CRIM - Consolidated Case Digests 2014-June 2016

CRIMINAL LAW DIGESTS 2014 - June 2016
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
FELONIES
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO

G.R. No. 189833, February 5, 2014
J. PEREZ
The accused contends that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was
apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal
transportation of dangerous drugs. The Court ruled on the contrary stating that in conspiracy, it need
not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and
pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually
inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of
some complete whole.
Facts:
On 15 October 2001, Javier Morilla (Morilla), Mayor Ronnie Mitra (Mayor Mitra), Willie Yang y Yao
(Yang) and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan (Dequilla) were all charged for violating Sec. 14 of RA 6425;
who all belong to an organized/syndicate crime group as they all help one another, for purposes of
gain in the transport of illegal drugs, and in fact, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually aiding and abetting one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
transport by means of two (2) motor vehicles, namely a Starex van bearing plate number RWT-888
with commemorative plate to read "Mayor" and a municipal ambulance of Panukulan, Quezon
Province, methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug which is commonly known as shabu,
and with an approximate weight of five hundred three point sixty eight (503.68) kilos, without
authority whatsoever.
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City convicted Morilla and his co-accused Mayor Mitra, then
incumbent Mayor of Panukulan, Quezon, of illegal transport of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
commonly known as shabu. However, it absolved Dequilla and Yang due to the prosecution’s failure
to present sufficient evidence to convict them of the offense charged. The CA affirmed the ruling
of the RTC, thus the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether the RTC and CA erred in ruling that conspiracy is present in the commission of the crime.
Ruling:
SC finds that ruling of conspiracy by both courts is correct.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to
commit a felony.
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Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is not
sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal transportation of
dangerous drugs.
This argument is misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. In this case, the totality of the factual
circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire
to transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were
on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up
by the police operatives. When it was Morilla’s turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was
requested to open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered on the
floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in
conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he was with the mayor.
His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he just obeyed
the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle likewise bears no
merit.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY T. GO

G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014
J. Peralta
Where a private person has been charged of conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019
but the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the
Information, the private person may be indicted alone.
In crimes involving conspiracy, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired
and confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused
conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy. Even if one or more of the accused has died, or
cannot be charged of the crime, if there is sufficient evidence, one of the conspirators may be
charged alone of the crime.
Facts:
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., which nullified the various contracts awarded by
the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to
Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office
of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those
charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having
Page 2 of 519
supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a
contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the
offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused,
HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession
Agreement, after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium!
PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement
covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic
Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption
by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV,
Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are
more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the
Republic of the Philippines.
On March 10, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (SB) issued an order giving the prosecution 10 days to show
cause why the case should not be dismissed. The prosecution complied with the above Order
contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason
of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The
prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a
private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the
ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019.
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, granting the Motion to Quash, stating that
the lone accused in the case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator – public official was
already dead before the case was filed in court.
Hence the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner, being a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died
prior to the filing of the Information
Ruling:
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation
of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His
death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between
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him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that
there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement
of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted
together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person
may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged coconspirators in an indictment for conspiracy. If two
or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is,
in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This
means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance
of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done or written by each of them and it makes
no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. The death
of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL VILLALBA AND RANDY VILLALBA

G.R. No. 207629, October 22, 2014
J. Leonardo-De Castro
Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven as the crime itself. Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to
commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from
the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered
into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal
objective is to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in
concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim. There is no clear
evidence that accused-appellants had a common design to kill Maximillian. To recall, Maximillian's
group and accused-appellants' group completely met by chance that fateful early morning of April 29,
2006 near Gaisano Mall. They did not know each other before this meeting. The events swiftly happened,
in a matter of minutes, from the meeting of the two groups, to Maximillian's insulting remark to Jenny,
to the scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel, and to accused-appellant Arnel's
stabbing of Maximillian. The scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel broke out
because the former tried to grab the latter's arm. It was at this point that prosecution witnesses saw
accused-appellant Randy block Maximillian's way and hold Maximillian's hand/s. Josephine testified
that accused-appellant Randy held only Maximillian's left hand, and Frederick narrated that accused-
appellant Randy held both of Maximillian's hands; but neither of these witnesses was able to describe
the extent that Maximillian's ability to defend himself or flee was impaired by accused-appellant Randy's
hold on his hand/s. Given the circumstances, the Court has serious doubts that accused-appellant Randy
so acted to ensure that accused-appellant Arnel would be able to stab and kill Maximillian. It is
completely reasonable and plausible that accused-appellant Randy was merely stepping in to stop
Maximillian from further attacking his cousin accused-appellant Arnel. There was no proof that
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accused-appellant Randy had prior knowledge that accused-appellant Arnel carried a sharp weapon
with him or that accused-appellant Arnel intended to stab Maximillian.
Facts:
Maximillian, a college instructor, attended a farewell party for his students in Butuan City on
the night of April 28, 2006. Maximillian was accompanied by his wife Josephine and their friends
Frederick, Homer, and Homer's wife Marilou. Around 2:30 in the morning of April 29, 2006, Josephine
begged Maximillian that they already go home. Maximillian still did not want to leave, but Josephine
insisted. Angry, Maximillian rushed out of the restaurant and headed towards the direction of the
Gaisano Mall in Butuan City. Josephine asked Frederick to catch up with Maximillian. Josephine,
Homer, and Marilou then trailed about 10 meters behind Maximillian and Frederick.
When they turned at the corner, Maximillian and Frederick chanced upon accused-appellants
and their girlfriends, Maximillian's group and accused-appellants' group did not know each other
prior to the early morning of April 29, 2006. Maximillian suddenly ordered accused-appellants to
wear their shirts, and then asked accused-appellant Arnel, "How much is that?" referring to accused-
appellant Arnel's girlfriend. Frederick intervened and told accused-appellant Arnel, "Brod, don't
mind him. He is a little bit drunk." Accused-appellant Arnel replied, "That was nothing, Kuya."
However, Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel continued to stare at each other. Moments later,
Maximillian tried to get hold of accused-appellant Arnel's left arm but the latter was able to wave
away Maximillian's hand. Accused-appellant Randy blocked Maximillian's way and held
Maximillian's hand/s as accused-appellant Arnel hit Maximillian on the chest and abdomen. At this
point, it appeared to eyewitnesses Frederick, Josephine, and Homer that Maximillian was just being
boxed by accused-appellant Arnel. Frederick tried to break the scuffle, as Josephine and Flomer, who
were only five meters away, came running to help. Accused-appellants stepped back and then ran
away.
Despite telling Josephine that he was stabbed, Maximillian still chased accused-appellants,
with Frederick and Homer at his heels. Stones were thrown their way but none of them were hit. All
of a sudden, Maximillian fell to the ground. Josephine checked Maximillian's body yet found no blood
or wound. Assuming that Maximillian was simply drunk and in pain because of the fist fight,
Josephine, with the help of Frederick and Homer, brought Maximillian home on board a motorized
"trisikad." During the ride home, Maximillian was unconscious but snoring heavily. However, when
they were already at their house, Josephine felt that Maximillian had no more pulse and his eyes had
turned white. Josephine, again with Frederick and Homer, rushed Maximillian to Manuel J. Santos
Hospital.
Maximillian was later pronounced dead.
Accused-appellants were charged for the crime of murder. Both the RTC and CA convicted
the accused. Hence this appeal.
Accused-appellant Arnel asserts that he cannot be adjudged criminally liable for the resulting
death of Maximillian as he only stabbed Maximillian in self-defense. Accused-appellant also argues
that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing of Maximillian to murder, as even the
prosecution admits that provocation and aggression came from Maximillian and that an altercation
between accused-appellant Arnel and Maximillian preceded the stabbing.
Page 5 of 519
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, is correct in convicting the
accused Arnel and Randy Vilalalba.
Ruling:
No. The Court, after a meticulous review of the records of the case, finds bases to downgrade
accused-appellant Arnel's crime from murder to homicide and to absolve accused-appellant Randy
of any criminal liability for Maximillian's death.
At the outset, the Court bears in mind the following pronouncement in People v. Gerolaga.In
this Decision, this Court emphasizes the need to review the facts and details of appealed cases with
meticulous, laser-like precision. While, as a rule, the findings of fact of trial courts are accorded great
respect by appellate tribunals, still, the latter must wade through the mass of evidence in order to
ensure that the trial court did not overlook or misapprehend little details that could spell the
innocence of the accused, or at least mitigate their guilt. This is but consistent with the doctrine that
all doubts must be resolved in their favor. Indeed, it is far better to set free a thousand guilty persons
than to unjustly punish an innocent one.
Nonetheless, accused-appellant Randy's presence at the time and place of Maximillian's

stabbing does not necessarily mean that the former should bear criminal liability for the latter's
death, as the Court will subsequently discuss herein. The Information charged accused-appellants
with Maximillian's murder, alleging that accused-appellants, acting in conspiracy with each other,
and with abuse of superior strength, treachery, and/or evident premeditation, stabbed Maximillian
with an icepick.
Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven as the crime itself. Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide
to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred
from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and
entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by
which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that
the accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim.
There is no clear evidence that accused-appellants had a common design to kill Maximillian. To recall,
Maximillian's group and accused-appellants' group completely met by chance that fateful early
morning of April 29, 2006 near Gaisano Mall. They did not know each other before this meeting. The
events swiftly happened, in a matter of minutes, from the meeting of the two groups, to Maximillian's
insulting remark to Jenny, to the scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel, and to
accused-appellant Arnel's stabbing of Maximillian. The scuffle between Maximillian and accused-
appellant Arnel broke out because the former tried to grab the latter's arm. It was at this point that
prosecution witnesses saw accused-appellant Randy block Maximillian's way and hold Maximillian's
hand/s. Josephine testified that accused-appellant Randy held only Maximillian's left hand, and
Frederick narrated that accused-appellant Randy held both of Maximillian's hands; but neither of
these witnesses was able to describe the extent that Maximillian's ability to defend himself or flee
was impaired by accused-appellant Randy's hold on his hand/s. Given the circumstances, the Court
Page 6 of 519
has serious doubts that accused-appellant Randy so acted to ensure that accused-appellant Arnel
would be able to stab and kill Maximillian. It is completely reasonable and plausible that accused-
appellant Randy was merely stepping in to stop Maximillian from further attacking his cousin
accused-appellant Arnel. There was no proof that accused-appellant Randy had prior knowledge that
accused-appellant Arnel carried a sharp weapon with him or that accused-appellant Arnel intended
to stab Maximillian. For his part, accused-appellant Arnel admitted stabbing Maximillian but asserted
that he used only a barbecue stick which he found in the area. A barbecue stick, with a sharp end,
could cause a puncture wound consistent with that which killed Maximillian. That accused-appellant
Arnel used a barbecue stick he found in the area as weapon shows that he acted instantaneously and
spontaneously in stabbing Maximillian, thus, further negating the possibility that he conspired with
accused-appellant Randy to commit the stabbing.
This Court has held that the suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound from
behind the victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack was made, or the
fact that the victim was unarmed, do not by themselves render the attack as treacherous. This
is of particular significance in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he
gained an advantageous position over the victim when the latter accidentally fell and was rendered
defenseless. The means employed for the commission of the crime or the mode of attack must
be shown to have been consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the
consummation of the crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation
from the intended victim. For the rules on treachery to apply, the sudden attack must have
been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim, and without provocation on the
part of the latter. Treachery is never presumed. Like the rules on conspiracy, it is required that
the manner of attack must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime
itself.
The elements of treachery are wanting in this case. At the risk of sounding repetitive, the
Court once more emphasizes the swiftness of the events that took place on April 29, 2006 when
Maximillian's group unexpectedly came upon accused-appellants' group. The tension and physical
violence between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel quickly escalated from a verbal exchange,
to a physical scuffle, and then to the stabbing of Maximillian by accused-appellant Arnel. Accused-
appellant Arnel merely found a barbecue stick in the area which he used to stab Maximillian. The
barbecue stick could hardly be a weapon of choice and accused-appellant Arnel obviously used it only
in desperation. Moreover, it cannot be said that Maximillian did not expect at all some form of attack
from accused-appellant Arnel. Maximillian provoked accused-appellant Arnel by making a crude
remark about the latter's girlfriend, then grabbing accused-appellant Arnel's arm, and taunting
accused-appellant Arnel if he was brave. It would appear that Maximillian was, in fact, spoiling for a
fight. In addition, as the Court previously observed herein, it cannot simply assume in the absence of
proof that accused-appellant Randy held Maximillian's hand/s to prevent the latter from retaliating
as accused-appellant Arnel stabbed Maximillian. Accused-appellant Randy could just as well be
holding Maximillian's hand/s to stop Maximillian from further attacking accused-appellant Arnel
during the scuffle. Lastly, the Court is unconvinced that accused-appellant Arnel took advantage of
Maximillian's drunken state. No clear and convincing evidence has been presented to show the
degree of Maximillian's intoxication or if it had even affected his strength and intelligence.
Page 7 of 519
ANGELITA CRUZ BENITO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR. No. 204644, February 11, 2015
J. Leonen
Conspiracy must be proven with evidence that can convince a trial court of its existence beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, when the co-accused stated in open court that her fellow co-accused had no
participation in the crime of estafa, such statement was an admission against her interest. The statement
negated the alleged “common design or purpose”of conspiracy between her and Benito. It alsomeans
that she admitted that her companion’s acts can never be attributed to her.
Facts:
Rebecca Agbulos (Agbulos) and Angelita Cruz Benito (Benito) were charged with estafa
punished under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Abadilla knew Agbulos and Benito through Abadilla’s friend, Pamintuan. Pamintuan
introduced Agbulos to Abadilla as a jeweler. Abadilla and Agbulos entered into several transactions
for the sale of jewelry, with Agbulos going to Abadilla’s residence.
Agbulos received pieces of jewelry from Abadilla. They agreed that Agbulos would return the
pieces of jewelry in the afternoon should Agbulos fail to sell them. Agbulos then issued Abadilla
acheck for the value of the jewelry received.
Abadilla deposited the checks Agbulos issued to her, and all were dishonored by reason of
“closed account.” Abadilla then tried to locate Agbulos, but Agbulos could no longer be found.
After several months, Abadilla learned from Agbulos’ sister-in-law that the latter received
pawn tickets from a friend. Abadilla, through her friend Pamintuan, obtained from Agbulos’ sister-in-
law pawn tickets issued by E. Ochoa Pawnshop. Appearing on the pawn tickets was the name “Linda
Chua.”
Abadilla went to E. Ochoa Pawnshop to verify the items described in the pawn tickets. She
learned that the items pawned were among the piecesof jewelry she turned over to Agbulos,
specifically, a men’s diamond ring and a set of diamond ring and earrings. She also learned from
Diloria, the pawnshop appraiser, that the “Linda Chua” who pawned her jewelry was Benito.
Benito denied that she was the “Linda Chua” who pawned Abadilla’s jewelry. According to her,
she was at the house of Agbulos’ mother, working as a cook and taking care of Agbulos’ children. She
denied being with Agbulos when the latter transacted with Abadilla and that she only knew of
Abadilla when the latter looked for Agbulos.
Agbulos supported the testimony of her co-accused Benito, statingthat the latter “had no
participation in her transactions with Abadilla. Agbulos likewise denied that Benito accompanied her
to Abadilla’s residence whenever she received jewelry from Abadilla.
The Regional Trial Court found that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
Agbulos and Benito conspired to commit estafa.
Page 8 of 519
Benito appealed before the Court of Appeals, maintaining that she had nothing to do with
Agbulos’ transaction with Abadilla. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals sustained the finding that
Benito was the “Linda Chua” who pawned Abadilla’s jewelry as testified to by the pawnshop appraiser,
Diloria.
Issue:
Whether Angelita Cruz Benito conspired with Rebecca Agbulos in committing estafa punished
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
No, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt Benito’s conspiracy with
Agbulos to commit estafa.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, “a conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” Proof of
conspiracy may be direct or circumstantial. So long as the evidence presented show a “common desig
nor purpose” to commit the crime, all of the accused shall be held equally liable as co-principals even
if one or more of them did not participate in all the details of the execution of the crime.
As testified to by Abadilla, only Agbulos received the pieces of jewelry from her, and Benito
was merely “present during the negotiation”.
Even assuming that Benito accompanied Agbulos in going to Abadilla’s residence, this does
not prove that Benito received any jewelryfrom Abadilla. As the helper of Agbulos’ brother, Benito
may have accompanied Agbulos on her employer’s order. “Mere presence at the scene of the crime is
not by itself indicative of conspiracy between the accused.”
Interestingly, Agbulos testified that the transaction was only between her and Abadilla. She
alone issued security for the jewelry, namely, the dishonored checks and the spurious certificate of
title. Agbulos even declared in open court that Benito had no participation in the case at bench.
Agbulos’ statement was an admission against her interest. The statement negated the alleged
“common design or purpose” between her and Benito and would lead to her beingsolely liable for the
crime. It also means that she admitted that her companion’s acts can never be attributed to her.
There is no proof of Benito's direct participation in the commission of the crime charged.
Neither is there proof beyond reasonable doubt of her conspiracy with Agbulos. The presumption of
innocence holds in favor of Benito.
COMPLEX CRIME
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
Page 9 of 519
RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014
J. BRION
The accused were charged with the crimes of frustrated murder and homicide and is claiming
the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The Court did not appreciate the justifying circumstance
ruling that by invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts
for which they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated them.
With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to show that the killing and
frustrated killing of the victims were attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression
on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self-defense.
Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real
imminent injury, upon a person. The element of unlawful aggression must be proven first in order for
self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.
Facts:
Rodolfo Guevarra and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide of Erwin
Ordonez and homicide for David Ordonez.
The prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who survived the hacking. Erwin narrated
that, at around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he, his brother David and Philip went to
a birthday party and passed in front of the petitioners' compound. He was walking twenty (20)
meters ahead of his companions when, suddenly, Philip ran up to him saying that David was being
stabbed by Joey with a bolo. While approaching the scene of the stabbing, which was three (3)
meters away from where his brother David was, Erwin was met by Rodolfo who then hacked him,
hitting his arm and back. Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin inside the petitioners'
compound and kept on hacking him. He was hacked and stabbed thirteen (13) times. He became
weak and ultimately fell to the ground. Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the
petitioners' house and damaged Rodolfo's tricycle. They did not likewise destroy the petitioners'
gate, which was only damaged when his brother David clung on to it while he was being pulled by
Rodolfo and Erwin into their compound.
The petitioners claim self-defense, stating that the David, Erwin and Phillip forced their way to
Guevarras compound and threw stones at the house and tricycle, and that he had only hacked and
hit the David and Erwin after David had struck him with his “panabas”. Upon seeing Erwin and
David lying on the ground, Rodolfo called on someone to bring the brothers to the hospital. He
stayed in his house until the policemen arrived.
RTC found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated homicide and
homicide and denied the petitioners' claim of self-defense for lack of clear, convincing and
satisfactory supporting evidence. CA affirmed the RTC's judgment and convicted the petitioners of
the crimes charged.
Page 10 of 519
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in failing to appreciate the presence of the justifying circumstance of self-
defense
Ruling:
SC denies the present petition, finding no reversible error in the CA decision.
The petitioners' intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds sustained
by their victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other
things, of the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of,
or immediately after the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim. The CA aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered
and which eventually caused his death, and the thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds Erwin sustained,
confirmed the prosecution's theory that the petitioners purposely and vigorously attacked David
and Erwin.
In fact, the petitioners admitted at the pre-trial that "the wounds inflicted on the victim Erwin
Ordonez would have caused his death were it not for immediate medical attendance."
By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts for which
they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated them. With
this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to show that the killing and frustrated
killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to
self-defense.
Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real
imminent injury, upon a person. The element of unlawful aggression must be proven first in order
for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted
to self-defense.
As the RTC and the CA did, SC finds the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the part
of the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just passing by the
petitioners' compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly attacked by
Joey while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside, not inside, the
petitioners' compound, as evidenced by the way the petitioners' gate was destroyed. The manner
by which the wooden gate post was broken coincided with Erwin's testimony that his brother David,
who was then clinging onto the gate, was dragged into the petitioners' compound. These
circumstances, coupled with the nature and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly
show that the petitioners did not act in self-defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The
petitioners were, in fact, the real aggressors.
Page 11 of 519
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERWIN LALOG, ROOSEVELT CONCEPCION, EDWIN RAMIREZ,
and RICKY LITADA
G.R. No. 196753, April 21, 2014, J. Del Castillo
To avail of self-defense as a justifying circumstance so as not to incur any criminal liability, it

must be proved with certainty by satisfactory and convincing evidence which excludes any vestige of
criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. It cannot be entertained where it is not only
uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is also doubtful. Thus, the claim of an accused
that he stabbed the victim at the back portion of the latter’s body (Lumbar area) while the former was
lying down is not only uncorroborated by any other evidence but it is improbable and contrary to the
physical evidence especially when the vicitm was lying on the ground while the accused was on top and
at the same time choking him, making the plea of self-defense dubious.
Facts:
On September 29, 1999 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Ryan Gain [Gain], Roswel
Mercado [Mercado], Rex Rey [Rey] and Jayson Manzo [Manzo] were strolling at the Municipal Park
of Poblacion, Municipality of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, when they were blocked by four (4)
persons, namely Erwin Lalog [Lalog], Roosevelt Concepcion [Concepcion], Edwin Ramirez [Ramirez]
and Ricky Litada [Litada]. alog angrily talked to Gain, but Mercado intervened and apologized to the
group of Lalog.
Later, Gain and Mercado went down the stairs of the park locally known as the "RAINBOW[.]"
Mercado was walking ahead of Gain by six (6) arms length when he looked back, he saw Gain being
ganged upon by the group of the respondents held both the hands of Gain, while Lalog stabbed Gain.
Fearing for his life, Mercado immediately fled the scene. Sensing that the assailants had left the scene,
Mercado approached Gain and brought him to the hospital but it was already too late for he was
declared dead on arrival.
On the other hand, Lalog admitted stabbing Gain in self-defense, while the other respondents
denied their participation in the stabbing incident, claiming that the three of them were in a drinking
session during the stabbing incident.
An Information was filed charging appellants Lalog, Concepcion, Ramirez, and Litada with the
crime of murder. The RTC ruled against the respondents. Aggrieved, appellants appealed to the Court
of Appeals. However, the appellate court affirmed in full the Decision of the trial court.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are guilty of the crime of murder.
Ruling:
Yes, they are.
Page 12 of 519
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Mercado that initially, the respondents
attacked the victim at the place known in the locality as the "rainbow" but later recanted and stated
that the stabbing occurred on the ground near the "rainbow", deserves no consideration. Whether
the victim was stabbed at the "rainbow" or near the "rainbow" is inconsequential. What is important
is the fact that Mercado unwaveringly testified that he saw appellants gang up on the victim, render
him immobile, and then stab him at the back several times.
Moreover, the claim of self-defense by Lalog, is of no moment. To avail of self-defense as a

justifying circumstance so as not to incur any criminal liability, it must be proved with certainty by
satisfactory and convincing evidence which excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part
of the person invoking it. It cannot be entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any
separate competent evidence but is also doubtful. If the accused fails to discharge the burden of proof,
his conviction, shall of necessity follow on the basis of his admission of the killing.
The claim of Lalog that he stabbed Gain at the back portion of the latter’s body (Lumbar area)
while the former was lying down is not only uncorroborated by any other evidence but it is
improbable and contrary to the physical evidence because how could Lalog stab Gain’s back when
the former was lying on the ground while the latter was on top and at the same time choking him.
The testimony of prosecution witness Mercado that Gain was stabbed at his back by Lalog while both
his hands were being held by the other appellants is more logical, believable and [in] consonance
with the physical evidence. Gain could not have been easily stabbed at his back if his hands were not
being held considering that Gain is much taller and bigger in built than the accused particularly Lalog
unless Gain just simply let his back (lumbar area) be stabbed without any resistance or struggle on
his part which is impossible under any state of circumstances.
Furthermore, the number of wounds sustained by Gain is indicative of Lalog’s desire to kill
the former and not really defend himself because not a single moment of the incident was his life and
limb being endangered which is the essence of self-defense. The fact that the decease Gain was not
armed all the more negates self-defense.
Finally, contrary to respondents’ argument, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was

clearly proved. We agree with the trial court’s observation that appellants attacked Gain in a
treacherous manner. They held Gain’s arms, rendered him immobile and then thrust the knife into
his body several times.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNALDO BOSITO Y CHAVENIA

G.R. No. 209346, January 12, 2015, J. Carpio
Self-defense, to be successfully invoked, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence that
excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. Bosito failed to present
adequate evidence to prove otherwise. Thus, his claim of self-defense cannot stand.
Facts:
Bosito was charged in an Information for murder. The prosecution alleged that Bonaobra
arrived at the house of his sister Rosemarie at around noon of 11 June 2007. After 30 minutes, Bosito
arrived at Rosemarie’s house. Bosito stood beside Bonaobra and watched a card game being played
by other guests. At around 1:00 in the afternoon, without warning, Bosito hacked Bonaobra with
Page 13 of 519
a bolo as the victim was trying to sit. He tried to crawl away but Bosito hacked him again and hit him
in the leg. Bosito then positioned himself behind Bonaobra and hacked him in the head two more
times. Although already mortally wounded, Bonaobra still managed to stand up and run away.
After Bonaobra’s escape, Adonis picked up a wooden post from the ground and told Bosito to
stop. However, Bosito waved his bolo and told Adonis not to come near him. Later, Adonis saw
Bonaobra being boarded on a boat and found out that Bonaobra was taken to a hospital. Later on,
Bonaobra died of aspiration pneumonia due to sustained multiple hack wounds.
For the defense, Bosito testified that while on their way to the rice field, he and his sister
Analisa passed by the house of Rosemarie Bongon where Adonis was having a drinking spree with
his brothers, Juan and Arnold, and Bonaobra. The group called on Bosito to join them and when he
approached them, Adonis struck him with a piece of wood, hitting his wrist as he parried the blow.
While still holding the piece of wood, Bonaobra, together with Juan and Arnold, who were all drunk
and holding bladed weapons surrounded Bosito. Just as Bonaobra was about to stab him, Bosito
immediately pulled out his bolo and hacked the victim. Analisa testified that she and her brother
Bosito were on their way to the rice field when they passed by Bonaobra, Adonis, Juan and Arnold on
a drinking spree at Rosemarie’s house. Adonis invited Bosito for a drink which the latter refused.
Bonaobra then pushed Bosito and struck Bosito with a bolo four times but Bosito evaded these
thrusts.
The RTC found Bosito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The CA
affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC. The CA stated that Bosito’s plea of self-defense
has been rebutted by the positive and categorical testimony of prosecution witness Adonis who had
convincingly established that the unlawful aggression emanated from Bosito and not from the victim.
The CA added that the trial court correctly accorded credence to Adonis whose testimony it found
spontaneous, straightforward, candid and evincing credence and belief. Further, the CA ruled out the
presence of ill-motive on the part of Adonis to falsely implicate his uncle. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Bosito is guilty of the offense charged
Ruling:
The Court agreed with the RTC and the CA in ruling that the prosecution fully established
Bosito’s guilt for the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt. Adonis positively identified Bosito
as the person who hacked Bonaobra and caused his death. Considering that Adonis and Bosito were
blood relatives, Adonis was candid, straightforward, spontaneous and firm in his narration of the
events.
In his Appellant’s Brief, Bosito admitted hacking Bosito although in self-defense. By invoking
self-defense, appellant admits killing the victim and the constitutional presumption of innocence is
effectively waived. Bosito claims that the unlawful aggression consisted of Bonaobra’s group ganging
up on him and attempting to stab him with a knife. However, aside from Bosito’s self-serving
testimony, the defense did not present any witness to corroborate his testimony that Bonaobra
pulled a knife and tried to stab him. Likewise, Bosito failed to present the knife which he said he
grabbed during the tussle and kept in his possession. Next, the means employed by Bosito to prevent
Page 14 of 519
or repel the supposed unlawful aggression was beyond reasonably necessary. As correctly found by
the trial and appellate courts, the number, nature, and gravity of the wounds sustained by Bonaobra
reveal a determined effort to kill and contradict Bosito’s claim of self-defense. The prosecution’s
evidence shows that Bonaobra sustained and died from multiple hack wounds. The records show
that after Bonaobra received the first blow to his head, which proved to be the most fatal, Bosito still
continued to thrust his bolo to the victim three more times. Clearly, the means utilized was not
reasonable under the circumstances.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN CASAS Y VINTULAN

G.R. No. 212565, February 25, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The accused failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of either Joel or Eligio, which is
a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense to obtain. As case law puts it,
there can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who
resorted to self-defense. As shown by the records, it was Casas who was actually the aggressor, as he was
the one who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay prostrate, and again on
Eligio as he was fleeing. Being the party initiating the attack, and overbearing with a deadly weapon,
Casas cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Verily, for unlawful aggression to
be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not
merely a threatening or intimidating attitude,as against the one claiming self-defense. Evidently, the
contrary happened in this case.
However, the Court disagrees that the accused should be convicted of the crime of Murder with
respect to the death of Joel, considering the prosecution’s failure to prove the existence of treachery. In
order to appreciate treachery, the victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the
moment of the attack. Should it appear, however, that the victim was forewarned of the danger he was
in, and, instead of fleeing from it he met it and was killed as a result, then the qualifying circumstance
of treachery cannot be appreciated.
In this case, Joel knew that Casas was armed with a knife and had just used the same on Eligio.
Joel elected to intervene, and even armed himself with a bamboo pole. Accordingly, it is rather obvious
that Joel was aware of the danger to his life. Further, acting in the heat of the moment, and there being
no showing that no appreciable interval of time had elapsed from Joel’s mishap to his stabbing so as to
allow for the assailant’s careful reflection, it does not equally appear that Casas deliberately adopted
means in order to ensure that Joel had no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. Evidently, this lack
of deliberation on the part of Casas, as well as Joel’s obvious awareness of the danger to his life, prompts
this Court to discount treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
Facts:
Two (2) criminal Informations were filed before the RTC charging Casas of the Murder of Joel
Tabiley Gulla (Joel) and the Frustrated Murder of Eligio Ruiz y Ricardo(Eligio). During arraignment,
Casas entered a plea of not guilty. After which, joint trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution alleges that on December 24, 2007, Casas, accompanied by a certain “Ron-
Ron” (Ron-Ron), went to a certain taho factory located in San Juan City, looking for a certain Jesus.
Failing to find the person he was looking for, Casas brandished a knife and stuck it into a pail used
for making taho. Consequently, Eligio, an employee of the taho factory, confronted Casas, saying to
Page 15 of 519
the latter, “Benjie [(referring to Casas)], bakit ang yabang mo? Kung hindi mo makita ang kalaban mo,
dapat hanapin mo na lang.” Casas replied “Gusto mo ito? (referring to his knife).” Eligio told Casas to
get rid of the knife, which the latter gave to Ron-Ron. Eligio and Casas then had a fistfight. During the
ensuing melee, Casas took the knife from Ron-Ron and stabbed Eligio twice while the latter was
fleeing. Casas, during his continued pursuit of Eligio, then ran into Joel, who, for his part, tried to help
Eligio with the use of a bamboo pole. However, Joel slipped, fell face first on the floor, and was
prostrate. There and then, Casas stabbed him twice, the first blow entering his back and exiting at the
front of his torso, and the second blow hitting the left side of his abdomen. Casas managed to overtake
Eligio, and stabbed him again on the stomach. Fearing that Casas would kill him, Eligio grabbed a
plastic stool and hit Casas on the head with it, forcing the latter to drop the knife and cease the attack.
PO1 Silverio R. Fuentes (PO1 Fuentes) claimed that he was riding his motorcycle on the date of the
incident when he met PO3 Eduardo Fronda (PO3 Fronda) who asked for assistance as the latter saw
a bloodied male. The two immediately proceeded towards the victim, who turned out to be Casas,
and asked him what happened. The latter replied that he had just stabbed someone. After confirming
that there was indeed a stabbing incident nearby, PO1 Fuentes and PO3 Fronda arrested Casas.
After the prosecution rested its case, Casas filed a demurrer to evidence on the basis of the
alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which the RTC denied. After
the demurrer’s denial, the defense changed its theory as Casas admitted that he stabbed both Joel
and Eligio but interposed self-defense to justify his actions. RTC convicted Casas of Murder and
Attempted Homicide. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC’s conviction of Casas. Aggrieved, Casas filed the
instant appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Casas’s conviction for the crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide should
be upheld.
Ruling:
The appeal is partly meritorious.
After a careful review of the records, the Court is satisfied that the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
correctly pronounced that the above-mentioned requirements were not present in this case. It is
significant to point out that upon invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, Casas assumed
the burden of proving the justification of his act with clear and convincing evidence. This is because
his having admitted the killing required him to rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the
weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, which, even if it were weak, could not be disbelieved in view
of his admission.
Preliminarily, Casas failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of either Joel or Eligio,
which is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense to obtain. As case law
puts it, there can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the
person who resorted to self-defense. As shown by the records, it was Casas who was actually the
aggressor, as he was the one who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay
prostrate, and again on Eligio as he was fleeing. Being the party initiating the attack, and overbearing
with a deadly weapon, Casas cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Verily, for
unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or
Page 16 of 519
imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude,as against the one
claiming self-defense. Evidently, the contrary happened in this case.
Thus, given that the core element of unlawful aggression was not proven, Casas’s claim of
self-defense falters and his criminal liability stands.
This notwithstanding, the Court, however, disagrees that Casas should be convicted of the
crime of Murder with respect to the incidents in Crim. Case No. 136842, i.e., the death of Joel,
considering the prosecution’s failure to prove the existence of treachery. The Court expounds.
The elements of Murder that the prosecution must establish are: (a) that a person was killed;
(b) that the accused killed him or her; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.
Among the qualifying circumstances thus enumerated in Article 248 is treachery. Under
Article 14 of the RPC, “[t]here is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.” In other words, to appreciate treachery, it must be shown that: (a) the means of
execution employed gives the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the
methods of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted; indeed, treachery cannot be
presumed, it must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
In People v. Se, the Court explained that the essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected,
and unforeseen attack on the victim, without the slightest provocation on the latter’s part. The victim
must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the moment of the attack. Should it appear,
however, that the victim was forewarned of the danger he was in, and, instead of fleeing from it he
met it and was killed as a result, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated.
In People v. Discalsota, the Court held that treachery cannot be appreciated in instances when
the victim had the opportunity to flee or defend himself.
In this case, the records show that a fistfight ensued between Eligio and Casas. Joel, seeing
that Casas had stabbed Eligio, wanted to help the latter by using a bamboo pole but slipped and fell. As
he was lying prostrate on the floor, Casas delivered the blows that ended Joel’s life. Under these
circumstances, it is the Court’s observation that Joel was fully aware of the danger posed in assisting
Eligio. He knew that Casas was armed with a knife and had just used the same on Eligio. Joel elected
to intervene, and even armed himself with a bamboo pole. Accordingly, it is rather obvious that Joel
was aware of the danger to his life. Further, acting in the heat of the moment, and there being no
showing that no appreciable interval of time had elapsed from Joel’s mishap to his stabbing so as to
allow for the assailant’s careful reflection, it does not equally appear that Casas deliberately adopted
means in order to ensure that Joel had no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. Palpably, Casas
just happened to stab Joel as the latter had just slipped on the floor when the former caught up with
him (Joel). Evidently, this lack of deliberation on the part of Casas, as well as Joel’s obvious awareness
of the danger to his life, prompts this Court to discount treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
Page 17 of 519
Thus, insofar as the incidents in Crim. Case No. 136842 go, the Court downgrades the
conviction to the crime of Homicide. In consequence, Casas is instead meted with the penalty of
imprisonment with an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the concomitant
accessory penalties, for the Homicide of Joel.
SHERWIN DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

G.R. No. 189405, November 19, 2014, J. Peralta
The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Other than Dela Cruz’s
testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly responded to Dela
Cruz’s questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun
from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed — an assault which may have caused Dela Cruz
to fear for his life. Even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun initially came from the victim,
the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It is
settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the
former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed .A person making a defense
has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased.
Facts:
On January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, Sherwin Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) went to
the office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Center, Ayala Avenue,
Makati City. When Dela Cruz was already inside the building, he went to the work station of the
deceased victim, Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the eye witness
Antonette Managbanag’s sketch, was seated fronting his computer terminal, with his back towards
the aisle.
As Dela Cruz approached Jeffrey from the back, Dela Cruz was already holding a gun pointed
at the back of Jeffrey’s head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of Dela Cruz
holding the gun, and a short struggle for the possession of the gun ensued thereafter. Dela Cruz won
the struggle and remained in possession of the said gun. Dela Cruz then pointed the gun at Jeffrey’s
face, pulled the trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in
the forehead, eventually killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey, Dela Cruz fled the office.
Dela Cruz authored the death of the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. But he raised self-defense to
exculpate him from the criminal liability for Homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not the elements of self-defense exist to exculpate Dela Cruz from the criminal
liability for Homicide
Ruling:
No, Dela Cruz’s defense is sorely wanting.

Page 18 of 519
The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. In other
words, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the
accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable
means to resist the attack.
Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal liability, it is
well settled that when he invokes the same, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. The burden of proving that the killing
was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts upon him. As such, he must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution for, even if the
prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted the
killing.
First, the evidence on record does not support Dela Cruz’s contention that unlawful
aggression was employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him. Unlawful aggression is the
most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent
danger — not merely threatening and intimidating action. There is aggression, only when the one
attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent
and actual, not merely speculative. In the case at bar, other than Dela Cruz’s testimony, the defense
did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly responded to Dela Cruz’s questions or
initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and
tried to shoot Dela Cruz but failed — an assault which may have caused Dela Cruz to fear for his life.
Even assuming arguendo that the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired,
and therefore, danger may have in fact existed, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the
moment Dela Cruz disarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. After Dela Cruz had
successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have
necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, Dela Cruz had every opportunity
to run away from the scene and seek help but refused to do so.
In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. Dela Cruz admitted
that he wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in time until Jeffrey shouted "guard, guard",
then took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful aggression coming from the victim. Dela Cruz
had the opportunity to run away. Therefore, even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun
initially came from Jeffrey, the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by Dela
Cruz from the Jeffrey. It is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has
any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is
committed. A person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful
aggression has ceased.
Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to
self-defense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. To be sure, when the present
victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no
longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the
part of the offender. Undoubtedly, Dela Cruz went beyond the call of self-preservation when he
Page 19 of 519
proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when the allegedly
unlawful aggression had already ceased.
Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the instant case, the
severe wounds inflicted by Dela Cruz upon Jeffrey was unwarranted and, therefore, cannot be
considered a justifying circumstance under pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased victim,
Jeffrey, the means employed by Dela Cruz was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent
of the alleged attack, which he sought to avert.
Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, Dela
Cruz likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homer's punch was reasonable.
The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence
between the means of attack and the defense. Dela Cruz claimed that the victim punched him and
was trying to get something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his
hunting knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a wound on a vital part of the
victim's body was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by Dela Cruz himself,
the victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him.
Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally

necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The opposite was, however, employed by Dela
Cruz.
In view of the foregoing, the Court found it illogical to discuss further the third element of
self-defense since it is recognized that unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for upholding
the justifying circumstance of self-defense. If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two
requisites of self-defense will have no basis. Hence, there is no basis to entertain Dela Cruz’s
argument that a privileged mitigating circumstance of self-defense is applicable in this case, because
unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete, on the part of the latter.
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. FLORO BUBAN BARCELA

G.R. No. 208760, April 23, 2014, J. Mendoza
The special qualifying circumstance such as the minority of the victim and relationship with the
offender must be alleged in the criminal complaint or information and must be proved conclusively and
indubitably as the crime itself. Although it was shown during the trial that Barcela was the common law
spouse or live-in partner of the mother of victims AAA and BBB, this fact would not alter the crimes in
their qualified form inasmuch as the two separate informations did not specifically allege such
relationship as aqualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to be informed of
the charge lodged against him. The relationship alleged in the information is different from that actually
proven.
Facts:
Page 20 of 519
AAA and BBB are sisters who were living, along with Floro Barcela, their mother, grandmother
and sister in a two-storey house where all of the family members sleep together in one room in San
Pedro, Laguna, because the other rooms were being rented to other people. Flor Barcelo is the
common law husband of AAA and BBB’s mother.
AAA was seven years old when Flor Barcelo, her stepfather, committed the despicable by
sexually abusing her. Based on her testimony, she was lying on the floor sleeping one early morning,
when she was awakened and noticed that her stepfather lifted her clothes and removed her shorts.
Barcelo then placed his hand on his organ as AAA lay still with her hands on the floor shocked by
what was happening. Barcelo successfully inserted his penis inside AAA’s vagina.
Her elder sister BBB, who was then 14 years old, also suffered the same horrible fate. In
addition, BBB also saw her stepfather molesting her sister AAA. BBB also testified prior to being
raped, Barcelo had been regularly touching her private private organ.
AAA informed her mother, grandmother and her sister BBB of what happened to her. On the
other hand, BBB informed her classmate, teacher and school principal the grim experience she and
her sister underwent in the hands of her stepfather.
Hence, Barcela was charged with qualified rape.
The trial court found that Barcela was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in convicting Barcela of the offense of qualified rape
Ruling:
Yes.
In the crime of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with
the offender is a special qualifying circumstance and raises the penalty to the supreme penalty of
death. It is essential that this circumstance must be alleged in the criminal complaint or information
and must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself; otherwise, the crime shall be
considered simple rape warranting the imposition of thelower penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The prosecution failed to prove the allegation in the informationthat Barcela was the step-
father of AAA at the time of the commission of the crime. It bears stressing that a stepfather-
stepdaughter relationship presupposes a legitimate relationship, which in this case is the valid
marriage between Barcela and the natural mother of AAA (also of BBB),and the best evidence to
prove the same is the marriage contract.
Although it was shown during the trial that Barcela was the common law spouse or live-in
partner of the mother of victims AAA and BBB, this fact would not alter the crimes in their qualified
form inasmuch as the two separate informations did not specifically allege such relationship as a
qualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge
lodged against him. The relationship alleged in the information is different from that actually proven.
Page 21 of 519
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MATIMANAY WATAMAMA a.k.a. AKMAD SALIPADA, TENG
MIDTIMBANG
G.R. No. 188710, June 2, 2014, J. Sereno
Without any evidence to appreciate the aggravating circumstance of treachery in the killing of
Calim, respondent can only be held liable as principal for the crime of homicide. For treachery to be
considered, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no
particulars are known as to how the killing began, the perpetration of an attack with treachery cannot
be presumed. Furthermore, Watamama’s theory of mistaken identity is not persuasive; witnesses need
not know the names of the assailants, as long as they recognize the latter’s faces.
Facts:
Matimanay Watamama and his co-accused Teng Midtimbang were charged under an
Information for murder. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Midtimbang remained at
large as of the date of promulgation of the RTC Decision.
The evidence for the prosecution states that around eight in the morning on 26 October 1998,
Francisco Arobo, Jr., Calim, and five other farmers were at the farm of Ali Samad located in Sitio
Matingao, Malapag, Carmen, Cotabato. They were ploughing the unplanted area, while Samad was
tending his corn plants. Arobo was five meters ahead of Calim when the former heard gunfire coming
from behind. Arobo immediately looked to the rear and saw Midtimbang and Watamama firing gar
and rifles at Calim, who was then slumped near his plow. Midtimbang and Watamama were
positioned ten meters apart and five meters obliquely behind Calim. Because of the successive
gunshots, Arobo and the rest of their group scampered to take cover in the shrubbery, while Samad
ran towards the nipa hut at the other side of the farm where his children were staying. Watamama
and Midtimbang also fired at Samad, but he was not hit. Thereafter, the two fled. Samad then reported
the incident to a barangay kagawad. The postmortem examination by the local municipal health
officer showed that Calim sustained multiple gunshot wounds in the head, chest, right and left thighs,
and right elbow.
The version of the defense was that Watamama was simply mistaken for Teng Midtimbang
because of their physical and facial resemblances. Watamama claimed that his real name was Akmad
Salipada, not Matimanay Watamama. Allegedly, on that fateful morning of 26 October 1998, he was
at their house in Sitio Maitum. He had just eaten breakfast with his wife, Guianila Salipada, when they
heard seven gunshots. Guianila peeped through their window and Teng Midtimbang and Ali Sampo
Midtimbang passed by their house. The two were carrying rifles. Guianila asked them where they had
come from, and they supposedly told her that they came from the house of Calim and that they shot
him because he had stolen a carabao.
Zaid Tayuan, a detention prisoner, testified for the defense. The gist of his testimony was that
he had witnessed the Midtimbang brothers kill Calim, and that Watamama was nowhere in the
vicinity of the crime. He claimed that he was about six meters from the Midtimbang brothers when
they shot Calim to death. The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder. The CA affirmed appellant’s conviction for the crime of murder in view of the presence of
treachery but ruled that evident premeditation was not sufficiently proven by the prosecution. It
modified the damages awarded by the RTC.
Page 22 of 519
Issue:
Whether or not Watamama was correctly convicted of the crime of murder
Ruling:
No, conviction of murder is not proper.
The Court finds Watamama guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, rather than murder,
as the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish treachery in the killing of Calim. For the charge of
murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove the following: (1) the offender killed the victim, and
(2) the killing was done through treachery, or by any of the five other qualifying circumstances, duly
alleged in the Information. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons by employing means, methods or forms that tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense that the offended party might make.
The mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery.
The Court agrees with Watamama. For treachery to be considered, it must be present and
seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are known as to how
the killing began, the perpetration of an attack with treachery cannot be presumed. Circumstances
that qualify criminal responsibility cannot rest on mere conjecture, no matter how reasonable or
probable, but must be based on facts of unquestionable existence. These circumstances must be
proved as indubitably as the crime itself.
It cannot be simply assumed that at its inception, Calim was unable to parry the attack, as he
was caught unaware. Both Arobo and Samad admitted that they did not see how the attack
commenced, and that it was the initial gunfire that caught their attention. Thus, it cannot be said with
certainty that the victim was engrossed in his farm work when he was initially attacked. Neither can
it be conclusively said that there was no chance or opportunity for Calim to defend himself from
aggression. However, the Court is persuaded by Watamama’s theory of mistaken identity. Witnesses
need not know the names of the assailants, as long as they recognize the latter’s faces. What is
imperative is that, on the basis of their personal knowledge, the witnesses are positive as to the
physical identification of the perpetrators, as obtained in this case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNY LIKIRAN alias “Loloy”

G.R. No. 201858, June 4, 2014, J. Reyes
Jenny stabbed the victim out of the blue during town festivities. A sudden attack which is not
preconceived by the accused belies the holding of treachery. When the victim is merely a bystander in
an altercation, when suddenly the accused stabs him, absent any other qualifying circumstance, the
accused is only liable for homicide.
Facts:
Here are the facts as stated by the prosecution’s witnesses.
Page 23 of 519
On March 19, 2000, in Brgy. Bugca-on, Bukidnon, during the eve of the Town Fiesta, Celso
Daganon (another witness) and Rolando Sareno Sr. (victim) were outside the dance area when they
heard a commotion. This commotion was cause by Jerome Likiran, the brother of the accused, Jenny
Likiran who punched Prescado Mercado (one of the prosecution’s witnesses) in the mouth.
Afterwards, Jerome approached Sareno, armed with a short firearm, and shot Sareno several
times. Jenny likewise, stabbed Sareno on the back with a hunting knife. Daganon saw the incident
first-hand as he was only thee (3) meters away from Sareno. Dagangon was able to bring Sareno to
the hospital only after Jerome and the accused-appellant left, but Sareno was already dead at that
point. Sareno suffered multiple gunshot wounds and a stab wound at the left scapular area.
Jenny Likiran, however, denied any involvement in the crime. While he admitted that he was
at the dance, he did not go outside when the commotion happened. He and Jerome stayed within the
area where the sound machine was located and they only heard the gunshots outside. Several
witnesses were given by Likiran attesting to the same. Furthermore, Jenny also asserted that the
information charged him of murder committed by attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting
Sareno, thereby causing his instantaneous death. The accused-appellant argued that the evidence on
record established that Sareno was in fact shot by some other person.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellant’s culpability.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC sustaining the conviction and the existence of
treachery but denied the existence of conspiracy.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Jenny may be held liable for the death of Sareno despite the infliction of
gunshot wounds by his brother, Jerome
2. Whether or not treachery is present in this case
Ruling:
1. Yes. He can still be held liable for the death of Sareno.
The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters stipulated upon and
admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Cidric
Dael (Dr. Dael) of the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and reviewed by the Rural Health Physician of
Malaybalay City "is admitted as proof of fact and cause of death due to multiple stab wound scapular
area.
In this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement was signed only by the prosecution
and defense counsel, the same may nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object
to its admission. Moreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the regular
performance of his duty is prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the victim.
More importantly, Jenny is criminally liable for the natural and logical consequence resulting
from his act of stabbing Sareno. It may be that he was not the shooter, it is nevertheless true that the
stab wound he inflicted on Sareno contributed to the latter’s death.
Page 24 of 519
2. No. Treachery is not present.
Treachery is not present when the killing is not premeditated, or where the sudden attack is
not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part
of the accused as a result of a provocative act of the victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of
the moment.
In this case, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses all point to the fact that the shooting
and stabbing of Sareno was actually a spur of the moment incident, a result of the brawl that
happened during the barrio dance. The prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant and his
brother Jerome deliberately planned the means by which they would harm Sareno. In fact, what was
revealed by the prosecution evidence was that Sareno was an innocent bystander who unfortunately
became a target of the accused-appellant and Jerome’s rampage. Consequently, the accused-appellant
should be liable only for the lesser crime of Homicide.
MIGUEL CIRERA y USTELO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014, J. Leonen
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance must be deliberately sought to ensure the safety of the
accused from the defensive acts of the victim. The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis
of a finding of treachery even if the attack was intended to kill another as long as the victim’s position
was merely accidental. A finding of the existence of treachery should be based on “clear and convincing
evidence.” Such evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. In this case, no evidence was
presented to show that petitioner consciously adopted or reflected on the means, method, or form of
attack to secure his unfair advantage.
Facts:
Romeo Austria testified that at around 8:30 a.m. on April 20, 2000, he was playing a lucky
nine game at a wake on Araneta Avenue, Quezon City. Miguel arrived, asking money from Austria so
he could buy liquor. In response, Austria asked Miguel "to keep quiet." Gerardo Naval "arrived and
asked [Austria] to go home. There was an exchange of words between Naval and Miguel. Austria
"stood up [and] felt that he was stabbed." As he ran home, he noticed Miguel "armed with a knife, this
time chasing Naval. Austria was "hospitalized . . . and was . . . confined for more than a month."
Gerardo Naval testified that Miguel was irked when he asked Austria to go home. After he and
Miguel had an exchange of words, he "felt a hard blow on his back. Naval retaliated. However, he ran
away when he saw Miguel holding a knife. Miguel chased Naval who fell on the ground. When Naval
saw that Miguel was "about to stab him again, he hit [Miguel] with a bench" and left him lying on the
ground, unable to stand. According to Naval, "he did not see the [knife] land on his back." Naval was
also confined at the hospital but only for six (6) days.
Dr. Carlos Angeles testified that "he treated [Austria] for [the] stab wound at [his] back." He
declared that Austria could have died without an emergency operation. According to him, "a long and
sharp instrument, probably a knife," could have been used to stab the victim. Dr. Arnold Angeles,
Naval’s doctor, testified that "continuous blood loss" could have caused Naval’s death.
Page 25 of 519
In its decision, the Regional Trial Court found Miguel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of frustrated murder, finding that Miguel caused the stab wounds of private complainants.
Naval and Austria were able to positively identify him and describe how they obtained their injuries.
Miguel’s acts were not attended by evident premeditation as ruled by the trial court.
However, there was treachery on Miguel’s end, considering the length of time it took private
complainants to realize that they were stabbed. This, according to the Regional Trial Court, was a
method or form that tended to insure the execution of an act without risk from the offended party’s
defense.
Miguel appealed the Regional Trial Court’s decision to the Court of Appeals, raising as issue
the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. In a decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the trial court that there was treachery in this
case because" the attack was so sudden and unexpected that "self-defense was not possible.
Miguel’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the Court of Appeals’ resolution
promulgated on February 18, 2008.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there was treachery.
Ruling:
No, there was no treachery in this case.
The requisites of treachery are:
1. The employment of means, method, or manner of execution which will ensure the
safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim, no
opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and
2. Deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of execution.
A finding of the existence of treachery should be based on "clear and convincing evidence."
Such evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. Its existence "cannot be presumed."
As with the finding of guilt of the accused, "[a]ny doubt as to [its] existence . . . [should] be resolved
in favor of the accused.
The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a finding of treachery even if the
attack was intended to kill another as long as the victim’s position was merely accidental. The means
adopted must have been a result of a determination to ensure success in committing the crime.
Page 26 of 519
In this case, no evidence was presented to show that Miguel consciously adopted or reflected
on the means, method, or form of attack to secure his unfair advantage.
The attack might "have been done on impulse [or] as a reaction to an actual or imagined
provocation offered by the victim." In this case, Miguel was not only dismissed by Austria when he
approached him for money. There was also an altercation between him and Naval. The provocation
might have been enough to entice Miguel to action and attack private complainants.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGILIO AMORA y VISCARRA

G.R. No. 190322, November 26, 2014, J. Del Castillo
The accused who was charged and convicted with the crime of murder contends that the trial
court and the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The SC ruled that the
appellant’s sudden attack on the victim amply demonstrates that treachery was employed in the
commission of the crime. It further held that It is of no consequence that appellant was in front of the
victim when he thrust the knife to his torso for even a frontal attack could be treacherous when
unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it.
Facts:
Appellant Amora, in this case, was charged with murder defined and penalized under Art. 248
of the RPC. Upon arraignment, Amora entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter,
pre-trial and trial on the merits followed.
During the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution testified that on September 12, 2004 at
around 5:45 p.m., Anselmo, Aurelio and the victim Romeo were walking on their way to Sampol
Market in San Jose Del Monte City. As they were making their way to the market, they saw Amora in
his store. Suddenly, Amora rushed towards them and stabbed Romeo twice, one on the chest and
another on the abdomen. Romeo fell to the ground while Amora quickly ran away from the scene.
Appellant Amora on the other hand contended that on September 12, 2004, at around 5:45
p.m., he was working as a construction worker in a site 8 to 9 kilometers away from his residence. He
alleged that he does not know Romeo and that the only reason he could think of why he is being
falsely accused was that he turned down Anselmo’s request to buy shabu.
The RTC rendered a decision convicting Amora of the crime of murder. It found that the
stabbing of Romeo was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as it was sudden and
unexpected such that Romeo was unable to react or defend himself from the attack. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.
Ruling:
No, it did not.

Page 27 of 519
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC provides that “[t]here is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.” Thus in order for the qualifying circumstance of
treachery to be appreciated, the following requisites must be shown: (1) the employment of means,
method, or manner of execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or
retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate,
and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender. “The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape.”
In this case, the appellant’s sudden attack on Romeo amply demonstrates that treachery was
employed in the commission of the crime. The eyewitnesses were all consistent in declaring that the
appellant in such a swift motion stabbed Romeo such that the latter had no opportunity to defend
himself or to fight back. The deliberate swiftness of the attack significantly diminished the risk to
himself that may be caused by the retaliation of the victim.
It is of no consequence that appellant was in front of Romeo when he thrust the knife to his
torso. Records show that appellant initially came from behind and then attacked Romeo from the
front. In any event, “[e]ven a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an
unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it,” as in this case.
Undoubtedly, the RTC and CA correctly held that the crime committed was murder under
Article 248 of the RPC by reason of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
GARY FANTASTICO AND ROLANDO VILLANUEVA vs. ELPIDIO MALICSE, SR.

AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 190912, January 12, 2015, J. Peralta
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between
the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous
for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that
there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed
with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the
victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had
the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely
use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The
appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.
Facts:
On the afternoon of June 27, 1993, Elpidio Malicse, Sr. was outside the house of his sister
Isabelita Iguiron in Pandacan, Manila when all of a sudden, he heard Isabelita's son, Winston,
throwing invectives at him. Thus, Elpidio confronted Isabelita but she also cursed him, which
prompted the former to slap the latter. On that occasion, Elpidio was under the influence of alcohol.
The Barangay Chairman heard what transpired and went to the place where the commotion was
Page 28 of 519
taking place in order to pacify those who were involved. Elpidio was eventually persuaded to go
home. On his way there, he passed by the house of Kagawad Andy Antonio and requested the latter
to accompany him, but was instead told to go back home, leaving Elpidio to proceed alone.
Upon reaching Isabelita's house, Elpidio saw the former's son, Titus Iguiron and her son-in-
law Gary Fantastico and asked the two where he can find their parents. Titus and Gary responded,
“putang ina mo, and kulit mo, lumayas ka, punyeta ka.” In his anger, Elpidio kicked the door open and
saw Isabelita's elder son, Salvador Iguiron Salvador behind the door holding a rattan stick or arnis.
Salvador hit Elpidio on the right side of his head that forced the latter to bow his head but Salvador
delivered a second blow that hit Elpidio on the right eyebrow. Gary hit Elpidio on the right side of his
head with a tomahawk axe when the latter was about to go out of the house. Elpidio tried to defend
himself but was unable to take the tomahawk axe from Gary. Elpidio walked away from Titus but
Gary, still armed with the tomahawk axe and Salvador, with his arnis, including Titus, chased him.
Roland Villanueva, without any warning, hit Elpidio on the back of his head with a lead pipe
which caused the latter to fall on the ground. Elpidio begged his assailants to stop, but to no avail.
Salvador hit him countless times on his thighs, legs and knees using the rattan stick. While he was
simultaneously being beaten up by Salvador, Titus, Gary, Rolly, Nestor, Eugene and Tommy, he tried
to cover his face with his arm. Gary hit him with the tomahawk axe on his right leg, between the knees
and the ankle of his leg, which caused the fracture on his legs and knees.
Thereafter, a certain “Mang Gil” tried to break them off but Titus and Gary shouted at him:
“Huwag makialam, away ng mag-anak ito” and the two continued to maul Elpidio. The people who
witnessed the incident shouted “maawa na kayo” but they only stopped battering him when a
bystander fainted because of the incident. Elpidio then pretended to be dead. It was then that
concerned neighbors approached him and rushed him to the emergency room of the Philippine
General Hospital.
A case for Attempted Murder was filed against Salvador Iguiron, Titus Malicse Iguiron, Saligan
Malicse Iguiron, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao and petitioners Gary
Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva. The trial court issued a decision which acquitted Titus Iguiron,
Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros but found Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for Attempted Murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorati under Rule 45. It is the contention of the petitioners
that the Information filed against them was defective because it did not state all the elements of the
crime charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the Information was defective
Ruling:
A close reading of the Information would show the contrary. The Information partly reads:
x x x but the said accused did not perform all the acts of the execution which should
have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other than
Page 29 of 519
their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse,
Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily mortal.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows: (a) The offender commences
the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; (b) He does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony; (c) The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous
desistance; (d) The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than
his spontaneous desistance. From the above-quoted portion of the Information, it is clear that all the
elements of the crime of attempted murder has been included.
Petitioners question the inclusion of the phrase “not necessarily mortal” in the allegations in
the Information. According to them, the inclusion of that phrase means that there is an absence of an
intent to kill on their part. Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through
external manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and
immediately thereafter. The Court considered the following factors to determine the presence of an
intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after
the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the
motives of the accused. All of these, were proven during the trial.
Petitioners also claim that the prosecution was not able to prove the presence of treachery or
any other qualifying circumstance.In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms
in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. From the facts proven by the
prosecution, the incident was spontaneous, thus, the second element of treachery is wanting.
However, the trial is correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. The trial court was correct when it ruled: But it was a lopsided attack as the victim was
unarmed, while his attackers were all armed (rattan stick, tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim
was also drunk. This establishes the element of abuse of superior strength. The suddenness of the blow
inflicted by Salvador on Elpidio when he entered the premises show that the former was ready to hit the
victim and was waiting for him to enter. It afforded Elpidio no means to defend himself. And Salvador
consciously adopted the said actuation. He hit Elpidio twice on the head. Treachery is present in this
case and must be considered an aggravating circumstance against Salvador Iguiron.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANIEL VILLA MATIBAG y DE @ "DANI" "DANILO,"

G.R. No. 206381, March 25, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
In convicted the accused of the crime of murder, the RTC appreciated the use of firearm as an
special aggravating circumstance. The Supreme Court affirmed such ruling by citing Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8294, which treats the unauthorized use of a
licensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as a special aggravating
circumstance.
Facts:
In an Amended Information dated May 5, 2005, Matibag was charged with the crime of
Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended.
Page 30 of 519
Matibag entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment. After the termination of the pre-trial,
trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution asserted that at around 8:40 in the evening of March 27, 2005, Enrico Clar
de Jesus Duhan, who just came from a meeting with the other officers of the homeowners’ association
of Twin Villa Subdivision, was walking along Iron Street in Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City
when Matibag confronted Duhan, and asked, “ano bang pinagsasasabi mo?” Duhan replied “wala,”
and without warning, Matibag delivered a fist blow hitting Duhan on the left cheek and causing him
to teeter backwards. Matibag then pulled out his gun and shot Duhan, who fell face-first on the
pavement. While Duhan remained in that position, Matibag shot him several more times.
In his defense, Matibag alleged that on said date, he was at the despedida party of his neighbor
when Duhan arrived together with the other officers of the homeowners’ association. Wanting to
settle a previous misunderstanding, Matibag approached Duhan and extended his hand as a gesture
of reconciliation. However, Duhan pushed it away and said, “putang ina mo, ang yabang mo,” thereby
provoking Matibag to punch him in the face. Matibag saw Duhan pull something from his waist and
fearing that it was a gun and Duhan was about to retaliate, Matibag immediately drew his own gun,
shot Duhan, and hurriedly left the place. In a Decision dated August 1, 2008, the RTC convicted
Matibag as charged. In a Decision dated September 13, 2012, the CA affirmed Matibag’s conviction
in toto. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the illegal use of firearm be appreciated as special aggravating circumstance in the
crime of murder
Ruling:
Yes.
The RTC and CA held, the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm,
which was duly alleged in the Information, should be appreciated in the imposition of penalty.
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8294, treats the
unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as a
special aggravating circumstance:
Section 1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows: “Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. – x x x. x x x x “If homicide or murder is committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered
as an aggravating circumstance. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) Further, under Section 5 of RA
8294, the scope of the term “unlicensed firearm” has already been expanded as follows:
Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. – The term unlicensed firearm shall
include: 1. firearms with expired license; or 2. unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the
commission of the crime. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, when Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm, the use thereof was unauthorized
under the purview of RA 8294 and is equally appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance. As a
Page 31 of 519
result, the imposition of the maximum penalty of death, which is reduced to reclusion perpetua in
light of RA 9346, stands proper. To this, the Court adds that Matibag is not eligible for parole.
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR OFFENSES

PENALTIES
APPLICATION
REYNALDO S. MARIANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 178145, July 7, 2014, J. Bersamin
The CA modified the felony committed by Mariano from frustrated homicide to reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. The court ruled that CA incorrectly considered the
Mariano's act as a grave felony had it been intentional, and should not have imposed the penalty
at arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. Instead, the
accused's act that caused the serious physical injuries, had it been intentional, would be a less grave
felony under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code.
Facts:
Mariano drove his pick-up truck at a fast speed in order to overtake the jeep of Ferdinand. In
so attempting to overtake, he unavoidably hit Ferdinand, causing the latter’s injuries.
RTC convicted Mariano of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of three (3) years and four (4) months of Prision Correccional as minimum to six (6) years
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum. On appeal, the CA modified the felony committed by
Mariano from frustrated homicide to reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries and
was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven (11) days ofprision correccional, as
maximum.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender can be appreciated in

favor of the accused
2. Whether or not CA erred in imposing the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries
Ruling:
1. No.
To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere
negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of the
consequences is required.
Page 32 of 519
Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal Code, expressly states that in the imposition of the
penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. “The rationale of the law,” according to People v. Medroso, Jr.:
x x x can be found in the fact that in quasi-offenses penalized under Article 365, the
carelessness, imprudence or negligence which characterizes the wrongful act may vary from
one situation to another, in nature, extent, and resulting consequences, and in order that
there may be a fair and just application of the penalty, the courts must have ample discretion
in its imposition, without being bound by what the Court may call the mathematical formula
provided for in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. On the basis of this particular provision,
the trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of Article 64 in the instant case even if
appellant had two mitigating circumstances in his favor with no aggravating circumstance to
offset them
2. Yes
Verily, anyone judicially declared guilty of any crime must be duly punished in accordance
with the law defining the crime and prescribing the punishment. Injustice would always result to the
offender should the penalty exceed that allowed by the law. The imposition of the correct penalty on
the offender is the essence of due process of law.
The penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is based on the gravity of the
resulting injuries had his act been intentional. Thus, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code stipulates
that had the act been intentional, and would constitute a grave felony, the offender shall
suffer arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; and if it would have constituted alight felony, arresto menor in its maximum period shall
be imposed. Pursuant to Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, a grave felony is that to which the law
attaches the capital punishment or a penalty that in any of its periods is afflictive in accordance with
Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code; a less grave felony is that which the law punishes with a penalty
that is correctional in its maximum period in accordance with Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code;
and a light felony is an infraction of law for the commission of which a penalty of either arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both is provided.
The Revised Penal Code classifies the felony of serious physical injuries based on the gravity
of the physical injuries, to wit:
Article 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault
another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the injured
person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind; xxx
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in consequence
of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed, or shall have
lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or
incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he as habitually engaged for a period
of more than ninety days; xxx
The CA found that Ferdinand had sustained multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior
part of the right orbital wall, and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma; that he had
become stuporous and disoriented as to time, place and person. It was also on record that he had
Page 33 of 519
testified at the trial that he was unable to attend to his general merchandise store for three months
due to temporary amnesia; and that he had required the attendance of caregivers and a masseur until
October 31, 1999.
With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind, his physical injuries did
not fall under Article 263, 1, supra. Consequently, the CA incorrectly considered the petitioner’s act
as a grave felony had it been intentional, and should not have imposed the penalty at arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. Instead, the petitioner’s act that
caused the serious physical injuries, had it been intentional, would be a less grave felony under
Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, because Ferdinand’s physical injuries were those under Article
263, 3, supra, for having incapacitated him from the performance of the work in which he was
habitually engaged in for more than 90 days.
Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from one to four months. As earlier
mentioned, the rules in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code are not applicable in reckless
imprudence, and considering further that the maximum term of imprisonment would not exceed one
year, rendering the Indeterminate Sentence Law inapplicable, the Court holds that the straight
penalty of two months of arresto mayor was the correct penalty for the petitioner.
MANOLITO GIL ZAFRA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 176317, July 23, 2014, J. Bersamin
At any rate, even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted his being guilty only
of malversation through negligence, the Court would not be barred from holding him liable for the
intentional crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents because his
appealing the convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is axiomatic that by
appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, leaving him open to being
convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately conclude from the records to have been
actually committed by him within the terms of the allegations in the informations under which he had
been arraigned.
Facts:
Appellant Manolito Gil Z. Zafra (Zafra) was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR), Revenue District 3, in San Fernando, La Union from 1993 to 1995.
Among his duties was to receive tax payments for which BIR Form 25.24 or the revenue
official receipts (ROR) were issued. The original of the ROR was then given to the taxpayer while a
copy thereof was retained by the collection officer. Every month, Zafra submitted BIR Form 12.31 of
the Monthly Report of Collections (MRC) indicating the numbers of the issued RORs, date of
collection, name of taxpayer, the amount collected and the kind of tax paid. The original copy of the
MRC with the attached triplicate copy of the issued RORs was submitted to the Regional Office of the
Commission on Audit (COA).
In July 1995, an audit team was tasked to audit the cash and non-cash accountabilities of
Zafra. The audit team reviewed several documents including CARs furnished by the Assessment
Division of the BIR and the triplicate copies of the RORs attached to the MRCs submitted by appellant
Page 34 of 519
to COA. The audit team likewise requested and was given copies of the RORs issued to the San
Fernando, La Union branch of the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
The audit team found that comparison of the entries in said documents revealed that the data
pertaining to 18 RORs vary with respect to the name of the taxpayer, the kind of tax paid, the amount
of tax and the date of payment. Of particular concern to the audit team were the lesser amounts of
taxes reported in appellant’s MRCs and the attached RORs compared to the amount reflected in the
CARs and PNB’s RORs.
In sum, although the RORs bear the same serial numbers, the total amount reflected in the
CARs and PNB’s 12 copies of RORs is Php 615,493.93, while only Php1,342.00 was reported as tax
collections in the RORs’ triplicate copies submitted by appellant to COA and in his MRCs, or a
discrepancy of Php 614,151.93, Thus, the audit team sent to Zafra a demand letter requiring him to
restitute the total amount of Php 614,151.93. Zafra ignored the letter, thus, prompting the institution
of the present criminal action.
RTC convicted the Zafra for 18 counts of malversation of public funds and imposed
corresponding penalties therein respectively. In its consolidated decision of, the RTC pegged the
maximum terms within the minimum periods of the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. It also fixed the indeterminate sentences on some counts despite the maximum
of the imposable penalties being reclusion perpetua. RTC likewise omitted in its order for the
restitution of the amount so malversed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, is correct in convicting
Zafra of an intentional felony of malversation of public funds and not of malversation through
negligence.
2. Whether or not the penalties imposed are correct.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, was correct in not convicting Zafra of
an intentional felony of malversation of public funds.
The findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA. Hence, Zafra was correctly convicted
of the crimes charged because such findings of fact by the trial court, being affirmed by the CA as the
intermediate reviewing tribunal, are now binding and conclusive on the Court. Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the prosecution sufficiently established that Zafra had been the forger of the falsified
and tampered public documents, and that the falsifications of the public documents had been
necessary to commit the malversations of the collected taxes.
Notably, there is a big disparity between the amount covered by BIR Form No. 25.24 issued
to the taxpayer, and the amount for the same receipt number appearing in the Monthly Collection
Reports indicating the falsification resorted to by the accused in the official reports he filed, thereby
remitting less than what was collected from taxpayers concerned, resulting to the loss of revenue for
the government as unearthed by the auditors.
Page 35 of 519
Zafra relies on this passage of the RTC’s ruling to buttress his contention that he should be
found guilty of malversation through negligence. His reliance is grossly misplaced, however, because
the RTC did not thereby pronounce that he had been merely negligent. The passage was nothing but
a brief forensic discourse on the legal consequence if his defense were favorably considered, and was
not the basis for finding him guilty. To attach any undue significance to such discourse is to divert
attention away from the firmness of the finding of guilt. It cannot be denied, indeed, that the RTC did
not give any weight to his position.
As can be seen, both lower courts unanimously concluded that the State’s evidence
established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for malversation of public funds through falsification
of public documents. Their unanimity rested on findings of fact that are now binding on the Court
after he did not bring to our attention any fact or circumstance that either lower court had not
properly appreciated and considered and which, if so considered, could alter the outcome in his favor.
At any rate, even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted his being guilty
only of malversation through negligence, the Court would not be barred from holding him liable for
the intentional crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents
because his appealing the convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is axiomatic
that by appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, leaving him open
to being convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately conclude from the records to have
been actually committed by him within the terms of the allegations in the informations under which
he had been arraigned.
1. No. The penalties imposed are correct.
Yet, there is a need to correct the penalties imposed on Zafra. He was duly convicted of 18
counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents, all complex crimes.
Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for each count is that prescribed on the
more serious offense, to be imposed in its maximum period.
Falsification of a public document by a public officer is penalized with prisión mayor and a
fine not to exceed P5,000.00.Prisión mayor has duration of six years and one day to 12 years of
imprisonment.In contrast, the penalty for malversation ranges from prisión correccional in its
medium and maximum periods depending on the amount misappropriated, and a fine equal to the
amount of the funds malversed or to the total value of the property embezzled.
To determine the maximum periods of the penalties to be imposed on Zafra, therefore, the
Court must be guided by the following rules, namely: (1) the penalties provided under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees; and (2) considering that the penalties provided under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are not composed of three periods, the time included in the
penalty prescribed should be divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming one
period, pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code should be
divided into three periods, with the maximum period being the penalty properly imposable on each
count, except in any instance where the penalty for falsification would be greater than such penalties
for malversation.
.
Page 36 of 519
To illustrate, the count involving the largest amount misappropriated by the Zafra totaling
P75,489.76 merited the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusionperpetua,
and a fine of P75,489.76. Obviously, the penalty is that prescribed for malversation of public funds,
the more serious offense.
In its consolidated decision of February 17, 2004, the RTC erred in pegging the maximum
terms within the minimum periods of the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code. It committed another error by fixing indeterminate sentences on some counts despite the
maximum of the imposable penalties being reclusion perpetua. There is even one completely
incorrect indeterminate sentence. And, as earlier noted, the penalty for falsification under Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code was applicable in Criminal Case No. 4635 involving P4,869.00 due to its
being the higher penalty.
One more omission by the CA and the RTC concerned a matter of law. This refers to their
failure to decree in favor of the Government the return of the amounts criminally misappropriated
by Zafra. That he was already sentenced to pay the fine in each count was an element of the penalties
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and was not the same thing as finding him civilly liable for
restitution, which the RTC and the CA should have included in the judgment. Indeed, as the Court
emphasized in Bacolod v. People, it was imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties
when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless
there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO BARAGA y ARCILLA

G.R. No. 208781, June 4, 2014, J. Reyes
Baraga allegedly raped his own daughter 2 times and committed acts of lasciviousness twice.
He was convicted by both the RTC and the CA. The decisions differ as to the penalty imposable. The Court
reconciled the different impositions by stating that in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
crime as alleged in the criminal complaint must be followed. The Court cannot interchange the law
applicable just on the basis of the victim’s age. The fact that the victim is beyond 12 years old when the
act of lasciviousness occurred, such fact does not exclude it from the application of the Anti-Child Abuse
Law.
Facts:
Rolando Baraga was charged with 3 counts of acts of lasciviousness and 2 counts of rape,
committed upon the person of his daughter, AAA, who was then still a minor. Upon arraignment,
Baraga pled not guilty to the crimes charged. After pre-trial conference, a joint trial on the merits
ensued.
Rolando Baraga, and the mother of AAA were no longer living together. Baraga committed his
initial acts of lasciviousness, 11 days before AAA turned 12. On said date, AAA was at their house
when Baraga sat beside her and touched her vagina. AAA relayed her ordeal to her grandmother who
then confronted Baraga about the incident.
Page 37 of 519
On the night of August 8, 2007, while AAA and her siblings were sleeping, Baraga approached
AAA, held her thigh, and touched her vagina. He then brought her to a corner of the room where he
removed AAA’s shorts and made her sit on his lap. Baraga then inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina.
On August 19, 2007, while AAA was at home, Baraga again touched AAA’s vagina. She then
relayed to her uncle what her father did to her. The matter was subsequently reported to the Women
and Children Protection Desk of the Las Piñas City Police Station. Upon medical examination by the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, it was discovered that AAA’s hymen had a "shallow
healed laceration," which evidences a blunt force penetrating trauma on AAA’s hymen.
Baraga denied the allegations against him, asserting that he never touched AAA’s vagina nor
had carnal knowledge of her. He claimed that he could not have committed the charges against him
during the said dates as he was then busy with his work.
On April 26, 2011, the RTC rendered a Consolidated Decision, which found Baraga guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness under Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610 in Criminal Case Nos. 07-0685 and 07-0864 and two (2) counts of rape.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s disquisition albeit with a modification on the penalty
imposed. As regards the charge of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 07-0685, inasmuch as
AAA was already 12 years old when the acts were committed by Baraga, the CA, imposed the penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum.
On the charge of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 07-0864, since AAA was merely
11 years old at the time Baraga committed the acts alleged therein, the CA meted the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months, and ten (10) days of reclusion
temporal.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment
Ruling:
Yes. The CA erred in imposing the penalty of imprisonment based on Art. 336 of the Revised
Penal Code instead of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 also known as the Anti-Child Abuse
Law.
Under Section 5, Article III, of R.A. No. 7610, the offender shall be punished with the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. However, when the victim of the
sexual abuse is under 12 years old, the imposable penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period.
In Criminal Case No. 07-0864, since AAA was only 11 years old when the lascivious conduct
alleged therein was committed by Baraga, the imposable penalty, as aptly pointed out by the CA, is
reclusion temporal in its medium period, that is from fourteen(14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and
Page 38 of 519
taking the alternative circumstance of relationship as an aggravating circumstance, the CA did not
err in imposing upon Baraga the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from thirteen (13)
years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years,
five (5) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 07-0685, the Court finds that the CA erred in applying the provisions of
Article 336 of the RPC. The CA applied Article 336 of the RPC on the sole ground that AAA was already
12 years old at the time the lascivious conduct alleged therein was perpetrated by Baraga. It bears
stressing that the Information in Criminal Case No. 07-0685 specifically charged Baraga for violation
of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. Thus, the CA should have applied the provisions of Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, and imposed upon Baraga the prescribed penalty therein for sexual
abuse.
The penalty for sexual abuse performed on a child under 18 years old but over 12 years old
under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
The Court likewise considers the alternative circumstance of relationship against Baraga as an
aggravating circumstance. Since there is an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua.
PROBATION LAW
ENRIQUE ALMERO Y ALCANTARA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIRASOL

BARTOLOME, CLARITA P. MATIAS, ROSENDO P. MATIAS AND ANTONIO MATIAS
G.R. NO. 188191. MARCH 12, 2014
CJ Sereno
Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the
judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While
he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the
guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to
circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation
mutually exclusive remedies.
Facts:
Petitioner bewails the defects committed by the trial court during the promulgation of the
judgment. Yet in the same breath, he persists in his application for probation, despite the waiver
and admission of guilt implicit in any procedure for probation.
RTC- petitioner entitled to apply for bail
CA- revered RTC decision
Issue:
Page 39 of 519
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to apply for bail
Ruling:
Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by the State,
and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests
solely upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Probation is a special privilege granted
by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an
otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and
expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed
his conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part
of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally affirmed
on appeal… he now applies for probation as an “escape hatch” thus rendering nugatory the appellate
court’s affirmance of his conviction.
Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for the
treatment of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on diametrically
opposed legal positions. An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the
judgment. The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the
crime which led to the judgment of conviction. This was the reason why the Probation Law was
amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction - even
if the sentence is probationable - for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the
probation only if the accused fails in his bid. In the present case, petitioner cannot make up his
mind whether to question the judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a
waiver of his right to appeal. While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he
assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of
probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which
seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
The assignment of errors in the Petition before us reflects the diametrically opposed positions taken
by accused petitioner. On the one hand, he bewails the defects committed by the trial court during
the promulgation of the judgment, thus casting doubt on the judgment itself. Yet in the same
breath, he persists in his application for probation, despite the waiver and admission of guilt
implicit in any procedure for probation - precisely the unhealthy wager the law seeks to prevent.
NEIL E. SUYAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CHIEF PROBATION AND PAROLE
OFFICER, DAGUPAN CITY
G.R. No. 189644, July 02, 2014, C.J. Sereno
Suyan has been apprehended twice for drug possession while on probation. The court held that
as probation is a mere discretionary grant, Suyan was bound to observe full obedience to the terms and
conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this privilege. The Court's
discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only
incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial
court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.
Page 40 of 519
Facts:
On 22 November 1995, Suyan was convicted for violating Section 16, Article III of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6425 for which he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional and to pay the costs. On even date, he filed his application for probation. The RTC issued
a Probation Order covering a period of six (6) years.
While on probation, Suyan was arrested on two occasions, for violating Section 16, Article III
of R.A. No. 6425. Atty. Navarro, then the Chief Probation and Parole Officer of Dagupan City, filed a
Motion to Revoke Probation which was granted by the RTC. Atty. Navarro alleged that Suyan has been
apprehended twice for drug possession while on probation. The former further alleged that Suyan
was considered a recidivist, whose commission of other offenses while on probation was a serious
violation of the terms thereof.
On a petition under Rule 65, Suyan argued that he was denied due process as he was not
furnished with a copy of the Motion to Revoke; and when the motion was heard, he was not
represented by his counsel of record. The CA granted the petition by annulling the revocation of
Suyan's probation.
In compliance with the CA Decision, the RTC conducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke.
However, instead of rebutting the allegations mentioned in the Violation Report, Suyan merely
questioned the absence of such a report when his probation was first revoked.
The RTC found that Suyan had violated the conditions of his probation and thus, ordered that
his probation be revoked. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the probation was validly revoked.
Ruling:
Yes. On the procedural grounds, the Court does not subscribe to his contention that his right
to due process was violated after the RTC had already conducted a full-blown trial on the Motion to
Revoke, in compliance with the directive of the CA. Based on record, he had ample opportunity to
refute the allegations contained in the Violation Report.
The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in
support of his case; what the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to
be heard. When the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and
to air his side, but it was by his own fault or choice that he squandered these chances, then his cry for
due process must fail.
On substantive grounds, the Court believes that there was sufficient justification for the
revocation of his probation. Suyan does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has
served out his sentence for another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of
another offense is a direct violation of Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order, and the effects are
clearly outlined in Section 11 of the Probation Law.
Page 41 of 519
Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall render
the probation order ineffective. Section 11 states:
Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. - A probation order shall take effect upon its issuance,
at which time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon
his failure to comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of
another offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on
probation.
As probation is a mere discretionary grant, Suyan was bound to observe full obedience to the
terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this privilege.
Regrettably, Suyan wasted the opportunity granted him by the RTC to remain outside prison bars,
and must now suffer the consequences of his violation. The Court's discretion to grant probation is
to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of
the accused. Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to
order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.
MODIFICATION AND EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJIE CONSORTE y FRANCO
G.R. No. 194068, November 26, 2014, J. Reyes
The criminal and civil liability ex delicto of a person convicted for murder who moved for
reconsideration of his conviction and died pending resolution, will be extinguished.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Consorte was found guilty by the RTC for the murder of Elizabeth Palmar.
The CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Consorte moved for reconsideration of the
SC’s decision; however he died in prison while his motion was pending.
Issues:
Did Consorte’s death extinguish his criminal and civil liability?
Ruling:
In People v. Brillantes, the Court, citing People v. Bayotas, clarified that Death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
In the case at bar, Consorte died before final judgment, as in fact, his motion for
reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Court. As such, it therefore becomes necessary for
us to declare his criminal liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto to have been extinguished by
his death prior to final judgment.
Page 42 of 519
PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME
RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG vs. TERESITA D. RIVERA

G.R. No. 200148, June 4, 2014, J. Reyes.
Rivera was resigned from work. However, her separation pay and other benefits were withheld.
She sent several text messages to the account manager of her former company. The President of the said
company instituted a criminal action for libel due to the contents of the text messages. Rivera alleged
that libel can no longer prosper due to prescription. "Although the general rule is that the defense of
prescription is not available unless expressly set up in the lower court, as in that case it is presumed to
have been waived and cannot be taken advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is not always of absolute
application in criminal cases, such as that in which prescription of the crime is expressly provided by
law, for the State not having then the right to prosecute, or continue prosecuting, nor to punish, or
continue punishing, the offense, or to continue holding the defendant subject to its action through the
imposition of the penalty, the court must so declare.
Facts:
Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF). On the
other hand, Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF. She was hired in September of 2002
with a monthly salary of Php 30,000.00. About three years after, River tendered her resignation to be
effective on February 3, 2006. However, Rivera actually continued working for BANFF until March of
the same year to complete the turn-over of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas (Lumapas),
who succeeded her.
Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her
remaining salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be
paid, but the check representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold
by Syhunliong.
On April 6, 2006, at around 11:55 a.m., Rivera sent the following text message to one of
BANFF’s official cellular phones held by Lumapas:
I am expecting that[.] [G]rabe talagasufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng last pay ko. I
don’t deserve this [because] I did my job when I [was] still there. God bless ras. [S]ana yung pagsimba
niya, alam niya real meaning.
Minutes later, Rivera once again texted another message, which reads:
Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyan including incentive up to the last date
na nandyan ako para di na kami abot sa labor.
Rivera filed before the National Labor Relations Commission a complaint against Syhunliong
for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month and incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund in the total
sum of Php 698,150.48. On April 16, 2007, pending the resolution of the aforecited labor case,
Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel, the origin of the instant petition.
Page 43 of 519
Rivera filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the text message, which was the subject of the
libel complaint, merely reflected the undue stress she had suffered due to the delay in the release of
her unpaid salaries, benefits and incentives. Rivera entered a plea of not guilty, during arraignment.
On December 4, 2008, the RTC issued an Order denying Rivera’s Motion to Quash. Rivera
challenged the orders issued by the RTC through a Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA. CA
rendered a decision directing the dismissal of the information for libel filed against Rivera.
Syhunliong argues that Rivera may not validly question the denial of her motion to quash
before the CA after voluntarily allowing herself to be arraigned even during the pendency of such
motion to quash. Moreover, also refutes the CA’s finding that the facts charged in the information did
not constitute the crime of libel. The text message was apparently an indictment of his personality
and character since it portrayed him as a hypocrite.
Lastly, Syhunliong invokes People v. Judge Gomez which enunciated the doctrine that in a libel
case, the privileged nature of a communication is not a ground for a motion to quash, but is merely a
matter of defense to be proven during the trial.
On the other hand, Rivera alleges that the RTC no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance
of Syhunliong’s complaint. The text message was sent on April 6, 2006. Per Syhunliong’s narration in
the instant petition, his complaint was filed on August 18, 2007, beyond the one year prescriptive
period for instituting actions for libel provided for in Articles 90 and 91 of the RPC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not prescription has set in

2. Whether or not the text messages falls within the ambit of privilege communication
Ruling:
1. Yes, prescription has set in.
There is no reason why the Court should deny Zafra the benefits accruing from the liberal
construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription emanates from the liberality of
the State. x x x Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee thereof, the accused.
In the case at bar, it is extant in the records that Syhunliong filed his complaint against Rivera
more than one year after the allegedly libelous message was sent to Lumapas. Whether the date of
the filing of the complaint is April 16, 2007 or August 18, 2007, it would not alter the fact that its
institution was made beyond the prescriptive period provided for in Article 90 of the RPC. The Court
finds no persuasive reason why Rivera should be deprived of the benefits accruing from the
prescription of the crime ascribed to her.
Although the general rule is that the defense of prescription is not available unless expressly
set up in the lower court, as in that case it is presumed to have been waived and cannot be taken
advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is not always of absolute application in criminal cases, such as
that in which prescription of the crime is expressly provided by law, for the State not having then the
right to prosecute, or continue prosecuting, nor to punish, or continue punishing, the offense, or to
Page 44 of 519
continue holding the defendant subject to its action through the imposition of the penalty, the court
must so declare.
In sum, even if the Court were to sustain Syhunliong’s stance that Rivera availed of the wrong
remedy when she resorted to filing a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the RTC orders
denying the motion to quash, the result would only prove circuitous. Even if the trial proceeds and
an adverse decision is rendered against Rivera, she can appeal the same, but the CA and this Court
would still be compelled to order the dismissal of the information on account of prescription of the
crime.
2. Yes, the text message falls within the ambit of privilege communication.
The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on
any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is
privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty.
In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of either the delay or denial of the
latter's claims for payment of salaries, benefits and incentives by Syhunliong. Rivera expressed
through the subject text message her grievances to Lumapas. At that time, Lumapas was the best
person, who could help expedite the release of Rivera's claims.
Prescinding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA' s declaration that Rivera's
text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she "was speaking
in response to duty [to protect her own interest] and not out of an intent to injure the reputation" of
Syhunliong. Besides, "[t]here was no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond [that] of
conveying it to the party concerned."
CIVIL LIABILITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs. BENJAMIN SORIA Y GOMEZ
G.R. NO. 179031. FEBRUARY 24, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as civil liability ex delicto as provided under Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Facts:
On November 14, 2012, this Court its decision finding accused guilty of the crime of rape. The said
Decision supposedly became final and executory on December 20, 2012. Subsequently, the Court
received a letter from the Bureau of Corrections informing us of the death of accused-appellant on
August 16, 2012. Clearly, accused-appellant’s demise on August 16, 2012 transpired before the
promulgation of this Court’s Decision on November 14, 2012 or before its finality on December 20,
2012. Therefore, when accused-appellant died, his appeal before this Court was still pending
resolution.
Page 45 of 519
Issue:
Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto
Ruling:
The Court has no course of action but to set aside its Decision and dismiss the criminal case against
accused by reason of his death. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MA. HARLETA VELASCO y BRIONES, MARICAR B. INOVERO,
MARISSA DIALA, and BERNA M. PAULINO
G.R. No. 195668, June 25, 2014, J. Bersamin
Considering that the crime of illegal recruitment, when it involves the transfer of funds from the
victims to the accused, is inherently in fraud of the former, civil liability should include the return of the
amounts paid as placement, training and processing fees. Hence, Inovero and her co-accused were liable
to indemnify the complainants for all the sums paid. The nature of the obligation of the co-conspirators
in the commission of the crime requires solidarity, and each debtor may be compelled to pay the entire
obligation. As a co-conspirator, then, Inovero’s civil liability was similar to that of a joint tortfeasor
under the rules of the civil law.
Facts:
Novesa Baful testified that she went to Harvel International Talent Management and
Promotion ("HARVEL") at Unit 509 Cityland Condominium, Makati City upon learning that
recruitment for caregivers to Japan was on-going there. She allegedly met Inovero, Velasco, and Diala,
and saw Inovero conducting a briefing on the applicants. She also testified that Diala, the alleged
talent manager, directed her to submit certain documents, and to pay placement and processing fees.
Diala also advised her to undergo physical examination. Baful was promised deployment within two
(2) to three (3) months. She likewise testified that Inovero briefed her and her co-applicants on what
to wear on the day of their departure. However, she was never deployed.
Danilo Brizuela, another complainant, likewise attended an orientation conducted by Inovero

at which time, he and his batchmates were advised what clothes to wear on the day of their departure.
He was assured of deployment on the first week of June 2003, however, on the eve of his supposed
"pre-departure orientation seminar," Paulino texted him that the seminar was cancelled because
Inovero, who had the applicants’ money, did not show up. He testified that he was not deployed.
Neither was his money returned, as promised. Brizuela testified that Inovero was the one who
conducted the orientation, and represented to all the applicants that most of the time, she was in the
Japanese Embassy expediting the applicants’ visa.
Page 46 of 519
Rosanna Aguirre, the third complainant, was informed by Diala that Inovero was one of the
owners of HARVEL and Velasco was its President. Despite her undergoing medical examination and
several training seminars, she was however not deployed to Japan. Worse, she found out that
HARVEL was not licensed to recruit workers. The same thing happened to complainant Annaliza
Amoyo and Teresa Marbella.
Mildred Versoza, a Labor and Employment Officer at the POEA Licensing Branch, testified
that she prepared a Certification certifying that neither HARVEL nor Inovero was authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment as per records at their office.
Inovero, Velasco, Diala and Paulino were charged with Illegal recruitment in large scale. Only
Inovero was arrested and prosecuted, the other accused having remained at large. The RTC rendered
judgment convicting Inovero of illegal recruitment committed in large scale. CA affirmed. However,
both the RTC and CA did not adjudicate Inovero’s personal liability for them in their judgments.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the civil liability should be made part of the judgment by the RTC and the
CA even if the complainants did not appeal;
2. Whether or not Inovero’s liability is solidary
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court, being the ultimate reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also
the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. It is, indeed, a basic tenet of our criminal
law that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Civil liability includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages. To enforce the civil
liability, the Rules of Court has deemed to be instituted with the criminal action the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged unless the offended party waives the
civil action, or reserves the right to institute the civil action separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action. Considering that the crime of illegal recruitment, when it involves the
transfer of funds from the victims to the accused, is inherently in fraud of the former, civil liability
should include the return of the amounts paid as placement, training and processing fees. Hence,
Inovero and her co-accused were liable to indemnify the complainants for all the sums paid.
That the civil liability should be made part of the judgment by the RTC and the CA was not
disputable. The Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People that it was "imperative that the courts
prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be
imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or
a waiver of its recovery," because:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate
under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state:
"(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the
accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty
imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
Page 47 of 519
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their
disregard compels the Court to act lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission.
That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no
hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority
but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
2. Yes. The nature of the obligation of the co-conspirators in the commission of the crime
requires solidarity, and each debtor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation. As a co-
conspirator, then, Inovero’s civil liability was similar to that of a joint tortfeasor under the rules of
the civil law. Joint tortfeasors are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done,
if done for their benefit. They are also referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or
whose acts, if independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury. Under Article 2194 of the
Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words, joint
tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had
performed the wrongful act themselves. As regards the extent of their respective liabilities, the Court
expressed in Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals: Where several causes producing an
injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against
any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that
one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not same.
BOOK II, RPC AND SPECIAL LAWS
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE TO A PERSON IN AUTHORITY OR AGENTS OF SUCH PERSON
EDMUND SYDECO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014, J. Velasco
The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC
are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a
lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his
agent. There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority
or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely Sydeco’s act of exercising one’s
right against unreasonable searches to be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be
equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC.
Facts:
P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3 Benedict Cruz III and another officer
were manning a checkpoint when, from about twenty (20) meters away, they spotted a swerving red
Ford Ranger pick-up driven by petitioner Sydeco. The team members flagged the vehicle down and
asked Sydeco to alight from the vehicle so he could take a rest at the police station situated nearby,
before he resumes driving. Sydeco who the policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being
drunk and insisted he could manage to drive. Then in a raised voice, Sydeco started talking rudely to
the policemen and in fact yelled at P/Insp. Aguilar blurting: “P…g ina mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli.” At
Page 48 of 519
that remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who earlier pointed out to Sydeco that his team had seen him swerving
and driving under the influence of liquor, proceeded to arrest Sydeco who put up resistance. Despite
Sydeco’s efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually succeeded in subduing him who was
then brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined and found to be under the influence
of alcohol. Sydeco was then turned over to the Malate Police Station for investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not Sydeco is guilty of violation of Art. 151 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
No.
Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off
between the police team, on one hand, and Sydeco on the other, was the latter’s refusal to get off of
the vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only.
Sydeco’s twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful order. He may have
sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make him a criminal. It
remains to stress that the Sydeco has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or performed an
overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid the road block
established. He came to a full stop when so required to stop. The two key elements of resistance and
serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his
agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2)
That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent. There can be no quibble that
P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority or agents of a person in authority
manning a legal checkpoint. But surely Sydeco’s act of exercising one’s right against unreasonable
searches to be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let
alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often been said, albeit
expressed differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not in the
rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the people to assert and use them whenever they are
ignored or worse infringed.
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS (R.A. 8294)
ARNULFO A.K.A. ARNOLD JACABAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 184355, March 23, 2015, J. Peralta
Once the prosecution evidence indubitably points to possession without the requisite authority
or license, coupled with animus possidendi or intent to possess on the part of the accused, conviction for
violation of the said law must follow. Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination
of which is largely dependent on attendant events in each case. It may be inferred from the prior or
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.
Here, the prosecution had proved the essential elements of the crime charged under PD 1866 as
amended by R.A. No. 8294. The existence of the seized firearm and the ammunitions was established
through the testimony of PO3 Sarte. There was an inventory of the items seized which was made in the
Page 49 of 519
presence of the petitioner and the three barangay tanods who all voluntarily signed the inventory
receipt. PO3 Sarte identified all the seized items in open court.
Facts:
In July 1999, police operatives armed with a search warrant went to the house of the Accused-
appellant Jacaban and there recovered numerous firearms and ammunitions. The search was
attended by three (3) barangay tanods and the confiscated items were duly docu-mented. Later, a
certification coming from the firearms and explosives office of the PNP showed that Jacaban was not
authorized to possess the confiscated dangerous items. Upon his indict-ment, Jacaban asserted that
he was framed-up by the police and as disclosed by his sister, who stood as a witness, he merely
observed the search conducted at the house of his uncle.
The RTC found Jacaban guilty of violating PD 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, consi-dering
that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crime charged. The CA agreed with
the RTC’s conclusion that the elements of the crime charged were duly proved by the prosecution.
Anent Jacaban’s claim of the alleged discrepancy in the testimony of PO3 Sarte on the time the raid
was conducted, the CA found the same to be minor and did not damage the essential integrity of the
prosecution’s evidence in its material whole.
Issue:
Whether or not Accused-appellant Jacaban is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms.
Ruling:
YES, Accused-appellant Jacaban is guilty of the crime charged.
[Jacaban] argues that the RTC decision finding him guilty… is premised on its erroneous
conclusion that he is the owner the house where the unlicensed firearms and ammunitions were
found. He reiterated his claim that there was discrepancy in the testimony of PO3 Sarte as to the time
the raid was conducted.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. As such, [the Court is] not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence
already considered in the proceedings below… This rule, however, is not without exceptions.
However, [Jacaban] failed to show that his case falls under any of the exceptions.
The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions are: (1) the existence of subject firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused who
possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it. The unvarying rule is
that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What
the law requires is merely possession, which includes not only actual physical possession, but also
constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one’s control and management.
Once the prosecution evidence indubitably points to possession without the requisite
authority or license, coupled with animus possidendi or intent to possess on the part of the accused,
Page 50 of 519
conviction for violation of the said law must follow. Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence
or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant events in each case. It may be inferred
from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.
Here, the prosecution had proved the essential elements of the crime charged under PD 1866
as amended by R.A. No. 8294. The existence of the seized firearm and the ammunitions was
established through the testimony of PO3 Sarte. There was an inventory of the items seized which
was made in the presence of the petitioner and the three barangay tanods who all voluntarily signed
the inventory receipt. PO3 Sarte identified all the seized items in open court.
It was convincingly proved that [Jacaban] had constructive possession of the gun and the
ammunitions, coupled with the intent to possess the same. [Jacaban's] act of immediately rushing
from the living room to the room where SPO2 Abellana found a calibre .45 and grappled with the
latter for the possession of the gun proved that the gun was under his control and management. He
also had the animus possidendi or intent to possess the gun when he tried to wrest it from SPO2
Abellana.
[Jacaban's] lack of authority to possess the firearm was established by the testimony of Police
Officer IV Sultan, Chief Clerk of the Firearms and Explosive Division of the PNP-Visayas (FED-PNP-
Visayas) that [he] is not licensed to possess any kind of firearm or ammunition based on the FED-
PNP master list.
Anent [Jacaban's] argument that the house where the firearm was found was not owned by
him is not persuasive. xxx. For one, “… the alleged owner of the house did not testify. He was allegedly
suffering from hypertension. The defense, however, did not file a motion to take his deposition.”
Even assuming that petitioner is not the owner of the house where the items were recovered,
the ownership of the house is not an essential element of the crime under PD 1866 as amended. xxx.
[Jacaban] likewise questions the discrepancies in the testimony of prosecution witness

[Sarte]. [He] contends that PO3 Sarte could not even testify correctly as to the time the raid was
conducted.
It bears stressing that minor discrepancies might be found in her testimony, but this does not
damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its material whole, nor should it reflect adversely on
the witness' credibility as it erases suspicion that the same was perjured. Here, prior testimony of
PO3 Sarte as to the time of the raid is considered only a trivial matter which is not even enough to
destroy or discredit her credibility. xxx. The record likewise does not reveal that PO3 Sarte was
actuated by ill-motive in so testifying against [Jacaban]. Thus, when there is nothing to indicate that
a witness was actuated by improper motives, her positive declarations on the witness stand, made
under solemn oath, deserve full faith and credence.
People of the Philippines vs. Ronaldo Casacop y Amil,

G.R. No. 210454, January 13, 2016
Page 51 of 519
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of Violation of R.A. No. 9165. The evidence for the
prosecution are as follows:
Acting on a tip from an informant that a certain Edong was selling shabu in Quezon St., Brgy. San
Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna, the Chief of Police of said stattion formed a team to conduct
surveillance on appellant. Upon receiving a positive result, SPO4 Dela Pena prepared a pre-
operation report which was sent to the PDEA.
SPO4 Pena then formed a buy bust team composed of PO1 Signap as the poseur-buyer, SPO2
Fernandez, SPO1 Jacob and PO1 Bautista, as police backup. Thereafter, the buy-bust team
proceeded to the target area. PO1 Signap and the informant approached appellant’s house. PO1
Signap was introduced to appellant by the informant as the buyer of shabu. He handed the marked
money, consisting of 3 Php100 bills, to appellant, who took a plastic sachet from his left pocket and
gave it to him. PO1 Signap made the pre-arranged signal of cllaing SPO4 Dela Pena. The backup
team rushed towards appellant’s house and arrested him. Thereafter, appellant was brought to the
police station.
Appellant, for his part, denied the charges of possession of shabu and its paraphernalia and sale of
shabu. Appellant testified that he was urinating at the back of his house on 21 July 2005 at aroung
12pm when 5 police officers barged into his house. After confirming that he is Edong, appellant was
handcuffed and brought to the police station. Appellant claimed that the police only planted
evidence against him because they were not able to pin him down in a robbery case.
The RTC convicted accused which conviction was affirmed by the CA.
Appellant asserts that the chain of custody of the object evidence was never established. Moreover,
appellant claims that Section 21 (a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 was not complied with.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of R.A. No. 9165.
Held: No. For the successful prosecution of a case for illegal sale of shabu, the followng elements
must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other hand, in prosecuting a
case for illegal possesin of dangerous drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused is
in possesion of an item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
In this case, all the elements for the illegal sale of shabu were established. PO1 Signap, the poseur-
buyer, positively identified appellant as the person who sold him the white crystalline substance in
one plastice sachet which was later proven to be positive for shabu. In exchange for this plastic
sachet, PO1 Signap handed the marked money as payment. The delivery of the contraband to the
poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-
bust transaction.
Page 52 of 519
All the elements in the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs and paraphernalia
were likewise established. Found in appellant’s pocket after he was caught in flagrante were two
more plastice sachets containing shabu, an improvised glass tootter containing shabu residue and
the rolled alumininum foil with shabu residue.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
FALSIFICATION BY PUBLIC OFFICER
VENANCIO M. SEVILLA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 194390, August 13, 2014, J. Reyes
Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged the intentional felony
of falsification of public documents, is untenable. Reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents,
the latter being the greater offense. While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful
crime, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi-offense, in [the RPC], it may however be said
that a conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission
of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.
Facts:
Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with falsification of public docu-
ment, penalized under Art. 171 of the RPC. That on or about 02 July 2001 in the City of Malabon,
Sevilla, a public officer, being then a member of the Sangguniang Panlunsod of Malabon City, having
been elected a councilor thereof, taking advantage of his official position and committing the offense
in relation to duty, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously make a false statement in
a narration of facts, the truth of which he is legally bound to disclose, by stating in his Personal Data
Sheet, an official document, which he submitted to the Office of the Secretariat, Malabon City Council
and, in answer to Question No. 25 therein, he stated that no criminal case is pending against him,
when in fact, as the accused fully well knew, he is an accused in Criminal Case No. 6718-97 for Assault
upon an Agent of a Person in Authority, pending before the MeTC of Malabon City.
Upon arraignment, Sevilla entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
Based on the same set of facts, an administrative complaint, was likewise filed against Sevilla. The
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) found Sevilla administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification
of official document and dismissed him from the service. The Court in the Resolution affirmed the
findings of the OMB as regards Sevilla’s administrative liability. Sevilla admitted that he indeed
marked the box corresponding to the “no” answer vis-à-vis the question on whether he has any
pending criminal case. However, he averred that he did not intend to falsify his PDS. He claimed that
it was Editha Mendoza a member of his staff, who actually prepared his PDS.
According to Sevilla, since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in his house, he was
informed by Mendoza that he needs to accomplish his PDS and submit the same to the Personnel
Office of the City of Malabon before five o’clock that afternoon. He then instructed Mendoza to copy
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the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was
filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just signed the same without
checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer to the question of
whether he has any pending criminal case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the “no”
answer. The defense presented the testimony of Edilberto G. Torres, a former City Councilor. Torres
testified that Sevilla was not yet given an office space in the Malabon City Hall on July 2, 2001; that
when the members of Sevilla’s staff would then need to use the typewriter, they would just use the
typewriter inside Torres’ office. Torres further claimed that he saw Mendoza preparing the PDS of
Sevilla, the latter having used the typewriter in his office.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision, finding Sevilla guilty of Falsification of Public

Documents through Reckless Imprudence. Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla
cannot be convicted of falsification of public document under Art. 171(4)10 of the RPC since he did
not act with malicious intent to falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS. The reckless signing of
the PDS without verifying the data therein makes him criminally liable for his act.
Before the Court, Sevilla claims that the Information that was filed against him specifically
charged him with the commission of an intentional felony, under Art. 171(4) of the RPC. Thus, he
could not be convicted of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under Art.
365 of the RPC, which is a culpable felony, lest his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him be violated.
Issue:
Whether or not Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him in the Information was for
the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Art. 171(4) of the RPC.
Ruling:
Yes, Sevilla can be convicted.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan’s designation of the felony suppo-
sedly committed by Sevilla is inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless impru-
dence, punished under Art. 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of a public document.
However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence. The foregoing designation implies that reckless impru-dence is not a
crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Art. 365 of the RPC are
distinct and separate crimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of
crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. In
truth, criminal negligence in [the RPC] is treated as a mere quasi-offense, and dealt with separately
from willful offenses. Thus, the proper designation of the felony should be reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents and not falsification of public documents through
reckless imprudence. The rules on variance between allegation and proof are laid down under Secs.
4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and
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proof, a defendant may be convicted of the offense proved when the offense charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved.
There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged against Sevilla and that
proved by the prosecution. Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved then is whether
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is necessarily included in the
intentional felony of falsification of public document under Art. 171(4) of the RPC. While a criminal
negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a
quasi-offense, in [the RPC], it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under
an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the
greater includes the lesser offense.
Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged the intentional
felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable. To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of
falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the
Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.
GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR. vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, LEONARDO B. ROMAN,
ROMEO L. MENDIOLA, PASTOR P. VICHUACO, AURORA J. TIAMBENG, AND NUMERIANO G.
MEDINA
G.R. No. 197567, November 19, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The absence of such allotment not only renders invalid the release of funds therefor but also
taints the legality of the project’s appropriation as well as the Province’s contract with a contractor.
Facts:
Herein petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, Jr., incumbent Provincial Governor of Bataan, before the
Ombudsman, against respondents former Governor Leonardo B. Roman, former Executive Assistant
Romeo L. Mendiola, former Provincial Treasurer Pastor P. Vichuaco, former Budget Officer Aurora J.
Tiambeng, and incumbent Provincial Accountant Numeriano G. Medina (Medina), charging them with
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents under Article 217 in relation
to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of R.A. 3019,
the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also charged were incumbent Provincial Engineer Amelia
R. De Pano, Assistant Provincial Engineer Angelito A. Rodriguez, Engineer Noel G. Jimenez, and
Architect Bernardo T. Capistrano, as well as Noel Valdecanas, the owner and manager of V.F.
Construction.
It was alleged that Roman, being the Provincial Governor at that time, entered into a contract
with V.F. Construction, as represented by Valdecanas, for the construction of a mini-theater at the
Bataan State College - Abucay Campus. As approved with a certification for completion and receipts
issued by V.F. Construction show that it received the payments for the project.
Notwithstanding the various documents attesting to the project’s supposed completion, as

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well as the disbursement of funds in payment therefor, Garcia – Roman’s successor as Governor –
authorized the inspection of the project sometime in August 2004 and discovered that while its
construction was indeed commenced, it remained unfinished.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict De Pano, Rodriguez, Jimenez, and Capistrano
for the crime of Falsification of Public Documents by making it appear through the aforesaid
Certification and Accomplishment Report that the project had already been completed when the
same was only partially constructed. On the other hand, the Ombudsman cleared respondents from
liability on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, reasoning that “mere signature on a voucher or
certification is not enough” to establish any conspiracy among them which would warrant their
conviction.
Dissatisfied, Garcia moved for reconsideration, citing the Commission on Audit’s Audit
Observation Memorandum, which stated that the project had no source of funds, thus rendering the
contract therefor void and the payments made therefor illegal. Still it was denied, thus, the instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing all the criminal
charges against respondents for lack of probable cause?
Ruling:
Yes, the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing charges for lack of probable
cause.
The elements of the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019 are as follows: a) the offender
must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; b) he must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and c) his action
caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Considering the findings contained in the CoA Memo, which the Ombudsman, however,
disregarded, it is quite clear that all the foregoing elements are, in all reasonable likelihood, present
with respect to respondents’ participation in this case.
Respondents, who were all public officers at the time of the alleged commission of the crime
– particularly, as provincial officials of Bataan discharging administrative functions (first element) –
apparently acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith – or, at the very least, gross inexcusable
negligence – when they issued the pertinent documents and certifications that led to the diversion of
public funds to a project that had no proper allotment, i.e., the mini-theater project (second element).
The absence of such allotment not only renders invalid the release of funds therefor but also
taints the legality of the project’s appropriation as well as the Province’s contract with V.F.
Construction.
Considering that the illegal diversion of public funds for the mini-theater project would
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undermine the execution of other projects legitimately supported by proper allotments, it is quite
obvious that undue injury on the part of the Province and its residents would be caused. Likewise,
considering that V.F. Construction had already received full payment for a project that had yet to be
completed, it also appears that a private party was given unwarranted benefits by respondents in the
discharge of their functions (third element).
FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL
RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015, J. Villarama
Falsification of documents under par. 1, Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171 of the RPC refers to
falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. In the case at bar, David made the
untruthful statement in the Miscellaneous Lease Application, a public document, that he is a Filipino
citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. The
MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Art. 172,
par. 1.
Facts:
Renato David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization.

Upon their retirement, David and his wife returned to the Philippines. They purchased a 600-square
meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential
house. However, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is public land and
part of the salvage zone.
David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR. In
the said application, David indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Editha A. Agbay opposed the
application on the ground that David, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a
criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code against the David. Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225 on October 11, 2007.
In his defense, David averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare
himself as a Filipino.
The OCP found a probable cause to indict David for violation of Art. 172 of the RPC and
recommended the filing of the corresponding information in court. David challenged the said
resolution in a petition for review he filed before the DOJ. The CENRO issued an order rejecting
David’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure
the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.
In the meantime, the petition for review filed by David was denied by the DOJ which held that
the presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to warrant
indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or intended to
injure a third person in committing the act of falsification. Consequently, an information for
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Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was issued against
David.
Before his arrest, David filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause in the
MTC. MTC ruled that since the crime for which David was charged was alleged and admitted to have
been committed before he had re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, it does not have jurisdiction
over the person of the accused.
David elevated the case to the RTC, arguing that jurisdiction over the person of an accused
cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the court that issues a
warrant of arrest. He further contended that the MTC disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-
born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under
R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on account of said
naturalization.
Issues:
1. Whether or not David may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a
Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225.
2. Whether or not MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable
cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Ruling:
1. Yes, David was correctly indicted and prosecuted for violating Art. 172 of the RPC.
Falsification of documents under [par. 1, Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171 of the RPC] refers to
falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of falsification of
documents under paragraph 1, Art. 172 of the RPC are:
1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not
take advantage of his official position;
2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC;
and
3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.
David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino
citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen.
Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in
a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine
citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 six months later, the
falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his
dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for
falsification of public document under Art. 172, par. 1.
2. NO, the trial court erred in invoking lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion.
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The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of David as ground for denying
petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest.
However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application
for bail. In Miranda vs. Tuliao, which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court
discussed the distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Thus, in arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their
person was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our
pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago vs. Vasquez:
“The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over
his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a
motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction
there over, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of
bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule
the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.”
The Court’s pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant
where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,
while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.
One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to
quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his
trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody
of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify
that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in
court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
To recapitulate what the Court has discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an
accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the
person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination
of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person.
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Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTC’s order, the RTC correctly ruled that no
grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of merit.
Felix L. Arriola vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 217680, May 30, 2016
Facts: Accused was charged with the crime of 21 counts of falsification of public documents.
During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the offenses being charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The facts as synthesized by the RTC are as follows:
In the year 2002, Gregg Business Agency, a local accounting firm, needed to procure community
tax certificates (CTCs) for twenty one (21) of its clients. It then appeared that Rosalinda Pagapong
(Pagapong), its Liaison Officer, was instructed by the owner to coordinate with a certain "Girlie
Moore" to obtain the same. This was the same "Girlie Moore" who personally visited the accounting
firm on January 17, 2002 to get the names of the clients after receiving a total amount of P38,500.00
to process the CTCs. She promised that she will deliver the CTCs by January 19, 2002.
However, it was only on January 31, 2002, after frequent follow-ups, that Pagapong was able to
obtain from "Girlie Moore" the CTCs. They met at the Inner Court of the Manila City Hall located
at the ground floor. A soon as Pagapong received the CTCs, she proceeded to the Releasing Area of
the Office of the City Treasurer to secure an Order of Payment and presented the CTCs as a
requirement. It was at such instance that, upon verification, the CTCs were found to be fake or
falsified. Pagapong was thereafter subjected to investigation at the Office of the City Treasurer.
At around 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Liberty M. Toledo, then the City Treasurer of
Manila, was apprised of the falsified CTCs with Serial Nos. 15492830 to 15492850 found in the
possession of Pagapong. The CTCs bearing the same serial numbers were counter-checked from
the files of the Office of the City Treasurer and were found to have been actually stamped as
"UNEMPLOYED" under "MANILA, CLASS A - ONLY," having been issued to unemployed residents
of the City of Manila for a fee of P5.00 each. Further verification from the records disclosed that the
CTCs with the same serial numbers were requisitioned by and issued to Felix Arriola, Local Treasury
Operations Officer I of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila. A subsequent inquiry with
Pagapong revealed that the CTCs were obtained from "Girlie Moore." Another verification with the
Department of Public Services (DPS) revealed that the woman who posed as "Girlie Moore" was
actually Ma. Theresa Tabuzo, then employed as Manila Aide I assigned at District 4 of the City of
Manila.
For his defense, accused Felix L. Arriola interposed the defense of denial.
Accused Arriola averred that he is presently employed as Revenue Examiner of the Office of the
City Treasurer of Manila tasked with the duty of computing business taxes and collecting tax
deficiencies. In the course of his employment as such, he denied having known the person of Ma.
Theresa Tabuzo nor of having participated in the falsification of CTCs which specifically implicated
Ma. Theresa Tabuzo.
Page 60 of 519
In the year 2002, he admitted to have occupied the position of an accountable officer who held the
responsibility of requisitioning CTCs. He had five (5) employees then under him who issued the
CTCs to individual taxpayers and it was to them that he gave the CTC booklets for such purpose.
Such booklets were under Class "A" at the cost of P5.00 each. He further averred that after receiving
the amount of P250.00 from each booklet from the collectors, he immediately remitted the same
to the Office of the City Treasurer.
On January 28, 2002, he recounted that Community Tax Certificate No. 15492830 was issued by
Elena Ronquillo as the booklet which contained the same was given to said Elena Ronquillo. The
booklets which were returned to him no longer contained the originals thereof as what was
returned were the duplicate and triplicate copies; hence, he had no control in the issuance of the
originals. From his assessment of the duplicate and triplicate copies of the booklets, he found no
unusual alterations of any portions thereof. When he was thus summoned for questioning by Ms.
Rosalie Reyes, OIC of the Administrative Division, he denied any implication in the issuance of
falsified CTCs. He likewise denied having written the entries in the questioned CTCs. He
endeavored to ask Elena Ronquillo of the purported anomaly but the latter also denied knowledge
of the same. He likewise denied having known Rosalinda Pagapong.
After trial, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged.
Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Held: No, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused is guilty of the
crime charged in the Information.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that every criminal conviction requires the prosecution
to prove two things: (1) the fact of the crime, that the presence of all the elements of the crime with
which the accused stands charged, and (2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the
crime.When a crime is committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can be no conviction even if the
commission of the crime is established. In the case at bench, the State, aside from showing the
existence of the crime of falsification of public document, has the burden of correctly identifying
the author of such crime. Both facts must be proven beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of
the prosecution evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense.
The Supreme Court pored over the entire records of both courts a quo and concluded that Arriola
should be exonerated. Contrary to the findings by the RTC, the circumstantial evidence adduced
by the prosecution failed to evoke the moral certainty that the petitioner was guilty. Clearly, there
is no direct evidence that links Arriola to the commission of the crime.
Moreover, in the instant case, the Supreme Court held that it could be that Arriola had actually
participated in the commission of the crime. The Court, however, cannot convict him when the
circumstantial evidence relied upon by the RTC and subscribed to by the CA is plainly inadequate
and unconvincing. Thus, it cannot be said that the prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond
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reasonable doubt.
xxx And where there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of an accused, he must be
acquitted even though his innocence may be questioned, for it is not sufficient for
the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more
likely to be true than the contrary. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, more than mere
likelihood, requires moral certainty - a certainty that convinces and satisfies the
reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it.
CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSELITO BERAN y ZAPANTA

G.R. No. 203028, January 15, 2014
J. Reyes
When the accused is arrested through a buy-bust operation and prosecution did not bother to
offer an explanation for why an inventory and photograph of the seized evidence was not made either
in the place of seizure and arrest or at the police station, as required by the Implementing Rules in
case of warrantless arrests, or why the marking of the seized item was not made at the place of seizure
in the presence of the accused.
It is well-settled that in the prosecution of cases involving the illegal sale or illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, the evidence of the corpus delicti which is the dangerous drug itself, must be
independently established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime
must be established, and the chain of custody requirement under R.A. No. 9165 performs this function
in buy-bust operations as it ensures that any doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.
Facts:
A confidential informant (CI) reported to the District Anti-Illegal Drug (DAID) Office of the
Western Police District (WPD) at the United Nations Avenue, Manila, and approached Police
Officer 3 (PO3) Rodolfo Enderina (Enderina) to report that a certain Joselito Beran, alias "Jose," a
pedicab driver, was selling prohibited drugs, particularly "shabu," in the vicinity of San Antonio
Street in Tondo, Manila. P03 Enderina relayed the information to Police Colonel Marcelino Pedroso,
Chief of DAID-WPD, who then ordered him to form a buy-bust team to apprehend the suspect.
The buy-bust team, composed of PO3 Enderina, PO3 Hipolito Francia, PO3 Benito Decorion
(Decorion), PO2 Ernie Reyes, PO2 Alexander Delos Santos (Delos Santos) and PO3 Knowme Sia
(Sia), who was to act as the poseur-buyer, arrived in Tondo.
After the consummation of the buy-bust sale of shabu, the accused have been placed under arrest.
The buy-bust team brought Beran to the DAID-WPD office, where PO3 Sia marked the confiscated
plastic sachet with the initials of Beran, JB. He also recorded the incident in the police blotter, and
accomplished the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report.
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In his defense, Beran vehemently denied the above incident, asserting that he was only resting at
his house when the policemen arrived and arrested him, bring him to WPD headquarter. He further
claimed that two of his arrestors, PO3 Francia and PO3 Sia, demanded from him the amount of Php
20,000.00 in exchange for his release without any charge. But he could not produce the amount
they asked, and they trumped up a charge against him of illegal sale of shabu.
The prosecution was able to present two witnesses, PO3 Francia and PO3 Sia, but only PO3 Sia gave
a witness account of the drug buy-bust itself. PO3 Francia admitted that he served as a mere look-
out to prevent any intruder from interfering in the buy-bust operation, and that he did not witness
the buy-bust transaction itself.
RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution, finding Beran guilty of violating Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165.
CA affirmed the ruling in toto. Thus, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether the accused is guilty despite the prosecution’s failure to establish the identity of the
prohibited drug.
Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused despite the police officer’s non-
compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165.
Ruling:
The petition is granted.
In People v. Dela Rosa, SC ruled that the prosecution must establish by records or testimony the
continuous whereabouts of the exhibit, from the time it came into the possession of the police
officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, and all the way to the
time it is offered in evidence. In the instant case, from the testimony of PO3 Sia it is clear that the
apprehending operatives did not, immediately after seizure and confiscation of the illegal item,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused, his representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and an elected public
official, notwithstanding that they were supposed to have been conducting a planned sting
operation. Indeed, it is not gratuitous to state that they took no efforts whatsoever to observe even
a modicum of the above procedures. Worse, the prosecution did not bother to explain why they
failed to observe them, although they knew these procedures were intended to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the item seized.
Moreover, none of the other witnesses of the prosecution could corroborate the culpatory narrative
of PO3 Sia at any of its material points to create the successive links in the custody of the seized
drug. Of the six-man buy-bust team, only PO3 Sia and PO3 Francia testified in court, and PO3
Francia himself twice stated that he did not witness the actual buy-bust sale as it was taking-place.
Lapses in the strict compliance with the requirements of

Page 63 of 519
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 must be explained in terms of

their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value
of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.
The concern with narrowing the window of opportunity for tampering with evidence found
legislative expression in Section 21(1) of RA 9165 on the inventory of seized dangerous drugs and
paraphernalia by putting in place a three-tiered requirement on the time, witnesses, and proof of
inventory by imposing on the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
the duty to "immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof." Although RA 9165 is silent on the effect of non-compliance
with Section 21(1), its implementing guidelines provide that "non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items." We have interpreted this provision to mean
that the prosecution bears the burden of proving "justifiable cause" (People v. Sanchez, id.; People
v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, 25 February 2009, 580 SCRA 259).
In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer an explanation for why an inventory
and photograph of the seized evidence was not made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at
the police station, as required by the Implementing Rules in case of warrantless arrests, or why the
marking of the seized item was not made at the place of seizure in the presence of Beran. Indeed,
the very identity of the subject shabu cannot be established with certainty by the testimony alone
of PO3 Sia since the rules insist upon independent proof of its identity, such as the immediate
marking thereof upon seizure. And as we already noted, PO3 Sia claimed that he personally
transported the shabu to the WPD station, yet other than his lone testimony there is no other
evidence of his exclusive and uninterrupted custody during the interval from seizure and
transportation to turn over at the WPD. Then, the record shows that PO3 Sia submitted the sachet
of shabu for laboratory examination only the next day, and therefore presumably he retained
custody of the subject sachet overnight. In view of his self-serving admission that he marked the
sachet only at the precinct, but without anyone present, along with his lack of mention of the
laboratory technician or officer who received the sachet from him, the charge that the subject drug
may have been tampered with or substituted is inevitable.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN

G.R. No. 200304, January 15, 2014
J. Leonardo-de Castro
Where the accused is charged of illegal possession of prohibited drugs and now questioning
the legality of his arrest as the same was done without a valid search warrant and warrant of arrest,
the Court ruled that the accused was caught in flagrante delicto and had reiterated that warrantless
searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search
of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches,
Page 64 of 519
(5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes
a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a
valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest
in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
Facts:
Donald Vasquez (Don), claiming that he was an employee of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), was arrested, together with Reynar Siscar, through a buy-bust operation of the Philippine
National Police. The police found six plastic bags of shabu seized during the buy-bust operation
contained in a self-sealing plastic envelope placed inside a brown envelope. When the brown
envelope was confiscated from Don, the police put her initials "JSF" therein and signed it. The police
also noticed that there were markings on the envelope that read "DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y
Sunga" but the police did not bother to check out what they were for or who made them. When
they interrogated Don about the brown envelope, they found out that the same was submitted as
evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory. The police also testified that after the appellant was arrested,
they conducted a body search on the two suspects. The search yielded 12 more plastic sachets of
drugs from the appellant which vary in sizes and were contained in a white envelope and marked
each of the 12 sachets with his initials "CVT" and the date. The police officers then informed the
suspects of their rights and they proceeded to the police headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Don denied all the allegations of the prosecution stating that the drug specimen was obtained from
him through force when the police entered his house and searched his room, picking up what they
could get. One of the police opened a cabinet and got drug specimens in [Donald’s] possession in
relation to his work as a laboratory aide; from two (2) cases and marked as DD-93-1303 owned by
Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392 owned by SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug specimen contained
in the envelope marked as DD-93-1303 was intended for presentation on 3 April 1998. Aside from
the drug specimens, the policemen also took his jewelry, a VHS player, and his wallet
containing P2,530.00.
Issues:
Whether the search and arrest of the accused is illegal.
Whether the accused is not guilty of violating Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425 (as amended) as
he has the authority to possess the drugs.
Ruling:
The petition is denied.
The Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in
People v. Tampis that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made
before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the
information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning
the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial
Page 65 of 519
court’s jurisdiction." Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His
arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity
of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs
from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in People v. Cabugatan that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and
such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest,
for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of
arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
As to the authority of his possession of illegal drugs
To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following
elements should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
In the case at bar, the testimonies of the police officers established that a buy-bust operation was
legitimately carried out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to entrap the appellant. The police/poseur-
buyer, positively identified the appellant as the one who sold to her six plastic bags of shabu that
were contained in a big brown envelope for the price of P250,000.00. She likewise identified the six
plastic bags of shabu, which contained the markings she placed thereon after the same were seized
from the appellant. When subjected to laboratory examination, the white crystalline powder
contained in the plastic bags tested positive for shabu. SC finds that the police’s testimony on the
events that transpired during the conduct of the buy-bust operation was detailed and
straightforward. It was also consistent and unwavering in her narration even in the face of the
opposing counsel’s cross-examination.
The records of this case are also silent as to any measures undertaken by the appellant to criminally
or administratively charge the police officers herein for falsely framing him up for selling and
possessing illegal drugs. Being a regular employee of the NBI, the appellant could have easily sought
the help of his immediate supervisors and/or the chief of his office to extricate him from his
predicament. Instead, what the appellant offered in evidence were mere photocopies of documents
that supposedly showed that he was authorized to keep drug specimens in his custody. That the
original documents and the testimonies of the signatories thereof were not at all presented in court
did nothing to help the appellant’s case. To the mind of the Court, the evidence offered by the
appellant failed to persuade amid the positive and categorical testimonies of the arresting officers
that the appellant was caught red-handed selling and possessing a considerable amount of
prohibited drugs on the night of the buy-bust operation.
Page 66 of 519
LITO LOPEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 188653, January 29, 2014
J. PEREZ
In cases of seizures of prohibited drugs, where the police had conflicting testimonies and lack
of evidence leading to a reasonable conclusion that no markings were actually made on the seized
items. The Court held the accused not guilty stating that marking after seizure is the starting point
in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked because
succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence
serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from
the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed at the end of criminal proceedings,
obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.
Facts:
On July 13, 2000, with the authority of a search warrant, the police, together with three (3) barangay
officials, went to the house of Lito Lopez (Lopez), the accused, and presented the search warrant
to him. He eventually relented to the conduct of search. The police officers was able to seize a piece
of folded paper containing four (4) 1/4 x 1/2 inch transparent plastic packets of white powder, two
(2) 2x1-1/2 inch plastic sachets containing white powder, and a crystal-like stone measuring 2 inches
in contoured diameter concealed in the kitchen, two (2) 2x1-1/2 inch plastic sachets containing
white powder in the bathroom, one (1) 1/4 x 1/2 inch plastic packet containing suspected residue of
shabu inside the master’s bedroom and one (1) 1x1-1/2 inch plastic sachet containing suspected
residue of shabu, four aluminum rolls, and a piece of paper partly burned at one end. Barangay
officials witnessed the conduct by the policemen of the search in the petitioner’s house. After the
search, the seized items were photographed and a seizure receipt, properly acknowledged by Lopez,
was issued. Lopez was then brought to the police station while the seized plastic sachets were
brought by the Chief of Police to the Legazpi City Crime Laboratory for examination.
Testifying on his own behalf, petitioner denied the allegations stating that on 31 July 2000, more
than ten (10) policemen barged into his house and stating that they were not able to witness the
search because they were made to sit in the living room. Furthermore, Lito also claimed that the
barangay officials did not accompany the policemen in the search inside the kitchen and bedroom
and that he refused to sign the seizure papers.
RTC convicted petitioner of the charge of illegal possession of shabu in violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the accused is guilty as the identity and integrity seized items were not proven beyond
reasonable doubt
Ruling:
Page 67 of 519
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized
contraband is immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused
until they are disposed at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence.
As already stated, it is the unique characteristic of dangerous and illegal drugs which renders
imperative strict compliance with the prescribed measures to be observed during and after the
seizure of dangerous drugs and related paraphernalia, during the custody and transfer thereof for
examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court.
The conflicting testimonies of the police officers and lack of evidence lead to a reasonable
conclusion that no markings were actually made on the seized items. It is also worth mentioning
that the photographs which the prosecution witnesses claim to have been taken after the seizure
do not appear on the records nor were they presented or offered as evidence.
A substantial gap in the chain of custody renders the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti
dubious.
There were indeed substantial gaps in the chain of custody from the initial stage with the apparent
lack of markings. Upon confiscation of the shabu, the prosecution witnesses never recounted which
police officer had initial control and custody upon their confiscation and while in transit. At the
police station, nobody witnessed if and how the seized items were marked. SPO4 Bognalos alleged
that it was the Chief of Police who forwarded the seized sachets to the crime laboratory, while PO3
Telado intimated that it was the investigator who turned them over to the crime laboratory. Their
records were likewise bereft of any detail as to who exercised custody and possession of the seized
items after their chemical examination and before they were offered as evidence in court. All these
weak links in the chain of custody significantly affected the integrity of the items seized, which in
turn, created a reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSELITO MORATE Y TARNATE

G.R. No. 201156, January 29, 2014
J. LEONARDO–DE CASTRO
The accused, arrested through a buy-bust operation of the police, is questioning the non–
compliance with the rule on chain of custody of seized illegal drugs but the accused only raised such
objection on appeal at the CA. SC ruled that objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form
of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
Facts:
On April 2006, the Philippine National Police in Tabaco City received a confidential information
that “Palito” of Cormidal, Tabaco City is engaged in the illegal sale of marijuana. Upon
investigation, it was later on confirmed that “Palito”, the accused–appellant Joselito Morate, is
Page 68 of 519
indeed involved in the sale of illegal drugs. The police officers, then planned for the buy-bust
operation with PO1 Manamtam designated as poseur-buyer.
Morate was then arrested through the buy-bust operation and was brought to the police station.
Upon arrival at the police station, the items confiscated during the buy–bust were counted, marked
and inventoried. The marking and inventory of the seized items were witnessed by Barangay
Kagawad Julio Marbella of Cormidal, Tabaco City and Emmanuel Cea III, a local newsman, both of
whom signed the Certification of Inventory. The seized items were all transferred to PO3 Eva as
the evidence custodian.
PO3 Eva thereafter prepared a Receipt of Seized Evidence/Property before handing the seized items
to PO1 Reynaldo Borromeo who signed the receipt upon taking hold of the items. PO1 Borromeo
proceeded to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Legazpi City bringing with him the seized items and a
Request for Laboratory Examination. The seized items were received by the PNP Crime Laboratory
in Legazpi City where PSInsp. Josephine Macura Clemen, a forensic chemist, examined them.
PSInsp. Clemen subsequently presented the seized drugs to the trial court as the prosecution’s
evidence in the course of her testimony.
The lower court finds the accused, Joselito Morate, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 5 of Art. II of R.A. 9165 and Section 11, Art. II of the same law. Morate appealed his case to
the Court of Appeals questioning the non–compliance with the rule on chain of custody of seized
illegal drugs. CA rejected the contentions of Morate and denied his appeal. Hence, the petition of
Morate.
Issue:
Whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt despite the prosecution’s non–compliance
with the chain of custody requirement under Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165.
Ruling:
This Court denies Morate’s appeal.
It must be emphasized that accused–appellant’s defense of alleged non–compliance with Section

21 of Republic Act No. 9165 was raised belatedly and for the first time on appeal. Failure to raise
the issue of non–observance of the chain of custody requirement during trial is fatal to the case of
the accused–appellant. As explained in People v. Sta. Maria:
The law excuses non–compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable
grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy–bust operation in this case from
complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during
trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers’ alleged
violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial
court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least
intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that
affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the
Page 69 of 519
first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must
so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for
the first time on appeal.
In this case, the accused–appellant never questioned the chain of custody during trial. Specifically,
the records show that the accused–appellant never assailed the propriety and regularity of the
process of marking and inventory of the seized items during the prosecution’s presentation of
evidence on that matter during the testimony of PO1 Manamtam. Also, when the prosecution
formally offered the Certification of Inventory as evidence for the purpose of proving “the
immediate and accurate inventory, marking and packing of the purchased and the seized marijuana
to maintain and preserve [their] identities and integrity” and the four sachets of marijuana as
evidence for the purpose of proving “the identities and integrity of the purchased and the seized
marijuana as those were immediately inventoried, marked and documented/recorded,” the
accused–appellant’s comment was simply “Denied as to the purposes for which they are being
offered for being self[–]serving pieces of evidence” and said nothing about non–compliance with
the chain of custody requirement.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES vs.GLENN SALVADOR y BAL VERDE, and DORY ANN
PARCON y DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 190621, February 10, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
In case of illicit sale of dangerous drugs, the accused contends that the marking of the seized
sachets of shabu should have been made in his presence while at the scene of the crime instead of in
the police station. The Court ruled on the contrary stating that it is clear from the earlier cited Sec.
21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 that in a buy-bust situation, the marking
of the dangerous drug may be done in the presence of the violator in the nearest police station or the
nearest office of the apprehending team. Appellant should not confuse buy-bust situation from search
and seizure conducted by virtue of a court-issued warrant. It is in the latter case that physical
inventory (which includes the marking) is made at the place where the search warrant is served.
Nonetheless, “non-compliance with [the] requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.”
Facts:
On Septermber 2, 2003, while PO2 Soriano was on duty in Police Station 2, Baler Street, Quezon
City, a confidential informant (CI) reported that a certain alias Bumski was engaged in the illicit
sale of dangerous drugs in Barangay Pag-asa, Quezon City. PO2 Soriano immediately relayed this
information to Police Chief Inspector Joseph De Vera (P/C Insp. De Vera). A surveillance operation
conducted the same day on alias Bumski, who turned out to be the Glenn Salvador (appellant),
confirmed the report. Thus, a police team was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation. During the
buy-bust operation, Dory Ann Parcon arrived and asked appellant for shabu. Appellant gave her a
small heat-sealed plastic sachet that she placed in her coin purse. Thereafter, the poseur-buyer
handed the buy-bust money and the appellant handed the former heat-sealed plastic sachet
Page 70 of 519
containing white crystalline substance. Appellant was immediately arrested after the exchange of
the drugs and marked money.
Appellant and Parcon were then taken to the Baler Police Station. The items recovered during the
buy-bust operation were marked by PO2 Soriano as "SJ-03" and "AP-03" and turned over to the
designated investigator, PO1 Vicente Calatay (PO1 Calatay). PO1 Calatay then prepared a letter-
request for laboratory examination, which, together with the confiscated specimen, was brought by
PO2 Soriano to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Appellant denied the claims of prosecution and denied knowing Parcon and the arresting officers
and claimed that he saw Parcon for the first time during the inquest and the arresting officers when
they arrested him.
The RTC held that the evidence adduced by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of appellant of a violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 and Parcon violation of Sec. 11, Art.
II of the same act. Appellant’s appeal to the CA was dismissed, hence the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether the buy-bust team failed to comply with Sec. 21 of RA 9165.
Ruling:
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical
inventory and photographed the objects confiscated does not ipso facto result in the unlawful arrest
of the accused or render inadmissible in evidence the items seized. This is due to the proviso added
in the implementing rules stating that it must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds
and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have not been preserved. "What
is crucial is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved for they will
be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."
"The integrity and evidentiary value of seized items are properly preserved for as long as the chain
of custody of the same are duly established.” “‘Chain of Custody’ means the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court. Such record of movements
and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who had temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody was made in the course
of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.”
There are links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, namely:
“first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
Page 71 of 519
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and, fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.”
In this case, the prosecution established clearly the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated shabu. There is no evidence that PO2 Soriano lost possession and control of the seized
shabu from the time it was recovered from the appellant until its turnover to the police station. He
marked the seized item immediately upon arrival at the police station. He turned it over to PO1
Calatay, the investigating officer, who prepared the letter request for the laboratory examination of
the contents of the plastic sachets. These facts were admitted by the appellant.
On the same day, PO2 Soriano personally brought the letter request and specimens to the PNP
Crime Laboratory where they were received by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Arban who conducted the
examination on the specimens submitted. During the pre-trial conference, appellant admitted the
purpose for which P/Insp. Arban’s testimony was being offered. The marked sachet of shabu and
the marked money used in purchasing the same were both presented in evidence.
Appellant’s contention that the marking of the seized sachets of shabu should have been made in
his presence while at the scene of the crime instead of in the police station fails to impress. It is
clear from the earlier cited Sec. 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 that in
a buy-bust situation, the marking of the dangerous drug may be done in the presence of the violator
in the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending team. Appellant should not
confuse buy-bust situation from search and seizure conducted by virtue of a court-issued warrant.
It is in the latter case that physical inventory (which includes the marking) is made at the place
where the search warrant is served. Nonetheless, "non-compliance with [the] requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE ROM

G.R. NO. 198452. FEBRUARY 19, 2014
J. PEREZ
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following essential
elements must be duly established: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the illicit
drug to the poseur-buyer, as well as the receipt of the marked money by the seller, successfully
consummates the buy-bust transaction. Hence, what is material is the proof that the transaction or
sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
Facts:
In three separate Informations all dated 1 September 2000, the appellant was charged with violation
of Sections 15, 15-A and 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended for illegal sale of shabu,
maintenance of a drug den and illegal possession of shabu in a buy-bust transaction. In the case at
bench, the prosecution was able to establish the above-enumerated elements beyond moral
certainty. The prosecution witnesses adequately proved that a buy-bust operation actually took
place on which occasion the appellant was caught red-handed giving one heat-sealed plastic packet
Page 72 of 519
containing white crystalline substance to PO2 Martinez, the poseur-buyer, in exchange for P100.00.
PO2 Martinez, being the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant in open court to be the
same person who sold to him the said one-heat sealed plastic packet of white crystalline substance
for a consideration of P100.00, which when examined was confirmed to be methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
RTC – convicted accused
CA- affirmed RTC
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following essential
elements must be duly established: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the
illicit drug to the poseur-buyer, as well as the receipt of the marked money by the seller, successfully
consummates the buy-bust transaction. Hence, what is material is the proof that the transaction or
sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
Evidently, the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the appellant’s guilt for the
offense of illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.

vs. HERMANOS CONSTANTINO, JR. Y BINAYUG, A.K.A. "JOJIT"
G.R. NO. 199689. MARCH 12, 2014
J. LEONARDO- DE CASTRO
Facts:
On January 20, 2005, Police Superintendent Mariano Rodriguez (Rodriquez), the Chief of Police of
Tuguegarao City, received a report from a confidential informant (CI) that a certain Jojit was selling
illegal drugs in the said city; a buy-bust operation was immediately formed wherein PO3 Domingo
(Domingo) was designated as poseur-buyer. Around 8:00 in the evening of the same day, the team
proceeded to Reynovilla the place where, according to the CI, Jojit was selling shabu. During the
buy-bust operation, the respondent was arrested for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165. The
defense of the respondent is that it was a set-up by the police officers and that the chain of custody
was not established; that when PO3 Domingo, as poseur-buyer, received two plastic sachets of
shabu from Constantino in exchange for P1,000, PO3 Domingo himself did not put any markings
on the two plastic sachets of shabu. That instead, upon arrival of the buy-bust team with
Constantino at the police station, PO3 Domingo turned over the two plastic sachets of shabu to the
investigator, SPO2 Tamang, who was also a member of the buy-bust team. PO3 Domingo testified
that it was SPO2 Tamang who put the marking "NBT" on the said sachets of shabu.
Page 73 of 519
Issue:
Whether or not accused is proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
Jojit is acquitted. Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous
drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking
upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will
use as reference point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to separate the marked
evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the
accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting" or
contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the
integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires.
Herein, the prosecution is completely silent as to why PO3 Domingo, the poseur-buyer, despite
having immediate custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu purchased from Constantino, failed
to immediately mark the seized drugs before turning over the custody of the same to another police
officer. This lapse in procedure opened the door for confusion and doubt as to the identity of the
drugs actually seized from Constantino during the buy-bust and the ones presented before the trial
court, especially considering that three different people, during the interval, supposedly received
and marked the same. To clarify the matter, the prosecution could have presented as witness either
SPO2 Tamang or SPO2 Taguiam to directly validate the marking in court, but unfortunately, the
prosecution chose to dispense with the testimonies of both officers. This omission diminished the
importance of the markings as the reference point for the subsequent handling of the evidence. As
a consequence, an objective person could now justifiably suspect the shabu ultimately presented as
evidence in court to be planted or contaminated.
The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is fatal to its case as the
Court can no longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FREDDIE LADIP Y RUBIO

G.R. NO. 196146, March 12, 2014
J. Perez
The prosecution witnesses should give credence to the narration of the incident especially
when they are police officers that are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner,
unless there is evidence to the contrary. Thus, when the defense fails to show any ill motive on the
part of the police officers, the presumption of that the police officer performed his duties in a regular
manner should prevail.
Hence, there the poseur-buyer, a police officer, himself testified that there was an actual
exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug, it follows that the accused was fully aware
that what he was selling was illegal and prohibited. Such testimony should provide a great weight for
the prosecution.
Facts:
Page 74 of 519
In the morning of December 7, 2006, a male confidential informant came to the station and
provided PO2 Zamora, PO1 Almario, and PO2 Salas, at the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) -
Station Operation Task Group with the information that a certain Freddie Ladip was selling illegal
drugs. Consequently, a buy-bust operation was conducted on the same day whereupon the accused
was arrested for selling methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
As narrated during the trial, PO1 Sibal, who acted as poseur-buyer, and the informant went to a
house located in the abovementioned area around 1 o’clock in the afternoon of December 7, 2006,
wherein the accused was already waiting for them outside the said house. The informant
introduced PO1 Sibal to the accused as a buyer of shabu. Accused immediately inquired as to the
quantity of shabu that he intends to purchase by asking, “magkano?” PO1 Sibal replied that he
wanted to buy P300.00 worth of shabu. Accused then asked for the payment, for which PO1 Sibal
readily gave him the marked money consisting of three 100-peso bills. In return, accused handed
to PO1 Sibal a transparent heat-sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline granules. Upon
the exchange and conveyance of shabu and the marked money having been completed, PO1 Sibal
gave the pre-arranged signal by removing the cap from his head to signify to his back-up team,
strategically stationed near the scene of the crime, that the transaction was consummated.
Afterwards, the team arrested the accused.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (for drug pushing). He appealed to the CA
but the appellate court affirmed the RTC in toto. Hence, this case.
Issue:
Whether the accused is guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
Ruling:
It has been consistently ruled that for the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal
sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1)
the identity of the buyer and seller, object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor. In other words, there is a need to establish beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused actually sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and that the former
indeed knew that what he had sold and delivered to the latter was a prohibited drug.
Contrary to the claim of accused, the prosecution was able to clearly recount how the buy-bust
operation was conducted, and the eventual submission of the subject sachet of shabu as part of its
evidence.
The prosecution indeed established that there was a buy-bust operation conducted, showing that
accused sold and delivered the shabu for P300.00 to PO1 Sibal, the poseur-buyer. PO1 Sibal himself
testified that there was an actual exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug.
Certainly, accused was fully aware that what he was selling was illegal and prohibited. Thereafter,
the corpus delicti or the subject drug was seized, marked, and subsequently identified as a
prohibited drug.
Page 75 of 519
Also, it is a well-entrenched principle that findings of fact of the trial court as to the credibility of
witnesses are accorded great weight and respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of
facts, and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.
The rationale behind this rule is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility
of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during trial. This rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are
sustained by the Court of Appeals. This Court does not find any convincing reason to depart from
the ruling of the trial court, which was affirmed by the appellate court. Thus, we affirm the assailed
Decision of the appellate court and uphold the conviction of the accused.
BARRY LANIER AND PERLITA LANIER vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 189176, March 19, 2014
J. Perez
When the Secretary of Justice concluded that there was planting of evidence based on the lone
fact that the raiding team arrived ahead of the search team, he, in effect went into the merits of the
defense. Such is no longer the duty of the Secretary of Justice. His duty involves the finding of whether
there is probable cause to charge a party of a crime.
Where the court has established that the presence elements of the crime of illegal possession
of drugs by evidence, such is a sufficient ground to establish a well-founded belief that the crime of
illegal possession of drugs has been committed. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the court
is not bound by a resolution of the DOJ regarding the presence of probable cause, but is required to
evaluate the evidence before proceeding farther with the trial. While the Secretary's ruling is
persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
Facts:
SPO1 Juan Gorion (SPO1 Gorion) and PO2 Noemi Remaneses (PO2 Remaneses) narrated that on 17
December 2003, police operatives proceeded to the house of petitioners to serve the search warrant
obtained after the police operatives conducted a test-buy at petitioners’ residence where they were
able to purchase P5,000.00 worth of shabu and P1,000.00 worth of marijuana from petitioners. After
presentment of the warrant, the police operatives, in the presence of the Barangay Captain and
some members of the media, conducted the search. In the living room in the second floor, they
recovered three (3) sachets of shabu weighing 10.4 grams more or less, inside a jewelry box. They
also found one big pack containing dried marijuana leaves weighing 950 grams and two gift packs
containing 9 bricks of marijuana with an aggregate weight of 800 grams. SPO1 Nathaniel Tan
prepared a Receipt for Property Seized, but petitioners refused to sign the same. Thereafter,
petitioners were placed under arrest.
Petitioners filed a petition for review before the DOJ assailing the Resolution of the provincial
prosecutor filing an Information charging petitioners of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. The
Secretary of Justice acted on the petition favorably and directed the withdrawal of the Information,
which the provincial prosecutor followed by filing a Motion to Withdraw Information before the
trial court. The trial court granted the Motion to Withdraw Information.
Page 76 of 519
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
seeking to annul the DOJ Resolutions directing the withdrawal of the Information against
petitioners and the RTC’s Order granting the Motion to Withdraw filed by the provincial
prosecutor.
The Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the DOJ Resolutions and the RTC Order and reinstated
the Information against petitioners.
In the main, the appellate court found that there is probable cause to sustain petitioners’
indictment. Petitioners elevated the case to this Court seeking the reversal of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals and consequently, the withdrawal of the Information for illegal possession of
prohibited drugs filed against them.
Issue:
Whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal complaint against the petitioners
Ruling:
As a requisite to the filing of a criminal complaint, probable cause pertains to facts and
circumstances sufficient to incite a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof. Only such facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against
the respondent are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of
guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a
conviction. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should
be held for trial.
The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item
or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
The presence of these elements was attested to by evidence such as the Joint Affidavit of Arrest and
the Receipt of the Properties seized. The police officers averred that they recovered 3 sachets of
shabu weighing 10.4 grams inside a jewelry box on petitioners’ living room. They also seized one (1)
big gift pack containing dried marijuana leaves weighing more or less 950 grams and two (2) gift
packs containing nine (9) bricks of dried marijuana leaves weighing 800 grams on top of the head
board of petitioners’ bed. Moreover, the finding of a dangerous drug in the house or within the
premises of the house of the accused is prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
When the Secretary of Justice concluded that there was planting of evidence based on the lone fact
that the raiding team arrived ahead of the search team, he, in effect went into the merits of the
defense. When he made a determination based on his own appreciation of the pieces of evidence
for and against the accused, he effectively assumed the function of a trial judge in the evaluation of
the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction.
When confronted with a motion to withdraw Information on the ground of lack of probable cause
based on a resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an
Page 77 of 519
independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case,
the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding
farther with the trial. While the Secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL APLAT Y SUBLINO AND JACKSON DANGLAY Y
BOTIL, MANUEL APLAT Y SUBLINO,
G.R. No. 191727, March 31, 2014
J. Del Castillo
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. Thus, even
in a case where an informant acts as a broker or agent between the poseur-buyer police officer and
the accused, as long as the poseur-buyer police officer went through the operation as a buyer and his
offer was accepted by appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former, the crime is
considered consummated by the delivery of the goods.
Facts:
At around 3:00 p.m. of April 12, 2006, SPO4 Edelfonso L. Sison (SPO4 Sison), while on duty at the
Baguio City Police Office Drug Enforcement Section,[4] received information from a civilian
informant that his acquaintance named “Manuel” was looking for a prospective buyer of dried
marijuana leaves. Forthwith, SPO4 Sison instructed the informant to get in touch with Manuel and
accept the latter’s offer. The informant acceded and shortly thereafter returned to tell SPO4 Sison
that Manuel accepted the offer to buy and that the sale would take place between 4:30 to 5:00 p.m.
of the same day in front of JR Bakery along Kayang corner Hilltop Streets, Baguio City.
SPO4 Sison immediately relayed the information to his superior, Police Senior Inspector Damian
Dulnuan Olsim (P/Sr. Insp. Olsim), who, acting on the same, organized a buy-bust team for
Manuel’s entrapmen. The team was composed of SPO4 Sison as team leader, PO3 Philip R. Fines
(PO3 Fines) as poseur-buyer, with PO3 Robert Sagmayao (PO3 Sagmayao) and PO2 Roy C. Mateo
(PO2 Mateo) as back-ups. PO3 Fines was provided with one P1,000.00 bill and one P500.00 bill as
buy-bust money. He photocopied the bills and had them authenticated by Prosecutor Victor Dizon
and then coordinated the operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.
Accompanied by the informant, the team proceeded to the target area, which is only about 50
meters away from their office. Upon arrival thereat at about 4:30 p.m., PO3 Fines and the informant
posted themselves at the terminal of Sablan-bound passenger jeepneys, just across JR Bakery.
Simultaneously, the rest of the team members took strategic positions at the loading area of the
jeepneys bound for Plaza Quezon Hill where they would wait for the pre-arranged signal from the
poseur-buyer. Not long thereafter, two men, one with a sando plastic bag, arrived from Upper
Kayang. Manuel, who turned out to be the appellant, approached the informant and asked where
the buyer was. The informant pointed to PO3 Fines and introduced him as the prospective buyer.
After a brief conversation, appellant demanded the payment from PO3 Fines who immediately
handed to him the marked money. Upon receipt, appellant in turn took an item wrapped in a
newspaper from the sando bag held by his companion, later identified as Danglay, and gave the
same to PO3 Fines. PO3 Fines smelled and assessed the item and once convinced that it was a brick
Page 78 of 519
of marijuana leaves, tapped appellant’s shoulder as a signal to his companions that the sale was
already consummated. With the brick in hand, PO3 Fines then introduced himself as a police
officer and with the aid of SPO4 Sison arrested appellant. Danglay, on the other hand, was arrested
by PO3 Sagmayao and, when frisked by the latter, was found possessing 1½ bricks of suspected
marijuana.[6] After appellant and Danglay were apprised of their violation and constitutional
rights, the team brought them to the police station.
At the police station, PO3 Fines marked the suspected marijuana brick he bought from appellant
with “PRF, 04-12-06, BB” representing his initials, date of operation and the word buy-bust. PO3
Sagmayao, on the other hand, marked the confiscated bricks from Danglay with “RPS, 04-12-06.”
They likewise placed their signatures on the sando plastic bag. Appellant and Danglay were also
identified at the police station and the suspected dried marijuana leaves inventoried[7] and
photographed[8] in their presence as well as of the representatives from the Department of Justice
(DOJ), the media and an elected barangay official. After a preliminary test on the bricks were made
at their office, PO2 Mateo brought on the same day the confiscated items to the Regional Crime
Laboratory at Camp Baldo Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for chemistry examination per request of
P/Sr. Insp. Olsim.[9] Forensic Chemist Officer P/Sr. Insp. Emilia Gracio Montes[10] then examined
the bricks and found them positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
They were charged and later on convicted by the RTC. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court
affirmed the RTC.
Issue:
Whether appellant’s guilt for the illegal sale of marijuana, a dangerous drug, was proven beyond
reasonable doubt
Ruling:
While it may be true that it was the informant who brokered the transaction, appellant and the
poseur-buyer talked to each other after the informant introduced to appellant PO3 Fines as the
prospective buyer. As testified to by PO3 Fines, appellant demanded the money from him after
their brief conversation. And upon receipt of the item from appellant, he immediately smelled and
assessed the contents of the wrapped item and found the same to be a brick of marijuana.
“In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that the
transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence;
and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.”[19] “The commission of the offense of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens
the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. Settled is the rule that as long as the police
officer went through the operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted by appellant and the
dangerous drugs delivered to the former, the crime is considered consummated by the delivery of
the goods.
In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that a sale of one brick of marijuana for P1,500.00
took place between PO3 Fines, as buyer, and appellant as seller. The brick of marijuana was
presented before the trial court as Exhibit “O.” PO3 Fines positively identified appellant as the
seller. It is, therefore, beyond doubt that a buy-bust operation involving the illegal sale of marijuana,
Page 79 of 519
a dangerous drug, actually took place. Moreover, such buy-bust operation, in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary and based on the facts obtaining in this case, was regularly carried out by
the police operatives.
“A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.” In this
regard, police authorities are given a wide discretion in the selection of effective means to
apprehend drug dealers and the Court is hesitant to establish on a priori basis what detailed acts
they might credibly undertake in their entrapment operations for there is no prescribed method on
how the operation is to be conducted. As ruled in People v. Salazar, a buy-bust operation deserves
judicial sanction as long as it is carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards,
such as in this case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCO ALEJANDRO

G.R. No. 205227, April 7, 2014, J. Villarama Jr.
Firmly established in our jurisprudence is the rule that in the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, the following essential elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took
place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and
seller were identified. Implicit in all these is the need for proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the confiscated prohibited or regulated drug as evidence.
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the
concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
Facts:
Confidential Informant (CI) went to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
Regional Office 4A (CALABARZON) at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba City, Laguna. The CI informed
Regional Director that he was able to set up a deal with a certain “Aida” who directed him to look for
a buyer of 100 grams of shabu for the price of P360, 000.
Immediately, Police Chief Inspector Bargamento organized the team composed of eleven
police officers and made the proper coordination with PDEA. During the briefing, SPO1 Cariaso was
designated as poseur-buyer while SPO1 Platon will be his back- up arresting officer. Four pieces of
five hundred peso (P500) bills were then prepared and marked by SPO1 Cariaso. Prior to these
preparations, the CI had contacted “Aida” through her cell phone and arranged the 2:00 p.m.
meeting/sale transaction the following day.
The next day, at around 12:00 noon, the team accompanied by the CI boarded two service
vehicles and proceeded to the target area. As agreed during the briefing, SPO1 Platon positioned
himself in a spot where he could see SPO1 Cariaso. The other police officers posted themselves where
they could see SPO1 Platon as the latter will wait for a “missed call” from SPO1 Cariaso . The CI
introduced SPO1 Cariaso with Aida then left. Aida asked SPO1 Cariaso where the money is and he
opened his belt bag to show her the money. SPO1 Cariaso in turn asked her where the shabu is and
she replied that he should wait for Alejandro (appellant). SPO1 Cariaso and the woman then went
Page 80 of 519
inside the Revo and waited for Alejandro. After about five minutes, a Toyota Vios arrived and parked
in frontof the Revo. The woman told SPO1 Cariaso that the driver of the Vios was Alejandro.
Alejandro alighted from the Vios and went inside the Revo. The woman introduced Alejandro
to SPO1 Cariaso as the buyer. After Alejandro ascertained that SPO1 Cariaso had the money with him,
he went down and got something from the Vios. When Alejandro returned, he was carrying an item
wrapped in newspaper. Inside the Revo, Alejandro uncovered the item and SPO1 Cariaso saw a
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which appellant handed to him.
Alejandro then demanded for the money. SPO1 Cariaso gave Alejandro the belt bag containing the
marked bills and boodle money and quickly pressed the call key of his cell phone, the pre-arranged
signal for the team that the sale had been consummated.
As planned, SPO1 Cariaso arrested Alejandro and the woman (“Aida”) who was later
identified as Imelda G. Solema. Meanwhile, SPO1 Platon arrested the woman passenger in the Vios
who was later identified as Jenny del Rosario.
The seized plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was marked by SPO1
Cariaso with his initials and signed it at the bottom. SPO1 Cariaso also recovered the marked P500
bills and boodle money from appellant. The three accused and the confiscated items were brought to
the PDEA Regional Office in Camp Vicente Lim
Subsequently, Appellant Marco P. Alejandro (Alejandro) along with Imelda G. Solema and
Jenny V. del Rosario, were charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 in an
information. When arraigned, all three accused pleaded not guilty. Upon demurrer to evidence filed
by accused Jenny del Rosario, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting her of the crime charged
considering that her mere presence in the car used by appellant is not indicative of conspiracy in the
sale of illegal drugs
RTC convicted Alejandro and Solema. The RTC found that the police officers complied with
all the requirements in conducting a buy-bust operation, and that their testimonies were
spontaneous, straightforward and consistent on all material points. Convinced that Alejandro and his
co-accused Imelda Solema had conspired in selling shabu, the RTC noted that it was the latter who
called- up the former about the offer of the poseur-buyer SPO1 Cariaso to buy shabu. Alejandro thus
brought the pack of shabu to be sold to SPO1 Cariaso, unaware of the entrapment plan of the police
officers. CA later on appeal upheld their conviction.
Alejandro argues that there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that a sale transaction of
illegal drugs took place as there appeared to be no prior meeting or conversation between SPO1
Cariaso and Alejandro, and hence they could not have agreed on a price certain for a specified weight
of drugs to be sold. It stressed that from the prosecution’s narration of facts, the basis of the meeting
between the poseur-buyer and “Aida” was the arrangement made by the CI for the sale of shabu;
hence, there was already an agreement for the sale of 100 grams of shabu for the amount of
P360,000.00
Issue:
Page 81 of 519
Whether or not there was a consummated illegal sale of dangerous drugs in contemplation
of Article II, Sec. 5 of RA 9165 that warrants conviction.
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
Yes, there was a consummated illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Clearly, all the elements of the
crime were established by both the oral and object evidence presented in court.
Firmly established in our jurisprudence is the rule that in the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, the following essential elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale
took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer
and seller were identified. Implicit in all these is the need for proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the confiscated prohibited or regulated
drug as evidence.
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is
proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.
The above elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution. Poseur-buyer SPO1
Cariaso identified appellant as the seller of shabu. While the police officers were initially unaware of
the identity of Alejandro, as their CI had only informed them about Alejandro’s co-accused, “Aida”
(Imelda Solema) with whom the CI had set up a drug deal for 100 grams of shabu for the price of
P360, 000.00, presence at the buy-bust scene, and his act of delivering the shabu directly to SPO1
Cariaso clearly identified him as the seller who himself demanded and received the payment from
SPO1 Cariaso after giving the shabu to the latter. Alejandro’s arrival at the house of Imelda Solema at
the appointed time of the sale transaction arranged the previous day by the CI, and with Imelda
Solema informing SPO1 Cariaso that they should wait for Alejandro after SPO1 Cariaso asked for the
shabu, were clear indications that they acted in coordination and conspiracy to effect the sale of
shabu to a buyer brought by the CI and who turned out to be a police officer detailed with the PDEA.
SPO1 Cariaso placed his initials and date of buy-bust on the plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance sold to him by Alejandro. After Forensic Chemical Officer Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. conducted
a chemical analysis of the said specimen, the result yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. The same specimen was presented in court as evidence
after it was properly identified by SPO1 Cariaso and Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. to be the same substance
handed by Alejandro to SPO1 Cariaso and examined by Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr.
It is settled that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to
prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they enjoy the presumption of having performed
their duties in a regular manner, unless, of course, there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-
motive on their part or deviation from the regular performance of their duties. Since no proof of such
ill motive on the part of the PDEA buy-bust team was adduced by Alejandro, the RTC and CA did not
err in giving full faith and credence to the prosecution’s account of the buy-bust operation.
Page 82 of 519
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERRY YABLE y USMAN

G.R. No. 200358, April 7, 2014, J. Perez
The fact that the marking on the seized item was done at the police station, and not at alleged
crime scene, did not compromise the integrity of the seized evidence. As ruled by this Court in Marquez
v. People, the phrase “marking upon immediate confiscation” contemplates even marking at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team. What is important is that the seized item marked at
the police station is identified as the same item produced in court. As correctly ruled by the CA, the
prosecution was able to establish the integrity of corpus delicti and the unbroken chain of custody. PO1
Vargas identified in open court the sachet of shabu that was offered in evidence against Gerry as the
same one she seized from the latter and marked immediately thereafter in the presence of the police
investigator. Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that even in instances where the arresting
officers failed to take a photograph of the seized drugs as required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165,
such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in evidence. What is
of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Facts:
Accused Gerry Yable (Gerry) was apprehended in an entrapment operation on account of the
tip given by the confidential informer. It appears however that that no physical inventory or
photograph was conducted at the crime scene or in his presence. Instead, the marking of the
confiscated drug was done in front of the investigator at the police precinct. Thereafter an
information was filed against Gerry before RTC for violation of Sec. 5, Article II of RA 9165.
The trial court rendered a Decision finding Gerry guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged which was later affirmed by the CA.
Gerry submits that the trial court and the CA failed to consider the procedural flaws
committed by the arresting officers in the seizure and custody of drugs as embodied in Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and further alleges that no physical inventory or photograph
was conducted at the crime scene or in his presence. Instead, the marking of the confiscated drug was
done in front of the investigator at the police precinct. Such lapses on the part of the apprehending
officers raises doubt on whether the shabu submitted for laboratory examination and subsequently
presented in court as evidence, was the same one confiscated from Gerry.
Isuue:
Whether or not trial court gravely erred in convicting the Gerry despite the prosecution’s
failure to establish the chain of custody of the alleged confiscated drug
Ruling:
The appeal is bereft of merit. Clearly, the rule authorizes substantial compliance with the
procedure to establish a chain of custody, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
item is properly preserved by the apprehending In People v. Pringas, the Court recognized that the
strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 may not always be possible under field
conditions; the police operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the
niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence.
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Moreover, the fact that the marking on the seized item was done at the police station, and not
at alleged crime scene, did not compromise the integrity of the seized evidence. As ruled by this Court
in Marquez v. People, the phrase “marking upon immediate confiscation” contemplates even marking
at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. What is important is that the seized
item marked at the police station is identified as the same item produced in court.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the prosecution was able to establish the integrity of corpus
delicti and the unbroken chain of custody. PO1 Vargas identified in open court the sachet of shabu
that was offered in evidence against Gerry as the same one she seized from the latter and marked
immediately thereafter in the presence of the police investigator
At the pretrial conference, both the prosecution and defense stipulated on the findings of the
chemist or laboratory examination report. The report on the laboratory examination showed that the
marking “PV042705” was indicated on the seized item. Such marking, as testified by the police
investigator, was made by PO1 Vargas in his presence at the time the evidence was turned over to
him. This admission of the parties completed the chain of custody of the seized item.
Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that even in instances where the arresting
officers failed to take a photograph of the seized drugs as required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165,
such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in evidence. What
is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items,
as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In other
words, to be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through records or
testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were seized from the accused
by the arresting officers; turned-over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the laboratory for
determination of their composition; and up to the time these are offered in evidence. For as long as
the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural requirements
provided for in Section 21 of R.A. No.9165 was not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will
not be affected.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SUKARNO JUNAIDE Y AGGA

G.R. No. 193856, April 21, 2014, J. Abad
When there is variation of the supposed marked item from the one actually presented in court
for identification, the Court shall conclude that there may have been switching of evidence in the selling
charge. Guilt in that charge has not, therefore, been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
This is true as in a prosecution for the sale and possession of the prohibited drugs known as
shabu, the State does not only carry the heavy burden of proving the elements of the offense. It also
bears the obligation to prove the corpus delicti, failing in which the State would not have proved the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. And, to prove the corpus delicti, it is indispensable for the
prosecution to show that the dangerous drugs subject of the sale and examined in the police laboratory
are the same drugs presented in court as evidence.
Facts:
It may be recalled that the prosecution witnesses in this case testified that on November 25,
2004 the Zamboanga Drug Enforcement Unit received a tip that respondent Sukarno Junaide was
selling prohibited drugs at Lower Calarian, Zamboanga City. The police unit formed a buy–bust team
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with SPO1 Roberto Roca as poseur–buyer. It then went to the place mentioned. As the informant
and SPO1 Roca saw accused Junaide standing near a store, they approached him. The informant told
Junaide that his companion wanted to buy P100.00 worth of shabu.
Accused Junaide took a sachet from his pocket and handed it to SPO1 Roca who in turn gave
him a marked P100.00 bill. The police officer then signaled the rest of the police team to come. When
SPO1 Roca let it known that he was a police officer, Junaide tried to flee but the police stopped him.
SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr. searched and found four sachets of suspected shabu and the marked money
on Junaide.
Subsequently, the police brought accused Junaide to the police station where SPO1 Mirasol
marked the four sachets seized from him and turned these over to the case investigator, SPO1
Federico Lindo, Jr. The latter then turned over the seized items to the police crime laboratory. The
sachet Junaide sold was found to contain 0.0101 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu;
the other sachets contained a total of 0.0235 gram.
The Public Prosecutor charged accused Junaide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Zamboanga City with (1) illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
91651 in Criminal Case 5601 (21215) and (2) illegal possession of shabu in violation of Section 11,
Article II of the same law in Criminal Case 5602 (21216).
The RTC found accused Junaide guilty of both charges. The Court of Appeals (CA) rendered
judgment affirming the RTC Decision in toto.
Junaide filed a motion for reconsideration pleading for re-examination of the Court’s finding
that the police officers involved substantially complied with the requirements of Section 21, Article
II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Junaide could be held liable of the crime of illegal sale of shabu
despite the fact that the required procedure of Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. 9165 was not substantially complied with
Ruling:
No, Junaide could only be held guilty of the crime of illegal possession but not of illegal sale
of shabu.
In a prosecution for the sale and possession of the prohibited drugs known as shabu, the State
does not only carry the heavy burden of proving the elements of the offense. It also bears the
obligation to prove the corpus delicti, failing in which the State would not have proved the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
And, to prove the corpus delicti, it is indispensable for the prosecution to show that the
dangerous drugs subject of the sale and examined in the police laboratory are the same drugs
presented in court as evidence. The first stage in the chain of custody is the marking of the seized
drugs or related items. Marking is the affixing of the initials or other identifying signs on the seized
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items by the arresting officer or the poseur–buyer. This must be done in the presence of the accused
shortly after arrest.
Here, compliance with the requirement of marking is not clear. SPO1 Roca testified that he
marked the plastic sachet of shabu that he bought with his initials “RR” but when the supposed sachet
was presented to him in court for identification, it instead carried the marking “RR–1.” This may be
just a mistake but he denied having made a mistake and admitted that the “RR–1” marking could have
been made by just anybody.
SPO1 Roca may have truly marked the item of shabu he seized from accused Sukarno as “RR”
which he insisted he did. Someone else, therefore, replaced the item by another one, now marked as
“RR–1.” Indeed, Roca has not ruled out the possibility that the latter marking on the shabu item
presented in court may have been made by someone else. This leads the Court to conclude that there
may have been switching of evidence in the selling charge. Guilt in that charge has not, therefore,
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARLON ABETONG y ENDRADO

G.R. No. 209785, June 4, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it
is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession,
the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. Thus, if the prosecution failed to present the testimony of a police inspector who had the only keys
to the evidence locker where the sachet of shabu, the unbroken chain of custody was not established and
the accused must be acquitted.
Facts:
An information was filed with the RTC, charging accused-appellant Marlon Abetong with a
violation of Section 5, R.A. 9165 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. For the prosecution, PO3 Perez
testified that he conducted a buy-bust operation on August 22, 2003 to purchase illegal drugs from
accused-appellant Marlon Abetong. After Abetong handed PO3 Pereza sachet of a white crystalline
substance, the latter introduced himself as a police officer and signaled his back up to arrest Abetong
and his three companions. The suspects attempted to flee but their plans were foiled by the timely
arrival of the other policemen. They were then brought to the police station where their arrest and
the list of the items confiscated from them were entered in the police blotter. From their arrest until
the items seized were transmitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, the
pieces of evidence were allegedly under PO3 Perez’s custody. In his testimony, PO3 Perez stated that
he kept the items inside the evidence locker in the Drug Enforcement Unit Office, to which only
Inspector Lorilla has a key.
On August 25, 2013, PO3 Perez brought the sachet containing crystalline substance and the
tooter to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing. The items were received by Inspector Augustina
Ompoy (Inspector Ompoy), the Forensic Chemical Officer the PNP Crime. Inspector Ompoy testified
that after she received the pieces of evidence, she performed the necessary examinations them. The
tests revealed that the white crystalline substance was positive for shabu.
Page 86 of 519
Abetong argued that he was illegally arrested. He was at home, sweeping the floor when
suddenly, a male person entered the open door and held him by his pants. When Abetong asked what
his fault was, the man answered to just go with him. The person was in civvies, fair skinned and tall;
he did not introduce himself. Abetong was handcuffed while they were at the foot-walk and searched,
but nothing was recovered from him except his money – P9.00.Hewas made to board a vehicle at
Aguinaldo; three handcuffed persons were inside. All four were brought to BAC-Up 2 and placed in a
cell. Abetong was not informed of the cause of his arrest; no drugs were presented to him. He knew
of the charge – Violation of Section 5, R.A. 9165 – only during arraignment in court.
The RTC convicted Abetong, and the CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue:
Did the prosecution fail to establish an unbroken chain of custody?
Ruling:
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in
fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. And the risk of
tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit of this nature is greatest when the exhibit is
small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances
familiar to people in their daily lives. As a reasonable measure, in authenticating narcotic specimens,
a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable
must be applied––a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with
another or been contaminated or tampered with.
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to
the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone
not in the chain to have possession of it.
In the case at bar, the failure of Inspector Lorilla to testify is fatal to the prosecution’s case.
To recall, only PO3 Perez and Inspector Ompoy testified against Abetong. During his testimony, PO3
Perez admitted that he put the confiscated item in the evidence locker on August 22, 2003 for
safekeeping and subsequently brought them to Inspector Ompoy at the crime laboratory on August
25, 2003. During this three-day interval, the items were allegedly kept inside the evidence locker to
which only Inspector Lorilla has the key.
It is evident from this sequence of events that during the interim, Inspector Lorilla
constructively acquired custody over the seized items. As the lone key holder and consequentially a
Page 87 of 519
link in the chain, Inspector Lorilla’s testimony became indispensable in proving the guilt of accused-
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Only he could have testified that from August 22 to 25, 2003 no
one else obtained the key from him for purposes of removing the items from their receptacle. Only
he could have enlightened the courts on what safety mechanisms have been installed in order to
preserve the integrity of the evidence acquired while inside the locker. Absent his testimony,
therefore, it cannot be plausibly claimed that the chain of custody has sufficiently been established.
To be sure, PO3 Perez did not even testify that he was assigned to safeguard the evidence locker for
the said duration; only that he was the one who put it in and three days later took them out of the
locker room before bringing them to the crime laboratory.
Requiring the key holder’s testimony is especially significant in this case in view of the law
enforcers’ failure to deliver the confiscated items to the crime laboratory within 24 hours, as required
under Sec. 21 of RA 9165. While the delay in itself is not fatal to the prosecution’s case as it may be
excused based on a justifiable ground, it exposes the items seized to a higher probability of being
handled by even more personnel and, consequently, to a higher risk of tampering or alteration. Thus,
the testimony of the key holder becomes necessary to attest to the fact that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated evidence have been preserved.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NENITA GAMATA y VALDEZ

G.R. No. 205202, June 9, 2014, J. Reyes
Illegal sale of prohibited drugs is consummated at the moment the buyer receives the drug from
the seller. In a buy-bust operation, the crime is consummated when the police officer makes an offer to
buy that is accepted by the accused, and there is an ensuing exchange between them involving the
delivery of the dangerous drugs to the police officer.
In order to successfully prosecute the offense, proof beyond reasonable doubt of two elements
must be satisfied by the prosecution, viz: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the identity of the
object and the consideration of the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the payment for
the thing.
As correctly ruled by the courts a quo in this case, the presence of both requisites was clearly
established by the testimony of the poseur-buyer himself, PO2 Aseboque, who positively testified that the
illegal sale took place when he gave theP500.00 marked money to the accused-appellant in exchange
for the shabu.
Facts:
Nenita Gamata y Valdez (Gamata) was charged by Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of
Appeals (CA) of the violation of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 wherein she pleaded “Not
Guilty”. Gamata, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, give away, distribute and deliver to another, zero point zero three [0.03] gram of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride which is a dangerous drug, in exchange of Php.500.00 pesos.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Police Officer 2 RenieAseboque
(PO2 Aseboque), Noel Pulido (Pulido) and Juan Siborboro, Jr., both operatives of the Makati Anti-
Drug Abuse Council (MADAC), and Police Inspector May Andrea Bonifacio (P/Insp. Bonifacio),
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Forensic Chemist of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. The aforementioned
parties narrated that on July 25, 2006, an information was received by Senior Inspector Joefel
Felongco Siason (S/Insp. Siason) of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force
(SAIDSOTF), Makati City, from a confidential asset of the MADAC that rampant illegal drug peddling
in Laperal Compound, Barangay Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City was being carried out by the accused-
appellant, Jun Gamata (Jun), Toto Madera and Totoy Pajayjay. Apparently, their names are also
included in the watch list of the MADAC.
A team composed of SAIDSOTF police officers and MADAC operatives was formed to conduct
a buy-bust operation against the said subjects. PO2 Aseboque was designated as the poseur-buyer
while the rest of the team members were assigned to be his back-up. The operation was coordinated
with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) under Pre-Coordination Sheet Control Number
MMRO-072506-0212 duly acknowledged to have been received by PO1 Nemencio V. Domingo of the
PDEA. One piece of a 500.00 bill was also marked for use in the operation.
At around 4:30 p.m., the team, together with the confidential informant, proceeded to the
subject area. The team members positioned themselves in spots where they can monitor the possible
transaction. Meanwhile, PO2 Aseboque and the informant walked towards Laperal Compound and
thereupon noticed a woman clad in white t-shirt and maong pants. The informant identified her to
PO2 Aseboque as the accused-appellant.
The two of them then approached the accused-appellant whom PO2 Aseboque queried as to
the whereabouts of Jun. In response, the accused-appellant said that Jun was not around and that
"kami nandito lang, bakit kukuha ba kayo?" PO2 Aseboque comprehended her response as the street
language used in the dealing of dangerous drugs and that she actually meant that she was selling
shabu if they wanted to buy one. PO2 Aseboque repeated his query to which the accused-appellant
replied, "Wag niyong hintayin si Jun, ako meron." PO2 Aseboque took her response as a confirmation
that she was indeed selling shabu. He then asked her if she had 500.00 worth of shabu.
Gamata took out one plastic sachet from her right pocket and handed it over to PO2 Aseboque
who in turn examined its contents and thereafter handed the buy-bust money to Gamata. As she was
placing the money inside her pocket, PO2 Aseboque made the pre-arranged signal to his buy-bust
team mates by lighting a cigarette.
Upon seeing MADAC operative Pulido rushing towards the scene, PO2 Aseboque held the
accused-appellant and introduced himself as a police officer. He directed her to empty the contents
of her pockets but she refused. This prompted PO2 Aseboque to order Pulido to dig into the accused-
appellant’s pockets. Pulido complied and discovered three more pieces of transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance suspected as shabu along with the buy-bust money and 120.00
of the accused-appellant’s personal money.
Gamata was then informed of her constitutional rights while the sachet she sold to PO2
Aseboque was immediately marked by the latter with his initials "REA" while those recovered by
Pulido were marked with "REA-1", "REA-2", and "REA-3". At the crime scene, PO2 Aseboque also
prepared an Acknowledgment Receipt7which he and the arresting team signed.
Gamata and the seized evidence were subsequently brought to the Makati SAIDSOTF office
where they were turned over to PO2 Rafael Castillo (PO2 Castillo) for investigation, interrogation
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and proper disposition. At the same office, PO2 Aseboque executed an Affidavit of Arrest and a
Supplemental Affidavit.
She then refuted all of the above occurrences and has her own version of the said event.
RTC sustained the prosecution’s version and held that the pieces of evidence submitted
established the presence of the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Gamata’s denial and alibi
were rejected for being unsubstantiated. Her imputations of frame-up to the police officers were
likewise found uncorroborated by convincing proof and thus overthrown by the presumption of
regularity attached to the performance of the police officers’ official duties.
The RTC found Gamata guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.CA affirmed RTC’s
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Gamata is guilty of violating violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165
Ruling:
Gamata is guilty of violating violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
The Court finds no reversible error imputable to the appellate court and the trial court in
finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu defined and penalized under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Illegal sale of prohibited drugs is consummated at the moment the buyer receives the drug
from the seller. In a buy-bust operation, the crime is consummated when the police officer makes an
offer to buy that is accepted by the accused, and there is an ensuing exchange between them involving
the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the police officer. In order to successfully prosecute the
offense, proof beyond reasonable doubt of two elements must be satisfied by the prosecution, viz: (a)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the identity of the object and the consideration of the sale;
and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the payment for the thing.
As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, the presence of both requisites was clearly established
by the testimony of the poseur-buyer himself, PO2 Aseboque, who positively testified that the illegal
sale took place when he gave theP500.00 marked money to the accused-appellant in exchange for
the shabu.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LARRY MENDOZA y ESTRADA
G.R. No. 192432, June 23, 2014, J. Bersamin
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti. The Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable
requirement of proving the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 when the dangerous drugs
are missing but also when there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous
drugs
Facts:
Page 90 of 519
Policemen Arnel Diocena and Alfredo DG Lim testified that on September 29, 2007, they
received reports that an alias ‘Larry’ was selling shabu at St. Claire Street, Barangay Calumpang,
Binangonan, Rizal. They organized a buy-bust operation where Diocena acted as the poseur buyer
while Lim served as back-up. They proceeded to the target area with their asset at around 10:45 p.m.
There Diocena and the asset waited in the corner on their motorcycle while Lim and the other cops
positioned themselves in the perimeter. The asset texted Larry and they waited for him to arrive.
Later, Larry arrived and told them, ‘Pasensya na at ngayon lang dumating ang mga items.’ Larry then
asked them how much they were buying and Diocena told P500.00 worth. Larry took out two plastic
sachets of shabu and gave it to Diocena who gave him a marked P500 bill. Diocena lit the left signal
light of his motorcycle to signal Lim and the other cops that the deal was done. They then arrested
Larry who turned out to be the accused. After frisking him, they recovered another sachet of shabu
from him. Diocena marked the items. These were sent to the police crime lab for forensic testing
where they tested positive for 0.03, 0.01 and 0.01 grams for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or
shabu respectively. ‘LEM-1’ and ‘LEM-2’ were made the basis of the pushing charge while ‘LEM-3’ the
one for possession."
Issue:
Whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violations of Section 5 and Section
11 of RA No. 9165
Ruling:
No, he is not.
The State did not satisfactorily explain substantial lapses committed by the buy-bust team in
the chain of custody; hence, the guilt of the accused for the crime charged was not established beyond
reasonable doubt. The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not
indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of the
dangerous drugs should be established beyond doubt by showing that the dangerous drugs offered
in court were the same substances bought during the buy-bust operation. This rigorous requirement,
known under RA No. 9165 as the chain of custody, performs the function of ensuring that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
therefore, the Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti. That proof is vital to a judgment of
conviction. On the other hand, the Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable requirement
of proving the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 when the dangerous drugs are missing
but also when there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that
raise doubts about the authenticity of the evidence presented in court.
An examination of the records reveals that the buy-bust team did not observe the statutory
procedures on preserving the chain of custody. To start with, the State did not show the presence
during the seizure and confiscation of the contraband, as well as during the physical inventory and
photographing of the contraband, of the representatives from the media or the Department of Justice,
or of any elected public official. Such presence was precisely necessary to insulate the apprehension
and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity
Page 91 of 519
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIE ORTEGA y KALBI, a.k.a AY-AY

G.R. No. 207392, July 2, 2014, J. Perez
A buy-bust operation was conducted wherein accused was caught selling illegal drugs. The
accused argued that there was there was lack of inventory, and the marking of the items was not done
in his presence, a representative of media, the Department of Justice and an elected official. The Court
affirmed his conviction and ruled that substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the
handling of the seized item” is sufficient. Such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items
seized inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
Facts:
A confidential informant tipped the Zamboanga City Police Office, Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operations Task Force: Tumba Droga that a married couple named Ay-ay and Lenlen were selling
shabu in their residence.
A team was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation and PO2 Jaafar Jambiran was tasked to
act as the poseur-buyer, with PO3 Alvin Ajuji as his immediate back-up. Five others were included in
the team to serve as perimeter security.
Upon arriving PO2 Jambiran and the informant walked towards Ramie’s house. The
informant pointed to Ramie, who was then seated on a bench outside. The informant asked him, in
Tausug dialect, if he has stuff or shabu since PO2 Jambiran wanted to purchase some of the stuff. He
replied by asking how much is he buying, to which informant answered P200.00. PO2 Jambiran gave
the marked twoP100.00 bills in exchange for two plastic sachets of shabu, which Ramie took from his
right pocket.
PO2 Jambiran scrutinized the items sold to him and then executed the pre-arranged signal of
removing his hat. PO3 Ajuji rushed to the scene while PO2 Jambiran grabbed Ramie’s hand and
introduced himself as a policeman.
PO2 Jambiran informed him of his constitutional rights and the fact the he violated R.A. No.
9165. After handcuffing Ramie, PO3 Ajuji conducted a body search on him and found two P100.00
bills inside his right pocket. Using her cellphone, PO2 Hilda Montuno took pictures of Ramie and his
wife Len-len (who was acquitted since evidence against her was inadmissible for being a product of
an invalid search) before bringing them to the Police Office.
PO2 Jambiran turned over to the investigator, PO3 Allan M. Benasing, two plastic sachets of
shabu taken from Ramie, which he consequently marked with initials “JJ.” PO3 Ajuji turned over the
marked money and the two other plastic sachets of shabu taken from Len-len, which he also
successively marked with his initials “AA.” PO2 Montuno also turned over the photographs. These
were all received pursuant to Complaint Assignment Sheet No. 1894.
Upon receiving all the evidence, PO3 Benasing also placed his initials “AB.” PO3 Benasing then
prepared a request for laboratory examination for the plastic sachets, personally forwarded the
request to the Crime Laboratory Office and these were received by the duty Police Non-
Commissioned Officer thereat by placing the stamp of the said office at the same day.
Page 92 of 519
Police Senior Inspector Melvin Ledesma Manuel, a forensic chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory examined the contents of the plastic sachets and issued report which yielded positive
findings for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. It was co-signed by Police Chief Inspector
Constante Sunio Sonido.
Both the trial court and appellate court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
sale of drugs.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody was broken
Ruling:
No, the Court ruled that it was not and convicted Ramie.
The Court held that all elements of illegal sale of drugs were present. The prosecution’s
evidence positively identified the buyer as PO2 Jambiran and the seller as Ramie. Likewise, the two
sachets of shabu as the object of the sale and the P200.00 as consideration were presented. Finally,
the delivery of the shabu sold and its payment were clearly testified to by prosecution witnesses.
Ramie alleged that there was lack of inventory and the marking of the items was not done in
his presence, a representative of media, the Department of Justice and an elected official. Further, he
averred that the confiscated items were only examined two days after it was submitted for laboratory
examination. Such failure casts doubt on the validity of his arrest and the identity of shabu allegedly
seized and confiscated from him.
Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of custody in the handling of
evidence, “substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of the seized item” is
sufficient. Even if the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the requirements under Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized
inadmissible in evidence.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. In this case, the Court ruled that the prosecution has clearly shown that the chain of custody
has been unbroken.
Even if there was no categorical statement on the part of the prosecution witnesses that a
physical inventory was prepared, it was testified on that the Complaint/Assignment sheet prepared
by PO2 Jambiran and the police report prepared by PO3 Benasing reflected the details of items seized.
Likewise, PSI Manuel was able to explain why the plastic sachets turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory were examined by him only two days after these were delivered.
Page 93 of 519
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014, C.J. Sereno
A person apprehended or arrested who are to be subject of confirmatory drug test cannot
literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context
and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law. In this case, the accused appellant was
arrested in the alleged act of extortion, hence, the drug test conducted to him despite his objection is
rendered illegal and is therefore inadmissible. Since the drug test was the only basis for his conviction,
the Court ordered the acquittal of the accused.
Facts:
Petitioner Jaime D. Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic
Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in an Information dated 14
February 2006. When arraigned, petitioner Jaime, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to
the charge.
The evidence of the prosecution reveals that Dela Cruz was apprehended for the crime of
Extortion. After apprehension, the accused was brought to the forensic laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO
where forensic examination was done by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Jaime was required
to submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs
as indicated in the confirmatory test result labelled as Toxicology (Dangerous Drugs) Report No.
2006-TDD-2402 dated 16 February 2006. On the basis of which, the accused was charged with the
violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
The defense presented Dela Cruz as the lone witness. He denied the charges and testified that
while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When
he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying
he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI.
His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the
taking of his urine sample, to no avail.
RTC Cebu found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. His conviction was affirmed by
the CA. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the drug test conducted upon Dela Cruz is legal
Ruling:
No. A person apprehended or arrested cannot literally mean any person apprehended or
arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A.
9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of the law.
Page 94 of 519
Accordingly, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for,
among others, the “importation,” “sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution
and transportation”, “manufacture” and “possession” of dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals; possession thereof “during parties, social gatherings or
meetings”; being “employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort”; “maintenance of a den, dive or
resort”; “illegal chemical diversion of controlled precursors and essential chemicals”; “manufacture
or delivery” or “possession” of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous
drugs “during parties, social gatherings or meetings”; “unnecessary” or “unlawful” prescription
thereof; “cultivation or culture of plants classified as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof”;and
“maintenance and keeping of original records of transactions on dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals.”
To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not
listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Moreover, making the phrase
“a person apprehended or arrested” in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended
for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory
drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime.
In this case, Dela Cruz was arrested in the alleged act of extortion, hence, the drug test
conducted to him despite his objection is rendered illegal and is therefore inadmissible. Since the
drug test was the only basis for his conviction, the Court ordered the acquittal of Dela Cruz.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELINO VITERBO y REALUBIT and RONALD VITERBO y
REALUBIT
G.R. No. 203434, July 23, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received, and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not automatically
render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is true only when (a) there is a
justifiable ground for such noncompliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. Hence, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and
should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
A punctilious examination of the records in this case shows that the prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from the accused-appellants, militating
against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Facts:
A confidential informant (CI) reported to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Regional Office V that there were persons peddling
Page 95 of 519
illegal drugs in Albay. Immediately, Police Senior Inspector Dennis Vargas (PS/Insp. Vargas), a
member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), formed a team composed of six (6)
police officers to conduct a buy-bust operation. Senior Police Officer 4 Fernando Cardona (SPO4
Cardona) of the CIDG was designated as the poseur-buyer, while Police Officer 2 Leonardo Garcia
(PO2 Garcia) and Police Officer 2Emerito Zamora (PO2 Zamora) were assigned as arresting officers.
A 500-peso bill was marked with the initials "NL" which was then given to SPO4 Cardona.
Together with the CI, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target. SPO4 Cardona and the CI
were tasked to negotiate with them, while the rest of the buy-bust team strategically positioned
themselves nearby to observe the transaction.
Upon meeting the accused-appellants, the CI introduced SPO4 Cardona, who expressed
interest in buying shabu worth 500.00. As SPO4 Cardona handed the marked money to Marcelino,
the latter told his brother, Ronald, who was standing beside him, to give the shabu to SPO4 Cardona.
Ronald then reached inside his pocket and produced two (2) transparent plastic sachets allegedly
containing shabu which he gave to SPO4 Cardona who, upon receipt thereof, executed the pre-
arranged signal by scratching his head. Thereupon, PO2 Garcia and PO2 Zamora immediately rushed
in, apprehended accused-appellants and apprised them of their constitutional rights. SPO4 Cardona
kept the two (2) sachets in his possession and, together with the rest of the buy-bust team, brought
accused-appellants, the marked money, and the plastic sachets to the PDEA Office
At the PDEA Office, SPO4 Cardona marked the plastic sachets while PS/Insp. Vargas prepared
the request for laboratory examination of the substances found in the plastic sachets. SPO4 Cardona
and another policeman brought the laboratory request and the plastic sachets to the PNP Regional
Crime Laboratory Office, but since no chemist was available that evening, they returned to the PDEA
Office. The following day, the plastic sachets together with the laboratory request were brought by
another policeman to the same crime laboratory for examination.
Upon qualitative examination, Police Inspector Josephine Macura Clemen (P/Insp. Clemen),
a forensic chemist, found that the contents yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu.
A complaint was filed against the accused-appellants for drug pushing. RTC convicted them
and was affirmed by CA.
Issue:
Whether or not accused appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165
Ruling:
No, they are not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5, Article
II of RA 9165.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165,
the following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and
Page 96 of 519
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. As the dangerous drug
itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that the
identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must
be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it
was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti.
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission
of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link
in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such
a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was
received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
The chain of custody requirement "ensures that unnecessary doubts respecting the identity
of the evidence are minimized if not altogether removed." In relation thereto, Section 21(1), Article
II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure on the chain of custody of confiscated, seized, or surrendered
dangerous drugs.
While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not automatically
render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is true only when (a) there is a
justifiable ground for such noncompliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved. Hence, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified
and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
A punctilious examination of the records in this case shows that the prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from the accused-appellants, militating
against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SPO4 Cardona, the poseur-buyer who transacted with accused- appellants, testified that he
kept in his possession and custody the two (2) plastic sachets containing the illegal substance from
the time they were confiscated up to the time that he marked them in the PDEA Office. Together with
a companion, he brought the confiscated items as well as the laboratory request to the PNP Regional
Crime Laboratory Office. However, he was unable to deliver the confiscated items and the laboratory
request because he was informed that there was no chemist to conduct the examination at the time.
As such, he decided to return to the PDEA Office, bringing with him the items and the laboratory
request. The following day, someone else delivered the confiscated items and the laboratory request
to the crime laboratory.
It is clear that the confiscated items changed hands before they were delivered to the crime
laboratory, i.e., from SPO4 Cardona to "Captain Vargas" who, unfortunately, did not testify in this case
in order to shed light on what happened to the seized items when they were turned over to his
possession, or at the very least, to clarify if he was the person who successfully delivered the plastic
sachets together with the laboratory request to the crime laboratory. His testimony in this regard is
significant, considering that the laboratory request, on its lower left portion, reflects that it was
delivered by a certain "PO2 Zamora" who, the Court notes, was likewise not presented in court to
explain his role in the chain of custody of the seized items. What was established, instead, was that
the seized items and the laboratory request were received by the clerk of the crime laboratory, who
Page 97 of 519
turned them over to P/Insp. Clemen, the forensic chemist who performed the qualitative examination
on the substances.
However, the records are devoid of evidence to indicate the PDEA member/agent who
specifically delivered the items to her. Clearly, while the custodial link began and ended with SPO4
Cardona, there were substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized items, particularly the
events that transpired from the time the items left the hands of SPO4 Cardona and turned over to the
possession of "Captain Vargas," as well as the identity of the PDEA agent who brought them together
with the laboratory request to Garcia, the receiving clerk of the crime laboratory, in the morning of
the following day.
While the laboratory request was prepared and signed by PS/Insp. Vargas, whom the Court
reasonably presumes to be the same "Captain Vargas" referred to in SPO4 Cardona’s testimony, there
is dearth of evidence showing that he was the same person who brought the items to Garcia, taking
into consideration the fact that the laboratory request accompanying the items was signed/delivered
by "PO2 Zamora." These are crucial missing links in this case which should have been clearly
accounted for in order to establish the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
The prosecution’s case is further weakened by the fact that the seized items were delivered
not on the same day of the buy-bust operation, but only the following day. To the Court’s mind, the
considerable amount of time that had transpired from the conduct of the buy-bust operation until
the same were brought for laboratory examination, especially when viewed together with the above-
mentioned considerations, figures into a gaping hiatus in the chain of custody of the said items, which
is extremely fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
Thus, in the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that there exists reasonable doubt on
the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items, necessitating therefor strict compliance
with the provisions of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PETER FANG y GAMBOA a.k.a. "Fritz”

G.R. No. 199874, July 23, 2014,
J. Jose Portugal Perez
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be sufficiently proved:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. Indeed, all these elements were duly established. Pertinently, it is
the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items which must be proven to
establish the corpus delicti. The mere fact that the drugs obtained were more, had no bearing on the
crime charged. This is because liability under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 is without regard to the
quantity of the drugs seized. The prosecution herein was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary
value of the said illegal drugs. The concurrence of all elements of the illegal sale of shabu was proven by
the prosecution
Facts:
Acting on a tip from an informant that a certain "Fritz" and "Kaday" were selling shabu at the
Slaughter Compound, Police Chief Inspector Pacatiw of the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) in Baguio City formed a buy-bust composed of PO2 Lubos as poseur-buyer, a certain
SPO4 Lucas from Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency and a certain PO1 Lacangan from the CIDG,
Page 98 of 519
who acted as back-ups. PO2 Lubos and SPO4 Lucas brought the buy-bust money and a piece of Five
Hundred Peso bill, to the Fiscal’s office for authentication.
Then the buy-bust team proceeded to the Slaughter Compound. Upon reaching the area, PO2
Lubos and the informant went to the house where the alleged illegal drug activity was taking place.
Other members of the buy-bust team were positioned in the area. The informant knocked on the door
and a certain Fritz, who was later identified as appellant Peter Fang, and Kaday, who was later
identified as appellant’s son, Jefferson Fang (Jefferson), came out of the house. Peter talked to the
informant.
Thereafter, the informant and Peter approached PO2 Lubos, and asked the latter how much
will he get. PO2 Lubos answered "limampiso lang," which means Five Hundred Pesos. Latter asked
about the money prompting PO2 Lubos to bring out the Five Hundred Peso bill and hand it to Peter.
In turn, Peter brought out 2 small sachets of shabu and gave it to PO2 Lubos. After examining the
same, PO2 Lubos made the pre-arranged signal of removing his cap. The back-up police operatives
emerged and arrested Peter, and SPO4 Lucas frisked Peter and was able to recover the buy-bust
money and another sachet of shabu from his pocket.
Police Chief Inspector Pacatiw frisked Jefferson and recovered two sachets of marijuana.
After informing the accused of their constitutional rights, they were placed under arrest and brought
to the CAR-CIDG. The confiscated sachets of shabu were marked and an inventory of the seized items
was made.
RTC rendered a Joint Judgment finding Peter in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165. Jefferson was acquitted for illegal possession of shabu and marijuana, respectively
which the CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Peter is liable for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
Ruling:
Yes, Peter is liable for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be sufficiently
proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Indeed, all these elements were duly established.
Peter was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu through a buy-bust operation conducted by
members of the CIDG in Baguio City.
The result of the laboratory examination, as testified to by the forensic chemist, confirmed
the presence of methamphetamine hydrochlorideon the white crystalline substance inside the plastic
sachet confiscated from appellant. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt
by the seller of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction. This was
further corroborated by the presentation of the marked money in evidence. Peter asserts that the
standard procedures for the custody and disposition of the confiscated drugs as provided in Section
Page 99 of 519
21 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not complied with. Peter argues that the physical inventory of the
seized items was not conducted in the place where the seizure had taken place.
Pertinently, it is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
which must be proven to establish the corpus delicti. The mere fact that the drugs obtained were
more, had no bearing on the crime charged. This is because liability under Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 9165 is without regard to the quantity of the drugs seized.
The prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the said illegal
drugs. The concurrence of all elements of the illegal sale of shabu was proven by the prosecution.
Moreover, the rule is that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor
details and collateral matters, do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity,
or the weight of their testimony. Such minor inconsistencies even enhance their veracity as the
variances erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
The chain of custody does not appear to have been broken. The recovery and handling of the
seized drugs were satisfactorily established. As correctly found by the appellate court, "no ‘break’
whatsoever in the chain of custody of the prohibited drugs occurred. The testimonial, documentary,
and object evidence presented by the prosecution established every link in the custody of the
prohibited drugs. This leads to no other conclusion than that the specimen examined by the forensic
chemist, which tested positive for shabu, and which were presented as evidence during the trial, were
the ones taken from accused-appellant during the buy-bust operation."
Peter’s defense, which is predicated on a bare denial, deserves scant consideration in light of
the positive testimonies of the police officers. The defense of frame-up or denial in drug cases
requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement
agencies acted in the regular performance of their official duties. Bare denials of appellant cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of the three police officers. Moreover, there is no evidence of
any improper motive on the part of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation to
falsely testify against appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. REYMAN ENDAYA y LAIG

G.R. No. 205741, July 23, 2014, J. Perez
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration for
the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in the
prosecution of an illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation of the corpus delicti in court as evidence.
The commission of illegal sale merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction,
which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. As long as a police officer or
civilian asset went through the operation as a buyer, whose offer was accepted by the appellant,
followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former, the crime is already consummated. In the
case at bar, the prosecution has amply proven all the elements of the drug sale with moral certainty.
The records show that appellant was arrested in a legitimate buy-bust operation conducted
after a week of surveillance. The police officers comprising the buy-bust team positively identified
Page 100 of 519
appellant as the one who sold the plastic sachet of shabu to their civilian asset who, in turn, handed the
marked money to appellant. Both the sachet of shabuand the marked money were presented as evidence
in court.
Facts:
Police operatives, acting on a report from a barangay official that Endaya is involved in illegal
drug activities, conducted surveillance operations on him. A team, composed of SPO4
MorielBenedicto (SPO4 Benedicto), SPO3 Nestor Babadilla (SPO3 Babadilla) and PO2 Edwin Chavez
(PO2 Chavez), was formed to perform a buy-bust operation against appellant. A civilian asset, armed
with five (5) pieces ofP100.00 bills as marked money, acted as poseur-buyer.
On board a car, the police operatives and the civilian asset proceeded to the place of
operation. Endaya subsequently arrived and approached the civilian asset, who was standing in front
of the beer house. The two talked for a while, after which, the police operatives saw the civilian asset
hand the marked money to appellant who, in turn, handed something to the former which later
turned out to be a plastic sachet containing shabu.
After receiving the plastic sachet from Endaya, the civilian asset made the pre-arranged signal
of touching his head to signify that the transaction had been completed. The police officers then
immediately approached Endaya, introduced themselves as police officers and informed him that he
is under arrest for selling shabu. Appellant was informed of his constitutional rights in Tagalog and
then frisked by SPO3 Babadilla and PO2 Chavez for any deadly weapon.
During this body search, SPO3 Babadilla recovered the marked money from
Endaya. Meanwhile, the shabu subject of the sale between Endaya and the civilian asset was handed
by the latter to PO2 Chavez. The shabu subject of the buy-bust operation, on the other hand, was
marked by PO2 Chavez by writing the same figure "8" on the sachet but he added a distinctive mark
by burning the edges of the plastic sachet to distinguish it from the other eight sachets confiscated
from appellant.
The team thereafter conducted an inventory of the items seized from Endaya in the latter’s
presence. A photograph of Endaya and the seized items, together with the aforementioned witnesses
was taken at the police station. Finally, a letter request for laboratory examination, together with the
marked sachets, was transmitted to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory. The qualitative
examination conducted on the specimens yielded positive results for methamphetamine
RTC convicted Endaya of the offenses charged in these cases for violation of Section 5
(paragraph 1) and Section 11 (paragraph 3), both of Article II of Republic Act 9165 which was
affirmed by CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Endaya is guilty for violation of Section 5 (paragraph 1) and Section 11
(paragraph 3), both of Article II of Republic Act 9165
Ruling:
Page 101 of 519
Yes, Endaya is guilty for violation of Section 5 (paragraph 1) and Section 11 (paragraph 3),
both of Article II of Republic Act 9165
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration
for the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in the
prosecution of an illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation of the corpus delicti in court as evidence.
The commission of illegal sale merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction,
which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. As long as a police officer or
civilian asset went through the operation as a buyer, whose offer was accepted by the appellant,
followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former, the crime is already consummated. In
the case at bar, the prosecution has amply proven all the elements of the drug sale with moral
certainty.
The records show that Endaya was arrested in a legitimate buy-bust operation conducted
after a week of surveillance. The police officers comprising the buy-bust team positively identified
appellant as the one who sold the plastic sachet of shabu to their civilian asset who, in turn, handed
the marked money to Endaya. Both the sachet of shabu and the marked money were presented as
evidence in court.
For the successful prosecution of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object that is
identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
The foregoing elements were likewise convincingly established herein. When the police
operatives bodily searched Endaya for his wallet at the police station, they found eight(8) plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance which, upon laboratory examination, turned out to be
shabu.
To ascertain that the illegal drugs presented in court are the ones actually seized from the
accused, the prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 has been complied with or falls within the saving clause provided in Section 21(a),
Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165; and (b) there was an
unbroken link in the chain of custody with respect to the confiscated items. Section 21, Article II of
R.A. 9165 embodies the procedural safeguards intended to counter or prevent possible police abuses
in cases of buy-bust operations.
Compliance with the foregoing provisions, "especially the required physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs in the presence of the accused, the media, and responsible
government functionaries, would be clear evidence that the police had carried out a legitimate buy-
bust operation."
The records of this case clearly show that the foregoing requirements were complied with.
Page 102 of 519

As mandated by the above-quoted provision of law, the apprehending team conducted a physical
inventory of the drugs confiscated from Endaya, as evidenced by the "Receipt for Property
Seized" which was signed by representatives from the municipal trial court, a non-governmental
organization, the media, and three locally elected public officials, as proof that they were present
when the inventory was carried out.
Likewise, a photograph of the Endaya, together with the items seized from him, and with the
aforementioned representatives from the public and private sector as witnesses, was taken at the
police station. The physical inventory and taking of the photograph were done after the confiscated
items were marked by PO2 Chavez. Finally, within 24 hours from the time the plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance were taken from Endaya, the same were forwarded to the
regional crime laboratory office for qualitative examination where the specimens tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
In view of the foregoing, the allegation of Endaya that the apprehending officers failed to
comply with the mandates of Section 21, particularly paragraph 1, of R.A. No. 9165 has no basis. In
addition to this, jurisprudence states that "the phrase ‘marking upon immediate confiscation’
contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team." Hence,
the fact that the seized plastic sachets were marked at the police station only does not deviate from
the elements required in the preservation of the integrity of the seized drugs.
In any case, contrary to Endaya’s claim, strict compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 is not necessary" as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team
Indeed, this Court has, in many cases held that "while the chain of custody should ideally be
perfect, in reality it is not, ‘as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. The most
important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as
they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused."
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered
from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be
established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt." That the substances which
were sent to the crime laboratory and examined by the forensic chemical officer and found to be
shabu were the very same substances which the police officers seized from appellant is proven
Finally, in order to prove the unbroken chain of custody of the prohibited drugs confiscated
from appellant, the respective testimonies of SPO4 Benedicto and PO2 Chavez establish that the
plastic sachet subject of the illegal sale was handed over by the civilian asset acting as poseur buyer
to PO2 Chavez while still at the crime scene.
PO2 Chavez continued to be in possession of the same until they reached the police station
where he accomplished the marking thereof. The eight sachets of shabu in the wallet of appellant, on
the other hand, which were found by PO2 Chavez after bodily searching the former at the police
station, were likewise marked by PO2 Chavez. Once marked, the items were turned over to the police
investigator and thereafter, a letter-request together with the marked sachets was forwarded to the
crime laboratory for examination where the substances inside the plastic sachets tested positive for
shabu. These sachets, with their identifying marks still intact, were then presented in court.
Page 103 of 519

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUELITA AMPATUAN y GONZALES, et al.

G.R. No. 188707, July 30, 2014, J. Perez
The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are as follows: (1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
payment therefor. The prosecution, to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, must present in evidence
the corpus delicti of the case. The corpus delicti is the seized illegal drugs. This Court is convinced that
the prosecution has sufficiently discharged its burden to establish the elements in the illegal sale of
shabu. The prosecution was able to establish the (1) identity of accused-appellants as the sellers, and
the buyer, Dujon; and (2) the object of the transaction, which is the jumbo sachet of shabu, weighing
46.4490 grams; and the delivery of the sold illegal shabu to Dujon, the poseur-buyer.
Facts:
Police officers apprehended Edward Dujon (Dujon) for violation of R.A. No. 9165, which
resulted to his detention. While in detention, Dujon approached Police Chief Inspector Wilkins
Villanueva (Chief P/Insp. Villanueva) to give information on the alleged drug activity of accused-
appellant Manuelita and her groupas one of his suppliers of shabu.To verify Dujon’s claim, Chief
P/Insp. Villanueva ordered Dujon to contact Manuelita. When Dujon was able to talk to Manuelita, he
ordered shabuand asked that it be delivered to him.
Subsequently, Manuelita texted Dujon that she and her men, accused-appellants Mastor and
Warren, were already waiting for him near Dimsum Diner. At around nine o’clock in the morning,
Dujon and Manuelita’s convoy arrived at Jogue’s. Dujon, after getting a room, went to Room No. 3
together with Manuelita’s group. After a few minutes in Room No. 3, they were informed to move to
Room No. 2. In Room No. 2, Dujon asked Manuelita to wait for his assistant. Manuelita then took out
the headscarf she was clasping, opened it, and handed the jumbo sachet with crystalline substance
over to Dujon.
Meanwhile, when Dujon failed to update the PDEA as previously planned, PO1 Anthony Alpiz
(PO1 Alpiz) peered through a window of Room No. 2. According to PO1 Alpiz, he clearly saw
Manuelita hand Dujon the jumbo sachet with crystalline substance. Upon seeing that the jumbo
sachet with crystalline substance was in Dujon’s possession, PO1 Alpiz, followed by other PDEA
operatives, rushed into Room No. 2.After reading accused-appellants their constitutional rights, the
PDEA operatives handcuffed them.
Issue:
1. Whether or not accused-appellants Mastor and Warren are liable for illegal sale of
shabu.
2. Whether or not Dujon is disqualified as principal witness against Mastor and Warren.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are as follows: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and payment therefor. The prosecution, to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, must present
in evidence the corpus delicti of the case. The corpus delicti is the seized illegal drugs. This Court is
convinced that the prosecution has sufficiently discharged its burden to establish the elements in the
illegal sale of shabu. The prosecution was able to establish the (1) identity of accused-appellants as
Page 104 of 519
the sellers, and the buyer, Dujon; and (2) the object of the transaction, which is the jumbo sachet of
shabu, weighing 46.4490 grams; and the delivery of the sold illegal shabu to Dujon, the poseur-buyer.
Relative to the required proof of an unbroken chain of custody of the seized illegal shabu and
shabu paraphernalia, the parties agreed to stipulate on the relevant testimony of the witnesses, the
request for laboratory examination, machine copy blotter, inventory, photographs, and affidavits, all
attesting to the fulfillment of the requirement. Indeed, the defense never raised as defense any break
in the chain of custody of the seized shabu and drug paraphernalia.
2. No. The qualification and credibility of Dujon as a principal witness cannot be assailed. The law has
specifically provided for the immunity of informants from prosecution and punishment. Section 33,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides:
Section 33.Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment. – Notwithstanding the provisions of

Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of Republic Act
No. 6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act of 1991, any person who has violated
Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 19, Article II of this Act, who voluntarily gives information about any
violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 16, Article II of this Act as well as any violation of the
offenses mentioned if committed by a drug syndicate, or any information leading to the whereabouts,
identitiesand arrest of all or any of the members thereof; and who willingly testifies against such
persons as described above, shall be exempted from prosecution or punishment for the offense with
reference to which his/her information of testimony were given, and may plead or prove the giving
of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided,That the following conditions
concur:
(1) The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the persons described
above;
(2) Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;
(3) Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points;
(4) the informant or witness has notbeen previously convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude, except when there is no other direct evidence available for the State other than the
information and testimony of said informant or witness; and
(5) The informant or witness shall strictly and faithfully comply without delay, any condition
or undertaking, reduced into writing, lawfully imposed by the State as further consideration
for the grant of immunity from prosecution and punishment.
Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness who does
not appear to be most guilty for the offense with reference to which his/her information or testimony
were given: Provided, finally, That there is no direct evidence available for the State except for the
information and testimony of the said informant or witness.
The allegation that Dujon is engaged in illegal sale, indeed even the fact that Dujon is a
detainee charged with violation of the law is not a disqualification from immunity since such is not
equivalent to a previous "conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude."Dujon, having all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the law, is eligible for immunity from
prosecution. While Dujon was part of the entrapment, the sale and possession of dangerous drugs
were proven solely by Dujon’s testimony but largely and importantly by the testimony of the
apprehending authorities and by the admitted documents.
Page 105 of 519
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKE STEVE y BASMAN and RASHID MANGTOMA y
NONI
G.R. No. 204911, August 6, 2014, J. Perez
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and convicted the accused for the violation
of RA 9165. The Basman and Mangtoma contend that they cannot be convicted of the crime charged
due to the failure to the procedure of the chain of custody rule. The Supreme Court ruled that failure to
strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not render the arrest
of the accused-appellants illegal or the item seized/confiscated from them inadmissible. The essential
thing to consider is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."
Facts:
The respondents Basman and Mangtoma were charged with a criminal complaint for the
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165. A drug buy-bust operation was planned by the police officers and
subsequently, the respondents were arrested. The Regional Trial Court convicted the respondents
and found them guilty for the crime charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, the current petition.
The accused-appellants contended that there were glaring inconsistencies with the
testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses pertaining to the conduct of the buy-bust operation, and
the manner of the alleged consummation of saleof dangerous drug; thatthere were procedural lapses
on the part of the buy-bust team to comply with Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, which accordingly
failed to secure the evidence related to the arrests, and to protect the chain ofcustody; and that
ultimately, the prosecution miserably failed to prove the accused-appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents should be acquitted for failure to comply with the chain of
custody procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ruled that the
respondents are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the commission of the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.
This Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of authenticating
evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be precededby evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
Page 106 of 519
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.
However, as correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, failure to strictly comply with the
prescribed procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not render the arrest of the accused-
appellants illegal or the item seized/confiscated from them inadmissible. The essential thing to
consider is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." Hence:
From the point of view of jurisprudence, the court are not beating any new path by holding
that the failure to undertake the required photography and immediate marking of seized items may
be excused by the unique circumstances of a case. In People v. Resurreccion, the court already stated
that "marking upon immediate confiscation" does not exclude the possibility that marking can be at
the police station or office of the apprehending team. In the cases of People v. Rusiana, People v.
Hernandez, and People v. Gum-Oyen, the apprehending team marked the confiscated items at the
police station and not at the place of seizure. Nevertheless, the court sustained the conviction because
the evidence showed that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items seized had been preserved.
To reiterate what the Court have held in past cases, the Court is not always looking for the strict step-
by-step adherence to the procedural requirements; what is important is to ensure the preservation
of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The court succinctly explained this in People v. Del Monte when the Court
held:
The Court would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the
making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not
render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence
is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For
evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no
such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will [be]
accorded (to) it by the courts. x xx
The Court does not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring
about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section,
is not of admissibility, but of weight — evidentiary merit or probative value — to be given the
evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances
obtaining in each case.
From the testimonies of the police officers in the case at bench, the prosecution established
that they had custody of the drug seized from the accused-appellants from the moment they were
arrested, during the time they were transported to the police station, and up to the time the seized
prohibited drug was submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. As regards to the handling
of the seized drug, there are no conflicting testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that would cast
doubt on the integrity thereof as evidence presented and scrutinized in court. It is therefore safe to
conclude that, to the unprejudiced mind, the testimonies show without a doubt that the evidence
seized from the accused-appellants at the time of the buy-bust operation was the same one tested,
introduced, and testified to in court. This fact was further bolstered by the stipulations entered into
Page 107 of 519

between the parties as to the testimony of Forensic Chemist Bonifacio. Needless to say, the integrity
of the evidence against accused-appellants was indeed preserved.
By way of resume, although this Court finds that the police officers did not strictly comply
with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, such noncompliance did not affect the
evidentiary weight of the drug seized from the accused-appellants because the chain of custody of
the evidence was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the case. Similarly, Section 86 of
R.A. No. 9165 is silent as to the consequence of failure to comply therewith; hence, the same shall not
be considered as a sole ground to make an arrest without the participation of the PDEA illegal or
evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Note that the subject drug confiscated
from the accused-appellants was properly accounted for and forthrightly submitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for its extensive examination. Consequently, considering the pieces of evidence presented
by the prosecution, the mere denial of and the allegation of a frame-up by accused-appellants should
fail. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, the defense of frame-up in drug cases requires
strong and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the law enforcement agencies
acted in the regular performance of their official duties. On the other hand, courts generally view the
defense of denial with disfavor due to the facility with which an accused can concoct it to suit his or
her defense. As evidence that is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more
credibility than the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby
positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed.
Again, findings of fact of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses are accorded great
weight and respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary
and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The rationale behind this rule is
that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their
testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial. This rule finds an
even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the CA. This Court does not find
any convincing reason to depart from the ruling of the trial court, which was affirmed by the appellate
court. Thus, the court affirms the assailed Decision of the appellate court and uphold the conviction
of both accused-appellants.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO HOLGADO y DELA CRUZ, et al.

G.R. No. 207992, August 11, 2014, J. Leonen
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-compliance with Section 21 indicates a

failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this non-
compliance suffices as a ground for acquittal. The integrity of three (3) of the four (4) links (i.e., seizure
and marking, turnover by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer, and turnover by the
investigating officer to the forensic chemist) has been cast in doubt. This doubt must be resolved in favor
of accused-appellants Holgado. Law enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement to ensure
integrity in the chain of custody of seized dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. This is especially
true when only a miniscule amount of dangerous drugs is alleged to have been taken from the accused.
Facts:
Accused-appellants Roberto Holgado y Dela Cruz (Holgado) and Antonio Misarez y Zaraga
(Misarez) were charged in an information for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. In the
evening of January 17, 2007, police operatives went to No. 17, C. Raymundo Street for the buy-bust
Page 108 of 519
operation. PO1 Philip Aure, acting as poseur-buyer and accompanied by the police informant,
approached Holgado who was then part of a drinking session with two (2) companions. Holgado
asked the informant if he was buying drugs while at the same time offering him a drink. The
informant accepted the drink and introduced PO1 Aure as a drug user. PO1 Aure then handed
Holgado two (2) marked one hundred peso bills.
Holgado called Misarez. After some time, co-accused Antonio Misarez stepped out of the
restroom and asked who was buying drugs. PO1 Aure and the informant answered, “Kami.” Misarez
then handed a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance to PO1 Aure. PO1 Aure
examined the sachet’s contents and took out his cellphone. This was the pre-arranged signal to the
other police operatives that the sale of drugs had been consummated.
PO3 Abuyme prepared an inventory of the seized items. Specifically with respect to the plastic
sachet which was the basis of the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, PO1 Aure supposedly
marked the plastic sachet handed to him by Misarez with “RH-PA”11 at the site of the buy-bust
operation.
After trial, the RTC found Holgado and Misarez guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs (i.e.,
violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165). The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision
convicting Holgado and Misarez.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish compliance with the requisites of
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165
Ruling:
No, the SC declared that accused-appellants Roberto Holgado y Dela Cruz and Antonio
Misarez y Zaraga should be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
On corpus delicti, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640,
provides for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or
drug paraphernalia. The failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 implies
a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus delicti. It
produces doubts as to the origins of the seized paraphernalia.
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore, ensures
the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4)
respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the
substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident
allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the
person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement
forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner.

failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this
non-compliance suffices as a ground for acquittal.
Page 109 of 519
While the buy-bust operation team allegedly conducted an inventory of the seized items, it is
unclear if this inventory was limited to those seized pursuant to the enforcement of the search
warrant (i.e., after the conduct of the buy-bust operation) or was inclusive of whatever items seized
during the buy-bust operation. In any case, this inventory was discredited as Holgado was acquitted
by the Regional Trial Court of the charge of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia because the
inventory was found to be unreliable vis-a-vis the testimony of PO2 Castulo. The paraphernalia to
which PO2 Castulo testified to in court were different from those indicated in the inventory
supposedly made when the search warrant was enforced.
There have been claims to the effect that the search warrant was enforced “in coordination
with a barangay official and in the presence of some media people.” However, this “barangay official”
and these “media people” have neither been identified nor presented as witnesses. In any case, even
if it were to be granted that these individuals took part in the events that transpired in the evening
of January 17, 2007, their participation was alleged to have been only with respect to the enforcement
of the search warrant. It did not extend to the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the
seized items arising from the buy-bust operation, as required by Section 21. For that matter, it was
not even shown that photographs of the sachet marked as “RH-PA” were taken. Per his own
testimony, PO1 Aure himself doubted if any photograph was taken.
In sum, the integrity of three (3) of the four (4) links enumerated in People v. Nandi (i.e.,
seizure and marking, turnover by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer, and turnover
by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist) has been cast in doubt. As in Nandi, this doubt
must be resolved in favor of accused-appellants Holgado.
It is true that Section 21(1), as amended, now includes a proviso to the effect that
“noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.” However, the prosecution
has not shown that when the buy-bust operation was allegedly conducted on January 17, 2007 and
the sachet was supposedly seized and marked, there were “justifiable grounds” for dispensing with
compliance with Section 21. Rather, it merely insisted on its self-serving assertion that the integrity
of the seized sachet has nevertheless been, supposedly, preserved. The omission became more
glaring considering that the prosecution asserted that the events of January 17, 2007 entailed a
carefully planned operation, engendered by reports of drug-related activities along C. Raymundo
Street. This planning even led to the application for and issuance of a search warrant.
Apart from the officers’ glaring non-compliance with Section 21, two (2) circumstances are
worth underscoring in this case. First, the shabu supposedly seized amounted to five (5) centigrams
(0.05 gram). This quantity is so miniscule it amounts to only about 2.5% of the weight of a five-
centavo coin (1.9 grams) or a one-centavo coin (2.0 grams). Second, Holgado and Misarez were
acquitted by the Regional Trial Court of all other charges (i.e., for possession of dangerous drugs and
for possession of drug paraphernalia).
Page 110 of 519

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUSTY BALA

In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be sufficiently proved:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. All these elements were duly established. Appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto selling shabu through a buy bust operation conducted by members of the Malabon
Drug Enforcement Unit. The poseur-buyer, PO1 Fernandez, positively testified that the sale took place
and appellant was one of the authors of the illegal sale of drugs.
Facts:
This case is an offshoot of G.R. No. 1523513, following a buy-bust operation, appellant Bala
and Mala were charged with a violation of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The RTC rendered a decision convicting both appellant and Mala of the crime charged. The
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 152351 affirmed the conviction only of Mala, appellant’s co-accused in this
case.
The factual antecedents, as narrated by prosecution witnesses, have been summarized in G.R.
No. 152351 as follows:
On 4 April 2001, a confidential informant came to the office of the Drug Enforcement Group,
Malabon Police Station. He reported that a transaction with two Muslims for the sale of 200 grams of
shabu in the amount of P130,000 would take place in his house. Acting on this information, the police
formed a buy-bust team composed of PO1 Joel Fernandez [PO1 Fernandez] as poseur-buyer, SPO2
Armando Isidto [SPO2 Isidto], SPO2 Manolito Manalo, and other policemen. PO1 Fernandez was then
given "boodle money" consisting of fake P1,000 bills, which were wrapped in a plastic bag.
Fernandez and the confidential informant were inside the latter’s house when Bala and Mala
arrived. The informant introduced Fernandez to the two as the buyer of shabu. When Mala asked for
the money, Fernandez showed to him the boodle money contained in a plastic bag. The former gave
to the latter the suspected shabu wrapped with a yellow transparent plastic bag. As Mala was
counting the money, he noticed it to be fake. The appellants then talked with each other in Muslim
and instantly grabbed the suspected shabu from Fernandez.
The confidential went out of the house and gave the signal to the other policemen, Isidto and
Manalo entered the house just as Fernandez was drawing his gun. Isidto confiscated the suspected
shabu from Mala, and the boodle money from Bala. The shabu was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for examination, which yielded positive result for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
Appellant Jamil Mala denied the accusation against him and his co-appellant. He claimed that
he was engaged in the selling of VCDs. One time, four persons in civilian clothes frisked him and told
him to undress. They then handcuffed him along with his companion Rusty Bala. Two of the armed
men went out of the house and later returned with two plastic bags. When appellant Mala learned of
the charges against him and Bala, he asked his wife to file charges against the arresting officers. But
his wife instead returned home to their home province.
Page 111 of 519

Appellant Rusty Bala was no longer called to testify because his lawyer allegedly "had a hard
time communicating with him"; and he appeared somewhat mentally deficient and would only
corroborate Mala’s testimony.
The RTC rendered an Amended Decision finding appellant guilty of the crime of drug pushing
under Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, penalized with reclusion perpetua. The trial
court did not give credit to appellant’s defense of denial and frame-up.
The Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction in toto. It also dismissed appellant’s
claim of frame-up and denial as insufficient. Bala appealed his conviction before this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant Bala is also guilty of the crime charged
Ruling:
Yes, appellant Bala is also guilty of the illegal sale of shabu since their acts constitute
conspiracy.
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
All these elements were duly established. Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto selling
shabu through a buy bust operation conducted by members of the Malabon Drug Enforcement Unit.
The poseur-buyer, PO1 Fernandez, positively testified that the sale took place and appellant was one
of the authors of the illegal sale of drugs.
It can be gleaned that appellant acted in common concert with his co-accused in the illegal
sale of shabu. They were both present during the entire transaction. Their acts clearly demonstrate
the presence of conspiracy. To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy.
Bala assails his conviction despite the apprehending officers’ failure to preserve the
evidentiary value of the seized items.
Section 1 of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board
Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, provides that all prohibited and regulated drugs shall be physically
inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof, to wit:
Section 1. All prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses and articles
specially designed for the use thereof when unlawfully used or found in the
possession of any person not authorized to have control and disposition of the same,
or when found secreted or abandoned, shall be seized or confiscated by any national,
provincial or local law enforcement agency. Any apprehending team having initial
Page 112 of 519
custody and control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia, should immediately after
seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in
the presence of the accused, if there be any, and/or his representative, who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Thereafter,
the seized drugs and paraphernalia shall be immediately brought to a properly
equipped government laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination.
The apprehending team shall: (a) within forty-eight (48) hours from the
seizure inform the Dangerous Drugs Board by telegram of said seizure, the nature and
quantity thereof, and who has present custody of the same, and (b) submit to the
Board a copy of the mission investigation report within fifteen (15) days from
completion of the investigation.
This rule is now incorporated as Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 that repealed
Republic Act No. 6425.
The alleged procedural infirmity pointed out by Bala does not prove fatal to the prosecution’s
case.
In People v. De Los Reyes, a case which also involved an objection regarding the non-
compliance with the chain of custody rule, the Court held that:
The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation No. 3, Series
of 1979 is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is
totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that the commission of the
crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is
established x x x and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the failure of the arresting officers
to comply with the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board.
In People v. Del Monte, this Court held that what is of utmost importance is the preservation
of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items which must be proven to establish the corpus delicti.
Bala’s defenses, which are predicated on denial and frame-up, are invariably viewed with
disfavor because such defenses can easily be fabricated and are common ploy in prosecutions for the
illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. They deserve scant consideration in light of the
positive testimonies of the police officers.
In fine, it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that Bala sold shabu. Section
15, Article III, in relation to Section 20(3) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, states:
Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution

of Regulated Drugs.- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any regulated drug. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this
Page 113 of 519
Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug
involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or

Instruments of the Crime.- The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of
Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if
the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabuor methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hempor marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuanaresin or marijuanaresin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond
therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs
Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty
shall range from prision correccionalto reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity.
In the instant case, Bala was found to have sold to the poseurbuyer a total of 211.6 grams of
shabu, which amount is more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law for the imposition
of reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that when the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Thus, in this case,
considering that no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended the Bala’s violation of Section
15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and the fine of P1,000,000.00.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO BALAQUIOT y BALDERAMA

Coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may
carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 8615 of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the
National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with
the PDEA on all drug related matters," the provision does not, make PDEA’s participation a condition
sine qua non for every buy-bust operation. A buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned
by Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of the Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort to in
apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA. A buy-bust operation is not
invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA. The conduct of the buy-bust operation was
already established by the testimonies of PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman who were the very
Page 114 of 519

participants of such operation. Balderama’s qualm regarding the absence of coordination between the
Camiling PNP and the PDEA is also immaterial.
Facts:
On 11 June 2008, Eduardo Balaquiot y Balderama (Balaquiot) was arrested during a buy bust
operation performed by officers of the PNP in Camiling, Tarlac. He was charged with the offense of
illegal sale of shabu under an Information filed before the RTC of Tarlac.
During trial, the prosecution presented, the following object evidence:
1 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.049 grams of white crystalline

substance; dated "11 June 2008" and marked with "JSE-EBB," and Chemistry Report D-184-085.
It is supplemented by the testimonies of Police Officer Jay Espiritu (PO3 Espiritu), Special
Police Officer Noli Daraman (SPO1 Daraman) and police chemist Jebie Timario (Mr. Timario).
PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman were the police officers who conducted the buy-bust
operation that led to the arrest of Balaquiot. Their testimonies recounted the following events:
On 11 June 2008, PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman engaged in a buy-bust operation against
Balderama after receiving confirmation from the Chief Intelligence Officer (CIO) of the Camiling PNP
that he was involved in the peddling of shabu. PO3 Espiritu met with the Balaquiot outside the latter’s
residence. While, SPO1 Daraman hid behind a tree about 10-20 meters from where PO3 Espiritu and
Balderama were standing.
PO3 Espiritu was able to successfully purchase one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet.
In exchange, PO3 Espiritu handed a previously marked P500 bill. After the transaction, PO3 Espiritu
arrest Balderama. SPO1 Daraman, who was able to witness the exchange, emerged from his hiding
place and aided in the arrest.
PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman retrieved from Balaquiot the marked P500 bill; call the
barangay officials to witness the inventory of the plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance and the marked money. Photographs of the plastic sachet, the marked bill were also taken.
They brought Balaquiot and the items to the Camiling PNP station. The plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance were then dated "11 June 2008" and marked with "JSE-EBB"—
the initials of both PO3 Espiritu and the appellant.
On 12 June 2008, PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory the plastic
sachet, now dated "11 June 2008" and marked "JSE-EBB," along with a request for laboratory
examination.
Mr. Timario, is a police chemist for the Camiling PNP and the one who conducted laboratory
examination on the contents of the plastic sachet. He is also the signatory of Chemistry Report D-184-
08 and he was able to confirm the contents of the plastic sachet as positive for methamphetamine
Page 115 of 519

The defense, relied on the testimonies of Balaquiot and his brother, Exequil Balaquiot
(Exequil). Balaquiot denied being caught, in flagrante, selling shabu and claimed that he was merely
a victim of a police frame-up. Exequil corroborated the denial of his brother.
RTC rendered a decision finding Balaquiot guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
illegal sale of shabu under Section 512 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. RTC gave
full faith and credence to the testimonies of PO3 Espiritu, SPO1 Daraman and Mr. Timario. RTC
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. The CA
affirmed the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the surrounding circumstances destroy the credibility of the prosecution
story that the Camiling PNP really undertook a genuine buy bust operation that will lend
trustworthiness to Balaquiot’s version that he was merely a victim of a frame-up
Ruling:
We deny the appeal.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving full faith and credence to the testimony
of the prosecution witnesses. The circumstances cited by the Balaquiot does not at all destroy its
credibility.
The conduct of the buy-bust operation was already established by the testimonies of PO3
Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman who were the very participants of such operation. Balaquiot’s qualm
regarding the absence of coordination between the Camiling PNP and the PDEA is also immaterial. In
People v. Roa, this Court ruled that prior coordination with the PDEA is not a condition sine qua non
for the validity of every entrapment operation conducted by police authorities:
Coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities
may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 8615 of Republic Act No. 9165
requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close
coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters," the provision does not, make PDEA’s
participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-bust operation. A buy-bust is just a form of an in
flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of the Court, which police authorities
may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA.
A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
The assertion that the Camiling PNP could have just applied for a search warrant instead of
conducting a buy-bust operation is irrelevant to the issue of whether a legitimate buy-bust operation
was undertaken. The decision whether to apply for a search warrant or to conduct instead a buy-bust
operation on any given case is a matter rightfully addressed to the sound discretion of the police
officers. Police officers have the right to choose which legal means or processes are best suited, given
the circumstances, in accomplishing the task they are called upon to perform.
Balaquiot is left with only his denial to fend off the serious accusations against him. Such
denial cannot overcome the weight traditionally accorded to affirmative testimonies by police
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officers with unsullied credibility. The RTC and the CA were, correct in giving full faith and credit to
the open court narrations of PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARISSA MARCELO

G.R. No. 181541, August 18, 2014, J. Del Castillo
In a prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must concur: "(1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor. x x x What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti" or the illicit drug in evidence. In this case, the prosecution successfully proved the
existence of all the essential elements of the illegal sale of shabu.
Facts:
On August 4, 2003, an Information charging Marcelo with violation of Section 5, Article II of

RA 9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," as amended, was
filed in the RTC of Sorsogon City.
The prosecution presented Police Inspector Perfecto Rabulan (P/Insp. Rabulan), Police
Officer 2 Freddie Salvatierra (PO2 Salvatierra), Police Inspector Josephine M. Clemen (P/Insp.
Clemen),Police Officer 2 Russan Jimenez (PO2 Jimenez) and Barangay Chairperson Elsa Arbitria
(Arbitria) as witnesses. From their testimonies, the following facts emerged:
Tarog informed P/Insp. Rabulan that Marcelo would arrive at his rented unit in Visitor’s Inn,,
Donsol, Sorsogon to deliver and sell shabu. P/Insp. Rabulan formed a buy-bust team and requested
Tarog to participate in the operation.
On July 31, 2003, at 10 p.m., Tarog told P/Insp. Rabulan of Marcelo's impending arrival. Tarog
was instructed to act as poseur-buyer and was given marked money.
On August 1, 2003 at 6 p.m., Marcelo arrived at the Visitor’s Inn. The buy-bust team waited in
front of the inn until Tarog signal for the buy-bust team to enter and proceed to his unit. They saw
Marcelo sitting on a couch with her back turned to the door as she was giving shabu to Tarog who
was in turn handing to her the marked money. The police officers thus immediately entered the unit.
PO2 Salvatierra took the shabu from Tarog and handed it to P/Insp. Rabulan, while the latter took
the buy-bust money.
Arbitria, baranggay chairperson, entered the room and saw Marcelo sitting on a couch with a
sachet containing white crystalline substance beside her. After being asked why she was in the
premises, appellant answered that she was collecting a debt. PO2 Jimenez conducted a body search
on appellant in the comfort room and in the presence of Arbitria, but no prohibited drug was
recovered in her possession. Neither did the search on her wallet yield any illegal substance.
The buy-bust team photographed the shabu and money and brought her to the police station
for investigation. A day later, P/Insp. Rabulan brought Marcelo and the specimen confiscated from
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her to the Crime Laboratory for examination. The specimen, which weighed 2.3234 grams, tested
positive for shabu.
Marcelo averred that there was no buy-bust operation conducted against her and that she
was just a victim of a frame-up.
The RTC rendered a Decision convicting Marcelo for violation of Section 5, Article II of
RA9165, as amended. The RTC was convinced that the prosecution’s evidence established the guilt
of appellant beyond reasonable doubt since (1) appellant was positively identified by the police
officers in open court as the seller of 2.3234 grams of shabu, and (2) the delivery of the shabu to the
poseur-buyer as well as the appellant’s receipt of the marked money were attested to by the
prosecution witnesses.
Marcelo’s denial and alibi cannot prevail over the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Besides, no improper motive can be attributed to the police officers in imputing the crime to the
appellant. Hence, their testimonies are worthy of belief coming as it does from law enforcers who are
presumed to have regularly performed their duties.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling in its Decision. Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in finding Marcelo guilty with the crime charged despite
the failure of the prosecution to prove the offense beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Elements for the Prosecution of Illegal Sale of Shabu.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must concur: "(1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti" or the illicit drug in evidence.
In this case, the prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the essential elements of
the illegal sale of shabu. Marcelo was positively identified by the police officers who conducted the
buy-bust operation as the person who sold the shabu presented in court. P/Insp. Rabulan testified
that Tarog, their informant acting as a buyer, purchased the shabu from her during a legitimate buy-
bust operation. He narrated the circumstances leading to the consummation of the sale of the shabu
and the arrest of Marcelo.
The Court finds no reason to doubt the credibility of the said witnesses and their testimonies.
The RTC, as sustained by the CA, found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were direct
and definite. Their testimonies were consistent on relevant matters with each other and the exhibits
that were formally offered in evidence.
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The Presentation of the Poseur-Buyer is not Indispensable.
Marcelo’s insistence that the failure to present the poseur-buyer is fatal to the prosecution
fails to impress. "The relevant information acquired by the ‘poseur-buyer’ was equally known to the
police officers who gave evidence for the prosecution at the trial. They all took part in the planning
and implementation of the buy-bust operation, and all were direct witnesses to the actual sale of the
shabu, her arrest immediately thereafter, and the recovery from her of the marked money. The
testimony of the poseur-buyer was not indispensable or necessary; it would have been corroborative
at best. His testimony can be dispensed with since the illicit transaction was actually witnessed and
adequately proved by the prosecution witnesses.
The Entrapment Established the Illicit Sale of Shabu
Marcelo's contention that there was no direct link between her, the marked money and shabu
again fails to impress. In an entrapment operation, the prosecution must establish the poseur-buyer’s
receipt of the shabu from appellant and present the same in court. The eyewitness testimonies of
P/Insp. Rabulan and PO2 Salvatierra are sufficient to prove the actual exchange of the marked money
and the plastic sachet of shabu between the poseur-buyer and appellant. These objects were
presented in evidence during the trial. The existence of the illicit sale is therefore evident.
A Warrant of Arrest was not Necessary
Marcelo’s argument that her warrantless arrest was not valid is untenable. The Court
emphasizes that the prosecution proved that appellant was apprehended after she exchanged the
shabu in her possession for the marked money of the poseur buyer. Having been caught in flagrante
delicto, the police officers were not only authorized but were even duty-bound to arrest her even
without a warrant.
There was no Evidence of Denial and Frame-up.
Marcelo’s defenses of denial and frame-up do not deserve credence. Denial cannot prevail
over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses. On the other hand, frame-up is viewed with
disfavor since it can easily be fabricated and is a common ploy in prosecution for violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Law. For this defense to prosper, it must be proved with clear and convincing
evidence. There must also be evidence that the police officers were inspired by improper motive.
Besides, Marcelo should have filed the proper charges against the police officers if she was
indeed the victim of a frame-up. The failure to file administrative or criminal charges against them
substantiates the conclusion that the defense of frame-up was a mere concoction.
In the absence of evidence that the prosecution witnesses were impelled by improper motive
to testify falsely, appellant failed to overturn the presumption that the arresting officers regularly
performed their duties. There is, therefore, no basis to suspect the veracity of their statements.
Page 119 of 519

The Proper Penalty
The Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that
appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, as defined and penalized under
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. Under this law, the penalty for the unauthorized sale of shabu,
regardless of its quantity and purity, is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. However, with the enactment of RA 9346, only life imprisonment
and fine shall be imposed. Moreover, appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 2 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONALDO BAYAN y NERI

A buy-bust operation was conducted by police operatives based on a tip. The accused alleges
that the prosecution failed to proof that the money presented during trial is the money he allegedly
received in exchange for drugs. The Court ruled that the failure to present the buy-bust money is not
fatal to the prosecution’s cause. It is not indispensable in drug cases since it is merely corroborative
evidence, and the absence thereof does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution provided
the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented
before the court. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-
bust operation.
Facts:
Police operatives from the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Novaliches Police
Station received a tip from a confidential informant that a certain Ronaldo Bayan and Irene Bayan
(Irene) were engaged in illegal drug trade in Barangay Capri, Novaliches, Quezon City. The leader
formed a buy-bust team which then conducted surveillance in Brgy. Capri. PO2 Mendoza was
assigned as the poseur-buyer. At about 7:40 p.m. of the same day, the team proceeded to the target
place. PO2 Mendoza, as poseur-buyer went to the house of Ronaldo Bayan. When Ronaldo opened
the door, the informant introduced PO2 Mendoza to appellant as the buyer of shabu. Ronaldo’s live-
in partner, Irene, was likewise present. PO2 Mendoza readily gave the 100-peso bill to Ronaldo in
exchange for the small plastic sachet containing shabu. Immediately after the exchange, PO2 Mendoza
introduced himself as a police officer and arrested appellant. Irene meanwhile tried to escape but
PO3 de Guzman was able to arrest her. PO3 de Guzman recovered from Irene’s possession dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in a newspaper. Ronaldo and Irene were brought to the police station
where PO2 Mendoza put his markings "EM" on the plastic sachet he received from appellant.
Thereafter, they brought the plastic sachet to the crime laboratory which tested positive for shabu.
In their defense, both Ronaldo and Irene denied the charges against them. They alleged that
while walking to the market, suddenly five (5) armed men frisked, handcuffed and brought them to
the police station where they were coerced through violence to sign certain documents. Later that
night, they were brought to the prosecutor’s office for inquest without the assistance of a counsel.
The RTC convicted both Ronaldo and Irene for violations of R.A. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act. On appeal with the CA, only Ronaldo’s conviction was sustained. Hence, this
petition.
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Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish that Ronaldo is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt
Ruling:
Yes, the prosecution was able to establish that Ronaldo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Jurisprudence dictates that minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of the witness.
The Court has held that "discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring
to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their
credibility. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant
details concerning the principal occurrence.
Failure to present the buy-bust money is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause. It is not
indispensable in drug cases since it is merely corroborative evidence, and the absence thereof does
not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution provided the sale of dangerous drugs is
adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. Neither law
nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust operation.
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Indeed, all these elements were duly established.
Furthermore, the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
said illegal drugs. The prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the following circumstances
showing an unbroken chain of custody over the shabu that was seized from Bayan: (1) P02 Mendoza,
who acted as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, was the one who received the
transparent plastic sachet containing shabu from the Ronaldo; (2) the said transparent plastic sachet
was then brought by PO2 Mendoza to the police station where he placed his initials "EM"; (3)
thereafter, said sachet was brought to the crime laboratory for examination; and (4) the laboratory
examination was conducted by Police Inspector Abraham Verde Tecson.
The defense of frame-up or denial in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence
because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of
their official duties. Bare denials of appellant cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the three
police officers. Moreover, there is no evidence of any improper motive on the part of the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation to falsely testify against appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. REYNALDO BATURI

G.R No. 189812, September 1, 2014, J. Del Castillo
Arguing that the failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the procedure governing the
handling, custody and disposition of the illegal drugs resulted to the failure of the prosecution to
establish the corpus delicti, the appellant contends that the RTC and the CA erred in finding him guilty
of violating Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165. The SC found no hiatus or confusion in the confiscation,
handling, custody and examination of the shabu. The illegal drug that was inventoried at the PDEA
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office, subjected to qualitative examination at the crime laboratory, and finally introduced in evidence
against appellant was the same illegal drug that was confiscated from him when he was caught
inflagrante delicto selling the same. No apparent irregularity is sufficiently shown to have attended the
chain of custody of the shabu. Its identity, integrity and probative value were preserved and kept intact
by the police officers. Besides, the failure of the police officers to comply strictly with the chain of custody
rule is not fatal. It will not render the arrest of appellant illegal or the items seized or confiscated from
him inadmissible. "What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused."
Facts:
On August 6, 2005, a confidential informant reported to the Philippine Drug Enforcement

Agency (PDEA) the illegal drug activities of appellant Baturi, a.k.a. Naldong, in Rosales, Pangasinan.
PO3 Velasquez then relayed the information to SP02 Rabago, the Special Enforcement Team Leader
of the PDEA, who, in turn, ordered the former to conduct a surveillance to verify the information.
Immediately after PO3 Velasquez closed a deal with appellant Baturi regarding the sale of 10
"bultos" of shabu that would transpire the next day, SPO2 Rabago formed a team to conduct an
entrapment operation where PO3 Velasquez was to act as poseur-buyer.
The next day, the buy-bust team coordinated with the police authorities stationed in the
Municipality of Rosales and held a final briefing before proceeding to Baturi’s house. Upon arrival
thereat, PO3 Velasquez approached Baturi and informed him that he already had the payment.
Thereafter, Baturi took out a carton, opened it and showed the contents thereof to PO3 Velasquez,
who, in turn, gave the buy-bust money.
PO3 Velasquez examined the contents of the carton and upon seeing that it contained plastic
sachets with white crystalline granules, he made the pre-arranged signal. Another police officer
immediately showed up and recovered the buy-bust money from Baturi, while PO3 Velasquez seized
he carton containing the sachets of white crystalline granules. After informing Baturi of his rights, the
police officers arrested and took him to the PDEA office for further investigation.
A Certificate of Inventory was then prepared by the police authorities which was signed by
two barangay officials and a media representative. Baturi was requested to sign the certificate of
inventory which he refused. This whole process was photographed. Thereafter, on the basis of a
formal request, the seized shabu was referred and delivered to the PNP Provincial Crime Laboratory.
P/Insp. Roderos issued Chemistry Report No. D-121-2005-Ustating that the white crystalline
substance was positive for shabu.
The RTC convicted Baturi and found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165. On appeal, Baturi contended that the buy-bust team failed
to comply with the procedure governing the handling, custody and disposition of the illegal drugs.
Because of this, there was failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the corpus delicti. Thus,
the RTC erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged. The Court of Appeals then rendered a
decision affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Page 122 of 519

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove appellant Baturi’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt
Ruling:
Yes, the prosecution was able to prove Baturi’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must concur: "(1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. x x x What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti" or the illicit drug in evidence.
In this case, the prosecution successfully established all the essential elements of the illegal
sale of shabu. PO3 Velasquez, who acted as poseur-buyer, positively identified Baturi as the seller of
the shabu and categorically testified that the shabu was received by him, and the payment therefor
by Baturi, in a legitimate buy-bust operation.
The Court is not persuaded by Baturi’s averment that the prosecution failed to establish that
the shabu allegedly seized from him was the same shabu submitted for laboratory examination. The
following negates Baturi’s claim: (1) the police officers inventoried the confiscated shabu
immediately after its seizure from Baturi. The process was witnessed by barangay officials and a
media representative who affixed their signatures in the Certificate of Inventory; (2) the inventory-
taking was photographed and the photographs show that the actual conduct of inventory was
witnessed by Baturi himself; (3) it is undisputed that Baturi was asked to affix his signature in the
Certificate of Inventory but he refused; (4) it was shown that a PDEA personnel thereafter prepared
a formal request and the white crystalline granules contained in the plastic sachets seized from Baturi
were indorsed and delivered promptly by PO3 Velasquez to P/Insp. Roderos to the crime laboratory.
It is true that the prosecution did not formally offer in evidence the Certificate of Inventory
and the formal request for examination of the confiscated substance. Be that as it may, the Court has
previously held that even if an exhibit is not formally offered, the same "may still be admitted against
the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has
itself been incorporated in the records of the case."PO3 Velasquez categorically testified that an
inventory of the seized drugs was performed, a corresponding certificate was prepared, and a formal
request for examination was made. He further narrated that together with the formal request, he
submitted and delivered the confiscated drugs to the crime laboratory. On the basis of the said formal
request, P/Insp. Roderos examined the specimen and she likewise testified on this. The counsel of
Baturi even asked the said prosecution witnesses regarding these documents. Considering the said
testimonies and the fact that the documents were incorporated in the records of the case, they are
therefore admissible against Baturi.
Besides, the failure of the police officers to comply strictly with the chain of custody rule is
not fatal. It will not render the arrest of Baturi illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him
inadmissible. "What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
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value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused."
In this case, the Court finds no hiatus or confusion in the confiscation, handling, custody and
examination of the shabu. The illegal drug that was inventoried at the PDEA office, subjected to
qualitative examination at the crime laboratory, and finally introduced in evidence against Baturi was
the same illegal drug that was confiscated from him when he was caught inflagrante delicto selling
the same. No apparent irregularity is sufficiently shown to have attended the chain of custody of the
shabu. Its identity, integrity and probative value were preserved and kept intact by the police officers.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO DE LA TRINIDAD y OBALLES

G.R. No. 199898, September 3, 2014, J. Perez
The finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by a
particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is
sufficient to convict. Here, Trinidad failed to present any evidence to overcome such presumption. He
merely insisted that he was framed and had no knowledge of where the prohibited drugs came from. In
the absence of any contrary evidence, he is deemed to be in full control and dominion of the drugs found
in his house. Thus, he must be convicted for possession of illegal drugs.
Non-compliance with the requirements for the custody and handling of seized dangerous drugs
is permitted under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items. Thus, if the police were accompanied by the witnesses who were
present since the briefing for the execution of the search warrant, in its execution and arrest of Trinidad,
and the inventory of the seized marijuana; and when the witnesses also signed the bags where the
marijuana were placed, the chain of custody is preserved.
Facts:
An information was filed with the RTC charging accused-appellant Leo De La Trinidad with
violation of Sec. 11, Art. II or R.A. 9165. The police conducted two test-buys after confirming that
Trinidad was involved in drug trafficking. The police were twice able to purchase marijuana from
Trinidad. The police applied for two search warrants; one for violation of R.A. 9165, the other for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. Among those in the briefing for the execution of the
warrants were the mandatory witnesses: a representative of DOJ, media representative, and 2 elected
barangay officials.
The group proceeded to the residence of Trinidad. They were accompanied by the DOJ and
media representatives together with the local barangay officials. Upon reaching Trinidad’s house, the
raiding team knocked at his door and identified themselves as police officers and informed him that
they are executing the search warrants. They told Trinidad that they have witnesses with them, and
read to him the contents of the warrants and apprised him of his constitutional rights. PO2 Quintin
Tusara took pictures of everything that transpired while the operatives were executing the warrants.
When Trinidad was asked to produce the items enumerated in the search warrant, if indeed
he really had them, he voluntarily presented the items which he took under his pillow. The items
consisted of nine and a half (9 ½) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves sealed with packaging
Page 124 of 519
tape, two (2) big bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves sealed with packaging tape, four (4)
medium size cubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves placed inside the small transparent plastic
sachet, and eighteen (18)pieces of small cubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves placed inside the
small transparent plastic sachet Also found were seventy-seven (77)pieces of empty transparent
plastic sachets. SPO1 Aguilar, placed his initial, “FBA,” in the said items.
No firearm was found at the residence of Trinidad. An inventory was then conducted right
inside the house of appellant and a certificate of inventory was prepared by SPO1 Louie Ordonez. The
Certificate of Inventory and Certification of Orderly Search were duly signed by the witnesses in the
presence of Trinidad. When subjected to both initial and final test the seized items were found
positive for the presence of marijuana.
The defense narrated that Trinidad was in his house together with his wife and children. The
police arrived and framed him up with the charge.
The RTC convicted Trinidad, as the evidence for the prosecution adequately proved all the
elements of the offense. The CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue:
1. Was Trinidad not in possession of the drugs as he had no knowledge of their location, and
that the police only framed him up?
2. Did the prosecution fail to establish the corpus delicti?
Ruling:
1. No, as mere possession of illegal drugs, coupled with intent to possess, is sufficient to convict an
accused absent any satisfactory explanation.
Trinidad’s contention is belied by the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. It
bears to stress that the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed with
disfavor by this Court for it can easily be concocted and is a common defense ploy in most
prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. They are self-serving evidence, and unless
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot be given weight over the positive assertions
of credible witnesses.
In the prosecution of illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following

elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified
to be prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the drug. As correctly ruled by the CA, these elements were duly
established by the prosecution. Jurisprudence is consistent in that mere possession of a prohibited
drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
Criminal intent is not necessary. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had
the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual
possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the
immediate possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists
when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
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dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control isnot
necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the
place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.
It must be emphasized that the finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building
owned or occupied by a particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession
thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to convict. Here, Trinidad failed to present any evidence
to overcome such presumption. He merely insisted that he was framed and had no knowledge of
where the prohibited drugs came from. In the absence of any contrary evidence, he is deemed to be
in full control and dominion of the drugs found in his house.
2. No, as the chain of custody rule provides that non-compliance with its requirements ma be allowed
on justifiable grounds
Sec. 21 (a), Art. II of the IRR of R.A. 9165, which states in part that “that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items” does not even require that
the certificate of inventory must indicate the markings and the weight of the seized items. In fact, the
rule even sanctions substantial compliance with the procedure to establish a chain of custody, as long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are property preserved by the apprehending
officers. In People v. Pringas, the Court recognized that the strict compliance with the requirements
of Section 21 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied
conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of
confiscated evidence.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the prosecution was able to establish the integrity of corpus
delicti and the unbroken chain of custody. It was sufficiently established that representatives from
the media and Department of Justice and even two (2) barangay local officials were present during
the briefing and even until the conduct of the inventory. And that immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the dangerous drugs, the same were inventoried and photographed in the presence
of Trinidad and said persons, who even signed copies of the inventory. The seized illegal drugs were
marked at accused’s residence and in his presence. P/S Insp. Villalobos testified that the seized item
she received from Aguilar already contained the markings, “FBA”. Besides, he also placed his own
initials and signatures in blue markings to preserve and maintain the integrity of the specimens.
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing
of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Trinidad bears the burden of
showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of
regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public officers
properly discharged their duties. Trinidad in this case failed to present any plausible reason to
impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the testimonies of the apprehending
officers deserve full faith and credit. In fact, Trinidad did not even question the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. He anchored his appeal solely on his allegation of frame-up and denial and on
the alleged broken chain of the custody of the seized drugs.
Page 126 of 519

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDILBERTO BALIBAY y LABIS and MARICEL

BALIBAY BIJA-AN
G.R. No. 202701, September 10, 2014, J. PEREZ
When there are doubts on whether the seized substance was the same substance examined and
established to be the prohibited drug, there can be no crime of illegal possession or illegal sale of a
prohibited drug. Such is the case at bar. Failure to prove that the specimen allegedly seized from the
accused was the same one presented in court is fatal to the prosecution’s case. Besides its failure to
identify the corpus delicti with moral certainty, the prosecution also failed to establish an unbroken
chain of custody. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labelling and
recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence.
Facts:
Accused’s conviction stemmed from two (2) sets of Information. Criminal Case No. 2004-469
accuses Edilberto Balibay y Labis (Labis)and Maricel Balibay y Bija-An (Bija-An)for Violation of
Paragraph 1, Section 5 in relation to Section 26, both of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.Criminal
Case No. 2004-470accuses Maricel Balibay y Bija-An for violation of Section 11, Paragraph 2(3),
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
During trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Senior Police Officer 1 Mariano
Durango (SPO1 Durango), the Receiving Clerk of the Crime Laboratory, Philippine National Police
(PNP), Patag, Cagayan de Oro City; Police Officer 3 Danilo Radam (PO3 Radam), who after seeing the
accused hand one (1) sachet containing white crystalline substance to PO1 Cotta Tanggote (PO1
Tanggote), arrested the accused, informed them of their constitutional rights and conducted a body
search and recovered the P200.00 marked money; and PO1 Tanggote, who acted as poseur-buyer,
conducted a body search on accused Maricel and recovered one (1) sachet containing white
crystalline substance.
Acting as poseur-buyer, PO1 Tanggote, together with a confidential agent, proceeded to the
house of the accused to conduct buy-bust operation. While there, accused Edilberto called her
daughter, accused Maricel, who was at the second floor of the house. After a while, accused Maricel
went downstairs and handed one (1) sachet containing white crystalline substance to PO1 Tanggote,
who immediately called the back-up police officers. Immediately, the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) personnel rushed to the scene and arrested both the accused. PO3 Radam, after
informing the accused their constitutional rights, conducted a body search on accused Edilberto and
recovered the marked money of P200.00. PO1 Tanggote, on the other hand, conducted a body search
on accused Maricel and recovered one (1) transparent sachet containing white crystalline substance.
Both the accused were brought to the PDEA Office at Velez Street, Cagayan de Oro City for
booking and inventory. The investigation was conducted by SPO1 Benjamin Amacanim (SPO1
Amacanim). While conducting the investigation, SPO1 Amacanim requested PO1 Tanggote to mark
the specimen
After the investigation, the specimens were returned to PO3 Radam, who drafted the request
for laboratory examination and brought the specimens to the laboratory for testing. In the PNP Crime
Laboratory, the seized specimens together with the sample urine from both the accused, were
received by the receiving clerk SPO1 Durango, and turned over to Chemist April Grace Carbajal
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Madroño (Madroño), who conducted the laboratory tests, which all tested positive for
Methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The RTC and the CA rejected the defense’s allegation of planting of evidence. According to the
lower courts, there was no evidence that points to any irregularity in the arresting officers’ exercise
of duty except for the accused’s bare denials of the accusations against them. It was pointed out that
the arresting officers do not know the accused before their arrest and have no motive to implicate
them. The CA, affirming the ruling of the RTC, relied on the principle of presumption of regularity.
Such that absent ill-motive or deviation in the exercise of their duty, police officers are presumed to
have exercised their duty regularly; their testimony shall prevail over the accused’s allegation of
frame-up. Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not due to the failure without any justification of the arresting officers to
substantially comply with the requirements provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such as
conducting an inventory and taking photographs of the specimen, the integrity of the corpus
delicti has not been properly established.
2. Whether or not there is a break in the chain of custody of the evidence as the prosecution
failed to establish how SPO1 Amacanim preserved the specimen.
Ruling:
The Court cannot discount the arresting officer's utter disregard of the procedural
requirements, failure to establish with moral certainty the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti,
and hiatus in the chain of custody under the cloak of the presumption of regularity.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are as follows: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and payment therefor. The prosecution, to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, must present
in evidence the corpus delicti of the case. The corpus delicti is the seized illegal drugs. This is to
establish with unwavering exactitude that the seized illegal drugs from the suspect is the very same
substance offered in court as exhibit.
The prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime; the prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the corpus delicti, much less, the identity of the corpus delicti with moral
certainty. As this court already held, when there are doubts on whether the seized substance was the
same substance examined and established to be the prohibited drug, there can be no crime of illegal
possession or illegal sale of a prohibited drug. Such is the case at bar. Failure to prove that the
specimen allegedly seized from the accused was the same one presented in court is fatal to the
prosecution’s case.
Besides its failure to identify the corpus delicti with moral certainty, the prosecution also
failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody.
The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labelling and
recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in
evidence. Besides the fact that PO1 Tanggote failed to ascertain the identity of the seized substance,
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the prosecution also failed to establish how SPO1 Amacanim, the investing officer, and Chemist
Madroño, the laboratory technician, preserved the integrity of the substance. The prosecution failed
to establish the manner of handling, storage, labelling and recording of the substance from the time
it was seized until it was offered as evidence in court as the substance contained unidentified
markings and sealing. Assuming that PO1 Tanggote’s allegation that SPO1 Amacanim labeled the
substance is truthful, SPO1 Amacanim and other officers who held custody of the substance should
have been presented in the court to attest to such fact. Further, all other police officers who had
custody of the substance, may it be briefly or otherwise, must be presented in court to attest to the
allegation of PO1 Tanggote.
Since the evidence custodian, SPO1 Amacanim, was not presented in court, we cannot be sure
and certain that the substance offered as evidence in court was the same substance seized from the
accused.
The prosecution failed to show how the seized shabu changed hands. Given the unique
character of shabu, and the unavoidable multiple transmittal of the specimen to different hands, it is
imperative for the officer who seized the substance from the accused to place his marking on its
plastic container and seal the same, preferably with adhesive tape that cannot be removed without
leaving a tear on the plastic container, which the arresting officer failed to comply. The police officer’s
failure to properly seal the seized shabu, coupled with the failure of the prosecution to present the
officer who had custody of the seized substance deprived the court of the means to ascertain the
corpus delicti in drugs cases.
Indeed, where, as here, there was non-compliance with the requirements set forth in Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165, there can be no presumption that the official duties have been regularly
performed by the police officers.
In resume, PO1 Tanggote, the arresting officer, failed to identify with moral certainty the
corpus delicti. Second, the prosecution failed to establish the presence of an unbroken chain of
custody of the seized substance. Despite the failure to properly seal the seized substance, the
prosecution also failed to present the testimony of the officers who held custody of the seized
substance including the handling, storage, labelling and recording of the seized substance from the
time it was seized until it was offered as evidence in court to establish that there is an unbroken chain
of custody of the seized substance. Third, without any justifiable reasons, the arresting officers failed
to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICHARD GUINTO

In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object and consideration of the sale and the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. Hence, to establish a concrete case, it is an utmost importance to prove the identity of the
narcotic substance itself as it constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence
is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is therefore imperative for the prosecution to first establish
beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the dangerous drug before asserting other arguments.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that each and every element that constitutes an
illegal sale of dangerous drug was present to convict the accused. Upon evaluation of the testimonies of
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PO1 Familara and PO1 Mendoza, it is apparent that there is an inconsistency on the identity and number
of plastic sachets bought from the accused. In his statement, PO1 Familara recalled that upon arrival at
the place of arrest, PO1 Mendoza told him that he was able to buy one plastic sachet of shabu from
Guinto. On the other hand, PO1 Mendoza recalled that he was able to buy two plastic sachets instead of
one. The pointed inconsistency is not a minor one that can be brushed aside as the discrepancy taints
the very corpus deliciti of the crime of illegal sale. A vital point of contention, the prosecution’s evidence
places in reasonable doubt the identification of the dangerous drug that was presented in court.
Facts:
Accused Guinto was apprehended on January 20, 2004 thru a buy-bust operation conducted
by the operatives from the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Task Force (AIDSTF), Pasig City in coordination
with the PDEA. According P01 Mendoza, who stood as the poseur-buyer, he was introduced by the
informant to Accused Guinto as the person in need of illegal drugs worth P200.00. When PO1
Mendoza gave the buy-bust money, Guinto drew two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu and gave it
to the former. Consequently, Guinto was arrested and underwent further investigation while the
pieces of evidence used or obtained in the buy-bust operation were documented and examined.
The prosecution presented two (2) other witnesses. PO1 Familara corroborated the
statements of P01 Mendoza but there were certain inconsistencies that surfaced concerning: 1) who
gave the buy-bust money; 2) the pre-arranged signal; 3) the time of arrival of the asset; and 4) the
number of sachets sold by Accused Guinto. The last witness, P02 Noble, also differed as to the time of
arrival of the asset, of the police team and when Guinto went out.
For the defense, Guinto interposed denial. He narrated that prior to the apprehension there
were several unidentified men who barged in to his house, grabbed his arm and searched the
premises. Thereafter, he was brought to the police. The wife and son of Guinto related the same
sequence of events.
The trial court found the Accused Guinto guilty of violating Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9156.
It held that all the elements to constitute illegal sale were proven. On appeal, the CA affirmed this
judgment and further held that the chain of custody was established and in spite certain
inconsistencies the presumption of regularity must be accorded to the arresting officers.
Issue:
Whether or not the elements of illegal sale were duly proven to support the guilty verdict
Ruling:
NO, the elements of illegal sale were not all satisfactorily proved in this case.
In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale and the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. Hence, to establish a concrete case, it is an utmost importance to prove the identity
of the narcotic substance itself as it constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its
existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is therefore imperative for the prosecution to
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first establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the dangerous drug before asserting other
arguments.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that each and every element that constitutes an
illegal sale of dangerous drug was present to convict the accused. Upon evaluation of the testimonies
of PO1 Familara and PO1 Mendoza, it is apparent that there is an inconsistency on the identity and
number of plastic sachets bought from the accused. In his statement, PO1 Familara recalled that upon
arrival at the place of arrest, PO1 Mendoza told him that he was able to buy one plastic sachet of
shabu from Guinto. On the other hand, PO1 Mendoza recalled that he was able to buy two plastic
sachets instead of one. The pointed inconsistency is not a minor one that can be brushed aside as the
discrepancy taints the very corpus deliciti of the crime of illegal sale. A vital point of contention, the
prosecution’s evidence places in reasonable doubt the identification of the dangerous drug that was
presented in court.
Further, “the conflicting statements of the police officers” negates the presumption of
regularity and the credibility of the entire buy-bust operation. The testimonies of the police officers
are not consonant with respect to the pre-arranged signal, length of time the police officers spent in
waiting for the accused and the exact time of the arrest. The inconsistencies are further amplified
when the witnesses differed as to the source of the buy-bust money, as to the circumstances that took
prior to arrest, and during the encounter from which pocket of Guinto they were able to retrieve the
marked money.
In People v. Roble, the Court ruled that generally, the evaluation of the trial court of the
credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great weight and generally not
disturbed upon appeal. However, such rule does not apply when the trial court has overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied any fact of weight or substance. In this present case, the contra-
dictions, numerous and material, warrant the acquittal of accused-appellant.
Similarly, one of the means used by the Court in determining the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses is the objective test. Following this test, in order to establish the credibility of prosecution
witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust operation, prosecution must be able to present a
complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation—from the initial contact between the poseur-
buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the
consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of sale. The manner by which the initial
contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the
delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding
citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. In light of these guiding principles, [the
Court rules] that the prosecution failed to present a clear picture on what really transpired on the
buy-bust operation.
In People v. Unisa, the Court held that “in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drug Act,
credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive
on the part of the police officers.”
True, the absence of ill motive or ill will is ordinarily considered by the Court as proof that
the statement of the police officers is credible. As maintained by the People, through the OSG, in the
absence of any improper motive, presumption of regularity of performance of duty prevails.
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However, it must be similarly noted that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of
public officers does not outweigh another recognized presumption – the presumption of innocence
of the accused until proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In several occasions, the Court had declared that the presumption of regularity of
performance of duties must be harmonized with the other interest of the State which is the interest
of adherence to the presumption of innocence of the accused.
However in case of conflict between the presumption of regularity of police officers and the
presumption of innocence of the accused, the latter must prevail as the law imposes upon the
prosecution the highest degree of proof of evidence to sustain conviction.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICHARD GUINTO Y SAN ANDRES

Dangerous drugs: In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale and the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor. Hence, to establish a concrete case, it is an utmost importance to prove the
identity of the narcotic substance itself as it constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact
of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is therefore imperative for the prosecution
to first establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the dangerous drug before asserting other
arguments.
Credibility of witness: One of the means used by the Court in determining the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses is the objective test. Following this test, in order to establish the credibility of
prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust operation, prosecution must be able to present
a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation—from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer
and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the
consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of sale. The manner by which the initial
contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery
of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are
not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
Facts:
As narrated by PO1 Mendoza, a buy-bust operation was conducted on 20 January 2004 by the
members of Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Task Force (AIDSTF). It was prompted by an information given
by a female caller received by AIDSTF. According to the female caller, a certain “Chard” was
selling shabu in a place located Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. Upon positive verification,
P/Insp. Esguerra formed a buy-bust team and designated PO1 Mendoza to act as the poseur-buyer. In
turn, SPO3 Matias prepared the pre-operation report and coordinated with the PDEA on the buy-bust
operation. PO1 Mendoza, as the poseur-buyer, was given 2 pieces of marked P100.00 bills as buy-
bust money by P/Insp. Esguerra.
After the briefing, the team including the informant proceeded to the target area. Upon
arrival, PO1 Mendoza and the informant positioned themselves outside the house of this certain
“Chard” (later identified as the accused Richard S.A. Guinto) and waited for him to step out. Guinto
finally went out of the house. The informant approached Chard and introduced PO1 Mendoza as a
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person in need of illegal drugs worth P200.00. PO1 Mendoza then gave buy-bust money to Guinto as
payment. Guinto, in turn, drew two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu and gave them to PO1
Mendoza. Guinto then put the money on his left pocket. The other members of the team responded
and arrested Guinto. The buy-bust team brought Guinto to Pasig City Police Station. PO1 Mendoza
turned over the confiscated drugs to SPO2 Basco. Consequently, SPO2 Basco asked for a laboratory
examination request to determine the chemical composition of the confiscated drugs. Thereafter,
confiscated drug was brought by PO1 Noble to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
for examination. The prosecution also presented PO1 Familara as its second witness to corroborate
the statements given by PO1 Mendoza. However, several inconsistencies were apparent in his
testimony.
The defense interposed denial. Guinto narrated that at the time of the arrest at 10:00 o’clock
in the evening of 19 January 2004, he was in their house cooking with his family. Several men
suddenly entered the house, grabbed his arm and searched the premises. When asked why the men
entered their home, the men did not give them any reason. Afterwards, Guinto was brought to the
police headquarters and investigated by the police.
The trial court rendered a decision finding Guinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It ruled that all the
elements of illegal sale of dangerous drug were proven as testified by the police officers PO1 Mendoza
and PO1 Familara. It found credible the straightforward and categorical statements of the
prosecution witnesses on what transpired during the buy-bust operation
Issue:
Whether or not Guinto is guilty of the offense charged.
Ruling:
The Court reverses the finding of trial court. The prosecution failed to prove the identity of
the corpus delicti. This is fatal in establishing illegal sale. Moreover, the conflicting statements of the
policemen on material points tarnished the credibility of the testimony for the prosecution.
The prosecution failed to prove that each and every element that constitutes an illegal sale of
dangerous drug was present to convict the accused. Upon evaluation of the testimonies of PO1
Familara and PO1 Mendoza, it is apparent that there is an inconsistency on the identity and number
of plastic sachets bought from the accused. In his statement, PO1 Familara recalled that upon arrival
at the place of arrest, PO1 Mendoza told him that he was able to buy one plastic sachet of shabu from
Guinto. On the other hand, PO1 Mendoza recalled that he was able to buy two plastic sachets instead
of one. The pointed inconsistency is not a minor one that can be brushed aside as the discrepancy
taints the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal sale. A vital point of contention, the prosecution’s
evidence places in reasonable doubt the identification of the dangerous drug that was presented in
court.
The Court found several inconsistencies on points material to the credibility of the buy-bust
operation, among others are the following: First, as to identity of the corpus delicti of the crime.PO1
Mendoza and PO1 Familara fatally contradicted each other’s testimony as to the number of sachets
bought from Guinto. In his direct testimony, PO1 Mendoza positively identified that the accused gave
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two plastic sachets in exchange of the P200 marked money, However, the same identification was
refuted when PO1 Familara testified that PO1 Mendoza informed him that he (Mendoza) successfully
bought one plastic sachet of shabu from Guinto. Second, as to where the marked money was
recovered after the buy-bust operation. According to PO1 Mendoza, he was able to obtain possession
of the buy-bust money from the left front pocket of Guinto as transcribed in his direct testimony dated
19 August 2004. However, in his direct testimony dated 18 August 2005, Mendoza testified that he
was able to recover the buy-bust money from the right hand of Guinto, as opposed from his previous
narration that he recovered the money from Guinto’s left pocket. Third, conflicting circumstances
before the arrest. In his first testimony, PO1 Mendoza recalled that upon their arrival at the target
area at around eleven o’clock in the evening, the team waited for almost two hours for the accused to
come out from his house. However, PO1 Familara testified that they arrived at the target area at
around one o’clock in the morning of 20 January 2004. Witness PO1 Noble, on the other hand, recalled
that they left for the area at around eleven in the evening and waited for 15 to 20 minutes for Guinto
to come out but contradicted his former statement and testified that they arrived at around one
o’clock in the morning. The prosecution failed to present a clear picture on what really transpired on
the buy-bust operation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GARRY DELA CRUZ y DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 205821, October 1, 2014, J. Leonen
Apart from the blatantly irregular handling by PO1 Bobon of the seven (7) sachets, it is also
admitted that no physical inventory and taking of photographs in the presence of Dela Cruz or of any of
the other persons specified by Section 21 were conducted. The significance of complying with Section
21’s requirements cannot be overemphasized. Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing
identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these offenses, non-compliance will, thus,
engender the acquittal of an accused.
Facts:
Dela Cruz was arrested in a buy-bust operation. The buy-bust operation was allegedly
conducted after a civilian informant tipped the Zamboanga City Police Office that a certain “Gary” was
selling illegal drugs at the parking area for buses behind Food Mart, Governor Lim Street, Sangali,
Bunguioa, Zamboanga City (the target area).
At around 11:00 a.m. of September 14, 2004, the buy-bust operation team, accompanied by
the informant, went to the target area. The informant initially brokered the sale of shabu. It was PO1
Bobon who handed the marked money to Dela Cruz in exchange for one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet
of suspected shabu. After which, he removed his bull cap. SPO1 Roca then arrested Dela Cruz.
Upon frisking dela Cruz, PO1 Bobon supposedly recovered six (6) more heat-sealed sachets
of suspected shabu. PO1 Bobon placed the sachet he purchased from dela Cruz in his right pocket and
the six (6) other sachets in his left pocket. SPO1 Roca recovered the marked 100.00 bill. The Regional
Trial Court convicted Dela Cruz for violating Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming Dela Cruz’
conviction in toto.
Issue:
Page 134 of 519
Whether Dela Cruz’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sections 5 and 11 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was established
Ruling:
No. In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first
be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be
shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus
delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
With respect to the element of corpus delicti, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 provides for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or
surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia.
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of
the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with
an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant
is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA
Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by the
forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject item/s:
Page 135 of 519
Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the
time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the
quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however,
That a final certification shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said examination and
certification;

failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this
non-compliance suffices as a ground for acquittal.
In People v. Nandi, the Court explained that four (4) links “should be established in the chain
of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover
and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.”
In this case, the Regional Trial Court acknowledged that no physical inventory of the seized
items was conducted. Similarly, there is nothing in the records to show that the seized items were
photographed in the manner required by Section 21. Likewise, none of the persons required by
Section 21 to be present (or their possible substitutes) have been shown to be present. The
circumstance of PO1 Bobon keeping narcotics in his own pockets precisely underscores the
importance of strictly complying with Section 21. His subsequent identification in open court of the
items coming out of his own pockets is self-serving.
The prosecution effectively admits that from the moment of the supposed buy-bust operation
until the seized items’ turnover for examination, these items had been in the sole possession of a
police officer. In fact, not only had they been in his possession, they had been in such close
proximity to him that they had been nowhere else but in his own pockets.
Keeping one of the seized items in his right pocket and the rest in his left pocket is a doubtful
and suspicious way of ensuring the integrity of the items. Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ finding
that PO1 Bobon took the necessary precautions, the Court finds his actions reckless, if not dubious.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLITO ANDAYA y REANO

G.R. No. 183700, October 13, 2014, J. Bersamin
The non-presentation of the confidential informant as a witness does not ordinarily weaken the
State's case against the accused. However, if the arresting lawmen arrested the accused based on the
pre-arranged signal from the confidential informant who acted as the poseur buyer, his non-
presentation must be credibly explained and the transaction established by other ways in order to satisfy
the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt because the arresting lawmen did not themselves
participate in the buy-bust transaction with the accused.
Facts:
Page 136 of 519

On February 7, 2003, an information for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA
9165) (illegal sale of dangerous drugs) was filed charging Pablito Andaya y Reano (Andaya). Upon
arraignment, Andaya pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The
prosecution presented five (witnesses), namely: SPO4 Delfin Alea, SPO3 Nelio Lopez, SPO2 Danilo
Mercado, SPO4 Protasio Marasigan and Jupri Delantar.
SPO2 Delfin Alea testified that at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of December 16, 2002,
their asset who was conducting surveillance of Pablito Andaya in Barangay San Jose Sico, Batangas
City, arrived at their station. Said asset reported that he had arranged to buy shabu from Pablito. A
team composed of SPO1 Aguila, SPO1 Cabungcal, Eric de Chavez, PO1 Lindberg Yap, Edwalberto Villar
and asset Bagsit was constituted to conduct a buy-bust. Two (2) pieces of P100.00 bills both duly
marked "X" were recorded in the police blotter. Alea gave the marked bills to the asset. Upon reaching
the designated place, the team members alighted from their vehicles and occupied different positions
where they could see and observe the asset. The asset knocked on the door of Pablito's house. Pablito
came out. Pablito and the asset talked briefly. The asset gave Pablito the marked money. The asset
received something from appellant. As the pre-arranged signal signifying consummation of the
transaction was given, the team members approached Pablito and the asset, introduced themselves
as police officers and arrested accused. He was brought to the police station and the arrival of the
team was recorded in the police blotter. The merchandise handed by accused to the asset was then
sent to the Regional Crime Laboratory in Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. Eventually, the
specimen was positive for methampethamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug. Also, SPO2
Lopez testified that received the person of the accused, the marked money and the item accused
handed to the asset. He also prepared the request for laboratory examination and the documents
required for the filing of the case with the Public Prosecutor. Furthermore, when presented, SPO2
Danilo Mercado testified that he recorded the marked bills in the police blotter before the buy-bust.
Upon the team's return, the marked money and the merchandise from accused were turned over to
him. He prepared a complaint sheet. Thereafter, he turned over accused and the evidence to the
Police Investigator.SPO4 Protacio Marasigan, for his part testified that he received a written request
for laboratory examination of the subject merchandise and brought the same to the crime laboratory
in Laguna. Moreover, Jupri Delantar, a Forensic Chemical Officer in Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna,
testified that he conducted the examination in which the merchandise tested positive for shabu.
Eventually, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, in Batangas City (RTC) rendered its judgment
convicting Andaya as charged, and meted him the penalty of life imprisonment. On appeal, the said
decision was affirmed in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not Andaya shall be held guilty for the illegal sale of shabu albeit the prosecution’s
non-presentation of the confidential informant, which according to accused, was adverse to the
prosecution and indicates that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Accused Pablito Andaya y Reano is hereby acquitted for failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and his immediate release from confinement at the National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa City is also ordered.
Page 137 of 519

To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs as defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs
Act of 2002), the State must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the
transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and (b) that the dangerous
drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal prosecution, it is
the State, and no other, that bears the burden of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond
reasonable doubt. This responsibility imposed on the State accords with the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused, who has no duty to prove his innocence until and unless the
presumption of innocence in his favor has been overcome by sufficient and competent evidence.
Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. It is notable that the members of the buy-
bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. The pre-
arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-bust team that the transaction had been
consummated between the poseur buyer and Andaya. However, the State did not present the
confidential informant/poseur buyer during the trial to describe how exactly the transaction
between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have been no issue against that, except that
none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the transaction, if any, between
Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being positioned at a distance from the poseur buyer and
Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction.
This Court is also of the view that the justification by the CA in not finding anything wrong or
odd in the non-presentation of the poseur buyer as a witness against the accused, was off-tangent
and does not help the State's cause. In this case, the poseur buyer and the confidential informant were
one and the same. Without the poseur buyer's testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate
Andaya.
Under the law, selling was any act "of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical whether for money or any other consideration;"while delivering
was any act "of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any
means, with or without consideration." Given the legal characterizations of the acts constituting the
offense charged, the members of the buy-bust team could not incriminate Andaya by simply declaring
that they had seen from their positions the poseur buyer handing something to Andaya who, in turn,
gave something to the poseur buyer. If the transaction was a sale, it was unwarranted to infer from
such testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team that what the poseur buyer handed over were
the marked P100.00 bills and that what Andaya gave to the poseur buyer was the shabu purchased.
Another mark of suspicion attending the evidence of guilt related to the reliance by the
members of the buy-bust team on the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. To start with, the
record does not show what the prearranged signal consisted of. It is fundamental enough to expect
the State to be clear and definite about its evidence of guilt, particularly here where the conviction of
Andaya would require him to spend the rest of his natural life behind bars. Secondly, the reliance on
the supposed signal to establish the consummation of the transaction between the poseur buyer and
Andaya was unwarranted because the unmitigatedly hearsay character of the signal rendered it
entirely bereft of trustworthiness. The arresting members of the buy-bust team interpreted the signal
from the anonymous poseur buyer as the sign of the consummation of the transaction. Their
interpretation, being necessarily subjective without the testimony of the poseur buyer, unfairly
threatened the liberty of Andaya. We should not allow that threat to perpetuate itself. And, lastly, the
Page 138 of 519
reliance on the signal would deprive Andaya the right to confront and test the credibility of the poseur
buyer who supposedly gave it.
The Court should look at the situation of Andaya with utmost caution because of what our
judicial experience through the years has told us about unscrupulous lawmen resorting to stratagems
of false incrimination in order to arrest individuals they target for ulterior reasons. In this case, the
arrest did not emanate from probable cause, for the formless signal from the anonymous poseur
buyer did not establish beyond reasonable doubt the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWIN CABRERA

When an accused raises the issue of non-compliance by the police officers with Sec. 21 of the IRR
of R.A. No. 9165 particularly the lack of physical inventory of the seized specimen and the non-taking of
photograph thereof on appeal after the CA rendered a decision, the Court must uphold his conviction.
Cabrera should have raised the said issue before the trial court. Truly, objection to evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must
so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first
time on appeal.
Facts:
After receiving information from informants and a report from a confidential asset, police
operatives, namely PO1 Palconit, PO3 Cabuenas, and PO2 Cunan conducted a buy-bust operation
against Accused-appellant Cabrera on September 30, 2002. At about 4:30 p.m., poseur-buyer PO1
Palconit, together with the confidential asset, approached Cabrera who was standing outside his
house. The confidential asset introduced PO1 Palconit to Cabrera as a person who wanted to buy
shabu. PO1 Palconit gave Cabrera two marked PhP50.00 bills, while the latter handed to him two
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. Thereupon, PO1 Palconit made the pre-
arranged signal by touching his head with his right hand. His back-ups then rushed to the scene and
simultaneously therewith PO1 Palconit arrested the appellant. He then wrote the markings “EC” on
the two plastic sachets and brought the same to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Labo-
ratory for forensic examination.
Thereafter, a complaint/information was filed against appellant charging him with violation
of Sec. 5, Article II, of R.A. No. 9165 as amended. The chemistry report from the PNP Crime Laboratory
later revealed that the two plastic sachets marked with “EC” tested positive for shabu, a dangerous
drug. Cabrera pleaded “not guilty” to the crime charged and interposed a denial.
The RTC convicted Cabrera of the crime charged which was affirmed by the CA. Cabrera in
his ultimate appeal raised as additional assignment of errors the lack of physical inventory of the
seized specimen and the non-taking of its photograph pursuant to Sec. 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165.
Issue:
Whether or not Cabrera should be held guilty for violating R.A. No. 9165 in spite certain
procedural lapses of the arresting officers.
Page 139 of 519

Ruling:
Yes, Cabrera can still be held liable.
With regard to the non-compliance by the police officers with Sec. 21 of the IRR of R.A. No.
9165 as alleged by Cabrera in his Supplemental Brief, particularly the lack of physical inventory of
the seized specimen and the non-taking of photograph thereof, the Court notes that [Cabrera] raised
the same only in this appeal.
The records of the case is bereft of any showing that Cabrera objected before the RTC
regarding the seizure and safekeeping of the shabu seized from him on account of the failure of the
police officers to maintain an unbroken chain of custody of the said drugs. The only time that Cabrera
questioned the chain of custody was before the CA but not on the ground of lack of physical inventory
or non-taking of photograph, but on the alleged gap between the time of confiscation of the specimen
and the time of its submission to the PNP Crime Laboratory. But even then, it was already too late in
the day for appellant to do so. Cabrera should have raised the said issue before the trial court.
In similar cases, the Court brushed aside the Cabrera's belated contention that the illegal
drugs confiscated from his person were inadmissible because the arresting officers failed to comply
with Sec. 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165. Whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers
from literally complying with Sec. 21 will remain unknown, because Cabrera did not question during
trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the
form of an objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
Besides and as already mentioned, the CA had already aptly concluded that the identity of the seized
drugs was established by the prosecution and its integrity preserved.
RIZALDY SANCHEZ Y CAJILI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014, J. Mendoza
In this case, the prosecution failed to account for each and every link in the chain of custody of
the shabu, from the moment it was allegedly confiscated up to the time it was presented before the court
as proof of the corpus delicti. The Court entertains doubts whether the shabu allegedly seized from
Sanchez was the very same item presented during the trial of this case. The Court notes that there were
several lapses in the law enforcers’ handling of the seized item which, when taken collectively, render
the standards of chain of custody seriously breached. Thus, the chain of custody requirement has a two-
fold purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, and (2) the
removal of unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence.
Facts:
Sanchez was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in the Information, filed before the RTC. That,
the Sanchez, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, control and custody, 0.1017 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
commonly known as “shabu,” a dangerous drug. When arraigned, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the existence and
due execution of the following pieces of evidence: 1) the request for laboratory examination; 2)
Page 140 of 519
certification issued by the National Bureau of Investigation; 3) Dangerous Drugs Report; and 4)
transparent plastic sachet containing small transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution’s version states that around 2:50 pm of March 19, 2003, acting on the
information that Jacinta Marciano, aka “Intang,” was selling drugs to tricycle drivers, SPO1 Elmer
Amposta, together with CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr., and CSU Samuel Monzon, was
dispatched to Barangay Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite to conduct an operation. While at the place, the
group waited for a tricycle going to, and coming from, the house of Jacinta. After a few minutes, they
spotted a tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The group chased the tricycle.
After catching up with it, they requested Rizaldy to alight. It was then that they noticed Rizaldy
holding a match box. SPO1 Amposta asked Rizaldy if he could see the contents of the match box.
Rizaldy agreed. While examining it, SPO1 Amposta found a small transparent plastic sachet which
contained a white crystalline substance. Suspecting that the substance was a regulated drug, the
group accosted Rizaldy and the tricycle driver. The group brought the two to the police station. Salud
M. Rosales, a forensic chemist from the NBI, submitted a Certification that the specimen/s gave
positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
In the present petition, Sanchez denied the accusation against him and presented a different
version of the events that transpired in the afternoon of March 19, 2003. He testified that on the date
and time in question, he, together with a certain Darwin Reyes, was on their way home from Brgy.
Alapan, Imus, Cavite, where they transported a passenger, when their way was blocked by four (4)
armed men riding an owner-type jeepney. Without a word, the four men frisked him and Darwin. He
protested and asked what offense they committed. The arresting officers told him that they had just
bought drugs from Alapan. He reasoned out that he merely transported a passenger there but the
policemen still accosted him and he was brought to the Imus Police Station where he was further
investigated. The police officer, however, let Darwin Reyes go.
The RTC rendered its decision finding that Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto, in actual
possession of shabu. It stated that the police operatives had reasonable ground to believe that
Sanchez was in possession of the said dangerous drug and such suspicion was confirmed when the
match box Sanchez was carrying was found to contain shabu. The CA found no cogent reason to
reverse or modify the findings of facts and conclusions reached by the RTC and, thus, upheld the
conviction of the accused for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The CA then went on
to write that non-compliance by the police officers on the requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, particularly on the conduct of inventory and photograph of the seized drug,
was not fatal to the prosecution’s cause since its integrity and evidentiary value had been duly
preserved. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess
of jurisdiction when it held that non-compliance with Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic
Act no. 9165 does not automatically render the seized items inadmissible in evidence.
Page 141 of 519

Ruling:
Yes, the CA erred. Furthermore, the Court entertains doubts whether the shabu allegedly
seized from Sanchez was the very same item presented during the trial of this case. The Court notes
that there were several lapses in the law enforcers’ handling of the seized item which, when taken
collectively, render the standards of chain of custody seriously breached.
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. The function of the chain of
custody requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. Thus,
the chain of custody requirement has a two-fold purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, and (2) the removal of unnecessary doubts as to the identity of
the evidence.
In this case, the prosecution failed to account for each and every link in the chain of custody
of the shabu, from the moment it was allegedly confiscated up to the time it was presented before the
court as proof of the corpus delicti. The testimony of SPO1 Amposta was limited to the fact that he
placed the marking “RSC” on the seized drug; and that he and the three other police officers brought
Sanchez and the subject shabu to their station and turned them over to their investigator. The
prosecution evidence did not disclose where the marking of the confiscated shabu took place and
who witnessed it. The evidence does not show who was in possession of the seized shabu from the
crime scene to the police station. A reading of the Certification, issued by Forensic Chemist Salud
Rosales shows that a certain PO1 Edgardo Nario submitted the specimen to the NBI for laboratory
examination, but this piece of evidence does not establish the identity of the police investigator to
whom SPO1 Amposta and his group turned over the seized shabu. The identities of the person who
received the specimen at the NBI laboratory and the person who had the custody and safekeeping of
the seized marijuana after it was chemically analyzed pending its presentation in court were also not
disclosed.
Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, a serious uncertainty hangs over the identity
of the seized shabu that the prosecution introduced in evidence. The prosecution failed to establish
an unbroken chain of custody, resulting in rendering the seizure and confiscation of the shabu open
to doubt and suspicion. Hence, the incriminatory evidence cannot pass judicial scrutiny.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSALINDA CASABUENA

G.R. No. 186455, November 19, 2014, J. Brion
In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object,
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. To remove any
doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that
the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from Casabuena;
otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails. The testimonies
of SPO1 Balolong, SPO2 Ancheta, and Armando all showed that the police did not inventory or
photograph the seized shabu either at the place where it was seized or at the police station. No
photographs or certificate of inventory of the confiscated items appear in the records.
Page 142 of 519
Facts:
The prosecution charged the Casabuena with illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165. That Casabuena, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell in a buy
bust operation to Armando Joaquin acting as the poseur-buyer 0.0139 gram of shabu, a dangerous
drug, contained in one plastic sachet, without any license or authority to sell the same. The Casabuena
was duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge laid.
SPO1 Balolong testified that on February 4, 2004, one of the police informants, Armando,
went to the Laoag City Police Station and informed him that the Casabuena was selling shabu in
Barangay 5. Acting on this information, the city’s chief of police formed an entrapment team. The
team conducted a ‘briefing’, assigned Armando as the poseur-buyer, and then went to the target area.
When the team arrived there, they positioned themselves 15 meters from the Casabuena’s
compound. Armando followed them after receiving a call from SPO1 Balolong. Armando entered the
Casabuena’s house when he arrived; he went out after two (2) minutes and made the pre-arranged
signal to the other members of the buy-bust team.Once inside, Armando handed the sachet of shabu
to SPO1 Balolong. Armando then led the police to the bathroom, and there, Armando grabbed the left
hand of the Casabuena. SPO1 Balolong, for his part, “forced open” Casabuena’s right hand and took
two P100 bills from her. SPO1Balolong informed the Casabuena of her constitutional rights, and then
ordered PO1 Mangapit to arrest her.
The police then brought the Casabuena and the seized items to the Laoag City Police Station.
When they arrived there, SPO1 Balolong submitted the seized items to SPO2 Loreto Ancheta, the
evidence custodian who, in turn, marked these items. On cross examination, SPO1 Balolong stated
that Armando was just a “walk-in” informant. SPO1 Balolong also admitted that he did not witness
the transaction between Armando and the Casabuena since he was outside the latter’s house. P/Sr.
Insp. Cayabyab, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Laoag City, stated that,
Merlita Pasion, the laboratory’s receiving clerk, handed to her a letter-request and a small plastic
sachet containing alleged shabu. She put her initials on the sachet, made an initial preliminary
examination on the submitted specimen, and found it positive for the presence of 0.0139 gram of
shabu. She conducted a confirmatory test on the specimen, and this test yielded the same result. The
results of these two tests were reflected in the Initial Laboratory Report and in Chemistry Report.
With regard to the marked money, SPO2 Ancheta claimed that he noted their respective serial
numbers, and then placed them in a steel cabinet. He maintained that the item presented to him was
the same item given to him by SPO1 Balolong because it bore the markings he made.
The Defense version states that Abian recalled that at around 11:00 a.m. on February 4, 2004,
he was in front of the gate of the Casabuena’s house when Armando approached him and asked if
there was any available shabu, and whether his aunt was selling shabu. When he answered in the
negative, Abian asked him for his aunt’s identity. Abian pointed to the Casabuena – who was then
near the bathroom. Thereafter, the Casabuena called Abian and asked him to buy a shampoo. Abian
did as instructed and bought shampoo. When he returned, he handed the shampoo to the Casabuena
who, in turn, went inside the bathroom. Afterwards, SPO1 Balolong went to the bathroom, kicked the
door open, and asked the Casabuena where the money was. When the Casabuena answered that there
was no money, SPO1Balolong pulled her out of the bathroom. The police asked Casabuena to put her
clothes on, and then brought her to the police headquarters. According to the Casabuena, the police
did not sign any confiscation receipt. She maintained that she did not sell shabu to Armando on
February 4, 2004.The RTC found the Casabuena guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
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Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA held that the prosecution was able to prove that the
appellant sold shabu to the poseur-buyer.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody over the seized drug was broken and that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the object evidence had not been preserved
Ruling:
Yes, the chain of custody was broken.
In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object,
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. To remove
any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely
show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from
Casabuena; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required
because of the illegal drug's unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and
easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. The outlined
procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the members of the buy-bust
team, and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the
said statutory requirement in handling the seized evidence. The testimonies of SPO1 Balolong, SPO2
Ancheta, and Armando all showed that the police did not inventory or photograph the seized shabu
either at the place where it was seized or at the police station. No photographs or certificate of
inventory of the confiscated items appear in the records.
Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express
requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. These conditions were not met in the present
case, as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification why it failed to inventory and
to photograph the seized items. The Court cannot simply presume what these justifications are.
Contrary to the CA’s ruling, the so-called “field test of the drugs recovered” and its turn over to the
crime laboratory together with the marked money are not the procedures mandated by Section 21
and its IRR.
In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti
of the offense and its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the
corpus delicti. The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. The rule seeks to settle definitively whether the
object evidence subjected to laboratory examination and presented in court is the same object
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allegedly seized from appellant. In the present case, the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the
chain that would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen seized
from the Casabuena.
A vital link in the chain of custody is SPO1 Balolong’s possession of the plastic sachet at Barangay 5,
Laoag City and his delivery of this sachet at the police station. This Court points out that SPO1
Balolong did not mark the plastic sachet; it was SPO2 Ancheta who allegedly placed markings when
the plastic sachet was handed to him at the police station. P/Sr. Insp. Cayabyab’s testimony is
inconsistent the claim of SPO2 Ancheta that he marked the seized sachet with, among others, “RC”
which stands for the appellant’s initials. This Court is puzzled why the specimen presented to SPO2
Ancheta bore the initial “RC” while the item presented to P/Sr. Insp. did not have Casabuena’s initials.
In the absence of any evidence, we cannot assume that the markings being referred to in both the
Initial Laboratory Report and in the Chemistry Report were the same markings allegedly placed by
SPO2 Ancheta. The Court cannot assume a matter not stated in the records. The Court also notes that
there is a discrepancy between the quantity of shabu stated in the Request For Laboratory
Examination (0.1 gram) and in the Chemistry Report (0.0139 gram).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIL DORIA DAHIL AND ROMMEL CASTRO y CARLOS
G.R. No. 212196, January 12, 2015, J. Mendoza
The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not indispensable in
every prosecution for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of the
dangerous drugs should be established beyond doubt by showing that the items offered in court were
the same substances bought during the buy-bust operation. This rigorous requirement, known under
R.A. No. 9165 as the chain of custody, performs the function of ensuring that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
Facts:
On October 1, 2002, Dahil and Castro were charged in three (3) separate Informations before
the RTC. In Criminal Case No. DC 02-376, Dahil and Castro were charged with violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the sale of 26.8098 grams of marijuana. In Criminal Case No. DC 02-377,
Dahil was charged with possession of 20.6642 grams of marijuana. In Criminal Case No. DC 02-378,
Castro was charged with possession of 130.8286 grams of marijuana. On November 14, 2002, Castro
was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Dahil, on the other hand, filed a motion for reinvestigation
and his arraignment was deferred. The RTC discovered that Dahil was never arraigned through
inadvertence.
Evidence of prosecution shows that PDEA conducted relative to the information they
received that a certain alias “Buddy” and alias “Mel” were trafficking dried marijuana. The Chief of
PDEA formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. The team proceeded to the target place. When
PO2 Corpuz and the informant were in front of the house, they met Dahil and Castro. The informant
then introduced PO2 Corpuz as the buyer of marijuana. Dahil asked PO2 Corpuz how much would he
be buying and the latter answered that he would buy 200.00 worth of marijuana. At this juncture,
Dahil took out from his pockets plastic sachets of marijuana and handed them to PO2 Corpuz. After
checking the items, PO2 Corpuz handed 2100.00 marked bills to Castro. Immediately thereafter, PO2
Cruz took off his cap to signal that the sale had been consummated. The rest of the buy-bust team
then rushed to their location and arrested Castro and Dahil. PO2 Corpuz frisked Dahil and recovered
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from his possession another 5 plastic sachets containing marijuana while SPO1 Licu searched the
person of Castro and confiscated from him 1 brick of suspected marijuana. Both Castro and Dahil,
together with the confiscated drugs, were then brought by the buy-bust team to the PDEA office.
There, the seized items were marked by PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu. Sergeant dela Cruz then prepared
the request for laboratory examination, affidavits of arrest and other pertinent documents. An
inventory of the seized items was also prepared which was signed by Kagawad Pamintuan.
Thereafter, PO2 Corpuz brought the confiscated drugs to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination,
which subsequently yielded positive results for marijuana.
In his defense, Dahil claimed that on September 29, 2002, a tricycle driver came looking for
him after he had arrived home. He was then asked by the unknown man whether he knew a certain
Buddy in their place. He answered that there were many persons named Buddy. Suddenly, persons
alighted from the vehicles parked in front of his house and dragged him into one of the vehicles. He
was brought to Clark Air Base and was charged with illegal selling and possession of marijuana.
Castro testified that on September 29, 2002, he was on Barangay Ninoy Aquino, Angeles City,
watching a game of chess when he was approached by some men who asked if he knew a certain Boy
residing at Hardian Extension. He then replied that he did not know the said person and then the men
ordered him to board a vehicle and brought him to Clark Air Base where he was charged with illegal
possession of marijuana.
The RTC found both accused liable. The RTC was convinced that the prosecution was able to
prove the case of selling and possession of illegal drugs against the accused. All the elements of the
crimes were established. On appeal, the CA denied the appeal. In its view, the prosecution was able
to establish that the illegal sale of marijuana actually took place. It was also held that the prosecution
was able to establish the chain of custody. PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu testified that the said drugs
were marked at the police station.
Issue:
Whether or not the law enforcement officers substantially complied with the chain of custody
procedure required by R.A. No. 9165.
Ruling:
No. The strict procedure under Sec. 21 of RA 9165 was not complied with.
The said provision requires the apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation, to
immediately (1) conduct a physically inventory; and (2) photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. First,
the inventory of the property was not immediately conducted after seizure and confiscation as it was
only done at the police station. The prosecution did not even claim that the PDEA Office Region 3 was
the nearest office from TB Pavilion where the drugs were seized. The prosecution also failed to give
sufficient justification for the delayed conduct of the inventory. Second, there is doubt as to the
identity of the person who prepared the Inventory of Property Seized. According to the CA decision,
it was Sergeant Dela Cruz who prepared the said document.27 PO2 Cruz on the other hand, testified
that it was their investigator who prepared the document while SPO1 Licu’s testimony was that a
certain SPO4 Jamisolamin was their investigator. Third, there were conflicting claims on whether the
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seized items were photographed in the presence of the accused or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official.
The prosecution failed to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
were preserved.
PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu claimed that they had placed their initials on the seized items.
They, however, gave little information on how they actually did the marking. It is clear, nonetheless,
that the marking was not immediately done at the place of seizure, and the markings were only placed
at the police station based on the testimony of PO2 Corpuz. From the place of the seizure to the PDEA
Office Region 3, the seized items were not marked. It could not, therefore, be determined how the
unmarked drugs were handled. Also, the investigator in this case was a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin.
Surprisingly, there was no testimony from the witnesses as to the turnover of the seized items to
SPO4 Jamisolamin. It is highly improbable for an investigator in a drug-related case to effectively
perform his work without having custody of the seized items. Further, no testimonial or documentary
evidence was given whatsoever as to how the drugs were kept while in the custody of the forensic
chemist until it was transferred to the court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANOLITO OPIANA Y TANAEL

G.R. No. 200797, January 12, 2015, J. Del Castillo
For the violation of Section 5, the prosecution satisfactorily established the following
elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in evidence.
Facts:
On April 8, 2008, the Makati police officers and Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC)
operatives conducted an entrapment/buy-bust operation on Opiana who was reportedly engaged in
illegal drug trade. MADAC operative Serrano acted as poseur-buyer. After having been introduced
by the informant as a “scorer” of shabu, Opiana and Serrano negotiated for the sale of P300.00 worth
of shabu. Serrano gave Opiana the P300 marked money and in exchange, appellant handed to
Serrano a heat-sealed sachet containing white crystalline substance. After making the pre-arranged
signal, Opiana was apprehended and when bodily frisked, 19 heat-sealed sachets were recovered
from his possession. Laboratory examination revealed that all 20 heat-sealed sachets yielded
positive results for shabu. Opiana was charged with the crimes of violations of Section 5 (sale of illegal
drugs; 0.05 gram) and Section 11 (possession of dangerous drugs; 0.74 gram), both of Article II, RA
9165.
Opiana denied the charges against him. He claimed that on April 8, 2008, he was repairing a
vehicle in front of his house when a green van arrived and 3 men alighted. When he affirmatively
answered to their query whether he is “Noli,” he was immediately arrested. He asserted that the
police officers mistook him as the “Noli” who was known to be a drug peddler in their area. He argued
that he is known in their place as “Noli Mekaniko,” and not the drug peddler.
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The RTC convicted appellant of violations of Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of RA 9165.Opiana

appealed to the CA. In his Brief, Opiana alleged that the buy-bust team did not observe the proper
procedure governing the handling, custody and disposition of the illegal drugs. However, the CA
denied the appeal. The CA ruled that all the elements for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Hence,
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether Opiana is guilty of the offense charged.
Ruling:
The Court finds the appeal to be lacking in merit.
For the violation of Section 5, the prosecution satisfactorily established the following
elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale
of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in evidence. The prosecution satisfactorily
established the following elements for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs in violation of
Section 11, to wit: appellant was shown to have been in possession of 0.74 gram of shabu, a prohibited
drug; his possession was not authorized by law; and that he freely and consciously possessed the said
illegal drug.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAKIM MINANGA y DUMANSAL

G.R. No. 202837, January 21, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
The Court gives full faith and credence to the testimonies of the police officers and upholds the
presumption of regularity in the apprehending officers’ performance of official duty. It is a settled rule
that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses
who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless
there is evidence to the contrary.
Facts:
After receiving reliable information from a police asset that Rakim is actively engaged in
selling illegal drugs, a team and the police asset was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation in
Butuan City, against the appellant. PO1 Rommel dela Cruz Condez (PO1 Condez) was designated to
act as the poseur-buyer with PO2 Saldino Virtudazo (PO2 Virtudazo) as his back-up. The team
brought with them the amount of P20,000.00 as show money.
Upon arrival at the designated place, the police asset introduced PO1 Condez to Rakim as an
interested buyer of shabu. After Rakim agreed to sell to PO1 Condez four “sacks” of shabu for the
amount of P20,000.00, appellant told PO1 Condez to wait. Appellant then left and after a few minutes
returned. He then showed PO1 Condez four big sachets of shabu. After receiving the four sachets,
PO1 Condez examined them and being convinced of their genuineness, gave the prearranged
signal. Thus, PO2 Virtudazo rushed to the scene. The police officers introduced themselves as PDEA
agents and arrested the appellant, informing the latter of his constitutional rights. The money was
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not given to appellant as it was intended only as show money. PO1 Condez marked the four sachets
given by the appellant as RCC 1 to RCC 4. The appellant was then brought to the police station for
investigation.
At the police station, Rakim was photographed in the presence of a Barangay Captain and a
State Prosecutor. Armed with the corresponding requests, the four marked sachets and the appellant
were brought by PO1 Condez and PO2 Virtudazo to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. At
the PNP Crime Laboratory, the four sachets were marked as A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 by the Forensic
Chemist. While the drug test conducted on the person of the appellant yielded a negative result, the
four sachets with a total weight of 12.882 grams were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Initially the PDEA filed a case against the appellant for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 or for illegal sale of shabu but when the investigation reached the Office of the City
Prosecutor the case was modified to one for illegal possession.
On the other hand, Rakim denied such allegations and presented different witnesses to belie
the claim.
The RTC found Rakim guilty as charged of violation of Section 11, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph
(1),20 Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision and subsequently denied a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The essential elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possess the said drug.
The Court finds that these essential elements were proven in this case. Rakim was caught in
flagrante possessing 12.882 grams of shabu, a dangerous drug, packed in four big sachets. His
possession of said dangerous drugs is not authorized by law. And he was freely and consciously
possessing the contraband as shown by his act of handing these four sachets to PO1 Condez in an
intended sale. The Court notes that Rakim was positively identified by PO1 Condez as the one who
handed over the four sachets. However, the money was not given to Rakim as it was intended only
as show money.
The Court gives full faith and credence to the testimonies of the police officers and upholds
the presumption of regularity in the apprehending officers’ performance of official duty. It is a settled
rule that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution
witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
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On the other hand, Rakim failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the
presumption that the arresting officers regularly performed their duties. Except for his bare
allegations of denial and frame-up that a certain Muslim was behind his arrest, nothing supports his
claim that the police officers were impelled by improper motives to testify against him. In fact, in his
direct testimony, appellant was asked whether he knew said Muslim but despite the opportunity
given to him, he failed to identify him in court.
This Court has invariably viewed with disfavor the defenses of denial and frame-up. Such
defenses can easily be fabricated and are common ploy in prosecutions for the illegal sale and
possession of dangerous drugs. In order to prosper, such defenses must be proved with strong and
convincing evidence.
Moreover, in weighing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses vis-à-vis those of the
defense, the RTC gave more credence to the version of the prosecution, to which this Court finds no
reason to disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will
not be disturbed on appeal. Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of
the police officers who conduct the “buy-bust” operation and appellate courts, upon established
precedents and of necessity, rely on the assessment of the credibility of witnesses by the trial courts
which have the unique opportunity, unavailable to the appellate courts, to observe the witnesses and
to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under direct and cross-examination.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHI CHAN LIU A. K. A. CHAN QUE AND HUI LAO CHUNG A.K.A.
LEOFE SENGLAO
G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015, J. Peralta
Charging appellants with illegal possession when the information filed against them charges the
crime of importation does not violate their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation brought against them. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense
as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged. An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter.
Facts:
At 10:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998, SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3 Isagani Yuzon, the
officers-on-duty at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, Looc, Occidental Mindoro, received
a radio message from the Barangay Captain of Ambil Island, Looc, Maximo Torreliza, that a suspicious
looking boat was seen somewhere within the vicinity of said island. Immediately thereafter, the police
officers headed towards the specified location wherein they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by
side, one of which resembled a fishing boat and the other, a speedboat. They noticed one (1) person
on board the fishing boat and two (2) on board the speed boat who were transferring cargo from the
former to the latter. As they moved closer to the area, the fishing boat hurriedly sped away. Due to
the strong waves, the police officers were prevented from chasing the same and instead, went towards
the speed boat, which seemed to be experiencing engine trouble.
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On board the speed boat, the officers found the appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a. Chan Que and
Hui Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao with several transparent plastic bags containing a white,
crystalline substance they instantly suspected to be the regulated drug, methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as “shabu.” They requested the appellants to show their
identification papers but appellants failed to do so. Thus, the police officers directed appellants to
transfer to their service boat and thereafter towed appellants’ speed boat to the shore behind the
Municipal Hall of Looc, Occidental Mindoro. On their way, the police officers testified that appellant
Chi Chan Liu repeatedly offered them “big, big amount of money” which they ignored.
Upon reaching the shore, the police officers led the appellants, together with the bags
containing the crystalline substance, to the police station. In the presence of the appellants and
Municipal Mayor Felesteo Telebrico, they conducted an inventory of the plastic bags which were forty-
five (45) in number, weighing about a kilo each. Again, SPO3 Yuson requested proper documentation
from the appellants as to their identities as well as to the purpose of their entry in the Philippine
territory. However, the appellants did not answer any of SPO3 Yuson’s questions. Immediately
thereafter, SPO3 Yuson reported the incident to their superiors. The PNP Regional Director General
Reynaldo Acop advised them to await his arrival the following day.
On December 4, 1998, General Acop arrived. They talked with Mayor Telebrico and the
arresting officers and then brought the appellants with the suspected illegal drugs to Camp Vicente
Lim, Calamba, Laguna, for further investigation. There, the appellants and the suspected prohibited
drugs were turned over to Police Inspector Julieto B. Culili, of the Intelligence and Investigation
Division, PNP, Regional Office IV, who attempted to communicate with the appellants using “broken”
English. According to Inspector Culili, appellant Chi Chan Liu only kept saying the phrase “call China,
big money,” giving him a certain cellular phone number.
With the assistance of said interpreter, Inspector Culili informed and explained to the
appellants their rights under Philippine laws inclusive of the right to remain silent, the right to
counsel, as well as the right to be informed of the charges against them, and the consequences thereof.
Inspector Culili also requested the interpreter to ask the appellants whether they wanted to avail of
said constitutional rights. However, appellants only kept repeating the phrase “big money, call China.”
According to Inspector Culili, moreover, he was able to confirm that the appellants are Chinese
nationals from Guandong, China, based on an earlier intelligence report that foreign nationals on
board extraordinary types of vessels were seen along the sealine of Lubang Island in Cavite, and
Quezon Province.
Thereafter, Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo, PNP Chief Forensic Chemist/Physical
Examiner assigned at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Service Office, Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna
conducted an examination of the white, crystalline substance in the forty-five (45) bags seized from
the appellants. After performing three (3) tests thereon, she positively confirmed in her Chemistry
Report that the same is, indeed, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as “shabu.”
On December 8, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed an
Information21 with the RTC of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, against appellants for violation of
Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No. 6425 as amended by RA No.
7659, or the Importation of Regulated Drugs. Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges against
them.
Page 151 of 519
The testimonies of the witnesses for the defense, namely: Jesus Astorga and Fernando Oliva,
both residents of Ambil Island, Leopoldo S. J. Lozada, a former Supervising Crime Photographer of
the PNP, and Godofredo de la Fuente Robles, a Member of the Looc Municipal Council, essentially
maintain that the subject crystalline substance was merely recovered by the apprehending police
officers from the house of Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza and not actually from the speed boat
the appellants were on
The trial court found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC in its Decision dated January 9,
2009. On April 24, 2009, it further denied the appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution
finding no cogent reason to make any revision, amendment, or reversal of its assailed Decision.
Issues:
1. Are all elements of the crime of importation of regulated drugs punishable under Section14,
Article III, in relation to Section 21(A), Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended by
Republic Act 7659, present in this case?
2. Has the corpus delicti of the crime charged been established beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling:
1. No. The crime of importation of regulated drugs is committed by importing or bringing any
regulated drug into the Philippines without being authorized by law. According to appellants, if it is
not proven that the regulated drugs are brought into the Philippines from a foreign origin, there is
no importation.
The CA, in finding that there was importation in the present case, stated: Appellants’
admission that they were Chinese nationals and their penchant for making reference during custodial
investigation to China where they could obtain money to bribe the police officers lead this Court to
no other reasonable conclusion but that China is the country of origin of the confiscated drugs. All
elements of the crime of illegal importation of regulated drugs being present in this case, conviction
thereof is in order.
The Court disagrees. The mere fact that the appellants were Chinese nationals as well as their
penchant for making reference to China where they could obtain money to bribe the apprehending
officers does not necessarily mean that the confiscated drugs necessarily came from China. The
records only bear the fact that the speed boat on which the appellants were apprehended was docked
on the coast of Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc, Occidental Mindoro. But it could have easily
come from some other locality within the country, and not necessarily from China or any foreign port,
as held by the CA. This Court notes that for a vessel which resembles a speed boat, it is rather difficult
to suppose how appellants made their way to the shores of Occidental Mindoro from China.
Moreover, an earlier intelligence report that foreign nationals on board extraordinary types of
vessels were seen along the sealine of Lubang Island in Cavite, and Quezon Province, does not
sufficiently prove the allegation that appellants herein were, in fact, importing illegal drugs in the
country from an external source. This, notwithstanding, had the prosecution presented more
Page 152 of 519
concrete evidence to convince this Court that the prohibited drugs, indeed, came from a source
outside of the Philippines, the importation contention could have been sustained.
Appellants’ exoneration from illegal importation of regulated drugs under Section 14, Article
III of RA No. 6425 does not, however, free them from all criminal liability for their possession of the
same is clearly evident.
At this point, this Court notes that charging appellants with illegal possession when the
information filed against them charges the crime of importation does not violate their constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against them. The rule is that
when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that
proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged. An
offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
Indeed, the courts have had several occasions in the past wherein an accused, charged with
the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, was convicted of illegal possession thereof. In those cases, this
Court upheld the prevailing doctrine that the illegal sale of dangerous drugs absorbs the illegal
possession thereof except if the seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of another
quantity of dangerous drugs not covered by or not included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity
of dangerous drugs was probably intended for some future dealings or use by the accused. Illegal
possession of dangerous drugs is therefore an element of and is necessarily included in illegal sale.
Hence, convicting the accused with the former does not violate his right to be informed of the
accusation against him for it is an element of the latter.
In a similar manner, considering that illegal possession is likewise an element of and is

necessarily included in illegal importation of dangerous drugs, convicting appellants of the former, if
duly established beyond reasonable doubt, does not amount to a violation of their right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them. Indeed, where an accused is charged
with a specific crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or
offenses included therein.
Thus, in view of the fact that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in
the illegal importation of regulated drugs, this Court shall determine appellants’ culpability under
Section 16, Article III of RA No. 6425.
The elements of illegal possession of regulated drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a regulated drug; (b) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the regulated drug.
The evidence on record clearly established that appellants were in possession of the bags
containing the regulated drugs without the requisite authority. As mentioned previously, on the date
of appellants’ arrest, the apprehending officers were conducting a surveillance of the coast of Ambil
Island in the Municipality of Looc, Occidental Mindoro, upon being informed by the Municipality’s
Barangay Captain that a suspicious-looking boat was within the vicinity. Not long after, they spotted
two (2) boats anchored side by side, the persons on which were transferring cargo from one to the
other. Interestingly, as they moved closer to the area, one of the boats hurriedly sped away. Upon
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reaching the other boat, the police officers found the appellants with several transparent plastic bags
containing what appeared to be shabu which were plainly exposed to the view of the officers. Clearly,
appellants were found to be in possession of the subject regulated drugs.
2. Yes. From the time of appellants’ arrest, the seized bags of regulated drugs were properly
marked and photographed. Proper inventory was also conducted in the presence of the appellants
and Mayor Telebrico, who signed a receipt evidencing that the confiscated drugs were turned over
to the PNP Regional Headquarters. There, the evidence was sent to the Regional Crime Laboratory
Service Office for an examination which yielded positive results. The laboratory report, photographs,
and receipts were all made part of the records of this case. In fact, the bags containing the crystalline
substance were presented before the trial court during the hearing held on October 12, 1999 which
was identified by SPO3 Yuson, the officer who confiscated the same. Evidently, an unbroken chain of
custody of the confiscated drugs was established by the prosecution.
Anent appellants’ claim that their constitutional rights were further violated for during
custodial investigation, they did not have counsel of their choice nor were they provided with one,
this deserves scant consideration since the same is relevant and material only when an extrajudicial
admission or confession extracted from an accused becomes the basis of his conviction. In this case,
neither one of the appellants executed an admission or confession. In fact, as the records clearly show,
appellants barely even spoke and merely kept repeating the phrase “call China, big money.” The trial
court convicted them not on the basis of anything they said during custodial investigation but on
other convincing evidence such as the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Verily, there was no
violation of appellants’ constitutional right to counsel during custodial investigation.
From the foregoing, considering that appellants were found to have possessed forty-five (45)
kilograms of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is more than the two hundred (200) grams
stipulated above, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, in accordance with R.A. No. 9346,
otherwise known as “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.” As
regards the fine, the Court finds that the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for each
appellant imposed by the RTC is proper, in view of the quantity seized from them.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERARDO ENUMERABLE y DE VILLA

G.R. No. 207993, January 21, 2015, J. CARPIO
It is settled that in prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drug, not only must the essential
elements of the offense be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but likewise the identity of the prohibited
drug. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence
is vital to a judgment of conviction. Hence, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish who had
custody of the illegal drug from the moment it was allegedly transmitted to the Batangas Provincial
Crime Laboratory on 27 May 2004 until it was allegedly delivered to the Regional Crime Laboratory on
4 June 2004, it is just right for the Court to acquit the appellant.
While appellant admitted during the pre-trial the authenticity and due execution of the
Chemistry Report, prepared by Police Inspector and Forensic Chemist, this admission merely affirms the
existence of the specimen and the request for laboratory examination and the results thereof.
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Facts:
A buy-bust operation was conducted by the elements of the Batangas City Police Station with
the assistance of Police Inspector Danilo Balmes of the CIDG Batangas Province on May 27, 2004 at
11:30 o’clock in the morning at the Petron Gasoline Station along B. Morada Ave., Lipa City. Using two
(2) pieces of marked P500.00 bills and boodle money to make the appearance of about P24,000.00,
the police asset, PO3 Edwalberto Villas, who posed as a buyer transacted with the alias Gerry upon
his arrival at the gas station. After the exchange of the marked money and the three (3) plastic
sachets of shabu placed in a black plastic box, alias Gerry was placed under arrest. He was later
identified as Gerardo Enumerable y de Villa. The marked money was recovered from his possession
by PO3 Villas who also took custody of the specimen shabu which he marked EMV 1 to EMV 3. The
three (3) sachets of shabu were turned over to the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory, pursuant
to the request for laboratory examination. However, that Crime laboratory indorsed to the Regional
Crime Laboratory in Calamba City.
Police Inspector and Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas found the specimens positive
for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, as shown by Chemistry
Report No. D-566-04, the authenticity and genuineness of which were admitted by accused during
the pre-trial.
The trial court found Enumerable guilty of the offense charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction of Enumerable for the offense charged. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution established the identity and integrity of the confiscated illegal drug,
which is the corpus delicti of the offense charged against Enumerable.
Ruling: Appeal granted
It is settled that in prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drug, not only must the essential
elements of the offense be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but likewise the identity of the
prohibited drug. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of
its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction.
Necessarily, the prosecution must establish that the substance seized from the accused is the
same substance offered in court as exhibit. In this regard, the prosecution must sufficiently prove
the unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated illegal drug.
In this case, there was a glaring gap in the custody of the illegal drug since the prosecution
failed to sufficiently establish who had custody of the illegal drug from the moment it was allegedly
transmitted to the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory on 27 May 2004 until it was allegedly
delivered to the Regional Crime Laboratory on 4 June 2004. There was no evidence presented how
the confiscated sachets of shabu were stored, preserved or labeled nor who had custody prior to their
delivery to the Regional Crime Laboratory and their subsequent presentation before the trial
court. This is evident from the testimony of PO3 Villas, who stated he had no knowledge on who had
custody of the sachets of shabu from 27 May 2004 until 4 June 2004. PO3 Villas had no personal
knowledge on (1) how the illegal drugs were delivered and who delivered the drugs from the
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Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory to the Regional Crime Laboratory; (2) who received the drugs
in the Regional Crime Laboratory; and (3) who had custody of the drugs from 27 May 2004 to 3 June
2004 until their presentation before the trial court. The testimony of PO3 Villas merely attests to the
existence of the Memorandum from the Chief of the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory to the
Regional Crime Laboratory.
While Enumerable admitted during the pre-trial the authenticity and due execution of the
Chemistry Report, prepared by Police Inspector and Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas, this
admission merely affirms the existence of the specimen and the request for laboratory examination
and the results thereof. Appellant’s admission does not relate to the issue of chain of custody. In fact,
appellant qualified his admission that the specimens were not taken or bought from him.
Since the failure of the prosecution to establish every link in the chain of custody of the illegal
drug gravely compromised its identity and integrity, which illegal drug is the corpus delicti of the
offense charged against Enumerable, his acquittal is therefore in order.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NATHANIEL PASION Y DELA CRUZ A.K.A. “ATHAN” AND
DENNIS MICHAEL PAZ Y SIBAYAN
G.R. No. 203026, January 28, 2015, J. Perez
It is a well-entrenched rule that full faith and credence are given to the narration of police
officers who testify for the prosecution on the entrapment or buy-bust operation, because as police
officers, they are presumed to have regularly performed their duties. This presumption is overturned
only if there is clear and convincing evidence that the officers were not properly performing their duty
or that they were inspired by improper motive. The foregoing principle applies with equal, if not greater,
force in prosecutions involving violations of [R.A. No.] 9165, especially those originating from buy-bust
operations. In this case, while the defense denied having violated [R.A. No. 9165], it offered no evidence
that the arresting officers had been improperly or maliciously motivated in effecting the arrest of
appellants. With nothing to substantiate appellants’ malicious accusation that the police officers were
improperly motivated, credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution
witnesses.
Facts:
Two separate Informations were filed against Nathaniel Pasion and Dennis Paz for violation
of Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 (Illegal Delivery of Dangerous Drugs) and violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. 9165 (Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs). Immediately, during arraignment,
Pasion pleaded not guilty; Paz, on the other hand, refused to enter a plea arguing that his arrest was
illegal. Pursuant to the Rules the trial court ordered the entry of a plea of “not guilty” on Paz’s behalf.
Both the accused-appellants were apprehended through a separate buy-bust operation.
During trial, for their defense, both accused-appellants Pasion and Paz denied liability and
maintained that on the evening in question they were just having a drinking spree to unwind at
Pasion’s house, Pasion. Paz, on the other hand, was supposed to go to Pasion’s house later that night
when he received a text message from Pasion to instead meet at 365 Plaza. Upon his arrival at 365
Plaza, he was suddenly manhandled, searched and arrested by unknown men who turned out to be
PDEA officers conducting a purported buy-bust operation. In the main, appellants claimed that they
were framed up in a buy-bust operation by the police for no apparent reason.
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After trial, the RTC found the accused-appellate guilty. The appellate court subsequently
affirmed the RTC’s decision.
To question the finding of guilt of both the lower courts, accused- appellants Pasion and Paz
assail the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
officers who conducted the surveillance of appellants, and the separate buy bust operations that led
to their apprehension. Accused-appellants Pasion and Paz first insist that the intelligence officers’
testimonies were riddled with inconsistencies, specifically on their respective locations during their
surveillance of accused-appellants Pasion and Paz which, they argue, indicate that no actual
surveillance was carried out.
Issue:
Whether the inconsistencies on the apprehending officer’s testimonies regarding the location
of their surveillance warrant the acquittal of Pasion and Paz.
Ruling:
No.
It is a well-entrenched rule that full faith and credence are given to the narration of police
officers who testify for the prosecution on the entrapment or buy-bust operation, because as police
officers, they are presumed to have regularly performed their duties. Indeed, the presumption of
regularity must prevail over appellants’ unsubstantiated allegations. This presumption is overturned
only if there is clear and convincing evidence that the officers were not properly performing their
duty or that they were inspired by improper motive. In this case, there was none.
The foregoing principle applies with equal, if not greater, force in prosecutions involving
violations of [R.A. No.] 9165, especially those originating from buy-bust operations. In such cases, the
testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operations are generally accorded full
faith and credit, in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duties. Hence,
when lined up against an unsubstantiated denial or claim of frame-up, the testimonies of the officers
who caught the accused red-handed are given more weight and usually prevail. In order to overcome
the presumption of regularity, jurisprudence teaches us that there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duties or that they were prompted
with ill motive.
While the defense denied having violated [R.A. No. 9165], it offered no evidence that the
arresting officers had been improperly or maliciously motivated in effecting the arrest of appellants.
With nothing to substantiate appellants’ malicious accusation that the police officers were
improperly motivated, credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution
witnesses because, being police officers, they are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner. Certainly, the presumption of regularity must prevail over appellants’ unfounded
allegations. Bare denials and the frail defense of frame-up cannot prevail over the categorical and
unshaken testimonies of the apprehending officers who nabbed them red-handed and positively
identified them as the persons they caught for violation of R.A. 9165 during the buy-bust operation.
Page 157 of 519

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DENNIS SUMILI

When there was delay in the turn-over of the corpus delicti to the PNP Crime Laboratory as it
was alleged that the date the illegal sachet was seized falls on a Friday and therefore the PNP Crime
Laboratory was closed but it appears that said date falls on a Wednesday, not on a Friday, conviction
must be immediately set aside. It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal
drugs, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity
of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items.
Facts:
On June 7, 2006, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Iligan City Sub-Office received a
report from a confidential informant that Sumili was selling shabu. Acting on the same, SPO2
Englatiera dispatched SPO2 Cabahug to conduct surveillance on Sumili, which confirmed the truth
and veracity of the aforesaid report. Consequently, SPO2 Englatiera organized a team divided into
two (2) groups and briefed them on the buy-bust operation.
During the buy-bust operation, Sumili let the poseur-buyer in, the latter gave the pre-
arranged signal that the sale has been consummated. Almost immediately, the buy-bust team
stormed the house but Sumili escaped by jumping through the window, throwing the marked money
at the roof beside his house. The poseur-buyer turned over the sachet of suspected shabu to SPO2
Englatiera, who marked the same and prepared a request for laboratory examination and instructed
Non-Uniform Personnel Carlito Ong (NUP Ong) to bring the sachet together with the request to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. However, NUP Ong failed to do so on the same day as the
PNP Crime Laboratory was already closed. It was only on June 9, 2006, or two (2) days after the buy-
bust operation, that NUP Ong was able to bring and turn-over the seized sachet to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. Upon examination, it was confirmed that said sachet contained 0.32 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
The RTC found Sumili guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA
9165. The CA affirmed Sumili’s conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not Sumili’s conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs in violation of Section
5, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.
Ruling:
No, Sumili is not guilty.
the following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, object, and
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the corresponding payment for it. As the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore
essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the
prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug,
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from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of
the corpus delicti.
To expand, Section 2129 of RA 9165 provides the “chain of custody rule” outlining the
procedure that the apprehending officers should follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to
preserve its integrity and evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending team
that has initial custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take
photographs of the same in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items were
seized, or the accused’s or the person’s representative or counsel, a representative from the media,
the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall then sign the copies of the
inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours
from its confiscation for examination purposes. While the “chain of custody rule” demands utmost
compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of RA 9165, as well as jurisprudence nevertheless provide that non-compliance with the
requirements of this rule will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and
invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance; AND (b) the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved. Hence, any divergence from the prescribed
procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated items.
After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish
the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from Sumili due to unjustified gaps in the chain of
custody, thus, militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
As may be gleaned from the established facts, there was delay in the turn-over of the corpus
delicti. To justify this, SPO2 Englatiera and NUP Ong insist that the PNP Crime Laboratory was already
closed on June 7, 2006, and since it was a Friday, the delivery of the seized sachet was only done on
June 9, 2006. However, contrary to their claims, June 7, 2006 is not a Friday, but a Wednesday. Thus,
if the PNP Crime Laboratory was indeed closed on June 7, 2006, the delivery of the seized sachet
could have easily been done on the next day, or on June 8, 2006, instead of doing it two (2) days after
the buy-bust operation. This glaring fact, coupled with the absence in the records as to who among
the apprehending officers had actual custody of the seized sachet from the time it was prepared for
turn-over until its delivery to the PNP Crime Laboratory, presents a substantial and unexplained gap
in the chain of custody of the alleged shabu seized from Sumili. Undoubtedly, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.
It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation
of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with
moral certainty that they are the same seized items. Failing in which, the acquittal of the accused on
the ground of reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right, as in this case.
In sum, since the identity of the prohibited drugs had not been established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, Sumili’s conviction must be immediately set aside.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDER DACUMA y LUNSOD

G.R. No. 205889, February 04, 2015, J. Perez
In the prosecution of illegal sale, what is essential is to prove that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti. The consummation
of sale is perfected the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In this case, the prosecution
failed to prove that the four sachets which tested positive for shabu and eventually presented in court
were the same ones confiscated by the police officers due to its non-marking at the place where the buy-
bust operation was committed at the police station. This non- marking violated the measures defined
under Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 and Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 which are also known as the Rule on Chain of Custody.
Facts:
PO2 Cabaltera, certain PO3 Macalino, PO3 Baltar and PO2 Llovia, members of Anti-Illegal
Drug Task Force of Leyte Provincial Police Office under the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), were ordered by their superior Superintendent Unay to proceed to Carigara Police Station
to verify the veracity of a report of a confidential informant about the sale of dangerous drugs. Upon
arrival at the police station, Chief of Police Repulda gave a short briefing to conduct a buy-bust
operation and gave the assigned poseur-buyer PO2 Cabaltera four pieces of one hundred peso bills to
be used as marked money. Thereafter, PO2 Cabaltera, PO2 Parena and the confidential informant
proceeded to the target area. Upon arrival, PO2 Cabaltera and the confidential informant approached
the accused-appellant Dacuma and proposed to buy shabu worth P600.00. Meanwhile, PO2 Parena
remained at a distance to act as a back-up police officer. Dacuma, accepted the offer and took from
his pocket four plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance and handed them to PO2
Cabaltera, who in turn, handed the marked money including his personal money worth P400.00.
Thereafter, PO2 Cabaltera raised his hand as pre-arranged signal to alert the back-up police officers
that the illegal sale had already been consummated. PO2 Parena immediately ran towards them and
introduced himself as a police officer. They then apprehended the accused and brought him to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Station. Barangay Councilor Lesiguez and a certain Councilor
Macalinao were summoned by the police officers to conduct a body search on the person of Dacuma
inside the police station. During the search, three sachets of shabu, marked money and one disposable
lighter were recovered from Dacuma.
Issue:
Whether or not Dacuma is guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Ruling:
No.
The following requisites are necessary in order to successfully prosecute an offense of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of
the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
In the prosecution of illegal sale, what is essential is to prove that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti. The
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consummation of sale is perfected the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In this
case, the prosecution failed to prove that the four sachets which tested positive for shabu and
eventually presented in court were the same ones confiscated by the police officers due to its non-
marking at the place where the buy-bust operation was committed at the police station.
This non- marking violated the measures defined under Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 and
Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 which are
also known as the Rule on Chain of Custody.
In this case, records show that the first element to establish chain of custody which is
the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer is
missing to establish illegal sale. In fact, no one among the prosecution witnesses testified about the
marking of the four sachets subject of illegal sale. Though the police officers in their testimonies
narrated that there was a buy-bust operation and they apprehended the accused red-handed, all of
them failed to testify on who among them complied with the marking requirement to identify the
seized items. Quite notably, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest also failed to mention that the apprehending
officers marked the four sachets confiscated from Dacuma. It was only then when Police
Superintendent Amado E. Marquez, Jr. sent a request for a laboratory examination to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, Region 8 that the fours sachets containing white crystalline substance were shown to be
marked as “SD.” These specimens eventually became the specimens tested by Forensic Chemist
Cruto which resulted to a positive result of methamphetamine hydrochloride and presented in court
as the corpus delicti. Clearly from the foregoing, there is a serious doubt on the identity of the corpus
delicti presented in court as subject of illegal sale.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES vs. MHODS USMAN y GOGO

A buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. Since accused-appellant was caught by the buy-bust team
in flagrante delicto, his immediate arrest was also validly made. Accused-appellant’s arrest being valid,
we also hold that the subsequent warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from his person is equally valid.
Facts:
A male confidential informant came to PO1 Joel Sta. Maria (PO1 Sta. Maria), PO2 Elymar
Garcia, Irene Vidal, and PSI Judycel Macapagal (PSI Macapagal) and SPO3 Rolando del Rosario, and
informed them of the illegal selling of shabu by a certain Mhods, a muslim at Isla Puting Bato. This led
them to conduct a buy bust operation against the subject.
When they reached the place of Usman, the latter approached the Confidential Informant and
asked him if he is going to get, meaning if he is going to buy shabu. Instead of answering, the
confidential informant pointed to him who was beside him at that time. The herein witness showed
the marked money and the accused took them. Usman turned his back a little and got something
from his right pocket and passed to him a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
suspected to be shabu. Upon receipt he grabbed the Usman and introduced himself as a police officer.
Thereafter, the plastic sachet was turned over to the investigator Elymar Garcia, who in turn
prepared a request for laboratory examination (Exhibit “C”) and brought the same together to the
crime laboratory for examination. After lab test, the specimen was found positive for
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methamphetamine hydrochloride. On cross-examination, Usman claimed that he was a victim of

frame-up by the arresting officers.
The RTC rendered a judgment of conviction. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC
Decision. The appellate court ruled that Usman’s arrest was valid because he was caught in flagrante
delicto selling dangerous drugs, that all the elements of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs
are present in the case at bar, that there was substantial compliance with the legal requirements on
the handling of the seized item, and that there was no proof to support accused-appelllant’s allegation
of frame-up.
Issue:
Whether or not there were serious lapses in the procedure mandated by R. A. No. 9165 in the
handling of the seized shabu, as well as non-compliance with the chain of custody rule that could
render him innocent of the crime charged.
Ruling:
No, there was none. Usman is liable of the crime charged.
The fact of the matter is that Usman was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to
an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section
5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is
deemed lawful.
A buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. Since accused-appellant was caught by the buy-bust
team in flagrante delicto, his immediate arrest was also validly made. Usman was caught in the act
and had to be apprehended on the spot. His arrest being valid, this Court also hold that the
subsequent warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from his person is equally valid. The legitimate
warrantless arrest also cloaks the arresting police officer with the authority to validly search and
seize from the offender those that may be used to prove the commission of the offense.
Aside from the validity of the arrest, the guilt of Usman was also established beyond
reasonable doubt. In a catena of cases, this Court laid down the essential elements to be duly
established for a successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous or
prohibited drugs, like shabu, under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to wit: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and payment therefor.
Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked
money by the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore,
is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti. The concurrence of said elements can be gleaned from the testimony of the witness.
However, this Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally be
perfect, in reality it is not, “as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.” The most
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they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, PO1 Sta. Maria retained possession of the
seized sachet until he was able to properly mark it, then turned it over to PO2 Garcia who prepared
the request for laboratory examination and brought the same to the crime laboratory, where PSI
Macapagal later on confirmed that the substance was methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The same sachet was positively identified by PO1 Sta. Maria in open court to be the same item he
confiscated from accused-appellant. Hence, the prosecution’s failure to submit in evidence the
physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article 21 of R. A. No. 9165,
will not render the accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible.
Lastly, on the issue of frame-up, although drug-related violators have commonly tendered
such defenses to fend off or refute valid prosecutions of their drug-related violations, the Court has
required that such defenses, to be credited at all, must be established with clear and convincing
evidence.
In the case at bar, Usman failed to ascribe, much less prove, any ill will or improper motive
on the part of the apprehending police officers. Usman admitted that he does not know said police
officers prior to his arrest, and that he is not aware of any established motive for them to charge him
falsely of a grave offense. Moreover, accused-appellant acknowledged that he is not a good subject
for extortion. Thus, in the absence of any evidence of ill will or improper motive, none is presumed
to exist.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMY DASIGAN y OLIVA

The prosecution’s failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the
seized drugs as required under Article 21 of R. A. No. 9165, will not render the accused’s arrest illegal or
the items seized from him inadmissible. Clearly, the chain of custody is not established solely by
compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the
presence of the enumerated persons.
However, the exoneration of an accused from the charge of illegal sale of dangerous or
prohibited drugs, does not spell freedom from all criminal liability as she may still be convicted for illegal
possession of dangerous or prohibited drugs. It is settled that possession is necessarily included in the
sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs.
Facts:
On December 5, 2006, at the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) office, Melvin Jones
Grandstand, Harrison Road, Baguio City, a male confidential informant reported to Police Chief
Inspector Luisito Meris that a certain alias “Amy” is engaged in delivering Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, also known as “Shabu” within the vicinity of the La Trinidad Trading Post at Km. 5, La
Trinidad, Benguet. Those present at the office were PO2 Arieltino Corpuz, SPO2 Cabily Agbayani and
SPO1 Bernardo Ventura and they all heard this piece of information.
A buy-bust operation was planned. PO2 Corpuz was introduced to “Amy” as the buyer of
“shabu”. “Amy” said she had something else to do and so she just gave PO2 Corpuz her cell phone
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number. Days after, PO2 Corpuz called “Amy” and asked her regarding their transaction as he was
willing to buy “shabu” worth two thousand pesos (PHP 2,000.00). “Amy” said she will deliver the
shabu the following day.
On the said day, “Amy” brought what appeared to be small transparent plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance, picked out two sachets (Exhibits “C” and “C-1”) and gave it to
PO2 Corpuz. “Amy” then demanded the payment. He was ready with the amount but he was
instructed that once the “shabu” was given to him, he need not hand the money any longer. So PO2
Corpuz placed the two sachets in his pant[s] pocket and held Amy’s right hand and announced “Pulis
ako!” PO2 Corpuz then got the sealed sachets and he turned over all the six sachets, the two sachets
sold to him and the four sachets which “Amy” brought out from her pocket, as well as the cell phone
to the team leader PCI Meris. PCI Meris then held on to the items as they went to the La Trinidad
Police Station. Oliva was charged of illegal possession of shabu with violation of Sections 11 (3)
(Criminal Case Nos. 072-CR-6702) and illegal sale in violation of Section 5 Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (Criminal case No. 073-
CR-6703)
PO2 Corpuz, SPO1 Ventura and SPO2 Agbayani each placed their initials on all the plastic
sachets containing suspected “shabu”. Inventory and laboratory examination was done and it was
revealed that the seized specimen were Methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled against Dasigan.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there was compliance of the chain of custody considering that no
photographs were taken by the apprehending officers, and as, although an inventory was conducted.
2. Whether or not Dasigan could be held guilty of illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs under Republic Act No. 9165.
Ruling:
1. Yes, there was compliance with the chain of custody rule.
This Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect,
in reality it is not, “as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.” The most
they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Hence, the prosecution’s failure
to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under
Article 21 of R. A. No. 9165, will not render the accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized from him
inadmissible. Clearly, the chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the prescribed
physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons.
In the case at bar, after the items were seized by Police Officer (PO) 2 Arieltino G. Corpuz (PO2
Corpuz) from Dasigan, he turned them over to Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Luisito Meris (PCI Meris)
who retained possession until they reached the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Office
where the arresting officers were able to mark them (i.e, “CJA for Cabily J. Agbayani; “AGC” for
Arieltino G. Corpuz, and “BAV” for Bernado A. Ventura). PCI Meris then submitted said seized items
to Senior Police Officer (SPO) 3 Romeo L. Abordo, Sr. (SPO3 Abordo, Sr.), the Evidence Custodian of
PDEA Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) who, in turn, prepared the inventory and the request
Page 164 of 519
for laboratory examination. It was SPO3 Abordo, Sr. who brought the request for laboratory
examination and the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory where they were received by PO1
Joseph Andrew P. Dulnuan who submitted them to Forensic Chemist Police Senior Inspector (PSI)
Edward Gayados, and it was the latter who, after a full qualitative examination, confirmed that the
seized items were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. In open court,
PO2 Corpuz and SPO2 Cabily Agbayani easily identified the sachets as the ones they seized from
Dasigan as the sachets still bore their initials, together with the initials of SPO1 Bernardo Ventura.
The fact that the seized items were marked only at the police station and not during the actual
apprehension and seizure will not exonerate Dasigan from the offense charged. In several cases, the
Court ruled that the marking of the seized substance immediately upon arrival at the police station
qualified as a compliance with the marking requirement.
Clearly, there was no hiatus or confusion in the confiscation, handling, custody and
examination of the shabu. The shabu that was seized from Dasigan, taken to the PDEA Office and
thereat duly marked, then taken to the crime laboratory and subjected to a qualitative examination,
and thereafter introduced in evidence against accused-appellant was the same shabu confiscated
from Dasigan when she was caught in flagrante delicto possessing the same.
2. No, Dasigan is guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs only.
Under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the elements of the offense of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be
a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
In the case of illegal possession, all these elements were proven. First, the four plastic sachets
containing shabu, which are the subject of the charge for illegal possession of dangerous or prohibited
drugs, were found on Dasigan’s person during the search conducted by the PDEA officers following
accused-appellant’s arrest in flagrante delicto for illegal sale of shabu. Second, Dasigan was not able
to demonstrate his legal authority to possess the subject shabu. And third, Dasigan’s act of giving
PO2 Corpuz, the poseur-buyer, one sachet and telling him “maganda ito, first class ito,” and then
bringing out more sachets and selecting two sachets to give to PO2 Corpuz indicates that she freely
and consciously possessed the subject shabu. Consequently, Dasigan was correctly charged and
convicted of illegal possession of shabu.
On the other hand, in a successful prosecution for offenses involving the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must concur: (1)
the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment for it. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
In the case of illegal sale, the Court notes, however, that the sale was not consummated as
there was no receipt of the consideration. It is undisputed from the facts that although Dasigan was
shown the consideration before she handed over the subject shabu to the poseur-buyer, such is not
sufficient to consummate the sale. As previously held by the Court, looking at a thing does not
transfer possession of it to the beholder. Such a tenet would make window shoppers liable for theft.
Page 165 of 519

Dasigan’s exoneration from the charge of illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs,
however, does not spell freedom from all criminal liability as she may still be convicted for illegal
possession of dangerous or prohibited drugs. It is settled that possession is necessarily included in
the sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROWENA TAPUGAY y VENTURA

The respondent was convicted both by the RTC and Court of Appeals for violation of Section 5 of
RA 9165(illegal sale of dangerous drugs).The respondents denies the accusations against her and
asserts that she should not be convicted of the crime charged. The Supreme Court ruled that the defense
of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as
easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecution for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Facts:
Tapugay was charged before RTC, Branch 16, Laoag City for violation of Section 5, Article II
of R.A No. 9165 in an information. Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) of Laoag City, SPO3 Rovimanuel Balolong (SPO3 Balolong), received a phone call from a
concerned citizen reporting the illegal drug activities of Rowena Tapugay (Rowena). Upon arrival at
the locus criminis at around 8 o’clock in the evening, PO2 Garcia walked towards three (3) women
who were then conversing, while the other members of the team strategically positioned themselves.
PO2 Garcia approached the woman in a red sleeveless shirt and told her that he was going to buy
shabu worth (Php500.00). PO2 Garcia then handed to Rowena the marked Five Hundred Peso
(Php500.00) bill. Rowena thereafter pocketed the money and asked PO2 Garcia to come near her.
Appellant then reached inside her jeans’ pocket to get the shabu and handed it to PO2 Garcia. It was
at this time that PO2 Garcia introduced himself as a police officer and grabbed appellant.13 The other
members of the team then rushed in to assist PO2 Garcia in arresting the suspect.14 SPO3 Balolong
recovered from Rowena the marked Php500.00 bill. Rowena was not able to produce any document
showing her authority to sell shabu when asked by SPO3 Balolong.
Rowena denied the accusations against her. The defense insisted that Rowena was having
dinner inside her house at around 8 o’clock in the evening of 28 November 2003 when police officers
suddenly entered and grabbed her. She was allegedly searched but the policemen did not find
anything inside her pocket. Rowena was thereafter forced outside her house, placed inside a police
car, and brought to the police station.
The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused of the crime charged. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the current petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Rowena can be convicted of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Ruling:
The Court finds the appeal bereft of merit and affirm Rowena’s guilt.
Page 166 of 519
In the prosecution of a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the
prosecution is able to establish the following essential elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its
payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-
buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction.
After a careful evaluation of the records, the Court finds that these elements were clearly met.
The prosecution’s evidence positively identified PO2 Garcia as the buyer and Rowena as the seller of
the shabu. Likewise, the prosecution presented in evidence one heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing shabu as the object of the sale and the marked Php500.00 as consideration thereof.
Finally, the delivery of the shabu sold and its payment were clearly testified to by the prosecution
witnesses.
Rowena’s defense which is anchored principally on denial and frame-up cannot be given
credence. It does not have more evidentiary weight than the positive assertions of the prosecution
witnesses. Her defense is unavailing considering that she was caught in flagrante delicto in a
legitimate buy-bust operation. This Court has ruled that the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi,
has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a
common and standard defense ploy in most prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JIMMY GABUYA y ADLAWAN

G.R. No. 195245, February 16, 2015, J. Del Castillo
The prosecution convincingly proved that the police operatives indeed complied with the
required unbroken chain in the custody of the subject illegal drugs. It bears stressing that the SC has
already brushed aside an accused’s belated contention that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person
is inadmissible for failure of the arresting officers to comply with Section 21 of R.A. 9165. This is
considering that whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers from literally complying
with Section 21 will remain unknown, because Gabuya did not question during trial the safekeeping of
the items seized from him. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a
party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection.
Facts:
PO1 Rosales relayed to P/Insp. Cruz the information he received from a confidential
informant that Gabuya was selling illegal drugs on Second Avenue, Caloocan City. Thus, P/Insp. Cruz
formed a buy-bust team and dusted a P100.00 bill with ultraviolet fluorescent powder to be used as
marked money. He designated PO1 Rosales as poseur-buyer while the other members would serve
as back-ups.
PO1 Rosales then approached Gabuya and told him that he wanted to buy illegal drugs worth
P100.00. He then showed appellant the P100.00 marked money who took the same and placed it in
his pocket. Thereafter, Gabuya retrieved from another pocket three plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance and gave one to PO1 Rosales, who thereupon scratched his head as the pre-
arranged signal to the buy-bust team that the illegal drug transaction had already been
Page 167 of 519
consummated. When the back-ups arrived, PO1 Rosales informed Gabuya that he is a police officer
and immediately caused his arrest. He then confiscated the other two plastic sachets from appellant
while PO3 De Guzman recovered the marked money after Gabuya emptied his pocket.
Gabuya, together with the marked money and the specimens recovered from him, were
turned-over to the police investigator, PO3 Randulfo Hipolito, who marked each sachet with the
letters JGA, the initials of Gabuya. The seized items and Gabuya were thereafter brought to the police
crime laboratory for examination of the forensic chemist, P/Insp. Jimmy Calabocal (P/Insp.
Calabocal). The results revealed that: (1) the contents of all the plastic sachets were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu; (2) the contents of the two sachets recovered from
Gabuya weighed 0.09 gram while the other one subject of the sale weighed 0.05 gram; and (3)
Gabuya’s hand and the marked money were positive for ultraviolet fluorescent powder.
Gabuya avers that the police officers did not comply with Section 21 of R.A. 9165 and its
Implementing Rules, particularly when they failed to mark the seized items at the scene of the crime
in his presence. He likewise argues that the lack of information on the whereabouts of the shabu after
its examination by the forensic chemist and the absence of testimony thereon revealed a gap in the
chain of custody of the evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not police operatives complied with the required unbroken chain in the custody
of the subject illegal drugs
Ruling:
Yes, the Court finds that the prosecution convincingly proved that the police operatives
indeed complied with the required unbroken chain in the custody of the subject illegal drugsviz:
a.) beginning from the lawful buy-bust operation undertaken by the police operatives on 06
June 2003 and the recovery of the subject illegal drugs as well as the marked money resulting
from Gabuya’s valid warrantless search and seizure;
b.) upon seizure of the one hundred (Php100) pesos with serial number #JK623663 used as
marked money and the subject drugs by PO1 ROSALES, said specimens remained in his
possession until they were turned over to the police investigator PO2 HIPOLITO upon
reaching the police headquarters;
c.) upon receipt of the subject drugs and buy-bust money, PO2 HIPOLITO marked the
specimens “JGA-1” (0.05 gram),”JGA-2”(0.04 gram) and “JGA-3”(0.05 gram) which stands for
the Gabuya’s initials;
d.) a Laboratory Examination Request was then prepared by Chief Police Inspector CESAR
GONZALES CRUZ (Chief P/Insp. CRUZ) addressed to the Chief PNP, NPD Crime Laboratory
Office, Samson Road, Caloocan City, requesting for the examination of the three (3) pieces of
small plastic transparent heat-sealed sachets containing white crystalline substance that
were confiscated from the Appellant;
Page 168 of 519

e.) upon receipt of the subject drugs, the same were examined by forensic chemist P/Insp.
CALABOCAL who found them to be positive for shabu;
f.) thereafter, Chief P/Insp. CRUZ prepared a Referral Slip dated 06 June 2003 addressed to
the City Prosecutor of Caloocan presenting as evidence, inter alia, the three (3) plastic sachets
confiscated from the Appellant, the Laboratory Examination Report dated 06 June 2003 and
the one hundred (Php100) pesos used as marked money;
g.) the three (3) plastic sachets were turned over to the custody of the prosecutor which PO1
ROSALES identified on direct examination as the subject drugs sold and confiscated from
Appellant during the buy-bust operation;
h.) the subject specimens were then marked as Exhibits “C-1”, C-2” and “C-3” for the
prosecution and was finally surrendered to the court a quo when formally offered as evidence
by the prosecution on 19 August 2004
It bears stressing that the Court has already brushed aside an accused’s belated contention
that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person is inadmissible for failure of the arresting officers
to comply with Section 21 of R.A. 9165. This is considering that whatever justifiable grounds may
excuse the police officers from literally complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because
Gabuya did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Objection to
evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he cannot
raise the question for the first time on appeal.” Besides and as already mentioned, the CA has already
concluded that the identity of the seized drugs was established by the prosecution and its integrity
preserved.
In view of the foregoing, the Court upheld Gabuya’s conviction for violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of R.A. 9165 as well as the penalties imposed upon him. It must be added, however, that
he is not eligible for parole with respect to the case of illegal sale of shabu.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABOLA BIO y PANAYANGAN

To sustain a conviction under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, all that is needed for the
prosecution to establish are (1) the identity of the buyer, seller, object and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the
other hand, it is necessary to prove that: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and, (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the drug. In his testimony, PO2 Salonga, the poseur-buyer, positively
identified Abola as the seller of the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which was later
identified by the PNP Forensic Chemist to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The same sachet and substance was identified in court by PO2 Salonga as the shabu sold to him by Abola
for the sum of P200.00. Therefore, all the elements of the offense of illegal sale of shabu are obtaining
in this case. In the same vein, Abola, upon being frisked after his apprehension, was found possessing
another plastic sachet containing 0.15 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. There is no
evidence on record showing that he was legally authorized to possess the same. Neither was there any
explanation that he did not freely or consciously possess the said illegal drug. Settled is the rule that
Page 169 of 519
“possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi,
which is sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession.”
Clearly, all the elements of the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are likewise present in
this case.
Facts:
In this case, the evidence for the prosecution established that at around 9:00 p.m. of
September 8, 2003, an asset reported to P/Supt. Wong, Chief of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operations Task Unit (SAID-SOTU), Novaliches Police Station, the alleged illegal drugs activities of
Abola. P/Supt. Wong immediately formed a team including PO2 Fernando Salonga (PO2 Salonga).
As PO2 Salonga would act as the poseur-buyer, he was provided with two 100-peso bills as buy-bust
money.
The team then proceeded to the designated area along Ramirez St., Brgy. Nova Proper. Upon
arrival thereat an hour later, the asset introduced PO2 Salonga to the Abola as a buyer of shabu. After
a brief conversation, Abola agreed to the sale. PO2 Salonga handed to Abola the two 100-peso bills
and, in turn, the latter gave the former a plastic sachet. PO2 Salonga thereupon scratched his head as
the pre-arranged signal to his companions that the sale had been consummated. He then introduced
himself to Abola as a police officer and apprehended him. However, before he could handcuff Abola,
a woman later identified as Abola’s wife, suddenly grabbed Abola such that the latter was able to run
away. PO2 Salonga gave a chase and caught Abola, who, when searched, was found possessing
another plastic sachet suspected to contain shabu.
Abola, together with the buy-bust money previously marked with PO2 Salonga’s initials “FAS”
and the two plastic sachets, were then brought to the Novaliches Police Station. Thereat, the plastic
sachet subject of the sale was marked with the initial “FAS”3 while the sachet recovered from
appellant’s possession with “FAS-1.” They were thereafter turned over to the duty desk officer for
booking and later, to PO1 Oliver Estrelles (PO1 Estrelles), the police investigator on duty. Afterwards,
Abola and the above-mentioned pieces of evidence were brought by PO2 Salonga and PO1 Estrelles
to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. A qualitative examination conducted by
Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Leonard Arban shows that each sachet contained a net weight of 0.15 gram
of white crystalline substance that tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding Abola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. 9165. It ruled that the elements for the prosecution of illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been established. The CA affirmed Abolas’s
conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove the indispensable element of corpus delicti of
the crime
Ruling:
No, the SC affirmed the lower courts’ findings of a confluence of the elements of illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs as to justify Abola’s conviction for the said offenses
Page 170 of 519

To sustain a conviction under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, all that is needed for the
prosecution to establish are (1) the identity of the buyer, seller, object and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the
other hand, it is necessary to prove that: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which
is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and, (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the drug.
In his testimony, PO2 Salonga, the poseur-buyer, positively identified Abola as the seller of
the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which was later identified by the PNP
Forensic Chemist to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The same sachet and
substance was identified in court by PO2 Salonga as the shabu sold to him by Abola for the sum of
P200.00. As correctly ruled, therefore, by both lower courts, all the elements of the offense of illegal
sale of shabu are obtaining in this case. In the same vein, Abola, upon being frisked after his
apprehension, was found possessing another plastic sachet containing 0.15 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. There is no evidence on record showing that he was
legally authorized to possess the same. Neither was there any explanation that he did not freely or
consciously possess the said illegal drug. Settled is the rule that “possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi, which is sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession.” Clearly, all the elements of
the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are likewise present in this case.
Abola, however, questions the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items due to the
failure of the police officers to comply with requirements set forth under Section 21 of R.A. 9165.
In the present case, the links in the chain have been duly proven. During the conduct of the
buy-bust operation, PO2 SALONGA, the poseur-buyer, was able to confiscate two (2) plastic sachets
of shabu from accused-appellant: the first one was sold to him in exchange for the buy-bust money,
and the second one was recovered from the latter during the routinary frisk conducted by PO2
SALONGA. He thereafter gave the plastic sachets to SPO3 CONCEPCION, who kept the same in his
custody until they reached the police station, where SPO3 CONCEPCION, in turn, surrendered them
to the desk officer who placed the appropriate markings thereon. Subsequently, the seized items
were turned over to PO1 ESTRELLES, the police officer on duty, who prepared the request for
laboratory examination on the specimens, which he delivered, together with the seized plastic
sachets, to the PNP Crime Laboratory on September 9, 2003. Thereupon, forensic chemist P/INSP
ARBAN duly received the request for laboratory examination and the confiscated items and
conducted the qualitative examination thereon, which yielded positive results.
Thus, the prosecution in this case was able to establish the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the shabu seized from Abola, hence, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of
the law. It must be stressed that non-compliance with Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 does not render an
accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. The requirements
under R.A. 9165 and its implementing rules are not inflexible. What is essential is ‘the preservation
of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.’
Page 171 of 519

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERIC ROSAURO y BONGCAWIL

Equally important in every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs is the
presentation of evidence of the seized drug as the corpus delicti. The identity of the prohibited drug must
be proved with moral certainty. It must also be established with the same degree of certitude that the
substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit.In
the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the confidential informant gave the seized item to SPO4
Larot who placed tape on the sachet and marked it “Exhibit A.” Upon reaching the police station, SPO4
Larot executed the Certificate of Inventory, as well as the request for laboratory examination. The
request, the specimen, as well as the marked money and Rosauro were then brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. They were received by SPO2 Ricardo Maisog, the Receiving Clerk of the PNP
Crime Laboratory Office, who then forwarded them to Police Inspector Ma. Leocy Jabonillo Mag-abo, the
Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Moreover, the seized item was duly identified
by SPO4 Larot in open court as the same item seized from Rosauro. Hence, the prosecution was able to
prove the corpus delicti.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Rosauro was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R. A. No. 9165.On
October 13, 2002, on the basis of unconfirmed reports that accused-appellant Eric Rosauro (Rosauro)
was selling and distributing drugs, the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit of Misamis Oriental
conducted a test-buy operation in the Municipality of Villanueva, Misamis Oriental using a
confidential agent. The confidential agent bought shabu from Rosauro at Purok 2, Barangay
Katipunan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. The substance bought from Rosauro was examined by the
PNP crime laboratory and yielded a positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (commonly
known as shabu).
On July 3, 2004, the police authorities received information that again drugs were being
distributed at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. Thus, at 5:30 o’clock in the
afternoon, the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Unit (PAID-SOTU) elements led
by SPO4 Lorenzo Larot and PO3 JuanchoDizon positioned themselves in the house of their
confidential agent.
There, the PAID-SOTU elements saw Rosauro negotiate with the confidential agent. In
exchange for the one (1) sachet of shabu given by Rosauro to the confidential agent, the latter gave
him a marked 100-peso bill with serial number YZ7 12579.
After the transaction, Larot and Dizon came out of their hiding place and arrested Rosauro.
Thereafter, the confidential agent handed the sachet to Larot, who taped it, marked it with the
marking “Exhibit A”, and placed it inside his pocket. He also took pictures of Rosauro and the drugs.
In the police station, he prepared a Certificate of Inventory and a Request for Laboratory
Examination. Both the drugs and Rosauro were then turned over to the Crime laboratory.
On the basis of the request made by Larot, Police Chief Inspector Ma. Leocy Mag-abo, the
Forensic Chemical Officer of PNP Crime Laboratory conducted a laboratory examination on the
contents of the sachet, on Rosauro, and the marked money. The examination of the seized item
yielded positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu); while Rosauro and the marked
Page 172 of 519

money tested positive for the presence of ultra-violet fluorescent powder. Both the RTC and CA
rendered a judgment of conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was not able to prove the corpus delicti, and that the statutory
safeguards provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not followed
Ruling:
No, the prosecution was able to prove the corpus delicti.
Indeed, equally important in every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited
drugs is the presentation of evidence of the seized drug as the corpus delicti. The identity of the
prohibited drug must be proved with moral certainty. It must also be established with the same
degree of certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same
item offered in court as exhibit.
In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the confidential informant gave the seized
item to SPO4 Larot who placed tape on the sachet and marked it “Exhibit A.” Upon reaching the police
station, SPO4 Larot executed the Certificate of Inventory, as well as the request for laboratory
examination. The request, the specimen, as well as the marked money and Rosauro were then
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. They were received by SPO2 Ricardo Maisog,
the Receiving Clerk of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office, who then forwarded them to Police Inspector
Ma. Leocy Jabonillo Mag-abo, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Moreover,
the seized item was duly identified by SPO4 Larot in open court as the same item seized from
Rosauro.
Furthermore, all the elements for a conviction of illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs
were proven by the prosecution: the identity of Rosauro as the seller, and that of the confidential
informant as poseur-buyer were established, as well as the exchange of the sachet of shabu and the
marked money. It was also ascertained that the seized item was positive for shabu, a dangerous drug,
and that the same item was properly identified in open court by SPO4 Larot. Moreover, the P100.00
bill with serial number YZ712579, or the subject marked money, as well as the living body of the
accused-appellant revealed a positive result for ultraviolet fluorescent powder. Therefore, Rosauro’s
guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANTE DELA PEÑA and DENNIS DELIMA
G.R. No. 207635, February 18, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
In the prosecution of a case for violation of R.A. 9165, both for illegal sale and illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, the primary consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the
seized drugs have been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until their
presentation as evidence in court. The prosecution must establish with moral certainty that the
specimen submitted to the crime laboratory and found positive for dangerous drugs, and finally
introduced in evidence against the accused was the same illegal drug that was confiscated from him. All
the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug, were clearly
proven by the prosecution through the credible testimony of IO1 Kintanar.
Page 173 of 519

Facts:
The three separate Informations filed on June 23, 2008 by the City Prosecutor's Office of
Cebu City indicted Dela Peña and Delima for the following crimes, to wit:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-83576, the Information charged Dela Peña with violation of Section
5, Article II, R.A. 9165 for illegal sale of shabu.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-83577, the Information charged Dela Peña with violation of Section
11, Article II of R.A. 9165 for illegal possession of shabu.
The Information in Criminal Case No. CBU-83578 charged Delima with illegal possession of
shabu.
Dela Peña and Delima separately entered pleas of “Not Guilty” upon arraignment. Joint trial
of the three cases was conducted by the RTC.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Intelligence Officer 1 Ferdenand
Kintanar (IO1 Kintanar); and (2) Intelligence Officer 1 Baby Rallos (IO1 Rallos), both operatives of
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, Region VII (PDEA-7). Their testimonies were summarized
by the appellate court, thus:
When IO1 Kintanar received a report from their confidential informant that Dela Peña
was selling shabu in Barangay Sawang Calero, Cebu City, he immediately instructed OJT Steven Balles
to conduct a surveillance, which confirmed the report.
In the evening of June 19, 2008, a team of PDEA officers was formed to conduct a buy-bust
operation against Dela Peña. IO1 Kintanar, who was tasked to act as poseur-buyer, was given 3pcs.
of one hundred peso (Php100.00) bills as buy-bust money bearing serial numbers which were all
pre-marked with IO1 Kintanar’s initials “FK”.
The buy-bust team, proceeded to Barangay Sawang Calero. The team searched for Dela Peña
in the area. When they finally found him standing along the road with Delima, IO1 Kintanar and the
confidential informant approached him while the rest of the members positioned themselves where,
from their vantage point, they could clearly see the transaction.
The informant and IO1 Kintanar informed Dela Peña of their intention to buy shabu. IO1
Kintanar handed the marked money to Dela Peña, who, in turn, handed a small sachet of suspected
shabu. Delima, who was beside Dela Peña, also showed a sachet of suspected shabu to IO1 Kintanar
but the latter ignored him. Immediately, IO1 Kintanar executed the pre-arranged signal indicating
that the sale was consummated.
The rest of the team members approached the group and arrested Dela Peña and Delima. IO1
Kintanar seized from Dela Peña the buy-bust money and 4 sachets of suspected shabu. On the other
hand, IO1 Rallos, who arrested Delima recovered from the latter a small sachet of shabu which he
turned over to IO1 Kintanar. The buy-bust team apprised the duo of their constitutional rights and
brought them, together with the confiscated items, to the PDEA office where the said items were
marked by IO1 Kintanar.
Page 174 of 519

The plastic sachet of shabu were marked, photographed and recorded in the blotter and
listed in a Certificate of Inventory in the presence of Dela Peña and Delima and was duly witnessed
and signed by Barangay Captain Jerome B. Lim and media representative Chito O. Aragon. The
following day, IO1 Kintanar delivered the confiscated plastic sachets of suspected shabu to the crime
laboratory which tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.
Both appellants interposed the defense of denial.
Giving credence to the version of the prosecution witnesses who have no ill-motive to testify
against Dela Peña and Delima, and finding that the prosecution established the elements of the crimes
charged, the RTC found Dela Peña and Delima guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision. However, the CA modified the penalties by lowering the
maximum periods of the imposed penalties from 15 years to 14 years and 8 months, to the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for a period of 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months
and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165.
Insisting on their innocence, Dela Peña and Delima interposed the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Dela Peña and Delima’s guilt for the crimes charged was established by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes, after a circumspect review of the evidence on record, the Court affirms the conviction of
Dela Peña and Delima. The elements of the crimes charged were established beyond reasonable
doubt.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of a charge for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 are:
(1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
On the other hand, the elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drug are:
(a) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous
drug;
(b) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
All the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug,
were clearly proven by the prosecution through the credible testimony of IO1 Kintanar. The identity
of the parties to the sale transaction (Dela Peña and IO1 Kintanar) involving the subject sachet of
shabu worth P300.00 and the consummation of the sale were duly established by IO1 Kintanar.
IO1 Kintanar’s testimony likewise established the illegal possession of sachets of shabu by Dela Peña
and Delima.
Page 175 of 519

No ill-motive was shown by the defense for IO1 Kintanar to unjustly implicate Dela Peña and
Delima in the present cases. Where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution
was actuated by improper motive, like IO1 Kintanar in the present case, the presumption is that he
was not actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
IO1 Kintanar, who acted as the poseur-buyer, recounted the details of the successful
entrapment conducted against Dela Peña, as well as how he saw Delima holding one sachet of shabu.
The contents of the plastic sachet sold by Dela Peña to IO1 Kintanar and the four sachets found in his
possession, the single sachet seized from Delima, all tested positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug, upon the laboratory examination.
Dela Peña and Delima failed to overcome with competent evidence the positive findings for
shabu of the contents of the subject sachets.
The Court’s judicious review of the records revealed no reason for the Court to deviate from
the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that a legitimate buy-bust operation was
successfully conducted against Dela Peña. What is material to the prosecution of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the illegal sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation
in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus

possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession.
Except for their self-serving denial, the accused could not present any viable defense. The
defense of denial or frame-up has been invariably viewed with disfavor for it can easily be
concocted and is a common defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of R.A. 9165. In the absence
of clear and convincing evidence to substantiate it, said defense deserves outright rejection. Hence,
in failing to produce their license and/or authority to possess the shabu, Dela Peña and Delima were
correctly found guilty for violation of Section 11, Article II, of R.A. 9165.
The prosecution established the unbroken chain of custody of the sachets of shabu seized
from Dela Peña and Delima.
In the prosecution of a case for violation of R.A. 9165, both for illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the primary consideration is to ensure that the identity and
integrity of the seized drugs have been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the
accused until their presentation as evidence in court. The prosecution must establish with moral
certainty that the specimen submitted to the crime laboratory and found positive for dangerous
drugs, and finally introduced in evidence against the accused was the same illegal drug that was
confiscated from him.
To sum up, from the time the illegal drugs were seized from Dela Peña and Delima, up to their
delivery to the crime laboratory for chemical examination, until their presentation in evidence before
the RTC, the integrity of said items was preserved. No evidence was adduced by the defense showing
that they were tainted in any manner. Verily, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be
preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered
with. Dela Peña and Delima failed to discharge their burden of proving that the evidence was
Page 176 of 519
tampered to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers
and the presumption that the public officers properly discharged their duties.
All told, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of Dela Peña in
Criminal Case Nos. CBU-83576 and CBU-83577, and of Delima in CBU- 83578, for violation of Sections
5 and 11 of R.A. 9165.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGILIO LARGO PERONDO

In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must concur (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. In this case, the prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the
essential elements of illegal sale of shabu. Perondo was positively identified by the police officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation as the person who sold the shabu to the poseur buyer. The Court is
not impressed with Perondo’s insistence that the failure to present the poseur-buyer is fatal to the
prosecution. The Court finds no reason to doubt the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their
testimonies. The RTC and the CA are one in finding that their testimonies were direct, definite, and
consistent with one another in relevant points and also with the physical evidence.
Facts:
An Information containing the following accusatory allegations was filed against Virgilio
Perondo that the accused with deliberate intent, and without authority of law, did then and there sell,
deliver or give away to a poseur buyer one heat sealed plastic packet of 0.05 gram of white crystalline
substance, locally known as “SHABU” a dangerous drug. Perondo pleaded “not guilty” during his
arraignment. After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented Police Senior Inspector Mutchit G. Salinas a Forensic Chemist, and
buy-bust team members SPO2 Benjamin G. Genzon, Jr. and PO3 Simeon A. Tapanan, Jr. From their
testimonies, on July 20, 2003, SPO2 Genzon, SPO1 James Estrera, PO3 Emmanuel Sarmiento and PO3
Tapanan were briefed regarding a planned buy-bust operation to be conducted against appellant on
that same day in Brgy. San Roque, Cebu City. During the briefing, a civilian asset was designated as
the poseur-buyer and two 50-peso marked bills were given to him as buy-bust money.
Thereafter, the team proceeded to the target area and, upon arrival, strategically positioned
themselves 10 to 15 meters away from the barangay hall where Perondo was seen standing. The
poseur-buyer approached Perondo. After briefly talking to the latter, the poseur-buyer took out the
50-peso marked bills from his pocket and gave them to the Perondo. In exchange, Perondo handed
over to the poseur-buyer a small plastic pack containing white crystalline substance. The poseur-
buyer examined it and then touched his head, which was the pre-arranged signal that the transaction
was already consummated. The members of the buy-bust team then rushed to the scene and arrested
Perondo. They recovered from him the buy-bust money. Anent the plastic sachet, PO3 Tapanan
retrieved the same from the poseur-buyer while PO3 Sarmiento wrote thereon Perondo’s initials. A
qualitative examination conducted on the contents of the plastic sachet by PSI Salinas later revealed
that the substance is positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Perondo denied that a
buy-bust operation was conducted against him. Instead, he claimed that at around 9:15 p.m. of July
20, 2003, he was eating and watching television at a barbecue stand when he was suddenly arrested
by SPO1 Estrera, PO3 Sarmiento and PO3 Tapanan. He was then taken to a police station and
Page 177 of 519
interrogated on the identities of big time drug dealers in Cebu. Because he was not able to provide
any information as he is not even from Cebu, the police officers blottered an incident implicating him
in the alleged sale of shabu. The RTC gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and
convicted Perondo of the crime charged. Agreeing with the OSG, the CA affirmed in toto the assailed
decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Virgilio Perondo guilty of violating Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act 9165 despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Ruling:
No, the trial court did not err.
In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must concur (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti. In this case, the prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the
essential elements of illegal sale of shabu. Perondo was positively identified by the police officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation as the person who sold the shabu to the poseur-buyer.
It is clear from the foregoing that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of illegal
sale of shabu. Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. The Court finds no reason to doubt the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies. The RTC and the CA are one in finding that their
testimonies were direct, definite, and consistent with one another in relevant points and also with
the physical evidence.
The Court is not impressed with Perondo’s insistence that the failure to present the poseur-
buyer is fatal to the prosecution. It must be noted that whatever relevant information the poseur-
buyer may have was also equally known to the police officers who testified for the prosecution during
trial. Perondo failed to proffer clear and convincing evidence of improper motive to overturn the
presumption that the arresting officers regularly performed their duties. Thus, there is no basis to
suspect the veracity of the statements of the police officers who testified against him. Denial cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses.
Perondo contends that the testimony of PSI Salinas, the Forensic Chemist, was insufficient to
conclude that the sachet of shabu she examined in the crime laboratory was the same illegal drug
allegedly seized from him. Perondo’s contention does not adversely affect the identity, integrity and
probative value of the seized shabu. Chemistry Report No. D-1252-2003 reveals that PSI Salinas
immediately conducted an examination on the specimen submitted and released the result thereof
on that day. The span of time that lapsed from the time the specimen was received by PO1 Abesia
until the same was examined by PSI Salinas was, therefore, too short to be considered
consequential. Also, the marking placed on the seized item by PO3 Sarmiento matches the label of
the heat-plastic packet containing white crystalline substance that, per said Chemistry Report No. D-
Page 178 of 519
1252-2003, was examined by PSI Salinas. It is thus reasonable to conclude that the specimen
submitted was the same one examined. Besides, Perondo’s claim that the same may have been
altered is just his mere speculation and nothing more.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO REYES y SANTOS

The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked
money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. In this case, SPO1 Acosta positively identified
Santos as the person he transacted with and who handed to him the two sachets of shabu presented in
court, however, the prosecution was unable to discharge its burden of establishing the element of
consideration or payment for the sachets of shabu. The charge against him was not confined to the sale
of shabu. To deliver a dangerous drug is an act that is also punishable under the same Section 5, Article
II of R.A. 9165. During the buy bust operation, SPO1 Acosta asked Santos for the shabu and Santos
responded by taking out from his pocket the shabu and handing over its possession to SPO1 Acosta
without receiving any payment thereto.
Facts:
An Information charging Alfredo Santos with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165,
otherwise known as “The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,” as amended, was filed with
the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, that Reyes sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer two (2) heat
sealed transparent plastic sachets containing Shabu, weighing 0.82 gram and 0.85, without first
securing the necessary permit, license or prescription from the proper government agency. Appellant
pleaded not guilty during his arraignment. After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial
ensued.
Based on the prosecution, on June 28, 2005, a confidential informant went to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency office in Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando City, La Union and reported to
SPO1 Rene Acosta that Santos was selling shabu. SPO1 Acosta relayed the information to his superior
officer, Senior Inspector Reynaldo Lizardo, who formed a buy-bust team and designated SPO1 Acosta
as poseur-buyer. On June 29, 2005, SPO1 Acosta and PDEA Agent Ellizier Ignacio, who would act as
back-up, arrived in the designated area at 5:30 a.m. Santos arrived after 20 minutes with the CI and
approached SPO1 Acosta. The CI then introduced SPO1 Acosta to Reyes as the buyer of shabu. SPO1
Acosta asked him if he has the stuff and if SPO1 Acosta could see them. Reyes thus handed over to
SPO1 Acosta two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. SPO1 Acosta then made the
pre-arranged signal by removing the towel from his shoulder to indicate the completion of the
transaction. Ignacio thus rushed to SPO1 Acosta and together, they arrested Reyes. Anent the seized
items, SPO1 Acosta took possession of the same up until they were brought to the police station.
Thereat, he marked them with his initials “RA.” On the same day, Sr. Insp. Lizardo prepared and
signed a Request for Laboratory Examination that SPO1 Acosta delivered together with the seized
plastic sachets to the PNP Crime Laboratory Office in La Union. Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II
conducted a qualitative examination on the contents of the plastic sachets and confirmed the same
to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
Reyes denied the accusations against him. He claimed that on June 28, 2005, he was on board
a bus bound for San Fernando City, La Union to discuss a business proposal with his wife’s nephew,
Rolando Pinon, Jr. However, Pinon was not around when he arrived in the early morning of June 29,
Page 179 of 519
2005. Tired from the long journey, Reyes boarded a tricycle and instructed the driver to take him to
the cheapest hotel. While on their way, a car suddenly blocked the road and three of the four men on
board the vehicle alighted and pointed their guns at him. He was instructed to board the car and taken
to Carlatan, San Fernando City, La Union. Upon their arrival, his captors ordered him to face the wall
and take off his clothes. They also confiscated his bag and then asked him why there was shabu inside.
He denied possession of the same. Santos spent the night in detention and was brought to the RTC of
San Fernando City, La Union the following morning. The RTC found appellant guilty as charged. The
CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC’s judgment of conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of Alfredo Reyes must be sustained
Ruling:
Yes, but for delivery of dangerous drugs, not for sale of shabu.
The crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, such as shabu, has the following elements: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by
the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. In this case, SPO1
Acosta positively identified Santos as the person he transacted with and who handed to him the two
sachets of shabu presented in court. However and as correctly pointed out by Santos, the prosecution
was unable to discharge its burden of establishing the element of consideration or payment for the
sachets of shabu. SPO1 Acosta practically admitted in his testimony the lack of consideration or
payment for the sachets of shabu delivered to him by Reyes. Clearly, the element of receipt of
payment for the thing sold is absent in this case. Hence, the offense of illegal sale of shabu against
Santos cannot stand. However, this finding does not necessarily result in Reyes’s exoneration.
The charge against him was not confined to the sale of shabu. To deliver a dangerous drug is
an act that is also punishable under the same Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165. Under Article I, Section
3(k) of the same statute, the term “deliver” means any act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to
another, personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration. To establish the
guilt of an accused for the illegal delivery of a dangerous drug, there must be evidence that (1) the
accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any
means; (2) such delivery is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused knowingly made the delivery
with or without consideration.
In this case, there was a prior arrangement between SPO1 Acosta and Reyes to meet. During
the scheduled meeting, SPO1 Acosta introduced himself and asked Reyes for the shabu. Reyes
responded by taking out from his pocket the shabu and handing over its possession to SPO1 Acosta
without receiving any payment therefor. Reyes had no authority under the law to deliver the
shabu since he was working as a carpenter at the time of his arrest. Reyes likewise knowingly and
voluntarily made the delivery. On the basis therefore of the charges against Reyes and the evidence
presented by the prosecution, he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal delivery of shabu under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.
Page 180 of 519

The Court disagrees with the contention of appellant that the police officers did not comply
with the chain of custody rule under Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
9165. In this case, the Certificate of Inventory prepared by the police officers belies the contention of
Santos that there was no compliance with the above-quoted provision. While the said certificate was
signed only by the DOJ representative, the failure of the police officers to include the signatures of
the other persons enumerated under the subject provision does not affect the evidentiary weight of
the subject shabu as the chain of custody of the evidence remained unbroken. In like manner, the
absence of photographs of the seized shabu does not render said drugs inadmissible or impair the
integrity of the chain of custody of the same. As established by the prosecution, the police officers
immediately arrested appellant after his delivery of the sachets of shabu. They took him to the police
station together with the seized items and conducted an investigation on his commission of the
criminal offense. There is also no doubt that the marking was done in the presence of Santos since he
was also in the police station at the time of the marking. The short period in which these events
occurred ensures the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
The RTC and CA did not err in giving credence to the narration of the incident by the
prosecution witnesses, who as police officers, are presumed to have regularly performed their official
duties. This presumption is not overturned by the assertion of appellant that: (1) they failed to
present the marked money; (2) they failed to inform him upon arrest of his constitutional right to
counsel; and (3) they detained him for 24 hours before the filing of the charges. The presentation of
the marked money is immaterial in this case since the crime of illegal delivery of a dangerous drug
can be committed even without consideration or payment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LARRY BASILIO y HERNANDEZ

A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police to apprehend Larry Basilio. Basilio was
successfully apprehended by the police after he sold shabu to a police acting as poseur-buyer. The RTC
and CA convicted the accused. Basilio questions the chain of custody of the drug. Marking the subject
item at the police station did not dent the prosecution's case. While R.A. No. 9165 provides for the
immediate marking of the seized item, it does not specify a time frame when and where said marking
should be done.
Facts:
Pursuant to an information he received the day before, Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Julian T.
Olonan (PSI Olonan) organized in the morning of November 2, 2006 a team to conduct a "buy-bust"
operation against a certain "Kagi" who was said to be active in the illegal sale of drugs.
At about 10:00 p.m., the team proceeded to the target area in San Gabriel, Old Sta. Mesa,
Manila. SPO1 Chua approached “Kagi,” later identified as Basilio and told the latter that he was going
to score. Basilio asked SPO1 Chua “magkano” and the latter replied “piso lang.” Basilio got the money
fromSPO1 Chua and in turn handed to the latter a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance. Whereupon, SPO1 Chua scratched the back of his head
signifying to the back-up members that the sale had been consummated. Forthwith, SPO1 Chua
arrested Basilio. Thereat, SPO1 Chua placed the marking “LBH” on the plastic sachet and turned over
the same to their investigator, PO3 Jimenez.PSI Reyes then conducted a qualitative examination of
Page 181 of 519

the specimen which weighed 0.083 gram and tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride,
a dangerous drug.
The RTC found all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs to have been clearly
established by the prosecution. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts correctly convicted Basilio of the offense of illegal sale of
shabu
Ruling:
The lower courts did not err in sustaining the conviction of Basilio.
The prosecution witnesses positively identified Basilio as the seller of the substance to the
poseur-buyer, SPO1 Chua, for the sum of P100.00. The white crystalline substance presented during
trial was identified by SPO1 Chua as the substance sold and delivered to him by Basilio. The substance
when examined by Forensic Chemical Officer PSI Reyes tested positive to methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Clearly, the prosecution has adequately and satisfactorily proved all the
elements of the offense.
The chain of custody requirement aims to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized item are preserved, so much so that doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed.
“To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts
of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was
tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence.”
Basilio also posits that the marking of the seized item at the police station instead of at the
place of seizure immediately after his arrest engendered serious doubt as to its identity. The Court is
not convinced. Marking the subject item at the police station did not dent the prosecution's case.
While R.A. No. 9165 provides for the immediate marking of the seized item, it does not specify a
timeframe when and where said marking should be done.
Finally, while it is admitted that the apprehending officers failed to conduct an inventory of
the seized item and to photograph the same. However, the non-compliance did not affect the seized
item's evidentiary weight and admissibility in evidence. As previously discussed, the chain of custody
of the seized item was unbroken; hence, its integrity and evidentiary value were not compromised.
It must be stressed that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized item.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALLAN DIAZ y ROXAS

Prosecution of cases involving illegal drugs depends largely on the credibility of the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is fundamental that the factual findings of the trial
court and those involving credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross
misapprehension of facts, or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from
Page 182 of 519
such findings. The trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard
their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds
an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the CA. thus, if the testimony of
the police who was the poseur-buyer and who marked the sachets of shabu are supported by documents
such as the marked buy-bust money, chemistry report, affidavit of arrest, among others, which all clearly
attest to the fact that a sale of shabu took place between him and Diaz, the conviction will be upheld.
In addition, an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to faithfully observe the
requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, for as long as the chain of custody remains
unbroken. Here, it is beyond cavil that the prosecution was able to establish the necessary links in the
chain of custody of the subject specimen from the moment it was seized from Diaz up to the time it was
presented during trial as proof of the corpus delicti.
Facts:
An information was filed with the RTC, charging accused-Diaz with a violation of Section 5,
R.A. 9165 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The prosecution alleged that the police caught Diaz
selling drugs in a buy-bust operation, with PO2 Coronel as the poseur buyer. After PO2 Coronel
received the shabu from Diaz, he the signal upon which the other police officers arrested Diaz. He was
brought to the police station where the plastic sachet containing the shabu was marked by PO2
Coronel. The substance tested positive for shabu. Diaz alleges that he was just walking home when
he was suddenly arrested, brought to the police station and subjected to inquest proceedings.
The RTC convicted Diaz as charged, and the CA affirmed in toto the RTC.
Issues:
1. Was PO2 Coronel not a credible witness?
2. Did the prosecution fail to comply with the chain of custody requirement?
Ruling:
1. No, PO2 Coronel’s testimony is supported by other evidence such as the marked buy-bust money,
chemistry report, affidavit of arrest, among others, which all clearly attest to the fact that a sale of
shabu took place between him and Diaz
Diaz assails the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of prosecution witness PO2 Coronel.
He faults the RTC in giving more faith and credit to PO2 Coronel’s testimony regarding the buy-bust
operation over his defense of denial.
Prosecution of cases involving illegal drugs depends largely on the credibility of the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is fundamental that the factual findings of the trial
court and those involving credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross
misapprehension of facts, or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered
from such findings. The trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having
heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The
rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the CA, as in this
case. The Court has thoroughly examined the records of this case and finds the testimony of PO2
Coronel credible. The said testimony is pertinently supported by documents such as the marked buy-
Page 183 of 519
bust money, chemistry report, affidavit of arrest, among others, which all clearly attest to the fact that
a sale of shabu took place between him and Diaz. On the other hand, Diaz’s defense of denial, aside
from being self-serving, is unsubstantiated and thus, has little weight in law. Hence, the lower courts
correctly gave more credence to the evidence of the prosecution.
2. No, even if the police failed to faithfully observe the requirements under Sec. 21, R.A. 9165, Diaz
may still be found guilty as the chain of custody remained unbroken.
Diaz banks on the prosecution’s alleged failure to comply with the requirements of law with
respect to the proper marking, inventory, and taking of photograph of the seized specimen. However,
it does not escape the Court’s attention that Diaz failed to contest the admissibility in evidence of the
seized item during trial. In fact, at no instance did he manifest or even hint that there were lapses on
the part of the police officers in handling the seized item which affected its integrity and evidentiary
value. As held by the Court in People v. Domado, citing People v. Hernandez, objection to the
admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. When a party desires the court
to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. In this case, Diaz raised the police operatives’
alleged non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the first time on appeal before
the CA. Thus, following established jurisprudence, the alleged flaws do not adversely affect the
prosecution’s case.
In any event, it is settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to
faithfully observe the requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, for as long as the
chain of custody remains unbroken. Here, it is beyond cavil that the prosecution was able to establish
the necessary links in the chain of custody of the subject specimen from the moment it was seized
from Diaz up to the time it was presented during trial as proof of the corpus delicti.
ALEX TIONCO y ORTEGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No.192284, March 11, 2015, J. Del Castillo
Accused was charged of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. He argued that no physical
inventory was conducted, or photograph of the drugs taken, immediately upon seizure, in violation of
the procedures provided by law. The Court ruled that the failure of the arresting officers to strictly
comply with the law is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items.
Facts:
Petitioner Alex was charged with violation of Section 11(3), Article II of R.A. 9165 or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
PO1 Joel G. Sta. Maria and PO1 Fernando Reyes were conducting an anti-criminality patrol in
Tondo, Manila. From a distance of about three meters, they saw Alex holding and examining a plastic
sachet with white crystalline substance believed to be shabu. They approached him and after
ascertaining the contents of the plastic sachet, confiscated the same. Alex was arrested, told of his
alleged violation, and apprised of his constitutional rights.
Page 184 of 519

Alex denied the charges against him. He recounted that in the morning of said incident, he
was sitting in front of his uncle’s house when policemen approached and arrested him. When he
asked them why he was being arrested, he was merely told to follow their instructions. He was
brought to Police Station 2 where he was frisked but nothing illegal was found on him. He was
detained after being informed that he violated the law pertaining to drugs. PO1 Sta. Maria demanded
P6,000.00 from him in exchange for his release but no money was forthcoming.
The RTC convicted Alex. The CA affirmed the conviction and found the elements of illegal
possession of dangerous drug present.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the conviction of Alex;

2. Whether or not there was failure on the part of the police officers to preserve the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized item
Ruling:
1. No, the Court upheld the conviction.
For illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following elements must be
established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.
The circumstances on how Alex was seen holding and examining a piece of plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance, how the same was confiscated from him by the police officers,
and his eventual arrest were narrated by PO1 Sta. Maria in a direct and consistent manner. In open
court, he positively identified Alex as the person holding the plastic sachet. He also identified the
plastic sachet marked “ATO” as the same item confiscated from Alex. There is nothing on record to
show that Alex was legally authorized to possess the same. And having been caught in flagrante
delicto, there is prima facie evidence that Alex freely and consciously possessed the drug, which he
failed to rebut.
The Court disagreed with the contention that it is highly improbable and contrary to human
experience that Alex would hold and examine the subject plastic sachet with people around and in
broad daylight. It has been observed in many cases that drug pushers sell their prohibited articles to
any prospective customer, be he a stranger or not, in private as well as in public places, even during
daytime. Undeniably, drug pushers have become increasingly daring, dangerous and, worse, openly
defiant of the law. Hence, what matters is not the time or place where the violation was committed
but the acts constituting the violation of the dangerous drug law.
2. No, there was no failure to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item.
With respect to the seized illegal substance, the presentation of the drug itself constitutes the
corpus delicti of the offense and its existence is indispensable to a judgment of conviction. It must be
shown that the item subject of the offense is the same substance offered in court as exhibit. The chain
Page 185 of 519
of custody requirements provided for in Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 performs this function as
it ensures the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the item so that unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
Alex argued that no physical inventory was conducted, or photograph of it taken, immediately
upon seizure, in violation of the procedures provided by law. The Court noted that the defense did
not question the admissibility of the seized item as evidence during trial. It was only during the appeal
to the CA that he questioned the same. Settled is the rule that no question will be entertained on
appeal unless it had been raised in the court below.
However, the Court ruled that the failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the
law is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from
him inadmissible.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. When Alex was arrested and the suspected shabu was confiscated from him by PO1 Sta.
Maria, the latter immediately brought the item to the police station where he marked the plastic
sachet with Alex’s initials “ATO,” and turned it over to the investigator PO 1 Garcia. The latter,
together with PO 1 Sta. Maria, then forwarded the said plastic sachet marked with "ATO" and the
letter request for laboratory examination to the WPD Crime Laboratory. Forensic Chemist P/Insp.
Macapagal personally received the same from PO 1 Garcia and after conducting qualitative
examination on the contents thereof, found the same to be positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. When the prosecution presented as evidence in court the plastic sachet
marked with "ATO," PO1 Sta. Maria in no uncertain terms positively identified it as the one he
confiscated from Alex.
The Court ruled that the chain of custody of the seized item was shown to not have been
broken, and, hence, its integrity and evidentiary value properly preserved.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BRIAN MERCADO

G.R. No. 207988, March 11, 2015, J. Perez
The Court has consistently ruled that for the successful prosecution of offenses involving the
illegal sale of drugs under Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1)
the identity of the buyer and seller, the object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the nothing sold
and the payment therefor. In other words, there is a need to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused actually sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and that the former indeed knew that
what he had sold and delivered to the latter was a prohibited drug. To reiterate, what is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, plus the presentation in court of corpus delicti as evidence. On the other hand, [the Court] have
adhered to the time-honored principle that for illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs under
Sec. 11 of the same law, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
Page 186 of 519

Facts:
Accused-appellant Mercado was arrested following a buy-bust operation in which the police
operatives obtained several sachets of shabu. Subsequently, he was formally charged for violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165. The trial court rendered a decision finding Mercado guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the said crimes.
The trial court held that the prosecution was able to prove the offer and sale that transpired
between Mercado and the police operatives. In addition, the testimonies of the police officers, who
participated in the buy-bust operation, appear credible and reliable and there is absence of any ill-
motive on their part to concoct trumped charges. On the opposite end, the claim of extortion of
Mercado was weak and unsubstantiated. The CA affirmed this judgment of conviction and rejected
Mercado’s protest that there were misgivings in the chain-of-custody of the confiscated drugs.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165.
Ruling:
YES, the prosecution was able to present evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of Mercado.
Upon perusal of the records of the case, the Court see no reason to reverse or modify the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of the testimony of prosecution’s witnesses, more so in
the present case, in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. It is worthy to mention that, in
addition to the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty, the court a
quo was in the best position to weigh the evidence presented during trial and ascertain the credibility
of the police officers who testified as to the conduct of the buy-bust operation and in preserving the
integrity of the seized illegal drug.
illegal sale of drugs under Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be proven:
(1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
nothing sold and the payment therefor. In other words, there is a need to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused actually sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and that the former
indeed knew that what he had sold and delivered to the latter was a prohibited drug. To reiterate,
what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, plus the presentation in court of corpus delicti as evidence. On the other
hand, the Court have adhered to the time-honored principle that for illegal possession of regulated
or prohibited drugs under Sec. 11 of the same law, the prosecution must establish the following
elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited
or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the drug.
Undoubtedly, the prosecution had indeed established that there was a buy-bust operation
showing that accused-appellant sold and delivered the shabu for value to … the poseur-buyer. xxx
Likewise, Mercado was fully aware that what he was selling was illegal and prohibited considering
Page 187 of 519
that when poseur-buyer told him, “pre, pa-iskor naman,” the former immediately answered,
“magkano?,” then when the poseur-buyer replied, “dos lang,” it resulted to the production of three
(3) pieces of plastic sachets from Mercado’s pocket. Thereafter, the corpus delicti or the subject drug
was seized, marked, and subsequently identified as a prohibited drug. Note that there was nothing in
the records showing that he had authority to possess them. Jurisprudence had pronounced
repeatedly that mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
Above all, Mercado likewise failed to present contrary evidence to rebut his possession of the shabu.
Taken collectively, the illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs by Mercado were indeed
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, the Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of
authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to
the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone
not in the chain to have possession of the same.
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered
from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be
established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt.
From the testimonies of the police officers in the case at bench, the prosecution established
that they had custody of the drug seized from the accused from the moment he was arrested, during
the time he was transported to the police station, and up to the time the drug was submitted to the
crime laboratory for examination. The same witnesses also identified the seized drug with certainty
when this was presented in court. With regard to the handling of the seized drugs, there are no
conflicting testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity thereof as
evidence presented and scrutinized in court. It is therefore safe to conclude that, to the unprejudiced
mind, the testimonies show without a doubt that the evidence seized from the accused-appellant at
the time of the buy-bust operation was the same one tested, introduced, and testified to in court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BRIAN MERCADO y SARMIENTO

A person carrying an illegal drug without authorization to do so shall be liable for violation of
RA 9165 for possession of dangerous drug. Mere possession of the same shall be prima facie evidence of
possession. On the other hand, if the person sells the drug, the prosecution must prove the following: (1)
the identity of the buyer and seller, the object and consideration; (2) actual delivery of the thing sold
and payment thereof.
Page 188 of 519

Facts:
A tip from an anonymous informant that Mercado was selling dangerous drugs was received
by the police. The police then planned a buy bust operation with SPO2 William Quillan as team leader
and PO3 Ramon Galvez as poseur buyer. PO3 Galvez told Mercado, “Pre, pa-iskor naman.” Mercado
then answered, “Magkano?” PO3 Galvez handed two marked 100-peso bills to Mercado and was given
an opportunity to choose 1 from the 3 sachets containing crystalline substance. After making his
choice, PO3 Galvez claimed from Mercado a sachet and signaled to his colleagues. The police force
arrested Mercado and the 3 sachets were confiscated and transmitted to laboratory for examination.
The results confirmed that the crystalline substance was shabu and Mercado was charged of
violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the trial, Mercado denied the version of facts of the prosecution and contended that
he was suddenly arrested by the police on the morning of July 27, 2007 and was asked to produce
P10,000 in exchange for his freedom. Having failed to do so, he was charged of the said offenses.
The RTC found Mercado guilty. On appeal, Mercado raised that he was wrongfully convicted
on the ground of inadmissibility of evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC
and rejected the stance of the accused holding that Mercado cannot raise an issue for the first time
on appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Mercado is guilty of selling and possession of illegal drugs

Ruling:
Yes, he is.
illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be
proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. In other words, there is a need to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused actually sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and that
the former indeed knew that what he had sold and delivered to the latter was a prohibited drug. To
reiterate, what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, plus the presentation in court of corpus delicti as evidence. On
the other hand, this court has adhered to the time-honored principle that for illegal possession of
regulated or prohibited drugs under Section 11 of the same law, the prosecution must establish the
following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the drug.
Undoubtedly, the prosecution had indeed established that there was a buy-bust operation
showing that accused-appellant sold and delivered the shabu for value to PO3 Ramon Galvez (PO3
Galvez), the poseur-buyer. PO3 Galvez himself testified that there was an actual exchange of the
marked-money and the prohibited drug. Likewise, accused-appellant was fully aware that what he
was selling was illegal and prohibited considering that when PO3 Galvez told him, “pre, pa-iskor
naman,” the former immediately answered, “magkano?,” then when the poseur-buyer replied, “dos
Page 189 of 519
lang,” it resulted to the production of three (3) pieces of plastic sachets from accused-appellant’s
pocket. Thereafter, the corpus delicti or the subject drug was seized, marked, and subsequently
identified as a prohibited drug. Note that there was nothing in the records showing that he had
authority to possess them. Jurisprudence had pronounced repeatedly that mere possession of a
prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation. Above all, accused-appellant
likewise failed to present contrary evidence to rebut his possession of the shabu. Taken collectively,
the illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs by accused-appellant were indeed
established beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RANDY ROLLO y LAGASCA

Randy avers that the police officers failed to strictly abide by the procedures for the custody and
disposition of the confiscated drugs as provided in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The Court held
that absent any missing link in the chain of custody of the seized drug items and absent any showing
that substantial or relevant facts bearing on the elements of the crime have been misapplied or
overlooked, the Court can only accord full credence to such factual assessment of the Regional Trial
Court which had the distinct advantage of observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses at the
trial.
Facts:
Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that Randy was engaged in the sale of prohibited
drugs, the 312 Provincial Mobile Group (PMG) of Malacampa, Camiling, Tarlac formed a buy-bust
team composed of PO1 Ayad as poseur-buyer. The PMG prepared a Five Hundred Peso (P500.00) bill
as marked money.
At around 4:30 p.m. of 23 June 2008, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area. Upon
reaching the area, PO1 Ayad proceeded to talk to Randy who was then standing in front of a store,
while the other members of the buy-bust team were positioned in the area. After a brief conversation,
Randy handed to PO1 Ayad two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. In exchange,
PO1 Ayad handed the pre-marked five hundred peso (P500.00) bill to appellant.
Thereafter, PO1 Ayad made the pre-arranged signal of removing the handkerchief on his
forehead. The back-up team emerged and introduced themselves as police officers to Randy. PO3
Verdadero and PO1 Ayad requested Randy to empty his pockets and they were able to recover the
buy-bust money and one heat- sealed sachet of white crystalline substance from appellant. Randy
was then arrested and brought to the police station for investigation. The seized items and the
marked money were turned over at the police station to SPO1 Jorge Caoagdan, who marked the two
plastic sachets. The Chemistry Report found that the seized plastic sachets are positive for the
presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu.
The RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the RTC.
Issue:
Page 190 of 519

Whether or not Randy is guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
Ruling:
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
All the elements for illegal sale were duly established with appellant being caught in flagrante
delicto selling shabu through a buy- bust operation conducted by members of the PMG in Camiling,
Tarlac.
In the affidavit, the police officers made a detailed account of the preparations made prior to
the buy-bust operation such as the documentation, marking on the boodle money, operational
strategy and the like were detailed. PO1 Ayad also categorically stated that he gave the marked
money to appellant in exchange for one (1) piece of transparent plastic heat-sealed sachet of shabu.
The result of the laboratory examination, as testified to by the forensic chemist, confirmed the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride on the white crystalline substance inside the plastic
sachet confiscated from appellant. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt
by the seller of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction.
Randy avers that the police officers failed to strictly abide by the procedures for the custody
and disposition of the confiscated drugs as provided in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. In
particular, he points out that the markings of the seized items were done in the police station; that
there was no physical inventory made or photographs of the seized items; and that there were no
representatives from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the custody and disposition
of the confiscated illegal drugs, to wit:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Jurisprudence dictates that a testimony that included the marking of the seized items at the
police station and in the presence of the accused was sufficient in showing compliance with the rules
on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team.
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical
inventory in the place where the subject shabu was seized does not automatically render accused’s
arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible. A proviso was added in the implementing
rules that “non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.”
Page 191 of 519
Pertinently, it is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items which
must be proven to establish the corpus delicti.
Resolving the chain of custody rule, this Court quotes with approval the pertinent ruling of
the Court of Appeals, thus:
Indeed, to erase all doubts as to the identity of the seized drugs, it is important to adhere to
the so-called chain of custody rule where the prosecution should establish the following links: first,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
In this case, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish every link in the chain of
custody, as well as the integrity of the corpus delicti. As testified to by PO3 Verdadero and PO1 Ayad,
after the arrest and confiscation of the items, they immediately brought Accused-Appellant to Camp
Makabulos, Tarlac City where the investigator at the station, SPO1 Jorge Caoagdan marked the seized
items with the initials “RRL1” and “RRL2” in the presence of PO1 Ayad. From the investigating officer,
the seized items were turned over to the forensic chemist PSI Jebie Timario [for] laboratory
examination. After examination, PSI Timario also placed her own markings on the said seized items.
On the witness stand, PSI Timario declared that the items shown to her were the same items which
she received from Pereja in the presence of Police Officer Dinoy. Lastly, PO3 Verdadero testified that
the items presented in court were the very same items that they seized during the buy-bust
operation.
The foregoing facts clearly established that there was substantial compliance with the law,
and the integrity of the drugs seized from Randy was well preserved. The chain of custody of the
drugs subject matter of the case was shown no to have been broken. Absent any missing link in the
chain of custody of the seized drug items and absent any showing that substantial or relevant facts
bearing on the elements of the crime have been misapplied or overlooked, this Court can only accord
full credence to such factual assessment of the Regional Trial Court which had the distinct advantage
of observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses at the trial.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHARLIE SORIN y TAGAYLO

G.R. No. 212635, March 25, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other
similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at
the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.
Hence, the Court should acquit the accused on the ground of failure to mark the plastic sachets
confiscated during the buy-bust operation
Facts:
Sorin was charged before the RTC for violating Sections 5 and 15, Article II of RA 9165.
According to the prosecution, on November 2, 2005, the Philippine National Police (PNP) intelligence
section chief of El Salvador, Misamis Oriental received a report that Sorin was selling illegal drugs at
Page 192 of 519
his residence in Barangay Amoros, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental. Prior to this date, or on October 25,
2005, a test-buy was conducted by the PNP where Sorin sold illegal drugs to a civilian asset. As a
result, Police Chief Inspector Rolindo Soguillon (PCI Soguillon) formed a buy-bust team composed of
PO2 Edgardo Dador (PO2 Dador) and PO1 Sonny Adams Cambangay (PO1 Cambangay), as poseur-
buyers, and PO3 Edilberto Estrada, SPO1 Graciano Mugot, Jr. (SPO1 Mugot), SPO1 Samuel Madjos,
and SPO2 Elias Villarte, as back-up team. The poseur-buyers were provided with four (4) one
hundred peso bills as marked money.
At around 7:30 in the evening, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area. PO2 Dador
and PO1 Cambangay approached Sorin’s residence, knocked on the door, and were eventually let in.
They asked if they could buy shabu, and Sorin responded that each sachet costs 200.00. PO2 Dador
offered to purchase two (2) sachets. After examining said sachets, each containing white crystalline
substance, PO2 Dador gave Sorin the 400.00 marked money. PO2 Dador then tapped Sorin on the
shoulder, brought him outside the house where he and the rest of the buy-bust team introduced
themselves as police officers, and arrested Sorin. The latter was then brought to the police station.
At the police station, PO2 Dador turned over the seized items and the marked money to SPO1
Mugot, who marked the same, prepared the inventory and request for laboratory examination, and
sent the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The PNP Crime Laboratory tested the following
items: (a) the sachets seized from Sorin during the buy-bust operation for the presence of illegal
drugs; (b) Sorin’s hands and the marked money used to purchase the aforementioned illegal drugs
for ultraviolet fluorescent powder; and (c) Sorin’s urine for the presence of illegal drugs. The seized
sachets tested positive for shabu, while Sorin’s hands and the marked money used contained traces
of ultraviolet fluorescent powder. Also, Sorin’s urine tested positive for the presence of shabu.
The RTC found Sorin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA
9165. Aggrieved, Sorin appealed his conviction before the CA. The CA affirmed Sorin’s conviction in
toto. Undaunted, Sorin filed the instant appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorin’s conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 should be
upheld.
Ruling:
No. In order to convict an accused charged with violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the
prosecution must be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
Accordingly, it is of paramount importance for the prosecution to establish that the transaction
actually took place, and to present the corpus delicti, i.e., the seized drug/s, before the court.
Similarly, it must be shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of such seized items have
been preserved. In other words, the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against an
accused must be the same as that seized from him. The chain of custody requirement ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. In People v. Viterbo, citing
People v. Cervantes, the Court had occasion to elaborate on the requirement’s rationale:
Page 193 of 519

the following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. As the dangerous drug
itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that the
identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must
be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it
was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti.
In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the
substance allegedly confiscated from Sorin due to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus
warranting his acquittal.
Records bear out that PO2 Dador, i.e., the apprehending officer who seized the sachets from
Sorin during the buy-bust operation conducted on November 2, 2005, failed to mark the same and,
instead, turned them over unmarked to SPO1 Mugot who was the one who conducted the marking;
prepared the request for laboratory examination of the seized sachets, Sorin’s urine, and the marked
money; delivered the said request, together with the seized sachets and marked money, to the PNP
Crime Laboratory; and later received the examination results. PO2 Dador had, in fact, admitted that
the sachets he seized from Sorin were not even marked in his presence.
The Court cannot over-emphasize the significance of marking in illegal drugs cases. The
marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar
or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the
end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.
Hence, in People v. Sabdula, the Court acquitted the accused on the ground of failure to mark the
plastic sachets confiscated during the buy-bust operation
With these lapses unveiled from the foregoing testimonies, the Court is unconvinced that the
chain of custody rule had been substantially complied with. Not only did the apprehending officer
who had initial custody over the seized drugs, i.e., PO2 Dador, fail to mark the same or even witness
its alleged marking, but also the officer to which the marking of the seized items was attributed to,
i.e., SPO1 Mugot, himself disclaimed that he had done such marking and admitted that he only marked
a transparent plastic cellophane container, and not the individual sachets PO2 Dador had turned-
over to him containing the seized drugs themselves. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.
People of the Philippines vs. Cristy Dimaano y Tipdas,

G.R. No. 174481, February 10, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with Violation of R.A. No. 9165. Dimaano was arraigned on
November 25, 2002, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
The version of the prosecution are as follows:
On November 13, 2002, Non-Uniformed Personnel Florence S. Bilugot (NUP Bilugot) was detailed
as frisker at the initial check-in departure area of the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal 1. At
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around 3:45 a.m., a woman arrived, placed her luggage at the x-ray machine, and passed through
the walk-through metal detector. The woman was then frisked by NUP Bilugot.
NUP Bilugot felt a hard object bulging near the woman’s buttocks. Asked what the object was, the
woman replied that it was a sanitary napkin, explaining that she was having her monthly period.
Suspicious, NUP Bilugot requested the woman to accompany her to the ladies’ room.NUP Bilugot
informed Senior Police Officer 2 Reynato Ragadio (SPO2 Ragadio), who was likewise detailed at the
initial check-in area, of the hard object she felt on the woman’s body. SPO2 Ragadio then
accompanied the woman and NUP Bilugot. The woman and NUP Bilugot proceeded to the ladies’
restroom while SPO2 Ragadio waited outside.
NUP Bilugot then asked the woman to remove her panties. On the panties’ crotch was a panty
shield on top of a sanitary napkin, but under all of these was a plastic sachet. Seeing a white
crystalline substance similar to "tawas," NUP Bilugot asked the woman what the plastic sachet
contained. The woman allegedly replied that it was "shabu." NUP Bilugot asked the woman further
as to who owned the shabu, but the woman answered that she was just asked to bring it.2NUP
Bilugot then seized the plastic sachet and, together with the woman, went out of the ladies’ room.
NUP Bilugot turned over the plastic sachet to SPO2 Ragadio.
SPO2 Ragadio recalled receiving from NUP Bilugot two (2) transparent plastic sachets, which NUP
Bilugot placed inside a plastic bag. He then requested the woman for her airline ticket, revealing
the woman’s name to be "Cristy Dimaano. Intelligence and Investigation Office of the Philippine
Center for Aviation and Security, 2nd Regional Aviation Security Office. According to SPO2
Ragadio, he and NUP Bilugot wrote their respective initials, "RBR" and "FSB," on the two sachets.
NUP Bilugot then returned to her post at the initial check-in area.
Investigators detailed at the Philippine Center for Aviation and Security examined the contents of
the two (2) plastic sachets.3One sachet contained three (3) smaller sachets while the other
contained four (4). Thirty minutes later, three investigators from the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency arrived to collect the specimen and placed their initials on the two plastic sachets. They
then brought Dimaano to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency office at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport.
At around 2:30 p.m., SPO2 Ragadio received a phone call from the PDEA investigators, requesting
him to go to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency office. There, he and NUP Bilugot were
informed that the specimen obtained from Dimaano tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu. He then executed his affidavit while NUP Bilugot executed an affidavit of
arrest.
That the sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride was corroborated by Police Inspector
Abraham B. Tecson (Police Inspector Tecson), a Forensic Chemist at the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City. In his Physical Science Report, Police Inspector
Tecson stated that he was the officer on duty at the chemistry department of the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory when he received a request for examination at around 2:20 p.m.
Page 195 of 519

of November 13, 2002. He received from Police Chief Inspector Roseller Fabian two plastic sachets
marked with "FSB," "RDR," and "RSA."
Police Inspector Tecson reported that one of the sachets contained three (3) heat-sealed plastic
sachets, while the other contained four (4). After subjecting the contents of the sachets to chemical
analysis, Police Inspector Tecson confirmed that the sachets contained a total of 13.96 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Waiving her right to testify in court, Dimaano instead filed a memorandum and argued that the
prosecution failed to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt She specifically alluded to the
conflicting testimonies of NUP Bilugot and SPO2 Ragadio as to the number of sachets allegedly
obtained from her person.
NUP Bilugot testified in court that she obtained from Dimaano only one (1) plastic sachet. On the
other hand, SPO2 Ragadio recalled receiving two (2) plastic sachets from NUP Bilugot. This
discrepancy, according to Dimaano, casts doubt as to the identity of the specimen allegedly
obtained from her. There was a break in the chain of custody of the seized drugs, which warranted
her acquittal.
In a decision, the RTC convicted appellant beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The CA
affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution established the unbroken chain of custody of the
methamphetamine hydrochloride allegedly seized from accused-appellant.
Held: Yes. Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 punishes the
transportation of dangerous drugs. The provision states, in part:
Sec. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Distribution and Transportation

of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any such
transactions.
The attempt to transport dangerous drugs is punished by the same penalty

prescribed for its commission:
SEC. 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. – Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the

following unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the
commission of the same as provided under this Act:
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....
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and

transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical[.]
To transport a dangerous drug is to "carry or convey it from one place to another. For an accused
to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove its essential element: the movement of
the dangerous drug from one place to another.
In cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the prosecution
must prove "the existence of the prohibited drug. The prosecution must show that the integrity of
the corpus delicti has been preserved because "the evidence involved—the seized chemical—is not
readily identifiable by sight or touch and can easily be tampered with or substituted."
To show that "the drugs examined and presented in court were the very ones seized from the
accused, "testimony as to the "chain of custody" of the seized drugs must be presented. Chain of
custody is: the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time
of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court
for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity
and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when
such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and
the final disposition and is governed by Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. Section 21, before amendment by Republic Act No. 10640 in 2013, provides, in part:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to
the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
Page 197 of 519

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under
oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after
the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does
not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination
report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to
be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall
be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next
twenty-four (24) hours[.]
The purpose of Section 21 is "to protect the accused from malicious imputations of guilt by abusive
police officers.
Nevertheless, Section 21 cannot be used to "thwart the legitimate efforts of law enforcement agents.
Slight infractions or nominal deviations by the police from the prescribed method of handling the
corpus delicti [as provided in Section 21] should not exculpate an otherwise guilty defendant." Thus,
"substantial adherence" to Section 21 will suffice, and, as section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act provides:
Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 under justifiable grounds, as long as the
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo dela Cruz y Gumabat @ Eddie,

G.R. No. 205414, April 4, 2016
Facts: The appellant was charged with violation of R.A. No. 9165 or “Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002”.
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the witnesses of the prosecution, namely, PO1 Jaycee John
Galotera, who acted as the poseur-buyer; PO1 Roderick Magpale, who was the investigator-on-duty
at the Special Operation and Task Unit; and PO3 Ryan Sulyao, who acted as the perimeter back-up,
are as follows:
At around 7:30 pm, on October 22, 2009, a confidential informant arrived at the Jose Abad Santo
Police Station, MPD and informed PO1 Ronnie Tan, PO3 Ryan Sulayao and PO3 Eric Guzman about
the illegal drugs activities being conducted by appellant along Solis Street, Tondo, Manila. Said
informant claimed to have gained access to appellant.
Consequently, the police officers immediately informed their station commander who the task the
unit to conduct a buy-bust operation to be led by P/Inspector Jeffrey Dallo. The latter gave PO1
Galotera 3 pieces of Php100 bills to be utiized as buy-bust money. The team also agreed that PO1
Galotera’s removal ofhis ball cap constitutes the signal indicating that the transaction has been
consummated and that the appellant may be arrested. The team left the station and proceeded to
the target area at 12:20am.
Page 198 of 519

PO1 Galotera and the confidential informant went straight to teh destination aboard a motorcycle,
while PO1 Tan, PO3 Sulayao and PO3 Guzman aboard a separate motorcycle. PO1 Galotera and the
informant then walked along an alley on Solis Street and saw two men standing at a dark portion
thereof. As they approached said men, the confidential informant whispered to PO1 Galotera that
the person on the right was appellant. Thereafter, appellant asked the informant what he needed.
In reply, the informant told appellant that he and his companion, needed “Valium” which contains
Diazepam, a dangerous drug. Appellant then asked how much Valium they need, to which PO1
Galotera answered “Isang banig lang”. PO1 Galotera then handed the marked money to appellant
who placed the same in his front left pocket. Thereafter, appellant pulled out one blister pack
containing ten pieces of round, blue tablets from his right pocke and handed the same to PO1
Galotera. Believing that what he receibed was Valium based on its appearance, PO1 Galotera
executed the pre-arranged signal. Appellant was then apprended.
During the trial, the prosecution failed to present the marked money. However, the RTC convicted
the appellant. The conviction was affirmed by the CA.
Issues: Whether or not appellant can be convicted of the crime of Violation of R.A. No. 9165 despite
the failure of the prosecution to present the marked money during the trial and for failure of the
arresting officers to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 (physical inventory of items seized and
photograph of the same)
Held: Yes. In the said case, the CA cited jurisprudence holding that the absence of the marked
money does not create a hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence, as long as the sale of the dangerous
drug is adequately proved. Furthermore, the appellant court rejected appellant’s contention that
there was no proof that the Valium that was subkected to qualitative examination was the same
Valium seized from him during the buy-bust operation. Accoring to the appellant court, the
unbroken chain of custody of the ten Valium tablets was established by the prosecution through
the testimonies of PO1 Galotera and PO1 Magpale. Thus, in the absence of any bad faith or proof
that the evidence has been tampered with, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been
preserved.
Likewise, the failure conduct a physical invetory of the seized items, as well as to take photographs
of the same in the presence of the persons required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, will not
automatically render an arrest illegal or the seized items inadmissible in evidence.
The Supreme Court has, time and again, ruled that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
shall not necessarily render the arrest of an accused as illegal or the items seized as inadmissible if
the intergrity and evidentiaty value of the seized items are properly preseved in compiance with
the chain of custody rule.
Page 199 of 519

People of the Philippines vs. Raul Amaro y Catubay alias “Lalaks”

G.R. No. 207517, June 1, 2016
Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with Violation of Section 5, R.A. No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerious Drugs Act of 2002. On arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The version of the prosecution are as follows:
At about 11:30 a.m. on July 6, 2005, a team composed of the members of the Intelligence Operatives
Section of the PNP Dumaguete Station, PDEA, and NBI, implemented a buy-bust operation against
Amaro in his residence located in Looc, Dumaguete City. The plan was brought about by reports
received by the Intelligence Operative of the police station that Amaro was engaged in the illegal
trade of selling shabu.
The team was alos armed with a search warrant, which was the result of surveillance and test buy
conducted prior to the buy-bust operation. It was agreed that the buy-bust would be executed prior
to the warrant. PO3 Abella was designated as the poseur-buyer. SPO2 Ferred handed him Two (2)
One (1) hundred pesos bills. As planned, while the rest of the buy-bust team concealed themselves
and served as back-up, PO3 Abella approached Amaro at the back portion of his house and
negotiated for the purchase of P200 worth of shabu. When Amaro received the P200.oo marked
money that PO3 Abella gave him, he went inside his house. Going back, he handed over to PO3
Abella a sachet of white crystalline substance. Upon examination, PO3 Abella immediatelt told him
that he is a police officer and placed him under arrest. In reaction, Amaro ran inside the house, but
was chased and caught by PO3 Abella. He was informed of the reason for his arrest and was
apprised, in the local dialect, of his constitutional rights. A body search conducted on him resulted
in the recovery of the marked bills inside his pocket.
The rest of the buy-bust team then entered Amaro’s residence to serve and implement the search
warrant. Barangay Councilor Nelso Merced as well as mediamen Elloren and Gallarde were present
to witness.
Only Amaro testified for the defense. While he admitted that illegal drugs were openly sold in Looc
where he had lived for almost ten years, he denied that he was sellinh shabu. He testified that he
was in his house at noontime of July 6, 2005 when PO2 Barandog, Jr.,SPO1 Sanchez and SPO1
Germodo kicked the door and went inside; that the policemen searched the house pursuant to a
warrant, which was shown to him, but they were not able to recover anything.
The RTC convicted accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section
5 of R.A. No. 9165.
On appeal before the CA, accused-appellant argued that the police officers who implemented the
buy-bust operation had planted evidence against him.
However, the CA affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC.
Page 200 of 519

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC.
Held: No. Amaro had the burden of proof to overcome the presumption that the police officers
handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly performed their official duties.
However, accused-appellant failed. Other than erroneously relying on the purported finding of the
trial court, no bad faith or planting of evidence was actually shown. He did not ascribe any improper
motive on the part of the police officers as to why they would choose to falsely implicate him in a
very serios crime that would cause his incarceration for life. For Amaro’s failure to demonstrate
with clear and convincing evidence that the memers of the buy-bust operation team were illicitly
motivated, or had failed to properly perform their official functions, the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses deserve full faith and credit.
For a successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, the following elements must be satisfied: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
In the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer
and the receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal transaction. What
matters is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, copuled with the presentation
in court of the prohibted drug, the corpus delicti, as evidence.
People of the Philippines vs. Joan Sonjaco y Sta Ana

G.R. No. 196962, June 08, 2016
Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Violation of Section 5 and 11, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Upon arraignment, accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the Information. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Officer 1 Flonorio Marmonejo, Jr. (POl Marmonejo)
who acted as the poseur-buyer and POl Percieval Mendoza (POl Mendoza), a member of the buy-
bust team. The prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with the testimony of Forensic
Chemical Officer Sharon Lontoc Fabros of the Philippine National Police Laboratory who examined
the seized drugs.
The prosecution established that based on information received on 6 August 2005, that appellant
and a certain alias Kenkoy were engaged in illegal drug trade in Pateros Street, Barangay Olympia,
Makati City, Police Superintendent Marieto Valerio (P/Supt. Valerio) formed a buy-bust team
composed of POl Marmonejo, POl Mendoza, POl Randy Santos and SPO3 Luisito Puno and two (2)
other anti-drug agents Eduardo Monteza and Llerminia Facundo. After a surveillance of the area
and coordination with the Phihppine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) were made, P/Supt.
Valerio briefed the team. PO1 Marmonejo was designated as poseur-buyer and two (2) pieces of
One Hundred Peso (P100) bills marked with the initials "MMV" were provided for the operation. At
five o'clock in the afternoon of that day, PO1 Marmonejo and the police asset, on board a tricycle
driven by PO1 Mendoza, proceeded to the target area. The other members of the buy-bust team
positioned themselves nearby. The police asset called appellant and told her that PO1 Marmonejo
wanted to buy shabu. Appellant asked PO1 Marmonejo how much, to which he replied, "katorse
lang" or P200.00 worth of shabu. Appellant then took out from her pocket two (2) transparent
Page 201 of 519
plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance, one of which she handed to POl
Marmonejo in exchange for two (2) One Hundred Peso (P100) bills. Appellant pocketed the other
plastic sachet.
Upon consummation of the transaction, PO1 Marmonejo revealed that he was a police officer and
immediately apprehended appellant, apprised her of her constitutional rights and asked her to
empty her pockets. POl Marmonejo recovered money in the amount of Five Hundred Forty Pesos
(P540.00), a mobile phone, and three (3) other plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance. PO1 Marmonejo marked the sachet sold to him as "BONG" while the three (3) other
sachets as "JOAN," "JOAN 1," and JOAN 2." Appellant was brought to the police station for
investigation and POl Marmonejo submitted the seized sachets to the Southern Police District
Crime Laboratory.6 The Forensic Laboratory Report confirmed that the sachets contained
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The sachets of shabu purchased and recovered from
appellant,the inventory of the seized items the marked buy-bust money and the Final Police
Investigation Report were likewise presented in court.
Appellant testified on her behalf and vehemently denied the indictment. She claimed innocence
and asserted that she had been at her mother-in-law's house when three (3) police officers entered
the house and forcibly brought her to the police station and there attempted to extort money from
her in exchange for her liberty.
On 10 July 2007, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes charged. On appeal before the CA, the latter affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Issue: Whether or not the lower courts erred in convicting accused-appellant of Violations of
Section 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165.
Held: No. As held by the Supreme Court, the prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty
the following elements required for all prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs: (1) proof
that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the
illicit drug as evidence. Appellant was apprehended, indicted and convicted by way of a buy-bust
operation, a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of
trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.
The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, merely requires the
consummation of the selling transaction which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug
from the seller. The crime is already consummated once the police officer has gone through the
operation as a buyer whose offer was accepted by the accused, followed by the delivery of the
dangerous drugs to the former.
Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto delivering two (2) plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance to PO1 Marmonejo, the poseur buyer, in exchange for P200.00. PO1
Marmonejo positively identified appellant in open court to be the same person who sold to him the
items which upon examination was confirmed to be methylamphetamine hydrochlloride or shabu.
Upon presentation of the same in open court, another member of the buy-bust team, PO1 Mendoza,
duly identified the items to be the same objects sold to the poseur buyer by appellant.
Page 202 of 519
On the other hand, to sustain a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following
elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object identified to be
a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed said drug. Obtained through a valid search the police officers
conducted pursuant to Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the sachets recovered from
appellant's person all tested positive for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Mere
possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation of such
possession.The burden of evidence to explain the absence of animus possidendi rests upon the
accused, and this, in the case at bar, the appellant failed to do.
People of the Philippines vs. John Happy Domino y Carag

G.R. No. 211672, June 14, 2016
Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 or
“Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”.
On 27 August 2008, the RTC promulgated a Decision finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). The RTC ruled
that the evidence presented by the prosecution successfully established the elements of illegal sale
of a dangerous drug as accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a valid buy-bust
operation. It noted that the defense of denial and frame-up offered by the defense cannot overturn
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties accorded to the apprehending
officers.
On intermediate appellate review, the CA upheld the RTC ruling. It found no reason to disturb the
findings of the RTC as it is in accordance with law and jurisprudence and was based on the evidence
presented and proven during trial. The appellate court likewise rejected the claim of accused-
appellant that he was framed-up by the apprehending officers because his brother failed to repair
the cell phone of the police asset. It agreed with the RTC that it is highly unbelievable that the buy-
bust team would concoct such a serious charge against accused-appellant especially considering
that it is the police asset, who is not even a member of the buy-bust team, that allegedly has an
issue against the brother of accused-appellant. The CA also held that the apprehending officers
complied with the proper procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drug and that the
identity of the confiscated drug has been duly preserved and its chain of custody has been properly
established by the prosecution.
Issue: Whether or not the lower courts erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Held: No, the lower courts did not err in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the said offense.
Page 203 of 519

In the prosecution of a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the prosecution is
able to establish the following essential elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment.
What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-
buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction.
In this case, all of these elements were clearly established. The prosecution's evidence positively
identified Police Officer 1 Marcial Eclipse (PO1 Eclipse) as the buyer and accused-appellant as the
seller of the shabu. The prosecution established through testimony and evidence the object of the
sale, which is a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing shabu and the two (2) marked Php
100.00 bills, as the consideration thereof. Finally, the delivery of the shabu sold and its payment
were clearly testified to by prosecution witness PO1 Eclipse.
Accused-appellant denied the accusation that he sold shabu to PO1 Eclipse and maintained that it
was only in the police station that he first saw the sachet containing the white crystalline substance
and the marked money allegedly taken from him. He claimed that the reason for his frame-up was
the failure of his brother to repair the cell phone of the police civilian asset Boyet Relos.
Accused-appellant's defense which is anchored mainly on denial and frame-up cannot be given
credence. It does not have more evidentiary weight than the positive assertions of the prosecution
witnesses. His defense is unavailing considering that he was caught in flagrante delicto in a
legitimate buy-bust operation. This Court has ruled that the defense of denial or frame-up, like
alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted
and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecution for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Moreover, we agree with the lower courts that the ill-motive imputed on the
apprehending officers is unworthy of belief. Accused-appellant's defense that he was framed-up
because his brother found it difficult to repair the cell phone of the police asset deserves scant
consideration. When the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation have no motive to testify
against the accused, the courts shall uphold the presumption that they performed their duties
regularly. In fact, for as long as the identity of the accused and his participation in the commission
of the crime has been duly established, motive is immaterial for conviction. As correctly noted by
the appellate court, the person who allegedly had a grudge against the brother of the accused-
appellant was not even a member of the buy-bust team. He was only a police informant. Moreover,
accused-appellant was clearly identified by PO1 Eclipse as the person who sold to him for two
hundred pesos a substance contained in a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which later on
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
UNJUST JUDGMENT
Page 204 of 519

Re: Verified Complaint for Disbarment of AMA Land Inc. (Represented by Joseph B. Usita)
against Court of Appeals Associate Justices Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinanbo E.
Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario
OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J. March 11, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment against respondent Justices. The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by
AMALI was not only repulsive, but also an outright disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this
Court.
Facts:
AMA Land, Inc., (AMALI) brought this administrative complaint against Associate Justice
Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario,
all members of the Court of Appeals (CA), charging them with knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of their oaths on account of their promulgation of the
decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994 entitled Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. v. The
Honorable Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264, Assigned in San Juan, and AMA Land,
Inc. AMALI alleged that the Justices conspired with the counsels of their adversary. AMALI stated
that the decision of the CA had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious and deliberate intent
to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In thereby knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, respondent Justices were guilty of gross misconduct, and violated
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
well as Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Justices are liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
Ruling:
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment against respondent Justices. The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by
AMALI was not only repulsive, but also an outright disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this
Court. Unfounded administrative charges against judges truly degrade the judicial office, and
interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. Although the Court did not then
deem fit to hold in the first administrative case AMALI or its representative personally
responsible for the unfounded charges brought against respondent Justices, it is now time, proper
and imperative to do so in order to uphold the dignity and reputation of respondent Justices, of the
CA itself, and of the rest of the Judiciary. AMALI and its representatives have thereby demonstrated
their penchant for harassment of the judges who did not do its bidding, and they have not stopped
doing so even if the latter were sitting judges and its judicial officers.
Page 205 of 519

UNJUST INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
ROMEO R. ARAULLO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.

G.R. No. 194157, July 30, 2014, J. Reyes
Specifically for the charge of violation of Art. 206 of the RPC which penalizes the issuance of
unjust interlocutory orders, it was necessary to show that; (1) the orders issued by the respondents to
his complaint were unjust, and (2) the said orders were knowingly rendered or rendered through
inexcusable negligence or ignorance. On this matter, the Ombudsman correctly held that LA’s order for
the quashal of the writ of execution, and the NLRC’s resolution affirming it, were not unjust, for being in
accordance with law and the rules of the NLRC.
Facts:
The records indicate that Petitioner Araullo had previously obtained a favorable judgment in
a labor complaint for illegal dismissal which he filed against Club Filipino. His labor complaint was
initially dismissed by the Labor Arbiter (LA) whose ruling was affirmed by the NLRC. Upon appeal,
however, both the CA and the Supreme Court ruled that Araullo was illegally dismissed from
employment. Club Filipino was then ordered to reinstate Araullo and to pay him his full backwages
and other monetary benefits.
Following the finality of the decision in his favor, Araullo filed with LA a motion for issuance
of a writ of execution. The issuance of the writ was questioned by Club Filipino on the ground that it
had filed a Motion to Recompute the judgment award, which remained unresolved by the LA. Club
Filipino then filed its Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution.
Dissatisfied with the quashal of the writ, Araullo filed a petition to set aside LA Anni’s order,
which was denied. When Araullo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC, he filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) the criminal complaint against Respondents LA Anni,
Chairman Nograles, Commissioner Go, Commissioner Velasco, Atty. Tabao, Atty. De Leon and Atty.
Balbin. He charged them of violating Art. 206 of the RPC and Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Araullo’s charges were dismissed by the Ombudsman. It reasoned that the deferral in the
execution of the judgment in favor of Araullo could not be attributed to the respondents in the
criminal complaint. The presumption that the respondents regularly performed their official duty
was not overcome by sufficient evidence. The LA’s and NLRC’s rulings were rendered pursuant to the
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. This finding then barred a prosecution for violation of Art. 206 of the
RPC.
Feeling aggrieved, Araullo filed this petition for certiorari to assail the Ombudsman’s
dismissal of his criminal complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman violated Art. 206 of the RPC or the unjust interlocutory order
when it granted the motion to quash filed by Club Filipino.
Ruling:
Page 206 of 519
No.
Upon review, the Court has determined that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. Explained clearly in the assailed resolution were the grounds that supported its finding of
lack of probable cause, and which then justified the dismissal of the criminal complaints filed by
Araullo.
To establish probable cause, Araullo, being the complainant, then should have proved the
elements of the crimes alleged to have been committed. In addition, there should have been a clear
showing of the respective participation of the respondents, to at least support a ruling that would call
for their further prosecution.
Specifically for the charge of violation of Art. 206 of the RPC which penalizes the issuance of
unjust interlocutory orders, it was necessary to show that, first, the orders issued by the respondents
to his complaint were unjust, and second, the said orders were knowingly rendered or rendered
through inexcusable negligence or ignorance. On this matter, the OMB correctly held that LA Anni’s
order for the quashal of the writ of execution, and the NLRC’s resolution affirming it, were not unjust.
Contrary to Araullo’s claim, the rulings of the labor officials were in accordance with law and the rules
of the NLRC, specifically since Rule XI, Sec. 4 of the 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure provided
that:
“Sec. 4. Computation during execution. – Where further computation of the award in the
decision, resolution or order is necessary during the course of the execution proceedings,
no writ of execution shall be issued until after the computation has been approved by
the [LA] in an order issued after the parties have been duly notified and heard on the
matter.”
Given this provision, the quashal of the writ was then only necessary to rectify LA Anni’s prior
issuance of a writ of execution notwithstanding a pending motion for re-computation that was filed
by Club Filipino. Araullo failed to establish that the labor officials were impelled by any motive other
than the correction of this error. At any rate, this issue on the propriety of the quashal of the writ had
been resolved by the Court in an earlier review.
Clearly, the Ombudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable cause
for violation of Art. 206 against the respondents labor officials. Without a finding of probable cause
against these labor officials, the dismissal of the charge against Atty. Balbin, Atty. Tabao and Atty. De
Leon, being private individuals who did not appear to conspire with their co-respondents for the
commission of a criminal offense, was also warranted.
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN

(THIRD DIVISION), and EMERLINA MOLETA
G.R. Nos. 175750-51, April 2, 2014, J. Perez
The following are the essential elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019: 1. the accused
must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. he must have acted
Page 207 of 519
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and 3. that his action caused any
undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
There is no doubt that Consigna, being a municipal treasurer, was a public officer discharging
official functions when she misused such position to be able to take out a loan from Moleta, who was
misled into the belief that she, as municipal treasurer, was acting on behalf of the municipality.
Facts:
On or about 14 June 1994, Petitioner Consigna, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna,
Surigao del Norte, together with Jose Herasmio, obtained as loan from private respondent Hermelina
Moleta, the sum of P320,000.00, to pay for the salaries of the employees of the municipality and to
construct the municipal gymnasium as the municipality’s IRA had not yet arrived. As payment,
Consigna issued three (3) LBP checks signed by Jaime Rusillon (Rusillon), the incumbent mayor of
the Municipality of General Luna.
Between 15 June 1994 and 18 August 1994, in several attempts on different occasions, Moleta
demanded payment from Consigna and Rusillon, but to no avail. Thus, on 18 August 1994, Moleta
deposited the three (3) LBP checks to her account in Metrobank Surigao Branch. Upon presentation
for payment, Metrobank returned the checks to Moleta as the checks had no funds. The following day,
Moleta again deposited the checks. This time, however, she deposited the checks to her LBP account.
Upon presentation for payment, the checks were again returned for the reason, “Signature Not on
File.” Upon verification, LBP informed Moleta that the municipality’s account was already closed and
transferred to DBP, and that Consigna, the municipal treasurer, has been relieved from her position.
Hence, Moleta filed with the Sandiganbayan two (2) sets of Information against Consigna, in the
latter’s capacity as Municipal Treasurer and Rusillon, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of General
Luna, for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Art. 315 of the RPC. After trial, the Sandiganbayan
found Consigna guilty, but exonerated Rusillon.
Issue:
Whether Consigna is guilty of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Ruling:
The following are the essential elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019: 1. the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. he must
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and 3. that his action
caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
There is no doubt that Consigna, being a municipal treasurer, was a public officer dischar-
ging official functions when she misused such position to be able to take out a loan from Moleta, who
was misled into the belief that she, as municipal treasurer, was acting on behalf of the municipality.
In Montilla vs. Hilario, the Court described the “offense committed in relation to the office” as:
the relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in the Court’s
opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be
Page 208 of 519
such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other words, the office
must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute xxx.
In this case, it was not only alleged in the Information, but was proved with certainty during
trial that the manner by which Consigna perpetrated the crime necessarily relates to her official
function as a municipal treasurer. Consigna’s official function created in her favor an impression of
authority to transact business with Moleta involving government financial concerns. There is,
therefore, a direct relation between the commission of the crime and Consigna’s office - the latter
being the very reason or consideration that led to the unwarranted benefit she gained from Moleta,
for which the latter suffered damages in the amount of P320,000.00.
As regards the two other elements, the Court explained in Cabrera vs. Sandiganbayan that
there are two (2) ways by which a public official violates Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance
of his functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b)
by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. The mode or under
both. In this case, Consigna was charged of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 under the alternative
mode of “causing undue injury” to Moleta committed with evident bad faith, for which she was
correctly found guilty. “Evident bad faith” connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and
patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some
perverse motive or ill will. “Evident bad faith” contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes, which
manifested in Consigna’s actuations and representation. The inevitable conclusion is that Consigna
capitalized on her official function to commit the crimes charged. Without her position, Consigna
would not have induced Moleta to part with her money. In the same vein, [she] could not have
orchestrated a scheme of issuing post-dated checks meddling with the municipality’s coffers and
defiling the mayor’s signature.
Given the above disquisition, it becomes superfluous to dwell further on the issue raised by
Consigna that Sec. 3(e) applies only to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or other concessions. Nonetheless, to finally settle the issue, the
last sentence of the said provision is not a restrictive requirement which limits the application or
extent of its coverage. This has long been settled in our ruling in Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan, where
the Court categorically declared that a prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will
lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is “charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.” All the elements of the crimes as charged are present in the case at bar.
ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No.166680, July 07, 2014, J. Del Castillo
The accused was charged for having allegedly utilized the cash advance for a purpose other
than for which it was obtained. He alleged that he was neither informed nor did he receive any demand
from COA to liquidate his cash advances. The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that a prior notice or
demand for liquidation of cash advances is not a condition sine qua non before an accountable public
officer may be held liable under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
Page 209 of 519

Facts:
The accused was the former municipal mayor of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. Sometime in January
1998, Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor Florence L. Paguirigan, during her examination of the
year-end reports of the municipality, she came across a disbursement voucher for P101,736.00
prepared for Lamauig, as cash advance for the payment of freight and other cargo charges for 12
units of motorcycles supposed to be donated to the municipality. The amount was covered by a
check wherein the payee is Lamauig. Her further investigation of the accounting records revealed
that no payment intended for the charge was made to Royal Cargo Agencies for the month of August
1994.
Lamauig admitted having obtained the cash advance of P101,736.00 during his
incumbency. This amount was intended for the payment of freight and insurance coverage of 12 units
of motorcycles to be donated to the municipality by the City of Manila. However, instead of
motorcycles, he was able to secure two buses and five patrol cars. He claimed that it never came to
his mind to settle or liquidate the amount advanced since the vehicles were already turned over to
the municipality. He alleged that he was neither informed nor did he receive any demand from COA
to liquidate his cash advances. It was only in 2001 while he was claiming for separation pay when he
came to know that he still has an unliquidated cash advance. And so as not to prolong the issue, he
paid the amount of P101,736.00 to the municipal treasurer on June 4, 2001.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted him for violation of Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act but convicted him of Failure of Accountable Officer to
Render Accounts under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
Lumauig argues that since the cases for which he was indicted involve the same subject cash
advance in the amount of P101,736.00, his exoneration in the anti-graft case should likewise
exculpate him from further liability in the present case.
Issues:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the anti- graft case is a bar to his conviction for failure to
render an account in the present case
2. Whether the prior demand to liquidate is a requisite for conviction under Article 218 of the Revised
Penal Code.
3. Whether the penalty imposed may be modified considering that the accused subsequently
liquidated the subject cash advance
Ruling:
1. No
It is undisputed that the two charges stemmed from the same incident. “However the Court
have consistently held that the same act may give rise to two or more separate and distinct
charges.” Further, because there is a variance between the elements of the two offenses
charged, Lumauig cannot safely assume that his innocence in one case will extend to the other case
even if both cases hinge on the same set of evidence.
To hold a person criminally liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the following elements must be
present:
Page 210 of 519

1. (1) That the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former;
2. (2) That said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her
official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
3. (3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private
party;
4. (4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to
such parties; and
5. (5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. 17
On the other hand, the elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of the Revised Penal
Code are:
(1) That the offender is a public officer whether in the service or separated therefrom;
2) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
(3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor;
and,
(4) That he fails to do so for a period of two months after such account should be rendered.
2. No
Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before an accountable
officer is held liable for a violation of the crime. The law is very clear. Where none is provided, the
court may not introduce exceptions or conditions, neither may it engraft into the law qualifications
not contemplated. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it
says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for
interpretation, but only application.
As correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was liable for violation of Article 218
because it took him over six years before settling his accounts.
3. Yes
In malversation of public funds, the payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of the funds
misappropriated may be considered a mitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary
surrender.Although this case does not involve malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code but rather failure to render an account under Article 218, the same reasoning
may be applied to the return or full restitution of the funds that were previously unliquidated
in considering the same as a mitigating circumstance in favor of Lumauig.
ROMEO R. ARAULLO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.

G.R. No. 194157, July 30, 2014, J. Reyes
Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 has the following elements: (1) the accused must be a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his action caused any
undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Applying the foregoing elements, the Ombudsman, in granting the motion to quash, did not
violate the said law considering that there could have been no undue injury suffered by Araullo notwith-
Page 211 of 519
standing the labor officials’ rulings as he was not left without any remedy to enforce the final judgment
in his favor. The NLRC’s endorsement of his case to the arbitration branch of origin was merely for the
resolution of pending incidents in the case; to hear these matters first in order to ensure that all the
parties to the case were afforded due process.
Facts:
The records indicate that Araullo had previously obtained a favorable judgment in a labor
complaint for illegal dismissal which he filed against Club Filipino. His labor complaint was initially
dismissed by the Labor Arbiter (LA) whose ruling was affirmed by the NLRC. Upon appeal, however,
both the CA and the Supreme Court ruled that Araullo was illegally dismissed from employment. Club
Filipino was then ordered to reinstate Araullo and to pay him his full backwages and other monetary
benefits.
Following the finality of the decision in his favor, Araullo filed with LA a motion for issuance
of a writ of execution. The issuance of the writ was questioned by Club Filipino on the ground that it
had filed a Motion to Recompute the judgment award, which remained unresolved by the LA. Club
Filipino then filed its Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution.
Dissatisfied with the quashal of the writ, Araullo filed a petition to set aside LA Anni’s order,
which was denied. When Araullo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC, he filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against Respondents LA Anni, Chairman
Nograles, Commissioner Go, Commissioner Velasco, Atty. Tabao, Atty. De Leon and Atty. Balbin. He
charged them of violating Art. 206 of the RPC and Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Araullo’s charges were dismissed by the OMB. For the claim of violation of R.A. No. 3019, the
Office of the Ombudsman also found no probable cause given Araullo’s failure to establish that the
respondents to his complaint gave undue advantage to Club Filipino, or that they acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence.
Feeling aggrieved, Araullo filed this petition for certiorari to assail the OMB’s dismissal of his
criminal complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the OMB violated Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 when it granted the motion to
quash filed by Club Filipino.
Ruling:
No.
A violation under this provision entails the following:
1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official

functions;
Page 212 of 519

2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negli-
gence; and
3) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.
The second and third elements are wanting in this case. With the Court’s finding on the
correctness of the LA’s and NLRC’s rulings, there could have been no undue injury suffered by Araullo
notwithstanding the mentioning that notwithstanding the labor officials’ rulings, Araullo was not
even left without any remedy to enforce the final judgment in his favor. The NLRC’s endorsement of
his case to the arbitration branch of origin was merely for the resolution of pending incidents in the
case. It was necessary to hear these matters first in order to ensure that all the parties to the case
were afforded due process.
There was also no showing that the labor officials’ actions were performed with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence. Araullo failed to prove that the respondents
were impelled to act by any of such motives. The records instead indicate that the labor officials only
wanted to satisfy the demands of law and their procedural rules.
Finally, the mere fact that Araullo’s counsel was not furnished with a copy of Club Filipino’s
motion to quash the writ also failed to support Araullo’s criminal complaint. As the Court had
declared in Araullo, “it appears that the apparent failure of petitioner's counsel to be served with a copy
of the assailed decision did not prejudice Araullo's rights.”
DIONISIO B. COLOMA, JR. vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 205561, September 24, 2014, J. Mendoza
Anent the third element of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the Sandiganbayan aptly
explained: By making himself a signatory to the current accounts and presenting a cost estimate
significantly higher than that submitted by Engineer Vacnot, the accused also caused undue injury to
the PPSC when the latter lost control of the funds for RTS 9, and only the authorized signatories could
enter into transactions with regard to the project. In this case, the Prosecution was able to prove the
existence of undue injury by giving a detailed background of the estimate for facilities and materials for
the construction of the project. The substantial difference between the cost estimate given by the
accused and that of Engineer Vacnot caused injury to the government in the amount of
approximately PhP2,500,00000 becomes more evident in light of the fact that the fifty capacity barracks
have not been constructed.
Facts:
Coloma, the Director of the Philippine National Police Academy (PNPA), was designated as
Special Assistant and Action Officer to the Director, Logistics and Installation Services (LIS) of the
Philippine Public Safety College (PPSC). Then PPSC President Ernesto B. Gimenez assigned Coloma
to assist in the search for a suitable construction site of the Philippine National Police Regional
Training Site 9 Annex in Bongao, Tawi-Tawi (RTS 9). The PPSC team including Coloma chose a four-
hectare lot formerly owned by one Juaini Bahad. The Engineering Division of the PPSC prepared the
graphical layout plan for the construction of the following: a) fifty-capacity barracks; b) one (1) unit
classroom; c) land development for the initial construction; and d) administration building. The
Page 213 of 519
layout was approved by Gimenez. The funds for the construction of RTS 9 came from the
Congressional Development Fund (CDF) of Tawi-Tawi Representative, Nur Jaafar. The same
eventually formed part of PPSC’s capital outlay. The approximate cost of the project construction
was PhP5,727,278.59, but the said amount was not released in 1998. Thus, in 1999, the amount
became “accounts payable” and were released to creditors, namely: New Alems Enterprise (the
supplier for materials) in the amount of PhP4,199,994.50; and A.C. Lim Construction (labor supplier)
in the amount of PhP1,800,005.50. Thereafter, Coloma was relieved by Atty. Ramsey Lapuz Ocampo,
the successor of Gimenez as PPSC President. Coloma was ordered to render a termination report
relative to his participation and observation in the construction of RTS 9. Coloma submitted a report
stating, among others, that: the land development was 100% complete; the construction of the
administration building was 90% accomplished; and the construction of the fifty-capacity barracks
and classroom had just started and was expected to be completed by December 15, 2001. In the same
report, Coloma allegedly attached the Deed of Donation signed by Juaini Bahad in favor of the PPSC.
Subsequently, Ocampo ordered an investigation and instructed SPO4 Gilbert Concepcion to

conduct the same. In his report, SPO4 Concepcion discovered the following irregularities: 1) the land
development which Coloma reported to be 100% completed referred only to the exact site where the
administration building and the one-unit classroom were erected; 2) only the administrative building
with one-unit classroom was erected; 3) the construction of the 50-capacity barracks which Coloma
reported to have been started was nowhere to be found; 4) the 50-capacity mess hall had also been
erected; 5) the appropriate cost of the facilities constructed and the improvements made on the
project was valued at around P3,150,000.00 only, contrary to what was reported by Coloma that the
payment made for the project was P5,722,278,29; 6) the payment made by the contractor and the
supplier of the construction materials was deposited at Land Bank Tawi-Tawi Branch under current
accounts booked with Coloma as joint depositor; and 7) contrary to Coloma’s After-Mission Report
stating that the value of the property on which the training facilities were constructed
was PhP1,500,000.00, the value of the property per hectare was only PhP9,730.00 as per a provincial
ordinance of Tawi-Tawi fixing the schedule of fair market value of real properties.
Coloma was indicted thru the information filed with the Sandiganbayan. The prosecution
presented, among others, Engr. Vacnot, as Project Evaluation Officer I of the PPSC, who testified that
the administration building approximately cost PhP11,280,000.00, while the standard two-unit
classroom and its comfort rooms approximately cost PhP1,800,000.00. The Sandiganbayan found
Coloma guilty as charged. It found that all the essential elements of the crime of violation of Sec. 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019.
Issue:
Whether or not Coloma’s conviction for the crime of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
was proper.
Ruling:
Yes, the conviction of Coloma is tenable under the circumstances.

Coloma was charged with the crime of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 which has the
following essential elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
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government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions. As observed by the Sandiganbayan, all these elements exist in this case.
It is irrefutable that the first element is present. Coloma was undisputably the Director of the
PNPA at the time material to the charge against him. Apart from this, he never denied his designation
as the Special Assistant and Action Officer to the Director of the LIS-PPSC. From the task of selecting
the site for RTS 9 to the dealings with the contractors for the project, this latter position signifies
Coloma’s task to oversee and administer the construction of RTS 9.
The second element of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed in three ways, that is,
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these
three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is enough to
convict. Here, the results of the ocular inspection clearly belie Coloma’s reports. While it may be
conceded that there was no averment of the entire project’s completion, and that “completion” may
be susceptible of a subjective interpretation, it still perplexes the Court as to why Coloma, a
responsible officer in the administration of the multi-million peso project, failed to provide a reliable
and accurate description of the project’s accomplishment. The discrepancy between the results of the
ocular inspection and Coloma’s statements in his report was not a trivial matter that would merit
disregard.
Anent the third element, the Sandiganbayan aptly explained: By making himself a signatory
to the current accounts and presenting a cost estimate significantly higher than that submitted by
Engineer Vacnot, the accused also caused undue injury to the PPSC when the latter lost control of the
funds for RTS 9, and only the authorized signatories could enter into transactions with regard to the
project. In this case, the Prosecution was able to prove the existence of undue injury by giving a
detailed background of the estimate for facilities and materials for the construction of the project.
The substantial difference between the cost estimate given by the accused and that of Engineer
Vacnot caused injury to the government in the amount of approximately PhP2,500,00000 becomes
more evident in light of the fact that the fifty capacity barracks have not been constructed.
VAN D. LUSPO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES/SUPT. ARTURO H. MONTANO vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES/C/INSP. SALLVADOR S. CURAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 188487 (consolidated), October 22, 2014, J. Nachura
In Cabrera vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court explained that there are two ways for a public official
to violate this provision in the performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any
party, including the government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference. In that case, [the Court] enumerated the essential elements of the offense, viz.:
1. [t]he accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; 2. [h]e
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3. [h]is
action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. It bears emphasis that
the charge against Luspo’s co-accused Domondon consisted of the same omissions. Both offered similar
documentary and testimonial pieces of evidence for their exoneration, but the same were appreciated
only in Domondon’s favor. The Sandiganbayan shelved Luspo’s claim that he was authorized by
Domondon to sign the ASAs in the former’s behalf, and tagged the same as self-serving and
unsubstantiated. In its consolidated comment, respondent People of the Philippines, represented by the
OMB through the OSP, harks back to the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion and lobbies for its affirmation. The
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Court disagrees with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of the records… the Sandiganbayan’s wherewithal
reveals the contrary and had the trial court expanded the range of its probing, it would not have arrived
at divergent conclusions regarding the two accused.
Facts:
Cesar P. Nazareno, being then the Director General; Guillermo T. Domondon, Director for
Comptrollership; Van D. Luspo, Chief, Fiscal Services and Budget Division; Arturo H. Montano, Chief
Comptroller, North CAPCOM and Salvador C. Duran, Sr., Chief, Regional Finance Services Unit (RFSU),
North CAPCOM, all of the Philippine National Police (PNP) where charged with violation of Sec. 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019. It appears that the PhP10,000,000.00 was released to DI-BEN Trading, MT
Enterprises, J-MOS Enterprises and Triple 888 Enterprises, all owned and operated by Accused
Margarita B. Tugaoen, purportedly for the purchase of combat, clothing and individual equipment
(CCIE) for use of North CAPCOM personnel, to which no actual delivery of said CCIE items were ever
effected by accused supplier Tugaoen.
Subsequently, the filed, upon leave of court, a Consolidated Motion for Demurrer to Evidence,
arguing in the main, the inadmissibility, under the best evidence rule, of the photocopies of the ASAs,
the 100 checks, the original printout of the full master list and detail list of the checks from the PHC,
and the bank statement prepared by the UCPB. The Information was dismissed as to Nazareno in a
resolution dated March 20, 2007 on account of his death. Domondon was also exonerated because
by virtue of the Delegation of Authority and Schedule of Delegation issued by Nazareno.
Sandiganbayan later convicted the accused-appellants.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is correct in convicting the accused-appellants.
Ruling:
Yes, the graft court should be upheld except as to its finding of conviction against Luspo.
In Cabrera vs. Sandiganbayan, we explained that there are two ways for a public official to
violate this provision in the performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any
party, including the government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference. In that case, we enumerated the essential elements of the offense, viz.: 1.
[t]he accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; 2. [h]e
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3.
his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
It bears emphasis that the charge against Luspo’s Co-accused Domondon consisted of the
same omissions. Both offered similar documentary and testimonial pieces of evidence for their
exoneration, but the same were appreciated only in Domondon’s favor. The Sandiganbayan shelved
Luspo’s claim that he was authorized by Domondon to sign the ASAs in the former’s behalf, and
tagged the same as self-serving and unsubstantiated. In its consolidated comment, Respondent
People, represented by the OMB through the OSP, harks back to the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion and
lobbies for its affirmation. [The Court disagrees] with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of the records…
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and the Sandiganbayan’s wherewithal reveals the contrary and had the trial court expanded the
range of its probing, it would not have arrived at divergent conclusions regarding the two accused.
Generally, factual findings of the anti-graft court are conclusive upon the Supreme Court,
except where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and
conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts and the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record. The last instance
attends in the instant case. Clear and unmistakable in the August 30, 1993 resolution of the OMB-AFP
is the crucial detail that, on January 31, 1991, Domondon issued a Memorandum delega-ting to Luspo
and a certain Supt. Reynold Osia the authority to sign for him (Domondon) and on his behalf,
allotments for personal services in the amount not exceeding Five Million Pesos (PhP5,000,000.00),
and in his absence, the amount of PhP20,000,000.00. This was, in fact, the hammer that drove the nail
and linked Domondon to the conspiracy theory advanced by the prose-cution.
Lastly, the prosecution cannot link Luspo as a conspirator to defraud the PNP/government
on the strength merely of his signature, nor can a valid assumption be made that he connived with
Duran and Montano, who subsequently disbursed the ASAs. Proof, not mere conjectures or
assumptions, should be proffered to indicate that the accused had taken part in… the “planning,
preparation and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government” for, otherwise, any
“careless use of the conspiracy theory (can) sweep into jail even innocent persons who may have (only)
been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds” really responsible for that irregularity.
Again, Luspo committed no prohibited act; neither did he violate any law, rule, or internal
order when he signed the ASAs. Logically, his signature in the ASAs cannot be considered as an overt
act in furtherance of one common design to defraud the government. Given the above premises, the
acquittal of Luspo is inevitable.
Unfortunately, the immediately preceding disquisition does not apply to Duran, Montano, and
Tugaoen. Duran avers that his signing of the checks was a mere ministerial act in compliance with
Montano’s directives and upon reliance on the latter’s assurance that their issuance was supported
by appropriate documents. The contention has no merit. The 100 checks were made payable to only
4 enterprises at 25 checks each. This should have sounded alarm bells in the mind of any reasonably
judicious accountable officer, such as Duran, to inquire into the veracity of the transaction concerned.
But he did not even bother to demand that the “alleged” supporting documents be forwarded to him,
in conformity with disbursement rules, to verify the legality or propriety of the claim.
To repeat, bad faith does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. It is a
manifest deliberate intent on the part of an accused to do wrong or to cause damage. There is nothing
on record to show that Luspo was spurred by any corrupt motive or that he received any material
benefit when he signed the ASAs.
Indeed, there is ample evidence proving beyond reasonable doubt that Duran and Montano
were propelled by evident bad faith in preparing and issuing 100 checks to facilitate a fictitious and
fraudulent transaction and Tugaoen, in accepting the checks and receiving their value without giving
in exchange a single piece of CCIE.
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Duran’s and Montano’s palpable bias in favor of Tugaoen is shown by their failure to support
and justify the checks issued to Tugaoen’s enterprises with the obligatory paper trail relative to the
conduct of public bidding or any procurement contract. As aptly discerned by the Sandiganbayan, the
acts of Duran, Montano and Tugaoen evince a bold and unabashed conspiracy scheme to defraud the
government of P10 million: The drawing of one hundred checks in the amount of one hundred
thousand pesos each by Duran and Montano, on that same day of August 12, 1992, eloquently
bespeaks of splitting of payments, too glaring to be ignored. These one hundred checks could have
been consolidated into four (4) checks only considering that there were only four (4) business
establishments with which they claim to have transacted with.
There is likewise no proof that Luspo acted with palpable bias or favor towards Tugaoen. The
prosecution failed to show that it was Luspo’s duty to search for, negotiate and contract with
suppliers. The only deduction extant from the prosecution’s evidence is that, being then the Chief of
the Fiscal Services and Budget Division of the Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership, it was
Luspo’s duty to distribute the funds allocated to the PNP by the DBM by the issuance of an ASA in
favor of the force’s regional commands. Once the funds were released from his custody through the
ASAs, his responsibility ceased and it then devolved upon the recipients of the ASA to see to it that
the funds were legally and properly disbursed for the purpose for which they were released. He had
no control over the disbursement, and thus, he could not be blamed if the funds were eventually
expended for unauthorized or illegal purposes.
At any rate, even if the Court was to hold that the investigation conducted by the PNP was
custodial in nature, the improprieties that Tugaoen bewail would not prevail against strong and
overwhelming evidence showing her and her co-conspirators’ guilt. Allegations of impropriety
committed during custodial investigation are material only when an extrajudicial admission or
confession is the basis of conviction. In the present case, the conviction of Montano, Duran, and
Tugaoen was not deduced solely from Tugaoen’s admission, but from the confluence of evidence
showing their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISISON ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) vs. THE HONORABLE

OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, et al.
G.R. No. 206357, November 12, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 11 provides that all offenses punishable under said law shall prescribe in ten
(10) years. This period was later increased to fifteen (15) years with the passage of [BP Blg. 195], which
took effect on March 16, 1982. This does not mean, however, that the longer prescriptive period shall
apply to all violations of [R.A. No. 3019]. Following the Court’s pronouncements in People vs.
Pacificador, the rule is that “in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more
favorable to the accused is to be adopted.” As such, the longer prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant
to BP Blg. 195 cannot be applied to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of the said amending law
on March 16, 1982. Considering that the crimes were committed in 1969, 1970, 1973, 1975, and 1977,
the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-year period set in R.A. No. 3019, the law in force at
that time. Moreover, the prescriptive period commences to run at the time of the discovery of the offense.
Facts:
Then-President Ramos issued an administrative order creating a Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee) who shall investigate and study loans
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granted by government financing institutions that amount to behest loans. One of the loan accounts
referred to the Ad Hoc Committee for investigation was that of Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC).
Incorporated in 1968, RHC was 37.2% owned by Rodolfo Cuenca, a known Marcos business
associate. RHC obtained four loans from DBP totalling to PhP86.9 million. On the basis of the
foregoing, the Ad Hoc Committee found that DBP’s total exposure as of 1986 amounted to PhP99.1
million. Subsequently, the Ad Hoc Committee submitted a report to the President where it concluded
that the RHC account qualifies as behest in character anchored on the ground among others that the
officers of the borrower corporation are identified as Marcos cronies. Consequently, the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB), against respondent directors and officers of RHC and the directors of DBP for
violations R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Acting on the motion, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order dismissing the complaint on
the ground of prescription stating that in as much as the record indicates that the instant complaint
was filed with the OMB office only on 6 January 2003, or more than ten (10) years from the time the
crimes were discovered on 4 January 1993, the offenses charged herein had already prescribed.
Aggrieved, PCGG seeks recourse from the Court arguing that the offense has not yet
prescribed. PCGG insists that the prescriptive period should only commence to run on January 6,
2003 when it filed the Affidavit-Complaint with the OMB, and not on January 4, 1993 when the crimes
were discovered. Moreover, he insists that Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 3019 sets the prescription of offenses
under said law at fifteen (15) years, not ten (10) as held by the Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not the affidavit-complaint of PCGG be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
Ruling:
Yes, prescription has set-in for the alleged offenses of R.A. No. 3019.
R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 11 provides that all offenses punishable under said law shall prescribe in
ten (10) years. This period was later increased to fifteen (15) years with the passage of BP Blg. 195,
which took effect on March 16, 1982. This does not mean, however, that the longer prescrip-tive
period shall apply to all violations of [R.A. No. 3019]. Following [the Court’s] pronouncements in
People vs. Pacificador, the rule is that “in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that
which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted.” As such, the longer prescriptive period of 15
years pursuant to BP Blg. 195 cannot be applied to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of the
said amending law on March 16, 1982. Considering that the crimes were committed in 1969, 1970,
1973, 1975, and 1977, the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-year period set in R.A.
No. 3019, the law in force at that time.
Going to the question of the reckoning point of the prescriptive period of violations of R.A.
No. 3019, an evaluation of jurisprudence on the matter reveals the following guidelines:
1) As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the
offense;
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2) If the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted form the
date of discovery thereof; and,
3) In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in a
particular case, the availability or suppression of the information relative to the crime
should first be determined.
If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could be discovered
is readily available to the public, the general rule applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from the
date of the commission of the crime. Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing thereof or
should information about the violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the
exception applies and the period of prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof.
In the case at bar, involving as it does the grant of behest loans which the Court had
recognized as a violation that, by their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by the simple
expedient of suppressing their documentation, the second mode applies. The Court, therefore, counts
the running of the prescriptive period from the date of discovery thereof on January 4, 1993, when
the Ad Hoc Committee reported to the President its findings and conclusions anent RHC’s loans. This
being the case, the filing by the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
on January 6,2003, a little over ten (10) years from the date of discovery of the crimes, is clearly
belated. Undoubtedly, the ten-year period within which to institute the action has already lapsed,
making it proper for the Ombudsman to dismiss PCGG’s complaint on the ground of prescription.
Simply put, and as correctly held by the Ombudsman, prescription has already set in when PCGG filed
the Affidavit-Complaint on January 6, 2003.
ALEJANDRO C. RIVERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 156577 (consolidated), December 03, 2014, J. Mendoza
The Court held that there are two ways by which a public official violates Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: by causing undue injury to any party, including the
Government; or by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The
Court found that the petitioners committed undue injury to the government and gave unwarranted
benefits to PAL Boat through manifest partiality. The manifest reluctance to hold a public bidding and
award the contract to the winning bidder indicates of favoritism and partiality toward PAL Boat.
Petitioners pre-qualified PAL Boat despite its financial inability to undertake the project. They also did
not impose retention money and taxes against PAL Boat, to the detriment of the government. The
government was obligated to use more funds and effort to rehabilitate the vessels.
Facts:
A MOA was entered into by the DoH, the DPWH, DILG, and the Development Coordinating
Councils for Leyte and Samar, for the construction of riverine boats to be used as floating clinics. The
construction of seven units of these floating clinics was proposed for the delivery of health care
services to the remote barangays in Samar and Leyte. The DOH Region VIII entered into a negotiated
contract with PAL Boat Industry, managed by Engineer Norberto Palanas, with a contract price of
PhP700,000.00.
An anonymous letter from a concerned citizen was sent to the Office of the Ombudsman,
stating that there were small white boats for the DOH in a small shipyard within their neighborhood.
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It further stated that the boats were built many months ago but they had been left rotting on land,
not on water. It asked why the boats were not delivered to the DOH. The officials of the various
agencies were directed to answer the complaint.
The COA conducted a technical-financial audit on the project. Internal Auditor Luz Ramos
reported the anomalies in the floating clinics project. The COA recommended the filing of criminal
information for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against
Montero, Perez, Rivera, Soriano and Elazegui. The case against Elazegui was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. After trial, the Sandiganbayan found Montero, Perez and Rivera guilty of
the crime charged but acquitted Soriano for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
As to the essential elements of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Sandiganbayan was satisfied that
these were substantiated by the COA Audit Report which stated that the accused failed to withhold
the 10% retention money, 1% withholding tax and 2% contractor’s tax on the first three progress
payments. The government could have had PhP47,590.20 retention money and PhO6,191.50 taxes,
in the total amount of PhP53,781.70. These reflect a clear undue injury dealt to the government. The
retention money could have been added to the balance of PhP70,000.00 as an additional security in
the performance of the contract. Also, the failure to withhold these amounts, at the very least, showed
gross negligence.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of the petitioners for violating R.A. No. 3019 is proper.
Ruling:
Yes, the Court affirmed the conviction.
The petitioners violated Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The essential elements of such crime are
as follows: (1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions; (2) The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and (3) The action of the accused caused undue injury to any party, including
the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of the functions of the accused.
The Court held that there are two ways by which a public official violates Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including
the Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference.
The accused may be charged under either mode or both. The disjunctive term “or” connotes
that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.It is not enough that undue
injury was caused or unwarranted benefits were given as these acts must be performed through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
“Partiality” is synonymous with “bias” which excites a disposition to see and report matters
as they are wished for rather than as they are. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
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negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong;
a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.
Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be
affected.
The Court found that the petitioners (1) committed undue injury to the government and (2)
gave unwarranted benefits to PAL Boat through manifest partiality.
The Court rules that the petitioners gave unwarranted benefits to PAL Boat and its manager,
Palanas, especially in its pre-qualification. The word “unwarranted” means lacking adequate or
official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. “Advantage”
means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit
from some course of action. “Preference” signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice
or estimation above another.
PAL Boat was not financially and technically capable of undertaking the floating clinics
project. Petitioners knew that and still awarded the project to PAL Boat. They also failed to follow the
proper procedure and documentations in awarding a negotiated contract. These unwarranted
benefits were due to the manifest partiality exhibited by them in numerous instances.
Under P.D. No. 1594, infrastructure projects are awarded in the order of priority as follows:
First, by public bidding and second by a negotiated contract. Resort to negotiated contract, however,
is permitted only after a failure of public bidding. The implementing rules are clear as to when there
is a failure of public bidding. Thus, if no bid is acceptable in accordance with the implementing rules
during the first bidding, the project should again be advertised for a second bidding and in the event
the second bidding fails anew, a negotiated contract may be undertaken.
As admitted by Montero, they never conducted the public bidding. So there can never be a
failure of bidding when there is no public bidding to begin with. According to Montero, it would be
futile to conduct public bidding if Palanas was the only qualified participant. The Court agreed with
Sandiganbayan that he should have instead published a region-wide invitation to bid. And even
assuming that Palanas was the only naval architect and marine engineer in Region VIII or in the whole
Visayas Region, a public bidding must still be conducted. It was only after conducting the required
public bidding that it could be fully verified that PAL Boat was the only qualified bidder.
The manifest reluctance to hold a public bidding and award the contract to the winning
bidder indicates of favoritism and partiality toward PAL Boat.
Perez pre-qualified PAL Boat despite its financial inability to undertake the project, and his
knowledge that PAL Boat had more liabilities than capital. The purpose of pre-qualification in any
public bidding is to determine, at the earliest opportunity, the ability of the bidder to undertake the
project. Thus, with respect to the bidder's financial capacity at the pre-qualification stage, the
government agency must examine and determine the ability of the bidder to fund the entire cost of
the project by considering the maximum amounts that each bidder may invest in the project at the
time of pre-qualification.
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Liquid assets of a prospective contractor are specifically required so that the contractor can
easily comply with the project, despite some delay in the progress payments. In this case, the alleged
1,200-square meter lot of PAL Boat was an unliquidated asset and should not have been considered
in determining its financial capability. As found by the Sandiganbayan, PAL Boat did not have the
working capital to augment whatever routinary delay that may occur in the release of funds.
There were also other dubious findings on PAL Boat. The Sandiganbayan found that PAL Boat
did not have a business license despite its operation since 1982. It was only one week after the
negotiated contract was approved when it applied for a business permit. These glaring circumstances
should have warned Perez to disqualify PAL Boat as a bidder. Perez also failed to publish the notice
invitation to bid. His lone testimony that he had posted such notices was self-serving absent any other
proof.
Rivera was also held liable for recommending the pre-qualification of Palanas based on the
documents submitted. As part of the technical staff, he should have followed the Implementing Rules
and Regulations by requiring Palanas to submit the detailed engineering documents consisting of
design standards, field surveys, contract plans, quantities, special provisions, unit prices, agency
estimate, bid/tender documents, and program work. The inadequate submission of these documents
led to the improper monitoring of the project.
Rivera failed to submit the proper documents for technical evaluation within five days from
the perfection of the negotiated contract. An inquiry as to the reasons for noncompliance initially
revealed that the agency did not conduct the detailed engineering works. If the contract underwent
technical evaluation, the corrective measures for defects could have been made. As there was lack of
proper basis for evaluation, the petitioners merely relied on ocular inspections, which were
insufficient to properly monitor the project.
The Court ruled that all these circumstances taken together clearly demonstrate the manifest
partiality of the petitioners towards PAL Boat, giving the latter unwarranted benefits to obtain the
government project.
Petitioners also caused undue injury to the government through their continuing and
manifest partiality towards PAL Boat.
Undue injury in the context of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 should be equated with that civil law
concept of “actual damage.” Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3(e) cannot be presumed
even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one
of the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury or the giving of any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue
injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.
The total contract price was PhP700,000.00. The DOH, however, only paid PhP630,000.00
because, upon the discovery by the new Regional Director Ortiz of the defects of the vessels, Palanas
was required to conduct repairs. Still he failed to do so. Ortiz formally severed the contract of PAL
Boat and did not anymore pay the remaining balance of PhP70,000.00.
Page 223 of 519

The retention money, according to the then IRR of P.D. No. 1594, is the amount retained, at a
rate of 10%, in every progress payment. Retention money is a form of security which seeks to ensure
that the work is satisfactorily done and on schedule. It is withheld by the procuring entity from
progress payments due to the contractor to guarantee indemnity for uncorrected discovered defects
and third-party liabilities in infrastructure projects.
The P53,781.70 was the retention money and taxes that should have been retained by the
petitioners in every progress payment. It is completely different from the PhP70,000.00 balance of
the project which Regional Director Ortiz refused to pay to PAL Boat. They came from different
sources but could have been both used for the same purpose of repairing the vessels. The petitioners
chose not to impose retention money and taxes against PAL Boat, to the detriment of the Government.
Perez contended that what was important was that the vessels were delivered to the riverside
barangays of Samar and Leyte. The vessels, however, were not correctly built by PAL Boat and the
government even had to spend additional funds to rehabilitate them. The defects were only
discovered when Director Ortiz came into office. Were it not for his intervention, the petitioners
would have probably continued the anomalous contract with PAL Boat. The final delivery of the
floating clinics to the end-users was not due to the proficiency of PAL Boat, as the contract was
already terminated. The government was obligated to use more funds and effort to rehabilitate the
vessels. The petitioners could not certainly use the fact of completion of the floating clinics to avoid
criminal liability.
The Court held that the criminal design still exists despite Soriano's acquittal, because all the
petitioners were involved in pre-qualifying PAL Boat. Rivera recommended the pre-qualification of
PAL Boat, which was approved by Perez and then Montero eventually entered into a negotiated
contract with it. Hence, the unity of criminal design and execution was very patent.
ALEX M. VALENCERINA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 206162, December 10, 2014, J. Mendoza
The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan in finding Valencerina guilty of violating Sec. 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 based upon the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution. In finding Valencerina
guilty of giving undue advantage or preference to Ecobel, in violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that the elements of the crime were duly
established.
In this case, Valencerina clearly extended, with evident bad faith, undue advantage to Ecobel in
the process of issuing and negotiating the subject bond. His act of endorsing Ecobel’s application to the
PGM despite his knowledge that the obligee of the loan was not PVB but a foreign lender, clearly shows
his disregard for the policy of GSIS requiring the existence of governmental interest in the transaction.
In the observation of the GSIS audit team, as it appeared in a report before the Sandiganbayan, PVB was
merely used to show that GSIS has an insurable interest in the loan. The truth, however, is that BSIL was
the funder and obligee of the credit sought to be guaranteed by the bond.
Facts:
Sometime in October 1997, Ecobel, represented by its Chairman and Accused Josephine
Boright, applied for the issuance of a bond with GSIS to guarantee the repayment of a loan in the
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amount of US$10,000,000.00, supposedly obtained from the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) and
allegedly for the construction of a 26-storey commercial/residential Ecobel Condominium. On
January 27, 1998, a memorandum was prepared by Petitioner Valencerina upon the instructions of
Accused Mallari, who was then the SVP of the GSIS General Insurance Group. It contained an
endorsement of Ecobel’s bond for evaluation of the GSIS Investment Committee. It also included
Mallari’s strong recommendation through a marginal note with the words “Strong reco. Based on info
& collateral herein stated.” On March 10, 1998, the GSIS Investment Committee approved the subject
bond. In a certification, dated January 14, 1999, it was made to appear that the bond was a genuine,
valid and binding obligation of GSIS. Eventually, Accused Estela J. Edralin, as a representative of
Ecobel, signed on February 4, 1999 a Term Loan Agreement with Bear Stearns Interna-tional, Ltd.
The following month, Ecobel made a drawdown from the loan in the amount of US$9,307,000.00. In
a letter, dated March 7, 2000, URSA Minor Limited, the assignee of BSIL, demanded payment from
Ecobel. A notice of failure was sent by Banker’s Trust, informing GSIS of Ecobel’s failure to pay the
obligation which became due on March 9, 2001. On April 5, 2000, Aon Financial Products, Inc., also a
subsequent assignee of BSIL, sent a Notice of Demand to the then Secretary of Finance, calling on the
guarantee of the Republic under the subject bond.
Thus, for having participated in, or contributed to the release or issuance of the subject surety
bond, an Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, against Valencerina, along with Campaña,
Mallari, Leticia G. Bernardo, Edralin, and Boright, for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The
Sandiganbayan found that Valencerina must have known that Ecobel could not be given such bond
to guarantee payment of a loan obtained from foreign entities because his position entailed
knowledge of the fact that GSIS could only issue a guarantee payment bond if the government had an
interest therein. Yet, despite this rule and his knowledge that the obligee was not actually PVB, as
misrepresented by Ecobel, but a foreign funder, Valencerina still submitted the application to the
PGM for the evaluation of the Investment Committee. The Sandiganbayan took this as proof of the
presence of the element of the offense: that Valencerina acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence in giving unwarranted benefits in favor of Ecobel.
Valencerina and Mallari separately moved for reconsideration, but their motions were
subsequently denied by the Sandiganbayan in its March 1, 2013 Resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the complained act of giving unwarranted benefit, preference or advantage
in favor of Ecobel with manifest impartiality, evident bad faith or gross negligence was proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes, some of the badges of graft enumerated under Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 3019 were duly proven
in the instant case warranting the conviction of the Valencerina.
It must be emphasized that irregularities did occur in the issuance of the subject bond. These
irregularities were adequately proved by the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense,
together with the documentary evidence presented before the Sandiganbayan – that the security
bond was issued without the adequate collaterals; that it was used to guarantee a high-risk foreign
loan which was disqualified for lack of government interest in it; that it was issued without the
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approval of the Board of Trustees as required by GSIS for high-risk bonds; that it was issued without
the premium for reinsurance being paid; and that Ecobel received undue benefits as it was able to
make a drawdown from the loan by reason of the guarantee under the subject bond. It is also quite
clear that the issues surrounding the Ecobel bond had exposed the government to unwarranted risks,
which could have been avoided had steps been taken to consciously follow the policies of GSIS.
It is in this light that Valencerina was tried. His participation in the issuance of the subject
bond was put to test to determine whether he violated Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan in finding Valencerina guilty of violating Sec. 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019 based upon the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution. In finding
Valencerina guilty of giving undue advantage or preference to Ecobel, in violation of Sec. 3(e) of the
Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that the elements of the crime
were duly established.
In this case, Valencerina clearly extended, with evident bad faith, undue advantage to Ecobel
in the process of issuing and negotiating the subject bond. His act of endorsing Ecobel’s application
to the PGM despite his knowledge that the obligee of the loan was not PVB but a foreign lender, clearly
shows his disregard for the policy of GSIS requiring the existence of governmental interest in the
transaction. In the observation of the GSIS audit team, as it appeared in a report before the
Sandiganbayan, PVB was merely used to show that GSIS has an insurable interest in the loan. The
truth, however, is that BSIL was the funder and obligee of the credit sought to be guaranteed by the
bond.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
PARRICIDE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROY SAN GASPAR

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3)
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. In this case, the prosecution was
able to satisfactorily establish that the victim, who is the legitimate spouse of Roy San Gaspar, was shot
and killed by the latter based on the eyewitnesses’ account, there being no showing that said
eyewitnesses were impelled by any ill motive to testify against him.
Facts:
On June 2, 2000, Roy San Gaspar (Roy) was charged with the crime of Parricide under Article
246 of the RPC in an Information. For the prosecution, the following witnesses testified: Joramel
Estimo (Joramel) and Cherme Estimo (Cherme), children of the victim Imelda E. San Gaspar (Imelda)
and stepchildren of Roy; and Dr. Flocerpida V. Jocson (Dr. Jocson), the Municipal Health Officer who
conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim, among others. Their collective testimonies are
summarized as follows:
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In the afternoon of April 25, 1999, Roy, without informing his lawfully married wife Imelda,
went to Norala, South Cotabato together with his father to attend the funeral of a relative. At that
time, Roy and Imelda were not on speaking terms for about a week already. At around 11:30 p.m. of
the same day and while Imelda and her two children Joramel and Cherme were already fast asleep,
Roy returned home and pounded on their front door. Apparently, Roy was mad because nobody
immediately opened the door for him. He got even more furious when he entered the house and saw
Imelda sleeping side-by-side with her grown-up children. Roy thus kicked Imelda on the leg while
she was still lying on the floor and this started a heated altercation between them.
Still enraged, Roy went upstairs and returned with a .12 gauge shotgun. He loaded it and lit a
kerosene lamp which he placed near the door of their room. He then aimed the .12 gauge shotgun at
his wife and in front of Joramel and Cherme, shot Imelda on the head. Roy thereafter immediately ran
away. Imelda was brought to Sultan Kudarat Provincial Hospital where she passed away.
Dr. Jocson, conducted an autopsy on Imelda’s body. According to the Autopsy Report, Imelda
suffered a fatal gunshot wound on the front left side of her head which penetrated her brain tissue
with a depth of six inches. Gunpowder residue surrounded the entry wounds, an indication that
Imelda was shot at close-range.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the following witnesses: Librada San Gaspar, the
mother of Roy; Vicente Martinez, the owner of the tricycle used in transporting Imelda to the hospital;
and Roy himself. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
In the morning of April 25, 1999, Roy went to Norala, South Cotabato with his father to attend
the funeral of a relative. It was already around 11:00 p.m. when Roy came home. But as he pushed
the door to enter their room, he heard a gunshot from a .12 gauge shotgun. Since it was dark, Roy
rushed downstairs to fetch a lamp to see what had just happened. With a lit lamp, he saw Imelda lying
on the floor drenched in her own blood. Joramel and Cherme were beside her crying. Roy thus
immediately went out of their house to look for a tricycle to transport Imelda to the hospital.
From the above narration, the defense postulates that when Roy pushed the door open, it hit
the shotgun, causing it to accidentally discharge and hit Imelda.
The RTC convicted Roy of the crime of Parricide. It relied on the testimonies of the witnesses
for the prosecution particularly, Joramel and Cherme. Having witnessed the shooting incident, both
of them positively identified Roy as the person who shot their mother, Imelda. On the other hand, the
RTC found Roy’s defense of denial doubtful and unreliable. It further held that denial is a weak
defense and that the same cannot prevail over the eyewitnesses’ positive identification of Roy as the
culprit.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, with modification as to the award for damages. It
held that since Roy asserted that the shooting was accidental, it was incumbent upon him to prove
the existence of the elements of the exempting circumstance of accident. However, he failed to
discharge this burden. Furthermore, Roy’s version of the circumstances leading to Imelda’s death
was incredulous. Contrary to his claim of accidental firing of the shotgun, the trajectory of the gunshot
and the gunpowder burns around Imelda’s wound suggest that the shooting was intentional.
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Issue:
Whether or not Roy San Gaspar is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide.
Ruling:
Yes. Roy is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.
In this case the prosecution was able to satisfactorily establish that Imelda was shot and killed
by Roy based on the eyewitnesses’ account. Joramel and Cherme positively and categorically
identified Roy as the one who shot and killed Imelda. Their testimonies corroborated each other on
material details. Moreover, there is no showing that Joramel and Cherme were impelled by any ill
motive to testify against Roy. It has been held that in the absence of any ill motives on the part of the
witnesses, their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. On the other hand, Roy only offered
his bare denial of the offense. However, “[t]he Court had consistently stressed that denial, like alibi,
is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused by
prosecution witnesses.”
Clearly, all the elements of the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the RPC are present in
this case.
While Roy describes the prosecution’s version of events as “unnatural, implausible, and
contrary to human nature and experience,” the Court finds that it is his story of accidental discharge
of the shotgun that is incredulous and unbelievable. Contrary to what Roy wants this Court to believe,
a .12 gauge shotgun will not go off unless it is loaded, cocked, and its trigger squeezed. To this Court,
Roy’s allegation is nothing but a self-serving statement without an ounce of proof or a lick of
credibility. Moreover, the same does not jibe with the result of the autopsy conducted on Imelda’s
body.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GEORGE ZAPATA y VIANA

G.R. No. 197046, July 21, 2014, J. Del Castillo
In the crime of parricide, only the following elements need to be satisfactorily established: (1)
the death of the deceased; (2) that he or she was killed by the accused; and (3) that the deceased was a
legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. In this case, all these
elements have been proven beyond doubt. Moreover, there is no doubt that the accused George Zapata
intentionally killed his wife; the shooting was not accidental. Both the trial court and the appellate court
correctly found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. His claim that he
accidentally pulled the trigger while attempting to catch the same when it fell from the cabinet is
incredible.
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Facts:
The accused George Zapata y Viana (Zapata) was charged with the crime of parricide. Zapata
entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned.
On May 11, 2002, around 3 o’clock in the afternoon, Zapata was having a drinking spree with
his brother Manny Zapata and his cousin Edwin Bautista in their family home in Rodriguez, Rizal.
After several hours of continuous alcohol splurge or at around 7 o’clock in the evening, a gunshot was
heard emanating from the bedroom of George Zapata and his wife Queeny. It appears that Zapata
killed his wife Queeny using his .45 caliber pistol with a single gunshot fired at close range at Queeny’s
chest. Zapata brought Queeny’s bloodied body to the sala. Seconds later, Edwin immediately left
Zapata’s house and proceeded to the house of his brother nearby while Manny likewise went to the
house of their cousin next door. Zapata fled from the scene of the crime without seeking help for his
wife. Queeny was left alone in the sala soaked in her very own blood.
The same gunshot alerted Zapata’s neighbors. Queeny’s body was later discovered and
brought to the Amang Rodriguez Medical Center.
During trial, Zapata claimed that the shooting of his wife was accidental. He alleged that he
wanted to show his gun to his cousin but it fell when he tried to retrieve the gun from the cabinet. In
his attempt to catch the gun, he accidentally squeezed the trigger hitting his wife in the process.
The trial court did not lend credence to his contentions. On the contrary, it found that based
on the evidence presented, Zapata deliberately pulled the trigger of his gun and shot his wife. Thus,
the trial court rendered judgment finding Zapata guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide.
Aggrieved, Zapata filed a Notice of Appeal. Just like the trial court, the Court of Appeals found
that the evidence presented satisfactorily showed that Zapata intentionally shot his wife.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused George Zapata is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide.
Ruling:
Yes. The accused George Zapata is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.
In the crime of parricide, only the following elements need to be satisfactorily established:
(1) the death of the deceased; (2) that he or she was killed by the accused; and (3) that the deceased
was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. All these elements
have been proven beyond doubt.
There is no doubt that Zapata intentionally killed his wife; the shooting was not accidental.
Zapata’s claim that he accidentally pulled the trigger while attempting to catch the same when it fell
from the cabinet is incredible. First, Zapata was a former Corporal in the Philippine Marines and is
thus assumed to know and undertake all safety precautions in storing his firearm. In this case, Zapata
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apparently threw caution to the wind when he placed the gun on top of a cabinet and not inside a
locked drawer or cabinet. Second, the gun was loaded. Third, the gun is equipped with several safety
measures. Interestingly, all these safety measures were not in place at the time of the shooting
making Zapata’s claim of accident highly unbelievable. Fourth, the trajectory of the bullet and the
point of entry negate Zapata’s claim that he pressed the trigger when the gun fell on the floor. If the
shot came from the floor where the gun allegedly fell, the shot should have been in an upward
direction. However, as testified to by the medico-legal officer, the bullet’s point of entry was at the
breast region and it exited at the lower back of the body. In short, the assailant was in front of the
victim and the shot was directed posteriorwards.
Moreover, Zapata’s actions immediately after the shooting is contrary to his assertion that he
did not intend to harm his wife. Indeed, if the shooting was accidental, Zapata would have
immediately sought help from his relatives and neighbors to bring the victim to the hospital. Instead,
he just left her sitting on a chair soaked in her blood. Zapata would not have become alarmed by the
arrival of the police authorities. Instead, he fled from the crime scene leaving his neighbors to tend
to his bleeding wife.
People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Macal y Bolasco,

G.R. No.211062, January 13, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of paricide. The facts established by the evidence for
the prosecution are as follows:
Angeles, the mother of Auria (the victim), narrated that Auria and appellant got married in March
2000 and that out of their union, they begot two children. Angeles claimed that, at the time of the
incident, they were all living together in a house in Taclaban City.
Angeles testified that at aroound 1:20 in the morning of Febraury 12, 2003, she, her children were
walking home after playing bingo at a local peryahan. Some friends tagged along with them. Along
the way, Angeles and her group met Auria’s husband, the appellant. The latter joinder them in
walking back to their house.
When they arrived at the house, the group proceeded to the living room except for Auria and
appellant who went straight to theri bedroom, about 4 meters away from the living room. Shortly
thereafter, Angels heard her daugther shouting, “mother help me I am going to be killed” Upon
hearing, Angeles and the rest of her companions raced towards the bedroom but they found the
door of the room locked. Arvin, one of Angeles’ children, kicked open the door of the bedroom and
there they all saw a bloodied Auria on one side of the room. Next to Auria was the appellant who
was then trying to stab himself with the ue of an improvised bladed weapon. Auria was immediately
taken to a hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.
For his defense, appellant did not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he stabbed
his wife, resulting in the latter’s death, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing
the defense that the stabbing was accidental and not intentional.
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Issue: Whether or not the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gravely erred in convicting accused-
appellant of the crime of parricide.
Held: In the said case, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.
Among the three requisites, the relationship between the offender and the victim is the most
crucial. The relationship is what actually distinguished the crim of parriced from homicide. In
parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the relationship between the offender and victim is
their marriage certificate. Oral evidence may also be considered in proving the relationship between
the two as long as such proof is not contested.
In this case, the spousal relationship between Auria and appellant is beyond dispute. The defense
already admitted that Auria was the legitimate wife of accused during the pre-trial conference. Such
admission was even reiterated by accused in the course of trial of the case. Nevertheless, the
prosecution produced a copy of the couple’ marriage certificate. Hence, the key element that
qualified the killing to paricide was satisfactoritly demonstrated in this case.
Moreover, the defense of appellant in untenable as the defense of accident presupposes lack of
intention to kill. This certainly does not hold true in the instant case based on the testimony of
accused. Morevoer, the prosecution witnesses, who were then within hearing distance from the
bedroom, testified that they distinctly heard Auria screaming that she was going to be killed by
appellant. Given the testimonies, the defense of accident is negated as he was carrying out an
unlawful act at the time of the incident.
MURDER/ HOMICIDE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL AQUINO y CENDANA

G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014
Where the ten-year old son of the victim was able to witness the death of his father and was
the lone witness to testify in the case, the Court ruled that when it comes to the matter of credibility
of a witness, settled are the guiding rules some of which are that (1) the appellate court will not disturb
the factual findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result
of the case, which showing is absent herein; (2) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to examine his
demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the
truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.
Page 231 of 519
Furthermore, Jurisprudence also tells us that when a testimony is given in a candid and
straightforward manner, there is no room for doubt that the witness is telling the truth.
Facts:
On September 5, 2005, at around 8:30 in the evening, the victim Jesus Lita, accompanied by his ten-
year old son, Jefferson, went out aboard the former’s black Kawasaki tricycle. Upon reaching San
Jose del Monte Elementary School, appellant Joel Aquino (Aquino) together with Noynoy
Almoguera a.k.a. Negro, Rodnal, Bing, John Doe and Peter Doe boarded the tricycle. Noynoy
Almoguera instructed the victim to proceed to the nipa hut owned by Aquino.
Upon reaching the said nipa hut, Jesus Lita, appellant and his companions had a shabu session
while Jefferson was watching TV. After using shabu, Noynoy Almoguera demanded from the victim
to pay Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00), but the victim said that he had no money. Bing suggested to
her companions that they leave the nipa hut, thus, the victim mounted his tricycle and started the
engine. Noynoy Almoguera and John Doe rode in the tricycle behind the victim while Aquino and
Rodnal rode in the sidecar with Jefferson [sitting] at the toolbox of the tricycle. Inside the tricycle,
Aquino pointed a knife at Jefferson while Noynoy Almoguera stabbed the victim’s side. After the
victim was stabbed, he was transferred inside the tricycle while Aquino drove the tricycle to his
friend’s house where they again stabbed the victim using the latter’s own knife. Then they loaded
the victim to the tricycle and drove to a grassy area where Aquino and his companions dumped the
body of the victim. Thereafter, they returned to Aquino’s residence. Jefferson told the sister of
Aquino about the death of his father but the sister only told him to sleep.
The next day, Jefferson was brought to the jeepney terminal where he rode a jeepney to get home.
Jefferson told his mother, Ma. Theresa Calitisan-Lita, about the death of his father. Ma. Theresa
Calitisan-Lita and Jefferson were about to leave for the morgue when they met a police outside their
residence. The police informed Ma. Theresa that the body of the victim was found in Barangay San
Rafael IV. Jefferson told the police that he was with his father at the time of his death and he brought
the police officers to the place where his father was stabbed and to the hut owned by appellant.
Thereat, the police officers recovered a maroon colored knife case and the sandals of the victim.
Aquino was invited to the police station for questioning but he refused alleging that he does not
know anything about the incident. The police officers were able to obtain a picture of appellant
which was shown to Jefferson and he positively identified the same as "Akong" one of those who
stabbed his father. Likewise, a video footage of Noynoy Almoguera alias "Negro" was shown to
Jefferson and he likewise identified the person in the video footage as the same "Negro" who also
stabbed his father.
Aquino denied the accusations against him.
RTC found Aquino guilty for murder and carnapping; the CA affirmed the decision with
modifications on penalties. Thus, the petition of the Aquino to reverse the decision.
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Issues:
Whether the trial court erred in finding that the alleged lone eyewitness positively identified the
accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes.
Whether the trial court erred in finding that treachery attended the killing.
Ruling:
As to the credibility of the lone eyewitness of the prosecution
With regard to appellant’s inquiry into the credibility of the lone eyewitness of the prosecution, we
depend upon the principle that the trial court is in a better position to adjudge the credibility of a
witness. In People v. Vergara, we elaborated on this premise in this wise:
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules some
of which are that (1) the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower
court, unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case,
which showing is absent herein; (2) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to examine
his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if such witness
is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible
witness.
Furthermore, Jurisprudence also tells us that when a testimony is given in a candid and
straightforward manner, there is no room for doubt that the witness is telling the truth. A perusal
of the testimony of Jefferson indicates that he testified in a manner that satisfies the aforementioned
test of credibility. More importantly, during his time at the witness stand, Jefferson positively and
categorically identified appellant as one of the individuals who stabbed his father.
As to the presence of treachery
The qualifying circumstance of treachery did attend the killing of Jesus. SC has consistently held
that treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. On this
point, we quote with approval the Court of Appeals’ discussion of this aspect of the case, to wit:
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting
victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even when the victim was forewarned
of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Records
disclose that Jesus was stabbed by the group on the lateral part of his body while he was under the
impression that they were simply leaving the place where they had [a] shabu session. Judicial notice
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can be taken that when the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle, his head is usually higher or
at the level of the roof of the side car which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers who are
seated in the side car. Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended
stabbing of his body both from the people seated in the side car and those seated behind him. Thus,
the trial court’s finding of treachery should be affirmed. There is treachery when the means,
methods, and forms of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused without danger to his person. What is decisive in an appreciation of
treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself.
RICARDO MEDINA, JR. y ORIEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
The accused was charged of homicide but is question his conviction as the prosecution did not
present the two knives used in the crime which could have proven that the knife that killed the victim
was the latter’s knife. The Court ruled that non-identification and non-presentation of the weapon
actually used in the killing did not diminish the merit of the conviction primarily because other
competent evidence and the testimonies of witnesses had directly and positively identified and
incriminated accused as the assailant of victim.
Facts:
On April 3, 1997, Ross Mulinyawe (Ross), Lino’s son, and Ronald Medina, the younger brother of
Ricardo and Randolf Medina was involved in a fight during a basketball game. Ronald had hit Ross
with a piece of stone. Hearing about the involvement of his brother in the fight, Randolf rushed to
the scene and sent Ronald home. Ross was brought to the hospital for treatment. Lino learned that
his son had sustained a head injury inflicted by one of the Medinas, and headed towards the house
of the latter accompanied by Jose Tapan and Abet Menes. He had a bread knife tucked in the back,
but his companions were unarmed. Along the way, Lino encountered Randolf whom he confronted
about the fight. Although Randolf tried to explain what had really happened between Ross and
Ronald, Lino lashed out at Randolf and gripped the latter’s hand. Tapan almost simultaneously
punched Randolf in the face. Lino, already holding the knife in his right hand, swung the knife at
Randolf who was not hit. Randolf retreated towards the store and took two empty bottles of beer,
broke the bottles and attacked Lino with them. Arriving at the scene, Ricardo saw what was
happening, and confronted Lino. A commotion ensued between them and Ricardo entered their
house to get a kitchen knife, then, came out. Lino made a thrust at Ricardo but failed to hit the
latter, who then stabbed Lino on the left side of his chest, near the region of the heart. Lino fell face
down on the ground. After that, Ricardo walked away, while Randolf threw the broken bottles at
the fallen Lino.
On April 4, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City charged Randolf with homicide
which was later amended with leave of court to include Ricardo as a co-conspirator. The RTC
acquitted Randolf but convicted Ricardo of homicide. It found no evidence of conspiracy between
Randolf and Ricardo because their actions appeared to be independent and separate from each
Page 234 of 519
other and did not show that they had mounted a joint attack against Lino. It rejected Ricardo’s
defense that the fatal stab wound of Lino had been self-inflicted. The CA affirmed the conviction
with modification of the penalty. Hence, the petition to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether the lower court erred in ruling that Medina stabbed Lino Mulinyawe in spite the fact that
the prosecution failed to present the actual knives during the hearing of cases
Whether CA erred in disregarding the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative (Art. 11, RPC)
Ruling:
The appeal has no merit.
As to the requirement of presentation of the two knives as evidence
Ricardo contends that the State did not present as evidence in court the two knives wielded by him
and Lino despite repeated demands for their presentation; that had the knives been presented, it
could have been demonstrated to the trial court that the smaller knife used by Lino had more blood
stains than the knife held by him and would fit the size of the mortal wound; that his assertion that
Lino had stabbed himself when he stumbled and lost his balance while swinging his knife at Randolf
would have been thereby validated; and that in his testimony, Dr. Emmanuel Aranas of the PNP
Crime Laboratory Service, Southern Police District, did not rule out the possibility that the wounds
sustained by Lino were self-inflicted.
The contention deserves no serious consideration.
The non-identification and non-presentation of the weapon actually used in the killing did not
diminish the merit of the conviction primarily because other competent evidence and the
testimonies of witnesses had directly and positively identified and incriminated Ricardo as the
assailant of Lino. Hence, the establishment beyond reasonable doubt of Ricardo’s guilt for the
homicide did not require the production of the weapon used in the killing as evidence in court, for
in arriving at its findings on the culpability of Ricardo the RTC, like other trial courts, clearly looked
at, considered and appreciated the entirety of the record and the evidence. For sure, the weapon
actually used was not indispensable considering that the finding of guilt was based on other
evidence proving his commission of the crime.
In addition, the witnesses incriminating Ricardo were not only credible but were not shown to have
harbored any ill-motive towards him. They were surely entitled to full faith and credit for those
reasons, and both the RTC and the CA did well in according such credence to them. Their positive
identification of him as the assailant prevailed over his mere denial, because such denial, being
negative and self-serving evidence, was undeserving of weight by virtue of its lack of substantiation
by clear and convincing proof. Hence, his denial had no greater evidentiary value than the
affirmative testimonies of the credible witnesses presented against him.
Page 235 of 519

As to serious error to the CA for not appreciating the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative
in his favor was bereft of any support from the records.
In order that defense of a relative is to be appreciated in favor of Ricardo, the following requisites
must concur, namely: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person
attacked, that the person making the defense took no part in the provocation. Like in self-defense,
it is the accused who carries the burden to prove convincingly the attendance and concurrence of
these requisites because his invocation of this defense amounts to an admission of having inflicted
the fatal injury on the victim.
In invoking defense of a relative, Ricardo states that his immediate impulse upon seeing Randolf
being attacked by Lino with a knife was to get his own weapon and to aid in the defense of Randolf.
But that theory was inconsistent with his declaration at the trial that Lino’s fatal wound had been
self-inflicted, as it presupposes direct responsibility for inflicting the mortal wound. Thus, his
defense was unworthy of belief due to its incongruity with human experience.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELINO DADAO, ANTONIO SULINDAO,

EDDIE MALOGSI (deceased) and ALFEMIO MALOGSI
G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
The accused, charged for the felony of murder, questions the appreciation of the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of strength when the same was not in the Information. The Court ruled that
even if abuse of superior strength was properly alleged and proven in court, it cannot serve to qualify
or aggravate the felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of
abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.
Facts:
Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and Alfemio Malogsi was charged
for the felony of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code when the accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with one another, with intent to kill, by means of treachery,
armed with guns and bolos, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault
and shot Pionio Yacapin, hitting his back and left leg, inflicting wounds that caused his death
thereafter.
Prosecution presented as witness Ronie Dacion, a 14-year old stepson of the Yacapin, testified that
on July 11, 1993 at about 7:30 in the evening he saw accused Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao,
Eddie Malogsi and Alfemio Malogsi helping each other and with the use of firearms and bolos, shot
to death the victim, Pionio Yacapin in their house at Barangay Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon. The
testimony of the second witness for the prosecution, Edgar Dacion, a 12-year old stepson of the
victim, corroborates the testimony of his older brother Ronie Dacion.
The RTC ruled that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt; CA affirmed the former’s
decision, thus, the instant petition.
Page 236 of 519

Issue:
Whether the RTC erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
when the same was not alleged in the information.
Ruling:
The petition is without merit.
Contrary to appellants’ claim that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was
used by the trial court to qualify the act of killing committed by appellants to murder despite it not
having been alleged in the criminal information filed against them, the text of the assailed January
31, 2005 Decision of the trial court clearly shows that, even though abuse of superior strength was
discussed as present in the commission of the crime, it was not appreciated as either a qualifying
or generic aggravating circumstance.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the lower court appreciated treachery, which was
alleged in the information, as an aggravating circumstance which qualified the offense to murder.
This is proper considering that, even if abuse of superior strength was properly alleged and proven
in court, it cannot serve to qualify or aggravate the felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled
that when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is
absorbed in the latter.
Time and again, SC has declared that treachery is present when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. Furthermore, SC has also held that the essence of treachery is that
the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In the case at bar, the
manner by which Pionio Yacapin was killed carried all the indubitable hallmarks of treachery. We
quote with approval the following discussion of the Court of Appeals on this matter, to wit:
Treachery, which was alleged in the information, was duly proven by the prosecution. The Court
notes, in particular, the testimony of Nenita Yacapin who declared that when the victim was making
a fire in the kitchen, she heard shots and she saw the barrel of the gun inserted on the bamboo split
walling of their house. Exhibit "B", the anatomical chart certified by the Philippine National Police
(PNP) personnel, shows the relative location of the gunshot wounds sustained by the victim. The
chart indicates that the victim was shot from behind. Clearly, the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES vs. WILFREDO GUNDA alias FRED

G.R. No. 195525, February 5, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
The accused, charged and convicted of the crime of murder, now questions the presence of
treachery in the commission of the crime. The Court ruled that there is indeed treachery and reiterated
that “There is treachery when the offender commits [a crime] against the person, employing means,
Page 237 of 519
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.” Furthermore,
two prosecution witnesses positively identified him as the person who waylaid the victim, and with
the help of his conspirators, stabbed the victim several times; and according to the postmortem
findings, the victim suffered 12 stab wounds which caused his death.
Facts:
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 25, 1997, the victim, Eladio Globio, Sr., and his son,
Eladio Jr., were walking along a trail at Sitio Candulungon, Barangay Cabay, Balangkayan, Eastern
Samar. Suddenly, when Eladio Jr. was about 10 meters ahead of his father, the latter was waylaid by
appellant and his unidentified companions. The John Does held the victim's arms whereupon
Wilfredo Gunda (Fred) stabbed him several times. Fearing for his life, Eladio Jr. fled and
unidentified assailants pursued him. Fortunately, he was able to outrun them and was able to reach
their house. In the morning of the following day, Eladio Jr. went to the house of his sister and
informed her of the death of their father. They then reported the incident to the police authorities
who eventually arrested Fred. Aside from Eladio Jr., Teofilo Ambal, Jr. (Ambal) who is a brother-in-
law of the appellant, also witnessed the crime. In the afternoon of May 25, 1997, while Ambal was
at his farm gathering feeds for his pigs, he saw appellant who was armed with a wooden pole
position himself at the back of the victim and strike the latter’s head with the wood. The
companions of appellant then held the victim’s arms whereupon appellant drew a bolo locally
known as depang from his waist and stabbed the victim several times. Fearing for his life, Ambal
likewise left the crime scene.
Appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that in the afternoon of May 25, 1997, he was
at Barangay Camada gathering and cleaning rattan poles.
RTC ruled against the accused finding him guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt and is
sentenced to suffer death penalty. CA denied the Fred’s appeal, affirming the decision of RTC with
modifications to the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. Aggrieved, appellant filed an appeal.
Issue:
Whether treachery is present in the commission of the crime.
Ruling:
We dismiss the appeal.
Based on the above narrations, we find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the trial
court as affirmed by the CA, that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder. Two prosecution witnesses positively identified him as the person who waylaid the victim,
and with the help of his conspirators, stabbed the victim several times. According to the
postmortem findings, the victim suffered 12 stab wounds which caused his death. There is also no
doubt in our mind that the attack on the victim was attended by treachery. The victim was unarmed
and had no inkling of the impending attack on his person. In fact, he was just on his way home
together with his son Eladio Jr. The victim was attacked by appellant from behind with a blow to
his head with a wooden pole. His cohorts then held the victim’s arms rendering him helpless and
Page 238 of 519
immobile. In such position, there is no opportunity for the victim to escape or even offer a feeble
resistance. Appellant then delivered the coup de grâce by stabbing the victim multiple times.
Undoubtedly, treachery qualified the killing to murder. "There is treachery when the offender
commits [a crime] against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make." As regards conspiracy, the CA correctly ruled that
it is not a circumstance which would aggravate or qualify the crime.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death.
There being no other aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
the CA correctly held that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two
indivisible penalties. "It must be emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole
pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that ‘persons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by
reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended’."
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO vs. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, ET AL.

RANDALL B. ECHANIS vs. HON. THELMA BAYUNI-MEDINA ETC., ET AL.
RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS vs. HON. THELMA BAYUNI-MEDINA ETC., ET AL.
VICENTE P. LADLAD vs. HON. THELMA BAYUNI-MEDINA ETC., ET AL.
G.R. No. 176830/G.R. No. 185587/G.R. No. 185636/G.R. No. 190005
February 11, 2014
CJ. SERENO
The petitioners were charged of murder in the RTC of Leyte and rebellion in the RTC of Makati.
They pray for the dismissal of the case on the ground of the political offense doctrine that the murders
were committed in furtherance of rebellion. The Court ruled against the petitioners and stated that
the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged by the defense, since motive is
a state of mind which only the accused knows. The proof showing political motivation is adduced
during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense.
It is not for the Supreme Court to determine the factual matter of the instant petitions.
Facts:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the
Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. The mass grave
contained skeletal remains of individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease"
(Operation VD) launched by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s
Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of
suspected military informers.
The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD. All of them
swore that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP and
were never seen again. They also expressed belief that their relatives’ remains were among those
discovered at the mass grave site. Affidavits of former members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP were also
Page 239 of 519
filed. According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central
Committee. Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo), Randall B. Echanis
(Echanis), Rafael G. Baylosis (Baylosis), and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad) were then members of the
Central Committee.
On 16 February 2007, prosecutor recommended the filing of an Information for 15 counts of multiple
murder against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein.
On 6 March 2007, the judge of RTC in Hilongos, Leyte issued an Order finding probable cause "in
the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged." He ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty.
On different instances, petitioners filed before the SC a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of Order of Judge of RTC in
Hilongos, Leyte and Resolution of prosecutor. The petitions prayed for the unconditional release of
petitioners, as well as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain the conduct of further proceedings during the pendency of the petition.
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis and Ladlad) docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was then pending before
the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati). Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner
Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime
of rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of
rebellion.
Issues:
Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed under the political offense
doctrine.
Ruling:
The political offense doctrine is not aground to dismiss the charge against petitioners prior to a
determination by the trial court that the murders were committed in furtherance of rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political
offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion
of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a
graver penalty."
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus, when
a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the
killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted
and punished as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge respondents
with simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in
Page 240 of 519

criminal procedure that the institution of criminal charges, including whom and what to charge, is
addressed to the sound discretion of the public prosecutor.
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial
for the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and
for the political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in furtherance of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the alleged murders can be
clearly seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-
conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged by
the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows. The proof showing
political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present
evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the
instant petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, if during
trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance
of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended,

in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave
of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged
in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The
court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished
all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing
of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided
the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to
give bail for their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion,
the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple
rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
Page 241 of 519

information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2)
it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has
been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in a
valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment.
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and penalized under
Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-
944 was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several others.
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944. Even before the
indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad
had already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ
denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack of
impartiality and independence. When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and
Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944. We
eventually ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy never had
a chance to attach.
Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty under the P100,000 cash bond posted before
the Office of the Clerk of Court. He shall remain on provisional liberty until the termination of the
proceedings before the RTC Manila.
The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional liberty of petitioners Echanis, Baylosis and
Ladlad in view of the ongoing peace negotiations. Their provisional release from detention under
the cash bond of P100,000 each shall continue under the condition that their temporary release
shall be limited to the period of their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace
negotiations with the government or until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC
Manila, whichever is sooner. It shall be the duty of the government to inform this Court the moment
that peace negotiations are concluded.

vs. NOEL ENOJAS Y HINGIPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZY FABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS Y
DELANTAR, AND ROGER JALANDONI Y ARI
G.R. NO. 204894. MARCH 10, 2014
J. ABAD
Page 242 of 519

In this case, the Court disagreed with the ruling of the CA convicting the appellants murder
since the aggravating circumstances of aid of armed men and use of unlicensed firearms did not
qualify the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder.
Facts:
This is case charging appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas), Arnold Gomez y Fabregas (Gomez),
Fernando Santos y Delantar (Santos), and Roger Jalandoni y Ari (Jalandoni) with murder before the
Las Pifias Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case 06-0854. P02 Gregorio testified that at
around 10:30 in the evening of August 29, 2006, he and PO2 Pangilinan were patrolling the vicinity
of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front
of the Aguila Auto Glass shop near the intersection of BF Almanza and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The
officers approached the taxi and asked the driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for his
documents. The latter complied but, having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of
documents shown them, they asked him to come with them to the police station in their mobile
car for further questioning. Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi
behind. On reaching the 7-11 convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they
stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he approached the store’s door,
however, he came upon two suspected robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one
suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan
causing his death. PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man whom he saw running
towards Pilar Village. He saw another man, who came from the Jollibee outlet, run towards
Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men
were able to take a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an ambulance. On
returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with them had
fled. PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in accused Enojas’
mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police then
conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni.
Subsequently, the police were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez.
RTC – convicted the accused
CA – affirmed decision of RTC
Issue:
Whether or not the accused are guilty of the crime of murder
Ruling:
The Court disagree with the CA’s ruling that the aggravating circumstances of a) aid of armed men
and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In "aid of armed
men," the men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of the crime
under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals
or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating
circumstance that is not among the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code as qualifying a homicide to murder. The accused in this case may be held liable only for
homicide, aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.
Page 243 of 519
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERWIN TAMAYO Y BAUTISTA

G.R. NO. 196960. MARCH 12, 2014
J. ABAD
Facts:
In the early morning of April 8, 2004, while Joey M. Obamen (Joey), Wilson, Alvin, and Lorenzo
Gloria (Lorenzo) were having drink and merriment beside the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) chapel on
Lacson Street in Tondo, Manila, someone hurled empty bottles of gin at them. As Wilson went to
look for whoever had done it, he saw accused Erwin and John, in the company of several others,
also having their drink. Retaliating, Joey and his group threw stones and empty gin bottles at
accused Erwin and his companions. Enraged, the latter group gave chase to Joey and the others with
him. Unfortunately, Joey tripped on an iron chain that guarded the INC’s parking area and fell to
the ground. He was in this position when Erwin and his companions attacked and mauled him.
Some, including Erwin, stabbed Joey with their knives. The assailants scampered away afterwards.
Joey was rushed to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but died shortly on arrival. A subsequent
autopsy of his body showed that he died of traumatic injuries on the head and multiple stab wounds
on the abdomen.
In his defense, Erwin claimed that when the killing took place, he was asleep at home with his wife
and a certain Maricel Bustarde although it would take but about 20 to 25 minutes to walk from his
house to where the incident took place. Accused Erwin claims that since about 15 men mauled Joey,
it is "highly possible" that the prosecution witnesses made a mistake in saying that it was he who
caused Joey’s death.
RTC – found appealant guilty
CA – affirmed RTC
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of murder
Ruling:
SC affirmed RTC and CA. The site of the murder was not far from where he lived. Besides, he
presented no corroborating testimony that he was then at his house. As to his lament that the RTC
and the CA should not have given credit to Norman’s testimony for he had a grudge against him,
Erwin presented no proof apart from his word that this was so. At any rate, the accounts of the
remaining eyewitnesses were just as positive, straightforward, consistent, and clear. They all
testified that Erwin stabbed Joey with a knife.
Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who inflicted the fatal wounds
on Joey during the commotion, Erwin’s liability is not diminished since he and the others with him
acted with concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy makes all the assailants
equally liable as co-principals by direct participation.
Page 244 of 519

Since about 15 men, including accused Erwin, pounced on their one helpless victim, relentlessly
bludgeoned him on the head, and stabbed him on the stomach until he was dead, there is no
question that the accused took advantage of their superior strength.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANTE DULAY

G.R. No. 194629, April 21, 2014, J. Reyes
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when
the offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been
physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
Hence, when the accused was not able to prove that he was in a certain place when the crime was
committed, and the witness positively identified him as the assailant, the denial and alibi are weak
defenses, which cannot prevail against positive identification.
Facts:
In the evening of 30 December 2002 at around 6:30, Orlando Jr. (or simply “Junior”), a child
about six years of age, was outside the kitchen of their house located in Ligaya, Aglipay, Province of
Quirino. His father, the late Orlando Sr., was also somewhere in the yard. Wondering why the dog
was barking loudly, Mrs. Engracia Legaspi peeped from inside the kitchen and noticed Dulay’s dog in
the vicinity. She surmised that its master, Dulay, was also present. Junior’s elder sister, Melanie went
out to look for the dog–leash to transfer the mutt to another area.
Using the flashlight he was constantly prohibited from playing with, Junior directed a beam
towards the grassy area where he discovered Dulay whom he recognized because of the
characteristic “mumps” below his left ear. Melanie also saw Dulay as he was staring at Orlando Sr.
Their uncle Dante suddenly threw something that resembled a ball, towards the cemented part of the
yard. It turned out to be a grenade, and it landed about seven meters from where Junior and his father
were. Junior was hurt in his pelvic area, while his father was fatally hit by shrapnel, causing his death.
Dulay then went away on his bicycle towards the direction of his house.
In the early morning, three of the male neighbors searched and found a grenade safety lever,
along with a torn–out pair of rubber shoes in the road near Dulay’s house. Examining the rubber
shoes which turned out to belong to the latter, the three men further recovered a grenade ring pin
from inside the left shoe.
The RTC found Dulay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with
Attempted Murder. The CA affirmed the conviction with modification. The CA convicted Dulay of the
complex crime of murder and frustrated murder.
Issue:
Whether or not Dulay should be held liable of the crimes charged.
Ruling:
Yes, he should.
Page 245 of 519
For the defense of alibi to prosper, Dulay must prove that he was somewhere else when the
offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been
physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
Since Dulay was not able to prove that he was in Dibul when the crime was committed, both the CA
and the RTC were correct in disregarding his alibi. Junior and Melanie, Junior’s elder sister, on the
other hand, have both positively identified Dulay as the assailant. On this score, this Court has held
in a number of cases that denial and alibi are weak defenses, which cannot prevail against positive
identification.
As regards the crime committed against Junior, the Court is in accord with the CA’s conclusion
that Dulay is guilty of frustrated murder. The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the
offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and (2) that the
felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will.”
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, Dulay has performed all acts of execution in
throwing the grenade which could have caused Junior’s death as a consequence, but because of
immediate medical assistance, a cause independent of Dulay’s will, Junior survived.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO FELICIANO, JR., et al.

G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014, J. Leonen
For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of
execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The victims in this case were eating lunch
on campus. They were not at a place where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any
sudden attack by rival fraternity men. The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead
pipes and baseball bats. The only way they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation
where they were unnamed and outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the
attackers. The attack also happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any possibility of the
bystanders being able to help them until after the incident. The swiftness and the suddenness of the
attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery,
therefore, was present in this case.
Facts:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the
Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying
baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of
them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity,
namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan, Robert Michael Beltran
Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano, Raymund E.
Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero, and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the RTC.
Page 246 of 519

The RTC found Alvir, Feliciano, Jr., Soliva, Medalla, and Zingapan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellants Feliciano, et al. were correctly charged with murder and
there was treachery in the commission of the crime
Ruling:
Yes, according to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, accused-appellants
were correctly charged with murder. Article 248 states:
ART. 248. Murder.-Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to
death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity;
xxxx
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men armed with lead pipes and baseball
bats attacked Dennis Venturina and his companions, which resulted in Venturina's death. As
correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the offense committed against Dennis
Venturina was committed by a group that took advantage of its superior strength and with the aid of
armed men. The appellate court, however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of treachery in the
commission of the offense.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The
essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur:
(1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to
defend themselves or retaliate; and
(2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants Feliciano, ruled that
contrary to the findings of the trial court, there was no treachery involved. In particular, they ruled
that although the attack was sudden and unexpected, "it was done in broad daylight with a lot of
people who could see them" and that "there was a possibility for the victims to have fought back or
that the people in the canteen could have helped the victims."
Page 247 of 519

This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus.
They were not at a place where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden
attack by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The
only way they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unnamed
and outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also
happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to
help them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to
retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGER RINGOR UMAWID

G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because an accused invoking
the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of such
insanity. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense.
Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists.
Two (2) conditions must concur for treachery to be appreciated: first, the employment of means
of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and,
second, the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted
The Court agrees in this case with the findings of the RTC and the CA that treachery was
attendant in the killing of Maureen. The facts of this case show that Umawid suddenly appeared at the
terrace of Vicente’s house and started attacking Vicente with panabas. However, the latter was able to
evade Umawid’s attacks, resulting in Maureen being inadvertently hit and killed in the process. While it
was not shown that Umawid consciously employed treachery so as to insure the death of Maureen, who
was then just two (2) years old at the time, it is well to reiterate that the killing by an adult of a minor
child is treacherous, and thus, qualifies Maureen’s killing to Murder.
Facts:
On November 26, 2002, Vicente Ringor (Vicente) was staying with his two (2)-year old
granddaughter, Maureen Joy Ringor (Maureen), at the terrace of their house located at Villanueva,
San Manuel, Isabela. Suddenly, Umawid appeared and started attacking Vicente with a panabas with
neither reason nor provocation. While Vicente was able to evade Umawid’s blows, the latter
nevertheless hit Maureen on her abdomen and back, causing her instantaneous death. Upon seeing
Maureen bloodied, Umawid walked away.
Thereafter, Umawid went to a nearby house which was only five (5) meters away from
Vicente’s house where his nephew, Jeffrey R. Mercado (Jeffrey), was sleeping. Awakened by the
commotion, Jeffrey went outside only to see his uncle charging at him with his panabas. Instinctively,
Jeffrey, along with his sister and cousin, rushed inside the house to seek for safety. However, Umawid
was able to prevent Jeffrey from closing the door of the house, and the former was able to barge into
the said house. Jeffrey crouched and covered his head with his arms to shield him from Umawid’s
Page 248 of 519
impending attacks. Eventually, Umawid delivered fatal hacking blows to Jeffrey, causing the
mutilation of the latter’s fingers. When Jeffrey pretended to be dead, Umawid stopped his barrage.
Umawid set up the defense of insanity, but did not, however, take the witness stand to attest
to the same. Instead, he presented the testimonies of Dr. Quincina and Dr. Juliana to bolster his claim.
Dr. Quincina testified that he evaluated Umawid’s psychiatric condition in May 2002, February 2003,
and on March 24, 2003 and found that the latter was manifesting psychotic symptoms. However, he
could not tell with certainty whether Umawid was psychotic at the time of the commission of the
crimes. On the other hand, Dr. Juliana failed to testify on Umawid’s mental state since she merely
referred the latter to another doctor for further evaluation.
RTC found Umawid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder of Maureen and
was also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder of Jeffrey. The RTC
held that Umawid committed the acts complained of in the informations and that they were done in
a treacherous manner, considering that Maureen was only two (2) years old at the time of the attack
and thus, cannot be expected to put up a defense, and that Jeffrey was never given an opportunity to
defend himself.
CA affirmed Umawid’s conviction. It held that by invoking the defense of insanity, Umawid
had, in effect, admitted the commission of the crimes but nevertheless pleaded to be exonerated from
criminal liability. However, he failed to prove by clear and positive evidence that he was actually
insane immediately preceding the time of the commission of the crimes or during their execution.
Issue:
Whether or not Umawid’s conviction for the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder should
be upheld.
Ruling:
Yes. Umawid’s appeal is bereft of merit.
The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because an accused
invoking the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because
of such insanity. As there is a presumption in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense
bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the evidence on this
matter must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the
offense/s with which he is charged. Thus, in order to lend credence to a defense of insanity, it must
be shown that the accused had no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his
or her acts.
Records, however, reveal that Dr. Quincina’s testimony only showed that he only examined
Umawid six (6) months before the latter committed the crimes and three (3) months and four (4)
months thereafter. Notably, he admitted that his findings did not include Umawid’s mental
disposition immediately before or at the very moment when he committed such crimes. As such, Dr.
Quincina’s testimony cannot prove Umawid’s insanity. Neither would Dr. Juliana’s testimony shore
up Umawid’s cause as the former failed to attest to the latter’s mental condition and even referred
Page 249 of 519

him to another doctor for further evaluation. Given these circumstances, Umawid’s defense of
insanity remained unsubstantiated.
The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that treachery was attendant in the
killing of Maureen. The facts of this case show that Umawid suddenly appeared at the terrace of
Vicente’s house and started attacking Vicente with panabas. However, the latter was able to evade
Umawid’s attacks, resulting in Maureen being inadvertently hit and killed in the process. While it was
not shown that Umawid consciously employed treachery so as to insure the death of Maureen, who
was then just two (2) years old at the time, it is well to reiterate that the killing by an adult of a minor
child is treacherous, and thus, qualifies Maureen’s killing to Murder.
Two (2) conditions must concur for treachery to be appreciated: first, the employment of
means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and, second, the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.
In the same manner, treachery exists in Umawid’s attack on Jeffrey, albeit the Court disagrees
with the RTC and the CA’s finding that Umawid employed means, methods, and forms that rendered
Jeffrey incapable of raising a credible defense.
A review of the factual circumstances herein would reveal that it was not impossible for
Jeffrey to put up a defense against Umawid’s attacks. In fact, Jeffrey was sufficiently informed of
Umawid’s impending assault upon him as he saw the latter charging at him. Jeffrey even attempted
to prevent Umawid from entering the house, albeit he was unsuccessful in doing so. Despite this,
Jeffrey was still capable of mounting a defense against Umawid’s attacks – but it was simply
unfortunate that he chose not to do so when he crouched and covered his head with his arms.
Nevertheless, treachery may still be appreciated on account of Jeffrey’s minority, considering that he
was just 15 years of age when Umawid attacked him. Instructive on this point is the case of People v.
Guzman where it was held that treachery attended the killing of a 17-year old victim due to his
minority.
Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense.
Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JEFFERSON WARRINER y NICDAO

G.R. No. 208678, June 16, 2014, J. Reyes
The accused shot the victim in the head, which was found to be the direct cause of his death. The
accused was found guilty of murder. It was not a case of self-defense since there was no unlawful
aggression from the victim. It is settled that not every form or degree of aggression justifies a claim of
self-defense. The Court ruled that there was treachery since the sudden attack of the accused upon the
victim was clearly without warning and unexpected on the part of the victim, giving him no chance for
defense.
Facts:
Jefferson and Jeffrey Warriner Nicdao, and Valentino Villaflor Masangkay were charged with
the crime of murder for conspiring and confederating with intent to kill, qualified by treachery,
Page 250 of 519

attacking Lou Anthony Sta. Maria Pamintuan by hitting and shooting him in the head with use of a .38
caliber revolver, inflicting a gunshot wound which was the direct cause of his death.
Prosecution presented as witnesses Joshua Candolisas and Claudinick Blacer, friends of the
victim, who were with Lou Anthony when he was shot at the Ray Charles Bar in Malate, Manila. They
claimed that some crew members of the Jollibee-Harrison Plaza branch has a bonding session at the
said bar until early morning. Their group stayed at the bar’s patio, and had ordered almost 20 bottles
of Red Horse beer. At about 2:30 a.m., Lou Anthony noticed that a group of three men from another
table kept giving their group dagger looks. He then remarked to Claudinick, “Pare, parang masama
yata yung tingin nung nasa kabilang table.”
Lou Anthony approached and confronted the other group. By that time, he had taken about
three bottles of beer and was already “tipsy.” After Lou Anthony returned to their table, Claudinick
approached the other group and apologized for his friend saying, “pare, pasensya na kayo.” The two
members of the other group, Jeffrey and Valentino, accepted the apology. Jefferson, however, did not
appear to take the matter lightly and said, “pag-suotin mo ng helmet yan,” referring to Lou Anthony.
At about 3:00 a.m., the group of Jefferson approached Lou Anthony’s table. Without any
warning, however, Jefferson hit Lou Anthony’s head with a gun, and as the latter was about to rise
from his seat and face his assailant, Jefferson shot Lou Anthony in the forehead. Jefferson’s group
immediately fled from the crime scene. Claudinick came to the assistance of Lou Anthony, whom he
and Jeff brought to the Philippine General Hospital.
All of the accused were presented as witnesses. They testified that Lou Anthony, who
approached them and tapped their table exclaiming, “Tang ina nyo, bakit ang sama ng mga tingin nyo,
ano ang gusto nyong mangyari?” Their group did not mind Lou Anthony and after the latter had left,
Claudinick approached their group to apologize. Jefferson allegedly replied, “Sige, okay lang.”
Jefferson admitted that he shot the victim, but invoked self-defense. He claimed that before
his group left the bar, Valentino went to the restroom while Jeffrey went to the cashier to pay their
bill. Jefferson approached the table of Lou Anthony, as he wanted to settle their earlier altercation.
Lou Anthony, however, grabbed Jefferson by his collar and uttered offensive words. Alarmed,
Jefferson instinctively reached for his gun and then shot Lou Anthony. Both Valentino and Jeffrey
denied any liability for Lou Anthony’s death.
The trial court found Jefferson guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and Jeffery and Valentino
were acquitted by the court for lack of evidence. The appellate court affirmed the RTC’s finding.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Jefferson can properly avail self-defense

2. Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery was established
Ruling:
1. No, there can be no self-defense in this case.
Page 251 of 519

There is no dispute that it was Jefferson who killed the victim. During the trial, Jefferson
admitted to have inflicted the gunshot wound which led to Lou Anthony’s eventual demise. While
Jefferson claimed to have merely defended himself given the “dagger looks” and “violent tendencies”
which were exhibited by his victim, the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled on the weakness of
such claim.
To successfully invoke self-defense, it requires the following elements: (1) unlawful

aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to
self-defense.
Jefferson failed to prove the elements. The records indicate the absence of an unlawful
aggression which could be ascribed to Lou Anthony. It is settled that not every form or degree of
aggression justifies a claim of self-defense. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under
the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal
safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat.
There must be concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must
be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least,
imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
From the prosecution and defense witnesses’ testimonies, it was clear that Lou Anthony did
not perform any act that put Jefferson’s life or safety in actual or imminent danger. The perceived
violent and aggressive attitude of Lou Anthony did not sufficiently demonstrate through acts that
confirmed Jefferson’s fear for a real peril.
2. Yes, there was treachery.
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist
or escape. Otherwise stated, an unexpected and sudden attack which renders the victim unable and
unprepared to put up a defense is the essence of treachery.
Any animosity between the two groups had waned following Claudinick’s offer of apology,
which was readily accepted by the group of Jefferson. No further exchange transpired between the
two groups until Jefferson’s group approached Lou Anthony’s group, on the pretext that the former
was already leaving the bar. Given the circumstances, the sudden attack of Jefferson upon Lou
Anthony by hitting him hard with a gun was clearly without warning and unexpected on the part of
the victim, who was then merely seated with his companions.
The strike upon Lou Anthony caused him to fall, and even before he could stand up to face his
assailant, Jefferson shot him in the forehead. Clearly, Lou Anthony had no chance to hold a defense
against Jefferson. Considering the circumstances, he could not have anticipated the fatal attack.
Page 252 of 519

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALEX DE LOS SANTOS

G.R. No. 207818, July 23, 2014, J. Bienvenido L. Reyes
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
that can validly be invoked. "There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in
actual or imminent danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be
actual physical force or actual use of a weapon." "It is present only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to one’s life."
It has been repeatedly ruled that the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by
the victim disprove a plea of self-defense.
The essence of treachery lies in the attack that comes without warning, and the attack is swift,
deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape, thereby ensuring its accomplishment without the risk to the aggressor, without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made
it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
Facts:
While having a drinking spree, Catriz asked the Alex De Los Santos if he can till the family lot
in Cagayan. When the De Los Santos answered that he cannot decide on the matter since the land is
family-owned, Catriz suddenly stood up and slapped the Alex’s face. The latter did not take offense
and simply left, while Catriz summoned his wife and children, and headed home. Catriz, however,
returned between 9:00 to 10:00 p.m. looking for Alex but didn’t find him.
After the incident, Alex saw Catriz unloading chickens. He approached him and offered help,
but Catriz pushed him away causing Alex to stumble down. Catriz then tried to hack Alex with a bolo
but the latter was able to dodge the attacks. On Catriz’s third attempt, Alex got hold of a knife from
the wall of a nearby house and defended himself by plunging the same on Catriz. When Catriz again
attempted to hack him, the latter shoved the knife against him once more. Alex failed to recall how
many times he stabbed Catriz because he got dizzy and lost touch with his senses.
Dazed with what he has just witnessed, Aginawang ran to the back of a house towards a creek.
Alex, on the other hand, proceeded towards the road where he met one Abe Ballesil who accompanied
him, upon his request, to the police station to surrender.
RTC convicted Alex for crime of murder which was affirmed by CA. Allegation of self-defense
was rejected because: (1) he failed to claim it at the earliest opportunity when he surrendered to the
police station; (2) the number and seriousness of the wounds he inflicted on Catriz showed a
determined effort on his part to kill the victim; and (3) he failed to surrender the weapon to the police
and he instead threw it away.
Issue:
Whether or not Alex De Los Santos is liable for crime of murder?
Page 253 of 519

Ruling:
Yes, Alex De Los Santos is liable for crime of murder.
Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent. However, if the accused
admits killing the victim, but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove
such defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal
aggression on his part. Self-defense, when invoked, as a justifying circumstance implies the
admission by the accused that he committed the criminal act. Thus, to escape criminal liability, the
accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following requisites
under the second paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), viz: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, that can validly be invoked. "There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
when he puts in actual or imminent danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense.
There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon." "It is present only when the one
attacked faces real and immediate threat to one’s life."
Here, the De Los Santos failed to prove that unlawful aggression was initiated by Catriz. The
physical evidence of Catriz’s incised wound on the left scapula belies the version of events adduced
by the defense and is more consistent with the narration of the prosecution’s eyewitness Bayudan –
that the initial blow came from the accused-appellant who suddenly emerged behind Catriz and
hacked him. The testimony of expert witness Dr. Yuaga further confirmed that such incised wound
could have been inflicted from behind.
De Los Santos’s claim that Catriz boxed him first and then tried to hack him with a bolois
grounded on contradictory, hence, unreliable testimonies. According to defense witness Aginawang,
he saw Catriz push and then box the De Los Santos. It is noticeable, however, from De Los Santos’s
own narration that the detail relating to the punching is absent. Also, Aginawang admitted oncross-
examination that it was the accused-appellant who delivered the first aggression by stabbing Catriz.
Further, the Court agrees with the CA’s observation that the presence of a knife in the wall of
the nearby house was highly dubious. The immediate availability of a knife within De Los Santos’s
convenient reach in a public place at the exact moment that he was allegedly being hacked by Catriz
is too inconceivable to warrant trustworthiness. The sequence of the narration of eyewitness
Bayudan is more rational and thus in accord with the spontaneity of a truthful account that – all the
while, the accused-appellant had the knife in his possession and he used it to continue stabbing Catriz
when the first weapon he used dislodged from its handle.
Further, the location, the number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on Catriz indicate a
determined effort to kill and not merely to defend. It has been repeatedly ruled that the nature,
number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim disprove a plea of self-defense.
Page 254 of 519

Further, the killing of Catriz by De Los Santos was attended with treachery. "There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to ensure the execution of the
crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. To
establish treachery, two elements must concur: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not
in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means
of attack employed."
"The essence of treachery lies in the attack that comes without warning, and the attack is
swift, deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape, thereby ensuring its accomplishment without the risk to the aggressor,
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. What is decisive is that the execution of
the attack madeit impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate."
It is evident in this case that, as testified by eyewitness Bayudan, De Los Santos attacked
Catriz when the latter was defenseless and unable to retaliate. He commenced his attack from behind
Catriz and when the latter eventually fell down to his knees begging for his life, De Los Santos
continued stabbing him. Clearly, he took advantage of the vulnerable position of Catriz to ensure the
successful execution of the offense without risk, and deny the victim the opportunity to defend
himself.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ROLANDO LAS PIÑAS, JIMMY DELIZO AND MERWIN LAS
PIÑAS
G.R. No. 191723, July 23, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Casto
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: (1)
that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any
of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the
killing is not parricide or infanticide. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim
no chance to resist or escape.
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito
were shot and killed; (2) the accused appellants were three of the eight perpetrators who killed them;
(3) Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito’s killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as
testified to by prosecution eyewitness, Roger; and (4) the killing of Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito were
neither parricide nor infanticide.
In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It does not need to be proven by direct evidence and
may be inferred from the conduct – before, during, and after the commission of the crime – indicative of
a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments as in conspiracy.
In this case, all the accused/accused-appellants were convincingly shown to have acted in
concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting
in concert was manifest not only from their going together to the fishpen located offshore on board the
same boat, but also from their joint attack commenced simultaneously, firing successive shots at the
Page 255 of 519
four victims and immediately followed by clambering up the platform and resuming their shooting of
Roger, Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito.
Facts:
Roger and his brothers, Edgardo and Benjamin, and their cousin, Carlito Lasala, were at
Edgardo’s fishpen. The fishpen was supported by four wooden posts arranged in a square. On top of
the posts was a 9 to 10-meter bamboo platform about four to five meters above the sea. While on the
platform, they lighted three pressure lamps in the middle of the fishpen to attract the fish. After
checking the fishnet and eating supper, they took turns in resting and watching.
While Roger was on guard duty and the rest were sleeping, the Rolando Las Pinas et al.
arrived on board a "sibid-sibid," a long wooden boat mobilized by paddles. The accused then climbed
up the platform and opened fire at the Aringo brothers and Carlito.
Specifically, Roger narrated that he saw accused Armando and Rolando shoot Edgardo and
Benjamin, while he witnessed Jimmy, Merwin and Freddie shoot Carlito. He likewise witnessed
Armando slash the throat of Edgardo after the latter was incapacitated, and throw his (Edgardo) body
into the sea. As for himself, Roger testified that his assailants were accused Renato, Salvador and
Gilberto; and tha the sustained gunshot wounds on his right cheek, left chest, and left buttock. The
carnage finally ended when the accused thought that the three Aringo brothers and Carlito were all
dead; and then they boarded their boat and left. Roger recognized all the accused because they used
to be neighbors at Sorsogon.
Of the four, only Roger remained alive by daybreak and was eventually rescued by a passing
fisherman. He was brought to the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital for treatment. Initially, only the
bodies of Benjamin and Carlito were recovered from the platform. But four days later, Edgardo’s body
was found floating in the water. Three informations were filed against Rolando Las Pinas et al with
the crime of Murder which circumstance was attended by treachery. On the other hand, Rolando Las
Pinas et al. denied such allegation by using the defense of alibi.
RTC convicted Rolando Las Pinas, et al. of the crime of Murder which was affirmed by CA.
Issue:
1) Whether or not Rolando Las Pinas et al. can be held liable for the crime of murder.
2) Whether or not there was Conspiracy.
3) Whether or not defense of denial and alibi can be admitted.
Ruling:
1) Yes, they can be held liable for the crime of murder.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides that
Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
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employing means toweaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established:
(1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended
by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4)
that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Edgardo, Benjamin and
Carlitowere shot and killed; (2) the accused appellants were three of the eight perpetrators who
killed them; (3) Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito’s killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance
of treachery as testified to by prosecution eyewitness, Roger; and (4) the killing of Edgardo, Benjamin
and Carlito were neither parricide nor infanticide.
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery as the direct
employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and
without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated,
two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or
forms of attack employed by him. These elements are extant in the facts of this case and as testified
to by Roger above-quoted.
To emphasize, the victims, Roger, Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, were caught off guard when
the accused, including the accused-appellants, in the dead of night, arrived at the fishpen and climbed
the same, and without warning, opened fire at the sleeping/resting victims to disable them. Upon
disabling the victims, the accused and the accused-appellants continued shooting at the victims –
accused Armando and accused-appellant Rolando shot Edgardo and Carlito; accused-appellants
Jimmy and Merwin and accused Freddie shot Benjamin; and accused Renato, Salvador and Gilberto
shot Roger. Accused Armando even slashed Edgardo’s throat after shooting him and threw his body
out to the sea – the stealth, swiftness and methodical manner by which the attack was carried out
gave the four victims no chance at all to evade the bullets and defend themselves from the unexpected
onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that the collective acts of the accused and the accused-appellants
reek of treachery.
2) Yes, there was Conspiracy.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code states that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." It does not
need to be proven by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct – before, during, and
after the commission of the crime – indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence
of sentiments as in conspiracy. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
That there was conspiracy among the accused and accused-appellants is a matter not in issue.
Both trial courts and the Court of Appeals deduced the conspiracy among the accused/accused-
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appellants from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. This Court is satisfied
that their deduction was warranted. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be
direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their conduct – before, during, and after
the commission of the crime – indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of
sentiments as in conspiracy. In this case, all the accused/accused-appellants were convincingly
shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims
with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only from their going together to the fishpen
located offshore on board the same boat, but also from their joint attack commenced simultaneously,
firing successive shots at the four victims and immediately followed by clambering up the platform
and resuming their shooting of Roger, Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito. It was also significant that they
fled together on board the boat that they arrived in as soon as they had achieved their common
purpose. Their conduct – before, during, and after the commission of the crime – indicated a joint
purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. Hence, conspiracy attended the
commission of the crimes.
3) No, twin defenses of denial and alibi must fail in light of the positive identification made
by one of their victims, Roger.
Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the
prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused as in this case. It is
also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. The accused-appellants’
alibis that they were at different places at the time of the shooting, and that family members and or
their friends vouched for their whereabouts are negative and self-serving assertions and cannot not
be given more evidentiary value vis-àvis the affirmative testimony of a credible witness. The accused-
appellants and Roger, at one point, resided in the same barangay and, are, therefore, familiar with
one another. Therefore, Roger could not have been mistaken on the accused-appellants’ identity,
including the five other accused who remained at large.
Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the
following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and
(ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission.
Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and
the location of the accused when the crime was committed. The accused must demonstrate that he
was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate
vicinity when the crime was committed. Here, the accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfy the
above-quoted requirements. As held by the Court of Appeals, "[j]udicial notice was taken of the fact
that Barangay Bitan-o in Sorsogon City where the accused claimed they were at the time of the
shooting and the area of the sea adjacent to the municipality of Castilla where the incident took place
are neighboring sites that can be negotiated with the use of a banca in one hour or less." Certainly,
the distance was not too far as to preclude the presence of accused-appellants at the fishpen, and/or
for them to slip away from where they were supposed to be, unnoticed.
Finally, the defense failed to show any ill motive on the part of the prosecution’s witnesses to
discredit their testimonies. Absent any reason or motive for a prosecution witness to perjure himself,
the logical conclusion is that no such motive exists, and his testimony is, thus, worthy of full faith and
credit.
Page 258 of 519

LEOPOLDO QUINTOS y DELAMOR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 205298, September 10, 2014, Acting C.J. Carpio
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence
that: (a) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to an actual or imminent threat to the
life and limb of the accused claiming self-defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity in the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) there was lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the accused claiming self-defense or at least any provocation executed by the accused
claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim’s aggression.
To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even
take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution
of the conspiracy.
In this case, the Court is not persuaded in the allegations of the petitioner Leopoldo that his
conviction was not supported by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His argument revolves mainly
on self-defense, defense of relatives and absence of conspiracy. The records of this case show that the
prosecution witnesses Eduardo Oyando, Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz positively and
consistently identified the accused and relayed the sequence of events.
Facts:
There are two versions of facts disputed in this case:
The prosecution established that on January 15, 2008, Freddie, Robert, Felomina (all
surnamed DELA CRUZ) and Eduardo Oyando were walking along the barangay road of Laois,
Labrador, Pangasinan. They were on their way to the town proper when they were accosted by
Leopoldo (Petitioner), Pedro, Rolly, Lando (all surnamed QUINTOS), Narciso Buni. Pedro was
wielding a samurai, Lando, Narciso and Leopoldo were carrying bolos, and Rolly was holding a big
stone. Freddie, Robert, Felomina and Eduardo ran back towards their house, but the five attackers
caught up with them.
Pedro struck Robert with the samurai, but the latter parried the attack with his left hand.
Robert attempted to gain control of the samurai, but Rolly hit him in the face, near the jaw, with the
stone Rolly was carrying. Robert lost his hold of the samurai and fell to the ground.
Lando struck Freddie at the back of his head, which caused the latter to fall face up. Leopoldo
joined Lando in hacking Freddie, who, while defending himself with his hands, sustained injuries on
his right hand and lost a few fingers on his left. Rolly then crushed Freddie’s chest with the same
stone he used to hit Robert in the face.
Pedro advanced towards Felomina as the latter moved towards Robert. Pedro pulled
Felomina’s hair, slashed her nape with the samurai, and then kicked her to the ground. Eduardo was
forced to stand aside and was prevented from helping the dela Cruzes because Narciso was aiming a
bolo at him. The attackers left when they were done, and only then was Eduardo able to approach
the victims and call for help. Robert, Freddie and Felomina, were brought to the hospital. They were
treated for the injuries sustained from the attack.
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After a few days, Freddie died from his injuries. Before he died, he identified Pedro and Lando
Quintos as his attackers.
The defense presented a different version of the events. They alleged that on January 15,
2008, Robert, Freddie, Felomina and Eduardo Oyando came to the Quintos’ house looking for trouble.
Pedro, who was in the front portion of the house, went out to try and pacify them. Robert punched
Pedro first, hitting him in the face. Robert then went to Felomina and took a bolo wrapped in a towel
that the latter was holding. Pedro and Robert grappled for the bolo. Felomina approached the two
and tried to help Robert, and in the process got slashed with the bolo. The scuffle resulted in Robert
falling to the ground and Pedro gaining control of the bolo.
Pedro then noticed that Freddie, who was holding a bolo, was fighting with Lando. Pedro
hurried over and hacked Freddie to defend his brother Lando. According to Pedro, his senses dimmed
and he did not remember how many times he hacked Freddie. His brothers pacified him, and Pedro
went with them back to the house; while Robert, Freddie and Felomina, were brought to the hospital.
RTC gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution. Petitioner was found guilty
for the crime of homicide for the death of Freddie dela Cruz. However, the trial court held that the
uncertainty on the nature of the wounds of Robert and Felomina dela Cruz warrants the appreciation
of a lesser gravity of the crime from frustrated homicide to attempted homicide.
Petitioner and Pedro Quintos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the
trial court gravely erred in convicting them despite the prosecution’s failure to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. CA found the appeal bereft of merit and dismissed it.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the conviction, despite the prosecution’s failure to prove
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that conspiracy exists, in particular, that a finding of
conspiracy should not be left to conjecture, in light of the alleged failure of the prosecution to
present evidence that petitioner took part in inflicting injuries on the victims in furtherance of a
common design to kill.
Ruling:
The petition is unmeritorious.
1. No. The Court is not persuaded in the allegations of the petitioner Leopoldo that his
conviction was not supported by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His argument revolves
mainly on self-defense, defense of relatives and absence of conspiracy. The records of this case
show that the prosecution witnesses Eduardo Oyando, Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz
positively and consistently identified the accused and relayed the sequence of events. Their
testimonies are corroborated by the evidence presented by the doctors who attended the hacking
victims, as well as by the police officer who took the statement of Freddie before the latter died.
The trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible. The assessment of the trial court on
this point is generally binding on this Court, and none of the exceptions to this rule are obtaining
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here. Pedro Quintos admitted to hacking Robert and Freddie dela Cruz, and hitting Felomina dela
Cruz, invoking self-defense. Because of Pedro’s admissions, he and his co-conspirators assumed
the burden to establish such defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, the
same admissions would lead to their conviction.
Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by independent

and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the accused must
discharge the burden of proof by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness
of the State’s evidence, because the existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence
of the crime, and establishing self defense does not require or involve the negation of any of the
elements of the offense itself.
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing
evidence that: (a) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to an actual or imminent
threat to the life and limb of the accused claiming self-defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity
in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) there was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense or at least any provocation
executed by the accused claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the
victim’s aggression.
Both petitioner and Pedro also testified that Pedro hacked Freddie in defense of their brother
Lando. For the accused to be entitled to exoneration based on defense of relatives, complete or
incomplete, it is essential that there be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, for if there
is no unlawful aggression, there would be nothing to prevent or repel.
Mere shouting, and intimidating or threatening attitude of the victim does not constitute
unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or
materialized or at the very least is clearly imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or merely a
threatening stance or posture.
2. No. Indeed, mere presence does not signify conspiracy. However, neither does it indicate the
lack thereof Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused
themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community
of interest. In fact, the prosecution established that petitioner was actively involved in the attack
on Freddie dela Cruz.
To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not
even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others
in the execution of the conspiracy.
Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated
to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal
objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise
extent or morality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators
are principals. The acts of petitioner before, during and after the attacks on Robert and Felomina
dela Cruz disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and design in the commission of the
felony.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and EDGAR PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014, C.J. Carpio
Appellants were charged in conspiracy with others for murder of two jail guards and for
carnapping. They alleged however, that the prosecution has failed to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and that they denied such allegation. There is treachery when the following essential
elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself;
and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method or form of
attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor
on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring
its commission withour risk of himself. In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not
afforded any chance of defending themselves. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy can be inferred
from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest. Once conspiracy is shown the act of one is the act
of all the conspirators. Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things. The elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the
vehicle; (2) the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person
other than the offender himself; and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. All
the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that they boarded the
Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, Benjamin Bauzon, testified that he did not
consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants.
Facts:
Appellants Charlie Fieldad (Fieldad), Ryan Comista (Comista) and Edgar Pimentel (Pimentel)
were charged in conspiracy with others for the murder of two jail guards and for camapping. The
prosecution established that at around 7:00 a.m. on 9 March 1999, JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa (JO2
Gamboa), JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr. (JO1 Bacolor) and JO2 Marlon Niturada (JO2 Niturada) were inside the
nipa hut searching area near the main gate of the district jail. JO2 Gamboa summoned inmate Dionisio
Badua (Badua). JO2 Gamboa gave Badua the keys to the prison cells and instructed the latter to open
all the cells for the routine headcount. Julius Chan (Chan) went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa
regarding the time of his hearing scheduled for that day. While JO2 Gamboa and Chan were
conversing, the telephone in the administration building rang. JO2 Niturada ran from the nipa hut to
the administration building to answer the phone. After the phone call, JO2 Niturada proceeded
towards the basketball court. On his way there, he turned his head towards the nipa hut and saw
Chan place an arm on the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa, who was seated, and shoot the latter with a short
firearm. JO2 Gamboa fell. Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the
possession of an armalite. Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of the head, which caused the latter
to fall down. Fieldad, armed with JO2 Gamboa’s gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal (Leal) took
the armalite from JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada returned fire with his .38 caliber
handgun. Cornista opened the main gate with keys taken from JO2 Gamboa. Twelve inmates went out
the main gate. After seeing the inmates run out, Badua padlocked the main gate and returned to his
cell. Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel boarded a parked Tamaraw
jeep with plate number CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin Bauzon, without the latter’s knowledge and
Page 262 of 519

consent. They picked up Federico Delim (Delim) and Chan along the way. Before they reached
Asingan, Pangasinan, the group alighted from the Tamaraw jeep and transferred to a Mazda pick-up
truck. When they reached San Miguel, Tarlac, the Mazda pick-up truck turned turtle. The group
abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane field. Police authorities surrounded the cane field and
arrested appellants and their companions. Appellants denied any criminal liability.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
carnapping
Ruling:
Yes, they are guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Nature of killing
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and speciallyto
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
take.
In People v. Escote, Jr., where an armed off-duty police officer was killed, the Court held:
There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. The essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission withour
risk of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his
life where he was defenseless and unable to flee atthe time of the infliction of the coup de grace. In
the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear,one on the
shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above
the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr.
and then shot him even as hepleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He
was shot at close range, thus insuring his death.
In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not afforded any chance of
defending themselves. Without warning, Fieldad and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail
officers. Chan held the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-up
with Cornista to divest JO1 Bacolor of his armalite, and to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2
Gamboa’s gun and shot JO1 Bacolor.
Conspiracy in the Killings
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by
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the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest. Once conspiracy is shown the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators.
Contrary to his contentions, the acts of Fieldad before, during and after the attacks on JOs
Bacolor, Jr. and Gamboa disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and design in the commission
of the felonies. The positive testimony of Badua is corroborated by a web of circumstantial evidence
that points to no other conclusion than that Fieldad was complicit in the conspiracy to murder the
jail guards.
Elements of Carnapping
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
The elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the
offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than
the offender himself; and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that they
boarded the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, BenjaminBauzon, testified
that he did not consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants. Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis
an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as
the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary
benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived orexpected from the
act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent
constitutes gain.
ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 178512, November 26, 2014, J. Bersamin
Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Without proof of such
intent, the felony may only be serious physical injuries. Intent to kill may be established through the
overt and external acts and conduct of the offender before, during and after the assault, or by the nature,
location and number of the wounds inflicted on the victim.
Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. Supreme Court
concurs with them. Contrary to the Alfredo’s submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were not
mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. Alfredo wielded
and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander
sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his
face. There is also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into his
death were it not for the timely medical intervention.
Page 264 of 519

Facts:
Alexander Flojo (Alexander) was fetching water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay Street,
Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman (Alfredo), the brother of his land
lady, Lucila Bautista (Lucila), hit him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo did
to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, “Pasensya ka na Mang Alex” and told the latter to
just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours. Then, at around
12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a
container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and chest.
Cirilino Bantaya, son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion of his
body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino
immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle and brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical
Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately rendered medical assistance to
Alexander. Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then,
he was brought to the second floor of the said hospital where he was confined for two days.
Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the Polymedic General Hospital where he was subjected for
further medical examination.
Alexander sustained two stabbed wounds. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the physician
who treated the victim, the second wound was fatal and could have caused Alexander’s death without
timely medical intervention.
Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on December 25, 1997 at around
midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally
hit Alexander’s back, causing the latter to throw invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a
fistfight ensued between them. They even rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek
causing blood to ooze from the latter’s face.
The RTC convicted the Alfredo of the crime of Frustrated Homicide. CA affirmed the Alfredo’s
conviction. CA denied the Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Alfredo is properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated
homicide.
Ruling:
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying
circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.
Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts found none of the qualifying circumstances in murder
under Article 248 to be present, the Court immediately proceed to ascertain the presence of the two
other elements.
Page 265 of 519

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill
the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a
specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove by either direct or
circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only
through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault
and immediately thereafter.
Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. Supreme
Court concurs with them. Contrary to the Alfredo’s submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander
were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them.
Alfredo wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed,
that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on
the left side of his face. There is also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest being
sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.
The Court has no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings of the trial and
appellate courts on the credibility of Alexander’s testimony. It is not disputed that the testimony of a
single but credible and trustworthy witness sufficed to support the conviction of Alfredo. This
guideline finds more compelling application when the lone witness is the victim himself whose direct
and positive identification of his assailant is almost always regarded with indubitable credibility,
owing to the natural tendency of the victim to seek justice for himself, and thus strive to remember
the face of his assailant and to recall the manner in which the latter committed the crime.
Moreover, it is significant that the Alfredo’s mere denial of the deadly manner of his attack
was contradicted by the credible physical evidence corroborating Alexander’s statements. Under the
circumstances, The Court can only affirm the Alfredo’s conviction for frustrated homicide.
ROGELIO J. GONZAGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 195671, January 21, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be
shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages
complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere
negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is
required. Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless
driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another,
either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would
disclose the danger to any reasonable person.
Facts:
Around 6 o'clock in the morning of June 25, 1997, Dionesio Inguito, Sr. (Dionesio, Sr.) was
driving his motorcycle along Brgy. Kiara, Bukidnon towards Brgy. Bocboc of the same municipality,
to bring his two (2) minor children, Dionesio Inguito, Jr. (Dionesio, Jr.) and Cherry Inguito6 (Cherry),
to school. While they were ascending the curving road going to Bocboc on their proper lane on the
right side of the road, a Toyota Land Cruiser (Land Cruiser) driven by Rogelio was swiftly descending
the same lane from the opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his motorcycle to signal the
Page 266 of 519
Land Cruiser to return to its proper lane but the Land Cruiser remained. In order to avoid collision,
Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve to the left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same
direction and collided head-on with the motorcycle.
As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his 2 children were thrown off the motorcycle.
Dionesio, Sr. was pinned beneath the Land Cruiser, while Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over
the hood of the Land Cruiser and fell on the side of the road, causing injuries to their legs. Siblings
Rolf, Cherry, and Jenny Ann Aquino, who were traversing the same road aboard their own
motorcycle, stopped to help and placed the victims together on the rightmost side of the road facing
Brgy. Bocboc, while Rogelio remained inside the Land Cruiser.
Rolf left the scene of the incident to seek further assistance, leaving his two (2) sisters to cater
to the victims. Eventually, he chanced upon Kagawad Nerio Dadivas (Kgd. Dadivas), who had just
opened his store, and informed the latter of the vehicular accident. After reporting the incident to the
police and getting his vehicle, Kgd. Dadivas proceeded to the site and loaded the victims to his vehicle
with Rolf’s assistance. Meanwhile, Rolf went to Brgy. Kawilihan to inform Dionesio, Sr.’s wife,
Clemencia Inguito (Clemencia), of what had transpired.
Thereafter, the victims were brought to the Emergency Hospital of Maramag where they were
treated. Operations were performed on the legs of Dionesio, Jr. and Dionesio, Sr., but the latter
eventually expired. Cherry’s leg was placed in a cast and she was confined in the hospital, together
with Dionesio, Jr., for more than one (1) month, or until July 26, 1997. All the expenses were
shouldered by Clemencia.
In view of the foregoing mishap, the provincial prosecutor filed an Information charging
Rogelio for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property “with the aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot to the
injured party such help that was in his hands to give” before the RTC. The RTC found Rogelio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double
Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property punishable under Article 365 in relation to Article
263 of the RPC.
Rogelio filed a motion for reconsideration35 which was partly granted in a Resolution dated
February 22, 2007, reducing the penalty to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, with the same
civil liabilities. Aggrieved, Rogelio appealed to the CA.
The CA reinstated the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision, thereby imposing on Rogelio the original
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum, and the same
civil liabilities, hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Rogelio’s conviction in accordance with the RTC’s
July 31, 2006 Decision
Page 267 of 519

Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the RPC, consists
in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be
shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more
than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the
consequences is required. Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the
meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action
which injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with
knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the
inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which
supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the
operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be
considered likewise at fault.
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelio’s act of driving very fast
on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death of
Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the road where the
incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound
and descending towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of
speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior. As a motorist, Rogelio was
bound to exercise ordinary care in such affair by driving at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate
with the conditions encountered, as this would enable him to keep the vehicle under control and
avoid injury to others using the highway. Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that a driver
slows down before negotiating a curve as it may be reasonably anticipated that another vehicle may
appear from the opposite direction at any moment. Hence, excessive speed, combined with other
circumstances such as the occurrence of the accident on or near a curve, as in this case, constitutes
negligence. Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at
a fast speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the incident happened,
thereby rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly accountable for the material damages
resulting therefrom.
Nonetheless, while the CA and the RTC concurred that the proximate cause of the collision
was Rogelio’s reckless driving, the CA Decision made no mention as to the presence or absence of the
limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty next
higher in degree upon the offender who “fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as
may be in his hands to give.” Based on case law, the obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent
on the means in the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance that he/she, at the
time and place of the incident, is capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate proof.
Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide
with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to Article
Page 268 of 519
263 of the RPC, a complex crime. Article 48 of the RPC provides that when a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime, in this case, Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide, shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Under Article 365 of the RPC, when reckless imprudence in the use of a motor vehicle results
in the death of a person, as in this case, the accused shall be punished with the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods,i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of said penalty should be
taken from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or
four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Consequently, the Court finds
a need to modify the penalty to be imposed on Rogelio and thus, sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to six
years of prision correccional in its maximum, as maximum.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO DILLA y PAULAR

G.R. No. 200333, January 21, 2015, J. DEL CASTILLO
The records show that there was direct proof identifying the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime, thus, belying the claim of the accused. Furthermore, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
established without a shadow of doubt that it was accused who mercilessly killed his brother.
Facts:
Domingo Dilla y Paular (Domingo) was charged with the crime of murder for the death of his
brother, Pepito Dilla y Paular (Pepito). Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution, it was
shown that at around 5:30 in the afternoon of July 22, 2003, at Sitio Ilaud, Himaao, Pili, Camarines
Sur, Pepito was working on his farm when Domingo suddenly appeared and shot Pepito with a gun
hitting him on his left thigh. The victim managed to run but was overtaken by Domingo who then
stabbed him with a bolo. The son of the victim, Pepito Jr., and Mary Jane Renegado (Renegado),
witnessed the incident.
On the other hand, Domingo claimed that it was Pepito who was the aggressor. He narrated
that Pepito went to Domingo’s house and challenged him to a fight. Dismissing the challenge,
Domingo went out of his house and proceeded to his farm to get his carabao but the victim pursued
him. They grappled for possession of the gun and bolo. In the ensuing struggle, he struck the victim
with a wrench. He denied having fired the gun. He pointed to somebody allegedly wearing a hat who
could have shot and stabbed Pepito.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, found Domingo guilty of murder,
finding Domingo’s tale incredible and self-serving especially in view of his positive identification by
the prosecution witnesses. On appeal to the CA, affirmed the ruling of the RTC with modification as
to damages and indemnity. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether Domingo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
Page 269 of 519

Ruling:
Yes, he is.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds the appeal to be lacking in
merit. The records belie appellant’s contention that there was no direct proof identifying him as the
perpetrator of the crime. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Pepito, Jr. and Renegado
established without a shadow of doubt that it was appellant who mercilessly killed his brother,
Pepito. Pepito, Jr.’s testimony was corroborated in all material points by the testimony of Renegado.
In fine, both the RTC and the CA correctly found Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and properly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Moreover, appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. The awards of civil
indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 are
proper. In addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00.
Anent the award of actual damages in the amount of P35,448.00, the find that only the amount
of P15,000.00 was duly receipted.9 The amount of P20,448.0010 which supposedly pertained to
expenses incurred during the wake was not supported by receipts but consisted only of handwritten
entries. As we held in People v. Villanueva, “when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than P25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate damages of P25,000.00 is
justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount.” Accordingly, the Court grants temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in lieu of actual damages. In addition, all damages awarded
shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TOMAS DIMACUHA, JR., et al.

G.R. No. 191060, February 2, 2015, J. Mariano C. Del Castillo
The fatal shooting of Agon was attended by treachery, a qualifying circumstance listed under
Article 248 and notably, alleged in the Information. For treachery to be properly appreciated, two
conditions must be present: (1) at the time of the assault, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack
employed by him. These conditions were present in the killing of Agon. The assault upon Agon was
deliberate, swift and sudden, denying him the opportunity to protect or defendhimself. He was unarmed
and unaware of the plot of appellants to kill him. Moreover, the means, method or manner of execution
of the attack was deliberately and consciously adopted by appellants, the same being in accordance with
their group’s plan to liquidate Agon.
There is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly
or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it." Here, the evidence is sufficient to
prove that appellants conspired to murder Agon. In this case, upon their arrival thereat, the members
of the group which included appellants positioned themselves according to their plan and waited for
Agon to leave. Later on, Caballero signaled Vitan and the other alleged gunman, accused Theo (Theo),
that the target had left the arena and that his vehicle was already approaching their position. When
Page 270 of 519

Agon’s vehicle came, Vitan and Theo fired at him. Vitan, Caballero, Alvarez, who acted as one of the
back-ups, and the rest of the group then fled the scene of the crime.
Facts:
Appellants Edgar Allen Alvarez (Alvarez) and Rodel Caballero (Caballero), together with the
accused who remain at-large, were charged with the crime of murder for the fatal shooting of Nicanor
Morfe Agon (Agon).
RTC found them guilty of the crime of murder. Aggrieved, appellants appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirming decision of RTC. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
1. Whether or not appellants were guilty for crime of murder.

2. Whether or not there was conspiracy.
Ruling:
1. Yes, appellants are guilty for crime of murder.
The elements of the crime of murder are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him
or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. These
requisites have been established by the prosecution.
The gunman himself who testified for the prosecution testified that his group "Black Shark"
killed Agon. One of the responding policemen PO2 Arnold Abdon, for his part, testified that he went
to the hospital where Agon was taken and the latter was already dead when he arrived. Further, the
Medico-Legal Officer testified on the post-mortem examination he conducted upon Agon which
showed that the latter sustained six gunshot wounds, two of which were fatal. The element therefore
that a person was killed is obtaining in this case.
The fatal shooting of Agon was attended by treachery, a qualifying circumstance listed under
Article 248 and notably, alleged in the Information. For treachery to be properly appreciated, two
conditions must be present: (1) at the time of the assault, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack
employed by him. These conditions were present in the killing of Agon. The assault upon Agon was
deliberate, swift and sudden, denying him the opportunity to protect or defendhimself. He was
unarmed and unaware of the plot of appellants to kill him. Moreover, the means, method or manner
of execution of the attack was deliberately and consciously adopted by appellants, the same being in
accordance with their group’s plan to liquidate Agon.
Finally, the killing of Agon was neither parricide nor infanticide. All the elements of the crime
of murder being present in this case.
It must be noted as well that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is also sufficient to
establish the presence of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, which has the
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following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time
between determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his
act. Vitan testified that the plan to kill Agon was conceived a day before the victim was fatally shot.
Appellants and their cohorts therefore, had adequate time to reflect on the consequences of their
contemplated crime prior to its execution. The period of time when appellants planned tokill Agon
and the time when they implemented such plan afforded them the opportunity for meditation and
reflection on the consequences of the murder they committed.
2. Yes, there was conspiracy.
The lower courts’ finding of conspiracy must also be sustained. There is conspiracy "when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony
and forthwith decide to pursue it." Here, the evidence is sufficient to prove that appellants conspired
to murder Agon. In this case, upon their arrival thereat, the members of the group which included
appellants positioned themselves according to their plan and waited for Agon to leave. Later on,
Caballero signaled Vitan and the other alleged gunman, accused Theo (Theo), that the target had left
the arena and that his vehicle was already approaching their position. When Agon’s vehicle came,
Vitan and Theo fired at him. Vitan, Caballero, Alvarez, who acted as one of the back-ups, and the rest
of the group then fled the scene of the crime.
Clearly, there was unity of action and purpose among the members of "Black Shark," which
include appellants in killing Agon. Conspiracy having been established, evidence as to who delivered
the fatal blow is no longer indispensable. Hence, it is immaterial if Caballero’s role was merely to
signal the gunmen and Alvarez’s, to act as back-up. Each of the offender is equally guilty of the
criminal act since in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OSCAR SEVILLANO y RETANAL

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting the accused of
the crime of murder for stabbing his victim seven times in the body. The accused contends that the act
was merely for self-dense. The Supreme Court ruled that it is not persuaded by the appellant’s defense
of denial as this cannot prevail over the eyewitnesses’ positive identification of him as the perpetrator
of the crime. Denial, like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
Facts:
The accused Retanal was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court for allegedly
stabbing his victim (the name of the victim is not indicated in the case). It was alleged that the victim
and his friends were seated at a vacant lot when the accused who is drunk came towards the victim
and his friends and repeated stabbed the victim. The victim was rushed to the hospital and thereafter
he died. The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused of murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the current petition. Retanal, for his part, denied the
accusations against him. He interposed self-defense to absolve himself from criminal liability.
Page 272 of 519

Issue:
Whether or not the accused Retanal is guilty of murder.
Ruling:
The accused Retanal is guilty of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
Well entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial judge is in the best position to assess the
credibility of the witnesses, and has the unique opportunity to observe the witness first hand and
note his demeanor, conduct and attitude under gruelling examination. Absent any showing that the
trial court’s calibration of credibility was flawed, the appellate court is bound by its assessment.
In the prosecution of the crime of murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the following elements must be established by the prosecution: (1) that a person was killed;
(2) that the accused killed that person; (3) that the killing was attended by treachery; and (4) that
the killing is not infanticide or parricide.
After a careful evaluation of the records, the Court finds that these elements were clearly met.
The prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person who stabbed Pablo
several times on the chest which eventually caused the latter’s death. They testified that they even
tried to stop appellant’s attack but unfortunately, were unsuccessful. The court finds no reason to
disbelieve the testimonies of these witnesses considering that their narration of facts were
straightforward and replete with details that coincide with the medical examination conducted on
the body of the victim. The Court is not persuaded by the appellant’s defense of denial as this cannot
prevail over the eyewitnesses’ positive identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime. Denial,
like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law.
By invoking self-defense, Retanal in effect, admits to having inflicted the stab wounds which
killed the victim. The burden was, therefore, shifted on him to prove that the killing was done in self-
defense. In Razon v. People, this Court held that where an accused admits the killing, he assumes the
burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would
follow from his admission that he killed the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated
when corroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by
itself.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELINO OLOVERIO

G.R. No. 211159, March 18, 2015, J. Leonen
There is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of
passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason. On the other hand, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind,
is treachery if such mode of attack was coolly and deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of
depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule does not apply, however, where the
attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation
Page 273 of 519
on the part of the accused because of the provocative act of the victim. The attack, while sudden, cannot
be said to have been unexpected or unprovoked. Accused-appellant alleged that before the attack,
Gulane had been insulting him and mocking him in a loud voice, "How many times did you have sexual
intercourse with your mother?" This utterance, along with testimonies of Gulane's previous insults,
would have been sufficient provocation for accused-appellant to stab him.
Facts: According to the prosecution, Rudipico Pogay and Dominador Panday saw Rodulfo Gulane
walking about five (5) meters away from them with Oloverio trailing behind him. Oloverio allegedly
tapped Gulane's right shoulder and hacked him on the chest and extremities with a bolo until Gulane
collapsed on the ground. Oloverio then allegedly took Gulane's money from his pocket. Pogay heard
Oloverio shouting the words, "Patay na ang datu sa Brgy. San Pablo!" ("The rich man in San Pablo is
already dead!") After, Gulane died.
In his defense, Oloverio alleged that at the time and day of the incident, Gulane had been
accusing him of having an incestuous relationship with his mother. He allegedly kept his cool and told
Gulane to go home, but the latter continued to mock him by asking in a loud voice, "How many times
did you have sexual intercourse with your mother?" He allegedly asked Gulane to go home again but
the latter angrily replied, "Who are you to tell me to go home?"
Gulane allegedly attempted to draw his bolo but Oloverio stopped him by drawing his
own bolo. They grappled with it, and eventually, Oloverio ended up stabbing Gulane, which resulted
in the latter's death. Accompanied by a barangay tanod, Oloverio went to the municipal hall to
surrender to the authorities. He admitted that he stabbed Gulane because he could no longer bear
the insulting remarks against him.
Romulo Lamoste, then Barangay Captain of Barangay Belen, alleged that Gulane and Oloverio
had an altercation before the incident. He alleged that Oloverio's daughter had once confided to
Oloverio that Gulane wanted to touch her private parts. About a month later, he allegedly heard
Gulane ask Oloverio "in a joking manner about his incestuous relationship with his mother." Oloverio
allegedly got mad and they ended up fighting, but Lamoste was able to subdue them.
The RTC found Oloverio guilty of murder. It ruled that the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation was not present in this case since it could not co-exist with the presence of treachery.
The only mitigating circumstance it found present was of voluntary surrender. As murder was
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, it imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA
affirmed the conviction.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation
and of voluntary surrender;
2. Whether or not the presence of treachery has been sufficiently established;
3. Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder
Ruling:
1. Yes. To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the
accused must be able to prove the following elements:
Page 274 of 519

a. that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind;
and
b. that said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.
In People v. Lobino: It has been held that "There is passional obfuscation when the crime was
committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due
to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason."
"The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason which
naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in
the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-
control, because the cause of this condition of mind must necessarily have preceded the commission
of the offense."
Moreover, "the act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission
of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might have recovered his normal
equanimity." There is no uniform rule on what constitutes "a considerable length of time." The
provocation and the commission of the crime should not be so far apart that a reasonable length of
time has passed during which the accused would have calmed down and be able to reflect on the
consequences of his or her actions. What is important is that the accused has not yet "recovered his
normal equanimity" when he committed the crime. To appreciate passion and obfuscation as a
mitigating circumstance, the facts must be examined on a case-to-case basis.
In the case at bar, Gulane not only threatened to molest Oloverio's daughter but also accused
him in public of having incestuous relations with his mother. Gulane was said to have insulted
accused-appelant in full view of his immediate superior, the barangay captain. There was neither a
reason given why Gulane acted that way towards Oloverio nor any evidence to show that Oloverio
had previously wronged him.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals considered Oloverio's voluntary surrender to the
authorities as a mitigating circumstance. We find no reason to disturb this conclusion.
2. No. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
For treachery to be appreciated, the following elements must be proven: (a) the employment
of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate,
and (b) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.
The mere suddenness of an attack should not be the sole basis in finding treachery. There
must be evidence to show that the accused deliberately or consciously adopted the means of
execution to ensure its success. In People v. Real: As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether
frontally or from behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was coolly and deliberately adopted by
him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule does not
Page 275 of 519

apply, however, where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered
by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocative act of the victim.
The attack, while sudden, cannot be said to have been unexpected or unprovoked. Oloverio
alleged that before the attack, Gulane had been insulting him and mocking him in a loud voice, "How
many times did you have sexual intercourse with your mother?" This utterance, along with
testimonies of Gulane's previous insults, would have been sufficient provocation for accused-
appellant to stab him.
3. No. Murder is the act of killing a person under the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. The provision states:
ARTICLE 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 24626 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment
or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or
with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone,, epidemic, or any other public
calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
To be able to sustain a conviction for murder, the prosecution must prove the following elements:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Since treachery has not been proven, the crime is merely homicide. Under the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill
another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article,
shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
People of the Philippines vs. Zaldy Salahuddinand three other unidentified companions,
G.R. No. 206191, January 18, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of murder. The facts established by the evidence for
the prosecution are as follows:
Page 276 of 519

On February 10, 2004, at around 5:30pm, Atty. Sengundo Sotto, Jr., a prominent law practitioner in
Zamboanga City, together with his niece, Liezel Mae Java, left the former’s law office and went
home driving an owner type jeep. On the way towards their house at Farmer’s Drive, Sta. Maria,
Zamboanga City, they passed by Nunez St., then turned ledt going to Governor Camins St. When
the jeep was nearing Farmer’s Drive, the jeep slowed down, the, there were two gun shots. Liezel,
the one sitting at the right side of the jeep felt her shoulder get number. Thinking that they were
the ones being fired at, she bent forward and turned left towards her uncle. While bending
downwatdws, she heard a sound of a motorcyle at her right side. Then, she heard another three
gunshots from the person in the motorcycle. After that, the motorcycle left.
While Liezel’s head was touching the abdomen of her uncle, she was crying and calling out his
name. A few minutes later, rescuers arrived. They were later brought to a hospital.
Juanchito Vicente Delos Reyes, a security guard at the house of George Camins, located in Brgy.
Sta. Maria, while seated on a stoll at the inner side of the gate, noticed that in the early evening of
February 10, 2004, he saw a man driving a jeep, with a woman inside. He then heard 2 gunshots.
Imediately after that, the jeep bumped at an interlink wire at the left side of the road, going to the
entrance of Farmer’s Drive. He peeped through the jeep and saw the face of the peron in the driver’s
seat slammed on the steering wheel. He thereafter saw the motorcycle in front of the victime and
the latter was shot again. The motorcyle wnet to the right side of the jeep and the bakcrider again
shot the victim.
After trial, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime murder. The CA affirmed the conviction.
Issues: Whether or not the RTC and CA correctly convicted the appellant for the crime of Murder.
Held: Yes. Murder is defined under Artcle 248 of the RPC as the unlawful killing of a person, which
is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circustances such as treachery or evident premeditation.
The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by the aggressor without the slightest provoation on
the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring
the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. Two conditions must concur for
treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was
deliberately and consciously adopted.
In the case at bar, the RTC correctly ruled that the fatal shooting of Atty. Segundo was attended by
treachery because apellant shot the said victim suddenly and without any warning with a deadly
weapon.
People of the Philippines vs. Nestor Roxas y Castro

G.R. No. 218396, February 10, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of murder. After appellant was arraigned and pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged, trial ensued.
Page 277 of 519

The witnesses for the prosecution testified that in the evening of October 25, 1995, Severino Manalo
(victim) and Vicente were talking to each other in front of the house of Alfredo Asi (Alfredo. Then,
Vicente saw the appellant approach Severino from behind and suddenly stab the latter thrice with
a white sharp bladed weapon. The three successive stab blows landed on Severino’s back, his
stomach and on his side. Vicente testified that Severino was caught off guard when he was stabbed
by appellant as the victim was facing the former while they were talking. Immediately after Severino
was stabbed, the appellant fled from the place of the incident. For fear that he might be also
attacked, Vicente scampered away to a safer distance until he reached his place where he called for
help. Vicente, together with some people, returned to the crime scene where they found Severino
sprawled on the ground already dead.
After receiving the report on the stabbing incident, P/Insp. Magtibay and SPO4 Lopez arrived at
the crime scene and conducted an investigation. They took pictures of the crime scene and the
body of the victim. Vicente volunteered to the responding officers that he witnessed the accused-
appellant stab the victim three times with a bladed weapon. Acting on this information, the police
officers looked for the appellant at his house as well as the residence of his relatives but he was
nowhere to be found.
For his part, appellant invoked self-defense. The appellant recalled that at around 6:00 o’clock in
the evening of October 25. 1995, he was on the road in front of his house in Barangay Dela Paz
Proper, Batangas City when Severino, Vicente and Afredo arrived. Without warning, Severino
punched the appellant, hitting him on the lower eyelid portion. In reaction, the appellant uttered
the following words to Severino “Huwag pare bakit mo ako sinuntok wala naman akong ginagawang
masama sa iyo” to which the latter replied “Uubusin ko kayong mag-anak” The appellant asked
again Severino why he was behaving that way as he had done nothing wrong to him. Severino’s
answer was to pull a knife, and poke it at the appellant. This prompted the appellant to grab the
knife and while they grappled for its possession, both Severino and appellant fell and rolled on the
ground. It was only when he stood up that the appellant noticed that he sustained stab wounds on
his left hand and saw Severino lying on the ground. The appellant claimed that while all these were
happening, Vicente and Alfredo were just looking and laughing at them as if they were drunk.
Fearing retaliation from the family of Severino, appellant immediately proceeded to his sister’s
place in San Pascual, Batangas and later escaped to Bicol. The appellant went into hiding for 15 years
and was apprehended only on September 18, 2010.
The RTC convicted the appellant for the crime of murder. The conviction was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the defense of self-defense raised by appellant is tenable.
Held: No. Basic is the rule that in every criminal case, the burden of proving the guilty of the
accused falls upon the prosecution which has the duty of establishing all the essential elements of
the crime. However, in cases where the accused interposes the justifying circumstances of self-
defense, this prosecutorial burden is shifted to the accused who himself must prove all the
indispensable ingredients of such defense, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Page 278 of 519

Following a meticulous review of the records of the instant case, the Court sees no compelling
reason to deviate from this well-settled rule. Confronted with two conflicting versions, this Court
is convinced that the trial court was correct in giving great weight and respect to Vicente’s
testimony detailing who, when, where and how the crime was committed in this case. As such, the
Court agrees with the trial court’s ruling that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. This can be gleaned from Vicente’s vivid narration of the stabbing incident during the direct
examination conducted by the public prosecutor.
Rafael Nadyahan vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 193134, March 02, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with homicide. On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. Subsequently, trial ensued.
The defense manifested at pre-trial that while petitioner indeed stabbed the victim, he did so in
self-defense. For this reason, a reverse trial, upon agreement of the parties, was conducted with the
defense presenting its evidence first.
The defense presented petitioner himself as its principal witness and a certain Pedro Binwag who
sought to corroborate the latter's statement. Their version goes:
In the evening of 26 May 2004, petitioner was driving his motorcycle on the way to Poblacion with
Mark Apilis at his back. As they reached the marker of the junction road going to Bontoc, they were
flagged down by Marcial Acangan (Acangan), who was then accompanied by Elias Nabejet
(Nabejet), Moreno Binwag (Binwag) and Mark Pagaddut (Pagaddut). Acangan asked petitioner for
a ride home and the latter readily obliged. Acangan further asked that they be treated to a drink.
Petitioner refused and explained that he had already spent his last money on drinks earlier in the
day. This angered Acangan. He slapped petitioner on the forehead and kicked his foot. Petitioner
did not back down. Instead, he got off his motorcycle and prepared to fight Acangan. At that
instance, he saw Acangan's companions pick up pieces of wood. Petitioner then ran towards Apilis
and instructed the latter to start the engine of the motorcycle. Before petitioner could leave, he was
struck on the back with a piece of wood by Nabejet. Petitioner impulsively took his knife from the
windshield of the motorcycle and ran to the direction of his house. Acangan's group followed him.
Upon reaching the parking area of the KMS Line, petitioner was met by Binwag. Petitioner even
managed to ask Binwag why his group was ganging up on him when he was hit by Pagaddut with a
belt buckle. As petitioner was starting to lose consciousness, he thrust his knife and stabbed
Pagaddut before both of them fell down. Petitioner then got up, wiped his face and prepared to go
home. Fie met Apilis who was driving his motorcycle. Apilis refused to go with him so petitioner
drove the motorcycle away and proceeded towards the house of a congressman. Petitioner then
spent four days in Barangay O-ong before going to San Jose City in Nueva Ecija to have his wounds
treated. Finally, he went back to Ifugao to surrender.
Pedro Binwag witnessed a commotion while he was waiting for a jeepney near the junction road.
He saw one person armed with a knife and running towards Bontoc while he was being chased by
two men. The person holding a knife was eventually cornered by three men and he was struck in
Page 279 of 519
the head by a club. While he was about to fall down, he was bumped by another man holding a
swinging object, causing the latter to fall. Sensing danger, Pedro Binwag immediately left the area.
Petitioner presented a medical certificate issued by the hospital in San Jose City to prove that he
suffered a lacerated wound on his forehead.
The prosecution presented Acangan and Nabejet whose version portrayed petitioner as the
aggressor. Acangan narrated that he and Pagaddut had just come from Viewer's Live Band located
at the market where they had a few drinks. Pagaddut went inside the cab of a tricycle with Acangan
as driver. While Acangan was about to start the engine, petitioner and Apilis, who were riding a
motorcycle, approach them. After saying that he has no problem with Pagaddut, petitioner
suddenly wielded a knife. Acangan ran and petitioner chased him around the tricycle. Pagaddut
alighted from the tricycle cab and tried to start the motorcycle engine. When petitioner saw
Pagaddut, he kicked the latter in the chest. Petitioner turned his ire on Pagaddut and stabbed his
upper right buttock. Nabejet came and tried to hit petitioner with a piece of wood but he missed.
Petitioner, in turn chased Nabejet. Acangan followed them and upon reaching the station of the
KMS Line, he saw petitioner pull the knife from Pagaddut's body. Acangan brought Pagaddut to
the hospital. Pagaddut expired at the hospital.
Nabejet recounted that he had just come from a wake and was near Viewer's Live Band when he
saw petitioner, who was armed with a knife, standing near Pagaddut. He took a piece of wood
nearby and approached Pagaddut. He then saw petitioner chase Pagaddut. He saw petitioner stab
Pagaddut in the back causing the latter to fall down. Petitioner continued stabbing Pagaddut but
the latter was able to parry the blows. Nabejet tried to hit petitioner with a piece of wood but he
missed. Petitioner turned his attention to Nabejet and chased him. Nabejet was able to escape.
Finding an incomplete self-defense, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted petitioner of the
crime of homicide.
Issue: Whether or not the claim of complete self-defense invoked by petitioner is tenable.
Held: No. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that case law has established that in invoking
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove
by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of the justifying circumstance, namely: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
In the instant case, while there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of petitioner, the means employed by petitioner to prevent or
repel the unlawful aggression was not reasonable.
Petitioner defends the use of a knife against four (4) men who were armed with a belt buckle and a
club. Petitioner claims that since the aggressors were ganging up on him, he was put in a situation
where he could not control or calculate the blows, nor could he have had time to reflect whether
to incapacitate the victim or hit the less vital part of his body.
Page 280 of 519

The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence
between the means of attack and the defense.
The following circumstances, as cited by the appellate court, negate the presence of a reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it:
First, there is intrinsic disproportion between a knife and a belt buckle. Although this disproportion
is not conclusive and may yield a contrary conclusion depending on the circumstances, we mention
this disproportionality because we do not believe that the circumstances of the case dictate a
contrary conclusion.
Second, physical evidence shows that the accused-appellant suffered only a lacerated wound on the
forehead. Contrary to what the accused-appellant wishes to imply, he could not have been a
defender reeling from successive blows inflicted by the victim and Binwag.
Third, the victim Pagaddut and his companions were already drunk before the fatal fight. This state
of intoxication, while not critically material to the stabbing that transpired, is still material for
purposes of defining its surrounding circumstances, particularly the fact that a belt buckle and a
piece of wood might not have been a potent weapon in the hands of a drunk wielder.
Fourth, and as the trial court aptly observed, the knife wounds were all aimed at vital parts of the
body, thus pointing a conclusion that the accused-appellant was simply warding off belt buckle
thrusts and used his knife as a means commensurate to the thrusts he avoided.
To be precise, the accused-appellant inflicted on the victim: two penetrating and perforating stab
wounds, one at the right infraclavicular, 7 cms. deep, and at the right anterior axillary fold, 5 cms.
deep, anther was at the base of the neck, 5 cms. deep, and a last one was in the lateral aspect upper
arm, 2 cms. deep. The depth of these wounds shows the force exerted in the accused-appellant's
thrusts while the locations are indicative that the thrusts were all meant to kill, not merely disable
the victim, and thereby avoid his drunken thrusts.
People of the Philippines vs. Gerry Lipata y Ortiza,

G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016.
Facts: Accused-appellant was charged and was convicted for Murder. The prosecution evidence are
as follows:
Mercelinda Valzado, sister-in-law of the victim Rolando Cueno, testified that on September 1, 2005
at around 6pm., she was in her house located in Sipna Compouse, Bagong Silangan, Quezon City.
She was about to leave the house to go to the market when she saw appellant, his borther Larry
Lipata and a certain [Rudy] attacking the victim by repeatedly stabbing him.She was at a distance
of more or less 10 meters from the indicent. Shocked at what she had just witnessed, she shouted
for help and pleaded the assailants to stop, but they did not stop stabbing the victim. In her account,
she recalled that the assailants, including appellant, used a tres cantos, an ice pick and a broken
piece of glass of Red Horse. At one point, the victim managed to take the knife away from appellant
and brandished the same at his attackers.
Page 281 of 519
Thereafter, the victim fell on the ground. Upon seeing the victim fall, appellant and the other
assailants left the scene. Through the help of some neighbors, Mercelinda rushed the victim to a
hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Criz Cuena, daugther of the victim, likewise testified that she saw the appellant together with the
other assailants stabbed her father.
On the other hand, the defense presented a sole witness in the person of appellant himself.
According to appellant, he was resting in his house in Sipna Compound, Brgy. Bagong Silangan,
Quezon City on September 1, 2005 at aroun 6pm when two children, namely John Paul Isip and a
certain Rommel, called him and told him to help his brother, Larry Lipata. He immediately rushed
to his brother and upon arrival he saw Larry being stabbed by the victim. He instateneously assisted
his brother but the victim continud stabbing Larry, causing Larry to fall to the ground. Thereater,
appellant managed to grab the knife from the victim and stab the victim. Then he fled from the
scene because he was wounded.
The conviction of appellant was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. However, on appeal before the
Supreme Court, appellant passed away.
Issues:
a. Whether or not the death of the appellant extinguishes his criminal liability.
b. Whether or not the death of the appellant extinguishes his civil liability based on delict.
Held: Yes. Pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, appellant’s death has the effect of
extinguishing his criminal liability.
With regard to the second issue, the same is in the affirmative.
In the said case, the Supreme Court said that upon death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as tehre is no longer a defendant to stand
as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
People of the Philippines vs. Ireneo Jugueta,

G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with double murder and multiple attempted murder.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr.
Lourdes Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of
Norberto died from gunshot wounds but could not confirm what kind of ammunitions were used.
Norbeto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June
6, 2002, as his entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the ‘”sack”
Page 282 of 519
walling of their hut was suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained.
With the covering of the wall gone, the 3 men responsible for the deed came into view. Norbeto
clearly saw their faces which were illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut.
Norberto identified the 3 men as appelllant, Gilvbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.
The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. Despite such
plea for mercy, a gunshot was fored, and Norberto immediately threw his body over his children
and wife in an attempt to protect them from being hit. Thereafter, he heard succesive gunshots
being fired in the direction where his family huddled together in their hut.
In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto
replied that he had a previouse altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he filed
a case against appellant’s two brother for molesting his daugther.
The conviction of appellant was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not conspiracy exists between appellant and the other assailants when they
perpetrated the crime.
Held: Yes, there is conspiracy between appellant and the other assailants.
In the said case, the Supreme Court held that appellant and othe two other malefactors are equally
responsible for the death of Norberto’s daugther because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly
conspired to kill Norberto’s family. Conspiract exist when two or o more persons come to an
agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a priod meeting
between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their
concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpse. In such case, the act of one is the act
of all. Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto
together, each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that
is the bullet particularly fired from appellant’s firearm that killed the children.
People of the Philippines vs. Mariano Oandasan, Jr.

G.R. No. 194605, June 14, 2016
Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with two (2) counts of murder and one (1) count of frustrated
homicide. During arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The facts established by the prosecution are as follows:

Ferdinand Cutaran, 37 years old, driver at Navarro Construction, testified that on July 29, 2003
between 8:00 to 9:00 in the evening, he and his companions Jose Ifurung, Arthur Cutaran and
victim Danny Montegrico were having a drinking spree outside the bunkhouse of Navarro
Construction at Barangay Pena Weste, Gattaran, Cagayan. Suddenly, appellant who appeared from
back of a dump truck, aimed and fired his gun at Montegrico. Cutaran ran away after seeing the
appellant shoot Mentegrico. He did not witness the shooting of the other two victims Edgar
Page 283 of 519

Tamanu and Mario Paleg. When he returned to the crime scene, he saw the bodies of Montegrico,
Tamanu and Paleg lying on the ground. Cutaran and his companions rushed the victims to Lyceum
of Aparri Hospital.
As a result of the shooting incident, Danilo Montegrico, 34, and Edgardo Tamanu, 33, died; while
Mario Paleg survived.
Prudencio Bueno, 68 years old, a checker at Navarro Construction and a resident of Centro 14
Aparri, Cagayan, stated that after having dinner with Cutaran and the others on the date and time
in question, he went inside the bunkhouse to drink water. Suddenly, he heard successive gun
reports. When he peeped through a window he saw the accused approaching from the back of a
dump truck holding something, and going to the table where they were eating. He confessed that
he did not actually see the appellant fire his gun at the victims.
On the other hand, accused-appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi. Accused-appellant, 38
years old, a native of Bulala Sur, Aparri, Cagayan, testified that from July up to October 2003, he
was staying at his sister's house in Imus, Cavite. He was hired by SERG Construction, Inc. as a mason
to work on a subdivision project in Rosario, Cavite. On that fateful day of July 29, 2003, he reported
for work from 7:00 a.m. up to 5:00 p.m. To bolster his claim, he presented an Employment
Certificate dated January 20, 2007 issued by Engr. Renato Bustamante of SERG Construction and a
time record sheet dated July 29, 2003. He went back to Aparri in October 2003 after the completion
of his project in Cavite. He further stated that he worked at Navarro Construction in February, 2003;
that he had a previous misunderstanding with his former co-workers witnesses Cutaran and Bueno
when he caught the two stealing sacks of cement from the company; that as a result, Cutaran and
Bueno were transferred to another project and their employer assigned him as checker in
replacement of Bueno; that the two planned to kill him as he prevented them from doing their
fraudulent act; and that he resigned between the months of March and May 2003 because the two
kept on disturbing him.
Fred Escobar, 48 years old, a resident of Pallagao, Baggao, Cagayan, testified that on July 29, 2003,
he was having a drink with Montegrieo and three other men whom he did not know; that when he
was about to go home at around 8:00 p.m., a stranger appeared and fired his gun at Montegrieo;
that the assailant whom he did not know fired his gun several times. He asserted that appellant was
not the assailant since the latter was shorter in stature.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found accused-appellant guilty of one (1) count of homicide, one
(1) count of murder, and one (1) count of frustrated homicide.
doubt of the said crimes.
Held: No. The defense of alibi raised by accused-appellant cannot prosper.
There is no doubt that Prosecution witness Ferdinand Cutaran positively identified the accused as
the person who had shot Montegrico. Considering that Cutaran's credibility as an eyewitness was
unassailable in the absence of any showing or hint of ill motive on his part to falsely incriminate
Page 284 of 519
the accused, such identification of the accused as the assailant of Montegrico prevailed over the
accused's weak denial and alibi. As such, the CA properly rejected the denial and alibi of the accused
as unworthy, and we adopt the following stated reasons of the CA for the rejection, to wit:
As for the defense of alibi, for it to prosper, it must be established by positive, clear
and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that the
accused was somewhere else. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between
the place where the accused was when the crime happened and the place where it
was committed, as well as the facility of the access betwee the two places. In the case
at bar, appellant failed to prove the element of physical impossibility for him to be
at the scene of the crime at the time it took place. His alibi that he was in Cavite and
the employment certificate and time record sheet which he presented cannot prevail
over the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Alibi is
the weakest defense not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also
because it is easy to fabricate. It is generally rejected when the accused is positively
identified by a witness.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that denial and alibi do not prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by the State's witnesses who are categorical and consistent and bereft
of ill motive towards the accused. Denial, unless substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
undeserving of weight in law for being negative and self-serving. Moreover, denial and alibi cannot
be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.
People of the Philippines vs. Apolonio “Totong” Avila y Alecante

G.R. No. 201584, June 15, 2016
Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of murder. During arraignment, accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The facts established by the prosecution are as follows:
On October 20, 2002 at about 7:30 in the evening, Ryan Vasquez, the 9-year-old brother of the
victim, returned home after borrowing a guitar next door as instructed by his sister. Ryan was atop
the stairscase leading to their house when he saw "Totong" and another man lingering outside their
door. Ryan saw the two men peeping inside the house and out of fear of being spotted by Totong
and his companion, he hid in a spot by the stairs, which was more or less 8 meters away from where
the men were standing. While hiding, Ryan saw Totong fire the first shot. The bullet went through
the door, hitting his sister [Janjoy] on the right side of her body. Totong then kicked the door open
and shot [Janjoy] on the head. The two men immediately fled the scene. Ryan rushed inside the
house and saw his sister lying on the ground bleeding. He hurried to his Ate Milda's nearby house
and asked for help. Ryan's Ate Milda and Kuya Ricky brought [Janjoy] to the hospital.
Page 285 of 519

The victim's neighbor and aunt sought to shed light on the whereabouts of accused-appellant
before and after the shooting incident. Bryan Hermano, a 19 year old construction worker and
neighbor of the Vasquez family, testified that on the same night between the hours of 7 and 8
o'clock in the evening, he was at the basketball court when he overheard Totong talking to his
companion, Bong Muslim, about his plan to kill Rovic Vasquez, father of the victim. Unfortunately,
before he could warn Rovic Vasquez, he learned that Janjoy was already shot. Jonalyn Vasquez, aunt
of the victim, was at home that night and around 7 to 7:30 in the evening, she heard a gun shot
coming from the next house. Upon hearing the gun shot, she immediately went outside and saw
the accused walking on the pathway between her house and the victim's house. She claimed that
no person other than the accused used said pathway after the shooting incident.
The defense of accused-appellant is one of denial and alibi. His version of the facts are as follows:
Between 11 o'clock to 12 o'clock in the evening of October 20, 2002, Apolonio Avila was inside a
room which he rented on that same day at Freedom Park, Batasan Hills, Quezon City. While
sleeping, he heard a loud bang at the door and several men forcibly entered. They introduced
themselves as policemen and barangay officials further asked him if he was Totong. Avila was then
informed that he was a suspect in a crime that took place at the lower part of Batasan and was
invited to go to Police Station 6 without being presented a warrant of arrest. Upon arrival thereat,
they waited for Rovic Vasquez, the private complainant in the case. At that time, he was not
required to give any statement nor was he asked to sign a waiver. When the complainant arrived,
he was brought to Camp Karingal to be incarcerated. He was not informed of the reason of his
detention and was subjected to inquest proceeding only after three (3) days, on October 23, 2002.
He affirmed that he was only renting a room in Freedom Park and was a resident of Santiago,
Caloocan City. He confirmed knowing the complainant as he was a 'kababayan' but he firmly denied
knowing a 'Toto Pulis' and 'Boy Muslim'."
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder.
doubt of the crime of murder.
Held: No, the lower courts did not err in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder.
Murder is the unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, provided that any
of the attendant circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is present. The
trial court ruled that treachery and abuse of superior strength were attendant in the commission of
the crime and that the prosecution foiled to establish the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation. Before a qualifying circumstance may be taken into consideration, it must be proved
with equal certainty as that which establishes the commission of the crime. It is not only the central
fact of killing that must be proved beyond reasonable doubt; every qualifying or aggravating
circumstance alleged to have been present and to have attended such killing, must similarly be
shown by the same degree of proof. As with the finding of guilt of the accused, any doubt to its
Page 286 of 519

existence should be resolved in favor of the accused. This Court finds that only the circumstance of
treachery should be appreciated, qualifying the crime to Murder.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and (specially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The requisites of treachery are: (1) The employment of means, method, or manner of execution
which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the
victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) deliberate
or conscious adoption of such means, method or manner of execution. A finding of existence of
treachery should be based on "clear and convincing evidence". The prosecution, through the
eyewitness testimony of Ryan Vasquez, was able to prove the treacherous manner of killing the
victim. Ryan testified that the accused-appellant and his companion were peeping inside the house
before the first shot was fired. The first shot was fired from behind a closed door, catching the victim
by surprise. The second shot to the victim's head was fired immediately after the door was forced
open by the accused-appellant. Such manner of execution of the crime ensured the safety of
accused-appellant from retaliation and afforded the victim no opportunity to defend herself. Thus,
the Supreme Court held that the circumstance of treachery should be appreciated, qualifying the
crime to Murder.
PHYSICAL INJURIES
FEDERICO SABAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192150, October 01, 2014, J. Brion
Since the accused alleges self-defense, he carries the burden of evidence to prove that he satisfied
the elements required by law; he who alleges must prove. By admitting the commission of the act
charged and pleading avoidance based on the law, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence to
prove that the facts that the legal avoidance requires are present; the weakness of the prosecution’s
evidence is immaterial after he admitted the commission of the act charged. As pointed out, Sabay failed
to substantiate his claimed self-defense because he did not even present any medical certificate as
supporting evidence, notwithstanding his claim that he consulted a doctor. Nor did he ever present the
doctor he allegedly consulted. His contention, too, that he was attacked by Godofredo and was shot with
a .38 caliber gun by Jessie was refuted by the prosecution eyewitnesses – Rodolfo and Dina – who both
testified that it was the petitioner who had attacked Godofredo.
Facts:
While Sabay and his daughter Erlinda were busy laying wood and water pipes in the yard of
Godofredo Lopez, the latter confronted Sabay about Sabay’s alleged intrusion into Godofredo’s
property. A verbal altercation ensued between them.
In the course of the verbal exchange, Erlinda hit Godofredo on the head with a hard object.
Sabay joined in by throwing a stone at Godofredo’s face, breaking the latter’s eyeglasses. Godofredo
claimed that as a result, he felt dizzy. Sabay and Erlinda then shouted at Godofredo and threatened
to kill him. Immediately thereafter, Jervie Lopez came and pacified the three. But in the course his
efforts, he was hit in the hand with a bolo. The neighbors intervened not long after and pacified the
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parties.
The Medico Legal Certificates dated June 12, 2001 showed that Godofredo suffered a
contusion on the left parietal area of his head and an abrasion in his left cheek, while Jervie sustained
a wound in his right palm.
On June 13, 2001, Godofredo and Jervie filed a complaint against Sabay before the
barangay. The parties agreed to settle the complaint based on the recommendation of the building
inspector and reflected their agreement in their Kasunduang Pag-aayos dated June 20,
2001. The Kasunduan, however, was not implemented because the building inspector failed to make
the promised recommendation to resolve the boundary dispute between the parties. Thus, the Office
of the Barangay Captain issued a Certificate to File an Action.Sabay was accordingly charged with the
crime of Physical Injuries under two (2) Informations before the MTC. Sabay, together with his
daughter Erlinda, was also charged with Light Threats for allegedly uttering threatening words
against the private complainant, Godofredo.
Sabay denied the charge and claimed that he had simply acted in self-defense. He narrated
that on the date of the incident while he was putting a monument on his lot, Godofredo suddenly hit
him with an iron bar in his right hand, causing him injuries. Jesus Lopez, Godofredo’s son, went out
of their house and with a .38 caliber gun, fired the gun at him. To defend himself, he got a stone and
threw it at Godofredo.
Issue:
Whether or not Bacay’s claim of self- defense exonerates him from the crime.
Ruling:
No.
Since the accused alleges self-defense, he carries the burden of evidence to prove that he
satisfied the elements required by law; he who alleges must prove. By admitting the commission of
the act charged and pleading avoidance based on the law, he must rely on the strength of his own
evidence to prove that the facts that the legal avoidance requires are present; the weakness of the
prosecution’s evidence is immaterial after he admitted the commission of the act charged.
In this case, Sabay admitted the acts attributed to him, and only pleads that he acted in self-
defense. His case essentially rests on the existence of unlawful aggression – that Godofredo hit him
with an iron bar on his right hand. As pointed out, Sabay failed to substantiate his claimed self-
defense because he did not even present any medical certificate as supporting evidence,
notwithstanding his claim that he consulted a doctor. Nor did he ever present the doctor he allegedly
consulted. His contention, too, that he was attacked by Godofredo and was shot with a .38 caliber gun
by Jessie was refuted by the prosecution eyewitnesses – Rodolfo and Dina – who both testified that
it was the petitioner who had attacked Godofredo.
The prosecution eyewitnesses’ testimonies were supported by the medico legal certificates
showing that Godofredo sustained a contusion on the left parietal area of his head and an abrasion
on his left cheek. These medico legal findings are consistent with Godofredo’s claim that the
petitioner hit him and inflicted physical injuries.
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In sum, we are fully satisfied that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of slight physical injuries. His claim of self-defense fails for lack of supporting evidence; he
failed to present any evidence of unlawful aggression and cannot thus be said to have hit Godofredo
as a measure to defend himself.
RAPE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. BERNABE PAREJA y CRUZ

G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014
The "date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and
truthfulness of the complainant’s narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of the
crime." Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime.
The enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, revolutionized the
concept of rape with the recognition of sexual violence on "sex-related" orifices other than a woman’s
organ is included in the crime of rape; and the crime’s expansion to cover gender-free rape. "The
transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against persons and the
introduction of rape by ‘sexual assault’ as differentiated from the traditional ‘rape through carnal
knowledge’ or ‘rape through sexual intercourse.’"
Facts:
On May 5, 2004, AAA, a minor, 13 years of age, charged Pareja, the common law spuse of AAA’s
mother with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape.
The fist incident took place when AAA’s mother was not in the house. Pareja allegedly undressed
the then asleep AAA sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into AAA’s anus. The second incident
likewise took place when AAA’s mother was not in the house. Pareja allegedly sucked AAA’s breasts,
caressed her vagina and inserted his finger in it. With regard to the last incident, it was AAA’s
mother who saw Pareja in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was asleep.
To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial and ill motive of AAA against him
as his defense. He denied raping [AAA] but admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter of his
live-in partner and that they all stay in the same house.
The RTC rendered a decision acquitting Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but finding him
guilty of the Crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of
the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Whether the trial court erred in convicting Pareja based solely on the prosecution witness’
testimony
Ruling:
The petition is denied.

Page 289 of 519
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain
guidelines that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez, we
enumerated them as follows: First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of
the testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor
of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine
the truthfulness of witnesses. Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the
reversal of the RTC’s assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the
lower court’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the
outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded. And third, the rule is even
more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a
domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their
deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts-and when
his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive
upon this Court." While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no
substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the
matter of AAA’s credibility.
Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony are generally expected. Since
human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account
has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a witness. The inconsistencies
mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential matters that merely caused AAA confusion
when she was being questioned. The inconsistency regarding the year of the December incident is
not even a matter pertaining to AAA’s ordeal. The date and time of the commission of the crime of
rape becomes important only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape itself
or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of convictionIn this case, although the dates of the
December 2003 and February 2004 incidents were not specified, the period of time Pareja had to
account for was fairly short, unlike "on or about the year 1992." Moreover, Ladrillo was able to prove
that he had only moved in the house where the rape supposedly happened, in 1993, therefore
negating the allegation that he raped the victim in that house in 1992.
As regards Pareja’s concern about AAA’s lone testimony being the basis of his conviction, this Court
has ruled, furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient
to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and
convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the
corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case.
Pareja’s living conditions could have prevented him from acting out on his beastly desires, but they
did not. This Court has observed that many of the rape cases appealed to us were not always
committed in seclusion. Lust is no respecter of time or place, and rape defies constraints of time
and space.
AAA’s conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja is also not
enough to discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within
reason or in accordance with society’s expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard
rational reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be
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expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a

human mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard
reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with
different circumstances.
Likewise, AAA’s delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the proper authorities is
insignificant and does not affect the veracity of her charges. It should be remembered that Pareja
threatened to kill her if she told anyone of the incidents. In People v. Ogarte, we explained why a
rape victim’s deferral in reporting the crime does not equate to falsification of the accusation.
A medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely
corroborative in character and not essential to conviction. x x x.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAA’s anus at the time
she was examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical examination actually bolsters
AAA’s claim of being raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and not just by anal penetration.
However, as the prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence and prove the incidence of carnal
knowledge, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code.
Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article 335, the provision on rape in the Revised Penal Code and
incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Thus, under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways:
1. Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse, also known as "organ rape"
or "penile rape." The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge, which
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called "instrument or object rape,"
or "gender-free rape." It must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in
subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.
In People v. Abulon, this Court differentiated the two modes of committing rape as follows:
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(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be a man
or a woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the offended party
may be a man or a woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the second
is committed by inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.
Under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by sexual assault is
"by any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person."
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his penis into her
anus. While she may not have been certain about the details of the February 2004 incident, she was
positive that Pareja had anal sex with her in December 2003, thus, clearly establishing the
occurrence of rape by sexual assault. In other words, her testimony on this account was, as the
Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and probable.
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is rape through carnal
knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault even though it was proven during
trial. This is due to the material differences and substantial distinctions between the two modes of
rape; thus, the first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa. Consequently,
to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault when what he was charged with was rape through carnal
knowledge, would be to violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under the
variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily

includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part
of those constituting the latter.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
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Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. — Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon
other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article,
shall be punished by prisión correccional.
The elements of the above crime are as follows:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.
Clearly, the above-mentioned elements are present in the December 2003 incident, and were
sufficiently established during trial. Thus, even though the crime charged against Pareja was for
rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without
violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROEL VERGARA y CLAVERO

G.R. No. 199226, January 15, 2014
J. Leonardo-de Castro
In rape cases, where the victim was only a child and was able to narrate how the accused had
been raping her since 2003 and describe in great detail the last rape that occurred on September 12,
2004, it is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit,
because when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of
truth and sincerity.
Facts:
Roel Clavero Vergara (Roel), the stepfather of one [AAA], began abusing her as soon as she had her
first menstruation and by the time AAA was nine (9) years old, he had sexually molested her five
(5) times. The last incident of rape happened at around 3 o’clock in the afternoon of 12 September
2004. The 9-year old AAA was left alone in the house with Roel and the latter’s 2-year old daughter.
The latter ordered AAA to go inside his bedroom where the latter allegedly raped her.
AAA confided her suffering to her mother’s friend, Tita, who helped her report the incident to the
police authorities. AAA was also examined by Dr. Remigion R. Camerino, whose findings revealed
the following: “thin circular hymen with rough edges and previous healed lacerations; (-) vaginal
lacerations; (-) bleeding/discharge; positive pregnancy test (9/15/04); uterus enlarged to 4 months
age of gestation.” On 16 January 2005, AAA gave birth to a baby boy.
Page 293 of 519
Accused-appellant on his own defense, denied that he raped AAA and offered an alibi that he
never had the chance to be with the victim on the day in question since his work was from 3:00
o’clock in the afternoon to 2:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day.
RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple statutory rape
which the CA affirmed, thus, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In People v. Teodoro, the Court clearly explained the elements of statutory rape committed under
Article 266-A(1)(d):
Rape under paragraph 3 of this article is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual
modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of
a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of
injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman
and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and
cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child’s consent is
immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA in the afternoon of September 12, 2004, when AAA was just
nine years old. In her Sworn Statement dated September 15, 2004 to Senior Police Officer 4 Eloisa
B. Ocava, AAA narrated how accused-appellant had been raping her since 2003, and described in
great detail the last rape that occurred on September 12, 2004.
It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, because
when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth
and sincerity.
Moreover, SC considers the alleged inconsistency on the place where the crime happened as a
minor inconsistency which should generally be given liberal appreciation considering that the place
of the commission of the crime in rape cases is after all not an essential element thereof. What is
decisive is that [accused-appellant’s] commission of the crime charged has been sufficiently proved.
The alleged inconsistency is also understandable considering that AAA was only ten (10) years old
at the time she testified before the trial court. Courts expect minor inconsistencies when a child-
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victim narrates the details of a harrowing experience like rape. Such inconsistencies on minor
details are in fact badges of truth, candidness and the fact that the witness is unrehearsed. These
discrepancies as to minor matters, irrelevant to the elements of the crime, cannot thus be
considered a ground for acquittal. In this case, the alleged inconsistency in AAA’s testimony
regarding the exact place of the commission of rape does not make her otherwise straightforward
and coherent testimony on material points, less worthy of belief.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL CRISOSTOMO y MALLIAR

G.R. No. 196435, January 29, 2014
J. DEL CASTILLO
An accused, charged of rape, questions the victim’s certainty as to what was inserted to her
private parts. Court rules "uncertainty" is so inconsequential and does not diminish the fact that an
instrument or object was inserted into the victim’s private parts. This is the essence of rape by sexual
assault. "[T]he gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault x x x is the insertion of the penis into
another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s genital or
anal orifice." In any event, "inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility,
especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the
commission of rape."
Facts:
Joel Crisostomo (Joel) was an employee of AAA’s father at a vulcanizing shop below the latter’s
house. On the 8th day of April, 1999, AAA was playing was playing with her playmates near the said
area. While "AAA" was at the house of accused, she claimed that her genitals and buttocks were
burned with a lighted cigarette by the said accused. "AAA" testified further that her clothes were
taken off by the same accused who also took his clothes off after which he allegedly placed himself
on top of her, inserted his penis and proceeded to have illicit carnal knowledge [of] the then six (6)
year old girl.
"BBB," father of "AAA," presented in court his daughter’s birth certificate which stated that she was
born on April 4, 1993. On the other hand, Dr. Emmanuel Reyes the Medico-Legal Officer who
examined "AAA" identified his Medico-Legal Report and testified that the victim indeed had two
(2) third degree burns in the perianal region. Dr. Reyes testified that it was possible that the said
burns were caused by a lighted cigarette stick being forced on the victim’s skin. Moreover, Dr. Reyes
confirmed that there was a loss of virginity on the part of the victim and that the same could have
been done 24 hours from the time of his examination which was also on April 8, 1999.
Joel denied the allegation of rape against him and presented his brother-in-law Rogelio Oletin who
testified that he was tending the store located at the house of accused when the latter supposedly
arrived from work at 10:00 [a.m.] of April 8, 1999 and slept until 5:00 [p.m.] of the same day.
RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of three counts of rape. CA affirmed the decision
with modification as to penalties. Hence, this appeal.
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Issue:
Whether the RTC erred in convicting the accused of three counts of rape despite the prosecution’s
failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt appellant’s guilt for two counts of rape by sexual
assault. Records show that appellant inserted a lit cigarette stick into "AAA’s" genital orifice causing
her labia majora to suffer a 3rd degree burn. Appellant likewise inserted a lit cigarette stick into
"AAA’s" anal orifice causing 3rd degree burns in her perianal region.
We agree with the CA that "AAA’s" "uncertainty" on whether it was a match, rod or a cigarette stick
that was inserted into her private parts, did not lessen her credibility. Such "uncertainty" is so
inconsequential and does not diminish the fact that an instrument or object was inserted into her
private parts. This is the essence of rape by sexual assault. "[T]he gravamen of the crime of rape by
sexual assault x x x is the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice." In any event, "inconsistencies in
a rape victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to
trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape." We also held in People
v. Piosang that –
"[t]estimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have
invented a horrible story. x x x "
Moreover, appellant’s argument that "AAA" did not manifest any stress or anxiety considering her
traumatic experience is purely speculative and bereft of any legal basis. Besides, it is settled that
people react differently when confronted with a startling experience. There is no standard
behavioral response when one is confronted with a traumatic experience. Some may show signs of
stress; but others may act nonchalantly. Nevertheless, "AAA’s" reaction does not in any way prove
the innocence of appellant. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, regardless of "AAA’s" reactions, it
did not diminish the fact that she was raped by appellant or that a crime was committed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AURELIO JASTIVA

G.R. NO. 199268. FEBRUARY 12, 2014
Case law shows numerous instances of rape committed under indirect and audacious
circumstances. The lust of a lecherous man respects neither time nor place. Neither the crampness of
Page 296 of 519
the room, nor the presence of people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held sufficient
and effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape. In the case at bar, the assertion of the accused
that a rapist, under normal circumstances, will not indulge in sexual foreplay is not sufficient to cast
a reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
Facts:
At about 11:00 in the evening, then 67 year old AAA was fast asleep when a certain man she later
identified as accused-appellant Aurelio Jastiva covered her mouth, threatened her with a knife and
told her not to scream because he will have sexual intercourse with her. After fulfilling his sexual
desire and before AAA could stand up, accused-appellant tapped AAA’s shoulder and said "Salamat"
AAA stood up and opened the door to let accused-appellant out. When the latter passed through
AAA, it was then that the AAA clearly recognized, through the illumination of the moon, that it
was their neighbor accused-appellant who abused her. At about 5:00 in the morning of the next
day, AAA relayed her ordeal to her neighbor Corazon Mokot and her husband BBB. On August 5,
2004, AAA and BBB went to the Barangay Hall of Barangay YYY to report the incident. Barangay
Kagawad Celedonio Paul Payla, Jr., the officer-on-duty wrote a barangay blotter about the incident.
On the same day, AAA was medically examined by Dr. Domiciano Talaboc, the Municipal Health
Officer of the Municipality of ZZZ.
According to the defense and testimonies of the witnesses offered by accused, appellant Jastiva, 49
years old at the time of the incident, could not have committed the crime because on the date and
time thereof, he was at home sleeping. Likewise, the testimonies of appellant Jastiva, Vilma and
Merlyn, common-law wife and daughter of appellant Jastiva, respectively, as well as Ordas, a friend
of Merlyn, were offered to show that on August 3, 2004, accused-appellant Aurelio Jastiva was in
their house at the Municipality of ZZZ, Zamboanga del Norte.
RTC - convicted accused
CA – affirmed RTC
Issue:
Whether or not accused is guilty of the crime of rape
Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the appeal of the accused and rejected the attempt of the
accused to interject reasonable doubt by pointing out that AAA’s claim that he indulged in sexual
foreplay prior to having sexual intercourse with her is unbelievable and contrary to the normal
conduct of a rapist, i.e., that "normally, a rapist, who is pressed for time so as not to be caught in
flagrante, would not leisurely engage in sexual intercourse with his victim, as what actually
happened in this case." He reasons that he could not have engaged in sexual foreplay because he
could not have known that AAA would be all alone in the farmhouse on the night in question. Case
law, however, shows numerous instances of rape committed under indirect and audacious
circumstances. The lust of a lecherous man respects neither time nor place. Neither the crampness
of the room, nor the presence of people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held
sufficient and effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape.
Page 297 of 519

EMILIO RAGA Y CASIKAT vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 200597. FEBRUARY 19, 2014
J. VILLARAMA
There is no reason to disturb the assessment and determination of AAA’s credibility by the
trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The straightforward, candid and intrepid revelation in
coming forward to avenge the immoral defilement upon her person is more convincing and plausible
compared to the weak and uncorroborated defense of petitioner. Despite the minor inconsistencies in
her testimony, her general statements remained consistent throughout the trial as she recounted the
sordid details of her tormenting experience in the hands of her own father.
Facts:
One night, sometime in the year 2000, while AAA’s mother, BBB, was out of the house and
while AAA and her other siblings were sleeping, AAA, who was then five years old, was suddenly
awakened when petitioner removed her clothes and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. When
petitioner was unsuccessful in inserting his penis into AAA’s vagina, he inserted his finger instead.
AAA told BBB what petitioner did to her, but BBB did nothing.
One night in May 2004, AAA, who was then already nine years old, was sleeping in the room
while her siblings were sleeping with their father in the living room. AAA was suddenly awakened
when her father carried her from the room to the living room. Petitioner then let AAA watch bold
movies but AAA turned away. Petitioner, who was half-naked waist down, thereafter removed
AAA’s clothes. He then laid on top of AAA and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. As he was
unsuccessful in inserting his penis into her vagina, he inserted his finger instead. Because AAA was
afraid of petitioner who used to whip her, she did not do anything.
According to AAA, petitioner raped her several times but she could only remember two
dates: one during the year 2000 and the other in May 2004. She testified that she was born on
December 16, 1994 which fact was duly substantiated by her birth certificate. She likewise identified
petitioner during the March 7, 2006 hearing.
Petitioner, for his part, raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that he was a stay-in
worker in his place of work in the year 2000.
RTC – convicted accused
CA- affirmed RTC
Issue:
Ruling:
SC found no reason to disturb the assessment and determination of AAA’s credibility by the trial
court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The straightforward, candid and intrepid revelation in
coming forward to avenge the immoral defilement upon her person is more convincing and
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plausible compared to the weak and uncorroborated defense of petitioner. Despite the minor
inconsistencies in her testimony, her general statements remained consistent throughout the trial
as she recounted the sordid details of her tormenting experience in the hands of her own father.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERVIN GAHI

G.R. NO. 202976. FEBRUARY 19, 2014
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court ruled that a rape victim’s pregnancy and resultant
childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. What is important and
decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter’s will or without
her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. Furthermore, even
assuming for the sake of argument that AAA had a romantic attachment with a person other than
the accused at the time of the rape incidents or thereafter, this does not negate the truth that AAA
was raped by her aunt’s husband.
Facts:
AAA is sixteen years old and a resident of Leyte. She testified that she knows accused Mervin Gahi,
the latter being the husband of her aunt DDD. The first rape AAA recounted that on March 11, 2002
at about 11:30 in the morning, she was in her grandmother BBB’s house with her epileptic teenage
cousin, CCC. At that time BBB was out of the house to collect money from debtors. AAA recounted
that Mervin came near her and instructed her to "Lie down, lie down". Mervin was successful in
raping her and AAA did not tell anyone for fear of her life. AAA recalled that the second rape
occurred on March 12, 2002 at about three o’clock in the afternoon. On her way to the field and
with a carabao in tow, she was met by Mervin along the foot trail. While on the foot trail, Mervin
went near AAA, prompting her to hurriedly scamper to BBB’s house. Mervin followed her. Once in
the living room of BBB’s house, Mervin approached AAA, poked a knife at the right side of her body,
pushed her and made her lie down and Mervin once again took advantage of her. Out of fear, AAA
did not once again tell anyone about the incident.
AAA narrated that the first person she told about her ordeal was Lynlyn, her employer in Ormoc,
where AAA spent three months working, when the former was able to detect her pregnancy. It was
also Lynlyn who accompanied her to the Capoocan Police Station to report and file the case. After
reporting the matter to the police, AAA did not go back to Ormoc anymore and later gave birth.
Instead, she and her baby stayed with the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).
The accused argues that he could not have possibly been guilty of rape because the time period
between the rape incidents and the birth of the alleged fruit of his crime is more than the normal
period of pregnancy. He also points out that defense witness Jackie Gucela’s admission that he was
AAA’s lover and the father of her child should suffice to negate any notion that he raped AAA twice.
He also puts forward the defense of alibi.
RTC - convicted accused
CA – affirmed RTC
Issue:
Page 299 of 519
Ruling:
The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower courts. A rape victim’s pregnancy and resultant childbirth
are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element
of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused,
or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the
accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter’s will or without her consent, and
such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. In any event, even assuming for the
sake of argument that AAA had a romantic attachment with a person other than the accused at
the time of the rape incidents or thereafter, this circumstance would not necessarily negate the
truth of AAA’s statement that the appellant, her aunt’s husband, twice had carnal knowledge of
her through force and intimidation and without her consent. The alleged relationship between
Jackie and AAA was not proven by substantial evidence. As to the defense of alibi, alibi is an
inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. Moreover, we have
required that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere
else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him
to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of
its commission.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERNESTO VENTURA, SR.

G.R. NO. 205230, March 12, 2014
J. Reyes
Where the accused interposed the defense of alibi saying that it was impossible for him to be
present at the date, time and place of the incident but the location where the incident took place was
just right outside the bakery where the accused claims that he was working at the date and time of
the incident, such defense cannot lie.
In addition, the erroneous reference to Article 266-A 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code referring
to a case where the offended party is demented, and the proper reference should have been Article 266-
A 1(b) referring to a case where the offended party is deprived of reason, in the Information will not
exonerate Ventura because he failed to raise this as an objection, and the particular facts stated in
the Information were protestation sufficient to inform him of the nature of the charge against him.
Facts:
On March 24, 2005, at about 2:00 a.m., BBB was passing by the bakery of Ventura’s son when she
saw Ventura, naked from waist down, on top of a woman on a bench in front of the bakery. BBB
coughed to get their attention and Ventura immediately stood up, put on his pants and entered his
house. BBB then realized that the woman was her niece, AAA, who was then only 17 years old,
unschooled and has a mental disability. She then brought her home. Thereafter, BBB confronted
AAA who confessed that she was already impregnated by Ventura and admitted that the latter was
sexually abusing her. Upon learning this, BBB sought help from the employer of AAA’s sister who
accompanied them to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) to file a complaint
against Ventura.
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On investigation, AAA narrated that she was near the bakery of Ventura’s son when Ventura asked
her to lie down on the bench. Ventura undressed her, went on top of her, and inserted his penis
inside her vagina. After succeeding in having carnal knowledge of her, Ventura threatened AAA by
poking a knife at her while instructing her not to tell anyone about the incident.
The Medico Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory testified that based
on his interview with AAA, he found out that AAA was mentally deficient. His initial and final
medico legal report revealed that AAA was already pregnant and that there was definite evidence
of abuse or sexual contact.
Ventura was later charged and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered
him to pay AAA by way of damages the amount of P100,000.00. The trial court viewed the findings
of the medico legal officer that AAA was already pregnant at the time of her physical and medical
examination as clear proof and manifestation that she is a victim of rape, particularly in her case
who was then only 17 years old, mentally deficient, illiterate, unschooled, and thus, incapable of
giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. The trial court also noted that
Ventura failed to present any defense as to the explicit testimony of AAA that she was also sexually
abused by him on other occasions since the only denial he interposed was against the consummated
rape done on March 24, 2005.
He appealed to the CA but was denied. Hence, this case.
Issue:
Whether the guilt of Ventura for the crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC, as amended, provides for two circumstances when having
carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered rape, to wit: paragraph 1(b) –
when the offended party is deprived of reason; and paragraph 1(d) – when the offended party is
demented.
Under paragraph 1(d), the term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition
of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual’s former intellectual
level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, under paragraph
1(b), the phrase deprived of reason has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental
abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Since AAA is mentally deficient, she should properly be
classified as a person who is “deprived of reason,” and not one who is “demented.” Hence, carnal
knowledge of a mentally deficient individual is rape under subparagraph b and not subparagraph d
of Article 266-A(1) of the RPC, as amended. Nevertheless, the erroneous reference to paragraph 1(d)
in the Information will not exonerate Ventura because he failed to raise this as an objection, and
the particular facts stated in the Information were protestation sufficient to inform him of the
nature of the charge against him.
In impugning AAA’s accusation of rape against him, Ventura interposed the defense of denial and
alibi. As can be gleaned from the records of this case, Ventura’s argument centered only on the fact
that it was impossible for him to rape AAA on the said date and time of the incident because he
Page 301 of 519
was busy making bread at their bakery, and the only time he left their house was at 10:00 a.m. Even
assuming that he worked inside their bakery the whole day, it was not impossible for him to commit
the crime because the rape took place on the bench located just in front of their bakery.
In sum, the defense of denial as well as the points advanced by Ventura miserably failed to cast
doubt on his culpability. The prosecution was able to prove that Ventura is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, as amended
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353. Taking into consideration the presence of the special qualifying
circumstance of Ventura’s knowledge of AAA’s mental deficiency, the same being properly alleged
in the Information charging the appellant of the crime of rape and proven during trial, this Court
has no option but to impose on the appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with
Section 2 of R.A. No. 9346.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY OBOGNE

G.R. No. 199740, March 24, 2014
J. Del Castillo
Under Article 266-B (10) of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of the mental
disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the commission of the rape is the
qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. Hence, the mere fact that
the rape victim is a mental retardate does not automatically render the crime as qualified rape. Where
the Information fails to mention such qualifying circumstance, the crime committed remains to be
simple rape.
Thus, the failure of the prosecution to formally allege that “AAA” is a mentally retarded person
as well as to duly prove that the accused knew about such fact, the crime committed by Ogbong
remains to be simple rape and not rape of mental retardate under Article 266-B (10).
Facts:
That on or about the 29th day of July 2002, in the afternoon, in barangay Ogbong, municipality of
Viga, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said
accused by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously x x x succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of “AAA”, a 12-year old mentally retarded person, to the damage and
prejudice of the said “AAA”.
When arraigned on December 17, 2004, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the
Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment finding Jerry Obogne guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of simple rape committed against “AAA”.
The trial court did not consider “AAA’s” mental retardation as a qualifying circumstance
considering that the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of “AAA’s” mental disability.
Obogne appealed the court’s finding of guilt to the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Page 302 of 519

Issue:
Whether the petitioner should be charged of simple rape or rape of mental retardate
Ruling:
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of simple rape and properly
imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266-B, par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. The trial court correctly ruled that “AAA’s” mental disability could not be considered
as a qualifying circumstance because the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of such
mental condition at the time of the commission of the crime. As held in People v. Limio:
By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does not
call for the imposition of the death penalty, unless knowledge by the offender of such
mental disability is specifically alleged and adequately proved by the prosecution.
For the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, now embodied in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
expressly provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with the qualifying circumstance of Article 266-B (10) when the offender knew of the mental
disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime.’ Said knowledge x x x qualifies rape as a heinous offense. Absent said
circumstance, which must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction
of appellant for qualified rape under Art. 266-B (10), RPC, could not be sustained, although the
offender may be held liable for simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
The mere fact that the rape victim is a mental retardate does not automatically merit the imposition
of the death penalty. Under Article 266-B (10) of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender
of the mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the commission of
the rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. As such
this circumstance must be formally alleged in the information and duly proved by the prosecution.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS BURCE

G.R. No. 201732, March 26, 2014
Where the accused has been charged and tried with five charges of rape, and among the five,
he was only convicted in one, it does not follow that his conviction is erroneous.
The charges of rape are different and separate from one another. The evidence adduced in one
case is different from that of the others. Thus, there is no logical, as well as legal, reason to say that
when the accused has only been found guilty in one of the five charges against him, he should be
acquitted in all the five charges, especially when the evidence against him in that one case is so strong
that it leaves no room for reasonable doubt.
Page 303 of 519

Facts:
At midnight of December 10, 2005, the victim, [AAA], was sound asleep in a house located
somewhere in the vicinity of x x x, Naga City when she was awakened by appellant who removed
her shorts and panty, and went on to sexually ravish her. [AAA] easily recognized appellant since
the light was turned on.
[AAA] resisted by pushing appellant away, but he immediately held her hands, pinned her legs with
his legs and inserted his penis into her vagina. While he was inside her, [AAA] fought and pushed
him. Thereafter, she felt pain in her vagina and pitied herself for what her own father had done to
her.
Thereafter, appellant repeated his dastardly acts against [AAA] on several occasions more. The last
rape incident was on September 16, 2007 and was witnessed by [CCC], the victim’s sister-in-law,
through a five (5)-inch hole in a divider made of old plywood. [CCC] clearly witnessed the whole
incident as she was only four (4) meters away and the room was well-illumined by a 7-watt
fluorescent.
CCC reported what she had seen to [BBB], mother of the victim. [AAA] was eventually constrained
to reveal to them appellant’s sexual forays on her body. Forthwith, [BBB] and [CCC], along with the
victim, went to the barangay hall to report the rape incidents to Barangay Captain Regmalos.
Burce was later charged and tried in the RTC of 5 rape charges which were consoildated for trial,
but he was only found guilty of one and acquitted from the 4 other charges. He appealed to the CA
but the CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue:
Whether Burce should be acquitted of the one charge he was convicted of
Ruling:
The court stresses, at the outset, that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime
so that each of them should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is required to
establish, by the necessary quantum of proof, the elements of rape for each charge.[23] Therefore,
Burce’s acquittal in RTC’08-0170 to RTC’08-0173 does not necessarily result in his acquittal in
RTC’08-0169. While the prosecution presented the same witnesses for all the cases, the content,
credibility, and weight of their testimonies differ for each charge.
Burce’s conviction in RTC’08-0169 is essentially dependent upon AAA’s testimony recounting how
her father raped her on December 10, 2005. The RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, gave
more weight to AAA’s testimony rather than Burce’s denial and alibi.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon us. As a general rule, on the question of whether
to believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense, the trial court’s choice is generally
viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to conclude so,
having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and deportment on the witness
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stand as they gave their testimonies. The trial court is, thus, in the best position to weigh conflicting
testimonies and to discern if the witnesses were telling the truth.
In contrast to AAA’s straightforward and positive testimony, Burce’s defenses consisted of denial
and alibi. Burce claims he was out of the house at the time of the alleged rape, driving a tricycle to
make a living.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place
at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the
geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was
committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two
places.
Burce failed to demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been home on the
night of December 10, 2005. Not only was Burce’s alibi uncorroborated, Burce’s work as tricycle
driver would have allowed him to go home with ease anytime he wanted. In fact, BBB, his own wife,
testified that Burce would go home late at night to sleep and just leave early in the morning to work
again.
Equally baseless is Burce’s contention that AAA is only charging him with rape because she is
interested in getting monetary compensation. Burce insinuates that AAA got the idea when her
sister, DDD, earlier lodged a rape complaint against Burce, and after Burce admitted his guilt in
said case, he paid P10,000.00 as victim’s compensation to DDD.
Once more, other than Burce’s bare allegations, there is no evidence that his minor daughter, AAA,
could be so induced by malice and materialism as to concoct a rape charge against her own father,
that would destroy her own and her father’s honor, as well as tear her family apart, all for
P10,000.00. The court has held that no young girl would concoct a sordid tale of so serious a crime
as rape at the hands of her own father, undergo medical examination, then subject herself to the
stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek
justice.[30] Being young and guileless, AAA had no ill motive to falsely testify and impute such a
serious crime against her own father.
All told, the court finds no reason to reverse the judgment of conviction rendered against Burce by
the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENE SANTIAGO

The elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(2) that the woman is below 12 years of age x x x. In this case, although the Informations alleged that
“AAA” was 11 years of age when the rape incidents transpired, she was actually 13 years of age when
the rape incidents transpired on December 25, 2004 and January 21, 2005, as her Certificate of Birth
showed that she was born on March 10, 1991. Thus, Santiago is guilty only of simple, not statutory rape.
Page 305 of 519

Facts:
Rene Santiago (Santiago) was charged with two counts of rape. When arraigned Santiago
entered a plea of not guilty. Santiago’s defense of denial and alibi was not given any credence by the
trial court for being self-serving and unsubstantiated and considering his positive identification by
“AAA.” Consequently, the Regional Trial Court rendered decision convicting Santiago of two counts
of simple rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the two cases.
Aggrieved, Santiago appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its decision, the appellate court
affirmed in toto the trial court’s ruling.
Santiago argues that “AAA” did not resist his sexual advances; neither were they against her
will. He also claims that the prosecution failed to establish that he intimidated or coerced “AAA” into
having sexual intercourse with him.
Issue:
Whether or not Santiago is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape.
Ruling:
Yes. Santiago is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape.
From a complete denial of the occurrence of the rape incidents when he testified before the
trial court, Santiago made a sudden turn-around by admitting having had sexual intercourse with
AAA that were, however, consensual as the latter never resisted his advances. But he offered no
reason why AAA would consent to having sexual liaison with him. By arguing in this manner, Santiago
changed the theory of his defense, i.e., from denial and alibi to consensual intercourse, to his utter
detriment. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, a change in theory merely accentuates the
Santiago’s lack of credibility and candor. Changing the defense on appeal is an indication of
desperation on the part of Santiago, due to the seeming inadequacy of his defense adopted in the first
instance.
With regard to Santiago’s second contention, “AAA” testified that she was threatened, forced,
and coerced into sexual copulation. When “AAA” was placed on the witness stand, she categorically
testified that during the first rape incident, Santiago threatened to hurt her if she would report the
incident to anyone. As regards the second rape incident, “AAA” declared that Santiago consummated
the dastardly act by pointing an “ice pick” at her. Admittedly, these were not mentioned in “AAA’s”
Sinumpaang Salaysay; however, they did not diminish her credibility. As correctly held by the
appellate court, that AAA failed to mention in her Sinumpaang Salaysay what she narrated in open
court about Santiago’s threats on her life and his use of an ice pick as he unleashed his perversity,
hardly affects her credibility.
It is generally conceded that ex parte affidavits tend to be incomplete and inaccurate for lack
of or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. It is not a complete reproduction of
what the declarant has in mind because it is generally prepared by the administering officer and the
affiant simply signs it after it has been read to him. Hence, whenever there is a variance between the
statements in the affidavit and those made in open court by the same witness, the latter generally
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prevail. Indeed, it is doctrinal that open court declarations take precedence over written affidavits in
the hierarchy of evidence.
Finally, both the trial court and the CA correctly convicted Santiago of simple rape, instead of
statutory rape. “The elements of [statutory rape] are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age x x x.” In this case, although the Informations
alleged that “AAA” was 11 years of age when the rape incidents transpired, she was actually 13 years
of age when the rape incidents transpired on December 25, 2004 and January 21, 2005, as her
Certificate of Birth showed that she was born on March 10, 1991. Thus, Santiago is guilty only of
simple, not statutory rape for which he was properly imposed the sentence of reclusion perpetua
pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. However, it must be mentioned that Santiago is
not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL DIOQUINO y GARBIN

G.R. No. 191390, April 2, 2014, J. Villarama, Jr.
In adopting the sweetheart theory as a defense, the accused necessarily admitted carnal
knowledge of ABC, the first element of rape. This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult
to defend, for it is not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, but also after the
prosecution has successfully established a prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the
accused, who has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual.
Facts:
Dioquino was charged with eight counts of rape allegedly committed against ABC, a 17-year
old minor. Upon arraignment, Dioquino entered a plea of not guilty to all the charges as stated in the
informations. Trial ensued. According to the prosecution, on July 31, 1999, at around 9:00 o’clock in
the evening, ABC and the Dioquino both attended a dance held in the national high school. When ABC
was on her way home, Dioquino attacked her and was able to obtain carnal knowledge of her despite
her resistance. The victim was not able to tell the attack to her parents. Dioquino was able to repeat
the sexual assaults upon ABC through the use of force and intimidation. Dioquino also threatened the
victim that he will kill the family of the victim if she disclose the incident to others.
On the other hand, Dioquino presented the sweetheart defense. Claiming to be ABC’s
boyfriend, Dioquino took the witness stand and asserted that the alleged rapes complained against
him were, in reality, the mutual acts of young lovers. Having made love to said minor two months
after she became his girlfriend, Dioquino claimed that he engaged in a string of consensual sexual
encounters with ABC.
The RTC found Dioquino guilty of seven counts of rape and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua for each count. The RTC did not give any credence to Dioquino’s sweetheart defense for it
was admittedly not supported by any evidence of their relationship. Moreover, the existence of force
and intimidation was proven by the prosecution for each of the times Dioquino had carnal knowledge
of ABC. The CA agreed with the RTC that ABC’s testimony was candid, straightforward, and credible.
Hence, this appeal.
Page 307 of 519

Issue:
Whether the CA and the RTC erred in not giving credence to the sweetheart theory
Ruling:
No. Dioquino’s bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot stand. To be credible, the
sweetheart theory must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually,
these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers.
Dioquino’s defense admittedly lacks these pieces of evidence. In adopting the sweetheart theory as a
defense, however, he necessarily admitted carnal knowledge of ABC, the first element of rape. This
admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an affirmative
defense that needs convincing proof, but also after the prosecution has successfully established a
prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, who has to adduce evidence that
the intercourse was consensual. No such evidence was presented to show that the several episodes
of sexual intercourse were consensual. The medical examination done on ABC debunks any claim of
Dioquino that he did not force himself upon ABC.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL ABAT y COMETA

G.R. No. 202704, April 2, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Impregnation of a woman is not an element of rape.
Facts:
On November 15, 2001, an Information was filed before the RTC, charging Abat with the
crime of Rape allegedly committed against AAA, his niece, and a 15 year old minor. Abat pleaded not
guilty to the charge upon his arraignment on January 30, 2002. The pre-trial conference was held,
after which, trial on the merits ensued. According to the prosecution, the facts of the case are as
follows: On September 22, 2001, around eight o’clock in the evening, AAA was home with her parents
and siblings. Abat, (an uncle of AAA, being the half-brother of AAA’s father), with the permission of
AAA’s parents, brought AAA with him to the poblacion to buy medicine. The two proceeded to the
poblacion on board a tricycle driven by Abat. Then, he drove the tricycle to Barangay Malabo. Upon
reaching Barangay Malabo, Abat brought AAA to her grandfather’s nipa hut. Abat undressed himself
then laid AAA down on a bamboo bed. Abat then succeeded to obtain carnal knowledge of the victim.
AAA struggled and tried to push Abat away but he threatened to kill her and her family if she would
tell anybody about the “act.” AAA, fearing that Abat will make good of his threat, didn’t tell her parents
of the assault.
On November 12, 2001, Abat tried to force AAA to go to his house. Thus, in the evening, AAA
informed her parents about the rape incident and they went to Victoria Police Station to lodge a
complaint against Abat. Because of rape, AAA, on April 24, 2002, gave birth to a baby girl. For his
defense, Abat claims that he and AAA considered themselves as lovers. She frequently visited him
during Saturdays and Sundays. AAA’s parents filed a case against him when they discovered she was
pregnant.
Abat was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape by the RTC.
The Court of Appeals found no error committed by the RTC, and affirmed Abat’s conviction.
Page 308 of 519
Abat is now alleging that he and AAA had a romantic relationship, which eventually turned sour when
AAA started asking for money from him all the time. In support of this claim, he cites the birth date
of the baby, who was supposedly the product of his crime. Abat says that if the baby was born in April
2002, then his version of the story, that they had consensual sex in July 2001, is more credible than
her story of rape in September 2001; otherwise, the baby would have been premature.
Issues:
1. Is the determination of the exact date of fertilization material to the crime of rape?
2. Is denial and ill-motive a defense in the crime of rape?
Ruling:
1. No. The Court, in People v. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 (1998), said: “[A]uthorities in
forensic medicine agree that the determination of the exact date of fertilization is problematic. The
exact date thereof is unknown; thus, the difficulty in determining the actual normal duration of
pregnancy.” Citing a Filipino authority, the Court further elucidated: “The average duration of
pregnancy is 270 to 280 days from the onset of the last menstruation. There is, however, no means
of determining it with certainty. Evidence derived from pregnancy following a single coitus is
trustworthy, but inasmuch as some authorities consider more than two weeks as the life span of the
spermatozoa in the vaginal canal, it is hard to ascertain the exact date of fertilization. There is no
synchrony between coitus and fertilization.
In any event, the impregnation of a woman is not an element of rape. Proof that the child was
fathered by another man does not show that Abat is not guilty, considering the positive testimony of
Amalia that accused appellant had abused her. As held in People v. Alib: Under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation;(2)When the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3)When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though
neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present. It is
therefore quite clear that the pregnancy of the victim is not required. For the conviction of an accused,
it is sufficient that the prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge
of the offended party and that he had committed such act under any of the circumstances enumerated
above. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a
woman.
2. Abat’s attempt to escape liability by denying the charge against him and coupling it
with the imputation of ill motive against AAA’s parents must be ignored. “Motives such as resentment,
hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor
rape victim.” More so in this case, where the attribution of the improper motive is against AAA’s
parents and not her personally.
Furthermore, the Court has never favorably looked upon the defense of denial, which
constitutes self-serving negative evidence that cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than
the positive declaration of a credible witness. To elucidate on the point, this Court, in People v.
Espinosa, held that: It is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law. Denial cannot prevail over the positive,
Page 309 of 519

candid and categorical testimony of the complainant, and as between the positive declaration of the
complainant and the negative statement of the appellant, the former deserves more credence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAURICIO HALLARTE y MENDOZA

G.R. No.205382, April 02, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape has in fact been committed.
In statutory rape, there must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused.
Facts:
Two separate informations were filed against Mauricio, charging him of the crime of rape.
The victims, as stated in the informations, are minors AAA, who was then 7 year old and BBB, then 8
year old. Both are nieces of Mauricio. During his arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. At pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the minority of both
AAA and BBB.
Upon trial, the prosecution claims that in the afternoon of June 4, 2000, AAA was playing with
Charissa Hallarte, her cousin and the daughter of her uncle, herein appellant, at the second floor of
the latter’s house in Barangay Pasong Tamo, Quezon City where she had also been staying. At the
time, Mauricio happened to also be at the second floor of the house. When Charissa went to the
ground floor to urinate, Mauricio approached AAA and began to remove his shorts. Thereafter, he
laid AAA, raised her skirt and pulled down her underwear. Then, Mauricio inserted his penis into her
vagina, causing AAA to feel pain and to shout for help from Charissa. When appellant realized that his
daughter Charissa might be returning anytime, he let AAA go. AAA did not recount her ordeal to
anyone until she complained to her mother, CCC, of the pain in her vagina. AAA then confessed that
her uncle, appellant herein, inserted his penis into her vagina.
On the other hand, at around 8 o’clock in the evening of June 17, 2000, while Mauricio’s other
niece, BBB, was with him in his house, he inserted his penis into her mouth and threatened her not
to tell anyone what he had done. BBB did not report the incident immediately because she feared
Mauricio.
Mauricio interposed the defense of denial.
On April 7, 2009, after trial on the merits, the RTC convicted Mauricio as charged. In a
Decision dated April 20, 2012, the CA affirmed appellant’s conviction for both crimes but modified
the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. Q-00-93226 for Rape by Sexual Assault, meting instead the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period as prescribed under Section 5(b) of Republic Act
No. (RA) 7610. Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming appellant’s conviction for both crimes charged.
2. Whether the penalty imposed by the CA is correct.
Page 310 of 519
Ruling:
1. No.
In this case, the Court gives full weight to the RTC’s finding, as affirmed by the CA, that
Mauricio indeed committed the crimes charged and is therefore guilty beyond reasonable doubt
therefor. As observed by the RTC, which had the opportunity to personally scrutinize both AAA’s and
BBB’s conduct and demeanor during trial, they were credible witnesses whose testimonies must be
accorded great probative weight. The trial judge’s evaluation, which the CA sustained, now binds the
Court, leaving Mauricio the burden to bring to the fore facts or circumstances of weight that were
otherwise overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted but would materially affect the
disposition of the case differently if duly considered. Unfortunately for Mauricio, he failed to
discharge this burden.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature,
courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified
is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. A young girl’s revelation
that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and
willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault
on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as mere concoction.
2. No.
While the Court upholds the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed upon Mauricio in
Criminal Case No. Q-00-93225 for Simple Rape, there is a need to modify the penalty imposed in
Criminal Case No. Q-0093226 for Rape by Sexual Assault in view of the failure of the prosecution to
satisfactorily prove the age of BBB. While the information alleged that BBB was “8 years of age, a
minor,” and the parties stipulated on her minority during the pre-trial conference, the same are
insufficient evidence of her age which must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself.
As the Court succinctly explained in People v. Soria:
“[T]here must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused.” Documents such as
her original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal certificate or school records would suffice
as competent evidence of her age. Here, there was nothing on record to prove the minority of “AAA”
other than her testimony, Mauricio’s absence of denial, and their pre-trial stipulation. The
prosecution also failed to establish that the documents referred to above were lost, destroyed,
unavailable or otherwise totally absent. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Apart from BBB’s testimony and the aforesaid stipulation, records are bereft of sufficient
evidence to prove BBB’s age.
Page 311 of 519

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO GUTIEREZ y ROBLES ALIAS ROD AND JOHN
LENNON
G.R. No. 208007, April 2, 2014, J. Leonen
Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the
accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation;
whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done through fraud or
grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual
intercourse.
Facts:
On November 30, 2005, an information was filed against Rodrigo Gutierez before the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Upon arraignment, Rodrigo Gutierez pleaded “not guilty.” Trial
on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented the victim, AAA, who was then 10 years old and a
Grade 2 student. She testified that on November 29, 2005, she went home from school at around 12
noon to have lunch. On the way home, she met Rodrigo at his house. He brought her to his room and
laid her down on the bed. He then raised her skirt and removed her panties. He pulled down his pants
and then inserted his penis into her vagina. According to AAA, Rodrigo stayed on top of her for a long
time, and when he withdrew his penis, white liquid came out. He then gave her five pesos (P5.00)
before she went back to school. AAA also disclosed during trial that Rodrigo had done the same thing
to her about 10 times on separate occasions. After each act, he would give her ten (P10.00) or five
(P5.00) pesos. The prosecution also presented Dr. Asuncion Ogues as an expert witness. Dr. Ogues
was the superior of Dr. Pascua who examined AAA. Dr. Ogues testified based on the medical
certificate issued by the examining physician that there was blunt force penetrating trauma that
could have been caused by sexual abuse.
In his defense, Rodrigo denied the allegation and claimed he was already at work at 1:30 p.m.
He has known AAA for a long time since his family rented the house of AAA’s grandfather from 2001
to 2004. Rodrigo admitted that he had a relationship with AAA’s sister, and they even lived together
as common law spouses. He also admitted that a similar complaint was filed against him by AAA’s
mother when AAA was eight years old, but they settled the case at the barangay level.
On July 4, 2007, the trial court rendered a judgment finding Rodrigo guilty.
Rodrigo appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that AAA’s testimony fell short of the requirement
of the law on the quantum of evidence required. He argued that she did not cry for help when her
family’s house was just nearby, which was cause for reasonable doubt that the trial court failed to
appreciate. On February 28, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the conviction.
Hence, this appeal was instituted.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Rodrigo was guilty
of statutory rape punishable under Article 266A of the Revised Penal Code.
Page 312 of 519

Ruling:
Yes. Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2)
the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or
intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done
through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that
there was sexual intercourse.
As shown by her testimony, AAA was able to narrate in a clear and categorical manner the
ordeal that was done to her. As a child victim who has taken significant risks in coming to court, her
testimony deserves full weight and credence. People v. Veloso, 690 SCRA 586 (2013), stated that: In a
litany of cases, this Court has ruled that the testimonies of child victims of rape are to be given full
weight and credence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who barely
understands sex and sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if what
she claims is not true. Her candid narration of how she was raped bears the earmarks of credibility,
especially if no ill will — as in this case — motivates her to testify falsely against the accused. It is
well settled that when a woman, more so when she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is required to prove the ravishment. The accused may thus be convicted solely on her
testimony — provided it is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things.
In any case, whether she cried for help is immaterial in a charge of statutory rape since “[t]he
law presumes that such a victim, on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of her
own.” Beyond reasonable doubt, Rodrigo Gutierez raped AAA, a minor who was only 10 years of age,
on November 29, 2005.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMENIGILDO DELEN y ESCOBILLA

G.R. No. 194446, April 21, 2014, J. De Castro
Under Section 3(b), Article I of Republic Act No. 7610, the term "child abuse" is defined as the
maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes the physical abuse of a child, among
other acts. In this case, AAA positively identified Delen as the person who kicked her in the buttocks, hit
her head with a hammer, and smashed her head on the wall on. Furthermore, the Court finds no cogent
reason to disbelieve AAA’s testimony, which was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Rivamonte
and Dr. Arellano that the victim’s hymen had "complete healed lacerations at 1, 3, 6, 9 o’clock positions."
Jurisprudence provides that the eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings
attesting to her non-virgin state, should be enough to confirm the truth of her charges of rape.
Facts:
Delen was separately charged with child abuse under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act
No. 7610 and qualified rape in separate informations before the RTC. Said crimes were alleged to
have been committed against AAA as follows:
AAA was born on March 29, 1992 to Delen and BBB. AAA’s parents separated as Delen was
beating BBB. AAA then lived with her aunt until the Delen took her in. In the year 2000, AAA lived in
the Delen’s house. One day, she was awakened from her sleep when Delen removed her shorts and
panty. Delen then removed his shorts and went on top of AAA. He inserted his penis into her organ
Page 313 of 519
and told her not to create any noise because their neighbors might hear them. He also warned AAA
that he would kill her if she would report the incident. AAA could not do anything but cry.
Subsequently, at around 6:00 a.m. on January 17, 2005, AAA woke up with her legs spread apart and
tied to wooden panels on the wall. She was only wearing her upper clothing and was not wearing her
shorts and panty anymore. Delen removed his shorts and only wore briefs. Delen then lay on top of
her and began to insert his penis into her organ, which caused her pain. While Delen was doing said
act, he told AAA not to report the incident; otherwise, he threatened to cut her tongue and kill her.
Thereafter, the Delen untied her.
On January 23, 2005, Delen asked AAA to look for a lighter. When AAA failed to find one, Delen
told her to go inside a room in their house. There, he kicked AAA in the buttocks, hit her head with a
hammer and smashed her head on the wooden wall. She suffered injuries on her forehead and the
back of her head. Afterwards, she told the Delen that she was going to use the toilet so she was able
to go out of their house. She ran to the street and went to the house of a neighbor, Ate Annie. Delen
looked for her there so she hid under the bed. After Delen left, AAA was brought to the house of Nanay
Loleng, a neighbor of Ate Annie. They treated AAA’s wounds and put her to sleep. When she woke up,
the barangay tanods were already at the place. They first talked to AAA then they called the police so
that Delen could be apprehended. When Delen was arrested, AAA was brought to the police station
where she gave her statement. AAA was then taken to the hospital where she was treated and
examined by doctors.
Issue:
Whether or not Delen is guilty of child abuse and qualified rape.
Ruling:
Yes.
In Criminal Case No. 13870, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found Delen guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing child abuse by infliction of physical injury against AAA. Under
Section 3(b), Article I of Republic Act No. 7610, the term "child abuse" is defined as the maltreatment
of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes the physical abuse of a child, among other acts.
In this case, AAA positively identified Delen as the person who kicked her in the buttocks, hit
her head with a hammer, and smashed her head on the wall on January 23, 2005. Because of the said
brutal and inhumane acts of Delen, AAA suffered bruises and contusions in different parts of her
body. The Medico-Legal Certification of Dr. Rivamonte and Dr. Arellano clearly reflected the fact that
AAA indeed sustained contusions, coupled with a finding that she suffered multiple physical injuries
secondary to mauling.
In the case of qualified rape, pursuant to Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, a charge of
rape to prosper under the above provision, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat, or
intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under
twelve years of age or was demented.
Page 314 of 519

In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish that Delen had carnal knowledge of
AAA on January 17, 2005. AAA narrated in a straightforward manner the harrowing details of how
Delen had sexual intercourse with her. Again, the RTC found credible and convincing AAA’s testimony
on this matter. Likewise, the Court finds no cogent reason to disbelieve AAA’s testimony, which was
corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Rivamonte and Dr. Arellano that the victim’s hymen had
"complete healed lacerations at 1, 3, 6, 9 o’clock positions." The Court held in People v. Oden that the
"eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings attesting to her non-virgin state,
should be enough to confirm the truth of her charges." As to the manner by which the rape was
committed, the Delen’s moral ascendancy over AAA takes the place of the force and intimidation that
is required in rape cases.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN

G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014, J. Reyes
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage.
A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon
her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and
penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353. It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to
love one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are
both spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion. The
definition of rape in Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual
assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single
definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape
committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage.
Facts:
In 1975, Jumawan and victim KKK got married and bore 4 children. In 1998, KKK and
Jumawan started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed to attend to him. In October
1998, Jumawan, his wife KKK and their children went about their nightly routine. The family store in
their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK did some of
her motherly duties to her children. Soon after, the Jumawan fetched KKK and bid her to come with
him to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied.
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did
not lie thereon with Jumawan and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive
behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order:
“You transfer here to our bed.” KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache
and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he
got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on
the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.
Jumawan then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by
tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she
was not feeling well. Jumawan again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed
defiant by refusing to bend her legs. Jumawan then raised KKK's daster, stretched her legs apart and
rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in
Page 315 of 519

penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately
shouting: “Don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well.”
Evening of the following day, KKK decided to spend the night in the room's small bed and the
girls were already fixing the beddings when Jumawan entered. “Why are you sleeping in the room of
our children”, he asked KKK, who responded that she preferred to sleep with the children. He left the
room and returned 15 minutes later and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated.
He lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: “Why will you
sleep here. Lets go to our bedroom.” When she defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing them
to tear apart. At this point, MMM interfered, “Pa, don't do that to Mama because we are in front of you.”
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify Jumawan who yelled, “Even in front of you, I
can have sex of your mother because I'm the head of the family.” The episodes in the bedroom were no
less disturbing. Jumawan forcibly pulled KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she
begged, “Don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you
wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex.” After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed
her legs, held her hands, mounted her and forced himself inside her.
Issue:
Whether or not Jumawan is guilty of rape.
Ruling:
Yes, Accused Jumawan is guilty of marital rape.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory
(states that women and wives are mere properties of men and husbands that they can have sexual
intercourse anytime) evolved have already been superseded by modem global principles on the
equality of rights between men and women and respect for human dignity established in various
international conventions, such as the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW). The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW,
recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in
the family is needed to achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take
all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women,
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes. One of such measures is
R.A. No. 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a
husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her consent to every act of
sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed. Another important interna-tional
instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women,
which was Promulgated by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the CEDAW. The Declaration, in
enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that constitute acts of discrimination against
women, identified “marital rape” as a species of sexual violence.
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage.
A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon
her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Decla-ration, defines
and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353. It is true that the Family Code, obligates the
Page 316 of 519
spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of
love, that are both spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or
coercion.
The definition of rape in Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known;
(b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The
single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between
rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords
protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other man alike. In fine, since
the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide for different
definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the law dictates,
cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law
sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as
it would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently
from the victims of non-marital rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRED TRAIGO

G.R. No. 199096, June 02, 2014, J. Brion
AAA was only ten (10) years old when Traigo raped her in September 2004. The minority of the
victim and her relationship to Traigo, however, raised the crime from statutory rape to qualified rape.
Simply put, qualified rape is statutory rape in its qualified form. The also evidence showed that the she
was 12 years old when she was raped on March 2006, as evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth
showing that she was born on November, 18, 1993. The evidence also established that the Traigo was
the common-law spouse of BBB. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall
be imposed when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim. The SC cannot, however, impose the death penalty in view of Republic Act
No. 9346, entitled “An Act Prohibiting the imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines.”
Facts:
AAA testified that the Fred Traigo inserted his penis into her vagina on two occasions that is
on March 2006 and September 2004. Her testimony was corroborated by the Initial Medico-Legal
Report showing that she suffered deep-healed hymenal lacerations. The RTC convicted Traigo of the
crimes of rape and qualified rape for the sexual abuses committed against AAA on March 2006 and
September 2004, respectively. The CA also ruled that the exact date of the rape is immaterial, and
that AAA’s delay in reporting this first rape was understandable since the appellant threatened to kill
her mother, BBB, if she would reveal the incident to anyone.
For the simple rape committed in March 2006, the RTC sentenced Traigo to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal interest. For the
qualified rape committed in September 2004, the RTC sentenced Traigo to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay the victim the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, also with legal
interest until fully paid.
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On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. It found AAA to be a “credible, honest, and
straightforward witness;” AAA never wavered in her identification of Traigo as her abuser despite
the defense’s grueling cross-examination. According to the CA, the testimony of a sole witness is
sufficient for conviction if it is free from any sign of impropriety or falsehood. The CA also found
unmeritorious Traigo’s denial, and reasoned out that the presence of other persons inside the room
did not negate the commission of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed by Traigo should be modified from simple rape to
qualified rape
Ruling:
Yes, the SC denied the appeal, but modified the crime committed, the penalty imposed, and
the awarded indemnities.
Traigo did not impute any improper motive on AAA’s part to falsely testify against him. AAA’s
testimony was also corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Joseph Palmero showing that the
victim suffered “deep-healed lacerations at 3 & 8 o’clock position” on her hymen. It is settled that
when a rape victim's account is straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by the medical
findings of the examining physician, the testimony is sufficient to support a conviction.
The Court find unmeritorious Traigo’s defense that it was impossible for him to rape AAA
because the latter’s two sisters also slept in the same place when the rapes allegedly happened. It is
recognized that lust is no respecter of time and place; rape can thus be committed even in places
where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where
there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family are also
sleeping. To the Court’s mind, it is not impossible or incredible for the members of the victim's sisters
to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while a sexual assault is being committed.
The Court modified the crime committed by the appellant in Criminal Case No. 133721 from
simple rape to qualified rape. The evidence showed that she was 12 years old when she was raped
on March 2006, as evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth showing that she was born on November,
18, 1993. The evidence also established that the appellant was the common-law spouse of BBB.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim
is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim. The Court cannot, however, impose the death penalty in view of Republic Act No. 9346,
entitled “An Act Prohibiting the imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines.” In lieu of the
death penalty, we impose on the appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole. Accordingly, the Court increases the awarded moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.
The Court likewise points out in Criminal Case No. 133722 that AAA was only ten (10) years
old when Traigo raped her in September 2004. The minority of the victim and her relationship to the
Traigo, however, raised the crime from statutory rape to qualified rape. Simply put, qualified rape is
statutory rape in its qualified form. Accordingly, the Court sentences Traigo to suffer the penalty of
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reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole; and increase the awarded moral damages from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 to conform to prevailing jurisprudence on qualified rape cases.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VALENTIN SABAL y PARBA, JR.

G.R. No. 201861, June 2, 2014, J. Brion
The modification of the crime committed by the Valentin Sabal from statutory rape to qualified
rape is proper. The evidence also established that the appellant was the brother of the victims' father.
The minority of the victims and their relationship to the appellant in the present case raised the crime
from statutory rape to qualified rape.
Facts:
In its decision dated August 20, 2008, the RTC convicted Valentin Sabal of two counts of
statutory rape for having carnal knowledge with two his nieces, AAA and BBB on May 2, 2003. The
RTC found the testimonies of the AAA and BBB credible and convincing; it was corroborated by the
findings of Dr. Victoria Galang showing that both victims suffered hymenal lacerations on their
private part. The RTC added that it was inconceivable for minor children aged ten (10) and seven (7)
years old, who are unfamiliar and naïve in the ways of the world, to fabricate a story of rape, allow
an examination of their private parts, and submit themselves to public ridicule had they not been
really sexually abused. It also found unmeritorious the appellant’s denial for being uncorroborated.
Accordingly, the RTC imposed on Valentin Sabal the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and directed him
to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as actual
damages, for each count of statutory rape. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision with
modifications. We decide the appeal, filed by appellant Valentin Sabal, Jr., decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of Valentin Sabal of statutory rape is proper.
Ruling:
No, the Court affirms Valentin Sabal’s conviction, but modify the designation of the crime
committed.
For a charge of rape to prosper under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he
accomplished such act through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. Sexual congress
with a girl under 12 years old is always rape. In this type of rape, force and intimidation are
immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took
place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her
tender years; the child’s consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern evil
from good. In the present case, AAA testified that while she was in the house of her grandmother in
the afternoon of May 2, 2003, her uncle, Sabal, undressed her and went on top of her; Sabal then
inserted his penis in her vagina, as a result of which she felt pain. BBB, for her part, narrated that on
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the same day and place, the Sabal removed her panty, inserted his penis in her vagina, and made a
‘push and pull movement.’ According to BBB, she kept crying during the rape.
Notably, Dr. Galang’s medical findings showed that both victims suffered hymenal lacerations
on their private part; she also testified that there had been penetration of the victims’ vagina. We find
unmeritorious the appellant’s twin defenses of denial and alibi. Denial could not prevail over the
victim’s direct, positive and categorical assertion. We modify the crime committed by the Valentin
Sabal in Criminal Case from statutory rape to qualified rape. The presented evidence showed that
AAA and BBB were ten (10) and seven (7) years old, respectively, when the appellant raped them on
May 2, 2003. The evidence also established that the appellant was the brother of the victims' father.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim
is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim. The minority of the victims and their relationship to Sabal in the present case raised the crime
from statutory rape to qualified rape. Since the death penalty cannot be imposed in view of Republic
Act No. 9346, the CA correctly sentenced Sabal to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole for each count.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEMOCRITO PARAS

G.R. No. 192912, June 4, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Pregnancy is not an essential element of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore
was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and
decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter's will or without her
consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. Thus, when the victim, a 17-
year old girl who was the house helper of the sister of the accused, categorically and consistently testified
that the accused had carnal knowledge of her while pointing a gun in her mouth, the courts will give
credence to her testimony and convict the accused regardless of the pregnancy of the victim.
Facts:
Democrito Paras was charged with rape before the RTC. It was alleged that sometime in
March 1996, AAA, a 17-year old house-helper of the Spouses Sergio and Heny Agua, the latter being
accused-appellant Democrito Paras’s sister. AAA was weeding the grass of her employer’s yard when
she was approached by a gun-wielding Paras. Paras pointed the gun at AAA’s mouth and gained
carnal knowledge of the latter. Subsequently, AAA got pregnant due to the incident, and gave birth to
a child.
Paras denied having raped AAA, and testified that he was in the market the whole day at the
time the alleged rape occurred. Paras also asserted that AAA accused her of rape due to a
misunderstanding between him and Sergio regarding the mango trees owned by Paras’s mother.
The RTC convicted Paras as charged, and the CA upheld the RTC. Hence the appeal.
Paras argues that since AAA was already 3 months pregnant when she was examined on
October 1996, AAA could have had sexual intercourse sometime in June or July 1996 and not in March
1996 when the alleged rape was supposed to have been committed.
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Issue:
Did the pregnancy of AAA prove that Paras did not rape her?
Ruling:
The appeal is denied.
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged the accused-appellant guilty of
rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent using force or intimidation. The courts
a quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the Paras as the perpetrator
of the sexual abuse. After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, the Court finds that AAA was
indeed categorical and consistent in her testimony that Paras was the one who pointed a gun to her
mouth and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. We, thus, see no reason to disturb the lower
courts’ appreciation of the credibility of AAA’s testimony.
Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape
victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is
important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter's will
or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEMOCRITO PARAS

G.R. No. 192912, June 4, 2014 ,
Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime
are not grounds for acquittal. As long as the inaccuracies concern only minor matters, the same do not
affect the credibility of witnesses. Truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-free
testimonies considering the lapse of time and treachery of human memory. Inaccuracies may even
suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.
Authorities in forensic medicine agree that the determination of the exact date of fertilization
is problematic. The exact date thereof is unknown; thus, the difficulty in determining the actual normal
duration of pregnancy. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child
which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no
moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against
the latter's will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner.
Facts:
While the victim [AAA], a house-helper of spouses Sergio and Heny Agua, was weeding grass
using a bolo at her employer’s farm in [XXX], appellant Democrito Paras approached her from behind.
He pulled [AAA] towards the lower portion of the farm and pointed a short firearm at her mouth.
While pointing the gun at [AAA], Democrito Paras pulled down her long pants and panties. He also
pulled down his pants and underwear. He laid [AAA] on the grassy ground and mounted her. Since
[AAA] was afraid of him and that she was also afraid to kill a person, she did not strike appellant with
Page 321 of 519
the bolo she was holding. Democrito Paras told [AAA] not to shout. While struggling, [AAA] even
threw stones at him. After appellant consummated his bestial lust, he dressed up and fled, while
[AAA] went back to the house of her employers Subsequently, [AAA] got pregnant due to the incident.
She gave birth to a child who was more than a year old when [AAA] testified.
The defense, on the other hand, laid out the following narrative of denial and alibi. Accused-
appellant, Democrito Paras, knows the private complainant because she was the helper at the house
of his elder sister. He vehemently denie[d] having raped AAA.
RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime charged which was upheld by CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Democrito Paras is guilty for the crime of rape.
Ruling:
Yes, Democrito Paras is guilty for the crime of rape.
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged the accused-appellant guilty of
rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent using force or intimidation. The courts
a quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the sexual abuse. After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, the Court finds
that AAA was indeed categorical and consistent in her testimony that the accused-appellant was the
one who pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her.
Inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-appellant in the testimony of AAA, namely, her
inability to remember the birth date of her child and the name of her neighbor, did not destroy her
credibility as a witness. These details had nothing to do with the essential elements of rape, that is,
carnal knowledge of a person through force or intimidation.
Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime
are not grounds for acquittal. As long as the inaccuracies concern only minor matters, the same do
not affect the credibility of witnesses. Truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-
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free testimonies considering the lapse of time and treachery of human memory. Inaccuracies may
even suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.
Authorities in forensic medicine agree that the determination of the exact date of fertilization
is problematic. The exact date thereof is unknown; thus, the difficulty in determining the actual
normal duration of pregnancy. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether
the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is
of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim
against the latter's will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful
manner.
Anent the alleged failure of AAA to defend herself despite having many opportunities to do
so, we are not persuaded. People react differently under emotional stress. There is no standard form
of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident, especially if the assailant is physically
near. The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. In a
given situation, some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be frozen into silence.
Consequently, the failure of complainant to run away or shout for help at the very first opportunity
cannot be construed consent to the sexual intercourse.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO BESMONTE

G.R. No. 196228, June 4, 2014,
To convict an accused for statutory rape, two elements must be proven: 1.) the victim is a female
under 12 years of age or is demented; and the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim. Thus, where
the prosecution was able to present a 7-year old girl’s credible, positive and categorical testimony
relative to the circumstances surrounding her rape; and the physical evidence consistent with AAA’s
assertion that she was raped, the accused must be held guilty of statutory rape.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Renato Besmonte was charged with two counts of statutory rape. The
prosecution alleged that the victim AAA was merely seven years old when the first rape incident was
committed. Besmonte was in AAA’s house, and after her younger brothers left the house upon
Besmonte’s instructions, the latter ordered AAA to lie down on a mat and remove her clothes.
Afterwards he undressed and tried to insert his penis into her vagina but was unable to penetrate
since AAA was crying because of pain. This prompted Besmonte to leave.
The second rape incident occurred when AAA was accompanying Besmonte in the upland to
get some root crops. AAA was made to sit down on a banana leaf Besmonte placed on the ground. He
tried to look for lice on her hair, and AAA was surprised when he poked a fan knife at her chest and
ordered her to lie down and remove her clothes. Thenceforth, he undressed himself, laid on top of
her, and succeeded in inserting his penis into AAA’s vagina. The latter felt pain and observed that her
vagina was torn. Besmonte denied raping AAA, her niece, on both occasions.
The RTC found Besmonte guilty of the two counts of rape, and imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
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Issue:
Were the accusations of rape insufficiently proven?
Ruling:
Basic in the prosecution of statutory rape is that there must be concurrence of the following
elements:
1. the victim is a female under 12 years of age or is demented; and

2. the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim.
Thus, to successfully convict an accused for said crime, it is imperative for the prosecution to prove
that the age of the woman is under 12 years and carnal knowledge took place.
In this case, Besmonte was charged with two counts of statutory rape. The RTC and the Court
of Appeals were one in finding that he twice had carnal knowledge of AAA, a child of tender years at
the time of the commission of the two counts of rape. Despite his vigorous protestations, the Court
agrees in the finding that the crime of rape committed by Besmonte against AAA was proved by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the following:
a) AAA’s credible, positive and categorical testimony relative to the circumstances

surrounding her rape; and
b) The physical evidence consistent with AAA’s assertion that she was raped.
Besmonte would have the Court reverse his conviction for the first count of statutory rape on
the ground that AAA admitted in open court that the rape committed in March 2000 did not happen.
His attempt is futile. A review of the transcript of the testimony of AAA clarified such
misleading assertion – her testimony that nothing happened simply meant that he tried to insert his
penis into her vagina but was unsuccessful because it did not fit. In fact, AAA cried out with pain at
his attempts to put it in; and her cry of pain was what prompted Besmonte to leave abruptly. That
she suffered severe pain inside her genitalia while his penis was penetrating her, could only be
understood in light of the foregoing explanation made herein about his penis attaining some degree
of penetration beneath the surface of her genitalia.
Carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated statutory rape, does not
require full penile penetration of the female. In People v. Campuhan, the Court made clear that the
mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient
to constitute carnal knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the consummated stage of rape is for
the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact with the lips of
the pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is consummated once the penis of the accused
capable of consummating the sexual act touches either labia of the pudendum. And People v. Bali-
Balita instructed that the touching that constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal contact, or
stroking or grazing of organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the
victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, but rather the erect penis touching the labias or sliding into the
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female genitalia. xxx is required, however, that this manner of touching of the labias must be
sufficiently and convincingly established. For the Court, the proof of the touching of the penis of
accused-appellant and the labias of AAA had been convincingly established – from AAA’s categorical
testimony that his penis had gone beyond her mons pubis and had reached her labias majora and
minora.
With respect to the rape committed on May 4, 2001 the Court concurs with the RTC and the
Court of Appeals’ conclusion that AAA’s testimonial account thereon and the physical injury that she
sustained as a result thereof sufficiently and convincingly established the commission of the second
count of statutory rape. Besmonte tried to interject reasonable doubt thereto by claiming that AAA’s
account of the second incident was highly incredible considering that she did not even bother to
escape from him; or why she even went with Besmonte in the first place in view of the supposed
earlier incident of rape.
But the Court, in People v. Jastiva taught that it does not follow that because the victim failed
to shout for help or struggle against her attacker means that she could not have been raped. The force,
violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age, size, and strength
of the parties but also on their relationship with each other. And physical resistance need not be
established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself
against her will to the rapist’s advances because of fear for her life and personal safety, or the exercise
of the moral ascendancy of the rapist over the victim.
Time and again, this Court has recognized that different people react differently to a given
situation involving a startling occurrence. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional
stress are unpredictable, and people react differently - some may shout, others may faint, and still
others may be shocked into insensibility even if there may be a few who may openly welcome the
intrusion. More to the point, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman
involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELIAS BUENVINOTO y PAGLINAWAN

G.R. No. 207990, June 9, 2014, J. Reyes
When a de facto foster father was alleged to have raped his de facto minor adopted child, and
the victim had clearly and categorically testified that he had penetrated her vagina, the absence of
hymenal laceration does not preclude rape, because it is possible for a woman’s hymen to remain intact
even after having been raped if it is lax, thick and elastic. Carnal knowledge is the element of rape, not
hymenal laceration. Further, delays in the reporting of the rape does not destroy the credibility of the
rape victim, especially when the accused had performed acts of violence on the victim, which are enough
to cow the 13-year old victim into silence.
Facts:
When AAA was still an infant, her biological mother, BBB, abandoned the family. AAA and her
four siblings were thus left in the sole care of their father, CCC, a shoemaker. When AAA was seven
months old, she was given by CCC to their neighbors, the accused-appellant Elias Buenvinoto and his
common-law wife. However, the adoption was merely verbal and was never formalized.
AAA claimed that she was raped by Buenvinoto on four separate occasions in 2004. Back then,
AAA was 13 years old. Shortly after AAA was allegedly raped for the fourth time, she reported the
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matter to the authorities. Four separate informations were thereafter filed before the RTC against
Buenvinoto.
Among the witnesses for the prosecution was AAA herself, who recounted the sordid acts
which Buenvinoto had committed against her. AAA alleged that she was first raped at around 11:00
a.m. of June 14, 2004. She was then at home, washing the dishes when Buenvinoto poked a knife at
her neck and dragged her towards a room. Buenvinoto undressed her even when she struggled to
push him away. He then inserted his penis inside her vagina and she cried in pain. He kicked her
when she continued in her attempt to push him away.
The second rape incident occurred at around 2:00 p.m. of July 7, 2004. AAA was at home
cooking food and washing. Buenvinoto dragged her to a room. At knifepoint, he undressed her, put a
piece of cloth in her mouth and made her lie down in bed. He again succeeded in inserting his penis
inside her vagina. When she tried to push him way, he slapped her. Thereafter, he ordered her to buy
ice. She complied as she was too consumed by fear.
At around 10:00 a.m. of August 18, 2004, AAA was working on her school assignments.
Buenvinoto again dragged her into a room and tore her dress apart. She cried and pleaded for the
Buenvinoto to stop. Her pleas fell on deaf ears as Buenvinoto proceeded to rape her for the third time.
On September 13, 2004, at around 3:00 a.m., both AAA and Buenvinoto were at home. The
latter forcefully removed AAA’s short pants and underwear, undressed himself and inserted his penis
into her vagina.
Dr, Fajardo, medico legal officer from the NBI, testified that she examined AAA’s genitalia and
found that her hymen was intact and did not bear lacerations, it was distensible, extending to more
than 2.5 centimeters. Dr. Fajardo explained that this condition is commonly caused by sexual
intercourse.
The defense, on its part, offered as evidence the lone testimony of the accused-appellant.
Buenvinoto interposed denial and alibi as defenses. He stated that on the dates and times the alleged
rape occurred, he was home alone and was oblivious of AAA’s whereabouts. Buenvinoto speculated
that the rape complaints were filed for the purpose of discrediting and ruining him, but the questions
of by whom and for what reason it was done, he could not answer. He claimed that AAA has been in
his custody since the latter was almost one year old and that their relationship with each other was
pleasant.
The RTC convicted Buenvinoto for four counts of simple rape. AAA clearly and categorically
stated that he was able to penetrate his penis into her vagina. The absence of lacerations or injury in
AAA’s vagina does not preclude rape. Buenvinoto’s alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive
and categorical statements of AAA. The CA affirmed the RTC in toto.
Issue:
Was Buenvinoto’s guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, considering that there
were no hymenal lacerations and AAA’s delay in reporting the rape incidents?
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Ruling:
The Court finds the RTC and CA decisions as amply supported by both evidence and
jurisprudence. Buenvinoto had not ascribed any ill motive on the part of AAA which could have
otherwise impelled her to file a fabricated charge. Further, AAA’s testimony was straightforward,
categorical and unwavering. It is likewise unlikely that a girl of tender age can concoct with detail the
commission against her of such sordid acts, which would cast shame and dishonor upon her family.
The Court need not belabor each of Buenvinoto’s arguments as the RTC and CA had
sufficiently disposed of the same. However, the Court takes exception of two of the accused-
appellant’s defenses, to wit, AAA’s lack of hymenal lacerations and the delay in reporting the rape
incidents.
Buenvinoto posited that the absence of lacerations in AAA’s hymen proves that she did not
fight off the sexual advances. Instead, her vaginal canal was lubricated, hence, evidence exists that
she was aroused during those instances of sexual intercourse. The Court agrees with the CA that the
Buenvinoto’s claim is plainly inane.
AAA cried rape and unwaveringly testified on how and when the acts were committed. The
accused-appellant, on the other hand, offered flimsy and uncorroborated defenses of alibi and denial,
and even now implores the Court to be swayed by his proposition that AAA consented to the
performance of sexual acts upon her. Buenvinoto’s alibi and denial were inconsistent with his claim
of consensual intercourse. Besides, the Court has repeatedly ruled that it is possible for a woman’s
hymen to remain intact even after having been raped if it is lax, thick and elastic.
As to AAA’s delay in reporting the rape incidents to the authorities, the Court finds no reason
to rule that this omission puts a dent on the credibility of her testimony. Delay in revealing the
commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This
is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the harsh glare
of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the
complainant.
In the case at bar, it is worth remembering that Buenvinoto had repeatedly inflicted acts of
physical violence and intimidation against AAA. He had slapped her, poked a knife at her neck, kicked
her, and shoved a piece of cloth in her mouth. These acts are enough to cow a 13-year-old girl into
silence and submission especially since the perpetrator is her own de facto adoptive father. The delay
is hence justified. Besides, there was no delay to speak of as far as the fourth rape incident is
concerned.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERUSALEM ESTEBAN y BALLESTEROS

G.R. No. 200920, June 9, 2014, J. Reyes
No sane girl would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and
subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek
justice for the wrong done to her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
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The Court has time and time again ruled that denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses as
these are self-serving. The absence of fresh lacerations in the hymen cannot be a firm indication that the
complainant was not raped. It is settled that hymenal lacerations are not an element of rape.
After a thorough perusal of the records of this case, the Court finds that the prosecution was
able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC. AAA,
who was then only 13 years old, testified that Esteban succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her
and, thus, being AAA’s father, is presumed to have employed force and/or intimidation. Both the lower
courts found AAA’s testimony in this matter clear, convincing and credible.
Facts:
It was alleged in an information charging the accused Jerusalem Esteban y Ballesteros

(Esteban) for the felony of rape that by means of force, threat and intimidation, he did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the private complainant [AAA] against
her will and in their own house, with the aggravating circumstances, to wit: the victim [AAA] is under
eighteen years of age; he is the father (parent) of the victim; and the rape was committed in the
dwelling house where both accused and victim reside.
Esteban pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. After pre-trial conference, trial on the merits
ensued. People alleged that on December 17, 2002, at around midnight, Esteban entered the room
where AAA, his daughter who was only 13 years old then, was sleeping. After entering the room,
Esteban removed his clothes and went beside AAA. Esteban then touched AAA’s back and started to
undress her. AAA shouted and struggled to prevent her father’s advances, but the latter threatened
and intimidated her. After removing AAA’s clothes, Esteban went on top of AAA; despite AAA’s pleas,
he inserted his penis in AAA’s vagina. After satisfying his lust, Esteban left AAA in the room. AAA
reported the incident to her brother BBB and her aunt CCC, who both did not believe her. AAA then
told her other aunt DDD what her father did to her; the latter then brought AAA to the barangay office
to report the matter. Afterwards, they proceeded to the police station in Mayantoc where AAA
executed her sworn statement.
On December 19, 2002, AAA submitted herself to medical examination by Dr. Carolyn Abrigo,
who found old lacerations above AAA’s clitoris and over her hymen. Esteban denied the allegations
against him, and claimed that at the time of the alleged rape incident, he was staying at the house of
his employer, Engineer Villalon, which is about 1,000 meters away from his own house. Before 2002,
only four of his six children were living with him. When AAA was only seven years old, EEE, his eldest
daughter, brought AAA to live with her in their house at Maliwalo, Tarlac City. There, EEE’s husband
raped AAA, but the case filed against him was settled and eventually dismissed. Thereafter, EEE took
AAA to Manila. In 2002, AAA and her other siblings again lived with Esteban in Mayantoc, Tarlac.
He also claimed that AAA visited him in jail after she had given her testimony in open court
and gave him a letter wherein she supposedly stated that her allegations against her father were not
true and that she was just angry at him for his failure to protect her from the sexual abuse she suffered
from her brother-in-law.
RTC ruled that Esteban is guilty of the crime of Rape punishable under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended in relation to Article 266-B (1) of the same Code.
Page 328 of 519

CA affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. As regards the letter supposedly written by
AAA, the CA held that, other than Esteban’s claim, there is no other evidence to support the finding
that AAA indeed retracted her allegations against her father in the said letter. Further, the CA opined
that the said letter is hearsay and has no probative value as AAA was never called to testify thereon.
Further, the absence of fresh laceration on AAA’s hymen, the CA pointed out, does not negate the
conclusion that Esteban raped AAA. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision which found Esteban guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC.
Ruling:
No. The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
The crime of rape is defined under Article 266-A of the RPC, which states that:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. – Rape is committed:

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in

paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis
into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
the genital or anal orifice of another person.
The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or
intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the
victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the felony of rape is
qualified when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is, inter alia, a parent.
After a thorough perusal of the records of this case, the Court finds that the prosecution was
able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC.
AAA testified that Esteban succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her and, thus, being AAA’s
father, is presumed to have employed force and/or intimidation. Both the lower courts found AAA’s
testimony in this matter clear, convincing and credible.
It is well-settled that, in a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally
accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by
substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court
Page 329 of 519

overlooked material and relevant matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual
findings of the court below. The Court sees no reason to depart from the foregoing rule.
Other than Esteban’s testimony that AAA indeed wrote the said letter, there is no other
evidence which would support the said claim. It is but a mere unsubstantiated allegation and, hence,
not worthy of credence. Further, as aptly pointed out by the CA, the said letter is hearsay since AAA
was not called upon to testify on the contents thereof.
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that AAA, then only 13 years old, would feign a traumatizing
experience merely out of spite towards her father, who supposedly failed to protect her from the
sexual abuse she suffered from her brother-in-law. No sane girl would concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not
in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. The weight of such testimony may be
countered by physical evidence to the contrary or indubitable proof that the accused could not have
committed the rape, but in the absence of such countervailing proof, the testimony shall be accorded
utmost value.
Against AAA’s testimony, Esteban was only able to proffer the defense of denial and alibi. The
Court has time and time again ruled that denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses as these are
self-serving.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE DALAN y PALDINGAN

G.R. No. 203086, June 11, 2014, J. Brion
The term statutory rape should only be confined to situations where the victim of rape is a
person less than 12 years of age. If the victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation, the crime committed is simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1) (b) as she is
considered "deprived of reason" notwithstanding that her mental age is equivalent to that of a person
under 12. In short, carnal knowledge with a mental retardate whose mental age is that of a person below
12 years, while akin to statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d), should still be designated as
simple rape under paragraph 1(b).
Facts:
The RTC convicted the Jose Dalan (Dalan) of two counts of statutory rape. It ruled that the
prosecution was able to prove that the Dalan inserted his penis in AAA's vagina on two occasions,
namely, in December 2006 and on March 3, 2007. It added that AAA's testimony was corroborated
by the medical findings of Dr. Sabrina Florendo. The RTC further explained that AAA's mental
retardation cannot disqualify her as a witness, since she capably narrated the details of the sexual
abuses committed against her by the Dalan.
Accordingly, the RTC sentenced the Dalan to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages, both for each count of statutory rape.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA ruled that AAA positively identified the
Dalan as the person who raped her on two occasions. According to the CA, AAA was consistent in her
Page 330 of 519
recollection of the details of the crime. It also added that AAA’s moderate mental retardation was
sufficiently established by the prosecution’s evidence. Finally, the RTC found the Dalan’s
uncorroborated denial and alibi to be unmeritorious. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation of the crime should be statutory rape.
Ruling:
The Court denies the appeal, but modifies the designation of the crime committed and the
awarded indemnities.
In the present case, the prosecution established the elements of rape under Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. First, AAA positively identified the Dalan as the person who
inserted his penis in her vagina in December 2006 and in March 2007; she never wavered in this
identification. Significantly, AAA’s claim of sexual intercourse had been corroborated by the medical
findings and testimony of Dr. Florendo who testified that the marked attenuated hymen at 6 o’clock
position was most probably caused by an erect penis, while the absent hymen at the 4, 5 and 7 o’clock
positions could be caused by repeated sexual experience.
Second, the prosecution satisfactorily established the mental condition of the victim. Dr. Ekid
conducted a battery of tests to determine the mental age, social maturity and emotional condition of
AAA. During trial, Dr. Ekid explained each test, and how she arrived at her conclusions. Accordingly,
she found AAA to be suffering from moderate retardation, with a mental age of a person four (4)
years and seven (7) months old.
Aside from erroneously equating AAA’s mental retardation with dementia, the RTC further
justified its conviction of Dalan of statutory rape on account of the victim’s mental age. The gravamen
of the offense of statutory rape, as provided for in Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years old. To convict an accused of
the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age of the complainant; second, the
identity of the accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused and the
complainant
It is not disputed that AAA was already 17 years old when she was raped. In People v.
Butiong, the Court held that carnal knowledge of a female mental retardate with the mental age below
12 years of age is considered as rape of a woman deprived of reason, thus:
It should no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under paragraph
1(b), of Article 266-A, x x x, because the provision refers to a rape of a female
"deprived of reason," a phrase that refers to mental abnormality, deficiency or
retardation.
Based on these discussions, we hold that the term statutory rape should only be confined to
situations where the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of age. If the victim of rape is a
person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, the crime committed is simple rape
under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(b) as she is considered "deprived of reason" notwithstanding that
Page 331 of 519
her mental age is equivalent to that of a person under 12. In short, carnal knowledge with a mental
retardate whose mental age is that of a person below 12 years, while akin to statutory rape under
Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d), should still be designated as simple rape under paragraph 1(b). At any
rate, proof of force, threat or intimidation is dispensed with in both statutory rape and rape with a
person who is deprived of reason.
Thus, the CA decision is affirmed with the modification, among others, that Dalan is found
guilty of simple rape under Article 266-A(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OLIVER A. BUCLAO

G.R. No. 208173, June 11, 2014, J. Leonen
Accused, the biological father of the 15-year-old victim, committed rape twice. Medical
examination results indicate that the victim did not suffer injuries. The Court held that the foremost
consideration in a rape case is the victim’s testimony which, in this case, was candid and
straightforward. It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed. Absence
of physical evidence does not necessarily negate commission of rape.
Facts:
Oliver Buclao was charged with two counts of rape. According to AAA’s testimony, on June 3,
2003, Oliver Buclao, her biological father, called the 15-year-old AAA inside the house then pushed
her onto the bed. He pulled her pants and panties and inserted his penis into her vagina and started
doing push and pull motion. Before he left, Buclao threatened AAA that he would kill her if she told
anyone about the incident.
On September 2004, AAA was raped for the second time. She was awakened when Oliver
Buclao was getting on top of her. After the incident, she was again threatened by Buclao. It was only
in 2006 when AAA told her maternal grandmother about the rape. They then reported it to the police.
Prosecution presented as witness Dr. Genalin Manipol who examined AAA’s genitalia and
found no injuries. Oliver Buclao denied raping his daughter twice.
The trial court found him guilty of two counts of rape. On appeal, it was affirmed with
modification. He was found guilty of two counts of qualified rape. In his brief, accused argued that
physical evidence is the best evidence in a rape case and Dr. Manipol’s examination resulted in a
possibility that no penis entered AAA’s vagina.
Issue:
Whether or not Oliver Buclao is guilty of two counts of qualified rape beyond reasonable
doubt
Ruling:
Yes, he is guilty. Rape is qualified when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
Page 332 of 519
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The elements are: (1) sexual
congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by force and without consent; (4) the victim is under 18 years
of age at the time of rape; (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted)
of the victim.
Both trial court and Court of Appeals found that prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements. The Court finds no reason to depart from the findings. AAA’s recollection of
the heinous acts of her father was vivid and straightforward. She was able to positively identify the
accused as her sexual assailant. Her testimony was given in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous, and candid manner.
The Court disagrees with the argument of Buclao, citing the ruling in the case of People vs.
Araojo that: “The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant’s body does not
necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration not being, to repeat, an element of the
crime of rape. A healed or fresh laceration would of course be a compelling proof of defloration.
However, the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim’s testimony and not the
findings of the medico-legal officer.”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BRICCIO BACULANTA

G.R. No. 207513, June 16, 2014, J. Reyes
Accused was charged of raping the 7-year-old victim. The victim’s testimony was found credible
and it sufficiently established the guilt of the accused. The Court ruled that testimonies of victims of
tender age are credible, more so if they are without any motive to falsely against their offender.
Facts:
On February 2005, the victim AAA, then 7 years old, was left with her younger brother at their
family residence by their mother, CCC. The accused Briccio Baculanta, whom AAA treated as close
relative being the godfather of CCC, was with them.
Baculanta ordered AAA to fetch water from the river near the house. He followed her to the
river and there, he pushed AAA into the water, then ordered her to get up and lie on a rock. Baculanta
undressed her and went on top her then inserted his penis to her vagina. Thereafter, he threatened
to kill AAA if she reported the incident.
The following day, CCC discovered that AAA was raped when her younger brother said AAA
was menstruating. Since she was too young to menstruate, CCC checked AAA and found blood on her
genitals. AAA then confided that she was raped.
Upon physical examination by Dr. May Conde Hernandez, there was a finding of an indicative
of penetration by a penis. She also surmised that AAA’s resistance to an internal examination was
due to pain resulting from the swelling of the girl’s vagina.
Both trial court and Court of Appeals found him guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt.
Page 333 of 519

Issue:
Whether or not Briccio Baculanta is guilty of rape
Ruling:
Yes, he is guilty. The testimony of AAA, corroborated by other testimonies and supported by
records, sufficiently established the fact of carnal knowledge by Baculanta of AAA. As held in People
vs. Abellera, testimonies of victims of tender age are credible, more so if they are without any motive
to falsely against their offender. Their revelations that they were raped, coupled with their
willingness to undergo public trial where they could be compelled to describe the details of the
assault on their dignity could not be easily dismissed as concoctions.
The trial court cited in its decision the credibility of AAA as witness and her clear narration
of her ordeal. Considering that the trial court has the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witness while on stand, it was in the best position to discern whether or not she was telling the
truth. The medical report also supported the claim of AAA.
AAA’s age at the time of rape, that she was only 7 years old, was also sufficiently established.
This is material, given that a man commits by having carnal knowledge of a child under 12 years of
age, even in absence of: (1) force, threat, or intimidation; (2) that the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; (3) fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMNIGILDO T. ABAYAN

G.R. No. 190620, June 18, 2014, J. Perez
Rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy. As such, it is usually only the
victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced coitus. In its prosecution, therefore, the
credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with.
Facts:
In the evening of 24 July 2006, AAA and her six year old brother stayed at the Abayan’s house
as their parents were out of town. Their grandmother, Abayan’s wife, was also not around so it was
only AAA, her brother and the Abayan who were at the latter’s house on the said date. On that fateful
night, they slept together in one room. While sleeping, AAA was awakened when she felt Abayan
removing her short pants and panty. He then took off his short pants and inserted his penis into AAA’s
vagina but he was unable to make full penetration. AAA cried and exclaimed, "it’s painful Lolo," to
which the Abayan replied, "do not cry." The next day, AAA disclosed to her aunt her harrowing
experience at the hands of her grandfather. They subsequently proceeded to the police station, where
AAA executed her sworn statement. Castillo confirmed the findings that AAA was positive for
gonococcal infection or gonorrhea as she was the one who examined the vaginal smear of AAA as
requested to by Dr. Guiang. The defense, for its part, presented Abayan as its sole witness, who relied
principally on denial for his defense.
Issue:
Whether Abayan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt

Page 334 of 519
Ruling:
Yes, he is.
To determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by
three settled principles: (a) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more
difficult to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and (c) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its
own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy. As such, it is usually only
the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced coitus. In its prosecution, therefore,
the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with. If her
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis thereof;
otherwise, he should be acquitted of the crime.
After poring through the records and the transcript of stenographic notes, the Court finds
AAA’s testimony, who was only eight years old when the rape occurred, to be clear, credible,
convincing and worthy of belief.
Moreover, the prevailing rule is that the testimony of rape victims who are young and
immature deserves full credence. No woman, especially one of tender age, practically only a girl,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter expose
herself to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended
and punished.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLOS ALHAMBRA

G.R. No. 207774, June 30, 2014, J. Reyes
Delay in revealing the commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily render such
charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her
defilement to the harsh glare of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained
may it work to discredit the complainant.
Facts:
Three informations were charged against Alhambra: first, Criminal Case No. 220-05 charging
him for the crime of rape having a carnal knowledge on October 6, 2004 with his own daughter, AAA,
a minor, 17 years old, against her will and without her consent; second, Criminal Case No. 219-05
charging Alhambra with the crime of rape and is similarly worded except as to the date of the
commission of the crime, which is during the summer of 1999, and the age of AAA, who was then only
12 years old; and third, Criminal Case No. 347-04 charging him with the crime of acts of
lasciviousness under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 for allegedly kissing her lips, neck,
breast, private parts and lay on top of his minor daughter AAA against the will and without the
consent of the latter on October 21, 2004. Upon arraignment, Alhambra entered a plea of not guilty
to the charges against him.
Page 335 of 519

AAA testified that, on October 6, 2004, while she was changing her clothes inside her room,
Alhambra suddenly entered her room, pushed her, removed her undergarments, and kissed her on
the neck, breasts, and vagina. Alhambra then inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, while kissing her
on the breast and undressing her. In the afternoon of October 21, 2004, AAA, still in her
undergarments with a towel wrapped around her body, after having taken a bath, entered her
bedroom to put on clothes. Alhambra then removed the towel covering AAA’s body and her bra. He
then started to kiss AAA on the neck. Consequently, AAA told her mother what her father had done
to her. Alhambra denied all the allegations against him, claiming that AAA only fabricated the
allegations against him since he wanted her to be separated from her boyfriend.
The RTC found Alhambra guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 220-05 and Crim.
Case No. 347-04. However, The RTC acquitted Alhambra of the charge in Criminal Case No. 219-05
since the evidence presented by the prosecution therein was insufficient to establish that he indeed
raped her daughter, AAA, during the summer of 1999. The RTC pointed out that statement of AAA
before the police and her testimony in court shows that there was just a passing mention of the
incident complained of. Alhambra appealed the RTC decision contending that his acquittal for the
charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 219-05 seriously casts doubt on the allegations of AAA. Moreover,
he claimed that AAA’s delay in reporting the charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 219-05, which
supposedly happened during the summer of 1999, calls into question the credibility of AAA as a
witness. Also, Alhambra alleged that he cannot be convicted for the crime of sexual abuse since AAA
is neither a child exploited in prostitution nor a child subjected to other sexual abuse. The CA affirmed
the RTC’s decision. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision which found Alhambra guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610.
Ruling:
The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
The prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of rape
under Article 266-A of the RPC. AAA testified that Alhambra succeeded in having carnal knowledge
with her on October 16, 2004, and, thus, being AAA’s father, is presumed to have employed force
and/or intimidation. 15 Both the lower courts found AAA’s testimony in this matter straightforward
and worthy of credence.
Alhambra’s claim that his acquittal for the charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 219-05 casts
serious doubt on AAA’s credibility deserves scant consideration. The charge in Criminal Case No. 219-
05 is separate and distinct from the charge in Criminal Case No. 220-05. AAA may have given an
incomplete account of the attendant circumstances in Criminal Case No. 219-05, which resulted in
Alhambra’s acquittal from the charge therein, but her testimony as regards the attendant
circumstances in Criminal Case No. 220-05 is clear. There is, thus, no reason for the Court to acquit
Alhambra in Criminal Case No. 220-05 merely on the mundane reason that he was acquitted of the
charge in Criminal Case No. 219-05.
Page 336 of 519

AAA’s delay in filing a complaint against him, for the alleged rape incident, which happened
during the summer of 1999, cannot be taken against AAA’s claim. Delay in reporting an incident of
rape does not create any doubt over the credibility of the complainant nor can it be taken against her.
Against AAA’s testimony, Alhambra was only able to proffer the defense of denial and alibi. In any
case, it should be stressed that the delay in the filing of the complaint is only with respect to the
charge in Criminal Case No. 219-05, where Alhambra was acquitted by the RTC. There was no
considerable delay in the filing of the complaint against Alhambra in Criminal Case No. 220-05. The
Court has time and time again ruled that denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses as these are
self-serving.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO RONDINA

G.R. No. 207763, June 30, 2014, J. Reyes
It has been held that when the victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physician’s finding of
penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal
knowledge; that laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.
The Court, however, finds no physical evidence of sexual penetration and no corroboration of other vital
details in AAA’s narration of the rape. when the victim says that the accused inserted his penis into her
vagina and pushed and pulled inside her "for a long time," and she felt pain and blood oozed from her
organ, the stark absence of any vaginal tear or laceration will have to be medically explained, or else,
the Court is left with no inference other than that the charge of rape may have been a mere fabrication.
Facts:
An information was filed against Rondina charging him of rape, as follows: That on or about
the 30th day of August, 1998, about 12:00 o’clock noon, at Barangay XXX, Municipality of YYY,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Rondina, with
lewd design and lustful intent and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one AAA, without her consent and
against her will.
The version of the defense paints a lovers’ tryst. According to Rondina he met AAA at a benefit
dance held during their town fiesta. On August 29, 1998, Rondina again saw AAA, and it was then that
he broached an "intimate" proposal to her. She agreed, but told him to come back at noon the next
day since her parents would be away in the farm. Rondina returned as agreed, and AAA herself
opened the door. AAA led him to the kitchen, and there the lovers lost no time kissing and caressing
each other. Rondina insisted that he and AAA still had their underwear on when BBB arrived just
when they were about to commence the sexual act. BBB caught them half-naked, and she angrily
demanded, “why did you do it?” But AAA just cried, while Rondina quickly arose and feebly tried to
explain that he and AAA already had an understanding. BBB refused to be pacified and Rondina had
to leave. He put on his shorts and exited through the kitchen. Believing that he committed no crime,
Rondina was surprised when the police came to his rented house and arrested him.
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt which was later affirmed
by the CA. The case is elevated to the SC for automatic review.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused s guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Page 337 of 519
Ruling:
The Court votes to acquit Rondina.
The elements of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC are: (1) the offender is a
man who had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force or
intimidation upon her; or she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or she is under 12
years of age or is demented. The RTC and the CA both found that AAA’s testimony clearly established
that Rondina had sexual intercourse with her without her consent and against her will; that to satisfy
his lust, he employed force and threats.
The victim’s narration is inconsistent with the physical evidence of the supposed rape by a
stranger. The Court, however, finds no physical evidence of sexual penetration and no corroboration
of other vital details in AAA’s narration of the rape. When the victim says that Rondina inserted his
penis into her vagina and pushed and pulled inside her "for a long time," and she felt pain and blood
oozed from her organ, the stark absence of any vaginal tear or laceration will have to be medically
explained, or else, the Court is left with no inference other than that the charge of rape may have been
a mere fabrication.
The scenario created by the prosecution is that of a barrio maiden whose purity was being
forcibly assailed in a sudden attack, and the attacker is a stranger, one who naturally has no demands
upon the victim’s affections nor exercises moral ascendancy over her. It thus beggars belief that
without putting up a resistance, AAA just lay still on her back and mutely suffered the shame and pain
of her repeated violation by Rondina. She did not even raise a shout or a whimper, yet it was noonday,
the windows and doors of her house were open, there were people within a few arms’ length in the
vicinity, and her grandmother BBB lived just a house away. After her attacker had fled, still she raised
no outcry.
The victim’s and her family’s actuations after the alleged rape defy logic and ordinary
experience. If indeed she was raped, AAA’s utter failure not only to resist Rondina’s advances but also
to shout for help before, during or after the rape are truly baffling, and defy the ordinary standards
of human behavior. Incomprehensibly, too, after the dastardly rape, which went on for a "long time,"
AAA stayed half naked and supine, and with her face looking up she carried on a hushed conversation
with her supposed attacker, who just sat still beside her, also half-naked like her. While a rape victim
is not expected to resist until death, it is contrary to human experience that AAA did not even make
an outcry or put up a resistance, particularly since throughout her ordeal, her hands were free of
restraint, and Rondina’s knife lay by her side most of the time, if indeed he had a knife. The neighbors
were just a few arms’ length nearby, and her granduncle was the barangay captain, so after Rondina
fled, AAA had no more reason to still be afraid. Yet AAA did not even tell her mother the first night,
or the next night, choosing instead to return to her employer in Tacloban two days later rather than
report the incident. It has been held that "the victim's instant willingness, as well as courage, to face
interrogation and medical examination could be a mute but eloquent proof of the truth of her claim.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSENDO AMARO

G.R. No. 199100, July 18, 2014, J. Perez
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal
Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation;
Page 338 of 519
(2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand,
rape under Article 266-A is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by: (1) force or
intimidation, or (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or (3) when she is under
twelve years of age. The prosecution was able to prove all these elements in this case.
Facts:
On 26 May 1998, Rosendo Amaro (Amaro) was charged with the crime of forcible abduction
with rape. Amaro pleaded not guilty. Trial then proceeded.
AAA, who was then only 7 years old, testified that she was walking on her way home from
school when she passed by Boots & Maya store. She met a man, whom she later identified in court as
the Amaro, who asked her to buy cigarettes. After buying the cigarettes and handing it to Amaro, the
latter gave her bread and banana cue. After eating them, she suddenly became dizzy and passed out.
AAA was brought to the house of Amaro. When she regained consciousness, she saw Amaro naked.
Amaro then undressed her, kissed her on the lips and neck, and inserted his penis into her vagina,
causing her to feel pain. AAA cried but Amaro covered her mouth with his hand. AAA was detained
for six (6) days and was raped five (5) times by Amaro. AAA clarified that Amaro’s penis touched the
outer portion of her vagina.
During the cross-examination, AAA admitted that she voluntarily went with Amaro because
the latter promised to bring her home. On the last day of her detention, AAA and Amaro went out of
the house. On their way to San Jose, a certain Aunt Ruthie saw AAA walking and immediately picked
her up and brought her to the police station. Amaro noticed AAA being taken away but he did nothing.
The prosecution also presented AAA’s mother, BBB, to corroborate her daughter’s testimony.
BBB narrated that on 26 March 1998, she was in the house when AAA came home at around noon
time to eat. Thereafter, AAA told BBB that she had to go back to school. At around 5:00 p.m. when
AAA had not come home, BBB went to the school to look for her. When the teacher told BBB that
school children had already been sent home, she proceeded to the police station to report her missing
daughter. After six (6) days, AAA was found by BBB’s former employer who brought her to the police.
Upon receiving a call from the police, BBB immediately went to the police station and saw her
daughter. BBB observed that AAA was still in shock and could not walk properly so she was brought
to the doctor on the following day. She only learned that her daughter was raped after the medical
examination.
Amaro testified on his behalf. He denied abducting and raping AAA but admitted that he
brought the latter to his house when AAA approached him asking for bread first, before begging him
to take her with him because she was always being scolded by her parents. Upon reaching his house,
Amaro entrusted AAA to the care of Florante Magay’s sister. Amaro then went back to town to attend
to his work as a mason. He only decided to go back home when he heard his name on the radio in
connection with the disappearance of a girl. He picked up the child in Barangay Tagburos and brought
her to her house in Buncag. AAA walked alone towards her house.
The trial court found Amaro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible
abduction with rape. It found AAA’s testimony as credible and straightforward and supported by
medical findings. From the aforesaid decision, Amaro appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, in turn,
affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Page 339 of 519
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish from the testimony of the complainant
the guilt of the accused for the crime of forcible abduction with rape beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes. The prosecution was able to establish the guilt of Amaro for the crime of forcible
abduction with rape beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal
Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or
reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. On
the other hand, rape under Article 266-A is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by:
(1) force or intimidation, or (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or (3)
when she is under twelve years of age.
The prosecution was able to prove all these elements in this case. The victim, AAA was a seven
(7)-year-old girl who was taken against her will by Amaro who told her that he knew her mother
and that he would bring her home. At her tender age, AAA could have easily been deceived by Amaro.
The employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking, especially since the victim is
an unsuspecting young girl. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that makes them easy
culprits of deceiving minds. The presence of lewd designs in forcible abduction is established by the
actual rape of the victim. The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by the medical findings that
the victim suffered from laceration on the upper and lower part of the introitus.
Amaro was properly charged of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. AAA’s
abduction was a necessary means to commit rape. Sexual intercourse with AAA was facilitated and
ensured by her abduction.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGILIO ANTONIO y RIVERA

G.R. No. 208623, July 23, 2014, J. Reyes
Jurisprudence strictly dictates that the guardian must be a person who has a legal relationship
with his ward, which does not obtain in this case. Ineluctably, guardianship cannot be considered as a
qualifying circumstance and the accused-appellant can only be convicted of simple rape.
Facts:
Two separate informations for rape were filed against the Antonio before the RTC. The victim,
as alleged by the informations, is AAA, a 14 year old minor. The accused-appellant entered a not guilty
plea during the arraignment. On February 23, 2005, pre-trial was conducted. The prosecution
proposed for the parties to stipulate on the following, which the defense admitted: (a) the identity of
Antonio; (b) his relationship as AAA’s godfather; (c) the dates, times and places of the commission of
rape; and (d) AAA’s minority at the time the crimes were allegedly perpetrated.
Page 340 of 519

Based on the evidence of the prosecution, in March of 2001, then eleven-year old AAA began
living with accused-appellant’s family in Maraburab, Alcala, Cagayan Province after her parents had
separated. Antonio and his wife, Rose, are AAA’s godparents, who treated her as one of their own
children.
The first incident of rape was allegedly occurred sometime in April 2001. Antonio, who
maintains a farm in the highlands of Cagayan, asked AAA to help him harvest palay there. They were
alone in the rice field. Just before lunch time, Antonio led AAA to a bamboo grove within the farm.
Once there, he threatened to kill her if she told anyone regarding what he was about to do. Antonio
lost no time in making AAA lie down. After which, he took off her shorts and underwear. Although
very much alarmed, he likewise removed his own shorts and underwear. AAA could not do anything
as she was afraid because they were alone. Antonio thereafter obtain carnal knowledge of the victim.
The second incident of rape happened on August 26, 2003 when the accused-appellant were left
alone in the home. Antonio went to the room where AAA was sleeping and proceeded to have a sexual
intercourse with her.
Antonio, on the other hand, was vehement in denying the charges against him.
On September 4, 2009, the RTC rendered a Judgment convicting Antonio of two counts of
rape. On October 8, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the accused-appellant’s conviction.
Issue:
Whether guardianship can be considered as a qualifying circumstance in this case.
Ruling:
No.
As regards the second rape incident, guardianship was alleged in the information and was
not assailed by the defense. Also, the parties stipulated during the pre-trial that Antonio was AAA’s
godfather. Notwithstanding the foregoing, jurisprudence strictly dictates that the guardian must be
a person who has a legal relationship with his ward, which does not obtain in this case. Ineluctably,
guardianship cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance and Antonio can only be convicted
of simple rape.
Nonetheless, the Court sustains the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the RTC and CA
on Antonio for each of the two counts of rape which he committed. The aggravating circumstances
of minority and commission of the crime in an uninhabited place were present as regards the first
rape incident. The second rape was, on the other hand, aggravated by minority alone since legal
guardianship was not proven. The aggravating circumstances attendant in the instant case are all
merely generic and not qualifying. Generic aggravating circumstances increase the penalty for the
crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree.
In Antonio's case, the two counts of rape were committed through the use of force and
intimidation. The crime falls under Article 266-A(l)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Article 266-B of the
same code provides that the said crime is punishable by reclusion perpetua, which is an indivisible
Page 341 of 519

penalty. Therefore, despite the attendance of generic aggravating circumstances, the penalty
imposable upon Antonio for each count of rape remains the same.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. STANLEY BUNAGAN y JUAN

G.R. No. 196786, July 23, 2014, J. Del Castillo
Rape may be committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman through threat or
intimidation. According to "AAA," every time Juan will have sexual intercourse with her, he would issue
threats that he would kill her, her mother and grandmother
Although "AAA’s" minority was alleged, the same was not proved during trial; neither was her
Birth Certificate submitted in evidence. Her relationship with the Juan was likewise not established.
Although the Information alleged that Juan is an uncle of "AAA," such relationship was not proved
during trial. Based on Juan’s testimony, he was never married to "AAA’s" relative.
Facts:
During trial, "AAA" testified that Bunagan is the husband of her grandmother; that she resided
in the house of her grandmother since she was nine years old; that in 1998 when she was already 13
years of age, Bunagan started raping her; that her grandmother leaves the house to work while
Bunagan is unemployed and just stays at the house; that the last rape incident happened in August
2001 when she was 16 years old; that Bunagan threatened to kill her mother and grandmother if she
would not succumb to his desire; that after the last rape incident, she got pregnant; that when her
mother and grandmother confronted her about her pregnancy, she told them that Bunagan raped her
several times; and that her mother and grandmother reported the incident to the police authorities
resulting in the arrest of the Bunagan.
RTC convicted Bunagan for crime of rape which was affirmed by CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Bunagan is guilty for crime of rape.

Ruling:
Yes, Bunagan is guilty for crime of rape.
The sexual congress between "AAA" and Bunagan is undisputed. In fact, he admits the same.
However, he claims that it is consensual because "AAA" was his girlfriend. Both the trial court and
the CA correctly disregarded the "sweetheart theory" proffered by Bunagan for being self-serving
and uncorroborated. No evidence such as love letters, pictures, gifts, etc. was offered to show the
existence of such relationship. Besides, such claim is totally absurd and preposterous.
Going by the testimony of the Bunagan that his love relationship with "AAA" started
sometime in 1997, "AAA" would have been only 12 years of age while Bunagan would be about 46
years old. It is also on record that "AAA" vehemently denied her alleged love relationship with the
Juan.
Page 342 of 519

Rape may be committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman through threat or
intimidation. According to "AAA," every time Bunagan will have sexual intercourse with her, he
would issue threats that he would kill her, her mother and grandmother.
Although "AAA’s" minority was alleged, the same was not proved during trial; neither was
her Birth Certificate submitted in evidence. Her relationship with the Juan was likewise not
established. Although the Information alleged that Juan is an uncle of "AAA," such relationship was
not proved during trial. Based on Juan’s testimony, he was never married to "AAA’s" relative.
In fact, Bunagan was merely the live-in partner of the sister of "AAA’s" grandmother. As such,
he and the victim cannot be said to be related by affinity within the third civil degree at the time of
the commission of the crime."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO BATTAD, et al.

Under the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape is committed when: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (b) that the same was committed by using force and intimidation. Despite
her low mentality, AAA was able to narrate her harrowing experience in the hands of the two accused,
who took turns in raping her. The SC ruled that a victim who cries rape, more so if she is a minor, almost
always says all that is needed to signify that the crime has been committed, and so long as her testimony
meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
Facts:
The 17-year old private complainant AAA, testified that on April 9, 2004 at around three
o’clock in the afternoon, she went to the fields located in Barangay PPP to pasture her three carabaos
and eight goats. On her way to the fields, AAA saw the Battad and Marcelino Bacnis (Bacnis) drinking
gin in the house of both AAA and Bacnis’ uncle, UUU. AAA knew Battad and Bacnis as they used to go
to her house to buy ice.
After AAA had pastured her carabaos, she was surprised when Battad and Bacnis approached
her from behind. Bacnis pulled her towards the place where paper trees grew. AAA said that Bacnis
undressed her and that the two accused took turns in raping her but she was confused as to who
raped her first. While one of them was raping her, the other was holding her hands and vice versa.
Her mouth was also covered to prevent her from shouting. When asked how Battad raped her, AAA
testified that he did it by inserting his penis.
According to AAA, Battad and Bacnis warned her not to tell anyone about the incident,
otherwise they would kill her. Eventually, however, AAA told her mother about it when the latter
noticed that AAA was pregnant. Later on, she slipped near a tamarind tree while carrying something
heavy which resulted to the miscarriage of the baby.
The other witness for the prosecution, (Dr. Eugenio), Medical Officer III of Gabriela Silang
General Hospital testified that she examined AAA on July 22, 2004 and found that the latter was
already 5 to 6 months pregnant as verified by an ultrasound result.
Page 343 of 519

After trial, both Battad and Bacnis were convicted of the crime of rape by the RTC. The RTC’s
decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove Battad’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
No, the SC does not find any basis to overrule Battad’s conviction for the crime of Rape.
Under Article 266-A (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape is committed when:
(1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) that the same was committed by using
force and intimidation.
Despite her low mentality, AAA was able to narrate her harrowing experience in the hands of
Battad and Bacnis, who took turns in raping her. "The Court have ruled that a victim who cries rape,
more so if she is a minor, almost always says all that is needed to signify that the crime has been
committed, and so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted
on the basis thereof."
The fact that AAA was not able to fight back or physically resist the attack does not negate the
presence of force, threat or intimidation. As already settled in jurisprudence, not all victims react the
same way. Some people may cry out; some may faint; some may be shocked into insensibility; others
may appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance, while others may be too
intimidated to offer any resistance at all. Besides, resistance is not an element of rape. A rape victim
has no burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed
upon her. As long as force or intimidation was present, whether it was more or less irresistible, is
beside the point.
AAA testified that while one of the accused raped her, her mouth was covered and her hands
were held by the other. Thus, it is needless to say that the combined strength of the two accused, both
male, overpowered AAA, a 17-year old female. Additionally, AAA and Bacnis’ uncle UUU, testified as
witness for the defense that he was not home during the incident. Therefore, the Battad’s allegation
that he along with Bacnis could not have pulled AAA in front of UUU’s inhabited house deserves scant
consideration, for there was in fact no one in the house who could have come to AAA’s aid even if the
crime was committed in broad daylight.
Finally, in Battad’s attempt to exonerate himself, he asserted that AAA was already 5 to 6
months pregnant based on Dr. Eugenio’s findings, whereas the alleged incident occurred merely 3
months before AAA’s medical examination; therefore he could not have authored the rape.
Contrary to Battad’s view, AAA’s pregnancy is immaterial to the issue. "Pregnancy is not an
essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by
the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that
the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter’s will or without her consent, and
such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner." As long as the elements of rape are
Page 344 of 519

present and proven by the prosecution, the accused could be adjudged guilty thereof
notwithstanding the attendance of other matters which are completely irrelevant to the crime.
Hence, the actuality that AAA was pregnant at the time of the rape does not go against the fact
that Battad and Bacnis had forcible sexual coitus with her. The gravamen of the offense is sexual
intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. And that is all the prosecution had
to prove.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO CLOSA Y LUALHATI

The precise date or time of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime
of rape. Hence, the fact that the victim could not remember the exact dates when each of other rapes
occurred will not affect the conviction of the accused.
Facts:
Romeo Closa y Lualhati (Closa) was charged with two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of
attempted rape of his minor daughter AAA.
Born on February 13, 1996 and the eldest of six (6) children of Romeo Closa , AAA was only
ten (10) years old and in Grade 2 when the first rape allegedly in 2006. Her mother was in Batangas
to attend an occasion, and she was asleep with four (4) of her siblings when the Closa, who slept in
the sala, entered her room, moved aside her baby sister who slept beside her, pulled down her shorts
and underwear, mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. For 10 minutes he did a pumping
motion, causing AAA much pain. Being only ten (10) years old, AAA did not understand the full
meaning of what her father did to her. In her fear of her father, she kept silent about it.
Closa continued to rape AAA during the next three years—too many times that she could not
recall the dates when they happened. But when she was 13 years old He pumped for 10 minutes and
after he ejaculated inside her he stood up. Afraid of what Closa do to her and her mother, AAA chose
to keep quiet about the incident. AAA became pregnant and eventually pointed to Closa as the father.
For his defense, Closa called AAA herself to the witness stand. She affirmed that she executed
an affidavit of desistance and that she was recanting her previous testimony, saying this time that it
was her boyfriend who had impregnated her.
The trial court rendered its decision finding Closa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of rape and one (1) count of attempted rape. It found that the original testimony of AAA was
substantiated by the medical examination conducted on her, whereas her recantation did not show
that her previous testimony was vitiated. The trial court also noted that she recanted due to pressures
exerted upon her by her family.
In his appeal, he claimed that AAA’s testimony was attended with numerous misgivings,
inconsistencies and contradictions, i.e. she could not recall the dates when she was allegedly raped
in the years 2007, 2008 and 2009; she said her birth was not registered but later she identified her
birth certificate.
Page 345 of 519

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove Closa’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of rape
Ruling:
No.
Rape is committed in secrecy, and often it is only the victim who can testify as to the fact of
the forced coitus. AAA’s sole testimony is sufficient to produce conviction. When a woman says she
was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that a rape was committed, and if her
testimony meets the test of credibility, conviction may issue on the basis thereof. This holds true with
greater force when the woman is the minor daughter of Closa, and no motive has been shown why
she would concoct such a sordid charge against her own father, unless it is true.
Furthermore, considering AAA’s very tender youth and the internal turmoil the accused-
appellant caused her by his unremitting abuses, it would not be fair to expect AAA to remember the
exact dates when each of these other rapes occurred. Nonetheless, the precise date or time of the
commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Contrary to the accused-
appellant’s allegation, the appellate court noted from the transcript that it was AAA herself and not
the prosecutor who supplied the date of the second reported rape, October 26, 2009.
Concerning AAA’s affidavit of desistance, it is important to note that it was executed only after
AAA had completed her testimony, boldly and candidly accusing her father of rape. The RTC and the
appellate court are correct to disregard AAA’s said affidavit.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SAMUEL "TIW-TIW" SANICO

"For conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was
accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is twelve years of age, or is demented." In the instant
appeal, the RTC and the CA both found AAA’s testimony that she was raped in 2005 as credible. AAA did
not specifically refer to an exact month and date when the sordid act was committed. Her testimony that
the he threatened to kill her, pushed her to the wall and inserted his penis in her vagina, while she was
alone washing dishes at home, was positive, clear and categorical.
Facts:
Two separate Informations were filed against Sanico before the RTC, viz:
In Criminal Case No. 12021 for Acts of Lasciviousness

In Criminal Case No. 12022 for Rape
Sanico went into hiding but was subsequently arrested in his hometown in Leyte on May 13,
2008.
Page 346 of 519
As indicated in her birth certificate, AAA was born on June 14, 1993. AAA was 12 years old
when the acts complained of were allegedly committed, but was already 15 years of age at the time
she testified in court.
Sanico was a pig butcher. He and his children rented a room for about ten (10) years in the
house where AAA lives with her family. Then, they moved to their own house built near AAA’s
residence.
AAA claimed that Sanico raped her in 2005, but she could not recall the exact month and date.
She remembered that she was raped while she was washing dishes in the kitchen. There was nobody
else in the house except her and Sanico. He threatened to kill her if she would shout. Knowing that he
was a pig butcher, AAA was overcome by fear. He then succeeded in removing her clothes and
pushing her against the wall. He inserted his penis into her vagina for two to three minutes. She felt
pain.
On April 19, 2006, at around 1:00 p.m., AAA was napping when AAA woke up, she felt that
Sanico was touching her. Her father, CCC, was just in another room but out of fear, AAA kept quiet.
Being merely built out of wood, the house shook, which caused CCC to wake up. CCC lost
consciousness for a short period of time when he caught Sanico performing lascivious acts on AAA.
Sanico then seized the opportunity to flee.
On the same day, Dr. Orais performed a medico-genital examination on AAA and found that
she have suffered from sexual abuse. AAA’s hymen was slightly open and bore "old healed laceration".
Sanico testified in court, he was 53 years old. On April 19, 2006, he had a drinking spree with
CCC. As the two were both drunk, Sanico slept in the sala while CCC did so in his room. He woke up
from slumber when AAA touched the former’s pocket to search for money. She got some coins and
bills. He, in turn, touched AAA’s chest and asked the latter to remove her short pants. AAA complied.
As he was touching AAA’s breast, CCC woke up. Upon seeing what was taking place, CCC got a bolo to
hack Sanico, but the latter escaped.
He testified that he had never inserted his penis in AAA’s vagina. He admitted touching AAA
but he did so only because the latter initiated it.
The RTC convicted Sanico of one count of rape and of acts of lasciviousness. The CA affirmed
with modifications the Omnibus Judgment of the RTC regarding the imposable penalties.
The contention of Sanico that the rape allegedly committed was highly implausible because
of the absence of fresh lacerations and spermatozoa in AAA’s vagina is untenable. It should be
emphasized that he was charged with rape that occurred sometime in 2005 and not on April 19, 2006.
The fact that only old healed lacerations were found does not negate rape. x x x:
x x x In People v. Espinoza, it was held that healed lacerations do not negate rape. In fact, lacerations,
whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.x x x. Moreover, in the
present case, Dr. Orais clarified to the court that even if the alleged sexual assault took place in the
year 2005 or a year after AAA was examined, the old healed lacerations could still be found.
Page 347 of 519

The absence of spermatozoa does not disprove rape, In fact, in People v. Perez, it was held
that:
The absence of spermatozoa is not a negation of rape. The presence or absence of

spermatozoa is immaterial since it is penetration, not ejaculation, which constitutes the crime of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not Sanico is guilty beyond reasonable doubt that he had, in fact, raped AAA.
Ruling:
Yes, The Court affirms the CA’s verdict convicting Sanico of the charges against him, but
modify the same by (a) reinstating the penalty and damages for lascivious conduct imposed by the
RTC in Criminal Case No. 12021; and (b) reducing to six percent the interests imposed upon the
damages awarded to AAA in both Criminal Case Nos. 12021 and 12022.
Criminal Case No. 12021
It would be a superfluity to exhaustively re-evaluate Sanico’s conviction in Criminal Case No.

12021 for lasciviousness conduct committed on April 19, 2006. The RTC and the CA uniformly found
him guilty as charged. Sanico himself admitted touching AAA’s breast and directing the latter to take
off her short pants.
The RTC and the CA, were however, not in agreement as to the proper imposable penalty for
the lascivious conduct. The RTC applied the provisions of Article 336 of the RPC and sentenced Sanico
to 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years of imprisonment. The CA, invoking Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, which punishes sexual abuses committed against minors, imposed upon the accused-appellant
the indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In the instant appeal, the Information relative to Criminal Case No. 12021 bears the caption
"for acts of lasciviousness." It is indicated that the acts are being prosecuted pursuant to the
provisions of "Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to R.A. No. 7610."
It bears stressing that the case before the Court involves two separate Informations filed –
one for rape and another for lascivious conduct.
In the case at bench, the commission of lascivious conduct was admitted by Sanico in his
testimony. No issue regarding his conviction for lascivious conduct had been raised in his appeal
before the CA as well. Despite the fact that the appeal filed was captioned as one with reference to
Criminal Case Nos. 12021 and 12022, the body stated in no uncertain terms that what was being
assailed was merely the conviction for rape. It was as if no appeal was filed relative to Criminal Case
No. 12021. Hence, the penalty imposed by the RTC for lascivious conduct should not be disturbed
anymore. The CA cannot impose a graver penalty and increase the amount of damages awarded to
AAA at least relative to Criminal Case No. 12021. This is the path more in accord with the general rule
that penal laws are to be construed liberally in favor of the accused.
In Criminal Case No. 12022 for Rape

Page 348 of 519
The court finds no reversible error committed by the RTC and the CA anent Sanico’s
conviction for rape.
The Court has repeatedly held that when the offended parties are young and immature girls,
as in this case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering
not only their relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be
exposed if the matter about which they testified were not true.
The foregoing doctrines apply with greater force in the instant case where the Sanico cannot
ascribe any ill-motive against AAA in accusing him of the offenses charged, and where the factual
findings of the RTC coincide with those of the CA.
"For conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was
accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is twelve years of age, or is demented."
In the instant appeal, the RTC and the CA both found AAA’s testimony that she was raped in
2005 as credible. AAA did not specifically refer to an exact month and date when the sordid act was
committed. Her testimony that the he threatened to kill her, pushed her to the wall and inserted his
penis in her vagina, while she was alone washing dishes at home, was positive, clear and categorical.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION: In
Criminal Case No. 12021, the indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of imprisonment
as minimum to 6 years as maximum imposed by the RTC upon the accused-appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WENDEL OCDOL y MENDOVA, EDISON TABIANAN, AND
DANTE BORINAGA
AAA while going home, was suddenly abducted by Edison and dragged into a dark portion. In
the said area, Wendel through force and intimidation, committed rape against AAA while Dante and
Edison held her and pointed a knife at her. Wendel posited the sweetheart defense. In disregarding the
said defense, the Court ruled that the "sweetheart theory" is an admission of carnal knowledge of the
victim and consequently places on the accused the burden of proving the supposed relationship by
substantial evidence. Otherwise called as the "sweetheart defense," it is an oft-abused justification that
rashly derides the intelligence of this Court and sorely tests the Court’s patience. The defense cannot just
present testimonial evidence in support of the theory, as in the instant case. Independent proof is
required – such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. Appellant presented no such evidence to
substantiate his claim.
Facts:
On August 31, 2000 at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, AAA was sent by her mother to buy
ice at the store. While AAA was about to go home, Edision Tabianan called AAA’s attention, told AAA
"just something" and he immediately held AAA’s arm dragging her to a darkened portion of a chapel
near the store. AAA resisted but she could not move because Edison poked a knife at her. Then, AAA
Page 349 of 519
saw two (2) people in the place where she was dragged. She identified the two as Dante Borinaga and
Tisoy known as Wendel Ocdol. Dante likewise poked an arrow at AAA’s neck. Wendel suddenly held
AAA’s hand, laid her on the ground, and removed her shorts and panty. AAA still resisted the attack.
Wendel took off his shorts and brief, mounted on top of AAA and inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina
causing the latter to pain. Wendel also kissed AAA on the lips and fondled her breasts. When the three
(3) accused heard that someone was looking for AAA, Wendel immediately got up and put on his brief
and shorts and three (3) accused scampered away. AAA put her panty and shorts on, and ran towards
home. The following day, AAA’s grandmother came and it was only then that AAA narrated what
happened to her. Upon learning of the incident, AAA’s grandmother left and reported it to Rufino
Villarino, the barangay captain of Matlang. Rufino summoned three (3) of his barangay tanods who
arrested Edison and Dante. The barangay officials referred the matter to the police who picked-up
the two accused for investigation. Upon advice of the policemen, AAA was brought by her mother to
a doctor for medico-legal examination. The medico legal certified that there were fresh hymenal
lacerations and several abrasions surrounding the vaginal opening.
On the other hand, Wendel interposed the sweetheart defense. He alleged that on August 27,
2000, Philip, Wendel’s friend, introduced him to AAA at the pier in Pingag, Isabel, Leyte until they
became friends. He met AAA again on August 29, 2000 at Philip’s house when the latter came to visit
him. They talked at the balcony of Philip’s house for one (1) hour and courted AAA until they became
sweethearts. Allegedly, AAA invited Wendel to the pier. In a nearby nipa hut located in the pier, AAA
embraced him first and so he returned the favor, and they kissed each other. Then, he removed his
shorts and AAA also took off her shorts and panty. Wendel inserted his organ into the vagina of AAA
but he was not able to penetrate because the latter felt pain. During the sexual act, AAA neither cried
nor shouted. Not long thereafter, they stopped and went home.
The RTC convicted Ocdol with rape and Edison and Dante as accomplices thereto. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Ocdol is
guilty of rape
Ruling:
Yes, the prosecution was able to discharge its burden.
At the outset, for conviction in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said
act was accomplished: (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.
In the case at bench, the presence of the first element is undisputed since Wendel admits his
sexual congress with complainant. While making such admission however, he contends that there
was no force or intimidation to speak of as it was consensual. Wendel alleges that AAA willingly
participated in the sexual act because they were lovers. He even presented a witness to corroborate
his claim. Notwithstanding, their testimonies leave the Court unconvinced of Wendel’s alleged
innocence.
Page 350 of 519
The "sweetheart theory" is an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently
places on the accused the burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence.
Otherwise called as the "sweetheart defense," it is an oft-abused justification that rashly derides the
intelligence of this Court and sorely tests the Court’s patience. The defense cannot just present
testimonial evidence in support of the theory, as in the instant case. Independent proof is required –
such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. Wendel presented no such evidence to substantiate his
claim.
Moreover, the Court agrees with the pronouncement of the appellate court that even if it were
true that they were indeed sweethearts, a love affair does not justify rape. As judiciously enunciated,
a man does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his unreciprocated carnal desires.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHARLES REYES y MARASIGAN

A minor was allegedly raped by the common law husband of her mother two times. The Court
upheld the conviction of the lower courts and stated that statutory rape is committed by sexual
intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual
act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape,
considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age
of 12. At that age, the law presumes that the victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of
giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape,
the prosecution carries the burden of proving: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the
accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant.
Facts:
Two separate informations for rape were filed against the Reyes before the RTC.
In 2002, AAA was an eleven (11) year old girl, having been born on October 31, 1990. She is
living with her mother BBB and her common-law husband, Charles Reyes in their residence in
Barangay Calero, Calapan City.
Sometime in May 2002, while AAA was alone inside the room of their house, Reyes entered
the room and touched her breasts, after which, Reyes removed her clothes, sando shirt, shorts and
panty; she tried to go out of the room but Reyes did not allow her to do so. Then, Reyes removed his
shorts and brief[s], placed himself on top of her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina causing
her to feel pain; failing to insert his penis into her vagina, Reyes put on his shorts and briefs and went
out of the house. Although AAA was able to talk to her mother after the rape incident, she did not
inform her about it because she was afraid of the threat of Reyes that the latter will kill her and her
mother.
On August 5, 2002, at around four o’clock in the afternoon, AAA was again alone in the room
of their house when Reyes entered the room. He removed her blouse, skirt, sando shirt and panty.
She was not able to do anything because Reyes threatened to kill her and her mother. While naked,
Reyes placed himself on top of her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. She tried to push
Reyes away but she was unsuccessful. She felt pain in her vagina when Reyes made a push and pull
Page 351 of 519
motion. Thereafter, Reyes put on his shorts and brief[s] and left her in the room[,] after which, she
put on her clothes.
At around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, she told her mother about the rape incidents. Her
mother and an employee of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
accompanied her to the Calapan City Police Station where they reported the rape incidents.
Reyes, who was then a 34-year old construction worker when he took the witness stand,
vehemently denied the charges against him.
On November 25, 2009, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision convicting the Reyes of two counts
of rape. On appeal, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision affirming in toto the RTC’s judgment.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Charles Reyes is innocent of the 2 counts of rape
Ruling:
No, the decision of the RTC and CA is affirmed.
The Court sustains the CA’s verdict convicting the Reyes of two counts of rape, but modify the
amount of damages imposed.
Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, substantially states that
rape is committed by a man, who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age or
is demented. To be liable under the above provision, it is not necessary that the commission of the
crime is attended by the use of force, threat, intimidation, fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority, or that the victim is deprived of reason or unconscious.
Article 266-B of the same code, on the other hand, provides that the imposable penalty for
acts falling under Article 266-A(1)(d) is reclusion perpetua. However, the death penalty shall be
imposed if rape is committed with aggravating or qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article
266-B therein, among which is when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
Records show that the elements of statutory rape are present in the case under review. First,
AAA was 11 years old when the sordid crimes were committed. Her birth certificate was presented
as evidence by both the prosecution and the defense. Second, AAA positively, categorically and
resolutely testified that the Reyes had carnal knowledge of her on two separate occasions in May and
on August 5 of 2002. Dr. Nieva-Bolor’s findings of hymenal lacerations, both healed and not, in AAA’s
vagina corroborated the latter’s claims.
The eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings attesting to her non-
virgin state, should be enough to confirm the truth of her charges." This is especially true in the case
of AAA, a girl of tender age, who is not likely to fabricate a story of her own defloration which may
expose her and her family to humiliation. Reyes denied the charges and in his defense posited that
Page 352 of 519
AAA filed the complaints in anger after the former drove BBB and the children away from the house.
The RTC declared this ascribed motive as too flimsy and insignificant, and we find no reason to depart
from the said finding.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ECO YABA y BASA a.k.a. “Plok”

When the rape victim had testified in a straightforward and categorical manner that the
accused had used force and intimidation to insert his penis into her vagina, and the trial court gave
credence to her testimony, such findings are binding upon the Supreme Court. In addition, the
sweetheart theory, absent any substantial evidence as proof of a relationship between the victim and
the accused, will not be a sufficient defense for rape. Besides, the fact that both parties are sweethearts
does not negate rape.
Facts:
Eco Yaba was charged before the RTC with rape in relation to R.A. 7610. The prosecution
alleged that AAA, a 15-year old minor at the time and who was staying with her grandmother on
schooldays, was permitted by her grandmother to go home in Lupi provided she was to be
accompanied by Yaba, who was a family friend.
While on the way, AAA told Yaba to return home as she was to be accompanied by a friend,
who turned out to be not yet home when AAA dropped by the latter’s house. AAA went home alone,
and while on the way Yaba grabbed her by the hair and boxed and kicked her thrice. Yaba threatened
physical harm upon AAA, and killing her family if she will not give in to what Yaba wanted. Yaba
undressed her, laid on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Yaba denied the allegations in the complaint, and averred that when he was accompanying
AAA, it rained heavily and AAA stumbled to the ground with her legs wide apart and hit a mango tree.
He noticed blood on AAA’s short pants and learned that she was menstruating that day. He helped
AAA stand up but kept his distance when AAA was changing her clothes. He, however, claimed that
was not the first time AAA undressed in front of him. He further claimed that AAA had no qualms
undressing in front of him because they were lovers.
The RTC relied on the straightforward and categorical narration of AAA on how Yaba raped
her, and convicted Yaba. Even if there was no medical certificate presented, the testimony alone of
the victim being credible, is enough to convict the Cordero of the crime charged. The trial court also
noted that the family of AAA subjected her to a medical examination right the following morning.
Such reaction revealed the family’s resolve to have justice served for what had happened to their
daughter. The trial court further held that even if the medical certificate did not mention about the
presence or absence of spermatozoa, still it was of the belief that AAA had been raped and it was the
Cordero who raped her. The CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue:
1. Whether or not AAA’s testimony not credible as to warrant Yaba’s conviction?

2. Whether or not the fact that Yaba and AAA were lovers negate the allegation of rape?
Page 353 of 519

Ruling:
1. No, as the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of the witness deserves great weight
and respect.
The trial court placed full faith and credence upon the testimony of AAA. It found her
testimony to be credible in itself. The theory of rape through force and intimidation proffered by the
prosecution was successfully established through the credibility of AAA’s testimony.
The basic rule is that findings and conclusions of a trial court, upon whom the responsibility
of assessing the credibility of witnesses primarily rests, deserve great weight and respect.
Conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie heavily on the sound judgment of the
trial court. When the question arises as to which version is to be believed, the judgment of the trial
court is accorded the highest respect in view of the opportunity it had to observe the witnesses’
demeanor and deportment on the witness stand. Concededly, it is in a better position than an
appellate court to discern whether a witness is telling the truth or fabricating a lie. Barring
arbitrariness and oversight of facts which might affect the result of the case, such assessment must
bind even this Court.
The Court finds no reason to depart from the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA.
Hence, the Court sustains the conviction.
2. No, as the sweetheart theory bereft of compelling evidence such as tokens, mementos and
photographs will not be a sufficient defense for rape. Besides, being sweethearts does not
prove consent to the sexual act.
Yaba would have this Court believe that he and AAA were lovers. This sweetheart theory,
however, is bereft of any substantial proof. Other than his self-serving assertions and the testimonies
of Sarmiento and Manalo, there were no other evidence presented to satisfactorily prove the alleged
romantic relationship. The testimonies that they were seen together talking on the day of the incident
or that they were walking hand in hand in going to Lupi do not give rise to the inference that they
were sweethearts. The Court previously held that the sweetheart theory or sweetheart defense is an
oft-abused justification that rashly derides the intelligence of this Court and sorely tests its patience.
For the Court to even consider giving credence to such defense, it must be proven by compelling
evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory, as in the
instant case. Independent proof is required – such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. There is
none presented here by the defense.
Besides, even if it were true that Yaba and AAA were sweethearts, this fact does not
necessarily negate the commission of rape. Being sweethearts does not prove consent to the sexual
act. Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancée and worse, employ violence
upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BOBBY BELGAR

G.R. No. 182794, September 8, 2014, J. Bersamin
Page 354 of 519

According to Article 266-A (1) (a), Revised Penal Code, rape is committed: 1) by a man who have
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) through force, threat or
intimidation.
In the instant case, according to AAA, Belgar poked a knife at her neck, forced her to get up from
her sleep, and dragged her outside of the house. She resisted and would have shouted but he warned her
against shouting, and threatened to stab her and her sleeping sisters. Once they were outside, he injected
a substance into her belly, thereby causing her to lose consciousness. Upon regaining her consciousness,
she was already naked and had blood in her vagina. Belgar employed force, threat and intimidation in
order to commit carnal knowledge of AAA.
The commission of the rape was competently established although AAA had been unconscious
during the commission of the act. Proof of the commission of the crime need not always be by direct
evidence, for circumstantial evidence could also sufficiently and competently establish the crime beyond
reasonable doubt. Indeed, the Court affirmed convictions for rape based on circumstantial evidence.
Facts:
There are two versions of facts in this case.
According to the Prosecution, on January 20, 2000, at about 8:00 p.m., AAA and her two
sisters were sleeping in their house in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, when she was awakened because
someone was touching her feet. She saw that it was Belgar, who was poking her neck with a knife.
She resisted but he warned her not to shout or he would stab her and her sisters. He dragged her
outside the house and brought her to a nearby tree, where he injected an unknown substance into
her stomach. She fell unconscious afterwards. Upon regaining consciousness, she found herself
naked, and her vagina was aching and soaked with white and red substance. She put on her clothes
and returned to the house. She attended school the next morning. During her class, she broke a mirror
and slashed her left wrist. Her teacher came to her aid and had her treated. While being treated she
confided the rape to her teacher. She was thus brought to the Municipal Health Office of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur, and was examined there by Dr. Villanueva, who issued her medico-legal report stating
that there is brownish discoloration of the skin at the anterior area of the distal portion of the left
lower arm, multiple hymenal lacerations old, healed complete at 9’ o clock and 6’ oclock positions
and old healed partial lacerations at 3’ o clock and 12’ o clock positions.
According to the Defense, Belgar denied raping AAA and interposed alibi, insisting that he
was sleeping in his house in San Miguel, Tigaon, Camarines Sur at midnight of January 20, 2000,
having gone to bed there at 8:00 p.m. on the same date and waking up at 5:00 a.m. of the next day;
that he did not leave the house in that period of time; and that it was his first time to see AAA when
she identified him inside the Municipal Jail of Tigaon as the one who had raped her at midnight of
January 20, 2000.
RTC found that all the elements of rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of Republic Act No. 8353
had been duly established; that the State had shown that Belgar had committed carnal knowledge of
AAA by force, threat, and intimidation; that AAA was candid and truthful as a witness; and that
Belgar’s alibi could not prevail because it was uncorroborated, and he did not show the physical
impossibility for him to be at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime.
Page 355 of 519

CA affirmed the conviction, holding that the conviction for rape could be based on the
circumstantial evidence adduced through the testimony of AAA; that the absence of spermatozoa
from the vagina of the victim did not disprove rape because ejaculation was not an element of the
crime; and that the RTC properly rejected Belgar’s alibi upon finding AAA’s testimony credible.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape when said victim
was unconscious when the incident happened.
Ruling:
The information charged Belgar with rape committed through force, threat or intimidation
as defined under Article 266-A (1) (a), Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, to
wit:
Article 266-A. Rape; Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed.
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
a) Through force, threat or intimidation
The elements of the crime charged are that the offender had carnal knowledge of a female,
and that the same was committed by using force, threat or intimidation. The elements were proved
beyond reasonable doubt. According to AAA, Belgar poked a knife at her neck, forced her to get up
from her sleep, and dragged her outside of the house. She resisted and would have shouted but he
warned her against shouting, and threatened to stab her and her sleeping sisters. Once they were
outside, he injected a substance into her belly, thereby causing her to lose consciousness. Upon
regaining her consciousness, she was already naked and had blood in her vagina.
Belgar employed force, threat and intimidation in order to commit carnal knowledge of AAA.
The Court likewise notes that AAA did not hesitate or waver in her narration even during her
rigorous cross examination. As such, her sole but credible testimony as the rape victim sufficed to
convict the accused of his crime. It is remarkable, indeed, that there was neither allegation nor proof
of any ill motive on her part or on the part of her family in accusing him of raping her.
Belgar’s alibi was rightly rejected. Alibi, to prosper, must be substantiated with clear and
convincing evidence. He must demonstrate not only that he was somewhere else when the crime
occurred, but also that it was physically impossible for him to beat the crime scene when the crime
was committed. But he failed to adequately support his alibi. Although he attested that on January
20, 2000, he slept in his house situated in Barangay San Miguel, Tigaon, Camarines Sur continuously
from 8:00 p.m. until getting up at 5:00 a.m. of the next day, he did not dispute that his house was but
two kilometers away from where the rape was committed.
The commission of the rape was competently established although AAA had been
unconscious during the commission of the act. Proof of the commission of the crime need not always
be by direct evidence, for circumstantial evidence could also sufficiently and competently establish
Page 356 of 519
the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the Court affirmed convictions for rape based on
circumstantial evidence. In this connection, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the
conditions set forth in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are shown to exist, to wit:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ADEL RAMOS y ABELLANA

The behavior of a rape victim in reacting to the incidents of rape after the offense varies from
one victim to another. The act of the victim of going back to the place where the crime was committed
does not ipso facto make the sexual intercourse consensual.
Facts:
AAA, a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, charged Ramos with 4 counts of
rape. The first incident happened when her family was staying at Ramos’ house since the construction
of their house was not yet finished. When she went to the comfort room during the wee hours in the
morning, she found Ramos who told her to enter the bathroom with a gun pointed at her side. She
was also told to lie down and undress. Ramos then successfully had carnal knowledge with her. The
second incident was when AAA’s mother sent viand for the Ramoses. She went to their house and
when she was about to leave, Ramos pulled her inside the house and successfully had sexual congress
with her. The third incident happened when she was returning things to Ranos’ daughter Jocelyn. She
entered the house and was about to leave when Ramos forced her to go back inside and had sex with
her. The last incident occurred when AAA went to the bathroom of their house and saw Ramos inside
already. He forced her to come inside and had sex with her standing up. AAA told her friend Roselyn
what happened and after her encouragement, AAA told the story to her mother. Her mother had her
medically checked.
During the trial, Ramos denied all the allegations with one sweeping denial. The RTC found
him guilty of rape which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Ramos is guilty of rape
Ruling:
Yes. Articles 266-A, paragraph 1(a), and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code enumerate how
rape is committed and the penalty therefor:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

Page 357 of 519
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
xxxx
Both the lower courts correctly gave credence to AAA’s testimony, which was personally
observed by the trial judge. On more than one occasion, we have held that in a prosecution for rape,
the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. As in this case, the
final resolution of the issue turns on the credibility of the victim.
In the review of rape cases, the Court continues to be guided by the following principles: (1)
an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the nature of the crime of rape where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution;
and, (3) the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the complainant's
credibility becomes the single most important issue.
Moreover, the Court has consistently held that the testimony of minor victims is normally
given full weight and credit. When a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape was committed. AAA was still a minor when the rape occurred and her
testimony was found by the lower courts to be a straightforward and categorical account of all the
incidents, notwithstanding her youth and innocence.
As the lower courts have noted, we find AAA’s testimony credible; she remained steadfast
and never wavered in her claim that Ramos raped her, as she recounted the harrowing ordeal
repeated four (4) times.
AAA’s testimony is corroborated by the medical finding evincing forcible defloration, which
taken together, provide sufficient basis to conclude that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge
through force, threat and intimidation have been established.
Ramos claims that AAA did not employ even the slightest amount of resistance as she did not
push him away or attempt to shout. He further avers that during the first incident when he
supposedly poked a gun at AAA, it was unusual that AAA remained passive under attack and went
back to sleep in Ramos’ house after having been sexually assaulted.
To begin with, tenacious resistance against rape is not required; neither is a determined or a
persistent physical struggle on the part of the victim necessary. It is well-settled that the force
contemplated by law in the commission of rape is relative, depending on the age, size and strength of
the parties.
Next, Ramos casts doubt on the credibility of AAA by insisting that AAA could have easily
escaped during the second and third incidents but did not, nor did she even try to shout for help. In
addition, he argues that her visits to his house twice a week thereafter and her carelessly going to his
house make it hard to believe that AAA was subjected to anything against her will.
Page 358 of 519

The Court disagrees.
Failure to cry for help or attempt to escape during the rape is not fatal to the charge of rape;
it does not make voluntary AAA’s submission to appellant’s lust. Rape through intimidation includes
the moral kind such as the fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol.
In this case, Ramos’ gun and continual threats were enough to make AAA cower in fear. Thus,
the lower courts did not err in finding that Ramos employed enough force and intimidation to
consummate his purpose in mind. And as correctly held by the trial court, the fact that she was able
to sleep after the first incident of rape is a trivial matter and does not affect the positive and
categorical testimony of AAA about the rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PRIMO P. JAPSON alias "Longlong"

G.R. No. 210658, September 17, 2014, J. Reyes
Japson was charged of the crime of raping AAA, who admitted she had a relationship with the
him. Japson claimed it was a consensual act. The Court held that the invocation of the sweetheart theory
cannot stand. To be credible, the sweetheart defense should be substantiated by some documentary or
other evidence of relationship such as notes, gifts, pictures, mementos, and the like.
Facts:
AAA, the complainant, testified that around 6 p.m., while on her way to her grandmother’s
house, Japson suddenly appeared and brought her into a grassy portion. She shouted for help but the
nearest house was still 80 to 100 meters away from where she was. She resisted and tried to free
herself but Japson was stronger than her.
Japson laid her down and went on top of her and placed his legs between her thighs and held
her arms with his hands. He pulled down her underwear with left hand and kicked it away. He then
inserted his index finger and forefinger inside AAA’s vagina causing her to feel pain and become weak.
He then inserted his penis into her vagina, and made push and pull movements. A few minutes later,
AAA noticed that fluids came out from his sexual organ.
Japson sexually abused AAA for the second time. He again inserted his two fingers inside
AAA’s vagina and afterwards his penis. Before leaving he threatened her not to tell her mother or
grandmother about the incident, otherwise, he would kill her. Upon arriving at her grandmother’s
house, AAA related the incident and subsequently, it was reported to the police.
Upon cross-examination, AAA admitted that she had a relationship with Japson for a month.
She broke up with him because her mother was against it since she was only 15 years old and was
still studying. AAA was submitted herself to a physical examination. The medical report revealed that
she has fresh hymenal lacerations at the 9, 6 and 5 o’clock positions.
Japson claimed their intercourse was a consensual act. He claimed that they agreed to have
sex near the area on the way to AAA’s grandmother’s house. He alleged that despite the break up,
they continued their relationship.
Page 359 of 519

CCC, the uncle of AAA, and his son, DDD, testified for Japson. They testified that Japson could
not have raped AAA because the two were sweethearts. They both stated that AAA used to send love
letters to him through CCC’s daughter-in-law. DDD also testified that on the date and time of the
incident, he saw both of them walking by the seashore going to the house of their grandmother as he
was watching them at a distance. He also said that while Japson was already in jail, AAA sent the latter
a love letter through him.
Both trial court and appellate court found Japson guilty of two counts of Rape.
Issue:
Whether or not Japson is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
Yes, the Court finds him guilty.
In resolving rape cases, the primordial question is given to the credibility of the victim’s
testimony because conviction for rape may be solely based on the victim’s testimony provided it is
credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
Both the lower courts found AAA’s testimony as credible and such finding is conclusive and binding.
The sole testimony of AAA, recounting the facts and circumstances of her ordeal was
sufficiently straightforward, spontaneous and consistent. AAA was really positive and firm in
pointing an accusing finger on Japson as the very person who sexually assaulted her.
Her behavior after the incident was indicative of her resistance to the acts of Japson. On the
same night, she directly reported to her grandmother that she was raped. The incident was
immediately reported to the police that same evening negating any opportunity for concoction. On
the following day after the incident, AAA went to the police station to formally lodge a complaint and
to submit herself to a medical examination. AAA’s testimony is buttressed by the medico-legal
findings. Indeed, AAA would not have sought police and medical assistance if her claim of rape were
a simple trumped-up story.
Japson averred the consensual sex theory and argued that there was no force or intimidation
to speak of as AAA willingly participated in the sexual act. Because of this, the burden of evidence has
shifted to him. Accused argued that there was no resistance from AAA during and after the act and
that the absence of injuries in AAA’s body negates the employment of force upon her.
The Court ruled that a rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all within her power
to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. The lack of active resistance cannot be equated
to consent. Absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission of rape
since proof of injuries is not an essential element of the crime.
The Court held that the invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot stand. The only evidence
adduced was Japson’s testimony and those of his relatives, CCC and DDD. The Court finds that these
testimonies are unpersuasive and rely too much on hasty conclusions rather than factual
observations. CCC merely said that he knew of the relationship because Japson told him, while the
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testimony of DDD as regards seeing AAA and Japson on the date and time of the incident walking
together does not in any way suggest a romantic or sexual relationship between them.
To be credible, the sweetheart defense should be substantiated by some documentary or

other evidence of relationship such as notes, gifts, pictures, mementos, and the like. The alleged love
letter sent by AAA, through DDD, to Japson while in jail was never produced in court, if indeed, there
really was one.
And even if it were true that they were sweethearts, this fact does not necessarily negate rape.
A love affair does not justify rape for a man does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved
to his carnal desires against her will.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULITO GERANDOY

The Court ruled that as to the first incident, accused is guilty of rape. Despite the absence in
AAA’s testimony that there was actual carnal knowledge considering that she lost consciousness before
that, circumstances indicate that the bloodied vagina was a result of insertion of the accused’s penis to
the vagina of the victim. Even without direct evidence, the accused may be convicted on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, provided the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to
one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
The Court held that there was only an act of lasciviousness on the second incident. Accused mounted
himself on top of AAA, touched and sucked her nipple and kissed her on her lips. Lascivious conduct is
the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner
thigh, or buttocks, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a
person.
Facts:
Gerandoy was charged with two counts of rape, with the qualifying circumstance of
relationship, the victim AAA being the daughter of the accused and aggravating circumstance of use
of deadly weapon.
According to AAA, then 13-years-old, narrated that her father, Gerandoy, raped her on two
occasions. She recalled in the first rape that while she was sleeping with her brothers and sisters in
one of the two rooms inside their house, she was awakened when Gerandoy entered the room and
hugged her. He then forced her to lie down despite her resistance. He then kissed her cheeks and tore
her dress with a knife. She kept on resisting but Gerandoy told her that he would kill them all if she
would not consent to his advances. He then boxed her stomach. She lost her consciousness. After she
became conscious, she was already undressed and noticed that her vagina was bleeding while
Gerandoy was lying beside her. She cried and went away to the farm and reported the incident to the
elder sister of her mother, CCC.
In the second incident of rape, AAA recalled that she was sleeping in a room she shared with
her brothers and sisters when awakened by Gerandoy. Gerandoy then touched her face and told her
that he will rape her again. She pleaded him to stop but her father continued to touch her body. AAA
resisted but her father held her arms and forced her to lie down. She kept on resisting but Gerandoy
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held a knife at her waist and warned that he could easily stab her. He slapped her and warned further
that he would kill all members of their family if she would keep on resisting. Gerandoy told her not
to resist anymore as her two older sisters have already been molested by him. She was then
undressed and Gerandoy mounted her. He touched and sucked her nipple and kissed her lips. After
that, AAA went again to her aunt and told her what happened.
AAA clarified that she reported the first incident of rape to her aunt one month after it
happened. She reported the second incident three months after. She explained that the delay was due
to her fear that her father would make real his warning and continuing threats that he would kill
them all. When asked why she reported the incidents to her aunt instead of her mother, she answered
that she did tell her mother about what happened but was told to keep quiet.
AAA then executed an Affidavit of Desistance that she was no longer pursuing her case against
her father. However, the court ordered the continuance of the case to determine the voluntariness of
the execution of the affidavit.
The defense presented its first witness BBB, the mother of AAA and wife of Gerandoy. She
denied that her daughter AAA was raped on the alleged date of the first incident as the victim was
not in their house. Likewise, she denied that AAA was raped on the alleged date of the second
incident. BBB testified that AAA left their house at around 8:00 p.m. to attend a Christmas party with
her friends. AAA did not return and stayed in her Aunt CCC’s house. BBB further said that it was
unlikely that Gerandoy would be able to rape AAA as he was in the farm on that date and time and
arrived home at 7:00 a.m. the day after. Upon learning that AAA did not return home, the he scolded
and beat her with a broom. As a result, AAA went away to her aunt.
AAA was called to testify on the voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance. She testified that
pity for her father prompted her desistance. She expressed her apprehension that nobody would take
care of her other siblings if the case against her father would push through. She confirmed that her
Aunt CCC convinced her to file a rape case against her father.
Gerandoy denied the charges and said he was in the farm during the alleged incidents and
that he did not even went home to sleep for a few days at that time.
The trial court found him guilty for each count of rape. On appeal, he was found guilty of two
counts of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation with Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 or Child
Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. The CA ruled that the two counts of rape have not been
sufficiently established by the prosecution with moral certainty.
Issue:
Whether Gerandoy is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness or Rape
Ruling:
The Court ruled that as to the first incident, Gerandoy is guilty of rape and as to the second
incident, he was found guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness.
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The Court found that the positive and credible testimony of AAA is sufficient to convict
Gerandoy of the crime of rape. The prosecution was able to prove that on the first incident, Gerandoy,
through the use of force, threat, intimidation and deadly weapon, succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with the victim against her will.
Despite the absence in AAA’s testimony that there was actual carnal knowledge considering
that she lost consciousness before that, circumstances indicate that the bloodied vagina was a result
of insertion of the accused’s penis to the vagina of the victim.
Even without direct evidence, Gerandoy may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial
evidence, provided the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. To
prove conviction based on circumstantial evidence, there was more than one circumstance; the facts
from which the inferences were derived were proved; and the combination of all the circumstances
was such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. What was essential was that the
unbroken chain of the established circumstances led to no other logical conclusion except Gerandoy’s
guilt.
The Court found Gerandoy guilty of the crime of rape based on the following unbroken
circumstances. First, Gerandoy entered the room where AAA was sleeping and forced her to lie down.
Second, AAA resisted but Gerandoy continued to kiss her. Third, Gerandoy succeeded in undressing
her by tearing her clothes with a knife despite her resistance. Fourth, he pointed his knife in her waist
and threatened to kill her. Fifth, due to AAA’s continued resistance, he stabbed and boxed her
stomach causing AAA to lose consciousness. Sixth, upon regaining her consciousness, AAA was
already undressed and her vagina was already bleeding while Gerandoy was lying at her side.
But the Court agrees with the appellate court that there was only an act of lasciviousness on
the second incident.
The Court found credible AAA’s testimony that Gerandoy entered the small room where the
victim was sleeping and pawed her body. Gerandoy undressed AAA and forced her to lie down. He
then mounted himself on top of AAA, touched and sucked her nipple and kissed her on her lips.
Lascivious conduct is defined as intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of

the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with the intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
It is deemed that a child is sexually abused under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, when
he or she is subjected to other lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. There
must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the
offended party’s free will.
As to the theory that Gerandoy could not have done such acts due to the presence of other
persons in the room, the Court ruled that “lust is no respecter of time and place.” Neither the
crampness of the room, nor the presence of other people therein, nor the high risk of being caught,
has been held sufficient and effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape.
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Gerandoy argued that the CA erred when it failed to consider the affidavit of desistance. The
Court ruled that an affidavit of desistance is generally looked upon with disfavor. The Court held that
the lower courts correctly favored AAA’s testimony in open court over the affidavit of desistance. The
statement that it was executed out of pity for her father is only an additional reason why the
desistance would not suffice to acquit Gerandoy. It cannot affect the conclusion that he raped and
sexually abused his daughter.
Further, the delay on the part of the victim in relating her ordeal from her own father was
understandable. He is her parent and her confusion and fear are logical under the circumstances. It
was established during trial that aside from the use of a knife to enfeeble her resistance, Gerandoy
likewise threatened to kill her and all the members of their family including himself if she would keep
fighting off. To make the matters worse, her own mother even expressed sympathy for the husband
over the child. Her mother’s expression that it was embarrassing to relate her sad plight aggravated
the fear already sowed inside the minor victim.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELADIO B. LUMAHO alias "ATTUMPANG”

Rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is
deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse
of authority; and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. In the case at bar, AAA positively
identified her father Lumaho as the person who had carnal knowledge of her in his shanty. She narrated
that when she visited her father, he brought her to a shanty and while inside, he removed all her pieces
of clothing, from her shirt up to her panty. He then successfully had a carnal knowledge of her by
inserting his penis into her vagina.
Facts:
The victim, AAA, then 7-years-old, narrated that her father, accused Lumaho, raped her
sometime in December 2007. She narrated that she was staying in her grandfather’s house in
Panubtuban, Asipulo, Ifugao, when she decided to visit her father Lumaho in his house located also
in Panubtuban. Upon reaching his house, she narrated that Lumaho brought her to a shanty and he
removed her shirt, pants and panty. He then had carnal knowledge of AAA by inserting his penis
inside her vagina. The victim felt pain and cried after the wrongful deed of her father. Lumaho warned
AAA not to tell anybody about the incident. However, the crime eventually came to the knowledge of
BBB (distant grandmother), prompting BBB and AAA to go to the police station to report the crime.
Afterwards, AAA was brought to the hospital for medical examination. Though the victim failed to
recall the exact date of the commission of rape, she remembered that it happened in December
because she was on a school vacation and Christmas carols were being played during that time.
The prosecution presented Dr. Mae Codamon-Diaz, a medico-legal expert who examined AAA.
Dr. Diaz narrated that on 28 January 2008, she examined AAA in relation to her complaint of sexual
abuse against her father. Upon examining AAA’s genitalia, Dr. Diaz found out that there was a month-
old healed laceration on the part of the victim’s hymen.
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Finally, the prosecution presented its last witness, BBB. BBB testified that she is the first
cousin of the grandmother of AAA. She testified that sometime in March 2008, AAA’s cousin, CCC,
went to her and told her about the rape incident committed against AAA. Out of pity, she brought
AAA to the police station to report the crime. In her presence, AAA narrated to the investigating
officers that she (AAA) was sexually abused by her own father Lumaho. Thereafter, CCC accompanied
AAA to the hospital to be medically examined. During cross-examination, however, BBB clarified that
the first part of her testimony was narrated to her by CCC while the last part was what she heard
during the investigation in the police station.
Aside from the testimonies of AAA, Dr. Diaz and BBB, the prosecution likewise offered as
evidence a certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registry of Asipulo, Ifugao that AAA was born
on 12 January 2000 to prove that she was a minor when the incident of rape happened. The medical
certificate issued by Dr. Diaz was also presented. The defense presented its lone witness Roland
Bennog to prove that the accused Lumaho was not present in his house in Nuntiguing, Asipulo when
the alleged rape happened. He testified that from August 2007 until 3 January 2008, Lumaho was
with him in his house located at Naddug, Panubtuban, Asipulo, Ifugao. The RTC found the accused
guilty. CA affirmed said decision.
Issues:
1. Whether or not accused Lumaho is guilty of rape;

2. Whether or not BBB’s testimony is hearsay
Ruling:
1. Yes. Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code describes how rape is committed:
Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Rape is qualified if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree,
or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
In this case, the prosecution established all the elements to constitute as qualified rape. In
open court, AAA positively identified her father Lumaho as the person who had carnal knowledge of
her in his shanty. She narrated that when she visited her father, he brought her to a shanty and while
inside, he removed all her pieces of clothing, from her shirt up to her panty. He then successfully had
a carnal knowledge of her by inserting his penis into her vagina. Without any other recourse, AAA did
nothing but cry. Before she left, Lumaho threatened her to keep silent about what happened. AAA’s
narration of the crime of rape was strengthened by the testimony of Dr. Diaz, who narrated that upon
her examination of AAA’s genitalia sometime in January 2008, she found that there was a month-old
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healed laceration on the victim’s hymen. The period was held to consistent with the allegation of rape
which happened on December 2007.
In People v. Manigo, where a victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of

penetration, there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place. A rape
victim’s account is sufficient to support a conviction for rape if it is straightforward, candid and
corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, as in the present case.
2. No. The defense is trying to suggest that BBB’s knowledge of AAA’s sexual abuse is only
hearsay. It emphasized BBB’s answer during cross examination that the first part of her testimony
was related only by CCC.
An evidence is considered hearsay if its probative value is not based on personal knowledge
of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand. A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge and derived from his own
perception.
Upon review of the records, BBB indeed testified that the first portion of her statement was
related only by CCC. However, the defense failed to specify with particularity which of the first
portion was hearsay. Contrary to the allegation of the defense, what is apparent is the narration of
BBB that she personally heard from AAA herself, during police investigation, that she was abused by
her father. And this statement obviously does not fall within the ambit of hearsay.
NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape
and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of
lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with the
female. However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape without
proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female's vagina.
Facts:
Norberto Cruz y Bartolome (Norberto) was charged in the RTC with attempted rape and acts
of lasciviousness involving different victims.
The prosecution alleged that on December 20, 1993, Norberto and, his wife, Belinda
employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their wares in Bangar, La Union which was then
celebrating its fiesta. From Libsong East, Lingayen, Pangasinan to Bangar, La Union, AAA and BBB
boarded a passenger jeepney owned by Norberto. The young girls were accompanied by Norberto,
Belinda, Ruben Rodriguez (driver) and a sales boy by the name of "Jess". Upon reaching Bangar, La
Union, at around 8:00 in the evening of December 20, 1993, they parked in front of Maroon
enterprises and brought out all the goods and wares for display. Two tents were fixed in order that
they will have a place to sleep. Belinda and the driver proceeded to Manila in order to get more goods
to be sold.
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On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning, AAA and BBB went to sleep.
Less than an hour later, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her. Norberto
was mashing her breast and touching her private part. AAA realized that she was divested of her
clothing and that she was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she’ll be killed. AAA
tried to push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She fought
back and kicked Norberto twice. Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered
her money and told her not to tell the incident to her mother otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went
out of the tent to seek help from Jess (the house boy) but she failed to wake him up. Thirty minutes
later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. AAA saw
her companion awake but her hands were shaking. When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left
and went outside.
Later that day, AAA and BBB narrated to Jess the incident that took place that early morning.
In the evening of December 21, 1993, AAA and BBB went straight to the municipal hall where they
met a policeman by the name of "Sabas". They told Sabas the sexual advances made to them by
Norberto. Norberto was summoned to the police station where he personally confronted his
accusers. When Norberto’s wife, Belinda, arrived at the police station, an argument ensued between
them.
On the other hand, Norberto denied the criminal acts imputed to him. Norberto maintained
that it was not possible for him to commit the crimes hurled against him. On the date of the alleged
incident, there were many people around who were preparing for the "simbang gabi". Considering
the location of the tents, which were near the road and the municipal hall, he could not possibly do
the dastardly acts out in the open, not to mention the fact that once AAA and BBB would scream, the
policemen in the municipal hall could hear them. He believes that the reason why the complainants
filed these cases against him was solely for the purpose of extorting money from him.
After the joint trial of the two criminal cases, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness. On appeal,
CA affirmed the conviction of Norberto for attempted rape, but acquitting him of the acts of
lasciviousness.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Norberto’s climbing on top of the undressed AAA such that they faced
each other, with him mashing her breasts and touching her genitalia with his hands,
constituted attempted rape.
2. Whether the acts of Norberto against AAA constitutes Acts of Lasciviousness
Ruling: The appeal is partly meritorious.
1. No, the acts of Norberto does not constitute attempted rape.
As the evolving case law on rape stands, rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility,
considering that the requisites of a frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code are
that: (1) the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and
(2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will. Obviously, the
offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his victim, because from
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that moment all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished, leaving nothing more
to be done by him. Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage.
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform
all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia
consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission
of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that
should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be
shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent
to lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal
law, that showing must be through his overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held
liable for attempted rape without such overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In
short, the State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt acts, should his criminal intent
be carried to its complete termination without being thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen
into rape, for, as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez, Jr.: "The gauge in determining whether the
crime of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse,
i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption."
Norberto climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his
hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his
designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended
felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her
being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double
interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, such that it was not permissible to directly
infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular injury. Verily, his felony would not
exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for
some other felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield to him) could
also be ultimate felony.
The Court clarifies that the direct overt acts of Norberto that would have produced attempted
rape did not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts directly
connected to rape as the intended crime, but the latter, whether external or internal, had no
connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory acts would
not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony. His preparatory acts could include his
putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for himself
and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares.
Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not
punishable under the Revised Penal Code for as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain
significance, because by their equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the
perpetrator’s intent really was.
2. Yes, Norberto may be held liable of Acts of Lasciviousness
It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness is the offender’s intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is
indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is
committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to
penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of
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consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing,
only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.
Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of lasciviousness is
consummated when the following essential elements concur, namely: (a) the offender commits any
act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness
or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is
deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years of
age. In that regard, lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of
immorality that has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.
The information charged that Norberto "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id] on
top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the
information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty
only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina and
breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile
penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about
his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.
The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against Norberto, even from his own
declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. A good illustration of
this can be seen in People v. Bugarin, where the accused was charged with attempted rape through
an information alleging that he, by means of force and intimidation, "did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by
then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the undersigned [complainant], a minor, and
about to lay on top of her, all against her will, however, [he] did not perform all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own
spontaneous desistance, that is, undersigned complainant push[ed] him away." Norberto was held
liable only for acts of lasciviousness because the intent to commit rape "is not apparent from the act
described," and the intent to have sexual intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking
her genitalia. The Court also pointed out that the "act imputed to him cannot be considered a
preparatory act to sexual intercourse."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO

G.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014, J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
The Court differentiated the terms "deprived of reason" and "demented," as follows, the term
demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality,
characterized by marked decline from the individual's former intellectual level and often by emotional
apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b)
has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation.
Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person
who is "deprived of reason," and not one who is "demented."
Facts:
BBB (AAA’s mother) testified that she knew accused-appellant Cataytay as her neighbor in
their compound in Mandaluyong City. Cataytay was a shoe repairman who had a shop six houses
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away from BBB’s house. Thirty minutes later, her neighbor, Lito, told her that there was a problem,
and brought her to the barangay outpost. AAA and Cataytay were already at the outpost. When BBB
saw AAA, the latter told her, "Mommy, ni-rape po ako." BBB asked her who raped her. AAA responded
by pointing to Cataytay.
During the interviews made by the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she was raped by
Cataytay, which ended when a certain "Mimi" knocked at the door. When Cataytay answered the
knock, Mimi told the former that she will shout if he does not leave the house. AAA went out of the
house and sought help from their neighbors. One of their neighbors, Amelita Morante, called the
barangay officials at the outpost.
BBB identified a Psychological Evaluation Report from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), which was conducted in connection with another rape case. The report stated
that AAA had the mental capacity of an eight-year-old child. BBB also identified AAA’s birth certificate
which showed that she was biologically 19 years old at the time of the incident.
On cross-examination, BBB confirmed that AAA was the victim in a rape case in 1999 against
a certain Norberto Lerit. BBB admitted that she did not personally witness the alleged rape
committed by the accused appellant. Cataytay countered such allegation by defense of denial and
alibi.
RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused Cataytay liable for crime of rape which was
affirmed by CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Cataytay is liable for crime of rape.
Ruling:
Yes, Cataytay is liable for crime of rape.
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

b) When the offended party is deprived of reasonor is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)
The differentiated the terms "deprived of reason" and "demented," as follows, the term
demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality,
characterized by marked decline from the individual's former intellectual level and often by
emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under
paragraph 1 (b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency,
or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly
classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," and not one who is "demented."
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In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental retardation with the mental
capacity of a seven-year old child. The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate on the
conclusion of the psychologist that the "mental age of the victim whose chronological age at the time
of the commission of the offense is nineteen (19) years old x x x is that of a seven (7) year old
child." Cataytay is therefore criminally liable for rape under paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code. The appropriate penalty is provided for by Article 266-B, which relevantly
provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances xxx When the offender knew of the mental disability,
emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of
the crime.
Since Cataytay’s knowledge of AAA’s mental retardation was alleged in the Information and
admitted by the former during the trial, the above special qualifying circumstance is applicable, and
the penalty of death should have been imposed. With the passage, however, of Republic Act No.
9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall instead
be imposed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENRIQUE QUINTOS Y BADILLA

G.R. No. 199402, November 12, 2014, J. Leonen
The accused was charged for raping an intellectually challenged girl. The Supreme Court
convicted the accused and ruled that a person commits rape when he sexually assaults another who
does not consent or is incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. Children, either in chronological or
mental age, are incapable of giving consent to a sexual act.
Facts:
Two informations were filed against the accused Enrique Quintos for allegedly raping a 21-
year old girl who is confirmed to be intellectually disabled at the time the rape incident happened.
AAA testified that on several occasions, Quintos inserted his penis in her vagina despite her protests.
For his defense, Quintos claimed that he has romantic relationships with AAA and that the act of AAA
accusing him of rape is only a way of AAA to get back at him because he ended their relationship.
The Regional Trial Court gave credence to the testimony of AAA and convicted Quintos for
the crime charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the
current appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Quintos is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of rape.
Ruling:
The accused is guilty for two counts of rape. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals and convicted the accused for the crime charged.
Page 371 of 519
The observance of the witnesses’ demeanor during an oral direct examination, cross-
examination, and during the entire period that he or she is present during trial is indispensable
especially in rape cases because it helps establish the moral conviction that an accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Trial provides judges with the opportunity to detect,
consciously or unconsciously, observable cues and microexpressions that could, more than the words
said and taken as a whole, suggest sincerity or betray lies and ill will. These important aspects can
never be reflected or reproduced in documents and objects used as evidence.
Hence, “[t]he evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility is a matter best left to the trial court
because it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial. Thus,
the Court accords great respect to the trial court’s findings,” more so when the Court of Appeals
affirmed such findings.
Moreover, when a victim’s testimony is credible and sufficiently establishes the elements of
the crime, it may be enough basis to convict an accused of rape. To be convicted of rape under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, it only needs to be shown that a man had carnal knowledge with a
woman, or a person sexually assaulted another, under any of the following circumstances:

b) The victim is deprived of reason;
c) The victim is unconscious;
d) By means of fraudulent machination;
e) By means of grave abuse of authority;
f) When the victim is under 12 years of age; or
g) When the victim is demented.
In this case, AAA made a spontaneous and unadorned testimony in court about the fact, the
manner, and the circumstances of Quintos’ sexual intercourse with her over a period of days. She
was also able to positively identify Quintos, when asked. It was also established by clinical
psychologist Brenda Tablizo, however, through examinations and interviews, that AAA was
intellectually disabled with a mental age of 6 years and 2 months.
AAA's mental condition does not make her testimony incredible as long as she can recount
her experience in a straightforward, spontaneous, and believable manner. In People v. Monticalvo,
this court said the following:
Competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld
by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capable and consistently.
Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainant's accusations, it even lends greater credence
to her testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and
explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the
accused.
AAA’s testimony was corroborated by the medical findings, which showed that there were
lacerations in her hymen that were produced by a blunt object. The testimonial evidence is bolstered
by the presence of these lacerations. Together, they produce a moral conviction that accused
committed the crimes charged. The presence of lacerations is not an element of the crime of rape.
This court previously characterized the presence or absence of lacerations as a "trivial or
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inconsequential [matter] that does not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape." The
presence of lacerations is, therefore, not necessary to sustain a conviction. An accused may be found
guilty of rape regardless of the existence or inexistence of lacerations. The absence of lacerations is
not a sufficient defense. However, the presence of lacerations may be used to sustain conviction of an
accused by corroborating testimonies of abuse and documents showing trauma upon the victim's
genitals.
Lastly, the Court ruled that Quintos’ allegation that AAA did not resist his advances was belied
by AAA’s testimony that accused threatened the lives of her mother and siblings. This is intimidation
that could explain AAA’s alleged lack of resistance. In any case, resistance is not an element of the
crime of rape. It need not be shown by the prosecution. Neither is it necessary to convict an accused.
The main element of rape is “lack of consent.”
Hence, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code does not simply say that rape is committed
when a man has carnal knowledge with or sexually assaults another by means of force, threat, or
intimidation. It enumerates at least four other circumstances under which rape may be committed:
(1) by taking advantage of a person’s deprived reason or unconscious state; (2) through fraudulent
machination; (3) by taking advantage of a person’s age (12 years of age) or demented status; and (4)
through grave abuse of authority. Article 266-A recognizes that rape can happen even in
circumstances when there is no resistance from the victim.
Resistance, therefore, is not necessary to establish rape, especially when the victim is
unconscious, deprived of reason, manipulated, demented, or young either in chronological age or
mental age.
The circumstances when rape may be committed under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code should be defined in terms of the capacity of an individual to give consent. An unconscious
person cannot rationally respond to stimuli or perform acts such as giving consent or offering
resistance because he or she is either unaware, asleep, or in a coma.
Meanwhile, when a person is a victim of fraudulent machination or manipulation, such as

when she is induced to have carnal knowledge to treat a person’s disease that he or she does not
really have, she is not in full control of his or her decisions. He or she acts without full or with false
knowledge of the circumstances from which he or she bases his or her actions. Therefore, any
consent he or she gives is either false or not his or her own. Any lack of resistance may not be
interpreted as voluntariness.
In this case, the victim, AAA, is intellectually disabled, with a mental age of 6 years and 2
months at 21 years of chronological age and an IQ of 38 at the time of the incident. Her capacity to
give consent is only that of a 6-year-and 2-month-old child. She is incapable of giving rational consent
to a sexual act. Any sexual intercourse with her, regardless of her relationship with accused and the
presence or absence of resistance, is considered rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GABRIEL DUCAY y BALAN

It is well-settled rule that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she
says in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Courts give greater weight to the
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testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, for it is most unnatural for a
young and immature girl to fabricate a story as sordid as her own defilement, allow a medical
examination of her genitalia, subject herself to a public trial and expose herself to public ridicule for no
reason other than her thirst for justice. Based on the foregoing guiding principle, the Court upholds the
RTC in giving full faith and credence to AAA’s testimony rather than the mere denial and alibi of Ducay.
AAA’s clear, straightforward and candid narration sufficiently established the fact of rape and the
identity of Ducay as the perpetrator.
Facts:
AAA was born in Tikala, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. When she reached Grade 6, she
transferred to Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City and lived in the house of her uncle, (Carlito). On June 10,
2001, the birthday of Carlito’s grandchildren, who were also Charlene’s sons, was celebrated. The
accused-appellant Gabriel Ducay y Balan (Ducay), being one of the neighbors, was invited as a guest.
After the affair, at around 11:20 p.m., AAA and Charlene went out to buy sugar. Along the way, they
passed by Ducay’s house.
Ducay followed the two girls, called them and volunteered to run the errand for them since
he was also going to buy cigarettes. Charlene acceded and gave him the money. He forthwith walked
ahead of them towards the store. The two then stayed outside a church. A few minutes later, Ducay
appeared and instructed Charlene to send AAA to get the sugar from him because he still had to buy
cigarettes. He was about five houses away from where AAA and Charlene stood and it was dark in the
area where he waited.
AAA obliged and moved towards him. Upon approaching, Ducay grabbed AAA and covered
her mouth with a towel. He tied her hands with a rope and walked her over to the coconut trees at
the seashore. Ducay then made AAA lie on the sand, and, with her hands still tied at her back, he
removed her shirt and shorts then squeezed her breasts. Ducay thereafter removed his shorts and
brief, laid on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina twice. After satisfying his lust, he put
his shorts back on. As Ducay turned his back, AAA crawled slowly away from him. He did not notice
her until a dog barked at her, at which point AAA started running. He gave her a chase but was unable
to catch up. AAA kept running until she reached the plaza in Agora. She was thereafter brought to the
police station by a barangay captain.
The RTC found that all the elements of rape were established beyond reasonable doubt. On
appeal, the CA upheld the RTC’s findings but modified the award of damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts were correct in finding Ducay guilty with the crime of rape
Ruling:
Yes, the Court affirms Ducay’s conviction.
It is well-settled rule that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped,
she says in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Courts give greater weight
to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, for it is most unnatural
for a young and immature girl to fabricate a story as sordid as her own defilement, allow a medical
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examination of her genitalia, subject herself to a public trial and expose herself to public ridicule for
no reason other than her thirst for justice.
Based on the foregoing guiding principle, the Court upholds the RTC in giving full faith and
credence to AAA’s testimony rather than the mere denial and alibi of Ducay. AAA’s clear,
straightforward and candid narration sufficiently established the fact of rape and the identity of
Ducay as the perpetrator.
When the victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physician’s finding of penetration, there
is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.
Laceration is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration. Force, on the other hand, is evident in
the manner by which Ducay physically coerced AAA to submit to his dastardly desires. After grabbing
her, Ducay tied AAA’s hands behind her and covered her mouth and nose with a towel. She remained
so bound and gagged while he was consummating the felonious coitus such that any attempt on her
part to resist his depraved deed was futile.
All told, the courts a quo were correct in convicting Ducay with rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Further, Ducay shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9346 which states that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not
be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL SATO

What is clear in this case is that the nine-year old victim, candidly and spontaneously testified
that she was raped by Sato. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined
to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also
the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Both denial and alibi are inherently weak
defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
that Sato committed the crime. For alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly
met.
Facts:
An information was filed before the trial court alleging that sometime in the afternoon of the
10th day of September, 2004, at Province of Cebu, Raul Sato with lewd design and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of "AAA" a 9-year old girl, against her will. During his arraignment, appellant pleaded "not
guilty" to the crime charged. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial ensued.
The prosecution states that on September 10, 2004, then nine-year old "AAA" and her six-
year old cousin "BBB" were invited by the Sato, who was their neighbor, to an abandoned nipa hut.
Sato then carried "AAA" while "BBB" walked towards the hut. Upon entering the premises, Sato told
"AAA" and "BBB" to undress. When the children complied, Sato started playing with the private parts
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of "AAA." He then counted "one, two, three," inserted his penis into "AAA’s" vagina, and made coital
movements that caused "AAA" to feel pain. Thereafter, Sato gave "AAA" P5.00 and threatened to kill
her and her father with a knife if she tells anyone of the things he did to her. The whole time, "BBB,"
who was likewise naked, was just sitting beside "AAA." Appellant did not molest or touch her.
Appellant then carried "AAA" and "BBB" and brought them out of the nipa hut through the window.
"AAA" reported the incident to her grandmother because her parents were not around at that time.
At the time of the incident, Efren Alcover was near the abandoned nipa hut gathering balani.
When he passed by the hut which had no door, he saw Sato, "AAA" and "BBB" inside. Upon getting
closer, he saw all of them naked. "AAA" was lying down while Sato was doing push and pull
movements on top of her. Beside "AAA" was "BBB" whom Sato only gazed at. When Sato was done,
Alcover saw him give the children money. "AAA" was physically examined. Her physician found
hyperemia or an increase in redness of "AAA’s" hymen.
Sato denied the accusations against him. He testified that at around 4:00 a.m. of September
10, 2004, he went fishing and returned ashore at 3:30 p.m. He cooked some of the fish he caught and
shared it with Arsenio Baraquia. This was corroborated by Baraquia. Sato attributed ill motive to
"AAA" and her parents in filing the case. He claimed that he would often scold "AAA" for hurting his
youngest son. Anent her parents, he averred that he had a confrontation with them before the
barangay. On July 3, 2006, the RTC rendered its Judgment finding Sato guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of statutory rape. The CA affirmed Sato’s conviction but modified the award of
damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Sato.
Ruling:
Yes, the CA correctly affirmed the decision.
To support his bid for acquittal, Sato banks on the alleged improbabilities of "AAA’s" claim of
rape. However, the Court finds that the said improbabilities have all been amply discussed and
correctly passed upon by the CA in its assailed Decision such that it is not minded to discuss them all
over again. Besides, the improbabilities pointed out by Sato are inconsequential matters that do not
bear upon the elements of the crime of rape. As such, they cannot be used as grounds for his acquittal.
What is clear in this case is that the nine-year old victim, "AAA," candidly and spontaneously
testified that she was raped by Sato. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and
credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if
the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity. Considering her tender age, "AAA" could not have invented a horrible story. And although
"AAA’s" testimony was already convincing proof, by itself, Sato’s guilt, it was further corroborated by
the testimony of Alcover, who personally witnessed the rape.
Page 376 of 519

On the other hand, all that Sato put forward for his defense was mere denial and the alibi that
at the time of the incident, he went fishing, was back ashore in the afternoon, cooked some fish, went
home and slept throughout the night. As this Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are
inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses that Sato committed the crime. For alibi to prosper, the requirements of time
and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that Sato somewhere else when the crime
happened. He must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission.
Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and
undeserving of any weight in law. Obviously, the physical impossibility is not present in this case.
Sato did not present any proof that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at
the time of the incident. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of
the RTC and the CA in finding Sato guilty of the crime of statutory rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO CASTRODES

G.R. No. 206768, December 03, 2014, J. Perez
Castrodes argued that it was highly improbable that AAA was raped in broad daylight and in a
very highly visible area surrounded by eight houses. The Court upheld his conviction. There is no rule
that rape is committed only in seclusion. A man’s carnality is not hindered by time or place—his prurient
desire impels him to commit rape even in the most public of places.
Facts:
AAA who was 15 years old was busy gathering firewood on the coconut plantation located
downhill from the house she shared with her aunt BBB and uncle CCC.
She was surprised when her neighbor Leonardo Castrodes suddenly appeared behind her
and wrested from her the bolo she was then using to gather firewood. With the bolo in his hand, he
embraced and carried AAA to a spot underneath a coconut tree. AAA could not do anything due to
fear of being hacked with the bolo. Leonardo then started kissing AAA and caressing her breasts. He
then forced AAA to lie on the ground and then removed her shorts and panty. With both of them
naked waist down, Leonardo then laid on top of AAA and attempted to insert his penis into her vagina.
AAA tried to evade from his advances by squirming underneath his hold but she was not
strong enough to free herself. When he finally was able to penetrate her, AAA felt pain and cried. After
ravaging AAA, he then stood up and put on his clothing. Leonardo threatened her that should she
reveal to anyone what had happened, he will kill her and anyone she confided to.
AAA kept her silence until when her uncle CCC noticed her crying inside their house. AAA
then told CCC what had transpired. The next day, BBB with AAA’s father reported the matter to the
barangay officials in their village and had her examined by the Municipal Health Officer.
Leonardo however narrated a different story. To corroborate his defense, his first cousin,
Jovenciano Castrodes took the witness stand. According to the defense, Leonardo on the fateful day
was nowhere near the area where the alleged rape happened. As on that same day, at around 6:30 in
the morning, he and Jovenciano left the former’s house and walked towards the latter’s farm. They
then started working around 7:00 a.m. and only took a break from working to take their lunch and
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again resumed around 1:00 p.m. They finished working around 5 p.m. and returned to Leonardo’s
house. Jovenciano affirmed that he was physically beside his cousin the whole day and there was no
moment that he could not see Leonardo.
The trial court found Leonardo guilty of the crime of rape. The appellate court affirmed the
ruling.
The defense pointed to several circumstances and inconsistencies: (1) it was highly
incredible for AAA to bring a bolo when she was just merely gathering firewood; (2) it was highly
improbable that AAA was raped in broad daylight and in a very highly visible area surrounded by
eight houses; (3) AAA’s delay in reporting the incident, which showed the incredulity of AAA’s
allegation; and (4) there were no vaginal lacerations found in AAA based on the Municipal Health
Officer’s report.
Issue:
Whether or not Leonardo is guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
Yes, the Court found him guilty.
There is no rule that rape is committed only in seclusion. A man’s carnality is not hindered
by time or place—his prurient desire impels him to commit rape even in the most public of places.
The Court ruled that delay in reporting an incident of rape does not discredit the credibility of a
victim.
Human experience dictates that a rape victim, especially a young girl, who experienced sexual
assault, is expected to conceal assaults on her virtue. This principle validates the social stigma a rape
victim may suffer after she discloses her ordeal, especially in a conservative society. In effect, "the
victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the harsh glare of public
scrutiny."
The Court held that in prosecuting crimes of rape, the medical examination is dispensable.
There could be a finding of rape even if the medical examination showed no vaginal laceration.
Leonardo's alibi that he was working in a farm when AAA was raped is not exculpatory because he
failed to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime at the time of the
incident. Leonardo was just twenty minutes away from the crime scene.
To merit credence, he must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other
than the situs criminis at the time when the crime was committed, such that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Leonardo failed to
prove the fact vital to the credibility of the alibi.
Page 378 of 519

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE ESTALIN PRODENCIADO

G.R. No. 192232, December 10, 2014, J. Del Castillo
When the crime of rape was committed by a father to his daughter, he shall be liable for qualified
rape and not simple rape. Also, the reactions of rape victims after the commission of the offense may
vary and shall not be confined to one classification.
Facts:
Jose and BBB were common law spouses and they had 5 children including AAA, the eldest.
Sometime in 1993 when AAA was just 8 years old, she went to her father’s hut where he rests after
fishing. Jose then pulled her inside the hut, pointed a knife at her and instructed her to undress.
Subsequently, Jose succeeded to have carnal knowledge with AAA.
When AAA reached 10 years old, Jose called AAA to the hut and had sexual intercourse with
her. At the aforementioned incidents, there were no other people near the hut. The third and fourth
incidents of sexual congress happened in the year 2000 when AAA was doing laundry by the river.
Her mother BBB was cooking 2 meters from the hut and AAA’s siblings were at the house when Jose,
armed with a bolo, dragged AAA to the hut and had carnal knowledge with her. After 30 minutes, Jose
and AAA had sex again. After seeing her daughter crying, BBB felt in her gut that AAA was being
sexually abused. She wanted to ask her what happened but Jose was constantly watching while
carrying his bolo.
BBB pretended to buy medicines to be able to report the incidents to the police and Jose was
successfully arrested and charged of 2 counts of statutory rape and 2 counts of simple rape. During
the trial, Jose alleged that the case was just a ploy by BBB to leave him and elope with her other
suitors. He also mentioned that AAA agreed to file the case because he was always scolding her for
accepting suitors at a very young age.
The RTC found Jose guilty of all charges which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose is guilty of all charges
Ruling:
Yes. Prodenciado made much of “AAA’s” failure to pinpoint the dates when she was raped.
According to him, this does not only render “AAA’s” credibility suspect, but likewise deprived him of
the full opportunity to defend himself thereby violating his right to due process. Time and again, the
Court has repeatedly held that it is not incumbent upon the victim to establish the date when she was
raped for purposes of convicting the perpetrator. This is because “[i]n rape cases, the date of
commission is not an essential element of the offense; what is material is its occurrence,” which in
this case, was sufficiently established by “AAA.”
Prodenciado also finds fault in AAA’s failure to report the alleged rape incidents. He avers
that if “AAA” was indeed sexually abused, she should have wasted no time in reporting the matter to
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her mother, brothers and sisters, other relatives and/or to the police considering that she was neither
pushed against the wall nor under Prodenciado’s watch 24 hours a day.
Clearly, “AAA” did not reveal to anyone what Prodenciado was doing to her out of fear that
he might make good his threats to kill her and her family. Indeed, in one case, we have recognized
that “[t]he fear of [the victim] that her father would kill her and the other members of her family,
should she report the incident to her mother or the police, is not so unbelievable nor is it contrary to
human experience.” Besides, “the failure of the victim to immediately report the rape is not an
indication of a fabricated charge and does not detract from the fact that rape was committed.”
Prodenciado also questions the facility whereby “AAA” was able to resume her life despite
the supposed rape incidents. This hardly convinces. It has been held that “different people react
differently to different situations and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when
one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience,” such as rape. Verily, some victims
choose to suffer in silence; while others may be moved to action out of a need to seek justice for what
was done to them. Then there are those who opt not to dwell on their experience and try to live as
though it never happened. To the Court’s mind, this is how “AAA” tried to cope with the harrowing
experience that befell her. Moreover, since she was just a young girl when all these rapes were
committed against her, “AAA” simply knew no other way of life than what she was accustomed to.
Appellant is liable for one count of statutory rape and three counts of qualified rape. Here, the
Information for the second rape subject of Criminal Case No. 3209-M-2000 alleges that the rape was
committed by appellant upon his own minor daughter “AAA,” who was then 10 years old. These were
eventually proved during trial. Thus, it was correct for the trial court to hold Prodenciado liable for
rape under Article 335(3) of the RPC, albeit with the modification that it is qualified by the attendant
circumstances of minority and relationship48 which, as mentioned, were sufficiently alleged in the
Information and ultimately proved by the prosecution in the course of the proceedings below.
Similarly, in the last two rape cases committed in 2000, the prosecution properly alleged in their
corresponding Informations and duly proved during trial that they were committed through force
and intimidation; that the victim “AAA” is a minor; and, that appellant as the offender is the victim’s
father. Hence, the trial court should have also found Prodenciado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified rape, not simple rape, under the now prevailing provisions on rape cases which is Article
266-A of the RPC, in relation to Article 266-B thereof.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCASIO DELFIN

G.R. No. 190349, December 10, 2014, J. Del Castillo
The failure of the prosecution to prove that the rape victim is below 12 years old does not
exonerate the convict from the offense but shall only be liable for simple rape.
Facts:
On May 27, 2001, AAA, an 11-year old girl, was ordered by Delfin to come to him. AAA tried
to run but Delfin threatened to fire a slingshot at her. Unwillingly, she went with Delfin inside a
commercial building where he successfully had carnal knowledge with AAA.
Page 380 of 519

The second incident happened on June 30, 2001 when AAA decided to sleep inside a jeepney
parked outside of a billiard hall. Delfin entered the jeepney, woke her up and successfully forced her
to have sexual congress with him.
AAA’s aunt, BBB noticed that AAA had a hard time urinating and swelling in her stomach. AAA
then told BBB about the incidents with Delfin. This prompted BBB to have AAA medically checked. It
was found out that AAA suffered lacerations and that when one finger was inserted in her vagina, she
felt pain.
Delfin was charged with statutory rape but during the trial, he denied the allegations of AAA
stating that he was at home at time the alleged rape incidents happened. Further, he argued that he
found AAA’s aunt CCC packing shabu with her live-in partner and reported them to the police and the
case against him was only their revenge.
The RTC convicted Delfin of statutory rape but the CA held that the prosecution failed to
prove that AAA was under 12 years of age but still found Delfin guilty of simple rape.
Issue:
Whether or not Delfin is guilty of simple rape
Ruling:
Yes. Under par. 1(a) Article 266-A of the RPC, rape is committed as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
xxxx
“Pertinently, the elements of rape under [the above-mentioned provision] are the following:
(1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and, (3) that
such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation” These elements are present in this case.
“AAA’s” testimony established that appellant, a man, had carnal knowledge of her, a young
lass. She positively identified Delfin as the one who raped her. Aside from being clear and
straightforward, her recollection of the material details of her harrowing experience at the hands of
Delfin is consistent. Moreover, the medical findings of Dr. Edano corroborated “AAA’s” testimony as
the same showed that her hymen was lacerated at 6 o’clock position. There is sufficient basis,
therefore, to conclude that carnal knowledge in fact took place.
Further, Delfin, in committing the crime used force, threat, and intimidation. Per “AAA’s”
testimony, she was forced to approach Delfin because he threatened to shoot her with his slingshot.
When “AAA” was already near the appellant, he suddenly grabbed her and dragged her to the second
floor of a commercial building near the market. He then took off her panty, forcefully laid her down
on top of folded cartons, spread her thighs apart and inserted his penis into her vagina. After
ravishing “AAA,” Delfin threatened to kill her and her family should she tell anyone about the incident.
Page 381 of 519
Verily, these satisfy the third element, that is, that the carnal knowledge was accomplished by using
force, threat or intimidation.
In view of the foregoing, the Court sustains Delfin’s conviction for simple rape under par. 1(a),
Article 266-A of the RPC.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR SUAREZ y MAGTANOB

G.R. No. 201151, January 14, 2015, J. Perez
Nestor was indicted before the RTC for the rape of his minor niece. It is a well-entrenched
principle that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl-
child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
Facts:
On the night of 21 December 2008, AAA, who was then 15 years old, went to sleep next to her
12-year old sister. Her parents were not at home at that time. At around 10:00 p.m., AAA was
awakened by someone mashing her breasts. She saw her uncle on top of her legs wearing only his
briefs. She we told by Nestor not to make any noise because if she does, something bad might happen
to her sister. AAA tried to free herself but she was too weak. Nestor first kissed her on different parts
of her body and sucked her breast before he lowered AAA’s shorts and underwear and inserted his
penis into her vagina.
The Medico Legal Certificate issued by Dr. Petronio Batulio shows that during the medical
examination, AAA’s had whitish vaginal discharge, healed vaginal laceration at 6 o’clock position, and
was found to be positive for pregnancy.
Finding that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant of
the crime of rape, the RTC rendered judgment against Nestor. The CA affirmed the conviction of
Nestor.
Nestor contends before the Court that there appears to be no significant resistance on the
part of AAA when he was allegedly defiling her and poses the possibility of a consensual sex with
another man.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape
Ruling:
Yes.
The conviction or acquittal of one accused of rape most often depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainant’s testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is generally
unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for herself. Her testimony is most vital and must
be received with the utmost caution. When a rape victim’s testimony, however, is straightforward
Page 382 of 519
and marked with consistency despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and
cannot be discarded. Once found credible, her lone testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
It has been settled that in rape cases, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to
prove resistance because it is not an element of rape. Not all victims react the same way. Some people
may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to
yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer
any resistance at all. The failure of a rape victim to offer tenacious resistance does not make her
submission to accused’s criminal acts voluntary. What is necessary is that the force employed against
her was sufficient to consummate the purpose which he has in mind.
The medical examination of the victim is not an element of rape. Moreover, the medical
examination does not seek to establish who committed the crime, rather it merely corroborates the
testimony of the rape victim that she has been raped. The prime consideration in the prosecution of
rape is the victim's testimony, not necessarily the medical findings; a medical examination of the
victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. The victim's testimony alone, if credible, is
sufficient to convict.
Indeed, and as contrasted to AAA’s convincing recital of facts, Nestor's denial and alibi will
not stand. Alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and
identification of the complainant. The records disclose that nobody corroborated his alibi. The
testimonies of his family relate to discrediting AAA’s credibility by mere speculations that AAA could
have been impregnated by her boyfriend. They never supported Suarez’s alibi. Alibi must be
supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, otherwise, it is fatal to the
accused. Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for
appellant to be present at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. By
his own testimony, he clearly failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to have been
present at the scene of the crime when the rape was alleged to have occurred. Appellant lived two
houses away from AAA’s family and he admitted to have free access to AAA’s house being their close
relatives.
All told, the Court is in accord with the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, which led to the finding that Nestor is guilty of the crime of rape, qualified by minority and
relationship. Both qualifying circumstances were sufficiently alleged in the information admitted by
the accused during pre-trial.
RICHARD RICALDE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015, J. Leonen
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as “instrument or object rape,”
“gender-free rape,” or “homosexual rape.” The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is “the insertion
of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another
person’s genital or anal orifice.”
Page 383 of 519

Facts:
On January 30, 2002, XXX1 requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonald’s Bel-Air, Sta.
Rosa at past 8:00 p.m.9 Ricalde, then 31 years old, is a distant relative and textmate of XXX, then 10
years old. After dinner, XXX’s mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was late. He
slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor.
It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as “he felt pain in his anus and stomach and
something inserted in his anus.” He saw that Ricalde “fondled his penis.” When Ricalde returned to
the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her what happened. He also told his mother that
Ricalde played with his sexual organ.
XXX’s mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense when she confronted Ricalde about
the incident, but he remained silent. She asked him to leave. XXX’s mother then accompanied XXX to
the barangay hall where they were directed to report the incident to the Sta. Rosa police station.The
police referred them to the municipal health center for medical examination. Dr. Roy Camarillo
examined XXX and found no signs of recent trauma in his anal orifice that was also “NEGATIVE for
[s]permatozoa.”
On February 4, 2002, XXX and his mother executed their sworn statements at the Sta. Rosa
police station, leading to the criminal complaint filed against Ricalde.
The Provincial Prosecutor of Binan, Laguna filed an Information charging Ricalde of rape through
sexual assault. Ricalde pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on August 21, 2002. The
prosecution presented the victim (XXX), his mother, and the medico-legal as witnesses, while the
defense presented Ricalde as its sole witness.
Ricalde denied the accusations. He testified that he met XXX during the 2001 town fiesta of
Calaca, Batangas and learned that XXX’s mother is the cousin of his cousin Arlan Ricalde. He and XXX
became textmates, and XXX invited him to his house. On January 30, 2002, XXX’s mother picked him
up to sleep at their house. He slept at 10:00 p.m. on the living room sofa while XXX slept on the floor.
He denied the alleged rape through sexual assault.
The Regional Trial Court found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual
assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Thus, Ricalde filed this Petition praying for his
acquittal.
Issues:
1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt petitioner Richard Ricalde’s guilt
for the crime of rape through sexual assault.
2. Is petitioner's reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in XXX’s anal orifice,
or any trace of spermatozoa, meritorious?
3. Is petitioner’s invocation of the “variance doctrine” citing People v. Sumingwa proper?
Page 384 of 519

Rulings:
1. Yes. The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 classified rape as a crime against persons and amended the
Revised Penal Code to include Article 266-A on rape through sexual assault:
Article 266–A. Rape; When and How Committed.—Rape is Committed:

xxx
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as “instrument or object
rape,” “gender-free rape,” or “homosexual rape.” The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is “the
insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
another person’s genital or anal orifice.”
The trial court found that XXX’s “straightforward, unequivocal and convincing testimony”
sufficiently proved that petitioner committed an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into XXX’s
anal orifice. There was no showing of ill motive on the part of XXX to falsely accuse petitioner. The
Court of Appeals accorded great weight to the trial court’s findings and affirmed petitioner’s
conviction.
No cogent reason exists for this court to overturn the lower courts’ findings.
First, petitioner’s argument highlighting alleged inconsistencies in XXX’s testimony fails to

convince. In a long line of cases, this court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of child
victims. Their “[y]outh and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.” XXX, then only 10
years old, had no reason to concoct lies against petitioner. This court has also held that “[l]eeway
should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of
abuse.
Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal
orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice.
In People v. Soria, this court discussed that a victim need not identify what was inserted into
his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was committed:
We find it inconsequential that “AAA” could not specifically identify the particular instrument
or object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed something
was inserted into her vagina. To require “AAA” to identify the instrument or object that was inserted
into her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process.
2. No. Petitioner's reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in XXX’s anal
orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice
does not negate the possibility of an erection and penetration. This result does not contradict the
positive testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural, and consistent with human
nature. This court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and the
possibility of convictions for rape based on the victim’s credible lone testimony.
Page 385 of 519

3. No. Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides for the “variance doctrine”:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which I included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included
in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged necessarily

includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former continue or form part of
those constituting the latter.
In Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654 was charged with qualified
rape but was convicted for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness committed against a child under
Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 since “there was no penetration, or even an attempt
to insert [the accused’s] penis into [the victim’s] vagina.”
In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven during
trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape through
sexual assault. XXX testified that he “felt something was inserted [into his] anus.” The slightest
penetration into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MICHAEL JOSON y ROGANDO

G.R. No. 206393. January 21, 2015, J. Perez
The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is not
tantamount to consent. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and
intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to her attackers of because of fear. Besides,
physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman voluntarily succumbed to the lust
of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while others
may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. After all, resistance is not an element of rape.
Facts:
Joson was charged with violation of Articles 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610. Prosecution’s evidence is based on the sole testimony of the victim. AAA lives
with Joson and his common-law partner. AAA testified that at around 1:00 in the morning of 14 May
2009, and while Joson’s wife was away, AAA was awakened by Joson undressing her. AAA tried to
struggle but Joson was tightly holding her arms. After undressing her, Joson kissed and mounted her.
Appellant was able to insert his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain in her genitalia. Thereafter, Joson
went back to sleep leaving AAA crying. At about 6:00 or 7:00 in the morning, Joson left AAA with a
letter apologizing for what happened and begging her not to tell on his wife.
Page 386 of 519

At around 5:00 in the afternoon of that same date, AAA related to Joson’s wife the rape
incident. And on 1 June 2009, AAA, accompanied by her father, reported the incident to the police
and she executed a sworn statement detailing the rape.
The prosecution presented a provisional medico-legal report on the examination conducted

on AAA by Irene D. Baluyut of Philippine General Hospital which essentially states that there is no
evident injury on AAA at the time of the examination. Also submitted as part of the prosecution’s
evidence is the birth certificate of AAA to prove that she was still a minor at the time the rape was
committed on 14 May 2009.
Joson admitted that AAA is his sister but he proffered the defense of alibi and claimed that he
was staying in Alfonso, Cavite on 14 May 2009 and only went back to his house in Dasmariñas on 26
May 2009. Joson vehemently denied the accusation against him and speculated that AAA resented
him because he was strict with his sister. Joson also denied writing the apology letter and presented
his specimen handwriting in court.
After evaluating the evidence, the trial court found Joson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape and meted out the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the judgment of conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape?
Ruling:
Upon a careful evaluation of the case, the Court find no reason to reverse Joson’s conviction.
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution
must prove that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished this
act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious,
or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.
AAA gave a complete account of her ordeal in the hands of her own brother. Her testimony
has established all the elements of rape required under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. First,
Joson had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA positively identified her own brother as the assailant.
She was likewise unwavering in her narration that Joson inserted his penis into her vagina. Second,
appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. At this juncture, we quote with
approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals on this point:
The Court has, time and again, ruled that the force or violence that is required in rape cases
is relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible. That it enables the offender to
consummate his purpose is enough. The parties’ relative age, size and strength should be taken into
account in evaluating the existence of the element of force in the crime of rape. The degree of force
which may not suffice when the victim is an adult may be more than enough if employed against a
person of tender age. In the case at bench, Joson employed that amount of force sufficient to
consummate the rape. It must be stressed that, at the time of the incident, AAA was only 14 years
old. Considering the tender years of the offended party as compared to Joson who was in the prime
Page 387 of 519
of his life, the act of Joson in pinning the arms of AAA to avoid any form of resistance from her suffices.
Force or intimidation is not limited to physical force. As long as it is present and brings the desired
result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.
The Court is not persuaded by the accused-appellant’s insistence that the absence of any
resistance on the part of AAA raised doubts as to whether the sexual congress was without her
consent. The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is not
tantamount to consent. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and
intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to her attackers of because of fear. Besides,
physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman voluntarily succumbed to the
lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while
others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. After all, resistance is not an element of
rape and its absence does not denigrate AAA’s claim that Joson consummated his bestial act.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PACITO ESPEJON y LEBIOS

The mere fact that AAA did not tell her parents about what happened to her immediately after
the first incident on 10 August 2003 does not discredit her accusations of rape and sexual molestation
against Espejon. Delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the
credibility of witnesses if such delay is satisfactorily explained. In this connection, fear of reprisal, social
humiliation, familial considerations, and economic reasons have all been considered by this Court as
sufficient explanations for such delay.
Facts:
On 15 June 2004, five (5) criminal informations for rape were filed against appellant Pacito
L. Espejon before the RTC. The informations charge Espejon of raping—on five separate occasions in
2003—AAA, a girl then only twelve (12) years old.
The testimony of AAA mainly revolved around the events that took place on the 10th of
August, the 28th of September, the 26th of October, the 9th of November and the 8th of December, all in
the year 2003. AAA testified that on those dates, the Espejon, armed with a bolo, brought her to the
lower “shrubby” portion of the XYZ elementary school wherein she was either undressed or was
made to undress. AAA narrated that in all five incidents Espejon was never able to penetrate her but
had always, except in the last one, forced her to masturbate him. AAA said that after masturbating
Espejon, would then give her P20.00.
The prosecution presented AAA’s birth certificate to prove that she was only twelve (12)
years of age during the events described in her testimony. Furthermore, the prosecution presented a
medico-legal report executed by doctors Manijas and Palmera Isip-Baltazar Isip-Baltazar. The report,
which contained the results of the clinical examination conducted by the two doctors upon AAA
stated that no physical finding of penetration was apparent on AAA’s vagina and that the latter’s
hymen is intact. The testimony of doctors Manijas and Isip-Baltazar, however, were dispensed with
after the defense admitted the report’s authenticity.
Page 388 of 519

Issue:
Whether or not Espejon is guilty of Attempted Rape.
Ruling:
Yes.
First. The mere fact that AAA did not tell her parents about what happened to her immediately
after the first incident on 10 August 2003 does not discredit her accusations of rape and sexual
molestation against Espejon. Delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily
impair the credibility of witnesses if such delay is satisfactorily explained. In this connection, fear of
reprisal, social humiliation, familial considerations, and economic reasons have all been considered
by this Court as sufficient explanations for such delay.
Second. AAA’s receipt of P20.00 from Espejon right after the former was forced to masturbate
the latter is not prejudicial to the accusations of rape or attempted rape Espejon. It neither excuses
Espejon’s dastardly acts nor implies AAA’s consent thereto. What is most notable is the fact that the
money was an unsolicited thing that was handed to AAA after the ruttish subjection, such act which
is indignity upon insult being part and parcel of the whole crime that started with the abductive
taking to the bushes. The fear that numbed the person of AAA was, at the time of the lustful offer, still
was overpowering.
Then too, the Court must consider that AAA is a 12-year-old victim of rape whose reputation
for purity and chastity had never been sullied prior to her encounters with Espejon. It is
incomprehensible that for an ordinary 12-year-old Filipina girl, who hitherto had only the faintest
notion of carnal matters if at all, would just suddenly, and without any explanation whatsoever,
surrender herself to the sexual desires of a married man almost four times her elder in exchange for
money.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NILO COLENTAVA

The RTC and the Court of Appeals convicted the accused of qualified rape. It is the contention of
the accused that he cannot be held liable for the crime charged because the testimony of AAA is
inconsistent and should not considered as a basis for his conviction. The Supreme Court ruled that
testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if
she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has
in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to
give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the
shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true.
Facts:
The defendant Nilo Colentava was charged with 3 separate information charging him with
qualified rape for raping his 16 year old daughter AAA on three separate occasions. The Regional
Trial Court convicted Colentava for the crime charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the RTC. Hence, the current petition.
Page 389 of 519
It is the contention of Colentava that the charges against him should not have been given
credence because “AAA’s” narration of the events leading to the alleged rape were vague and highly
improbable. The surrounding circumstances leading to the alleged three incidents of rape were all
the same which is highly unusual and contrary to common experience. Colentava also contends that
“AAA’s” conduct after the alleged rape incidents is questionable. Colentava argues that if he indeed
raped “AAA,” then the latter should have avoided returning to his house at Sitio Baco after the alleged
first incident of rape. Colentava also suggests that the normal thing to do on the part of “AAA” was to
report the rape to her grandmother which she failed to do. Colentava likewise posits that the
prosecution failed to rebut his allegation that “AAA” was mad at him because he chastised her due to
her improper ways. According to Colentava, this could have been the reason why “AAA” pressed
charges against him.
Issue:
Whether or not Colentava is guilty of the crime of qualified rape.
Ruling:
Colentava is guilty of qualified rape for raping his daughter who is a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The alleged inconsistency in the date of the third rape is trivial and forgivable, since a victim
of rape cannot possibly give an exacting detail for each of the previous incidents as these may just be
but mere fragments of a prolonged and continuing nightmare, a bad experience she might even be
struggling to forget. Verily, the exact date of rape is not an essential element of the crime, and the
mere failure to give a precise date, let alone an incorrect estimate, will not discredit the testimony of
the victim. While this Court agrees with the CA that the exact date of the commission of rape is not
an essential element of said crime, it cannot, however, convince itself that “AAA” committed any
inconsistencies in declaring that the third rape occurred on August 21, 2003.
In any case, an Information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense
and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. It is not necessary to state therein the precise date the
offense was committed, except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. And as earlier
mentioned, in rape cases the date or time of commission of the offense is not an essential ingredient
of said crime. “In fact, the precise time when the rape takes place has no substantial bearing on its
commission.”
The elements therefore of qualified rape are: “(1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3)
done by force and without consent; (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape; (5)
the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.”
“In this case, both the trial court and the CA found that the prosecution was able to sufficiently
establish all the elements of qualified rape. This Court sees no reason to depart from the findings of
the lower courts.” “AAA’s” testimony on her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant was
found by the lower courts to be positive, straightforward, categorical and steadfast. Moreover, the
evidence on record established that “AAA” was just 16 years old when appellant, her own father, had
carnal knowledge of her. Clearly, all the elements of qualified rape are present in this case.
Page 390 of 519
Moreover, it is noteworthy that “AAA” was a minor at the time she was raped. The Court has
been consistent in giving credence to testimonies of child-victims especially in sensitive cases of rape.
In People v. Garcia, it was held that:
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a
girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended
party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account
of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame
to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. A young girl’s revelation
that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical
examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to
give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as mere
concoction.
The Court thus upholds the credibility of “AAA” and accords credence to her testimony.
It takes much more for a sixteen year old lass to fabricate a story of rape, have her private
parts examined, subject herself to the indignity of a public trial and endure a lifetime of ridicule. Even
when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young
woman to concoct a story which would put her own father for the most of his remaining life to jail
and drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OSCAR SANTOS y ENCINAS

G.R. No. 205308, February 11, 2015, J. Carpio
The RTC and the CA convicted the accused of 1 count of rape and 15 counts of acts of
lasciviousness. The accused interposed a defense of denial and alibi. The Supreme Court ruled Denial
and alibi, which are self-serving negative evidence and easily fabricated, especially when
uncorroborated, cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive testimony of a
credible witness. Appellant’s denial and uncorroborated defense of alibi cannot prevail over the credible
and positive testimony of AAA that appellant raped her and committed acts of lasciviousness against
her. As found by the trial court and the appellate court, AAA categorically identified appellant as the
person who repeatedly molested her. AAA’s testimony was replete with delicate details which she could
not have concocted herself. She was consistent in her testimony and never wavered even during cross-
examination.
Facts:
Appellant Santos was charged in 16 informations with one count of rape (in relation to RA
7610) and 15 counts of acts of lasciviousness (violation of Art. 336 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 5 of
RA 7610). The information on rape alleged that in June 1997, appellant had carnal knowledge with
AAA, his seven-year old goddaughter. The 15 charges of acts of lasciviousness alleged that Santos
kissed AAA’s neck and lips, and and licked her sex organ on different dates from July 1997 to
September 1998.
Page 391 of 519

AAA testified that sometime in June 1997, Santos, whom she calls Ninong Boy, grabbed her
while she was playing alone outside their house. AAA could not shout for help because Santos covered
her mouth with his right hand. Santos then brought AAA to his house nearby. Inside the house, Santos
brought her to a room, removed her panties and licked her vagina. Santos then poked his penis into
her vagina. AAA felt pain and tried to resist but Santos held both her hands and told her to lie still.
Santos also kissed her lips and neck. AAA further testified that once a month from July 1997 to
September 1998, Santos brought her to his house and once inside, kissed her lips and neck, and licked
her vagina. On two incidents, in July and August 1997, Santos forcibly put his penis inside AAA’s
mouth. AAA was afraid and could not resist because Santos was restraining her and told her to keep
quiet. Santos would then give AAA money in amounts ranging from P1.50 to P5.00 after he was done
with her. AAA did not tell anyone about these incidents because she was afraid.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision convicting Santos of the crimes charged. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the current appeal.
Santos, the sole witness for the defense, denied sexually abusing AAA. He testified that as a
fisherman, he was always at sea fishing particularly during the period of the alleged incidents. Santos
testified that from June 1997 to September 1998, the only time he took a day off from fishing was on
Good Friday.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty as charged.
Ruling:
The Court finds the appeal without merit. The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the
ruling of the trial court that Santos’ guilt of the crimes he was accused of was clearly established by
the witnesses and the evidence of the prosecution. The trial court, having the opportunity to observe
the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial, can best assess the credibility of the witnesses and
their testimonies. The trial court’s findings are accorded great respect unless the trial court has
overlooked or misconstrued some substantial facts, which if considered might affect the result of the
case.
Denial and alibi, which are self-serving negative evidence and easily fabricated, especially
when uncorroborated, cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive testimony of
a credible witness. Santos’ denial and uncorroborated defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
credible and positive testimony of AAA that Santos raped her and committed acts of lasciviousness
against her. As found by the trial court and the appellate court, AAA categorically identified Santos as
the person who repeatedly molested her. AAA’s testimony was replete with delicate details which
she could not have concocted herself. She was consistent in her testimony and never wavered even
during cross-examination.
However, the Court notes that AAA testified that Santos also forcibly put his penis inside
AAA’s mouth on two occasions, that is, in July and August 1997. Under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC,
as amended by RA 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, rape is also committed when a person inserts
his penis into another person’s mouth through force or intimidation. RA 8353 expanded the
definition of rape and reclassified rape as a crime against persons.
Page 392 of 519
In this case, Santos was charged in 16 informations with one count of rape (in relation to RA
7610) and 15 counts of acts of lasciviousness (violation of Art. 336 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 5 of
RA 7610). The 15 charges of acts of lasciviousness alleged that Santos kissed AAA’s neck and lips, and
licked her vagina on different dates from July 1997 to September 1998. However, the Court notes
that AAA testified that Santos also forcibly put his penis inside AAA’s mouth on two occasions, that
is, in July and August 1997. Under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353 or the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997, rape is also committed when a person inserts his penis into another person’s
mouth through force or intimidation. RA 8353 expanded the definition of rape and reclassified rape
as a crime against persons. The amended definition of rape reads:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
(1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances
(a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
(2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Thus, the two incidents in July and August 1997 would have been categorized as rape had
these incidents happened after RA 8353 took effect on 22 October 1997. However, since the two
incidents happened prior to the effectivity of RA 8353, the informations for Criminal Case Nos. 7588
and 7589 correctly charged the accused with acts of lasciviousness (violation of Article 336 of the
RPC in relation to Section 5 of RA 7610). Therefore, the Court upholds the rulings of the trial court
and the appellate court, finding Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and 15
counts of acts of lasciviousness.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONALD NICAL y ALMINARIO,

G.R. No. 210430, February 18, 2015, J. Reyes
Alminario insisted that he could not be convicted of rape because the medical examination
results showed that AAA suffered no lacerations or contusions. It is settled that the absence of physical
injuries or fresh lacerations does not negate rape, and although medical results may not indicate
physical abuse or hymenal lacerations, rape can still be established since medical findings or proof of
injuries are not among the essential elements in the prosecution for rape.
Facts:
The Information charged Nical with the crime of rape. He pleaded not guilty on arraignment,
and when trial ensued, the prosecution presented AAA, the victim, and Dr. Angelito Magno, a
gynecologist at the PGH who examined her. The Nical testified alone in his defense.
Page 393 of 519

At around 1:00 p.m. on August 23, 2007, AAA, who worked as a maid, was folding laundry in
a room inside the big house when Nical, who was also a household helper, suddenly entered the room
and immediately proceeded to embrace her. She tried to run but he grabbed her by her shorts and
pushed her against the concrete wall of the room that she hit her head against it and became dizzy.
AAA managed to stand up and run out of the room. But he gave chase and caught up with her, where
again he embraced her. AAA lost consciousness, and when she woke up, she was lying naked with
him on top of her and half naked. Alminario inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain, but
she was able to to push him off with her knee and make her escape.
She ran and told Nelyn Nacion (Nelyn), another maid, what Nical had just done to her. Nelyn
then texted AAA’s sister, BBB, and they reported the incident to the barangay officials. Two days later,
AAA submitted herself for examination by Dr. Magno at the PGH.
Dr. Magno testified that he examined AAA and he found no signs of any injury, sexual abuse,
lacerations, and bleeding in the private parts of AAA, whose hymen he noted was no longer intact. Dr.
Magno clarified that AAA could have had prior sexual intercourse months or years earlier, although
his medical findings do not exclude the possibility that AAA was raped or sexually abused by the
Alminario a few days earlier.
The RTC gave full credence to AAA’s narration of her ordeal and found Alminario guilty as
charged. The CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Nical is guilty of the crime of rape.
Ruling:
The Court’s review of the assailed decisions yields no new matters that could prompt a
reconsideration or reversal of Nical’s conviction.
In her testimony, AAA gave a clear, credible and complete narration of damning details
showing that he did in fact assault her sexually.
Alminario insisted that he could not be convicted of rape because the medical examination
results showed that AAA suffered no lacerations or contusions.
It is settled that the absence of physical injuries or fresh lacerations does not negate rape, and
although medical results may not indicate physical abuse or hymenal lacerations, rape can still be
established since medical findings or proof of injuries are not among the essential elements in the
prosecution for rape.
In People v. Alicante, the Court held that the accused may be convicted on the basis of the
lone, uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is clear, positive,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Truly, the absence of
lacerated wounds in the complainant’s vagina does not negate sexual intercourse.
Page 394 of 519

No young woman would admit that she was raped, make public the offense and allow the
examination of her private parts, undergo the troubles and humiliation of a public trial and endure
the ordeal of testifying to all the gory details, if she had not in fact been raped.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO GALLANO y JARANILLA

G.R. No. 184762, February 25, 2015, J. Bersamin
Rape is a crime that is almost always committed in isolation or in secret, usually leaving only
the victim to testify about the commission of the crime. As such, the accused may be convicted of rape
on the basis of the victim's sole testimony provided such testimony is logical, credible, consistent and
convincing. Moreover, the testimony of a young rape victim is given full weight and credence considering
that her denunciation against him for rape would necessarily expose herself and her family to shame
and perhaps ridicule.
Gallano was guilty only of simple rape, not of qualified rape. In order that the accused is
convicted of qualified rape under Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code, two requisites must be
met, namely: (1) the victim must be a less than 18 years old; and (2) the offender must either be related
to the victim by consanguinity of by affinity within the third civil degree, or is the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim. These two requisites must be both alleged and proved with absolute certainty.
Otherwise, the accused could only be held guilty of simple rape. The qualifying circumstances of
relationship and minority remain to be relevant in the crime of rape despite the abolition of the death
penalty under R.A. No. 9346. The accused's civil liability depends on the mode of rape he committed.
Facts:
Private complainant, AAA, and her brother lived with their maternal aunt, BBB, BBB's
husband, Gallano, their children and BBB's brother in Baranggay Guimbala-on, Silay City.
On January 2, 2003, BBB went to the hospital to take care of her father and stayed there for
days. AAA was home and was about to make her brother go to sleep. She went inside the bedroom to
a mat when appellant took her aside, undressed her and laid her down on the bed. Standing over her,
Domingo Gallano (Gallano) pointed his penis at her and warned her not to tell her mother, otherwise,
he would kill her. When appellant's penis touched AAA's vagina, she felt pain and instinctively kicked
him away. Feeling distraught, AAA ran outside and cried.
On January 8, 2003, BBB's brother went to the hospital, he told BBB that he saw AAA and
Gallano inside the room, standing and facing each other. This prompted BBB to ask AAA about the
incident. At first, AAA hesitated and refused to talk but later admitted that she was raped. BBB
brought AAA to the city health officer for examination on January 9, 2003.
The City Health Officer who examined AAA found hymenal lacerations on AAA's private part.
Gallano denied the charge, and asserted alibi, insisting that on the day the rape was committed he
had been working in the sugarcane field, having left home for that purpose at 5:00 a.m. and returning
only at 5:00 p.m.; that he had brought his lunch then because he would take an hour to walk from the
sugarcane field to his house; and that he had learned of the charge of rape against him only after his
arrest and detention.
RTC convicted Gallano of rape, qualified by minority and relationship.

Page 395 of 519
On appeal, Gallano challenged his conviction, contending that the RTC committed an error in
finding him guilty of the crime of rape and in imposing the death penalty. The CA affirmed Gallano's
conviction for rape nonetheless because the State had established all the elements of rape, including
the force and intimidation employed by Gallano.
Issue:
Whether or not Gallano should be convicted of rape upon the sole testimony of AAA that had
been tainted with improbabilities and contrariness to human experience, hence, his guilt had not
been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The conviction of Gallano is affirmed, but the characterization of the crime as qualified rape
is set aside. He could be held guilty only of simple rape.
Rape is a crime that is almost always committed in isolation or in secret, usually leaving only
the victim to testify about the commission of the crime. As such, the accused may be convicted of rape
on the basis of the victim's sole testimony provided such testimony is logical, credible, consistent and
convincing. Moreover, the testimony of a young rape victim is given full weight and credence
considering that her denunciation against him for rape would necessarily expose herself and her
family to shame and perhaps ridicule. Indeed, it is more consistent with human experience to hold
that a rape victim of tender age will truthfully testify as to all matters necessary to show that she was
raped.
After reviewing the records, the Court concludes that the trial court was not arbitrary in its
appreciation of the proof of rape, and, therefore, the CA correctly ruled that the crime of rape was
established beyond reasonable doubt even upon the lone testimony of the victim herself. With the
lower courts not being shown by Gallano to have overlooked any matter or circumstance of weight
that could alter the result in his favor, their appreciation must be viewed with respect. It is settled
that the findings of fact by the trial court are accorded great weight, and are even held to be conclusive
and binding unless they were tainted with arbitrariness or oversight. This respect is but a recognition
that the trial court is better situated to assess the testimonies and evidence laid out before it during
the trial.
Nonetheless, Gallano was guilty only of simple rape, not of qualified rape. In order that the
accused [may be] convicted of qualified rape under Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code, two
requisites must be met, namely: (1) the victim must be a less than 18 years old; and (2) the offender
must either be related to the victim by consanguinity of by affinity within the third civil degree, or is
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. These two requisites must be both alleged and
proved with absolute certainty.
Although Gallano's relationship with AAA went uncontroverted because both he and BBB had
testified that they were legally married, AAA's minority was not thereby competently established.
People v. Pruna states the controlling guidelines in evaluating evidence presented to prove a
rape victim's minority, to wit:
Page 396 of 519
The Court hereby sets the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible,
of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document,

or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's
age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
It is clear that the Prosecution failed to adduce AAA's certificate of live birth, the best evidence
to prove AAA's age in the context of Pruna. The Prosecution did not also present any acceptable
substitutionary documentary evidence to prove the same. Instead, the Prosecution relied on the
testimonies of AAA and BBB to establish AAA's minority.
The Court holds that the testimonies of AAA and BBB are not sufficient to prove AAA's
minority even if coupled with Gallano's supposed admission of the same. BBB's testimony would have
sufficed considering that the information alleged that AAA was 12 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime, and the Prosecution was trying to prove that AAA was below 18 years old
for the purpose of qualifying the rape committed by the accused. Yet, Pruna dictated that BBB's
testimony must be clear and credible. BBB's testimony failed this test.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 21ST DIVISION, MINDANAO
STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, AND MOISES ALQUIZOLA
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015, J. Peralta
In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to
warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has been established that when a
woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has
Page 397 of 519
been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that
basis alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be offered
to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant’s testimony itself.
Facts:
AAA attended her high school graduation ceremony in the morning and asked permission
from her father that she would be attending a graduation dinner with her friends. AAA, together with
Christian John Lim (Lim), Joefhel Oporto (Oporto), and Raymund Carampatana (Carampatana), ate
dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno. After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson’s Palace, which
was merely a walking distance away from Gemeno’s house. Outside the Alson’s Palace, they were
greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while, they went inside
and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they again saw Montesco with Harold
Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one
Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to which
the rest agreed.
At first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor before. During the
session, they shared their problems with each other. When it was AAA’s turn, she became emotional
and started crying. It was then that she took her first shot. The glasses were passed around and she
consumed more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy. Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid
her head down on Oporto’s lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove her
baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the
cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed her.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and then she
was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola
Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been there before. She would thereafter
fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw
Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. She
started crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and
Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while
Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola
then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her body felt
heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her lower garments. When
AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for her and was already furious. When she told them
that she was raped, her mother started hitting her. They brought her to the Lala Police Station to
make a report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her medical examination. Dr.
Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of March 26, 2004, and
found an old hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock position and hyperemia or redness at the posterior
fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. After hearing, RTC found private
respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape. It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Aggrieved, private respondents brought
the case to the CA, where the court reversed the decision of the trial court and acquitted private
Page 398 of 519
respondents. In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents’ guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA
consented to the sexual congress.
Issue:
Whether the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape.
Ruling:
The elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such
act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age. Here, the accused
intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to
drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse
with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private
respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act
simply because she did not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that
she was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime.
The appellate court never provided any reason why AAA’s testimony should deserve scant or no
weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony
of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be
credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says
in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the
test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature
of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the
complainant’s testimony itself. The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not truthful to her
accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and tumble of a public trial. AAA was
certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as she narrated her harrowing
experience.
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She tried to
resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The RTC found AAA’s
testimony simple and candid, indicating that she was telling the truth. The trial court likewise
observed that her answers to the lengthy and humiliating questions were simple and
straightforward, negating the possibility of a rehearsed testimony.
Furthermore, when it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight,
and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe
directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than
the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence. Matters of credibility are addressed
basically to the trial judge who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight
and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before him. The
appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama during trial and have to rely solely on
the records of the case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore,
the Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court whose
findings must be given due deference. Since the CA and the private respondents failed to show any
Page 399 of 519
palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial court, these findings
deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding.
ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

FINANCE CENTER (AFPFC) vs. DAISY R. YAHON
G.R. No. 201043, June 16, 2014, J. Villarama, Jr.
The trial court directed AFPFC to automatically deduct a percentage from the retirement
benefits of S/Sgt. Charles Yahon, and to give the same directly to his wife Daisy Yahon as spousal support
in accordance of the permanent protection order issued for his violation of the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Despite the provision of exemption of funds provided in PD No.
1638, the Court held that Sec. 8 (g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as
laying down an exception to the general rule that retirement benefits are exempt from execution.
Facts:
Daisy R. Yahon filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the provisions of
R.A. No. 9262, otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,”
against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon, an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who
retired in January 2006. The couple did not have any child but Daisy has a daughter with her previous
live-in partner.
The trial court issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against Yahon, enjoining him from
threatening to commit further acts of physical abuse and violence against Daisy, directing him to stay
away at a distance of at least 500 meters from her, her residence or her place of work, to refrain from
harassing, annoying, intimidating, contacting or communicating with Daisy, prohibi-ting him from
using or possessing any firearm or deadly weapon on occasions not related to his job, and to provide
reasonable financial spousal support to Daisy. Furthermore, to insure that Daisy can receive a fair
share of Yahon’s retirement and other benefits, various agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government were directed to withhold any retirement, pension and his other benefits.
Because of Yahon’s failure to appear in the subsequent hearings of the case, the RTC allowed
the ex-parte presentation of evidence to determine the necessity of issuance of a Permanent
Protection Order (PPO). Daisy claimed that Yahon deliberately refused to give her spousal support
as directed in the TPO, the RTC issued another order directing Yahon to give her spousal support in
the amount of P4,000.00 per month and 50% of his retirement benefits which shall be automatically
deducted and given directly to Daisy.
Thereafter, the trial court granted the petition, issuing a PPO. Evidence showed that Yahon
repeatedly inflicted physical, verbal, emotional and economic abuse and violence upon Daisy. Medical
certificates showed physical injuries suffered by Daisy at instances of their marital altercations.
Yahon, at the height of his anger, often poked a gun on Daisy and threatened to massacre her and her
child causing them to flee for their lives and sought refuge from other people. He had demanded sex
at an unreasonable time when she was sick and chilling and when refused poked a gun at her. He
would shout at her that he was wishing she would die and he would celebrate if it happens and by
calling and sending her threatening text messages.
Page 400 of 519
Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC) filed before the RTC a Manifestation
and Motion that it furnished the AFP Pension and Gratuity Management Center (PGMC) copy of the
TPO for appropriate action. AFPFC asserted that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the
military institution due to lack of summons, and hence it cannot be bound by the said court order.
Not being impleaded in the case, AFPFC argued that it was not afforded due process.
Said motion was denied by the RTC for having been filed out of time. The decision granting
the PPO has long been final and executory. AFPFC filed a petition for certiorari before the CA praying
for the nullification of the aforesaid orders and decision insofar as it directs the AFPFC to
automatically deduct from Yahon’s retirement and pension benefits and directly give the same to
Daisy as spousal support, allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Daisy filed prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction, stating that that there is no
information as to whether Yahon already received his retirement benefit and that the latter has
repeatedly violated the provision on spousal support. CA granted Daisy’s application, enjoining
AFPFC to release the remaining pension that may be due to Yahon. It denied AFPFC’s petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not AFPFC may be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from the
retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the latter’s lawful wife
as spousal support.
Ruling:
Yes, AFPEC may be ordered to regularly deduct a portion of the retirement pension and/or
benefits of its member for spousal support.
A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against
women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary relief.
Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their
daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be included in the TPO, PPO or BPO,
which includes: “(g) directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if
entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an
appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the
respondent's employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit
and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without
justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court.”
AFPFC argued that it cannot comply with the RTC’s directive for the automatic deduction
from Yahon’s retirement benefits and pension to be given directly to Daisy, as it contravenes an
explicit mandate under the law governing the retirement and separation of military personnel. Sec.
31 of P.D. No. 1638 states that the benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein,
Page 401 of 519
shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall
they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third person.
Sec. 13 of Rule 39 of Rules of Civil Procedure enumerates those properties which are exempt
from execution: Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other,
shall be exempt from execution: “(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained
as such support, or any pension or gratuity from the Government.”
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws,
the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. The Court held
that that Sec. 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down an
exception to the general rule that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself
declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the
respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman
“notwithstanding other laws to the contrary.”
The Court also disagreed with AFPFC’s contention that the directive to segregate portion of
the retirement benefits is illegal because said money remained as public funds. Sec. 8(g) of R.A. No.
9262 used the general term “employer,” which includes in its coverage the military institution,
Yahon’s employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Sec. 8(g)
applies to all employers, whether private or government.
The Court emphasized that said provision is support enforcement legislation. In the United
States, provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act allow garnishment of certain federal funds
where the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child support. As these
provisions were designed “to avoid sovereign immunity problems” and provide that “moneys payable
by the Government to any individual are subject to child support enforcement proceedings,” the law is
clearly intended to “create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue valid
orders directed against Government agencies attaching funds in their possession.”
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically address one form
of violence committed against women—economic abuse. The relief provided in Sec. 8(g) thus fulfills
the objective of restoring the dignity of women who are victims of domestic violence and provide
them continued protection against threats to their personal safety and security.
BBB vs. AAA

G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015, J. Reyes
It bears stressing that Sec. 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly prohibits compromise on
any act constituting the crime of violence against women. Thus, in Garcia vs. Drilon, the Court declared
that: “[v]iolence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating
the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault.”
AM No. 10-4-16-SC,23 on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of all issues under the
Family Code and other laws in relation to support, custody, visitation, property relations and
guardianship of minor children, excepting therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.
Page 402 of 519

While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an independent action and not as an
incidental relief prayed for in a criminal suit, the instant petition cannot be taken outside the ambit of
cases falling under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. Perforce, the prohibition against subjecting the
instant petition to compromise applies.
Facts:
AAA and BBB are married. However, due to their frequent fights and alleged illicit relations
of BBB to a person named FFF and the alleged verbal abuses and distresses that BBB gives to AAA,
the latter filed an application for Permanent Protection Order (PPO) under R.A. No. 9262. The RTC
rendered a decision granting the application of PPO of AAA. The CA affirmed this decision.
During the trial, however, AAA and BBB entered into a compromise agreement. BBB submits
that since there has been a compromise agreement executed between the parties, the instant petition
before the Court is rendered moot and academic.
Issue:
Whether or not cases filed under R.A. No. 9262 can be a subject of a compromise agreement.
Ruling:
NO, cases filed within the contemplation of RA 9262 cannot be the subject of a compromise
agreement between the parties.
The Court cannot take the simplest course of finally writing finis to the instant petition by
rendering a judgment merely based on compromise as prayed for by BBB due to reasons discussed
below.
Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her application for the
issuance of a TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant petition,
what is essentially being assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC and which was affirmed by the CA.
The rules, however, intend that cases filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 cannot be a subject
of compromise agreements.
It bears stressing that Sec. 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly prohibits compromise
on any act constituting the crime of violence against women. Thus, in Garcia vs. Drilon, the Court
declared that: “[v]iolence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties
mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault.”
AM No. 10-4-16-SC,23 on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of all issues under
the Family Code and other laws in relation to support, custody, visitation, property relations and
guardianship of minor children, excepting therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.
While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an independent action and not as an
incidental relief prayed for in a criminal suit, the instant petition cannot be taken outside the ambit
of cases falling under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. Perforce, the prohibition against subjecting the
instant petition to compromise applies.
Page 403 of 519
People of the Philippines vs. Alexander “Sander” Bangsoy,

G.R. No.204047, January 13, 2016
Facts: In a Decision dated Augsut 16, 2010, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of statutory rape. It gave credence to the testimony of AAA that her uncle,
herein appellant, inserted his penis inside her vagina on two occassions. The RTC explained that
AAA tetifed clearly despite her mental weakness, and that she never wavered during cross-
examination. It further hled that the appellant’s moral ascendancy over AAA, combined with the
former’s use of a deadly weapon and threats of bodily har,, was more than enough to cow the victim
into submitting to the appellant’s desires. Finally, the RTC rejected the appellant’s a bare denial
and uncorroborated alibi.
On appellate review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Judgment. The CA held that AAA positively
identified the appellant as the person who sexually abused her on two occassions in April2004, and
who threatened to kill her if hse would report the incidents to her father. The CA further ruled that
the absence of hymenal lacerations did not negate a finding of rape. It added that rape is not always
committed in seclusion since lust is no respecter of time and place.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape despite the presence
of the victim’s father in the room during the commission of the crime.
Held: Yes. In the said case, the Supreme Court held that contrary to the appellant’s claim, the
presence of the victim’s father in the room does not negate the commission of the crime. Rape can
be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school
premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other
members of the family are also sleeping. It is not impossible or incredible for the members of the
victim’s family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while a sexual assault is being
committed. It is settled that lust is not a respecter of time or place and rape is known to happen in
the most unlikely places.
People of the Philippines vs. Ruben Baron,

G.R. No. 213215, January 11, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. The facts established by the
evidence for the prosecution are as follows:
AAA’s mother testified that at about 12:30 pm on May 4, 1999, AAA sought her permission to play
at the day care center, which was a short distance from their house. At about 1:30pm., Baron
(appellant) arrived with AAA, both of them wet from head to toe. They informed her that they
bathed at the seawall. They then asked her permission to go for a “joy-ride” in Baron’s trisikad. They
returned at about 4:00pm. At about 5:30pm, she noticed that her daugther was missing. She then
went to the Molo Supermarket to look for her common-law partner so that he may assist her. After
a certain Perla Tacorda informed them that AAA might have returned to the seawall, AAA’s mother
sought Baron’s assistance in searching for AAA. Baron intially refised, but with her prodding,
reluctantly relented. With the permission of the landowner, they entered the seawall, where they
found the lifeless body of AAA.
Page 404 of 519
Alcid Flores testifoed that at about 4:15pm on May 4, 1999, he saw Baron in a white sleeveless shirt
and short pants driving his trisikad with AAA in the passenger seat. They had passed by the seawall.
Later in the day, he joined the search for AAA.
Brgy. Captain Morales testifed that sometime between 7:00pm and 7:30pm of May 4, 1999, Romeo
Inocencio and Baron sought her permission to enter the seawall as AAA, who earlier went there,
was missing. There, Inocencio and Baron pointed to AAA’s lifeless body.
Gennivive Belarma, AAA’s seven-year old cousin, narrated that on May 4, 1999, she and AAA were
playing with another girl, Candy, when AAA was picked up by Baron. She knew Baron as he was the
husbanf of her mother’s younger sister. AAA never returned to play with them. That eveving, her
mother told her that AAA had died.
On the other hand, Baron resorted to denial. He testified that at about 2pm on May 4, 1999, AAA
joined him for a joy ride aboard his trisikad. At about 2:30pm., he turned over AAA to her mother
in the presence of Gingging Tacorda, Soledad Palacios, and Romeo Inocencio.At about 6:30pm.,
AAA’s mother approached him in the vicinity of the Molo Supermarket, asking AAA’s whereabouts.
He reminded her that he had returned AAA to her. Romeo Inocenciio asked him to go to the seawall
where they found AAA’s lifeless body. He claims to have learned of being implicated in AAA’s rape
and killing only after he was apprehended.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted him of the crime of rape with homicide based on
circumstantial evidence.
Issue: Whether the conviction by appellant based on circumstantial evidence is correct.
Held: Yes. The requirements for circusmtance evidence to sustain a conviction are settled. Rule
133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
a. There is more than one circumstances;

b. The facts fromwhcih the inferences are derived are proven; and
c. The combination of all the circumstance is such a to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the CA that a multiplicity of the
circumstances, which were attested to by credible witnesses and duly established from the
evidence, points to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant was responsible for the rape
and killing of the seven year old child, AAA:
1.) Seven year old Gennivie Belarma was playng with AAA when Baron picked up AAA and
brought her to the river/seawall.
2.) Acid Flores saw appellant clad in a white sleeveless shirt and short pants with AAA walking
towards the seawall at around 4:15pm on May 4, 1999;
Page 405 of 519
3.) 12 year old Tacorda saw a man in a white sleeveless shirt and short pants right behind AAA
as she was going towards the seawall. Her description of what the man was wearing matched
Flores’ and Valguna’s description of what Baron was wearing.
4.) Valguna saw appellant, clad in a white sleeveless shirt and short pants, nervously and
hurriedly leaving the seawall and thereafter, boarding his trisikad.
5.) Appellant’s conduct when he was asked by AAA’ s mother to join the search, in which he
expressed much reluctance despite his having been the last known companion of AAA.
6.) AAA’s body, which bore injuries at the vaginal area, was discovered at the seawall. The
seawall is the same place several witnessess identified as where AAA and appellant went in
the afternoon of May 4, 1999. This is also the same from where the appellant nervously and
hurriedly left in the same afternoon.
7.) The medico-legal findings pointing to asphyxiation by drowning as the cause of AAA’s
death, along with other injuries on her thorax, abdomen, and extremities.
People of the Philippines vs. Allan Rodriguez y Grajo,

G.R. No. 208406, February 29, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape. Appellant, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Lorenda Gozar, Psychologist at the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) Psychiatric Services, the victim, AAA; BBB, AAA's mother; and Dr. Roy
Camarillo, a Medico-Legal Officer; as well as documentary evidence. Their testimonies established
the following:
Appellant and AAA were neighbors. At around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of December 18, 2004,
AAA, who was then 27 years old but mentally retarded, was making rugs at their house when
appellant called her to look after his one-year-old son as his wife was doing laundry work at an
employer's house. AAA obliged and went to appellant's house. As soon as she entered the house,
appellant closed the door, kissed her, and removed her clothes and his pants. He then inse1ied his
penis into her vagina and it was painful. After satisfying his lust, appellant wiped the "white thing"
that came out of his penis. He then dressed AAA and warned her not to tell anyone about the
incident. Appellant just left and played cards with his friends while AAA looked after his son until
appellant's wife came back.
On December 25, 2004, AAA told her mother, BBB, that appellant molested "ginalaw" her. BBB
confronted appellant who just denied the accusation. BBB brought AAA to the police station to file
a complaint against appellant. AAA was referred to the Regional Crime Laboratory of Laguna and
examined by Dr. Roy Camarillo who issued a medical certificate which established among others,
that she had a deep recently healed lacerations at 7 o'clock position which can be three weeks to
two months old at the time of physical examination on January 13, 2005. He testified that the
multiple lacerations were caused by the insertion of an erected penis or by a hard or blunt object.
Upon receipt of the letter referral from the RTC, Lorenda Gozar conducted a battery of
psychological test on AAA for two days 16 and submitted her findings embodied in a Neuro
Psychiatric Examination and Evaluation Report dated September 12, 2007. She diagnosed AAA to
Page 406 of 519
be suffering from severe mental retardation with an IQ of 38 and a mental age consistent with a six
year and two months old child. She further testified that based on her examination and interview
on AAA, the latter can remember persons and incidents that happened in the past and she can
testify in court regarding the alleged rape even with her mental age of a six years old as a four (4)
year child can do so. She also noted that AAA's retardation was congenital because she started
walking and talking at the age of 3 years old when other can do the same at age one.
Appellant denied the accusation against him testifying that on December 18, 2004 at around 3
o'clock in the afternoon, he was doing carpentry work in Mang Henry's house which was located at
the back of his house, and got home at 6 o'clock in the evening. His wife corroborated his alibi and
further claimed that she was at home doing laundry work at the time of the alleged incident.
In a decision, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Appellant appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals. In his appeal, appellant contends that
his guilt for the crime charged was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. He alleges that AAA's
testimony on her direct examination is bereft of any indication of a mentally imbalanced person
who was abused against her will; that a judicious evaluation of her testimony would lead to the
inescapable conclusion that the same is replete with evidence demonstrating that she was coached
both in her direct and cross examinations; that she appeared spontaneous and was able to answer
directly and unequivocally all the questions propounded on her.
Appellant further argues that the evaluation on AAA's alleged mental retardation was incomplete
and inadequate to meet the requirements in determining a person's mental state as stated in
People v. Cartuano, Jr.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in convicting appellant beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of rape.
Held: No. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 provides:
ART. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed.
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Page 407 of 519

Clearly, the prosecution must prove that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the four enumerated circumstances. Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is
rape under the aforesaid provisions of law. 2Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a
mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the
facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the
latter.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution was able to establish the elements
of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
AAA's mental condition was clearly shown by the Neuro-Psychiatric Examination and Evaluation
Report submitted by psychologist Gozar which indicated that AAA is suffering from severe mental
retardation with an I.Q. of 38 and a mental age equivalent to that of a six (6) year and two (2)
month-old child; and that AAA's retardation was congenital since the latter was able to walk and
started talking at the age of three while ordinarily a child should start walking and talking at the
age of one.
A person's mental retardation can also be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence,
such as the testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court. Here, BBB also
confirmed that her daughter is mentally retarded. Dr. Camarillo also testified on AAA's mental
retardation as he observed that the latter gave incoherent answers during her interview as well as
the way she looked at him. Notably, it was the RTC that referred AAA for a neuro-psychiatric
examination and evaluation. Thus, we agree with the findings of both the RTC and the CA that AAA
is no doubt a mental retardate.
AAA positively identified appellant as the person who raped her. She testified in a straightforward
and clear manner that appellant, whose house was just located at the back of their house, called
her to babysit his one year old son. When AAA entered appellant's house, he closed the door, kissed
her, removed her clothing and then his own clothes and then inserted his penis into her vagina,
and it was painful. AAA's claim of sexual intercourse was corroborated by the medical report of Dr.
Camarillo which showed the presence of a deep healed laceration at 7 o'clock position which was
assessed to be three weeks to two months old which was caused by an insertion of an erected penis
or a hard or blunt object. Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical
evidence of forcible defloration.
People of the Philippines vs. Raul Yamon Tuando,

G.R. No. 207816, February 24, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of qualified rape. Appellant, duly assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
The factual antecedents are the following:
The victim AAA, in her testimony and sworn statement, narrated that she was 13 years old and a
resident of Taguig City. She recalled that during the month of January 2006, upon coming home
from school at noon-time, Tuando offered her softdrinks, which she accepted and drank. After
Page 408 of 519
consuming it, she felt dizzy. It was at this moment that Tuando pulled her inside the bedroom and
put her on the bed. Tuando then removed her school uniform and undergarments, kissed her and
laid himself on top of AAA. She tried to resist his advances but he boxed her hand and threatened
to kill her whole family. Thereafter, he kissed the victim’s breasts and inserted his penis inside the
victim’s private organ despite pleas to stop. After satisfying his lust, Tuando again threatened the
victim not to tell her mother about what happened. Then he left her. Since then, Tuando continued
raping her upon arriving from school with threats to kill her family.
Months later, AAA’s mother BBB noticed that AAA was not having her monthly menstrual period.
Upon the advice of her employer, BBB brought AAA to a local health center but she was told to
bring her child to the Child Protection Unit of Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for medical
examination. There, she was medically examined by Dr. Irene Baluyot (Dr. Baluyot) of PGH. On 11
July 2006, Dr. Baluyot confirmed through her Final Medico-Legal Report that AAA was 20 to 22
weeks pregnant. It was at this moment that AAA revealed to BBB that Tuando raped her. BBB
brought AAA to her employer’s house and let her stay there until she gave birth on 3 September
2006.
On 7 October 2006, AAA was again raped by Tuando when she went back to their house to visit her
brothers. She decided to spend the night inside the house upon learning that Tuando was not
around during that time. However, late in the evening, she was awakened when she felt that Tuando
was on top of her and started kissing her. Tuando covered her mouth and raped her again, this time
with a knife poked at her.
The next day, AAA told BBB that she was raped again by Tuando. Prompted by the abuse on her
daughter, BBB filed a complaint before the barangay officials, who in turn, invited Tuando to their
office for questioning. Thereafter, AAA and BBB proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) Office to report the rape and executed their respective sworn statements about the crime.
The barangay officials transferred Tuando to the NBI for investigation.
Tuando denied raping AAA. He testified that sometime in the year 2005, he and AAA had a
relationship like a husband and wife but only started to be sexually intimate in January 2006. Their
relationship was kept secret because during that time, he and BBB were still in a common-law
relationship. On June 2006, BBB came to know of his relationship with AAA when she noticed that
the latter was getting very close to him. Turning her anger on her daughter, she scolded and brought
AAA to her (BBB) employer’s house.
Tuando told the court that he knew that it was AAA’s brother CCC who filed the case against him
out of revenge when he scolded him.
At the end of his testimony, Tuando insisted that he never forced AAA to submit to sexual
intercourse; that it was consensual and that it was committed out of love. Finally, he found nothing
wrong in his relationship with AAA despite her minority and the fact that she is the daughter of his
common-law spouse.
Page 409 of 519

In a decision, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Rape which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by
the RTC against appellant.
Held: No, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution was able to prove that Tuando had sexual
intercourse with AAA, the then 13 year old daughter of his common-law wife, against her will. The
prosecution was able to present the evidence to support conviction for qualified rape: that (1) the
accused had carnal knowledge of the victim under 18 years of age at the time of rape; (2) said act
was accomplished (a) through the use of force, when he boxed her hand while inserting his penis
into AAA’s private organ, (b) through the threat of killing AAA’s family and (c) through
intimidation being the common-law spouse of the victim’s mother.
The concurrence of both the minority of the victim, as proven by her birth certificate, and her
relationship with her offender, qualified the rape raising the penalty to death. In People v. Floro
Barcela it is essential, as in this case, that both circumstances must be alleged in the criminal
complaint or information and proven as the crime itself.
Moreover, the SC found credibility with AAA’s narration that she was raped by Tuando. It was when
the victim’s senses were weakened by dizziness that the accused laid her on top of the bed. He
undressed the victim, kissed her and inserted his penis inside the victim’s private organ despite
appeals and struggle against the act. Not just the victim but her entire family was threatened with
death if she would expose the commission of the offense.
Dr. Baluyot confirmed in her final evaluation report that there was definite evidence of sexual abuse
and sexual contact committed against AAA.
On the other hand, we cannot sustain the sweetheart defense presented by Tuando that he and
AAA were involved in a romantic relationship as that of husband and wife, hence justifying the
sexual intercourse between them.
As testified to by the accused, he and BBB were common-law spouses living under the same roof
with the children of the latter, including AAA. After four years, he now claims before this Court
that upon his separation from BBB, he entered into a romantic relationship, this time with the
minor daughter of his former partner. When the trial judge asked the accused if he found nothing
wrong with his relationship with a minor, he answered negatively. It is hard for this Court to fathom
that a minor, a 13-year old child-woman, would enter into a relationship with a man thrice her age
and worse, a former common-law spouse of her own mother. It is even absurd, if not disturbing, to
even entertain the thought that a child like AAA, who has been living with her step father, the
accused, since she was 9 years old, would freely consent to sexual intercourse with the accused in
their own home.
We reiterate the principle that no young girl such as AAA would concoct a sordid tale, on her own
or through the influence of her mother BBB or even his brother CCC, and undergo the ordeal of
Page 410 of 519

having her private parts examined by a medical doctor, of being questioned by NBI operatives about
the details of how she was raped by Tuando, then eventually being subjected to the stigma and
embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire to seek justice.
People of the Philippines vs. Reman Sariego,

G.R. No. 203322, February 24, 2o16
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of qualified rape. Appellant, duly assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
The factual antecedents are the following:
According to AAA, at about 8:00 a.m. on December 5, 2000, she was at home with her father and
two (2) cousins washing clothes when her father asked her to buy cigarettes from a nearby store.
When she returned, she went to the room in the second floor of her house to give her father the
cigarettes she had bought. There, her father was already covered by a blanket in the dark. He held
her hand and told her to turn her back and remove her short pants. When she refused, appellant
removed her pants himself He then proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina with her back
towards him. He also told her to "stoop" on top of the table facedown. AAA kept asking her father
the reason for his actions but he did not answer. After appellant satisfied his lust, AAA went to the
comfort room downstairs to wash her private part.
The same incident happened on February 20, 2001 while AAA's mother was selling goods at the
Carbon Market. AAA pleaded that appellant stop what he was doing to her because she might get
pregnant, which would make her mother discover the horrific events, but to no avail. AAA revealed
that on both occasions, she refrained from seeking help from her cousins who were in the same
house because of fear that appellant might choke her mother, as what he would usually do in the
past. She also revealed that appellant would threaten that if she tells anyone of the incidents, he
will kill all of them in their house. She, however, could not keep the secret from her mother any
longer because she became pregnant. When she gave birth, she left the baby in Norfeld, a place for
unwed mothers subject to incest.
After AAA's testimony, the prosecution presented Dr. Astercita to appear on behalf of Dr. Julius
Caesar Santiago, her senior resident physician, the doctor who attended to AAA and prepared the
medical certificate on his findings, but was no longer connected with the Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center (VCMMC). According to Dr. Astercita, the medical certificate states that the
examination conducted on AAA's anus and genital area revealed that her hymen had deep notches
at the seven and ten o'clock positions. This meant that there was a 50% previous laceration thereon.
Dr. Astercita explained that it may have been caused by any blunt object inserted into AAA's vagina.
She further added that the examination on her abdomen also revealed that she was pregnant, which
was later confirmed by an ultrasound report. Moreover, when asked the standard five questions in
determining whether AAA was a victim of child abuse, AAA's answers showed a positive finding.
In contrast, the defense presented the lone testimony of appellant himself, who simply denied the
charges against him. While admitting that AAA was, indeed, his daughter, appellant refuted any
Page 411 of 519

allegation of involvement in her pregnancy.Instead, he pointed out that it was AAA's boyfriend who
impregnated her. He conceded, however, that he may have mauled his daughter in the past but
such bodily harm was inflicted because she was fond of flirting with the opposite sex.
In a decision, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified
rape.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the judgment of conviction for qualified rape
rendered against appellant.
Held: Yes. Appellant is only liable for simple rape for failure of the prosecution to prove the
minority of the victim.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that appellant cannot be held guilty of the crime of
rape in its qualified form. Article 266-B of the RPC provides that rape is qualified when certain
circumstances are present in its commission, such as when the victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Hence,
in a conviction for qualified rape, the prosecution must prove that (1) the victim is under eighteen
years of age at the time of the rape, and (2) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate
or adopted) of the victim. In other words, it is the concurrence of both the minority of the victim
and her relationship with the offender that will be considered as a special qualifying circumstance,
raising the penalty to the supreme penalty of death. Thus, it is imperative that the circumstance of
minority and relationship be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself; otherwise, the
crime shall be considered simple rape warranting the imposition of the lower penalty of reclusion
perpetua. If, at trial, both the age of the victim and her relationship with the offender are not proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the death penalty cannot be imposed.
In this case, while it is undisputed that AAA is the daughter of appellant, her minority was not
conclusively established. In People v. Pruna, the Court laid down the following controlling
guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the
following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents, such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim, would suffice to
prove age.
Page 412 of 519

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended
party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him.
Thus, the best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth certificate or certified true
copy thereof, and in their absence, similar authentic documents may be presented such as
baptismal certificates and school records. If the original or certified true copy of the birth certificate
is not available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the family may be
sufficient under certain circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or other authentic
documents and the testimonies of the victim's mother or other qualified relative are unavailable,
the testimony of the victim may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
People of the Philippines vs. Godofredo Comboy y Cronico,

G.R. No. 218399, March 02, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with two (2) counts of statutory rape and one (1) count of attempted
rape. On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, trial ensued.
The prosecution alleged that sometime in the year 2006, at around 11 o' clock in the evening, AAA,
who was sleeping beside her brother BBB, suddenly woke up with her father, Comboy, already on
top of her, and the latter's penis already inside her vagina. Startled by the pain she felt in her vagina,
AAA pushed Comboy and scampered away from him in order to move closer to BBB. This left
Comboy no choice but to leave the room.
Page 413 of 519

The incident was repeated sometime in February 2008, when AAA, while sleeping beside her
brother, BBB, was similarly awakened by the presence of her father, Comboy, on top of her with his
penis already inside her vagina. During this time, Comboy told AAA not to make any noise so as
not to disrupt the sleep of the other members of their family.
Finally, at around 2 o'clock in the morning of May 17, 2009, AAA, while again sleeping beside her
brother, BBB, woke up with her father, Comboy, already on top of her and in the process of
removing her underwear. However, AAA was able to push Comboy away and thereafter, went closer
to BBB, who was also awakened by the commotion. This prompted Comboy to simply leave the
room. BBB then reported the matter to their stepmother.
On May 28, 2009, AAA finally had the courage to report the foregoing incidents to
Barangay Kagawad Donald Andres14 Briobo, who in turn, helped AAA seek police assistance. AAA
was then examined by Municipal Health Officer Dr. Sotera C. Copino, who found her to have
sustained lacerations in her hymen which could have been caused by the penetration of a hard
object, such as an erect penis.
For his part, Comboy interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that he was in Manila
in February 2006 and February 2008, while AAA was in her mother's house in Albay, hence, he
could not have raped her. Comboy, however, revealed that he was actually working in Olongapo
City at the time of the incidents, and that on May 17, 2009, he was actually in Bicol but he was
staying with his common-law spouse. He further averred that AAA fabricated the accusations
against him as she was angry with him and his common-law spouse. He also presented his brother
Juan (Juan) who corroborated his claims. Juan maintained that he stayed in Comboy's house to look
after the latter's children, and that their mother's house was near Comboy's residence. He disclosed
that Comboy occasionally visited Bolo from Manila to visit his children and that the latter would
stay for one to two weeks
After trial, the RTC, as affirmed in toto by the CA, found accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of statutory rape and one (1) count of attempted rape.
doubt of the crime charged in the Information.
Held: No. However, the Supreme Court modified the conviction to two (2) counts of qualified rape
and (1) count of attempted qualified rape.
The elements of Rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through force, threat or intimidation. The
gravamen of Rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will. On the other hand, Statutory
Rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) is committed by having sexual intercourse with a woman below
twelve (12) years of age regardless of her consent, or lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force,
threat, or intimidation, or consent of the offended party is unnecessary as these are not elements
of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the
victim is below the age of twelve (12). The law presumes that the offended party does not possess
discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to sustain a
conviction for statutory rape, the prosecution must establish the following: (a) the age of the
Page 414 of 519
complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the accused
and the complainant. The foregoing acts of Rape shall be qualified pursuant to Article 266-B (1) of
the RPC if: (a) the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age; and (b) the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree,
or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
In the case at bar, the Court agrees with the finding of the courts a quo that the prosecution was
able to prove that Comboy: (a) had carnal knowledge of her without her consent on two (2) separate
occasions, the first occurring sometime in 2006 and the second in February 2008; and (b) attempted
to have carnal knowledge of her on May 17, 2009, but was stopped by a reason other than his own
desistance, i.e., BBB's intervention. Suffice it to say that Comboy's flimsy defense of denial and alibi
cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of AAA identifying him as the perpetrator
of the crimes. In this regard, it has been long settled that "a young girl would not concoct a sordid
tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the examination of her
private part, and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive
were other than a fervent desire to seek justice. Hence, there is no plausible reason why AAA would
testify against her own father, imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if this crime did not
happen," as in this case. However, since a plain reading of the Informations in Crim. Case Nos. T-
5006, T-5009, and T-5010 would readily reveal that Comboy was actually charged of raping his own
biological minor daughter, AAA, which facts of minority and relationship were already stipulated
upon during pre-trial, the Supreme Court finds it appropriate to modify Comboy's conviction from
two (2) counts of Statutory Rape and one (1) count of Attempted Rape to two (2) counts of Qualified
Rape and one (1) count of Attempted Qualified Rape.
People of the Philippines vs. Edgardo Perez y Alavado,

G.R. No. 208071, March 9, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape. On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, trial ensued.
AAA testified that she was born on August 18, 1986 to her parents who, at that time, were already
separated from each other. She stayed with her father in his house in Tugbungan, Zamboanga City.
On December 24, 1999, however, she spent Christmas with her mother who was in the house of her
uncle, appellant herein, also situated in Tugbungan, Zamboanga. AAA stated that appellant is the
husband of her mother’s sister. According to AAA, when she woke up at about 4:00am on January
3, 2000, she was already on the cement floor inside the room of appellant, who was wearing only a
white towel wrapped around his waist. She tried to get out of the room but appellant pushed her to
the floor and shut the door with a kick. He then pulled out her skirt, raised her shirt, and removed
her underwear, baring her breasts and vagina, which he kissed. Thereafter, he removed his towel,
mounted her, and inserted his penis into her vagina, thereby causing her pain. While doing this, he
continued on kissing her lips and breast. She cried and kicked him, but he did not stop. Afterwards,
he removed his penis and cleaned her vagina with a shirt. He wore his towel again and told her to
put on her underwear. He then gave her P10.00 which she used to buy “chippy”.
On January 5, 2000, she went home to her father. She did not tell him about the incident until
confronted by him. BBB testified that at about 2:00 pm on February 10, 2000, his son, AAA’s brother,
Page 415 of 519
told him that he saw appellant holding the hair of AAA and kissing her. Consequently, BBB
confronted AAA about what he had heard from her brother. She then told him what transpired on
the alleged incident. Thereafter, he brought her to the barangay officials who advised them to have
her examined by a doctor and obtain a Medico-Legal Certificate.
In contrast, appellant essentially interposed a defense of denial and alibi. He testified that at the
time of the alleged rape, he did not sleep in his room that he shared with his wife because he was
out driving his passenger tricycle. He added that during those times, they had many relatives from
Curuan, Zamboanga City, composed of the families of his in-laws, visiting them who all slept in the
living room of their house, together with the other members of the household. They all stayed in
his house because they came to know that the sister of his mother-in-law had just died. Thus, it was
highly unlikely for him to transport AAA to his room without waking anybody up. Appellant further
testified that the only reason why AAA and her father filed the rape charge against him was because
BBB had a personal grudge against him. This was because occasionally, appellant would scold AAA
and BBB’s other children.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted appellant beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Held: Yes. Time and again, the Court has always given primordial consideration to the credibility
of a rape victim’s testimony. This is because rape is a crime that is almost always committed in
isolation, usually leaving only the victims to testify on the commission of the crime. Thus, for as
long as the victim’s testimony is logical, credible, consistent and convincing, the accused may be
convicted solely on the basis thereof. Here, the trial court found AAA’s testimony to be categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank. In spite of her stringent cross-examination, AAA remained
steadfast, committing no material inconsistency which may adversely affect her credibility, clearly
and convincingly describing the events that transpired during the rape incidents.
People of the Philippines vs. Elpidio Castanas y Espinosa,

G.R. No. 192428, April 20, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of Rape. AAA, the victim, who was only 4 years old at
the time of the commission of the crime, and five years old when she took the witness stand, stated
that she knows the appellant as “tatay Pedio”. She testified that she has been sexually abused by the
latter two times. The first time was in the house of a certain Uncle Haludo. The second time was
on 12 January 2004 when appellant brought her to the house of a certain Uncle Isok. With no one
else in the house, appellant removed AAA’s panty, touched and kissed her vagina, sexually abused
and had sexual intercourse with her.
BBB, AAA’s mother, confirmed that AAA was 4 years old at the time of the commission of the crime
and this was supported by AAA’s birth certificate presented in court. BBB narrated that in the
morning of said date, she had asked AAA to bathe. Appellant, who was neighbot and who was
within the area, then interrupted to say in the vernacular, “karigo Eday para makuha an hiras”
which means “take a bath Eday to take away the itchiness.” After the bath, when AAA was without
underwear, BBB noticed AAA’s female anatomy to be reddish. BBB asked AAA the reason for the
Page 416 of 519
redness and AAA replied that appellant has kissed it. BBB then brought AAA to her mother’s house,
and there AAA revealed that appellant sexually molested her or “hupit:. Thus, BBB took AAA to the
hospital for medical examination.
During direct examination, Dr. Albeda explained that AAA’s vaginal opening was reddish due to
friction and opines that someone forced himself into AAA’s female anatomy but could not penetrate
due to its smallness in size and thus the discharge outside it.
Appellant, for his part, denied the charges. He testified that he knows AAA because they are
neighbours. He claimed that on 12 January 2004, at 9am, AAA approached him and went to his
house as she often did. There was no one else around that time Appellant claimed that AAA placed
herself on his lap while he was merely wearing underwear. Appellant confessed that when he
reached orgasm, he slapped AAA on her vagina, on the face of the labia minora.
Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt despite the fact that there
was no full penetration of the vaginal orifice.
Held: Yes, in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is
not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the
external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute
carnal knowledge. To be precise, the touching of labia minora or labia majora of the pudendum of
the penis constitutes consummated rape.
People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo Umanito,

G.R. No. 208648, April 13, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape. Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment.
Trial on the meris ensured. AAA, assisted by an interpreter, testified using a sign language. She
pointe to appellant as the one who raped and impregnated her. When asked what appellant did to
her, AAA respondent by tapping her thigh with her two fingers, which was interpreted as sexual
intercourse. BBB, AAA’s mother, testifeid that sometime in August 2005, she noticed that AAA’s
belly was growing. She called a hilot (midwife) who confirmed that AAA has been pregnant for
seven months. AAA gave birth to a baby boy on 10 December 2005. When BBB asked AAA who
impregnated her, AAA took BBB’s hand and brought her to the house of appellant which was
located some 50 meters away from their house. Upon learning the identity of the culprit, BBB
immediately sought help from the barangay. AAA was made to underso a medical examination. Dr.
Tadena issued a medical certificate confirming that AAA is mute and suffering from mental
retardation. AAA was also diagnosed to be pregnant.
Appellant testified in his own behalf and denied that he had raped AAA. Appellant alleged that he
only came to know that he was being accused of rape when he was summoned by the barangay
captain. Upon arriving at the barangay captain’s residence, he was confronted by AAA’s accusation.
Appellant denied the charge. Thereafter, he was detained at the police station.
The RTC found appelllant beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape which conviction was
affirmed by the CA.
Page 417 of 519
In his Brief, appellant invokes the case of People v. Guillermo where the Supreme Court acquitted
the accused because the private complianant, who is a mental retardate, merely testifed in gestures.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting appellant for the crime of rape.
Held: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the argument of the OSG that the case of People v.
Guillermo is not in all fours because in said case, the testimony of the accused was corroborated by
three other witnesses while in the instant case, the testimony of the accused is uncorroborated.
Moreover, in the instant case, the SC held that when a woman says that she has been rapes, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. Thus, the lone
testimony of the victim in a prosecution for rape, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of
conviction. The rationale is that, owing to the nature of offense, the only evidence that can be
adduces to establish the guilt of the accused is usually only the offended party’s testimony.
In the case of mentally-deficient rape victimes, mental retardation per se does not affect credibility.
A mental retardate may be a credible witness. The acceptane of her testimony depends on the
quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make them known to the court.
In fact, in People vs. Suansing, the SC held that it is highly improbable that a mental retardate would
fabricate the rape charge against appellant. It is likewise unlikely that she was instructed into
accusing appellant given her limited intellect. Due to her mental conditi0n, only a very traumatic
experience would leave a lasting impression on her so that she would be able to recall it when asked.
People of the Philippines vs. Jimmy Ulanday @ Saroy

G.R. No. 216010, April 20, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape. Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment.
Trial on the meris ensured.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the OSG and adopted by the CA, are as follows:
On the night of 11 March 2011, XYZ, 24 years old, sat beside the living room window near the main
foor of her family;s house. She looked out the window and watched the dance party which was
going on outside their house.
Out of nowhere, appellant, armed with a knife, entered XYZ house, pulled her out and dragged her
towards the house of her neighbor, AAA.
Although she does not know appellant, XYZ was able to identify him because she has seen him
before playing tong-its in ths gambling area near her house.
Appellant broght XYZ at the back of AAA’s house. No one was inside AAA’s house and it was dark.
Once inside AAA’s house, appellant immediately overpowed XYZ. He leaned XYZ against the wall
and removed her pants and underwear. Thereafter, appellant pulled down his zipper. Appellant
Page 418 of 519
then covered XYZ’s mouth using his left hand and pointed a knofe against her face using his right
hand. After, despite their standing position, appellant spread XYZ’s legs, inserted his penis into her
vagina and proceeded to rape her. During the entire assault, appellant poked his knife against XYZ’s
face.
After committing his dastardly act, appellant returned XYZ’s pants and underwear. XYZ then went
back home and slept.
A few months later, XYZ got the courage to tell her mother what happened. XYZ, accompanied by
the mother, reported the matter to the police.
On the other hand, the version of the defense are as follows:
On March 11, 2011, appellant was in Brgy. Kuako, Pangasinan, watching a wedding dance party when
he first met XYZ who was then seated inside their house also watching the dance party through
their window. XYZ then called appellant’s attention and when he approached her, they had a
conversation over the window. During their conversation, appellant noticed that XYZ was not alone
in the house as there are about 5 other persons living with her. Their converation lasted for about
an hout until he was called by his cousinn Eddie Ulanday to go home. He immediately slept upon
arriving thereat.
A week after the dance party, Jimmy was accosted by CCC and DDD, uncle of XYZ, while he was on
his way to Poblacion riding his motorcycle. He was being accused by them of raping XYZ, and when
he denied having done the same, they mauled him.
After trial, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape. The conviction was affirmed by the
CA.
Issue: Whether or not apellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Held: Yes. To be convicted of rape under Article 266-A paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the
requisite elements are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that he
accomplished this act through force, threat, or intimidation; when she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; by menas of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authorityl or when
she was under twelve years of age or was demented.
In the case at bar, The Supreme Court found that the prosecution sufficiently established the
presnce of these elements.
With certainty, XYZ positively identfied the appellant as the person who forced himself on her in
the evening of March 11, 2011. She never wavered in her identification and was straightforward in
recounting of how the appellant used force, threat and intimidation to satisfy his lust.
Both the trial and appellant courts upheld the credibility of XYZ and accorded credence to her
testimony. As recognized in a long line of cases, a rape victim would not charge her attackerat all
and thereafter exposed herself to the inevitable stigma and indignities her accusation will entail
Page 419 of 519
unless what she assets is the truth for it sis her natural instinct to protect her honor. There is no
showing that XYZ was impelled by improper motives to impute to the appellant such a grave and
scandalous offense.
People of the Philippines vs. Ruben dela Rosa

G.R. No. 206419, June 1, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of Qualified Rape. On arraignment, appellant pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged. Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented AAA, her mother, BBB, and Nimia Hermilia C. De Guzman, a clinical
psychologist of the National Center for Mental Health, as witnesses.
The prosection established that appellant and his family had been living wth AAA and BBB at the
latter’s house when sometime in June 2004, around nine o’clock in the evening, BBB saw appellant,
whom AAA called “daddy”, came out of her daugther’s room. BBB confronted appellant about this
the next day to no avail. Appellant’s wife was likewise unresponsive. In time, a neighbor disclosed
to BBB that AAA had told her in her stunted language, “Daddy, pasok titi, sakit-sakit, dito pasok
tito, hipo-hipo ded, halik-halik dito, iyak-iyak ako, hubad-hubad damit ko.” BBB promptly asked AAA
about the truth ofthis and the latter repled, ”Opo, ganun po ako, hubad damit Daddy, dito tass, kis-
kiss, lamas-lamas.”
AAA confirmed that indeed appellant had gone to her room, removed her clothes, kissed her breasts
and inserted his penis into her vagina.
BBB immediately brought AAA to the police station, then to Camp Crame where BBB was told that
AAA exhibited physical signs of having experienced sexual intercourse during several times.At the
mental hospital, AAA was examined by De Guzman who concluded in her report that AAA had the
mental age of a 9 year old child.
As sole witness for the defense, appellant interosed the defense of denial and asserted that he and
his family no longer lived with AAA and her mother at the time of the alleged commission of the
crime.He also averred that his wife had previosly filed a complaint before the barangay against BBB
and her sister for having maltreared appellant’s child.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted appellant beyong reasonable doubt for the crime of
Qualified Rape.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape.
Held: Yes. Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid
provisions of law. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental retardate is not capable
of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between
the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter.
Page 420 of 519

In rape cases, primordial is the credibility of the victim’s testimony because the accused may be
convicted solely on said testimony provided it is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things.
In this case, AAA testified in a clear, spontaneous and candid manner about the sexual abuse and
positively identifeid appellant as her abuser.
Moreover, while no medical examination was presented as evidence, it has been ruled that such is
merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensible element for conviction in rape. Of
primary importance is the clear, unquivocal and credible testimony of private complainant.
People of the Philippines vs. Daryl Polonio y Tuangcay

G.R. No. 211604, June 08, 2016
Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape. Upon arraignement, accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the Information. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The facts, as presented by the prosecution, are as follows:
CCC, 58 years old, married, a maintenance employee of Bessang Pass Memorial Hospital, testified
on July 5, 2006 that he is the uncle of AAA whose mother is his first cousin. AAA is staying with
him and his wife BBB in their house because the school where she is studying is far from the
barangay where her immediate family resides. CCC testified that AAA was 16 years old when the
alleged rape happened as evidenced by her birth certificate showing that she was born on October
14, 1988. CCC further testified that on February 10, 2005, he arrived in their house between 4:00 and
5:00 p.m. and was told by their neighbor Joel Caud that somebody was at their backyard garden.
Caud allegedly told CCC that he saw a person on top of another person and the one on top was
boxing the person lying on the ground. CCC immediately proceeded to the backyard garden and
saw a person about 10 meters away in a squatting position with his two hands raised, carrying his
niece AAA who was naked below the waist. He also noticed that while the person was carrying AAA,
she appeared to be unconscious because she was not moving. When the person noticed CCC's
presence, he ran away towards the west, still carrying AAA, but upon reaching a fence, he threw
AAA over it. CCC ran after the man but was unable to catch him. He instead rescued AAA, gathered
her panties and shorts, and put them back on her body while she was still unconscious.
CCC asked Caud to run after the man but Caud was not able to catch him either. CCC called Placido
Pasuli, another student staying with them, to call CCC's son for them to bring AAA to the Bessang
Pass Memorial Hospital, together with his wife BBB. CCC came to know later on, through his own
investigation on February 11, 2005, that the person he saw carrying AAA was the accused. He
positively identified the accused in open court as one and the same person whom he saw on that
afternoon carrying the unconscious AAA without her underwear and who threw AAA over the
fence.
CCC stated that AAA was hospitalized and showed medical certificates dated February 16 and 18,
2005, which he identified in court. He noticed that while AAA was confined in the hospital and still
Page 421 of 519

unconscious, she had a lump on her head and her mouth was bloodied. CCC also identified during
his testimony the panties and shorts worn by AAA at the time of the alleged crime.
Police Officer (PO) 1 Milagros Patil-ao, a Philippine National Police (PNP) member of Quirino
Police Station, testified for the prosecution on September 18, 2006 and stated that on February 10,
2005, the police station received information from BBB that her niece AAA was found bloodied at
their backyard. Together with PO3 Cabansay, PO1 Patil-ao proceeded immediately to the alleged
crime scene, which was the backyard garden of BBB. There PO1 Patil-ao saw AAA whose hair was
disheveled and whose eyeballs seemed to be rolling. She was carried by CCC on his back. They
brought her to Bessang Pass Memorial Hospital, about 200 meters away, for medical treatment. A
doctor and a nurse attended AAA and told the witness that AAA had been raped. PO1 Patil-ao,
together with her fellow police officers, took the panties and short pants to be used as evidence.
She noticed that the panties had blood stains. She presented the panties and shorts during her
testimony. When identified in court, the underwear still had blood stains while the shorts were full
of dirt. The witness also recovered a pair of red slippers and a piece of wood from the alleged crime
scene, which became part of the evidence for the prosecution.
AAA was already 18 years old and under the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DS WD) at the time of her testimony on January 29, 2007. She testified that when
the alleged rape happened in February 2005, she was 16 years old and studying in high school. While
she was watering the plants in her aunt's garden in the afternoon of the day the alleged crime took
place, a male person whom she did not know approached her. When asked during direct
examination if said male person was inside the courtroom, AAA positively identified the accused.
She said that the accused clubbed her on the head three times with a piece of wood. He also boxed
her. Before she lost consciousness, to protect herself, she bit the assailant's finger that was stuck
inside her mouth. When she regained consciousness, she was already at the Bessang Pass Memorial
Hospital with her aunt, Dr. Allan Licyayo, and her uncle. The doctor told her that she was raped.
Police officers took her statements and reduced them into writing, which she then signed.
AAA positively identified the pink shorts and panties that she was wearing when the alleged rape
happened. She said she felt ashamed, hurt, and very angry considering that she had suffered so
many injuries inflicted upon her by accused, including the lacerations in her vagina.
The defense presented the accused on February 17, 2009. He alleged that on February 10, 2005, at
around 10:00 in the morning, he was drinking gin and brandy with his cousins Oliver Gascao and
George Laus at a store in Poblacion, Cervantes, Ilocos Sur. They went outside the store and
continued drinking up to 2:00 in the afternoon. While outside, two unidentified men approached
and boxed him and Gascao for no apparent reason. He was hit on the mouth and this made him
dizzy. They ran away and he took the shortcut path leading to their place. While he was running,
he allegedly met someone at the curve and instinctively boxed that person, thinking that it was the
same person who had boxed him earlier. The person fell down. He sat on his stomach and boxed
the person again. He allegedly did not know the gender of the person he had boxed until he later
learned that she is female. The woman pleaded with accused not to box her anymore and then he
ran away to hide at the nearby mango and bamboo clusters for about 10 to 15 minutes. He then
proceeded to his uncle's house in Barangay Rosario, Cervantes, Ilocos Sur. He later on came to know
the identity of the person he had boxed as AAA, and he also received news that AAA had been
Page 422 of 519
raped. He admitted that AAA had bitten his finger and that he had it medically examined. He
denied CCC's allegations that he was on his way westward towards a fence carrying AAA without
her panties and shorts. He also denied running away leaving his slippers. He avouched that he did
not rape AAA but he admitted that he boxed her for the reason stated above.
The RTC convicted accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The CA
affirmed the judgment of conviction.
On appeal before the SC, accused-appellant questioned the conclusion reaached by the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, finding him guilty based on circumstantial evidence.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant may be convicted of the crime of rape based on
circumstantial evidence.
Held: Yes. Circumstantial evidence, if sufficient and competent, may warrant the conviction of the
accused of rape. In People v. Lupac, the Court considered circumstantial evidence as the victim was
unconscious at the time of the alleged rape.
In the instant case, the commission of the rape was competently established although AAA had
been unconscious during the commission of the act. Proof of the commission of the crime need not
always be by direct evidence, for circumstantial evidence could also sufficiently and competently
establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the Court affirmed convictions for rape based
on circumstantial evidence.
In People v. Perez, the SC affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape based on circumstantial
evidence, there being no direct proof of the sexual intercourse. The accused was charged with
having carnal knowledge of the 16-year old victim through force, intimidation and against her will.
The Prosecution established that he had entered the victim's room and had covered her nose and
mouth with a chemically-laced cloth, causing her to lose consciousness. Upon waking up, she felt
pain In her vagina, and she then saw blood and a white substance in her vagina. Her clothes were
in disarray and her underwear was in the corner of the room. He was no longer around.
Nonetheless, the Court held:
Conviction for rape may be based on circumstantial evidence when the victim
cannot testify on the actual commission of the rape as she was rendered unconscious
when the act was committed, provided that more than one circumstance is duly
proved and that the totality or the unbroken chain of the circumstances proven lead
to no other logical conclusion than the appellant's guilt of the crime charged.
Cristina's positive identification of the appellant as the person who came to the
room where she slept one early morning towards the end of May 1994, and that he
covered her nose and mouth with a foul smelling handkerchief until she lost
consciousness, the blood and white substance she found on her vagina which ached
the following morning, her torn shorts and her panty removed, all lead to one
inescapable conclusion that the appellant raped her while she was unconscious.
Page 423 of 519

People of the Philippines vs. Roger Galagati y Gardoce

G.R. No. 207231, June 29, 2016
Facts: Accused-appellant (Galagati) was charged with the crime of seven (7) counts of rape. Upon
arraignement, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the Informations.
The prosecution presented only the private complainant, AAA. The facts established by the
prosecution are as follows:
AAA was born on September 11, 1987 from parents Susie Valensona and Luciano Monasque, who
are not legally married. Galagati is the common-law spouse ("live-in" partner) of Susie. At the time
of the incidents, AAA was a 15-year-old second year student at Binicuil National High School and
residing at her grandfather's house, together with Galagati, and her mother, uncle, and three
siblings.
On September 13, 2002, at around 2:00 p.m., while AAA was alone in the changing room of their
house, Galagati forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. Acting on a threat that he would
kill her mother and siblings, he laid her down, took off her panty, and inserted his penis into her
vagina. She continuously cried and noticed a lot.of blood coming from her vagina. He then told her
to stop crying and take a bath, which she did. Her mother did not know what happened due to the
threat. As to the other rape incidents that occurred, AAA testified in open court.
On November 4, 2002, AAA was brought to the Kabankalan Police Station to shed some light
regarding the fight that transpired between Galagati and Susie's brother. In the course of the
interview, she was able to disclose the rape incidents to SPO1 Marilou Amantoy and Chona
Paglumotan of the- Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).
Galagati, on the other hand, denied having sexual congress with AAA. He asserted that on
September 13, 2002, AAA went back to school at 1 p.m. after eating lunch at the house; on October
8, 2002, there was no class but AAA told him that she would go to school; on October 15, 2002, AAA
did not go home; and on October 25, 2002, he was not in the house but in Bacolod. He stressed that
he did not touch AAA as he loves her like his own child. Galagati claimed that all the charges filed
against him were mere concoction because AAA was being threatened by her family. He revealed
that there was a fight between him and AAA's uncle, who is the brother of her mother, because
Susie's siblings would usually eat at their house without washing the dishes.
After trial, the RTC found that AAA's testimony was natural, candid, straightforward and credible,
while Galagati's defense of denial was unsupported by competent evidence. It convicted Galagati of
the crime charged in the seven (7) Information.
On appeal before the CA, the latter affirmed the judgment of conviction.
doubt of the crime charged in the seven (7) Information for Rape.
Page 424 of 519

Held: No, the lower courts did not err in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused
in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape
can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for
the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two
persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. Accordingly, in resolving rape cases, the primordial or single most important
consideration is almost always given to the credibility of the victim's testimony.When the victim's
testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused person's conviction since, owing to
the nature of the offense, in many cases, the only evidence that can be given regarding the matter
is the testimony of the offended party.
A rape victim's testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close relative of having
raped her, as in the case of a daughter against her father.
People of the Philippines vs. Renato B. Suedad

G.R. No. 211026, June 27, 2016
Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of three (3) counts of qualified rape. Upon
arraignement, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the Information.
The prosecution established that AAA is the only child of BBB and appellant, born to them on 5
July 1997. When AAA was less than two (2) years old, BBB had to work overseas and AAA was left
in the care of her father. BBB only came home occasionally.
AAA's ordeal began when she was eleven (11) years old, on 20 October 2008, when her father's initial
gestures of affection led to a sexual intimacy AAA had known to only belong to a husband and wife.
AAA narrated in detail how she was helplessly and hopelessly ravaged by her own father in their
own home. AAA alleged that appellant repeated the unspeakable acts on the last week of October
2008 though she vaguely remembers the particulars.
Then again on 26 November 2008, AAA recounted that during her paternal grandmother's wake
held at the house of the deceased, while sleeping in one of the rooms, appellant woke her, choked
her and succeeded in having sexual congress with her.
On 13 March 2009, within the confines of their house, appellant once more had carnal knowledge
of AAA.
Emboldened by the knowledge that her mother BBB would be home soon, AAA disclosed her
sufferings to her grandmother CCC on 15 April 2009 despite the threats to her life. The next day,
AAA, accompanied by her aunt, was subjected to a physical examination by Dr. Manansala.
Page 425 of 519
During the direct examination, Dr. Manansala explained that an eleven (11) year old girl who has
had frequent sexual contact may suffer full or partial lacerations depending on the thickness of the
hymen. A thick and elastic hymen may accommodate the male anatomy without lacerations. AAA
was found to have a thick hymen.
AAA stayed with CCC until BBB's arrival during which period the latter first learned of AAA's
torment. A complaint against appellant was filed before the prosecutor's office on 21 April 2009.
Appellant, for his part, admitted to having indeed been physically intimate with AAA during the
days of the alleged sexual abuses but denied the rape charges. He countered that there were ill
motives in filing the criminal charges against him. Appellant averred that AAA held a grudge against
him when he discovered a sensual letter the former wrote to one Marvin, her alleged boyfriend, and
has threatened to reveal this fact to her mother BBB. He also asserted that CCC had long planned
to file criminal cases against him to take away AAA from him. Moreover, CCC and appellant have
had many quarrels over several issues.
The defense also presented a nephew and a niece to support appellant's denial of the rape charges
on 26 November 2008 and 20 March 2009, respectively.
On 9 June 2011, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of
qualified rape. On appeal before the CA, the latter affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Issue: Whether or not the lower courts erred in convicting accused-appellant of three (3) counts
of qualified rape.
Held: No, the lower courts did not in convicting accused-appellant for three (3) counts of qualified
rape.
Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years old is always rape. In this type of rape, force and
intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own
on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity
to discern evil from good.
In rape cases, primordial is the credibility of the victim's testimony because the accused may be
convicted solely on said testimony provided it is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things.
It is also well-settled that the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses and of their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, in the absence
of any clear showing that the court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of the case. This is because the trial court, having seen and heard the witnesses
themselves, and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, is in a better position to decide
the question of credibility.
Page 426 of 519

The trial court lent full credence to AAA's testimony that appellant raped her on three (3) occasions.
AAA clearly, spontaneously and categorically testified that her father sexually abused her first at
their house on 20 October 2008, then at her deceased paternal grandmother's house on 26
November 2008 and again at their house on 20 March 2009. In fact, these instances may only be a
fraction of the several times appellant has had sexual congress with AAA leading her to sadly report
that appellant treated her as his wife.
The Court finds no reason to disbelieve AAA's testimony which both the trial and appellate courts
found credible and straightforward. Testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit,
for when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape was indeed committed. Youth and maturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity.
AAA's testimony was corroborated by the findings of Dr. Manansala showing that AAA had
lacerations on her female anatomy. Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best
evidence of forcible defloration. When the consistent and straightforward testimony of a rape
victim is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the
essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established.
ANTI-HAZING LAW
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, et al.

G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015, CJ. Sereno
It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed
in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even
the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established. Hence,
the Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright the case against respondents Bayabos, on the sole
ground that the case against the purported principals had already been dismissed. Nonetheless, the SC
affirmed the quashal of the Information against respondents Bayabos. The indictment merely states that
psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the
purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to
aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of
the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical
term – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts
allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Thus, the information must be quashed, as the
ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing.
Facts:
Fernando Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the Philippine Merchant
Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to
successfully complete the mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation Period,” which was set from 2
May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001. The prosecutor of Zambales issued a resolution
finding probable cause to charge the following as principals to the crime of hazing: Alvarez, Montez,
Reyes, and Simpas. A criminal case against Alvarez, et al. was then filed with RTC of Zambales.
Page 427 of 519
The prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for MOLEO the finding of probable
cause to charge the following school authorities as accomplices to hazing: RADM. Aris, LTSG. Bayabos,
LTJG. Doctor, LTJG. Ferrer, LTJG. Mabborang LTJG. Magsino, ENS. Velasco and ENS. Operio, or
collectively Respondents Bayabos. The Ombudsman Investigator agreed with the findings of the
prosecutor and so formal cases before the Sandiganbayan were commenced against Respondents
Bayabos as accomplices to the crime of hazing. Meanwhile, the RTC–Zambales issued an Order
dismissing the Information against the principal accused, Alvarez et al.
Respondents Bayabos, et al. filed a Motion to Quash the Information. They argued that the
case against the principal accused had already been dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being
no more principals with whom they could have cooperated in the execution of the offense, they
asserted that the case against them must be dismissed. The Special Prosecutor opposed the motion
of Bayabos et al. He insisted that the Information alleged the material facts that would sufficiently
establish the presence of the essential ingredients of the crime of accomplice to hazing.
Six days before Respondents were set to be arraigned, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed
Resolution (SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal case against them.
Six months after the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution dismissing the criminal case against
Bayabos et al., the accused Velasco surrendered and then filed his own Motion to Quash, adopting the
grounds raised by that court. On 3 August 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued another Resolution (SB
Resolution II) dismissing the case against him.
Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed with the SC on
13 March 2006 a Petition assailing SB Resolution I and, on 16 October 2006, another Petition
challenging SB Resolution II.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the prosecution of Respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can
proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused.
2. Whether or not the Information filed against Respondents Bayabos contains all the
material averments for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the
Anti-Hazing Law.
Ruling:
1. YES, the Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright the case against Respondents
Bayabos, on the sole ground that the case against the purported principals had already
been dismissed.
It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto
dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the
latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been
established.
The Court notes in the present case that Bayabos, et al. merely presented the Order of Entry
of Judgment dismissing the case against Alvarez, et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the
case was dismissed against the alleged principals, because no crime had been committed. In fact, it
Page 428 of 519
does not cite the trial court’s reason for dismissing the case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an
error when it simply relied on the Order of Entry of Judgment without so much as scrutinizing the
reason for the dismissal of the case against the purported principals.
Nonetheless, the Court affirms the quashal of the Information against Respondents Bayabos,
et al.
2. NO, the information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of
accomplice to hazing.
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established:
(1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or
psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s
admission or entry into an organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing
it from the crimes against persons defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction
by a person of physical or psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latter’s admission
or entry into an organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation
in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as
established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty
members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual
knowledge thereof.
First, the Court reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an
organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes – but is not
limited to – groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational
institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the
AFP. Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a
government-owned educational institution established for the primary purpose of producing
efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included in the term organization
within the meaning of the law.
The Court declared that the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the Information does not
include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing. The indictment merely
states that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation
that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization.
Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal
responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain
reference to a technical term – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a
characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Thus, the infor-
mation must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice
to hazing.
CHILD ABUSE LAW
FELINA ROSALDES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Page 429 of 519
In the crime of child abuse, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds or by words that
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. Such act, as
settled, need not be habitual. Although a school teacher could duly discipline her pupil, the infliction of
the physical injuries on the child was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The Family Code has even
expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual
engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis). Hence, a school teacher
may be convicted of the said crime and, all the more when her propensity for violence has been
established clearly by the prosecution.
Facts:
On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales (Michael) then a Grade 1 pupil
at Pughanan Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly
entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, Petitioner Felina
Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, she asked Michael to apolo-gize
to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat, she went to Michael and pinched
him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell,
Michael’s body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. She proceeded to pick Michael up by his
ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. After the incident, she proceeded to teach her
class. During lunch break, Michael, accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn
Gonzales, went home crying and told his mother about the incident. His mother and his aunt reported
the incident to their Brgy. Captain. Michael was also examined by a doctor and the incident was
reported to the Police Station.
Eventually, Rosaldes was criminally charged and eventually convicted with child abuse in the
RTC of Iloilo City. On appeal, the CA affirmed her conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not Rosaldes shall be held liable with the crime of child abuse.
Ruling:
Rosaldes is guilty of the crime charged.
First, the Court finds that the contention that she did not deliberately inflict the physical
injuries suffered by Michael to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or
degrade his dignity, is utterly bereft of merit. Credence cannot be given to her insistence that her acts
came under the doctrine of in loco parentis. Although as a school teacher, she could duly discipline
Michael as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and
excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably
claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was
precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of
corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising
special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis).
Page 430 of 519

Second, proof of the severe results of the her physical maltreatment of Michael was provided
by Dr. Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial Hospital
in Iloilo who examined the victim at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely
three hours from the time the boy had sustained his injuries. Hence, Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610 defines
child abuse, thusly:
xxxx xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;
3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx xxxx
In the crime charged against the Rosaldes, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by
deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the Rosaldes "went overboard in
disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy,” when she committed the acts stated
above. On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been
aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of
Rosaldes, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust again. Such
established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Rosaldes was guilty of child
abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael as a human
being.
Third, it was also shown that Michael’s physical maltreatment by Rosaldes was neither her
first nor only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross
examination that she had also experienced Rosaldes’ cruelty. She was also convicted by the RTC in
Iloilo City for maltreatment of another child named Dariel Legayada. Such previous incidents
manifested that she had “a propensity for violence.”
Last, Rosaldes’ claim that the information charging her with child abuse was insufficient in
form and substance deserves scant consideration. The information explicitly averred the offense of
child abuse charged against her in the context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in Sec.
3 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the requirements of Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain her challenge against the sufficiency of the
information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she
pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the ground that the information did not
conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting
in her waiver of the challenge.
Page 431 of 519

JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MILAN ROXAS

In determining the age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344,
Sec. 6 thereof clearly refers to the age as determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not the
mental age of the accused. Thus, a person who is eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the
crime of rape is not exempt from criminal liability despite having a mental age of nine years old.
Mere allegation that the victim is the niece of the accused is insufficient unless proven. Thus, if
what was proven is only the minority of the victim and not the relationship between accused and the
victim, only minority will be considered as the aggravating circumstance.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Milan Roxas was charged with five counts of rape with force and
intimidation. AAA, the minor niece of Roxas testified that from 1997 to 1998, Roxas, who was 18
years old, had carnal knowledge, while pointing a sharp instrument, at her. In his defense, Roxas
presented the testimony of Dr. Aglipay, the Regional Psychiatrist of the BJMP, who said that Roxas
was suffering from a mild mental retardation with a mental age of nine (9) to ten (10) years old.
The RTC held that Accused-appellant Roxas is not exempt from criminal responsibility on the
ground that he cannot be considered a minor or an imbecile or insane person, since Dr. Aglipay
merely testified that he was an eighteen-year old with a mental development comparable to that of
children between nine to ten years old. The CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision.
Issues:
1. May Roxas, who was eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime, be exempt
from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344 due to having a mental age of a nine year old?
2. Is the qualifying circumstance of relationship between Roxas and AAA sufficiently proven?
Ruling:
1. No, the determining age is anniversary of one’s birth date, not the mental age.
In the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 9344 is explicit in
providing that “[a] child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary
of his/her birth date.”
In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Sec. 6 clearly refers to
the age as determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not the mental age as argued by
Roxas. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construc-
tion or interpretation. Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court
interpret or construe its true intent.
2. No, mere allegation in the complaint that the victim is the niece of the accused is insufficient.
Page 432 of 519
While it appears that the circumstance of minority under Art. 335 (old rape provision) and
Art. 266-B was sufficiently proven, the allegation of the relationship between AAA and Roxas is
considered insufficient under present jurisprudence.
In the case at bar, the allegation that AAA was Roxas’s “niece” in each information is therefore
insufficient to constitute the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. Instead, the
applicable qualifying circumstance is that of the use of a deadly weapon, for which the penalty is
reclusion perpetua to death. Since there was no other aggravating circumstance alleged in the
Information and proven during the trial, the imposed penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of
rape is nonetheless proper even as the Court overturns the lower courts’ appreciation of the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
KIDNAPPING
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PETRUS YAU, A.K.A. “JOHN” AND “RICKY”, AND SUSANA YAU
G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014, J. Mendoza
An American national was allegedly kidnapped by the accused. The victim positively identified
the accused as his kidnapper. In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold, that
is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with
the same quantum of proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because, even if
the commission of the crime is a given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor
being likewise clearly ascertained.
Facts:
Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom in the Infor-
mation, dated February 13, 2004.
On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30pm Private Complainant Alastair Onglingswam, an,
American National, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was billeted, and hailed a white
Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take him from the said hotel to Virra Mall Shopping
Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. While the said taxicab was plying along EDSA, Alastair received a
phone call. He noted that while he was on the phone, Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have short black
hair, a moustache and gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to time turn to him and talk as if he
was also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-up his phone. He no longer
knew what transpired except that when he woke up lying down, his head was already covered with
a plastic bag and he was handcuffed and chained.
A man who was wearing a red mask and introduced himself as “John” approached him and
removed the plastic bag from his head and loosened his handcuff. John informed him that he was
being kidnapped for ransom and that he will be allowed to make phone calls to his family and friends.
Alastair was allowed to call his girlfriend and father and asked them for the PIN of his ATM cards and
for money, however, with instructions not to inform them that he was kidnapped. His kidnappers
Page 433 of 519

were demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand
Pesos (PhP20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.
Subsequently, Iris Chau, Alastair’s girlfriend, received an email from the purported kidnapper
demanding US$2,000.00. Chau then wired US$1,000.00, upon instructions, to Ong Kwai Ping thru
Metro Bank and Trust Company. Likewise, Alastair’s brother Aaron Onglingswam made eight (8)
deposits to Ong Kwai Ping’s account in Metro Bank, amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(PhP200,000.00), to ensure his brother’s safety and eventual release.
On February 10, 2004, the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response Task Force (PACER)
received information that a taxi with plate number PVD 115 plying along Bacoor was victimizing
passengers. Along the Aguinaldo Highway, they were able to chance upon the said vehicle. The police
officers talked with Yau who has driving, and stated that the vehicle was being used for kidnapping.
The driver introduced himself as Petrus Yau, a British national, they asked him for his driver’s license
and car registration but appellant was not able to produce any. Since he could not produce any
driver’s license and car registration, they were supposed to bring him to the police station for
investigation, however, when shown a picture of Alstair and asked if he knew him, he answered that
the man is being kept in his house. He was immediately informed that he was being placed under
arrest for kidnapping Alastair after being informed of his constitutional rights.
Yau then led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his residence, he was led back
to the police car. The rest of the members of PACER proceeded inside the house and found a man
sitting on the floor chained and handcuffed. The man later identified himself as Alastair
Onglingswam.
However, Petrus and Susana denied the accusation. On February 11, 2004 (the date the
victim was allegedly rescued) at around 8:30 – 9:00 o’clock in the morning, after he alighted from his
car, three (3) men bigger than him held his hands: one (1) of them held his neck. They pushed him
inside their van. They tied his hands with packing tape, covered his eyes with the same tape, and his
head with a plastic bag. They kicked and beat him until he became unconscious. They accused him of
being a kidnapper, to which he replied that he was not. He pleaded to them to allow him to make a
call to the British Embassy, his friends and his wife, but to no avail.
In its judgment, dated December 14, 2007, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as principal, of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, and Susana Yau, as an accomplice to
the commission thereof. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction for the crime of kidnapping such be sustained
Ruling:
Yes, the appeal is bereft of merit. The decisions of the RTC and the CA are affirmed.
In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the same
quantum of proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because, even if the
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commission of the crime is a given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor
being likewise clearly ascertained. Here, the prosecution was able to satisfactorily discharge this
burden.
Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota Corolla taxicab
with Plate No. PVD 115 .He claimed that while he was conversing thru phone inside the taxicab,
Petrus would turn his face towards him. Alastair claimed that he had a good look and an ample
opportunity to remember the facial features of the driver as to be able to recognize and identify him
in court. It is the most natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their
accosters and the manner in which the craven acts are committed. Alastair also recognized the voice
behind the red mask used by his kidnapper as belonging to Petrus. It was established that from the
first to the twentieth day of Alastair’s captivity, his kidnapper would meet him five times a day and
would talk to him for an hour, thus, enabling him to remember the culprit’s voice which had a unique
tone and noticeable Chinese accent. Alastair declared with certainty that it was the voice of Petrus.
The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The corollary rule is that the
circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the findings of
guilt by the RTC and the CA:
1) the victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus and Susana;
2) the Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115 was found in the possession of
the Accused-appellant Petrus on February 11, 2004;
3) the driver’s license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai Ping were recovered
inside the Toyota Corolla taxicab of Petrus Yau;
4) in the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence were found: one (1) chain
with padlock, handcuffs, short broken chain, checkered pajama, black blazer, two (2) video
camera cartridges, one showing the victim in lying down position and family footages; eight
(8) pieces of cellphones, two (2) Talk n Tex SIM cards, Globe SIM card, ACR of Petrus Yau,
Meralco bills, Asia Trust deposit slips, five ATM deposit slips, and PLDT bills, among others;
5) two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in the possession of
Petrus. Incidentally, it was reported that the owner of the QTEK Palmtop cellphone was a
certain Jasper Beltran, also a kidnapped victim whose whereabouts had not been known yet;
and
6) the DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that was recovered inside the
house and on the buccal swab taken from Petrus showed that both DNA profiles matched.
The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing pieces of
circumstantial evidence, when analyzed and taken together, definitely lead to no other conclusion
than that Petrus was the author of the kidnapping for ransom.
Anent the criminal liability of each accused-appellant, there is no doubt that Petrus is liable
as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on the other hand, is liable only as an
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accomplice to the crime as correctly found by the lower courts. It must be emphasized that there was
no evidence indubitably proving that Susana participated in the decision to commit the criminal act.
The only evidence the prosecution had against her was the testimony of Alastair to the effect that he
remembered her as the woman who gave food to him or who accompanied his kidnapper whenever
he would bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner.
People of the Philippines vs. Jerry Pepino y Rueras and Preciosa Gomez y Campos,
G.R. No.174471, January 12, 2016
Facts: The prosecution evidence showed that at 1:oopm, on June 28, 1997, two men and a women
entered the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat, Paranaque City, and
pretended to be customers. When Edward was about to receive them, one of the men, eventually
identified as Pepino pulled out a gun. Thinking that it was a holdup, Edward told Pepino that the
money was inside the cashier’s box. Pepino and the other man looted the cashier’s box, handcuffed
Edward, and forced him to go with them.
Pepino brought Edward to a metallic green Toyota Corolla where three other men were waiting
inside. The woman (later identified as Gomez) sat on the front passenger seat. The abductors then
placed surgical tape over Edward’s eyes and made wear sunglasses. After travelling for two and a
half hours, they arrived at an apartment in Quezon City. The abductors removed the tape from
Edward’s eyes, placed him in a room, and then chained his legs.
At around 5pm of the same day, the kidnappers called Edward’s father and demanded a Php40
Million ransom for his release. The abductors negotiated with Jocelyn who eventually agreed to a
Php700,000.00 ransom.
After five months, the NBI informed Edward that they had apprehended some suspects, and invited
him to identify them from a lineup consisting of seven persons. Edward identified Pepino, Gomez
and one Mario Galgo. Jocelyn likewise identified Pepino.
Subsequently, the prosecution charged the suspects with kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention before the RTC of Paranaque Branch 259.
In its Decision dated 15 May 2000,the trial court convicted Pepino and Gomez of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty.
Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of serious illegal detention and kidnapping beyond
reasonable doubt.
Held: Yes, the accused are guilty of the crime charged against them.
It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an
enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his liberty in any manner. For there to be
kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual
deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to
effect such deprivation.
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Notably, Jocelyn corroborated Edward’s testimony on the following points: Pepino poked a
handgun at Edward while they were on the second floor of Kilton; Pepino and his companion
brought him downstairs and out of the building, and made him board a car; and the kidnappers
demanded ransom in exchange for Edward’s release.
Considering the foregoing, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in convicting the
accused for the crime of serious illegal detention and kidnapping.
People of the Philippines vs. Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero, G.R. No. 208404,
February 24, 2016
Facts: Appellants were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code. Appellants, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
thereafter ensued.
The facts succinctly synthesized by the RTC are as follows:
The prosecution’s lone witness, Nicassius Cordero narrated in court how he was abducted while
opening the garage door of his residence in Mindanao Avenue in the late evening of April 20, 1999
by three armed men. He identified Devincio Guerrero as the man with a 38 cal. Revolver who came
from his left side and pushed him inside the car. The man who came from his right side and
identified later as Tito Lugnasin drove the car with Elmer Madrid riding at the back. After divesting
him of his P5,000.00 cash and asking some questions, he realized he was being kidnapped for
ransom. Repeatedly, he declared that he was not a rich man. Along Libis, another cohort, Celso
Lugnasin, rode with them until they reached the South Superhi[gh]way and after paying the toll
fee, they drove on for about fifteen minutes and stopped just behind an owner type jeepney before
they switched places. The jeepney driver introduced himself as Commander and drove the car.
[Cordero] saw Commander’s face. He was later identified as Vicente Lugnasin. After driving for
some minutes more, they alighted, [Cordero’s] abductors placed the car’s sunvisor around his face
and ordered him to walk barefooted towards a small house. [Cordero] was kept there for four days,
while they negotiated with Saleena, his sister-in-law for the ransom money. On the fourth day,
Commander was already angry and threatened to finish him off. He was eventually released,
without ransom money being paid.
Vicente Lugnasin, a resident of Luzviminda I, Dasmariñas Quezon City denied the accusation,
saying he only saw Cordero for the first time at the Department of Justice and Cordero could not
even identify him. He recounted that on May 14, 1999, while preparing for the town fiesta
celebration, policemen came to his residence and arrested him and his brother Tito and cousin
Excelsio for alleged involvement in a robbery case. They were tortured, then put on display for
media men to feast on and for alleged victims to identify. After posting bail, he was later arrested
for illegal possession of firearms. He was also charged with two other cases, a bank robbery and the
Mercury Bank robbery, both pending before the sala of Judge Jose Mendoza.
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Devincio Guerrero, a fish vendor at the Pasig Market, likewise denies any involvement in the
kindnapping]of Cordero. He swears he saw him for the first time only in the courtroom. He recalled
that nearing Holy Week in 2002, five uniformed policemen arrested him without a warrant in
Lucena City, where he used to buy smoked fish to sell. He was transferred to Camp Karingal before
being detained at the QC Jail, where he is detained up to the present. On May 14, 1999, he was a
sponsor at a baptism of the child of his kumpadre in Bgy. Luzviminda, Dasmarinas, Cavite. On his
way home, he was accosted by police officers while urinating along the roadside. He was detained
first at the Cavite City Jail then at the Trece Martires jail. He saw Vicente Lugnasin only at the
Quezon City Jail.
In a decision, the RTC convicted the appellants beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping
for ransom punishable under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
On appeal, the judgment of conviction was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered against
appellants.
Held: No. The CA correctly affirmed the judgment of conviction against appellants.
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female, or a public officer.
From the aforequoted provision, in prosecuting a case involving the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (i) the accused was a private
person; (ii) he kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; (iii)
the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (iv) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.
A painstaking review of the present case clearly shows that all the aforestated elements were proven
in the criminal case on review.
The testimony of Cordero sufficiently established the commission of the crime and both the
accused-appellants’ culpability. He positively identified in and out of court accused-appellants
Vicente and Devincio as two of his abductors. As the kidnap victim, a private individual, Cordero’s
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positive identification of both accused-appellants – as two of several men who abducted him from
the gate of his house, who brought him to a hut somewhere in the south, who chained him to a
bed, who essentially deprived him of liberty without lawful cause for four days, and, which
deprivation of his liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom from his family – collectively
establish the crime of kidnapping for ransom as the actions of both the accused-appellants were
certain and clear, and their intent was explicit and made known to Cordero himself.
The Supreme Court disregarded accused-appellants’ arguments casting doubt on Cordero’s positive
identification of their participation in the commission of the crime. As oft-explained, when the
credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This holds
truer if such findings are affirmed by the appellate court. Without any clear showing that the trial
court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed.
Herein, there is nothing farfetched or incredible in Cordero’s testimony. Both accused-appellants

failed to show that it was physically impossible for Cordero to recognize them, as in fact, Cordero
had the unhindered view of his captors’ faces before he was even blindfolded. Therefore, Cordero’s
eyewitness account deserves full faith and credit.
But accused-appellant Devincio avers that the length of time, which has elapsed from the time
Cordero was released, up to the time he identified his abductors would have already affected his
memory, such that the possibility of error in his identification of the abductors could not be
discounted. He also insists that Cordero’s "subsequent identification of him in open court should
be disregarded since the initial identification was seriously flawed, i.e., it was characterized by
suggestiveness."
People of the Philippines vs. SPO1 Catalino Gonzales, Jr.

G.R. No. 192233, February 17, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code. Appellant, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
thereafter ensued.
The facts succinctly synthesized by the RTC are as follows:
The victim Peter Tan (Tan) and his wife Huang Haitao (Haitao) lived in Retirees’ Village in Tanza,
Cavite. They operated a stall in a market also in Tanza.
Haitao narrated in her Sworn Statement that in the morning of 28 December 2005, Haitao left the
house ahead of Tan and their two-year old son to go to the market. When Haitao arrived at their
stall, she tried calling Tan in his phone but the latter did not answer. Finally, the call was answered
by someone who introduced himself as a National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent and who
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told Haitao that her husband was arrested for illegal possession of shabu. Haitao immediately asked
for her husband’s whereabouts but the alleged NBI agent hung up. Haitao then called Tan’s phone
again. Before she could talk to her husband, someone snatched the phone away from Tan and told
her that someone would get in touch with her. At around 10:30 a.m., an unknown Chinese man
called up Haitao and informed her that her husband and son were detained for possession of drugs,
and that she should pay off the captors. That evening, a man called Haitao and demanded
P5,000,000.00 for the release of her husband and son. The demand was lowered to P3,000,000.00.
Haitao was ordered by the captor to prepare the money and go to Luneta Park on the following day.
Haitao reported the incident to the Philippine Anti-Crime Emergency Response Unit (PACER) of
the Philippine National Police. The Luneta Park meeting did not push through. Haitao still received
various instructions from the captors to fetch her son until the PACER received information that
Haitao’s son was in White Cross Children’s Home. Haitao was eventually reunited with her son.
On 15 January 2006, Haitao received a text message from an unidentified man who claimed that he
knew about Tan’s kidnapping and demanded P30,000.00 from Haitao. They met at McDonald’s
restaurant in Tanza, Cavite. When the man, later identified as Edwin Torrente (Torrente)
approached Haitao, he was arrested by PACER agents.
It turned out that Torrente was part of the group which forcibly took Tan and his son. In exchange
for the needed information, Torrente was placed under the Witness Protection Program and was
utilized as a state witness.
In his Sworn Statement, Torrente narrated that on 27 December 2005, he was approached by
appellant and told about a plan to arrest Tan, an alleged drug pusher in Tanza, Cavite. At around
7:00 a.m. on 28 December 2005, Torrente received a text message from appellant asking him to
proceed to the Shell Gas Station along Coastal Road in Imus, Cavite. Thereat, Torrente met
appellant, his son, Joy Gonzales, Lt. Capitanea, and nine other people. The group then proceeded
to the Retirees’ Village in Tanza, Cavite to conduct a surveillance of the house of appellant. At
around 11:00 a.m., the group left the village and went to a nearby Mc Donald’s restaurant to have
some snacks. After eating, the group went back to the village and chanced upon Tan who was inside
his Ford vehicle. They immediately blocked Tan’s car, forced him and his son to alight from the
vehicle, and boarded them into another vehicle. Torrente then went back to the gas station to get
his motorcycle and proceeded to his house. On 31 December 2005, Torrente received a call from
appellant informing him that Tan would soon be released as negotiations were ongoing. Torrente
admitted that he called Haitao and asked for a meeting. When Torrente sensed the presence of
policemen, he immediately surrendered and voluntarily gave his statement.
Appellant denied the charges against him and proffered the defense of alibi. Appellant claimed that
on 28 December 2005, at 10:08 a.m., he was at the Land Bank of the Philippines branch in
Dasmariñas, Cavite to encash his check. After encashing his check, appellant went home and stayed
there until 8:00 p.m. to attend a party. On 31 December 2005, Torrente went to his house and
together, they conducted a surveillance against drug suspects. On 17 January 2006, he planned to
meet up with Torrente at the Shell Station along Anabu Road in Imus, Cavite. When appellant
arrived at the gas station, two armed men alighted from their vehicles and poked their guns on him.
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Appellant was then forcibly dragged into the vehicle. Appellant claimed that he was subjected to
physical and mental torture before he was brought to the PACER office.
The branch manager of Land Bank, Mr. Edgar Deligero, corroborated appellant’s alibi. He
acknowledged that a check under appellant’s name was encashed on 28 December 2005 at 10:08
a.m. He noted that based on the bank’s verification procedure, the signature of appellant is valid
and an identification document was presented by the appellant. Hence, the bank manager
confirmed that it was indeed appellant who personally encashed the check.
Appellant’s daughter corroborated appellant’s statement that he was tortured. Jocelyn Gonzales
witnessed his father’s condition while the latter was detained in the PACER’s office. She also saw a
first medical certificate and heard the DOJ prosecutor order a second medical examination. Dr.
Edilberto Antonio confirmed the issuance of two medical certificates certifying the injuries suffered
by appellant.
In a decision, the RTC convicted beyond reasonable doubt the appellant for the crime of kidnapping
for ransom which conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
a. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered against
appellant.
b. Whether or not he corpus delicti was proven despite the non-presentation of the kidnap
victims during trial.
Held: As to the first issue, No. The CA correctly affirmed the judgment of conviction.
The elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, are as follows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty;
(b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting
ransom for the release of the victim. Time is not a material ingredient in the crime of kidnapping.
As long as all these elements were sufficiently established by the prosecution, a conviction for
kidnapping is in order.
As to the second issue, the same is in the affirmative.
Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime which may be proved by the testimony of
the witnesses who saw it. The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact that
an individual has been in any manner deprived of his liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person.
To prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the prosecution to be able to show that (1) a certain
fact has been proven — say, a person has died or a building has been burned; and (2) a particular
person is criminally responsible for the act.
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ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SHIRLEY A. CASIO

G.R. No. 211465, December 03, 2014, J. Leonen
Shirley Casio was charged with violation of Anti-Trafficking by soliciting the services of minor
victims. However, she alleged the prosecution has failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
that the minor victims were willing to do such. The court ruled that Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute
is an analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. Regardless of
the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be trafficked, [the Court affirms] the text and spirit of our
laws. Minors should spend their adolescence moulding their character in environ-ments free of the vilest
motives and the worse of other human beings
Facts:
Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of R.A. No. 9208, Sec. 4(a), qualified by
Sec. 6(a) with deliberate intent, with intent to gain, did then and there hire and/or recruit AAA, a
minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation, by acting as their
procurer for different customers, for money, profit or any other consideration, in Violation of Sec. 4,
Par. (a), Qualified by Sec. 6, Par. (a), of R.A. No. 9208 (Qualified Trafficking in Persons).
AAA stated that she knew Shirley A. Casio was a pimp because AAA would usually see her
pimping girls to customers in Barangay Kamagayan. AAA further testified that on May 2, 2008,
Shirley A. Casio solicited her services for a customer. That was the first time that she was pimped by
Shirley A. Casio Accused brought her, BBB, and a certain Jocelyn to Queensland Motel. AAA descri-
bed that her job as a prostitute required her to display herself, along with other girls, between 7 p.m.
to 8 p.m. She received PhP400.00 for every customer who selected her.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution was able to prove Shirley Casio’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes, Casio should be punished for violating R.A. No. 9208.
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes
of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a
prostitute without one’s consent and to be sexually violated four to five times a day by different
strangers is horrendous and atrocious.
Human trafficking indicts the society that tolerates the kind of poverty and its accompanying
desperation that compels our women to endure indignities. It reflects the weaknesses of that society
even as it convicts those who deviantly thrive in such hopelessness. We should continue to strive for
the best of our world, where our choices of human intimacies are real choices, and not the last resort
taken just to survive. Human intimacies enhance our best and closest relationships. It serves as a
foundation for two human beings to face life’s joys and challenges while continually growing together
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with many shared experiences. The quality of our human relationships defines the world that we
create also for others.
Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be trafficked, [the Court affirms]
the text and spirit of our laws. Minors should spend their adolescence moulding their character in
environments free of the vilest motives and the worse of other human beings. The evidence and the
law compel the court to affirm the conviction of accused in this case. But this is not all that we have
done. By fulfilling our duties, we also express the hope that our people and our government unite
against everything inhuman. We contribute to a commitment to finally stamp out slavery and human
trafficking. There are more AAA’s and BBBs out there. They, too, deserve to be rescued. They, too,
need to be shown that in spite of what their lives have been, there is still much good in [the present
world]…
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
ROBBERY
RICARDO L. ATIENZA AND ALFREDO A. CASTRO

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 188694. FEBRUARY 12, 2014
J. PERLAS-BERNABE
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which
the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. It is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that
the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person.
In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence presented was not sufficient to support a conviction
Facts:
Atienza and Castro (petitioners) are employees of the CA, particularly assigned to its Budget
Division and holding the positions of Budget Officer I and Utility Worker I, respectively. On March
20, 1995, at about past noon,Juanito Atibula (Atibula), Records Officer I and Custodian of the CA
Original Decisions in the CA Reporter’s Division, was invited by Castro to attend Atienza’s birthday
party somewhere along Bocobo Street, Ermita, Manila. At the party, Atienza introduced Atibula to
a certain Dario and asked him to assist the latter in searching for the CA decision in the case entitled
"Mateo Fernando v. Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.", docketed as CA-G.R. No. 36808-R. On March 24, 1995,
after office hours, Atibula saw Dario outside the CA compound along Maria Orosa Street. As they
walked side by side towards the jeepney stop, Dario requested Atibula to insert a Decision dated
September 26, 1968 in one of the volumes of the CA Original Decisions but Atibula refused and
immediately left.
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On April 21, 1995, Atienza offered Atibula the amount of P50,000.00 in exchange for Volume 260
which the latter turned down. Atibula reported the incident to Atty. Arnel Macapagal, the Assistant
Chief of the CA Reporter’s Division, who then instructed him (Atibula) to hide Volumes 260, 265
and 267 in a safe place.
On May 9, 1995, Atibula discovered that Volume 266 covering the period from January 28 to
February 12, 1969 was missing and reported such to Atty. Macapagal.
On May 18, 1995, a certain Nelson de Castro, Clerk IV detailed at the CA Reporter’s Division, handed
to Atibula a bag containing a gift-wrapped package which turned out to be the missing Volume
266. He claimed that it was Castro who asked him to deliver the said package to Atibula.
Upon return of Volume 266, Atibula compared the contents of Volume 266 with the index of the
decisions and noticed that there were two new documents inserted therein, namely: (a) a
Resolution dated February 11, 1969 (subject resolution), ostensibly penned by Associate Justice Juan
P. Enriquez and concurred in by Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan and Edilberto Soriano,
recalling and setting aside the Entry of Judgment earlier issued in the Fernando case; and (b) a
Decision dated April 16, 1970 (subject decision), also ostensibly penned by Justice Enriquez and
concurred in by Associate Justices Jesus Y. Perez and Jose M. Mendoza, amending the original
decision dated September 26, 1968 in the aforementioned case. A duplicate of Volume 260 did not
contain such promulgations.
After considering the findings of the NBI, Informations against Atienza, Castro, and Dario for the
crimes of Robbery under Article 299(a)(1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and of Falsification of
Public Document under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(6) of the same code were filed with
the RTC.
RTC – convicted
Issue:
Whether or not probable cause existed to convict Atienza, Castro and Dario for the crimes
charged against them
Ruling:
The SC acquitted the petitioners because of the insufficiency of evidence against them. The only
evidence presented were circumstantial evidence which did not sufficiently support a conviction.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main
fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. It is sufficient for conviction
if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person.
Stated differently, the test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is
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sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be consistent
with each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused’s guilt
and inconsistent with his innocence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARK JASON CHAVEZ Y BITANCOR ALIAS “NOY
G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014, J. Leonen
The court has held that what is imperative and essential for a conviction for the crime of robbery
with homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offender’s intent to take personal property before
the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually carried out. In cases when the
prosecution failed to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the
victim, no accused can be convicted of robbery with homicide.
Facts:
On October 28, 2006, witness Peñamante arrived home at around 2:45 a.m., coming from
work as a janitor in Eastwood City. When he was about to go inside his house at 1326 Tuazon Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, he saw a person (later on identified as Chavez) wearing a black, long-sleeved shirt
and black pants and holding something while leaving the house/parlor of Elmer Duque (Barbie) at
1325 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, just six meters across Peñamante’s house.
Chavez could not close the door of Barbie’s house/parlor so he simply walked
away. However, he dropped something that he was holding and even fell down when he stepped on
it. He walked away after, and Peñamante was not able to determine what Chavez was
holding. Peñamante then entered his house and went to bed.
Sometime after 10:00 a.m., the Scene of the Crime Office team arrived, led by PCI Cayrel. The
team noted that the lobby and the parlor were in disarray, and they found Barbie’s dead body inside.
At around 11:00 a.m., Peñamante’s landlady woke him up and told him that Barbie was found dead
at 9:00 a.m. He then informed his landlady that he saw Chavez leaving Barbie’s house at 2:45 a.m.
Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily surrendered on November 5, 2006 to SPO3

Casimiro at the police station. In the information dated November 8, 2006, Mark Jason Chavez y
Bitancor was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not Chavez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide.
Ruling:
No, Chavez was only guilty of homicide.
In the instant case, while there is no direct evidence showing that the accused robbed and
fatally stabbed the victim to death, nonetheless, the Court believes that the following circumstances
form a solid and unbroken chain of events that leads to the conclusion, beyond reasonable doubt, that
accused Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor @ Noy committed the crime charged. First, it has been duly
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established, as the accused himself admits, that he went to the parlor of the victim at around 1:00
o’clock in the morning of 28 October 2006 and the accused was allowed by the victim to get inside
his parlor as it serves as his residence too; second, the victim’s two units of cellular phones without
sim cards and batteries, which were declared as part of the missing personal belongings of the victim,
were handled to SPO3 Steve Casimiro by the mother of the accused, Anjanette C. Tobias on 05
November 2006 when the accused voluntarily surrendered, accompanied by his mother, at the police
station: third, on 28 October 2006 at about 2:45 o’clock in the morning, witness Angelo Peñamante,
who arrived from his work, saw a person holding and/or carrying something and about to get out of
the door of the house of the victim located at 1325 G. Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and trying to
close the door but the said person was not able to successfully do so. He later positively identified the
said person at the police station as Mark Jason Chavez Y Bitancor @ Noy, the accused herein; and
finally, the time when the accused decided on 27 October 2006 to patch up things with the victim and
the circumstances when the latter was discovered fatally killed on 28 October 2006 is not a co-
incidence. The prosecution has equally established, based on the same circumstantial evidence, that
the accused had indeed killed the victim.
Nevertheless, the court has held that what is imperative and essential for a conviction for the
crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offender’s intent to take
personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually carried
out. In cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the
purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can be convicted of robbery with homicide.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL BALUTE

In People vs. Ibañez, the Court exhaustively explained that “[a] special complex crime of robbery
with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the
robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following
elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the
use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the
crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that the
robbery is the main purpose, and [the] objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to
the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before,
during or after the robbery.” Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on occasion of
robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to
preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the
robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.
In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC’s finding that the prosecution was able to
establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latter’s mobile phone, and
thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical intervention. This is buttressed
by Cristita and Blesilda’s positive identification of Balute as the one who committed the crime…
Facts:
An information was filed before the RTC charging Balute of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. According to the prosecution, at around 8 o’clock in the evening of March 22, 2002, SPO1
Manaois was on board his owner-type jeepney with his wife Cristita and daughter Blesilda, and was
Page 446 of 519
traversing Road 10, Tondo, Manila. While the vehicle was on a stop position at a lighted area due to
heavy traffic, two (2) male persons, later on identified as Balute and a certain Blaster, suddenly
appeared on either side of the jeepney, with Balute poking a gun at the side of SPO1 Manaois and
saying “putangina, ilabas mo!” Thereafter, Balute grabbed SPO1 Manaois’s mobile phone from the
latter’s chest pocket and shot him at the left side of his torso. SPO1 Manaois reacted by drawing his
own firearm and alighting from his vehicle, but he was unable to fire at the assailants as he fell to the
ground. He was taken to Mary Johnston Hospital where he died despite undergoing surgical
operation and medical intervention.
The RTC found Balute guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
with the aggravating circumstance of treachery. Aggrieved, Balute appealed to the CA. The CA
affirmed Balute’s conviction with modification that the aggravating circumstance of treachery was
no longer considered as the prosecution failed to allege the same in the Information.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Balute’s conviction for Robbery with Homicide.
Ruling:
YES, Balute must held liable for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
It must be stressed that in criminal cases, factual findings of the trial court are generally
overlooked material and relevant matters, that the Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual
findings of the court below. Guided by the foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the RTC’s factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.
In People vs. Ibañez, the Court exhaustively explained that “[a] special complex crime of
robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion,
of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain;
(3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires
certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the] objective of the malefactor and the killing is
merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing
may occur before, during or after the robbery.” Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or
on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of
the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the
commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.
thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical intervention. This is
buttressed by Cristita and Blesilda’s positive identification of Balute as the one who committed the
crime as opposed to the latter’s denial and alibi which was correctly considered by both the RTC and
the CA as weak and self-serving, as it is well-settled that “alibi and denial are outweighed by positive
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identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the
[eyewitnesses] testifying on the matter.” This is especially true when the eyewitnesses are the relatives
of the victim – such as Cristita and Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1 Manaois,
respectively – since “[t]he natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing the
conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from implicating persons other than the true culprits.”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAY HINLO aka “INDAY KABANG”, et al.
Accused-appellants conspired to commit robbery in the house of Sps. Clavel. Said robbery
resulted to the death of Freddie Clavel. The RTC and CA convicted the accused-appellants of Robbery
with Homicide. In affirming the ruling of the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court ruled that, it is settled that
the positive identification of accused-appellants prevails over their defense of alibi considering that in
this jurisdiction the latter is considered as inherently weak and, thus, cannot outweigh the testimony of
eyewitnesses establishing that accused-appellants committed the crime. Moreover, conspiracy having
been established, when a homicide takes place by reason of or on occasion of the robbery, all those who
took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually
participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavour to prevent the killing.
Facts:
Sometime in the afternoon of October 14, 2003, Jay Hinlo a.k.a. “Inday Kabang” (Hinlo), Palma,
Senido, Pedroso, and one Joemarie Dumagat (Dumagat) were drinking at the house of Senido when
the latter informed the others of the plan to rob the house of Spouses Freddie and Judy Ann. Palma,
Senido, and Hinlo were tasked to enter the house, Dumagat would act as a look-out at the back of the
house where a sugar cane field was located, and Pedroso would wait at the highway with a tricycle.
In the early morning of October 15, 2003, they proceeded to the house of Sps. Clavel where
Senido used a knife to cut the cyclone wire fence. They destroyed the knob of the kitchen door and
gained entry where they took certain valuable items. Meanwhile, Freddie woke up to go to the
bathroom and as he opened the bathroom door, Senido, who was hiding inside, assaulted him and
the two wrestled. Then, Hinlo approached Freddie and with the use of a bladed weapon, stabbed the
latter on his abdomen which led to his untimely demise. Thereafter, Palma, Senido, Pedroso, Hinlo,
and Dumagat hurriedly escaped. Shortly thereafter, the police arrived and recovered the two leather
bags where the compact discs and microphone were placed.
Consequently, an Information was filed charging Palma, Senido, Pedroso, Hinlo, and Dumagat
with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. Upon arraignment, Palma, Senido,
Pedroso, and Dumagat entered separate pleas of not guilty, while accused Hinlo remains at large.
Subsequently, in an Order, Dumagat was discharged as an accused to be a state witness. The RTC
convicted Palma and the others of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the ruling of the RTC
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Ruling:
The CA did not err in sustaining the conviction the accused.
In People v. Uy, the Court explained that the elements for the crime of robbery with homicide
are: (a) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is animo lucrandi or with intent to gain;
and (d) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, homicide was committed. A conviction requires
that the robbery is the main purpose and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to
rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery.
In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC’s conclusions finding that accused-
appellants were all armed with knives when they broke into the house of the Sps. Clavel, took certain
personal properties, and, in the course thereof, stabbed Freddie, resulting to his death. This is
supported by the testimony of the state witness, Dumagat, who presented a detailed, consistent, and
credible narrative of the incident and positively identified accused-appellants as the perpetrators of
the crime.
It is settled that the positive identification of accused-appellants prevails over their defense
of alibi considering that in this jurisdiction the latter is considered as inherently weak and, thus,
cannot outweigh the testimony of eyewitnesses establishing that accused-appellants committed the
crime. Moreover, conspiracy having been established, when a homicide takes place by reason of or
on occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that
there was an endeavour to prevent the killing.
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL BALUTE Y VILLANUEVA

A special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed
either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide,
the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to
another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4)
on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was
committed.
Facts:
An information was filed before the RTC charging Balute of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. According to the prosecution, at around 8 o’clock in the evening of March 22, 2002, SPO1
Raymundo B. Manaois (SPO1 Manaois) was on board his owner-type jeepney with his wife Cristita
and daughter Blesilda, and was traversing Road 10, Tondo, Manila. While the vehicle was on a stop
position at a lighted area due to heavy traffic, two (2) male persons, later on identified as Balute and
a certain Leo Blaster (Blaster), suddenly appeared on either side of the jeepney, with Balute poking
a gun at the side of SPO1 Manaois and saying “putang ina, ilabas mo!” Thereafter, Balute grabbed
Page 449 of 519
SPO1 Manaois’s mobile phone from the latter’s chest pocket and shot him at the left side of his torso.
SPO1 Manaois reacted by drawing his own firearm and alighting from his vehicle, but he was unable
to fire at the assailants as he fell to the ground. He was taken to Mary Johnston Hospital where he
died despite undergoing surgical operation and medical intervention.
RTC found Balute guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
with the aggravating circumstance of treachery. Aggrieved, Balute appealed to the CA. the CA
affirmed Balute’s conviction with modification that the aggravating circumstance of treachery was
no longer considered as the prosecution failed to allege the same in the Information. Hence, the
instant appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Balute’s conviction for Robbery with Homicide.
Ruling:
The appeal is bereft of merit.
It must be stressed that in criminal cases, factual findings of the trial court are generally
overlooked material and relevant matters, that the Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual
findings of the court below. Guided by the foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the RTC’s factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.
In People v. Ibañez, the Court exhaustively explained that “[a] special complex crime of
robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the
occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must
prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with
intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A
conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the] objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the
taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.” Homicide is said
to have been committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to
facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the
loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the
commission of the crime.
thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical intervention. This is
buttressed by Cristita and Blesilda’s positive identification of Balute as the one who committed the
crime as opposed to the latter’s denial and alibi which was correctly considered by both the RTC and
the CA as weak and self-serving, as it is well-settled that “alibi and denial are outweighed by positive
identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the
[eyewitnesses] testifying on the matter.” This is especially true when the eyewitnesses are the
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relatives of the victim – such as Cristita and Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1 Manaois,
respectively – since “[t]he natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing
the conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from implicating persons other than the true
culprits.”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHARLIE OROSCO

G.R. No. 209227, March 25, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
Charlie and John Doe had to kill Yap to accomplish their main objective of stealing her money. In
robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with
homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must
precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery.
Facts:
Arca testified that on May 16, 2006, about one o’clock in the afternoon, he went to the store
of Lourdes Yap (Yap). After purchasing the ice, he noticed there was a verbal tussle between Yap and
two male customers who are Charlie Orosco and John Doe. The men were arguing that they were
given insufficient change and insisting they gave a P500 bill and not P100. To verify, Yap allowed
them to enter the store. Upon getting inside, they held Yap with John Doe wrapping his arm around
her neck while Charlie held her hands at the back. With Yap pressed between the two of them, John
Doe stabbed her once in her chest before releasing her. Once she fell down, Charlie quickly took the
money placed at the altar inside the store and fled together with John Doe and the two lookouts
outside the store.Yap was brought to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was declared dead on
arrival.
Only Charlie was arrested as the others remained at large. The trial court rendered judgment
convicting Charlie of of the crime of robbery with homicide. Charlie went to the CA but his appeal was
dismissed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credit to the uncorroborated eyewitness
testimony of Arca who could not point to him during the trial
2. Whether or not the crime should only be robbery and not the complex crime of robbery
with homicide considering the fact that it was not Charlie who stabbed Yap
Ruling:
1. No
It is settled that witnesses are to be weighed not numbered, such that the testimony of a
single, trustworthy and credible witness could be sufficient to convict an accused. The testimony of
a sole witness, if found convincing and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to
warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been inaccurate.
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In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of the lone eyewitness,
Arca, convincing notwithstanding that he was quite slow in narrating the incident to the court and
that he initially desisted from physically pointing to appellant as the one who held Yap’s hands from
behind and took her money at the store after she was stabbed by appellant’s cohort (John Doe).
Assessing the identification made by Arca, the trial court concluded that he had positively
identified appellant as one of the perpetrators of the robbery and killing of Yap. Orosco repeatedly
harped on the hesitation of Arca to point to him at the trial. However, as the trial court’s firsthand
observation of said witness’ deportment revealed, Arca’s fear of appellant sufficiently explains his
initial refusal to point to him in open court during his direct examination. Arca was finally able to
point to appellant as one of the perpetrators of the robbery and killing of Yap during his additional
direct examination when he had apparently mustered enough courage to do so.
2. No
Robbery with homicide is defined under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
which provides in part:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal property
is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to
another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the
occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed. Homicide is said to have been
committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it is committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or
the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the
crime. In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery
must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the
robbery.
Here, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery as Charlie
and John Doe had to kill Yap to accomplish their main objective of stealing her money.
As the Court held in People v. Baron:
The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the
crime showed beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide takes
place by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the
killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the killing. There was no
evidence adduced in this case that the appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Thus,
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regardless of the acts individually performed by the appellant and his co-accused, and
applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the “act of one is the act of all,” the appellant
is guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal liabilities of the appellant and his co-
accused are one and the same. Having acted in conspiracy with his co- accused, appellant is
equally liable for the killing of Yap.
THEFT AND QUALIFIED THEFT
EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 207175, November 26, 2014, J. Mendoza
To warrant a conviction for theft of damaged property, the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable that the accused maliciously damaged the property belonging to another and, thereafter,
removed or used the fruits or object thereof, with intent to gain. When the [Magsumbol] was ordered by
his brother-in-law to cut down coconut trees on the latter’s property, and he asked permission from the
barangay captain to do so, and the fact that even the land owner was unsure as to the position of the
boundary of his land, then the accused had no criminal intent when he mistakenly cut the trees of the
complainant.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Magsumbol, together with Magsino, Inanoria and Ramirez, were charged
before the RTC of theft. The prosecution alleged that Ernesto Caringal, caretaker of the land of
Menandro Avanzado, saw Magsumbol with a group of men cutting down the coconut trees on the
property of Avanzado, and later the group turned the felled trees into coco lumber.
The defense alleged that Atanacio authorized his brothers-in-law, Magsino and Magsumbol,
to cut down the coconut trees within the boundary of his property, which was adjacent to the land
co-owned by Menandro. Magsumbol, Magsino, Ramirez, and Inanoria came to the office of Brgy.
Captain seeking permission to cut down the coconut trees planted on the land of Atanacio. Ramirez
and Magsumbol claimed that only the coconut trees which stood within the land owned by Atanacio.
The RTC convicted Magsumbol, et al. Magsumbol appealed to the CA, which sustained the
conclusions of law and fact made by the RTC.
Issue:
Did the prosecution fail to establish the criminal intent on the part of Magsumbol and his co-
accused?
Ruling:
NO, the Court finds for Accused-appellants Magsumbol et al.
To warrant a conviction under the… provision for theft of damaged property, the prosecution
must prove beyond reasonable that the accused maliciously damaged the property belonging to
another and, thereafter, removed or used the fruits or object thereof, with intent to gain. Evidently,
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theft of damaged property is an intentional felony for which criminal liability attaches only when it
is shown that the malefactor acted with criminal intent or malice. Criminal intent must be clearly
established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. Was criminal
intent substantiated to justify the conviction of Magsumbol and his co-accused?
It does not so appear in this case.
There is no dispute that the land co-owned by Menandro is adjacent to the land owned by
Atanacio. The prosecution claimed that the thirty three (33) cut coconut trees were planted within
the land co-owned by Menandro. The defense, on the other hand, averred that only the coconut trees
found within the land of Atanacio were felled by Magsumbol and his co-accused. Menandro testified
that there were monuments that delimit the boundaries between the adjacent lots while Atanacio
claimed that there were none and that “x” marks were just etched on the trunk of the trees to
delineate the boundary of his land. Apart from the bare allegations of these witnesses, no con-crete
and competent evidence was adduced to substantiate the irrespective submissions. In view of such
conflicting claims and considering the meager evidence on hand, the Court cannot determine with
certainty the owner of the 33 felled coconut trees. The uncertainty of the exact location of the coconut
trees negates the presence of the criminal intent to gain.
At any rate, granting arguendo that the said coconut trees were within Menandro’s land, no
malice or criminal intent could be rightfully attributed to Magsumbol and his co-accused. The RTC
and the CA overlooked one important point in the present case, to wit: Magsumbol and his co-accused
went to Barangay Kinatihan I, Candelaria, Quezon, to cut down the coconut trees belonging to
Atanacio upon the latter’s instruction.
Such fact was confirmed by Atanacio who narrated that due to financial reversals, he sold all
the coconut trees in his land to Ramirez, a coco lumber trader; that since he could not go to the site
due to health reasons, he authorized Magsumbol and Magsino to cut down his trees and to oversee
the gathering of the felled trees; that he informed Menandro about this and even offered to pay for
the damages that he might have sustained as some of [Menandro’s] trees could have been mista-kenly
cut down in the process; that Menandro refused his offer of compensation and replied that a case had
already been filed against the four accused; and that he tried to seek an audience again from
Menandro, but the latter refused to talk to him anymore.
If, indeed, in the course of executing Atanacio’s instructions, Magsumbol and his co-accused
encroached on the land co-owned by Menandro, because they missed the undetectable boundary
between the two lots, and cut down some of Menandro’s trees, such act merely constituted mistake
or judgmental error.
The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol and his co-accused
even sought prior permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut down the coconut trees which was
done openly and during broad daylight effectively negated malice and criminal intent on their part.
It defies reason that the accused would still approach the barangay captain if their real intention was
to steal the coconut trees of Menandro. Besides, criminals would usually execute their criminal
activities clandestinely or through stealth or strategy to avoid detection of the commission of a crime
or a wrongdoing.
Page 454 of 519

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG

G.R. No. 199208, July 30, 2014, J. Carpio
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, must be the result of the relation by
reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that
might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused. Applying this,
Cahilig’s act of deliberately misleading the board of directors into authorizing disbursements for money
that eventually ended up in her personal account makes him guilty of the crime of qualified theft
considering that his position was one reposed with trust and confidence as it involves “handling,
managing, receiving, and disbursing” money from complainant-depositors and other funds.
Facts:
Respondent Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with
handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI.
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the
funds of WPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal benefit. Cahilig would prepare
disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order
to withdraw funds from one of WPESLAI’s bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other bank
account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as WPESLAI
cashier. This procedure for transferring funds from one bank account to another was said to be
standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds. Instead, she made
it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made into her account and then she
would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital
contribution.
The trial court found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each of the 30 cases of
qualified theft filed against her. All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard. Upon agreement of
the parties, only three of the 30 cases went thru trial. These were submitted for resolution.
The RTC found Cahilig guilty of the crimes charged. The CA denied Cahilig’s appeal and
affirmed the RTC’s Decision. The RTC held that Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust and
confidence by the key officers of the association. The CA denied her appeal and affirmed the RTC’s
Decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Cahilig is guilty of the crimes charged.
Ruling:
Yes, Cahilig is liable for qualified theft.
The elements of qualified theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as follows: 1.
taking of personal property; 2. that the said property belongs to another; 3. that the said taking be
done with intent to gain; 4. that it be done without the owner’s consent; 5. that it be accomplished
Page 455 of 519
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; 6. that it be
done with grave abuse of confidence.
It is clear that all the elements of qualified theft are present in these cases. Cahilig took money
from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position. Her intent to gain is clear in
the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed scheme to commit the theft.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of qualified theft, “must be the result of the relation
by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that
might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused.” Cahilig’s position
was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves “handling, managing,
receiving, and disbursing” money from WPESLAI’s depositors and other funds of the association.
Cahilig’s responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance over the money
entrusted into her care. However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board
of directors into authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her personal
account, a fact that Cahilig did not deny.
JOEL YONGCO and JULIETO LAÑOJAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 209373 (consolidated), July 30, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
The elements of qualified theft, committed with grave abuse of discretion, can simply be
enumerated as follows: 1. Taking of personal property; 2. That the said property belongs to another; 3.
That the said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That it be done without the owner’s consent; 5. That
it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;
and6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. The accused in this case, it bears stressing, were
guards and drivers with access to the entrance and exit of the CEO premises. In other words, they enjoyed
the trust and confidence reposed on them by their employer to have access throughout the CEO premises
on account of their respective duties. It was this trust and confidence that was gravely abused by them
that makes the theft qualified.
Facts:
Pablo Salosod, a casual employee of the city government of Iligan, testified that on April 16,
2005 at around 1:30 a.m., while attending a wake, he was fetched and requested by Anecito Tangian,
Jr., Jr., one of herein petitioners, to accompany him to the City Engineer’s Office (CEO). At the office
garage, Salosod and his fellow garbage collectors were allegedly directed by Petitioners Tangian, Jr.
and Yongco to load car parts that petitioners considered as waste items, the subject items of the theft,
on the truck driven by Tangian, Jr. They then drove to Tominobo, Iligan City where the materials were
unloaded in front of Delfin Junk Store, and before the truck left the shop, Salosod allegedly saw
Petitioner Lañojan giving a thumbs-up sign to Tangian, Jr.. On the way back, Tangian, Jr. allegedly
confessed to Salosod that it was Lañojan who requested that the items be brought at the junk shop.
Prosecution witness Oliveros Garcia meanwhile testified witnessing the unloading of the
items in front of the junk store, after which, Lañojan covered the items up with a sack. The following
morning, he allegedly saw Lañojan’s brother-in-law, who coincidentally works at the shop, take the
items inside. Witnesses Dioscoro Galorio and Atty. Ulysses Lagcao, employee and consultant of the
city government, respectively, testified that they conducted investigations relative to the incident and
found out that the items stolen consisted of one Nissan transmission, one unit boom, one Nissan I-
beam, and one differential of Tamaraw, with total valuation of PhP12,000. Upon their investigation,
Page 456 of 519
they recommended to the city legal officer the filing of the present criminal case against the
petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of qualified theft.
Ruling:
Yes.
The elements of qualified theft, committed with grave abuse of discretion, can simply be
enumerated as follows: 1. Taking of personal property; 2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That it be done without the owner’s consent; 5.
That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things; and 6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
There is no dispute that the items (transmission, boom arm, differential assembly, and I-
beam) which are the subject matter of this case belong to the CEO of Iligan City. There is no dispute
that these items, although considered "heap of scrap," have not yet been declared unserviceable or
waste by the proper authority or office. Nor have they been marked for proper disposal. There is also
no dispute that these items were taken away from the CEO and were already under complete and
effective control of the persons taking the same. This is because these items were loaded onto the
garbage truck driven by Tangian, Jr. and brought to Tominobo at the Delfin Junk Store. Apparently,
the taking of these items was without the consent of the CEO of Iligan City because there was no gate
pass issued to that effect. Evidence shows that when the garbage truck left the premises of the CEO,
no gate pass was surrendered by Tangian, Jr. Yongco did not bother to ask for a gate pass on the
pretext that there was another guard on duty at the gate.
It is equally patent that the taking of these items was done with grave abuse of confidence.
The accused in this case, it bears stressing, were guards and drivers with access to the entrance and
exit of the CEO premises. In other words, they enjoyed the trust and confidence reposed on them by
their employer (the City of Iligan) to have access throughout the CEO premises on account of their
respective duties. More so since the primary function of the CSU is to guard the properties, including
the said items, of the CEO. It was this trust and confidence that was gravely abused by them that
makes the theft qualified.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERA “JOY” ELEUTERIO NIELLES, AND MERA NIELLES
DELOS REYES
Nielles questions the decision of the CA finding her guilty of the crime of qualified theft. The
elements of qualified theft are as follows 1) taking of personal property; 2) that said property belongs
to another; 3) that the said taking was done with intent to gain; 4) that it was done without the owner’s
consent; 5) that it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of
force upon things; and 6) that it was done with grave abuse of confidence. For having established all the
elements abovementioned, the SC affirmed the findings and decision of the trial court and appellate
court that petitioner had indeed committed the crime of qualified theft.
Page 457 of 519
Facts:
Private Complainant Juanita Flores was engaged in the business of guaranteeing purchase
orders and gift checks of Shoemart and Landmark and disposing, selling or transferring them for
consideration. Appellant Nielles, on the other hand, was employed by Flores as her cashier. As such,
she was assigned to bill and collect from sub-guarantors, and to encash and deposit checks.
On July 15, 2004, Mera Joy collected PhP640,353.86 from the sub-guarantors. Mera Joy
however did not remit the amount to Flores or deposit the same in the account of Flores. Instead,
she issued 15 personal checks totalling PhP640,353.86 and deposited them to Flores’ account. Upon
presentment all the checks were dishonored due to account closed. Thereafter, Nielles absconded.
The RTC rendered a decision finding Mera Joy guilty of the crime of theft. On appeal, Mera Joy
argued that since Flores was abroad on July 15, 2004, she could not have personally known whether
she indeed collected amounts from the sub-guarantors. She posited that mere issuance of the 15
checks is not proof that she received/collected payments from the sub-guarantors or that she failed
to remit the monies belonging to Flores. She insisted that the prosecution failed to establish that she
indeed collected monies from the sub-guarantors amounting to PhP640,353.86. Mera Joy also
theorized that she might have issued the checks in favor of the sub-guarantors for whatever
transactions they have between them; and that thereafter, when she went to these sub-guarantors to
collect their dues for Flores, these sub-guarantors used the same checks she previously issued as
their payment for Flores. For that reason her personal checks were deposited in private
complainant’s account.
The CA, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court. It held that the fact that Flores was
out of the country during the commission of the offense is irrelevant since the prosecution has
satisfactorily established that upon her arrival in the Philippines, she immediately investigated the
matter and talked to the sub-guarantors. Flores also confirmed that indeed Nielles issued 15
personal checks in lieu of the amounts collected and deposited the same to Flores’ account but were
all dishonored upon presentment. Significantly, the CA noted that aside from her bare denial,
appellant did not present any evidence to support her claim that she did not steal the amount of
PhP640,353.86 from Flores. In fine, the CA found all the elements for the crime of qualified theft to
be present.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove Mera Joy’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
YES, the guilt of Mera Joy was satisfactorily proven in the instant case.
The Court agrees with the findings of the trial court and the CA that the prosecution
satisfactorily established all the elements of qualified theft, to wit: 1) taking of personal property; 2)
that said property belongs to another; 3) that the said taking was done with intent to gain; 4) that it
was done without the owner’s consent; 5) that it was accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, or of force upon things; and 6) that it was done with grave abuse of
confidence.
Page 458 of 519
The Court is with the trial court and the appellate court in finding that the element of taking
of personal property was satisfactorily established by the prosecution. During her cross-
examination, private complainant Flores testified that upon having been apprised of the unremitted
collections, she conducted an investigation and inquired from her sub-guarantors who admitted
making payments to Nielles. She also testified during cross-examination that when Nielles arrived
from Hongkong, the latter went to Flores’ office and admitted to having converted the collections to
her personal use. Interestingly, when it was her turn to testify, Nielles did not rebut Flores’ testi-
mony.
Notably, when Flores testified during her cross-examination that she talked to the sub-
guarantors who admitted having made payments to Mera Joy, the latter’s counsel no longer made
further clarifications or follow-up questions. Thus, Flores’ testimony on this fact remains on record
unrebutted.
Significantly, when Mera Joy was placed on the witness stand, she did not even make any
attempt to explain her issuance of the 15 checks. In fact, during her entire testimony, she never made
any mention about the personal checks that she issued and deposited in Flores’ account. It was only
in her Memorandum filed with the trial court and her Brief submitted to the appellate court that the
same was discussed. However, her explanation as to its issuance is so convoluted that it defies
belief. All that Mera Joy could claim is that the issuance of the checks only proves that the same was
for a consideration – but omitted to explain what the consideration was. She also theorized that she
might have issued the checks to the sub-guarantors for her personal transactions but likewise failed
to elaborate on what these transactions were. In any event, if indeed Mera Joy did not steal the
amount of PhP640,353.86 belonging to Flores, how come she issued 15 personal checks in favor of
the latter and deposited the same in her account, albeit they were subsequently dishonored? Besides,
the Court notes that in Mera Joy’sCounter Affidavit dated August 20, 2004 subscribed before 3rd
Assistant City Prosecutor Hannibal S. Santillan of Makati City, she already admitted having taken
without the knowledge and consent of Flores several purchase orders and gift checks worth
thousands of pesos. She claimed though that she was only forced to do so by Edna Cruz and cohorts.
The Court also concurs with the findings of the trial court and the CA that the prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of PhP640,353.86 actually belonged to Flores;
that Nielles stole the amount with intent to gain and without Flores’ consent; that the taking was
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things;
and that it was committed with grave abuse of confidence.
CARNAPPING
People of the Philippines vs. Edgardo T. Cruz

G.R. No. 200081, June 08, 2016
Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of qualified theft. Upon arraignement,
accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the Information. Thereafter, trial
ensued.
Page 459 of 519

The prosecution pieces of evidence show that sometime in November 2000, private complainant
Eduardo S. Carlos (Carlos) put up a business engaged in the sale of tires, batteries, and services for
wheel alignment, wheel balancing and vulcanizing under the name and style of Chromax
Marketing(Chromax).
During the infancy of Chromax, Carlos sought the help of accused-appellant Edgardo T. Cruz (Cruz)
to register and manage the business, i.e., attend to the needs of the customers, receive orders, issue
receipts and accept payments, and to prepare daily sales report for Carlos to be able to monitor the
number of sales made, credits given, and total amount collected.
When Chromax began to gain recognition, Carlos employed several other employees. However,
despite the rise of number of clients they were servicing, Chromax's financial capital remained
unimpressive. Thus, upon inquiry prompted by suspicion, Carlos discovered through his sister,
Eliza Cruz, that Cruz was stealing from Chromax.
On 19 February 2002, Carlos, as part of his routine, checked the daily sales report containing the
list of payments and balances of customers. Upon examination, he discovered that the remaining
balance of their customers and Cruz's advances (vale) totaled to P97,984.00. At the bottom of the
balance sheet was an acknowledgment that the amount stated as lost was actually used by Cruz,
which reads, "Mr. Eddie Carlos Amount stated lost was actually used by me for my personal use and
which I promise to pay you back."
Upon further investigation, Carlos also discovered an irregularity in the receipts issued to services
rendered to Miescor covering the same transaction with an invoice number 0287. The discrepancies
were between the amounts as indicated in the receipt issued to Miescor and the receipt shown to
him by Cruz. The receipt issued to Miescor indicated the amount of P1,259.00 while the receipt
shown to him by Cruz contained the amount of P579.00.
Thus, on 18 July 2002, Carlos filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against Cruz.
On the other hand, the defense presented its sole witness, Cruz, who denied liability for qualified
theft. He insinuated that Chromax started losing money from the time another employee, Jeffrey
Albaitar (Albaitar), was employed. Moreover, with only few months since Albaitar was employed,
Albaitar was already able to buy a brand new cellphone valued at P11,000.00. Finally, Cruz averred
that his purported signature and declaration in the balance sheet that the missing collectible sum
of money was allegedly used by him for personal use were forged.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of qualified theft.
On appeal before the SC, accused-appellant argues that the CA erred in affirming the judgment of
conviction rendered by the RTC based on circumstantial evidence.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant may be convicted for the crime of qualified theft based
on circumstantial evidence.
Page 460 of 519

Held: Yes. The elements of Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence are as
follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
All the elements of Qualified Theft are present in this case.
First. The defense contends that the prosecution was not able to prove Cruz's guilt by direct
evidence. The defense's contention is incorrect. The records reveal that it is by Cruz's own
admission why a conviction can be sustained. As already stated, Cruz declared that he took the
money for his personal use, "Mr. Eddie Carlos (sic) Amount stated lost was actually used by me for
my personal use and (sic) which 1 promise to pay you back."
Nevertheless, even without Cruz's own admission and direct evidence proving Cruz's guilt, a
conviction can still be sustained. As correctly held by the CA, direct evidence is not the sole means
to establish guilt because the accused's guilt can be proven by circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that which "goes to prove a fact or series of facts other than
the facts in issue, which, if proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact in issue." Rule 133,
Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the requirements in order for circumstantial
evidence can sustain conviction: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Contrary to the defense's allegation that the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented were
insufficient, a perusal of the records reveal otherwise. Based on the evidence, there is more than
one circumstance which can prove Cruz's guilt.
As sufficiently discussed by the trial court, besides Cruz's own admission that he took the
unaccounted money without Carlos' knowledge and authority, Cruz's guilt was also proven through
the following circumstantial evidence: Cruz, as the manager of Chromax, had sole access to the
money and other collectibles of Chromax; he had sole authority to issue receipts; he gave
commissions without Carlos' authority; he forged the amount in the sales report and receipts; and
finally, insinuated that it was Albaitar who misappropriated the money without providing any
scintilla of proof to support his accusations.
Contrary to the defense's allegation that due to lack of direct evidence the Court cannot uphold
Cruz's conviction, circumstantial evidence is not a "weaker" form of evidence. The Rules of Court
does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence insofar as their probative value is
concerned. In the case at bar, the combination of the circumstantial evidence draws no other logical
conclusion, but that Cruz stole the money with grave abuse of confidence.
Page 461 of 519
ESTAFA
JEAN D. GAMBOA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 188052, April 21, 2014, J. Perez
The CA convicted the accused for the commission of the crime of estafa. Gamboa denied the
allegations. The Court has ruled that findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA is binding
upon it unless there is proof that such facts where overlooked, ignored, misconstrued, and
misinterpreted. The fact of misappropriation cannot be refuted by the mere allegation that the amount
claimed against Gamboa is unliquidated. Its effect is merely to put into question the actual amount
misappropriated and the damage sustained by TFS Pawnshop.
Facts:
Petitioner Gambao is the liaison officer of private complainant TFS Pawnshop. She was
charged with estafa with the prosecutor’s office for having misappropriated or converted the funds
she received in trust for the payment of permits and licenses of the private respondent TFS
Pawnshop.
Gambao denied the allegations by claiming that she did not misappropriate the said funds, in
fact, all the permits and licenses of TFS Pawnshop was already fully paid and that she is in possession
of the documents that would prove the fact of payment. During her direct testimony before the trial
court, in order to disprove that she misappropriated and converted the funs intended for the
payment of permits and licenses of TFS Pawnshop, Gambao claimed that she gave the monies to a
certain Lito Jacinto, a casual employee of the City Government of Manila. She alleged that, pursuant
to company practice, the employees were regularly transacting with Lito Jacinto in order to expedite
the process for the renewal of licenses and permits. To corroborate her testi-mony, Gamboa
presented as documentary evidence a photocopy of a receipt payment signed by Lito Jacinto.
Despite the defenses made by Gambao, the trial court rendered judgment convicting her for
having committed the crime of estafa punishable under Art. 315 par. 1(b) of the RPC. On appeal, the
OSG sided with Gambao after finding that her defenses are meritorious. The OSG claimed that the
element of misappropriation necessary for the conviction for the crime of estafa is absent in the case
at bar. It alleged that Gambao merely followed the instructions of her superior to transact and entrust
the money with Lito Jacinto. The CA, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner Gambao’s defenses should be given weight thereby rendering her
innocent of the crime of estafa.
Ruling:
No. the defense interposed by Gamboa should be given scant consideration.
It is well-settled that the credibility of witnesses is best determined by the trial judge, who
has the direct opportunity and unique advantage to observe at close range their conduct and
deportment on the witness stand. The general rule is that findings of fact of the trial court, its
Page 462 of 519
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, and the probative weight thereof, as
well as its conclusions based on said finding, are accorded by the appellate court utmost respect, if
not conclusive effect, and can only be set aside upon a clear showing that it overlooked, ignored,
misconstrued and misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would alter
the outcome of the case.
The Court, in affirming the decision of the CA, concluded that the defense made by Gambao
during her direct testimony that she gave the monies to Lito Jacinto is riddled with inconsistencies
and it is made only as a mere after thought. If indeed she had entrusted the funds to Lito Jacinto and
if indeed she is innocent, she would have alleged that fact at the earliest possible time. Her belated
invocation of the said defense bolsters the conclusion that the defense was made only as a mere after
thought.
Moreover, neither did the defense present the original or xerox copy of Exhibit “6” before the
court a quo for marking during the pre-trial held on November 14, 2000. In addition, it was only
during the direct examination of [Gamboa] on July 30, 2002 that she raised for the first time Exhibit
“6” as a defense by passing the blame to one Lito Jacinto. She never raised the said defense at the
earliest opportune time when she made a liquidation report of her cash advances. Further, she again
failed to raise the said defense before the OCP of Makati City during the preliminary investi-gation. If
indeed she was innocent of the crime charged, ordinary human behavior dictates that she should
have divulged the said information to her superiors or the investigating public prosecutor of such
fact. Her failure to do so casts serious doubt on her credibility.
In addition, the allegation that the actual amount of the claim is not liquidated thereby
cancelling out the fact of misappropriation cannot be given credence. The [Court] ruled that the lack
of certainty in the amount demanded by TFS merely puts into question the actual amount that was
misappropriated and the damage on TFS, but not the fact of Gamboa’s misappropriation.
LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014, J. Peralta
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d)
that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. The prosecution was able to prove
the existence of all the elements of the crime. Tangcoy gave Corpuz the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on
commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the
same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when Corpuz failed to remit the
proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry
within or after the agreed period despite demand from Tangcoy to the prejudice of the latter.
Facts:
Danilo Tangcoy and Petitioner Corpuz met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City
sometime in 1990. Tangcoy was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and,
upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, Corpuz approached him on May 2,
Page 463 of 519
1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Tangcoy
agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to Corpuz the following items: an 18k diamond ring for
men; a woman's bracelet; a men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of
P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date.
They both agreed that Corpuz shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return
the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without Corpuz remitting the proceeds
of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When Tangcoy was able to meet Corpuz, the latter
promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against Corpuz for the crime of estafa.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. After trial, the RTC found
Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the last element of estafa, which is, that there is a demand by the offended
party on the offender, was not proved
Ruling:
No, the Court disagrees that the last element of estafa, which is, that there is a demand by the
offended party on the offender, was not proved.
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for adminis-tration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his
part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. In his testimony,
Tangcoy narrated how he was able to locate Corpuz after almost two (2) months from the time he
gave the pieces of jewelry and asked Corpuz about the same items with the latter promising to pay
them.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even
be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that it has
indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the
money in this case, property, would be tantamount to a demand. As expounded in Asejo vs. People:
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa
need not be formal or written.
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of the crime. Tangcoy gave Corpuz the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on
commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the
same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when Corpuz failed to remit the
proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of
jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from Tangcoy to the prejudice of the latter.
Page 464 of 519
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANGELITA I. DAUD, HANELITA M. GALLEMIT and RODERICK
GALLEMIT y TOLENTINO
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and
Estafa. Roderick’s contention that he cannot be convicted of estafa because the element of deceit is
lacking is without merit, as private complainants were able to establish, through their positive and
credible testimonies, that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused to mislead private
complainants into believing that appellant and his co-accused, for a fee, can deploy private
complainants abroad for employment.
Facts:
Angelita I. Daud, Hanelita M. Gallemit, and appellant Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino were
charged before the RTC with illegal recruitment in large scale. That on or about February 5, 2001 to
August 2001, in the City of Parañaque, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist
and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, for a fee, recruit and promise employment abroad to complainants Marcelo De Guzman,
Evangeline Relox, Maricel Rayo, Brigida Rayo, Gina Decena, Nenita Policarpio, Myrna Crisostomo and
Francisco Poserio, without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment thus deemed committed in large scale and therefore amounting to economic
sabotage. Eight more Informations charged Daud, Hanelita, and appellant before the RTC with eight
counts of Estafa, committed separately upon eight private complainants, namely, Marcelo I. De
Guzman, Evangeline I. Relox, Marcelo E. Rayo, Brigada A. Rayo, Gina T. Decena, Nenita F. Policarpio,
Myrna S. Crisostomo and Francisco S. Poserio, respectively.
Only Roderick was apprehended, while his co-accused Daud and Hanelita eluded arrest and
remained at large. The nine criminal cases against appellant before the RTC were consolidated. When
arraigned, Roderick pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. Thereafter, joint trial of the nine
criminal cases ensued. The prosecution offered as evidence the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) Certification stating that Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and Consultancy,
operated by Roderick and his co-accused, is not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Of all the private complainants, only De Guzman, Decena, and Poserio testified against Gallem it.
Evidence for the defense consisted solely of appellant’s testimony.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 15, 2007 finding
appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa on three (3) counts. Considering that
accused Angelita i. Daud and Hanelita m. Gallemit remain at large for more than six (6) months since
the issuance and delivery of the warrant of arrest to the proper police or peace officer. Let an alias
warrant of arrest be issued against them. Following the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration by
the RTC, Roderick filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. All three complainants positively
identified appellant in court. The Court of Appeals affirmed Roderick’s conviction by the RTC
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the Roderick of Estafa despite the
absence of the element of deceit.
Page 465 of 519
Ruling:
No, the trial court did not err in convicting Roderick of Estafa.
We likewise affirm the conviction of Roderick for three counts of estafa committed against
the private complainants, based on the very same evidence that proved appellant’s criminal liability
for illegal recruitment. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a)of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Appellant contends that he
cannot be convicted of estafa because the element of deceit is lacking. He insists on the absence of
proof that he made any false statement or fraudulent representation to private complainants. Private
complainants were able to establish, through their positive and credible testimonies, that appellant
acted in conspiracy with his co-accused to mislead private complainants into believing that appellant
and his co-accused, for a fee, can deploy private complainants abroad for employment.
Appellant also argues that the second element of estafa, which is prejudice or pecuniary loss,
was not established during trial as the prosecution was unable to present any receipt signed by
Roderick proving that he received money from private complainants. We reiterate that when
conspiracy has been established, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. Again, there is no cogent
reason for us to disturb the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that both elements
of estafa are present in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123, 03-0127, and 03-0130. Thus, we sustain
appellant’s conviction for estafa, punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal
Code. It is not the issuance or signing of receipts for the placement fees that makes a case for illegal
recruitment, but rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the necessary license or
authority. The absence of receipts to evidence payment is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s
cause. A person charged with the illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the
testimony of the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing.
MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNDERSECRETARY MA.
MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, CELESTINO M. PALMA III, and HELEN T. CHUA
G.R. No. 168903, June 18, 2014, C.J. Sereno
As regards the first element, the Court finds that there was neither abuse of confidence nor deceit
in this case. On the charge of abuse of confidence, [the Court again finds] that there is no evidence that
could possibly lead to a conclusion that respondents committed abuse of confidence in dealing with
Madrigal. First, a perusal of the evidence reveals that Madrigal did not sign a blank document nor was
she deceived by respondents regarding the terms of the CSA. On its face, the CSA was a standard
preprinted form. A plain reading thereof shows that the signatory guarantees the punctual payment of
indebtedness that may have been due or owed by the borrower. Madrigal ought to have read the terms
of the CSA before she signed it.
Second, considering the accountability of the signatory upon signing the CSA, Madrigal must
have observed prudence in order to protect her interests. Hence, she should have personally indicated
her own terms in the CSA whether she was signing as a representative, a surety, or a witness. It is unlikely
that FEBTC officers would make it appear that she was personally liable as surety of a loan without her
Page 466 of 519

knowledge and authority. Madrigal failed to overcome the presumption in favor of respondents that the
ordinary course of business has been followed.
Facts:
Petitioner Madrigal is the President of Madrigal Transport, Inc. (MTI) while Respondents
Palma III is the Vice-President of Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), and Chua is an account
officer of FEBTC. Madrigal filed a complaint-affidavit charging Palma with the crime of estafa under
pars. 1(c), 2(a), 3(a) and 3(c) of Art. 315 of the RPC. Later on, Chua was named as additional
respondent.
In 1997, MTI obtained and was granted a loan in the amount of $10 million from FEBTC for
the acquisition of the feeder vessel M/V Alicia (formerly the M.V. Artemission). According to
Madrigal, as president of MTI, she applied for a loan from FEBTC in the amount of USD 10.5 million
to finance the acquisition of a feeder vessel, pursuant to a joint venture agreement between MTI and
the another corporation. FEBTC sent her various documents, and she signed the documents without
the material entries and sent them back to FEBTC. However, Madrigal was advised by Palma that
FEBTC could only grant MTI a loan in the amount of $10 million because of a lower valuation of the
vessel M/V Alicia. Thus, she reapplied for a loan for this reduced amount and signed a second set of
loan documents, guaranteeing the USD 10 million loan.
Madrigal then noticed that Respondent Palma was imposing upon MTI additional obligations
not originally contemplated and requested from FEBTC copies of the documents to be signed in
relation to the $10 million loan. Palma insisted that petitioner was personally liable under the first
agreement covering the $10.5 million loan and compelled Madrigal to disburse from her personal
funds the total amount of PhP5,903,172.30, which was paid to FEBTC, to protect her reputation.
On the other hand, Palma averred that MTI had applied for a loan from FEBTC in the amount
of USD 11 million to finance the purchase of a vessel named M/V Artemission (now the M/V Alicia)
and contends that FEBTC considered the immediate release of the proceeds of the loan, as
accommodation to Madrigal, provided that the latter, together with Luis P. Lorenzo, Jr. (the president
of other corporation), would execute “personal undertakings” as sureties for the loan of the MTI to
which Lorenzo acceded to do. Palma finally claimed that Madrigal’s institution of the criminal
complaint was merely a ploy resorted to question the due execution of the Comprehen-sive Surety
Agreement to evade her personal liability for MTI’s loan.
After the initial finding of probable cause, the crime of estafa under Art. 315 1(c) was filed
against Palma and Chua with the RTC. Palma and Chua filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in
view of the appeal before the DOJ which the RTC granted. DOJ Secretary upheld the finding of the
probable cause with the modification that the charge against respondents should be for estafa under
par. 3(c), Art. 315 of the RPC. Undersecretary Merceditas Gutierrez (Usec. Gutierrez) reversed and
set aside the Resolution after a motion for reconsideration by Palma and Chua. Magdrigal filed a
motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied by DOJ.
Madrigal then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the DOJ committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in setting aside the resolution finding
probable cause against Palma and Chua. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed
resolutions of the DOJ.
Page 467 of 519
The CA ruled that there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the Information for
estafa under par. 1(c), Art. 315 against respondents. It found that the indispensable element in the
crime of estafa under par. 1(c) that “the paper with the signature of the offended party must be blank”
was lacking. That an experienced businesswoman would thoughtlessly affix her signature to a blank
document was considered incredible by the appellate court. It likewise found to be devoid of merit
the assertion of petitioner that she did not sign the Comprehensive Surety Agreement in her personal
capacity, and that the agreement referred to an “abandoned” loan application. Hence, the present
action.
Issue:
Whether or not there is probable cause to charge Palma and Chua of the crime of estafa.
Ruling:
No, there is no probable cause.
The elements of estafa in general are: 1) That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of
confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and 2) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.
The first element covers the following ways of committing estafa: 1) with unfaithfulness or
abuse of confidence; 2) by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or 3) through fraudulent
means.
The first way of committing estafa is known as estafa with abuse of confidence, while the
second and the third ways cover estafa by means of deceit. [The Court] finds that the present case
does not constitute estafa in either form.
As regards the first element, the Court finds that there was neither abuse of confidence nor
deceit in this case. On the charge of abuse of confidence, the Court again finds that there is no evidence
that could possibly lead to a conclusion that respondents committed abuse of confidence in dealing
with Madrigal. First, a perusal of the evidence reveals that Madrigal did not sign a blank document
nor was she deceived by respondents regarding the terms of the CSA. On its face, the CSA was a
standard preprinted form. A plain reading thereof shows that the signatory guarantees the punctual
payment of indebtedness that may have been due or owed by the borrower. Madrigal ought to have
read the terms of the CSA before she signed it.
Second, considering the accountability of the signatory upon signing the CSA, Madrigal must
have observed prudence in order to protect her interests. Hence, she should have personally
indicated her own terms in the CSA whether she was signing as a representative, a surety, or a
witness. It is unlikely that FEBTC officers would make it appear that she was personally liable as
surety of a loan without her knowledge and authority. [Madrigal] failed to overcome the presump-
tion in favor of respondents that the ordinary course of business has been followed.
On the contrary, considering further that the loan of $10 million was approved and released
to Madrigal prior to the execution of the second set of documents, it is more sensible to believe that
Page 468 of 519
given her financial status and capability to recompense the loan the bank approved the loan upon her
personal guarantee and execution of the first CSA.
Any intent to deceive through concealment was also negated when the FEBTC officers, herein
respondents, willingly presented the documents pertaining to the loan upon the request of petitioner.
In fact, a communication letter she had sent the bank reveals that she knew all along and
acknowledged the obligation that she, together with Luis P. Lorenzo of Lapanday Holdings Corp., had
acted as a surety of MTI’s loan.
The existence of two (2) documents is irrelevant in this case as the original intention of the
parties is evident − that Madrigal and Luis P. Lorenzo, in their personal capacities are co-sureties of
MTI’s loan. It would therefore be absurd to conclude that Madrigal signed the CSA in her capacity as
President of MTI considering that the principle behind surety ship will be negated. Otherwise stated,
the borrower cannot at the same time be a guarantor/surety to assure the fulfillment of its own loan
application. Moreover, the CSA is a continuing guarantee that Madrigal, upon executing the said
document, bound herself to the contract “until the full and due payment and performance of all the
obligations of the borrower.” Undisputedly, there was only one loan transaction, and FEBTC does not
intend to collect from both loan documents. Thus, [the Court finds] no abuse of confidence or deceit
committed by respondents in the foregoing circumstances.
SOLEDAD TRIA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Tria received pieces of jewelry from Seven Sphere for her to sell on the condition that she will
deliver the proceeds and to return if unsold. Half of the jewelries were returned, but [she] failed to pay
the remaining value. She argued that the element of fraud is missing since she returned the jewelry. The
Court held that all elements of estafa through misappropriation or conversion are present. Tria’s
argument implies an admission of her receipt of the jewelry items and her failure to account for all of
them. The words “convert” and “misappropriate” connote the act of using or disposing of another’s
property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.
Facts:
Accused Soledad is charged for allegedly defrauding Seven Sphere Enterprises by misappro-
priating and converting to own use the assorted jewelry worth PhP23,375.50 received from Seven
Sphere for her to sell and to deliver the proceeds or to return if unsold.
Soledad received from Seven Sphere 22 pieces of jewelry valued at P47,440.00 subject to the
condition that she will remit the proceeds of the sale and return any unsold pieces within six days.
She returned 8 unsold pieces of the jewelry valued at P16,380.00 leaving a balance of P31,060.00.
Thereafter, Soledad issued four Banco Filipino post-dated checks all with the equal face value of
PhP7,765.00. The checks were dishonored for the reason: “account closed.” Upon being informed that
the checks were dishonored, Soledad returned three pieces of jewelry valued at P7,684.50, thus
leaving the unpaid balance of PhP23,375.50. Seven Sphere then sent a demand letter to Soledad for
the payment of the unpaid balance. She failed to pay.
After being formally charged in court, Soledad asserted that the element of fraud in estafa is
absent in view of Meneses’ admission that she returned the unsold pieces of jewelry and remitted
Page 469 of 519
part of the sale proceeds. During the pendency of the case, she claimed she has been paying her
balance upon Seven Sphere’s declaration that she will be eventually absolved from liability once she
settles the full amount. She averred that if it was her intention to defraud, then she could have evaded
paying the balance or even denied receipt of the jewelry entrusted to her. She also claimed she failed
to account for the jewelries because “they were, in truth and in fact, sold on credit, to different
customers, who, however, failed and/or refused to return the jewelries or pay the value thereof.:
Both trial court and appellate court found her guilty of estafa under Art. 315 (1)(b) of the RPC.
Issue:
Whether or not all the elements of estafa are present.
Ruling:
Yes, all the elements are present and thus, the Court found Soledad guilty of estafa.
Estafa through misappropriation or conversion is defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the RPC:
“Any person who shall defraud another: 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of

confidence, namely: (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of
another, money, goods or any other personal property received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such
obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property.”
The elements of estafa under this provision are: (1) that the money, good or other personal
property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of
such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
The first, third and fourth elements are immediately discernible from the ‘Receipt of Goods on
Consignment’ shows that Soledad received pieces of jewelry on consignment from Seven Sphere. This
was corroborated by the testimony of Gertrudes Meneses, the cash custodian, who signed the
document in behalf of the consignor at the time of its execution. She identified Soledad’s signature on
the document and confirmed the contents of the agreement as being a consignment contract, as well
as the Soledad’s consequent duties thereunder to remit sale proceeds or return the unsold pieces of
jewelry.
As to the second element, the words “convert” and “misappropriate” connote the act of using
or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal
presumption of misappropriation arises when the [Tria] fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to
return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.
Page 470 of 519
Meneses’ testimony that Seven Sphere was prejudiced in the amount of PhP23,370.00 after
the Soledad failed to return the remaining 11 pieces of jewelry was unrebutted. Soledad’s assertion
that she returned 11 pieces bolsters rather than weakens the case for the prosecution, as it implies
an admission of her receipt of 22 jewelry items from Seven Sphere and her failure to account for all
of them. Soledad bound herself to return all of them if unsold. She breached her legal duty under the
consignment contract.
The Court did not give credence to her claim that her failure to account for the jewelry was
because she sold the same on credit. Such act directly contravenes the explicit terms of the authority
granted to her because the consignment transaction with Seven Sphere prohibited her from selling
the jewelry on credit. Misappropriation and conversion is again palpable from these circumstances.
By selling the jewelry on credit, Soledad used the property for a purpose other than that agreed upon.
NENITA CARGANILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182424, September 22, 2014, J. Brion
The offense of estafa committed with abuse of confidence requires that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such
receipt that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and that there
is demand by the offended party to the offender.
Facts:
On September 23, 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal, Nueva Ecija, gave the Nenita
Carganillo the amount of P132,000.00 for the purpose of buying palay. According to the “Kasunduan”
signed by them. The parties agreed that for every kilo of palay bought, Nenita shall earn a commission
of twenty centavos. But if no palay is purchased and delivered on November 28, Nenita must return
the P132,000.00 to Teresita within one week after November 28.
After failing to receive any palay or the P132,000.00 on November 28 and one week
thereafter, Teresita made oral and written demands to the Nenita for the return of the P132,000.00
but her demands were simply ignored. She thus filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa against Nenita
before the Fiscal’s Office.
Issue:
Whether or not Nenita should be convicted for the offense charged, despite the prosecution’s
failure to prove her guilt of the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes, she should be.
Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the offense of
estafa committed with abuse of confidence requires that money, goods or other personal property is
Page 471 of 519
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of
such receipt that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
that there is demand by the offended party to the offender.
It was found that all the elements of estafa are present in this case: that the petitioner received
in trust the amount of P132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay and
misappropriated it when she failed to return the said amount to Teresita upon demand. As the CA
and the RTC did, the Court finds worthy of credit and belief the “Kasunduan” presented in evidence
by the prosecution that was admittedly signed by the petitioner and which contained the terms of
agreement between her and Teresita. This document clearly stated that the petitioner received in
trust the amount of P132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay with the
corresponding obligations to (1) deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before
November 28, 1998, and (2) return the P132,000.00 to Teresita one week after November 28 in the
event that the petitioner failed to make palay purchases
LEONORA B. RIMANDO vs. SPOUSES WINSTON and ELENITA ALDABA and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 203583, October 13, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
While a BP Blg. 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of facts, they
nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered “separate, distinct,
and independent” from each other. Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final adjudication – both
as to their criminal and civil aspects – subject to the prohibition on double recovery. Perforce, a ruling
in a BP Blg. 22 case concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given any
bearing whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa case. Clearly, the simultaneous
filing of BP Blg. 22 and estafa cases do not amount to double jeopardy.
As such, an acquittal and subsequent exoneration in the BP Blg. 22 cases had no effect in the
estafa case, even if both cases were founded on the same factual circumstances. There being no deceit
employed to induce another for the investment of money, the civil liability did not arise from any
purported act constituting the crime of estafa. Verily, the case at bar involves a liability traceable from
being an accommodation party. Thus, not being based upon the crime she is charged with, the lower
court correctly upheld the same despite her acquittal in the estafa case.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Rimando has been charged of the crime of estafa through the use of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations. Allegedly, she enticed Sps. Aldaba to invest in her
business under the assurance that it is stable and that their money would earn 8% monthly interest.
Convinced by Rimando’s proposal and taking into consideration their long friendship, Sps. Aldaba
gave her a check in the amount of PhP500,000.00 as investment in her business. In turn, she gave
Sps. Aldaba three (3) post-dated checks, one for PhP500,000.00 and the other two (2) for P40,000.00
each, and made them sign an investment contract with Multitel International Holding Corporation
(Multitel). Upon maturity of the checks, Sps. Aldaba attempted to encash the same but were
dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds. This prompted Sps. Aldaba to demand
Page 472 of 519

Rimando to make good the said checks, but to no avail. Hence, they were constrained to file a criminal
complaint for estafa against her.
In her defense, Rimando denied her friendship with Sps. Aldaba and that she enticed them to
invest in her own business, as she had none. According to her, she only referred them to Multitel
Investment Manager Jaimelyn Cayaban who handled their investment. She also maintained that she
only issued the three (3) post-dated checks to accommodate them while waiting for the check from
Multitel, but when the latter issued the check, Sps. Aldaba refused to accept it so she can be held liable
in case their investment fails.
Meanwhile, Sps. Aldaba also filed a criminal case against Rimando for violation of BP Blg. 22
before the MeTC of Manila. In July 2010, she was acquitted in the BP Blg. 22 cases on the ground of
reasonable doubt, with a declaration that the act or omission from which liability may arise does not
exist.
Eventually, the RTC acquitted her of the crime of estafa, but found her civilly liable to Sps.
Aldaba in the amount of PhP500,000.00. It found the absence of the element of deceit as Sps. Aldaba
were fully aware that they would be investing their money in Multitel and not in Rimando’s
purported business. Nevertheless, the RTC ruled that as an accommodation party to one of the checks
she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel, Rimando should be held liable to Sps. Aldaba for the
corresponding amount of PhP500,000.00. On appeal to the CA, she contended in her Appellant’s Brief
that her acquittal and exoneration from the civil liability in the BP Blg. 22 cases should have barred
Sps. Aldaba from claiming civil liability from her in the estafa case. Subsequently, the CA affirmed the
RTC Ruling. It held that a prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22 is distinct, separate, and independent
from a prosecution for estafa, albeit they may both involve the same parties and transaction. As such,
Rimando’s acquittal and subsequent exoneration from civil liability in the BP Blg. 22 cases does not
automatically absolve her from civil liability in the estafa case.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Rimando’s civil liability in the estafa case despite her
acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in the BP Blg. 22 cases.
Ruling:
It is well-settled that “the acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment
against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil;
and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.”
In this case, Rimando’s civil liability did not arise from any purported act constituting the
crime of estafa as the RTC clearly found that Rimando never employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to
induce them to invest money in Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being an
accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel. In lending
Page 473 of 519
her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to the latter, and as such, she may be held directly
liable for the value of the issued check. Verily, Rimando’s civil liability to Sps. Aldaba in the amount
of PhP500,000.00 does not arise from or is not based upon the crime she is charged with, and hence,
the CA correctly upheld the same despite her acquittal in the estafa case. In this relation, the CA is
also correct in holding that Rimando’s acquittal and subsequent exoneration in the BP Blg. 22 cases
had no effect in the estafa case, even if both cases were founded on the same factual circumstances.
In Nierras vs. Judge Dacuycuy, the Court laid down the fundamental differences between BP Blg. 22
and estafa, to wit:
“What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit and
damage are essential elements in [Art. 315 (2-d) of the RPC], but are not required
in [BP Blg. 22]. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored
gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued
the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the
Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a
drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under BP Blg. 22 even if he had
issued the same for a pre-existing obligation, while under [Art. 315 (2-d) of the
RPC], such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different
penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime
against property, while violation of BP Blg. 22 is principally a crime against public
interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; (4) violations of [Art. 315 of
the RPC] are mala in se, while those of BP Blg. 22 are mala prohibita.”
Owing to such differences, jurisprudence in People vs. Reyes even instructs that the
simultaneous filing of BP 22 and estafa cases do not amount to double jeopardy.
Essentially, while a BP Blg. 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of
facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered
“separate, distinct, and independent” from each other. Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final
adjudication – both as to their criminal and civil aspects – subject to the prohibition on double
recovery. Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused
cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa case, as
in this instance.
MARGIE BALERTA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Here, Balerta held the funds in behalf of BABMPC. Over the funds, she had mere physical or
material possession, but she held no independent right or title, which she can set up against BABMPC.
Balerta was nothing more than a mere cash custodian, thus one of the elements of estafa by
misappropriation - the juridical possession of the funds - is not proven. In addition, the testimony of the
BABMPC’s manager, without corroborating evidence, does not prove misappropriation on Balerta’s
part.
When the accused in an estafa case is acquitted due to reasonable doubt as to her criminal
liability, civil liability may still be proven by preponderance of evidence. Timonera made references to
the alleged falsifications and misappropriations committed by Balerta. However, he denied specific
knowledge of where exactly the falsifications and misappropriations were shown and recorded. This,
Page 474 of 519
plus the fact that the prosecution made no formal offer of documentary evidence, leaves the Court in the
dark as to how Balerta's civil liability, if any, shall be determined.
Facts:
Petitioner Balerta, cashier of Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative

(BABMPC) was charged before the RTC of estafa. The prosecution presented as its sole evidence, the
testimony of BABMPC’s General Manager, Napoleon Timonera. Timonera testified, among others that
Balerta stopped reporting for work after BABMPC discovered discrepancies and fraud in her records.
Upon audit, BABMPC found that there was a discrepancy of some PhP185,000.00, PhP90,000.00 of
which in the passbook, while the rest of the amount related to the records of the cooperative kept by
Balerta. When asked by the Balerta’s counsel about where exactly was the discrepancy shown in the
copy of the bank’s ledger and pages of a passbook, which were part of BABMPC’s records, Timonera
answered that he is not an accountant and BABMPC’s Internal Auditor Ambros knew more about the
matter.
Balerta, in her defense, testified that Timonera was ill-motivated when he initiated the filing
of the criminal complaint against her. Timonera intended to evade his financial liabilities from
BABMPC relative to his cash advances and the money which he had diverted to other projects in
violation of the rules of the cooperative. Balerta also suspected that Timonera must have speculated
that the former had money as she then had plans to go abroad.
The RTC convicted Balerta as she failed to prove and explain to the Court the exact figure or
amount of money she is accountable of. She failed to cause an audit of her own to show that no
shortage was incurred by her. Her testimony was not corroborated by any witness or other
documentary evidence. The CA affirmed the RTC, holding that all the elements of estafa were proven.
Issue:
Whether or not the elements of estafa are not proved?
Ruling:
Yes, the elements of estafa were not proven.
Balerta had no juridical possession over the allegedly misappropriated funds. Juridical
possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the trans-
feree may set up even against the owner.
In Guzman v. [CA], a travelling sales agent misappropriated or failed to return to his principal
the proceeds of things or goods he was commissioned or authorized to sell. He was, however, found
liable for estafa. In this case the Court explained the distinction between possession of a bank teller
and an agent for purposes of determining criminal liability: There is an essential distinction between
the possession by a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the bank, and an
agent who receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal.
In the former case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a
mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain or
possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own
Page 475 of 519
principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain money or goods received inconsequence of

the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify
him for damages suffered without his fault.
In the case at bench, there is no question that Balerta was handling the funds lent by Care
Philippines to BABMPC. However, she held the funds in behalf of BABMPC. Over the funds, she had
mere physical or material possession, but she held no independent right or title, which she can set
up against BABMPC. Balerta was nothing more than a mere cash custodian. Hence, the Court finds
that juridical possession of the funds as an element of the crime of estafa by misappropriation is
absent in the instant case.
In the prosecution of the crime of estafa, demand need not be formal if there exists evidence
of misappropriation. However, in the instant case, conclusive proofs of both misappropriation and
demand are wanting.
While this Court does not find Timonera’s testimony as incredible, by itself alone, it is
insufficient to discharge the burden of proof required for conviction in criminal cases. Balerta was
indicted for allegedly misappropriating the amount of PhP185,584.06. However, Timonera failed to
state with certainty where in the records held by Balerta were the discrepancies shown. Timonera
evaded answering the question by emphasizing that he is not an accountant and that Ambros knew
more about the matter. Note too that Timonera admitted it was Balerta and De Asis who were the
two authorized signatories relative to the funds lent to BABMPC by Care Philippines. Hence, Balerta
did not have sole access over the records and funds. Consequently, the authorship of the falsified
entries in the passbook cannot be attributed with certainty to Balerta alone. It was thus fatal for the
prosecution’s cause that Ambros, De Asis, Mombay and the bank personnel did not take the witness
stand especially since documentary evidence were never formally offered as well.
The RTC and the CA faulted Balerta for not offering countervailing evidence, including an
audit conducted in her own behalf. Still, it does not justify a conviction to be handed on that ground
because the courts cannot magnify the weakness of the defense and overlook the prosecution’s
failure to discharge the onus probandi.
In the case at bar the paltry evidence for the prosecution, consisting merely of Timonera’s
testimony, casts doubts anent the guilt of Balerta, and does not amply rebut her right to be pre-sumed
innocent of the crime charged.
MARIA LINA S. VELAYO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315(1)(b) of the
[RPC] are: (1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under
any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the
obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the
person who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it; (3) that such conversion,
diversion or denial is to the injury of another; and (4) that there be demand for the return of the
property.
Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which
the transferee may set up even against the owner.
Page 476 of 519
In this case, it was Velayo alone who transacted with WJA and AIMS in behalf of ARDC. It was to
her that all the above checks were handed in payment for the lots, and she alone opened a deposit
account with UCPB, although in the name of ARDC, where she deposited all the check payments she
received from WJA. Then, only her signature is in the UCPB signature cards, and thus she alone was the
sole authorized signatory for the said account. There is then no doubt that Velayo had sole possession
and control of the missing funds intended for payment of the capital gains and documentary stamps
taxes. Velayo did not receive the missing funds in behalf of ARDC, but received it for herself, through her
own representations. WJA had no obligation to pay to ARDC the withholding tax; its obligation was to
pay the same to the BIR itself. It was only due to Velayo’s own representations that she was able to get
hold of the money.
Facts:
On March 29, 2001 in Pasay City, Petitioner Velayo, defrauded and deceived WJA Holdings,
Inc. herein represented by its President, Jayne Abuid. Velayo, being then the President of Alorasan
Realty Development Corporation entered into in its behalf a contract to purchase two parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. 142675 and 122230 for PhP20 million and PhP40 million respectively with WJA
Holdings, Inc., with the understanding that the applicable withholding tax which WJA Holdings, Inc.
was supposed to withhold and remit to the BIR re: the PhP40 million purchase price in the amount
of PhP3 million representing the 7.5% withholding tax will not be deducted hence the total amount
of PhP40 million was received by the accused under the obligation of effecting the registration and
transfer of the title in the name of WJA and further accused received from the WJA the amount of
PhP346,670.00 representing documentary stamp tax for such transfer and the accused once in
possession of the said aggregate amount of PhP3,346,670.00, which amount accused misapplied,
misappropriated and converted to her own personal use and benefit, and despite repeated demand
made upon her, accused failed to comply, to the damage and prejudice of said complainant in the
aforesaid amount of PhP3,346,670.00.
RTC convicted Velayo of estafa. It found that Velayo actually received the total purchase price
of PhP60 Million, including the PhP3 Million for the withholding taxes on TCT No. 122230. It noted
in particular that notwithstanding the express provision in the parties’ Contract to Sell that WJA
would remit the said taxes, Velayo volunteered to do the errand herself for WJA and convinced them
not to deduct the taxes from the gross price. However, Velayo failed to remit to the BIR the PhP3
Million in taxes, as well as PhP429,617.00 in DST due on TCT No. 122230.
On appeal to CA, it affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC, having determined that all the
elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are present: a) that money, goods or other personal
property was received by Velayo in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; b) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by Velayo; or denial on her part of such
receipt; and c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of WJA.
Velayo maintains that an essential element of the crime of estafa is absent, since it is not
shown that personal property was held by her in trust, on commission, for administration or under
any other circumstance, for WJA.
Page 477 of 519

Issues:
1. Whether or not Velayo had no obligation to withhold taxes on behalf of the buyer WJA
and thus did not receive the subject funds in a manner that would make her liable for the
crime of estafa.
2. Whether or not Velayo did not have juridical possession over the subject funds and could
not therefore be held liable for the crime of estafa.
Ruling:
1. NO, Velayo is liable for the missing funds.
Velayo had sole possession and control of the missing funds intended for payment of the
capital gains and documentary stamps taxes.
It has been sufficiently established through the testimonies of Sayson, Abuid, Paderanga and
Pabilonia, as well as through the returned checks and the acknowledgment receipts signed by Velayo
herself, that Abuid gave to Velayo the entire purchase price for the subject properties, inclusive of
the missing funds intended for the withholding taxes on TCT No. 122230. Against Velayo’s bare denial
that she received the said funds, the checks and acknowledgment receipts presented in evidence by
the prosecution incontrovertibly show that she received the entire PhP60 Million. WJA likewise
issued a UCPB manager’s check for the payment of DST for the two properties in the amount of
PhP775,895.00.
Moreover, it was Velayo alone who transacted with WJA and AIMS in behalf of ARDC. It was
to her that all the above checks were handed in payment for the lots, and she alone opened a deposit
account with UCPB, although in the name of ARDC, where she deposited all the check payments she
received from WJA. Then, only her signature is in the UCPB signature cards, and thus she alone was
the sole authorized signatory for the said account. There is then no doubt that Velayo had sole
possession and control of the missing funds intended for payment of the capital gains and DSTs.
2. NO, Velayo has juridical possession over the subject funds and could therefore be held
liable for the crime of estafa.
That Velayo also had juridical possession of the said amount will become readily apparent as
the Court comes to understand that it was her offer of help in remitting the taxes to BIR which
induced WJA to not withhold the now-missing amounts but instead to entrust the same to her, upon
the understanding that she has to pay the same to BIR in its behalf. It was an obligation which Velayo
assumed personally and not on behalf of ARDC; ARDC itself did not have such a duty, notwithstanding
that the checks were deposited in ARDC’s account. Indeed, Velayo did not require a prior authority
from ARDC to volunteer for the aforesaid task, and WJA fully relied on Velayo’s assurance that she
could withdraw and remit the funds to the BIR, because all throughout the transaction she acted with
full freedom and discretion as regards the funds in the account of ARDC. Without a doubt, a trust
relationship was established between WJA and Velayo in her personal capacity, not in behalf of or
representing ARDC, over the funds she offered to remit to BIR.
First, Velayo is not a mere bank teller or bank employee with only a material possession of
the missing funds, she was a Director and Corporate Secretary of ARDC, and she exercised sole and
Page 478 of 519
complete control over the funds of the company; second, Velayo is not being sued by ARDC for
misappropriating the missing funds, but by WJA, who entrusted the same to her in her personal
capacity because of her assurance that she would remit the same to the BIR; third, in Chua-Burce, the
money deposited was intended for the depository bank, which acquired juridical possession, even
ownership, thereof, whereas here, although the checks for the withholding taxes were deposited in
the account of ARDC, Velayo and WJA were fully aware that Velayo not only had sole material
possession, but the missing funds were personally entrusted to her, not to ARDC. ARDC had no
obligation to receive, keep or remit them in behalf of WJA, only Velayo.
As the CA noted, the clear intention of the parties was for Velayo herself, not ARDC, to exercise
juridical possession over the missing funds. Stated otherwise, Velayo did not receive the same in
behalf of ARDC, but received it for herself, through her own representations. WJA had no obligation
to pay to ARDC the withholding tax; its obligation was to pay the same to the BIR itself. It was only
due to Velayo’s own representations that she was able to get hold of the money. Thus, while in Chua-
Burce, as in People v. Locson, money was received by the bank teller in the ordinary course of duty in
behalf of the bank, in the instant case ARDC had nothing to do with the arrangement between Abuid
and Velayo as to the remittance of the withholding taxes to BIR. Through her own representation,
Velayo was able to get hold of the funds, then she absconded with it. She acted on her own without
sanction from ARDC, and she cannot now be allowed to escape criminal liability for her breach of
trust. True, she was ARDC’s representative in the principal transaction, but this does not shield her
from criminal liability because it was her voluntary unilateral act which caused injury to WJA.
To reiterate then, it is well-settled that when the money, goods, or any other personal
property is received by the offender from the offended party in trust or on commission or for
administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession
of the thing received.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PALMY TIBAYAN AND RICO Z. PUERTO

G.R. Nos. 209655-60, January 14, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The elements of syndicated estafa are: (a) estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in Arts.
315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a syndi-cate of five
(5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, “samahang nayon(s),” or farmers’ associations,
or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICI’s modus operandi of inducing the
public to invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would be returned with a very high
monthly interest rate ranging from three to five and a half percent (3%-5.5%). Under such lucrative
promise, the investing public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI. However, as the
directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start that TGICI is operating without any paid-up
capital and has no clear trade by which it can pay the assured profits to its investors, they cannot comply
with their guarantee and had to simply abscond with their investors’ money. Thus, the CA correctly held
that accused-appellants, along with the other accused who are still at large, used TGICI to engage in a
Ponzi scheme, resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI investors.
Page 479 of 519

Facts:
Tibayan Group Investment Company, Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end investment company

registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Sometime in 2002, the SEC
conducted an investigation on TGICI and its subsidiaries. In the course thereof, it discovered that
TGICI was selling securities to the public without a registration statement in violation of R.A. No. 8799
or otherwise known as The Securities Regulation Code and that TGICI submitted a fraudulent
Treasurer’s Affidavit before the SEC. Resultantly, SEC revoked TGICI’s corporate registration for
being fraudulently procured.
The foregoing led to the filing of multiple criminal cases for syndicated estafa against the
incorporators and directors of TGICI including herein accused-appellants, who were then arres-ted
thru lawful warrants of arrest, while the others remained at large.
The prosecution was able to present several investors who were deceived by the illicit
schemes of TGICI. These investors after parting with their monies were given by TGICI checks
representing their respective ROI but the same bounced upon presentment. Accused-appellants
denied having conspired with the other TGICI incorporators and interposed the defense that their
signatures appearing on the company’s SEC documents were forged.
After due trial, the RTC rendered a judgment finding the accused-appellants only liable for simple
estafa. The CA, on appeal, held that there were sufficient evidenced adduced showing that TGICI and
its subsidiaries were engaged in a Ponzi scheme which relied on subsequent investors to pay its
earlier investors and is what PD 1689 precisely aims to punish. It further ruled that the accused-
appellants should be convicted for syndicated estafa.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of syndicated estafa.
Ruling:
YES, there are no cogent reasons propounded thru the instant appeal warranting the acquittal
of the accused-appellants.
Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC provides:
“Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxxx xxxx
“2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,

qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions; or by means of
other similar deceits.
Page 480 of 519
xxxx xxxx
The elements of estafa by means of deceit under this provision are the following: (a) that
there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, quali-fications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or
fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means
and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended
party suffered damage.41
In relation thereto, Sec. 1 of PD 1689 defines syndicated estafa as follows:
“Sec. 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as
defined in Arts. 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by
life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting
of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of
moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, “samahang
nayon(s),” or farmers’ associations, or funds solicited by corporations/associations from
the general public.
Thus, the elements of syndicated estafa are: (a) estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined
in Arts. 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate
of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, “samahang nayon(s),” or
farmers’ associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICI’s modus operandi of inducing the
public to invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would be returned with a very high
monthly interest rate ranging from three to five and a half percent (3%-5.5%). Under such lucrative
promise, the investing public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI. However, as the
directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start that TGICI is operating without any paid-up
capital and has no clear trade by which it can pay the assured profits to its investors, they cannot
comply with their guarantee and had to simply abscond with their investors’ money. Thus, the CA
correctly held that accused-appellants, along with the other accused who are still at large, used TGICI
to engage in a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the defrau-dation of the TGICI investors.
To be sure, a Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of
purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its organizers often
solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns
with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators focus on attracting new money to make
promised payments to earlier-stage investors to create the false appea-rance that investors are
profiting from a legitimate business. It is not an investment strategy but a gullibility scheme, which
works only as long as there is an ever increasing number of new investors joining the scheme.46 It is
difficult to sustain the scheme over a long period of time because the operator needs an ever larger
pool of later investors to continue paying the promised profits to early investors. The idea behind
this type of swindle is that the “con-man” collects his money from his second or third round of
Page 481 of 519

investors and then absconds before anyone else shows up to collect. Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only
last weeks, or months at the most.
In this light, it is clear that all the elements of syndicated estafa, committed through a Ponzi
scheme, are present in this case, considering that:
a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising more than five (5) people, including
herein accused-appellants, made false pretenses and representations to the investing
public -in this case, the private complainants -regarding a supposed lucrative investment
opportunity with TGICI in order to solicit money from them;
b) the said false pretenses and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with
the commission of fraud;
c) relying on the same, private complainants invested their hard earned money into TGICI;
and
d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with the private
complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice. Corollary thereto, the CA
correctly upgraded accused-appellants' conviction from simple estafa to syndic-cated
estafa. In a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review. Issues
whether raised or not by the parties may be resolved by the appellate court. Hence,
accused-appellants' appeal conferred upon the appellate court full jurisdiction and
rendered it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The elements of estafa under this Art. 315 of RPC are: (a) the offender's receipt of money, goods,
or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by
the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the offended
party that the offender return the money or property received.
It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is

considered to be only in the material possession of the employee. The material possession of an employee
is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession of the employer.
In this case, Benabaye maintains that the first element of estafa through misappropriation has
not been established, insisting that her possession of the collected loan payments was merely material
and not juridical; therefore, she cannot be convicted of the said crime. The Court agrees. Records show
that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from Siam Bank's clients. At the end of every
banking day, she was required to remit all cash payments received together with the corresponding cash
transfer slips to her supervisor, Tupag. As such, the money merely passes into her hands and she takes
custody thereof only for the duration of the banking day. Hence, as an employee of Siam Bank,
specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank teller, she had no juridical
possession over the missing funds but only their physical or material possession.
Page 482 of 519

Facts:
Petitioner Cherry Ann Benabaye (Benabaye) was the Loans Bookkeeper of Siam Bank Inc.,
Iligan City Branch (Siam Bank). As such, she was authorized to collect and/or accept loan payments
of Siam Bank's clients and issue provisional receipts therefor, accomplish a cash transfer slip at the
end of each banking day detailing the amounts of money that she has received, and remit such
payments to Jenkin U. Tupag (Tupag), her supervisor.
Sometime in 2001, Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation of its loan transactions for the
period December 1, 2000 to June 15, 2001, and thereby found out that fraud and certain irregu-
larities attended the same. Specifically, it discovered the non-remittance of some loan payments
received from its clients based on the provisional receipts issued by its account officers, as well as
the daily collection reports corresponding to the said provisional receipts. Based on the audit, 853
provisional receipts in the aggregate amount of P470,768.00 were issued by Benabaye but were
unreported, and, more significantly, the corresponding payments were unremitted based on the daily
collection reports on file.
Siam Bank directed Benabaye to explain, among others, the discrepancies between the
provisional receipts she had issued and the unremitted money involved. Likewise, Siam Bank made
a final demand upon her to return the amount of the money involved. In her written explanation,
Benabaye claimed, among others, that the discrepancies could be clarified by her supervisor, Tupag,
to whom she had submitted her daily cash transfer slips together with the corresponding provi-sional
receipts.
Meanwhile, Siam Bank also sent a memorandum to Tupag requiring him to explain the same
discrepancies between the provisional receipts and daily collection reports that were submitted to
him; it further demanded the return of the amount involved. In his written explanation, Tupag
admitted his accountability and, while claiming that some of his co-employees were privy to the acts
which resulted in the discrepancies, he did not disclose their identities.
Apparently dissatisfied with their explanations, Siam Bank terminated the employment of
both Benabaye and Tupag and subsequently filed a criminal case for estafa before the RTC of Iligan
City against them. The RTC found both Benabaye and Tupag guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b) as all the elements of the crime charged have been established.
The CA affirmed Benabaye's conviction in toto, ruling that Benabaye, together with Tupag,
held the money collected in trust for Siam Bank. Likewise, the CA found that while there were 853
unremitted provisional receipts involved in this case, Benabaye's “continuing intention to
commit estafa constituted a single intention although committed on different dates.” Thus, her crime
was a “continuing offense” as all the acts of misappropriation were part of a “single criminal design”
by the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining Petitioner Benabaye's conviction for the crime
of estafa through misappropriation.
Page 483 of 519

Ruling:
NO, the conviction must be reversed.
Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, as amended, under which Benabaye was charged and pro-
secuted, states:
“Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any means
mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
“1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
“xxx (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or

any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.”
The elements of estafa under this provision are: (a) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or
other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion
by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c)
the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the
offended party that the offender return the money or property received.
Under the first element, when the money, goods, or any other personal property is received
by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration,
the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing
received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing
which the transferee may set up even against the owner
It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is

considered to be only in the material possession of the employee. The material possession of an
employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession of the
employer. So long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee
-perpetrator, the offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise. Hence, the
conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having mere material possession of the
said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical
possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes estafa.
Page 484 of 519
In this case, Benabaye maintains that the first element of estafa through misappropriation
has not been established, insisting that her possession of the collected loan payments was merely
material and not juridical; therefore, she cannot be convicted of the said crime. The Court agrees.
Records show that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from Siam Bank's
clients. At the end of every banking day, she was required to remit all cash payments received
together with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her supervisor, Tupag. As such, the money
merely passes into her hands and she takes custody thereof only for the duration of the banking day.
Hence, as an employee of Siam Bank, specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin
to a bank teller, she had no juridical possession over the missing funds but only their physical or
material possession.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 163662, February 25, 2015, J. Bersamin
The estafa charged in the information may be committed, therefore, when: (1) the offender has
post-dated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or
issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank,
or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; (3) the payee has been
defrauded. The deceit here should be the efficient cause of the defraudation, and should either be prior
to, or simultaneously with, the act of the fraud.
All the elements of estafa were present in this case. The first element was admitted by
Villanueva, who confirmed that she had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she
had purchased. There is no question that Madarang accepted the checks upon the assurance
of Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment. It is clear that Madarang would not have
parted with and entrusted the pieces of valuable jewelry to Villanueva whom she barely knew unless
Villanueva gave such assurance to her. The second element was likewise established because the checks
were dishonored upon presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because the account was already
closed. The third element was also proved by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her
failure to collect from Villanueva the balance of PhP995,000.00.
Facts:
According to the prosecution, on August 1994, Loreto Madarang met Julie Villanueva through
a townmate and the latter was interested in buying jewelry. Being then engaged in the business of
selling jewelry, Madarang went to Villanueva’s residence at Galeria de Magallanes, and was able to
sell to Villanueva five sets of jewelry worth PhP1,010,000.00.Villanueva made out nine checks drawn
against PNB, eight of which were post-dated. Villanueva signed a receipt with a total of PhP1,010,000.
Madarang receive the checks because of Villanueva’s assurance that they would all be honored upon
presentment. However, the drawee bank paid only PNB Check No. 031501 and PNB Check No.
131531, the remaining seven checks being dishonored either by reason of “Account Closed” or “Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds.” Madarang tried to call and see Villanueva at her residence to inform her
of the dishonored checks, but Madarang was barred by security guards from reaching Villanueva and
then resorted to demand letters, but efforts to contact Villanueva proved futile. After Villanueva did
not settle her obligations, Madarang brought the criminal complaint for estafa and the corresponding
Information for estafa was ultimately filed in court.
Page 485 of 519
Villanueva denied the accusation. She claimed that she met Madarang on three times. The
first was at the residence of a certain Cheng Diaz Davis, where Madarang was selling jewelry. The
second time was at her residence in Galeria de Magallanes where Madarang arrived without prior
notice at around 7:00 or 7:30 in the evening. Madarang was persistent that Villanueva buy jewelry
on credit, and even assured Villanueva that she could replace the same if she was dissatisfied with
her purchase. Madarang prevailed on Villanueva to buy six pieces of jewelry, for which she issued
6 checks as payment, five of which were post-dated. On August 16, 1994, Villanueva saw Madarang
for the last time to have the jewelry replaced. Villanueva retrieved the checks she had previously
issued and replaced them with another set of post-dated checks that were the subject of the criminal
case against her. Villanueva maintained that the second set of checks was issued as guarantee under
the agreement that they were not to be deposited until Villanueva advised Madarang of the
sufficiency of funds in her account. Villanueva insisted that she did not received any notice from
Madarang regarding the dishonor of the checks
RTC rendered its judgment finding Villanueva guilty as charged of the crime of estafa as
punished under Art. 315 par. 2(d) of the RPC in relation to PD No. 818. As a consequence of this
judgment, accused shall suffer the penalty of punishment for a period of fourteen years eight months
and one day to twenty years which is within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but differed on the application of the ISLAW, to wit:
“Nonetheless, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the trial court, which is 14 years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, both of reclusion temporal, is erroneous.”
Issue:
Whether or not Villanueva is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa.
Ruling:
YES, Villanueva is guilty of the crime of estafa.
Art. 315, paragraph 2(d), of RPC provides:
“Art. 315. Swindling (estafa) – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned herein below:
“2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
“(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the

offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover
the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank
and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of
funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.”
Page 486 of 519

The estafa charged in the information may be committed, therefore, when: (1) the offender
has post-dated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating
or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the
bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; (3) the payee has
been defrauded. The deceit here should be the efficient cause of the defraudation, and should either
be prior to, or simultaneously with, the act of the fraud.
All the elements of estafa were present. The first element was admitted by Villanueva, who
confirmed that she had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had purchased.
There is no question that Madarang accepted the checks upon the assurance of Villanueva that they
would be funded upon presentment. It is clear that Madarang would not have parted with and
entrusted the pieces of valuable jewelry to Villanueva whom she barely knew unless Villanueva gave
such assurance to her. The second element was likewise established because the checks were
dishonored upon presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because the account was already
closed. The third element was also proved by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her
failure to collect from Villanueva the balance of PhP995,000.00.
In her defense, Villanueva adverts to an agreement with Madarang whereby the latter would
deposit or encash the checks only after being informed of the sufficiency of funds in Villanueva’s
account. Villanueva posits that the receipt Prosecution presented in evidence did not embody such
agreement. Villanueva does not impress. Her defense crumbles because she did not present proof of
the supposed agreement. The receipt signed by her proved the transaction and her issuance of the
post-dated checks by listing the items bought and the post-dated checks issued as payment.
The Court simply cannot accept that Villanueva signed the receipt despite not including the
supposed agreement that would shield her from probable criminal prosecution. In that regard, her
being a businesswoman presumably made her aware of the consequences of issuing unfunded
checks.
Under [Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, as amended by P.D 818], the penalty for estafa when the
total value of the checks exceed P22,000.00 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period (i.e., 17
years, four months and one day to 20 years), plus one year for each additional P10,000. Applying
the ISLAW, the minimum term shall be from six years and one day to 12 years of prison mayor. In
imposing the indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of prison mayor, as minimum, to
thirty years of reclusion perpetua as maximum, the CA correctly applied the ISLAW. It is well to state
that reclusion perpetua merely describes in this instance the penalty actually imposed on account of
the amount of the fraud involved.
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW
NARI K. GIDWANI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 195064, January 15, 2014
C.J. Sereno
The elements of a violation of B.P. 22 are the following: (1) making, drawing and issuing any check to
apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
Page 487 of 519

upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The SEC Order also created a suspensive condition. When a contract is subject to a suspensive
condition, its birth takes place or its effectivity commences only if and when the event that constitutes
the condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, at the time private respondent presented the September
and October 1997 checks for encashment, it had no right to do so, as there was yet no obligation due
from petitioner.
Moreover, it is a basic principle in criminal law that any ambiguity in the interpretation or application
of the law must be made in favor of the accused. Surely, our laws should not be interpreted in such a
way that the interpretation would result in the disobedience of a lawful order of an authority vested
by law with the jurisdiction to issue the order.
Facts:
On various dates from June 1997 to December 1997 GCMC issued a total of 10 BDO checks as
payment for El Grande’s services worth an aggregate total of ₱1,626,707.62. Upon presentment,
these checks were dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account. Thus, El Grande,
through counsel, sent three demand letters regarding 8 of the 10 issued checks.
On 15 October 1997, petitioner wrote to El Grande’s counsel acknowledging receipt of the demand
letter and informing the latter that the SEC issued an Order on 3 September 1997 ordering the
suspension of all actions, claims, and proceedings against GSMC until further order from the SEC
Hearing Panel. Despite its receipt on 16 October 1997 of GSMC’s letter and explanation, El Grande
still presented the two remaining checks to the drawee bank for payment.
El Grande, thereafter, filed a complaint charging petitioner with ten counts of violation of B.P. 22
where MTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten counts of
violation of B.P. 22 and ordered him to pay the face value of the checks plus interest. The RTC
affirmed the ruling of the MTC, but the CA rendered a decision acquitting petitioner of eight counts
of violation of B.P. 22, while sustaining his conviction for the two remaining counts and ordering
him to pay the total civil liability due to El Grande. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is guilty of a violation of B.P. 22
Ruling:
The elements of a violation of B.P. 22 are the following: (1) making, drawing and issuing any check
to apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Page 488 of 519
In convicting petitioner of two counts of violation of B.P. 22, the CA applied Tiong v. Co, but the
CA failed to consider that the facts of Tiong are not on all fours with those of the present case and
must be put in the proper context. In Tiong, the presentment for payment and the dishonor of the
checks took place before the Petition for Suspension of Payments for Rehabilitation Purposes was
filed with the SEC. There was already an obligation to pay the amount covered by the checks. The
criminal action for the violations of B.P. 22 was filed for failure to meet this obligation. The criminal
proceedings were already underway when the SEC issued an Omnibus Order creating a
Management Committee and consequently suspending all actions for claims against the debtor
therein. Thus, in Tiong, this Court took pains to differentiate the criminal action, the civil liability
and the administrative proceedings involved.
In contrast, it is clear that prior to the presentment for payment and the subsequent demand letters
to petitioner, there was already a lawful Order from the SEC suspending all payments of claims. It
was incumbent on him to follow that SEC Order. He was able to sufficiently establish that the
accounts were closed pursuant to the Order, without which a different set of circumstances might
have dictated his liability for those checks.
Considering that there was a lawful Order from the SEC, the contract is deemed suspended. When
a contract is suspended, it temporarily ceases to be operative; and it again becomes operative when
a condition occurs – or a situation arises – warranting the termination of the suspension of the
contract.
In other words, the SEC Order also created a suspensive condition. When a contract is subject to a
suspensive condition, its birth takes place or its effectivity commences only if and when the event
that constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, at the time private respondent
presented the September and October 1997 checks for encashment, it had no right to do so, as there
was yet no obligation due from petitioner.
Moreover, it is a basic principle in criminal law that any ambiguity in the interpretation or
application of the law must be made in favor of the accused. Surely, our laws should not be
interpreted in such a way that the interpretation would result in the disobedience of a lawful order
of an authority vested by law with the jurisdiction to issue the order.
Consequently, because there was a suspension of GSMC s obligations, petitioner may not be held
liable for the civil obligations of the corporation covered by the bank checks at the time this case
arose. However, it must be emphasized that her non-liability should not prejudice the right of El
Grande to pursue its claim through remedies available to it, subject to the SEC proceedings
regarding the application for corporate rehabilitation.
MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FIRST WOMEN’S CREDIT
CORPORATION
The Court, however, considers Campos' defense that she exerted efforts to reach an amicable
settlement with her creditor after the checks which she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank.
Campos categorically declared in her petition that, “she has in her favor evidence to show that she was
in good faith and indeed made arrangements for the payment of her obligations subsequently after the
Page 489 of 519
dishonor of the checks.” Clearly, this statement was a confirmation that she actually received the
required notice of dishonor from FWCC. Campos would not have entered into the alleged arrangements
beginning January 1996 until May 1998 if she had not received a notice of dishonor from her creditor,
and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks.
Facts:
On March 17, 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent First
Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of P80,000.00 and issued several post-dated
checks to cover the agreed installment payments. However, the checks were dishonored when
presented for payment and was declared to be drawn against a closed account.
Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC despite demand. She was
charged before the MeTC with violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and was tried in absentia. She was found guilty
of the said offense by the MeTC. Aggrieved, Campos appealed to the RTC which upheld Campos’
conviction. In affirming the RTC, the CA rejects the contention of Campos that she was not notified by
FWCC of the subsequent dishonor of the checks.
Issue:
Whether or not lack of notice of dishonor on the part of Campos constitutes good faith.
Ruling:
No, the contention of Campos is untenable.
To be liable for violation of [B.P. Blg. 22], the following essential elements must be present:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3)
the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by
Campos through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written demand letter
from FWCC, the entity in whose favor the dishonored checks were issued. In a line of cases, the Court
has emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor, although not as an
element of the offense, but as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of insufficiency
of funds when he issued the check and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the second element of
the offense and Sec. 2 of B.P. Blg. 22. Considering that the second element involves a state of mind
which is difficult to establish, Sec. 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency
of funds, as it reads:
‘Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing, and issuance
of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank, when presented within ninety days from the date of the check,
shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless
such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
Page 490 of 519
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.”
The Court has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation of registry return receipts
that cover registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written notices of dishonor had been
sent to or served on issuers of checks. The authentication by affidavit of the mailers was necessary in
order for service by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of notices of dishonor
and to predicate the existence of the second element of the offense.
In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers Campos'
defense that she exerted efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the checks
which she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank. Campos categorically declared in her petition
that, “[she] has in her favor evidence to show that she was in good faith and indeed made arrangements
for the payment of her obligations subsequently after the dishonor of the checks.” Clearly, this statement
was a confirmation that she actually received the required notice of dishonor from FWCC. Campos
would not have entered into the alleged arrangements beginning January 1996 until May 1998 if she
had not received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of
her funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks.
ARIEL T. LIM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Lim questions the decision of the CA finding him guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 despite the fact
that he had already paid the amount of the dishonored checks even before the informations against him
were filed in court. Ruling in favor of Lim, the Court ruled that although generally, only the full payment
of the value of the dishonored check during the five-day grace period would exculpate the accused from
criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 the Court acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases where,
even if all the elements of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of the accused would prove to
be abhorrent to society's sense of justice. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection of
the credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who have
evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even before charges have
been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the informations has
already attained the purpose of the law.
Facts:
In 1998, Petitioner Lim issued two Bank of Commerce checks, both payable to cash, in the
amount of PhP100,000 each. The checks were given to Mr. Willie Castor as his campaign donation to
the latter’s candidacy. Thereafter, Castor ordered the delivery of printing materials and used the
checks of Lim to pay the same. However, since the printing materials were delivered too late, Castor
instructed Lim to issue a “stop payment” order for the two checks. Thus, the checks were disho-nored
by the bank when the same was presented to it. The bank officer, who was presented on the witness
stand, likewise admitted that the said checks were drawn against insufficient funds. Subsequently,
Private Complainant Magna Badiee sent two demand letters to Lim and likewise filed a complaint
against her for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. After the lapse of more than one month from receipt of the
demand letters, and after receiving the subpoena from the OCP, Lim issued a replace-ment check
dated September 8, 1998 in the amount of PhP200, 000. Private Complainant Badiee was able to
encash the said replacement check.
Page 491 of 519
Nevertheless, six months after Lim had paid the amount of the bounced checks, two infor-
mations, were filed against him before the trial court which later rendered a decision finding Lim
guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Both the RTC and CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not Lim is still liable despite the fact that he had already paid the amount of the
dishonored checks even before the informations against him were filed in court.
Ruling:
No.
In the case of Tan vs. Philippine Commercial International Bank, the principle articulated in
the case of Griffith vs. Cawas the precedent cited to justify the acquittal of the accused in said case.
Therein, the Court enumerated the elements for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 being “(1) The accused makes,
draws or issues a check to apply to account or for value; (2) The accused knows at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.” To facilitate proving the
second element, the law created a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insuffi-ciency of funds
or credit, which is established when it is shown that the drawer of the check was notified of its
dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to fully pay the amount of the check or make
arrangements for its full payment. If the check, however, is made good or the drawer pays the value
of the check within the five-day period, then the presumption is rebutted. Evidently, one of the
essential elements of the violation is no longer present and the drawer may no longer be indicted...
Said payment within the period prescribed by the law is a complete defense.
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during the five-day grace
period would exculpate the accused from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 but, as the Court further
elaborated in Tan:
In Griffith vs. CA, the Court held that were the creditor had collected more than a sufficient
amount to cover the value of the checks representing rental arrearages, holding the debtor's
president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22 two years after the said collection is no
longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.
In that case, the Court ruled that albeit made beyond the grace period but two years prior to
the institution of the criminal case, the payment collected from the proceeds of the foreclosure and
auction sale of the petitioner's impounded properties, with more than a million pesos to spare,
justified the acquittal of the petitioner.
In the present case, PCIB already extracted its proverbial pound of flesh by receiving and
keeping in possession the four buses – trust properties surrendered by Lim in about mid 1991 and
March 1992 pursuant to Sec. 7 of the Trust Receipts Law, the estimated value of which was “about
PhP6.6 million.” It thus appears that the total amount of the dishonored checks – P1,785, 855.75 – xxx
Page 492 of 519
was more than fully satisfied prior to the transmittal and receipt of the July 9, 1992 letter of demand.
In keeping with jurisprudence, the Court then considers such payment of the dishonored checks to
have obliterated the criminal liability of Lim.
Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day period
provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the aforementioned
cases show that the Court acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all the
elements of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of the accused would prove to be
abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like in Griffith and in Tan, Lim should not be penalized
although all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to be present. The fact that the issuer
of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check after having received the subpoena
from the Office of the Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing of the Information in court. The
spirit of the law which, for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection of the credibility and stability of the banking
system, would not be served by penalizing people who have evidently made amends for their
mistakes and made restitution for damages even before charges have been filed against them. In
effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the informations has already attained the
purpose of the law.
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the
information has been filed in court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused from
possible conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Since from the commencement of the criminal
proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had every
intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill-effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then
there is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of
the law should be applied to its full extent.
Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be well differen-
tiated from cases where the accused is charged with estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the [RPC],
where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an oblige-tion
when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check. In said case of estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements
of the offense, and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying
the value of the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely
satisfy the civil liability of the crime but not the criminal liability.
In fine, the Court holds that Lim must be exonerated from the imposition of penalties for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as he had already paid the amount of the dishonored checks six (6) months
before the filing of informations with the court. Such a course of action is more in keeping with justice
and equity.
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERIC FERNANDEZ y JAURIGUE

G.R. No. 199211, June 4, 2014, J. Brion
Fernandez allegedly recruited several persons for overseas employment in Hongkong. The
persons recruited, for failure to be deployed, instituted a case of illegal recruitment against Fernandez.
The RTC and CA convicted Fernandez. The Supreme Court then ruled that for illegal recruitment in large
Page 493 of 519
scale to prosper, the prosecution has to prove three essential elements, namely: (1) the accused
undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the
Labor Code; (2) the accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the accused committed such illegal activity against three
or more persons individually or as a group.
Facts:
In its February 11, 2008 decision, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 211, Mandaluyong
City, convicted the appellant of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and five (5) counts of
estafa committed against complainants Airene Etac, Jowel A. Baja, Joemar Aquino, Luis M. Bernardo
and Anthony M. Canlas.
The trial court ruled that the appellant represented to the complainants that he had the
power and ability to send them in Hongkong, and that by virtue of this representation and fraud, the
complainants were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.
On appeal, the CA upheld the factual findings of the RTC. It agreed with the trial court that all
the elements of illegal recruitment, as defined under Article 13(b), in relation to Article 34 of the of
the Labor Code, were sufficiently established by the prosecution’s evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the convictions should be affirmed and the penalties prescribed
Ruling:
The decision of the CA is affirmed.
For illegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to prove three essential
elements, namely: (1) the accused undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any
prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused did not have the license or
the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the accused
committed such illegal activity against three or more persons individually or as a group. In the
present case, the appellant promised the five complainants that there were jobs available for them in
Hongkong; and that through his help, they could be deployed for work within a month or two. He
exacted money from them for the plane ticket, hotel accommodation, processing of visa and
placement fees. Notably, the prosecution presented a Certification dated January 10, 2003 issued by
Felicitas Q. Bay, Director II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Licensing Branch,
showing that the appellant had no authority or license to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers. These acts, to our mind, constitute illegal recruitment. There is illegal
recruitment when one who does not possess the necessary authority or license gives the impression
of having the ability to send a worker abroad. Corollarily, where the offense is committed against
three or more persons, as in this case, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale which
provides a higher penalty under Article 39(a) of the Labor Code.
We point out that conviction under the Labor Code for illegal recruitment does not preclude
punishment under the Revised Penal Code for the crime of estafa. We are convinced that the
Page 494 of 519
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant violated Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, which provides that estafa is committed by any person who defrauds
another by using a fictitious name; or by falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business; by imaginary transactions or similar forms of deceit
executed prior to or simultaneous with the fraud.
The maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum is not prision mayor minimum as apparently assumed by the RTC. To compute the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed
to form one period in accordance with Article 65 of the RPC. Following this procedure, the maximum
period of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and
21 days to 8 years. The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court.
In computing the incremental penalty, jurisprudence tells us that the amount defrauded
should be subtracted by P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction
of a year shall be discarded.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MILDRED SALVATIERRA y MATUCO

G.R. No. 200884, June 4, 2014, J. Peralta
The appellant assails the decision of the CA finding guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale. Affirming the decision of the CA the SC ruled that Illegal recruitment is deemed committed
in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. It is necessary
that the prosecution prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the offender undertakes any
of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13 (b) of the labor
Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code (now Section 6
of RA 8042) and (2) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. In the case of illegal recruitment in large
scale, a third element is added: that the offender commits any of the acts of recruitment and placement
against three or more persons, individually or as a group. In this case, appellant engaged in recruitment
when she represented herself to be capable of deploying workers to South Korea upon submission of the
pertinent documents and payment of the required fees. It is also clear from the evidence presented that
the crime of illegal recruitment was committed by against against five persons.
Facts:
Appellant Mildred was charged of having committed Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale in
violation of Sec. 6 of RA 8042 also known as The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
and of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315(a) of the RPC. She allegedly represented herself as having
the capacity to deploy workers to South Korea upon submission of certain documents and upon
payment of the required fees. Believing on such representation, the victims parted with their money
and waited for Mildred’s instructions. Upon receipt of the initial payments made by the victims,
Mildred issued either receipts or petty cash vouchers. After which, Mildred stopped seeing them and
failed to deploy them. Thereafter, Mildred yet demanded additional placement fee and made
instructions to meet them at Greenwich Restaurant in Shaw Blvd. in Mandaluyong City. However,
prior to said meeting, the victims went to the NBI to complain about Mildred’s activities. They
Page 495 of 519
likewise informed the NBI of their scheduled meeting with Mildred, hence, the plan for entrapment
operation where Mildred was arrested. Upon her arrest, the NBI agents took from her the marked
money.
Upon arraignment, Mildred pleaded" not guilty" to all the charges. Trial on the merits ensued.
Mildred denied having transacted with the victims. She likewise claimed the she herself was an
applicant and a victim of Llanesa Consultancy. As to the receipts and petty cash vouchers, she
admitted having signed them but only upon instructions of a certain Susan Carillo.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision finding Mildred guilty of all the charges filed against
her. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification by increasing the fine
imposed on the illegal recruitment case to P 500, 000. Hence, the present appeal.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Appellant Mildred is guilty of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.
2. Whether or not the Appellant Mildred is guilty of the crime of Estafa.
3. Whether or not the penalties imposed are correct.
Ruling:
1. Yes, appellant Mildred is guilty of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.
The crime of illegal recruitment is defined and penalized under Sections 6 and 7 of RA 8042,
or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, to wit:
SEC. 6. Definition. – For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or
not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13
(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines:
Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the
following acts, x x x:
xxxx
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)
or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale
if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and
accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their
business shall be liable.
Page 496 of 519

It is necessary that the prosecution prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the
offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under
Article 13 (b) of the labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the
Labor Code (now Section 6 of RA 8042) and (2) the offender has no valid license or authority required
by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. In the case of illegal
recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the offender commits any of the acts of
recruitment and placement against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
In this case, Mildred engaged in recruitment when she represented herself to be capable of
deploying workers to South Korea upon submission of the pertinent documents and payment of the
required fees. As Mildred claimed to be the liaison officer of Llanesa Consultancy Services, the victims
believed that she indeed had the capability to deploy them abroad. All the witnesses and the
supposed victims identified Mildred as the one who made such representation and received the
payments they made evidenced by the petty cash vouchers and receipts she signed. Moreover,
Mildred was caught in an entrapment operation when she received the amount demanded allegedly
as additional requirement before they can be deployed abroad. It was, likewise, certified to by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Licensing Division that neither Mildred nor Llanesa
Consultancy Services were licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. It is also clear from
the evidence presented that the crime of illegal recruitment was committed by Mildred against five
persons.
2. Yes, Mildred committed the crime of Estafa.
The Court likewise agrees with the appellate court that Mildred may also be held liable for
estafa. The very same evidence proving Mildred’s criminal liability for illegal recruitment also
established her criminal liability for estafa. The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.
In this case, as testified to by the victims/witnesses, Mildred defrauded the victims by making
them believe that she has the capacity to deploy them to South Korea as workers, even as she did not
have the authority or license for the purpose. Because of this enticement, the victims parted with
their money in varying amounts as placement fees to Mildred. Consequently, the victims suffered
damages as the promised employment abroad never materialized and the money they parted were
never recovered.
3. Yes. As the crime was committed in large scale, it is an offense involving economic sabotage
and is punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of not less than P500,000.00 nor more
than P1,000,000.00. The CA thus aptly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of P500,000.00.
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the RPC, is prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor minimum, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not
exceed P22,000.00. If the amount exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additionalP10,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not
exceed 20 years.
Page 497 of 519

As the amounts defrauded exceeded P22,000.00, the penalty shall be imposed in its
maximum period which is 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC, or anywhere within prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. Clearly, the
modification made by the CA on the RTC computation of the minimum term is improper. The
minimum term imposed which is 6 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision mayor is way above the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC. Although the minimum term imposed
by the RTC which is 4 years is within the range, we further modify the same and make it 4 years and
2 months in all the cases.
The maximum term, on the other hand, shall be that which could be properly imposed under
the rules of the RPC, which in this case shall be 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. The
incremental penalty, therefore, shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty,
which is anywhere between 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. Thus, in Criminal Case No.
MC05-9048, the amount defrauded is P83,500.00 which is P61,500.00 more than P22,000.00. Six
years shall be added to 6 years, 8 months and 21 days making the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence to 12 years, 8 months and 21 days.
VILMA M. SULIMAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of 3 or more persons

conspiring with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against 3 or more
persons individually or as a group. Both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution has established
that petitioner and her co-accused committed the acts enumerated under the provisions of Section 6 (a),
(1) and (m) of RA 8042 when: (1) they separately charged the private complainants placement fees; (2)
they failed to actually deploy the private complainants without valid reasons, and; (3) they failed to
reimburse the said complainants after such failure to deploy.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following, viz.: (a) that there must be a false
pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made
or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party
relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money
or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. In the instant case, all
the elements are present. It was proven beyond reasonable doubt, that Suliman and her co-accused
misrepresented and falsely pretended that they had the capacity to deploy the private complainants for
employment either in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Canada. It was the misrepresentation and false
pretenses made by petitioner and her co-accused that induced the private complainants to part with
their money. As a result the private complainants suffered damages as the promised employment abroad
never materialized and the various amounts of money they paid were never recovered.
Facts:
In 6 Informations, all dated June 6, 2003, herein petitioner Vilma M. Suliman and one Luz P.
Garcia were charged before the RTC with 2 counts of illegal recruitment under Section 6, paragraphs
Page 498 of 519
(a), (1) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, as well as 4 counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code.
Only petitioner Suliman was brought to trial as her co-accused, Garcia, remained at-large
despite the issuance of a warrant for her arrest.
The six cases were consolidated and the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of illegal recruitment and three (3) counts of estafa.
The CA promulgated its Decision wherein the RTC's decision is affirmed. Petitioner's counsel
received a copy of the CA's Decision on May 26, 2009. However, neither petitioner Suliman nor her
counsel filed a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period for filing the said
motion. Hence, on June 11, 2009, the subject CA Decision became final.
On July 3, 2009, Suliman through her new counsel, filed a Motion to Admit Attached Motion
for Reconsideration praying that the same be admitted in the higher interest of "substantial justice
and due process." Suliman contended that her former counsel committed gross and inexcusable
neglect of his duty as counsel in failing to immediately inform her about his receipt of the CA's
Decision, thereby depriving Suliman of her right to file a motion for reconsideration which is a
violation of her right to due process.
The CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner's Motion to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the CA erred in not admitting the motion for reconsideration of Suliman.
2) Whether or not the CA erred in not holding that Suliman should not be bound by the gross
negligence of his previous atty. in not informing her about his receipt of the decision of the CA adverse
to her or in not filing a motion for reconsideration to protect her rights.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
The Court is not persuaded by Suliman's contention that she should not be bound by her
counsel's gross neglect of duty in not informing her of the adverse decision of the CA. The Court
agrees with the observation of the CA that she is not entirely blameless as she was not vigilant in
monitoring the progress of her case. Evidence of her negligence is the fact that she did not make any
effort to personally follow up her appeal with her counsel. Instead, she merely relied on a certain
Conrad Lucero, the person who referred her to her counsel, regarding updates of her appeal with the
CA. In this respect, the Court's ruling in Bejarasco, Jr. v. People is instructive, to wit:
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel's acts, including even mistakes in the realm
of procedural technique. The rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once retained, holds the implied
authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the
Page 499 of 519
suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the authority
is regarded in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client himself.
A recognized exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel
deprives the client of due process of law. For the exception to apply, the gross negligence should not
be accompanied by the client's own negligence or malice, considering that the client has the duty to
be vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing in this
duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him.
A litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent party leaves
the fate of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the client's duty to be in contact with his
lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of the process and developments of his case; hence,
to merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not
enough.
It is a settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process;
it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provision of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply
with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. Deviations from the Rules cannot be tolerated.
The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to
facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. Their observance cannot be left to the whims and
caprices of appellants. In the instant case, petitioner remained obstinate in her non-observance of
the said Rules. Such obstinacy is incongruous with her late plea for liberality in construing the Rules.
On the above basis alone, the Court finds that the instant petition is dismissible.
Even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition, as it appears that petitioner
assails not only the denial by the CA of her motion to admit her belated Motion for Reconsideration
but likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for illegal recruitment and estafa, the Court still finds
no cogent reason to depart from the assailed ruling of the CA. After a thorough review of the evidence
on record, the Court finds that the lower courts did not commit any error in convicting petitioner of
the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa.
It bears reiterating that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the factual findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally held binding
and conclusive on the Court. We emphasize that while jurisprudence has provided exceptions to this
rule, the petitioner carries the burden of proving that one or more exceptional circumstances are
present in the case.
In the instant case, the Court finds that none of the exceptions are present . Thus, there is no
cogent reason to depart from the findings of both the RTC and the CA that petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The crime of illegal recruitment is defined under Section 6 of RA 8042, otherwise known as
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, which provides as follows:
Sec. 6. DEFINITIONS. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes referring,
contact services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when
Page 500 of 519
undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of

Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Provided, that such non-license or non-holder, who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the
following acts, whether committed by any persons, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or
holder of authority.
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the schedule
of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any
amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or
employment;
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of
misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in order to
offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from oppressive terms and
conditions of employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any persons or entity not to employ any worker who has not
applied for employment through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment of placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or morality
or to dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or by
his duly authorized representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittances of foreign
exchange earnings, separations from jobs, departures and such other matters or information as may
be required by the Secretary of Labor and Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and verified
by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties
up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department
of Labor and Employment;
(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or member of
the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly or indirectly in the
management of a travel agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for monetary or
financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing
rules and regulations;
Page 501 of 519

(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as determined by the Department of Labor and
Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation
and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take
place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered as offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories.
In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business
shall be liable.
Both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution has established that petitioner and her
co-accused committed the acts enumerated under the provisions of Section 6 (a), (1) and (m) of RA
8042 when: (1) they separately charged the private complainants the amounts of P132,460.00,
P120,000.00 and P21,400.00 as placement fees; (2) they failed to actually deploy the private
complainants without valid reasons, and; (3) they failed to reimburse the said complainants after
such failure to deploy.
As to the charge of estafa, the act complained of in the instant case is penalized under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, wherein estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud another
by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud. It is committed by using fictitious name, or by pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other
similar deceits. The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following, viz.: (a) that there must
be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent
representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was
induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage.
In the instant case, all the elements are present. It was proven beyond reasonable doubt, as
found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, that Suliman and her co-accused misrepresented and falsely
pretended that they had the capacity to deploy the private complainants for employment either in
South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Canada. The misrepresentation was made prior to private
complainants' payment of placement fees. It was the misrepresentation and false pretenses made by
petitioner and her co-accused that induced the private complainants to part with their money. As a
result of such false pretenses and misrepresentations, the private complainants suffered damages as
the promised employment abroad never materialized and the various amounts of money they paid
were never recovered.
Suliman argues that she could not be held liable because she was not privy nor was she aware
of the recruitment activities done by her co-accused. Petitioner avers that when her co-accused
Page 502 of 519
received several amounts of money from the private complainants, she acted in her personal capacity
and for her own benefit without the knowledge and consent of petitioner.
The Court is not persuaded. As owner and general manager, Suliman was at the forefront of
the recruitment activities of Suliman International. She has control, management or direction of the
business. Her denial is an intrinsically weak defense, especially in the face of positive assertions made
by the private complainants who had no ill motive to falsely testify against her. Where there is
nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their
positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the solemnity of an oath deserve
full faith and credence. She cannot deny participation in the recruitment of the private complainants
because the prosecution has established that petitioner was the one who offered the private
complainants an alleged alternative employment in Ireland when their original deployment did not
materialize.
ARSON
GILFREDO BACOLOD A.K.A. GILARDO BACOLOD

People of the Philippines vs. Ma. Fe Torres Solina a.k.a.
Ma. Fe Baylon Gallo,
G.R. No.196784, January 13, 2016
Facts: Accused-appellant was arraigned and tried under an Information dated June 16, 2006
charging her of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale under R.A. 8042. Accused-appellant
was also charged under seven seperate Information for estafa under Article 315 par. 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code.
The trial court convicted her for the crime of illegal reruitment in large scale.
The said conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Accused-appellant elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. She maintains her denial that she
was engaged in the business of recruiting possible workers for jobs abroad. She insists that like all
the private complaiants, she was also an applicant for a job as an overseas worker and that she
merely accompanied them to recruitment agency. She alleges that private complainant Dela Vega
and Dela Cruz conspired together, used her name, and represented themselves to the other
applicants as being authorized to collect documents and fees and that she only met the other
private complainants in the trainings/seminars she attended. Anent the acknowledgmet receipt
signed by her and presented by the prosection as evidence, accused-appellant argues that it does
not prove that the money received by her was the consideration for private complainant Gacrces’
placement abroad. As to the charges of estafa, accused-appellant claims that the prosecution failed
to prove that she employed deceit to entice private complainants to part with their money because
she did not represent or pass herself off as a licensed recruiter.
Page 503 of 519

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale under R.A. 8042.
Held: Yes, accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment
in large scale.
Accused-appellant’s defense of denial cannot ovecome the positive testimonies of the witnesses
presented by the prosecution. As is well-settled in this jurisdiction, greater weight is given to the
positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than the accused’s denial and
explanation concerning the commission of the crime. Based on the factual findings of the RTC, the
combined and corroborative testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution show that it was
appellant herself who informed them of the existence of the job vacancies in Japan and of the
requirements needed for the processing of their applications. It was properly establised that it was
accused-appellant who accompanied the private complainants to undergo training and seminar
conducted by a person who represented himself as connected with the TESDA. Evidence was also
presented that the private complainants, relying completely on accused-appellant’s
representations, entrusted their money to her. Finally, since there were six (6) victims, the RTC
therefore did not commit any error in convicting accused-appellant of the charge of illegal
recruitment in large scale.
People of the Philippines vs. Marissa Bayker,

G.R. No. 170192, February 10, 2016
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment and estafa. Appellant, duly
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
The State presented four witnesses, namely: Virgilio Caniazares, Reynaldo Dahab, Basilio
Miparanum and PO3 Raul Bolido.
Caniazares testified that he and Dahab had met the accused-appellant at the house of a friend in
Makati City in January 2001, and she had then represented herself to be recruiting workers for
overseas employment, probably as hotel porters in Canada; that on January 27, 2001, he had gone
to her residence in Pembo, Makati City to pay P4,000.00 for his medical examination, and she had
then accompanied him to the Medical Center in Ermita, Manila for that purpose; that on March 30,
2001, she had gone to his house to inform him that he would be deployed as a seaman instead but
that he had to pay P6,000.00 more; that he had paid the P6,000.00 to her, for which she had issued
a receipt; that two weeks thereafter, she had called him about his deployment on April 21, 2001; that
on the promised date, he had gone to her office at GNB Marketing in Makati but no one was around;
that he had then proceeded to her house, and she had then told him that his seaman's application
would not push through; that the two of them had then proceeded to her office bringing all his
certificates of employment, and that it was there that she had introduced him to her manager, the
accused Bermudez, who promised his deployment in Hongkong within two weeks; that because he
had not been deployed as promised, he had gone to the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), where he had learned that the accused, Bermudez and Langreo, had not
Page 504 of 519

been issued the license to recruit and place people overseas; and that he had then decided to charge
them all with illegal recruitment and estafa in the Philippine National Police Crime Investigation
and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Dahab declared that on January 27, 2001, he had met the accused-appellant at the Guadalupe
Branch of Jollibee to pay P2,500.00 for his medical examination; that a week later, he had undergone
the three-day training in Mandaluyong City, for which he paid P2,500.00; that she had then
demanded from him the placement fee of P25,000.00; and that after he had not been able to raise
the amount, he never saw her again; and that Caniazares soon called him to urge that he should
complain against the accused in the PNP-CIDG.
According to Miparanum, he met the accused-appellant through Caniazares, who was his cousin.
Caniazares arrived at his house with her in tow in order to borrow money for his placement fee. On
that occasion, she told Miparanum that she could help him find work abroad and even leave ahead
of Caniazares if he had the money. Convinced, Miparanum went to her residence on April 11, 2001
to apply as a seaman. On April 17, 2001, he delivered to her P6,000.00 for his seaman's book. She
again asked an additional P6,000.00 for the seaman's book, and P40,000.00 as the placement fee.
On April 20, 2001, Miparanum went to her office where he met Bermudez. There, he handed the
P46,000.00 to the accused-appellant but it was Bermudez who issued the corresponding receipt.
The accused-appellant and Bermudez told him to wait for his deployment to Hongkong as an
ordinary seaman within two weeks. Miparanum followed up on his application after two weeks, but
was instead made to undergo training, and he paid P2,700.00 for his ce1iificate. Sensing that he was
being defrauded, Miparanum later proceeded to file his complaint at the PNP-CIDG.
PO3 Raul Bo lido of the PNP-CIDG recalled that in July, 2001, the complainants went to Camp
Crame to file their complaints against the accused-appellant, Bermudez and Langreo. PO3 Bolido,
along with SPO4 Pedro Velasco and Team Leader Police Inspector Romualdo Iringan, conducted
an entrapment operation against the accused. They prepared 10 marked Pl00 bills dusted with
ultraviolet powder and gave the same to Miparanum. On July 23, 2001, the entrapment team
proceeded with Miparanum to Jollibee-Guadalupe where Miparanum was to meet the accused-
appellant. The team immediately arrested her upon her receiving the marked bills. The PNP Crime
Laboratory conducted its examination for traces of ultraviolet powder on her person, and the results
of the examination were positive for the presence of ultraviolet powder.
In contrast, the accused-appellant pointed to Langreo and Bermudez who had operated GNB
Marketing Agency. She claimed to have met Miparanum at Jollibee-Guadalupe only for the purpose
of bringing him to Bermudez. She refused to receive the money being handed to her by Miparanum
because she did not demand for it, but the four policemen suddenly arrested her, and one of them
rubbed his arm against her forearm.
The accused-appellant presented two witnesses, namely: Adelaida Castel and Edith dela Cruz.
Castel testified that she had known the accused-appellant for almost five years; that being then
present during the meeting between the accused-appellant and Caniazares she did not hear the
accused-appellant representing herself as a legitimate recruiter to the latter; that she had been
present when Miparanum delivered the P40,000.00 to Bermudez; and that prior to the entrapment
Page 505 of 519

of the accused-appellant, Caniazares had called their house three times to ask the accused-
appellant to accompany him to the house of Bermudez. On her part, dela Cruz attested that she
had known the accused-appellant since March, 2001 because they had worked together in a
handicraft factory; that she did not know if the accused-appellant had been a recruiter; that it was
Langreo who had been the recruiter because he had recruited her own daughter; and that she did
not know anything about the transactions between the accused-appellant and the complaining
witnesses.
Subsequently, Dahab recanted his testimony, and stated that he had only requested assistance from
the accused-appellant regarding his medical examination. He insisted that he had voluntarily paid
P5,000.00 to her, and she had then paid the amount to the Medical Center for his medical
examination.
In a decision, the RTC convicted appellant beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and
illegal recruitment which conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the judgment of conviction for estafa and illegal
recruitment against appellant.
Held: No. the CA correctly affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered against appellant.
Illegal recruitment is committed by a person who: (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined
under Article l 3(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 and Article 38 of the
Labor Code; and (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers. It is committed in large scale when it is committed against three or more
persons individually or as a group.
The CA properly affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant by the RTC for illegal recruitment
committed in large scale because she had committed acts of recruitment against at least three
persons (namely: Canizares, Dahab, and Miparanum) despite her not having been duly licensed or
authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for that purpose.
The accused-appellant's insistence on her very limited participation in the recruitment of the
complainants did not advance or help her cause any because the State established her having
personally promised foreign employment either as hotel porters or seafarers to the complainants
despite her having no license or authority to recruit from the POEA. The records made it clear
enough that her participation was anything but limited, for she herself had accompanied them to
their respective medical examinations at their own expense. In addition, she herself brought them
to GNB Marketing and introduced them to her co-accused. In this regard, the CA pointedly
observed:
The evidence established that without any license or authority to do so, appellant promised private
complainants overseas employment in regard to which she required them to undergo medical
examination and training and collected fees or payments from them, while repeatedly assuring that
they would be deployed abroad. On appellant's contention that it was Nida Bermudez and Lorenz
Page 506 of 519

Langreo who received money from the complainants, even assuming arguendo that appellant never
received any payment from the complainants, actual receipt of a fee is not an essential element of
the crime of Illegal Recruitment, but is only one of the modes for the commission thereof. Besides,
all the private complainants positively identified appellant as the person who recruited them and
exacted money from them. Appellant's bare denials and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over
the positive testimonies of the complainants who had no ill motive to testify falsely against her.
The accused-appellant's denial of her participation in the illegal recruitment activities of Bermudez
and Langreo did not gain traction from her charging her co-accused with the sole responsibility for
the illegal recruitment of the complainants. Based on the testimonial narration of the complainants
regarding their recruitment, she was unqualifiedly depicted as having the primary and instrumental
role in recruiting them for overseas placement from the inception. Also, her claim of having been
only casually associated with GNB Marketing did not preclude her criminal liability for the crimes
charged and proved. Even the mere employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal
recruitment could be held liable, along with the employer, as a principal in illegal recruitment once
it was shown that he had actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. This is because
recruitment and placement include any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, as well as referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.
In the same manner, the conviction of the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment committed in
large scale did not preclude her personal liability for estafa under Article 3l5(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code on the ground of subjecting her to double jeopardy. The elements of estafa as charged
are, namely: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and
(2) the offended party, or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation. In contrast, the crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale, as indicated
earlier, requires different elements. Double jeopardy could not result from prosecuting and
convicting the accused-appellant for both crimes considering that they were entirely distinct from
each other not only from their being punished under different statutes but also from their elements
being different.
People of the Philippines vs. Delia Molina y Cabral

G.R. No. 207811, June 1, 2016
Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale and illegal
recruitment to which, on arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. Thereafter,
trial ensued.
The following persons testified for the prosecution: Elisa Escobar; Geraldine Carino; and Diony
Aragon. The evidence for the Prosecution is summarized thus:
Sometime in April 2006, Escobar went to the office of the Southern Cohabite Landbase
Management Corporation (SCLMC) located in Makati City to meet Zulueta, an agent of the SCLMC.
Zulueta introduced Escobar to accused-appellant. The latter told Escobar she will be employd as a
factory worker in Korea within 3 months from payment of the Php75,000,00 placement fee. Escobar
tendered the said amount to Zulueta at the SCLMC office evidence by the cash voucher dated 28
Page 507 of 519
April 2009 signed by SCLAMCOR (Southern Cotabato Landbase Management Corp.). The cash
voucher acknowledged receipt of the Php75,000.00 from Escobar. It also stated that the said
amount was for payment of the processing fee for Korea. A month after paying the placemnet fee,
SCLMC informed Escobar she had to undero Korean Language Training. Escobar complied. When
Escobar did not hear from accused-appellant for another month, she decided to withdraw her
placement fee. Accused-Appellant failed to return her money, thus Escobar filed the suit for illegal
recruitment.
Carino testiied she came to know accused-appellant sometime in April 2006, when Zulueta brought
her to the office of the SCLMC at Makati City. Zulueta and accused-appellant told Carino she will
be employed as a factory worker in Krea within 3 months from payment of the Php75,000.000
placement fee. Carino tendered the said amount to Zulueta at the SCLMC office.
On the other hand, appellant denied all the allegations against her and presented the following
defense:
The SCLMC is a recrutiment agency, registered with SEC and POEA. Accused-appellant is the
President of the SCLMC. The SCLMC employed only three staff memners. Zulueta is not connected
with the SCLMC but he was at the SCLMC office because he tried to convince appellant to be a
distributor of Presense Green Tea. Accused-appellant denied all the allegations against her. She
denied meeting all of the private complainants prior to the filing of the case. She added SCLMC
could not have conducted recruitment activities in April and May 2006 because its license to
conduct business was temporarily suspended by the POEA during that period. Accused-appellant
surmised private complainants filed cases against her upon the prodding of Alan Basa. She testified
when she was arrested by the NBO, Alan Basa asked her for P300,000.00, in exchange for the
dropping of the complaints against her.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted accused-appellant for the offenses charged.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruiment in large scale.
Held: Yes. All the element of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are present, namely: (1)
the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the
meaning of “recruitment and placement” under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, or any of the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of R.A. 8042);
and (3) the offender committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
More importantly, all the said elements have been established beyond reasonable doubt.
It was accused-appellant herself who testified that SCLMC did not have authority to operate its
business on April and May, 2006, covering the dates that are alleged in the Informations filed
against her, proving that the first element of the crime is present. She claimed the SCLMC’s license
was temporarily suspended by the POEA during the alleged date when the crimd were committed
and that the suspension was lifted on July 31, 2006. Accused-appellant further admitted that the
SCLMC had no authort to recruit workers for Korea because it had no job offer to do so.
Page 508 of 519
Without any authority, accused-appellant still engaged in recruitment activities by offering and
promising jobs, and collecting placement fees as testified to by private complainants Escobar,
Carino and Aragon. Thus, the second element of the crime is present.
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that accused-appellant was engaged in the
recruitment and placement of the private complainant as the accused was the one who told private
complainants that they will be sent to Korea as factory workers within three months from payment
of the placement fees and that the placemnet fees were made in the office of the SCLMC in the
presence of the accused-appellant or on her instruction.
CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
BIGAMY
ALEJANDRO C. ALMENDRAS, JR. vs. ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS

G.R. No. 179491, January 14, 2015, C.J. Sereno
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be
understood by the persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in
another sense. In the instant case, the letters tag respondent as a “reknown black mailer,” a vengeful
family member who filed cases against his mother and siblings, and with nefarious designs. Even an
impartial mind reading these descriptions would be led to entertain doubts on the person’s character,
thereby affecting that person’s reputation.
Malice can also be presumed inasmuch as the letters are not privileged in nature. Respondent’s
contention that he has the legal, moral or social duty to make the communication cannot be
countenanced because he failed to communicate the statements only to the person or persons who have
some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by
the author of the statement. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged
when it is published and circulated among the public.
Facts:
Alejandro C. Almendras, Jr. (Alejandro) sent letters with similar contents on 7 February 1996
to House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., and on 26 February 1996 to Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President
of Oil Carriers, Inc. The controversial portion of the first and second letters reads as follows:
This is to notify your good self and your staff that one ALEXIS “DODONG” C. ALMENDRAS, a
brother, is not vested with any authority to liaison or transact any business with any
department, office, or bureau, public or otherwise, that has bearing or relation with my office,
mandates or functions. x x x.
Noteworthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that Mr. Alexis “Dodong” C. Almendras, a reknown
blackmailer, is a bitter rival in the just concluded election of 1995 who ran against the wishes
of my father, the late Congressman Alejandro D. Almendras, Sr. He has caused pain to the
Page 509 of 519
family when he filed cases against us: his brothers and sisters, and worst against his own
mother.
I deemed that his act of transacting business that affects my person and official functions is
malicious in purpose, done with ill motive and part of a larger plan of harassment activities
to perforce realise his egoistic and evil objectives.
May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above information to
concerned officials and secretariat employees of the House of Representatives.
xxxx
These letters were allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and published by Alejandro,
assisted by Atty. Roberto Layug, in Digos, Davao del Sur and Quezon City, with evident bad faith and
manifest malice to destroy Alexis C. Almendras’ (Alexis) good name. Hence, Alexis filed an action for
damages arising from libel and defamation against Alejandro in the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The RTC ruled in favor of Alexis, ruling that the he was libelled and defamed and granted the
award of damages of P5,000,000.00 as moral damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P10,000.00 for litigation expenses; and attorney’s fees in the amount of 25% of whatever amounts
actually received by Alexis for this judgment. Alejandro moved for reconsideration and/or new
trial, but the same was denied by the trial court. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC stating
that the letters were not privileged communications, since Alejandro was not acting as a member of
the Congress when he sent them. In fact, his letter stated that he extends his “apology for bringing
this personal matter in the open, Further, the CA upheld the damages awarded by the trial court, the
amounts being consistent with the social and financial standing of the parties involved. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the letters fall within the purview of privileged communication, hence, not
libellous in character.
Ruling:
The Court denies the petition.
For an imputation to be libelous under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following
requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given
publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.
Consequently, under Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,

even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive is shown. As an exception to the rule, the
presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged
communication. In order to qualify as privileged communication under Article 354, Number 1, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or
social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may
either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer
Page 510 of 519
or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish
the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and
without malice.
Were petitioner’s letters defamatory in nature? The Court believes so.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in

their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would
naturally be understood by the persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense. In the instant case, the letters tag respondent, Alexis, as a “reknown
black mailer,” a vengeful family member who filed cases against his mother and siblings, and with
nefarious designs. Even an impartial mind reading these descriptions would be led to entertain
doubts on the person’s character, thereby affecting that person’s reputation.
Malice can also be presumed inasmuch as the letters are not privileged in nature. Alejandro’s
contention that he has the legal, moral or social duty to make the communication cannot be
countenanced because he failed to communicate the statements only to the person or persons who
have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection
sought by the author of the statement. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified
as privileged when it is published and circulated among the public. Examination of the letters would
reveal that Alejandro himself intended for the letters to be circulated (and they were so) when he
said that:
May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above information to
concerned officials and secretariat employees of the House of Representatives.
This lack of selectivity on his part is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of
privileged communication because such publication created upon the minds of the readers a
circumstance which brought discredit and shame to respondent’s reputation.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
DR. FERNANDO SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 192123. MARCH 10, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
The SC found the appeal meritorious. The Prosecution presented no witnesses with special
medical qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on what standard of care
was applicable. It would consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the
first three elements of a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Facts:
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who had been part of the team of
anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-through operation conducted on a three-year old patient
born with an imperforate anus. Gerald Albert Gercayo was born with an imperforate anus. During
Page 511 of 519
the pull-through operation, Gerald suffered bradycardia and went into a coma. A complaint was
lodged for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s
Office of Manila against the attending physicians.
RTC – accused is guilty
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries
Ruling:
An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or administrative – calls for the plaintiff
to prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty owed by
the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance
with the specific norms or standards established by his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the
physician’s failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of care; (3) the causation, i.e.,
there must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act or omission and
the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient. In the medical profession, specific
norms or standards to protect the patient against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as
standards of care, set the duty of the physician to act in respect of the patient. Unfortunately, no
clear definition of the duty of a particular physician in a particular case exists. Because most medical
malpractice cases are highly technical, witnesses with special medical qualifications must provide
guidance by giving the knowledge necessary to render a fair and just verdict. As a result, the
standard of medical care of a prudent physician must be determined from expert testimony in most
cases; and in the case of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the standard of care by which the
specialist is judged is the care and skill commonly possessed and exercised by similar specialists
under similar circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be higher than that required of the
general practitioner.
The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued for
negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it does not depend, therefore, on any individual
physician’s own knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court may determine
whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical
testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required. The judge, as the trier of fact,
ultimately determines the standard of care, after listening to the testimony of all medical experts.
The SC found the appeal meritorious. the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical
qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on what standard of care was
applicable. It would consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the first
three elements of a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Page 512 of 519

MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the Cresencio, even without a warrant. Sec. 80
of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the PNP
to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is commit-ting in his presence any
of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense or the forest products gathered or taken by the offender. It is immaterial whether
the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products are legal or not. Mere possession of
forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber
comes from a legal source is immaterial because the Forestry Code is a special law which considers mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper documentation as malum prohibitum.
Facts:
Acting on an information that there was a stockpile of lumber or forest products in the vicinity
of the house of Petitioner Cresencio, Eufemio Abaniel, an officer at CENRO-DENR, Talibon, Bohol,
together with Forest Rangers Urcino Butal, Alfredo Bastasa and Celso Ramos went to the Cresencio’s
house at Balico, Talibon, Bohol on March 15, 1994 at 3:00 p.m. Upon arriving thereat, they saw forest
products lying under the house of the Cresencio and at the shoreline about two meters away from
the Cresencio’s house. As the DENR personnel tried to investigate from the neighborhood as to who
was the owner of the lumber, the Cresencio admitted its ownership. Thereafter, the DENR personnel
entered the premises of the Cresencio’s house without a search warrant.
Upon inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagon lumber, which is equivalent to 452 board feet, were
discovered. When the DENR personnel asked for documents to support the Cresencio’s claim of
ownership, the latter showed to them a receipt issued by Pengavitor Enterprises where she allegedly
bought the said lumber. However, when the DENR personnel scaled the lumber, they found out that
the dimensions and the species of the lumber did not tally with the items mentioned in the receipt.
The said receipt showed that the Crescencio bought 10 pieces of red lawaan.
Since the Cresencio could not present any other receipt, Abaniel ordered the confiscation of
the lumber, asked for police assistance, and told the Cresencio that they were going to transport the
confiscated lumber to the DENR office for safekeeping. SPO1 Desiderio Garcia testified that upon the
request of Abaniel for police assistance, he and PO3 Antonio Crescencio went to the house of the
Cresencio where they saw some lumber which was later loaded on a cargo truck. Thereafter, they
escorted the transport of the lumber to the DENR office.
Cresencio was charged by the Provincial Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, with violation
of Sec. 68 of PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277. During the arraignment, the Cresencio pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial ensued wherein Crecensio was found guilty of the
offense charged. The CA dismissed the appeal outright because the Cresencio failed to furnish the
OSG a copy of the Appellant’s Brief in violation of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Page 513 of 519
Whether or not Cresencio is correctly convicted of the crime charged.
Ruling:
Yes, brushing aside the issue of technicality, the Court still finds that the prosecution was able
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the Crescencio’s culpability.
In attempting to escape liability, the Crescencio contends that: (a) she had the supporting
documents to show that she bought the questioned lumber from legitimate sources; and (b) the
warrantless search and seizure conducted by the DENR personnel was illegal and, thus, the items
seized should not have been admitted in evidence against her.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right
to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. There
is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant when they went to
the house of the Cresencio. When the DENR personnel arrived at the Cresencio’s house, the lumbers
were lying under the latter’s house and at the shoreline about two meters away from the house of the
Crescencio. It is clear, therefore, that the said lumber is plainly exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure
of the lumber outside the Crescencio’s house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.
Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the Cresencio, even without a
warrant. Sec. 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any
personnel of the PNP to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is
committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and
confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense or the forest products gathered
or taken by the offender. It is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of
the forest products are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper
documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is
immaterial because the Forestry Code is a special law which considers mere possession of timber or
other forest products without the proper documentation as malum prohibitum.
In the present case, the magsihagon lumber were admittedly owned by the Crescencio but
unfortunately no permit evidencing authority to possess said lumber was duly presented. Thus, the
Information correctly charged the Crescencio with the second offense which is consummated by the
mere possession of forest products without the proper documents. The prosecution adduced several
documents to prove that the lumber was confiscated from the Crescencio, namely: a Statement
Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated on March 15, 1994, seizure
receipt, a photograph of the house of Crescencio, and a photograph of the confiscated lumber. More
so, the direct and affirmative testimony of the DENR personnel as state witnesses on the
circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes Crescencio’s liability.
EDIGARDO GEROCHE, et al. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Under Art. 128 of the RPC, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) if Violation of Domicile be committed at night time or
if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search
Page 514 of 519
made by the offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while they were sleeping
at night and, in addition, they took away with them his airgun. The penalty prescribed by Art. 128 of the
RPC is composed of only two, not three, periods. In which case, Art. 65 of the same Code requires the
division into three equal portions the time included in the penalty, forming one period of each of the
three portions.
Facts:
Petitioners Geroche, Garde and Marfil were charged with violation of domicile under Art. 128
of the RPC. The prosecution alleged that the Geroche was a barangay captain while Garde and Marfil
are members of the CAFGU. One evening, they suddenly entered the house of Baleriano without any
search warrant. The petitioners mauled him, striking with a Garand rifle, which caused his injuries.
They looked for firearms but instead found and took away his airgun. Petitioners denied the charge,
declaring that they were in their respective houses.
The RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Less Serious
Physical Injuries under the Art. 265 of the RPC. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of arresto mayor maximum, that is, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) months.
According to the RTC, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioners are public officers, which is an
essential element of Art. 128 of the RPC.
Petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which set aside the RTC decision, holding that
petitioners should be held liable for Violation of Domicile considering their judicial admissions that
they were barangay captain and part of the CAFGU. The CA sentenced them to an indeterminate
penalty of Four (4) Months, One (1) Day of arresto mayor maximum to Six (6) Months and One (1)
Day of prision correccional minimum with the accessory penalty of suspension from public office and
from the right to follow a profession or calling pursuant to Art. 43 of the RPC.
Issue:
Did the CA correctly impose the penalty?
Ruling:
NO, there is a need to rectify the penalty imposed.
Under Art. 128 of the RPC, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods (two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years if Violation of
Domicile be committed at nighttime or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime
be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender. In this case, petitioners barged
in the house of Baleriano while they were sleeping at night and, in addition, they took away with them
his airgun.
In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the [ISLAW] requires
courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence. The maximum term of the prison
sentence shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code. Yet the penalty prescribed by [Art. 128] of the RPC is composed of
only two, not three, periods. In which case, [Art. 65] of the same Code requires the division into three
Page 515 of 519
equal portions the time included in the penalty, forming one period of each of the three portions.
Applying the provision, the minimum, medium and maximum periods of the penalty prescribed by
Art. 128 are:
Minimum – 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days

Medium – 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days
Maximum – 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years
Thus, applying in this case, the maximum term should be within the medium period or from
3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, in light of the provisions of Art. 64
of the RPC that if there are no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the
commission of the crime, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.
On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the RPC for the crime. The penalty next lower to that prescribed by Art. 128 is
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (or 4 months and
1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
The foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this case, the Court
hereby sentences the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years.
ROSAL HUBILLA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 176102, November 26, 2014, J. Bersamin
Hubilla insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years and one
day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable him to apply
for probation under P.D. No. 968. This argument is bereft of legal basis. Neither the RPC, nor R.A. No.
9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause
the Court to deliberately violate the law. Thus, when he was convicted at age 23, the suspension of his
sentence is not available.
Facts:
Petitioner Hubilla was charged before the RTC with homicide. Hubilla was 17 years old when,
on March 30, 2000, he stabbed Jayson Espinola in front of an elementary school. Due to organ failure
and overwhelming infection, Espinola died. The RTC convicted him on July 19, 2006 and sentenced
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years and one day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
The CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty, reducing the sentence to six months
and one day to six years of prision correccional as minimum, to six years and one day to twelve years
of prision mayor as maximum. On motion for reconsideration by Hubilla, the CA again modified the
penalty, sentencing him an indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
Issues:
Page 516 of 519
1. Should the maximum of Hubilla’s indeterminate sentence be reduced to only six years of
prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under P.D. No. 968?
2. Would Hubilla’s imprisonment violate his rights as a child under R.A. No. 9344 and
international agreements?
Ruling:
1. No, further reduction in imposed penalty of imprisonment may be had thru P.D. No. 968.
Art. 249 of the RPC prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. Considering
that Hubilla was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17 years, four months
and 28 days old when he committed the homicide, such minority was a privileged mitigating
circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.
Under the ISLAW, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the penalty
next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional (i.e., six months and
one day to six years). For the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision mayor in its medium
period – eight years and one day to 10 years – was proper because there were no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one
day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Hubilla insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years and
one day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable him to
apply for probation under P.D. No. 968. This argument is bereft of legal basis. Neither the [RPC, nor
R.A. No. 9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal
penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law. Thus, when he was convicted at
age 23, the suspension of his sentence is not available.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC10 (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides that the rest-
rictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the minimum. Consistent with this
principle, the amended decision of the CA imposed the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate
penalty for homicide under the ISLAW. On its part, R.A. No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and
appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even for the sake of enabling
the child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.
Conformably with Sec. 9(a) of P.D. 968, which disqualifies from probation an offender
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years, the petitioner could not
qualify for probation. Although Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a
child in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the
child offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to Sec. 40 of R.A. No. 9344.
The Court notes that Hubilla was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for
homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer legally
feasible or permissible.
Page 517 of 519

2. No, both international law and agreements recognize imprisonment as the disposition of
last resort for juvenile offenders.
A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that imprisonment of
children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. While [Sec. 5 (c) of R.A. No. 9344] bes-
tows on children in conflict with the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their
liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain
restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or imprisonment is a
disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appro-priate
period of time. Thereby, the trial and appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic
Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty
was imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the
suspension of his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortest dura-tion
permitted by the law.
A survey of relevant international agreements supports the course of action taken herein. The
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing
Guidelines), the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh
Guidelines) and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty are
consistent in recognizing that imprisonment is a valid form of disposition, provided it is imposed as
a last resort and for the minimum necessary period.
EDMUND SYDECO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014, J. Velasco
In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and during the period
material appeared not to have performed their duties as required by law, or at least fell short of the
norm expected of peace officers. They spotted the Sionzon’s purported swerving vehicle. They then
signaled him to stop which he obeyed. But they did not demand the presentation of the driver’s license
or issue any ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation as required under the particular
premises by Sec. 29 of R.A. No. 4136 (Driving under the Influence of Liquor). Instead, they inspected the
vehicle, ordered the Sionzon and his companions to step down of their pick up and concluded that the
Sionzon was then drunk mainly because of the cases of beer found at the trunk of the vehicle.
Facts:
P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3 Benedict Cruz III and another officer
were manning a checkpoint when, from about twenty (20) meters away, they spotted a swerving red
Ford Ranger pick-up driven by petitioner Sydeco. The team members flagged the vehicle down and
asked Sydeco to alight from the vehicle so he could take a rest at the police station situated nearby,
before he resumes driving. Sydeco who the policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being
drunk and insisted he could manage to drive. Then in a raised voice, Sydeco started talking rudely to
the policemen and in fact yelled at P/Insp. Aguilar blurting: "P…g ina mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli." At
that remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who earlier pointed out to Sydeco that his team had seen him swerving
and driving under the influence of liquor, proceeded to arrest Sydeco who put up resistance. Despite
Sydeco’s efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually succeeded in subduing him who was
then brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined and found to be under the influence
of alcohol. Sydeco was then turned over to the Malate Police Station for investigation.
Page 518 of 519
Issue:
Whether or not Sionzon violated of R.A. No. 4136.
Ruling:
No, Sionzon is not guilty for driving under the influence of alcohol.
In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and during the period
material appeared not to have performed their duties as required by law, or at least fell short of the
norm expected of peace officers. They spotted the Sionzon’s purported swerving vehicle. They then
signaled him to stop which he obeyed. But they did not demand the presentation of the driver’s
license or issue any ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation as required under the
particular premises by Sec. 29 of R.A. No. 4136.
Instead of requiring the vehicle’s occupants to answer one or two routinary questions out of
respect to what the Court has, in Abenes vs. CA, adverted to as the motorists’ right of “free passage
without intrusive interruption,” P/Insp. Aguilar, et al. engaged Sionzon in what appears to be an
unnecessary conversation and when utterances were made doubtless not to their liking, they ordered
the latter to step out of the vehicle, concluding after seeing three (3) empty cases of beer at the trunk
of the vehicle that Sionzon was driving under the influence of alcohol. Then Sionzon went on with his
“plain view search” line. The remark apparently pissed the police officers off no end as one of them
immediately lashed at Sionzon and his companions as “mga lasing” (drunk) and to get out of the
vehicle, an incongruous response to an otherwise reasonable plea.
In fine, at the time of Sionzon’s apprehension, or when he was signaled to stop, to be precise,
Sionzon has not committed any crime or suspected of having committed one. “Swerving,” as
ordinarily understood, refers to a movement wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane to another or to
turn aside from a direct course of action or movement. Swerving is not necessarily indicative of
imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of reckless driving which is punishable. To constitute the
offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation
of a motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. Nothing in
the records indicate that the area was a “no swerving or overtaking zone.” Moreover, the swerving
incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00 a.m. when the streets are usually clear of moving
vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life, limb and property to third persons is minimal.
When the police officers stopped Sionzon’s car, they did not issue any ticket for swerving as required
under Sec. 29 of R.A. No. 4136. Instead, they inspected the vehicle, ordered the Sionzon and his
companions to step down of their pick up and concluded that the Sionzon was then drunk mainly
because of the cases of beer found at the trunk of the vehicle.
Page 519 of 519

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CRIMINAL LAW DIGESTS 2014 - June 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO

SC finds that ruling of conspiracy by both courts is correct.

This argument is misplaced.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY T. GO

Hence the instant petition.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL VILLALBA AND RANDY VILLALBA

Maximillian was later pronounced dead.

Nonetheless, accused-appellant Randy's presence at the time and place of Maximillian's

ANGELITA CRUZ BENITO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

SC denies the present petition, finding no reversible error in the CA decision.

To avail of self-defense as a justifying circumstance so as not to incur any criminal liability, it

Hence, this appeal.

Whether or not respondents are guilty of the crime of murder.

Yes, they are.

Moreover, the claim of self-defense by Lalog, is of no moment. To avail of self-defense as a

Finally, contrary to respondents’ argument, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNALDO BOSITO Y CHAVENIA

Whether or not the Bosito is guilty of the offense charged

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN CASAS Y VINTULAN

The appeal is partly meritorious.

SHERWIN DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

No, Dela Cruz’s defense is sorely wanting.

Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. FLORO BUBAN BARCELA

Hence, Barcela was charged with qualified rape.

Whether or not Watamama was correctly convicted of the crime of murder

No, conviction of murder is not proper.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNY LIKIRAN alias “Loloy”

Here are the facts as stated by the prosecution’s witnesses.

1. Yes. He can still be held liable for the death of Sareno.

2. No. Treachery is not present.

MIGUEL CIRERA y USTELO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Hence, this petition.

Whether or not there was treachery.

No, there was no treachery in this case.

The requisites of treachery are:

2. Deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of execution.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGILIO AMORA y VISCARRA

No, it did not.

GARY FANTASTICO AND ROLANDO VILLANUEVA vs. ELPIDIO MALICSE, SR.

Whether or not the Information was defective

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANIEL VILLA MATIBAG y DE @ "DANI" "DANILO,"

PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR OFFENSES

REYNALDO S. MARIANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

1. Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender can be appreciated in

MANOLITO GIL ZAFRA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

1. No. The penalties imposed are correct.

INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO BARAGA y ARCILLA

Whether or not the CA erred in the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment

ENRIQUE ALMERO Y ALCANTARA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIRASOL

RTC- petitioner entitled to apply for bail

CA- revered RTC decision

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to apply for bail

Whether the probation was validly revoked.

MODIFICATION AND EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Did Consorte’s death extinguish his criminal and civil liability?

RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG vs. TERESITA D. RIVERA

1. Whether or not prescription has set in

1. Yes, prescription has set in.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES