Nielsen 2015: 410-411)

— 197 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2
 ethical perspectives  – june 2017

3.  As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, it might seem implausible that someone
unable to meet their basic needs but with the right to vote can be said to have a sufficient level
of political freedom. It does seem plausible, however, that (at least in theory) we could have
someone with a sufficient level of all capabilities related to the fundamental interests of a human
being in a social setting, but where there is a lack in a capability related to basic human needs.
Even if one does not find this plausible, all I am stating here is that, in theory, it is not a necessity
that one has a sufficient level of all capabilities related to basic human needs in order to have a
sufficient level of all capabilities related to the fundamental interests of a human being in a social
setting, even if this will always be the case in practice.
4.  Casal (2007, 311). This quote was not made in relation to a utopian world as described
above, but the point still holds, and appropriately highlights the dilemma.
5.  As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, it could be warranted, certainly if we ever
manage to eliminate all inequalities related to central human capabilities, to discuss a possible
obligation of fairness. This, however, is outside the scope of the present contribution.
6.  I owe this entire article to Lasse Nielsen. Thank you for your general encouragement, for
your inspirational teaching, and for constructive criticism and comment. Acknowledgement should
also be addressed to Søren Flinch Midtgaard for his comment and critique, which helped further
the development of the arguments presented here, and to the anonymous commentators review-
ing this article prior to publication.

— 198 —
Ethical Perspectives 24 (2017) 2