ABAKADA Partylist vs Purisima, August 14, 2008

Facts:

RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR
and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions.It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least
six months of service, regardless of employment status.

However, Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a
system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption
and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve
the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition
for being premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted
any right or claim that will necessitate the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
respondents acknowledge that public policy requires the resolution of the constitutional issues
involved in this case. They assert that the allegation that the reward system will breed
mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9335 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

No, Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice, and lead modest lives.

Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain
but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and
service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government
officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called
upon to serve.

Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This
presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335
operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed
their revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation capability and collection.

The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be
overturned by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do)
specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared public policy.

Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and
employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal
basis; it is also purely speculative.

Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for
exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set
expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it
recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of
deserving government personnel.

Abundo vs COMELEC

Facts:

For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and
local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In the
2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as
winner one Jose Torres , who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the
winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office
starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a
little over one year and one month.

Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral
contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, predicated on the
three-consecutive term limit rule. The COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding for
Abundo, who in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes and was accordingly proclaimed 2010
mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.

Meanwhile before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification case Torres
initiated against Abundo, herein private respondent Ernesto R. Vega commenced a quo
warranto action before the RTC of Virac, Catanduanes to unseat Abundo on essentially the
same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.

The RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor. The RTC held citing
Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC, found Abundo to have already served three consecutive mayoralty
terms, to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence, disqualified for another, i.e.,
fourth, consecutive term. Abundo, the RTC noted, had been declared winner in the aforesaid
2004 elections consequent to his protest and occupied the position of and actually served as
Viga mayor for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007, to be
exact. To the RTC, the year and a month service constitutes a complete and full service of
Abundo’s second term as mayor.

Abundo appealed before the COMELEC. Just like the RTC, the COMELEC’s Second Division
ruled against Abundo on the strength of Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the unexpired
portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as
service for one full term within the contemplation of the three-term limit rule. Hence this
petion.

Issue: Whether Abundo is disqualified to run for Mayor on the ground of violation of the three
term limit rule.

Ruling:

No, The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive,
continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially
deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he,
after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the
electorate.

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code
(LGC) of 1991, thusly:

Sec. 43. Term of Office. (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted
constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:

(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post; and

(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or
her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term,
immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a "voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected." This
qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the
three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary
interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by
certain events or causes.

The court cited the case of Lonzanida vs COMELEC. In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was
elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-
1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and
was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of
failure of elections. On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections,
Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it
issued. Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term. In the May 1998
elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a
petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive
terms in the same post. The Court, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two (2) conditions which must
concur for the three-term limit to apply: "1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms."49

In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the foregoing requisites were absent in the case of
Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to
the post in the May 1995 elections since his assumption of office as mayor "cannot be deemed to
have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation." And as a
corollary point, the Court stated that Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term
having been ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term, a situation which
amounts to an involuntary relinquishment of office.

In this case of Abundo, deals with the effects of an election protest, for which the rulings in
Lonzanida, appear to be more attuned than the case of Aldovino Jr., the interrupting effects of
the imposition of a preventive suspension being the very lis mota in the Aldovino, Jr. case. But
just the same, We find that Abundo’s case presents a different factual backdrop.
But unlike in LOnzanida wherein the individuals subject of disqualification were candidates
who lost in the election protest and each declared loser during the elections, Abundo was the
winner during the election protest and was declared the rightful holder of the mayoralty post.
Unlike Mayor Lonzanida who were both unseated toward the end of their respective terms,
Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and had assumed the remainder of the
term. Notwithstanding the difference, the court still holds that Lonzanida case is applicable.
There was involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term. There can be no
quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the
election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and
served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month.

In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until
May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of
the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of
the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the
corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as
proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the
functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly
elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month.
Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3)
years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground
is that Abundo actually served less.

Aldovino Jr. is not applicable since In Aldovino Jr., the Court succinctly defines what temporary
inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective office means, thus:

On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective
post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it
does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the
office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for
a reason provided by law.

We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply to the instant
case. Verily, it is erroneous to say that Abundo merely was temporarily unable or disqualified
to exercise the functions of an elective post. For one, during the intervening period of almost
two years, reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said to have
retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who
would have the legal right to assume and serve such elective office. For another, not having
been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot
plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes,
even if the belated declaration in the election protest accords him title to the elective office from
the start of the term, Abundo was not entitled to the elective office until the election protest was
finally resolved in his favor.1âwphi1

Hence, the petion is granted in this case

Aldovino vs Comelec

Facts:

The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three
consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September
2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for
90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. However, the Supreme Court, subsequently
lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and
finished his term.

In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The
petitioners sought to deny Asilos certificate of candidacy on the ground that he had been
elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the
three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.

The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour. It
reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete
service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
However, the COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling. Hence,this
petition.

Issue: Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the

three-term limit rule

Ruling:

No, Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,

except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
 interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

The First branch of the rule fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective
officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms.

The second branch relates to the express initiative to prevent any circumvention of the
limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it expressly states
that voluntary renunciation of office shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This declaration
complements the term limitation mandated by the first branch.

The Supreme Court is replete of jurisprudence pertaining to the three-term limit rule.
However, the present case, is the first on the effect of preventive suspension on the
continuity of an elective officials term.

The Court held in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections that there are two requisites for
the application of the disqualification, viz:

1. That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post;
2. That he has fully served three consecutive terms.

In the case of Latasa vs Comelec instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida,

Adormeo and Socrates, that no three-term limit violation results if a rest period or break
in the service between terms or tenure in a given elective post
intervened. In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a private citizen with no title to any elective
office for a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly,
in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents lived as private citizens for two years
and fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these cases establish that the law contemplates a
complete break from office during which the local elective official steps down and
ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction
of a particular local government unit.

Further, the Court concluded that the interruption of a term exempting an elective official from
the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The
elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an
effective interruption to occur. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to
exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an
effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an
effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from
exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
In this case, as defined by law, Preventive suspension is an interim remedial measure to address the
situation of an official who have been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence
preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability. The suspended
official is barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the
meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that
only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability. The official is reinstated to
the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary
incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is
preventively suspended.

Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective
officials service in office and they do not overlap. Preventive suspension, by its nature, is a
temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term
limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the term.

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension
should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond
three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the
suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions
and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended
officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and
should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat,
however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let
it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it
does not require relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an
easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension
has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption
of a term can serve as a circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the
Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.

Side issue: Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as

contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
Yes, Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a
voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have
voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this
perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary
renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to
office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective
office demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is by its very nature the exact opposite of
voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery
of service, not the title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature,
different and non-comparable.

Jalosjos vs Comelec

Facts:

Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in
the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed on 6 December
2009 a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible
for the Office of Mayor.

Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already
been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the RTC of
Cebu City. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his
conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the
RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an
Order declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos further
stated that during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed
against him on the same grounds.

Cardino called the attention of the Commission on the decision of the Sandiganbayan dated
finding Gregorio F. Bacolod, former Administrator of the Parole and Probation Administration,
who issued the Certification attesting that respondent Jalosjos, Jr., had already fulfilled the
terms and conditions of his probation, guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for issuing a
falsified Certification on December 19, 2003 attesting to the fact that respondent Jalosjos had
fully complied with the terms and conditions of his probation. The Certification was used by
Jalosjos and became the basis for the Commission on Elections to deny the petition of James
Adasa for the disqualification of the probationer from running for re-election as Mayor of
Dapitan City in the National and Local Elections of 2004.

The Comelec ruled against Jalosjos and cancelled his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC
First Division concluded that "Jalosjos has indeed committed material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy when he declared, under oath, that he is eligible for the office he seeks
to be elected to when in fact he is not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the
sentence of which he has not yet served. The COMELEC First Division found that Jalosjos’
certificate of compliance of probation was fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served
his sentence.

Issue: Whether Jalosjos is disqualified to run for Mayor on the ground that he committed
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy.

Ruling:

Yes, A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for public
office is a false material representation which is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
same OEC.
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that he is
eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office.If a
candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from
running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is
eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation
that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.

A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section 40
of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a
material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

Section 40, Local Government Code:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence;

In this case, The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any
popular elective office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the temporary absolute
disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On the other hand, under Article 32
of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not
be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification," which is
perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification
constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these
ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material
representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the
judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend
on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or
not. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes
vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective
public office perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to
run for, any elective public office from the time his judgment of conviction became final.

Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prisión mayor, to which perpetual
special disqualification attaches by operation of law, is not a ground for a petition under Section
68 because robbery is not one of the offenses enumerated in Section 68. Insofar as crimes are
concerned, Section 68 refers only to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code and not
to crimes under the Revised Penal Code. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section
68 that will justify including the crime of robbery as one of the offenses enumerated in this
Section. All the offenses enumerated in Section 68 refer to offenses under the Omnibus Election
Code.

In this case, Jalosjos was not eligible to run for public office. The COMELEC concluded that
Jalosjos made a false material represent ation that is a ground for a petition under Section
78. However, since the false material representation arises from a crime penalized by prisión
mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local
Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his
petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which
remedy to adopt belongs to the petitioner.
The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of
candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.

Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from
running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is
addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to
implement the final judgment under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run
for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the
COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election.

RE: NOMINATION OF ATTY. LYNDA CHAGUILE, IBP IFUGAO PRESIDENT, AS

REPLACEMENT FOR IBP GOVERNOR FOR NORTHERN LUZON, DENIS B. HABAWEL

Facts:

There two administrative matters involed in this resolution by the SC

On March 27, 2013, Atty. Marlou B. Ubano, IBP Governor for Western Visayas, filed a Motion to
invalidate or to declare as ultra vires the portion of the Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors which approved the nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile as the replacement of IBP
Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel. Atty. Ubano noted that the Court approved
an amendment to Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws which considers as ipso facto resigned
from his or her post any official of the IBP who files a Certificate of Candidacy for any elective
public office.

Atty. Ubano alleged that the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel, filed a
Certificate of Candidacy to run for the position of Provincial Governor of the Province of Ifugao
and IBP President, Roan Libarios, filed a Certificate of Substitution to run as a substitute
congressional candidate for the First District of Agusan del Norte.

Atty. Ubano alleged that due to the impending ipso facto resignation of Pres. Libarios on 30
March 2013," the IBP Board of Governors agreed to constitute a five (5)-member Executive
Committee (Ex Com) to "prevent hiatus in the leadership of the IBP." Atty. Ubano also alleged
that Atty. Habawel nominated Atty. Lynda Chaguile, IBP Ifugao Chapter President, as his
successor to the position of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon. Thereafter, the Board of
Governors approved the succession of Atty. Chaguile as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon.
Atty. Ubano, together with two (2) other IBP Governors, allegedly objected. However, when the
matter was put to a vote, the other governors, Atty. Habawel included, approved Atty.
Chaguile’s replacement of Atty. Habawel as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon

In this Original Motion, Atty. Ubano challenged the IBP Board of Governor’s approval of Atty.
Chaguile’s succession as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon on two grounds: First, there was, as
yet, no vacancy. Atty. Habawel was himself present at the meeting where his replacement was
named. There was, therefore, no need to name a replacement. Second, the right to elect the
successor of a resigned IBP Governor is vested, not in the IBP Board of Governors, but in the
delegates of the concerned region; thus, the IBP Board of Governors’ approval of the nominee to
succeed Atty. Habawel is ultra vires.

In support of this second ground, Atty. Ubano cited the third paragraph of Section 44 of the IBP
By-Laws:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever
cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the
members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for
the unexpired portion of the term.

In its Comment, the IBP Board of Governors assailed the first ground raised by Atty. Ubano by
saying that it was not necessary for a position to be absolutely vacant before a successor may be
appointed or elected.As for the second ground, the IBP Board of Governors argued that it has
been the "tradition" of the IBP that "where the unexpired term is only for a very short period of
time, it is usually the Board of Governors which appoint [a replacement or an officer in charge
to serve the unexpired term." The IBP Board of Governors cited seven (7) precedents attesting to
this "tradition":

In his reply, Atty Urbano pointed out that even if it were true that the IBP Board of Governors
had a tradition of appointing the successor of a resigned governor, the tradition cannot be
validated in view of the first paragraph of Article 7 of the Civil Code which reads:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

The second Administrative Matter assails the conduct of th election of the IBP Executive Vice
President (EVP). In this election, Atty. Vicente M. Joyas was elected IBP Governor for Southern
Luzon.

Thereafter,Atty. Ubano filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion to nullify the election and restrain
Atty. Joyas from discharging the duties of EVP/Acting President.
Atty. Ubano sought to nullify the May 22, 2013 election on two (2) grounds:

First, he claimed that the IBP election of the EVP was marred by inordinate haste and
irregularities.

Second, he claimed that the election violated Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws which requires that
the EVP be elected by a vote of at least five (5) Governors. Atty. Ubano emphasized that Atty.
Chaguile’s vote in favor of Atty. Joyas was invalid, as Atty. Chaguile’s appointment as governor
was itself ultra vires, and therefore,void ab initio.

Issue: Whether the act of Atty. Chaguile of voting in favor of Atty. Joyas was invalid, as Atty.
Chaguile’s appointment as governor was itself ultra vires,

Ruling:

No, The court held that although IBP Board of Governors violated Section 44 of the IBP By-
Laws by relying on "tradition" to validate its action to appoint Atty. Chaguile. However,
following the adoption of the IBP Board of Governors Omnibus Resolution dated March 21,
2013. Atty. Chaguile acted as and performed the functions of the IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon. This is an accomplished fact which no amount of legal abstraction can undo. Given these
circumstances, the court held that Atty. Chaguile took on the role of IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon in a de facto capacity.

De facto means "in point of fact."To speak of something as being de facto is,thus,to say that it is
"actual or] existing in fact" as opposed to "existing by right or according to law," that is, de jure.
De facto is,therefore, "illegitimate but in effect

A de facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and discharging its duties under color
of authority. By color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment,
however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer

(A de facto officer is distinguished form a de jure officer, as follows:

The difference between the basis of the authority of a de jure officer and that of a de facto officer is
that one rests on right, the other on reputation. It may be likened to the difference between character
and reputation. One is the truth of a man, the other is what is thought of him.

Moreover, as against a mere usurper, "[i]t is the color of authority, not the color of title that
distinguishes an officer de facto from a usurper." Thus, a mere usurper is one "who takes
possession of [an] office and undertakes to act officially without any color of right or authority, either
actual or apparent." A usurper is no officer at all.) For purposes of study

A de facto officer unequivocally includes officers whose election is void because the body that
elected them lacked the capacity to do so. This is precisely the situation in this case: The power
to elect an IBP Governor is lodged in the delegates of the concerned region, not in the IBP Board
of Governors; yet the IBP Board of Governors approved Atty. Chaguile’s nomination as IBP
Governor for Northern Luzon.
To be a de facto officer, all of the following elements must be present:

1) There must be a de jure office;

2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and

3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith

In this case, there is no dispute that a de jure office—that of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon—
exists.

Neither is there any dispute that Atty. Chaguile took possession of and performed the functions
of the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon through a process, albeit "irregular or informal, so that
she is not a mere volunteer," that is, not through her own actions but through those of the IBP
Board of Governors. Thus, she did so under "color of authority," as defined in settled
jurisprudence. However, with regard to the 3rd requisite, the delegates of the IBP Northern
Luzon argued that there was no "general acquiescence by the public". But, the SC stated that the
court fail to see how the action of six(6) individuals sustains the assertion that the public never
acquiesced to the appointment of Atty. Chaguile. Granting that these six(6) individuals are in
fact the legitimate delegates of the IBP Northern Luzon Region and even if we disregard their
sheer number, they still fail to represent or embody the "public since they are direct participants
that makes them actual parties to the controversy.

The de facto doctrine was devised to benefit the public. On the validity of actions made by de
facto officers, it is settled that "the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as
those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned.

All considered, the circumstances under which Atty. Chaguile’s nomination was approved and
under which Atty. Chaguile subsequently assumed the role of IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon are sufficient to induce a general belief that she was properly the IBP Governor for
Northern Luzon and that her actions in this office were properly invoked.

Having established that Atty. Chaguile was the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon in a de
facto capacity, we turn to the validity of her actions as a de facto officer. The court held that it is
settled that "the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de
jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned." This is necessary so as to protect the sanctity of their dealings with those relying on
their ostensible authority.

Accordingly, all official actions of Atty. Chaguile as de facto IBP Governor for Northern Luzon
must be deemed valid, binding, and effective, as though she were the officer validly appointed
and qualified for the office. It follows that her participation and vote in the election for IBP EVP
held on May 22, 2013 are in order.
Funa vs Agra

Facts:

On March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting

Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes Devanadera in order to vie for
a congressional seat in Quezon Province; thereafter, President Arroyo designated Agra as the
Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity;

That on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a
lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent
appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution;

Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on January 12, 2010, he
was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the
Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as
the Secretary of Justice; President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice
vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for
Congress; that he then relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and
that pending the appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the
Acting Solicitor General. Subsequently, the court declared the unconstitutionality of Agra’s
concurrent designation as Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General.

Issue: Whether the official actions before the declaration of unconstitutionality of the
positions are valid.

Ruling:

Yes, In view of the unconstitutionality of Agra’s concurrent designation as Acting Secretary of

Justice and Acting Solicitor General.

Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de jure officer for the entire period of his tenure
as the Acting Secretary of Justice. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally
appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired.

During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers
and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that "in cases
where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the
office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of
the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations
attached to the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it
seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed
from all liability to pay any one for such services. Any per diem, allowances or other
emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned
positions may therefore be retained by them.
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may
also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de
facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or
third persons who are interested therein are concerned.

The court further held that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice,
assuming that was his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he
was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is necessary in
order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible
authority emanates from the State. Agra's official actions covered by this claritlcation extend to
but are not limited to the promulgation of resolutions on petitions for review filed in the
Department of Justice, and the issuance of department orders, memoranda and circulars relative
to the prosecution of criminal cases.
Moreno vs COMELEC

Facts:

Norma L. Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running

for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime
of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 Months and 1 Day to 2
Years and 4 Months by the Regional Trial Court. Moreno filed an answer averring that the
petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation and the imposition
of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. The
order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and restored
to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be
voted for in the July 15, 2002 elections.

The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for
preliminary hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer recommended
that Moreno be disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.

The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for

reconsideration filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was
affirmed. According to the Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides
that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. Since Moreno was
released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date
and end two (2) years thence.
Hence this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local
Government Code applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers
because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be
read as an exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies
only to probationers. He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the
disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to him.

Issue: WON petitioner should be disqualified from running for Punong Bagangay.

Ruling:

No, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, which reads:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from

running for any elective local position:
 (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year
or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence.

This seemingly clear and unambiguous provision, however, has spawned a controversy
worthy of this Courts attention because the Comelec, in the assailed resolutions, is
alleged to have broadened the coverage of the law to include even those who did not
serve a day of their sentence because they were granted probation.

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a
sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the
grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage.

Here, he accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage,
attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified
from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office
is put on hold for the duration of the probation. Clearly, the period within which a person is
under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the
Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the
sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed
upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the
probation order. This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served their
sentence by reason of the grant of probation which, we reiterate, should not be equated with
service of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office
because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
does not even begin to run.

Mercado vs Manzano

Facts:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were

candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The proclamation
of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by
a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States. In his answer to the petition, the respondent admitted that
he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino
father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on
September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
citizenshi. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.

In its resolution, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that
he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The private respondent filed
a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending even until after the election held on
May 11, 1998. On August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. The
COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent
qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: WON the respondent was disqualified to run for Vice Mayor
Ruling:
No, Under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which declares as disqualified from
running for any elective local position those with dual citizenship.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis ( citizenship is not determined by place of birth but by having one or both parents
who are citizens of the state.) is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen
of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for
the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli (is the right of anyone born in the territory of a state
to nationality or citizenship.)
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
 There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible
given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.

The court agreed to the decision of the COMELEC en banc that, by participating in Philippine
elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship
under American law, so that now he is solely a Philippine national. The filing of such certificate
of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. The Petitioners contention that merely taking
part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation as the alleged renunciation
was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should
have been made when he reached the age of majority is untenable since according to the case of
Frivaldo v. COMELEC “By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government” and there is no no law which requires the election of
Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and
support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that
he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country
are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may
have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

Rodriguez vs Comelec

Facts:
 Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr.were
protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections.
Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor.
Marquez challenged Rodriguez victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELE.
Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the United States where a charge, filed on November 12,
1985, is pending against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent
insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property. Rodriguez is
therefore a "fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under
Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code. The COMELEC dismissed Marquez quo
warranto petition and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof.
Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal via petition for certiorari in SC GR
112889. The crux of said petition is whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" as contemplated
by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code based on the alleged pendency of a criminal
charge against him. The Court promulgated on April 18, 1995 referred to as the MARQUEZ
Decision, declared that:

fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. However, the court
remanded the case to the COMELEC with the directive to proceed therewith with dispatch
conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision.

In the May 8, 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same
position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for
disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez
is a "fugitive from justice." This petition for disqualification (SPA No. 95-089) was filed by
Marquez on April 11, 1995 when Rodriguez' petition for certiorari (112889) from where the April
18, 1995 MARQUEZ Decision sprung was still then pending before the Court. Thereafter, the
COMELEC promulgated a Consolidated Resolution, allegedly having kept in mind
the MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice", found Rodriguez to be one.
Rodriguez again emerged as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for the position
of governor.
On May 10 and 11, 1995, Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez'
proclamation which the COMELEC granted on May 11, 1995. The COMELEC nullified
Rodriguez' proclamation. Hence this petition,
Issue: WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice which is a ground for his
disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code.
Ruling:

No, The court held that fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution." The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that
animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent
to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an
already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
Here, Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in
the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of
Immigrations preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on
November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by that same foreign
court, by almost five (5) months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about
such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no
complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time.
Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of the charges to be filed against him at
the time he left the United States, it becomes immaterial under such construction to determine
the exact time when he was made aware thereof. While the law, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, does not countenance flight from justice in the instance that a person flees the
jurisdiction of another state after charges against him or a warrant for his arrest was issued or
even in view of the imminent filing and issuance of the same, petitioner's plight is altogether a
different situation. When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not his own,
homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him while in the relative
peace and service of his own country, the fact that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction
of the former state does not qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice. The criminal process of
the United States extends only within its territorial jurisdiction. That petitioner has already left
said country when the latter sought to subject him to its criminal process is hardly petitioner's
fault. In the absence of an intent to evade the laws of the United States, petitioner had every
right to depart therefrom at the precise time that he did and to return to the Philippines. No
justifiable reason existed to curtail or fetter petitioner's exercise of his right to leave the United
State and return home.
Granting, as the evidence warrants, that petitioner Rodriguez came to know of the charges
only later. His subsequent knowledge while in the Philippines and non-submission to the
jurisdiction of the former country does not operate to label petitioner automatically a fugitive
from justice. As he was a public officer appointed and elected immediately after his return to the
country, petitioner Rodriguez had every reason to devote utmost priority to the service of his
office. He could not have gone back to the United States in the middle of his term nor could he
have traveled intermittently thereto without jeopardizing the interest of the public he serves. To
require that of petitioner would be to put him in a paradoxical quandary where he is compelled
to violate the very functions of his office."
To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or
ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local position under Section 40(e) of the
Local Government Code, should be understood according to the definition given in
the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit:

"A 'fugitive from justice' includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution."

Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has
already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. Not
being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon
Province gubernatorial post.

Sobejana- Condon vs COMELEC

Facts:

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents. On
December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a
certain Kevin Thomas Condon.On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire

Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section
3 of R.A. No. 9225."The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance
to the Republicof the Philippines on December 5, 2005.

On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of

Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs,
Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order certifying that she has ceased to be an
Australian citizen.

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost
in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the
position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the
winning candidate.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Picar,Pagaduan7 and Bautista,all registered voters of

Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility
before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her
elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.The petitioner denied being a
dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen.
She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in
Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for
public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship. The RTC held that the
petitioner’s failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run
and hold public office since the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was
not under oath. On appeal to the COMELEC, The COMELEC en banc concurred with the
findings and conclusions of the RTC. Hence this petition.

Issue: WON the petitioner is disqualified to run on the ground that that she is a dual citizen.

Ruling:

Yes, R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-
born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenshipby taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic. Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-
acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and
Philippine.

However, when petitioner filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship to seek elective public
office, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the
renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer
oath.To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner pleads the Court
to interpret the "sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) to be a
mere pro forma requirement in conformity with the intent of the Legislature. She anchors her
submission on the statement made by Representative Javier during the floor deliberations on
H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.

The court held that the the Court’s duty to interpret the law according to its true intent is
exercised only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental
duty of the Court is to apply the law. As such, when the law is clear and free from any doubt,
there is no occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room for application.The
language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. The law categorically requires persons
seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who
reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of
the certificate of candidacy.Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to
additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

Hence, in De Guzman v. COMELEC,24 we declared petitioner therein to be disqualified from

running for the position of vice-mayor for his failure to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of his American citizenship.

In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their
citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.The rule applies to
all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner. It is a pre-requisite
imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office.

Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino
citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act
that restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith in
accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation
of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her
political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian
citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.

Gaminde vs COA
Facts:

On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad
interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after
taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of
the Philippines confirmed the appointment for a term expiring February 2, 1999.

However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the
President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel, opined that petitioners term of office would expire on February 02,
2000, not on February 02, 1999.
Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. On
February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, wrote the Commission on Audit
requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous
staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on
February 02, 1999.
The General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that the term of
Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment
conformably with the constitutional intent.[3]
Consequently, Resident Auditor Flovitas Felipe issued notice of disallowance disallowing
in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff.
The petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit en banc. However,
the Commission on Audit issued a Decision dismissing petitioners appeal. The Commission on
Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioners term of
office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the
expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize
an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President.

Issue: whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February
02, 2000
Ruling:
No, the term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission,
under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on
February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000,
and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service
rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary
and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff.

The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is
prescribed in the 1987 Constitution, as follows:
Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a
Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.

The 1973 Constitution introduced the first system of a regular rotation or cycle in the
membership of the Civil Service Commission. The provision on the 1973 Constitution reads:

The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the Prime Minister for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Of the Commissioners first appointed, one shall hold office
for seven years, another for five years, and the third for three years. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.

In Republic vs. Imperial, we said that the operation of the rotational plan requires two
conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3)
Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death,
resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the
unexpired balance of the term. Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners
of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date,
irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees,
in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the
regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. Applying the
foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms
of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution
must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution.

In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between term and tenure. [T]he term of
an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time
during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which
the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The
tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent

Here, On June 11, 1993, the President appointed Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde Commissioner, Civil
Service Commission, for a term expiring February 02, 1999. This terminal date is specified in her
appointment paper. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
appointment. She accepted the appointment and assumed office on June 22, 1993. She is bound
by the term of the appointment she accepted, expiring February 02, 1999.

National Amnesty Commission vs COA, September 08, 2014

Facts:
 Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency tasked
to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a
Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice,
National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex
officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were
paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident
auditor disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting
to P255,750, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038. On September 1, 1998, the NGAO
upheld the auditors order and notices of disallowance were subsequently issued.
Meanwhile, on April 28, 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 which was
approved by then President Joseph Estrada on October 19, 1999. Section 1, Rule II thereof
provides: The ex officio members may designate their representatives to the Commission. Said
Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may
be authorized by law.
Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of
the resident auditor and the NGAO disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex officio members
representatives, to no avail. Further, NAC contended that the representatives are de facto officers
and as such are entitled to allowances, pursuant to our pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union
vs Executive Secretary which provides “where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who in
good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is
legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in appropriate action recover the
salary, fees and other compensation attached to the office”.

Issue: 1. WON the representatives are considered as de facto officers

2. WON the ex officio members was entitled to honoraria,per diems and allowances

Ruling:

1. No, A de facto officer derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face.
(He is) one who is in possession of an office and is discharging its duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular
or informal, so that the incumbent be not a mere volunteer.
Here, the representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were not
appointed but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled
to something their own principals are prohibited from receiving. Neither can they claim
good faith, given the express prohibition of the Constitution and the finality of our
decision in Civil Liberties Union prior to their receipt of such allowances
2. No, Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B provides "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries.". Although
Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of
multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and
appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate
another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other
office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution
itself.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution
itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering
positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office. The term
ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from
official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but
rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an
official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office." An ex-officio member of a board is one who
is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or
appointment. The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the
principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position.The reason is that these services
are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office
Here, The NAC ex officio members representatives who were all appointive officials with
ranks below Assistant Secretary are covered by the two constitutional prohibitions. First,
the NAC ex officio members representatives are not exempt from the general prohibition
because there is no law or administrative order creating a new office or position and
authorizing additional compensation therefor. The representatives in fact assumed their
responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere designation from the ex
officio members who were themselves also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An
appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise
the powers and functions of a given office; a designation merely connotes an imposition
of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by
virtue of an earlier appointment.[15]
 Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so
designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an
appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the
position. The legal basis of an employees right to claim the salary attached thereto is a
duly issued and approved appointment to the position,[16] and not a mere designation.
Second, the ex officio members representatives are also covered by the strict
constitutional prohibition imposed on the President and his official family. In Civil
Liberties Union, we held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and assistants,
who hold positions in ex officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional
compensation because their services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to their principal offices. Thus, in the attendance of the NAC
meetings, the ex officio members were not entitled to, and were in fact prohibited from,
collecting extra compensation, whether it was called per diem, honorarium, allowance or
some other euphemism. Such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
The agent, alternate or representative cannot have a better right than his principal, the ex
officio member. The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover the ex
officio member apply with equal force to his representative. In short, since the ex
officio member is prohibited from receiving additional compensation for a position held
in an ex officio capacity, so is his representative likewise restricted.

Amando Tetangco vs COA

Facts:

Petitioner Amando M. Tetangco, Jr., is the Governor of the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
Petitioners Peter B. Favila , Juanita D. Amatong, Nelly A. Favis-Villafuerte , Alfredo C. Antonio
and Ignacio R. Bunye were the MBM at the time that the allowance for EMEs was approved.

COA's March 23, 2010 Decision on the allocation and utilization of EME of the MBM, stated,
among others, that " the ex-officio member of the Monetary Board shall not be entitled to additional
EMEs, other than that appropriated for him or her under the GAA as a cabinet member.

As a consequence, the EMEs of MBM Neri and Favila were disallowed and became the subject
of ND dated August 13, 2010. Eventually, the MBM and BSP personnel, which include the
petitioners, were held personally liable under a ND.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal with the COA Director but the
same was denied. They filed a Petition for Review with the COA, but the same was likewise
denied.

Hence this petition, The petitioners alleged that the COA acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction:
(A) in disallowing the EMEs of the ex officio MBMs: (1) because the March 23, 2010 COA
Decision No. 2010-048, should not be applied since the disallowed EMEs were incurred by the
ex officio MBMs in the years 2007, 2008 and 2009, which years are prior to the date of finality
(May 5, 2010) of the said decision.

Issue: WON the Ex officio members of the Monetary board was entitled to EME

Ruling:

No, the nature of EME was not the foremost reason for the disallowance, but the limitations
imposed by law in availing such allowance. The ex officio members of the Monetary Board are
entitled to EMEs to the extent of that appropriated in the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since the ex officio members already received their EMEs from their respective Departments (as
appropriated in the GAA), the additional EMEs from BSP are no longer necessary. It must be
stressed that the ex officio position is actually and, in legal contemplation, part of the principal
office; hence, the ex officio member is no longer entitled to receive any form of compensation,
allowance or other euphemism from the extended agency. In fact, the ex officio membership of
the cabinet member in the Monetary Board does not comprise 'another office' but rather
annexed to or is required by the primary functions of his or her official position as cabinet
member. Of equal significance, too, is that the ex officio member of the Monetary Board already
receives separate appropriations under the GAA for EMEs, he or she being a member of the
cabinet. Being such, it is highly irregular that the said ex officio member of the Monetary Board,
who performs only additional duties by virtue of his or her primary functions, will be provided
with additional EMEs, which in this case, appear much higher than his or her appropriations for
the same expenses under the GAA as a cabinet member.

CASE DIGEST: IN RE: NOMINATION OF ATTY. LYNDA CHAGUILE, IBP

IFUGAO PRESIDENT, AS REPLACEMENT FOR IBP GOVERNOR FOR
NORTHERN LUZON, DENIS B. HABAWEL. A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC; December 10,
2013.
(Dela Cruz)

FACTS:
Atty. Marlou B. Ubano, IBP Governor for Western Visayas sought to invalidate
the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors which approved the nomination of Atty.
Lynda Chaguile as the replacement of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B.
Habawel. He noted that on the IBP By-Laws which considers as ipso facto resigned
from his or her post any official of the IBP who files a Certificate of Candidacy for any
elective public office. Under the amended By-Laws, the resignation takes effect on the
starting date of the official campaign period.

Atty. Ubano alleged that the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B.
Habawel, filed a Certificate of Candidacy to run for the position of Provincial Governor
of the Province of Ifugao. Hence, he is considered ipso facto resigned from the IBP.
 Atty. Ubano challenged the IBP Board of Governors' approval of Atty. Chaguiles
succession as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon on two grounds: First, there was, as
yet, no vacancy. Atty. Habawel was himself present at the meeting where his
replacement was named. There was, therefore, no need to name a replacement. Second,
the right to elect the successor of a resigned IBP Governor is vested, not in the IBP
Board of Governors, but in the delegates of the concerned region; thus, the IBP Board of
Governors approval of the nominee to succeed Atty. Habawel is ultra vires.

In support of this second ground, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Sec. 44.Removal of members. x xxxx x[x] In case of any vacancy in the office of
Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect
a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is
a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term.
In its Comment, the IBP Board of Governors assailed the first ground raised by
Atty.Ubano by saying that it was not necessary for a position to be absolutely vacant
before a successor may be appointed or elected.As for the second ground, the IBP Board
of Governors argued that it has been the "tradition"of the IBP that "where the unexpired
term is only for a very short period of time, it is usually the Board of Governors which
appoint a replacement or an officer in charge to serve the unexpired term."

Meanwhile, Atty. Ubano filed another motion seeking to prevent Atty. Chaguile
from exercising the functions as IBP Governor of Northern Luzon.

A.M. No. 13-05-08-SC: The second Administrative Matter assails the conduct of the
election of the IBP Executive Vice President (EVP). In this election, Atty. Vicente M.
Joyas was elected IBP Governor for Southern Luzon.

Atty. Ubano sought to nullify the May 22, 2013 election claiming that the IBP election of
the EVP was marred by inordinate haste, grave irregularities, patent hostility, manifest
bias and prejudice, as well as the presiding officers absolute lack of independence and
that the election violated Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws which requires that the EVP be
elected by a vote of at least five (5) Governors. Atty. Ubano emphasized that Atty.
Chaguiles vote in favor of Atty. Joyas was invalid, as Atty. Chaguiles appointment as
governor was itselfultra vires, and therefore, voidab initio.
ISSUES:
[1] Was the appointment of Atty. Chaguile as Governor ultra vires, therefore
restraining her to exercise functions relative to the position?

[2] Is the election for the IBP EVP void in violation Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws
and restrained Atty. Vicente M. Joyas from discharging his duties?

HELD:
As pointed out by the IBP Board of Governors in its Compliance, "the term of
Atty. Lynda Chaguile as Governor for Northern Luzon expired on June 30, 2013."A new
Governor for Northern Luzon, Atty. Oliver Cachapero, was elected.As Atty. Chaguile is
no longer serving as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, the matter of ousting or
restraining Atty. Chaguile from exercising the functions of such office is no longer an
available relief.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The
Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the
case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
(Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988; August 31, 2010)

However, we recognize that the validity of Atty. Chaguiles appointment as

Governor for Northern Luzon affects the validity of her actions as the occupant of this
office, especially her participation in the IBP Board of Governors election of the IBP
EVP, which is the subject of the second Administrative Matter.

We hold that Atty. Chaguile took on the role of IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon in a de facto capacity.
To be a de facto officer, all of the following elements must be present: 1) There
must be a de jure office; 2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the
public; and 3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, 319 Phil. 460

In the present case, there is no dispute that a de jure office, that of IBP Governor
for Northern Luzon exists. Likewise, Atty. Chaguile took possession of and performed
the functions of the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon through a process, albeit
"irregular or informal, so that she is not a mere volunteer,"that is, not through her own
actions but through those of the IBP Board of Governors. Thus, she did so under "color
of authority,Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr., 473 Phil. 844 (2004).

The IBP Board of Governors approval was secured through a process that it
characterized as a "tradition," allowing it to appoint a replacement for an officer who
vacates his or her office shortly before his or her term expires.

Although being in violation of the IBP By-Laws, this supposed tradition cannot
earn our imprimatur. Be that as it may, in all of the occasions cited by the IBP Board of
Governors, the authority of replacement governors was derived from a process, which,
though irregular,enabled them to act as and be accepted as governors.

Having said these, we agree with a point raised by Atty. Ubano. As with statutes,
the IBP By-Laws "violation or non-observance [ought] not be excused by disuse, or
custom, or practice to the contrary." CIVIL CODE, Art.7.We do not validate the IBP
Board of Governors erroneous practice. To reiterate our earlier words: "We cannot
countenance this. No amount of previous practice or "tradition" can validate such a
patently erroneous action."

Having established that Atty. Chaguile was the IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon in a de facto capacity, we turn to the validity of her actions as a de facto officer.
Accordingly, all official actions of Atty. Chaguileasde facto IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon must be deemed valid, binding, and effective, as though she were the officer
validly appointed and qualified for the office. It follows that her participation and vote
in the election for IBP EVP held on May 22, 2013 are in order. DENIED.

Funavs Agra
G.R. No. 191644,vFebruary 19, 2013
(c/o Tits)

Facts:
The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal
Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of
Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon
Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting
Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner,
commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent
appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution; that during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S.
Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that
Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on August 5,
2010.

Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on

January 12, 2010, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President
Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General
Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; that on March 5, 2010,
President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary
Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress
representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then
relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the
appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting
Solicitor General.

Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has
admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is
sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises
herein.

Issue:
Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is unconstitutional.

Held:
Yes.

At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested
in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.

A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B

of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 7. x xxUnless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position,
no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.

Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position
of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13,
Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence,
Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the
Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.

It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary

capacity. The text of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of
the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members
of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in
government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned.

In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be

in possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the
actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of
Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the
appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held
by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations,
whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective
of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.

To construe differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of

an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive Department and
of limitations on the Presidents power of appointment in the guise of temporary
designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-
in-charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or
controlled corporations.

It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor
General, was not covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra, due to
such position being merely vested with a cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic Act
No. 9417, he nonetheless remained covered by the general prohibition under Section 7,
supra. Hence, his concurrent designations were still subject to the conditions under the
latter constitutional provision. In this regard, the Court aptly pointed out in Public
Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma:

The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an
appointive official to hold more than one office only if “allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position.” In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court ruled
that, “[t]here is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government
offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility.” The
crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was laid
out in People v. Green – whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that
one office has the right to interfere with the other.

ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA- GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT

GR No. 203372, 2015-06-16
(Sarda)

Facts:
Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800 appointments to various
positions in several government offices.
The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution reads:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public... service or endanger public safety.
None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.
Issuance of EO 2
On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his
oath of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President
Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by
President Macapagal-Arroyo which... violated the constitutional ban on midnight
appointments.
The only known exceptions to this prohibition are (1)... temporary appointments
in the executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety and in the light of the recent Supreme Court decision in the case
of De Castro, et al. vs. JBC and PGMA, G.R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010, (2)...
appointments to the Judiciary;
(a) Those made on or after March 11, 2010, including all appointments bearing
dates prior to March 11, 2010 where the appointee has accepted, or taken his oath, or
assumed public office on or after March 11, 2010, except temporary appointments in the
executive... positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety as may be determined by the appointing authority.
Effect of the Issuance of EO 2
Atty. Velicaria-Garafil reported for work on 9 August 2010 without any
knowledge of her termination. She was made to return the office-issued laptop and
cellphone, and was told that her salary ceased as of 7 August 2010. On 12 August 2010,
Atty. Velicaria-Garafil was informed... that her former secretary at the OSG received a
copy of a memorandum on her behalf. The memorandum, dated 9 August 2010, bore
the subject “Implementation of Executive Order No. 2 dated 30 July 2010” and was
addressed to the OSG’s Director of Finance and Management Service.
Atty. Venturanza received via facsimile transmission an undated copy of DOJ
Order No. 556. DOJ Order No. 556, issued by DOJ Secretary Leila M. De Lima (Sec. De
Lima), designated Senior Deputy State Prosecutor Richard Anthony D. Fadullon (Pros.
Fadullon) as
Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City. In a letter
to Sec. De Lima dated 15 September 2010, Atty. Venturanza asked for clarification of his
status, duties, and functions since DOJ Order No. 556 did not address the same.
G.R. No. 209138
The OP withheld the salaries of Villanueva and Rosquita on the basis of EO 2. On
3 August 2010, Villanueva and Rosquita sought to intervene in G.R. No. 192991.[
Atty. Tamondong was removed from the SBMA Board of Directors on 30 July
2010.
Rulings of the CA
Even though the same issues were raised in the different petitions, the CA
promulgated separate Decisions for the petitions. The CA consistently ruled that EO 2 is
constitutional
 In the cases of Attys. Velicaria-Garafil and Venturanza, the CA stated that the OP
should consider the circumstances of their appointments. In the cases of Villanueva,
Rosquita, and Atty. Tamondong, the CA explicitly stated that the revocation of their
appointments... was proper because they were midnight appointees.

Issues:
We resolve the following issues in these petitions: (1) whether petitioners’
appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, and (2) whether
EO 2 is constitutional.

Ruling:
The petitions have no merit. All of petitioners’ appointments are midnight
appointments and are void for violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. EO 2 is constitutional.

The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which
should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment:

(1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;

The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the
Constitution and laws. Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of
appointment. Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power
necessarily exercises a discretion.

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right
of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself
who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and
eligibilities.

(2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal;

It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be
evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could
happen that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President months
before the appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term.
Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies
the President's intent of its issuance.

For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's existence and authenticity, the
appointment paper must bear the security marks (i.e., handwritten signature of the
President, bar code, etc.) and must be accompanied by a transmittal letter from the
MRO.

(3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and

Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any
part of it, unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.

(4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking

the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying
requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.

Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid
appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were
transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners
admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban.

Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any
part of it, unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.
Principles:
The President exercises only one kind of appointing power. There is no need to
differentiate the exercise of the President’s appointing power outside, just before, or
during the appointment ban. The Constitution allows the President to exercise the
power of... appointment during the period not covered by the appointment ban, and
disallows (subject to an exception) the President from exercising the power of
appointment during the period covered by the appointment ban.
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be
understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint and
evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and...
evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4)
receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee
who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence
of all... these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is
made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban.
Sarmiento vsMison
G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987
(Yap)
Facts:
The Court in this case is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. In
this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador
Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of
Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments,
on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of
respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.

Issue:

Whether the appointment of aCommissioner of the Bureau of Customs by the

President still needs a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments

Decision:

No, the appointment of a Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs needs no

Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, as amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential
Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as
thus amended, now reads as follows:

Sec. 601.Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of Customs

shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as
the Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy
Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual
compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing law. The
Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by
the President of the Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint:

1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors,

other public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments;
 2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law;

3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint; and

4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.

First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention.

By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that

an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow
that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Also, in the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to
exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence
of Sec. 16, Article VII.

Therefore, the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one

that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make,
such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.

BAUTISTA v. SALONGA
G.R. No. 86439 April 13, 1989
(Gultiano)

FACTS:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII,
without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government
"whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive
Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim
appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.

RULING:
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the
appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within
the authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art
7), that she appoint executive officials without confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally
delimited power to review presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm
appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone.

2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to

appointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very
nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of
the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are
to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make,
that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad
interim appointments.
CALDERON vs CARALE
208 SCRA 254
(Amorio)

FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6715 (Herrea-Veloso Law) was passed, amending PD 442 or the Labor
Code. Section 13 of RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding
Commissioners and other Commissioners shall be appointed by the President, subject
to the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Appointments to any
vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor.
The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall
be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.”
 Pursuant to the law, President Corazon Aquino assigned Carale as Chairman and
Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission.

This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the
permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the
respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715.

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the
Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers
of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis.

ISSUE:
Whether the Congress may, by law, require confirmation of the Commission of
Appointments, in relation to appointments extended by the President to government
officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of
the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the CoA.

RULING:
The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General.

Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required exclusively for the

heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of
the various Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments is required.

Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second
sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third
groups" of appointees, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents
Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is
unconstitutional because:

1. It amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution
by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and

2. It amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on
appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended
by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
of appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and
effect.

TarrosavsSingson
(Puertos)

Facts:
Respondent Singson was appointed Governor of the BangkoSentral by President
Fidel V. Ramos on July 2, 1993, effective on July 6, 1993.

Petitioner argues that respondent Singson's appointment is null and void since it
was not submitted for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments.

The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which
provides “The Governor of the BangkoSentral, who shall be the Chairman of the
Monetary Board. The Governor of the BangkoSentral shall be head of a department and
his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Whenever the Governor is unable to attend a meeting of the Board, he shall designate a
Deputy Governor to act as his alternate: Provided, That in such event, the Monetary
Board shall designate one of its members as acting Chairman “.

In their comment, respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative

powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
appointment of the Governor of the BangkoSentral. They contend that an appointment
to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
Respondents also aver that the BangkoSentral has its own budget and accordingly, its
budgetary requirements are not subject to the provisions of the General Appropriations
Act.

Issue:
WON the appointment of Singson was subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

Ruling:
No, The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks
the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or
exercising the powers of Governor of the BangkoSentral. Such a special civil action can
only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a
public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another"

In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 637 (1992), we held that the petitioner
therein, who did not aver that he was entitled to the office of the City Engineer of
Cabanatuan City, could not bring the action for quo warranto to oust the respondent
from said office as a mere usurper.

Here, it is obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought by

petitioner. To uphold the action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to
the courts, thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient
operation of the governmental machinery.

Its capstone having been removed, the whole case of petitioner collapses.
Likewise, the Court refrains from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A.
No. 7653 in deference to the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional
question unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case.

However for the information of all concerned, we call attention to our decision
in Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254 (1992), with Justice Isagani A. Cruz dissenting,
where we ruled that Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other
government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of
Article VII of the Constitution.

MANALO VS. SISTOZA

(Pontimayor)

Facts:
On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law
Republic Act 6975, creating the Department of Interior and Local Government. The said
Act states that the PNP Chief, Chief Superintendent and Director General shall be
appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino, through Executive Secretary Franklin S.
Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National
Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The said police officers took
their oath of office and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department
of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III,
authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality
of subject appointments and disbursements made therefor. He contents that: (1) RA
6975 requires confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior
superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where
the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the CA, and (3) Respondent
Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers
despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointments is acting without or
in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Issues:
1) Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation
2) Whether or not the PNP is akin to the AFP
3) Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional

Held:
1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of
the government to be appointed by the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.

It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group

require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of
respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress
cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned
in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.

The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article
XVI of the 1987 Constitution, “The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed
of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and service, as may be
provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State.”

On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that:
“The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope
and civilian in character to be administered and controlled by a national police
commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction
shall be provided by law.”

The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the
ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus,
directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police
officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

3. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on

Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are
not required by the Constitution to be confirmed are unconstitutional. The rest of
Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when provisions of law declared void
are severable from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions
would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute
remains valid without its voided sections.

PIMENTEL VS ERMITA
(Sarda)

Facts:
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their
respective departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator
Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the
appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment
without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with
Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of
the respective departments should be designated in an acting capacity and not anyone
else.

On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the
president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue
appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself
allows the president to issue temporary designation to an officer in the civil service
provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year.

During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.

Issue:
WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department
secretaries while Congress is in session.

Held:
Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature.
It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office
occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary,
the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary
before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in

session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the
very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an
acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session.

Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon

acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission
on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.

The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad

interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way
before the lapse of one year.

Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment of the undersecretary?

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.

The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not
interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to
appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislature’s
interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the
qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in
the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on
the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.

QuirogvsAumentado
G.R. No. 163443, November 11, 2008
(Yap)

Facts:
 On May 28, 2001, Bohol Provincial Governor Rene L. Relampagos permanently
appointed Liza M. Quirog as Provincial Government Department Head of the Office of the
Bohol Provincial Agriculture (PGDH-OPA). The appointment was confirmed by the
SangguniangPanlalawigan in a Resolution.

In the Order dated June 28, 2001, the Director of CSCROVII invalidated Quirog's
appointment as PGDH-OPA upon finding that the same was part of the bulk
appointments issued by then Governor Relampagos after the May 14, 2001 elections
allegedly in violation of a resolution dated June 4, 2001 on prohibition against the
issuance of midnight appointments.

Both Relampagos and Quirog moved for reconsideration of the CSCROVII

Order, alleging that when the latter took her oath of office on June 1, 2001, CSC
Resolution No. 010988 was not yet effective as it took effect only on June 4, 2001. They
argued that the subject appointment cannot be considered a midnight
appointment because it was made days before the expiration of Relampagos' term, and
that Quirog was already the acting Provincial Agriculturist a year prior to said
appointment or since June 19, 2000.

The CSC ruled that the promotional appointment extended to Quirog by

Governor Relampagos was not violative of the aforesaid CSC Resolution. This
interpretation by the CSC of its own rules should be given great weight and
consideration for after all, it is the agency tasked with interpreting or applying the
same.

Issue:
Whether the appointment of Quirog was a midnight appointment

Decision:
No, Quirog was not a midnight appointee.

The constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight appointments, specifically,

those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections,
applies only to the President or Acting President.

However, the aforementioned ruling does not mean that the raison d' etrebehind
the prohibition against midnight appointments may not be applied to those made by
chief executives of local government units, as here. Indeed, the prohibition is precisely
designed to discourage, nay, even preclude, losing candidates from issuing
appointments merely for partisan purposes thereby depriving the incoming
administration of the opportunity to make the corresponding appointments in line with
its new policies. As held in Aytona v. Castillo, the steps taken being apparently a mere
partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions,
and thereby to deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the
corresponding appointments.

Here, it is beyond dispute that Quirog had been discharging and performing the
duties concomitant with the subject position for a year prior to her permanent
appointment thereto. Surely, the fact that she was only permanently appointed to the
position of PGDH-OPA after a year of being the Acting Provincial Agriculturist more
than adequately shows that the filling up of the position resulted from deliberate action
and a careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's
qualifications. The fact that Quirog had been the Acting Provincial Agriculturist since
June 2000 all the more highlights the public need for said position to be permanently
filled up.

A careful evaluation of the circumstances obtaining in the issuance of the

appointment of Quirog shows the absence of the element of hurriedness on the part of
former Governor Relampagos which characterizes a midnight appointment.

There is also wanting in the records of the case the subversion by the former
governor of the policies of the incumbent Governor EricoAumentado as a logical
consequence of the issuance of Quirogs appointment by the latter.

Both elements are the primordial considerations by the Supreme Court when it
laid down its ruling in prohibiting midnight appointments in the landmark case of
Aytonavs Castillo, et. al.

In any event, respondent Governor Aumentado, in a Memorandum, has

reinstated Quirog to the permanent position of PGDH-OPA. Such act of respondent
bespeaks of his acceptance of the validity of Quirog’s appointment and recognition that
indeed, the latter is qualified for the subject position.

Therefore, Quirog was not a midnight appointee.

De Rama vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001
(Gultiano)

FACTS:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon,
petitonerConrado De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the
appointments of 14 municipal employees. Petitioner justified his recall request on the
allegation that the appointments of said employees were “midnight” appointments of
the former mayor, done in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The CSC
denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for
lack of merit. The CSC dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these were “midnight”
appointments, pointing out that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner
prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made
to apply to local elective officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can
validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long as the appointee meets
the qualification standards for the position.

ISSUE:
Whether the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are forbidden under
Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution

HELD:
The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called
“midnight appointments,” specifically those made within two months immediately
prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.
There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during
the last days of his or her tenure.
NAZARENO vs CITY OF DUMAGUETE
(Amorio)

FACTS:
Then Dumaguete City Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo sought re-election in the
May 14, 2001 elections, but lost to respondent Mayor Agustin R. Perdices. Thereafter, on
June 5, 7, and 11, 2001, outgoing Mayor Remollo promoted 15 city hall employees, and
regularized another 74 city hall employees, including the herein 52 petitioners.

On July 2, 2001, Mayor Perdices publicly announced at the flag raising ceremony at
the Dumaguete City Hall grounds that he would not honor the appointments made by
former Mayor Remollo. On the same day, he instructed the City Administrator,
respondent DominadorDumalag, Jr., to direct respondent City Assistant Treasurer
Erlinda C. Tumongha (now deceased), to refrain from making any cash disbursements
for payments of petitioners' salary differentials based on their new positions.

Petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin

respondents from taking any action or issuing any orders nullifying their appointments
against the City of Dumaguete, represented by Mayor Percides.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition, while the Civil Service Field Office
in Dumaguete revoked and invalidated the appointments of petitioners in violation of
CSC Resolution No. 010988 prohibiting midnight appointments immediately before
and/or after elections.

Unsatisfied, the petition was elevated to the CSC en banc and Court of Appeals.
Petitioners argued that the CSC Resolution is invalid because the Commission is
without authority to issue regulations prohibiting mass appointments at the local
government level. However, this was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether the CSC has the authority to prohibit midnight appointments, and apply
the same in the local government level.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the CSC has the authority to issue such resolution
and that the invalidation of the petitioners' appointments was warranted.
 The Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, has statutory
authority to establish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in
the civil service. Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, provides for the powers of the Commission, including the power to issue
rules and regulations and to review appointments.

There was substantial reason behind the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 010988. It
is true that there is no constitutional prohibition against the issuance of "mass
appointments" by defeated local government officials prior to the expiration of their
terms. Clearly, this is not the same as a "midnight appointment," proscribed by the
Constitution, which refers to those appointments made within two months immediately
prior to the next presidential election, the prohibition is precisely designed to
discourage, nay, even preclude, losing candidates from issuing appointments merely
for partisan purposes thereby depriving the incoming administration of the opportunity
to make the corresponding appointments in line with its new policies. It does not only
cause animosities between the outgoing and the incoming officials, but also affects
efficiency in local governance. Those appointed tend to devote their time and energy in
defending their appointments instead of attending to their functions.

Wherefore, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

NOTE: Not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials are invalid.
CSC Resolution No. 010988 does not purport to nullify all "mass appointments."
However, it must be shown that the appointments have undergone the regular
screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up the
vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk.

Province of Aurora vs Marco

Facts:

Governor Ong of the Province of Aurora, permanently appointed Hilario Marco as Cooperative
Development Specialist II five (5) days before the end of her term as Governor of the Province.
Thereafter, Marco's appointment, together with 25 other appointments, was submitted to the
Civil Service Commission. Annexed to Marco's appointment papers was a certification from
Provincial Budget Officer Clemente and Provincial Accountant Saturno stating there are funds
available to cover the position.

However, when newly elected Governor Castillo called an executive meeting of all the
department heads of the Province. Provincial Budget Officer Clemente allegedly manifested
that the Province had no funds available to pay for the salaries of Governor Ong's appointees.
She subsequently issued a Letter recalling the previously issued certification of the availability
of funds.

Due to the recall of the certification, the CSC Field Office disapproved Marco's appointment.
Marco then wrote the CSC Regional Office, moving for the reconsideration of the disapproval of
his appointment. The Regional Office, however, affirmed the disapproval of Marco's
appointment. of Aurora Province and their new governor.

Thereafter, Marco appealed before the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission
granted Marco's appeal and set aside the Regional Office's Decision. It ruled that Marco's
appointment was valid since it was accompanied by a certification of availability of funds.

The province appealed before the CA. For the first time, the Province argued that Marco was a
midnight appointee since Governor Ong appointed him during the last five (5) days of her
tenure. Therefore, Marco's appointment was void. The CA ruled in favor of Marco. On the claim
that Marco was a midnight appointee, the Court of Appeals said that Marco was fully qualified
for the position and underwent a screening process long before the election ban. Therefore, he
was validly appointed.

Issue: WON the appointment of Marco was considered a midnight appointment

Ruling:

No, A midnight appointment "refers to those appointments made within two months
immediately prior to the next presidential election."Midnight appointments are prohibited
under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution

Midnight appointments are prohibited because an outgoing President is "duty bound to prepare
for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he [or she] should not do
acts which he [or she] ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his [or her]
successor." An outgoing President should not "deprive the new administration of an
opportunity to make the corresponding appointments."

However, the constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential

appointments. It does not apply to appointments made by local chief executives.

In De Rama v. Court of Appeals, this court said that the prohibition on midnight appointments
"applies only to presidential appointments." The court noted that "there is no law that prohibits
local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure."

DE CASTRO VS. JBC

(Pontimayor)

FACTS:
 This is a consolidated case regarding the appointment of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo to Associate Justice Renato Corona as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.

All the petitions to the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the
incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement. The question is undoubtedly impressed with transcendental importance to
the nation because the appointment of the Chief Justice is any President’s most
important appointment. The conflicting provisions are Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII,
Sec. 9.

CONSIDERING, ART. VII, UNDER EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

ART. VII, SEC. 15. TWO MONTHS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE NEXT
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND UP TO THE END OF HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT
OR ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL NOT MAKE APPOINTMENTS, EXCEPT
TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE POSITIONS WHEN CONTINUED
VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE PUBLIC SERVICE OR ENDANGER
PUBLIC SAFETY.

IN RELATION TO ART. VIII, UNDER JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT,

ART. VIII, SEC. 9. THE MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDGES
OF THE LOWER COURTS SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT FROM A
LIST OF AT LEAST THREE NOMINEES PREPARED BY THE JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL FOR EVERY VACANCY. SUCH APPOINTMENTS NEED NO
CONFIRMATION.

FOR THE LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENTS
WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST.

ISSUE:
Whether the prohibition against presidential appointments under Art. VII, Sec.
15 (Midnight Appointment Ban), does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.

HELD:
Prohibition under Art. VII, Sec.15 does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among
others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential
power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Article VIII
is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of
Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Sec. 4(1) and Sec. 9 of this Article are
the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In
particular, Sec. 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be
made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the
JBC; Sec. 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Art. VII, Sec. 15
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer
to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Taken into consideration also that the appointment of the next Chief Justice by
the incumbent President is preferable to having the Associate Justice who is first in
precedence take over. Under the Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and
Executive Departments are popularly elected, and whoever are elected and proclaimed
at once become the leaders of their respective Departments. However, the lack of any
appointed occupant of the office of Chief Justice harms the independence of the
Judiciary, because the Chief Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice
performs functions absolutely significant to the life of the nation. With the entire
Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the
Chairman of the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the appointment of the next Chief
Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the incumbent President to make within the
90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is no justification to insist that the successor of
Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the next President.

CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD vs CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 196890 | Date January 11, 2018
Ponente: Justice Tjam
(Dela Cruz)

Petitioner: CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD, (CESB) represented by

CHAIRPERSON BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MA.
ANTHONETTE VELASCO-ALLONES, and DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ARTURO M. LACHICA
Respondent: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, represented by CHAIRMAN
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III and BLESILDA V. LODEVICO

DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and

prohibition are resorted to only where 1. a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and 2. there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except
in cases (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when
the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued are null; and (d)
when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority

FACTS:
BlesildaLodevico (Lodevico) was appointed by then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo on May 14, 2008 as Director III, Recruitment and Career Development Service,
CESB.

Lodevico possesses a Career Service Executive Eligibility since November 29, 2001, as
evidenced by the Certificate of Eligibility issued by the CSC.

June 30, 2010: Office of the President (OP) issued Memorandum Circular 1 (MC1)
which declared all non-career executive service positions vacant.

July 16, 2010: OP promulgated the Implementing Guidelines of MC 1, which

states that all non-Career Executive Service Officers (non-CESO) in all agencies of the
Executive Branch shall remain in office and continue to perform their duties until July
31, 2010 or until their resignations have been accepted and/or their replacements have
been appointed or designated, whichever comes first.

Pursuant to MC 1, Abesamis of CESB issued a memorandum informing Lodevico

that she shall only remain in office until July 31, 2010.
 Lodevico filed her appeal on the memorandum issued by Abesamis before the
CSC. CSC ruled in favor of Leodevico and declared the memorandum null and void.

Career Executive Service board filed an MR but it was denied. Hence, this
petition for certiorari under Rule 62.

Respondents aver that the petitioners resorted to a wrong mode of appeal as

Rule 43 is the proper remedy.

ISSUE:
WON Certiorari and Prohibition under rule 65 is proper? No

HELD:
It is well-settled that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
resorted to only where (a) a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In the case at bar, it is clear that the second requirement is absent as petition for
review under Section 118 of Rule 43 ·is available to petitioners. However, there are
exceptions to the aforementioned rule, namely: (a) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when the broader interests of justice so
require; (c) when the writs issued are null; and (d) when the questioned order amounts
to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

In the case of Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Leyeco IV Employees Union-

ALU, We relaxed the application of the rules of procedure to meet the ends of justice. In
Leyte IV, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of filing a
petition for review under Rule 43, but We gave due course to the petition to
accommodate the broader interest of justice.

In allowing the liberal application of procedural rules, We emphasized in the

case of Obut v. Court of Appeals, et al. that placing the administration of justice in a
straightjacket, i.e., following technical rules on procedure would result into a poor kind
of justice. Thus, a rigid application of the rules of procedure will not be entertained if it
will obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in the light of the
prevailing circumstances of the case under consideration.
Considering the foregoing and the circumstances obtaining in this case, We allow
the application of liberality of the rules of procedure to give due course to the petition
filed by petitioners as the broader interest of justice so requires.

Main Ruling of the Case: Lodevico’s appointment is merely temporary so her

services may be terminated with or without cause. Hence, her discharge was proper.
CES Eligibility and her appointment as Director do not automatically mean that her
appointment is permanent.
CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD vs CSC
G.R. No. 197762 March 7, 2017
(Sarda)

FACTS:
On 24 September 2010, the PAO received a copy of the CESB Report on the CES
Occupancy of the Department of Justice (DOJ).6 This document stated, among others,
that out of 35 filled positions in the PAO, 33 were occupied by persons without the
required CES eligibility.

In response to the report, PAO Deputy Chief Public Attorney Silvestre A. Mosing
(Deputy Chief Mosing) sent a letter7 to CESB Executive Director Maria Anthonette V.
Allones. He informed her that the positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief
Public Attorneys, and Regional Public Attorneys (subject positions) were already
permanent in nature pursuant to Section 68 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9406, which
accorded security of tenure to the occupants thereof.

A second letter dated 9 November 20109 was sent to the CESB by Deputy Chief
Mosing to reiterate its earlier communication. The letter also contained supplementary
arguments in support of the assertion that the subject positions were permanent posts;
hence, their occupants may only be removed for cause provided by law. Based on the
foregoing premises, the PAO requested the deletion of its office from the Data on CES
Occupancy for the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On 18 November 2010, the PAO received the reply sent to Deputy Chief Mosing
by the CESB, through Deputy Executive Director Arturo M. Lachica. 10 The latter
informed Deputy Chief Mosing that the CESB would conduct a position classification
study on the specified PAO positions to determine whether they may still be considered
CES positions in the DOJ.

It appears that while waiting for the CESB to respond to its letters, the PAO
wrote to the CSC to request a legal opinion on the same matter.17 The PAO thereafter
informed the CESB of the former's decision to seek the opinion and requested the latter
to issue no further opinion or statement, oral or written, relative to the qualifications of
the PAO officials.18
 The CSC issued the requested legal opinion stating that Chief Public Attorney,
Deputy Chief Public Attorney and Regional Public Attorney, no third level eligibility is
required but only RA 1080 (BAR) civil service eligibility.20

On 12 January 2011, the CESB issued Resolution No. 91821 (CESB Resolution No,
918) denying the PAO's request to declassify the subject positions. Citing the Position
Classification Study22 submitted by its secretariat, the CESB noted that the positions in
question "require leadership and managerial competence"23 and were thus part of the
CES. Hence, the appointment of persons without third-level eligibility for these posts
cannot be considered permanent.

Aggrieved by the CESB Resolution, the PAO filed a Verified Notice of

Appeal25 and an Urgent Notice of Appeal26with the CSC.

On the merits, the CSC ruled in favor of the PAO officials. It declared that the
CESB would be in violation of R.A. 9406 if the latter would require an additional
qualification - in this case, third-level eligibility - for purposes of permanent
appointments to certain PAO positions.

On 9 August 2011, the CESB filed the instant Petition40 imputing grave abuse of
discretion to respondent CSC. It asserts that (a) the CSC has no jurisdiction to review
the Resolution of the CESB, given the latter's autonomy as an attached agency; (b) CESB
Resolution No. 918 should have been appealed to the Office of the President, and not to
the CSC, in accordance with Article IV, Part III of the Integrated Reorganization Plan.

ISSUE:
Whether the CSC had the jurisdiction to resolve the appeal filed by the PAO and
to reverse CESB Resolution No. 918.

HELD:
Yes.

The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, is given the
comprehensive mandate to administer the civil service under Article IX-B, Section 3 of
the 1987 Constitution; and Section 12, Items (4), (5), and (14) of the Administrative
Code. It has also been expressly granted the power to promulgate policies, standards,
and guidelines for the civil service; and to render opinions and rulings on all personne1
and other civilservice matters.71
 Here, the question of whether the subject PAO positions belong to the CES is
clearly a civil service matter falling within the comprehensive jurisdiction of the CSC.
Further, considering the repercussions of the issue concerning the appointments of
those occupying the posts in question, the jurisdiction of the CSC over personnel actions
is implicated.

It must likewise be emphasized that the CSC has been granted the authority to
review the decisions of agencies attached to it under Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle
A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code:

SECTION 12. Powers and Functions.--The Commission shall have the following
powers and functions:

(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it

directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and
actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. Officials and employees who fail
to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the
Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and executory. Such
decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof;

Since the CESB is an attached agency of the CSC,72 the former's decisions
are expressly subject to the CSC's review on appeal.

Against the express mandate given to the CSC in the foregoing provision, the
contention of the CESB that its decisions may only be appealed to the Office of the
President must fail. We note that the supporting provision73 cited by the CESB in
support of its argument refers only to administrative cases involving the discipline of
members of the CES:

5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection,
classification, compensation and career development of members of the Career
Executive Service. The Board shall set up the organization and operation of the Service
in accordance with the following guidelines:
x xxx

h. Discipline. Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against

members of the Career Executive Service shall be governed by Article VI, Chapter II
and Paragraph I (d) of Article II, Chapter III of this Part; provided that appeals shall be
made to the Career Executive Service Board instead of the Civil Service Commission.
Administrative cases involving members of the Service on assignment with the Board
shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Board with the right to appeal to the Office
of the President. (Emphasis supplied)

In our view, the foregoing rule on appeals to the Office of the President only
covers disciplinary cases involving members of the CES. It is evident that this special rule
was created for that particular type of case, because members of the CES arc all
presidential appointees. Given that the power to appoint generally carries with it the
power to discipline,74 it is only reasonable for the president to be given the ultimate
authority to discipline presidential appointees. But this special rule cannot apply to the
matter at hand, because CESB Resolution No. 918 did not involve a disciplinary case.
Since it was clearly outside the scope of the foregoing provision, the Resolution did not
come within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President. It was therefore correctly
appealed to the CSC.

From the above discussion, it is evident that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction
when it resolved the PAO's appeal. The arguments of the CESB on this point must
perforce be rejected.
Mohammad vsSaqueton
G.R. No. 193584, July 12, 2016
(Yap)

Facts:
Mohammad in this case was appointed as Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer II
(PARO II) of the Department of Agrarian Reform in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (DAR-ARMM). His appointment was temporary as he had no Career Service
Executive Eligibility (CSEE) or eligibility in the Career Executive Service (CES).

Mohammad requested the regional secretary of DAR-ARMM to change his

appointment status from temporary to permanent. His request was pursuant to an RTC
decision concerning the change in status of division superintendents. He opined that his
position was the same as that of petitioners therein, whose petition for mandamus had
been granted by the trial court.

Respondent Grace Belgado-Saqueton (respondent), Director IV of CSCRO

No.XVI, denied the request on the ground of the inapplicability of the RTC Decision,
which was binding only on the parties to that case.

Petitioner did not elevate the case to the Civil Service Commission proper.
Instead, he filed a special civil action for mandamus before the RTC. He invoked an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: when the question is
purely legal.

RTC maintained that it had jurisdiction over the case which presented a pure
question of law. The court further held that had petitioner taken the route of appealing
to the CSC proper, it would have been an exercise in futility, since issues of law cannot
be decided with finality by the commission.
 On intermediate appellate review, the CA reversed the RTC Orders. It agreed
with respondent that petitioner had prematurely brought the case to the RTC without
exhausting all the remedies available to him.

Issue:
Whether exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies:
when the question is purely legal is applicable

Decision:
No, this case was not among the exemptions of applying the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The Court has laid down tests to distinguish questions of fact from questions of
law: when doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, or when it becomes
clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question is one of
fact.

In this case, the question is whether petitioner was eligible for a permanent
appointment to the PARO II position, which had already been classified as a third-level
position requiring CSEE or CES. The issue is therefore not one of law, but of the merit
and fitness of the appointee, which is a question of fact.

Hence, the Petition was dismissed outright.

Mohammad pleads for a liberal construction of the rules owing to the nature of the case
as one of first impression involving a position in the ARMM vis-a-vis the application of
CSC rules. His plea has been mooted, however, by the promulgation of Buena, in which
the Court highlighted Section 4, Art. XVI of the Organic Act for the ARMM which states
that "until the Regional Assembly shall have enacted a civil service law, the civil service
eligibilities required by the central government or national government for
appointments to public positions shall likewise be required for appointments to
government positions in the Regional Government."
BUENA, JR. v. BENITO
G.R. No. 181760, 14 October 2014
(Gultiano)

FACTS:
Regional Governor Dr. Parouk S. Hussin of the ARMM appointed Dr. Sangcad
D. Benito as Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of Education
(DepEd) Division on Lanaodel Sur in a temporary capacity. In 2005, Hussin reappointed
Dr. Benito in the same position but in a permanent capacity. Hussin requested the Civil
Service Commission Regional Office of the ARMM toattest to Dr. Benito’s appointment.
However, Regional Director Anacleto B. Buena (Buena) declined on the ground that Dr.
Benito did not possess the career executive service eligibility required for the said
position. The latter filed a petition for Mandamus before the Regional Trial Court to
compel the Regional Office to attest to his permanent appointment arguing that the
position does not belong to the Career Executive Service under the Administrative Code
of 1987, thus, the position does not require Career Executive Service eligibility. He
further claimed that under RA 9054, Regional Governor of the ARMM is the appointing
authority for positions in the civil service in the region. Since Hussin already exercised
his discretion, the Regional Office had no choice but to attest to his appointment.

Buena claimed that the permanent appointee must have career executive service
eligibility. According to Buena, the Regional Office recognizes the autonomy of the
ARMM. However, until the region enacts its own regional civil service law, the
Regional Office shall carry on with the Civil Service Commission’s mandate
under the Constitution to promote and enforce civil service laws and rules.

ISSUE:
 Is Dr. Benito validly appointed as Assistant Schools Division Superintendent in a
permanent capacity by the Regional Governor of ARMM?

RULING:
No. The position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent belongs to the
Career Executive Service. Appointment to the position is based on merit and fitness and
gives the appointee an opportunity for advancement to higher career positions, such as
Schools Division Superintendent. If permanently appointed, the appointee is
guaranteed security of tenure. The position is above Division Chief. An Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent has a salary grade of 25. As to functions and
responsibilities, the Assistant Schools Division Superintendent assists the Schools
Division Superintendent in performing executive and managerial functions under
Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001. In fact, the law recognizes that the position
of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent belongs to the Career Executive Service.
Section 7 of the said law explicitly provides that an appointee to the position must be a
career executive service officer. In this case, Dr. Benito does not possess the required
career executive service eligibility. He, therefore, cannot be appointed to the position of
Assistant Schools Division Superintendent in a permanent capacity. The Civil Service
Commission cannot be compelled to attest to the permanent appointment of Dr. Benito.

The Regional Governor has the power to appoint civil servants in the ARMM
under Republic Act No. 9054. In Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 279 or the
ARMM Basic Education Act of 2010, the Regional Assembly set the qualification
standards of Assistant Schools Division Superintendents of Divisions of the Department
of Education in the Autonomous Region. Nevertheless, when Dr. Benito was appointed
Assistant Schools Division Superintendent in 2005, there was yet no regional law
providing for the qualifications for the Assistant Schools Division Superintendents of
Divisions of the Department of Education in the Autonomous Region.
DE CASTRO vs CARLOS
(Amorio)

FACTS:
In this case, petitioner Emmanuel de Castro filed a petition for quo warranto under
Rule 66, seeking to oust respondent Emerson Carlos from the position of Assistant
General Manager for Operations (AGMO) of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA). The controversy arose from the issuance of OP Memorandum
Circular Nos. 1 and 2, which applies to all non-CESO's occupying CES positions in all
agencies of the executive branch. Petitioner, being a non-CESO, avers that he is not
covered by these OP memoranda considering that the AGMO of the MMDA is a non-
CES position.

On July 29, 2009, PGMA appointed de Castro as AGMO.

On 2010, De Castro was reassigned to the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office,
Office of the General Manager. The service vehicle and the office space previously
assigned to him were withdrawn and assigned to other employees. Subsequently,
Carlos was assigned as OIC of the Office o the AGMO. Thereafter, the name of the
petitioner was stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he did not receive his salary
beginning November 2010.
 Petitioner was later offered the position of Director IV of MMDA Public Health and
Safety Services and/or MMDA consultant. He turned down the offer, claiming that it
was a demotion in rank.

Demanding payment of his salary and reinstatement in the monthly payroll,

petitioner sent a letter on 5 December 2010 to EdenisonFaisan, assistant general
manager (AGM) for Finance and Administration; and Lydia Domingo, Director III,
Administrative Services. For his failure to obtain an action or a response from MMDA,
he then made a formal demand for his reinstatement as AGMO through a letter
addressed to the Office of the President on 17 December 2010.

However, on 4 January 2011, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino)

appointed respondent as the new AGMO of the MMDA. On 10 January 2011, the latter
took his oath of office.

Hence, the instant Petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the position of AGMO.

RULING:
No, an AGMO performs functions that are managerial in character; exercises
management over people, resource, and/or policy; and assumes functions like
planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and overseeing the activities
of MMDA. The position requires the application of managerial or supervisory skills
necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities involving functional guidance,
leadership, and supervision.

For the foregoing reasons, the position of AGMO is within the coverage of the CES.

With particular reference to positions in the career executive service (CES), the
requisite civil service eligibility is acquired upon passing the CES examinations
administered by the CES Board and the subsequent conferment of such eligibility upon
passing the examinations. Once a person acquires eligibility, he either earns the status
of a permanent appointee to the CES position to which he has previously been
appointed, or he becomes qualified for a permanent appointment to that position
provided only that he also possesses all the other qualifications for the position. Verily,
it is clear that the possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make an
appointment in the career executive service a permanent one. Petitioner does not
possess such eligibility, however, it cannot be said that his appointment to the position
was permanent.

Petitioner undisputedly lacked CES eligibility. Thus, he did not hold the position of
AGMO in a permanent capacity or acquire security of tenure in that position. Otherwise
stated, his appointment was temporary and "co- terminus with the appointing
authority."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.

Agyao vs CSC

Facts:

Agyao was re-appointed as Department Manager II of PEZA (Philippine Economic Zone

Authority) The renewal of Agyao’s appointment was submitted by PEZA to the CSC.

However, Agyao’s re-appointment was invalidated by the CSC Field Office, through a letter of
Director Tabao. The letter stated that Agyao lacked the prescribed Career Executive Service
Office (CESO)/ Career Service Executive Examination (CSEE) eligibility, and there were
qualified eligibles actually available for appointment.

Thereafter, PEZA Director-General Lilia B. De Lima appealed to the CSC seeking a

reconsideration of its action on the appointment of Agyao. The CSC issued Resolution denying
Director-General De Lima’s appeal and affirming the invalidation by the CSC Field Office of
Agyao’s appointment as Department Manager II of PEZA. On appeal, the CA rendered a
decision affirming the resolution of the CSC.

Hence, this petition. Agyao contends that the position of Department Manager II of PEZA is not
among those covered by the Career Executive Service (CES) also known as presidential
appointees. The appointment to the position is made by the PEZA Director-General.
Accordingly, he does not need to possess the required CESO/CSEE to continue acting as
Department Manager II.

The CSC, on the other hand, argues that although the position of Department Manager II does
not require a presidential appointment, it is a third level position which requires either a CESO
or CSEE eligibility. The rank of Department Manager II falls under the coverage of CES as the
same is a third level career position above the division chief level and performing executive or
managerial functions.

Issue: Whether or not the position of Department Manager II of PEZA requires CESO or CSEE
eligibility.
Ruling:

No, In a plethora of cases decide by the court it consistently held that the CES covers
presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Department Manager II of the PEZA
does not require appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall under the CES.

Under the Administrative Code of 1987 “"Positions in the CES include those of Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President. Simply put, third-level
positions in the Civil Service are only those belonging to the Career Executive Service, or
those appointed by the President of the Philippines.

However, the issue as to whether a particular position belongs to the Third Level has been
settled by jurisprudence where the Honorable Supreme Court ruled citing the provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987, that the Third Level shall cover positions in the Career
Executive Service (CES). Positions in the Career Executive Service consists of Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may
be identified by the Career Executive Service Board (CESB), all of whom are appointed by
the President.

To classify other positions not included in the above enumeration as covered by the CES and
require appointees thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure
will lead to unconstitutional and unlawful consequences. It will result either: in (1) vesting the
appointing power for non-CES positions in the President, in violation of the Constitution; or, (2)
including in the CES a position not held by presidential appointee, contrary to the
Administrative Code.

To reiterate, the Third Level covers only the positions in the CES as enumerated in the
Administrative Code of 1987 and those identified by the CESB as of equivalent rank, all of
whom are appointed by the President of the Philippines.

Here, the position of Director Manager II at the PEZA is not among the enumerated positions in
the Career Executive Service, much less, a position that requires presidential appointment. Even
the CSC admits that the position of Director Manager II does not require presidential
appointment.

For said reason, Agyao only needs the approval of the PEZA Director-General to validate his
appointment or re-appointment. As he need not possess a CESO or CSEE eligibility, the CSC
has no valid and legal basis in invalidating his appointment or re-appointment as Department
Manager II.

Araos, et. al. vs. Hon. Regala

G.R. No. 174237; Feb. 18, 2010
(Dela Cruz)
FACTS:
Petitioners are SSS employees who, in 1999, were appointed and/or promoted to
CESO (Career Executive Service Officer) Ranks. Respondents are a judge of the RTC
together with the SSS.

Laws Relevant:
PD 847 (ADOPTING A COMPENSATION SCHEME FOR THE CAREER EXECUTIVE
SERVICE AND RELATED MATTERS)
*said law made a distinction of salaries between Career Executive Service Officers
(CESO) and Non-CESO whereby the former shall start at Grade 2 of the corresponding
rank while the latter shall start at Grade 1 of the corresponding rank. (Meaning: refer
to Reso No. 94-5840 below)

MEMO order No. 372 ("MODIFYING THE RANKING STRUCTURE AND SALARY
SCHEDULE IN THE CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE (CES) - only gave a ranking
structure and corresponding salary schedule.

Resolution No. 94-5840 (CSC)

*providing that a Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) is entitled to the second step
of the salary grade of his rank.

Reso No. 129 (Career Executive Service Board)

*Career Executive Service Officers (CESOs), who were already receiving at least the
second step of the salary grades of their ranks due to merit or longevity prior to the
issuance of CSC Resolution No. 5840, otherwise known as "Rules on Compensation in
the CES including those of Graduates of NDCP and CESDP", are entitled to a one-step
adjustment as provided for in the Paragraph 3.1.4 of subject Resolution, the spirit of
which is to set apart the CESOs and non-CESOs.

Circular No. 12 (CESB)

*Laying down guidelines on grant of a one-step adjustment in the Salary of the CESOs.
*A CESO whose salary at the time of the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 94-5840 is
already on the second or higher step of the salary grade of his rank by virtue of step
increments earlier granted based either on merit or length of service, shall be entitled to
a one-step adjustment in the salary grade of his rank effective 26 November 1994…

R. A. 9282 (Social Security Act of 1997)

*Section 3(c) 4 of which EXEMPTED respondent Social Security System (SSS) from the
application of RA No. 6758, "THE COMPENSATION AND POSITION
CLASSIFICATION ACT OF 1989" or the Salary Standardization Law.

*Sometime in 2001, the SSC approved Resolution No. 483 appropriating funds for the
grant of a one-step salary increment to nine SSS CESOs (PETITIONERS).

MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 12 (OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT)

* said Memo directed all heads of GOCCS, GFIs and Subsidiaries as EXEMPT from the
SALARY STANDARDIZATION LAW. Sec. 1 thereof states “Immediately suspend the
grant of any salary increases and new or increased benefits….”

The corporate auditor of the Commission on Audit thus advised the President of
the SSS, by Memorandum dated June 29, 2001, against the implementation of aonestep
salary increment for SSS CESOs in view of Memorandum Order No. 20 of the President.
The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) likewise issued, on August
13, 2001, an opinion, that unless approved by the Office of the President, a one-step
salary increment for SSS CESOs may not be implemented. Acting under the OGCC's
advice, the SSS recommended, on April 9, 2002, to the Office of the President the
approval of a one-step salary adjustment for SSS CESOs. DBM, however, was of the
opinion that:

[T]he CES pay under CSC Resolution No. 94-5840 is based on SSL. The S[alary] G[rade]
equivalence for each CESO rank and the automatic 2nd step adjustment are all based on
the salary schedule and position classification and compensation system prescribed
under SSL. Since SSS is exempt from the SSL, we believe that CSC Resolution No. 94-
5840 does not apply to SSS and other SSL-exempt agencies.

Petitioners made repeated demands to SSS management for the release of the one-step
salary adjustment but was of no avail causing them to file a petition for mandamus
praying that the SSS be ordered to implement the one-step salary increment due them
by virtue of their CESO rank. BOTH RTC AND CA dismissed. Hence, this petition for
review on Certioari.

ISSUE:
WON the petition for MANDAMUS will lie.
HELD:
NO.
For mandamus to issue, it is essential that the person petitioning for it has a clear
legal right to the claim sought. It will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel
compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists.
Thus, unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, it will be denied.
As to the issue of Clear legal right to the Claim sought:

The Court said that the intention of the law was to make a distinction between
CESOs and Non-CESOs (per P.D. 847). To maintain such, CSC Reso 94-5840 required
that CESOs were already receiving at least the second step of the salary grade of their
rank due to longevity or merit. Without the increment, a CESO who, due to longevity or
merit, is already receiving the second step of the salary grade of his rank as of the
effectivity of CSC Resolution No. 94-5840, would be no different from a similarly
situated non-CESO within the same salary grade.

THEREFORE, PETITIONERS HAVE NO CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT BECAUSE:

Petitioners must thus establish that when they were appointed or promoted to CESO
ranks in 1999, they were already receiving the second step of the salary grade of their
ranks. Petitioners failed to do so, however.

CESB CIRCULAR NO. 12 is UNENFORCEABLE for failure to file three (3) copies of
said circular with the Office of the National Register (ONAR) of the UP Law Center as
required under the Administrative Code of 1987. As such it has yet to take effect and
therefore, unenforceable.

Caringalvs PCSO
G.R. No. 161942, October 13, 2005
(Yap)

Facts:
Caringal in this case was appointed Assistant Department Manager II in the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), respondent as Assistant Manager in the
Legal Department. Subsequently, a new Chairman issued a Special Order re-assigning
Caringal to the Assets and Investment Department. Caringal protested this re-
assignment, the same being a constructive dismissal.
 With this, the Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) wrote to the
Manager of the PCSO Administrative Department, stating that his office inadvertently
omitted to stamp on petitioners appointment the collatilla that the appointee does not
have security of tenure until he obtains CES eligibility. However, Director of CSC could
not effect the necessary correction since petitioner has the original copy of his
appointment.

Caringal then filed with the CSC an administrative complaint for constructive
dismissal and culpable violation of the Constitution on civil service appointments.
However, CSC dismissed the complaint, affirming the complaint. Also, the Appellate
Court issued the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and affirming the Resolutions
of the CSC. Thus, this complaint

Issue:
Whether Caringal is guaranteed its right to security of tenure

Decision:
No, Caringal was not guaranteed a right to security of tenure

Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service La[9] provides:

(1) Permanent status. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a

person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he
is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed,
in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards
promulgated in pursuance thereof.

Career Executive Service Eligibility

Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of

CES eligibility and the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligibles.
Conferment of CES eligibility is done by the Board through a formal Board
Resolution after an evaluation is done of the examinees performance in the four
stages of the CES eligibility examinations.
 Appointment to CES Rank

Upon conferment of a CES eligibility and compliance with the other

requirements prescribed by the Board, an incumbent of a CES position may
qualify for appointment to a CES rank. Appointment to a CES rank is made by
the President upon the recommendation of the Board. This process completes
the officials membership in the CES and most importantly, confers on him
security of tenure in the CES.

In this case, there is no question that petitioner does not possess the required CES
eligibility. Hence, he has no security of tenure as his appointment is merely temporary.
To be sure, his appointment did not attain permanency. Such being the case, it can be
withdrawn from him anytime without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to
security of tenure.
AMORES vs CSC
(Amorio)

FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Pepito M. Amores was the Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services at
the Lung Center of the Philippines (LCP). His civil service career began in 1982 when he was
initially engaged at the LCP as a resident physician. In the course of his service, he had been
promoted to the position of Medical Specialist, then to Department Manager,and finally to
Deputy Director. Dr.CalixtoZaldivar was then the Executive Director of the LCP and when he
retired from service in 1999, petitioner was designated as officer-in-charge of the LCP by the
Department of Health (DOH) Secretary Alberto Romualdez, Jr.

Petitioner had taken charge of the LCP in the interim that the DOH selection board was in
the process of selecting a new executive director.

Petitioner was caught by surprise when, on August 27, 2002, he received a letter from the
LCP Board of Trustees informing him of his separation from service as Deputy Director
effective September 30, 2002. To the said letter was attached a copy of the Boards Resolution[16]
dated August 23, 2002, principally directing petitioners termination from service after
consultation with the Career Executive Service Board (CES Board). Petitioner brought an appeal
from the resolution to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

Resolving the appeal, the CSC declared that the LCP Board of Trustees had properly and
validly separated petitioner from his post as Deputy Director. It pointed out that petitioners
separation from service was anchored on his lack of a CES eligibility which is required for the
position of deputy director and, as such, he enjoyed no security in his tenure.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is eligible for the position

RULING:
We begin with the precept, firmly established by law and jurisprudence that a permanent
appointment in the civil service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the
position to which the appointment is made in accordance with law and the rules issued
pursuant thereto.

Security of tenure in the Career Executive Service, which presupposes a permanent

appointment, takes place upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board. It
is that which entitles the examinee to conferment of CES eligibility and the inclusion of his
name in the roster of CES eligibles. Under the rules and regulations promulgated by the CES
Board, conferment of the CES eligibility is done by the CES Board through a formal board
resolution after an evaluation has been done of the examinees performance in the four stages of
the CES eligibility examinations. Upon conferment of CES eligibility and compliance with the
other requirements prescribed by the Board, an incumbent of a CES position may qualify for
appointment to a CES rank. Appointment to a CES rank is made by the President upon the
Board’s recommendation. It is this process which completes the officials membership in the CES
and confers on him security of tenure in the CES. Petitioner does not seem to have gone through
this definitive process.

At this juncture, what comes unmistakably clear is the fact that because petitioner lacked
the proper CES eligibility and therefore had not held the subject office in a permanent capacity,
there could not have been any violation of petitioners supposed right to security of tenure
inasmuch as he had never been in possession of the said right at least during his tenure as
Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.