Drewry 2019 - Global Container Terminal Operators Annual Review and Forecast 2019 PDF

Global Container Terminal Operators
Annual Review and Forecast

ANNUAL REPORT 2019
2019 Global Container Terminal Operators Contents
Contents
Global Container Terminal Operators
1. Executive Summary��2 Editor:

Neil Davidson
davidson@drewry.co.uk
2. The Global Container Terminal Industry��7 Subrata Behera
behera@drewry.co.uk
Ruby Tomar
3. League tables of global/international
tomar@drewry.co.uk
terminal operators��16 Kanika Batura
kanika@drewry.co.uk
Amar Singh
4. Analysis of leading operators and investors��69 amar@drewry.co.uk
5. Analysis by world region��199 Drewry Maritime Research

15-17 Christopher Street,
London EC2A 2BS
6. Appendices��232 Tel +44 (0) 20 7538 0191 Fax
+44 (0) 20 7987 9396
enquiries@drewry.co.uk
www.drewry.co.uk
© Copyright 2019 | Drewry Shipping Consultants Limited. Unauthorised redistribution of this content is prohibited.
Licenced Content may only be shared across the Licenced Site in accordance with Drewry’s Standard Site Licence terms.
1
2019 Global Container Terminal Operators Executive Summary
1. Executive Summary
I n this report we provide a detailed analysis of both the overall

container terminal industry and its key players, defined here as
global/international terminal operators (GTOs/ITOs). There are also
Key industry players
are defined in this
report as global/
comprehensive profiles of selected other terminal operators and owners. international terminal
These profiles include the ownership, throughput and capacity of each operators
terminal in each operator’s portfolio.
We provide five-year forecasts of container port demand on a regional
and global basis, as well as capacity projections for the same period and
in the same level of detail. We also provide capacity projections through
to 2023 for each GTO/ITO.
The report includes Drewry’s long established league tables of GTOs/
ITOs measured by throughput (two types) and capacity, along with
regional throughput league tables. The activities, performance and
strategies of GTOs/ITOs are also analysed in detail, including aspects
such as financial performance, operational performance, geographical
spread and risk profiles. Other key aspects of the industry are also
covered including the ship-to-shore gantry crane fleet and orderbook.
We summarise below the key findings of our analyses, which are covered
in more detail in subsequent pages.
The global container terminal industry
• The most common institutional structure in the global container port In 2018, terminals
industry is the landlord port authority owned or partially
• Drewry categorises 21 companies as global/international terminal owned by GTOs/ITOs
operators (GTOs/ITOs) accounted for 65% of
• GTOs/ITOs can be divided into three main categories – stevedores,
global throughput
global carriers and hybrids
• Global hybrids now account for 35% of GTO/ITO volumes
• In 2018, terminals owned or partially owned by GTOs/ITOs,
accounted for 65% of global throughput
• Back in 1996, GTOs/ITOs had just 18% share of global throughput
• Regions where in 2018 GTOs/ITOs accounted for the highest
proportion of volume were Europe and the Middle East/South Asia
• An estimated 35-40% of global throughput is handled at ports and
terminals that are state-owned and state-run
5 things you need to know…

 Drewry’s five-year
global container
port demand
 Global terminal
capacity is
forecast to
 In 2018,
terminals owned
or partially
 A number of
GTOs/ITOs
achieved
 Typical EBITDA
margins of
GTOs/ITOs are
forecast is 4.4% increase by just owned by GTOs/ double-digit in the 20-50%
per annum under 2% per ITOs accounted volume growth in range
annum through for 65% of global 2018
to 2023 throughput
2
League tables of global/international terminal operators
• Cosco heads the Drewry total teu throughput league table for 2018 Wide variances in
• The strongest volume growth in percentage terms was achieved by terminal operator
Hyundai (23%) and Cosco (16%) nature, performance
and strategies
• PSA heads GTO/ITO equity-adjusted teu throughput ranking in 2018
• Hutchison and PSA have been the top two GTOs/ITOs since 2008
• 2M and Ocean have a much greater scale of terminal ownership than
THE alliance
• China Merchants, Bollore, ICTSI and SAAM Puertos have the
heaviest involvement in emerging markets
• DP World and APMT have the highest levels of global coverage; most
GTOs/ITOs derive their throughput from a relatively small number of
geographic areas
• In all but one case at least half of all volumes for each GTO/ITO are
from gateway traffic
• Typical GTO/ITO terminal size is around one million teu per annum Typical GTO/ITO
• HHLA has by far the largest proportion of home port volume, terminal size is ~ one
followed by PSA million teu
• Cosco added the most capacity in 2018; K Line and NYK saw the
largest percentage increases in capacity
• PSA is projected to add the most capacity over the next five years; DP
World is boosted by both acquisitions and greenfield projects
• Greenfield terminals in emerging markets are the main focus – for
those that are expanding; a number of GTOs/ITOs have no new
projects at all lined up
• GTO/ITO M&A activity is picking up pace and there is expansion
into a ‘trade enabler’ role for DP World – and others?
• The average terminal worldwide had around 1,130 metres of quay, 10
gantry cranes and handled 1.3 million teu in 2018
• Terminals in Asia achieve the highest performance figures, but they
are more than 50% larger than the world average
• North America achieved among the lowest performance levels, Terminals in Asia
reflecting much lower intensity of asset utilisation achieve the highest
performance levels,
• The ship-to-shore gantry crane fleet is 6,300 units and there are 238
North American
cranes on order with 64% of them being 22+ rows outreach
among the lowest
• The weak global economic outlook beckons caution; the Chinese
economy is growing at the slowest pace in more than two decades
• Drewry has revised downwards its year-on-year growth in global
container port traffic from 3.9% to 3.0% for 2019
• Container revenue yields across the 11 companies DMFR covers
remained broadly flat in 2018 year-on-year
• The trade war has deepened the chill in quoted port company
valuations; port valuations are nearing maturity
3
Analysis of leading operators and investors
• Hutchison Ports’ overall activity levels were similar in 2018 to 2017, A number of GTOs/
but with significant ups and downs at the terminal level ITOs achieved double-
• A significant change in APMT strategy involves closer links with digit volume growth in
Maersk Line and focus on core activities; equity-adjusted teu was up 2018
8% despite exits from three terminals
• Overall growth across the PSA portfolio was more than 8% in 2018;
the company has been active on the acquisition trail in Poland and
North America
• Being a global trade enabler is now the key DPW strategy; total throughput
was up by just over 2%, with a 3% decline at home port Jebel Ali
• The acquisition of OOCL, a stake in SIPG, plus consolidation at
Dalian and Qingdao has had a significant impact on Cosco’s figures
• For TIL, new terminals at Abu Dhabi, Panama and Rio added
significantly to total throughput
• Equity-adjusted throughput for Eurogate was unchanged
• Double-digit growth in throughput for SSA in 2018 was driven by the
US and Panama
• CMA CGM’s unadjusted total teu growth was 10%, while adjusted was
3.5%; equity teu was down 5% due to Los Angeles divestment
• NYK, K Line and MOL have merged their container shipping NYK, K Line and MOL
operations into ONE (Ocean Network Express); international are due to merge their
terminals of the three are due to follow international terminal
• ICTSI’s Melbourne terminal made a big contribution to 2018 portfolio portfolios under ONE
throughput growth of ~7%
• There was big growth in Hyundai throughput mainly due to full-year
effects of acquisitions at Algeciras and Kaohsiung
• Double-digit volume growth was achieved by the CMP portfolio in 2018
• For Bollore Ports, three terminals in the portfolio (Pointe Noire, Kribi
and Tuticorin) were responsible for around three-quarters of the
~11% 2018 growth
• Yilport throughput was up by around 4.5% in 2018, with double-digit
growth at a number of terminals
• SAAM Puertos saw double-digit growth in equity teu despite exiting
from two terminal investments
• HHLA has re-qualified as a GTO/ITO after a hiatus and is now
looking for more selected international expansion
Operator/ownership analysis by world region
• Drewry’s five-year global container port demand forecast is 4.4% per Drewry’s five-year
annum, but there are many uncertain economic and political factors global container port
at play right now demand forecast is
• South Asia, Southeast Asia and North Africa are forecast to have the 4.4% per annum
highest demand growth rates through to 2023
• Global terminal capacity is forecast to increase by just under 2% per
annum through to 2023, so most regions can expect to see an increase
in average terminal utilisation levels
4
Operator/ownership analysis by world region
• Significantly, Chinese capacity expansion appears to be largely on hold Chinese capacity

• The equity teu of the top 10 players accounted for just over 60% of Far expansion is largely on
Eastern regional throughput hold; consolidation is
the trend instead
• Shanghai’s SIPG continues to lead the regional table but terminal
ownership in China is becoming more and more intertwined
• PSA remains the dominant player in Southeast Asia but Malaysia’s
MMC has moved up into second position with an 11% share in
regional throughput
• APMT heads North America’s top 10 owners / operators table
• Hutchison Ports is once again at the top spot in North Europe, with its
equity teu accounting for just over 16% of the region’s throughput
• Cosco has moved to the top of the South Europe table where the top
three players accounted for 36% of the regional throughput
• Macquarie once again tops the Eastern Europe table, but not for much Cosco has moved to
longer the top of the South
• In the Middle East, DP World had ~38% share of regional volumes in Europe table
2018 but TIL moved five places up the table
• DPW continues to occupy the top spot in South Asia, although its
market share is being eroded
• In South America, SPRC, APMT and TIL all have similar regional
shares at the top of the table
• Hutchison remains at the top of the Central America / Caribbean
region although its share has reduced
• The top nine African players in 2018 are unchanged versus the
previous year
• The Oceania region is dominated by Patricks and DP World
Figure 1.1. Projected regional container handling (mteu) and average annual growth (%), 2018-2023
3.4% 4.9%
3.6% 136 160

423 538
68 81
5.1%
69 89
4.1%
3.7% 27 34
48 57
2.0%
13 14
2018 Average annual growth (2018-2023) 2023
Source: Drewry Maritime Research
5
Market analysis and
advice tailored to your
commercial needs
Drewry Maritime Advisors bring

together market-leading sector
expertise, resources and robust
analysis to deliver actionable
market insight tailored to your
commercial needs
enquiries@drewry.co.uk
About Drewry Maritime Advisors

While research is in our DNA, we do not stop there. We are passionate about applying this insight to provide actionable, practical and
timely advice. The combination of understanding and expertise in the markets we serve allows our clients, whether shippers, carriers
and port operators, banks, investors and financial intermediaries, to make the right commercial decisions at the right time.
UK India Singapore China

15-17 Christopher Street 4th Floor, Tower C #13-02 Tower Fifteen Unit D01 Level 10,
London Pioneer Urban Square 15 Hoe Chiang Road Shinmay Union Square Tower 2,
EC2A 2BS Sector 62, Gurugram Singapore 089316 506 Shang Cheng Road, Pudong,
United Kingdom Haryana - 122 101, Shanghai 200120 P. R. China
India
T +44 20 7538 0191 T +91 124 497 4979 T +65 6220 9890 T +86 (0) 21 5081 0508
enquiries@drewry.co.uk www.drewry.co.uk
2019 Global Container Terminal Operators The Global ContainerTerminal Industry
2. The Global Container Terminal Industry

Nature of GTOs and ITOs
F or the purpose of this report, Drewry categorises 21 companies as

global/international terminal operators (GTOs/ITOs). These are
privately owned or state-controlled organisations that have container
21 companies are
classified as GTOs/
ITOs by Drewry for
terminal interests in more than one world region and meet the detailed 2018
qualifying criteria set out in Appendix 2 of this report. It should be noted
here that the word ‘international’ is included, even though it results in
a slightly awkward nomenclature and abbreviation. However, this is
important because few operators are truly global in their activities. Most
are international, while some border on the regional. Purely regional
operators do not qualify as GTOs/ITOs under Drewry’s criteria.
GTOs/ITOs can be divided into three main categories – stevedoring,
global carriers and hybrids. The main characteristics of each of these
categories, together with Drewry’s assessment of which companies
fall into them, are contained in Figure 2.1 with a summary of the key
strategic aims of each type in Table 2.1. Notably, Drewry does not
include financial, infrastructure and institutional owners of terminal
portfolios in the list of GTOs/ITOs. This is because Drewry’s focus is not
only on terminal ownership, but also the commercial and operational
expertise, and the experience of developing and running terminals on an
international basis.
Table 2.1 Strategic aims and targets of global/international stevedores, hybrids and carriers
Global/International
Global/International Hybrids Global Carriers
Terminal Operators
Main activity
The main activity of the company is
Terminal operation is prime purpose of Container shipping is prime
liner shipping, but terminals form a
business purpose of business
separate business unit
Financial aims
Terminals are run more as profit
Terminals are profit centres centres than cost centres, although Terminals are usually cost centres
the degree varies
Efficiency aims
Greater efficiency of terminals
Greater efficiency of terminals through Greater efficiency of the shipping
through implementing common
implementing common practices network rather than the terminals
practices
Main purpose of terminals network
Terminal network supports shipping

Spreading of investment risk, Terminal network supports
activities but also provides an
maximisation of profits shipping activities and strategy
additional business stream
7
Figure 2.1 Key characteristics of global/international stevedores, carriers and hybrids

Global/International Stevedores’ Terminal Operations
--Hutchison Ports
--PSA International
--DP World
--Terminal Investment Limited (TIL) *
--China Merchants Ports
--Eurogate --China Cosco Shipping
--SSA Marine --CMA CGM
--ICTSI --NYK Line **
--Bollore Ports --APM Terminals ***
--Yildirim/Yilport
ds
--SAAM Puertos
--HHLA ybri --Evergreen
H
nal --MOL **
tio
erna --Yang Ming
Int
al/
--Hyundai
ob
Gl --K Line **
Global Carriers’ Terminal Operations
Global/International Stevedores’ Global Carriers’ Terminal

Global/International Hybrids
Terminal Operations Operations
--Prime focus: Terminal operation --Prime focus: Main activity is liner --Prime focus: Container shipping
--Terminals run as: Profit centres shipping, but terminals form a --Terminals run as: Cost centres
separate business unit
--Greater efficiency aimed for by --Greater efficiency is gained by
implementing common systems --Additional focus: Terminal integrating the terminal with the
across the terminal network to operation wider shipping service network
improve productivity --Terminals run as: More as profit --Extensive terminal networks
--Extensive terminal networks centres than cost centres, support shipping activities and
spread investment risk although the degree varies strategy
--Extensive terminal networks
support shipping activities
but also provide an additional
business stream
Notes:
See Appendix 2 for Drewry rules and explanation regarding classification as global/ international terminal operators
The concept of “stevedore” is different from the concept of “stevedoring” in this context. A stevedore in this context is a terminal operator providing
all aspects of service, not just labour supply or crane operation.
CMA CGM includes APL
China Cosco Shipping includes OOCL
* Terminal Investment Limited has a strategic relationship with MSC
** The international terminal portfolios of the three Japanese lines are due to be merged under ONE
*** New corporate strategy by AP Moller Group has moved APMT and Maersk Line closer together
8
The primary business of ‘stevedores’ is port and terminal operations. Global/international

The aim of such companies is to maximise profits by achieving greater stevedores have
operational efficiency, commercial advantage and economies of scale by terminal operations as
operating an international container terminal network. In this context, their primary business
note that the concept of ‘stevedore’ is different from the concept of
‘stevedoring’. A stevedore in this context is a terminal operator providing
all aspects of service, not just labour supply or ship/crane operations.
Well-known major players such as Hutchison Ports, PSA International
and DP World fall into this category as do others such as ICTSI and
SSA. APM Terminals was in the stevedore category but is now classed
as a hybrid as parent group AP Moller’s strategy is to have APMT and
Maersk Line work more closely together than in the past. That said,
APMT remains committed to handling third-party business and offering
a service akin to a stevedore-category operator. TIL is similar to APMT
in many ways in terms of having a major carrier as a sister concern and
it could be argued that TIL ought to be viewed as a hybrid as well. The
dividing line is a grey one and it should immediately be apparent that the
distinction between the three categories of GTO/ITO is not a sharp one
– rather it is more of a continuum.
The core business of global carrier GTOs/ITOs is container shipping and The core business of
their container terminal networks exist primarily to support the liner global carrier GTOs/
shipping activity. Terminals that often run as cost centres are integrated ITOs is container
with a global shipping services network and are generally dedicated to shipping
the specific needs of an individual carrier and its alliance partners, at
least at the outset. Evergreen, Yang Ming and Hyundai are examples of
this type of operator. OOCL fell into this category as well, but after being
acquired by Cosco, the OOCL terminals are now viewed in the same way
as the Cosco ones, i.e. as a hybrid category business. Two Japanese lines
(K Line and MOL) are expected to move towards the hybrid category as
well, joining NYK under the ONE banner. The list of global carrier-type
GTOs/ITOs is shortening therefore.
A hybrid is a company for which the main activity is container shipping, Global/international
but one where a separate terminals division exists as a business unit. hybrids have shipping
These companies generally handle third-party traffic as well as the as the main focus, but
associated liner shipping business and are generally more profit centres a separate terminals
than cost centres. Cosco, CMA CGM and the aforementioned APMT are division
classed in this category, along with NYK (mainly through its ownership
of Ceres Terminals, which has its origins as a stevedore).
In all of these cases, there is a degree of distinction between a shipping
line operation and a terminal operation, with different commercial and
financial reporting mechanisms in place. However, the extent to which
the terminal divisions operate independent of their parent shipping
line varies (that is, not all hybrids are the same), and the dividing line
between stevedores and hybrids on the one side, and carriers and
hybrids on the other, is not distinct.
Carrier-owned
There are a number of advantages and disadvantages in shipping lines terminals have pros
either owning stakes in terminals, or owning them outright: and cons
9
Advantages
• Increases certainty of volumes for terminal operator
• Provides terminal operator with insight into shipping line plans and
intentions, e.g. with regard to the increasing ship size
• Allows a shipping line to influence the way the terminal is developed
• If the terminal is entirely dedicated to a shipping line, it provides
flexibility to the line and guarantees access to capacity
Disadvantages
• Terminals entirely dedicated to a shipping line are often run as cost
centres rather than profit centres
• Dedicated terminals might not result in the most intensive use of
resources (e.g. quay line, land area and cranes) compared with multi-
user terminals
• Shipping line customers that do not hold a stake in a terminal might
fear poorer quality of service compared with shipping lines that do
own a stake in a particular terminal
Strengths and weaknesses of GTOs/ITOs Being a GTO/ITO

has a number of
There are a number of attractions in being a GTO/ITO, but also some attractions, but
weaknesses: weaknesses too
Strengths
• Spreading of risk
• Increased purchasing power
• Global relationships with customers
• Financial strength because of size
• Ability to share expertise between terminals
• Ability to offer consistent quality and common procedures
• Access to investment funds
• Reputation and familiarity
Weaknesses
• Customers might seek global deals across the portfolio, which result
in squeezed prices
• Might encounter market share issues in some locations
• Resistance to (or fear of) overseas control of ports in some countries
• Effective management of a geographically disparate portfolio can be
challenging
It should also be noted that there are limited economies of scale in being
a GTO/ITO. Economies of scale in the container terminal industry
are to be found at the individual terminal level, not across a group.
Additionally, the operational efficiency and performance of well-run
local terminal operators can often be as good as those of GTOs/ITOs.
10
Institutional structures
T he typical institutional structure in the global container port

industry is the ‘public port authority-private terminal operators’
model, commonly known as the landlord port authority. A public or
The most common
institutional structure
in the global container
state-owned body owns and manages the port estate and builds and port industry is the
maintains the infrastructure. This body acts as a landlord signing long- landlord port authority
term deals with tenants who invest in superstructure and equipment and
carry out cargo-handling. Drewry estimates that this structure exists in
80-85% of ports worldwide, but that this model only accounts for around
60-65% of global container port throughput. This is because there are
a small number of large ports that are not under the landlord port
authority model. It should also be noted here that there are a number of
variants to the model.
While the public port authority-private terminal operator model is the An estimated 35-40%
most prevalent, an estimated 35-40% of global throughput is handled of global throughput
at ports and terminals that are state-owned and state-run. The quay is handled at ports
and landside operations, as well as the land area, infrastructure and and terminals that
superstructure, are controlled by a state or public organisation. are state-owned and
state-run
However, the definition of ‘state-owned’ is one that rapidly blurs. For
example, most of the main Chinese ports are owned and run by state
bodies such as Shanghai International Port Group and Qingdao Port
Group. Jebel Ali port in Dubai is entirely owned and operated by DP
World, which is ultimately majority-owned by the state. Similarly, PSA
in Singapore port is government-owned. While there is a separate port
authority organisation (MPA), both PSA and MPA are state-owned.
The GTOs/ITOs which are majority-owned by organisations linked The definition of
to national governments tend to operate in a similar, commercially ‘state-owned’ is one
orientated manner to their private sector equivalents. These, and other that rapidly blurs
state-owned port companies, are often run as private or quasi-private
organisations, and some are quoted on stock exchanges too. Additionally,
many Chinese port companies operate their container terminals in
joint ventures with private operators such as PSA, HPH, APMT and DP
World.
Finally, under the state ownership category, there are the institutional
structures (mainly in the US) where the port authority owns and invests
in equipment as well as infrastructure. However, the port authority
allows private stevedores to work vessels on common user berths, and in
some cases, the yards, but the entire terminal is not under concession.
Determining whether these terminals are state-run or privately run is a
matter of opinion in many cases.
The remainder of the industry is characterised by ports and terminals
where the land, infrastructure and equipment are all controlled by a
private operating company that functions as both port authority and
terminal operator. The ports of Teesport and Liverpool in the UK are
examples of this, where there is no involvement of the state sector. These
100% private ports/terminals are fairly rare instances, globally.
11
Forecast global container terminal capacity
T able 2.2 provides a breakdown of current and forecast global

container terminal capacity split by ownership type. The aim is to
show the current and possible future split of ownership between GTOs/
ITOs and other types of operators, with the latter category further split
between state-owned and privately owned companies. Making this
assessment, one terminal at a time, is not straightforward. For example,
there are many terminals with a mix of shareholders that fall into more
than one ownership category. Additionally, the line between private and
state ownership can be blurred, and in some cases, in certain obscure
locations, the nature of ownership is not clear at all (and is categorised
simply as ‘Other’). Finally, there is the challenge that in the future,
certain operators might well become categorised as GTOs/ITOs when
they currently are not (and indeed some might cease to be global/
international).
During this analysis, Drewry’s approach has been to make a judgement Drewry has made
based on which party has the most significant stake in each terminal, judgements based on
along with who exercises management control. We have also assumed, which party has the
for the purposes of Table 2.2, that Chinese port companies generally most significant stake
fall under the state ownership category, but where individual terminals in each terminal, along
have significant GTO/ITO involvement, they are placed in the GTO/ITO with who exercises
management control
category instead.
Table 2.2 indicates that in 2018 around 62% of the world capacity fell
under the GTO/ITO category, up slightly from 61% in 2017. This share is
forecast to be maintained at more or less the same level through to 2023 In 2018, around 62%
of the world capacity
as GTO/ITO capacity grows closely in line with the overall industry level
fell under the GTO/ITO
(1.5% CAGR for GTOs/ITOs versus 1.9% CAGR globally). Many GTOs/
category
ITOs remain cautious about greenfield capacity expansion in the face of
greater risks and lower returns from projects and so this explains why
they are expanding at below the industry rate. This year for the purpose
of this table we have not assumed that any other operators qualify as
GTOs/ITOs during the forecast period.
Table 2.2 F
orecast development of container port capacity by ownership, 2018-2023 (by million teu and
share of world capacity)
Ave. Annual
Growth
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2018-23
694.6 710.8 728.9 741.7 747.3 749.6 1.5%
Global/International Operators
61.9% 61.7% 61.3% 61.1% 60.9% 60.9%
196.6 200.0 205.5 209.2 213.0 213.9 1.7%
Other Private Sector
17.5% 17.4% 17.3% 17.2% 17.3% 17.4%
210.2 217.5 227.7 234.4 238.3 238.3 2.5%
State Sector
18.7% 18.9% 19.2% 19.3% 19.4% 19.3%
21.2 22.9 26.6 28.8 29.4 30.0 7.2%
Other *
1.9% 2.0% 2.2% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4%
Total 1122.5 1151.2 1188.8 1214.0 1228.0 1231.8 1.9%
* Capacity for which control category is unclear
Categorisation between State Sector and Other Private Sector ownership can be a grey area e.g. most Chinese port authority companies behave
like private companies but are ultimately state owned
12
Forecast global container terminal capacity
Other Private Operators are also forecast to be growing their capacity at The state-sector
a rate slightly below the overall average, most likely for the same reason category is projected
as GTOs/ITOs. Meanwhile the State Sector category is projected to show to show the highest
the highest growth, at 2.5% per annum. This is mainly due to capacity growth, at 2.5% per
expansion by large state-owned Chinese operators (that are not GTOs/ annum
ITOs).
It should also be noted here that while the ‘Other’ category in the table is
small, it is projected to grow strongly. This is because at this stage, while
it is clear that for a number of new projects the ownership category will
not be the state sector, it is not yet certain whether it will be Global/
International Operators or Other Private Operators.
Regional split of port ownership types
T able 2.3 shows the type of ownership across the industry from
another perspective; this time, based on throughput and split
by world regions. Once again, there are numerous challenges in
determining which category of ownership each terminal should be
placed in, especially when there are multiple shareholders of differing
types for the same terminal (for example, state and global/international).
However, using the same assumptions as Table 2.2, there is a degree of
consistency in the overall ownership split.
In 2018, terminals owned or partially-owned by GTOs/ITOs, accounted In 2018, terminals
for 65% of global throughput, with other private operators around 15% owned or partially
and the state sector representing around 20%. At this global level, GTOs/ owned by GTOs/ITOs,
ITOs increased their share slightly at the expense of non-GTO/ITO accounted for 65% of
private operators versus 2017. The state sector share was unchanged. At global throughput
the regional level, the changes were more pronounced, with the most
significant reasons for differences being:
Table 2.3 World container port handling by region and ownership, 2017-2018
% Share of Throughput % Share of Throughput
2017 Global/ 2018 Global/

Throughput International Private State Throughput International Private State
(’000 teu) (’000 teu)

North America 63,898 59.6% 19.9% 20.5% 67,518 58.2% 20.7% 21.1%
Europe 130,483 70.6% 21.8% 7.6% 137,031 76.3% 16.4% 7.3%
Asia 404,411 64.7% 10.5% 24.9% 423,077 64.2% 10.5% 25.4%
Middle East Indian Sub Continent 65,565 68.5% 13.0% 18.5% 66,682 73.0% 11.4% 15.6%
Latin America 44,806 56.4% 31.6% 12.0% 47,127 56.7% 32.5% 10.8%
Africa 24,520 54.3% 7.5% 38.1% 25,852 56.1% 6.1% 37.8%
Oceania 12,586 30.7% 59.4% 10.0% 13,119 33.6% 56.6% 9.9%
World 748,386 64.2% 15.5% 20.3% 783,630 65.3% 14.5% 20.3%
13
Regional split of port ownership types
• In North America, the GTO percentage was down due to several factors:
In Tacoma, Yang Ming exited, moving the terminal to the Private
category, plus its throughput was down by 50% and in Lazaro Cardenas
the throughput of GTO Hutchsion was down 33%. There were also
changes in Los Angeles and Freeport TX affecting GTO throughput.
• In Europe, the GTO share was up sharply due to the terminals of
HHLA coming under the global operator category in 2018.
• In the Middle East/South Asia region the GTO share was also up
noticeably. This was due to TIL’s entry in Khalifa, Abu Dhabi, where
the 2018 throughput was a significant 1.7m teu.
• In Oceania, the GTO share was up in 2018 because ICTSI added Lae
and Motukea to its portfolio.
The regions where the global/international players accounted for the
highest proportion of volume in 2018 were Europe and the Middle East/
Regions where GTOs/
South Asia, with 73-76% of throughput in each region. The GTO/ITO ITOs accounted for
presence was also significant in Asia (64%). In North America, Latin the highest proportion
America and Africa, just over half of each region’s throughput was handled of volume were
at GTO/ITO terminals, even though in Africa, the state sector still has the Europe and the Middle
largest presence of any region, with around 38% of the total. Oceania had East/South Asia
the lowest GTO/ITO presence (and the highest Private category), mainly
because of the significant market share of Patrick Ports in Australia.
Europe and Oceania were the regions where the state sector has the
lowest presence, with no more than 10% of throughput in both cases.
Split by type of GTO/ITO
F igure 2.2 provides a time series of the split between the three types
of ownership from 1996 to 2018. In 2018, the GTO/ITO sector’s
throughput grew 6.5%, boosted by the inclusion of HHLA in this
Back in 1996, GTOs/
ITOs had just 18%
share of global
category. The other private sector category decreased by just over 2% throughput - in 2018 it
while the state sector was up over 4%. The context for these figures is the reached 65%
global growth rate of 4.7% in 2018.
Figure 2.2 Development of control of global container terminal volumes

800
600
Million teu
400
200 Other private sector

Global/international operators
0 State sector
1996 2004 2017 2018
14
Split by type of GTO/ITO
Back in 1996, GTOs/ITOs had just 18% share of the global throughput.
In 2018 it reached 65%. The state sector had a 35% share which has now
reduced to 20% and the other private sector category has dropped from
46% to just 14% in the same time period.
Figure 2.3 provides a detailed breakdown of global/international Global hybrids now
operator shares split into the three types of GTOs/ITOs for 2016-18. account for 35% of
In 2016, around 70% of GTO/ITO volume was accounted for by the GTO/ITO volumes
stevedore category, with around 20% in the hands of hybrids and less
than 10% under global carriers. This has changed markedly such that
in 2018, only 60% was stevedores and the hybrid sector jumped to 35%.
The global carriers meanwhile have shrunk to 5% of the total.
There are several reasons for these sharp changes:
• APMT was classed as a stevedore until 2017 when the change in
corporate strategy to move it closer to Maersk Line led us to move
APMT into the hybrid category
• Global carrier Hanjin went out of business and so is not included after
2016
• Carriers OOCL and APL have both been acquired by hybrid operators
(Cosco and CMA CGM respectively) and so their volumes have been
clubbed in the hybrid sector under their new parent companies
• SAAM has been added as a stevedore GTO/ITO from 2017 onwards
and HHLA from 2018 onwards
Figure 2.3 Global/international terminal operator throughput by operator type, 2016-18

500
400
300
Million teu
200
100
2016
0 2017
Global/international stevedores Global carriers Global/international hybrids 2018
15
2019 Global Container Terminal Operators League Tables of Global/International Terminal Operators
3. League tables of global/international

terminal operators
Throughput league tables
T his section provides league tables of annual container throughput

figures for companies that are categorised as global or international
terminal operators (GTOs/ITOs). Companies are considered by Drewry
to be GTOs/ITOs if they have significant existing container terminal
operations in more than one of Drewry’s world regions. The detailed
measures applied to decide whether a company qualifies for Drewry’s
league tables are described in Appendix 2. The task of categorising
companies as GTOs/ITOs, and also determining their throughputs, is
not straightforward. Drewry has a detailed set of rules to help ensure that
comparisons are as fair and meaningful as possible, and are consistent
over time. The aim is also to make the process as transparent as possible.
The primary purpose of the GTO/ITO throughput league tables is The purpose of the
unchanged from when this report was first published in 2003: throughput league
To identify, analyse and objectively rank those companies with hands-on tables has remained
operational and commercial expertise in running container terminals on
the same since 2003
an international basis.
The two types of throughput league tables used by Drewry seek to reflect
this as fairly as possible. Given the complexity of the task, a number of
judgement calls are necessary, based on Drewry’s long experience and
deep understanding of the industry. The spirit of the throughput league
tables is about showing the scale of the players holding the control of and
expertise in each terminal business. The fundamental aim of the Drewry
total teu league table (Table 3.1) is to reflect in particular who has the
control and operational/commercial expertise associated with the
throughput, rather than taking an accountancy type of approach.
In Table 3.1, GTOs/ITOs are listed by accumulating the throughput from Two types of
all terminals in which they have a shareholding of over 10%. The table, throughput league
which compares the throughput performance for both 2018 and 2017, tables – total and
also indicates the share of the GTOs/ITOs in the world container port equity teu
throughput in these two years.
Table 3.2 lists GTOs/ITOs in order of equity-adjusted teu volume.
Drewry has adjusted the total throughput figures to match the
percentage shareholdings that the operator has in its various terminals.
For example, if a GTO/ITO has a 30% stake in a particular terminal,
only 30% of the throughput at this facility is included in the volume of
container traffic attributed to the GTO/ITO.
For both tables, wherever possible, confirmed throughput and
shareholding figures have been obtained from each GTO/ITO. However,
not all GTOs/ITOs provide data, and some do not provide it in sufficient
detail. Additionally, there are numerous examples where GTOs/ITOs,
with stakes in the same terminal, provide different throughputs (and
sometimes different shareholdings). Wherever possible, figures have
been validated and checked, and gaps filled using alternative sources, but
some estimates have had to be made inevitably.
16
The total teu throughput measure is a fairly simplistic one as business Total teu throughput
from a terminal that is wholly owned is given the same weight as league table takes a
one in which an operator has only a minority shareholding. Double broad brush approach
counting occurs when more than one GTO/ITO has a stake in the
same terminal. Notwithstanding this, given that it is not uncommon
for a GTO/ITO to be responsible for the day-to-day management of
a terminal even if its shareholding is a minority one, the teu method
does give a degree of insight into the extent of volume under the
management of each operator.
GTOs/ITOs that have stakes in other GTOs/ITOs or other major GTOs/ITOs that have
terminal operators create an additional complication when seeking to stakes in other GTOs/
assess their total teu throughput. In the GTO/ITO figures in this table, ITOs or other major
Drewry’s approach is not to include the throughput of other operators terminal operators
in which stakes are held. The rationale for this is twofold: First, it avoids create an additional
double counting, and second, there is usually a primary owner with a complication
majority or controlling stake for any operator, and it makes sense to
credit only that primary owner with the operator’s volume.
For example, PSA has a 20% stake in Hutchison Ports (HP). Adding
HP’s total throughput to the PSA total would result in double counting
the HP throughput in Table 3.1. Additionally, the primary control of
HP is with Hutchison and not PSA. Similarly, China Merchants Ports
(CMP) has a 49% stake in CMA CGM’s Terminal Link portfolio. Adding
the Terminal Link throughput to the CMP total would result in double
counting the Terminal Link throughput in Table 3.1 (because it is already
included under CMA CGM). Also, the primary control of Terminal Link
is with CMA CGM and not CMP.
Methodology for generating the total teu

throughput league table
• For each GTO/ITO the table includes the total throughput of
terminals in which a stake of more than 10% is held
• For each GTO/ITO the table excludes the throughput of
‘separate operators’, in which stakes are held by the GTO/ITO *
• However for illustrative purposes, the table does include an
‘indirect influence’ column where the throughput of ‘separate
operators’ is added in
• For each GTO/ITO the table excludes the throughput of river/
barge terminals
stevedoring-only terminals
* To include the ‘separate operator’ throughput would artificially inflate GTO/ITO totals
and make the table lose meaning. It would then quickly become a numbers game. Stakes in
separate operators are instead accounted for in the equity teu league table.
17
Table 3.1 Global/international terminal operators’ throughput league table, 2017-2018 (mteu/% share of
world container port throughput)
2018 2017
T’put T’put
including including
“indirect “indirect Growth/ Growth/
Ranking T’put Share influence” # T’put Share influence” # decline decline
2018 2017 Operator (mteu) (%) (mteu) (mteu) (%) (mteu) (mteu) (%)
1 1 China Cosco Shipping 105.8 13.5% 172.8 91.3 12.2% 14.5 15.9%
2 2 Hutchison Ports 82.6 10.5% 82.3 11.0% 0.2 0.3%
3 4 PSA International 80.1 10.2% 162.6 73.9 9.9% 156.2 6.2 8.4%
4 3 APM Terminals 78.6 10.0% 80.2 76.3 10.2% 77.8 2.3 3.1%
5 5 DP World 70.0 8.9% 68.7 9.2% 1.3 1.9%
6 6 Terminal Investment Limited (TIL) 47.7 6.1% 44.0 5.9% 3.7 8.4%
7 7 China Merchants Ports 34.5 4.4% 116.5 31.0 4.2% 109.4 3.5 11.4%
8 8 CMA CGM 25.6 3.3% 24.8 3.3% 0.9 3.5%
9 9 Eurogate 13.7 1.7% 13.8 1.9% -0.1 -1.1%
10 10 SSA Marine 12.6 1.6% 11.3 1.5% 1.3 11.4%
11 11 NYK 10.6 1.4% 11.0 1.5% -0.4 -3.4%
12 12 Evergreen 10.4 1.3% 10.3 1.4% 0.1 0.9%
13 13 ICTSI 9.7 1.2% 9.2 1.2% 0.6 6.4%
14 16 Hyundai 7.6 1.0% 6.1 0.8% 1.4 23.1%
15 HHLA 7.4 1.0%
16 15 MOL 7.3 0.9% 7.1 0.9% 0.2 3.4%
17 17 Yildirim/Yilport 6.4 0.8% 32.0 6.1 0.8% 30.9 0.3 4.4%
18 18 Bollore 5.3 0.7% 4.7 0.6% 0.5 11.5%
19 19 Yang Ming 4.4 0.6% 4.6 0.6% -0.3 -5.5%
20 20 K Line 3.3 0.4% 3.4 0.5% -0.2 -5.3%
21 21 SAAM Puertos 3.2 0.4% 3.0 0.4% 0.1 4.9%
Global/international operators total 626.6 80.0% 582.9 78.2% 43.7 7.5%
Notes:
#
“Indirect influence” throughput figure includes the total teu (excluding individual terminals with stake of 10% or less) of any other GTO/ITO or non-
GTO/ITO operators in which a stake is held. Results in some double counting.
See Appendix 2 for Drewry rules and explanation regarding classification as global/international terminal operators
Unless stated otherwise figures include total annual throughput for all terminals in which more than 10% shareholding held as at 31st Dec 2017/31st
Dec 2018
Figures do not include stevedoring operations at common user terminals and also exclude barge/river terminals
Figures for each operator do not include volumes from other GTO/ITO and non-GTO/ITO operators in which stakes are held, apart from in the
“indirect influence” column.
Due to method of calculation there is some degree of variation between Drewry’s figures and some terminal operators’ publicly announced results
Hutchison figure includes HPH Trust volumes
TIL figure does not include MSC/affiliated companies
CMA CGM includes APL terminals
Some figures are estimated
18
A judgement call needs to be made to define a ‘terminal’ and a ‘separate What is a terminal and
operator’. This judgement is based on commercial and operational what is a ‘separate
considerations, rather than for any legal, financial or tax reasons. Besides operator’?
considering the size of the shareholding held by the GTO/ITO, to
determine if a company should be classed as a ‘separate operator’ Drewry
also considers factors such as:
• What party holds the operational and commercial expertise for the
terminals involved
• The extent to which there is a clear brand name/identity and the
degree of separation/independence of this brand
• The views, understanding and perceptions of the industry. Drewry
seeks to reflect these views and perceptions in an independent and
objective manner
Drewry makes no distinction whether the ‘separate operator’ is a GTO/
ITO or not. For example, SIPG, MTL and Terminal Link are each a
portfolio of terminals, majority-owned, managed and controlled by
a party other than CMP, even though CMP has a significant stake in
each. They each have their own brands, industry reputation as well as
independent operational and management expertise. APMT is treated in
the same way as CMP in the table. It has a minority stake in GPI (the latter
is not a GTO/ITO) which is regarded as a ‘separate operator’. No volume
for GPI is included in the APMT total teu figure in this league table.
Notwithstanding the above comments, it is evident that, apart from the
operational/commercial control and expertise aspect described above Direct control vs
(direct control), it is also becoming more relevant to recognise the indirect influence is a
indirect influence that a shareholder can have in portfolios that it owns consideration
or has a stake in (indirect influence).
As a result, Table 3.1 includes an additional column, which shows a
total throughput figure, including volume where ‘indirect influence’
is held. This applies to GTOs/ITOs that have stakes in other operators
and adds the ‘other operator’ throughput to their total. The additional
methodology continues with our standard practice of excluding any
individual terminal in which a stake of 10% or less is held.
• The most complex operator in this respect is CMP. The CMP
throughput, including ‘indirect influence’, adds in the total throughput
of SIPG, MTL, PDA and Terminal Link (including all terminals in
which these operators hold more than a 10% stake). This figure is
closer to CMP’s own total throughput figure, which it reports publicly
and uses for investor relations.
• The PSA throughput, including ‘indirect influence’, adds in the total
throughput of HP, including HPH Trust.
• For APMT, the GPI throughput is included.
• Yilport/Yildirim has an ‘indirect influence’ figure, which adds in the
CMA CGM throughput because Yildirim owns 24% of CMA CGM.
• Cosco has minority stakes in SIPG and Qingdao Port Group, so these
are included in the ‘Indirect influence’ column.
19
Our ‘indirect influence’ enhancement does result in double counting,

plus the resultant throughput numbers begin to lose meaning, especially
in the case of PSA and Cosco. Note that the basis for ranking operators
in the total teu league table reflects the ‘direct control’ throughput of
each operator and is the primary driver of our total teu rankings.
To provide context, below is a listing of the overall throughput figures
for 2018 as released by those operators that publish their figures. These Operators’ published
are the official figures released by the operators, usually for stock market throughput figures for
and shareholder briefing, that illustrate the complexity of throughput 2018
reporting which we seek to standardise.
Some operators use a methodology that includes the total throughput
of all terminals (and other operators) in which they have stakes,
while others use an equity-based approach and some opt for an
accountancy-based approach. While some include river and barge
terminal throughputs, others do not. In fact, some do not report
figures at all.
APM Terminals 17 million moves (equity-weighted basis) *

CM Port 109.1 million teu
Cosco Shipping Ports 117.4 million teu (total) and 37.1 million teu
(equity-adjusted)
DP World 71.4 million teu (total) and 36.8 million teu
(consolidated)
Eurogate 14.1 million teu
Hutchison Ports 84.6 million teu
ICTSI 9.7 million teu
PSA 81 million teu
SAAM Puertos 3.4 million teu
Yilport 6.4 million teu
* not including the eight transhipment terminals under the Maersk Ocean division
Table 3.1 provides the total teu league table for 2018, with a comparison
against 2017. HHLA is a new entry to the table for 2018, having re- Cosco heads the
qualified as a GTO/ITO under Drewry’s criteria after a period of Drewry total teu
absence. The scale of the company’s home port operations in Hamburg league table
means that it re-enters the table in 15th place.
Cosco tops the table with a calculated throughput of over 100 million teu
in 2018, the first time this level has ever been reached. The 16% growth
over 2017 was boosted by the full-year effects of the OOCL acquisition.
Hutchison Ports sits in second place once again, with volume little
changed on 2017, just ahead of PSA which saw growth of over 8%. Both
companies had throughput figures in excess of 80 million teu in 2018.
20
Close behind is APMT with 78 million teu for the year, having slipped
from third to fourth place in 2018 due to PSA’s strong growth. Each of
the top four players had a share of at least 10% of global throughput
(when measured in total teu terms).
DP World achieved 70 million teu and 9% global volume share and
TIL sits in sixth place with just under 48 million teu. China Merchants
occupies 7th place with 34.5 million teu under the Drewry total
teu methodology, although if ‘indirect influence’ volumes are also
considered (see explanation above), the figure is 116 million teu. This
though is still well below PSA and Cosco by the same measure.
Overall, PSA and Hyundai were the only operators to move up
the table, while APMT and MOL moved down. All others were The strongest volume
unchanged. The strongest volume growth in percentage terms was growth in percentage
achieved by Hyundai (23%) and Cosco (16%) with three other terms was achieved
operators registering double-digit growth (China Merchants, SSA and by Hyundai (23%) and
Bollore). The largest declines were suffered by K Line and Yang Ming, Cosco (16%)
both just over 5%.
Collectively the 21 companies classified by Drewry as GTOs/ITOs this
year handled 627 million teu which was 80% of world throughput,
up from 78% in 2017. However, the total teu method does result in
significant double counting of volume.
More detailed explanation of the reasons behind the growth/decline of
volumes for individual operators can be found in Section 4 of this report.
The equity teu league table (Table 3.2) gives credit to those operators
that have invested more in container terminal ventures, and reflects the
extent of shareholding held in each terminal (and in other operators Equity-adjusted
where relevant). Those with larger shareholding can also be said to throughput league
have greater control over the longer-term destiny of each facility (or table reflects
operator) and hence more influence within the industry. The equity teu investment and
measure also more accurately represents the status of those companies control
that have accumulated a large number of minority holdings, and is
a more precise reflection of the financial implications of the volume
handled for the shareholder.
The GTOs/ITOs which have stakes in other GTOs/ITOs or major
operators create an additional complication. In Table 3.2, where a GTO/
ITO has a stake in another one, the owning GTO/ITO is credited with
the relevant portion of the owned GTO’s/ITO’s equity teu (and the
owned GTO’s/ITO’s equity teu figure is reduced accordingly).
When a GTO/ITO owns a stake in another major operator that is not a
GTO/ITO (such as APMT’s stake in GPI or CMP’s stakes in MTL and
SIPG), the GTO/ITO is credited with the relevant portion of the owned
operator’s equity teu. For example, CMP is credited with 26.5% of SIPG’s
equity teu and 27% of MTL’s equity teu.
21
Methodology for generating the equity teu

throughput league table
• For each GTO/ITO the table includes the throughput of
terminals in which a stake is held, with the throughput adjusted
pro rata according to the size of the stake held.
• For each GTO/ITO the table includes the throughput of other
operators (including separate operators) in which stakes are
held, calculated by applying the size of the stake to the other
operator’s equity teu figure.
• Other and ‘separate operators’ include both GTOs/ITOs and
non-GTOs/ITOs.
• In cases where one GTO/ITO has a stake in another GTO/ITO
(e.g. PSA’s 20% stake in HPH), we adjust upwards the owning
GTO’s/ITO’s equity throughput and deduct an equivalent
amount of equity teu from the owned GTO/ITO.
• In cases where a GTO/ITO has a stake in a non-GTO/ITO
operator, this kind of deduction does not apply.
• In cases where two GTOs/ITOs each have a stake in an operator,
e.g. CMA CGM and CMP’s stakes in Terminal Link, the equity
teu of the owned operator is allocated on a pro rata basis to each
shareholder according to the size of its shareholding.
• For each GTO/ITO the table excludes the throughput of river/
barge terminals.
stevedoring-only terminals.
HPH Trust is a unique (and awkward) case when it comes to equity

teu league table calculations. The Trust is an entity that owns stakes
in terminals in Hong Kong and Shenzhen, and also acts as a terminal
operator. It is managed by Hutchison Port Holdings Management (the
Trustee-Manager), an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of CK Hutchison, HPH Trust is a unique
which is also the parent company of Hutchison Ports (HP). HPH Trust (and awkward) case
is listed on the stock exchange and the so-called unit holders own stakes, in terms of equity teu
but CK Hutchison Holdings Ltd has a deemed interest of 30.07% in HPH calculations
Trust and CK Hutchsion Global Investments Ltd has 27.62%. A further
complication is the fact that PSA and its parent Temask have a combined
24% stake in HPH Trust (as well as PSA having a 20% stake in HP).
The equity teu throughput of HPH Trust (see Table 4.1.1) is calculated
based on the Trust’s stakes in its various terminals. In some cases, this
is 100%, but in others it is less, and the equity throughput is adjusted
accordingly for each terminal. The question then arises as to how much
of this equity teu should be included in the HPH total. To date, we have
included the entire HPH Trust equity teu in the HPH figure in Table 3.2,
but some might argue that less should be included as the remainder is
‘owned’ by other unit holders.
22
Table 3.2 G
lobal/international terminal operators’ equity based throughput league table, 2017-2018
(mteu/% share of world container port throughput)
2018 2017
Growth/ Growth/
Ranking T’put share T’put share decline decline
2018 2017 Operator (mteu) (%) (mteu) (%) (mteu) (%)
1 1 PSA International 60.3 7.7% 56.3 7.5% 4.0 7.2%
2 2 Hutchison Ports 46.7 6.0% 46.8 6.3% -0.1 -0.2%
3 5 China Cosco Shipping 46.1 5.9% 34.9 4.7% 11.3 32.3%
4 3 DP World 44.2 5.6% 42.8 5.7% 1.4 3.3%
5 4 APM Terminals 42.8 5.5% 39.7 5.3% 3.1 7.8%
6 6 China Merchants Ports * 35.1 4.5% 31.0 4.2% 4.1 13.1%
7 7 Terminal Investment Limited (TIL) 26.5 3.4% 24.0 3.2% 2.4 10.1%
8 10 ICTSI 8.9 1.1% 8.3 1.1% 0.6 7.0%
9 9 Evergreen 8.5 1.1% 8.4 1.1% 0.2 2.1%
10 11 SSA Marine 8.1 1.0% 7.2 1.0% 0.9 13.2%
11 8 CMA CGM * 8.0 1.0% 8.7 1.2% -0.7 -7.5%
12 12 Yildirim/Yilport ** 7.1 0.9% 7.1 1.0% -0.0 -0.1%
13 13 Eurogate 6.8 0.9% 6.8 0.9% 0.0 0.1%
14 HHLA 6.7 0.9%
15 17 Hyundai 4.1 0.5% 3.0 0.4% 1.1 36.0%
16 14 NYK 3.7 0.5% 3.8 0.5% -0.1 -2.0%
17 18 Bollore 3.1 0.4% 2.8 0.4% 0.3 11.1%
18 16 MOL 3.0 0.4% 3.1 0.4% -0.0 -1.4%
19 20 K Line 2.4 0.3% 2.5 0.3% -0.1 -2.7%
20 19 Yang Ming 2.4 0.3% 2.5 0.3% -0.1 -5.8%
21 21 SAAM Puertos 2.1 0.3% 1.9 0.3% 0.2 13.0%
Global/international operators total: 376.7 48.1% 341.4 45.8% 35.3 10.3%
Notes:
See Appendix 2 for Drewry rules and explanation regarding classification as global/international terminal operators
Unless stated otherwise figures include total annual throughput for all terminals in which shareholdings held as at 31st Dec 2017/31st Dec 2018,
adjusted according to the extent of equity held in each terminal
Figures for each operator include equity volumes from other GTO/ITO and non-GTO/ITO operators in which stakes are held
PSA and HP figures have been adjusted to account for PSA’s 20% shareholding in HP
* CMA CGM and CMP figures have been adjusted to account for CMP’s 49% shareholding in Terminal Link. CMA CGM figure also includes APL
volumes
** Yildirim/Yilport and CMA CGM figures have been adjusted to account for Yildirim’s 24% stake in CMA CGM (and hence indirect stakes in
Terminal Link, CMA Terminals and the APL portfolio)
Hutchison figures include HPH Trust volumes
APM Terminals figure has been adjusted to account for its stake in GPI
Some figures are estimated
23
This illustrates the ‘level of ownership’ complexities as discussed in

Appendix 2 (Section 2). For example, a proportion of DPW is owned
by various shareholders on the stock exchange (and not by DPW’s
parent company Port & Free Zone World FZE that is 100% owned by
Dubai World), but it seems illogical to deduct some of DPW’s equity
teu from Table 3.2. In a similar vein, given that HP effectively remains
closely involved in the day-to-day running of the HPH Trust terminals,
it would seem harsh to reduce HP’s equity teu to a fraction of the total.
As discussed earlier, our primary aim is to reflect commercial and
operational considerations rather than take an accountancy, financial or
legal approach.
Terminal ownership is not only complex, but also increasingly
intertwined. Figure 3.1 shows in the form of a matrix the myriad
relationships that the 21 companies identified as GTOs/ITOs in this GTO/ITO ownership
year’s report have with each other. As mentioned above, there are several is complex and inter-
instances where one GTO/ITO has a stake in another GTO/ITO, plus linked
the international terminal portfolios of the three Japanese lines due to be
merged. There are also numerous cases where at least two GTOs/ITOs
are JV partners in at least one terminal.
Interestingly though, there is a wide variation in the number of
such relationships that operators have. As shown in Figure 3.1, the
player with the most relationships is PSA (11) mainly through JV
terminals in specific locations. APMT, Cosco and CMA CGM also
have numerous relationships and CM Ports and DP World are not
far behind. However, ICTSI has only one JV with another GTO/ITO
(this being PSA in Buenaventura) so clearly prefers to ‘go it alone’.
Figure 3.1 Ownership connections between GTOs/ITOs, 2019

China Cosco
relationships
SSA Marine
Yang Ming
CMA CGM
Evergreen
Hutchison
Number of
Terminals
DP World
CM Ports
Eurogate
Shipping
Hyundai
Puertos
Yildirim
Bollore
SAAM
K Line
HHLA
ICTSI
Ports
APM
MOL
NYK
PSA
TIL
APM Terminals 10
Bollore 3
China Cosco Shipping 10
CM Ports 8
CMA CGM 10
DP World 8
Eurogate 3
Evergreen 2
HHLA 0
Hutchison Ports 2
Hyundai 5
ICTSI 1
K Line 4
MOL 5
NYK 7
PSA 11
SAAM Puertos 1
SSA Marine 4
TIL 7
Yang Ming 6
Yildirim 3
Operators have at least one JV terminal with each other

Operator (in left-hand column) owns a stake in the other operator
Operators intend to merge (international terminal portfolio)
Note: Cosco and CMA CGM have a cooperation MoU for their terminal interests. CMA CGM includes APL; Cosco includes OOCL
24
Hutchison is similar, having only two relationships with other GTOs/

ITOs (these being JV terminals with Cosco and TIL). TIL itself has a
number of relationships, a reflection of the company’s stated policy of
liking JV arrangements. Yang Ming has a surprisingly large number of
relationships for a small GTO/ITO, but this is mainly a consequence
of the multiple GTO/ITO shareholders in the company’s Kao Ming
terminal in Kaohsiung. New entrant HHLA has no relationship with any
other GTO/ITO.
Table 3.2 provides the 2018 equity-adjusted league table. As per previous
years, PSA and Hutchison occupy first and second places respectively,
with PSA’s pre-eminence due to its 20% stake in Hutchison Ports.
Fortunes varied – PSA volume was up 7% and topped 60 million teu
PSA heads GTO/ITO
while Hutchison was largely unchanged at just under 47 million. Cosco equity-adjusted teu
moved up to third place in 2018 (from fifth in 2017) by achieving throughput ranking in
over 30% growth, boosted by the OOCL acquisition. This meant that 2018
DP World and APMT each dropped one place to fourth and fifth
respectively. The latter registered nearly 8% growth, helped by the closer
relationship with Maersk Line resulting in more of the carrier traffic
directed to APMT facilities.
China Merchants (35 million teu) and TIL (26.5 million teu) remained
in sixth and seventh places respectively despite both recording double-
digit growth in equity-adjusted volume in 2018. The top seven players
accounted for 38.5% of global throughput for the year, up from 37%
in 2017.
After these big players, there is a gap in scale, with ICTSI in 8th place
handling just under nine million teu in 2018. A growth rate of 7%
helped move the company up two places from 10th in 2017. Evergreen
was a non-mover in 9th and up one place to 10th was SSA. New entrant
HHLA sits at 14th in the table.
The highest growth was recorded by Hyundai (36%) and Cosco (32%).
Besides China Merchants and TIL, double-digit growth was achieved by
SSA, Bollore and SAAM. The largest declines were CMA CGM (-7.5%)
and Yang Ming (nearly -6%). Overall growth across the 21 operators was
just over 10% and they accounted for around 48% of global throughput,
up from 46% in 2017. More detailed explanation of the reasons behind
the growth/decline of volumes for individual operators can be found in
Section 4 of this report.
Figure 3.2 provides a snapshot of the development over time of the
top 10 GTOs/ITOs measured by equity teu for the period 2008-18.
Hutchison and PSA have occupied first and second places throughout Hutchison and PSA
the period, with PSA moving into first place when it took a 20% have been the top two
stake in Hutchison Ports in the mid-2000s. Third and fourth places GTOs/ITOs since 2008
remained with DPW and APMT over the years, but in 2018 Cosco
leapfrogged them into third place. The rapid emergence of CM Ports
is clearly evident.
25
Despite making little change to its portfolio over the years, Evergreen has
remained in the top 10 throughout, although it has been dropping down
the list. TIL meanwhile has been a consistent member of the elite group
for more than 10 years. SSA Marine returned to the top 10 in 2018,
having last been in this snapshot in 2008.
The liner shipping industry operates on the three main east-west
routes in three large alliances (2M, Ocean and THE). Almost all of the
carriers in these three alliances have terminal portfolios of varying sizes
and complexities and naturally a desire to see their terminals called
at. Carriers will generally seek to use terminals that they have stakes
in, but at the same time, alliance membership means that there have 2M and Ocean have
to be many compromises as each carrier in each alliance has its own a much greater scale
of terminal ownership
interests. Individual shipping lines are not in complete control of port/
than THE alliance
terminal choices due to liner alliances. Also, no matter how large a
shipping line’s (or alliance’s) terminal portfolio is, there will always be
many locations around the world where they do not have terminals and
so still have to use terminals run by independent operators or other
shipping lines. It is a complex set of compromises and requires horse
trading by the players.
Figure 3.2 Evolution of top 10 GTO/ITOs by equity teu, 2008-2018
Rank 2008 2011 2014 2017 2018
26
Table 3.3 illustrates the scale of terminal portfolios (in equity teu terms) In general, the
when grouped by liner alliance. In general, the terminal portfolios that terminal portfolios
are affiliated with shipping lines exist with the primary aim to serve affiliated with shipping
the shipping line (as opposed to being a business in their own right). lines exist with the
However, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 in Section 2, some carriers’ terminal primary aim to serve
portfolios can be categorised as hybrids. Additionally, the positioning of the shipping line
APMT is changing from being a clear stevedore (independent) business
to one more closely affiliated to Maersk Line.
It is very clear from Table 3.3 that the terminal businesses associated
with the members of the 2M and Ocean alliances have much larger
activity than those of THE alliance. This will still be the case even
when Hyundai joins THE alliance in 2020. Ocean and 2M have greater
opportunity and incentive to leverage their terminal interests for the
benefit of their respective alliances than THE alliance. The average size
of their terminals is also more than double that of THE alliance.
Table 3.3 Illustration of equity-adjusted terminal portfolio volumes if shown by alliance and alliance
members (2018)
2018 Number of Average equity
equity teu terminal interests * teu per terminal
(million) (million)
APMT (Maersk) 42.8 59 0.73
TIL (MSC) 26.5 37 0.72
2M alliance
Hyundai 4.1 8 0.51
“2M” total 73.4 104 0.71
CMA CGM 13.0 35 0.37
China Cosco Group 46.1 50 0.92
Ocean alliance
Evergreen 8.5 12 0.71
“Ocean” total 67.7 97 0.70
NYK 3.7 14 0.26
MOL 3.0 11 0.28
K Line 2.4 7 0.35
THE alliance
Yang Ming 2.4 5 0.48
Hapag-Lloyd / UASC 0.6 1 0.65
“THE” total 12.2 38 0.32
Notes:
* In a number of cases, fellow alliance members have stakes in the same terminal, leading to an element of double counting
Maersk Line owns Hamburg Sud which has one terminal interest (Itapoa, Brazil)
Hyundai’s membership of the 2M is a slot charter arrangement, due to end in 2020
CMA CGM equity teu figure is before adjustment for China Merchants and Yildirim stakes
China Cosco includes OOCL
CMA CGM and Cosco Shipping Ports have a cooperation MoU
NYK, K Line and MOL have merged their container shipping businesses, and intend to merge their international (non-Japanese) terminal portfolios
27
Nature of GTO/ITO portfolios
I n order to graphically illustrate the varying nature of GTOs/ITOs,

Figure 3.3 provides a snapshot of two key aspects of their existing
portfolios in the form of a matrix. The size of the circle for each operator
Market focus and
degree of globalisation
varies markedly by
represents its 2018 equity teu figure (taken from Table 3.2) so the wide operator
variation in the scale of GTOs/ITOs can be seen easily. The extent to
which each operator’s portfolio is focused on lower risk/lower growth
mature markets versus higher risk/higher growth emerging markets
is shown on the vertical y-axis. This has been assessed by taking each
operator’s equity teu and allocating each terminal’s equity volume to
either the emerging or mature market category.
On the horizontal x-axis, the extent to which each GTO/ITO can be
regarded as either global or more regional in terms of the geographical
spread of their existing portfolio is shown in conjunction with their
degree of internationalism, which is a reflection of how much of their
volume is generated outside their home base. In both analyses, an
element of judgement is required. As much as possible, both factors in
the matrix have been assessed numerically, but an element of subjective
decision-making is also required when placing each operator.
Europe, North America and Australasia are classed as mature markets, Europe, North America
along with Japan. Also, some transhipment hubs, while located in mature and Australasia are
markets, mainly serve cargo moving to/from emerging economies, either classed as mature
through hub and spoke transhipment or relay (interlining). Thus, for PSA, markets, along with
its Singapore volumes have been categorised as ‘emerging market’ because Japan
most of Singapore’s transhipment activity serves emerging markets such
as Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia. This is also the assumption for
Freeport (Bahamas) for HP and TIL, serving the Caribbean and Latin
America. The same might also be argued for some Med hubs such as
Algeciras (which handles significant volumes to/from the emerging
markets of West Africa), but we have decided to draw the line here.
With regard to the geographical spread and degree of internationalism of
each operator, the range of world locations in which terminals are held
is clearly a straightforward measure but the size of each operation also
has a bearing. For example, some operators have a wide geographical
coverage but have much of their volume concentrated in one or two
ports or countries. Others might have activities spread over several
continents, but in some locations, they only have a small terminal or a
small shareholding. The basic approach has been to assess how many
world regions each operator has a presence in but then adjust this
(downwards) if the presence in some regions is small, or if the presence
in one region is disproportionately large.
Figure 3.3 shows that the market focus of most GTOs/ITOs is naturally China Merchants,
towards emerging markets, given that the majority of global container Bollore, ICTSI and
port activity is generated by such markets. The players most heavily SAAM Puertos
involved in these markets are China Merchants, Bollore, ICTSI and have the heaviest
SAAM Puertos. The major global operators such as DP World, PSA, involvement in
Hutchison and Cosco also have a strong bias towards emerging markets, emerging markets
although APMT less so due to its more extensive interests in Europe,
Japan and North America.
28
Several operators have little or no emerging market exposure. All of K

Line’s is in mature market locations and most of Eurogate and HHLA’s
activity is in Europe (although their transhipment activity does serve
emerging markets such as Russia). The other two major Japanese lines
(MOL and NYK) also have a high presence in mature market locations,
largely because of their significant home country activities. Clearly this
mix will change once the international terminal activities of the three
Japanese lines are merged under ONE.
Figure 3.3 GTO/ITO current (2018) portfolios by market/risk and geographical spread
Equity teu, 2018
Emerging
markets
Market
focus/
risk
Notes: PSA and Hutchison equity teu adjusted for

PSA's 20% stake in Hutchison Ports.
China Merchants equity teu figure includes effect of
stakes held in other operators.
Yildirim equity teu figure includes effect of stake held in
CMA CGM.
Mature CMA CGM equity teu figure includes APL and is
adjusted to account for stakes held by Yildirim and
markets China Merchants.
Cosco includes OOCL.
Hutchison Ports includes HPH Trust
Geographical spread/ Global

Regional
degree of internationalism
29
The geographical spread/internationalism of GTOs/ITOs also shows DP World and APMT

significant variations. Some operators are closer to being regional players have the highest levels
and only a few are truly global with their portfolios. Not surprisingly these of global coverage
are the big players, particularly DPW (with the most extensive coverage)
and APMT. Next are CMA CGM and TIL with roughly similar degrees of
internationalism, ahead of HP and PSA which are slightly less global with
both having no presence in North America for example (although this
is now changing for both). Most GTOs/ITOs are to be found nearer the
regional than the global end of the spectrum with Eurogate and HHLA the
most evident in this respect, followed by SAAM, Yilport and Bollore.
One complication that affects both axes of the matrix is those GTOs/
ITOs with stakes in other GTOs/ITOs. For instance, we have not sought
to reflect in Figure 3.3 the fact that PSA has a 20% stake in HP as this
would be too complicated to achieve. Similarly, it has not been possible to
reflect CMP’s 49% stake in CMA CGM’s Terminal Link. As a result, when
looking at CMP’s position in Figure 3.3, it is also important to look at
CMA CGM’s position at the same time (albeit that CMA CGM’s position
reflects the combined portfolio of Terminal Link and CMA Terminals).
To further illustrate the nature of GTOs/ITOs, Figure 3.4 outlines two In all but one case
other aspects of their portfolios. In this matrix, the nature of the type at least half of all
of traffic handled is displayed on the vertical y-axis, with the balance volumes for each
between gateway and transhipment analysed. This is a useful insight into GTO/ITO are from
volume risk, with transhipment typically being higher risk and more gateway traffic
footloose. It is also generally accepted that profit margins on gateway
traffic are usually higher than on transhipment business.
The extent of transhipment activity, especially in terminals handling
a mix of cargo, is not always clear. For the matrix, we have taken all
ports with at least 45% of their throughput as transhipment, along
with all GTO/ITO terminal volumes at these ports. However, we have
made selected adjustments. For example, if a GTO/ITO has a large
terminal with 50% transhipment, only 50% of the volume is recorded as
transhipment for the matrix.
In all but one case at least half of all volumes for each GTO/ITO are from
gateway traffic. The exception is PSA where around 60% of activity is
transhipment due to the huge hub that is Singapore. Next is CMA CGM
at a 50-50 split between transhipment and gateway as the company has
a number of key hubs to support its liner network. Hyundai and TIL are
similar to CMA CGM but interestingly Cosco has a much stronger bias
towards gateway traffic than the other main liner companies, a reflection
of its extensive interests in Chinese gateway ports.
For some operators, all or nearly all of their volumes are derived from For some operators,
gateway traffic. These players are ICTSI, the three Japanese lines and all or nearly all of their
SAAM Puertos. Bollore, China Merchants and Hutchison Ports also volumes are derived
have high gateway traffic proportions. In the case of the latter operator, from gateway traffic
it should be noted that the substantial volume of barge traffic handled at
Hong Kong terminal is not regarded as transhipment by Drewry, even
though the port describes it as such.
30
The horizontal x-axis of Figure 3.4 reflects the average throughput of the Typical GTO/ITO
terminals in each operator’s portfolio. This is useful in understanding the terminal size is around
nature of the operations and the scale of assets where the operator has one million teu per
invested. It should be noted that the average terminal size can be skewed annum
by acquisitions or start-up terminals that have only been operating
for part of the year for a particular GTO/ITO, or the terminal is in the
process of ramping up.
Figure 3.4 GTO/ITO current (2018) portfolios by traffic type and average terminal size
100%
Gateway
Traffic
focus
Notes: PSA and Hutchison equity teu adjusted for PSA's 20%
stake in Hutchison Ports.
China Merchants equity teu figure includes effect of stakes held
25% in other operators.
Yildirim equity teu figure includes effect of stake held in CMA
Gateway-
CGM.
75% CMA CGM equity teu figure includes APL and is adjusted to
Trans account for stakes held by Yildirim and China Merchants. Equity teu, 2018
-hipment Cosco includes OOCL.
Hutchison Ports includes HPH Trust
Smaller Average terminal size Larger
31
Across all 21 GTOs/ITOs the overall average terminal size is just over
one million teu per annum throughput. Unsurprisingly, smaller players
tend to have smaller average terminal sizes. Five operators (K Line,
Yildirim, ICTSI, SAAM and Bollore) all have averages of less than 0.5
million teu per annum. The larger players are typically at around 1.25-
1.75 million teu. At the top end of the scale there is one outlier, China
Cosco Shipping, with an average terminal size of over 2.2 million teu, a
result of its investments to date mainly in larger Chinese terminals.
GTOs/ITOs that have evolved from a stevedoring as opposed to a
container shipping or investor background often have a ‘home port’ that HHLA has by far the
has tended to account for a relatively high percentage of the throughput largest proportion of
home port volume,
handled by the company. This is the port where the operator began
followed by PSA
activities and established its experience and expertise before expanding
internationally. The most significant ‘home port’ GTOs/ITOs are shown
in Table 3.4.
PSA continues to have a high proportion of home port activity (around
45%) although this figure has reduced from being over 50% several years
ago. However, new entrant HHLA tops the list by some margin with 94%
of its volume generated by home port Hamburg. The company though
has already embarked on a strategy of overseas expansion.
Eurogate has close to 40% of its activity generated by Bremerhaven and
ICTSI just under a quarter of its volume in the home port of Manila. DP
World generated 21% of its volume from Jebel Ali, but this is steadily
reducing. Hong Kong is important for Hutchison but is less than 15% of
volumes while the home port operations of SSA and Yilport represent
around 10% and 9% of their total activity.
Table 3.4 G
lobal/international stevedores’ home port volumes, 2016-2018 (throughput at home port/% total
throughput)
2016 2017 2018
2018 total Home port Share in Home port Share in Home port Share in
‘t’put rank Operator Home port t’put total t’put t’put total t’put t’put total t’put
(‘000 teu) (%) (‘000 teu) (%) (‘000 teu) (%)
3 PSA International Singapore 30,590 45.2% 33,350 44.9% 36,310 45.1%
9 Eurogate Bremerhaven 5,487 37.6% 5,537 38.4% 5,467 38.8%
13 ICTSI Manila 2,170 25.0% 2,281 24.9% 2,380 24.4%
5 DP World Dubai 14,772 23.3% 15,368 22.0% 14,954 21.0%
2 Hutchison Ports Hong Kong 11,100 14.0% 11,680 14.1% 10,900 13.2%
10 SSA Marine Seattle 711 6.7% 1,109 9.8% 1,290 10.3%
17 Yildirim Yilport (Gebze) 398 7.1% 501 8.2% 554 8.6%
15 HHLA Hamburg 6,505 95.8% 7,014 96.0% 6,995 93.9%
Note: Hutchison figures exclude river/barge terminals
32
GTO/ITO terminal capacity
I n Table 3.5 GTOs/ITOs are listed according to the capacity of the

terminals in which they had a shareholding in 2018 and 2017, including
all terminals in which they have a stake (even where their holding is
under 10%). This means that if two (or more) operators have a stake in
the same terminal, that terminal’s full capacity is credited to both (or all)
of these operators. Therefore, an element of double counting exists. The
figures do exclude the capacity of other operators in which a GTO/ITO
has a stake. For example, the PSA figure does not include HPH’s capacity.
Terminals where the GTO/ITO has a management-only role are included,
but stevedoring-only and river/barge terminals are excluded.
As discussed in Appendix 2, measuring terminal capacity is a challenging
exercise and one where methods of measurement and opinions vary. Measuring terminal
Indeed, for some GTOs/ITOs, the capacity figure for certain terminals capacity is a
varies from year to year when new terminal management or regional challenging exercise
directors provide their particular view.
In absolute terms Cosco added the most capacity in 2018 largely due to
the inclusion of the OOCL terminal assets (although from 2019 onwards
the large Long Beach facility no longer forms part of the portfolio).
The two Noatum terminals were also significant additions, as was the
development at Khalifa in the UAE. PSA was also active, adding over Cosco added the
eight million teu of capacity, much of it at Singapore but also in locations most capacity in 2018
such as Jawaharlal Nehru Port. NYK experienced a large uplift mainly
due to the consolidation of terminal ownership in Dalian port. TIL
achieved a capacity increase of five million teu in 2018 largely a result
of the full-year effect of acquisitions made in 2017 together with the
opening of the Khalifa terminal.
In percentage terms, K Line’s capacity increased by more than 40% due
to increases in the assessed capacity of its two US terminals, while NYK
was 35% up as a result of the aforementioned Dalian consolidation.
K Line and NYK saw
Besides Cosco, two other operators saw double-digit capacity increases the largest percentage
– ICTSI (14%) and Hyundai (11%). For the former, the ramp-up of increases in capacity
Melbourne plus the addition of two terminals in Papua New Guinea
were the main drivers. For the latter, it was the full-year effects of the
Kaohsiung and Algeciras terminal acquisitions.
At the other end of the scale, APMT saw a slight decline in total capacity
in 2018 due to exits from two terminals in 2017 (Tacoma and Dalian).
Eurogate also declined but this was due to an adjustment of Gioia Tauro’s
capacity (which has since become academic for the company as Eurogate
exited the terminal in 2019).
Table 3.6 provides our projections of capacity by individual GTO/ITO
through to 2023. The figures reflect any new terminal or asset in which
a stake has been acquired, and any divestment made to date. Known
divestments are reflected in the table, but it is of course impossible to
predict what other divestments (or acquisitions), if any, might occur.
33
A significant degree of judgement is necessary to arrive at these Drewry applies its

projections as the precise timing and phasing of the greenfield expansion judgement to timing
plans are always subject to a degree of uncertainty. Operators usually and phasing of
publicise their plans, but may focus on the ultimate, final capacity of the capacity expansion
terminal and not specify the phasing. The timing and phasing of capacity plans
expansion often remains ‘subject to market conditions’, with operators
naturally taking the view that decisions on timing and phasing have to
be taken in the light of the conditions prevailing at that time. The same is
often true for the expansion of existing terminals.
Table 3.5 Global/international terminal operators’ capacity league table, 2017-2018 (mteu)
Change
Capacity rank 2018 2017 2017-2018
2018 2017 Operator (mteu) (mteu) (%) (mteu)
1 1 China Cosco Shipping * 130.0 110.4 17.8% 19.6
2 3 PSA International 112.6 104.3 7.9% 8.2
3 2 Hutchison Ports 112.0 110.3 1.6% 1.8
4 4 APM Terminals 99.7 101.7 -2.0% -2.0
5 5 DP World 89.7 86.9 3.2% 2.8
6 6 Terminal Investment Limited (TIL) 62.4 57.4 8.7% 5.0
7 7 China Merchants Ports 42.9 40.8 5.2% 2.1
8 8 CMA CGM ** 38.4 37.8 1.6% 0.6
9 11 NYK 23.8 17.7 34.6% 6.1
10 9 Eurogate 22.6 24.3 -7.0% -1.7
11 10 SSA Marine 20.2 19.7 2.5% 0.5
12 13 ICTSI 17.9 15.7 13.7% 2.2
13 12 Evergreen 17.2 16.6 3.6% 0.6
14 14 Hyundai 12.3 11.1 10.8% 1.2
15 HHLA 10.3 9.5 8.4% 0.8
16 16 Yildirim/Yilport 10.1 10.2 -0.2% -0.0
17 17 MOL 10.0 9.6 4.8% 0.5
18 19 Bollore 9.4 8.9 6.2% 0.5
19 18 Yang Ming 8.4 8.9 -5.9% -0.5
20 21 K Line 5.7 4.0 44.1% 1.8
21 20 SAAM Puertos 5.2 4.8 8.4% 0.4
Notes:
* Cosco includes OOCL in 2018 but not 2017 as acquisition not finalised
** CMA CGM includes APL terminals
Hutchison figure includes HPH Trust terminals
Includes total capacity for all terminals in which shareholding held (regardless of size of shareholding)
Does not include capacity related to stevedoring operations at common user terminals or barge/river terminals
Some figures are estimated and some double counting occurs where joint ownership/management structures exist
Figures for each operator do not include capacity of other operators in which stakes are held
34
In our projections, we not only incorporate the numbers and the timing
information released by the operators, but also take into account the
upcoming likely market conditions over the next five years, and seek
to reflect how each operator will react to this. For example, if a market
is flat and/or more than one operator is adding capacity, operators
will most probably seek to add capacity slowly or delay the capacity
addition. However, we also reflect that if construction work is already
underway, and cranes have already been ordered, then to a large extent,
capacity is certain to be added. Terminals with more than one GTO/ITO
shareholder also present challenges as different shareholders might have
different (public and private) views about the likely build-out of capacity
(or indeed the initial capacity in the first place).
PSA is projected to add the most capacity over the next five years (12
million teu), primarily a combination of expansion at Singapore but
also the effects of recent acquisitions. Cosco is not far behind with just
PSA is projected to
over 10 million teu to be added; this is accounted for by expansion at
add the most capacity
locations such as Singapore, Khalifa, Nantong, Ningbo and Savona.
over the next five
APMT also has around 10 million teu of capacity due to come on years
stream by 2023 at Tanger Med, Tema, Abidjan, Moin, Savona and
Tanjung Pelepas among others. Similarly TIL has close to 10 million
teu in the pipeline, located at numerous ports but mainly Khalifa,
Ashdod, La Spezia plus the full-year effects of 2018 acquisitions such as
Rodman (Panama).
DP World has around seven million teu of capacity coming through the
system, boosted not only by acquisitions in 2019 (Lirquen, San Antonio
and Fraser Surrey Docks), but also greenfield projects such as Banana
DP World’s capacity
and Posorja. This growth is despite exits from Djibouti and Surabaya.
gets a boost from
Hutchison Ports is adding the least amount of capacity of the big both acquisitions and
players with just under three million teu. In the main this is expansion greenfield projects
at existing locations. There is also an exit from Shantou accounted for.
CMA CGM has over seven million teu being added, including expansion
at Zeebrugge (acquisition), Kribi and Lekki (greenfield), and Kingston
(expansion of existing facility).
Two of the medium-sized operators have the highest average annual
growth rates in terms of capacity additions – Bollore Ports (6.1% pa)
and Yilport (5.5% pa). Bollore is expanding with greenfield projects at
Timor, Kribi and Abidjan (and exiting Douala) while Yilport is growing
capacity at several existing terminals, plus adding Taranto and Gulfport
to the portfolio.
The projections for the three Japanese lines have become complicated
by the merger and creation of ONE. This has required us to show the
international terminals of the former three against ONE but also show
the Japanese terminals of each company separately, as they were not part
of the merger.
35
Table 3.6 Forecast development of global/international terminal operators’ capacity, 2018-2023 (mteu)
Capacity rank Average Total capacity
annual increase
2018 (2023) Operator 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 growth 2018-2023
1 (1) China Cosco Shipping * 130.0 133.7 135.6 137.8 139.6 140.2 1.5% 10.2
2 (2) PSA International 112.6 117.9 121.6 123.6 124.6 124.6 2.1% 12.0
3 (3) Hutchison Ports 112.0 112.4 113.1 114.7 114.7 114.7 0.5% 2.7
4 (4) APM Terminals 99.7 103.6 107.0 108.4 109.1 109.5 1.9% 9.8
5 (5) DP World 89.7 91.2 94.0 94.8 96.4 97.0 1.6% 7.3
6 (6) Terminal Investment Limited 62.4 67.2 69.2 71.1 72.0 72.0 2.9% 9.6
7 (8) China Merchants Ports 42.9 44.2 44.6 45.3 45.3 45.3 1.1% 2.4
8 (7) CMA CGM ** 38.4 42.4 43.1 45.0 45.0 45.6 3.5% 7.2
(9) ONE *** 2.0 36.2 36.2 36.2 36.2 36.2
9 (20) NYK #
23.8 22.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 -37.8% -21.6
17 (21) MOL # 10.0 10.6 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 -27.4% -8.0
20 (22) K Line # 5.7 5.8 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 -23.9% -4.3
10 (10) Eurogate 22.6 19.5 19.3 20.6 21.2 21.2 -1.3% -1.5
11 (12) SSA Marine 20.2 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.5 0.2% 0.2
12 (11) ICTSI 17.9 20.9 21.2 21.4 21.4 21.4 3.6% 3.5
13 (13) Evergreen 17.2 17.2 17.2 17.2 18.2 18.2 1.1% 1.0
14 (16) Hyundai 12.3 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 0.3% 0.2
15 (17) HHLA 10.3 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.6 0.6% 0.3
16 (14) Yildirim/Yilport 10.1 11.8 12.7 13.3 13.3 13.3 5.5% 3.1
18 (15) Bollore Ports 9.4 10.9 12.1 12.7 12.7 12.7 6.1% 3.3
19 (18) Yang Ming 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 0.0% 0.0
21 (19) SAAM Puertos 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 0.2% 0.0
Notes:
* Cosco figure includes OOCL terminals
*** International terminals of NYK, K Line and MOL are due to be combined as part of ONE merger
#
Japanese terminals only from 2019 onwards
Hutchison figure includes HPH Trust terminals
Figures include total capacity for all terminals in which shareholding held (regardless of size of shareholding)
Figures do not include capacity related to stevedoring operations at common user terminals and also exclude barge/river terminals
Figures based on confirmed expansion plans only
Some double counting occurs where joint ownership/management structures exist
Figures for each operator do not include capacity of other operators in which stakes are held
36
Operator strategies
F igure 3.5 provides a snapshot of our assessment of the strategic

focus of each GTO/ITO in the form of a matrix measuring two
variables. First, the extent to which they are focused on mature versus
Focus varies from
mature to emerging
markets and greenfield
emerging markets for their portfolio expansion, and second, whether vs acquisition
they appear to be looking mainly to greenfield/brownfield developments
or acquisitions of existing businesses for their growth. In this context, the
term ‘portfolio expansion’ is defined as adding more terminal locations
rather than simply expanding capacity at existing locations.
Each operator has been placed in the matrix based on its known projects
and plans. Judgement has been made on plans or projects that are
too speculative at this stage, and so have been left out (for example, if
no progress has been made beyond signing an MoU, the project has
been left out). Some operators might clearly have confidential plans or
intentions and it is obviously not possible to reflect these in Figure 3.5.
It must also be noted that most GTOs/ITOs have very few expansion
plans in the pipeline (an average of two per operator and a range from
zero to six) and so the positioning in the matrix is based on a relatively
small sample. Today, portfolio expansion is viewed much more
cautiously and with much greater selectivity than it was in the 1990s
and 2000s.
The majority of operators have emerging markets as the focus of their Greenfield terminals
portfolio expansion plans. Moreover, the spotlight is on greenfield in emerging markets
developments rather than acquisitions, with ICTSI being the exception. are the main focus
Interestingly the current expansion target for Hutchison, PSA and – for those that are
Yilport is in mature markets, with a wide spread between greenfield expanding
and acquisitions.
Six GTOs/ITOs have no projects at all and appear to have a ‘no change’
strategy at present, inclined to simply maintain their current portfolio.
This does not mean that these companies would not be interested
in expansion if the right opportunities arose. It simply means that at
present, they have no specific publicly revealed plans for expanding the
number of terminals in their portfolio.
Figure 3.6 provides a different insight into the GTO/ITO strategy An ‘extensive’ array
by showing the extent of each operator’s portfolio expansion plans of portfolio expansion
(ranging from limited to extensive), plotted against each operator’s projects is actually
perceived appetite or need to divest assets. As with Figure 3.5, the quite limited
extent of expansion plans can only be based on currently confirmed
plans and projects. Some operators clearly have a strong appetite and
desire to expand, and will most probably do so, but to attempt to reflect
this in the matrix would be speculative. As far as an appetite or need
to divest is concerned, this is a judgement call. It considers the extent
to which stevedore GTOs/ITOs might wish to divest assets in order
to re-balance their portfolios and take natural exits from investments,
and the extent to which carriers might have financial pressure to sell
terminal assets.
37
Operator strategies
None of the GTOs/ITOs can be described as having an extensive array of

portfolio expansion projects. All remain cautious, some ultra-so. Seven of
them appear in the upper part of the matrix, relatively speaking trending
towards ‘extensive’ if not actually there. This includes APMT which along
with Cosco has the highest number of projects (six), but for APMT these
are essentially legacy developments that were already in the pipeline
before AP Moller’s corporate strategy changed. CMA CGM is next with
five new developments, followed by DPW and PSA each with four.
Twelve GTOs/ITOs are in the lower, ‘limited projects’ part of the matrix, A number of GTOs/
with a number having no new projects lined up (CM Ports, HHLA, ITOs have no new
Hyundai, SAAM, SSA and Yang Ming). This contrasts markedly with the projects lined up
position when we first produced this matrix six years ago, when GTOs/
ITOs generally had much more aggressive expansion plans.
Figure 3.5 GTO/ITO strategic focus by market/risk and nature of investments
Emerging
markets
Portfolio
expansion
locations
Mature
markets
Greenfield / Nature of Acquisition
brownfield investments
“No change”
strategy, or
no current
pipeline:
Notes: CMA CGM includes APL; Cosco includes OOCL; international terminals of 3 Japanese lines combined under ONE
38
Operator strategies
Significantly, 16 operators are all placed in the left-hand side of the Most operators
matrix, indicating that in Drewry’s view, they generally have a low generally have a low
appetite or need to divest. Five years ago most operators were in appetite or need to
the right-hand quadrants, judged as having a much greater need or divest
appetite to divest. For shipping lines, this was because they were under
severe financial pressure. For stevedores, this was because the attitude
to investment was changing, moving away from continually adding
to portfolios and towards a portfolio management type of approach,
encompassing exits as well as acquisitions. This year only three operators
have been placed in the right-hand side of the matrix, all are shipping
lines facing varying degrees of financial pressure (Evergreen, Hyundai
and Yang Ming). That said, all have weathered their storms over the last
few years or expanded their portfolio, as is the case of Hyundai.
Figure 3.6 GTO/ITO strategic focus by expansion plans and divestment appetite/need
Extensive
Portfolio
expansion
projects
Limited
Lower Potential divestment Higher

appetite/need
Notes: CMA CGM includes APL; Cosco includes OOCL; international terminals of 3 Japanese lines combined under ONE
39
Operator strategies
Table 3.7 provides a summary of a selection of M&A and concession GTO/ITO M&A activity
activity by GTOs/ITOs in 2018 and 2019 to date. Activity levels have picking up pace
picked up compared with the last few years with PSA and DPW
among the most high profile. There have also been several ownership
restructures with for example a stake in TIL being sold by one financial
investor to another, and the parent company of Ports America changing
hands. Overall the motivations for the deals have been wide and varied,
ranging from portfolio management and expansion to parent company
changes. Most of the deals listed are M&A with a few concessions also
in evidence.
Besides the traditional strategy of the expansion of a terminal portfolio, Expansion into ‘trade
there is another important GTO/ITO strategic trend emerging, namely a enabler’ role for DP
desire to become more involved in the wider supply chain and in doing World – and others?
so get closer to cargo owners. In some ways this is not new – GTOs/
ITOs have offered intermodal rail services in Europe for example, and
Hutchison Ports has interests in inland/river terminals in Belgium,
Holland and Germany. Similarly Chinese port companies such as SIPG
have ownership of river/barge terminals.
Figure 3.7 Average terminal utilisation levels across portfolio, GTOs/ITOs, 2018
Bollore
K Line
ICTSI
SSA Marine
Eurogate
SAAM Puertos
Yildirim
NYK
PSA International
Yang Ming
HHLA
Evergreen
MOL
Hutchison Ports
Terminal Investment Limited (TIL)
Hyundai
DP World
CMA CGM
APM Terminals
China Merchants Port Holdings
China Cosco Shipping
0 15 30 45 60 75 90
40
Operator strategies
However, today the aim of certain players is far wider, none more so than
DP World whose strategy is to move from being a global port operator
to being a ‘global trade enabler’. This entails moving into the wider
supply chain by acquiring logistics providers but also through entering
into shipping. Various IT and digital initiatives are also under way with
an overall aim to offer a ‘one-stop shop’ to cargo owners covering not
only transportation from origin to destination, but also management of
their supply chain. This aim reflects that of some of the major shipping
lines, notably Maersk Line, which is seeking to do much the same thing,
becoming a ‘global integrator of container logistics’.
In the liner shipping sector, the opinions and consequent strategies
of the different major lines vary widely, with Maersk at one end of
the spectrum, and CMA CGM taking a similar view. At the other
end, Hapag-Lloyd believes that such a strategy cannot succeed and
instead is focusing on optimising its core shipping function. There are
similarities in the terminal operator sector with DPW at the extreme
end of the spectrum and PSA having a broadly similar approach (albeit Parallels between liner
perhaps more IT focused). The main Chinese players Cosco and China shipping and port
Merchants are also active beyond the terminal gates, but their aim sector strategies
is less supply chain oriented and more focused on broad economic
development such as the Belt and Road Initiative and China Merchants’
Port-Park-City concept. Hutchison is less active in the supply chain
in terms of strategy while APMT’s role is part of the wider Maersk
Line strategy. Some operators such as ICTSI and SSA do not have any
particularly obvious supply chain-related strategy.
In summary, terminal operators are pursuing the idea of getting closer to
cargo owners and their supply chains but:
• The enthusiasm with which it is being pursued varies (some are more
believers than others)
• The degree to which it is being pursued varies (some are targeting the
whole supply chain, others just certain aspects)
• The extent varies (some seeking global coverage, others very specific
geography)
• The success varies (depends on opportunities being available and
then won)
This reflects the varied nature of terminal operators:
• Some global, most not
• Some owned by, or affiliated with, shipping lines, some not
• Some pure profit seekers, some geopolitical too
41
Operator strategies
Table 3.7 Selected M&A and concession activity by global/international terminal operators, 2018-19
Terminal operator/owner Port Details of activity
In Oct 2018 APMT announced the sale of its stake in the Petlim
APM Terminals Nemrut Bay (Izmir) Container Terminal to JV partner Azerbaijani state oil company Socar.
APMT remains as terminal manager
In November 2018, a consortium formed by Bolloré Ports and
Bollore Ports Ibom PowerChina International Group Ltd won an international tender to
build and operate the future deep-sea port at Akwa Ibom in Nigeria
In March 2019 Brookfield Asset Management Inc. announced it was
acquiring a majority stake (~62%) in the Oaktree Capital Group, LLC,
which owns Ports America. Oaktree owns a majority stake in Ports
Brookfield Various
America Holdings through Highstar Capital, which Oaktree acquired
in 2014. CPP, one of Canada’s largest pension funds, also holds a
10% equity stake in Ports America.
In December 2018, completed acquisition of a 49.9% stake in
Liaoning (Dalian and
China Merchants Liaoning Port, parent of Dalian Port Group and Yingkou Port Group,
Yingkou)
operators of the two largest ports in Northern China
In late 2018, CMA CGM acquired Container Finance, the holding
HaminaKotka, Helsinki company of shortsea operator Containerships and 25% owner
CMA CGM
and St. Petersburg of Multi-Link, which operates container facilities in HaminaKotka,
Helsinki and St. Petersburg
Acquired from China Shipping Ports Development Co. Limited, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of COSCO Group, a 10% equity interest in
CMA CGM Zeebrugge
CSP Zeebrugge Terminal NV, through its wholly-owned subsidiary
CMA Terminals
In January 2019, CSP acquired a 60% stake in Terminales Portuarios
Chancay S.A. (Chancay Terminal) from Volcan Compañía Minera for a
Cosco Shipping Ports Chancay
total consideration of $225m. Chancay is a greenfield multi-purpose
port in Peru.
71.3% stake in Puertos y Logistica S.A. (“Pulogsa”) acquired from
Minera Valparaiso and other shareholders associated with the Matte
DP World San Antonio and Lirquen Group in early 2019. Investment of $502m in consideration for 100%
equity ownership. Covers two terminals, one in San Antonio and one
in Lirquen
In January 2019 DP World announces the acquisition of an additional
stake in DP World Australia from Gateway Infrastructure Investments
DP World DPW Australia
and other financial investors, increasing DPW’s stake to 60%. The DP
World Australia enterprise value is put at ~$997 m.
Marsa Maroc, Eurogate International and Contship Italia in JV to
develop and operate Container Terminal 3 (T3), scheduled to launch
Eurogate Tanger Med
in 2020 and to be marketed as Marsa International Tangier Terminals
(MINTT).
Evergreen is reported to have agreed a 50-year lease of Kaohsiung’s
Evergreen Kaohsiung Terminal 7, currently under construction. The first three berths (1,200
metres) will become available in 2019
50-year concession signed in Sept 2018 with the State of Delaware
(USA) to operate and develop the Port of Wilmington. Expected
Gulftainer Wilmington
investment of up to $600m in the port to upgrade and expand the
terminal
Québec Port Authority has signed a long-term commercial agreement
with Hutchison Ports and CN (Canadian National Railway) to build
Hutchison Ports Quebec
and operate a new 500,000 teu capacity container terminal, known as
project Laurentia (previously Beauport 2020).
42
Operator strategies
Table 3.7 Selected M&A and concession activity by global/international terminal operators, 2018-19 cont’d
Terminal operator/owner Port Details of activity
Sale of 70% stake in Shantou International Container Terminals,
Hutchison Ports Shantou
China, in Jan 2019
In late 2017, ICTSI acquired a 35% stake in Manila North Harbour
ICTSI Manila Port, Inc. (MNHPI). The terminal has capaity for 2.2m teu, 2m tonnes
of break-bulk cargoes and 2.5m passengers per year.
ICTSI signed a concession agreement in Jan 2019 to operate,
ICTSI Port Sudan
manage and develop the South Port Container Terminal (SPCT)
Sale in early 2019 by Macquarie of its majority stake in DCT Gdansk
to a consortium of investors including Poland’s sovereign wealth
Macquarie Gdansk
fund PFR, Australian infrastructure group IFM Investors and PSA
international
Halterm Container Terminal in Halifax (Canada), and multi-purpose
Macquarie Halifax and Philadelphia terminal operator Penn Terminals in Philadelphia (USA) sold by
Macquarie to PSA International in April 2019
Multi-purpose terminal Fraser Surrey Docks sold by Macquarie to DP
World in May 2019, acquired through Canadian subsidiary DP World
Macquarie Vancouver
Canada Investment Inc, which is 45% owned by Caisse de dépot et
placement du Québec (CDPQ)
Long Beach Container Terminal acquired by Macquarie from OOCL
Macquarie Long Beach
(Cosco) for $1.78bn in April 2019
In Sept 2018, Canadian investor ATCO announced the acquisition of
Neltume Ports Various
40% of Neltume Ports for approximately $340m.
In July 2017 it was announced that Cosco would be acquiring
OOCL’s parent company OOIL. Deal was finalised in July 2018.
Four terminals in Taiwan,
OOCL Cosco is majority shareholder, with SIPG taking 9.9% stake and CK
USA and China
Hutchison (owner of Hutchison Ports) taking 5%. OOCL’s Long
Beach terminal subsequently sold to Macquarie in 2019.
50-year lease to continue to operate at the Napoleon Avenue and
Ports America New Orleans Nashville Avenue Terminals. As part of the agreement, Ports America
will invest $66.5 million in infrastructure and equipment
In March 2019, Chilean port, towage and logistics services provider
SAAM Puertos Arica
SAAM sold its 15% stake in Terminal Puerto Arica for $12.2m
25 year deal for lease and expansion project for the development of
SSA Marine Jacksonville Jacksonville International Gateway (JIG) terminal, Blount Island to
commence on July 31, 2019.
In May 2019, Singapore sovereign wealth fund GIC acquired a 10%
Terminal Investment Limited Various stake in TIL from Global Infrastructure Partners (GIP). This was
accompanied by MSC increasing its own stake in TIL to 60%
April 2019 sale of the 50% stake of CSM Italia Gate, owned by
Terminal Investment Limited Gioia Tauro Contship Italia S.p.A., to Itaterminaux S.à.r.l. a fully controlled
subsidiary of Terminal Investment Ltd. (TiL). TiL now holds 100%
In May 2018, Yılport took a 55% stake in the operation of the multi-
Yilport Puerto Quetzal
purpose terminal. Operations started in Dec 2018
In Nov 2018, Yilport was awarded a concession to operate the multi-
purpose facilities within the Port of Taranto. The legal framework
Yilport Taranto
will be finalised in 2Q19. First operation expected to start at the
beginning of 2H19.
43
Geographic coverage
T able 3.8 provides a breakdown of equity teu throughput for 2017

and 2018 for each operator according to the 12 geographic world
regions used to determine GTO/ITO status. It should be noted here that
CM Ports’ complex portfolio involving minority stakes in Terminal Link,
SIPG, PDA and MTL as well as directly owned terminals, cannot be fully
shown in this table.
The table shows that most GTOs/ITOs derive most of their throughput
from interests in a relatively small number of geographic areas – Most GTOs/ITOs
particularly true of carrier portfolios, a number of which are focused derive their throughput
only on the Far East and North America. Also, it is evident that for from a relatively small
many operators, the Far East generates a significant proportion of their number of geographic
throughput, which is not surprising given that the Far East is by far the areas
largest world region in terms of container traffic.
DP World remains the only operator with activities in all 12 world regions, DP World is the only
while four are present in 11 regions (HP, APMT, TIL and CMA CGM). operator with activities
Two operators (SAAM and HHLA) are present in just two world regions. in all 12 world regions
Several key changes in 2018 can be observed from the table:
• Cosco’s regional spread was influenced by the OOCL acquisition (and
will be further influenced by the Long Beach terminal sale in 2019).
• APMT’s Far East proportion was down 2% and the Caribbean/Central
America was up 1.5%.
• CMP’s South America share was up due to the acquisition of TCP
Paranagua.
• ICTSI’s Oceania proportion was markedly increased due to its
Melbourne terminal ramping up.
• CMA CGM’s North America exposure was sharply down as a result of
the sale of 90% of the APL Los Angeles terminal.
• Hyundai’s North America proportion was down due to the closure of
its Los Angeles terminal, with South Europe sharply up as a result of
its Algeciras acquisition.
Table 3.8 Global/international operators terminal portfolio by region (% share of throughput, 2017-18)
South Caribbean/
T’put North North South Far East Middle Central South South East
Year Rank Operator America Europe Europe East Asia East America America Oceania Asia Africa Europe
2018 1 PSA 10.5 7.3 19.5 56.8 0.4 0.5 0.7 4.2
2017 1 International 9.4 7.5 20.5 57.6 0.5 0.1 0.6 3.8
2018 2 Hutchison 19.0 4.4 45.7 11.6 2.3 10.2 0.5 1.1 2.7 1.8 0.7
2017 2 Ports 19.2 3.3 46.9 10.5 2.3 11.8 0.3 0.8 2.6 1.7 0.5
2018 3 China Cosco 6.8 4.1 14.5 70.1 3.4 1.1
2017 5 Shipping * 5.0 4.5 13.7 72.2 3.1 1.6
2018 4 2.3 13.4 2.2 16.9 4.6 37.1 1.5 5.1 1.9 10.1 3.7 1.2
DP World
2017 3 2.3 12.7 2.0 16.8 4.6 38.5 1.4 4.1 2.0 10.4 4.1 1.3
2018 5 APM 10.3 15.5 14.6 17.1 9.4 4.0 2.8 6.0 6.1 12.7 1.6
2017 4 Terminals 10.0 15.3 15.2 19.1 9.5 4.9 1.3 5.0 5.9 13.0 0.8
44
Geographic coverage
Table 3.8 Global/international operators terminal portfolio by region (% share of throughput, 2017-18) cont’d
South Caribbean/
T’put North North South Far East Middle Central South South East
Year Rank Operator America Europe Europe East Asia East America America Oceania Asia Africa Europe
2018 6 China 2.5 79.2 3.1 11.3 4.0
Merchants
2017 6 Ports 2.5 81.5 11.8 4.2
2018 7 Terminal 12.3 19.1 22.5 5.8 11.9 8.9 2.0 9.6 3.6 2.2 2.0
Investment
2017 7 Limited (TIL) 13.5 20.4 24.6 7.2 12.0 5.3 1.8 9.3 2.8 1.8 1.3
2018 8 3.2 38.1 5.5 18.2 14.8 5.0 4.8 3.4 7.0
ICTSI
2017 10 3.2 38.8 6.1 18.2 16.2 1.1 6.2 3.5 6.6
2018 9 22.5 61.9 5.0 8.1 2.4

Evergreen
2017 9 22.0 63.9 4.8 7.1 2.2
2018 10 45.7 1.0 43.7 9.6

SSA Marine
2017 11 45.1 0.4 43.8 10.6
2018 11 4.1 15.5 17.8 12.0 20.3 2.7 15.2 0.5 2.5 8.4 1.0
CMA CGM
2017 8 16.4 13.4 15.9 11.1 16.8 2.6 13.0 0.4 1.3 8.0 0.8
2018 12 Yildirim 10.1 84.6 5.4
2017 12 /Yilport 10.5 85.0 4.5
2018 13 79.3 15.0 5.4 0.2

Eurogate
2017 13 79.0 15.3 5.5 0.2
2018 14 93.3 6.7

HHLA
2017 na
2018 15 23.1 9.4 31.4 36.1

Hyundai
2017 17 40.9 11.5 7.1 40.4
2018 16 46.0 43.4 10.6

NYK
2017 14 46.0 44.8 9.2
2018 17 4.6 4.7 90.7

Bollore
2017 18 5.4 2.8 91.8
2018 18 32.1 12.8 38.0 17.2

MOL
2017 16 31.1 11.3 41.8 15.8
2018 19 46.6 2.3 51.1

K Line
2017 20 46.0 2.9 51.1
2018 20 26.0 2.3 71.6

Yang Ming
2017 19 31.2 2.9 65.9
2018 21 SAAM 9.7 90.3

2017 21 Puertos 9.8 90.2
Figures based on equity throughput
PSA and Hutchison Ports equity teu and regional percentages are calculated before consideration of PSA’s 20% stake in Hutchison Ports
Hutchison Ports figure includes HPH Trust volumes
* Cosco 2018 figures include OOCL
CMA CGM includes CMA Terminals, Terminal Link and APL
Yildirim/Yilport and CMA CGM figures do not include effects of Yildirim’s 24% stake in CMA CGM
China Merchants Ports does not include effects of stakes in SIPG, MTL and Terminal Link
45
Risk profiles
T able 3.9 sets out a risk rating for seven world regions. We have
assessed each world region using the country risk ratings published
by the OECD (1 is low, 8 is high). These ratings are intended to provide a
North America has the
lowest regional risk
ranking, followed by
basis for identifying the element of risk that is attached to investment in a Europe and Oceania
particular geographical region. This formula takes into account economic
and political factors, among others. We have calculated the degree of
risk faced by global container terminal operators in relation to terminal
capacity, as opposed to throughput. This is considered a better benchmark
against which to assess risk as it reflects the extent of the immovable
investment made in particular regions by individual operators. North
America has the lowest regional risk ranking, followed by Europe and
Oceania. Africa has the highest risk ranking, with the Middle East/South
Asia and Latin America at the higher end of the scale. Asia occupies the
middle ground with its mix of emerging and more mature economies.
Table 3.9 also sets out each region’s historical container traffic growth
record for 2013-18 and contains a forecast of growth prospects through to Africa has the highest
2023, summarising the current and projected regional utilisation based on risk ranking, with
Tables 5.1 and 5.2. For Latin America, the forecast demand growth rate is the Middle East/
higher than the historical average, but this is from a low base. For Europe South Asia and Latin
the projected rate is similar to the historical one while for Africa and Asia America at the higher
it is marginally higher. However, the forecasts for North America and end of the scale
Oceania are lower than their historical averages. North America’s past rate
has been boosted by front-loading due to tariff worries.
In all but one world region, forecast average terminal utilisation is
projected to rise. This is due to a combination of solid demand growth
Drewry expects
projections and a continuation of caution about capacity expansion the global terminal
plans, particularly greenfield projects. The most significant increase utilisation to rise by
is projected for Asia, even though as discussed in Section 5, there are 2023
reasons why this projection needs to be treated with caution. In most
cases the increase is in the range of 1-5%.
Africa is the only region where a fall is projected (-4%). As one of the
smaller world regions, one or two large capacity expansion projects
can make a significant difference to the regional utilisation picture.
Additionally, with all of these regional figures, it is important to
remember that regional averages can hide wide variations in utilisation
numbers at the country, port and terminal levels.
Our analysis of individual GTO/ITO exposure to risk, by both total
capacity and equity-adjusted capacity measures, is set out in Tables 3.10
and 3.11. The indexed risk rating figures in these tables are generated by
applying the appropriate OECD country risk rating to the capacity of each
terminal in each operator’s portfolio. Thus, a one million teu capacity
terminal in a low-risk country has a lower rating than a one million teu
capacity terminal in a higher-risk country. This is then converted into an
overall weighted average risk rating on the 1 to 8 scale for each operator.
In Table 3.10, the risk rating is applied to the total capacity of each
terminal, while in Table 3.11, it is applied to an equity-adjusted capacity
figure for each terminal (i.e. the capacity of each terminal is adjusted to
46
Risk profiles
reflect the size of the shareholding held in it). This is instructive because
in most cases, the equity-adjusted risk figure for each operator is either
the same or lower than the total capacity-based figure. This suggests that
higher the risk of a location, the more likely it is that GTOs/ITOs will
take smaller shareholdings in terminals, in order to mitigate the risk.
The weighted average risk figures vary widely across the 21 GTOs/ITOs.
Bollore has by some margin the highest weighted averages by both
measures as most of its capacity is in West Africa, where most countries It should not be
are ranked 6 to 8 on the OECD risk scale. ICTSI is also relatively high as assumed that a
it has significant capacity in a number of higher risk-ranked countries, higher risk profile is
plus its home base in the Philippines is ranked 4 by the OECD. Also necessarily a bad
towards the higher-risk end of the scale are CM Ports, Hutchison, DPW thing
and APMT – each with a significant presence in regions such as Africa.
Joining them this year is CMA CGM which has seen a marked increase
in its weighted risk score. This is a result of the addition of capacity in
higher-risk locations such as Cameroon.
PSA has seen an increase in its risk profile, due to the adding of capacity in
higher-risk locations such as Dalian and Jawaharlal Nehru Port. However, in
the case of the former, while the capacity addition is large, the shareholding
by PSA is a minority one; hence the impact is felt more acutely in Table PSA has seen an
3.10 than in Table 3.11. It is also important to note that while Singapore’s increase in its risk
transhipment activity takes place in a low-risk country, most of this is profile
generated by neighbouring higher-risk countries. Overall it should not
be assumed that a higher-risk profile is necessarily a bad thing, and that low
risk is better. Economic theory reminds us that ‘profit is the return for risk’.
As in previous years, K Line has the lowest risk position of all the players
(in fact, the lowest figure possible) because all its terminals are located in
the lowest-risk countries (in this instance, Japan, the US and Belgium).
Several other operators have low-risk averages, including Hyundai and K Line has the lowest
risk position of all the
Eurogate as most of their terminals are in low-risk locations as well.
players
Cosco saw a decrease in its risk rating due to the addition of OOCL
terminals to the portfolio, in particular the large terminal in low-risk
Long Beach. However the company has since exited this investment, and
so its rating will likely increase next year.
Table 3.9 Regional investment prospects summary

Middle
East /
North South Latin
America Europe Asia Asia America Africa Oceania
Regional Risk Rating * 1.8 2.8 3.7 5.6 5.2 6.6 3.1
Average Annual Growth in Port Throughput
Historic (2013-2018) 4.8% 3.3% 4.2% 5.2% 2.5% 3.4% 3.9%
Forecast (2018-2023) 3.6% 3.4% 4.9% 5.1% 3.7% 4.1% 2.0%
Utilisation Levels
Current (2018) 66.5% 61.6% 77.1% 66.0% 57.6% 60.5% 69.6%
Forecast (2023) based on confirmed plans only 71.7% 66.9% 92.9% 69.2% 61.7% 56.6% 71.0%
Forecast (2023) based on confirmed + unconfirmed plans 68.4% 64.6% 92.3% 65.5% 59.1% 51.9% 66.6%
Note:
* Regional risk calculated pro rata to container port capacity per country; Risk categories rank 1 - low/ 8 - high, sourced from OECD
47
Risk profiles
Table 3.10 G
lobal/international operators’ portfolio risk indexes, 2018 (weighted risk rating based on
terminal capacity)
Portfolio Portfolio Portfolio

Operator risk index Operator risk index Operator risk index
K Line 1.00 SSA Marine 2.22 DP World 2.92
Hyundai 1.15 SAAM Puertos 2.35 Hutchison Ports 2.97
Eurogate 1.29 PSA International 2.42 APM Terminals 3.34
HHLA 1.68 Evergreen 2.50 CMA CGM ** 3.66
Yang Ming 1.71 Terminal Investment Limited (TIL) 2.55 China Merchants Ports 3.84
NYK 1.98 China Cosco Shipping * 2.57 ICTSI 4.69
MOL 2.19 Yildirim/Yilport 2.64 Bollore 6.29
Average 2.66
Notes:
Country risk categories rank 1-low/8-high, sourced from OECD
Calculations do not include capacity related to stevedoring operations at common user terminals, exclude barge/river terminals and do not include
in the calculations the capacity of other operators in which a GTO/ITO has a stake
Hutchison includes HPH Trust, TIL does not include MSC/affiliated companies
* Cosco includes OOCL
Table 3.11 G
lobal/international operators’ portfolio risk indexes (equity adjusted basis), 2018 (weighted risk
rating based on terminal capacity)
Portfolio Portfolio Portfolio
Operator risk index Operator risk index Operator risk index
K Line 1.00 HHLA 1.74 Hutchison Ports 2.92
Eurogate 1.13 Evergreen 2.01 Yildirim/Yilport 3.03
Hyundai 1.32 China Cosco Shipping * 2.30 DP World 3.05
NYK 1.48 Terminal Investment Limited (TIL) 2.51 APM Terminals 3.07
MOL 1.58 SSA Marine 2.52 China Merchants Ports 3.79
PSA International 1.67 CMA CGM ** 2.69 ICTSI 4.69
Yang Ming 1.74 SAAM Puertos 2.92 Bollore 6.47
Average 2.55
Notes:
Country risk categories rank 1-low/8-high, sourced from OECD
Calculations do not include capacity related to stevedoring operations at common user terminals, exclude barge/river terminals and do not include
in the calculations the capacity of other operators in which a GTO/ITO has a stake
Hutchison includes HPH Trust, TIL does not include MSC/affiliated companies
* Cosco includes OOCL
48
Operational performance
T able 3.12 provides the metrics for the operational performance of

the industry in 2018 using a sample of terminals handling more
than 200,000 teu, and for which, confirmed throughput data is held. Data
Sample size equates
to close to 60% of
global throughput for
for almost 350 terminals worldwide has been used, with an aggregate 2018
throughput of around 450 million teu, equating to close to 60% of global
throughput for the year. The sample size is considered to be good, and
the results generated tally well with industry rules of thumb. The results
for the overall sample are compared with those terminals within the
sample that are operated by GTOs/ITOs. Three different measures have
been used, all of which reflect the intensity of asset usage: teu per metre
of quay; teu per ship-to-shore crane; and teu per hectare. Therefore,
these measures have great relevance in terms of risk and returns as they
reflect the primary capital investment made in container terminals.
Based on the sample data, the average terminal worldwide has around The average terminal
1,130 metres of quay, 10 gantry cranes and an area of 52 hectares, worldwide had around
handling 1.3 million teu per annum. This generates operational 1,130 metres of quay,
performance by the industry of around 1,150 teu per metre of quay 10 gantry cranes and
per annum, 130,000 teu per gantry crane per annum and 25,000 teu handled 1.3 million teu
per hectare per annum. All of these averages and performance figures in 2018
are slightly down on the 2017 figures, although the difference is not
great and clearly the nature of the sample terminals each year does vary
according to the availability of data.
There are significant regional variations in operational performance, as Terminals in Asia
can be seen in Figure 3.8 as well as Table 3.12. Terminals in Asia achieve achieve the highest
the highest figures, being 44% above the world average for teu per metre of figures, but they
quay, 39% higher for teu per hectare and 21% better for teu per crane. Asia is are more than 50%
the only region whose results exceed the world norms. That said, average larger than the world
throughput per terminal in the sample for Asia is 56% higher than the world average
average, and experience shows that larger terminals generally achieve higher
performance figures. The Middle East / South Asia region also performed
well, with its result for all three metrics being just below the world averages,
and this with a typical terminal size below the world average.
At the other extreme, terminals in North America achieved among North America
the lowest performance levels, reflecting much lower intensity of asset achieved among the
utilisation. Teu per crane was 21% below the world average, per metre lowest performance
was 31% lower and per hectare 43% less. Part of the reason is that due to levels, reflecting much
the high cost of night-time dock labour in the US in particular, terminals lower intensity of
do not work round the clock. The results for Oceania in 2018 are asset utilisation
markedly lower than those for 2017, but this is a small sample affected in
2018 by the addition, for example of VICT in Melbourne which is a large
new terminal still ramping up.
While teu per metre of quay and teu per crane are closely correlated,
given that both relate to the shipside operation, teu per hectare is more
dependent upon the type of equipment deployed in the yard, as well
as factors such as typical dwell times. For example, teu per hectare in
Europe is relatively low, but the region does have the highest proportion
of straddle carrier terminals. By contrast, Asian terminals tend to opt for
high density RTG systems in the yard.
49
GTO/ITO-operated terminals achieve results that are 2-3% above the GTO/ITO-operated
overall average for each metric. Having said this, the average terminal terminals achieve
size for GTOs/ITOs in the sample is also slightly higher than the overall results that are 2-3%
average across the sample. above the overall
average for each
Looking at the teu per metre measure, GTOs/ITOs are well above
metric
the average in Oceania, North America and the Middle East / South
Asia region. In Africa though, they underperform against the regional
average. Teu per crane for the GTOs/ITOs is markedly higher than the
overall sample in the Middle East / South Asia and Europe, but lower in
Oceania and Africa. For the teu per hectare metric, GTOs/ITOs achieved
higher results than the regional averages in all cases, although for this
measure, as mentioned above, yard equipment type is a significant
variable factor.
The deployment of ship-to-shore gantry cranes by region, outreach and Ship-to-shore gantry
ownership is shown in Table 3.13. There are just over 6,300 gantry cranes crane fleet is 6,300
deployed worldwide, a near 5% increase on the previous year. While units
most of this increase is new deliveries, some of the change may also be
a result of a detailed audit of crane data undertaken by Drewry for this
year’s report. By crane size, only the Panamax fleet declined in numbers
due to the continued scrapping of older, smaller cranes by operators. It
should be noted here that for reasons of consistency with previous years’
reports, the definition of Panamax crane outreach in this table remains
based on the original, unexpanded Panama Canal dimensions (13 rows).
Figure 3.8 Regional container terminal performance comparison, 2018

Asia
World
Middle East / South Asia
Teu per Africa
Europe
metre of Latin America
quay North America
Oceania
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000
Asia
Teu per World
ship to Africa
Oceania
shore Europe
gantry North America
Latin America
crane
0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000
Asia
World
Latin America
Teu per Oceania
Africa
hectare Europe
North America
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000
Notes: Container terminals handling > 200,000 teu in 2018.
Excludes terminals where handling is undertaken by means other than ship-to-shore gantry cranes.
The analysis is based only on terminals for which non-estimated throughput data is held.
50
Table 3.12 Regional container terminal performance comparison, 2018

Middle
East &
Latin Indian North
Africa Asia Europe America SC America Oceania World
No of terminals sampled 22 118 73 35 39 49 11 347
Average terminal throughput (million teu) 0.79 2.03 1.04 0.82 1.00 0.89 0.52 1.30
Total throughput (million teu) 17.3 239.2 75.8 28.8 38.9 43.7 5.7 449.4
Global/international operators’ throughput
12.4 177.9 67.7 23.7 31.8 37.3 3.9 354.7
(million teu)
% Global/international operators 71.8% 74.4% 89.3% 82.4% 81.7% 85.4% 67.7% 78.9%
Regional average
Quay length (metres)
Total Sample 930 1,231 1,259 1,001 918 1,125 673 1,127
Global/international operators 871 1,225 1,377 1,062 910 1,132 722 1,157
Ship to shore gantry cranes
Total sample 7 13 9 8 8 9 5 10
Global/international operators 6 13 10 9 8 10 6 10
Yard area (hectares)
Total sample 37 61 53 36 43 63 24 52
Average crane spacing (metres)
Total sample 158 116 158 154 129 163 158 141
Performance data
Teu per metre of quay
Total sample 846 1,647 825 822 1,086 792 772 1,149
Global/international operators 792 1,669 878 828 1,204 889 893 1,180
% difference -6.4% 1.4% 6.4% 0.7% 10.9% 12.3% 15.6% 2.6%
Teu per ship to shore gantry crane
Total sample 113,093 157,662 109,723 98,659 121,163 103,232 112,047 130,330
Global/international operators 107,078 162,184 116,317 101,873 131,930 105,284 101,763 133,297
% difference -5.3% 2.9% 6.0% 3.3% 8.9% 2.0% -9.2% 2.3%
Teu per hectare
Total sample 21,025 34,796 19,352 23,156 23,582 14,247 21,279 25,031
Global/international operators 22,926 36,484 20,437 23,501 25,242 15,119 22,122 25,824
% difference 9.0% 4.8% 5.6% 1.5% 7.0% 6.1% 4.0% 3.2%
Notes:
Container terminals handling > 200,000 teu in 2018
Excludes terminals where handling is undertaken by means other than ship-to-shore gantry cranes
The analysis is based only on terminals for which non-estimated throughput data is held
51
Almost one-third of the world crane fleet is deployed in the Far East, not
surprisingly as it is the largest region in terms of throughput. Southeast
Asia is next with a 13% share.
Just over 60% of the global fleet is in terminals that GTOs/ITOs
operate or have stakes in, reflecting closely throughput and capacity Just over 60% of
proportions. However, almost 80% of the largest cranes (22+ box the global fleet is in
outreach) are in GTO/ITO terminals. By contrast, just 34% of Panamax terminals that GTOs/
cranes are located in GTO/ITO terminals, indicating that GTOs/ITOs ITOs operate or have
tend to be focused on larger, newer terminals, handling the largest stakes in
ships. The largest cranes (22+ box outreach) now represent one-third of
the world fleet.
Table 3.13 D
eployment of ship-to-shore gantry cranes by region, outreach and ownership, 2018
(number of cranes)
Region Panamax 16-18 Rows 18-20 Rows 20-22 Rows 22+ Rows Total
Total 52 48 59 29 77 265
Africa
GTOs/ITOs 35 67.3% 25 52.1% 12 20.3% 10 34.5% 64 83.1% 146 55.1%
Caribbean/ Total 71 36 49 29 73 258

Central America GTOs/ITOs 45 63.4% 25 69.4% 46 93.9% 21 72.4% 68 93.2% 205 79.5%
Total 76 15 30 3 19 143
Eastern Europe
GTOs/ITOs 19 25.0% 7 46.7% 18 60.0% 3 100.0% 5 26.3% 52 36.4%
Total 391 351 266 143 857 2,008
Far East
GTOs/ITOs 111 28.4% 185 52.7% 157 59.0% 89 62.2% 590 68.8% 1,132 56.4%
Total 78 55 63 63 179 438
Middle East
GTOs/ITOs 26 33.3% 24 43.6% 33 52.4% 5 7.9% 162 90.5% 250 57.1%
Total 138 113 92 125 150 618
North America
GTOs/ITOs 35 25.4% 63 55.8% 70 76.1% 76 60.8% 106 70.7% 350 56.6%
Total 195 62 64 91 236 648
North Europe
GTOs/ITOs 47 24.1% 49 79.0% 52 81.3% 88 96.7% 231 97.9% 467 72.1%
Total 38 32 36 3 109
Oceania
GTOs/ITOs 14 36.8% 6 18.8% 23 63.9% 0 0.0% 43 39.4%
Total 281 140 118 45 240 824
South East Asia
GTOs/ITOs 88 31.3% 105 75.0% 86 72.9% 45 100.0% 225 93.8% 549 66.6%
Total 49 25 73 33 67 247
South America
GTOs/ITOs 30 61.2% 9 36.0% 42 57.5% 8 24.2% 30 44.8% 119 48.2%
Total 46 30 77 30 50 233
South Asia
GTOs/ITOs 15 32.6% 16 53.3% 53 68.8% 22 73.3% 41 82.0% 147 63.1%
Total 151 69 90 58 155 523
South Europe
GTOs/ITOs 74 49.0% 50 72.5% 76 84.4% 43 74.1% 151 97.4% 394 75.3%
Total 1,566 976 1,017 652 2,103 6,314
World
GTOs/ITOs 539 34.4% 564 57.8% 668 65.7% 410 62.9% 1,673 79.6% 3,854 61.0%
Note:
Definition of Panamax crane outreach in this table remains based on the original, unexpanded Panama Canal dimensions (13 rows)
52
There are also significant regional variations in the GTO/ITO shares,

reflecting the extent to which GTOs/ITOs have populated each region.
In South Europe and Central America / Caribbean over 75% of cranes
deployed are at GTO/ITO terminals, but at the other extreme in Eastern
Europe, the figure is just 36%.
Table 3.14 shows the orderbook for ship-to-shore gantry cranes, split by
crane size and world region. A total of 238 cranes are on order, with 64% 238 cranes are on
of them being 22+ rows outreach. Clearly the ongoing growth in ship order with 64% of
sizes means that most new orders are for the largest cranes possible. That them being 22+ rows
said there are a significant number of smaller cranes on order, destined outreach
for niche terminals and uses such as dedicated shortsea terminals.
Once again, North America is the region with the largest number of
cranes on order, accounting for 23% of the orderbook. Most of these
cranes are the largest size (nearly 70%) and reflect the rapid increase
in ship sizes in USEC ports since the expansion of the Panama Canal.
Plus the general increase in ship sizes on WCNA services. The Far North America is the
East, Southeast Asia and the Middle East also have significant numbers region with the largest
with each representing over 10% of the orderbook. These four regions number of cranes on
collectively have nearly 60% of the cranes currently on order. Several order
regions such as Oceania have few cranes on order, these being the
smaller ones in terms of total throughput. South Europe is also on this
list despite having several new developments in the pipeline. This is
because new cranes have already been delivered.
It should be noted that for the time being, we are retaining the ‘old’
definition of Panamax here, even though this has been superseded by
the opening of the expanded Panama Canal in 2016, which has created a
new or neo-Panamax ship size definition.
Table 3.14 Ship-to-shore gantry cranes on order, 2019

Region Panamax 16-18 Rows 18-20 Rows 20-22 Rows 22+ Rows Total
Africa 8 3 11 22
Caribbean/Central America 2 1 4 7
East Europe 5 3 8
Far East 4 8 5 3 12 32
Middle East 4 23 27
North America 3 2 12 37 54
North Europe 1 1 14 16
Oceania 3 3
South America 4 11 15
South Asia 23 23
South East Asia 6 5 5 10 26
South Europe 5 5
Grand total 13 17 32 23 153 238
Note:
Definition of Panamax crane outreach in this table remains based on the original, unexpanded Panama Canal dimensions (13 rows)
53
Financial performance
T able 3.15 provides a summary of the 2017 and 2018 financial results
of selected GTOs/ITOs. The numbers, including throughput, are all
as per publicly stated figures from operators. Given the varying nature of
individual GTOs/ITOs in terms of their activities, as well as the varying
ways of reporting financial figures, it is not possible to claim that this
is a like-for-like comparison. Particularly, the way in which JVs and
subsidiaries are treated, causes complications (gross versus consolidated
results). However, wherever possible, we have sought to focus purely
on the results generated by container terminal activities only for each
operator and, as far as profitability is concerned, on EBITDA. EBITDA
margins must be viewed in the light of the absolute level of the tariff. For
example, a 20% EBITDA margin on a tariff of $150 per teu yields $30 per
teu, but the same 20% margin on a tariff of $50 per teu yields an absolute
result of only $10 per teu.
Despite continued pressure on margins caused by ever-larger ships and
stronger liner alliances, the typical EBITDA margins of the selected Typical EBITDA
GTOs/ITOs remain in the 20-50% range. The variation in margins margins of the
achieved is the result of level of portfolio risk of each terminal operator selected GTOs/ITOs
but also a function of average revenue per teu. Average revenue per are in the 20-50%
range
teu is high for gateway terminals whereas due to greater competitive
pressure, transhipment hubs have to contend with charging lesser tariffs.
Table 3.15 Financial performance of selected global/international terminal operators, 2017 & 2018 ($ million)
Terminal Reported Earnings Margin Revenue Earnings
operator Year throughput Revenue Earnings type % age per teu per teu
(mteu)
2017 14.4 749 180 24.1% 52.0 12.5
Eurogate EBITDA
2018 14.1 694 144 20.8% 49.2 10.2
2017 84.7 4,370 1,608 36.8% 51.6 19.0
Hutchison Ports * EBITDA
2018 84.6 4,492 1,710 38.1% 53.1 20.2
2017 9.2 1,244 578 46.4% 136.0 63.1
ICTSI EBITDA
2018 9.7 1,386 636 45.9% 142.4 65.3
2017 74.2 3,968 1,948 49.1% 53.5 26.2
PSA EBITDA
2018 81.0 4,086 2,021 49.5% 50.4 25.0
2017 80.8 4,138 717 17.3% 51.2 8.9
APMT ** EBITDA
2018 na na na na na na
2017 23.5 635 205 32.3% 27.0 8.7
Cosco Shipping Ports *** EBIDTA
2018 33.5 1,000 319 31.9% 29.9 9.5
2017 36.5 4,729 2,469 52.2% 129.6 67.7
DPW *** EBITDA
2018 36.8 5,646 2,808 49.7% 153.6 76.4
Notes:
Financial year ending December 2018 - Exchange rates as at 31 December 2018 (Source: CapitalIQ)
Financial year ending March 2018 - Exchange rates as at 1st Apr 2018 (Source: CapitalIQ)
Jan -Dec reporting period for HP, ICTSI, PSA, APMT, Cosco Shipping Ports, DPW
Apr-Mar reporting period for Eurogate
Revenue and EBIDTA for PSA refers to port operations only
Revenue and EBIDTA for Cosco Shipping Ports refers to container terminal businesses only
* Hutchison figures include HPH Trust
** APMT ceased reporting results separately due to AP Moller’s restructuring
*** Consolidated numbers i.e. pertaining to subsidiaries only; 2018 throughput figures includes contribution from acquisitions
Source: DMFR
54
However, high EBITDA margins cannot always be expected in locations

with high tariffs because the absolute margin becomes unsustainable
in the market, as discussed above. Other factors also play a role, for
example, the number of start-up terminals in the portfolio.
Eurogate saw its EBITDA margin slip in 2018 due to volume loss,
while Hutchison Ports was able to increase its margin despite a slight
fall in activity levels. ICTSI and PSA remained consistently profitable
while APMT’s performance is now no longer transparent due to the
restructuring of the AP Moller group. Cosco’s margin fell slightly but
volume and revenue were up sharply. Meanwhile, DPW registered a
dramatic revenue jump due to acquisitions, but as some of these were
outside the port space, its EBITDA margin fell slightly.
The global economy underwent an unprecedented expansion until 2018
led by emerging markets, the US and Europe. Advanced economies
expanded 1.7% in the period between 2001 and 2017 whereas Asia Global economic
growth prospects are
expanded 5.6% and China 9.4%, accelerating economic activity in most
dampening throughput
regions, with the US and Europe enjoying one of the longest consecutive
recovery in the short
growth runs in GDP. Quantitative Easing (QE) flooded the market term
with cheap debt which then spurred consumption. Now with economic
activity fading in 2019, companies under the DMFR coverage face
strains on their balance sheets.
Focusing on the present economic and financial indicators, they all
point to robust economic health – The S&P500 and Dow Jones Index
breached their all-time highs in the week ending 8 July 2019. While
the financial markets may have reason to rejoice as the Fed is due to
announce another cut in interest rate, consumption is slowing and
production has suffered in both emerging and advanced economies
alike. As the growth is weakening the global economy is entering a new
business cycle affected by total spending outpacing wage growth and
inflation. The trade war appears to have seized Chinese demand for
foreign manufactured goods including the much-sought-after German
engineering as the mood swings from consumption to caution. German
manufacturing orders plummeted 8.6% in May 2019 year on year.
Chinese containerised volume growth softened to 2.9% in the first five
months of 2019 compared with 5.4% in the same period of 2018. Global
trade is at risk as we enter a new world dominated by President Trump’s
favourite method to resolve trade – “get in line or get tariffed”. In view
of that we have downgraded our 2019 global port throughput growth
estimate to 3.0% from the earlier 3.9%.
The Purchasing Manufacturing Index is a measure of economic health
and demand. Manufacturing has weakened in the face of the trade war.
When companies plan their manufacturing months in advance, a small Weak global economic
drop in demand is often followed by manufacturers cutting production
outlook beckons
caution
and thereby extending the downturn. The world PMI index dropped to
52.2 (see Figure 3.9) in end June 2019 from the high seen in March of
the same year marking one of the lowest levels seen since 2012.
55
Figure 3.9 World PMI

65
60
55
World PMI
50
China PMI
US PMI
45
Mar 14 Sep 14 Mar 15 Sep 15 Mar 16 Sep 16 Mar 17 Sep 17 Mar 18 Sep 18 Mar 19 Eurozone PMI
The IMF has sounded alarms over elevated tensions related to the
trade war weighing on the global economy, and in April it downgraded
its forecast for global growth for 2019 to 3.3%. The heightened trade
tensions mean both importers and exporters are having a rethink of their
strategies to continue with manufacturing bases in China or moving
them to other Asian countries as no resolution appears to be in sight for
this conflict.
China’s economy grew at 6.3% in 1H19, its slowest pace in more than
two decades. This is lower than the 1Q19 growth of 6.4% and FY18
growth of 6.6% as China navigates headwinds at home and abroad.
Slowdown in emerging markets (primarily Argentina, Turkey and Chinese economy
Venezuela) is also weighing down the global outlook. However, while grows at the slowest
the economic activity in emerging markets is expected to pick up pace pace in more than two
in the latter part of 2019 and early 2020, the advanced economies are decades
expected to face gradual slowdown as the fiscal impetus fades. Despite
the economic challenges, China and India will grow, though at a slower
pace than in preceding years. Risks to global economy remain deeply
entrenched in trade conflicts, but business confidence could rebound
and investor sentiments strengthen further should the US and China
resolve their differences sooner than later.
The economic slowdown has met with tepid response in the emerging
markets, and India recently announced key interest rate cuts following
the lead from the US’ Fed. Meanwhile, the Fed has announced rate cuts
and the European Central bank, Bank of England and Bank of Japan
have all declared their stance as accommodative in response to the global
manufacturing slowdown.
56
As global throughput suffered in 2018 the impact of the trade war Drewry has revised
began to show on manufacturing and trade activity in China, Germany downwards its year-
and much of Europe. Drewry has revised downwards its year-on-year on-year growth in
growth in global container port traffic from 3.9% to 3.0% for 2019. It is global container port
possible that there will be strains in the supply chain due to the trade traffic from 3.9% to
war nudging China-based factories to look for alternatives elsewhere in 3.0% for 2019
order to avoid US tariffs. Port throughput was disappointing as global
volumes shrank by 0.2% in the first quarter of 2019, registering a rolling
annual average growth of 3.0%. On the flipside a prolonged trade war
may push Chinese manufacturing to find a new home in South Asia. We
expect this scenario to spell an increase in demand for port services in
the medium term. Nevertheless, the ongoing trade battle between the US
and China remains a key risk for port throughput.
Growth in Chinese port throughput during the first five months of
2019 was 3.1%, down from 5.1% during the same period last year. The
contraction was most pronounced in February 2019 when volumes
shrank 3.5% year on year. Trade tensions are causing demand- and
supply-side players to adopt caution in orders and building inventories
as they look for longer-term solutions to tariff woes.
Meanwhile, the top 10 Chinese ports handled 69.8 million teu as of May
2019, representing a 3.5% year-on-year increment over the same period
last year (see Figure 3.10). One of the most important themes emerging
from this trade scenario is that the transhipment incidence continues to
decrease as direct port connectivity improves.
Volumes of DPW declined 0.7% and its biggest port, Jebel Ali, was the
hardest hit with a fall of 8.8% in 1Q19 year on year as Cosco and MSC
shifted their transhipment volumes to Port Khalifa in Abu Dhabi. Port
Khalifa has an initial design capacity of 2.6 million teu and Abu Dhabi
ports plan to ramp up capacity to 5.0 million teu further escalating
competition for transhipment cargo with Jebel Ali. Port Khalifa’s volumes
surged 20% in 2018 over 2017 as transhipment traffic shifted from Jebel Ali.
Figure 3.10 Chinese container port volume growth

25,000 15%
20,000 10%
15,000 5%
'000 teu
10,000 0%
5,000 -5% China

throughput
0 -10% Growth YoY

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 (right axis)
Source: Ministry of Transport (PRC), Drewry Maritime Financial Research
57
Figure 3.11 highlights Port Klang losing its transhipment volumes to

Singapore as new alliances came into effect in 1H18. Busan Port, which
handled 9.0 million teu as of May 2019, knocked Hong Kong out of the
list of the top five largest container ports in the world (see Figure 3.12).
Average revenue per teu varies considerably depending on operators
with several factors at play. Moreover, average container handling tariffs
vary significantly from region to region and country to country. Firstly,
locations with high wage rates and strong unions, such as the US and
Japan, almost always attract higher handling charges while China on the Average revenue
other hand has significantly lower container handling charges as labour is per teu varies
cheap and unions do not have much say. Secondly, average tariffs per teu considerably
for transhipment are typically lower than gateway traffic with transhipment depending on
being more a competitive and price-sensitive sector to operate in. Lastly, operators
operators offer complementary services in addition to container handling
earning them ancillary revenues. Therefore, for example, the revenue from
container storage on the terminal varies, as does the extent of services
such as reefer connection. There may also be elements such as container
transportation services in some of the revenue figures.
Figure 3.11 Total volumes at selected transhipment hubs

40
30
Million teu
20
Singapore
10
Hong Kong *
Abu Dhabi (Khalifa Port)

0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Port Klang
* Hong Kong throughput is estimated/adjusted by Drewry excluding barge moves

Figure 3.12 Hong Kong and Busan volume growth

40%
20%
Volume growth
0%
-20%
Hong Kong
-40%
Busan
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Source: Drewry Maritime Research, Drewry Maritime Financial Research
58
Subdued equity throughput expansion resulted in weak revenue Muted throughput

growth for most of the companies in our coverage. Dalian, Global expansion weighs on
Ports, HPH Trust and the troubled Santos Brasil saw declining revenue, revenue growth
of which only HPHT registered a fall in volumes as well (Table 3.16).
HPHT recorded a revenue decline of 1% in 2018 and also reported a
2% drop in throughput year on year. Hong Kong port continues to shed
transhipment volumes (12% decline in volumes up to May 2019 year
on year) as China’s mainland ports gain prominence thereby reducing
reliance on Hong Port. A new terminal alliance has emerged in Hong
Kong port to cooperate on operational optimisation to counter
regional competition.
Table 3.16 Financials of selected DMFR port coverage

Revenue EBITDA EBIT FY18 Margins Container Yield
(USD’m) (USD’m) (USD’m) (%) (USD/teu)
YoY YoY YoY YoY

FY17 FY18 change FY17 FY18 change FY17 FY18 change EBITDA EBIT FY17 FY18 change
Cosco Shipping Ports 635 1,000 58% 205 319 56% 98 213 117% 32 21 27 28 5.5%
CMPH * 1,048 1,241 18% 478 473 -1% 293 167 -43% 38 13 68 62 -8.8%
DP World 4,729 5,646 19% 2,469 2,808 14% 1,837 2,084 13% 50 37 91 96 5.4%
Dalian Port 1,388 983 -29% 247 266 8% 116 129 11% 27 13 37 34 -8.5%
Global Ports 331 344 4% 202 217 8% 151 169 12% 63 49 263 255 -3.0%
HHLA 896 861 -4% 234 240 3% 131 151 15% 28 18 125 117 -5.8%
HPHT 1,478 1,469 -1% 845 862 2% 461 462 0% 59 31 71 73 2.7%
ICTSI 1,244 1,386 11% 578 642 11% 405 441 9% 46 32 136 142 4.7%
Santos Brasil 203 239 18% 25 27 8% 10 17 70% 11 7 135 142 5.0%
Tianjin Port * 910 892 -2% 438 417 -5% 285 286 0% 47 32 41 42 3.1%
Westports 423 389 -8% 230 237 3% 184 185 1% 61 48 40 29 -26.1%
Notes:
* Financials represents only port operations and cargo handling business
Financial year ending December 2018 - Exchange rates as at 31 December 2018 (Source: CapitalIQ)
Financial year ending December 2017 - Exchange rates as at 1st Jan 2018 (Source: CapitalIQ)
Revenue and EBIDTA for Cosco Shipping Ports refers to terminal operations only
Revenue and EBIDTA for CMPH refers to port operations only
Revenue and EBITDA for DP World excludes construction revenues relating to service concessions
Revenue and EBITDA for HHLA refers to container segment only
Revenue and EBITDA for Santos Brasil refers to port terminals only
Source: Companies, CapitalIQ, DMFR
59
GLPR’s volume (see Figure 3.13) recovered on the back of improved Buoyant throughput
Russian economic output while Santos Brasil’s revenue jumped 18% in cheered revenues
2018 as volumes advanced 12% (see Figure 3.14). Buoyant throughput for Chinese players
cheered revenues for Chinese players Cosco and CMPH. Throughput Cosco and CMPH
from Cosco’s overseas portfolio surged as synergies from OCEAN
alliance helped push volumes up. CMPH also enjoyed a position of
growth in revenue helped by throughput growth across its home and
overseas portfolios.
Meanwhile DPW’s total throughput remained resilient despite persistent
volume weakness at Jebel Ali which shed 8.8% volumes in 1Q19 year on
year. Strong revenue growth is driven by inorganic expansion in the non-
container sector rather than throughput. We remain unconvinced on
Jebel Ali’s volume recovery as Port Khalifa gains transhipment volumes
from Cosco and MSC.
Figure 3.13 St Petersburg container port volume growth

250 40%
200 20%
150 0%
'000 teu
100 -20%
50 -40%
Volume
0 -60%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Growth (right axis)
Source: Drewry Maritime Research, Drewry Maritime Financial Research
Figure 3.14 Port of Santos volume growth

500 40%
400 20%
300 0%
'000 teu
200 -20%
Port of Santos
volume
100 -40%
Port of Santos
growth (right axis)
0 -60% Tecon Santos
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 growth (right axis)
Source: Port of Santos, Company, Drewry Maritime Financial Research
60
HHLA’s 2018 throughput grew 2% to 7.3 million teu due to the impact of
reshuffling in alliance services. We expect throughput growth in FY19 to
remain moderate at 1-4% as concerns on growth in China and the trade
war remain pertinent risks to HHLA’s export volumes.
Container revenue yields across the 11 companies DMFR covers stayed
flat in 2018. The reasons for the sluggish growth are the obvious lack of Container revenue
improvement in headline volumes and pressures faced by the industry yields across the 11
from bigger and mightier shipping alliances. The challenge is not just companies DMFR
delivering on sustainable earnings growth but maintaining a level to covers remained
retain investor confidence. The port companies are usually reliable, broadly flat in 2018
maintaining steady earnings that traditionally attracted value investors.
Our outlook for ICTSI, DPW and Westports remains positive in view
of strong volume growth following a ramp-up in throughput from
start-up terminals and expanding footprint in emerging markets. For
ICTSI, Asia-led throughput growth marked by resurgent trade activity
drove earnings margin to a new high. We anticipate earnings growth Our outlook for ICTSI,
momentum to stick in 2019, supported by ramp-up in throughput at
DPW and Westports
remains positive
key terminals. Meanwhile, DPW’s earnings were diluted as traditionally
lower-margin businesses of container warehousing and shipping were
integrated into the core container handling business. We believe these
acquisitions will temper the earnings margin in the medium term but
they serve the management strategy to look to diversify DPW’s revenue
base to mitigate Jebel Ali’s gradual decline in volumes.
Meanwhile, we are not as positive about CMPH, HPHT, Santos Brasil
and GLPR earnings. The common thread binding the companies
reporting negative earnings growth is their expanding territorial We are not as positive
ambitions and challenging macro environment at home. While the about CMPH, HPHT,
malaise in earnings for Santos may not stabilise in the near term, the Santos and GLPR
company faces headwinds from the depressed macro outlook of the earnings
Brazilian economy. In addition to macro headwinds, Santos faces intense
competition within the port of Santos that strains its revenue per teu and
elevates its cost due to rising inflation.
CMPH’s earnings were impacted by higher interest expenses despite
decent results in revenue terms. Operating profit for port operations
business was impacted by the massive depreciation charge in 2018.
The company faces short-term debt maturity which will put immediate
pressure on its earnings. HPH Trust’s revenue per teu remained under
pressure as competition with Chinese ports heats up and efficiency
issues mar productivity eventually dragging earnings down. GLPR
earnings improved 8% in 2018 as the road to full recovery (in terms
of profitability) remains a milestone. We believe adherence to cost
discipline and deleveraging in addition to stepping up capacity
utilisation remain key priorities.
61
Mounting debt that fuelled expansion is becoming a liability for Rising debt to strain
companies across our coverage universe. The net debt across the 11 balance sheets further
companies that we track rose to $20.1 billion in 2018 from $17.2 billion
in 2017 while the cash cushion also improved to $8.0 billion, against $7.3
billion (see Table 3.17).
DPW’s net gearing rose substantially to 65%, which translated to a
28% increase in net debt, after the company raised $3.3 billion in a
multi-tranche bond transaction in 2018. The sharp rise in net debt
was attributed to aggressive funding support to Unifeeder and other
supply chain acquisitions in India and Peru. Meanwhile, DPW had a
comfortable cash cushion as its operations generated $2.6 billion in 2018
after rising 76% from 2017. On a cash flow basis, the company has about
2.8x net debt to LTM EBITDA leverage. However, for a port operator
with global scale and a wide source of capital stream, we opine that the
UAE-based operator could sustain the leverage which is within the target
ceiling of 4.0x. Most recently DPW announced the acquisition of Topaz
Marine, an oil and gas supply chain company.
CMPH’s net debt shot up 67% as the company issued a fixed rate
unlisted note maturing in 2021 and another two tranches of listed notes
adding up to $900 million and $600 million maturing in 2023 and 2028
respectively to finance the company’s funding spree and capex. We
believe the port operator will have to tap on the medium-term notes
fully. However, the Chinese state-owned enterprises, CMPH and CSP,
are comfortable scaling leverage up to 40% and 60% respectively to
fund their expansion plans. CSP has $765 million in undrawn banking
facilities which we believe is a war chest for overseas M&A in 2019.
Table 3.17 Listed port company gearing statistics

Company Cash level Capex 2019 Net debt Net gearing
% YoY
(in USD’m) FY17 FY18 change Budget FY17 FY18 change FY17 FY18
Cosco Shipping Ports 560 543 -3% 1,700 1,768 1,873 6.0% 30% 32%
CMPH 1,183 933 -21% 300 * 2,472 4,119 66.6% 26% 43%
DP World 1,484 2,615 76% 1,400 6,105 7,806 27.9% 53% 65%
Dalian Port 1,126 859 -24% na 262 859 227.9% 8% 27%
Global Ports 130 92 -30% 40¹ 866 780 -9.9% 230% 317%
HHLA 243 209 -14% 225 162 304 88.0% 28% 55%
HPHT 880 854 -3% 37.4 * 3,299 3,240 -1.8% 43% 53%
ICTSI 279 447 60% 380 1,214 860 -29.2% 65% 39%
Santos Brasil 77 66 -14% na -11 -7 nm -3% -2%
Tianjin Port 1,295 1,283 -1% na 805 726 -9.8% 23% 22%
Westports 138 107 -22% 15 235 253 7.7% 40% 44%
Notes:
Results as of December 2018 (Exchange rates as at 31 December 2018)
* Based on DMFR estimates
Source: Companies, CapitalIQ, DMFR
62
ICTSI has also been widening its geographical footprint with

borrowings. Its net gearing, which was portending on the high side
of our port coverage universe, slipped from 64.8% to 38.6% as the
company raised $400 million fixed-for-life senior guaranteed perpetual
capital securities, with a call in 2022 to support its expansion pipeline.
Meanwhile, we expect debt reduction to be the main financial theme for
GLPR as gearing is critically high at 330% compared with 261% in 2017.
The M&A landscape dampened in 2018, as cumulative M&A in 2018
with disclosed figures was $600 million, representing a steep year-on- Chinese players and
year decline from the levels recorded a year earlier. Valuations were DPW dominate M&A
recorded in the range of 8-21x EBITDA (see Figure 3.15) with variable activity
target risks and acquirers’ targeting brownfield expansions.
Trade tensions between the US and China, and US and other trading
partners stoked fears of a slowdown, shifting the attitude to caution.
Investor sentiments were also dented by the falling demand and tighter
growth in container throughput. Port players were more concerned
with protecting market share than expanding their reach in 2018.
Notwithstanding this, DPW went on a buying spree in 2018 and
acquired multiple non-container but complementary businesses such
as Unifeeder, Container Warehousing in India and logistics business in
Peru among other undertakings.
The appetite of Chinese players for geographical diversification cooled
in 2018 as the trade war and weak demand weighed on investment
decisions. Cosco Shipping Ports and China Merchants Ports Holdings Port players were
made a string of acquisitions, and the duo revealed that they are more concerned with
comfortable leveraging their balance sheets to pursue their global protecting market
expansion goals. Most recently in 2019, CSP acquired Volcan and share than expanding
Chancay Terminal in a share purchase transaction. The company aims their reach in 2018
to build the terminal into a successful gateway port and bolster Cosco
Shipping’s connections in the region.
Figure 3.15 Recent disclosed and estimated port sector transaction multiples
Long Beach Container Terminal (100%)
Noatum Port Holdings (51%)
Thessaloniki Port (67%)
TCP Participacoes SA (90%)
Qingdao Port International (16.82%)
Terminal Portuário de Navegantes SA (50%)
Global Ports Investments (30.75%)
Sihanoukville Port (13.5%)
0 5 10 15 20 25
EV/EBITDA
Source: Drewry Maritime Financial Research
63
Apart from CMPH’s investment in acquiring a 50% stake in the Port of

Newcastle for $481 million, there was limited other notable deal activity
in the quoted port company sector. ICTSI increased its stake by another
15.17%, taking its total shareholding to 50% in Manila North Harbor,
its competitor at home port Manila for PHP 910 million. The largest
German port operator, HHLA acquired Estonian terminal operator
Transiidikeskuse in March 2018 to restore its growth trajectory.
DPW is aggressively ramping up its non-terminal revenue in order to
mitigate risks in container volume growth. The company has pursued
its revenue diversification, and often opportunistic, strategy; in 2018,
it spent $1.3 billion on acquisitions across the supply chain. DPW is
growing its foothold in India through investments in logistics and supply
chain players which we believe is earnings accretive for the company in
the long term.
The market-weighted Drewry Port Index (DPI), which comprises 11
port companies under our coverage, tracked the downward momentum
of global economy with a loss of 24.9% in 2018. It trails the MSCI
Emerging Markets Index which shed 17% in the same period (see Figure
3.16). Hence the price gap between the two indices narrowed to around Trade war dampens
valuations
8%, one of the closest gaps in the indices since we started tracking them
in 2012. The glum market sentiments against the backdrop of the trade
war depressed the valuations of the port sector. We argue that valuations
have not found the floor yet and the volatile market has exacerbated the
variety in their levels.
All companies in our coverage went into decline for the first three
quarters of 2018 as the trade war gathered steam with September being
the lowest point for valuations. Uncertainty gripped the market and
valuations of most companies are now emerging from their bottom; the
trade war has spared no one, although some players are more immune to
it than others.
Figure 3.16 Drewry Port Index vs Global Emerging Market Index

200
150
100
MSCI EM Index
50
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Drewry Port Index
Source: Bloomberg, Drewry Maritime Financial Research
64
In addition, returns on equity in the port sector appreciated from an

average 9.0% in 2017 to 9.8% in 2018 and should be under pressure as
income to equity holders remains steady in our outlook. Port operators
are increasingly jittery as a few, such as DPW, diversify into supply chains
by providing integrated end-to-end services to counter competitive
market landscape and eventually adding to the stickiness of cargo.
DPW’s valuation remains Attractive as it trades at 9.5x 2019e PE
compared with the DPI at 23.8x, at close of trading on 13 July 2019. We
believe the valuations are cheap as DPW trades 8.4x on EV/EBITDA LTM
compared with 10.8x for all companies we cover. While we anticipate
the impact of recent acquisitions on earnings margin to be dilutive, we
believe the strategy to diversify its revenue stream into multiple sectors of
supply chain is unlikely to pay off in the medium term.
Both CMPH and CSP, two major Chinese players, have recently
consolidated their stakes in Tianjin port to bolster efficiency and take
advantage of cost savings. The ongoing trade war and dampening CMPH and CSP have
demand due to weaknesses in Chinese economic growth remain key recently consolidated
risks for throughput in 2019. On forward PE basis CMPH and CSP
their stakes in Port of
Tianjin
trade 15.6x and 8.1x respectively ahead of the current DPI forward PE
of 23.8x, an attractive valuation for both Chinese players. However, the
risks as discussed above remain pertinent and show no sign of fading.
Westports, Santos Brasil and HHLA are lagging in the current race
to become more involved in the wider supply chain mainly due to
unwillingness to steer respective companies in that direction and also
because of lack of financial muscle that backs the likes of Cosco Shipping
Ports and DPW. HHLA is one of the most undervalued stock in our
coverage; we value it at 8.3x current EV/EBITDA, much lower than the
average 10.8x for the companies we cover. HHLA continues to demonstrate
its resilience to difficult outlook and intense competition. The completion
of Elbe fairway adjustment to allow for large container ships to enter with
reduced waiting time for tidal windows is the key catalyst for growth.
Figure 3.17 Valuation: Port vs Emerging Market

20 40
15 30
10 20
Ports
premium
5 10
Drewry Port
Index (right axis)
0 0 MSCI EM
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 (right axis)
65
Expansion in Port Klang hinges on 75% utilisation of 14 million teu capacity.

With CT10-19 expansion requiring significant capital commitment,
which will strain the balance sheet of Westport, the risk remains high. At
14.5x forward EV/EBITDA, the stock is trading at a premium to most of
its international peers, but we retain our Neutral stance given the lack of
a material catalyst to drive value. In 1Q19, Santos Brasil struggled with
both inefficiency and sluggish volume growth. The company’s container
throughput was flat, inviting fresh fears on a further squeeze due to
intense competition amid the contracting Brazilian economy.
Valuations have had a tumultuous run since the start of 2018, falling
at the beginning of the year and recovering thereafter. However, the
valuations moved in a band of 1.3 standard deviations for the entire 2018. Port valuations
With declining throughput expectations, valuations look expensive at nearing maturity
the current levels and P/E ratios trade at around one standard deviation
above the five-year historical P/E ratio of 22.9x (see Figure 3.18).
However, it is worthwhile to note that the returns from the industry
(Figure 3.19) have been on a downward trajectory as well, albeit with
a slight uptick in 2017. The contraction in P/E represents subdued
market sentiment, and we expect the market to rebound once the
clouds of uncertainty dispel. However, when viewed together with the
trend in ROIC, it points towards an inevitable maturing of the industry,
suggesting only a modest expansion in the valuations going forward.
Value
This is a measurement of Drewry’s fair value against current market
price. This is a one-year view of the company, but does not provide
a useful timing tool for entry and exit of the company’s shares.
• Attractive Drewry’s fair value exceeds the current market
price by more than 15%
• Neutral Drewry’s fair value is between -15% and 15% of
the current market price
• Unattractive Drewry’s fair value is 15% below the current
market price
Risk
DMFR ranks each company’s risk according to the following
weighted parameters: balance sheet strength (25%), income growth
(15%), diversification (20%), transparency (25%) and shareholding
structure (15%).
From the assessment of these parameters, DMFR derives a rating
of 1 to 5, with 5 being the least risky and 1 being the most risky
investment. This is a longer-term assessment of the company.
• Low Greater than 3.5 on the DMFR risk scale
• Medium Between 2.5 and 3.5 on the DMFR risk scale
• High Less than 2.5 on the DMFR risk scale
66
Figure 3.18 5-year port valuation

30
25
20
Drewry Port Index
Std Dev +1
15
Jul 14 Jan 15 Jul 15 Jan 16 Jul 16 Jan 17 Jul 17 Jan 18 Jul 18 Jan 19 Jul 19 Std Dev -1
Table 3.18 Valuation comparison between listed port operators
EV/
Market Free Listed P/Earnings EBITDA
Ticker cap float currency Price (LTM) P/Book (LTM) P/Sales (LTM) ROA ROE
USD’m (%) FY18 Current FY18 Current FY18 Current Current FY18 FY18
Cosco
1199 HK
Shipping 2,925 54% HKD 7.2 7.2 10.1 0.6 0.6 3.2 2.8 9.5 3.2% 9.0%
Equity
Ports
China 144 HK
5,854 38% HKD 13.4 7.9 6.6 0.7 0.7 4.6 4.3 9.9 5.4% 9.1%
Merchants Equity
DPW DU
DP World 13,280 20% USD 16.0 15.9 11.8 1.7 1.3 2.8 2.4 7.9 4.7% 10.7%
Equity
2880 HK
Dalian Port 2,990 29% HKD 1.0 31.4 19.5 0.7 0.6 1.4 1.7 15.9 n.a. 3.2%
Equity
GLPR LI
Global Ports 298 23% USD 2.9 na na 1.7 1.8 1.3 1.6 6.6 n.a. 10.6%
Equity
Hamburger HHFA GR
1,866 30% EUR 23.0 17.3 15.0 2.5 2.6 1.0 1.3 6.9 n.a. 18.5%
Hafen Equity
HPHT SP
HPHT 1,960 56% USD 0.2 22.7 na 0.5 na 1.5 nm 11.3 0.7% 1.9%
Equity
ICT PM
ICTSI 5,317 45% PHP 135.0 28.0 30.7 1.9 2.4 2.8 3.6 11.5 3.2% 16.2%
Equity
STBP3 BZ
Santos Brasil 906 31% BRL 5.1 121.1 114.7 1.6 2.1 3.1 3.6 16.7 0.1% 1.1%
Equity
3382 HK
Tianjin Port 646 25% HKD 0.8 8.7 10.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 8.0 n.a. 7.7%
Equity
WPRTS
Westports 3,298 31% MYR 4.0 19.6 23.6 5.5 5.5 7.0 8.3 14.5 10.6% 22.8%
MK Equity
Notes:
P/E ratio greater than 40.0x or less than 0.0x is shown as n.a.
Pricing as of 25 July 2019
Source: Capital IQ, DMFR
67
Figure 3.19 Sample port operators: ROIC

10%
9.2%
8.7% 8.8%
8.4%
7.6%
8%
8.1%
6%
6.0% 6.0%
5.6%
5.4% 5.2%
Average
4%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Linear (Average)
Note: Includes CSP, CMPH, DPW, ICTSI, HHLA, Tianjin, Santos Brasil and APMT (until 2017)
Table 3.19 DMFR value and risk rating and share price performance of listed operators
Listed Current
currency price Value Risk 1-month 3-month YTD
Cosco Shipping Ports HKD 7.23 Neutral Medium -6.9% -16.9% -6.1%
CMPH HKD 13.38 Neutral High 0.8% -17.5% -5.1%
DP World USD 16.00 Neutral Low -0.6% -11.8% -6.4%
Dalian Port HKD 1.00 Neutral High -2.0% -3.8% -1.0%
Global Ports USD 2.86 Neutral High -4.7% 17.2% 23.3%
HHLA EUR 23.02 Neutral Medium -0.5% 4.5% 32.6%
HPHT USD 0.23 Neutral Medium 2.3% -6.2% -8.2%
ICTSI PHP 135.00 Attractive Medium -5.9% 11.2% 35.7%
Santos Brasil BRL 5.13 Unattractive High 16.6% 35.0% 20.7%
Tianjin Port HKD 0.82 Neutral High 0.0% -11.8% -1.2%
Westports MYR 3.98 Neutral Medium 2.1% 6.1% 9.9%
Note:
Pricing as of 25 July 2019
Source: Capital IQ, DMFR
68
2019 Global Container Terminal Operators Analysis of Leading Operators and Investors
4. Analysis of leading operators and investors

Global and international terminal operators (GTOs/ITOs)
This section of the report provides a detailed commentary on the 21 companies categorised as GTOs/
ITOs by Drewry in this year’s analysis. This includes a table for each operator, listing their terminals
along with the capacity, throughput and shareholding for each one for 2018. In addition there is a factfile
graphic for each operator which summarises their activity levels, strategies, geographical spread and
forecast capacity development.
Hutchison Ports (HP)
H ong Kong-based Hutchison Ports (HP) has terminals in over 50

ports around the world. The Hutchison Group also has interests
in logistics and transportation businesses, cruise terminals, airport
operations, distribution centres, rail services and ship repair, and is part
of the much larger CK Hutchison Holdings business.
HP’s home port of Hong Kong, together with neighbouring Shenzhen
(Yantian), provides almost 30% of the total volumes. The port’s activity
is housed under the HPH Trust arrangement which is a publicly traded
trust with investors being unitholders. The CK Hutchison Group has
deemed interests totalling 58% in HPH Trust where HP acts as trustee-
manager. The Group also has a small stake in OOIL (OOCL) along with
SIPG and majority owner Cosco. Besides this, HP’s port business in
Europe, the Middle East and Americas is extensive.
HP does not release detailed terminal-by-terminal capacity and
throughput figures and so, in accordance with previous years, the data
has been drawn together from the public disclosure by HP (throughput
data at the country level), together with indirect sources and estimates.
The highlights of HP’s 2018 throughput performance are: Overall activity levels
• Excluding river/barge terminals, the HP portfolio total was 58.5 were similar in 2018
million teu, up 1% on 2017, while the HPH Trust terminals handled to 2017, but with
24.3 million teu, down 1.4%. Combined, the activity level was little significant ups and
changed from 2017.
downs at the terminal
level
• For HPH Trust, activity in Hong Kong was down nearly 7% as the
port continued to lose market share. Yantian fared better, with a 3.6%
increase. The newly formed alliance of terminal operators in Hong
Kong port, of which HP is a member, is a critically important move to
try and recover some of the port’s competitiveness.
• Overall equity-adjusted throughput for HP and HPH Trust came
to 54.3 million teu (excluding river/barge terminals), virtually
unchanged from 2017. These figures are before PSA’s 20% stake in HP
is taken into account.
• The stars in terms of growth were Port Klang, Rotterdam (Euromax) and
Barcelona in absolute terms, and Brisbane, Buenos Aires and Shantou in
percentage terms. HP has now sold its 70% stake in the latter.
69
• On the downside, volume at the Panama transhipment hub of Balboa was

down by over 800,000 teu (nearly 30%), and Felixstowe was down by an
estimated 10% as IT issues led to services switching to other ports. Activity
at Xiamen was down by 24%.
HP has a couple of greenfield projects on the go:
• In Stockholm, it has a 100% shareholding to develop a new terminal at Greenfield projects
Nynäshamn where $264 million will be invested to build an 800 metre quay in Stockholm and
with 15 metre draft. Scheduled to start operations by 2021, the existing Quebec
terminal in Stockholm will be closed once the new one starts operations.
• In Canada, HP has signed an agreement with the Québec Port Authority
and CN (Canadian National Railway) to build and operate a new deep-
water container terminal known as project Laurentia. The port currently
has no container traffic so will need to win market share from the likes of
market leader Montreal.
• HP also has a long-standing approval to develop a new terminal in Harwich
in the UK, but this project is in abeyance.
Table 4.1.1 Hutchison Ports (HP)

2018
Share- Equity
Port Terminal name Nature of involvement Capacity Throughput Utilisation holding throughput
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
Formed in 2003, SPICT
Shanghai Pudong operates Phase I of the
International Waigaoqiao Terminal
Shanghai 3,000 2,602 86.7 30.0% 781
Container (30% shareholding HP,
Terminal 30% Cosco Shipping
Ports and 40% SIPG)
Shanghai
50% JV with SIPG for
Mindong
Waigaoqiao phases 5 &
Container
Shanghai 6, operational Jul 2005. 5,600 6,252 111.6 50.0% 3,126
Terminal
Cosco China Shipping
(Waigaoqiao
holds 20%
Phase 5 & 6)
Xiamen
International 49% shareholder in
Xiamen Container equity JV registered 2,750 983 35.7 49.0% 481
Terminal (XICT under PRC law
Berth 2-4)
Shantou 70% shareholding
Shantou Container in terminal operating 1,300 665 51.1 70.0% 465
Terminal company *
JV with Huizhou Port
Huizhou
Affairs Group Company
Quanwan
Ltd. In Dec 2016, HPH
Huizhou International 500 253 50.6 38.7% 98
Trust acquired a 41.3%
Container
stake from Hutchison
Terminals (HQCT)
Ports
70
Table 4.1.1 Hutchison Ports (HP) cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East cont’d
Ningbo Beilun
49% shareholding
Ningbo International 4,000 2,100 52.5 49.0% 1,029
obtained in Jan 2002
Terminal
Hutchison
100% shareholding
Busan Container
Busan in terminal operating 3,780 1,800 47.6 100.0% 1,800
Terminal (HBCT),
company
Jasungdae
Korea
89% shareholding in
Kwangyang International 1,120 1,000 89.3 88.9% 889
Phase II development
Terminals
Southeast Asia
24% shareholding
West Ports, in terminal operating
Port Klang Klang Multi company (reduced from 14,000 9,531 68.1 23.6% 2,245
Terminal 31.5% after IPO in Oct
2013)
Jakarta 51% shareholding in
Tanjung Priok
International JICT terminal operating 3,000 2,057 68.6 49.0% 1,008
(Jakarta)
Container Terminal company
45.09% shareholding
Tanjung Priok
Koja Terminal in terminal operating 1,000 889 88.9 45.1% 401
(Jakarta)
company
Thai Laem
87.5% shareholding
Chabang
Laem Chabang in terminal operating 400 304 75.9 87.5% 266
Terminal Co Ltd,
company
Terminal A2
Hutchinson 80% shareholding
Laem Chabang Laem Chabang in terminal operating 400 99 24.8 80.0% 79
Terminal A3 company
Laemchabang 80% shareholding in ro-

Laem Chabang International Ro- ro terminal. Operational 80 100 125.0 80.0% 80
Ro Terminal in 2009
80% shareholding
Laem Chabang Terminal C1-C2 in terminal operating 2,500 2,172 86.9 80.0% 1,738
company
80% shareholding
Terminal D
Laem Chabang in terminal operating 700 176 25.1 180.0% 316
(Phase 1)
company
Myanmar
International 85% shareholding in
Rangoon 500 200 40.0 85.0% 170
Terminals Thilawa cooperative JV
(MITT)
70% shareholding in
Saigon
cooperative JV. Terminal
Cai Mep International 800 0 0.0 70.0% 0
became operational in
Terminals
Aug 2010
71

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
South Asia
Karachi
International 100% shareholding
Karachi Container in terminal operating 900 796 88.5 100.0% 796
Terminal, (West company
Wharf)
KICT signed agreement
with Karachi Port Trust
for development of Phase
III (Keamari Groyne).
South Asia
Concession granted until
Karachi Pakistan 1,500 749 49.9 90.0% 674
2027 for a 1,500 metre
Terminals
quay facility with draft of
up to 18 metres. Terminal
started operations from
end 2016
Middle East
International 51% shareholding
Dammam Port Services in terminal operating 2,000 1,142 57.1 51.0% 583
Dammam company
65% equity interest with
Oman
Sohar Industrial Port
International
Sohar Company (SIPC), first 1,500 800 53.3 65.0% 520
Container
phase operational Sep
Terminal
2006.
In Jan 2012, HAJT took
the management contract
for Ajman Port. HAJT
Hutchison Ajman
operates both container
Ajman International 200 150 75.0 100.0% 150
and general cargo berths
Terminals (HAJT)
with a quay length of
1,250 metres and a yard
area of 12.9 hectares.
In Nov 2017, Hutchison
Saqr Port Ports signed an
Ras Al Khaimah
Container agreement to operate the 350 0 0.0 100.0% 0
(Mina Saqr)
Terminal container terminal at RAK
for a period of 25 years
In Nov 2017, Hutchison
Ports awarded a
Ahmed Bin Hutchison Ports
concession to operate 50 0 0.0 100.0% 0
Rashi Port UAQ
Ahmed Bin Rashid Port in
Umm Al Quwain (UAQ)
In Aug 2017, Hutchison
Ports signed an O&M
agreement with Nawah
Port Management (NPM)
Basra General
Basra for a container and 50 0 0.0 100.0% 0
Terminal
general cargo terminal at
Basra port. The terminal
is capable of handling
300,000 teu annually
72

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
North Europe
93.5% shareholding
Delta Dedicated in terminal operating
East & West company. 4.5% reputedly
Rotterdam 4,630 4,000 86.4 93.5% 3,740
Terminals, ECT with NYK and remaining
Delta 2% with Stichting
Werknemersaandelen
Delta Dedicated
50-50 JV between ECT
Rotterdam North Terminal, 1,140 1,338 117.4 50.0% 669
and TIL (MSC)
ECT Delta
Cosco Shipping Ports
acquired 35% stake in
Rotterdam Euromax Terminal May 2016 and began 2,550 3,054 119.8 65.0% 1,985
reporting volumes from
Oct 2016
Felixstowe South 100% shareholding
Felixstowe Terminal, Trinity in terminal operating 5,400 3,700 68.5 100.0% 3,700
Terminal company
80% shareholding
London
Thamesport in terminal operating 800 200 25.0 80.0% 160
Thamesport
company
100% shareholding
Harwich Parkeston in terminal operating 75 0 0.6 100.0% 0
company
Signed agreement with
Container
Port of Stockholm to
Stockholm Terminal 200 57 28.7 100.0% 57
operate terminal from
Frihamnen
Mar 2009
Eastern Europe
Hutchison Ports 99.2% stake in general
Gdynia 480 375 78.1 99.2% 372
Gdynia cargo terminal
South Europe
Barcelona Europe Prat Pier container
Barcelona South Terminal terminal. Phase 1 became 2,600 2,400 92.3 100.0% 2,400
(BEST) operational in Sep 2012
Central America/Caribbean
Ensenada 100% shareholding
Ensenada International in terminal operating 250 272 108.9 100.0% 272
Terminal company
Internacional de
Contenedores
100% shareholding
Asociados de
Vera Cruz in terminal operating 800 1,176 147.0 100.0% 1,176
Veracruz (ICAVE
company
Container
Terminal)
Terminal
Internacional
Manzanillo Owned by ICAVE 500 0 0.0 100.0% 0
de Manzanillo
(TIMSA)
73

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Central America/Caribbean cont’d
Lazaro Cardenas 100% interest in JV
Lazaro
Terminal Porturia terminal operating 2,000 538 26.9 100.0% 538
Cardenas
de Contenedores company
51% shareholding
Freeport in terminal operating
Freeport 1,840 1,094 59.5 51.0% 558
Container Port company, remaining 49%
with TIL
90% shareholding
Panama Ports
Balboa in terminal operating 3,700 2,054 55.5 90.0% 1,849
Company
company
90% shareholding
Colon Panama Ports
in terminal operating 2,000 1,283 64.1 90.0% 1,154
(Cristobal) Company
company
South America
Buenos Aires
100% shareholding
Container
Buenos Aires in terminal operating 500 254 50.8 100.0% 254
Terminal Services
company
(BACTSSA)
Africa
Tanzania 70% shareholding
Dar es Salaam International in terminal operating 600 550 91.7 70.0% 385
Container Terminal company
Agreement with
Alexandria Port Authority
Alexandria
for two terminals at
Alexandria International
Alexandria Port and at 1,000 750 75.0 80.3% 602
(El Dekhila) Container
El-Dekheila Port. Signed
Terminals
Mar 2005, operational in
2007
Oceania
New terminal became
Brisbane
operational mid 2013.
Brisbane Container 500 200 40.0 100.0% 200
Capacity of 850,000 teu
Terminals
p.a. at full build out
30-year concession to
develop and operate
Sydney
the third terminal in Port
International
Sydney/Botany Botany. Commenced 600 375 62.5 100.0% 375
Container
operations in early 2014.
Terminals
Capacity of one million
teu p.a. at full build out
Sub-total 92,217 58,492 63.4 38,143
Reducing 20% of
equity teu as PSA
has 20% stake in 7,629
Hutchison Ports
(HP)
Total 92,217 58,492 63.4 30,515
74

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
River/barge terminals #
Rivertrade 50% shareholder in jointly

Hong Kong 2,250 800 35.6 50.0% 400
Terminal (RTT) controlled entity
Delta Barge
Rotterdam Feeder Terminal 100% owned 700 600 85.7 100.0% 600
(ECT)
New Developments
Port Terminal name Nature of involvement Shareholding
100% shareholding to develop a container handling facility at the Port
Container
of Nynäshamn near Stockholm. $264 million will be invested to build an
Stockholm Terminal 100.0%
800 metre quay with 15 metre draft. Scheduled to start operations by
Nynashamn
2021, old terminal will be closed once the new one starts operations
Regulatory approval granted Apr 2006 for a 1.7 million teu capacity
greenfield terminal. HP asked for an extension of permissions until
Harwich Bathside Bay 100.0%
2021 due to recession in the UK. Construction has not commenced
and no timescale given.
In May 2019, Hutchison Ports signed an agreement with the
Quebec container
Québec Port Authority (QPA) and Canadian National Railway (CN)
Quebec terminal
to build and operate the new container terminal known as project
(Laurentia)
Laurentia (previously known as Beauport 2020)
Notes:
* Hutchison Ports (HP) sold the stake in early 2019.
#
River/barge terminals are defined by Drewry as terminals that cannot (or do not) handle seagoing vessels.
The official HP figure for the combined throughput of its Netherlands terminals is understood to include barge volumes. These cannot be precisely
confirmed but an estimate has been made and recorded against the ECT Delta Barge Feeder terminal. However, some barge volume may also still
be included under the deep-sea terminals in Rotterdam.
HPH Trust
2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
100% ownership by
HPH Trust in terminals
Hong Kong HIT Terminal 10,000 7,641 76.4 100.0% 7,641
4, 6, 7 and two berths in
Terminal 9
In Mar 2014, HPH Trust
Terminal 8W, ACT
sold 60% stake in ACT
(Asia Container
Hong Kong to China Cosco Group - 1,600 1,465 91.6 40.0% 586
Terminal), Kwai
Cosco (40%) and Cosco
Chung
China Shipping (20%)
50% shareholding in
Cosco-HIT
Hong Kong jointly controlled entity 1,800 1,794 99.7 50.0% 897
Terminal
(Cosco 50%)
Yantian
International
56.4% effective
Shenzhen Container 4,500 3,007 66.8 56.4% 1,696
shareholding in Phase I, II
Terminals Co
(Phase I, II)
75

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
HPH Trust cont’d
Far East cont’d
Yantian
International
51.6% effective
Container
Shenzhen shareholding in Phase III 10,000 10,153 101.5 51.6% 5,239
Terminals Co
and West Port
(Phase III & West
Port)
Huizhou In Dec 2016, HPH Trust
Quanwan acquired a 41.3% stake
Huizhou International from Hutchison Ports. 500 253 50.6 41.3% 104
Container Hutchison Ports still
Terminals (HQCT) holds 38.7% stake
Sub-total 30,418 24,313 79.9 16,163
River/barge terminals #
Nanhai Container
Terminal/ At each terminal HPH
Nanhai,
Jiangmen Trust is 50% shareholder 1,300 400 30.8 50.0% 200
Jiangmen
International in equity JV
Container
Notes:
HPH Trust is a publicly traded trust that holds ownership interests in the above container facilities as well as some ancillary businesses. Investors
in the trust are unitholders and HPH acts as trustee-manager. CK Hutchison Holdings Ltd has a deemed interest of 30.07% in HPH Trust and CK
Hutchsion Global Investments Ltd has 27.62%.
#
River/barge terminals are defined by Drewry as terminals that cannot (or do not) handle seagoing vessels.
Figure 4.1.1 Location of Hutchison Ports owned/managed terminal operations
Felixstowe Rotterdam
Harwich
Harwich
Stockholm
Thamesport
Stockholm
Quebec
Gdynia
Kwangyang
Barcelona Busan
Basra Ajman Ras Al-Khaimah Shanghai
Ensenada
Ningbo
Veracruz Freeport Alexandria Karachi
Dammam Xiamen Huizhou
Manzanillo
Ahmed Bin Rashid Sohar Rangoon
Lazaro Cardenas Shantou (1) Shenzhen
Laem Chabang
Cai Mep
Colon/Cristobal
Hong Kong
Port Klang
Dar es Salaam
Tanjung Priok
Brisbane
Balboa Sydney
Buenos Aires
Note: Non-operational Throughput under 1m teu per annum Throughput of 1m plus teu per annum
(1) Stake sold in early 2019.
76
Hutchison Ports
Hong Kong, China
Equity teu league
table ranking 2nd
Growth Total teu Equity teu
Equity teu 2017 4.0%  2.5% 

46.7m teu 2018 0.3%  -0.2% 
0 1 2 3
1.56m teu
Average throughput per terminal 2018
Total handling in 2018 2017 2018
No. of countries with existing terminals 23 23
82.6m teu
No. of existing terminals 53 53
No. of new developments (greenfield and acquisitions) 6 2
Market focus/risk profile Mainly emerging markets although significant presence in Europe
Traffic type focus Mostly gateway. Some exposure to transhipment in certain terminals
Degree of internationalism High (global presence) although significant proportion of volumes in home base of China. Limited
presence in North and South America and Africa
Core strategy Maintenance of existing portfolio, but expansion of capacity at established terminals where
required. Selected greenfield expansion e.g. Quebec and Stockholm
Note: Includes HPH Trust, excludes river/barge terminals. Equity teu adjusted for PSA stake.
Forecast development of capacity (m teu) Equity teu breakdown by region, 2018

115 115 115 South America 0.5% Africa 1.8%
Central America/
Caribbean 10.2% Oceania 1.1%
South Europe 4.4%
Eastern Europe 0.7%

113
Far East 45.7%
112
112
North Europe 19.0% Southeast Asia 11.6%
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Middle East 2.3% South Asia 2.7%
Note: Includes HPH Trust Note: Hutchison figure includes HPH Trust volumes
Source: Drewry Maritime Research Source: Drewry Maritime Research
77
APM Terminals
A PM Terminals (APMT) is based in The Hague, Netherlands, and

is part of the Danish AP Moller group. One of the largest global
terminal operators, it has stakes in around 60 operating terminal facilities
with six new developments in the pipeline. It also has a 30.75% stake in
Russia’s Global Ports Investments. Maersk Line is a sister company.
APMT has had a significant change of strategy in the recent few years.
Previously the focus was on expansion, especially through greenfield
projects, and on building APMT’s role as an independent terminal
operator. However, the AP Moller group decided to bring Maersk Line
and APMT closer together with a view to exploiting the synergies
between lines and terminals. The aim for APMT at present is to Significant change
maximise and optimise the use of the existing terminal portfolio, with in APMT strategy
deliberate support from Maersk Line. In fact, eight key transhipment involves closer links
terminals run by APMT have been placed under the liner division for with Maersk Line
reporting purposes. A moratorium has been placed on new greenfield and focus on core
projects. Moreover, Maersk Line’s strategy is to become a full supply activities
chain provider, offering door-to-door shipping and logistics services
(the so-called “global integrator” strategy). This means that APMT is not
pursuing this aspect in the way that some other terminal operators such
as DP World are. In fact the inland services businesses that were under
APMT have been moved to Maersk Line in 2019.
The key takeaways in terms of total throughput performance for APMT
in 2018 are:
• The combined throughput of all terminals in which the company had
a direct stake (of any size) was 83.3 million teu. This compares with
the 2017 total of 80.8 million teu (an increase of just over 3%).
• This does however include one terminal with a shareholding of 10%
or less (QQCTU in Qingdao). Excluding this for the purposes of the
Drewry league table, total throughput was 78.6 million teu, up just
over 3%.
• Three terminals have been removed when the portfolio is compared Equity-adjusted teu
with 2017 (exits from Tacoma, Zeebrugge and Dalian). This removed was up 8% despite
about 1.5 million teu of annual throughput from the APMT total, so exits from three
the underlying growth of the remaining terminals was higher than 3%. terminals
• At the end of 2018, APMT also sold its interest in the Nemrut Bay
terminal in Turkey, but remains as manager.
• Overall equity-adjusted teu for the portfolio (including the stake in
GPI) was 42.8 million teu, up by nearly 8% on 2017.
• Star performers in terms of absolute increase in throughput were
transhipment hub Tanjung Pelepas (up by nearly 600,000 teu), Lazaro
Cardenas (over 400,000 teu), closely followed by Rotterdam MVII.
Two US terminals (Los Angeles and New York) both added over
300,000 teu to their 2018 total.
• Some of the smaller terminals registered very high double-digit
percentage growth, including Puerto Quetzal, Buenos Aires, Itajai
and Progreso.
78
APM Terminals
• On the downside, Salalah lost over half a million teu of transhipment

activity and Tianjin was down by over 250,000 teu. Barcelona also
had a disappointing year. Together, the two terminals in Qingdao
also recorded a fall – a mere 3.1%, but due to the scale of activity this
equated to over 400,000 teu.
APMT has a number of new developments in the pipeline, all of which
are greenfield projects:
• New terminals in Puerto Limon (Costa Rica) and Tanger Med
(Morocco) opened this year, as did one in Tema (Ghana). A new
facility in Savona (Vado) in Italy is also nearing commencement of
Six greenfield projects
operations. The latter two projects are both JVs.
in the pipeline but no
• In the Ivory Coast, a second terminal at Abidjan is due to become new ones
operational in 2021 and APMT also has a project for an upriver
terminal in Bangkok, Thailand.
• All of these projects were committed to prior to the change in strategy
by AP Moller. Since then, APMT has not entered into any new
greenfield projects.
Table 4.1.2 APM Terminals

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
Rokko Island
Leased terminal (jointly
Kobe Terminal (RC 263 229 86.9 100.0% 229
with K Line)
4W/4/5)
Minami Honmoku
Yokohama Terminal (MC1/ Leased terminal 1,100 1,090 99.1 100.0% 1,090
MC2)
Qingdao
20% shareholding in JV
Qianwan
with DP World / Qingdao
Qingdao Container 8,500 8,463 99.6 20.0% 1,693
Port Group for combined
Terminal Co
Phase II / III operation
(QQCT)
Qingdao
Qianwan United 8% shareholding in JV
Qingdao Container with CM Ports, DP World 4,860 4,704 96.8 9.2% 435
Terminal and Qingdao Port Group
(QQCTU)
Shanghai East
JV management
Container
company owned 49%
Shanghai Terminal 4,150 4,191 101.0 49.0% 2,053
APMT / 51% Shanghai
(Waigaoqiao
International Port Group
Phase 4)
Xiamen Songyu
25% JV with Xiamen Port
Xiamen Container 1,500 1,129 75.3 25.0% 282
Group
Terminal
79
APM Terminals
Table 4.1.2 APM Terminals cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East cont’d
Tianjin Port
20% stake in JV with PSA
Alliance
(20%), OOCL (20%) and
Tianjin International 2,100 1,827 87.0 20.0% 365
remaining held by Tianjin
Container Terminal
Port Group
Co (TACT)
Guangzhou 20% JV with China

Guangzhou South China Cosco (39%) and
5,500 5,165 93.9 20.0% 1,033
(Nansha) Oceangate Guangzhou Port Group
Terminal, Phase 2 (41%)
Southeast Asia
Port of Tanjung 30% shareholding and
Tanjung Pelepas 10,553 8,961 84.9 30.0% 2,688
Pelepas management contract
LCB Container 35% share; in JV with
Laem Chabang Terminal 1 Ltd. ESCO (40%) and Bangkok 1,715 1,870 109.0 35.0% 355
(LCB1) Modern Terminal (25%)
31.5% effective
shareholding in the
terminal. LCB1 holds
LCMT Company
Laem Chabang 90% share (where APMT 109.0 31.5% 269
Ltd. (LCMT)
holds a 35% share in
LCB1); Bangkok Modern
Terminal 10%
49% share in JV with
Cai Mep
Cai Mep Vinalines (36%) and 1,152 1,464 127.1 49.0% 717
International
Saigon Port (15%)
South Asia
APM Terminals 43% with various local
Pipavav 1,304 889 68.1 43.0% 382
Pipavav institutional investors
Jawaharlal APM Terminals
with Container Corporation 2,248 2,077 92.4 74.0% 1,537
Nehru Port Trust Mumbai
of India (CONCOR)
South Asia
Colombo 32.8% shareholding 1,850 2,067 111.7 32.8% 678
Gateway Terminal
Middle East
30% shareholding and
Salalah Port management control
Salalah 5,000 3,385 67.7 30.1% 1,020
Services of terminal operating
company
80% shareholding in
Khalifa Bin Bahrain Gateway JV with Kanoo Group,
800 432 54.1 64.0% 277
Salman Terminal reduced to 64% after IPO
in 4Q18
Aqaba Container 50-50 JV with the Aqaba
Aqaba 912 821 90.0 50.0% 411
Terminal Development Corporation
North Europe
APM Terminals -
Aarhus 100% ownership 527 486 92.2 100.0% 486
Aarhus A/S
North Sea
Bremerhaven 50-50 JV with Eurogate 3,700 2,893 78.2 50.0% 1,446
Terminal
80
APM Terminals

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
North Europe cont’d
Container Terminal
Wilhelmshaven 30-70 JV with Eurogate 1,350 647 47.9 30.0% 194
Wilhelmshaven
APM Terminals
Rotterdam 100% ownership 3,098 1,788 57.7 100.0% 1,788
Rotterdam
APM Terminals
Rotterdam Rotterdam 100% ownership 2,210 2,009 90.9 100.0% 2,009
Maasvlakte II
APM Terminals
Gothenburg 100% share 1,014 673 66.3 100.0% 673
Gothenburg
Eastern Europe
APM Terminals
Poti 100% ownership 600 364 60.7 100.0% 364
Poti
South Europe
Fos 2XL 42% share JV with TIL
Marseilles-Fos 1,000 439 43.9 41.7% 183
-Seayard SAS (50%) and Cosco (8%)
100% share acquired in
TCB - Terminal
Mar 2016 as part of the
Barcelona de Contenidors 1,600 994 62.1 100.0% 994
acquisition of the Grup
de Barcelona
Maritim TCB portfolio
TCV Stevedoring Majority share acquired in
Valencia 1,400 1,215 86.8 75.0% 911
Company Mar 2016
Terminal de
Gijón Contenedores de 117 81 69.4 50.0% 41
Mar 2016
Gijón

Terminal 100% share acquired in
Castellón 350 153 43.8 100.0% 153
Polivalente Mar 2016
Castellón
APM Terminals
Algeciras 100% ownership 3,822 3,653 95.6 100.0% 3,653
Algeciras
Acquired in Aug 2015.
Vado Reefer Operations will be
Vado (Savona) 275 65 23.7 50.1% 33
Terminal merged with new Vado
terminal when it opens
Operating under a 28-year
concession agreement
APM Terminals with Turkish petrochemical
Nemrut (Izmir) 1,300 276 21.2 100.0% 276
Izmir * conglomerate Petkim,
terminal opened in Dec
2016
North America
South Florida 49% share of JV with
Miami 309 305 98.8 49.0% 150
Container Terminal Terminal Link
APM Terminals
New York Port Elizabeth 100% ownership 1,531 1,746 114.1 100.0% 1,746
(NJ)
APM Terminals
Los Angeles 100% ownership 3,200 2,186 68.3 100.0% 2,186
Pier 400
Mobile Container
Mobile 100% ownership 447 349 78.1 100.0% 349
Terminal
81
APM Terminals

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Terminal de
Puerto Progreso Contenedores de 110 145 131.3 100.0% 145
Mar 2016
Yucatán
New terminal opened
Lázaro Lázaro Cárdenas
in Apr 2017, 32-year 1,075 777 72.3 100.0% 777
Cárdenas Terminal 2 (TEC2)
concession
Terminal de
New terminal opened in
Puerto Quetzal Contenedores 353 318 90.2 85.0% 270
2017
Quetzal
South America
Buenos Aires Terminales 4 SA 100% ownership 479 380 79.3 100.0% 380
APM Terminals
Itajai 100% ownership 576 403 70.0 100.0% 403
Itajai S/A
APM Terminals
Pecem
Pecém 75% ownership 483 284 58.9 75.0% 213
Operacoes
Portuarias Ltda
Brasil Terminal 50% share with JV
Santos 1,680 1,468 87.4 50.0% 734
Portuário partner TIL
52.8% ownership,
APM Terminals increased from 40% in
Callao 1,159 1,038 89.5 52.8% 547
Callao S.A. Mar 2018. TIL acquired
29% stake in 2014
Sociedad
Portuaria
Terminal de Majority share acquired in
Buenaventura 720 361 50.2 61.9% 224
Contenedores Mar 2016
de Buenaventura
(TCBUEN)
Cartagena
JV with Compas SA
Cartagena Container Terminal 251 127 50.7 51.0% 65
finalised in Jan 2016
Operator
Africa
Suez Canal
including Cosco Pacific
Port Said Container 3,900 2,610 66.9 55.0% 1,435
and the Suez Canal
Terminal (SCCT)
Authority
Abidjan Abidjan Terminal 750 642 85.5 40.0% 257
with Bolloré Group
Meridian Port 42% shareholding in JV
Tema 1,000 842 84.2 35.0% 295
Services with Bolloré Group
43% shareholding in
Douala
JV with Bolloré Group,
Douala International 403 379 93.9 43.0% 163
increased from 40% in
Terminal
Nov 2018
82
APM Terminals

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Africa cont’d
APM Terminals
Lagos Majority ownership 1,000 577 57.7 94.0% 542
Apapa
West Africa
Onne Container 100% ownership 312 240 76.9 100.0% 240
Terminal
APM Terminals
90% ownership.
Tanger Med Tanger-Med 2,066 2,053 99.4 90.0% 1,848
Operational in 2007
(Phase 1)
APMT JV with Bolloré
Congo Terminal
Pointe Noire Africa Logistics 638 739 115.9 22.5% 166
S.A.
consortium
Cotonou Coman 100% ownership 258 229 88.7 100.0% 229
APM Terminals
Monrovia 75% ownership 205 93 45.3 75.1% 70
Liberia
Sogester
Luanda Container 600 300 50.0 51.0% 153
Gestao de Fundos
Terminal
APMT acquired a
25% share in Conakry
Conakry Conakry Terminal Terminal, Guinea, from 294 235 80.0 24.9% 59
Bolloré Africa Logistics in
late 2015
Total 107,742 83,325 77.3 42,363
Shareholdings in other operators #
30.75% share; N-Trans

Global Ports
Russia also has a 30.75% share; 1,480 30.8% 455
Investments (GPI)
remainder listed on LSE
Total 42,819
New developments
APMT was awarded a 32-year concession to develop and operate
Moin Container
Puerto Limon a new $1 billion facility on Costa Rica’s Atlantic Coast. Facility
Terminal
opened in Feb 2019
In Mar 2016 APMT and local partners were named winner of a
APM Terminals
Tanger Med 30-year concession for a 5 million teu p.a. capacity transhipment
MedPort Tangier
terminal at Morocco’s Tanger-Med 2 port complex. It opened in 1Q19
JV with existing partner Bolloré (70%) and the Ghana Ports &
Harbours Authority (30%). Will add 3.5 million teu of annual
Meridian Port
Tema throughput capacity. Greenfield project located outside the present
Services
facility that includes an upgrade to the adjacent road network. Trial
operations started from Jun 2019
Container New facility will be able to accommodate vessels of up to 8,000 teu in
Abidjan
Terminal 2 size (existing facility 0.75 million teu). Planned operational date is 2021
83
APM Terminals

New developments cont’d
50-year concession for the design, construction, operation and
APM Terminals maintenance of a new deep-sea gateway terminal. JV agreement with
Vado (Savona)
Vado China COSCO Shipping Ports (40%) and Qingdao Port International
Development (9.9%); APMT (50.1%). Planned operational date is 2019
APMT has signed an MoU with Sahathai Terminal PLC (PORT)
Bangkok River
Bangkok and Mitr Phol Sugar to develop a greenfield container terminal in
Terminal (BRT)
Bangkok, Thailand, with a handling capacity of 345,000 teu.
Notes:
APMT capacity for Qingdao Qianwan Container Terminal Co (QQCT) differs from the DP World (9,000,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
APMT capacity for Qingdao Qianwan United Container Terminal (QQCTU) differs from the DP World (5,400,000 teu) and CM Ports (4,050,000 teu)
capacity for the same terminal.
APMT throughput for Qingdao Qianwan United Container Terminal (QQCTU) differs from the CM Ports (5,242,000 teu) throughput for the same terminal.
APMT capacity for Shanghai East Container Terminal (Waigaoqiao Phase 4) differs from the SIPG (4,000,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
APMT throughput for Tianjin Port Alliance International Container Terminal Co (TACT) differs from the OOCL (1,767,000 teu) throughput for the same
terminal.
APMT capacity for Fos 2XL -Seayard SAS differs from the TIL (680,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
APMT capacity for South Florida Container Terminal differs from Terminal Link capacity (450,000 teu) for the same terminal.
APMT throughput and capacity for Brasil Terminal Portuaria (BTP) differs from TIL throughput (1,306,170 teu) and capacity (1,505,000 teu) for the
same terminal.
APMT throughput and capacity for APM Terminals Callao differs from TIL throughput (1,001,520 teu) and capacity (1,320,000 teu) for the same terminal.
APMT throughput and capacity for Abidjan Terminal differs from Bollore throughput (739,000 teu) and capacity (1,000,000 teu) for the same terminal.
APMT capacity for Douala International Terminal differs from Bollore capacity (450,000 teu) for the same terminal.
APMT capacity for Congo Terminal S.A. differs from Bollore capacity (1,000,000 teu) for the same terminal.
APMT capacity for APM Terminals Liberia differs from Bollore capacity (125,000 teu) for the same terminal.
* APMT divested Izmir, Turkey, in 4Q18, but remains as manager.
#
GPI figure shown under “2018 throughput” column is this company’s equity teu figure.
While Rokko Island, Kobe terminal is jointly leased, the capacity, throughput figures and shareholding shown are only for APMT. Volumes are
handled independently.
Qingdao New Qianwan Container Terminal (QQCTN) is currently a holding company and APMT holds a 16% share in QQCTN.
APMT has 5.6% financial stake in Qingdao Qianwan United Advance Container Terminal (QQCTUA), the capacity and throughput of the terminal has
been rolled into the figures for QQCT and QQCTU terminals.
APMT sold 25% share in Tianjin Port Euroasia International Container Terminal in end 2010. Now holds just 5% as financial stake and does not
report volumes.
Figure 4.1.2 Location of APMT owned/managed terminal operations

Aarhus
Wilhelmshaven
Bremerhaven
Rotterdam
Gijon Gothenburg
Barcelona Marseilles-Fos Poti

New York Vado Tianjin
Castellon
Vado Kobe
Mobile Valencia Nemrut (1) Yokohama
Algeciras Qingdao
Los Angeles Khalifa bin Salman
Tanger Med Port Said
Puerto Progreso Miami Xiamen Shanghai
Pipavav
Tanger Med Aqaba
Lazaro Cardenas JNPT
Cartagena Guangzhou
Puerto Quetzal Laem Chabang
Salalah
Conakry
Puerto Limon Bangkok Cai Mep
Colombo
Buenaventura Pointe Noire
Pecem Tanjung Pelepas
Luanda
Callao
Santos Cotonou Onne
Abidjan
Itajai Monrovia Lagos

Abidjan Tema Tema
Douala
Buenos Aires
Notes:
APMT has a minority stake in GPI which has
terminals in Russia and Finland.
(1) Stake sold in 2018 but APMT remains as
manager. Non-operational Newly operational Throughput under 1m teu per annum Throughput of 1m plus teu per annum
84
APM Terminals
The Hague, Netherlands
Equity teu league
table ranking 5th
Equity teu 2017 6.9%  6.6% 

42.8m teu 2018 3.1%  7.8% 
0 1 2 3
1.41m teu

No. of countries with existing terminals * 38 37
No. of existing terminals ** 62 59
78.6m teu#
No. of new developments (greenfield and acqusitions) 5 6
#
Including “indirect influence” throughput, the 2018 figure was 80.2 million teu
* (plus 2 more through stake in GPI) ** (not including GPI)
Market focus/risk profile Balanced portfolio - just over half of equity teu is from emerging markets. Substantial presence in
Europe (30% of equity teu)
Traffic type focus Around 70% gateway traffic, although it has a number of large transhipment terminals (financials of
which are now reported under Maersk Line)
Degree of internationalism High (global presence). Oceania is the only region where it is not present
Core strategy Closer relationship with Maersk Line than in the past, but third party business also remains key.
Maersk Line taking the lead in the supply chain enabler role. APMT's focus is on optimising
existing terminals with no new greenfield projects in the pipeline (although a number of existing
projects are coming through)
Note: Total teu excludes sub-10% shareholdings. Average teu per terminal includes all throughput.

109 Africa 12.7% Far East 17.1%
109
108
107
South America 6.0%
Central America/
Caribbean 2.8%
104 Southeast
North America 10.3% Asia 9.4%
South Asia 6.1%

100
Middle East 4.0%

South Europe 14.6%
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Eastern Europe 1.6% North Europe 15.5%
Source: Drewry Maritime Research Note: APMT figure has been adjusted to account for its stake in GPI
85
PSA International (PSA)
S ingapore-based PSA International has a portfolio of over 40 terminals

worldwide, with the transhipment hub of Singapore itself generating
around 45% of the total throughput. The company also has a 20%
stake in Hutchison Ports, plus a stake in HPH Trust along with parent
Temasek. PSA does not release terminal-by-terminal capacity and
throughput figures so estimates and indirect sources have been used.
The company is exploring the wider supply chain and also IT
opportunities as part of its strategy. In July 2018, it acquired a majority
stake in a rail-served inland port facility located approximately 300
kilometres east of the port of Vancouver for example. PSA has also taken
majority control of CrimsonLogic, which offers a comprehensive suite
of services to help traders meet regulatory and compliance requirements
from government agencies and trade associations around the world,
providing a digital layer supporting fully integrated physical-regulatory-
financing logistics execution in the global supply chain.
The key takeaways from PSA’s 2018 throughput performance are:
• Total volume was 80.5 million teu (this differs from the official PSA Overall growth
total as Drewry seeks to exclude barge traffic from the total). This was across the portfolio
an 8.5% increase on 2017 (over 6.0 million teu). was more than 8%
• Home port Singapore achieved 9% growth, topping 36 million teu as in 2018, with home
the positive effects of JV terminals with major carriers were felt. port Singapore and
overseas terminals
• Throughput across the rest of the portfolio grew by around 8% both performing well
reaching 44.2 million teu.
• Taking into account PSA’s stake in HP, equity-adjusted teu in 2018 was
60.3 million teu, up 7.2%.
• Several terminals registered very high growth in 2018. Rodman in
Panama gained transhipment market share, upping its traffic by over
0.5 million teu for the year. New terminals in Tanjung Priok and
Jawaharlal Nehru Port ramped up, adding more than 300,000 teu each.
• Estimated volume at PSA’s Antwerp terminals was 15% up (over 1.0
million teu). A significant part of this was the ongoing ramp-up of the
JV terminal with MSC (TIL).
• Only a few terminals performed poorly. Double-digit declines were
experienced at three Chinese terminals (Dalian Dagang, Tianjin and
Dongguan) and at Tuticorin in India.
PSA has several new developments lined up, mainly through acquisitions:
• A majority holding in DCT Gdansk, Poland, was acquired by a PSA
consortium from Macquarie in 2019.
• PSA also acquired Halterm and Penn Terminals on the ECNA from
PSA has been active
Macquarie this year.
on the acquisition trail
• In Singapore, another JV terminal with a shipping line has been in Poland and North
established – this time with ONE. The Cosco JV has also been America
expanded, adding two more berths.
• At the same time, work continues on the massive Tuas port
development at Singapore, and older, city-centre terminals are gradually
being phased out. Eventually the entire port activity will move to Tuas.
86
Table 4.1.3 PSA International

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
Guangzhou
Container
49% shareholding,
Terminal, China
Guangzhou remaining 51% held with 2,000 1,280 64.0 49.0% 627
(Huangpu
Guangzhou Port Group
Xingang / Xinsha
berths)
DCT merged with DICT
and DPCT in Nov 2017.
Dalian Container 26% shareholding in JV
Dalian 10,300 3,876 37.6 26.0% 1,224
Terminal with Dalian Port (48.15%)
/ Cosco (19%) / NYK
(6.85%)
Dalian Dagang
China Shipping 8% shareholding with
Dalian 100 22 22.0 8.0% 2
Container CSTD (35%)
Terminal
Fuzhou Qingzhou
Fuzhou Container 49% shareholding 1,000 776 77.6 49.0% 380
Terminal
Fuzhou JV with Fuzhou Port
International Group (46%), terminal
Fuzhou 1,500 886 59.1 40.0% 354
Container became operational in
Terminal 2002
PSA acquired stake
Fujian Jiangyin in May 2013 in Fujian
International Jiangyin International
Fuzhou 1,200 940 78.4 25.0% 235
Container Container Terminal (FJCT)
Terminal (FJCT) with Fuzhou Port Group
(FPG).
20% stake in JV with
PSA Tianjin
APMT (20%), OOCL
Alliance
Tianjin (20%) and remaining 2,100 1,827 87.0 20.0% 365
Container
held with Tianjin Port
Terminal
Group
49% stake with Tianjin
Port Group to construct
Tianjin Port
and operate six berths
Tianjin Pacific ICT, 4,000 3,530 88.3 49.0% 1,730
in Phase III. First three
Phase III, Tianjin
berths operational 2007.
PSA 49% TPG 51%
Dongguan/
49% stake with
Humen Port Cont
Dongguan Dongguan Humen Port 1,200 1,204 100.3 49.0% 590
Terminal (Berth 5
Construction
& 6), Dongguang
JV between PSA and
Lianyungang Port Group.
Lianyungang
The terminal has a design
Lianyungang Container 2,800 1,870 66.8 49.0% 916
capacity of 2.8 million
Terminal
teu p.a. and commenced
operations in Jun 2014
87
Table 4.1.3 PSA International cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East cont’d
Consortium of PSA,
regional shipping line
PIL and Beibu Gulf
Beibu Gulf-PSA
Port Group developed
International
Qinzhou a deep-water terminal 1,000 189 18.9 49.0% 93
Container
with an ultimate capacity
Terminal (BPCT)
of 3 million teu p.a.
Operations commenced
in 4Q15
PSA ownership reached
Pusan Newport
100% in mid 2016 by
Busan International 2,400 2,200 91.7 100.0% 2,200
acquiring the remaining
Terminal (PNIT)
40% from Hanjin
PSA Hyundai
Pusan Newport
Terminal
50% stake with HMM
Busan (PHPNT), 2,500 2,135 85.4 50.0% 1,068
(50%) *
formerly Hyundai
Pusan Newport
Terminal (HPNT)
Incheon 60% stake in terminal
Incheon Container operating company, 800 800 100.0 60.0% 480
Terminal operational 2004
Hibiki Container
34% shareholding;
Kitakyushu Terminal, 500 50 10.0 34.0% 17
operational 2005
Kitakyushu
Southeast Asia
JV with TIL/MSC for a
Pasir Panjang
five-berth terminal at
Singapore Terminal (PSA/ 7,000 6,436 91.9 50.0% 3,218
Pasir Panjang. Opened
MSC)
Mar 2006
PSA-COSCO 51% shareholding in JV

Singapore 3,000 3,199 106.6 51.0% 1,631
Terminal Pvt. Ltd. with Cosco
In Jun 2016, PSA

announced the formation
of a JV company with
Pasir Panjang
Singapore CMA CGM to operate 4,300 4,388 102.0 51.0% 2,238
(PSA/CMA-CGM)
and lease four container
berths at Pasir Panjang
Singapore
Pasir Panjang
Singapore 100% shareholding 15,000 10,987 73.2 100.0% 10,987
Terminal (PSA)
with Pacific International
Singapore Keppel (PSA-PIL) 1,000 500 50.0 51.0% 255
Lines (49%), became
operational in 2009
Singapore Keppel Terminal 100% shareholding 8,400 6,000 71.4 100.0% 6,000
88

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Southeast Asia cont’d
Singapore Brani Terminal 100% shareholding 6,500 4,800 73.8 100.0% 4,800
PSA Singapore
Singapore Terminal operations 47,218 36,310 76.9 29,129
Terminals
Terminal B3,
50% shareholding in
Eastern Sea
company that directly
Laem Chabang
Laem Chabang operates Terminal B3, 600 511 85.1 50.0% 255
Terminal
and is a shareholder in
Company Ltd
Terminals B1 and A0
(ESCO)
50% shareholding in
ESCO, which holds a
Terminal A0
Laem Chabang 40% share in LCB1m 700 791 113.0 18.0% 142
(LCMT)
which holds a 90% share
in LCMT (A0)
50% shareholding in
ESCO which holds 40%
Terminal B0-B1
Laem Chabang share in JV with APMT 1,015 942 92.8 20.0% 188
(LCB1)
(35%) and Bangkok
Modern Terminal (25%)
SP-PSA
International Port JV with Saigon Port, first
Cai Mep 750 0 0.0 49.0% 0
(Phase I & II), phase operational 2009
Vung Tau
Joint operating company

comprising IPC (51%),
Mitsui, PSA and NYK
New Priok
(collectively 49%).
Container
Tanjung Priok Design capacity 1.5 1,500 1,170 78.0 20.0% 234
Terminal One
million teu. Started
(NPCT1)
partial operation from
Aug 2016 and full
operation from Mar 2017
South Asia
Tuticorin
Tuticorin Container 57.5% shareholding 450 447 99.4 57.5% 257
Terminal
Bharat Kolkata Fully owned subsidiary

Kolkata Container of PSA, operating at five
850 657 77.3 100.0% 657
(Calcutta) Terminals (Netaji berths (3-8), commenced
Subhas Dock) operations in Nov 2014
PSA holds 100%

Chennai 2nd
shareholding. SICAL sold
Chennai Container 1,200 940 78.4 100.0% 940
its 40% share to PSA in
Terminal
Jun 2010
89

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
South Asia cont’d
PSA has signed an MoU

with Kakinada Seaports
Kakinada
Ltd for operating a
Kakinada Container 200 25 12.6 33.0% 8
container terminal at the
Terminal
port. Terminal handled
first vessel in Jan 2016
Bharat Mumbai New terminal with an

Container ultimate capacity of 4.8
Jawaharlal
Terminals million teu p.a. Received 1,000 336 33.6 100.0% 336
Nehru
(Fourth container first vessel call in Feb
terminal) 2018
Middle East
JV between the Public

Saudi Global Investment Fund (PIF)
Dammam 1,000 450 45.0 50.0% 225
Ports and PSA, started
operations from Apr 2015
North Europe
Europa Terminal
Antwerp (Schelde Berths Long-term concession 1,800 1,177 65.4 100.0% 1,177
855-869, HNN)
Noordzee
Terminal (Schelde
Antwerp Long-term concession 2,200 1,064 48.4 100.0% 1,064
berths
901-915, HNN)
Antwerp
JV with K Line, Yang
Antwerp International 500 395 79.0 58.0% 229
Ming
Terminal (AIT) #
MSC PSA 40-year concession

European awarded in 2004;
Antwerp Terminal (MPET) operational 2005. 8,300 6,130 73.9 50.0% 3,065
- Deurganckdok Terminal being expanded
West and redeveloped
South Europe
Genoa Voltri Terminal 98.8% shareholding 2,000 1,583 79.1 98.8% 1,564
Southern
European
Genoa 40% shareholding 500 314 62.9 40.0% 126
Container Hub
(SECH)
Venice Vecon 98.8% shareholding 450 450 100.0 98.8% 445
Sines Terminal XXI with Terminal Investment 2,100 1,724 82.1 50.0% 862
Ltd (50%)
90

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
South Europe cont’d
PSA International Pte
Ltd (PSAI) and AKFEN
Holding (AKFEN),
through their joint-
Mersin
Mersin venture company 2,600 1,723 66.3 50.0% 861
International Port
Mersin International Port
Management Inc. (MIP),
have full operational rights
of Mersin port until 2043.
South America
PSA International has
held a 50% stake in
Exolgan Terminal,
International Trade
Buenos Aires Buenos Aires, 1,150 722 62.8 50.0% 361
Logistics (ITL) since 2008.
Argentina
JV partner is now TIL
(MSC)
Earlier PSA share was
PSA Panama 60%, TIL acquired 42%
Rodman International in JV with PSA (42%) 1,750 609 34.8 42.0% 256
Terminal and local partner (15%),
effective from Apr 2018
Management role in new
deep-water terminal that
Mariel, Cuba TC Mariel S.A. 800 430 53.8 0.0% 0
commenced operations
in 2013
Aguadulce Multi-User
Container Terminal
Sociedad (AMCT), a JV between
Puerto Industrial ICTSI (46%) and PSA
Buenaventura 550 50 9.1 46.0% 23
Aguadulce S.A. International (46%), had
(SPIA) its soft launch in Nov
2016 and has a 30-year
concession
Sub-total 120,637 80,535 66.8 52,686
Shareholdings in other operators ##
PSA International owns

20% of Hutchison Ports,
Hutchison Ports 20.0% 7,629
remaining 80% owned by
CK Hutchison Holdings **
Total 120,637 80,535 66.8 60,314
New developments
Magenta A JV between Ocean Network Express (ONE) and PSA Singapore.It
Singapore Singapore operates four mega container berths in Pasir Panjang Terminal with 50.0%
Terminal (MST) a combined capacity of four million teu
91

In early 2019, PSA acquired DCT Gdansk from Macquarie,
jointly with the Polish Development Fund (PFR) and IFM Global
Gdansk DCT Gdansk 63.8%
Infrastructure Fund (GIF). The terminal has a container handling
capacity of three million teu p.a.
PSA is planning to acquire Halterm Container Terminal at the Port
Halifax Halterm 100.0%
of Halifax from Macquarie Group, subject to regulatory approval
In May 2019, PSA announced the acqusition of Halterm Container
Philadelphia Penn Terminals Terminal in the Port of Halifax from Macquarie Group, subject to 100.0%
regulatory approval
Notes:
Drewry estimated capacity for Dalian Container Terminal differs from NYK reported capacity (6,250,000 teu) for the same terminal.Throughput
figure used here is from NYK. There is a marked discrepancy in NYK’s throughput figure vs Cosco’s throughput figure for this now unified terminal
business, presumably due to differing bases of calculation.
* In May 2018, HMM and PSA ownership increased to 100% (50% each) by acquiring remaining shares from IMM Investment (HMM took a further
40% and PSA 10%).
** PSA, through wholly owned subsidiary PortCapital Limited, also holds a 10.4% deemed interest in HPH Trust units, and PSA’s parent Temasek
Holdings has 14% interest.
#
Antwerp International Terminal is physically located within the PSA Noordzee Terminal.
##
Hutchison Ports figure shown under “2018 throughput column” is equity teu
The estimated throughput figures for PSA’s Antwerp terminals exclude barge volume.
Figure 4.1.3 Location of PSA owned/managed terminal operations
Gdansk
Antwerp
Venice Incheon
Halifax Genoa Dalian
Busan
Philadelphia Sines Tianjin
Mersin Kitakyushu
Kolkata Lianyungang
Fuzhou Guangzhou
Mariel Dammam Kakinada
JNPT Qinzhou
Dongguan
Chennai Cai Mep
Rodman
Tuticorin Laem Chabang
Buenaventura Singapore
Singapore
Tanjung Priok
Buenos Aires
Note:
PSA International owns 20% of Hutchison Ports. Non-operational Acquired in 2019 Throughput under 1m teu per annum Throughput of 1m plus teu per annum
92
PSA International
Singapore
Equity teu league
table ranking 1st
Equity teu 2017 9.8%  7.4% 

60.3m teu 2018 8.4%  7.2% 
0 1 2 3
1.75m teu
80.1m teu
Market focus/risk profile Almost 85% of traffic from emerging markets. Singapore a mature market location but
transhipment volume drawn mainly from emerging markets
Traffic type focus Overall around 40% gateway traffic. Transhipment in Singapore is a significant part of the total.
Remainder of volume elsewhere in portfolio mainly gateway
Degree of internationalism Moderate to high - global activities but no presence in Africa, limited presence in Latin America.
North America now added due to acquitions in 2019. Significant proportion of volume generated
in Singapore home base
Core strategy Development of capacity at existing locations, especially Singapore. Expansion through
acquisitions. Pursuing IT developments and new technologies
Note: Equity teu figure includes effects of 20% stake in HPH

125 125 South America 0.7% Central America/
124 Caribbean 0.5%
122 South Europe 7.3%
Far East 19.5%

North Europe 10.5%
118
Middle East 0.4%
113
South Asia 4.2% Southeast Asia 56.8%
2018 2019 2020 2020 2022 2023

93
DP World
U AE-based global terminal operator, DP World (DPW) has presence

in every continent and holds stakes in terminals in nearly 50 ports
around the world. The company’s home port is Jebel Ali in Dubai which
accounted for 21% of the total throughput in 2018 and 34% of equity-
adjusted volumes.
The company started as a local port operator, growing a portfolio slowly
until the 2000s when several large-scale acquisitions, along with a steady
stream of individual purchases and concession wins, catapulted DPW
into a global terminal operator.
Today, the strategy is to move from being a global port operator to
being a ‘global trade enabler’. This entails moving into the wider supply
chain by acquiring logistics providers but also through entering into
shipping (DPW has bought European short-sea line Unifeeder and has Being a global trade
had the Dubai World-owned P&O Ferries moved into its ambit). Dubai enabler is now the key
Maritime City and Drydocks World are also part of the DPW stable now. DPW strategy
The aim is to get closer to cargo owners and to diversify revenue sources.
In 2018, while 75% of the company’s EBITDA was from port activities,
25% was derived from logistics, parks and economic zones, and this
percentage is expected to increase.
Government-to-government discussions and agreements also form part
of DPW’s strategy, reflecting the company’s ultimate ownership by the
UAE. For example, recently DPW signed an agreement with the Russian
Direct Investment Fund (an investment fund of the Russian Federation),
ROSATOM (the infrastructure operator of the North Sea Route) and
Norilsk Nickel (producer of palladium and high-quality nickel) to jointly
implement a project for the integrated development of the Arctic sea
route. DPW would develop and operate ports on the route.
The company is also at the forefront of IT and digitalisation initiatives,
and new technological ideas such as the ‘hyperloop’ rapid transport
concept for containers which uses electric propulsion through a
low-pressure tube with a freight vehicle floating above a track using New technological
magnetic levitation. The company is also exploring a high bay storage ideas such as
hyperloop and Boxbay
system (named Boxbay) for yard stacking at Jebel Ali. This is a high
are being explored
density racking system where any container can be accessed without
having to move another. Instead of stacking containers directly on top
of each other, the system places each container in an individual rack
compartment, eleven-stories high.
The highlights in terms of total throughput performance for DPW in
2018 are:
• The throughput of all terminals in which stakes (of any size) were held
was 71.2 million teu, up 2.1% on the 2017 level. Total throughput was
• The company has only one terminal in its portfolio for which its up by just over 2%,
stake is 10% or less (QQCTUA in Qingdao), so for the purposes of with a 3% decline at
the Drewry league table, the throughput of this terminal is deducted. home port Jebel Ali
Total throughput on this basis was 70 million teu in 2018, up 1.9%.
94
DP World
• Several terminals posted substantial increases in throughput for 2018. London Gateway’s
London Gateway’s activity was up 38% (367,000 teu) as the terminal activity was up 38%
continues to gain a share of the UK market. Jeddah also posted an
increase of over 30% and over 300,000 teu.
• Volume across the four Qingdao terminals in which DPW has stakes
was up nearly 900,000 teu or just over 6%.
• Good performance was also seen in Jawaharlal Nehru Port in India
where an 18% uplift (218,000 teu) was recorded, but on the flip side,
traffic at nearby Mundra was down 30%.
• Also on the downside, reported volume for the Dolareh Container
Terminal fell by over 800,000 teu in 2018 due to the dispute with the
Djibouti government over the ousting of DPW as terminal owner and
operator. DPW only recorded one month’s throughput before exiting.
• Buenos Aires also disappointed, with traffic down 32% to around
360,000 teu for the year, as did Hong Kong (down 28%). Interestingly
DPW is the only terminal operator not to have joined the alliance of
Hong Kong terminal operators formed to cooperate and coordinate
activities in the port.
• Throughput in DPW’s home port of Jebel Ali was down by nearly 3%
which due to the scale of the operation translated into over 400,000
teu for the year. Competition from neighbouring Khalifa port in Abu
Dhabi, as well as regional political issues, had a negative effect on
traffic levels.
Looking at DPW’s equity teu throughput for 2018:
• Activity reached 44.2 million teu, up 3.3% on 2017.
• Most significant contributors on the upside were Jeddah with nearly
350,000 teu more equity volume and London Gateway (up 367,000
teu). Both terminals are 100% owned.
• Santos increased by over 400,000 teu (even though the terminal’s Equity-adjusted
throughput did not grow) because DPW increased its shareholding to throughput was up by
100% at the end on 2017. over 3%, boosted by
• DPW’s equity teu throughput was naturally hit by the issues at good growth at 100%
Djibouti, but also by the volume decline in Jebel Ali, given its scale owned terminals
and 100% ownership.
• The impact of the volume declines at Buenos Aires and Hong Kong
was limited in equity terms as the former is a relatively small terminal
and the latter is a small shareholding.
• In 2019, equity throughput from DPW’s Australian terminals will be
boosted because the company has increased its stake from 25% to 60%.
DPW has a number of new developments in the pipeline:
• Two greenfield projects are taking shape: Posorja in Ecuador where a Two greenfield
0.75 million teu capacity terminal is being built to compete with the projects and two port
main port of Guayaquil and Banana in the Democratic Republic of business acquisitions,
Congo where a new terminal will compete with upriver Matadi. plus logistics
95
DP World
• Posorja is scheduled to start operations in August 2019 and Hapag-

Lloyd, CMA CGM and Cosco Shipping have been announced as the
first customers, with their Europe-NCSA-WCSA service.
• DPW has also been active in terms of acquisitions, buying multi-
purpose terminal Fraser Surrey Docks in the Greater Vancouver area
of the WCNA and Pulogsa in Chile which operates multi-purpose
terminals in San Antonio and Lirquen.
• The company has also been active in acquiring related businesses such
as Continental Warehousing Corporation (CWC) in India, which DPW has been active
is a multimodal logistics provider covering warehousing, Container on the acquisition trail
Freight Stations (CFS) and Inland Container Depots (ICD).
Table 4.1.4 DP World

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
Share in JV with port
Yantai authority and ICTSI to
International operate terminal; opened
Yantai 1,100 558 50.7 12.5% 70
Container Dec 2003. Shareholding
Terminal Ltd. reduced to 12.5% in Sep
2013
Tianjin Orient 24.5% shareholding in
Tianjin Container Sino-foreign equity JV, 1,370 1,117 81.5 24.5% 274
Terminals (TOCT) expires Mar 2027
Qingdao
29% share in JV with
Qianwan
APMT, Qingdao Port
Qingdao Container 9,000 8,463 94.0 29.0% 2,454
Group for combined
Terminal Co
Phase II / III operation
(QQCT)
Qingdao
Qianwan United 13% shareholding with
Qingdao Container CM Ports, APMT and 5,400 4,698 87.0 13.4% 630
Terminal Co Qingdao Port Group
(QQCTU)
Qingdao
Qianwan 9% shareholding with
United Advance various partners including
Qingdao 1,200 1,188 99.0 9.4% 112
Container CM Ports, APMT and
Terminal Co CMA CGM (APL)
(QQCTUA)
Qingdao New
Qianwan
Qingdao Container 27% stake in JV 1,500 1,176 78.4 26.8% 315
Terminal
(QQCTN)
96
DP World
Table 4.1.4 DP World cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East cont’d
Previously held 66.7%
stake. Divestment
CT3 (Container
announced in Mar 2013
Hong Kong Terminal 3), Kwai 700 687 98.1 16.7% 115
with 17% share and
Chung
management contract
retained
42% shareholding since
2009 with Samsung, KCTA
and other Korean partners,
Pusan New Port increased to 66% in 2016.
Busan 5,500 5,285 96.1 66.0% 3,490
Co (PNC) Consolidated stake in
Pusan Newport Company
Limited with 66.03%
ownership
Southeast Asia
Terminal
49-51 JV between DPW
Tanjung Perak Petikemas 2,100 1,464 69.7 49.0% 717
and state
Surabaya *
50.5% shareholding in
ATI, which was awarded
South Harbour
the operating concession
Container
for Manila South Harbour
Manila Terminal, Asian 1,558 1,474 94.6 50.5% 745
Terminal in 1995; ATI
Terminals Inc
also has shareholding
(ATI)
in terminals in General
Santos and Batangas
Laem Chabang 34.5% stake in the
International terminal operating
Laem Chabang 1,800 1,623 90.2 34.5% 560
Terminal Co company. CMA CGM
(LCIT) (APL) has 14.5% stake
South Asia
30-year lease to equip
/ operate terminal on
Visakha existing berth awarded
Visakhapatnam Container in 2002 to United Liner 500 438 87.6 26.0% 114
Terminal Agencies of India (74%) /
DPW (26%); operational
2003
Vallarpadam
International Cargo handling shifted
Cochin (Kochi) Container from RGT to VICTT in Jun 900 575 63.9 85.0% 489
Transhipment 2010. 85% shareholding
Terminal (VICTT)
DPW is 100%
Chennai shareholder in terminal
Chennai Container operating company, 1,000 671 67.1 100.0% 671
Terminal awarded concession in
Nov 2001
97
DP World

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
South Asia cont’d
Nhava-Sheva
100% shareholding in
Jawaharlal International
the terminal operating 1,200 565 47.1 100.0% 565
Nehru Port Container
company
Terminal
Nhava-Sheva 100% shareholding in

Jawaharlal
India Gateway the terminal operating 1,000 895 89.5 100.0% 895
Nehru Port
Terminal (NSIGT) company
Mundra P&O Ports purchased

International 100% assets / equity
Mundra 1,400 819 58.5 100.0% 819
Container from private port operator
Terminal Adani Group in May 2003
Qasim
75% shareholding in
International
Port Qasim the terminal operating 1,290 1,209 93.7 75.0% 907
Container
company
Terminal
Middle East
Jebel Ali 100% owned and
Dubai 19,300 14,954 77.5 100.0% 14,954
Terminals 1, 2 & 3 operated
Jeddah South
Concession awarded to
Jeddah Container 2,400 1,431 59.6 100.0% 1,431
DPW / Siyanco
Terminal
North Europe
60% shareholding in
Antwerp Gateway JV with China Cosco
Antwerp Terminal NV (20%), CMA CGM (10%) 2,800 2,230 79.6 60.0% 1,338
(Deurganckdok) and Duisport (10%);
operational mid-2005
100% shareholding
Southampton
since Nov 2015. ABP
Southampton Container 2,283 1,949 85.4 100.0% 1,949
previously had 49% stake
Terminals
in the terminal
Terminal de Effective shareholding
Le Havre
France 50%, DPW (P&OP) in a
50-50 JV with CMA CGM
Generale de to acquire 80% stake 2,400 1,485 61.9 50.0% 743
Le Havre Manutention in Egis Ports in 2003;
Portuaire (GMP) Egis Ports is the majority
shareholder in GMP
Freehold terminal,
London Gateway
London became operational in 2,400 1,320 55.0 100.0% 1,320
Terminal
Nov 2013
30% shareholder and
operator of the terminal.
Rotterdam World
Rotterdam Other partners are MOL, 2,350 1,940 82.6 30.0% 582
Gateway
HMM and CMA CGM/
APL
98
DP World

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Eastern Europe
Operator of the container
terminal since 2004.
Constanta Pier II S Shareholding increased 1,200 533 44.4 100.0% 533
from 75% to 100% in Apr
2015
South Europe
Fos Container Effective shareholding
Marseilles-Fos Terminal, MGM- 50%. DPW (P&O Ports)
D2, Eurofos 740 755 102.0 50.0% 378
in a 50-50 JV with CMA
Marseilles-Fos Fos 2XL, Phase I CGM (Terminal Link)
Tarragona 60% shareholding in

Tarragona 120 42 35.0 60.0% 25
Container Terminal Contarsa
100% owned and
DP World
Yarimca operated, commenced 900 576 64.0 100.0% 576
Yarimca
operations in 2Q16
North America
Partnership with CDPQ
to create $3.7 billion
Vancouver Centerm 750 712 94.9 55.0% 392
investment platform with
55% ownership in 2016
100% ownership acquired
during 2015. Partnership
with CDPQ to create $3.7
Fairview billion investment platform
Prince Rupert 1,350 1,036 76.7 55.0% 570
Terminals with 55% ownership in
2016. Capacity increased
during 2017 by completion
of second berth
In Jul 2016, DP World
signed a long-term
lease agreement for the
expansion and operation
of the multi-purpose
Rodney Rodney Container
Port St. John Container Terminal. Operations 200 59 29.5 100.0% 59
Terminal started in 2017 and
planned expansion
programme expected to
be completed in 2021,
with the lease continuing
for 30 years after
South America
30-year concession
awarded in 2006 to
Muelle Sur
develop and operate
Callao Container 1,300 1,270 97.7 100.0% 1,270
660-metre terminal in
Terminal
Callao. Terminal became
operational in mid-2010
99
DP World

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
South America cont’d
Terminales Rio de
Buenos Aires 55.62% shareholding 650 363 55.8 55.6% 202
la Plata
Freehold terminal
became operational in Jul
Santos Embraport 2013. Ownership stake 1,200 646 53.8 100.0% 646
increased to 100% in Dec
2017
Suriname Paramaribo 60% shareholding 130 70 53.8 60.0% 42
In Mar 2018, DP
World announced the
acquisition of Cosmos
Agencia Maritima (CAM)
for $316 million. Based
in Peru, CAM owns a
fully integrated logistics
Terminales
service business.
Portuarios
Paita Cosmos Group also 330 164 49.7 50.0% 82
Euroandinos
holds a 50% stake in
(TPE) **
Terminales Portuarios
Euroandinos (TPE) which
operates the container
terminal at Paita. The
balance of the ownership
in the terminal is held by
Yilport (via Tertir)
50% shareholding,
Caucedo DPW Caucedo JV with Caucedo 1,440 1,332 92.5 50.0% 666
Development Corporation
Africa
El Sokhna 100% shareholding

El Sokhna Container acquired from Amiral 945 655 69.3 100.0% 655
Terminal Holdings
Doraleh
Operational in early 2009,
Djibouti Container 104 54 51.9 33.3% 18
33.3% shareholding.
Terminal ***
Maputo
Maputo International Port 60% shareholding 350 106 30.3 60.0% 64
Services
Terminal a 90% shareholding in

Dakar 900 643 71.4 90.0% 579
Conteneur existing terminal
operate DPW Djazair,
Algiers DP World Djazair 550 434 78.9 50.0% 217
control gained in early
2009
100
DP World

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Africa cont’d
DP World Djen develop and operate
Djen Djen 100 44 44.0 50.0% 22
Djen DPW Djen Djen, control
gained in early 2009
30-year concession
(with 10-year automatic
extension) for the
management of the
existing multi-purpose
port in Somalialand.
Berbera Berbera Port 150 105 70.0 65.0% 68
Development work started
in 2017 and will take
around 24 months to
complete. First phase takes
capacity from 0.15 million
teu to 0.45 million teu
Oceania
Fisherman Minority shareholding
Brisbane Islands Container plus management 720 588 81.7 25.0% 147
Terminal contract #
Minority shareholding
North Quay Inner
Fremantle plus management 300 220 73.3 25.0% 55
Harbour Port
contract #
West Swanson
Melbourne plus management 1,532 1,384 90.3 25.0% 346
Berths
contract #
Port Botany Minority shareholding
Sydney Container plus management 1,320 1,195 90.5 25.0% 299
Terminal contract #
Total 99,822 71,200 71.3 44,166
New developments
In Jun 2016, DP World won a 50-year concession for the development
of a greenfield multi-purpose port project. Ground-breaking for
Posorja Ecuador 78.0%
construction took place in Sep 2017 and will take around 24 months to
complete, resulting in 0.75 million teu of capacity
30-year concession for greenfield multi-purpose port in Banana
(Democratic Republic of the Congo) with 70% control (government
Democratic of DRC with 30% share). Estimated initial investment of $350
Banana Republic of million will include a 600-metre quay and 25-hectare yard extension 70.0%
Congo with a container capacity of 350,000 teu and 1.5 million tonnes for
general cargo. Construction is expected to start in 2019 and will
take approximately 24 months to complete
71.3% stake in Puertos y Logistica S.A. (Pulogsa) acquired from Minera
Valparaiso and other shareholders associated with the Matte Group.
San Antonio
Chile Investment of $502 million in consideration for 100% equity ownership. 71.3%
and Lirquen
The acquisition is expected to close in the first half of 2019. Covers two
terminals, one in San Antonio and one in Lirquen
101
DP World

In May 2019, it was announced that DPW, through Canadian subsidiary
DP World Canada Investment Inc, which is 45% owned by Caisse
Vancouver Canada de dépot et placement du Québec (CDPQ), will acquire Fraser Surrey 55.0%
Docks from Macquarie. The terminal has 1,200 metre of quay in 2018
and handled over one million tonnes of grain and 250,000 teu
Notes:
* Operating contract will not be renewed after expiry in 2019.
** Capacity and throughput figures are for Jun-Dec.
*** Capacity and throughput figures are for Jan 2018 only, as DPW has been ousted from terminal by Djibouti government. Annual capacity reduced
to 1.25 million teu as quay length (1,050 metre) can only accommodate two large vessels at a time.
#
DPW increased its stake in DPW Australia to 60% in early 2019.
DPW capacity for Yantai International Container Terminal Ltd. differs from the ICTSI (1,300,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
DPW capacity for Qingdao Qianwan Container Terminal Co (QQCT) differs from the APMT (8,500,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
DPW capacity for Qingdao Qianwan United Container Terminal Co (QQCTU) differs from the APMT (4,860,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
DPW capacity for Qingdao Qianwan United Advance Container Terminal Co (QQCTUA) differs from the APL (1,300,000 teu) capacity for the same
terminal.
DPW throughput for Qingdao Qianwan United Advance Container Terminal Co (QQCTUA) differs from the CM Ports (1,398,000 teu) throughput for
the same terminal.
DPW throughput for Laem Chabang International Terminal Co (LCIT) differs from the APL (1,436,000 teu) throughput for the same terminal.
DPW capacity for Antwerp Gateway Terminal NV (Deurganckdok) differs from the CMA CGM (2,400,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
DPW capacity for Rotterdam World Gateway differs from the MOL (2,100,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
DPW capacity for Fos Container Terminal differs from Terminal Link (1,000,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
DPW reported annual capacity for Terminales Portuarios Euroandinos (TPE) differs from Yilport (300,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Figure 4.1.4 Location of DP World owned/managed terminal operations
Rotterdam
London
Antwerp
Southampton
Le Havre
Prince Rupert
Vancouver Constantza
Vancouver Marseille-Fos
Yarimca Tianjin
Saint John Tarragona
El Sokhna
Dubai Port Qasim Yantai
Algiers Djen Djen Hong Kong
Caucedo Jeddah Qingdao

Dakar Busan
Djibouti (3) Visakhapatnam Manila
Paramaribo
Laem Chabang
Berbera
Posorja Mundra
Paita (2) Banana
Callao Jawaharlal Nehru Tanjung Perak (1)
Chennai Fremantle
Santos Brisbane
Maputo
San Antonio
Sydney
Lirquen Buenos Aires Cochin
Notes: Melbourne
(1) Operating contract will not be renewed after
expiry in 2019.
(2) Throughput based on half-year.
(3) DPW exited in dispute. Non-operational Acquired in 2019 Throughput under 1m teu per annum Throughput of 1m plus teu per annum
102
DP World
Dubai, UAE
Equity teu league
table ranking 4th
2017 10.2%  6.8% 
Equity teu 2018 1.9%  3.3% 
44.2m teu
0 1 2 3
1.42m teu
70.0m teu
Market focus/risk profile Highly focused on emerging markets although some presence in Europe and growing activities in
North America
Traffic type focus Transhipment at Dubai is a significant part of the total. Remainder of the volume elsewhere in the
portfolio is mainly gateway, overall around 75% is gateway across the portfolio
Degree of internationalism High (global presence). Lowest presence in North America but growing. Significant proportion of
volume generated in Dubai home base
Core strategy Key strategy is to become a "global trade enabler" expanding the company's role into the supply
chain. Selected strategic acquisitions of terminals, shipping lines and logistics businesses. Some
greenfield projects in emerging market locations too. Multi-purpose ports of interest as well as
container. Strong interest in IT developments and new technology

97 Central American/ Africa 3.7%
96 Caribbean 1.5%
Oceania 1.9%
South America 5.1%
95
Far East 16.9%
94 North America 2.3%
South Europe 2.2% Southeast Asia 4.6%
91
South Asia 10.1%
90
Eastern Europe 1.2%
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 North Europe 13.4% Middle East 37.1%
Source: Drewry Maritime Research Note: Germersheim volumes are excluded as this is a river/barge terminal
103
C hina Cosco Shipping has stakes in 44 terminals worldwide, with

around three quarters of these in home country China, along with
its extensive liner and other shipping interests. The company also has
minority stakes in Qingdao Port Company and Shanghai International
Port Group, along with a 90.1% stake in OOCL. The majority of the
terminals and stakes are held by Cosco Shipping Ports (CSP), with a
handful under CSP’s parent company Cosco Shipping Group. CSP’s 2018
adjusted net profit was $325 million, based on revenue of $1.4 billion.
The key takeaways in terms of total throughput performance for Cosco
in 2018 are:
• The throughput of all terminals in which stakes (of any size) were held
was 97.8 million teu for CSP (up 5% from 93.1 million teu in 2017)
and 7.7 million teu for the terminals owned by Cosco Shipping Group
(up 14% from 6.8 million teu in 2017).
• Market-related growth was seen at most of the company’s Chinese Consolidation at
terminals. Dalian and Qingdao
• CSP’s stakes in Qingdao terminals that were included in its 2017 has had a significant
figures have been replaced by a stake in the parent company Qingdao impact on Cosco’s
Port International (QPI). Drewry does not include this throughput in figures
its total teu figures (removing around 5.7 million teu from the total),
only the equity teu.
• At Dalian, CSP’s stake in DCT has been replaced in 2018 by a stake
in the merged DCT, DICT and DPCT. This resulted in an increase in
reported throughput of 2.8 million teu.
• Nantong has been added to the portfolio, although volumes are
relatively small.
• Strong growth was evident in Singapore in 2018 (57%) after the
addition of a third berth, leading to volumes topping 3.0 million teu
for the year. Two further berths have been added to the JV with PSA.
• Piraeus had another good year with ~20% growth at Piers 2 and 3.
• The acquisition of majority stakes in the Noatum terminals in
Valencia and Bilbao added 3.4 million teu to the group’s total
throughput in 2018.
Looking at Cosco’s equity teu throughput for 2018:
• CSP reached 35.1 million teu, including the effect of its 18% stake in
QPI. This was up from 32.8 million teu the year before (7% growth). Big jump in Cosco
• The terminals owned by Cosco Shipping Group reached 2.3 million equity teu, especially
teu, up from 2.1 million teu the year before, but when the minority due to SIPG stake
stake in SIPG is included the 2018 figure leaps up to 7.6 million teu.
The key takeaways in terms of throughput performance for OOCL in
2018 are:
• The total throughput of the OOCL terminals was 7.6 million teu, down
from the 7.8 million teu achieved in 2017. This was mainly due to
declines at Tianjin (15%) and Long Beach (10%). The latter is surprising
given that the terminal is newly re-developed and state-of-the-art.
104
• Equity teu throughput totalled 3.8 million teu in 2018, up slightly on LBCT sale will hit
3.7 million teu the year before. The OOCL total will be lower in 2019 OOCL terminal
due to the sale of Long Beach Container Terminal (LBCT) in April to throughput in 2019
Macquarie Infrastructure Partners (MIP) for $1.8 billion. As part of the
deal OOCL has entered into a 20-year Terminal Services Agreement.
Cosco has a number of new developments in the pipeline:
• At Abu Dhabi (Khalifa), the company has a JV with Abu Dhabi
Ports to develop the second terminal at the port, with operations
commencing in April 2019.
• In Italy, Cosco, along with QPI, is a partner in a JV with APMT for a
new deep-water terminal at Vado (Savona) due to open this year.
New developments in
• The company has several developments in China. In Wuhan it has a UAE, Italy, China and
majority stake in a river barge terminal under development while in Peru
Qingdao and in Ningbo it has interests in new terminals being built,
although the timing of the latter is unclear.
• At the beginning of 2019, Cosco announced the acquisition of a 60%
stake in Terminales Portuarios Chancay S.A. (Chancay Terminal)
for a total consideration of $225 million. Chancay is a greenfield
port development just north of Callao in Peru. Phase 1 of the
development will have four berths, of which two are multi-purpose
berths and two are container berths with a design capacity of 1.0
million teu per annum.
In terms of strategic development, it is interesting to note that Cosco
Shipping and Bolloré Transport & Logistics have signed an MoU for
the companies “to explore the possibilities of commercial collaboration
Cooperation MoUs
in order to develop their respective activities and satisfy the needs of with CMA CGM and
their customers, particularly in terms of digitalization”. Cooperation now Bolloré
will reportedly focus on the African continent, where Bolloré has a
strong presence. Cosco Shipping Ports already has a global cooperation
agreement with Ocean Alliance partner CMA CGM covering the
terminal sector. Ocean Alliance volumes account for over 40% of the
throughput of the Cosco terminals portfolio.
Cosco remains committed to continued expansion of its overseas
portfolio, while at home in China the main focus is reorganisation and
consolidation of port groups.
105
Table 4.1.5 China Cosco Shipping

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Cosco Shipping Ports
Far East - Bohai Rim
Merged with DICT

and DPCT in Nov
Dalian Container 2017. Cosco has 19%
Dalian 10,300 9,513 92.4 19.0% 1,807
Terminal shareholding in JV with
Dalian Port (48.15%) /
PSA (26%) / NYK (6.85%)
Dalian Dagang
China Shipping Shareholding with PSA
Dalian Container International (8%) and 100 22 22.0 35.0% 8
Terminal (Berths state government (32%)
22-24)
Tianjin Five
Continents 28% in JV with NWS /
Tianjin International CM Ports / Tianjin Port 2,800 2,709 96.7 28.0% 758
Container Group
Terminal Co
Tianjin Port
Euroasia
with Tianjin Development
Holdings Ltd, operational
Container
in Jul 2010
Terminal Co
with Yingkou Port Group.
Note that a merger
Yingkou
of Yingkou Container
Yingkou Container 1,500 1,339 89.2 50.0% 669
Terminal and Yingkou
Terminals Co
New Century Terminal
was completed in May
2017
Yingkou
New Century JV with Yingkou Port
Yingkou 1,400 1,414 101.0 40.0% 566
Container Liability (60%)
Terminal
JV with Jinzhou Port Co
Jinzhou New
(34%) and Dalian Port
Jinzhou Age Container 1,200 711 59.2 51.0% 362
Container Terminal Co
Terminal
(15%)
Qinhuangdao JV with Dalian Port (15%)
Port New and Qinhuangdao Port
Qinhuangdao Harbour Group (55%) to develop 800 585 73.1 30.0% 175
Container new terminal, became
Terminal operational in 2008
Shanghai Pudong
International
Shanghai with HP (30%) / SIPG 3,000 2,602 86.7 30.0% 781
Container
(40%)
Terminals
106
Table 4.1.5 China Cosco Shipping cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Cosco Shipping Ports cont’d
Far East - Yangtze River Delta
Shanghai
Mingdong 20% stake acquired from
Shanghai 5,600 6,252 111.6 20.0% 1,250
Container SIPG in Jan 2015
Terminal
20% shareholding in
Ningbo Yuan
Ningbo JV with OOCL / port 4,000 3,060 76.5 20.0% 612
Dong Terminals
authority
Zhangjiagang
Suzhou Win Hanverky
with Zhangjiagang Port 1,000 762 76.2 51.0% 389
(Zhangjiagang) Container
Group (49%)
Terminal Co
55.59% effective
Yangzhou shareholding in JV with
Yuanyang Yangzhou Port Co., Ltd.
Yangzhou 700 500 71.5 55.6% 278
International and Zhangjiagang Win
Ports Co Hanverky Container
Terminal Co., Ltd.
Nanjing Port
16% JV with Nanjing Port
Nanjing Longtan 4,500 2,930 65.1 16.1% 472
(45%), Sinotrans (8.98%)
Container Co
Taicang
JV with Jiashan Group
International
Taicang Company (51%) and local 550 561 102.0 39.0% 219
Container
government
Terminals Co
Agreement with
Lianyungang
Lianyungang Seaport
New Oriental
Corporation to develop
Lianyungang International 3,000 2,876 95.9 55.0% 1,582
and operate terminal,
Container
NOICT became
Terminal (NOICT)
operational in 2004
Acquired by Cosco
Nantong Tonghai Shipping Ports in Sep
Nantong 400 264 66.1 51.0% 135
Terminal 2017 and was put into
operation in Jun 2018 *
Far East - Pearl River Delta, Southeast Coast and Southwest Coast
COSCO-HIT
Hong Kong Terminals (Hong 1,800 1,794 99.7 50.0% 897
with HPH Trust
Kong)
Asia Container 60% shareholding in JV
Hong Kong 1,600 1,465 91.6 60.0% 879
Terminal with HPH Trust
Yantian
International
14.6% effective
Shenzhen Container 4,500 3,007 66.8 14.6% 439
shareholding in Phase I, II
Terminals Co
(Phase I, II)
107

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East - Pearl River Delta, Southeast Coast and Southwest Coast cont’d
Yantian
International
13.36% effective
Shenzhen Container 8,000 8,030 100.4 13.4% 1,073
shareholding in Phase III
Terminals Co.,
Ltd. (Phase III)
Yantian
International
13.36% effective
Shenzhen Container 2,000 2,123 106.2 13.4% 284
shareholding in West Port
Terminals (West
Port )
Guangzhou
South China 39% effective
Guangzhou Oceangate shareholding in JV with 5,500 5,165 93.9 39.0% 2,014
Container APMT / port authority
Terminal Co
Operating terminal along
Nansha
with Guangzhou Port
Guangzhou Container 5,000 5,805 116.1 40.0% 2,322
Group holding (51%) and
Terminal Phase 1
Nansha Terminal (9%)
Quan Zhou
Quanzhou Pacific Container 1,800 1,560 86.7 82.4% 1,285
JV with port authority
Terminal Co
Jinjiang
Jinjiang Pacific Ports 800 426 53.2 80.0% 340
with port authority
Development Co
Xiamen Ocean
with local government.
Xiamen Gate Container 2,600 1,969 75.7 70.0% 1,378
Terminal became
Terminal Co
operational in May 2012
Qinzhou
International JV with Qinzhou Port
Qinzhou 1,200 1,371 114.3 40.0% 548
Container Group (60%)
Terminal Co.,Ltd.
Far East
Acquired at end 2012.
Kao Ming
CM Ports, Yang Ming,
Kaohsiung Container 2,800 1,746 62.3 20.0% 349
NYK and Ports America
Terminal
also shareholders
In Nov 2016, KBCT was
merged with Busan
International Terminal
Busan Port (BIT) to set up a new
Busan 5,800 3,758 64.8 5.5% 207
Terminal company Busan Port
Terminal Co Ltd (BPT).
CSP now holds a 5.5%
stake in BPT
108

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Southeast Asia
with PSA. The terminal
in 2017 consisted of two
berths and a capacity of
two million teu. A third
COSCO-PSA
berth was added in Jan
Singapore Terminal (Pasir 3,000 3,199 106.6 49.0% 1,567
2018 and the capacity
Panjang)
increased to three million
teu. Another two berths
were added in Jan 2019,
bringing the total capacity
to 4.85 million teu
North Europe
Antwerp Antwerp Gateway with DPW / Duisport / 2,800 2,230 79.7 20.0% 446
Terminal Link (CMA CGM)
85% shareholding in
CSP Zeebrugge
Zeebrugge JV with CMA CGM and 1,000 393 39.3 85.0% 368
Terminal
Zeebrugge port authority #
In May 2016, CSP
entered into a purchase
Rotterdam Euromax Terminal agreement with ECT 2,550 3,054 119.8 35.0% 1,069
Rotterdam (HP) to
acquire a 35% stake
South Europe
26% effective equity
interest acquired in Dec
Ambarli
Kumport 2015 in a deal with China 2,100 1,258 59.9 26.0% 327
(Istanbul)
Merchants and CIC as
co-shareholders
In Oct 2016, Cosco
Shipping Ports acquired
Reefer Teriminal
Savona (Vado) a 40% stake of APM 300 67 22.2 40.0% 27
S.p.A (VADO)
Terminals Vado Holding
B.V.
In Jun 2017, Cosco
Shipping Ports entered
CSP Iberian into a Sale and Purchase
Valencia Terminal Agreement with TPIH
Valencia and
and CSP Iberian in connection with the 4,570 3,371 73.8 51.0% 1,652
Bilbao
Bilbao purchase of 51% of the
Terminal shares of Noatum Port
Holdings in two Spanish
terminals ##
In Oct 2009, started a 30-
Piraeus Container year (+5-year extension)
Piraeus 5,500 4,409 80.2 100.0% 4,409
Terminal concession to operate and
develop Piers 2 and 3
109

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
North America
Cosco Shipping Group
(20%) and Cosco
Seattle Terminal 30 ** Shipping Ports (13.33%) 470 168 35.7 13.3% 22
in JV with SSA Marine
and Matson Group
Africa
Suez Canal 20% shareholding in JV
Port Said Container with EICT (APMT) / other 3,900 2,610 66.9 20.0% 522
Terminal public shareholders
Sub-total 120,712 97,794 81.0 33,303
Shareholdings in other operators ***
Cosco sold its stakes
in Qingdao terminals
Qingdao Port
to Qingdao Port
Qingdao International Co., 9,715 18.4% 1,789
International Co (QPI) in
Ltd
early 2017, taking a stake
in QPI at the same time
Total 35,092
New developments

In Sep 2016, Cosco Shipping Ports announced a 35-year deal
Khalifa Terminal with Abu Dhabi Ports Co to develop a second terminal at Khalifa
Abu Dhabi 90.0%
Phase II Port, UAE. Ultimate capacity of 2.4 million teu p.a. and due to
commence operations in Apr 2019
The planned deep-water Vado container terminal, under a 50-year
APM Terminals concession, is scheduled to become operational in 2020 with the ability
Vado (Savona) 40.0%
Vado to accommodate vessels of up to 18,000 teu, as well as having liquid
bulk facilities. In Oct 2016, Cosco acquired 40% share from APMT
In Dec 2017, Cosco Shipping Ports acquired 70% of Wuhan
Terminal (a river barge terminal). Upon completion of devlopment
Wuhan Wuhan Terminal 70.0%
works in 2020, the capacity of the entire Port of Yangluo will reach
2.8 million teu
Qingdao Qianwan
Construct and operate Qianwan fourth phase with total capacity of
Qingdao Intelligent 31.2%
1.3 million teu. Expected to be operational in 2020
Container Terminal
In 2011, Cosco signed a JV agreement with Ningbo Port and
Ningbo Meishan established New Harbour Terminal Operation Co Ltd, to invest and
Ningbo Container operate Meishan Phase 1 Berth 1-2. This is now a JV with Ningbo Port 20.0%
Terminal and PSA for a terminal with capacity of 1.2 million teu. Negotiations are
still on for asset transfer and the completion date is still uncertain
On 23 Jan 2019, Cosco Shipping Ports agreed to subscribe for
60% of the shares in TPCH, the remaining 40% will be held by
Chancay Port of Chancay Volcan, a polymetallic mining company in Peru. The greenfield 60.0%
project is expected to commence operations in 2022. Phase I will
include two dry bulk berths and two container berths
110

Beibu Gulf Port Beibu CSP acquired 4.34% stake in Beibu Gulf Port in Dec 2018
Notes:
#
Equity teu figure is calculated on the basis of 100% ownership for Jan-Jul 2018 and 85% for Aug-Dec 2018.
##
Equity teu figure calculated on the basis that Noatum Ports holds 100% of Valencia terminal and 78% of Bilbao terminal.
* Capacity and throughput are for Jul-Dec.
** Note that this is the same terminal in Seattle as shown in the sub-table below.
*** Qingdao Port International throughput figure shown under “Throughput” column is equity teu.
The capacity figures in this table are, in most cases, Drewry’s best assessment of actual in place capacity for 2018. The company’s official capacity
figures often vary from this because they focus on i) design rather than operational capacity, design being that set at feasibility stage by the approval
authority, and ii) future full capacity when full quay length is operational. Even when using Drewry capacity figures, utilisation levels at some terminals
still appear exceptionally high (well over 100%) due to the way that throughput is recorded by the company.
China Cosco Shipping throughput and capacity for Dalian Container Terminal differs from NYK Line throughput (3,876,000 teu) and capacity
(6,250,000 teu) for the same terminal.
China Cosco Shipping capacity for Nanjing Port Longtan Container Terminal differs from SIPG capacity (2,200,000 teu) for the same terminal.
China Cosco Shipping capacity for Kao Ming Container Terminal differs from NYK and Ports America capacity (3,300,000 teu) for the same terminal.
China Cosco Shipping capacity for Antwerp Gateway differs from CMA CGM capacity (2,400,000 teu) for the same terminal.
China Cosco Shipping capacity for Kumport differs from China Merchants capacity (1,700,000 teu) for the same terminal.
China Cosco Shipping capacity for Terminal 30, Seattle, differs from SSA Marine capacity (470,000 teu) for the same terminal.
China Cosco Shipping capacity for Suez Canal Container Terminal differs from APMT capacity (3,900,000 teu) for the same terminal.
2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East - Bohai Rim
Yantai Port
Yantai JV partner 2,110 3,002 142.3 10.0% 300
Co.,Ltd
South Europe
In 2016, CSP acquired
a 51% stake in the
Piraeus Port Authority
(PPA) company, with
Piraeus Port provision for an increase
Piraeus 1,000 499 49.9 51.0% 254
Authority to 67% within five years.
PPA operates the Pier
1 container terminal
in Piraeus and acts as
overall port landlord.
8.3% effective
Marseilles-Fos Seayard Terminal shareholding with TIL 680 430 63.2 8.3% 36
(50%) and APMT (42%)
Pacific Maritime 51% JV with SSA and
Long Beach 2,400 2,056 85.7 51.0% 1,048
Services, Pier J CMA CGM
North America
West Basin JV with Yang Ming (40%)
Los Angeles 1,900 1,555 81.8 40.0% 622
Container Terminal / Ports America (20%)
111

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Cosco Shipping Group cont’d
North America cont’d
(20%) and Cosco
Seattle Terminal 30 * Shipping Ports (13.33%) 470 168 35.7 20.0% 34
in JV with SSA Marine
and Matson Group
Total 10,578 7,709 72.9 2,294
acquired 15% equity
Shanghai SIPG interest in SIPG held by 35,542 15.0% 5,331
Shanghai Tongsheng
Investment Group Co Ltd
Total 7,625
Note:
* Note that this is the same terminal in Seattle as shown in the main table above.
#
SIPG throughput figure shown under “Throughput” column is equity teu.
Cosco Shipping Group throughput and capacity for Pacific Maritime Services, Pier J, differs from CMA CGM throughput (1,777,000 teu) and
capacity (2,200,000 teu) for the same terminal.
Cosco Shipping Group throughput for Pacific Maritime Services, Pier J, differs from SSA Marine throughput (2,039,000 teu) for the same terminal.
Cosco Shipping Group throughput and capacity for West Basin Container Terminal differs from the Ports America throughput (1,591,000 teu) and
Cosco Shipping Group capacity for Marseilles-Fos Seayard Terminal differs from the APMT capacity (1,000,000 teu) for the same terminal.
Figure 4.1.5 Location of China Cosco Shipping owned/managed terminal operations
Jinzhou
Rotterdam Yingkou
Qinhuangdao
Dalian
Tianjin
Zeebrugge Antwerp
Qingdao (1) Yantai
Lianyungang Qingdao
Marseilles-Fos Vado
Seattle Ambarli Yangzhou
Bilbao Guangzhou Busan Nantong
Vado Port Said
Los Angeles
Valencia Shenzhen
Piraeus Nanjing Taicang
Long Beach (2)
Abu Dhabi Suzhou
Hong Kong Shanghai (3)
Qinzhou Xiamen
Quanzhou Ningbo
Singapore Ningbo
Jinjiang
Chancay Kaohsiung
Notes:
Small stake acquired in Beibu Gulf Port (China)
in December 2018.
(1) Minority shareholding in Qingdao Port Group.
(2) OOCL sold LBCT to a consortium led by
Macquarie Infrastructure Partners (MIP) in 2019.
(3) Minority shareholding in SIPG. Non-operational Operational in 2019 Throughput under 1m teu per annum Throughput of 1m plus teu per annum
112
China Cosco Group

Beijing, China
Equity teu league
table ranking 3rd
Equity teu
32.4m teu** Growth Total teu Equity teu
2017 8.4%  2.8% 
2018 15.9%*  32.3%** 
0 1 2 3
1.99m teu
Total handling in 2018 2017 2018*

99.6m teu*
* Figures include OOCL portfolio
** Figures include OOCL portfolio (90% stake) and stakes held in SIPG and QPG
Market focus/risk profile Around 75% of the activity is generated by emerging markets
Traffic type focus Primarily gateway. Limited exposure to transhipment apart from certain terminals
Degree of internationalism Moderate - mainly focused on China at present, although expanding internationally
Core strategy International and domestic expansion through acquisitions and greenfield developments.
Consolidation of port and terminal ownership in China. Strong commitment to Belt and Road
Initiative locations. Strategic alliance with CMA CGM for terminals. Government to government
relationships

140 North America 6.8% Africa 1.1%
140
138
South Europe 14.5%
136
134
North Europe 4.1%
130
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Southeast Asia 3.4% Far East 70.1%
Note: China Cosco Shipping includes Cosco Shipping Ports, Cosco Note: China Cosco Shipping includes Cosco Shipping Ports, Cosco
Shipping Group & OOCL; Seattle counted once Shipping Group & OOCL
113
Table 4.1.6 OOCL

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
Terminal 2, Long-term lease
Kaohsiung Kaohsiung, agreement for Piers 65 1,500 1,273 84.9 100.0% 1,273
Taiwan and 66
Tianjin Alliance 20% stake in JV with

International APMT (20%), PSA (20%)
Tianjin 2,100 1,767 84.2 20.0% 353
Container and remaining held with
Terminals Tianjin Port Group
20% stake in five berth

Ningbo Yuan development in Beilun
Dong Container with Cosco and Ningbo
Ningbo 4,000 3,060 76.5 20.0% 612
Terminal, Ningbo, Port Group. Terminal
China became operational in
2007
North America
40-year lease agreement
for the Middle Harbor
Redevelopment Project.
Long Beach
In Apr 2019, OOIL sold
Long Beach Container 2,700 1,546 57.3 100.0% 1,546
LBCT for $1.78 billion
Terminals, USA
to a consortium led by
Macquarie Infrastructure
Partners (MIP)
Total 10,300 7,646 74.2 3,784
Notes:
OOCL throughput for Tianjin Alliance International Container Terminals differs from APMT throughput (1,827,000 teu) for the same terminal
114
T IL was founded in 2000 to secure berths and terminal capacity in the

major ports used by Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) and
now has stakes in 37 terminals worldwide. TIL’s largest customer is MSC, but
in addition, a number of TIL’s terminals provide services to other customers
on contractually agreed rates and terms. Naturally, in a number of key
locations this includes MSC’s partner in the 2M Alliance, Maersk Line.
This year, all terminals are reported under the TIL brand with none
shown as owned by MSC or associated companies. That said, the
owners of MSC also reportedly have indirect stakes via various holding
companies in several other terminals around the world including This year, all terminals
locations in Italy (La Spezia), Morocco (Tanger Med) and Chile are reported under the
(Valparaiso). However, ownership of these terminals is not formally TIL brand
acknowledged by TIL or MSC, and so they are not included in the
portfolio table in this report.
Financial investor Global Infrastructure Partners (GIP) has held a minority
stake in TIL since 2013. Initially 35%, it was subsequently increased to 49%
with co-investors. In early 2019 it was announced that GIP would be selling MSC increases stake
19% of its stake, with 10% going to Singapore sovereign wealth fund GIC in TIL to 60%
and 9% to MSC, resulting in MSC’s holding increasing to 60%.
The key takeaways in terms of total throughput performance for TIL in
2018 are:
• An 8.5% increase to 48.8 million teu (from 45 million teu in 2017),
taking into account all terminals in which stakes (of any size) were held.
• Throughput was boosted by the addition of several new terminals to New terminals at Abu
the portfolio during 2018 (Abu Dhabi adding 1.1 million teu in a half- Dhabi, Panama and
year, Panama adding almost 600,000 teu in a nine-month period, plus Rio added significantly
Rio de Janeiro and the transfer of San Pedro from MSC). to total throughput
• Growth of ~500,000 teu in throughput was achieved at four existing
terminals: Singapore, Antwerp, King Abdullah and Mundra. For the
latter two, this represented growth of 33% and 41% respectively.
• In percentage terms though, Klaipeda took the crown, more than
doubling its volume with a 114% increase, reaching 387,000 teu for
the year. A noteworthy recent event here has been a test call by a
19,500 teu MSC vessel.
• On the downside, double-digit percentage falls in throughput were
experienced by TIL’s terminals in Las Palmas, Port Everglades and
Navegantes. Traffic at Freeport (Texas) dropped to zero, although
from a minimal 51,000 teu in 2017.
Looking at TIL’s equity teu throughput for 2018:
• A 10% increase to 27.3 million teu was achieved, up from 24.8 million
teu in 2017.
Three ports (King
• Between them, King Abdullah, Abu Dhabi and Mundra added 1.3
Abdullah, Abu
million teu to the portfolio total in 2018, around half of the total growth.
Dhabi and Mundra)
• Las Palmas managed to add over 200,000 teu to the TIL equity total accounted for around
despite its overall volume decreasing by 150,000 teu, a result of TIL half of equity teu
increasing its shareholding from 55% to 100%. growth
115
• Similarly Callao made a positive contribution of 180,000 teu to the

equity total despite having a flat year in 2018, as TIL increased its
shareholding from 29% to 47%.
• In 2019, equity teu will be boosted by TIL’s move to acquire 100% of
the Gioia Tauro terminal, having previously held 50%. Relations with
co-shareholder Contship Italia appear to have broken down and the
Eurogate-affiliated operator exited in April 2019.
TIL has several new developments lined up:
• In Genoa, the company is developing a new terminal (Calata Bettolo)
expected to be operational in 2019, adding 750,000 teu of capacity to
the port.
• In Israel, TIL is behind a greenfield container terminal development New greenfield
due to open in 2021. developments focus
on the Mediterranean
• TIL also has the San Pedro (Ivory Coast) deep-sea terminal
development that was previously housed under MSC. This is a 35-
year concession agreement with the terminal having an expected
operational date of 2022.
• TIL is also reportedly the sole bidder for the role of developing the fourth
container terminal at Valencia, due to open in 2024. Ultimately the new
terminal could have a capacity as large as 5.0 million teu per annum. TIL
already has a terminal with 1.3 million teu capacity in the port.
Table 4.1.7 Terminal Investment Ltd (TIL)

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
TIL / NPG Beilun Third
Ningbo Gangji Container Co. Ltd. JV
Ningbo 3,100 3,070 99.0 50.0% 1,535
Terminal Co., Ltd operates 3 of 5 berths at
Phase IV, operational 2007
Southeast Asia
MSC-PSA Asia
JV with PSA at Pasir Panjang.
Singapore Terminal Pte 7,000 6,436 91.9 49.0% 3,154
Opened Mar 2006
Limited (MPAT)
South Asia
Adani 50% shareholding in JV with
International Adani Ports and Special
Mundra Container Economic Zone Limited. 2,400 1,926 80.3 50.0% 963
Terminal Pvt. Terminal became operational
Limited (AICTPL) during 2013
Middle East
49% shareholding in JV with
Abu Dhabi Khalifa Port CT1 1,300 1,104 84.9 49.0% 541
ADP. Effective from Jul 2018 *
National Container TIL has increased
King Abdullah Terminals Limited shareholding to 75% since 3,000 2,258 75.3 75.0% 1,693
(NCT) May 2018
Basra
Umm Qasr Multipurpose Partnership (50%) 535 228 42.7 50.0% 114
Terminal (BMT)
116
Table 4.1.7 Terminal Investment Ltd (TIL) cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
South Europe
Concession from port
MSC Terminal
Valencia authority awarded in 2004; 1,260 1,113 88.3 100.0% 1,113
Valencia, SA
operational 2006
PSA Sines - 50% shareholding in JV with
Sines Terminais de PSA Europe Pte Limited 2,100 1,724 82.1 50.0% 862
Contentores, S.A. (50%)
Ambarli Marport Main & 50% shareholding in JV with
2,040 1,572 77.1 50.0% 786
(Istanbul) West Terminal Arkas
Assan Liman 50% shareholding in JV
Iskenderun
iSletmeleri with Kibar Holding, acquired 340 223 65.7 50.0% 112
(Assanport)
Anonim Sirketi during 2013
70% shareholding with
Asyaport
Soyuer Group. Terminal
Asyaport Container 1,980 1,112 21.4 70.0% 779
commenced operations in
Terminal
2015
50% JV with APMT (42%),
Cosco (8%), terminal
Marseilles-Fos Fos 2XL 680 437 64.3 50.0% 218
commenced operations in
Feb 2012
Operaciones
Portuarias 100% shareholding held by
Las Palmas 1,380 648 47.0 100.0% 648
Canarias SA TIL.
(OPC SA)
Medcenter
Gioia Tauro Container JV with Contship Italia ** 2,500 2,288 91.5 50.0% 1,144
Terminal (MCT)
Trieste Maritime
Trieste JV with T.O. Delta 750 607 80.9 50.0% 303
Terminal (TMT)
North Europe
Terminal 50% partnership with
Normandie MSC Perrigault Participations. TIL
Le Havre 1,540 1,141 74.1 50.0% 570
& Terminal Porte has acquired 50% in TPO
Océane S.A. with effect from May 2018 ***
PSA at Deurganckdok; TIL
MPET PSA-DGD
Antwerp involvement with effect from 8,300 6,130 73.9 50.0% 3,065
(Deurganckdok)
Sep 2014. Terminal under
expansion
Bremerhaven MSC-Gate JV with Eurogate 2,380 1,503 63.2 50.0% 752
Delta MSC
Terminal (Delta 50% shareholding in JV with
Rotterdam 1,140 1,338 117.4 50.0% 669
Dedicated North ECT
Terminal)
Eastern Europe
Klaipedos
Klaipeda Smelte Container TIL acquired Smelte in 2008 600 387 64.5 96.1% 372
Terminal
Container 20% stake acquired from
St Petersburg Terminal Saint UCL Port B.V. in Mar 2012. 780 722 92.6 20.0% 144
Petersburg UCL Port B.V. now holds 80%
117

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Africa
Lome Container
Lome China Merchants. Opened 1,365 1,040 76.2 50.0% 520
Terminal
2014
Terminal San 100% owned by TIL since
San Pedro Pedro, Ivory Dec 2018 (previously MSC 210 149 71.0 50.0% 75
Coast owned).
North America
Total Terminals Partnership with Hyundai
Long Beach 2,880 2,278 79.1 80.0% 1,822
Inc (TTI) (20%)
Port Newark 50-50 JV between Ports
New York Container America and TIL. Started in 1,625 1,238 76.2 50.0% 619
Terminal 2010
Termont Terminal 50% shareholding in JV with
Montreal (Maisonneuve/ NYK Ports (Ceres) 25% / 735 676 92.0 50.0% 338
Viau) Logistec 25%
Total Terminals Partnership with Hyundai
Seattle 660 312 47.3 80.0% 250
Inc (TTI) (20%)
Houston Terminal Partnership with Ceres
Houston 2,500 1,147 45.9 75.0% 860
#
Terminals (25%)
New contract signed in 2014,
Port Everglades
10 years with 2 x 5-year
Port Everglades Terminal 250 159 63.6 60.0% 95
option. Local partner holds
(Southport)
40%
Napoleon Avenue Partnership with Ceres
New Orleans 400 267 66.7 51.0% 136
Container Terminal Terminals
Partnership with Ceres
Freeport, Texas Freeport Terminal 300 0 0.0 75.0% 0
Terminals (25%)
South America
Portonave
- Terminal
Navegantes Sole shareholding 1,380 743 53.9 100.0% 743
Portuarios de
Navegantes S/A
Brasil Terminal 50% shareholding in JV with
Santos 1,505 1,306 86.8 50.0% 653
Portuaria (BTP) APMT. Opened end Nov 2013
Buenos Aires Exolgan S.A. 1,150 722 62.8 50.0% 361
PSA. Effective from Aug 2014
Partnership with APMT
APM Terminals
Callao and local partner. TIL stake 1,320 1,002 75.9 47.0% 471
Callao
increased to 47% in 2018
TIL acquired 42% in JV with
PSA Panama
PSA (42%) and local partner
Panama International 1,313 564 43.0 42.0% 237
(15%), effective from Apr
Terminal S.A
2018 ##
Multi-TIL 46% shareholding in JV
Sociedade with Multi-Rio Operações
Rio de Janeiro 650 176 27.1 46.0% 81
em Conta de Portuárias. Effective from Jan
Participações 2018
Freeport 49% shareholding in JV with
Freeport 1,840 1,094 59.5 49.0% 536
Container Port Hutchison
Total 69,224 48,841 70.6 27,335
118

New developments
Hadarom 100% stake in development of deep-sea terminal with 1,295
Ashdod Container metres of quay and 2.2 million teu capacity. Expected operational
Terminal date 2021
100% stake in development of deep-sea terminal. Expected
Genoa Bettolo
operational date 2019
Terminal
100% stake in development of deep-sea terminal under a 35-year
San Pedro Conteneurs San
concession agreement. Expected operational date 2022
Pedro (TCSP)
Notes:
TIL capacity for Fos 2XL at Marseilles-Fos differs from APMT capacity (1,000,000 teu) for the same terminal.
TIL capacity for Port Newark Container Terminal at New York port differs from Ports America capacity (1,470,000 teu) for the same terminal.
TIL capacity for Total Terminals Inc (TTI), Seattle differs from Hyundai capacity (517,000 teu) for the same terminal.
TIL throughput and capacity for Termont Terminal, Montreal, differs from NYK capacity (900,000 teu) and throughput (698,000 teu) for the same terminal.
TIL throughput and capacity for Termont Terminal, Montreal, differs from Macquarie capacity (820,000 teu) and throughput (698,000 teu) for the
same terminal.
TIL throughput and capacity for Total Terminals Inc (TTI), Long Beach, differs from Hyundai throughput (2,312,000 teu) and capacity (2,646,000 teu)
for the same terminal.
TIL throughput and capacity for Brasil Terminal Portuaria (BTP) differs from APMT throughput (1,468,000 teu) and capacity (1,680,000 teu) for the
same terminal.
* Capacity and throughput figures are for Jul-Dec.
** TIL stake increased to 100% during 2019.
*** Capacity and throughput figures are for May-Dec.
#
Stevedoring only operation at Bayport and Barbours Cut terminals in Houston. The terminals are owned and equipped by the port authority and
operated by more than one stevedore.
##
Capacity and throughput figures are for Apr-Dec.
An associate company of MSC reportedly has a 40% stake in TPS, Valparaiso.
MSC reportedly also has stakes in Tanger Med and several Italian terminals but these are understood to not be held by MSC or associated companies.
Figure 4.1.6 Location of TIL owned/managed terminal operations
Bremerhaven
Rotterdam
Antwerp
St Petersburg
Ambarli
Klaipeda
Montreal Le Havre Genoa Asyaport
Seattle
Marseilles-Fos Trieste
New York
New Orleans Sines Iskenderun
Freeport Valencia Gioia Tauro
Long Beach Umm Qasr
Freeport Las Palmas Ningbo
Ashdod
Houston (1)
Port Everglades King Abdullah Abu Dhabi Mundra
Lome
Rodman
Singapore
San Pedro San Pedro
Callao
Rio de Janeiro
Santos
Navegantes
Buenos Aires
Note:
(1) Stevedoring only operation. Non-operational Throughput under 1m teu per annum Throughput of 1m plus teu per annum
119
Terminal Investment Limited

Geneva, Switzerland
Equity teu league
table ranking 7th
2017 16.8%  24.5% 
2018 8.4%  10.1% 
Equity teu
26.5m teu
0 1 2 3
1.29m teu
47.7m teu
Market focus/risk profile More or less equal traffic split between developed and emerging market locations
Traffic type focus Just under 60% gateway traffic across the portfolio. Significant transhipment activity in several key
terminals
Degree of internationalism Quite high, although strong focus on Europe and North America
Core strategy Strategic relationship with MSC. Consolidation of MSC terminal shareholdings under TIL
onwnership. Selected greenfield investments and acquisitions. JVs with other GTOs/ITOs
Note: Figures exclude terminals owned by MSC or its affiliates

Central America/ Far East 5.8%
72 72 Caribbean 2.0%
71
69 South America 9.6% Southeast Asia 11.9%

67
North America 12.3% South Asia 3.6%
Middle East 8.9%

Africa 2.2%
62
East Europe 2.0%
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 North Europe 19.1% South Europe 22.5%
Note: Excludes MSC/affiliates Note: Does not include MSC/affiliated companies
120
Eurogate
B remen-based Eurogate is a 50-50 JV between the privately owned

Eurokai group (majority owned by the Eckelmann family) and BLG
Logistics, which is majority owned by the city-state of Bremen (Freie
Hansestadt Bremen). Eurogate has terminals in Hamburg, Bremerhaven
and Wilhelmshaven in Germany which accounted for 55% of the group’s
throughput in 2018, as well as interests in Morocco and Russia.
Eurokai meanwhile owns 66.6% of Contship Italia, which in 2018 had
stakes in six terminals in the Mediterranean. The balance of 33.3% of
Contship Italia is owned by Eurogate.
The key takeaways for Eurogate for 2018 are:
• Total throughput (including all terminals irrespective of size of
shareholding) was 14.1 million teu, down by just over 2%.
• Excluding sub-10% shareholding terminals, the total was 13.7 million
Equity-adjusted
teu, down just over 1%.
throughput for
• Equity-adjusted throughput was 6.8 million teu, unchanged from 2017. the group was
• Volumes at the group’s German terminals were flat in 2018, unchanged, but
with Hamburg and Bremerhaven down slightly but the smaller within this there were
Wilhelmshaven up 18%. Carrier alliance formation and resultant numerous ups and
service call changes had a significant impact. downs at the terminal
level
• Activity levels at the Italian terminals were down by 6%. The transhipment
hubs of Cagliari and Gioia Tauro suffered. The former lost key client
Hapag-Lloyd and its future viability is now in doubt. The latter experienced
a dispute with key customer and joint shareholder MSC which led in 2019
to MSC acquiring the Eurogate/Contship Italia shareholding.
• The Italian gateway terminals fared better – La Spezia was up nearly
1% and Salerno nearly 6%.
• Eurogate’s Lisbon terminal saw a near 30% decline in throughput in
2018, impacted by strike action.
• New addition to the portfolio, Limassol was up 14%, nearing 400,000
teu for the year.
• Meanwhile traffic at the Tanger Med transhipment hub was flat at 1.4
million teu in 2018. Eurogate/Contship Italia is reportedly now part of
a JV to develop Terminal 3 at Tanger Med with Marsa Maroc.
Table 4.1.8 Eurogate

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
North Europe
Eurogate Container
Bremerhaven Terminal Bremerhaven 100% ownership 2,000 1,072 53.6 100.0% 1072
GmbH
North Sea Terminal
Bremerhaven Bremerhaven GmbH 50% JV with APMT 3,700 2,893 78.2 50.0% 1446
& Co.
121
Eurogate
Table 4.1.8 Eurogate cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
MSC Gate Bremerhaven
Bremerhaven 50% JV with TIL 2,380 1,503 63.2 50.0% 752
GmbH & Co. KG
Eurogate Container
Hamburg 100% ownership 4,100 1,636 39.9 100.0% 1636
Terminal Hamburg GmbH
Eurogate Container Eurogate holds a 70%
Wilhelmshaven Terminal Wilhelmshaven stake, APMT 30%. 1,350 656 48.6 70.0% 459
GmbH & Co. KG Opened in Sep 2012
South Europe
Medcenter Container 50-50 JV between
Gioia Tauro 2,500 2,288 91.5 16.7% 382
Terminal S.p.A. Contship Italia and TIL *
La Spezia Container 60% owned by Contship
La Spezia 1,400 1,350 96.4 20.0% 270
Terminal S.p.A. Italia S.p.A.
Contship Italia S.p.A.
Terminal Contenitori holds indirectly a 30%
Ravenna 285 98 34.4 6.0% 6
Ravenna S.r.l. stake through La Spezia
Container Terminal S.p.A.
Contship Italia S.p.A.
Salerno Container holds indirectly a 15 %
Salerno 500 332 66.4 3.0% 10
Terminal S.p.A. stake through La Spezia
Container Terminal S.p.A.
CICT - Porto Industriale 92% owned by Contship
Cagliari 1,300 289 22.2 30.7% 89
Cagliari S.p.A. Italia S.p.A.
LISCONT Operadores 16.34% shareholding.
Lisbon 570 137 24.1 16.3% 22
de Contentores S.A. Balance owned by Yilport
Eurogate holds 60%,
Interorient Navigation
Company Ltd 20% and
Limassol Container
Limassol East Med Holdings S.A. 500 394 78.7 60.0% 236
Terminal
20% in 25-year concession
agreement. Operations
taken over from Jan 2017
Eastern Europe
80% GPI / 20% Eurogate,
Ust-Luga Container
Ust-Luga Terminal became 440 69 15.7 20.0% 14
Terminal, Russia
operational in Dec 2011
Africa
Eurogate and Contship
Italia hold a 20% stake
each, CMA CGM has
Tanger Med Eurogate Tanger S.A. 1,600 1,377 86.1 26.7% 367
40% (incl. 20% share
of Comanav) and MSC
affiliate has remaining 20%
Total 24,643 14,093 57.2 6,761
New developments
Local operator Marsa Maroc has signed a JV deal with
Eurogate and Contship Italia whereby they will jointly own
Tanger Med Tanger Med Terminal 3
and develop Terminal 3. The facility will have a capacity of 1.5
million teu at full build out
Notes:
* Contship Italia exited in early 2019.
Eurogate throughput for Eurogate Tanger S.A. Terminal differs from CMA CGM throughput (1,416,000 teu) for the same terminal.
122
Eurogate
Bremen, Germany
Equity teu league
table ranking 13th
2017 -1.6%  -9.2% 
2018 -1.1%  0.1% 
0 1 2 3
Equity teu
1.01m teu
6.8m teu
13.7m teu
Market focus/risk profile Highly focused on mature market locations (over 90% of portfolio activity)
Traffic type focus Around 65:35 gateway:transhipment split to volumes, including several pure hubs. Significant
gateway traffic in Germany and Italy
Degree of internationalism Limited - focused on Europe almost exclusively
Core strategy Optimisation of activities in existing locations, with appetite for occasional geographical expansion

23 Eastern Europe 0.2% Africa 5.4%
South Europe 15.0%
21 21
21
19
19
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 North Europe 79.3%
123
Evergreen
T aiwanese company, Evergreen has a portfolio of interests in 12

container terminals around the world, with the majority of activity
focused in the Far East and USWC. The company declines to provide
its data for this report so it has been drawn together from indirect
sources and estimates. Around 44% of the portfolio’s total throughput
is generated by Evergreen’s interests in three terminals in its home base
of Taiwan, rising to 54% by the equity teu measure. The estimated traffic
level for these terminals was virtually unchanged in 2018 versus 2017, at
around 5.4 million teu.
The key takeaways in terms of throughput performance for Evergreen in
2018 are:
• Total throughput, taking into account all terminals in which stakes (of
any size) were held, reached an estimated 12.5 million teu, up from an
estimated 12.1 million teu in 2017.
• Equity teu is estimated at 8.5 million teu for 2018, up slightly on the Over half of
2017 level of 8.4 million teu. Evergreen’s equity
• Colombo saw the largest volume growth in 2018 (over 250,000 teu) teu is from its three
but Evergreen only has a 10% stake in this terminal, so the effect on Taiwanese terminals
equity teu was limited.
• Traffic at Colon also grew strongly (16.5%), the only other terminal to
see double-digit percentage growth in 2018, and here Evergreen has a
controlling 85% stake.
• Volumes at Busan were down by an estimated 13%, but Evergreen’s
shareholding here is only 30%.
Evergreen has one new development in the pipeline. In late 2018,
the company signed an agreement with Taiwan International Port
Corporation (TIPC) to lease five berths at the 7th container terminal in
Kaohsiung port. The first phase of the project will be completed in 2022.
Table 4.1.9 Evergreen

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
Dongbu Pusan
Container
Busan Leased terminal 1,600 1,000 62.5 30.0% 300
Terminal
(SinGamman)
Kaohsiung Terminals 4 & 5 Leased terminal 3,500 3,260 93.1 100.0% 3,260
Taichung Berths 32 & 33 Leased terminal 700 494 70.6 100.0% 494
Taipei Port 50% shareholding with
Taipei Container Wan Hai (40%) and Yang 2,400 1,660 69.2 50.0% 830
Terminal Ming (10%)
124
Evergreen
Table 4.1.9 Evergreen cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East cont’d
Yumeshima
Osaka Terminal - Berth Leased terminal 300 165 55.0 100.0% 165
C-11
Aomi Terminal –
Tokyo Leased terminal 600 238 39.7 100.0% 238
berth 4
Southeast Asia
Evergreen
Laem Chabang Container Leased terminal 700 832 118.8 51.0% 424
Terminal
South Asia
South Asia
Colombo 10% shareholding 1,850 2,067 111.7 10.0% 207
Gateway Terminal
North America
Container
Los Angeles Terminal (Berths Leased terminal 1,600 850 53.1 100.0% 850
226-236)
Ben E Nutter
Oakland Leased terminal 600 353 58.8 100.0% 353
Terminal
Pierce County
Tacoma Leased terminal 1,340 722 53.9 100.0% 722
Terminal
Colon Container
Colon 85% shareholding 2,000 816 40.8 85.0% 694
Terminal
Total 19,208 12,457 64.9 8,537
New developments
In late 2018, Evergreen signed an agreement with Taiwan
International
International Port Corporation (TIPC) to lease five berths at the 7th
Kaohsiung Container
container terminal in Kaohsiung port. The first phase of the project
Terminal (CT7)
will be completed in 2022
125
Evergreen
Luzhu, Taiwan
Equity teu league
table ranking 9th
2017 9.6%  9.8% 
2018 0.9%  2.1% 
0 1 2 3
1.04m teu
Equity teu
8.5m teu
10.4m teu
Market focus/risk profile Mainly emerging market locations (around 75% of equity teu).
Traffic type focus Around 70% gateway but with several key transhipment hubs
Degree of internationalism Below average - focused mainly on Asia and North America. Around half of equity teu generated in
home base country
Core strategy Maintaining holding position with existing portfolio. Expansion of capacity at certain existing
locations

Central America/
18 18
Caribbean 8.1%
17 17 17 17 North America 22.5%
South Asia 2.4% Far East 61.9%
2108 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Southeast Asia 5.0%
126
SSA Marine
S eattle-based terminal operator SSA Marine has stakes in 18 container

terminals, half of which are in the US with most of the remainder in
Central and South America, and the company also has two terminals
in Vietnam. It also has stevedoring activities at numerous ports in the
US, the Caribbean, South Africa and New Zealand. Container handling
under the stevedoring heading totalled 3.8 million teu in 2018.
SSA’s parent company (Carrix) is majority owned by the founding
Smith/Hemingway family, with Mexican businessman Fernando Chico Blackstone
a minority shareholder. He became a part owner of Carrix in 2014 after Infrastructure Partners
Goldman Sachs sold its interest back to the Smith/Hemingway family. buys into parent
In May 2019, it was reported that funds affiliated with Blackstone company Carrix
Infrastructure Partners (BIP) will make “a growth-oriented investment”
in the company.
The key takeaways in terms of throughput performance for SSA in
2018 are:
• Total throughput from terminal operations (excluding stevedoring)
was 12.6 million teu, up from 11.3 million teu in 2017 (an 11%
increase), while equity teu rose to 8.1 million teu compared with 7.2
million teu in 2017 (up 13%). Double-digit growth
• The nine terminals in the US collectively registered volume growth in throughput in 2018
of 13%, with the strongest increase seen at the three terminals in driven by US and
Seattle-Tacoma (28%), aided in particular by the full-year effect of the Panama
Tacoma terminal where operations were assumed in late 2017.
• SSA’s three terminals in Long Beach accounted for around half of its
US volume in 2018.
• Strong contribution to overall volume growth was also made by Colon
(Panama) where the 350,000 teu uplift in traffic (18%) pushed the
transhipment terminal to a total of 2.2 million teu for the year.
• The Manzanillo (Mexico) terminal also had a good year, registering
over 7% growth while in Tuxpan, volumes remain at the early stages
of development.
• Volumes at SSA’s two Vietnamese terminals remain modest, but Cai Lan
in the north of the country did see growth of over 80% while Cai Mep
in the south saw its first traffic since opening a number of years ago.
SSA has one new development in the pipeline. A 25-year lease and
expansion project has been signed for the development of Jacksonville
International Gateway (JIG) terminal to commence in July 2019. The Expansion project at
contract calls for the Jacksonville Port Authority (Jaxport) and SSA to make Jacksonville based on
a combined $238 million investment in the facility and makes SSA the new 25-year lease
operator of the existing Blount Island container terminal in the port.
The company has also been linked in the press with greenfield port
developments in Anaklia (Georgia) on the Black Sea and Melford
Atlantic Gateway, a proposed deep-water container terminal to
be constructed on Nova Scotia, Canada. SSA does not formally
acknowledge a connection to these projects though.
127
SSA Marine
Table 4.1.10 SSA Marine/Carrix

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Terminal operations
North America
JV with Matson at leased

Long Beach Pier A 1,600 872 54.5 65.0% 567
terminal

Long Beach Berth C60 682 360 52.8 65.0% 234
terminal
Pacific Container JV with Cosco and CMA

Long Beach 2,400 2,039 85.0 44.0% 897
Terminal, Pier J CGM at leased terminal
Oakland
International
JV with Matson and NYK
Oakland Container 1,955 1,593 81.5 52.0% 828
at leased terminal
Terminal (Berths
55-59)

Oakland Berths 60-63 572 161 28.1 65.0% 104
terminal

Seattle Terminal 18 1,275 1,126 88.3 65.0% 732
terminal
JV with Cosco and

Seattle Terminal 25/30 470 164 35.0 43.3% 71
Matson at leased terminal
West Sitcum JV with Matson at leased

Tacoma 690 208 30.2 65.0% 135
Terminal terminal
Jacksonville JV with Cooper/T. Smith

Jacksonville International Stevedoring Co. at leased 250 166 66.3 80.0% 133
Gateway terminal 1
Manzanillo, SSA Mexico

Concession for terminal 2,100 1,627 77.5 100.0% 1,627
Mexico Manzanillo
Tuxpan Port Owned land and

Tuxpan, Mexico 710 13 1.9 92.7% 12
Terminal concession for waterfront
Manzanillo
Colón, Panama International Concession for terminal 3,500 2,238 63.9 85.0% 1,902
Terminal
South America
San Antonio JV with Sudamericana

San Antonio,
Terminal Agencias Aéreas y 1,400 1,173 83.8 42.5% 499
Chile
Internacional Marítimas S.A. (SAAM)
San Vicente JV with Sudamericana

San Vicente,
Terminal Agencias Aéreas y 1,200 456 38.0 42.5% 194
Chile
Internacional Marítimas S.A. (SAAM)
128
SSA Marine
Table 4.1.10 SSA Marine/Carrix cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Terminal operations cont’d
South America cont’d
Santa Marta JV with Sociedad

Santa Marta, International Portuaria Regional
300 195 65.0 41.7% 81
Colombia Terminal de Santa Marta, S.A.
Company (SPRSM)
Barranquilla JV with Sociedad

Barranquilla,
Container Portuaria del Norte, S.A. 7 2 32.2 23.7% 1
Colombia
Terminal (SPN) 2
Southeast Asia
Cai Lan
JV with Cai Lan Port
Cai Lan, International
Investment Joint Stock 520 110 21.1 49.0% 54
Vietnam Container
Co.
Terminal
SP-SSA
Thi Vai-Cai Mep, JV with Saigon Port and
International 600 51 8.5 50.0% 26
Vietnam Vinalines
Terminal
Terminal operations total 22,249 12,555 56.4% 8,097
Stevedoring operations
Charleston
Container Private stevedoring on
Charleston
Terminal (Wando common-user berths
Welch)
Columbus St. Private stevedoring on

Charleston 1,561 80.0% 1,249
Term common-user berths
North Charleston Private stevedoring on

Charleston
Term common-user berths
Terminal owned by Port

Garden City
Savannah Authority but operated by 367 80.0% 294
Terminal
private players
Other US ports 4 Mainly stevedoring 320 ~90% 287
Terminal operator for

San Juan, Puerto Rico Puerto Rico Terminals,
533 100.0% 533
Puerto Rico Terminals which consists of TOTE
and Intership
South Africa Private stevedoring on

South Africa 1,562 74.4% 1,162
Cargo Services common-user berths
129
SSA Marine
Table 4.1.10 SSA Marine/Carrix cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Stevedoring operations cont’d
SSA New Private stevedoring on
New Zealand 332 100.0% 332
Zealand common-user berths
Stevedoring operations total 4,675 3,857
Notes:
1 SSA Atlantic, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Carrix, recently announced signing a long-term lease and expansion project for the Jacksonville
International Gateway (JIG) to commence on 31 Jul 2019.
2 Exited Barranquilla, Colombia, operations in Feb 2018.

3
SSA Marine / Carrix acts as a stevedore only in some locations (i.e. it is not the exclusive leaseholder of a terminal). In these instances, the
shareholding figure shown relates to SSA Marine’s shareholding in the stevedoring company. No capacity figures are shown as SSA Marine does not
provide operations for all throughput and activity at these terminals.
4
Wilmington, Mobile, Tacoma, Anchorage, Panama City, Delaware River
SSA Marine capacity for San Antonio Terminal Internacional differs from the SAAM Puertos capacity (1,750,000 teu) for the same terminal.
SSA Marine capacity for San Vicente Terminal Internacional (SVTI) differs from the SAAM Puertos capacity (1,300,000 teu) for the same terminal.
Figure 4.1.7 Location of SSA owned/managed terminal operations
Seattle Tacoma
Seattle Oakland
Oakland
Long Beach
Long Beach Jacksonville
Tuxpan
Santa Marta Cai Lan
Manzanillo
Colon Barranquilla (1) Thi Vai
Notes:
SSA also performs stevedoring San Antonio
operations at Charleston,
San Vicente
Savannah and a number of other
US ports, plus Puerto Rico, South
Africa and New Zealand.
(1) Exited Barranquilla, Colombia
operations in February 2018. Non-operational Throughput under 1m teu per annum Throughput of 1m plus teu per annum
130
SSA Marine
Seattle, USA
Equity teu league
table ranking 10th
2017 6.6%  10.2% 
2018 11.4%  13.2% 
0 1 2 3
Equity teu
0.70m teu
8.1m teu
12.6m teu
Market focus/risk profile Around 50-50 split between mature and emerging markets
Traffic type focus Around 65% of activity is gateway traffic. Limited exposure to transhipment apart from Panama
Degree of internationalism Below average - mainly focused on the Americas, although stevedoring activities widen the
geographical scope
Core strategy Maintaining, expanding and optimising existing facilities.
Note: Figures exclude stevedoring

20 20 20 20 20 20 Southeast Asia 1.0%
South America 9.6%
North America 45.7%

Central America/
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Caribbean 43.7%
Note: Excludes stevedoring Source: Drewry Maritime Research

131
CMA CGM
C MA CGM’s terminal activities are split into three entities, Terminal

Link (TL), CMA Terminals (CMAT), both owned by holding
company CMATH, and the APL terminal portfolio. China Merchants
Ports owns 49% of TL which has stakes in 12 terminals around the world
(Europe, North America, Africa and Asia), plus a stevedoring activity
in Houston. CMAT has interests in 15 terminals in various locations
globally. The APL terminal portfolio, which was acquired by CMA CGM
when it bought the APL shipping line and brand in June 2016 has stakes
in eight terminals in North America, Asia and Europe.
CMA CGM’s terminal
CMA CGM has an MoU with Cosco Shipping Ports which aims to activities are split into
facilitate cooperation and joint development of terminal interests. Cosco three entities: Terminal
Shipping and CMA CGM are partners in Ocean Alliance, the liner Link, CMA Terminals
shipping alliance. and the APL portfolio
The key takeaways in terms of total throughput performance for SSA in

2018 are:
• The combined throughput of all terminals in which CMA CGM
had a direct or indirect stake (of any size) was 31.9 million teu. This
compares with the 2017 total of 28.9 million teu (an increase of 10%).
Unadjusted total teu
• This does however include several terminals with shareholdings of growth was 10%,
10% or less, and a stevedoring operation at Houston. Stripping these while adjusted was
out, the total becomes 25.6 million teu, 3.5% up on 2017. 3.5%
• In absolute terms, key contributors to the near 10% growth of TL
volumes were new addition Thessaloniki (over 400,000 teu in 2018)
and Busan (over 300,000 teu).
• For CMAT’s 15% growth, substantial extra volume was delivered by
Singapore (over 600,000 teu) and Mundra (almost 300,000 teu).
• Long Beach and Rotterdam also generated increases of around
200,000 teu each. Kingston also had a good year with 10% growth. The
addition of the new Kribi terminal to the portfolio also contributed to
increased volumes for CMAT.
• Overall volume growth by the APL terminals was a more modest
5% in 2018. While Rotterdam, Laem Chabang, Yokohama and
Qingdao provided double-digit growth, declines were experienced at
Kaohsiung and Los Angeles.
Looking at CMA CGM’s equity teu throughput:
• The combined equity teu of CMAT, TL and APL (excluding
stevedoring) was 13 million teu in 2018, down 5% on the 2017 figure Equity teu was down
of 13.7 million teu. The reason for this decline was almost entirely the 5% due to Los
fact that CMA CGM divested 90% of its stake in the large Los Angeles Angeles divestment
terminal (not helped by the terminal also experiencing a 6% decline in
volumes over 2017).
• Note that the overall equity teu figure used in the league table in this
report has to reflect the fact that China Merchants Ports owns 49%
of TL and Yildirim owns 24% of CMA CGM, so these companies are
credited with the relevant proportions of equity teu. This reduces the
CMA CGM equity teu by around 40%.
132
CMA CGM
CMA CGM has a number of new developments in the pipeline: Greenfields and
• Greenfield projects at Lekki (Nigeria) and Antioquia (Colombia), acquisitions will boost
both new port developments where CMA CGM (CMAT) is a JV CMAT in future
partner. There is also a long-standing but much delayed project
concept at Cai Mep, Vietnam.
• Acquisitions at Zeebrugge, where a small stake has been taken in the
Cosco-owned terminal and minority stakes in terminals in Finland
and St. Petersburg through CMA CGM taking ownership of short-sea
liner operator Containerships.
Table 4.1.11 CMA CGM (CMAT+TL)

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Terminal Link
Far East
Busan New
Terminal Link holds 12%
Busan Container 2,400 2,335 97.3 12.0% 280
stake in BNCT
Terminal (BNCT)
South Europe
Terminal Link’s stake
through Portsynergy,
Marseilles-Fos Eurofos a 50-50 JV between 1,000 755 75.5 50.0% 378
Terminal Link and DP
World
50% shareholding by
Malta Freeport
Marsaxlokk Terminal Link, balance 3,500 3,316 94.7 50.0% 1,658
Terminals
held by Yildirim Group
In Apr 2017, a
consortium comprising
Terminal Link and two
financial investors
(Deutsche Invest Equity
Partners and Belterra
Investments) won the
Thessaloniki Pier 6 417 425 102.0 22.0% 94
bidding for a 67% stake
in Thessaloniki port,
Greece. The consortium
has a 35-year concession
for the multi-purpose
port and took over the
business in Mar 2018 *
North Europe
Terminal du 50-50 JV between
Nantes Saint-
Grand Ouest Terminal Link and Bollore 500 192 38.4 50.0% 96
Nazaire
(TGO) Ports France
Terminal des 91% Terminal Link and
Dunkirk 500 413 82.6 91.0% 376
Flandres 9% Port of Dunkirk
133
CMA CGM
Table 4.1.11 CMA CGM (CMAT+TL) cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Terminal Link cont’d
Terminal de France,
Terminal Link holds
50% of GMP through 1,600
Portsynergy. Located in
Generale de the Port 2000 area
Le Havre Manutention Terminal Nord, Terminal 1,485 70.7 50% 743
Portuaire (GMP) Link holds 50% of GMP
through Portsynergy.
500
Two terminal berths in
operation: Europe and
America
JV partners: DPW (60%),
Antwerp Antwerp Gateway Cosco (20%), Duisport 2,400 2,230 92.9 10.0% 223
(10%)
North America
TLT is a JV stevedore
at Bayport Container
Terminal Link
Houston Terminal between 1,000 501 50.1 51.0% 256
Texas (TLT) #
Terminal Link (51%) and
Ports America (49%)
South Florida Terminal Link holds 51%
Miami Container shareholding and APMT 450 305 67.8 51.0% 156
Terminal 49%
Africa
Casablanca Somaport operate the terminals for 450 332 73.8 100.0% 332
containers and bulk
Eurogate and Contship
Italia hold a 20% stake
each, Terminal Link has
Tanger Med Eurogate Tanger 40% (incl. 20% share 1,600 1,416 88.5 40.0% 566
of Comanav), and MSC
affiliate has remaining
20% stake
Exclusive handling of
ro-ro vessels in port of
Abidjan Terra Abidjan Abidjan. Annual capacity 70 40 56.6 33.0% 13
of 700,000 tonnes for
general cargo
Total 18,405 13,745 74.7 5,169
Notes:
* Capacity and throughput are for Mar-Dec 2018.
#
Stevedoring services only.
China Merchants Ports has held a 49% stake in Terminal Link since Jun 2013.
Terminal Link capacity for BNCT differs from the Macquarie (2,500,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Terminal Link capacity for Eurofos differs from the DP World (740,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Terminal Link capacity for Malta Freeport Terminals differs from the Yildirim (3,800,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Terminal Link capacity for Antwerp Gateway differs from China Cosco Shipping and DP World capacity (2,800,000 teu) for the same terminal.
Terminal Link capacity for South Florida Container Terminal differs from APMT capacity (309,000 teu) for the same terminal.
134
CMA CGM

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
CMA Terminals
North Europe
CMA CGM has 10%
shareholding in terminal
Rotterdam World
with DPW, APL (also
Rotterdam Gateway Terminal 2,350 1,940 82.6 10.0% 194
now owned by CMA
(Maasvlakte II)
CGM), Hyundai and MOL.
Operational in Sep 2015
South Europe
Med Europe
Marseilles-Fos 100% shareholding 220 117 53.2 100.0% 117
Terminal
JV of OPDR (CMA CGM)
and Boluda in 30-year
agreement from Jan 2017
Terminal Marítima
Seville to operate terminal with 300 139 46.3 50.0% 70
del Guadalquivir
350 metre quay and two
gantry cranes, a third to
be added
Eastern Europe
local partners in Brooklyn
Odessa BKP 280 261 93.2 50.0% 131
Kyiv Port, operational
since Oct 2008
North America
10% stake acquired
Pacific Maritime in Nov 2012. Other
Long Beach 2,200 1,777 80.8 10.0% 178
Services, Pier J shareholders are SSA
Marine and Cosco
Générale de
Manutention
Pointe à Pitre 100% shareholding 300 199 66.3 100.0% 199
de Guadeloupe
(GMG)
Générale de
Pointe des Manutention
100% shareholding 200 146 73.0 100.0% 146
Grives de Martinique
(GMM)
Kingston 30-year concession,
Kingston Container 100% ownership by 2,100 1,624 77.3 100.0% 1,624
Terminal CMAT Holding*
South America
Degrad des
Somarig 100% shareholding 70 67 95.7 100.0% 67
Cannes
Africa
Pointes des
70% CMAT and 30%
Galets (La SAMR 230 193 83.9 70.0% 135
Bolloré
Réunion)
135
CMA CGM

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
CMA Terminals cont’d
Africa cont’d
CMA Terminals (29.4%)
with Bolloré (30.6%)
and CHEC (20%) in
consortium to develop
and operate Kribi
Terminal, Cameroon. The
existing infrastructure
Kribi Container will be equipped and
Kribi 350 136 38.9 29.4% 40
Terminal terminal will be expanded
in two phases (4 years +
21 years). Capacity will
increase from 300,000
teu to 1,000,000 teu.
Commercial operations
started early 2018 with
350,000 teu capacity
Southeast Asia
Pasir Panjang
Singapore 49-51 JV with PSA 4,300 4,388 102.0 49.0% 2,150
(PSA/CMA CGM)
South Asia
In Jul 2014, CMA
Terminals formed an
Mundra fourth
50-50 JV with APSEZ
Mundra container 1,200 661 55.1 50.0% 331
for developing the fourth
terminal
container terminal at
Mundra Port
Middle East
Lattakia
51% CMA CGM and
Lattakia International 700 333 47.6 51.0% 170
49% Souria Holding
Container Terminal
100% shareholding.
Umm Qasr Berth No.4 ** Operations started mid 250 181 72.4 100.0% 181
2010
Total 17,068 12,162 71.3 5,731
New developments
In Apr 2018, CMA CGM signed an MoU to be the operator of the
container terminal at Lekki port. The terminal will have two berths
Lekki Container
Lekki when operational end-2020. Ultimately it will have 1,200 metres of
Terminal
quay, 13 cranes and a capacity of 2.5 million teu. With 16 metre
water it will be able to handle ships up to 14,000 teu
25% shareholding with a Vietnamese local company Gemadept.
Gemalink
The container terminal will provide 1,060 metre quay length
International
Cai Mep including a barge berth of 260 metres, depth of 15.5 metres for an 25.0%
Container
annual throughput capacity of 1.2 million teu. Earlier the plan was
Terminal
to commence operations from 2013 but this has been delayed
In early 2018, an agreement was reached between Cosco Shipping
Cosco Terminals Ports and CMA CGM for the latter to acquire a 10% stake. CMA
Zeebrugge 10.0%
Zeebrugge CGM is in the process of consolidating this asset into its results,
and so did not report 2018 volume
136
CMA CGM

CMA Terminals cont’d
In Jun 2018, it was announced that CMA CGM would be acquiring
Container Finance Ltd Oy, owner of shortsea line Containerships.
Multi-Link The deal will include minority interests in three terminals: MLT-
Various 25.0%
Terminals Helsinki (0.27 mteu), MLT-Kotka (0.15 mteu) and Moby Dik (0.40
mteu). CMA CGM is in the process of consolidating these assets
into its results, and so did not report 2018 volume
30-year concession with Colombian government for a new port
at Antioquia, near Turbo. Puerto Inversiones y Obras S.A.S. in
Antioquia Puerto Antioquia 24.0%
partnership with CMA CGM. The $300 million multi-purpose terminal
will be able to receive container ships of up to 366 metres loa
Notes:
* CMAT Holding (CMATH) owns 51% of Terminal Link and 100% of CMA Terminals (CMAT).
** From Jul 2017, the terminal also included Berth No. 5.
Caribbean island terminals are held under CMA CGM Antilles-Guyane business unit.
CMA Terminals also owns 100% of the Marseille Manutention terminal, which handles rolling units.
CMA Terminals capacity for Rotterdam World Gateway Terminal (Maasvlakte II) differs from MOL capacity (2,100,000 teu) for the same terminal.
CMA Terminals capacity for Pacific Maritime Services, Pier J, Long Beach, differs from Cosco and SSA capacity (2,400,000 teu) for the same
terminal.
CMA Terminals throughput for Pacific Maritime Services, Pier J, Long Beach, differs from Cosco (2,056,000 teu) and SSA throughput (2,039,000
teu) for the same terminal.
CMA Terminals capacity for SAMR terminal differs from Bollore capacity (300,000 teu) for the same terminal.
Figure 4.1.8 Location of CMA CGM owned/managed terminal operations

Rotterdam
Zeebrugge
Antwerp
Dunkirk
Kotka
Le Havre
St Petersberg
Helsinki
Dutch Harbour
Nantes Saint-Nazaire Marseilles-Fos
Odessa
Seville
Thessaloniki
Los Angeles Houston Tanger Med Qingdao
Lattakia Yokohama
Casablanca
Miami Marsaxlokk Busan
Long Beach
Umm Qasr Kaohsiung
Pointe a Pitre Laem Chabang
Kingston Mundra
Lekki
Pointe des Grives Ho Chi Minh City
Antioquia Degrad des Cannes Kribi Cai Mep
Abidjan
Singapore
Pointes des Galets
Terminal Link
CMA Terminals
APL
Note:
China Merchants Ports has held a 49% stake in
Terminal Link since June 2013. Non-operational Acquired in 2018 Throughput under 1m teu per annum Throughput of 1m plus teu per annum
137
CMA CGM
Table 4.1.12 CMA CGM (APL)

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
Terminal 3,
Kaohsiung Leased terminal 1,230 587 47.7 100.0% 587
B68/69
Honmuku
Yokohama Leased terminal 543 405 74.6 100.0% 405
Terminal D4
Qingdao
Qianwan
United Advance
Qingdao 24% shareholding 1,300 1,189 91.5 24.0% 285
Container
Terminal
(QQCTUA)
Southeast Asia
Laem Chabang 14.5% shareholding with
International DPW (34.5% stake in
Laem Chabang 1,800 1,436 79.8 14.5% 208
Terminal Co Ltd the terminal operating
(LCIT) company)
Vietnam
Ho Chi Minh International 47.25% shareholding
680 580 85.3 47.3% 274
City Container with Mitsui (16%)
Terminal (VICT)
North America
Leased terminal operated
Global Gateway
Los Angeles * by APL subsidiary Eagle 2,400 1,803 75.1 10.0% 180
South (GGS)
Marine Services
Terminal operating
Dutch Harbour APL Terminal 30 20 66.7 100.0% 20
company
North Europe
APL (CMA CGM) has
Rotterdam 20% shareholding in
World Gateway terminal with DPW, MOL
Rotterdam Terminal, and CMA CGM (also 2,350 1,940 82.6 20.0% 388
Maasvlakte 2 owner of 10% share
(RWG) directly). Operational in
Sep 2015
Total 10,333 7,960 77.0 2,348
Notes:
* In Jul 2017, CMA CGM announced the sale of a 90% stake in the Global Gateway South terminal to EQT Infrastructure and its partner P5
Infrastructure. CMA CGM remains a 10% minority shareholder and has a long-term utilisation agreement
CMA CGM (APL) capacity for Rotterdam World Gateway Terminal (Maasvlakte II) differs from MOL capacity (2,100,000 teu) for the same terminal.
CMA CGM (APL) capacity for Qingdao Qianwan United Advance Container Terminal (QQCTUA) differs from DP World and China Merchants
CMA CGM (APL) throughput for Qingdao Qianwan United Advance Container Terminal (QQCTUA) differs from China Merchants throughput
(1,398,000) for the same terminal.
CMA CGM (APL) throughput for Laem Chabang International Terminal Co Ltd (LCIT) differs from DP World throughput (1,623,000) for the same terminal.
138
CMA CGM
Marseilles, France
Equity teu league
table ranking 11th
2017 49.4%  69.4% 
2018 3.5%  -7.5% 
Equity teu
8.0m teu# 0 1 2 3
0.90m teu

TL CMAT APL TL CMAT APL
No. of countries with existing terminals 8 14 7 9 15 7
No. of existing terminals 12 14 8 12 15 8
25.6m teu* No. of new developments (greenfield and acqusitions) 1

#
5 0 0 5 0
Reflects effects of Yildirim and CM Port stakes in CMA CGM/Terminal Link. Includes APL * Includes APL
Market focus/risk profile Generally balanced - 60% of the activity is in emerging market locations
Traffic type focus 50-50 spilt between gateway and transhipment traffic but latter concentrated in several large
transhipment hubs
Degree of internationalism Above average. High geographical spread but with particular focus on Europe and North America
Core strategy Expansion through greenfield developments and acquisitions, in both emerging and mature
markets. Strategic alliance with China Cosco Shipping for terminals
Note: Total teu excludes sub-10% shareholdings. Average teu per terminal includes all throughput. Excludes stevedoring

46 Middle East 2.7% Far East 12.0%
45 45
South Asia 2.5% South Europe 17.8%

43
42
Southeast Asia 20.3%
South America 0.5%
North Europe 15.5%

38
Central America/
North America 4.1%
Caribbean 15.2%
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Eastern Europe 1.0% Africa 8.4%
Note: CMA CGM figure also includes APL capacity; Rotterdam Note: CMA CGM figure includes APL volumes
counted once Source: Drewry Maritime Research
139
NYK Line
J apanese liner company NYK has a portfolio of interests in 14 terminals

around the world, with the entire volume concentrated in Asia and
North America. The company also has extensive stevedoring operations
in North America, handling over 5.0 million teu in 2018.
NYK, K Line and MOL
The three major Japanese container lines (NYK, K Line and MOL)
have merged their
merged their container shipping operations into a new JV company container shipping
in 2018 called ONE (Ocean Network Express). This strategic change operations into ONE
included the international terminals of each line (but excluded their (Ocean Network
Japanese terminal interests). As yet, the disparate terminal portfolios have Express); international
not been brought under a unified management or ownership structure. terminals of the three
are due to follow
Meanwhile in Japan, NYK and Mitsubishi Logistics Corp have signed an
MoU to establish a 51-49 JV that will comprise four terminal operating
companies. They operate in Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka and are also
involved in ship’s agency, warehousing and trucking.
The key takeaways in terms of total throughput performance for NYK in
2018 are:
• Total throughput, taking into account all terminals in which stakes
(of any size) were held, increased sharply to 16.2 million teu, up 28%
on 2017.
• The majority of this increase was due to restructuring in Dalian where
three terminals have been merged, and NYK’s stake has moved from Significant throughput
20% in one terminal to 7% in a much larger terminal entity. increases in Dalian
(restructuring and
• Strong growth was also recorded in Tanjung Priok, where the new merger) and Tanjung
terminal is ramping up, and New York where Maher Terminals Priok (new terminal
topped 10% growth for the year. Overall, volumes in NYK’s six North ramping up)
American terminals grew 5% in 2018.
• However, for the purposes of the Drewry league table, where
terminals with stake of 10% or less are excluded (Dalian and
Kaohsiung), the total teu figure is a more modest 10.6 million teu,
down 3.4% on 2017.
• This was partly because volumes in the four Japanese terminals were
flat in 2018 versus 2017, but also because the Dalian shareholding has
dropped below 10%.
Looking at NYK’s equity teu in 2018:
• The figure of 3.7 million teu was down 2% on the previous year. Equity teu slightly
• In general, the terminals in which NYK has a smaller stake showed down as terminals
the best growth and those in which it has majority or 100% stakes where smaller stakes
experienced poorer growth or declines (Kobe, Tokyo and Yokohama, held fared better than
plus Los Angeles and Halifax). those with larger
stakes
Note that NYK has no new developments in the pipeline and that in
March 2019 it was announced that the company had sold its stake in the
New Orleans and Montreal terminals to Macquarie.
140
NYK Line
Table 4.1.13 NYK

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
6.85% shareholding in JV
Dalian Container with Dalian Port (48.15%)
Dalian 6,250 3,876 62.0 6.9% 266
Terminal (DCT) / PSA (26%) / Cosco
(19%)
NYK Kobe
Kobe Container Leased terminal 560 299 53.4 100.0% 299
Terminal
NYK Tokyo
Tokyo Container Leased terminal 700 643 91.9 100.0% 643
Terminal
NYK Yokohama
Yokohama Container Leased terminal 250 118 47.1 100.0% 118
Terminal
Tobishima Pier Shareholder in terminal
South Side operating company with
Nagoya 700 651 93.0 14.5% 94
Container K Line, MOL and other
Terminal local partners
Leased terminal. Co-
Kao Ming shareholders are Yang
Kaohsiung Container Ming, Ports America, 3,300 1,746 52.9 10.0% 175
Terminal Corp Cosco Group and China
Merchants
Southeast Asia
Shareholder in terminal
Laem Chabang TIPS Co Ltd 1,000 816 81.6 24.4% 199
operating company
PT New Priok Joint operating company

Container comprising IPC (51%),
Tanjung Priok 1,500 1,170 78.0 16.3% 191
Terminal One Mitsui, PSA and NYK
(NPCT1) * (collectively 49%)
North America
Napoleon Leased terminal,
New Orleans Container Macquarie holds 24% 476 257 54.0 24.99% 64
Terminal stake **
Leased terminal,
Yusen Terminals
Los Angeles Macquarie holds 49% 1,765 1,376 77.9 51.0% 702
Inc.
stake
Oakland
Shareholder with SSA
International
Oakland Marine (52%) in terminal 2,000 1,582 79.1 20.0% 316
Container
operating company
Terminal
Macquarie holds 12.25%
Maisonneuve/
stake through NYK Ports
Montreal Viau Terminals 900 698 77.6 12.8% 89
(Ceres) and TIL holds
(Termont)
50% **
141
NYK Line
Table 4.1.13 NYK cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Fairview Cove
Halifax Leased terminal 780 241 30.9 100.0% 241
Container Terminal
Stake in leased terminal
acquired in early 2016.
New York Maher Terminals 3,600 2,737 76.0 10.2% 279
Macquarie holds 89.8%
balance
Total 25,799 16,211 62.8 3,676
Notes:
* Capacity, throughput and shareholding for Tanjung Priok NPCT1 are undisclosed by NYK. Figures are Drewry estimates.
** In Mar 2019, it was announced that NYK sold its stake in New Orleans and Montreal to Macquarie.
Excludes stevedoring operations in North America which totalled 5.26 million teu in 2018 (not including Montreal and New Orleans already shown in table).
NYK capacity for Dalian Container Terminal differs from Drewry estimated capacity (10,300,000 teu). There is also a marked discrepancy in NYK’s
throughput figure vs Cosco’s throughput figure for this now unified terminal business, presumably due to differing bases of calculation.
NYK capacity for Kao Ming Container Terminal Corp differs from Cosco, China Merchants and Yang Ming capacity (2,800,000 teu) for the same terminal.
NYK throughput for Yusen Terminals at Los Angeles port differs from Macquarie throughput (1,398,000 teu) for the same terminal.
NYK capacity and throughput for Maisonneuve Terminal at Montreal port differs from Terminal Investment Limited capacity (735,000 teu) and
throughput (676,000 teu) for the same terminal.
NYK capacity for Maisonneuve Terminal at Montreal port differs from Macquarie capacity (820,000 teu) for the same terminal.
NYK capacity for Maher Terminals at New York differs from Macquarie throughput (2,898,000 teu) for the same terminal.
NYK has a minority stake in ECT Rotterdam but shareholding level is confidential.
Figure 4.1.9 Location of ONE owned/managed terminal operations
Tokyo
Kobe Nagoya
Yokohama
Montreal (1) Rotterdam

Osaka
Tacoma
Halifax Antwerp
Oakland New York Dalian

Los Angeles
Jacksonville
Long Beach
New Orleans (1) Kaohsiung
Hai Phong
Laem Chabang
Cai Mep
Singapore
Tanjung Priok
Note: K-Line ONE

Ownership of international (non-Japanese) MOL
terminals is due to be merged under ONE. NYK
(1) In March 2019, it was announced that NYK
sold its stake in New Orleans and Montreal to
Non-operational Throughput under 1m teu per annum Throughput of 1m plus teu per annum
Macquarie.
142
NYK Line
Tokyo, Japan
Equity teu league
table ranking 16th
2017 13.9%  9.3% 
2018 -3.4%  -2.0% 
0 1 2 3
1.16m teu
Equity teu
3.7m teu
10.6m teu
Market focus/risk profile Highly focused on mature markets

Traffic type focus Almost entirely focused on gateway traffic, limited exposure to transhipment
Degree of internationalism Below average - mainly Far East (esp. Japan) and North America
Core strategy Maintenance of existing portfolio. Occasional disposals. International terminal activities to be
merged with those of K Line and MOL as part of ONE
Note: Total teu excludes sub-10% shareholdings. Average teu per terminal includes all throughput. Figures exclude stevedoring

NYK ONE North America 46.0%
36 36 36 36
24
22
Far East 43.4%
2 2 2 2 2
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Southeast Asia 10.6%
143
K Line
K Line has interests in seven terminals in Japan, Benelux and the US.
Most of them are majority or wholly owned, with the exception being
Antwerp International Terminal. This is an unusual facility in any case (it
is a terminal within a terminal) as it forms part of the larger PSA Noordzee
Terminal. The company also has a sub-10% financial stake in the Tobishima
Pier South Side Container Terminal, Nagoya, but does not report volumes.
K Line’s portfolio in 2018 was unchanged from the previous year, and the K Line’s terminal
company has not planned any new development. However, as mentioned portfolio in 2018 was
above, the international (non-Japanese) terminals of the company will be unchanged from the
brought together with those of NYK and MOL, as part of the ONE liner previous year
merger of the three major Japanese lines.
The key takeaways in terms of throughput performance for K Line in
2018 are:
• Total throughput reached 3.3 million teu, down 5% on the previous year. 2018 volumes were
• Equity teu was 2.4 million teu, down 3%. down slightly, with
• Worst performers were Antwerp (2018 volume down 24%), Long Antwerp and Long
Beach (down 13%) and Kobe (down 10%). Beach the main
culprits; Tacoma was
• Countering this, Tacoma registered 23% growth in the year and Yokohama the star
6.5%. Collectively though, volume at the four Japanese terminals was
down 2.6% while that of the two US terminals was down 1.4%.
Table 4.1.14 K Line

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
Rokko Island, RC Leased terminal (jointly
Kobe 310 265 85.5 100.0% 265
4/5 with APMT Japan K.K.)
Osaka Nanko C8 Leased terminal 165 120 72.7 100.0% 120
Tokyo Ohi No.1/2 Leased terminal 710 695 97.9 100.0% 695
Yokohama Daikoku C4 Leased terminal 280 165 58.9 100.0% 165
North Europe
Antwerp International JV with PSA-Antwerp and
Antwerp 500 395 79.0 14.0% 55
Terminal (AIT) * Yang Ming
North America
Leased terminal. Operated
Long Beach ITS Terminal (Pier G) by ITS, K Line 70% and 2,726 970 35.6 70.0% 679
Ports America 30%
Leased terminal. Operated
Husky Terminal
Tacoma by Husky, 100% subsidiary 1,038 650 62.6 70.0% 455
(Terminal 4)
company of ITS
Total 5,729 3,260 56.9 2,434
Notes:
Rokko Island, Kobe - While terminal is jointly leased, the capacity, throughput figures and shareholding shown are only for K Line. Volumes are
handled independently.
* Antwerp International Terminal is physically located within the PSA Noordzee Terminal.
K Line has a sub-9% financial stake in the Tobishima Pier South Side Container Terminal, Nagoya but does not report volumes.
K Line throughput and capacity for ITS Terminal (Pier G) differs from Ports America capacity (1,750,000 teu) and throughput (915,000 teu) for the
same terminal.
K Line throughput and capacity for Husky Terminal differs from Ports America capacity (750,000 teu) and throughput (599,000 teu) for the same terminal.
144
K Line
Kobe, Japan
Equity teu league
table ranking 19th
2017 8.7%  8.1% 
2018 -5.3%  -2.7% 
0 1 2 3
0.47m teu
Equity teu
2.4m teu
3.3m teu
Market focus/risk profile Exclusively mature markets

Traffic type focus Entirely focused on gateway traffic
Degree of internationalism Low - around half of equity teu from home base in Japan
Core strategy Maintenance of existing portfolio. International terminal activities to be merged with those of NYK
and MOL as part of ONE

K Line ONE North America 46.6%
36 36 36 36
Far East 51.1%
5.7 5.8
2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 North Europe 2.3%
145
Mitsui OSK Lines
M OL has interests in 11 terminals in Asia and the US. The company

has four terminals in Japan (three of which are 100% owned) and
three terminals in the US, along with a stake in DP World’s Rotterdam
World Gateway (RWG) terminal. A new addition in 2018 was the
Haiphong International Container Terminal in Lach Huyen, Vietnam,
which started operations in May. The company also has a 9% financial
stake in the Tobishima Pier South Side Container Terminal, Nagoya, but
does not report volumes.
As mentioned previously, the international (non-Japanese) terminals of Total throughput was
the company will be brought together with those of K Line and NYK, up but equity teu was
as part of the ONE liner merger of the three major Japanese lines. MOL down, mainly due to
does not have any new developments in the pipeline. poor performance
by the Japanese
The key takeaways in terms of throughput performance for MOL in terminals
2018 are:
• Total throughput across the portfolio was up 3.4% to 7.3 million teu.
• Equity teu though was down by just over 1% at 3.0 million teu.
• Double-digit growth was achieved in Cai Mep (13%) where volume
neared 1.5 million teu for the year. Rotterdam also posted 11% growth.
• However, the four Japanese terminals had a poor year; collectively
their throughput was down by over 9%. Since these are the terminals
in which MOL has the largest stakes (three of them are 100%), this
impacted equity teu.
• Traffic levels at the three terminals in the US were flat in 2018 versus 2017.
Table 4.1.15 MOL

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
TICT (Tokyo
International
Tokyo Leased terminal 872 627 71.9 100.0% 627
Container
Terminal)
YICT (Yokohama
Internatinal
Yokohama Leased terminal 190 153 80.6 100.0% 153
Container
Terminal)
OICT (Osaka
International
Osaka Leased terminal 221 93 42.3 100.0% 93
Container
Terminal)
KICT (Kobe
International
Kobe Jointly leased terminal 750 563 75.1 50.0% 282
Container
Terminal)
146
Mitsui OSK Lines
Table 4.1.15 MOL cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Southeast Asia
Laem Chabang Tips Co Ltd. the terminal company 1,000 816 81.6 24.4% 199
with NYK (also 24.4%)
JV with Saigon Newport
Company, Hanjin
Tan Cang-Cai
Transportation Co. Ltd
Cai Mep Mep International 1,600 1,461 91.3 21.3% 311
and Wan Hai Lines. The
Terminal
terminal started operation
in Jan 2011
17.5% stake in JV
with Saigon Newport
HaiPhong
Company (51%), Wan
Hai Phong (Lach International
Hai Lines (16.5%) and 640 65 10.2 17.5% 11
Huyen) Container
Itochu Corporation (15%).
Terminal *
The terminal started
operations in May 2018
North America
by MOL subsidiary
TraPac Los
Los Angeles TraPac, Inc. Brookfield 1,620 778 48.0 51.0% 397
Angeles Terminal
Asset Management holds
49% stake
by MOL subsidiary
TraPac Oakland
Oakland TraPac, Inc. Brookfield 558 444 79.6 51.0% 226
Terminal
Asset Management holds
49% stake
TraPac Leased terminal operated
Jacksonville Jacksonville by MOL subsidiary 495 352 71.1 100.0% 352
Terminal TraPac, Inc.
North Europe
Shareholding in new
Rotterdam World development with other
Rotterdam Gateway Terminal partners DPW, HMM and 2,100 1,940 92.4 20.0% 388
(Maasvlakte II) CMA CGM / APL, started
operations in Sep 2015
Total 12,064 7,293 60.4 3,040
Notes:
* Capacity for Lach Huyen is for May-Dec 2018, full-year capacity is 1.1 million teu. Throughput for 2018 reflects the fact that terminal was in ramp
up phase.
MOL has a 9% financial stake in the Tobishima Pier South Side Container Terminal, Nagoya, but does not report volumes.
MOL capacity for Rotterdam World Gateway Terminal differs from DP World and Hyundai (2,350,000 teu) and CMA CGM capacity (2,300,000 teu)
for the same terminal.
147
MOL
Toranomon, Japan
Equity teu league
table ranking 18th
2017 20.4%  8.8% 
2018 3.4%  -1.4% 
0 1 2 3
0.66m teu
Equity teu
3.0m teu
7.3m teu
Market focus/risk profile Highly focused on mature markets, although new development in Vietnam
Traffic type focus Entirely focused on gateway
Degree of internationalism Below average - Asia and North America the main focus
Core strategy Maintenance and development of existing portfolio. International terminal activities to be merged
with those of NYK and K Line as part of ONE

MOL ONE North Europe 12.8%
36 36 36 36
Far East 38.0%
10 11
2 2 2 2 2
North America 32.1% Southeast Asia 17.2%

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
148
Yang Ming
T aiwanese shipping line Yang Ming has interests in five terminals in

the Far East, US and North Europe, although the latter is a virtual
terminal arrangement within a PSA terminal in Antwerp. Two of the
facilities are in the home territory of Kaohsiung port and a third is in
Taipei, meaning that all the Far Eastern facilities are in Taiwan. Together,
they accounted for 72% of the company’s equity teu in 2018. The US
terminal is located in Los Angeles.
The company has no new terminal projects in the pipeline and has not Yang Ming’s
divested any terminal interests despite financial pressures on the parent throughput was down
company. The small Tacoma terminal was liquidated in October 2017 though. in 2018, with the
The highlights in terms of throughput performance for Yang Ming in Taiwanese terminals
registering growth but
2018 are:
overseas terminals
• Total volume was 6.0 million teu, down nearly 4% on 2017, while declining
equity-adjusted traffic levels were 2.4 million teu, down nearly 6%.
• Throughput in the company’s three Taiwanese terminals was up 2%
at 4.1 million teu, but that in Los Angeles, Yang Min’s largest overseas
terminal was down 2%.
• Traffic was also down at Antwerp (by a sharp 24%) and Tacoma was
removed from the portfolio.
Table 4.1.16 Yang Ming

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
Kaohsiung Berth 70 Long-term lease 750 672 89.6 100.0% 672
Kao Ming
Container
Kaohsiung (20%), Ports America 2,800 1,746 62.4 50.0% 873
Terminal
(10%), China Merchants
(Terminal 6)
(10%) and NYK (10%)
Taipei Port 10% shareholding with
Taipei Container Evergreen (50%) and Wan 2,400 1,660 69.2 10.0% 166
Terminal Hai (40%)
North Europe
Antwerp
JV with PSA-Antwerp and
Antwerp International 500 395 79.0 14.0% 55
K Line
Terminal (AIT)
North America
JV with China Cosco
West Basin
Group (China Shipping)
Los Angeles Container 1,900 1,555 81.8 40.0% 622
(40%) and Ports America
Terminal
(20%)
Total 8,350 6,028 72.2 2,388
Notes:
Antwerp International Terminal is physically located within the PSA Noordzee Terminal.
Yang Ming capacity for Kao Ming Container Terminal Corp differs from NYK and Ports America capacity (3,300,000 teu) for the same terminal.
Yang Ming throughput and capacity for West Basin Container Terminal differs from the Ports America throughput (1,591,000 teu) and capacity
149
Yang Ming
Keelung, Taiwan
Equity teu league
table ranking 20th
2017 4.1%  -0.3% 
2018 -5.5%  -5.8% 
0 1 2 3
1.21m teu
Equity teu
2.4m teu
4.4m teu
Market focus/risk profile Around three quarters of the portfolio activity is in emerging markets
Traffic type focus Primarily gateway traffic (70%), although Kaohsiung is a significant hub
Degree of internationalism Moderate to low - mainly Far East and North America. Over 70% of equity teu generated in home
base country
Core strategy Maintenance of existing portfolio

North America 26.0%
8 8 8 8 8 8
Far East 71.6%
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 North Europe 2.3%
150
ICTSI
P hilippine-based ICTSI continues to be an active international

operator with a wide-ranging geographical spread and interests in 25
existing terminals worldwide, along with two new developments.
The key takeaways in terms of throughput performance for ICTSI in
2018 are:
• Total teu up 6.4% to 9.7 million teu and equity teu up 7% reaching 8.9 Melbourne
million teu. The fact that ICTSI has majority stakes in all but one of terminal makes big
its terminals, and in a number of cases 100% holdings, means that the contribution to 2018
total teu and equity teu are at similar levels for this operator. portfolio throughput
• The company reported that excluding new terminals, consolidated growth of ~7%
volume would have increased by 3% in 2018.
• In terms of absolute growth in 2018, star performers were Melbourne
(adding 188,000 teu as the terminal continues to ramp up), Manila
and Manzanillo.
• Double-digit percentage growth was achieved by Subic (57%), Matadi
(21%), Batumi (18%) and Gdynia (13.5%).
• The two new terminals in Papua New Guinea added to the portfolio
in 2018 and contributed over 160,000 teu in the half-year period
from June.
• The worst performer was Karachi, which suffered an 18% decline in
traffic levels, most likely due to greater competition from Hutchison
which now has two terminals in the port.
• Throughput in Tanjung Priok also declined, by over 14%.
• In Argentina, the Tecplata terminal which has been idle since opening
in 2015, recorded no volume for 2018 but in 2019 secured its first
regular liner customer.
ICTSI has two new developments which will add to the portfolio:
• In the company’s home port of Manila, in late 2017, it acquired a New developments
35% stake in Manila North Harbour Port, Inc. The terminal has home and away –
capacity for 2.2 million teu, 2.0 million tonnes of break-bulk cargoes Manila acquisition
and 2.5 million passengers per year. ICTSI reportedly increased the and Port Sudan
stake to 50%. concession
• In Port Sudan, ICTSI has won a bid for a 20-year concession to
operate, manage and develop the South Port Container Terminal
(SPCT) which has a capacity of 1.0 million teu per annum. The facility
has 1,200 metre of quay with a depth of up to 16 metre and eight ship-
to-shore gantries.
• ICTSI’s capital expenditure budget of $380 million for 2019 includes
provision for ongoing expansion projects in Manila, Mexico and Iraq.
• In addition, in June 2019 it was announced that ICTSI had been
declared the preferred bidder for the concession for the multipurpose
terminal at the port of Kribi, Cameroon. Exclusive concession
contract negotiations ahead of final contract signature are said to be
under way.
151
ICTSI
Table 4.1.17 ICTSI

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
Yantai
International Majority stake acquired in
Yantai 1,300 558 42.9 51.0% 285
Container YICT in Jul 2014
Terminals Ltd.
Southeast Asia
Manila
25 + 25 years concession
International
Manila until 2038, held since 3,000 2,380 79.3 100.0% 2,380
Container
1988. 100% ownership
Terminal
Subic Bay
In 2007, SBITC was
International
awarded the contract to
Terminal Corp.,
Subic operate NCT-1 at Cubi 300 206 68.7 83.3% 172
New Container
Point for a period of 25
Terminal - 1
years
(NCT-1) *
Subic Bay
In Jul 2011, ICTSI
International
signed a contract for
Terminal Corp,
Subic the operation and 300 0 0.0 100.0% 0
New Container
management of NCT-2 for
Terminal - 2
a period of 25 years
(NCT-2) *
50% ownership. 10-
year management and
South Cotabato
operation contract from
General Santos Integrated Port 250 228 91.2 50.0% 114
2006 with subsequent
Services Inc.
one-year hold-over
authorities
97% ownership. 10-year
Davao Integrated
contract from 2006. Since
Port and
Apr 2016, DIPSSCOR has
Davao Stevedoring 500 177 35.4 97.0% 172
had a series of hold-over
Services
authorities for a period of
Corporation
six months
Mindanao
100% ownership,
International
25-year-concession
Cagayan de Oro Container 300 232 77.3 100.0% 232
contract executed in Apr
Terminal
2008
Services, Inc.
95% stake bought in

PT Makassar May 2006, 10-year
Makassar Terminal cooperation agreement 250 175 70.0 95.0% 166
Services, Inc. with Pelindo IV now
extended until 2023
152
ICTSI
Table 4.1.17 ICTSI cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
PT Karwell Indonesia
Tbk, now known as
PT ICTSI JasaPrima
Tbk, holds 80% of
the shares of PT PBM
OlahJasaAndal (PT OJA).
PT PBM Olah
In Jun 2013, OJA signed
Tanjung Priok Jasa Andal 400 185 46.3 80.0% 148
a 15-year Cooperation
(Terminal 300)
Agreement with Pelindo,
Tanjung Priok Branch, for
international container
stevedoring services
under a profit-sharing
scheme
South Asia
PICT has a contract
Pakistan for the operation and
International management of a
Karachi 750 654 87.2 65.0% 425
Container common user container
Terminal terminal for 21 years
commencing Jun 2002
Middle East
10-year contract from
2014 for operation and
management of Berth
20, along with phased
expansion under a
26-year deal including
Basrah Gateway
Umm Qasr a new 200 metre quay. 600 493 82.2 100.0% 493
Terminal
Second phase expansion
announced in Feb
2018, with two new
berths expected to raise
capacity to 1.2 million
teu p.a.
Eastern Europe
20-year operating lease
awarded in 2003. 100%
Baltic Container
Gdynia ownership. Commenced 1,200 412 34.3 100.0% 412
Terminal Ltd.
commercial operations in
Nov 2007
Batumi 100% ownership.
International Acquired a 48-year lease
Batumi Container in Sep 2007. Commercial 150 90 60.0 100.0% 90
Terminal operations started in Mar
LLC 2008
153
ICTSI

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Eastern Europe cont’d
51% ownership of
Adriatic Gate
terminal from Mar 2011.
Rijeka Container 600 227 37.8 51.0% 116
Concession period is for
Terminal
30 years until 2041
29-year concession for
a container and general
cargo terminal won in Feb
Operadora
2013. Redevelopment of
Portuaria
existing facilty, initially
Puerto Cortes Centroamericana 1000 675 67.5 100.0% 675
increasing capacity from
S.A. de C.V.
0.6 million teu p.a. to 0.9
(OPC)
million teu p.a. Ultimate
capacity 1.8 million teu
p.a.
Signed concession in
Contecon
Manzanillo, 2010 to run until 2044.
Manzanillo SA de 1,000 946 94.6 100.0% 946
Mexico Operations started in
C.V. (CMSA)
2013
South America
Contecon
Guayaquil operate a multi-purpose 1,400 851 60.8 100.0% 851
Guayaquil S.A.
terminal won in Jan 2007
100% ownership. 30-year
concession awarded
Suape Container
Suape in 2001. Commercial 700 463 66.1 100.0% 463
Terminal (Tecon)
operations started in
2002
Aguadulce Multi-User
Container Terminal
(AMCT), a JV between
ICTSI (46%) and PSA
Buenaventura SPIA ** 550 46.0%
International (46%), had
its soft launch in Nov
2016 and has a 30-year
concession
Concession period for
30 years until 2038.
La Plata TECPLATA 450 0 0.0 100.0% 0
Greenfield terminal now
operational
Africa
Madagascar
International 20-year operating
Toamasina Container concession signed Jun 400 246 61.5 100.0% 246
Terminal Services 2005
Ltd.
154
ICTSI

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Africa cont’d
In Jan 2014, ICTSI
announced a JV to
develop a multi-
purpose terminal in the
Matadi ICTSI Congo DR Democratic Republic 175 96 54.9 60.0% 58
of Congo. Phase 1 has
350 million of quay and
175,000 teu capacity
p.a.
Oceania
Victoria
100% stake in long-term
International
concession to develop
Melbourne Container 1,000 280 28.0 100.0% 280
a new terminal. Ultimate
Terminal Limited
capacity 1.4 million teu
(VICTL)
25-year terminal
operating agreement
with PNG Ports
Corporation Limited
(PNGPCL) for the
operation, management
and development of
the international ports
South Pacific in Motukea and Lae.
Container The estimated annual
Lae 250 118 47.2 100.0% 118
Terminal Limited capacity of the Lae Tidal
(SPICTL) Basin is 250,000 teu.
The total developed
land area is 11.4 hectare
and quay length is
250 metre. Partial
commercial operations
started Feb 2018, full
operations commenced
in Jun 2018
25-year terminal
operating agreement with
PNG Ports Corporation
Limited (PNGPCL) for the
Motukea operation, management
Motukea International and development of 250 44 17.6 100.0% 44
Limited (MITL) the international ports
in Motukea and Lae.
MITL full commercial
operations commenced
in Jun 2018
Total 23,129 9,736 42.1 8,885
155
ICTSI

New developments
Manila North In late 2017, ICTSI acquired a 35% stake in MNHPI. The terminal
Manila Harbour Port, has capacity for 2.2 million teu, 2 million tonnes of break-bulk cargo 35%
Inc. (MNHPI) *** and 2.5 million passengers per year
South Port ICTSI signed Concession Agreement in Jan 2019 to operate,

Port Sudan Container manage and develop the South Port Container Terminal (SPCT).
Terminal (SPCT) The terminal has a capacity of one million teu p.a.
Notes:
ICTSI capacity for Yantai International Container Terminals Ltd. differs from the capacity of DP World (1,100,000 teu) for the same terminal.
* Throughput figure shown against Subic NCT-1 is actually combined throughput for NCT-1 and NCT-2.
** At Buenventura, ICTSI does not consolidate SPIA and MNHPI volumes since these are affiliates, so no throughput is shown. Currently under first
phase development, AMCT, commercially launched as Puerto Aguadulce, features a 13 hactre container yard and a capacity of 550-600,000 teu per
annum. It has a 600 metre quay equipped with four Super post-Panamax quay cranes and a controlling depth of 14.5 metre.
*** ICTSI acquired additional 15.17% of Manila North Harbour Port, Inc (MNHPI) from Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc. in Sep 2018, subject to
certain conditions precedent; Upon completion of this transaction, ICTSI shareholdings in MNHPI will increase from 34.83% to 50%. MNHPI was
not consolidated in 2018 so no container throughput was recorded (it was booked under equity method of accounting).
In Davao, Philippines, ICTSI has a 65% stake in Hijo International Port Services Inc (HIPS). This a two berth terminal company specialising in banana
exports. At present general cargo is handled and no containers.
Figure 4.1.10 Location of ICTSI owned/managed terminal operations
Gdynia Subic
Manila
Batumi
Rijeka
Yantai
Umm Qasr
Cagayan de Oro
Port Sudan Karachi
Manzanillo Puerto Cortes
Davao
Buenaventura General Santos
Guayaquil
Suape Matadi Tanjung Priok Lae
Makassar
Toamasina Motukea
Melbourne
La Plata
Concession signed in 2019 Throughput under 1m teu per annum Throughput of 1m plus teu per annum
156
ICTSI
Manila, Philippines
Equity teu league
table ranking 8th
2017 5.3%  5.1% 
2018 6.4%  7.0% 
0 1 2 3
0.41m teu
Equity teu
8.9m teu
9.7m teu
Market focus/risk profile Existing portfolio is highly focused on emerging markets (over 90%), with significant concentration
of activity in Manila
Traffic type focus Entirely focused on gateway
Degree of internationalism Moderrate/high (near global presence although some terminals are small)
Core strategy Portfolio expansion through acqusitions and selected greenfield projects.Focus on small to
medum sized terminals with high majority stakes

21 21 21 Oceania 5.0% Far East 3.2%
21
21
Africa 3.4% Southeast Asia 38.1%
South America 14.8%
18
Central America/
Caribbean 18.2% South Asia 4.8%
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Eastern Europe 7.0% Middle East 5.5%
157
Hyundai Merchant Marine
S outh Korea’s Hyundai has stakes in eight terminals in Asia, Europe

and North America and no new developments in the pipeline. It had
previously been in the process of acquiring the HPC Tokyo terminal but
this has not proceeded.
The highlights in terms of throughput performance for Hyundai in
2018 are:
• Total throughput, taking into account all terminals in which stakes (of
Big growth in Hyundai
any size) were held, increased sharply to 9.7 million teu, up 17% on 2017.
throughput mainly
• However, for the purposes of the Drewry league table, from which due to full-year
terminals where the stake is 10% or less are excluded, the total effects of acquisitions
throughput was only 7.6 million teu (nevertheless this was a 23% at Algeciras and
increase on 2017). Kaohsiung
• The league table figure is markedly lower than the overall total
because during 2018, Hyundai only had a 10% stake in one of the
largest terminals in its portfolio, Busan. From January 2019 though,
Hyundai’s ownership stake has increased to 50%.
• The equity-adjusted throughput of the portfolio was 4.1 million teu,
up 36%.
• The key contributor to the 2018 growth was Algeciras where the full-
year effect of Hyundai’s acquisition in late 2017 added over 1.0 million
teu to the portfolio throughput.
• The HPC terminal in Kaohsiung added over 300,000 teu in 2018
(another full-year effect becoming evident) and the Long Beach
terminal over 200,000 teu. An 11% increase at Rotterdam also
contributed to the overall strong growth.
• Volume was down in Tacoma, Seattle, and Kaohsiung Terminal 4, but
each of these is one of the smaller terminals held by the company.
• Also, in 2018 Los Angeles was no longer part of the portfolio, with its
CUT terminal ceasing operations in July 2017.
Table 4.1.18 Hyundai

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
Terminal 4
Kaohsiung (Berths 118 and 100% ownership 800 610 76.3 100.0% 610
119)
HMM Pacific 100% ownership
Kaohsiung 1,000 662 66.2 100.0% 662
Corp (HPC) acquired end Apr 2017
Hyundai Pusan
New Port 10% shareholding with
Busan 2,500 2,135 85.4 10.0% 214
Terminal (HPNT) - PSA *
Phase 2-2
158
Hyundai Merchant Marine
Table 4.1.18 Hyundai cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
North America
Washington 100% ownership and

Tacoma United Terminal 30-year lease agreement 900 425 47.2 100.0% 425
(WUT) approved in 1999
Total Terminals 20% shareholding with

Long Beach 2,646 2,312 87.4 20.0% 462
International (TTI) TIL (MSC)
Total Terminals 20% shareholding with

Seattle 517 324 62.6 20.0% 65
International (TTI) TIL (MSC)
North Europe

Rotterdam World
DPW, MOL and CMA
Rotterdam Gateway Terminal 2,350 1,940 82.5 20.0% 388
CGM / APL. Operational
(Maasvlakte II)
in Sep 2015
South Europe
100% ownership
Algeciras TTIA (Algeciras) 1,600 1,293 80.8 100.0% 1293
acquired in Nov 2017
Total 14,331 9,700 67.7 4,118
Notes:
* In Jan 2019, HMM ownership increased to 50% with HMM and PSA operating jointly.
Hyundai capacity for Rotterdam World Gateway Terminal (Maasvlakte II) differs from the MOL (2,100,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Hyundai capacity for Total Terminals International (TTI), Long Beach, differs from the TIL (2,880,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Hyundai throughput for Total Terminals International (TTI), Long Beach, differs from the TIL (2,278,000 teu) throughput for the same terminal.
Hyundai capacity for Total Terminals International (TTI), Seattle, differs from the TIL (660,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
159
Hyundai
Seoul, South Korea
Equity teu league
table ranking 15th
2017 141.6%  38.5% 
2018 36.0%  23.1% 
0 1 2 3
1.21m teu
Equity teu
4.1m teu
7.6m teu
Market focus/risk profile Around two-thirds of the portfolio is in mature markets

Traffic type focus 50-50 split between gateway and transhipment traffic. Kaohsiung and Busan significant hubs
Degree of internationalism Below average - Asia, Europe and North America only
Core strategy Maintenance of existing portfolio following acquisition of Hanjin terminal stakes in several locations

North Europe 9.4%
13 13 13 13 13
12
Far East 36.1%
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 South Europe 31.4% North America 23.1%
160
China Merchants Port Holdings Co Ltd (CMP)
S tate-owned China Merchants Group (CMG) is based in Hong Kong

and is parent to China Merchants Port Group Limited, itself owner of
China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited. For ease of reference
we refer to CMG’s port business as CMP. It is involved in a wide range
of business sectors including transportation (ports, sea, air and logistics)
and manufacturing. CMP has direct interests in a number of container
terminals in China and overseas, as well as stakes in several other major
terminal operators such as Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG),
Modern Terminals (MTL), Terminal Link (TL) and Liaoning Port Group
(parent of Dalian Port Group and Yingkou Port Group). Liaoning Port
Group was established in response to the central government’s call to
consolidate the port sector. CMP’s parent CMG also has stakes in four
terminals in China.
TL is classed as a GTO/ITO under CMA CGM (along with CMA CMP has stakes
Terminals, which is 100% owned by CMA CGM). SIPG and MTL is several other
operators, one of
meanwhile are almost entirely focused on terminals in China (including
which, Terminal Link,
Hong Kong) and are not classed as GTOs or ITOs, nor is Liaoning Port.
is part of a GTO/ITO
Assessing CMP’s throughput for the purpose of this report has a number
of complexities. Equity teu is influenced by the nature of shareholdings
for a number of terminals, with a choice to be made between using
Assessing CMP’s
direct stakes versus effective interests – taking into consideration
throughput for the
indirectly held stakes. This is particularly so with certain terminals
purpose of this report
where CMP has a direct stake and also an indirect one because MTL has a number of
also holds a stake in the same terminals (and CMP has a stake in MTL). complexities
As a general rule, Drewry has sought to show effective shareholdings, as
this more closely reflects the portion of profits from the terminal entity
flowing to shareholders.
As far as CMP’s stakes in other operators are concerned (these being
MTL, SIPG, TL and Liaoning Port) Drewry deals with this in the same
way as it does in other cases (such as PSA’s 20% stake in HP). The total
teu does not include the throughput of the operators in which stakes
are held. This is different from the way in which CMP computes its
total throughput, which is based on adding in the total throughputs of
SIPG, MTL, TL and Liaoning Port to its figure, leading to an overall
throughput of 109 million teu in 2018, up 6% on 2017.
However, in Table 3.1, an additional total is included by Drewry where Drewry includes an
the figures are sums of the throughput of these operators and the CMP ‘indirect influence’
total, resulting in an ‘indirect influence’ total throughput figure of 116.5 throughput figure for
million teu. The large difference between this figure and CMP’s 109 CMP in its league
million teu is mainly because of the way that MTL and SIPG are dealt table
with. CMP only includes the throughput of MTL’s Hong Kong terminal
whereas for the purpose of ‘indirect influence’, Drewry has included
the throughput of all the MTL terminals. Similarly for SIPG, CMP only
includes the Shanghai total whereas Drewry includes all SIPG terminals.
For equity teu, CMP is credited with a proportion of the equity teu of the
operators in which it has a stake, based on its shareholding in that operator.
161
The highlights in terms of throughput performance for CMP in 2018 are:

• Total throughput (as calculated by Drewry for league table purposes)
showed an increase of over 11%, reaching 34.5 million teu. Including
the volume of Kaoshiung Kao Ming terminal, in which only a 10%
stake is held, the total was 36.3 million teu, again up 11%.
• Equity-adjusted volume, including the effect of stakes in other
operators such as SIPG, was 35.1 million teu, up by over 13%.
• Throughput at the group’s 14 Chinese terminals was up 9% in 2018,
Double-digit volume
reaching 27.5 million teu. Performance ranged from triple-digit
growth for the CMP
percentage growth at Shantou (reflected the full-year effect of the
portfolio in 2018
2017 acquisition) to a 100% decline in Shenzhen Haixing Harbour
Development Co. where berth renovation resulted in no volume
being handled.
• Double-digit growth was achieved at Mawan, Zhangzhou, Hong Kong
and Qingdao.
• All of CMP’s overseas locations registered growth apart from troubled
Djibouti where overall traffic was down 7.5%.
• Ambarli, Colombo and Lome all recorded double-digit percentage
growth, while the Paranagua acquisition added nearly 700,000 teu of
throughput to the portfolio in 2018.
• CMP benefitted from equity teu growth from all four operators in
which it has a stake. From the largest contributor SIPG it was up 6.5%
and from TL it was up by the same percentage. MTL was up by just
over 1% but the corporate restructuring at Dalian and Yingkou led to
a 45% uplift in equity teu generated by this venture in 2018.
CMP does not have any greenfield developments or acquisitions in the
pipeline at the time of writing. However, the company is very active in
the area of port ownership consolidation in China. Also, it continues to Port-Park-City
develop Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, although at present the focus is concept remains a key
on bulk traffic which is also the focus of the Port of Newcastle, Australia, strategy, along with
digital innovation
in which CMP acquired a 50% stake during 2018. CMP’s strategy
continues to focus on the Port-Park-City concept, as well as pursuing
innovation and smart port ideas.
162
Table 4.1.19 China Merchants

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
China Merchants Group Company Limited
Far East
39.25% effective
shareholding through
Chiwan Container stakes in CND, SCW,
Shenzhen 4,000 2,281 57.0 69.2% 1,237
Terminal 1 Hidoney and MTL
increased to 69.2% in the
second half of the year
45.6% effective
shareholding in JV with
Shenzhen
Shenzhen other partners, increased 1,000 1,126 112.6 100.0% 820
Chiwan Wharf 2
to 100% in the second
half of the year
83.6% effective
shareholding in JV with
China Merchants other partners, increased
Shenzhen 2,000 2,008 100.4 100.0% 1,845
Mawan Port 3 to 100% shareholding
in the second half of the
year
Baoman
40.3% share in Zhanjiang
Zhanjiang Container Terminal 800 984 123.0 40.3% 397
Port Group
(Phase 1) 4
China Merchants Port Holding Company Limited

Far East
Shekou Container
Shenzhen Terminals Ltd -
Phase I
Direct stake of 80%.
Shekou Container
Some indirect stake as
Shenzhen Terminals Ltd - 6,000 5,620 93.7 80.0% 4,496
well, reflected under
Phase II
Modern Terminals below
Shekou Container
Shenzhen Terminals Ltd -
Phase III
Shenzhen
Haixing Harbour
67% in JV with Sinotrans
Shenzhen Development 1,000 0 0.0 67.0% 0
(33%)
Co., Ltd. (Mawan
Berths 1-4) 5
China Merchants
Shenzhen multi-purpose facility 1,500 310 20.7 100.0% 310
Port Services
focsed on domestic trade
Tianjin Five
14% shareholding in
Continents
JV with NWS / China
Shipping / Cosco/ port
Container
authority
Terminal Co., Ltd.
163
Table 4.1.19 China Merchants cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
China Merchants Port Holding Company Limited cont’d
Far East cont’d
Qingdao Qianwan
with APMT, DP World,
Qingdao United Container 4,050 5,533 136.6 50.0% 2,767
Pan Asia, Qingdao Port
Terminal (QQCTU)
Bureau
Qingdao Qianwan 50% shareholding in JV
United Advance with APMT, DP World,
Qingdao 1,200 1,398 116.5 35.0% 489
Container Terminal APL, SITC, Pan Asia,
(QQCTUA) Qingdao Port Group
60% in JV with
Zhangzhou Development
Zhangzhou China
Zhangzhou Zone China Merchants 1,000 457 45.7 60.0% 274
Merchants Port
Harbor Business Co.
(40%)
In Apr 2017, CMP
announced the
subscription of shares
representing 60% equity
Shantou Ports
Shantou stake in Shantou Ports 1,050 1,291 123.0 60.0% 775
Group (SPG)
Group (SPG). Remaining
40% stake in SPG
continue to be held by
Shantou SASAC
Ningbo Daxie
45% in JV with Ningbo
China Merchants
Ningbo Port Group (35%) and 3,000 3,160 105.3 45.0% 1,422
International
CITIC (20%)
Terminals
China Merchants
Hong Kong Container 750 634 84.5 100.0% 634
mid-stream operator
Services Ltd
10% stake acquired at
Kao Ming end 2012. Cosco and
Kaohsiung Container China Shipping also 2,800 1,746 62.3 10.0% 175
Terminal acquired 10% each as
part of a joint deal
South Europe
CMP acquired 40%
effective equity interest
of Kumport Terminal
Ambarli Kumport near Istanbul, Turkey, in 1,700 1,258 74.0 40.0% 503
Dec 2015 in a deal with
Cosco and CIC as co-
shareholders
South Asia
Colombo 85% in JV with the Sri
International Lanka Ports Authority
Colombo 2,400 2,677 111.6 85.0% 2,276
Container (15%). Started operations
Terminal (CICT) 6 in Jul 2013
164

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
China Merchants Port Holding Company Limited cont’d
South America
Paranagua TCP 90% shareholding in TCP 1,500 693 46.2 90.0% 624
Africa
28.5% shareholding with
Tin-Can Island
Bollore (52.5%), China-
Lagos Container 800 480 60.0 28.5% 137
Africa Development Fund
Terminal Ltd.
(19%)
PDSA has a 67% stake
Dolareh in Dolareh Container
Djibouti Container Terminal resulting in a 1,600 810 50.6 15.7% 127
Terminal 7 15.7% effective stake for
CMP
CMP has a 23.5%
stake in Djibouti Port
Djibouti PDSA Terminal Co (PDSA), which owns 350 0 0.0 23.5% 0
and operates the PDSA
terminal in the port
PDSA has a 100% stake
Doraleh
in Doraleh Multipurpose
Djibouti Multipurpose 220 49 22.3 23.5% 12
Port which became
Port (DMP)
operational in mid-2017
50% shareholding
with TIL in deep-water
Lome Container greenfield terminal with
Lome 1,365 1,051 77.0 50.0% 525
Terminal ultimate capacity of 2
million teu. Operations
started in Oct 2014
Sub-total 46,921 36,289 77.3 20,225
Shanghai SIPG 35,542 26.5% 9,401
SIPG
27% stake in MTL (Wharf
Modern
Hong Kong Holdings 68% and 7,415 27.0% 2,003
Terminals Ltd
Jebsen 5%)
In Jun 2013, CMP
acquired a 49% stake in
CMA CGM Terminal Link 4,914 49.0% 2,408
a portfolio comprising 15
Terminal Link terminals
In early 2016, CMP
acquired 21% equity
Liaoning Project Dalian Port stake in Dalian Port (PDA)
4,866 21.1% 1,027
(Dalian) 8 Company Company, becoming
its second largest
shareholder
Total 35,063
165

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
River terminals ##
CKRTT holds interests in
Chu Kong River 10 terminals in the Pearl
Hong Kong 1,200 1,168 97.4 20.0% 234
Trade Terminal River Delta area, with 2.5
kilometre of quayline
Container and bulk
Shunde Shunde New Port 500 221 44.2 51.0% 113
terminal
Notes:
1
China Merchants Group shareholding was 39.25% in the first half of 2018. Equity teu calculated on a pro rata basis.
2
China Merchants Group shareholding was 45.6% in the first half of 2018. Equity teu calculated on a pro rata basis.
3
China Merchants Group shareholding was 84% in the first half of 2018. Equity teu calculated on a pro rata basis.
4
China Merchants Group shareholding has increased to 58.4% in Feb 2019.
5
Berth renovation at Shenzhen Haixing Harbour Development Co., Ltd. (Mawan Berths 1-4) resulted in no volume being handled in 2018.
6
Capacity figure is design capacity (actual capacity is higher).
7
DP World exited in Jan 2019.
8In Dec 2018, China Merchants Group completed 49.9% equity acquisition of Liaoning Port (including Dalian Port Group and Yingkou Port Group).
From Jan 2019 the stake in Dalian Port Co was 67.8%. For Yingkou Port Company the future plan is for a 45.9%+ shareholding.
#
SIPG, Modern Terminals, Terminal Link and Dalian Port Company throughput figures shown under “Throughput” column are these companies’
equity teu figures
##
River terminals are defined by Drewry as terminals that cannot (or do not) handle seagoing vessels
Hambantota Port Development Project is an 85% JV with the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (15%). Started operations for bulk cargo business in Mar 2018.
CM Ports capacity for Qingdao Qianwan United Container Terminal Co (QQCTU) differs from the capacity of DP World (5,400,000 teu) and APMT
CM Ports throughput for Qingdao Qianwan United Container Terminal Co (QQCTU) differs from the throughput of DP World (4,698,000 teu) and
APMT (4,704,000 teu) for the same terminal.
CM Ports capacity for Qingdao Qianwan United Advance Container Terminal Co (QQCTUA) differs from APL capacity (1,300,000 teu) for the same terminal.
CM Ports throughput for Qingdao Qianwan United Advance Container Terminal Co (QQCTUA) differs from DP World and APL throughput
CM Ports capacity for Kao Ming Container Terminal differs from NYK and Ports America capacity (3,300,000 teu) for the same terminal.
CM Ports capacity for Kumport differs from China Cosco Shipping capacity (2,100,000 teu) for the same terminal.
Figure 4.1.11 Location of CM Ports owned/managed terminal operations
Antwerp
Dunkirk Tianjin
Le Havre
Dalian
Marseilles-Fos Qingdao
Nantes Saint-Nazaire Thessaloniki
Busan Nanjing
Ambarli
Houston Tanger Med
Haifa
Casablanca Taicang
Miami Marsaxlokk
Shanghai
Jiaxing
Lome
Ningbo
Djibouti Colombo
Abidjan Lagos
Wenzhou
Jiangyin
Zhanghzhou
Paranagua Shenzhen
Shenzhen
Zhanjiang
CMP Terminal Link Shantou
SIPG Dalian Port Company Kaohsiung
MTL Terminals Hong Kong Hong Kong
Shareholdings in other operators Throughput under 1m teu per annum Throughput of 1m plus teu per annum
166
China Merchants Port Holdings

Hong Kong, China
Equity teu league
table ranking 6th
2017 8.9% 10.8% 
2018 11.4%  13.1% 
Equity teu
35.1m teu
0 1 2 3
1.45m teu

No. of countries with existing terminals* 7 8
No. of existing terminals** 23 25
34.5m teu #
#
Including “indirect influence” throughput, the 2018 figure was 116.5 million teu * Plus a further 9
countries through stake in Terminal Link ** Not including stakes in other operators (Terminal Link has
stakes in 13 terminals, SIPG in 15 terminals, MTL in 4 terminals, Dalian Port Company in 2 terminals)
Market focus/risk profile Primarily emerging markets although Terminal Link portfolio has significant mature market volumes
Traffic type focus Mainly gateway traffic (over 90%) although certain terminals are highly active in transhipment
Degree of internationalism Above average - substantial proportion of terminals directly and indirectly owned are in China.
Stake in Terminal Link provides an international dimension
Core strategy Continued domestic and international expansion of portfolio, through acquisitions and greenfield
developments. Partnerships with other global players. Stimulate and develop wider economic and
industrial activity in and around its ports, the so-called "Port-Zone-City" concept.
Note: Capacity and total teu throughput does not include the effects of stakes in SIPG, MTL, Dalian Port or Terminal Link. Equity teu does.

Africa 4.0%
45 45 45
45 South America 3.1%

44
South Asia 11.3%
Far East 79.2%

43
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 South Europe 2.5%
Note: Excludes capacity of other operators in which stakes are held Note: Does not include effects of stakes in SIPG, MTL, PDA and
Source: Drewry Maritime Research Terminal Link
167
Bolloré Ports (Bolloré Transport and Logistics)
T hrough Bolloré Ports, Paris-based Bolloré Transport & Logistics

has a portfolio of 18 container terminals in Europe, Asia and
particularly West Africa. Besides owning and operating container
terminals, Bolloré Ports is also active in ship’s agency, general cargo
handling, and dry ports in 45 African countries.
The key takeaways in terms of throughput performance for Bolloré in
2018 are:
• Total throughput increased 11.5%, reaching 5.3 million teu while Three terminals in
equity-adjusted volume was 3.1 million teu, a similar increase. the portfolio were
• Three terminals in the portfolio were responsible for around three- responsible for around
quarters of the 2018 growth: Pointe Noire saw 23% growth (140,000 three-quarters of the
teu), the new terminal at Kribi came on stream (adding 136,000 ~11% 2018 growth
teu) and Tuticorin in India achieved a huge 85% uplift in volumes (Pointe Noire, Kribi
(handling an additional 137,000 teu). and Tuticorin)
• Double-digit growth was also registered at Conakry, Lome, Cotonou,
Libreville and Moroni while the biggest declines were suffered by
Dakar (27%) and Rouen (9%). Both of these terminals are among the
smallest in the portfolio though, so the impact was limited.
The company has several expansion projects under way:
• In Abidjan (Ivory Coast) the group in partnership with APMT Greenfield and
and Bouygues has a concession for the second container terminal. brownfield
Investment is $590 million and the new facility will have 16 metre developments are in
draft along its 1,100 metre of quay. Planned operational date is 2020. progress at Abidjan,
• Dili (Timor Leste) in Southeast Asia is the location for construction of a Dili, Haiti and Tema,
new port complex with a price tag of $262 million. The plan will put in with Ibom a longer-
term project
place a 630 metre quay having 15 metre draft, with operations expected
to commence in 2021. It is the country’s first public-private partnership.
• Bolloré Group has an agreement for the operation of Terminal
Varreux in Port au Prince (Haiti). Construction of a new quay and
yard for container handling is underway at a cost of around $50
million, with starting date for operations being end-2019. General
cargo handling is already under way.
• At Tema (Ghana) a new terminal (MPS 2) is a development/expansion
of the existing MPS terminal, a JV with APMT.
• A consortium of Bolloré Ports and PowerChina International Group has
won the tender to build and operate a new deep-sea port for containers,
general cargo and bulk at Ibom in Nigeria. Works will include dredging
a 20 kilometre access channel which will be 18 metre deep, erecting a
1,100 metre breakwater and building over 2,500 metre of quay.
Bolloré is reportedly in exclusive negotiations with French group Strategic
Maritime Kuhn for the sale of the Bolloré Ports France unit, which has developments include
port handling activities at 15 French ports. It is seen as part of a strategy possible sale of
to focus port handling and logistics activities in international markets France unit and MoU
where Bolloré is already established, particularly West Africa. with Cosco Shipping
As mentioned in the commentary in this report on Cosco Shipping,
Bolloré Transport & Logistics has signed an MoU with the former
covering cooperation focused on the African continent.
168
Table 4.1.20 Bollore Ports (Bollore Transport & Logistics)

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
North Europe
Rouen BLP Rouen 100% shareholding 150 49 32.7 100.0% 49
Terminal du
Nantes JV with Terminal Link 500 188 37.6 50.0% 94
Grand Ouest
Africa
Dakar Dakar Terminal Majority shareholding 100 66 66.0 75.0% 50
Majority shareholding in
Conakry Conakry Terminal 300 238 79.3 75.1% 179
partnership with APMT
Freetown
Freetown Majority shareholding 400 108 27.0 80.0% 86
Terminal
Abidjan Abidjan Terminal 1,000 635 63.5 60.0% 381
partnership with APMT
MPS Terminal
JV with APMT on equal
Tema (Meridian Port 1,000 836 83.6 35.0% 293
terms
Services) *
Lome Togo Terminal 100% shareholding 1,000 355 35.5 100.0% 355
Benin Terminal /
Cotonou 100% shareholding 850 337 39.6 100.0% 337
SMTC
Tincan Island
Lagos Container 800 483 60.4 52.5% 254
partnership with CMHI
Terminal
Douala
JV with APMT on equal
Douala International 450 380 84.4 43.7% 166
terms
Terminal
30.8% stake in
Kribi Container
Kribi partnership with CMA 350 136 38.9 30.8% 42
Terminal
CGM and CHEC
Owendo
Libreville Container 100% shareholding 300 142 47.3 100.0% 142
Terminal
Pointe Noire Congo Terminal partnership with APMT 1,000 739 73.9 60.1% 444
and local partner
Moroni Moroni Terminal Majority shareholding 30 21 70.0 80.8% 17
APM Terminals Minority shareholding in

Monrovia 125 91 72.8 24.9% 23
Liberia partnership with APMT
Pointes des Minority shareholding in

Galets SAMR partnership with CMA 300 193 64.3 30.0% 58
(La Réunion) CGM
169
Table 4.1.20 Bollore Ports (Bollore Transport & Logistics) cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
South Asia
Tuticorin Tuticorin Terminal in partnership with local 750 299 39.9 49.0% 147
partner
Total 11,423 5,296 46.4 3,115
New developments
In Jun 2013, the Bollore Group signed a concession agreement
with partners APMT and Bouygues for the second container
Abidjan, Ivory Second container terminal at Abidjan. With planned investment of $590 million, the
Coast terminal (TC2) new facility will have 16 metre draft, 35 hactre yard along with
1,100 metre of quay and will be able to accommodate vessels of up
to 12,000 teu capacity. Planned operational date is 2020
Bolloré Group is undertaking the construction of the new port
of Dili. Project investment is worth $262 milllion. Construction
Dili, Timor Leste Timor Port encompasses a 630 metre quay at 15 metre draft and a 24 hactre
yard. Vessels up to 7,500 teu should be able to call at the port.
Planned operational date is 2021
Bolloré Group and TEVASA signed an agreement in May 2015 for
the operation of Terminal Varreux. Operation has already started for
Port au Prince, Terminal Varreux general cargo. Construction of a new quay and yard for container
Haiti Bolloré (TVB) activities and handling equipment procurement is currently carried
out. Project investment is worth around $50 million. Container
operations starting date is end of 2019
Notes:
* At Tema, the new terminal (MPS 2) is a development / expansion of MPS.
Bollore capacity for Conakry Terminal differs from the APMT (294,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Bollore capacity for Abidjan Terminal differs from the APMT (750,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Bollore throughput for Abidjan Terminal differs from the APMT (642,000 teu) throughput for the same terminal.
Bollore throughput for MPS Terminal (Meridian Port Services) differs from the APMT (842,000 teu) throughput for the same terminal.
Bollore capacity for Douala International Terminal differs from the APMT (403,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Bollore capacity for Congo Terminal differs from the APMT (638,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Bollore capacity for APM Terminals Liberia differs from the APMT (205,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Bollore capacity for SAMR terminal differs from CMA Terminals capacity (230,000 teu) for the same terminal.
170
Bolloré Transport & Logistics

Paris, France
Equity teu league
table ranking 17th
2017 10.7%  12.6% 
2018 11.5%  11.1% 
0 1 2 3
0.29m teu
Equity teu
3.1m teu
5.3m teu
Market focus/risk profile Highly focused on emerging markets, especially Africa

Traffic type focus Predominantly gateway traffic (over 90%)
Degree of internationalism Limited - most activity focused on West Africa, although gradual widening of focus is taking place
Core strategy Active portfolio expansion, mainly emerging market greenfield projects

South Asia 4.7% North Europe 4.6%
13 13 13
12
11
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Africa 90.7%

171
Yildirim Group (Yilport Holding)
T urkey-based Yildirim Group is a large family-owned conglomerate

with wide industrial interests. The group is active in minerals and
fertilisers, as well as shipping (including a significant minority stake
of 24% in CMA CGM) and ports. Yilport Holding is the brand under
which the group’s port activities operate. As well as container terminals,
Yilport has extensive breakbulk, bulk and ro-ro facilities.
The stakeholding in CMA CGM is considered to deliver good synergies
and at present Yildirim has no intention of disposing of it, the company
says. The company remains committed to aggressive expansion on an
international basis, and was disappointed not to have been successful in
its bid for Long Beach Container Terminal this year.
The key points from Yilport’s throughput performance in 2018 are:
• Total throughput reached 6.4 million teu, up 4.4% on 2017, while Yilport throughput was
comparable equity-adjusted throughput was 4.6 million teu, showing up by around 4.5%
a similar percentage increase. in 2018, with double-
• However, the overall equity teu figure used in the league table in this digit growth at a
report has to reflect the fact that Yilport has a 24% stake in CMA CGM. number of terminals
This increased Yilport’s equity teu figure to 7.1 million teu, but this was
unchanged from 2017 (because CMA CGM’s equity teu was 5% down).
• Malta Freeport provided the largest absolute increase in throughput
for the portfolio (rising 164,000 teu in 2018, just over 5%), but it is the
largest terminal in which Yilport holds a stake.
• A number of other, smaller terminals posted double-digit growth
for the year: Gebze and Gemlik in Turkey both achieved nearly 11%
increases, with Oslo just topping this. Increases of over 20% were
registered by Puerto Bolivar (Ecuador) and Paita (Peru) in South
America, along with Huelva and Figueira da Foz in Iberia. On the downside,
overall Iberian
• At Puerto Bolivar, the company has committed to investing $750 throughput was hit by
million over five phases for the development and modernisation of the strike action
port, one of the largest shipment points for fruit and seafood.
• On the volume downside, throughput fell at Lisbon (Liscont) by 38%
due to strike action and at Setubal by 26%. Across all seven of Yilport’s
Iberian terminals, traffic levels were down by around 6% for the year.
• In Gavle, Sweden, where Infrastructure investor Infranode became a
minority shareholder in March 2019, traffic was down by nearly 9%
in 2018.
Yilport has several expansion plans in progress:
• Late 2018 saw the first volumes reported by Yilport for Puerto Quetzal
in Guatemala. The company has taken a 55% share in the multi- Portfolio expansion
purpose operations of the port (APMT runs the container terminal). plans are under way
The terminal handles general cargo, containers, reefer traffic, liquid in South America,
cargo and ro-ro services with its 820 metre long main berth. Yilport is Scandinavia, the
investing in four mobile harbour cranes for the facility. Mediterranean and the
US
• At Gavle, a second container terminal is being constructed. Planned
to be operational in 2019 with around 160,000 teu capacity, it is
adjacent to the existing Gavle Container Terminal.
172
• In November 2018, Yilport was awarded a concession to operate the

multi-purpose facilities within the Port of Taranto which include
the container terminal vacated by Evergreen a number of years ago.
Yilport is reportedly aiming to reinstate the port as a transhipment
hub and is in discussion with liner companies. The terminal has 10
ship-to-shore gantry cranes, and the company states that the current
infrastructure and superstructure provides 2.0-2.5 million teu of
annual handling capacity.
• In the US, Yilport has signed a letter of intent for the long-term lease
and operation of Gulfport and is currently discussing the concession
arrangements with the Mississippi State Port Authority. This would be
Yilport’s first port investment in North America.
Table 4.1.21 Yildirim Group (Yilport Holding)

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
South Europe
Freehold terminal with
Gebze Yilpor Gebze 1,000 554 55.4 100.0% 554
100% ownership
Freehold terminal with
Gemlik Yilport Gemlik 1,600 525 32.8 100.0% 525
100% ownership
50% shareholding held by
Malta Freeport
Marsaxlokk Yildirim Group, balance 3,800 3,316 87.3 50.0% 1,658
Terminal Ltd
held by Terminal Link
Long-term concession
held since 1984, amended
Yilport Lisboa
Lisbon in 2008 till 2042. Balance 570 144 25.3 82.9% 120
Liscont
of ownership held by
Eurogate
100% shareholding
Yilport Lisboa
Lisbon in terminal operating 450 154 34.3 100.0% 154
Sotagus
company
100% shareholding
in terminal operating
Leixoes Yilport Leixoes 650 661 101.7 100.0% 661
company and five-year
extension secured in 2017
100% shareholding
Setubal Yilport Setubal in terminal operating 250 116 46.5 100.0% 116
company
Yilport Figueira Liscont has 100% stake
Figueira 21 20 96.0 100.0% 20
da Foz in terminal company
100% shareholding
in terminal operating
Huelva Yilport Huelva 90 66 73.5 100.0% 66
company after 40% share
acqusition in Nov 2018
Long-term concession
Ferrol Yilport Ferrol 375 5 1.2 98.6% 5
until 2048
North Europe
100% shareholding
Oslo Yilport Oslo in terminal operating 275 232 84.4 100.0% 232
company
100% shareholding
Yilport Gavle
Gavle in terminal operating 300 230 76.8 100.0% 230
Container
company *
173
Table 4.1.21 Yildirim Group (Yilport Holding) cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
South America
Tertir is part of a consortium
Terminales which holds a 30-year
Paita Portuarios concession from 2009. DPW 300 271 90.3 50.0% 135
Euroandinos acquired the balance 50%
stake in Mar 2018
Yilport Puerto 50 + 10-year concession
Puerto Bolivar 450 109 24.1 100.0% 109
Bolivar signed in Aug 2016
In May 2018, Yılport was
awarded a contract for
Yilport Puerto
Puerto Quetzal operation of the multi- 13 4 32.3 51.0% 2
Quetzal
purpose terminal. Operations
started in Dec 2018 **
Total 12,162 6,408 52.7 4,587
New developments
Yilport Gavle Baltic Sea Gateway comprises a greenfield container terminal within
Container port of Gavle. Phase 1 of the new container terminal is planned to
Gavle, Sweden 100.0%
Terminal be operational in 2019 with around 160,000 teu capacity, adjacent
(Greenfield) to existing Gavle Container Terminal
In Nov 2018, Yilport was awarded a concession to operate the
multi-purpose facilities within the Port of Taranto. The legal
Taranto Yilport Taranto 100.0%
framework will be finalised in 2Q19. First operation expected to
start at the beginning of 2H19.
Notes:
* Infrastructure investor Infranode became a minority shareholder in Mar 2019.
** Capacity and throughput for Quetzal are for Dec 2018 only, and only one crane (of the two).
Figure 4.1.12 Location of Yilport owned/managed terminal operations
Oslo
Gavle
Ferrol Gavle
Gebze
Gemlik
Leixoes Taranto
Figueira
Lisbon
Setubal Marsaxlokk
Puerto Quetzal
Huelva
Puerto Bolivar
Paita
Non-operational Throughput under 1m teu per annum Throughput of 1m plus teu per annum
174
Yildirim Group (Yilport Holdings)

Istanbul, Turkey
Equity teu league
table ranking 12th
2017 9.2%  37.0% 
2018 4.4%  -0.1% 
0 1 2 3
0.53m teu
Equity teu
7.1m teu#

6.4m teu
## Including “indirect influence” through CMA CGM
#
##
Including “indirect influence” throughput, the 2018 figure was 32 million teu
Market focus/risk profile Mainly mature markets (70%), although Malta transhipment primarily serves emerging markets
Traffic type focus Around two-thirds gateway, but Malta is a transhipment hub, and represents significant proportion
of equity teu
Degree of internationalism Currently below average (activities only in Europe and South America), but increasing
Core strategy International expansion, primarily through acqusition of portfolios of existing terminals plus
greenfield expansion at existing locations. Emerging and mature markets are both targets

South America 5.4%
13 13 13
13
North Europe 10.1%
12
10
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 South Europe 84.6%
Source: Drewry Maritime Research Note: Yildirim/Yilport figures do not include effects of Yildirim’s 24%
stake in CMA CGM
175
SAAM Puertos (SAAM Ports)
S ociedad Matriz SAAM S.A. (SM SAAM) was established in 1961

and is listed on Chile’s Santiago Stock Exchange with a market
capitalisation of over $1 billion. It has interests in terminal operations,
towage, ship agency and logistics and is controlled by major Chilean
conglomerate Quiñenco (Luksic Group) with 52.2% ownership.
The Port Terminals Division of the company (SAAM Puertos) accounted
for 55% of SAAM’s EBITDA in 2018 and is active in eight terminals in
the Americas, mostly in Latin America, especially Chile which is home
to four container terminals. The Chilean terminals account for just under
half of SAAM’s equity teu. The company has no reported greenfield
developments or acquisitions in the pipeline.
The highlights from SAAM’s throughput performance in 2018 are:
• Total throughput, including all types of container handling terminals Double-digit growth
in which stakes are held, was 3.4 million teu, up 7% on 2017. in equity teu despite
• Equity-adjusted throughput reached 2.3 million teu, up by over 14%. exiting from two
terminal investments
• However, for the purposes of the Drewry league tables, we exclude
Florida International Terminal as it has multi-operator berths, using
gantry cranes owned and maintained by the port authority. Under this
measure, total teu in 2018 was 3.2 million teu (up 5%) and equity teu
was 2.1 million teu (up 13%).
• The growth in throughput in 2018 was despite the fact that SAAM
exited from two terminals – Matarani and Arica.
• By far the largest contributor to the increase in the portfolio’s
throughput was the Guayaquil terminal which registered a 41% The second largest
growth, adding 240,000 teu to its volume for the year, due to market terminal in the
share gains. This terminal is the second largest in the SAAM portfolio portfolio, Guayaquil,
and is 100% owned, so the effect of the volume growth was significant was the biggest
in equity teu terms. contributor to
• The largest terminal, San Antonio, reported good growth of over 9% the increase in
throughput, achieving
for the year, nearing 1.2 million teu throughput. Traffic levels at the
over 40% growth
three other Chilean terminals were less impressive (Sab Vicente and
Iquique were both down by over 7%), so overall Chilean terminal
volumes were only up 2.5% in 2018.
176
SAAM Puertos (SAAM Ports)
Table 4.1.22 SAAM Puertos (SAAM Ports)

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
South America
50% in JV with SSA
San Antonio
Marine. Lease awarded
Terminal
San Antonio until 2024 with an option 1,750 1,173 67.0 50.0% 587
Internacional
to extend for another five
(STI)
years
50% in JV with SSA
San Vicente
Marine. Lease awarded
Terminal
San Vicente until 2029. Terminal 1,300 456 35.1 50.0% 228
Internacional
became operational in
(SVTI)
2000
100% ownership since
Iquique Terminal
Iquique Jun 2017. Lease awarded 320 260 81.3 100.0% 260
Internacional (ITI)
until 2030
In JV with Empresas
Antofagasta
Navieras S.A (35%) and
Antofagasta Terminal 270 80 29.6 35.0% 28
FCAB (30%). Lease
Internacional
awarded until 2033
Terminal 100% ownership to
Guayaquil Portuario De operate the terminal until 810 825 101.9 100.0% 825
Guayaquil (TPG) 2056
100% ownership to
operate until 2032 with
Terminal Maritima an option of further
Mazatlan 80 48 60.0 100.0% 48
Mazatlan extension for another
12 years. SAAM started
operations in Nov 2012
Sociedad
51% ownership in JV with
Portuaria de
Comercializadora R y S
Caldera (SPC)
S.A. (21%), Logistica de
Puerto Caldera and Sociedad 620 310 50.0 51.0% 158
Granos (19%) and M&H
Portuaria
Inversiones S.A. (9%).
Granelera de
Lease awarded until 2026
Caldera (SPGC)
North America
70% in JV with Agunsa
(CCNI) (30%). Concession
Florida renewed in 2015 for 10
Port Everglades International years with two options of 270 255 94.4 70.0% 179
Terminal LLC extension for 5 years each.
SAAM has operated FIT
since 2005.
Total 5,420 3,407 62.9 2,312
Notes:
Florida International Terminal is understood to consist of a 44 acre leased yard and with use of common-user berths, using gantry cranes owned
and maintained by the port authority.
SAAM Puertos also has 50% in JV with Sociedad de Inversiones Portuarias in Portuaria Corral, private port. The main cargo handled is wood chips.
Bulk cargo totalled 1.1 million tonnes in 2018
Figures for Terminal Puerto Arica (TPA) not included in table because the asset was classified as held for sale since Sep 2017, and sold in Feb of
2019 (15% stake)
SAAM capacity for San Antonio Terminal Internacional (STI) differs from the SSA (1,400,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
SAAM capacity for San Vicente Terminal Internacional (SVTI) differs from the SSA (1,200,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
177
SAAM Puertos
Santigo, Chile
Equity teu league
table ranking 21st
2017 18.2%  38.5% 
2018 4.9%  13.0% 
0 1 2 3
0.43m teu
Equity teu
2.1m teu
3.2m teu
Market focus/risk profile Over 90% of equity teu from emerging markets
Traffic type focus Entirely gateway traffic
Degree of internationalism Low - focused on Central and South America
Core strategy Occasional select expansion or divestment

5 5 5 5 5 5 Central America/
Caribbean 9.7%
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 South America 90.3%
Source: Drewry Maritime Research Note: Does not include stevedoring operation at Port Everglades
178
HHLA
H HLA is the largest terminal operator in the Port of Hamburg, where it

has three terminals including the highly automated Altenwerder facility.
The company has this year qualified as a GTO/ITO, several years after having
HHLA has re-qualified
as a GTO/ITO after
a hiatus and is now
dropped out of this club. The majority of HHLA’s activity remains at terminals looking for more
in its home base port. However, in addition to a long-standing investment selected international
in Odessa, HHLA has added a terminal business in Estonia, pushing its expansion
2018 equity teu from other world regions beyond Drewry’s 5% threshold.
HHLA’s strategy involves “continuous investment in the quality and
profitability of the core business, as well as the identification and
development of new growth areas, particularly in the digital space”.
Moreover, there is a desire to make more terminal acquisitions, but only
if they are a suitable fit (and not expansion for expansion’s sake).
The key takeaways in terms of throughput performance for HHLA in 2018 are:
• Total throughput was up 2%, reaching 7.4 million teu, of which
HHLA’s Hamburg activity accounted for around 94% of the volume.
Marginal increase
• Equity-adjusted throughput was up by just over 2%, at 6.7 million teu. in volumes in 2018,
HHLA holds majority stakes in all of its terminals, often 100%. boosted by new
• Volumes at HHLA’s three Hamburg container terminals were largely Estonian acquisition
unchanged at 6.9 million teu. For 2019 though, new North American
services should boost volumes.
• The Odessa terminal experienced strong (16%) traffic growth while
the newly acquired terminal in Tallinn contributed over 100,000 teu of
volume on a part-year basis in 2018.
Table 4.1.23 HHLA

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
North Europe
Burchardkai/
Hamburg 100% shareholding 5,700 4,300 75.4 100.0% 4,300
Tollerort Terminals
Container Terminal 74.9% shareholding with
Hamburg 3,000 2,585 86.2 74.9% 1,936
Altenwerder Hapag Lloyd (25.1%)
Hamburg Unikai Terminal 200 100 50.0 51.0% 51
Grimaldi Group (49%)
51% shareholding with Belgian
Hamburg Frucht Terminal 100 10 10.0 51.0% 5
New Fruit Wharf (49%)
Eastern Europe
Established in 2001, 100%
Odessa HPC Ukraine
affiliate of HPC Hamburg, 1,000 338 33.8 100.0% 338
created to manage the terminal
In Mar 2018, HHLA signed a
Muuga Container contract to acquire Estonia’s
Tallinn (Muuga) 300 113 37.7 100.0% 113
Terminal * biggest terminal operator
Transiidikeskuse
Total 10,300 7,446 72.3 6,743
Notes:
* Capacity and throughput are part-year figures. HHLA assumed full responsibility for the terminal on 27 Jun 2018.
The throughput split at Hamburg terminals is a Drewry estimate.
HHLA also has a 25.1% stake in Cuxport, a multi-purpose facility (majority shareholder Rhenus AG). Main cargoes handled are ro-ro in nature along
with project cargo and offshore support.
Unikai and Frucht terminals form part of Logistics business segment, other terminals are Container business segment.
179
HHLA
Hamburg, Germany
Equity teu league
table ranking 14th
2018 1.9%  2.2% 
0 1 2 3
1.24m teu
Equity teu
6.7m teu
7.4m teu
Market focus/risk profile Highly focused on mature markets. Hamburg terminals account for over 90% of equity teu
(although they serve some emerging markets as hubs e.g. Russia)
Traffic type focus Around 70% gateway
Degree of internationalism Low - just re-qualified as a GTO/ITO
Core strategy Selected international expansion is back on the agenda

Eastern Europe 6.7%
11 11 11 11 11
10
North Europe 93.3%

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
180
Selected other players (terminal operators and investors)

This section of the report features a commentary on a selection of players in the container terminal business - a
mix of operators, owners and investors. The list of companies featured is not meant to be exhaustive. The entities
have been chosen for various reasons; for instance, some of them have international portfolios of terminals, but
do not yet qualify for Drewry’s GTO/ITO league tables, some have extensive single-country activities, while
others are financial investors that are active in the sector. It is therefore a cross-section of players of interest.
Deutsche Bank (Deutsche Asset & Wealth Management)
D eutsche Asset & Wealth Management (DB) owns a 49.9% stake in the
UK port operator Peel Ports. Peel owns and runs container terminals
in Liverpool, Clydeport and Dublin as well as non-container terminals. Peel
also acts as landlord and port authority at these ports and several others in
the UK such as Medway. In 2015, Peel Ports acquired Great Yarmouth Port
Authority, a multi-purpose and offshore support port on the UK’s east coast.
Having exited from other port investments over the last few years (New
York and Prince Rupert), Deutsche Bank does not appear to have any
acquisitions in mind. In fact, the investor is reportedly mulling the sale Sale of part of DB’s
of 10-15% of its stake in Peel Ports. stake in Peel Ports
• Throughput figures are estimated for this investor and in 2018 total is said to be under
consideration
activity was around 1.0 million teu, similar to 2017.
• Equity-adjusted volume was around 0.5 million teu, again similar to
the previous year.
Table 4.2.1 Deutsche Asset & Wealth Management

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
North Europe
Greenock Ocean 49.9% shareholding in
Clydeport 200 86 43.0 49.9% 43
Terminal Peel Ports
Royal Seaforth 49.9% shareholding in
Liverpool 800 550 68.8 49.9% 274
Container Terminal Peel Ports
Coastal Container 49.9% shareholding in
Liverpool 100 50 50.0 49.9% 25
Line Terminal Peel Ports
Liverpool2 New deep-water riverside
Liverpool container container terminal, started 600 122 20.3 49.9% 61
terminal operations in late 2016
Marine Terminals
Ltd. (South 49.9% shareholding in
Dublin 450 177 39.3 49.9% 88
Quays Container Peel Ports
Terminal)
Total 2,150 985 45.8 491
Note:
Deutsche Bank has an indirect 49.9% stake in Great Yarmouth Port Company through Peel Ports.
Terminal throughputs are Drewry estimates.
Peel Ports’ Portia Port Management has management and operational roles in several ports and terminals e.g. Beirut Container Terminal and Port of
Spain, Trinidad.
181
Global Ports Investments (GPI)
G PI is a Russia-based terminal operator with container-handling

facilities in the Baltic (St Petersburg and Ust-Luga) and Far East
(Vostochny), as well as two terminals in Finland. Throughput at GPI’s
three St. Petersburg terminals, plus that of nearby Ust-Luga represented 65%
of the total in 2018. It is the dominant container terminal operator in Russia
and along with Vopak also has interests in a liquid bulk terminal in Estonia.
GPI also handles ro-ro, cars and bulk cargo, and has two inland terminals.
The company has no greenfield developments or acquisitions in the pipeline.
GPI is listed on the London Stock Exchange with 20.5% of its shares in
free float. The two main shareholders were APMT and Russia-based
N-Trans, each with a stake of 30.75%, but in early 2018 it was announced
that N-Trans was selling its stake to another Russian player, Delo. This
company has its main port operations in Novorossiysk on the Black Sea,
including the NUTEP container terminal. The two Finnish terminals are
25% owned by Container Finance which is now owned by CMA CGM.
The highlights in terms of throughput performance for GPI in 2018 are:
• A 3.5% increase in total volume to 1.54 million teu and a 5.5%
increase in equity teu bringing it to 1.48 million teu. Vostochny volume
growth was the
• Activity across the three St. Petersburg terminals increased by 2%
strongest in the
while that in the smaller Ust-Luga facility was down 7%.
portfolio while Ust-
• The strongest performer was the Vostochny terminal in the Russian Luga and the Finnish
Far East which achieved a 13% increase in throughput. terminals slipped
• Traffic levels at GPI’s two Finnish terminals were down nearly 7%.
Table 4.2.2 Global Ports Investments (GPI)

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
Vostochnaya
Vostochny Stevedoring 100% shareholding 650 419 64.5 100.0% 419
Company (VSC)
Eastern Europe
Petrolesport
St Petersburg Container 100% shareholding 1,000 246 24.6 100.0% 246
Terminal (PLP)
St Petersburg Moby Dik 400 82 20.4 75.0% 61
Container Finance (25%)
First Container 100% shareholding acquired
St Petersburg 1,250 617 49.4 100.0% 617
Terminal by the end of 2013
80% shareholding,
Ust Luga
remaining 20% share
Ust-Luga Container 440 69 15.7 80.0% 55
Eurogate. Terminal became
Terminal
operational in Dec 2011
North Europe
MLT Helsinki 75% shareholding in JV with
Helsinki 270 107 39.6 75.0% 80
(Multi-link terminal) Container Finance (25%)
MLT Kotka (Multi- 75% shareholding in JV with
Kotka 150 1 0.7 75.0% 1
link terminal) Container Finance (25%)
Total 4,160 1,541 37.1 1,480
Note: Container Finance is now owned by CMA CGM.
182
Gulftainer
G ulftainer currently has terminal interests in the UAE, Iraq, Saudi

Arabia, Lebanon and the US, as well as a multi-purpose facility in
Recife, Brazil. The company does not qualify as a GTO/ITO for the purposes
of Drewry’s league tables, as only a negligible amount of its equity teu is
generated outside the Middle East region. However, it clearly has ambition to
become significantly more international in the coming years. The company
has not provided data on its terminal capacities and throughputs and so
the data has been drawn together from indirect sources and estimates.
The key takeaways in terms of Gulftainer’s throughput performance in
2018 are:
• Estimated total volume was 3.3 million teu, down sharply (24%)
from the 2017 estimate of 4.4 million teu, itself down from the 2016
estimate of nearly 6.0 million teu.
• The reason is almost entirely the fact that transhipment activity
at Gulftainer’s flagship terminal Khor Fakkan has shifted to other
Middle Eastern hubs over the last few years, due to liner M&A and the
formation of the mega-alliances.
• Back in 2012, Khor Fakkan accounted for 80% of the company’s Estimated Gulftainer
throughput, and strenuous efforts to expand and diversify the volume continues to
portfolio saw this fall to around 60% in 2013, continuing to drop be hit by transhipment
thereafter. However, it remained the largest terminal in the portfolio losses at Khor Fakkan
and so the loss of transhipment activity has hit hard.
• Equity-adjusted throughput saw a similar decline in 2018, with the
estimated figure of 2.4 million teu down from 3.4 million teu the
previous year.
• It appears that most of the other terminals in the portfolio experienced
declines in volume in 2018, although clearly not as severe as Gulftainer.
The company remains committed to international expansion and now
Continued
counts two concessions in the US as part of its growth strategy. In Port commitment
Canaveral, it has had in place for a couple of years a 35-year concession to international
to develop and operate the container and multi-purpose cargo terminals. expansion logical in
In late 2018, further up the US East Coast in Wilmington (Delaware), face of home port
Gulftainer was awarded a 50-year concession to operate existing and challenges; the US is
develop new terminal facilities. There are plans to build a new container a key focus area
terminal in Edgemoor with 1.2 million teu capacity.
Back home in the Middle East, Gulf Stevedoring (51% owned by
Gulftainer), has signed a deal to manage King Fahad Industrial Port in
Yanbu on the Red Sea. The company will handle all types of cargo including
containers, breakbulk, vehicles and bulk. Gulf Stevedoring already operates
the Northern Container Terminal in Jeddah and Jubail Commercial Port.
At Jeddah, the company is facing a challenge from neighbouring Red Sea
Gateway Terminal which is seeking to gain permission to take over the
Gulf Stevedoring terminal and merge the two facilities.
The key elements of Gulftainer’s strategy can be summarised as:
• Become more vertically integrated and get closer to cargo owners.
Ownership of Momentum Logistics is a key part of this.
183
Gulftainer
• Continue to diversify the portfolio not just in terms of geography but Strategic aims are
cargo sectors e.g. project/breakbulk and reefer in Iraq and Wilmington. diversification –
Seek opportunities in other sectors such as dry and liquid bulks. geography, cargo
• Diversify away from transhipment and focus on gateway business sectors, services –
which has more growth potential and margin opportunity. and focus on small/
medium brownfield
• Focus on acquiring brownfield small/medium sized facilities in opportunities
developing markets.
Table 4.2.3 Gulftainer

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Middle East
Sharjah
Concession from Sharjah
Port Khalid Container 750 385 51.3 100.0% 385
Ports Authority
Terminal
Khorfakkan Concession from Sharjah
Khorfakkan 5,000 600 12.0 100.0% 600
Container Terminal Ports Authority
Umm Qasr * ICT/IPT 20/10-year concession 650 390 60.0 100.0% 390
Northern Announced in Jun 2013
Jeddah Container the acquisition of a 51% 3,000 1,208 40.3 51.0% 616
Terminal stake in Gulf Stevedoring
Co, Saudi Arabia. Gulftainer
now the majority owner and
Jubail
Jubail operates the NCT container 1,000 723 72.3 51.0% 369
Commercial Port
terminal in Jeddah and the
Jubail Commercial Port
25-year concession for new
Tripoli Container 750,000 teu p.a. capacity
Tripoli (Lebanon) 400 13 3.3 100.0% 13
Terminal terminal. Partial operations
started from 2016
South America
Recife ** Recife Terminal 49-year concession 250 0 0.0 100.0% 0
North America
develop and operate
Container and
container and multi-purpose
Canaveral multipurpose 200 6 3.0 100.0% 6
cargo terminal. Capacity of
terminal
200,000 teu p.a. Operational
from Jan 2016
Total 11,250 3,325 29.6 2,379
New developments
In Sep 2018, Gulftainer was awarded a 50-year concession to
Existing terminal
operate existing and develop new terminal facilities. Existing volume
(Berths 1-3) /
Wilmington Del at the port is ~350,000 teu p.a. Plans to build new container terminal
New Container
at Edgemoor facility with 1.2 million teu capacity. Regulatory
Terminal
permission for the deal to be obtained
Notes:
All throughput and capacity figures are Drewry estimates
* Gulftainer owns and operates the Iraq Container Terminal (ICT) and Iraq Projects Terminal (IPT) at the Umm Qasr port. The capacity and throughput of
ICT & IPT have been combined to show total Umm Qasr performance. From Nov 2018, Gulftainer also operates the Iraq South Terminal (IST) on Berth 4.
** Only breakbulk cargo handled in 2018.
184
Macquarie
D uring 2018, infrastructure investor Macquarie had stakes in nine

container terminals in Asia, Europe and North America, as well as
interests in several non-container terminals. The company has recently
been very active in the M&A sector, selling its stakes in four terminals
and acquiring another terminal, as well consolidating ownership in two
further terminals:
• The majority holding in DCT Gdansk was sold to a consortium
Very high level of M&A
including PSA. activity by Macquarie
• PSA also acquired Halterm and Penn Terminals on the ECNA.
• Fraser Surrey Docks in Greater Vancouver was sold to DP World
(which already owns terminals in Vancouver port and Prince Rupert).
• Long Beach Container Terminal was acquired by Macquarie from
OOCL (Cosco) for $1.78 billion in April 2019.
• Macquarie acquired Ceres (NYK)’s minority holdings in Montreal and
New Orleans.
The key takeaways in terms of throughput performance for Macquarie in
2018 are:
• Total volume increased by 16%, reaching 10.4 million teu, while Double-digit volume
equity-adjusted throughput was 6.2 million teu, up 18%. growth achieved
• All of the terminals in the portfolio reported increased volume in 2018, across the portfolio,
with growth ranging from 4% (Los Angeles, the only terminal not to with all terminals
achieve a double-digit growth rate) to nearly 80% (Fraser Surrey). reporting increased
traffic
• In absolute terms, Maher Terminals in New York achieved the largest
additional volume (over 400,000 teu), with Busan and Gdansk both
adding more than 300,000 teu.
Table 4.2.4 Macquarie

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
30% shareholding along

Busan BNCT with CMA CGM (Terminal 2,500 2,349 94.0 30.0% 705
Link) (12%) and others
Eastern Europe
Gdansk DCT Gdansk * 64% shareholding 3,000 1,932 64.4 63.8% 1,233
North America
Halifax Halterm ** 550 306 55.7 100.0% 306
operating company
Philadelphia Penn Terminals ** 421 254 60.3 100.0% 254
operating company
185
Macquarie
Table 4.2.4 Macquarie cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Fraser Surrey 100% shareholding in
Vancouver 640 250 39.1 100.0% 250
Docks *** operating company
Yusen Terminals Leased terminal. 49%
Los Angeles 1,700 1,398 82.3 49.0% 685
Inc stake via NYK Ports
Napoleon Leased terminal. 24%
New Orleans Container stake via NYK Ports 432 283 65.6 24.0% 68
Terminal (Ceres) #
Leased terminal. 12.2%
Maisonneuve/
stake via NYK Ports
Montreal Viau Terminals 820 698 85.1 12.2% 85
(Ceres). TIL holds 50%
(Termont)
stake #
80% direct stake, 9.8%
New York Maher Terminals indirect stake via NYK 3,600 2,898 80.5 89.8% 2,603
Ports
Total 15,681 10,370 66.1 6,190
New developments
Long Beach
LBCT acquired by Macquarie from OOCL (Cosco) for $1.78 billion
Long Beach Container 100.0%
in Apr 2019
Terminal
Notes:
Facilities at Philadelphia and Vancouver are multi-purpose ones (containers and breakbulk); however, only container throughput and capacity are
reported above.
Macquarie also has significant stakes in two non-container terminals in China (Nanjing and Tianjin).
* Stake sold in 2019 to consortium including PSA.
** Sold to PSA in 2019.
*** Sold to DP World in 2019.

#
Macquarie completed the acquisition of additional 51% (for a total of 100%) shareholding interest in Ceres from NYK in Mar 2019.
Macquarie capacity for BNCT differs from the CMA CGM (2,400,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Macquarie capacity for Yusen Terminals Inc differs from the NYK (1,765,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Macquarie capacity for Maisonneuve / Viau Terminals (Termont) differs from the TIL (735,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Macquarie capacity and throughput for Maher Terminals differs from the NYK (3,000,000 teu) capacity and (2,737,000 teu) throughput for the same
terminal.
Macquarie capacity for Napoleon Container Terminal differs from the NYK (476,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
186
Mitsui
M itsui is a large Japanese conglomerate with interests in a wide range

of industrial sectors. It has brought together a portfolio of interests
in container terminals, centred on Singapore-based niche operator Portek
Mitsui’s role is
essentially as an
owner and investor
International. The overall portfolio in 2018 included interests in 10 terminal rather than an
businesses in various locations around the world (none of which are in the operator
company’s home base of Japan). Mitsui has no greenfield developments or
reported acquisitions in the pipeline, nor is it making any disposals.
Mitsui’s role is more as an owner and investor rather than an operator,
which is the primary reason why Drewry does not include it for
consideration as a GTO/ITO (the other being that the volumes seen at
several of the terminals in the portfolio are under management contracts
rather than full ownership and control). It is important to note that
Portek was originally port equipment engineering service provider, and
while it remains so, it also offers a blend of engineering, IT and financial
solutions, with a focus on capacity and productivity enhancement.
Portek is a niche operator of small-to-medium terminals.
The highlights of Mitsui’s throughput performance in 2018 are:
• Total traffic increased by 19% to 3.9 million teu, while equity-adjusted Strong volume growth
volume was 1.4 million teu, up 31%. in 2018 driven mainly
• Mitsui now has stakes in three terminals in Tanjung Priok, having by Tanjung Priok
acquired the DHU facility at the end of 2018. The large NPCT1
terminals
continued its ramp up after commencing operations in 2017.
Combined volume across these facilities increased from just under 1.0
million teu in 2017 to 1.7 million teu in 2018, a 57% increase.
• Riga in Latvia achieved 19% growth while Bejaia and Ho Chi Minh
City were in single digits.
• On the downside, traffic at the Gabonese ports was down by a third
as was that at Buenos Aires (although the shareholding in the latter is
only 5%).
Table 4.2.5 Mitsui

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Southeast Asia
Agreement signed
by Portek with port
PT Serbaguna
management in 2003 to
Tanjung Priok Terminals 300 139 46.4 51.0% 71
supply equipment. In
(T009)
return, Serbaguna shares
50% of its revenue
New Priok Joint operating company
Container comprising IPC (51%),
1,500 1,170 78.0 16.3% 191
Tanjung Priok Terminal One Mitsui, PSA and NYK
(NPCT1) (collectively 49%)
187
Mitsui
Table 4.2.5 Mitsui cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
PT Dwipahasta
Utamaduta 67% stake acquired by
Tanjung Priok 600 368 61.4 67.0% 247
(DHU), Berths Portek in Dec 2017
110-113
Laem Chabang B2 Terminal 700 832 118.9 49.0% 408
Evergreen (51%)
Vietnam
Ho Chi Minh International 16% shareholding with
680 580 85.3 15.7% 91
City Container APL (CMA CGM) (47%)
Terminal (VICT)
South Europe
Portek has a 55% stake
Valletta Gateway in JV with Tumas Group
Valletta Terminals Ltd of Malta to manage and 200 4 1.8 55.0% 2
(VGT) operate the terminal since
2006. 30-year concession
Eastern Europe
Rigas
Universalais 100% ownership of multi-
Riga Terminals/ purpose terminal through 140 129 91.9 100.0% 129
Riga Universal Portek
Terminal (RUT)
South America
5% shareholding in the
Terminales Rio de terminal since 1998
Buenos Aires 650 363 55.8 5.0% 18
la Plata with DPW the main
shareholder
Africa
49% stake acquired
Bejaia
by Portek in 2005,
Mediterranean
Bejaia operational in 2006. 300 253 84.3 49.0% 124
Terminals SPA
20-year concession in
(BMT)
Algerian terminal
Portek holds a 25-year
concession with port
Gabon Ports
management signed in
Owendo Management 130 71 54.6 100.0% 71
2007 for activities in the
(GPM)
ports of D’Owendo and
Gentil *
Total 7,218 3,909 54.2 1,351
Notes:
In Banten, Portek has a management contract for a 150,000 teu capacity multi-purpose terminal.
* In Gabon, Portek has a concession / management contract for the whole public port of Owendo (Libreville). Within the public port, a Bolloré-led JV
has the concession of the Owendo container terminal activity.
188
MMC Corporation (MMC)
M MC is a large conglomerate with interests in energy, utilities,

construction and engineering, as well as ports. Through MMC
Ports, it has majority or sole interests in facilities at all of the main
Malaysian ports including Port Klang (Northport), Tanjung Pelepas,
Johor Port and Penang. The company also has an associate stake in Red
Sea Gateway Terminal in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, but it does not report
volumes. Besides containers, significant volumes of general cargo are also
handled, at Port Klang and Johor in particular. MMC has no greenfield
projects in the pipeline and no reported divestments or acquisitions.
The key takeaways from MMC’s throughput performance in 2018 are:
• Total volume increased 3.4%, reaching 14.2 million teu while
equity-adjusted volume was 11.5 million teu, up by over 10%. MMC
increased its stake in Penang from 49% to 100%, hence the higher
growth in equity versus total teu. 10% increase in
• Transhipment hub Tanjung Pelepas registered 7% growth for the year equity teu, boosted by
(with both transhipment and gateway traffic growing at a similar rate) Penang stake increase
but Northport in Port Klang was down nearly 6%, impacted by the
switch of some transhipment business to Singapore.
• Gateway port Johor recorded 4.5% volume growth while overall traffic
at Penang was unchanged from 2017.
Table 4.2.6 MMC Corporation Berhad (MMC)

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Southeast Asia
Port of Tanjung 70% shareholding with
Tanjung Pelepas 12,500 8,961 71.7 70.0% 6,273
Pelepas APMT (30%)
Johor Johor Port 100% ownership 1,200 942 78.5 100.0% 942
99.1% ownership via
Port Klang Northport 5,600 2,785 49.7 99.1% 2,760
NCB Holdings
49% effective shareholding
increased to 100% in
May 2018 by acquiring
Penang Butterworth 100 90 90.0 100.0% 90
remaing 51% from Seaport
Terminal Johor (MMC’s
majority owner)
North
Penang 2,000 1,420 71.0 100.0% 1,420
Butterworth
Total 21,400 14,198 66.3 11,485
New developments
Tanjung Bruas In early 2018, MMC agreed to acquire a 70% equity interest in KMB
Melaka Port Multipurpose Seaport, which operates Tanjung Bruas multipurpose pier in the 70.0%
Terminal port of Melaka. A trial container vessel was handled in Apr 2019
Notes:
MMC also has a 20% associate stake in Red Sea Gateway Terminal Company Limited at Jeddah port which handled an estimated 1.69 million teu in
2018. Volume is not reported in MMC’s annual report and not included in above figures.
MMC capacity for Port of Tanjung Pelepas differs from APMT capacity (10,553,000 teu) for the same terminal.
189
Modern Terminals Limited (MTL)
H ong Kong-based Modern Terminals (MTL) has interests in

four terminals in China and is majority-owned by Hong Kong
conglomerate Wharf Holdings, with China Merchants having a
significant minority stake. Besides having 100% ownership of the very
large facilities in Hong Kong, MTL has interests in three terminals in
neighbouring Shenzhen, of which Dachan Bay is majority owned.
A critical development for MTL is the terminal alliance involving all but
one of the operators in Hong Kong port (DPW). It will cover 23 of the 24
berths and includes the development of a common terminal operating
system to allow coordinated and more efficient use of infrastructure and
resources. This is seen as key to addressing Hong Kong’s ongoing market
share losses. Linked to this is a focus on digitisation and smart ports.
MTL has, for example, joined TradeLens, jointly developed by Maersk
and IBM to apply blockchain to the world’s global supply chain.
The key takeaways for MTL for 2018 are:
• Total throughput in 2018 was 14.5 million teu, up 3.6% on 2017 while
equity-adjusted volume was 7.4 million teu, up just over 1%.
MTL bucked the trend
• Traffic at the company’s flagship Hong Kong terminal was up just
in Hong Kong port by
over 1%, a significant achievement given that overall Hong Kong port registering growth in
volume was down by over 5%. 2018
• DaChan Bay though slipped by over 7%, mitigated by growth of
around 7% at Shekou and Chiwan. However the latter two are
minority stakes, hence the impact on equity teu is noteworthy.
Table 4.2.7 Modern Terminals Ltd (MTL)

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
Modern Terminals Kwai Chung terminal
Hong Kong 7,000 5,300 73.8 100.0% 5,300
Limited (MTL) * 100% owned
65% owned by MTL
DaChan Bay and remaining 35% with
Shenzhen 3,000 1,230 26.5 65.0% 799
Terminals Shenzhen Yantian Port
Group
Shekou Container 20% owned by MTL with
Shenzhen 6,000 5,620 84.6 20.0% 1,124
Terminals CMHI holding 80%
Chiwan Container MTL and CMHI JV holds
Shenzhen 4,000 2,400 62.8 8.0% 192
Terminal 20%, with MTL 8%
Total 20,000 14,550 73% 7,415
Notes:
* Throughput figures cover all contracted volume. This includes some handled by other nearby terminals but commercial relationship with shipping
lines is maintained by MTL.
MTL Hong Kong is owned by The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd (68%), China Merchants Holdings (International) Co Ltd (27%) and Jebsen Securities Ltd (5%).
MTL throughput for Chiwan Container Terminal, Shenzhen, differs from China Merchants throughput (2,281,290 teu) for the same terminal.
190
Neltume Ports
N eltume Ports has interests in eight container terminal in Chile,

Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina, with the home-port operation at
Valparaiso accounting for 38% of its total throughput in 2018. Neltume
has no greenfield projects or acquisitions in the pipeline. However, in early
2019 the company did consolidate its ownership of its Arica terminal, so
that it is now fully controlled by two shareholders, Neltume and Belfi.
In September 2018, it was announced that Canadian conglomerate
ATCO had acquired a 40% stake in Neltume Ports for about $340
million. The transaction is said to complement ATCO’s existing Canadian investor
businesses, which include electricity and natural gas infrastructure, ATCO has taken a
modular construction and logistical support services. Richard von largest minority stake
Appen, Chairman of Ultramar said of the deal “We have defined a in Neltume
growth strategy with both sizeable and attractive opportunities that
support the company’s long-term regional development”. There is an
intention to pursue growth therefore and to focus on South America.
The key points of Neltume’s 2018 throughput performance are:
• Total throughput dropped by around 6% to 2.3 million teu, but Total throughput
equity-adjusted volume grew by just under 1% to 1.3 million teu. was down but
• Overall traffic was hit by a 17% decline at Valparaiso, where lengthy equity teu was up
strike action by dockers hit activity levels. due to increase
in Montevideo
• The bright star in Chile was Coronel which registered a 23% increase shareholding
in throughput in 2018, topping 0.5 million teu for the year.
• Throughput was also down at Montevideo (11%) but equity teu was up
35% due to an increase in stake to 100% in 2018 (compared with 66% in
2017). Consequently, Neltume’s overall equity teu inched up in 2018.
Table 4.2.8 Neltume Ports

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
South America
50% in JV with Belfi since
Terminal Puerto
Arica early 2019 (up from 35%). 550 241 43.8 35.0% 84
Arica (TPA)
Concession until 2030
40% in JV with Belfi and CMB.
Puerto Puerto Angamos
Concession for 30 years. 660 154 23.3 40.0% 61
Angamos Terminal
Terminal operational in 2003
Terminal Puerto 70% in JV with Belfi to operate
Coquimbo 65 2 2.7 70.0% 1
Coquimbo (TPC) the terminal
Terminal Pacífico 60.01% in JV with Contug
Valparaiso 1,300 879 67.6 60.0% 527
Sur (TPS) Terminals (MSC) from end 2016
Puerto Coronel 16.7% in JV to operate the
Coronel 756 529 70.0 16.7% 88
Terminal terminal
Montevideo Montecon Terminal 100% stake from end 2017 600 446 74.3 100.0% 446
50% in JV with Vicentín Group to
Terminal Puerto
Rosario operate 65 hactre multi-purpose 150 72 47.8 50.0% 36
Rosario (TPR)
terminal on River Parana
86% ownership in late 2017.
Rio Grande Sagres Sagres operates in public port 97 8 8.1 86.0% 7
area of Rio Grande
Total 4,178 2,330 55.8 1,251
191
Ports America
P orts America operates in more than 40 ports in the US, handling

container, bulk, break bulk and automotive cargo, and is one of
the major operators in the country. Oaktree Capital, through Highstar
Capital is the majority owner of the company, with the Canada Pension
Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) holding a 10% stake. In March 2019, it
was announced that Brookfield Asset Management would be acquiring
62% of the Oaktree business in a cash-and-shares deal.
For some time it looked as if Ports America might be sold to a strategic
investor, with Yilport reportedly the frontrunner. However, a deal never The company has
materialised and since then the strategy for Ports America appears to switched from sale
have switched from a sale mode to a growth mode. In particular, Ports mode to growth mode,
America is seeking to gain a greater role in the supply chain, moving with particular focus
beyond the terminal gates and getting closer to cargo owners. Any future on cargo owners
acquisitions are likely to be in North America, the company has said.
The highlights of Ports America’s throughput performance in 2018 are:
• Throughput generated by all facilities in which full operations were
carried out rose by just under 2% to 8.9 million teu. US terminals
collectively achieved 1.6% growth while the company’s sole overseas
interest, a 10% stake in the Kao Ming terminal, Kaohsiung, saw a 2.8%
uplift in volumes.
• Equity-adjusted throughput from these terminals was 3.7 million teu,
up nearly 3%.
• Ports America’s US Gulf terminal operations performed best in 2018,
with both New Orleans and Houston registering double-digit growth.
Modest growth in
At New Orleans, under the terms of a new and restated agreement,
2018 overall, but
the port authority is issuing Ports America with a 50-year lease to
double-digit growth in
continue to operate at the Napoleon Avenue and Nashville Avenue several key terminals
Terminals. As part of the agreement, Ports America will invest $66.5
million in infrastructure and equipment to accommodate up to four
new container cranes at the terminals.
• The Husky terminal in Tacoma also reported double-digit growth for
the year.
• The Long Beach terminal (K Line) saw the largest fall in volumes
(14%), partially compensated by a 5% growth at the Los Angeles
terminal (Yang Ming/Cosco).
• Stevedoring volumes amounted to 4.4 million teu in 2018 (on an
equity-adjusted basis), down from 4.6 million teu in 2017, mainly
due to the cessation of provision of this service in Pierce County
Terminal (Tacoma).
192
Ports America
Table 4.2.9 Ports America

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
Kao Ming Container 10% stake acquired from Yang
Kaohsiung 3,300 1,746 52.9 10.0% 175
Terminal (Terminal 6) Ming in Jun 2012
North America
Port Newark Ports America leases and
New York * Container Terminal operates the terminal (JV with 1,470 1,271 86.5 50.0% 636
(PNCT) TIL)
Seagirt Container Ports America leases and
Baltimore 1,867 1,095 58.7 100.0% 1,096
Terminal operates the terminal
Dundalk Marine Ports America leases and
Baltimore 70 8 11.8 100.0% 9
Terminal operates the terminal
Napoleon Avenue Stevedoring and terminal
New Orleans 500 391 78.2 100.0% 392
Container Terminal operations
Bayport Container
Houston JV with Terminal Link 1,000 532 53.2 49.0% 261
Terminal
Eller-ITO and JVs with Continental Stevedoring
Miami 1,266 762 60.2 50.0% 381
POMTOC and Florida Stevedoring
West Basin JV with Yang Ming (40%) /
Los Angeles * 2,100 1,591 75.8 20.0% 319
Container Terminal China Shipping (40%)
International
JV with K Line (70%), Ports
Long Beach Transportation 1,750 915 52.3 30.0% 275
America (30%) from Oct 2014
Service (ITS), Pier G
Husky Terminal JV with K Line (70%), Ports
Tacoma 750 599 79.8 30.0% 180
(Terminal 4) America (30%) from Oct 2014
Terminal operations total 14,073 8,910 63.3 3,724
Stevedoring operations
Norfolk International
Hampton Roads Stevedoring 1,500 1,306 87.1 50.0% 654
Terminal
Pierce County
Tacoma Stevedoring operations # 660 148 22.4 100.0% 148
Terminal
Olympic Container
Tacoma Stevedoring operations 263 77 29.4 100.0% 78
Terminal
Savannah Garden City Stevedoring operations 4,500 2,346 52.1 100.0% 2,346
Various operations in other ports
Other Locations 1,200 1,199 100.0% 1,199
in the US, mostly stevedoring
Stevedoring operations total 8,123 5,076 4,425
Terminal + stevedoring operations 8,149
Notes:
* Ports America handles 100% of stevedoring volume.
#
As of May 2018, Ports America no longer provides stevedoring operations at PCT Terminal.
Ports America acts as a stevedore only in a number of locations (i.e. it is not the exclusive leaseholder of a terminal). In these instances the
shareholding figure shown relates to Ports America’s estimated shareholding in the stevedoring company. In some instances other companies carry
out stevedoring at the same terminal, so the utilisation level for Ports America at these terminals may appear artificially low.
Napoleon Avenue Container Terminal, New Orleans, is understood to have two separate operators - Ports America and an NYK / TIL JV. This may
lead to an element of double counting.
Bayport Container Terminal, Houston, is understood to have two separate operators - Ports America-CMA CGM (Terminal Link) JV and TIL-Ceres /
NYK JV. This may lead to an element of double counting.
Ports America capacity for Port Newark Container Terminal (PNCT) differs from the TIL (1,625,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Ports America capacity for Kao Ming Container Terminal (Terminal 6) differs from the China Merchants Ports (2,800,000 teu) capacity and Cosco
(2,800,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Ports America throughput and capacity for West Basin Container Terminal differs from the Cosco (1,555,000 teu) throughput and (1,900,000 teu)
capacity for the same terminal.
Ports America throughput and capacity for International Transportation Service (ITS), Pier G at Long Beach differs from K Line (970,000 teu)
throughput and (2,726,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
Ports America throughput and capacity for Husky Terminal differs from K Line (650,000 teu) throughput and (1,038,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
193
Shanghai International Ports Group (SIPG)
S IPG is one of the world’s largest container terminal operators

through its activities in its home port of Shanghai (the world’s largest
container port) where it is owner and operator of numerous terminals,
including the largest which are on Yangshan Island. It also has interests
in several other terminals for seagoing vessels in China, as well as
a number of river and barge terminals (the throughput of the latter
exceeded 4.0 million teu in 2018).
Greenfield
SIPG has no overseas terminal interests (having exited from its minority
development at Haifa,
stake in Zeebrugge at the end of 2017) but is developing a new greenfield
Israel, due on stream
port facility in Haifa, Israel, where operations are due to commence in 2021. in 2021
The key takeaways from SIPG’s 2018 throughput performance are:
• Total throughput reached 47.6 million teu, of which almost 90% was
generated by Shanghai. This was a 4% increase on 2017 (Shanghai
terminals up 4.5%, other terminals up 6%).
• Shanghai activity was aided by the Yangshan Phase 4 terminal Equity teu up 6.5%,
becoming operational. The total volume handled at Yangshan was boosted by growth in
over 18 million teu, which if taken alone would make it the eighth Shanghai and addition
largest container port in the world. of minority stake in
OOCL terminals
• Equity-adjusted throughput was 35.5 million teu, 6.5% up on the 2017
level, boosted by the inclusion of SIPG’s near 10% stake in OOCL
from mid-2018, and hence the crediting of SIPG with this proportion
of the OOCL terminal portfolio’s equity teu.
Table 4.2.10 Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG)

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East
Wenzhou Jinyang JV with Wenzhou Port
Wenzhou Container (40.5%), Ningbo Port 500 673 134.7 20.0% 135
Terminal (39.5%)
Pinghu Dushan JV with Pinghu Dushan
Jiaxing 300 154 51.3 65.0% 100
Container Terminal Port (35%)
Jiangyin Sunan JV with PYI Corporation
Jiangyin 1,000 574 57.4 30.0% 172
Container Terminal (40%), Jiangyin Port (30%)
Nanjing Port Co., JV with Nanjing Port
Nanjing 2,200 2,930 133.2 10.28% 301
Ltd Group (>50%)
Taicang Port
SIPG Zhenghe JV with Taicang port
Taicang 1,000 1,312 131.2 45.0% 590
Container (55%)
Terminal Co Ltd
SIPG Yidong
Shanghai Container 100% shareholding 2,800 4,005 143.0 100.0% 4,005
Terminal
SIPG Luojing
Shanghai 100% shareholding 100 13 13.2 100.00% 13
Terminal
194
Table 4.2.10 Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
Far East cont’d
SIPGL Gongqing
Shanghai 100% shareholding 250 53 21.0 100.0% 53
Terminal
SIPG Zhendong
Terminal
Shanghai 100% shareholding 6,000 6,552 109.2 100.00% 6,552
(Waigaoqiao
Phases 2 & 3)
Shanghai Pudong
International
JV with Cosco Pacific
Shanghai Terminal 3,000 2,602 86.7 40.0% 1,041
(30%) and HP (30%)
(Waigaoqiao
Phase 1)
Shanghai East
Container Terminal
Shanghai JV with APMT (49%) 4,000 4,103 102.6 51.00% 2,092
(Waigaoqiao
Phase 4)
Shanghai
Mingdong JV with HP (50%),
Shanghai Container Terminal China Shipping Terminal 5,600 6,252 111.6 30.0% 1,876
(Waigaoqiao Development (20%)
Phase 5 & 6)
Shanghai
Shengdong
International
Container Terminal
(Yangshan Phases
1 & 2)
Shanghai
Guandong
International
Container Terminal
(Yangshan Phase
3)
Shanghai
Shangdong
International
Container Terminal
(Yangshan Phase
4)
Sub-total (seagoing vessel terminals) 45,368 47,648 105.0 35,355
In Jul 2017, it was
announced that Cosco
Four terminals Shipping Holdings (90.1%)
in Taiwan, USA OOCL and SIPG (9.9%) would be 1,892 9.9% 187
and China acquiring OOCL’s parent
company OOIL. Deal was
finalised in Jul 2018
Total 35,542
195
Table 4.2.10 Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) cont’d

2018
Share- Equity
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%) (%) (’000 teu)
River terminals *
SIPG Jiujiang JV with Jiujiang Municipal
Jiujiang 335 405 120.9 91.7% 371
Port Government (8.33%)
JV with Wuhan Municipal
Wuhan Port
Wuhan Government (26%), 1,595 951 59.6 49.0% 466
Group
Wuhan New Port (25%)
JV with Hunan
Chenglingji Lingang
New Area Development
Chenglingji Port
Chenglingji Investment (58.75%), 500 505 100.9 25.0% 126
Group
Hunan Changsha New
Port (10%), CCCC
Investment (6.25%)
Wuhu Port Co.
Wuhu JV with Wuhu port (65%) 600 951 158.6 35.0% 333
Ltd
ANJI - SIPG
JV with Zhejiang Huzhou
Anji International Port 300 229 76.3 30.0% 69
Anji Port (70%)
Co Ltd
Chongqing
Orchard JV with Taicang port
Chongqing 660 253 38.3 35.0% 88
Container (65%)
Terminals Limited
Chongqing
International JV with Chongqing Port
Chongqing 1,540 508 33.0 35.0% 178
Container (65%)
Terminal
JV with Yibin state-owned
Yibin Port Co.,
Yibin Assets Management 500 403 80.5 30.0% 121
Ltd
(97%)
New developments
SIPG won the bid to develop and operate a new port in Haifa,
Haifa New port Israel, in Mar 2015. 25-year deal, operations expected to
commence in 2021
Notes:
Capacity figures for each terminal are mainly Drewry estimates as company figures focus on design rather than operational capacity, and also have
complexities with regard to physical facilities vs. subsidiary company names / holdings. This means that throughput figures for each “terminal” may
not correspond directly to the physical facilities and equipment of that terminal, and utilisation levels can appear excessively high.
#
OOCL throughput figure shown under “Throughput” column is this company’s equity teu figure for six months.
* River terminals are defined by Drewry as terminals that cannot (or do not) handle seagoing vessels.
SIPG capacity for Nanjing Port Co., Ltd differs from the Cosco (4,500,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
SIPG capacity for Shanghai Pudong International Terminal (Waigaoqiao Phase 1) differs from the Cosco (2,300,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
SIPG capacity for Shanghai East Container Terminal (Waigaoqiao Phase 4) differs from the APMT (4,150,000 teu) capacity for the same terminal.
196
Other Players
Abu Dhabi Ports (ADP), owner of Abu Dhabi Terminals (ADT), is Abu Dhabi Ports has
the landlord and developer of the new port of Khalifa in Abu Dhabi. international growth
ADP now has two JV terminal agreements with major players in its aspirations
home port, these being Cosco Shipping Ports and TIL/MSC. ADP’s
other business interests include the Khalifa Industrial Zone Abu Dhabi
(KIZAD) as well as general cargo and passenger handling in Zayed and
Mussafah ports in Abu Dhabi. The company has stated its ambition
to pursue international investment opportunities and already has one
overseas business, in Guinea, West Africa. Here it runs a lighterage
operation known as Kamsar Container Terminal for Emirates Global
Aluminium. The terminal has two berths and is capable of handling
ships up to 140 metre in length. Closer to home, ADP also has a 35-year
concession to operate Fujairah port in the UAE.
Adani Ports is an Indian-based stock market listed company with a Adani Ports is
growing portfolio in the port sector. The parent group is a very large developing a new
conglomerate with activities in coal mining (both in India and overseas), terminal in Myanmar
power generation and transmission, as well as ports and logistics. Adani
operates ports in Mundra, Dahej, Hazira, Dhamra, Vizhinjam and
Kattupalli and terminals in Mormugao, Visakhapatnam, Ennore and
Kandla (Tuna-Tekra), along with ICDs in several locations. Besides
containers, coal is also an important commodity handled at the Indian
ports, and Adani also holds a 99-year lease on the Abbot Point coal
port in Queensland, Australia. The company is not only seeking further
expansion opportunities in the port sector in India, but also overseas. To
this end, it was announced in May 2019 that Adani is to develop Adani
Yangon International Terminal on the Yangon River under a 50-year
build, operate and transfer agreement with the Myanmar government.
With an overall investment of $290 million, Phase 1 will have up to
150,000 teu capacity once it is completed by the end of 2020 and Phase 2
will then take a further six months and increase capacity to 800,000 teu
per annum. The Yangon River can accommodate container ships of up to
1,500 teu in size.
Arcus Infrastructure Partners is an infrastructure investor that was Arcus has exited
a joint shareholder in pan-European bulk and multi-purpose terminal from Forth Ports and
operator Euroports and 63% owner of the UK-based port operator Forth Euroports
Ports, which has activities in Tilbury and in several ports in Scotland.
In late 2018, it was announced that Arcus had agreed to sell its shares
in Forth Ports to Canada’s PSP Investments. PSP, which was already an
investor in Forth Ports, subsequently shared the Arcus investment with
long-term investment partners including GLIL, Australia’s First State
Super and Cbus. Then in March 2019, Arcus, along with its partners
Antin and Brookfield entered into an agreement to sell Euroports to a
new joint venture headed by R-Logitech (Monaco Resources Group).
197
Other Players
Based in Canada, Brookfield Asset Management/Brookfield Brookfield has exited

Infrastructure Partners was a joint shareholder in Euroports (see from Forth Ports but
above) and owns PD Ports (Teesport) in the UK. Brookfield also owns acquired a stake in
Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal in Australia. In the US, Brookfield has a Ports America
strategic alliance with MOL and has a 49% stake in the TraPac terminals
in Los Angeles and Oakland. The company has varied infrastructure
investments worldwide including property and power. In March 2019, it
was announced that Brookfield Asset Management would be acquiring
62% of the Oaktree stake in Ports America.
Global Infrastructure Partners (GIP) is a large infrastructure investor GIP holds Port of
with investments across energy, water, waste and transportation. GIP is Melbourne and
active in the port and terminal sector, with interests in companies that reduces its stake in
are landlords and also handle cargo. The company had a 35% stake in TIL
MSC’s TIL business, acquired through a deal worth $1.9 billion in 2013.
This was subsequently increased to 49% with co-investors. In early 2019
it was announced that GIP would be selling 19% of its stake, with 10%
going to Singapore sovereign wealth fund GIC and 9% to MSC, resulting
in MSC’s holding increasing to 60%. The GIP Australia Fund, together
with a number of co-investors, has a ~40% equity stake in the 50-year
lease of the Port of Melbourne from the State Government of Victoria.
Global Ports Holding (GPH) is a Turkey-based company with interests GPH a major cruise
primarily in cruise ports and terminals in the Mediterranean and claims port operator in the
to be the world’s largest cruise port operator with presence mainly in Med
the Mediterranean but also in Havana and Singapore. Besides cruise,
GPH also has interests in cargo-handling ports. It is the sole owner and
operator of Port Akdeniz – Port of Antalya in Turkey, a multipurpose
facility with capability for cruise ships, container handling and bulk
cargo vessels as well as a marina. GPH also owns a 64.5% interest in
Container Terminal and General Cargo JSC-Bar, the company that
operates the cargo terminal at Port of Adria (Bar) in Montenegro, which
has an operating concession for 30 years, terminating in 2043.
198
2019 Global Container Terminal Operators Analysis by World Region
5. Analysis by world region

Five-year regional demand and capacity projections
T able 5.1 sets out Drewry’s projection of container port demand and
capacity by region through to 2023, by analysing 20 sub-regions. The
countries that make up each sub-region are listed in Appendix 1b. Table
5.2 represents an alternative forecast, which includes capacity expansion
projects that Drewry regards as unconfirmed. These projects are unlikely
to find their way into our forecasts, unless perhaps demand growth in
certain locations turns out to be much higher than expected.
Our container port demand forecast for the next five years is for global
growth of 4.4% per annum on average, lifting world container port
throughput from 784 million teu in 2018 to 973 million teu by 2023,
an absolute increase of almost 190 million teu. The forecast growth rate
is lower than in last year’s report (5.7% CAGR), inevitably affected by Five-year container
economic and trade war issues that have surfaced in the last 12 months. port demand forecast
For example, in its spring update, the IMF again revised downwards
is 4.4% per annum
its growth projection of the world economy to a 10-year low of 3.3%.
This has impacted our year 2019 forecast in particular and in turn this
automatically influences subsequent years. The latest five-year forecast
is a far cry from the heady days of the 2000s when our forecasts were
around 9% growth per annum until the global financial crisis of 2007-08
brought this to a shuddering halt.
Numerous factors have caused Drewry to lower its overall box handling
growth forecast for 2019 from 3.9% to 3.0% (and hence reduce the
growth in subsequent years) including:
• The escalation of the US-China trade war (a detailed analysis of this Many uncertain
issue can be found in the June 2019 edition of Drewry’s Container economic and political
Forecaster report) factors at play right
• The uncertainty caused by Brexit now
• Fears that China’s years of rapid economic growth are coming to an end
• Tighter credit policies in China
• Further confrontation between the US and Iran
• Heightened tensions between Iran and other Middle East states
primarily Saudi Arabia – following attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf
• The ending of state-funded stimulus programmes (e.g. quantitative
easing) which has put the brake on global expansion
• Oil price volatility
• Severe stress lines in the Argentine, Brazilian and Turkish economies
• New car sales in the advanced economies have peaked and may
decelerate with greener technologies being developed to reduce pollution
While these issues play out centre stage, in the background there is the
steady drum beat of near-shoring and regionalisation which would have
negative consequences for deep-sea liner shipping.
199
Our detailed modelling results in varying forecast growth rates at the South Asia, Southeast
regional level. Several locations are expected to outperform markedly the Asia and North Africa
global average, most notably South Asia (7.5% CAGR), Southeast Asia are forecast to have
(6.3% CAGR) and North Africa (5.4% CAGR). On the flipside, several the highest demand
regions are projected to be well below the average, in particular Oceania growth rates through
(2% CAGR) and West Africa (2.5% CAGR). Hovering around the 3% to 2023
growth per annum mark are the two Mediterranean regions, the Middle
East and WCNA. Greater China is the largest region in our analysis
(accounting for 31% of global throughout in 2018) and the forecast here
is bang on the global average of 4.4% per annum.
Using bottom-up projections on a terminal-by-terminal basis, global
container port capacity is projected to increase by just under 110 million
teu by 2023 at a CAGR of 1.9%, based on confirmed additions only. This Global terminal
is well below the projected demand growth and reflects the continued capacity is forecast
easing off from greenfield projects by investors over the last few years. to increase by just
As a consequence, average utilisation at the global level is forecast to under 2% per annum
through to 2023
increase significantly from 70% in 2018 to 79% by 2023. This though
remains a comfortable level for both operators and customer alike.
The regions forecast to have the highest growth in capacity are North,
East and West Africa (relatively small markets where a small number
of large expansions e.g. Tanger Med have a large bearing), South Asia
and the Gulf Coast of North America. By contrast the lowest growth is
predicted for Greater China and Northwest Europe (both less than 1%
per annum).
Figure 5.1. Projected regional container handling (mteu) and average annual growth (%), 2018-2023
3.4% 4.9%
3.6% 136 160

423 538
68 81
5.1%
69 89
4.1%
3.7% 27 34
48 57
2.0%
13 14
2018 Average annual growth (2018-2023) 2023
200
At the regional level, almost all locations are projected to see their average Most regions can
utilisation levels increase. The sharpest upward swings are expected in expect to see an
Greater China and Southeast Asia (with the former hitting 100% by 2023). increase in average
In Southeast Asia, around 15 million teu of new capacity is expected to be utilisation levels
added by 2023, but our bullish demand growth rate in excess of 6% per
annum pushes up utilisation sharply to nearly 90% by 2023.
However, as far as the projections in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 for Greater
China are concerned, a few notes and caveats are necessary. Throughput
figures for Chinese ports are complicated by the fact that many ports
and terminals handle a large number of barge moves as well as seagoing
vessels. The line between barge moves and feeder moves is often blurred.
It is also a challenge to distinguish between what is and what is not a
river port (a river port is one that does not handle seagoing vessels).
Confusion can arise among ports that are physically located up rivers
(and are river ports in this sense), but handle seagoing vessels, compared
with upriver ports that handle only barges. Drewry’s aim is to record
only seagoing vessel container traffic, but it is often very difficult to
isolate this. Some observers also suggest that certain Chinese ports use
methodologies to count their throughput that result in inflated totals.
With demand subject to this level of uncertainty, it is difficult to forecast
it as well as to match it to capacity. Chinese container port capacity itself
is also subject to complications (as discussed in Appendix 2, item 4).
This said, it is the case that the previous very rapid pace of capacity
expansion in Chinese ports is on hold, with the focus instead being on Chinese capacity
consolidation or port and terminal ownership into large groups. This, expansion appears to
plus the uncertainty about China’s international trade growth in the face be largely on hold
of tariff wars and protectionism, suggests that the authorities are taking a
cautious approach.
Marked increases in average utilisation levels are also forecast for
Northwest Europe (but this simply brings it to a more healthy 73%),
North Asia (again to a healthy 78% in 2023) and WCSA (similar story).
Three regions are forecast to see a decline in average utilisation: the
Middle East (slight fall), and North and West Africa (11% and 9%
decline respectively). As mentioned above, this is a consequence of a few
large projects, and the “lumpiness” of adding new terminal capacity.
The utilisation figures shown in Table 5.1 are of course the helicopter
view, at the macro level. At this level, it appears that most regions have
sufficient capacity, which is true, but the picture changes when drilling
down to the micro level. For particular port markets, individual ports
and specific terminals, the story is often a different one, because not The micro level is what
all capacity is the same. Rapid growth in ship sizes has increased the really matters
segmentation of terminal capacity; for example, not all ‘deep-sea’
capacity can handle all deep-sea vessels. It is often the case therefore that
berths that are able to handle larger ships are highly utilised and in short
supply, while older deep-water berths are underutilised. It is also true
that the peak in volumes due to larger ships means that capacity may be
highly utilised on some days of the week, but underutilised on others.
201
Table 5.1 Forecast supply and demand in the global container port market, 2018-2023 (mteu)
Average
annual
growth Trend in
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2018-2023 utilisation
Throughput 25.8 27.2 28.0 29.1 30.3 31.5 4.1%
East Coast
Capacity 37.3 38.2 39.9 40.9 42.0 43.2 3.0%
North America
Utilisation 69.2% 71.1% 70.1% 71.3% 72.1% 72.9% Ç
North America
Throughput 6.2 6.5 6.8 7.1 7.5 7.8 4.7%

Gulf Coast
Capacity 8.6 8.6 9.8 10.3 10.7 10.7 4.4%
North America
Utilisation 72.4% 75.7% 69.4% 69.3% 70.1% 73.5% Æ
Throughput 35.5 36.6 37.5 38.8 40.1 41.4 3.1%
West Coast
Capacity 55.7 56.1 56.9 56.8 58.3 58.7 1.1%
North America
Utilisation 63.7% 65.4% 66.0% 68.4% 68.7% 70.6% Ç
Throughput 61.8 63.9 66.1 68.7 71.4 74.4 3.8%
North West
Capacity 98.6 99.9 100.4 101.7 101.7 102.3 0.7%
Europe
Utilisation 62.7% 64.0% 65.8% 67.6% 70.3% 72.7% Ç
Throughput 12.0 12.5 12.8 13.2 13.7 14.2 3.4%
Scandinavia &
Capacity 25.6 26.1 27.6 27.9 28.0 28.0 1.8%
Baltic
Europe
Utilisation 46.9% 48.0% 46.2% 47.4% 49.0% 50.8% Ç

Throughput 29.5 30.1 30.8 31.8 33.0 33.9 2.8%
West
Capacity 42.2 43.6 44.9 45.0 46.2 46.2 1.9%
Mediterranean
Utilisation 69.9% 68.9% 68.6% 70.7% 71.4% 73.3% Ç
Throughput 32.3 32.7 33.7 35.0 36.1 37.4 3.0%
East
Mediterranean & Capacity 53.9 56.9 58.8 61.5 62.5 62.5 3.0%
Black Sea
Utilisation 59.9% 57.5% 57.3% 56.9% 57.8% 59.9% Æ
Throughput 68.1 70.6 73.2 76.6 80.6 85.1 4.5%
North Asia Capacity 102.8 104.0 106.0 106.6 107.9 108.9 1.2%
Utilisation 66.3% 67.9% 69.0% 71.9% 74.7% 78.1% Ç
Throughput 244.0 250.0 261.4 275.0 288.4 303.1 4.4%
Asia
Greater China Capacity 292.4 297.2 299.1 301.3 301.8 301.8 0.6%
Utilisation 83.4% 84.1% 87.4% 91.3% 95.5% 100.4% Ç
Throughput 110.9 118.0 125.6 133.4 141.4 150.2 6.3%
South East Asia Capacity 153.7 155.7 159.2 165.1 168.1 168.6 1.9%
Utilisation 72.2% 75.8% 78.9% 80.8% 84.1% 89.1% Ç
Throughput 39.0 39.3 40.2 41.7 43.6 45.5 3.1%
Mid East & Indian SC
Middle East Capacity 62.9 64.5 71.8 74.0 75.0 75.0 3.6%
Utilisation 62.0% 61.0% 55.9% 56.4% 58.1% 60.7% È
Throughput 30.0 32.1 34.8 37.5 40.3 43.1 7.5%
South Asia Capacity 41.6 45.3 48.4 51.9 53.1 53.1 5.0%
Utilisation 72.1% 70.9% 71.9% 72.4% 75.9% 81.2% Ç
202
Table 5.1 Forecast supply and demand in the global container port market, 2018-2023 (mteu) cont’d
Average
annual
growth Trend in
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2018-2023 utilisation
Throughput 23.2 22.1 23.3 24.6 26.1 27.4 3.4%
Central America/
Capacity 42.1 44.8 47.6 48.7 48.2 48.2 2.8%
Caribbean
Utilisation 55.2% 49.3% 49.0% 50.5% 54.0% 56.9% Æ
Latin America
Throughput 13.4 13.3 14.1 14.6 15.2 15.8 3.3%

East Coast
Capacity 23.9 24.1 25.2 25.8 26.3 26.3 2.0%
South America
Utilisation 56.0% 54.9% 55.9% 56.5% 57.6% 59.9% Ç
Throughput 11.2 11.0 11.9 12.6 13.3 14.1 4.8%
West Coast
Capacity 17.0 17.4 18.0 18.4 18.4 18.4 1.5%
South America
Utilisation 65.7% 63.5% 66.4% 68.5% 72.4% 76.7% Ç
Throughput 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.7 4.9%
East Africa Capacity 8.2 8.4 10.2 10.3 10.3 10.3 4.7%
Utilisation 54.8% 57.5% 49.2% 50.8% 53.1% 55.5% Æ
Throughput 6.9 7.1 7.5 7.9 8.4 8.9 5.4%
North Africa Capacity 8.3 9.4 10.9 12.4 12.4 12.4 8.4%
Utilisation 82.6% 75.0% 68.4% 63.7% 67.6% 71.9% È
Africa
Throughput 10.7 10.0 10.5 10.9 11.5 12.0 2.5%

West Africa Capacity 19.3 21.7 23.3 24.6 26.3 26.3 6.4%
Utilisation 55.2% 46.1% 45.0% 44.5% 43.6% 45.9% È
Throughput 5.5 5.8 6.1 6.5 6.7 7.0 4.9%
Southern Africa Capacity 9.7 9.8 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 1.7%
Utilisation 57.0% 58.9% 57.7% 61.4% 63.9% 66.5% Ç
Throughput 13.1 13.3 13.7 13.9 14.2 14.5 2.0%
Oceania
Oceania Capacity 18.9 19.5 20.2 20.4 20.4 20.4 1.6%

Utilisation 69.6% 68.0% 67.7% 68.3% 69.6% 71.0% Æ
Throughput 784 807 843 884 927 973 4.4%
Global Total Capacity 1,123 1,151 1,189 1,214 1,228 1,232 1.9%
Utilisation 69.8% 70.1% 70.9% 72.8% 75.5% 79.0% Ç
203
Table 5.2 A
lternative supply and demand forecast in the global container port market taking into account
unconfirmed capacity expansion plans, 2018-2023 (mteu)
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Unconfirmed capacity plans 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.5 2.5
East Coast
Alternative capacity forecast 37.3 38.2 39.9 41.1 44.5 45.7
North America
Alternative utilisation forecast 69.2% 71.1% 69.7% 67.2% 68.1% 72.9%
North America

Gulf Coast
North America
West Coast
North America
North West
Europe
Scandinavia &
Baltic
Europe

West
Mediterranean
East
Mediterranean & Alternative capacity forecast 53.9 56.9 58.8 63.3 64.6 65.6
Black Sea
North Asia Alternative capacity forecast 102.8 104.0 106.0 106.9 108.2 109.2
Asia
Greater China Alternative capacity forecast 292.4 297.2 299.1 301.3 301.8 301.8
South East Asia Alternative capacity forecast 153.7 155.7 159.2 166.5 171.7 172.2
Mid East & Indian SC
Middle East Alternative capacity forecast 62.9 64.5 71.8 75.8 78.5 79.0
South Asia Alternative capacity forecast 41.6 45.3 48.4 53.8 55.8 56.3
204
Table 5.2 A
lternative supply and demand forecast in the global container port market taking into account
unconfirmed capacity expansion plans, 2018-2023 (mteu) cont’d
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Central America/
Caribbean
Latin America

East Coast
South America

West Coast
South America
East Africa Alternative capacity forecast 8.2 8.4 10.2 10.3 10.8 11.3
North Africa Alternative capacity forecast 8.3 9.4 10.9 12.4 13.7 14.7

Africa
West Africa Alternative capacity forecast 19.3 21.7 23.3 25.2 28.4 28.4
Southern Africa Alternative capacity forecast 9.7 9.8 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5

Oceania
Oceania Alternative capacity forecast 18.9 19.5 20.2 20.7 20.7 21.7
Global Total Alternative capacity forecast 1,123 1,151 1,189 1,226 1,257 1,268
205
Far East
T he top 10 owners / operators in the Far East are shown in Table 5.3.
This region is by far the largest in the world in terms of throughput
(40% in 2018), the majority of which is generated in Chinese ports
The equity teu of
the top 10 players
accounted for just
(78% of the region’s throughput). The equity teu of the top 10 players over 60% of Far
accounted for just over 60% of Far Eastern regional throughput in 2018, Eastern regional
a proportion that has been creeping up steadily each year as the big throughput
players have been consolidating their positions in the market.
As the largest container port in the world by some margin, Shanghai’s
SIPG continues to lead the regional table with its equity throughput in
excess of 35 million teu. This throughput represents over 11% of regional
volumes, boosted slightly by half-year effects of a small stake in OOCL.
Cosco saw a sharp increase in equity throughput in 2018 with the
addition of OOCL’s terminals in the Far East, plus the effects of minority Shanghai’s SIPG
stakes in SIPG and Qingdao Port Group boosting the company’s regional continues to lead the
share to 10.4% in 2018, up from 8.6% in 2017. Hutchison and China regional table
Merchants swapped positions in 2018 with the latter moving into third
place by virtue of strong growth but also because Hutchison’s volumes
were quite flat, particularly in Hong Kong. These four big players
accounted for nearly 40% of Far Eastern throughput in 2018. Several
individual Chinese port companies also feature in the top 10, namely
Ningbo, Guangzhou, Qingdao and Tianjin. The remaining places are
taken by PSA and DP World, the only overseas operators in the list.
Terminal ownership in China is becoming more and more intertwined.
China Merchants has stakes in three major Chinese (including Hong
Kong) operators (MTL, SIPG and Dalian Port Company) and Cosco Terminal ownership
has minority stakes in SIPG and Qingdao Port. SIPG itself has JVs in a in China is becoming
number of its terminals with both Chinese operators such as Cosco and more and more
intertwined
Hutchison and overseas players, plus a minority stake in Cosco’s OOCL.
It is interesting to note that ultimately, most Chinese operators are state-
owned enterprises and at the end there is a common ownership.
Alongside SIPG, Cosco and Hutchison, China Merchants completes
the list of big four portfolio-based Far Eastern operators. This takes
into consideration China Merchants’ stakes in SIPG, Dalian Port
Company and MTL, and in the Far Eastern terminals in the Terminal
Link portfolio. While its equity throughput is boosted by the effects of
its minority stakes in the likes of SIPG and MTL, this also makes CM
Ports’ throughput calculation process challenging, particularly total
throughput, which could be so massive that it starts to lose meaning. For
the purpose of the table, the total throughput figure shown is only that
for terminals in which stakes are held directly (i.e. not including stakes
held in other operators). This approach is in common with that taken
for the other operators in the table and has no bearing on the ranking, as
equity teu is used for this purpose.
206
Far East
Table 5.3 Far East – Top ten terminal owning/operating companies, 2018
Share of
equity teu in
Total Equity regional
Rank Owner/Operator throughput throughput throughput Location of main terminal operations
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%)
Shanghai International Shanghai, Nanjing, Wenzhou, Jiangyin, Jiaxing,
1 47,648 35,465 11.4%
Port Group * Taicang
Qingdao, Dalian, Tianjin, Yingkou, Shanghai,
Ningbo, Suzhou (Zhangjiagang), Yangzhou,
Nanjing, Taicang, Hong Kong, Shenzhen,
2 China Cosco Shipping ** 86,138 32,331 10.4%
Guangzhou, Quanzhou, Jinjiang, Xiamen,
Kaohsiung, Yantai, Lianyungang, Qinhuangdao,
Qinzhou, Jinzhou, Nantong, Busan
Hong Kong, Qingdao, Shenzhen, Tianjin,
China Merchants Port
3 29,270 28,585 9.2% Zhangzhou, Zhanjiang, Ningbo, Kaohsiung,
Holdings ***
Dalian, Shantou
Shanghai, Xiamen, Shantou, Zhuhai, Shantou,
4 Hutchison Ports # 39,714 24,832 8.0% Huizhou, Ningbo, Busan, Kwangyang, Hong
Kong, Shenzhen
5 Ningbo Port Group 26,351 18,467 5.9% Ningbo
6 Guangzhou Port Group 19,997 13,382 4.3% Guangzhou
Guangzhou, Dalian, Fuzhou, Tianjin, Dongguan,
7 PSA International 21,586 10,281 3.3% Lianyungang, Qinzhou, Busan, Incheon,
Kitakyushu
Tianjin Port Development
8 14,463 9,975 3.2% Tianjin
Group ##
9 Qingdao Port Group 18,442 8,544 2.7% Qingdao, Rizhao, Weihai
10 DP World 23,172 7,458 2.4% Yantai, Tianjin, Qingdao, Hong Kong, Busan
Total 189,322 60.6%

Regional Total 312,159
Note:
PSA has a 20% shareholding in HPH (not reflected in above figures)
River/barge terminals are excluded from the calculations
Assessing the Top 10 in this region is complicated by inter-related shareholdings, e.g. China Merchants has a shareholding in Modern Terminals and
SIPG. Some double counting of total and equity teu occurs as a result.
* SIPG total throughput does not include OOCL terminals, but equity teu calculation does reflect stake held in OOCL. If the total throughput figure
were to include OOCL Far East terminals, it would be 48.8 teu
** China Cosco Shipping figures include Cosco Shipping Group and OOCL. China Cosco Shipping total throughput does not include Qingdao Port
International (QPI) or SIPG, but equity teu calculation does reflect these stakes held. If the total throughput figure were to include QPI and SIPG, it
would be 143.5 million teu
*** China Merchants’ total throughput does not include SIPG, MTL, Dalian Port Group or Terminal Link’s Far East terminals, but equity teu calculation
does reflect stakes held in these companies. If the total throughput figure were to include SIPG, MTL, Dalian Port Group and Terminal Link’s Far East
terminals, it would be 98.6 million teu
#
Hutchison Ports and Hutchison Port Holdings Trust
##
Tianjin Port Development Group includes Tianjin Development Holdings Ltd., Tianjin Port Group and Tianjin Port Holding Company Ltd.
207
Far East
Figure 5.2 Ownership of major Chinese container terminals: North China (Bohai Bay area)
Jinzhou
COSCO SHPG PORTS Yingkou
COSCO SHPG PORTS
Qinhuangdao
APMT OOCL COSCO SHPG PORTS
CMP
CMP
Tianjin
COSCO SHPG PORTS
COSCO SHPG PORTS Dalian
DPW PSA
NYK
PSA
Bohai Bay
COSCO SHPG PORTS
DPW Yantai
ICTSI
COSCO SHPG PORTS

APMT
Note: China Cosco Shipping has acquired OOCL
CMA CGM (APL) Qingdao
CMP
DPW Yellow Sea
PSA Operational
COSCO SHPG PORTS Lianyungang
208
Far East
Figure 5.3 Ownership of major Chinese container terminals: Central China (Shanghai area)
COSCO SHPG PORTS
Yangzhou
COSCO SHPG PORTS
COSCO SHPG PORTS

Nanjing
SIPG Zhangjiagang
COSCO SHPG PORTS
SIPG
Taicang
HP
APMT
CMP Shanghai
COSCO SHPG PORTS

SIPG
SIPG
SIPG
Yangshan
Jiaxing
East
China Sea
Note: China Cosco Shipping has acquired OOCL
CMP
Ningbo
COSCO SHPG PORTS
HP
OOCL
TIL
Operational Non-operational
COSCO SHPG PORTS
209
Far East
Figure 5.4 Ownership of major Chinese container terminals: South China (excluding Pearl River area)
SIPG
Wenzhou
PSA
SIPG Fuzhou
Jiangyin
COSCO SHPG PORTS
CMP Quanzhou
Zhangzhou COSCO SHPG PORTS

Xiamen Jinjiang
APMT COSCO SHPG PORTS HP
CMP Shantou
Huizhou
HP
COSCO SHPG PORTS

HP
CMP
PSA
Qinzhou
Zhanjiang
South China Sea
Operational
210
Far East
Figure 5.5 Ownership of major Chinese container terminals: Pearl River area
APMT
COSCO SHPG PORTS Guangzhou
PSA
PSA
Dongguan
Nansha
COSCO SHPG PORTS
COSCO SHPG PORTS
MTL
HPH TRUST Yantian

Dachan Bay
CMP
Pearl River Delta

CMP
Mawan
CMP Shekou
CMP
Chiwan
MTL
COSCO SHGP PORTS Hong Kong
MTL
DPW HPH TRUST MTL
South China Sea
Operational
211
Far East
Figure 5.6 Breakdown of forecast capacity expansion by 2023, Far East
22% 22%
Shanghai Busan
Incheon Tianjin
6%
Shenzhen Dalian
15%
7%
Kaohsiung Others
8%
10%
10%
Southeast Asia
T able 5.4 depicts the top 10 players in Southeast Asia in 2018. PSA’s
huge transhipment hub in Singapore plus interests in three terminals
in Laem Chabang and now Tanjung Priok means that the company
PSA remains the
dominant player in
Southeast Asia
continues to occupy the dominant position in the region, with nearly
29% of the regional throughput (up from 27.5% in 2017 and 27% in
2016). It should be remembered that PSA has a 20% stake in Hutchison
Ports so if this was taken into account in the table, PSA’s share of regional
activity would be even higher.
Malaysian conglomerate MMC has moved up into second position with
an 11% share of throughput with its majority stakes in terminals in Johor,
Tanjung Pelepas, Port Klang and Penang. The state-owned Indonesian MMC has moved up
port companies, taken collectively as they have common ultimate into second position
ownership, have dropped to third place in the region, with their myriad with an 11% share in
regional throughput
of ports, large and small. They accounted for just under 11% of the
regional throughput. Together the equity teu of these top three players in
the region represented just over 50% of Southeast Asia’s throughput.
Besides PSA, five other GTOs / ITOS are in the top 10 list. Hutchison
is the most significant with a 6% regional share with its numerous
terminal interests in Laem Chabang plus stake in large facilities in Port
Klang and Jakarta. The six GTOs/ITOs in the list accounted for 47.5%
of the regional throughout in 2018. The remaining places are taken by
Vietnamese companies Saigon New Port and Vietnam National Shipping
Lines that together generate over 8% of the regional throughput.
212
Southeast Asia
Table 5.4 Southeast Asia – Top ten terminal owning/operating companies, 2018
Share of
equity teu in
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%)
Singapore, Laem Chabang, Cai Mep,
1 PSA International 39,724 29,950 28.7%
Tanjung Priok
Malaysia Mining Corporation Johor, Tanjung Pelepas, Port Klang,
2 14,198 11,485 11.0%
Berhad (MMC) Penang
Port Kelang, Tanjung Priok (Jakarta),
3 Hutchison Ports 15,528 6,303 6.0%
Laem Chabang, Rangoon, Cai Mep
4 Saigon New Port Company 8,000 5,235 5.0% Thi Vai-Cai Mep, Ho Chi Minh City
Tanjung Pelepas, Laem Chabang,
5 APM Terminals 12,295 4,030 3.9%
Cai Mep
Manila, Subic, General Santos,
6 ICTSI 3,583 3,384 3.2% Davao, Cagayan de Oro, Makassar,
Tanjung Priok
Cai Lan, Da Nang, Haiphong, Ho Chi
7 Vietnam National Shipping Lines 4,394 3,359 3.2%
Minh City, Thi Vai Cai Mep
8 6,436 3,154 3.0% Singapore
(TIL)
Singapore, Laem Chabang, Ho Chi
9 CMA CGM * 6,404 2,632 2.5%
Minh City
10 DP World 4,561 2,022 1.9% Tanjung Perak, Manila, Laem Chabang
Total 71,553 68.7%

Note:
PSA has a 20% shareholding in HPH (not reflected in above figures).
* CMA CGM includes APL terminals
Figure 5.7 Breakdown of forecast capacity expansion by 2023, SE Asia
17% Singapore* Tanjung Priok

27%
Cebu Patimban
11% Tanjung Pelepas Yangon
Penang Kuantan
3%
3% 7% Sihanoukville Kuala Tanjung
4%
4% 7% Laem Chabang Others
5%
5% 7%
Note: * Singapore is a net figure after closure of older terminals

213
North America
T able 5.5 provides an analysis of the top 10 terminal owners /

operators in North America. Despite having exited from several
locations in recent years, APMT heads the table mainly by virtue of two
APMT heads North
America’s top 10
owners / operators
large wholly owned terminals in New York and Los Angeles. table
Georgia Ports Authority sits in second place with its large operation
in Savannah while financial investor Macquarie is third in the region,
although Macquarie’s recent sale of terminals in Canada and the USEC
will affect its position next year. Pension fund-owned Global Container
Terminals with terminals in Vancouver and New York is fourth and
SSA has moved up two places to fifth. Cosco has entered the top 10 as a
result of the acquisition of OOCL but the sale of Long Beach Container
Terminal in 2019 will mean that the company is likely to drop out again
next year.
The equity teu of the top 5 players in North America only accounted
for around one-third of the regional volume in 2018 and the top 10 just
under 60%, so the ownership and operation of the region’s terminals
remains fairly fragmented.
It should be noted that North America, particularly the US, is unusual
in having a significant amount of stevedoring activity performed
by separate stevedoring companies. This is largely related to labour
provision and practices. Throughput from activities where companies Stevedoring is a
significant activity in
provide stevedoring services only (stevedoring operations) compared
the region
with throughput where full operation of the terminal is covered
(terminal operations) is shown separately in Table 5.5. Ports America
remains the dominant player in this activity, with SSA also significant.
NYK is also important through Ceres but the company declines to
provide details of its activity levels.
Producing the terminal operations section of the table is also
complicated because the US is unusual in having several large
container ports / terminals that are owned and operated by port
authorities. Calculations are complicated further by stevedoring
companies that carry out ship work at these terminals. In Virginia,
while Virginia Port Authority (VPA) is in charge of cargo handling Port authority-
at the port’s two terminals in Norfolk (Hampton Roads), the operated terminals
actual operations are carried out by a service company – Virginia are also significant in
International Terminals – that is linked to the VPA but not owned the US
by it (in effect it has no owners, it simply exists to serve VPA). In
Charleston, South Carolina, the port authority also has a prominent
role in terminal activities, although private stevedoring companies
carry out actual cargo handling. The situation is similar in Savannah,
Georgia (private stevedoring), but the Georgia Ports Authority is
understood to have a greater hands-on role in the overall running of
the terminal.
214
North America
Table 5.5 North America – Top ten terminal owning/operating companies, 2018
Share of
equity teu in
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%)
1 APM Terminals 4,587 4,431 7.3% Miami, New York, Los Angeles, Mobile
2 Georgia Ports Authority 4,352 4,352 7.2% Savannah

Halifax, Philadelphia, Vancouver, Los
3 Macquarie Group* 6,088 4,251 7.0% Angeles, New Orleans, Montreal, New
York
4 Global Container Terminals 3,791 3,791 6.3% New York, Vancouver
Long Beach, Oakland, Seattle, Tacoma,
5 SSA Marine 6,689 3,702 6.1%
Jacksonville
New York, Baltimore, New Orleans,
6 Ports America 7,164 3,549 5.9% Houston, Miami, Los Angeles, Long
Beach, Tacoma
Terminal Investment Limited Long Beach, New York, Montreal,
7 4,930 3,260 5.4%
(TIL) Seattle, Port Everglades, New Orleans
8 China Cosco Shipping ** 5,171 3,119 5.1% Los Angeles, Long Beach, Seattle
9 Virginia International Terminals 2,856 2,856 4.7% Hampton Roads/Norfolk
10 Evergreen Group 1,925 1,925 3.2% Los Angeles, Oakland, Tacoma
Total 35,236 58.1%
Note:
* Macquarie sold its Halifax, Philadelphia terminals to PSA and Vancouver terminal to DP World in 2019.
** China Cosco Shipping includes OOCL
South Carolina Ports Authority at Charleston handled 2.3 m teu in 2018 at terminals serviced by various stevedoring companies
North America -Top 2 stevedoring operators, 2018

Share of
equity teu in
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%)
Hampton Roads, Tacoma,
1 Ports America 5,076 4,425 7.3%
Savannah, Other locations *
Charleston, Savannah, San Juan,
2 SSA Marine 2,782 2,363 3.9%
Port-au-Prince, Other US ports *
Total 6,788 11.2%
Notes:
* Various stevedoring operations in other ports in the USA
NYK regards the breakdown of its stevedoring activities as confidential and so has had to be excluded from the table. However, globally the
company’s stevedoring total was 5.26 m teu in 2018, much of which can be expected to be generated by Ceres in North America
215
North America
Figure 5.8 Breakdown of forecast capacity expansion by 2023, North America
11%
Wilmington Del Norfolk
27%
11% New York Houston
Honolulu Vancouver
8%
Charleston Canaveral
5%
5% 8% Long Beach Montreal
5% Others
6% 7%
7%
North Europe
T able 5.6 shows the top 10 owners / operators of North European

terminals, with Hutchison Ports once again at the top spot, with
its equity teu accounting for just over 16% of the region’s throughput.
This was slightly down on 2017 and markedly down on the 19%+ it
registered in 2016, mainly due to the sale of a minority stake in the
Rotterdam Euromax terminal to Cosco Shipping Ports.
APMT has moved up to second place due to a 10% increase in equity
teu in 2018 versus 2017, pushing HHLA to third (the company
saw a slight decline in equity teu) while DPW remains fourth. Like
APMT, DPW’s equity teu growth in 2018 was around 10%, boosted
in particular by strong growth at London Gateway. PSA occupies fifth
place and this is solely due to its large operations in Antwerp which saw
over 20% growth in equity teu in 2018.
The equity teu of the top 10 players accounted for 80% of North
European throughput in 2017, up on the 77% seen in 2017 and
regaining the level achieved in 2016. The top 5 companies accounted for
55% of the regional throughput, with the top three accounting for over
one-third.
216
North Europe
Table 5.6 North Europe – Top ten terminal owning/operating companies, 2018
Share of
equity teu in
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%)
Rotterdam, Felixstowe, Thamesport,
1 Hutchison Ports 12,350 10,312 16.4%
Harwich, Stockholm
Aarhus, Bremerhaven, Wilhelmshaven,

2 APM Terminals 8,495 6,596 10.5%
Rotterdam, Gothenburg
3 HHLA 6,995 6,292 10.0% Hamburg

Antwerp, Southampton, Le Havre,
4 DP World 8,924 5,932 9.4%
London, Rotterdam
5 PSA International 8,766 5,535 8.8% Antwerp
Bremerhaven, Hamburg,
6 Eurogate 7,759 5,364 8.5%
Wilhelmshaven
Terminal Investment Limited Le Havre, Antwerp, Bremerhaven,
7 10,112 5,056 8.0%
(TIL) Rotterdam
Nantes, Dunkirk, Le Havre,
8 CMA CGM 6,260 2,019 3.2%
Antwerp,Rotterdam
9 China Cosco Shipping 5,677 1,883 3.0% Antwerp, Zeebrugge, Rotterdam
Liverpool, Dublin, Belfast, Sheerness,

10 Peel Group 1,427 1,427 2.3%
Clydeport, Great Yarmouth
Total 50,416 80.2%

Note:
Throughput figures for HPH and PSA are understood to include barge volumes at Rotterdam and Antwerp
Figure 5.9 Breakdown of forecast capacity expansion by 2023, North Europe
20%
31% Antwerp
Rotterdam
10% Gavle
Dunkirk
11% Others
28%
217
South Europe
T able 5.7 shows the top 10 owners / operators in South Europe. Cosco
has moved to the top of the table from third place in 2017, largely as a
result of the full-year effects of the majority acquisition of the two Noatum
Cosco has moved to
the top of the South
Europe table
terminals in Spain but also because of continued strong growth at Piraeus.
The company now has a near 13% share of the region’s throughput. Note
that Noatum no longer qualifies in the table as a separate operator.
APMT has dropped to second despite increasing its volume and TIL
moves down to third, although its acquisition of complete control at
Gioia Tauro will boost its 2019 figure. These top three players accounted
for 36% of the regional throughput in 2018. Yilport remains in fourth
place with a regional share of around 7.5% and PSA is still fifth with a
similar share. Hutchison has moved up to sixth due to strong growth The top three players
at its sole South European terminal (Barcelona). Hyundai is a new accounted for 36%
entrant into this region’s top 10, a result of its acquisition of the TTI of the regional
transhipment terminal in Algeciras at the end of 2017. DP World is also throughput
a new entrant in tenth position.
Collectively the top 10 accounted for two-thirds of the region’s
throughput in 2018, up slightly on 2017.
Table 5.7 South Europe – Top ten terminal owning/operating companies, 2018
Share of
equity teu in
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%)
Marseilles-Fos, Piraeus, Ambarli,
1 China Cosco Shipping 10,033 6,705 12.8%
Savona (Vado), Valencia, Bilbao
Marseilles-Fos, Barcelona, Valencia,
2 APM Terminals 6,877 6,244 11.9% Gijón, Castellón, Algeciras, Nemrut
(Izmir)*, Vado (Savona)
Valencia, Sines, Ambarli (Istanbul),
Terminal Investment Limited Iskenderun (Assanport), Asyaport,
3 9,724 5,965 11.4%
(TIL) Marseilles-Fos, Las Palmas, Gioia
Tauro, Trieste
Yilport (Gebze), Gemport/Gemlik,
4 Yildirim Group 5,562 3,879 7.4% Marsaxlokk, Lisbon, Leixoes, Setubal,
Figueira, Huelva, Ferrol
5 PSA International 5,793 3,857 7.4% Genoa, Venice, Sines, Mersin
6 Hutchison Ports 2,400 2,400 4.6% Barcelona
Marseilles-Fos, Marsaxlokk,
7 CMA CGM (Terminal Link) 4,752 2,316 4.4%
Thessaloniki, Seville
8 Hyundai 1,293 1,293 2.5% Algeciras
Gioia Tauro**, La Spezia, Ravenna,
9 Eurogate 4,888 1,015 1.9%
Salerno, Cagliari, Lisbon, Limassol
10 DP World 1,373 979 1.9% Marseilles-Fos, Tarragona, Yarimca
Total 34,651 66.3%
Note:
* APMT divested Izmir, Turkey in Q4 2018, but remains as manager
Eurogate owns 33.33% of Contship Italia and the above equity throughput is adjusted accordingly. The balance of Contship Italia is owned by
Eurokai and this equity throughput is not included in the above table.
** Contship Italia sold its stake to TIL in early 2019
218
South Europe
Figure 5.10 Breakdown of forecast capacity expansion by 2023, South Europe
19%
25%
Piraeus Taranto*
6% La Spezia Savona
7% Genoa Derince
13%
7% Livorno Others
10% 13%
Note: * Reopening of existing terminal

Eastern Europe
D rewry’s definition of Eastern Europe for the purpose of Table 5.8

is geographically diverse as it covers Russia’s Baltic and Black Sea
coasts (along with Bulgaria, Georgia, Ukraine and Romania), as well as
Drewry’s definition
of Eastern Europe is
geographically diverse
the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Poland. In addition,
Croatia, Slovenia and Montenegro are included in the Adriatic Sea
(although Albania is not included).
There are numerous countries spread across the three seas. These
countries were once bound together by Communism, but today the
dividing line between North and South Europe on the one hand, and
Eastern Europe on the other has become quite blurred, and to some
extent increasingly less relevant. However, once again we are retaining
the old Eastern Europe definition for the ownership analysis in Table 5.8,
partly to allow comparison with previous years and partly because the
‘Western’ Russian market covers both the Baltic and Black Sea.
Macquarie once again tops the table through its majority stake in DCT
Gdansk, the only investment it has in the region. The owner represented
Macquarie once again
nearly 18% of the regional throughput in 2018 but the sale of this asset
tops the table, but not
in 2019 by Macquarie to a consortium including PSA will result in a
for much longer
significant change to the table next year. GPI, which slipped to second
place last year, has dropped a further place to third in 2018, with Luka
Koper moving up into second.
GPI creates complexities for this table as it is 30.75% owned by APMT and
30.75% by the Russian Delo Group. We have had to make a level of ownership
judgement to decide how to reflect GPI’s activity (and avoid double counting)
and have focused on the company itself in the table rather than its parents.
Hence Delo is not in the table and APMT’s equity teu figure does not include
GPI. It is also important to note that in Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port
(NCSP) Delo wholly owns one of the terminals (NUTEP).
Overall, the top 10 operators generated just under two-thirds of the
regional throughput in 2018, with the top three accounting for 36%.
219
Eastern Europe
Table 5.8 Eastern Europe – Top ten terminal owning/operating companies, 2018
Share of
equity teu in
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%)
1 Macquarie Group 1,932 1,233 17.8% Gdansk
2 Luka Koper 989 989 9.1% Koper
3 Global Ports Investments (GPI) 1,014 980 9.0% St Petersburg, Ust Luga
Novorossiysk Commercial Sea
4 620 620 5.7% Kaliningrad (Baltiysk), Novorossiysk
Port (NCSP)
5 ICTSI 729 618 5.7% Gdynia, Batumi, Rijeka
Universal Cargo Logistics
6 722 578 5.3% St Petersburg, Taganrog
Holding B. V.
7 DP World 533 533 4.9% Constanta
8 Terminal Investment Limited (TIL) 1,109 516 4.8% Klaipeda, St Petersburg
9 HHLA 451 451 4.2% Odessa, Tallinn
10 Hutchison Ports 375 372 3.4% Gdynia
Total 6,890 63.4%
Note:
* GPI is 30.75% owned by APM Terminals and 30.75% owned by Delo Group.
Figure 5.11 Ownership of main container terminals: Eastern Europe region (Baltic Sea)
GPI (APMT)
Primorsk UCLH / TIL
Bronka
GPI (APMT) / Eurogate St.
Petersburg
HHLA Ust- Fenix
Tallinn Luga
Baltic GPI (APMT) / CMA CGM (CMA Terminals)
Sea
Estonia
Mariner Russia
Portek (Mitsui)
Riga Latvia
Klaipedos Terminalas
TIL
HP Klaipeda
ICTSI NCSP Lithuania
Operational Gdynia Russia

Gdansk Kaliningrad
Non-operational
Macquarie
Note: Includes some multi-purpose terminals. Poland
In early 2019, PSA acquired DCT Gdansk from Macquarie.
220
Eastern Europe
Figure 5.12 Ownership of main container terminals: Eastern Europe region (Black Sea)
Ukraine
Former NCC shareholders

Russia
Odessa
Ilyichevsk
CMA CGM (CMA Terminals)
Novorossiysk
HHLA
Romania NCSP
NUTEP
Georgia
DPW Constantza APMT Poti
Black Sea ICTSI Batumi
Operational
Note: Includes some multipurpose terrminals
Figure 5.13 Breakdown of forecast capacity expansion by 2023, Eastern Europe
2% 8%
27%
Batumi Bourgas
27%
Bronka Klaipeda
Koper Others
19%
17%
221
Middle East
T able 5.9 sets out the top 10 Middle East players and as usual DP
World dominates with a near 38% share of regional volumes in
2018, primarily generated by Jebel Ali (despite a slight decline here).
DP World had ~38%
share of regional
volumes in 2018
Gulftainer has dropped from second to third place with its share having
fallen from just over 11% in 2016 to close to 5% in 2018 due to a sharp
fall in activity levels at Khor Fakkan. The state-owned operators in Israel
moved into second place when taken together (given that they have
common ownership).
TIL has moved up the table from ninth place in 2017 to fourth in 2018.
This is due to continued growth at King Abdullah port (33% increase)
and the establishment of a JV terminal at Abu Dhabi (Khalifa). This TIL moved five places
though has had the effect of knocking Abu Dhabi Ports out of the top 10 up the table in 2018
as its shareholding was diluted. The state-owned Iranian ports dropped
one place to fifth in 2018 and ongoing sanctions and political tensions
are hitting volumes hard in 2019.
Overall, the top 10 players accounted for 76% of regional throughput,
much the same as 2017. The combined shares of nine operators in
places 2 to 10 in the table was about the same as DPW’s share of the
regional market.
Table 5.9 Middle East – Top ten terminal owning/operating companies, 2018
Share of
equity teu in
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%)
1 DP World 16,385 16,385 37.6% Dubai, Jeddah
2 Israeli Port Companies * 2,947 2,947 6.8% Ashdod, Haifa
Khor Fakkan, Port Khalid (Sharjah), Umm

3 Gulftainer Company 3,319 2,373 5.4%
Qasr, Jeddah, Jubail, Tripoli (Lebanon)

4 3,590 2,348 5.4% Abu Dhabi, King Abdullah, Umm Qasr
(TIL)
Bandar Abbas, Bandar Khomeini,
5 PSO Iran 2,238 1,951 4.5%
Bushehr
6 APM Terminals 4,638 1,707 3.9% Salalah, Khalifa Bin Salman, Aqaba
7 Red Sea Gateway Terminal 1,690 1,690 3.9% Jeddah

8 Port of Beirut ** 1,306 1,306 3.0% Beirut
Dammam, Sohar, Ajman, Ras Al Khaimah
9 Hutchison Ports 2,092 1,253 2.9% (Mina Saqr), Ras Al Khaimah (Mina Saqr),
Basra
10 Kuwait Port Authority 1,060 1,060 2.4% Shuaiba, Shuwaikh
Total 33,019 75.7%
* Comprises state-owned port operating companies Haifa Port Company and Ashdod Port Company under landlord Israel Ports Company
** Beirut Container Terminal Consortium is operator/manager of state-owned Beirut Container Terminal
222
Middle East
Figure 5.14 Ownership of major Middle East container terminals: Arabian Gulf
Iraq
CMA CGM (CMA Terminals) Gulftainer ICTSI TIL
HP / Local state sector PSO Iran
HP Ras Al Khaimah
Basrah Bandar Khomeini
Al-Faw
Umm HP Ahmad Bin Rashid
Qasr BOT opportunity Iran
Shuwaikh Mubarak Ajman
HP
Al Kabeer Kuwait Port Authority Port Khalid
Kuwait Khor Fakkan Gulftainer
Shuaiba
PSO Iran Gulftainer
Bushehr
Kuwait Port Authority Fujairah Abu Dhabi Ports / Port of Fujairah
Kuwait Port Authority
Arabian Gulf PSO Iran
Jubail Bandar Abbas PSO Iran

Gulftainer (Gulf Stevedoring)
HP / International Port Services
PSA / Public Investment Fund Dammam

Khalifa Bin Salman
APMT / YBA Kanoo Holding Qatar
Bahrain
JNPT / KPT
QTerminals QTerminals
Hamad Port
Chabahar
Milaha Port Services Mesaieed Jebel Ali DPW
Khalifa Port
Saudi Arabia DPW Sohar
Ruwais HP / Sohar Port Corp.
Cosco / Abu Dhabi Ports
Abu Dhabi Petroleum Ports Operating Company (IRSHAD) Gulf of Oman
Abu Dhabi Ports / TIL
United Arab Emirates

Oman
Note: Includes some multipurpose terminals
223
Middle East
Figure 5.15 Ownership of major Middle East container terminals (excluding Arabian Gulf)
Jordan
Aqaba APMT / ADC
Dhiba Red Sea Gateway Terminal
Saudi Arabia
TIL / National Port Services Ltd (NPS)
King Abdullah
DPW
Oman
Jeddah Gulftainer (Gulf Stevedoring)
Red Sea Gateway Terminal
Consortium Antwerp Port (CAP) / Oman Govt. Duqm
Red Sea
APMT / Oman Govt.
Yemen Salalah
Port and Marine Affairs Corp.

Port and Marine Affairs Corp.
Hodeidah Yemen Ports Authority Indian Ocean

Mukalla
Aden
Gulf of Aden
224
Middle East
Figure 5.16 Breakdown of forecast capacity expansion by 2023, Middle East
21%
29%
Khalifa Jebel Ali
Haifa Bandar Abbas

7%
Hamad (Doha) Ashdod
9%
Others
13%
9%
12%
South Asia
T able 5.10 sets out the top 10 owners / operators of terminals in South
Asia. DPW continues to occupy the top spot, although its market
share is being eroded, having fallen from around 18% in 2016 to just over
DPW continues to
occupy the top spot,
although its market
16% in 2017 and hitting 15% in 2018. Adani Ports remains in second share is being eroded
place, edging up its share from 10.4% in 2017 to 11.6% in 2018. Sri Lanka
Ports Authority is unchanged in third position with around 10% regional
share and APMT is still fourth, again with a largely consistent share. It is
a similar story for China Merchants and PSA in the next two places. As
with previous years, the top 10 players in the region accounted for around
80% of throughput and the top five over half of the region’s activity.
Table 5.10 South Asia – Top ten terminal owning/operating companies, 2018
Share of
equity teu in
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%)
Visakhapatnam, Cochin (Kochi),
1 DP World 5,172 4,459 14.9% Chennai, Jawaharlal Nehru Port,
Mundra, Port Qasim
Adani Ports and Special
2 4,768 3,467 11.6% Mundra, Hazira, Kattupalli
Economic Zone Limited (APSEZ)
3 Sri Lanka Ports Authority 7,047 3,016 10.1% Colombo
4 APM Terminals 5,033 2,598 8.7% Pipavav, Jawaharlal Nehru Port, Colombo
5 China Merchants Port Holdings 2,677 2,276 7.6% Colombo
Tuticorin, Kolkata, Chennai, Kakinada,
6 PSA International 2,405 2,198 7.3%
Jawaharlal Nehru Port
7 Saif Powertec 1,900 1,720 5.7% Chittagong
8 Hutchison Ports 1,546 1,471 4.9% Karachi
9 Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust 1,180 1,180 3.9% Jawaharlal Nehru Port
10 Chittagong Port Authority 1,000 1,000 3.3% Chittagong
Total 23,385 78.0%
Note:
225
South Asia
Figure 5.17 Ownership of the major container terminals in India
APSEZ / CMA CGM
APSEZ / TIL
APSEZ Larsen & Toubro / Precious Shipping

JM Baxi / KPT
DPW PSA / ABG / Magseas Maritime Services
Kandla
Mundra India Kolkata
Kulpi
APSEZ
Pipavav DPW
Hazira
APSEZ Dhamra
JN Port / MMB
APMT / Foreign institutions / Others
Wadhwan
Mumbai ICTPL
MPT
Jawaharlal Nehru
DPW / JM Baxi
APMT / CONCOR
DPW Gangavaram Visakhapatnam
PSA / KIHPL / Bothra Shipping DVS Raju / Warburg Pincus / AP Govt

JN Port
Kakinada
PSA
Mormugao Port Trust Mormugao 3i Group / Navyuga Engineering
Krishhapatnam
APSEZ
Kattupalli
Ennore APSEZ
Mangalore Port Trust New Mangalore Port Chennai

DPW
PSA
Karaikal KPPL / MARG / Other private investors
DPW / CONCOR Cochin
Tuticorin
Vizhinjam
ABG / Bollore
APSEZ
PSA / SICAL / Nur Investment
Note: Includes some multipurpose terminals
226
South Asia
Figure 5.18 Breakdown of forecast capacity expansion by 2023, South Asia
21% 20% Colombo Jawaharlal Nehru Port
Chittagong Krishnapatnam
4% Visakhapatnam Ennore
5% 12% Vizhinjam Port Qasim

5% Kolkata Dhamra
5% 10%
Others
5%
6% 7%
South America
T able 5.11 shows the top 10 owners / operators in South America for
2018. Cartagena operator SPRC remains the leading player with a
9% share while APMT and TIL now each have a similar 9% share (both
SPRC, APMT and
TIL all have similar
regional shares at the
up markedly from 2017) and sit in second and third places respectively. top of the table
The remaining players in positions four to nine are unchanged from
2017 but the tenth spot is now occupied by Chilean operator Pulgosa
which has recently been acquired by DPW. As with previous years, the
top 10 players only accounted for 60-65% of regional volume, indicating
a degree of fragmentation of ownership. The top five operators accounted
for 42% of the traffic though, up from 38% in 2017.
Table 5.11 South America – Top ten terminal owning/operating companies, 2018
Share of
equity teu in
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%)
1 Contecar (SPRC) 2,594 2,594 9.2% Cartagena (Colombia)
Buenos Aires, Itajai, Pecém, Santos,
2 APM Terminals 4,062 2,566 9.1%
Callao, Buenaventura, Cartagena
Terminal Investment Limited Navegantes, Santos, Buenos Aires,
3 4,513 2,546 9.0%
(TIL) Callao, Rodman, Rio de Janeiro
Callao, Buenos Aires, Santos,
4 DP World 2,513 2,242 7.9%
Suriname, Paita
San Antonio, San Vicente, Iquique,
5 SAAM Puertos 2,794 1,928 6.8%
Antofagasta, Guayaquil
6 Santos Brasil 1,684 1,684 6.0% Santos, Imbituba, Vila Do Conde
7 ICTSI 1,314 1,314 4.6% Guayaquil, Suape, Buenaventura, La Plata
Arica, Puerto Angamos, Valparaiso,
8 Neltume Ports 2,330 1,251 4.4% Montevideo, Coronel, Coquimbo,
Rosario (Argentina), Rio Grande
9 Wilson, Sons 1,054 1,030 3.6% Rio Grande, Salvador
10 Pulgosa * 808 808 2.9% Lirquen, San Antonio
Total 17,963 63.5%
* DP World acquired 71.3% stake in Puertos y Logistica (Pulgosa) in early 2019.
227
South America
Figure 5.19 Breakdown of forecast capacity expansion by 2023, South America
18% 20%
Itapoa Paranagua
6%
Posorja Puerto Cabello
14% La Guaira Puerto Antioquia
9%
Ponta Do Poco Others
10%
12%
11%
Central America / Caribbean
I n 2017, Hutchison accounted for over a quarter of the regional volume

but as Table 5.12 shows, in 2018 this had dropped to not much more
than a fifth due to transhipment volume loss in Balboa (Panama).
Hutchison remains at
the top although its
share has reduced
However the company does still head the top 10 for the region through
its activities in Mexico, Panama and the Bahamas. SSA remains in
second place and has recovered market share to over 13% after a fall in
2017. CMA CGM is unchanged in third spot and ICTSI in fourth. This
year Crowley Maritime makes the top 10 based on a revision of Drewry
data, although it must be noted that estimates have been necessary as
actual throughput figures are not available.
The top 10 players accounted for 68% of the regional throughput, a
similar level to previous years. The top two players generated more than
one-third of the regional throughput in 2018.
Figure 5.20 Breakdown of forecast capacity expansion by 2023, Central America and Caribbean
19% 19%
Colon Kingston
Vera Cruz Caucedo

10%
16% Puerto Limon Rodman (Balboa)
11% Others
14%
11%
228
Central America / Caribbean
Table 5.12 Central America / Caribbean – Top ten terminal owning/operating companies, 2018
Share of
equity teu in
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%)
Freeport, Ensenada, Vera
1 Hutchison Ports 6,418 5,548 21.0% Cruz,Manzanillo (Mexico), Lazaro
Cardenas, Balboa, Colon (Cristobal)
Colon (Panama), Manzanillo (Mexico),
2 SSA Marine 3,878 3,541 13.4%
Tuxpan
Pointe à Pitre, Pointe des Grives,
3 CMA CGM 1,969 1,969 7.5%
Kingston
4 ICTSI 1,621 1,621 6.1% Puerto Cortes, Manzanillo (Mexico)
Puerto Progreso, Lázaro Cárdenas,
5 APM Terminals 1,240 1,192 4.5%
Quetzal
6 Japdeva (Port Authority) 1,188 1,188 4.5% Puerto Limon
7 Crowley Maritime 845 845 3.2% Rio Haina, Santo Tomas, San Juan
8 Evergreen Group 816 694 2.6% Colon
Caucedo Development
9 1,332 666 2.5% Caucedo
Corporation
10 DP World 1,332 666 2.5% Caucedo
Total 17,930 67.9%
Note:
Africa
T he top 10 owners / operators in Africa are shown in Table 5.13.

The top nine players in 2018 are unchanged versus the previous
year, with APMT in pole position and holding a near 17% share of the
The top nine African
players in 2018 are
unchanged versus the
regional volume through a mixture of major hubs in North Africa and previous year
a range of West African terminals. State-owned South African operator
Transnet remains in second place with a 15% share due to its monopoly
in one of the largest economies in the region, and major West African
operator Bollore sits in third place with a 9% share. Between them,
these three players accounted for 40% of African throughput in 2018,
much the same as in 2017. Moroccan operator Marsa Maroc enters the
table in tenth place this year and is likely to consolidate its position
in the coming years as it is developing a greenfield terminal in Tanger
Med. Overall, the top 10 African players represented two-thirds of the
regional throughput.
229
Africa
Table 5.13 Africa – Top ten terminal owning/operating companies, 2018

Share of
equity teu in
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%)
Port Said East, Abidjan, Tema, Douala, Lagos,
1 APM Terminals 8,937 5,456 16.8% Onne, Tanger Med, Pointe Noire, Cotonou,
Monrovia, Luanda, Conakry
Transnet National Ports Durban, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East
2 4,883 4,883 15.0%
Authority London, Coega (Ngqura), Richards Bay
Abidjan, Tema, Lagos, Douala, Cotonou,
Libreville, Pointe Noire, Lomé, Freetown,
3 Bollore Ports 4,760 2,825 8.7% Conakry, Moroni (Comoros), Dakar
(Sénégal), Pointes des Galets (La Réunion),
Monrovia,Kribi
El Sokhna, Djibouti, Maputo, Dakar, Algiers,
4 DP World 2,041 1,623 5.0%
Djen Djen, Berbera
5 Kenya Ports Authority 1,304 1,304 4.0% Mombasa
Damietta Container
6 & Cargo Handling 1,151 1,151 3.5% Damietta
Company
Abidjan, Casablanca, Tanger Med, Pointes des
7 CMA CGM 2,117 1,087 3.3%
Galets (La Réunion)
Alexandria Container
8 & Cargo Handling 1,017 996 3.1% Alexandria (El Dekhila)
Company
9 Hutchison Ports 1,300 987 3.0% Dar es Salaam, Alexandria (El Dekhila)
10 Marsa Maroc 885 885 2.7% Casablanca, Agadir
Total 21,197 65.1%
Note:
Figure 5.21 Breakdown of forecast capacity expansion by 2023, Africa
23% Tanger Med Port Said East

26%
Lome Abidjan
Lekki Tema
3% 10% Kribi Casablanca

3%
4% Dar Es Salaam Port Louis
9%
4% Others
6% 6%
6%
230
Oceania
T able 5.14 shows the top five operators for the Oceania region. Since
it is relatively small and dominated by Australia and New Zealand,
a top 10 listing is not considered necessary. Australian operator Patrick
Region dominated by
Patricks and DP World
Stevedores occupied first place with a share of around 27%, unchanged

from 2017. Corsair by virtue of its majority ownership of the Australian
DPW terminals sits in second place with a near 20% share, although
this will change in 2019 as DPW has increased its share of its Australian
terminals to 60% in 2019. DPW itself appears in fifth place through its
2018 stake of 25% in these terminals. If Corsair and DPW are taken
together, their regional share is roughly equal to that of Patricks. All
three account for 53% of the regional total, down slightly on 2017’s 55%.
The top five players accounted for around 70% of the regional
throughput in 2018, with the list dominated by Australian- and New
Zealand-based players. Relatively new entrants to the Australian market,
ICTSI and Hutchison, have yet to make the top-five list.
Table 5.14 Oceania – Top 5 terminal owning/operating companies, 2018

Share of
equity teu in
(’000 teu) (’000 teu) (%)
Brisbane, Fremantle, Melbourne,
1 Patrick Stevedores 3,569 3,564 27.2%
Sydney,
Corsair Infrastructure Brisbane, Fremantle, Melbourne,
2 3,387 2,540 19.4%
Management * Sydney
3 Port of Tauranga Ltd 1,212 1,212 9.2% Tauranga
4 Ports of Auckland Ltd (POAL) 951 951 7.2% Auckland, Onehunga
Brisbane, Fremantle, Melbourne,
5 DP World 3,387 847 6.5%
Sydney
Total 9,114 69.5%
Note:
* Citigroup transferred the investment management responsibilities and operational authority for Citi Infrastructure Investors to Corsair Infrastructure
Management in March 2015.
Figure 5.22 Breakdown of forecast capacity expansion by 2023, Oceania
15%
Auckland
Lae
14% 41%
Burnie
Motukea
13%
Other
17%
231
2019 Global Container Terminal Operators Appendices
6. Appendices
Appendix 1a Definition of world regions (for GTO/ITO qualification)
Region Countries
North America Bermuda, Canada, USA
Belgium, Denmark, Eire, Finland, France (north / west coast), Germany, Greenland, Iceland, Netherlands,
North Europe
Norway, Sweden, UK
Albania, Cyprus, France (south coast), Gibraltar, Greece, Italy, Madeira, Malta, Portugal (incl. Azores /
South Europe
Madeira), Spain (incl. Canary Islands), Turkey
Guam, Hong Kong, Japan, China (People’s Republic of), Russia (Sea of Japan coast), South Korea,
Far East
Taiwan
South East Asia Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
Middle East Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, Yemen
Bahamas, Barbados, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Leeward Islands,
Caribbean
Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Trinidad & Tobago, Virgin Islands, Windward Islands
Central America Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama
South America Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guiana, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
Oceania Australia, Fiji, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tahiti, Tuvalu, Vanuatu
South Asia Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
Algeria, Angola, Ascension Island, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana,
Africa Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nigeria, Reunion, South Africa, Senegal, Seychelles
Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia (Baltic and Black Sea
East Europe
coasts), Slovenia, Ukraine, Montenegro
232
Appendices
Appendix 1b Definition of sub-regions by country (for section 5 forecasts)

Region Countries
North America * USA, Canada, Bermuda, Mexico
North West Europe Belgium, Eire, France (North and West Coasts), Germany, Madeira
Netherlands, Spain (Atlantic Coast), Portugal, Azores, United Kingdom
Scandinavia and Baltic Greenland, Iceland, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland
Russia (Baltic Coast)
West Mediterranean France (Med Coast), Spain (Med Coast), Malta, Italy, Gibraltar
Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia (Black Sea), Slovenia, Ukraine,
East Mediterranean & Black Sea
Montenegro
Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece
North Asia Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Russia (Pacific Coast)
Greater China China, Hong Kong
South East Asia Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam
Middle East Yemen, Jordan, Oman, UAE , Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran
South Asia Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka
Colombia (NE Coast), Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam, French Guiana, Panama, Bahamas, Barbados, Cayman Islands,
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Leeward Islands, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto
Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, Virgin Islands, Windward Islands
East Coast South America Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina
West Coast South America Ecuador, Chile, Peru, Colombia (Pacific Coast)
Kenya, Reunion, Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, Eritrea, Djibouti,

East Africa
Somalia
Canary Islands, Mauritania, Senegal, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory
West Africa
Coast, Togo
Ghana, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroun, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, DR Congo, Ascension Island,
Angola
North Africa Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria
Southern Africa Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique
Australia, New Zealand, Guam, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, New Caledonia, Samoa, Tahiti,
Oceania
Tuvalu,Vanuatu
* North America is further split into ECNA (East Coast North America), GCNA (Gulf Coast North America) and WCNA (West Coast North America)
233
Definitions and methodologies
This Appendix defines and explains some of the key measures and
categorisations used in the report.
Overall, Drewry strives to achieve accuracy and fairness as well as avoid
double counting. However, the complex nature of the industry, the
widely varying extent of information provided by terminal owners and
operators (ranging from comprehensive to nothing) and the different
interpretation of key factors make the analysis a challenging exercise.
Over the last 17 years of publishing this report, Drewry has developed
and evolved a set of rules and approaches for dealing with this
increasing complexity.
Global and international terminal operators

The global terminal operator/international terminal operator (GTO/
ITO) league tables in Section 3 of this report include GTOs / ITOs that
are defined as:
A stevedore, carrier or hybrid that operates significant container terminal
facilities in at least two different world regions.
• Stevedore: A company that has container terminal operations as its
core business and invests in container terminals for expansion and
geographical diversification. Note that the term ‘stevedore’ is used
here in a generic sense (that is, as an overall operator of a terminal
and not just a labour supplier or crane operator).
• Carrier: A company with container shipping as its core business, but
has a network of terminals to serve this liner shipping activity.
• Hybrid: A company that has container shipping as its main activity,
but has a separate business unit for terminals.
It is difficult to decide whether some terminal activities indirectly
associated with carriers should be categorised as hybrids, or should they
be regarded as stevedores. Some operators are more ‘hybrid’ than others
− some are closer to the carrier end of the spectrum while others are
closer to the stevedore end.
Within the industry, opinions vary about which category certain
operators should be placed in, with some observers believing that a
terminal operating company with any kind of connection with a carrier
cannot ever be regarded as independent. Others rightly point to the
corporate goals of terminal operators associated with carriers; for
instance, is it a profit centre rather than a cost centre; is it seeking third-
party business; is it treating all shipping line customers equally?
234
Regardless of the above categories, to qualify as a GTO or ITO for the

purpose of the tables in Section 3 of the report, the following tests are
applied:
• Operators need to have significant activities in more than one of
Drewry’s 12 world regions, with activities in more than one country.
This test applies only to the portfolio of terminals directly owned by
the operator, and not stakes that may be held in other operators.
• ‘Significant activities’ mean that at least 5% of an operator’s equity teu
must be generated in a world region outside the operator’s home-base
region (the basis of calculation – excluding stevedoring teu).
• The combined equity teu of an operator’s portfolio must be at least
one million teu per annum (excluding stevedoring teu).
• If the entire non-home-base equity teu is generated by terminal(s) in
a country bordering the home-base country (even though it is in a
different world region), Drewry does not categorise that operator as a
GTO or ITO.
• Non-home-base equity teu is applicable only if the terminal(s) in
question is controlled and operated in all respects, that is, if the
activity is stevedoring only, or a management contract only, or if
shared berths or cranes are used, then the volume does not apply.
Drewry’s aim with the Section 3 GTO/ ITO tables is to focus on
operators with significant international activity and expertise on a
wide geographical basis. In other words, the definition and tests are
deliberately exclusive.
This is particularly relevant because in Section 3, Drewry compares the
performance and development of GTOs and ITOs as a group versus
the rest of the industry, and so the GTO/ITO group needs to be highly
focused.
For reference, Drewry’s 12 world regions for the purpose of GTO/ITO
definition are as follows:
• North America
• North Europe
• South Europe
• Far East
• Southeast Asia
• Middle East
• Central America/Caribbean
• South America
• Oceania
• South Asia
• Africa
• Eastern Europe
235
Owners vs. operators

Another challenge for the Drewry analysis is to define an ‘operator’
and an ‘owner’ of container terminals. Clearly, there is a spectrum
here, ranging from the party that has the day-to-day operational
management control of the terminal to the party (or parties) that
determines its longer-term development, through to the party (or
parties) that simply has a minority shareholding – a seat on the board
and dividend each year.
We have a deliberately tight definition of what we categorise as terminal
operators for the league tables. The criteria for categorising companies as
terminal operators include:
i. Port and terminal operations are the primary (and usually sole)
business activity
ii. There is a distinct brand identity for the terminals business
iii. There are over-arching functions across the portfolio covering commercial,
operations, finance, procurement, business development, strategy etc
iv. The business has its own financial results
Note that the preceding applies to independent, non-liner affiliated
terminal operators. The criteria are slightly different for terminal
businesses owned by shipping lines, as these tend to define themselves as
operators by default (rather than owners).
Level of ownership
Then there is the question of analysing the level of ownership of a
terminal, that is, shareholding companies often are themselves owned
by other holding companies, with some having many layers and levels
of ownership. Similarly, the question arises as to whether the terminal-
operating company is the ‘owner’ of the terminal it operates (which in
one sense it clearly is), or whether it is the ultimate parent company or
companies of this terminal operating company.
Figure A2.1 Illustration of terminal operator vs terminal owner complexity
Dubai World Various parent companies

100%
Multiple shareholders via
Port & Free Zone World FZE
stock exchange listing
80.5% 19.5%
DP World
Company may have

Holding company
co-shareholders
Company holding
Company may have
Port authority terminal lease /
co-shareholders
concession
Terminal A’s infrastructure Terminal A’s equipment
236
In this respect, it is particularly challenging to produce the regional

league tables in Section 5 of this report, in terms of deciding which
companies to include. Figure A2.1 illustrates the ’level of ownership’
complexity using DP World as an example.
Drewry’s underlying aim with this report (and particularly the GTO/ITO
league tables in Section 3) has always been to focus on companies with
expertise in running, shaping and developing international container
terminals (that is, stevedores, carriers and hybrids). However, elsewhere
in the report, Drewry has also sought to highlight some key owners and
investors (where they are different from GTOs/ITOs).
Nevertheless, defining whether a particular company is an operator or
an owner requires a significant element of judgement. Indeed certain
operators might regard some other players as owners rather than operators,
whereas these players might regard themselves as operators rather than
owners. Drewry believes that there is no definitive rule on this matter.
GTOs and ITOs with stakes in other owners/operators

The original purpose of introducing equity teu calculations some years
ago was two-fold:
1. To more accurately reflect instances where, for example, an operator
has a small stake in a large terminal
2. To avoid double counting where more than one GTO or ITO has a
stake in the same terminal
Drewry is increasingly seeing instances where a GTO or ITO has a
stake in another portfolio owner or operator (that may or may not
itself be a GTO or ITO). The instances of owners or operators having
stakes in other owners or operators are becoming an increasingly
complex challenge to deal with in the league tables, in particular, as
more deals are being finalised leading to more interlinked ownership
structures. For example, China Merchants Ports has a 49% stake in
CMA CGM’s Terminal Link, while CMA CGM itself is 24% owned by
Yildirim Group.
When PSA bought 20% of HPH some years ago, Drewry had the first
instance of one GTO owning a slice of another GTO. In order to avoid
double counting in the Section 3 equity teu league table (Table 3.2),
Drewry took the decision to take 20% of HPH’s equity teu and credit
PSA with it.
Drewry has continued with this approach since then, primarily to avoid
double counting in the equity teu league table, and apply this rule to
any other cases where a GTO or ITO owns stakes in other operators.
However, total teu figures are not adjusted in the Section 3 league table
(Table 3.1) as Drewry does not consider it appropriate to credit a GTO or
ITO with another operator’s total teu (whether or not this other operator
is a GTO/ITO).
237
In the company-wise tables in Section 4, the equity teu figures without

adjustment can still be found, plus the concept of ‘indirect influence’
throughput is included in Table 3.1.
There is also a challenge in determining how to deal with HPH
terminals that were incorporated into HPH Trust in March 2011
because the ownership of the terminals is administered via HPH Trust
(in which Hutchison Ports’ parent company Hutchison Whampoa
has a stake). Investors in the trust own units in the trust rather than
owning the terminals themselves, so in this sense, HPH is still the
terminal ‘owner’. For the purpose of HPH’s table and also the league
tables, Drewry has worked on the basis that the Hutchison group
remains the owner of the terminals, and perhaps, more importantly, it
is the operator and manager of HPH Trust terminals and so it is fair to
include them in HPH figures.
Terminal capacity
Capacity is always a moving target and depends on a range of factors,
many of which are outside the control of the terminal operator. These
parameters can also change over time. There are also distinctions
between, for example, design capacity, commercial capacity, theoretical
capacity and the absolute physical upper limit. Operators often quote
capacity figures without qualifying the terms on the basis of which they
are quoted.
Drewry seeks to focus on the commercial capacity of each terminal,
this being:
The maximum throughput that can be achieved at the quality of service
the operator would like to guarantee to its customers (or quality of service
acceptable to most customers).
In other words, if a terminal has a capacity of one million teu per annum,
it means that the terminal can handle one million teu per annum and still
offer a reasonable level of service to most customers at most times.
In the first instance, Drewry seeks capacity figures for each terminal
from the terminal operator or owner, and if this is not available or
forthcoming, moves on to secondary sources, or estimates based on
benchmarks. In all cases, however, Drewry’s aim is to show the real-
world commercial and operational capacity of each terminal, as opposed
to a design or theoretical maximum capacity.
However, this approach is not easy with Chinese terminals in particular,
where design capacity is often the officially declared figure (and indeed
the ultimate design capacity at final build-out is sometimes quoted even
if not all phases have been built yet). In addition, with many Chinese
terminals, a question arises as to whether the capacity figure relates to the
physical infrastructure and equipment, or whether the ‘terminal’ is, in
fact, an accounting or legal entity and the capacity refers to this instead.
238
Drewry has, wherever possible, sought to show the capacity of the

physical terminal in its tables, with the allied aim that the throughput of
the terminal is also recorded on a basis consistent with the capacity.
A further complication arises where a terminal has several
shareholders, and each one may have a different view of what the
capacity of the terminal is, depending on their assumptions and their
definition of capacity.
Throughput and shareholdings

As with previous years, Drewry has sought to obtain actual throughput
figures by terminal from all operators, as well as precise shareholdings.
Many operators are helpful, some less so, some not at all. Some are
bound by corporate disclosure restrictions that limit what they can say.
What does happen is that for terminals that are JVs or have more than
one shareholder, it is quite common to receive different throughput data
from each shareholder (for the same terminal), or perhaps receive data
from one but not another. Sometimes this difference is explainable – for
example, one shareholder includes barge moves across the quay, another
does not, or perhaps one includes re-stows whereas another does not.
Often the reasons for the differences cannot be found.
On certain occasions, there are also differences that defy explanation in
the shareholding percentages provided by co-shareholders in the same
terminal.
Sometimes the throughput figures received from two shareholders in the
same terminal can be very different indeed (in millions of teu), especially
for some Chinese terminals. In particular, it seems that domestic trade
volumes handled by some Chinese terminals may not be as high as is
reported. There are suggestions from some sources for example that
some ports have recorded as throughput the total number of boxes
onboard each ship that calls, rather than just those actually handled
across the quay.
Another fairly common challenge across the world is the fact that the
sum of the throughput of the various terminals at a port may exceed the
total port throughput as reported by the port authority.
Drewry is not in a position to decide which operators’ figures are right
(and indeed they may all be right in their own way, depending on how
throughput is viewed and recorded) and so in a number of cases Drewry
shows each operator’s figures in its Section 4 table, meaning that across
all the tables there may be differences for the same terminal.
This can also be true of capacity and sometimes shareholdings. However,
for capacity, Drewry is more able to take its own view of what is the
’right’ figure, based on the equipment and infrastructure. Throughput, as
reported to Drewry, is much harder to verify.
For divestments and acquisitions of terminals that take place in the year
under analysis, Drewry aims to show throughput and capacity for the
part of the year when the stake in the terminal was held.
239
Stevedoring
In the US, in particular, there is often a terminal-operating company
(which provides overall management and usually holds the lease on a
terminal) and a stevedoring company (which provides labour for the
terminal). The terminal operating company (or its shareholders) may have
a shareholding in the stevedoring company, but it is not always the case.
The stevedoring company is physically handling the cargo and receiving
revenue for its services, and is therefore of interest in throughput terms in
the context of this report. However, in a wider sense, the party ultimately
in control of the management and development of the terminal is the
terminal operating company holding the lease on the facility.
As a result, Drewry has taken the view that in operators’ tables, stevedoring
should be shown separately. In terms of equity teu calculations, the
shareholding will either be that held in the terminal company, or that held
in the stevedoring company, clearly shown in each case.
However, in terms of the Section 3 GTO/ ITO league tables, Drewry only
includes equity teu from terminal activities, not stevedoring activities.
This rule eradicates double counting (in those instances where one
operator or owner has a shareholding in the terminal operating company
and another operator has a shareholding in the stevedoring company)
and also leads to a more consistent method of calculating equity teu,
based on the party that is ultimately in control of the management and
development of the terminal.
Barge terminals and volumes

In addition to having terminals that handle seagoing vessels, a number
of operators also own or operate terminals exclusively for barges and
river craft. Drewry’s policy is to exclude the volume and capacity of such
terminals from the GTO/ITO league tables, although it does show them
in some of the individual company tables.
Barge terminals are defined by Drewry as terminals that cannot (or do
not) handle seagoing vessels. This, therefore, includes barge terminals
on European inland waterways such as the Rhine, and on major Chinese
rivers such as the Yangtze.
A further complication arises when some deep-sea terminals are
integrated with adjacent barge terminals, for instance, ECT Delta
terminal in Rotterdam or PSA in Antwerp. The operators of such
terminals often include barge volumes in their overall deep-sea terminal
throughput figures.
Drewry’s aim is to exclude such volumes from its analyses and focus
solely on volumes handled on seagoing vessels. However, the lack of
transparency in some operators’ reporting means it is not always possible
to separate them.
240
2019 Global Container Terminal Operators Tables and figures listing
Tables and figures listing

Tables
TABLE 2.1 STRATEGIC AIMS AND TARGETS OF GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL STEVEDORES, HYBRIDS AND CARRIERS�� 7
TABLE 2.2 FORECAST DEVELOPMENT OF CONTAINER PORT CAPACITY BY OWNERSHIP, 2018-2023............................ 12
TABLE 2.3 WORLD CONTAINER PORT HANDLING BY REGION AND OWNERSHIP, 2017-2018........................................... 13
TABLE 3.1 GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL TERMINAL OPERATORS’ THROUGHPUT LEAGUE TABLE, 2017-2018..................... 18
TABLE 3.2 GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL TERMINAL OPERATORS’ EQUITY BASED THROUGHPUT
LEAGUE TABLE, 2017-2018 (MTEU/% SHARE OF WORLD CONTAINER PORT THROUGHPUT)........................ 23
TABLE 3.3 ILLUSTRATION OF EQUITY-ADJUSTED TERMINAL PORTFOLIO VOLUMES IF SHOWN
BY ALLIANCE AND ALLIANCE MEMBERS (2018).................................................................................................. 27
TABLE 3.4 GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL STEVEDORES’ HOME PORT VOLUMES, 2016-2018................................................. 32
TABLE 3.5 GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL TERMINAL OPERATORS’ CAPACITY LEAGUE TABLE, 2017-2018 (MTEU).............. 34
TABLE 3.6 FORECAST DEVELOPMENT OF GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL TERMINAL OPERATORS’
CAPACITY, 2018-2023 (MTEU)................................................................................................................................ 36
TABLE 3.7 SELECTED M&A AND CONCESSION ACTIVITY BY GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL
TERMINAL OPERATORS, 2018-19......................................................................................................................... 42
TABLE 3.8 GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS TERMINAL PORTFOLIO BY REGION................................................... 44
TABLE 3.9 REGIONAL INVESTMENT PROSPECTS SUMMARY.............................................................................................. 47
TABLE 3.10 GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS’ PORTFOLIO RISK INDEXES, 2018.................................................... 48
TABLE 3.11 GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS’ PORTFOLIO RISK INDEXES.............................................................. 48
TABLE 3.12 REGIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL PERFORMANCE COMPARISON, 2018...................................................... 51
TABLE 3.13 DEPLOYMENT OF SHIP-TO-SHORE GANTRY CRANES BY REGION, OUTREACH AND
OWNERSHIP, 2018 (NUMBER OF CRANES)........................................................................................................ 52
TABLE 3.14 SHIP-TO-SHORE GANTRY CRANES ON ORDER, 2019...................................................................................... 53
TABLE 3.15 F
INANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL TERMINAL OPERATORS,
2017 & 2018 ($ MILLION)..........................................................................................................................................54
TABLE 3.16 FINANCIALS OF SELECTED DMFR PORT COVERAGE....................................................................................... 59
TABLE 3.17 LISTED PORT COMPANY GEARING STATISTICS................................................................................................ 62
TABLE 3.18 VALUATION COMPARISON BETWEEN LISTED PORT OPERATORS................................................................... 67
TABLE 3.19 DMFR VALUE AND RISK RATING AND SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE OF LISTED OPERATORS................... 68
TABLE 4.1.1 HUTCHISON PORTS (HP).................................................................................................................................... 70
TABLE 4.1.2 APM TERMINALS................................................................................................................................................. 79
TABLE 4.1.3 PSA INTERNATIONAL.......................................................................................................................................... 87
TABLE 4.1.4 DP WORLD........................................................................................................................................................... 96
TABLE 4.1.5 CHINA COSCO SHIPPING................................................................................................................................. 106
TABLE 4.1.6 OOCL.................................................................................................................................................................. 114
TABLE 4.1.7 TERMINAL INVESTMENT LTD (TIL).................................................................................................................... 116
TABLE 4.1.8 EUROGATE......................................................................................................................................................... 121
TABLE 4.1.9 EVERGREEN....................................................................................................................................................... 124
TABLE 4.1.10 SSA MARINE/CARRIX...................................................................................................................................... 128
TABLE 4.1.11 CMA CGM (CMAT+TL)..................................................................................................................................... 133
TABLE 4.1.12 CMA CGM (APL)............................................................................................................................................... 138
TABLE 4.1.13 NYK.................................................................................................................................................................. 141
TABLE 4.1.14 K LINE............................................................................................................................................................... 144
TABLE 4.1.15 MOL.................................................................................................................................................................. 146
TABLE 4.1.16 YANG MING...................................................................................................................................................... 149
TABLE 4.1.17 ICTSI................................................................................................................................................................. 152
TABLE 4.1.18 HYUNDAI.......................................................................................................................................................... 158
TABLE 4.1.19 CHINA MERCHANTS....................................................................................................................................... 163
TABLE 4.1.20 BOLLORE PORTS (BOLLORE TRANSPORT & LOGISTICS)............................................................................ 169
TABLE 4.1.21 YILDIRIM GROUP (YILPORT HOLDING).......................................................................................................... 173
241
Tables
TABLE 4.1.22 SAAM PUERTOS (SAAM PORTS).................................................................................................................... 177
TABLE 4.1.23 HHLA................................................................................................................................................................ 179
TABLE 4.2.1 DEUTSCHE ASSET & WEALTH MANAGEMENT................................................................................................. 181
TABLE 4.2.2 GLOBAL PORTS INVESTMENTS (GPI).............................................................................................................. 182
TABLE 4.2.3 GULFTAINER...................................................................................................................................................... 184
TABLE 4.2.4 MACQUARIE...................................................................................................................................................... 185
TABLE 4.2.5 MITSUI................................................................................................................................................................ 187
TABLE 4.2.6 MMC CORPORATION BERHAD (MMC)............................................................................................................. 189
TABLE 4.2.7 MODERN TERMINALS LTD (MTL)....................................................................................................................... 190
TABLE 4.2.8 NELTUME PORTS.............................................................................................................................................. 191
TABLE 4.2.9 PORTS AMERICA............................................................................................................................................... 193
TABLE 4.2.10 SHANGHAI INTERNATIONAL PORT GROUP (SIPG)....................................................................................... 194
TABLE 5.1 FORECAST SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN THE GLOBAL CONTAINER PORT MARKET, 2018-2023....................... 202
TABLE 5.2 ALTERNATIVE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FORECAST IN THE GLOBAL CONTAINER PORT
MARKET TAKING INTO ACCOUNT UNCONFIRMED CAPACITY EXPANSION PLANS, 2018-2023.................... 204
TABLE 5.3 FAR EAST – TOP TEN TERMINAL OWNING/OPERATING COMPANIES, 2018.................................................... 207
TABLE 5.4 SOUTHEAST ASIA – TOP TEN TERMINAL OWNING/OPERATING COMPANIES, 2018...................................... 213
TABLE 5.5 NORTH AMERICA – TOP TEN TERMINAL OWNING/OPERATING COMPANIES, 2018....................................... 215
TABLE 5.6 NORTH EUROPE – TOP TEN TERMINAL OWNING/OPERATING COMPANIES, 2018........................................ 217
TABLE 5.7 SOUTH EUROPE – TOP TEN TERMINAL OWNING/OPERATING COMPANIES, 2018........................................ 218
TABLE 5.8 EASTERN EUROPE – TOP TEN TERMINAL OWNING/OPERATING COMPANIES, 2018.................................... 220
TABLE 5.9 MIDDLE EAST – TOP TEN TERMINAL OWNING/OPERATING COMPANIES, 2018............................................. 222
TABLE 5.10 SOUTH ASIA – TOP TEN TERMINAL OWNING/OPERATING COMPANIES, 2018............................................. 225
TABLE 5.11 SOUTH AMERICA – TOP TEN TERMINAL OWNING/OPERATING COMPANIES, 2018..................................... 227
TABLE 5.12 CENTRAL AMERICA / CARIBBEAN – TOP TEN TERMINAL OWNING/OPERATING COMPANIES, 2018............ 229
TABLE 5.13 AFRICA – TOP TEN TERMINAL OWNING/OPERATING COMPANIES, 2018..................................................... 230
TABLE 5.14 OCEANIA – TOP 5 TERMINAL OWNING/OPERATING COMPANIES, 2018....................................................... 231
APPENDIX 1A DEFINITION OF WORLD REGIONS (FOR GTO/ITO QUALIFICATION)........................................................... 232
APPENDIX 1B DEFINITION OF SUB-REGIONS BY COUNTRY (FOR SECTION 5 FORECASTS).......................................... 233
Figures
FIGURE 1.1. PROJECTED REGIONAL CONTAINER HANDLING (MTEU) AND AVERAGE
ANNUAL GROWTH (%), 2018-2023...................................................................................................................... 5
FIGURE 2.1 KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL STEVEDORES, CARRIERS AND HYBRIDS................. 8
FIGURE 2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF CONTROL OF GLOBAL CONTAINER TERMINAL VOLUMES ............................................ 14
FIGURE 2.3 GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL TERMINAL OPERATOR THROUGHPUT BY OPERATOR TYPE, 2016-18................ 15
FIGURE 3.1 OWNERSHIP CONNECTIONS BETWEEN GTOS/ITOS, 2019.............................................................................. 24
FIGURE 3.2 EVOLUTION OF TOP 10 GTO/ITOS BY EQUITY TEU, 2008-2018....................................................................... 26
FIGURE 3.3 GTO/ITO CURRENT (2018) PORTFOLIOS BY MARKET/RISK AND GEOGRAPHICAL SPREAD......................... 29
FIGURE 3.4 GTO/ITO CURRENT (2018) PORTFOLIOS BY TRAFFIC TYPE AND AVERAGE TERMINAL SIZE........................ 31
FIGURE 3.5 GTO/ITO STRATEGIC FOCUS BY MARKET/RISK AND NATURE OF INVESTMENTS......................................... 38
FIGURE 3.6 GTO/ITO STRATEGIC FOCUS BY EXPANSION PLANS AND DIVESTMENT APPETITE/NEED........................... 39
FIGURE 3.7 AVERAGE TERMINAL UTILISATION LEVELS ACROSS PORTFOLIO, GTOS/ITOS, 2018.................................... 40
FIGURE 3.8 REGIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL PERFORMANCE COMPARISON, 2018...................................................... 50
FIGURE 3.9 WORLD PMI.......................................................................................................................................................... 56
FIGURE 3.10 CHINESE CONTAINER PORT VOLUME GROWTH............................................................................................. 57
FIGURE 3.11 TOTAL VOLUMES AT SELECTED TRANSHIPMENT HUBS................................................................................ 58
242
Figures
FIGURE 3.12 HONG KONG AND BUSAN VOLUME GROWTH................................................................................................ 58
FIGURE 3.13 ST PETERSBURG CONTAINER PORT VOLUME GROWTH............................................................................... 60
FIGURE 3.14 PORT OF SANTOS VOLUME GROWTH............................................................................................................. 60
FIGURE 3.15 RECENT DISCLOSED AND ESTIMATED PORT SECTOR TRANSACTION MULTIPLES.................................... 63
FIGURE 3.16 DREWRY PORT INDEX VS GLOBAL EMERGING MARKET INDEX.................................................................... 64
FIGURE 3.17 VALUATION: PORT VS EMERGING MARKET..................................................................................................... 65
FIGURE 3.18 5-YEAR PORT VALUATION................................................................................................................................. 67
FIGURE 3.19 SAMPLE PORT OPERATORS: ROIC................................................................................................................... 68
FIGURE 4.1.1 LOCATION OF HUTCHISON PORTS OWNED/MANAGED TERMINAL OPERATIONS...................................... 76
FIGURE 4.1.2 LOCATION OF APMT OWNED/MANAGED TERMINAL OPERATIONS.............................................................. 84
FIGURE 4.1.3 LOCATION OF PSA OWNED/MANAGED TERMINAL OPERATIONS................................................................. 92
FIGURE 4.1.4 LOCATION OF DP WORLD OWNED/MANAGED TERMINAL OPERATIONS................................................... 102
FIGURE 4.1.5 LOCATION OF CHINA COSCO SHIPPING OWNED/MANAGED TERMINAL OPERATIONS........................... 112
FIGURE 4.1.6 LOCATION OF TIL OWNED/MANAGED TERMINAL OPERATIONS................................................................. 119
FIGURE 4.1.7 LOCATION OF SSA OWNED/MANAGED TERMINAL OPERATIONS............................................................... 130
FIGURE 4.1.8 LOCATION OF CMA CGM OWNED/MANAGED TERMINAL OPERATIONS.................................................... 137
FIGURE 4.1.9 LOCATION OF ONE OWNED/MANAGED TERMINAL OPERATIONS.............................................................. 142
FIGURE 4.1.10 LOCATION OF ICTSI OWNED/MANAGED TERMINAL OPERATIONS........................................................... 156
FIGURE 4.1.11 LOCATION OF CM PORTS OWNED/MANAGED TERMINAL OPERATIONS................................................. 166
FIGURE 4.1.12 LOCATION OF YILPORT OWNED/MANAGED TERMINAL OPERATIONS..................................................... 174
FIGURE 5.1. PROJECTED REGIONAL CONTAINER HANDLING (MTEU) AND AVERAGE ANNUAL
GROWTH (%), 2018-2023.................................................................................................................................. 200
FIGURE 5.2 OWNERSHIP OF MAJOR CHINESE CONTAINER TERMINALS: NORTH CHINA (BOHAI BAY AREA).............. 208
FIGURE 5.3 OWNERSHIP OF MAJOR CHINESE CONTAINER TERMINALS: CENTRAL CHINA (SHANGHAI AREA)........... 209
FIGURE 5.4 OWNERSHIP OF MAJOR CHINESE CONTAINER TERMINALS: SOUTH CHINA............................................... 210
FIGURE 5.5 OWNERSHIP OF MAJOR CHINESE CONTAINER TERMINALS: PEARL RIVER AREA...................................... 211
FIGURE 5.6 BREAKDOWN OF FORECAST CAPACITY EXPANSION BY 2023, FAR EAST................................................... 212
FIGURE 5.7 BREAKDOWN OF FORECAST CAPACITY EXPANSION BY 2023, SE ASIA...................................................... 213
FIGURE 5.8 BREAKDOWN OF FORECAST CAPACITY EXPANSION BY 2023, NORTH AMERICA...................................... 216
FIGURE 5.9 BREAKDOWN OF FORECAST CAPACITY EXPANSION BY 2023, NORTH EUROPE........................................ 217
FIGURE 5.10 BREAKDOWN OF FORECAST CAPACITY EXPANSION BY 2023, SOUTH EUROPE...................................... 219
FIGURE 5.11 OWNERSHIP OF MAIN CONTAINER TERMINALS: EASTERN EUROPE REGION (BALTIC SEA).................... 220
FIGURE 5.12 OWNERSHIP OF MAIN CONTAINER TERMINALS: EASTERN EUROPE REGION (BLACK SEA).................... 221
FIGURE 5.13 BREAKDOWN OF FORECAST CAPACITY EXPANSION BY 2023, EASTERN EUROPE.................................. 221
FIGURE 5.14 OWNERSHIP OF MAJOR MIDDLE EAST CONTAINER TERMINALS: ARABIAN GULF................................... 223
FIGURE 5.15 OWNERSHIP OF MAJOR MIDDLE EAST CONTAINER TERMINALS (EXCLUDING ARABIAN GULF)............. 224
FIGURE 5.16 BREAKDOWN OF FORECAST CAPACITY EXPANSION BY 2023, MIDDLE EAST........................................... 225
FIGURE 5.17 OWNERSHIP OF THE MAJOR CONTAINER TERMINALS IN INDIA................................................................. 226
FIGURE 5.18 BREAKDOWN OF FORECAST CAPACITY EXPANSION BY 2023, SOUTH ASIA............................................. 227
FIGURE 5.19 BREAKDOWN OF FORECAST CAPACITY EXPANSION BY 2023, SOUTH AMERICA..................................... 228
FIGURE 5.20 BREAKDOWN OF FORECAST CAPACITY EXPANSION BY 2023, CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN...... 228
FIGURE 5.21 BREAKDOWN OF FORECAST CAPACITY EXPANSION BY 2023, AFRICA..................................................... 230
FIGURE 5.22 BREAKDOWN OF FORECAST CAPACITY EXPANSION BY 2023, OCEANIA.................................................. 231
FIGURE A2.1 ILLUSTRATION OF TERMINAL OPERATOR VS TERMINAL OWNER COMPLEXITY........................................ 236
243
Subscription Report Titles & Prices – 2019
Drewry Maritime Research; 15-17 Christopher Street; London EC2A 2BS
Tel No: +44 (0)20 7538 0191; Fax No: +44 (0)20 7987 9396;
E-mail: enquiries@drewry.co.uk Web: www.drewry.co.uk

MONTHLY TITLES Price in
USD ($) Subscription (Annual)
(Annual subscription)
Container Freight Rate Insight $3,125 Subscription

Sea & Air Shipper Insight Tier 1 $1,250 Subscription
Tier 2 $1,825
The Shipping Insight $1,150 Subscription
QUARTERLY TITLES
(Annual subscription or a single copy)
Benchmarking Club Price on application
Ports & Terminals Insight $1,965 Subscription
Chemical Forecaster $3,300 Subscription

$1,745 Single copy – latest edition
Container Forecaster $4,150 Subscription

Dry Bulk Forecaster $2,840 Subscription

LNG Forecaster $2,840 Subscription

LPG Forecaster $2,840 Subscription

Crude Tanker Forecaster $2,650 Subscription

Product Tanker Forecaster $2,650 Subscription

Multipurpose Shipping Forecaster $3,125 Subscription

Multipurpose Shipping Annual Review and Forecast 2019/20 $1,995 Single copy – Annual Review
Container Census & Leasing Industry – 2019/20 and

Container Equipment Insight $3,520 Subscription
Container Census & Leasing Industry – 2019/20 $2,375 Single copy – Annual Review
All subscriptions run for an annual 12 month period. Subject to the product titles purchased the client will receive monthly and quarterly updates released
during whilst their subscription is active and current. At subscription start the client will automatically receive the current issue. Access to product media
and online services is conditional to receipt of payment.
Subscription Report Titles & Prices – 2019
Drewry Maritime Research; 15-17 Christopher Street; London EC2A 2BS
Tel No: +44 (0)20 7538 0191; Fax No: +44 (0)20 7987 9396;
E-mail: enquiries@drewry.co.uk Web: www.drewry.co.uk
Price in Date of
CONTAINER RELATED
USD ($) Publication Order No
Annual Container Market Review & Forecast – 2018/19 $1,995 Oct 2018 R1804
Container Terminal Capacity & Performance Benchmarks $2,495 Oct 2014 R1415
Annual Review Of Global Container Terminal Operators 2018 $2,625 Jul 2018 R1806

COSTS RELATED
Ship Operating Costs Annual Review & Forecast – 2018/19 $1,950 Nov 2018 R1807
Manning Annual Review and Forecast 2019/20 $1,870 May 2019 R1902

OTHER
Reefer Shipping Market Annual Review & Forecast – 2018/19 $1,870 Aug 2018 R1805
Product Tanker Market Annual Review and Forecast 2015/16 $1,870 Sep 2015 R1512
Finished Vehicle Shipping Annual Review & Forecast 2018/19 $1,950 Oct 2018 R1808
Number of companies Annual subscription

EQUITY RESEARCH
under coverage (base pricing)
Container Shipping 6 $4,150

Ports & Terminals 11 $3,950
Dry Bulk Shipping 7 $2,840
LNG Shipping 3 $2,250
LPG Shipping 3 $2,840
Crude Tanker Shipping 6 $2,650
Product Tanker Shipping 1 $750
Annual subscription
BUNDLE MARKET AND EQUITY RESEARCH PACKAGE
(discounted pricing)
Container Shipping $6,500

Ports & Terminals $6,250
Dry Bulk Shipping $4,500
LNG Shipping $4,000
LPG Shipping $4,500
Crude Tanker Shipping $4,250
Product Tanker Shipping $3,000
About Drewry Research
Drewry Maritime Research is the research arm of global shipping consultancy Drewry. The company
has over 40 years’ experience in the maritime sector and employs more than 90 specialists across
its offices in London, Delhi, Singapore and Shanghai.
Our market research is renowned for its quality and is trusted by industry leaders around the world
to deliver impartial, robust analysis and balanced opinion. This independence, alongside our sector
knowledge and expertise, sets our research apart and gives clients the rich market insight they need
to make informed business decisions.
Copyright Terms and Conditions

Drewry owns full copyright of all its research products, covering both reports and online interactive
resources. Drewry’s rights and entitlements as copyright holder are protected by law in all jurisdic-
tions. In this context, Drewry operates a simple policy of single-site and multi-site licences. All basic
research products are sold on the basis of a standard licence covering a single site.
The primary source of market insight, analysis and advice trusted by a global audience of maritime
and shipping industry stakeholders
UK India Singapore China

15-17 Christopher Street 4th Floor, Tower C #13-02 Tower Fifteen Unit D01 Level 10,
London Pioneer Urban Square 15 Hoe Chiang Road Shinmay Union Square Tower 2,
EC2A 2BS Sector 62, Gurugram Singapore 089316 506 Shang Cheng Road, Pudong,
United Kingdom Haryana - 122 101, Shanghai 200120
India P. R. China
T +44 20 7538 0191 T +91 124 497 4979 T +65 6220 9890 T +86 21 5081 0508
enquiries@drewry.co.uk www.drewry.co.uk

Drewry 2019 - Global Container Terminal Operators Annual Review and Forecast 2019 PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Drewry 2019 - Global Container Terminal Operators Annual Review and Forecast 2019 PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Global Container Terminal Operators

Annual Review and Forecast

1. Executive Summary���������������������������������������������2 Editor:

5. Analysis by world region����������������������������������199 Drewry Maritime Research

I n this report we provide a detailed analysis of both the overall

The global container terminal industry

5 things you need to know…

League tables of global/international terminal operators

Analysis of leading operators and investors

Operator/ownership analysis by world region

Operator/ownership analysis by world region

• Significantly, Chinese capacity expansion appears to be largely on hold Chinese capacity

3.6% 136 160

2018 Average annual growth (2018-2023) 2023

Source: Drewry Maritime Research

Drewry Maritime Advisors bring

About Drewry Maritime Advisors

UK India Singapore China

2. The Global Container Terminal Industry

F or the purpose of this report, Drewry categorises 21 companies as

Terminal network supports shipping

Source: Drewry Maritime Research

Nature of GTOs and ITOs

Figure 2.1 Key characteristics of global/international stevedores, carriers and hybrids

Global Carriers’ Terminal Operations

Global/International Stevedores’ Global Carriers’ Terminal

Nature of GTOs and ITOs

The primary business of ‘stevedores’ is port and terminal operations. Global/international

Nature of GTOs and ITOs

Strengths and weaknesses of GTOs/ITOs Being a GTO/ITO

T he typical institutional structure in the global container port

Forecast global container terminal capacity

T able 2.2 provides a breakdown of current and forecast global

Forecast global container terminal capacity

Regional split of port ownership types

2017 Global/ 2018 Global/

(’000 teu) (’000 teu)

Regional split of port ownership types

Split by type of GTO/ITO

Figure 2.2 Development of control of global container terminal volumes

200 Other private sector

Split by type of GTO/ITO

Figure 2.3 Global/international terminal operator throughput by operator type, 2016-18

Source: Drewry Maritime Research

3. League tables of global/international

T his section provides league tables of annual container throughput

Throughput league tables

Methodology for generating the total teu

Throughput league tables

Hutchison figure includes HPH Trust volumes

TIL figure does not include MSC/affiliated companies

CMA CGM includes APL terminals

Some figures are estimated

Source: Drewry Maritime Research

Throughput league tables

Throughput league tables

Our ‘indirect influence’ enhancement does result in double counting,

APM Terminals 17 million moves (equity-weighted basis) *

Throughput league tables

Throughput league tables

Methodology for generating the equity teu

HPH Trust is a unique (and awkward) case when it comes to equity

Throughput league tables

1. Executive Summary��2 Editor:

5. Analysis by world region��199 Drewry Maritime Research

3. League tables of global/international