CKB 30103 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

CKB 30103
CHAPTER 2 PART 2

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 TOPIC OUTCOMES
AT THE END OF THIS CHAPTER, YOU WILL BE ABLE TO;

1. UNDERSTAND THE TERM ‘RISK’.

2. CALCULATE RISK ASSESSMENT.
3. IDENTIFY THE SIGNIFICANT RISK
4. UNDERSTAND THE CRITERIA THAT DETERMINE THE
SIGNIFICANT RISK.
5. CONSTRUCT EVENT TREE & FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
6. USE EVENT TREE & FAULT TREE ANALYSIS AS
PROBABILITY QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

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 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS (ETA)
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA)
LAYER OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS (LOPA)

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 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS (ETA)

• AN EVENT TREE ANALYSIS (ETA) IS AN INDUCTIVE METHOD

THAT SHOWS ALL POSSIBLE OUTCOMES RESULTING FROM AN
ACCIDENTAL (INITIATING) EVENT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT
WHETHER INSTALLED SAFETY BARRIERS ARE FUNCTIONING OR
NOT, AND ADDITIONAL EVENTS AND FACTORS.

By studying all relevant accidental events (that have been identified by a preliminary hazard
analysis, HAZOP, or some other technique), the ETA can be used to identify all potential
accident scenarios and sequences in a complex system.

Design and procedural weaknesses can be identified, and probabilities of the various
outcomes from an accidental event can be determined. 4

CKB 30103 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

 ETA PROCEDURE
1. IDENTIFY (AND DEFINE MAY BE A SYSTEM FAILURE, EQUIPMENT FAILURE, HUMAN ERROR) A
RELEVANT ACCIDENTAL (INITIAL/INITIATING EVENT) EVENT THAT MAY GIVE RISE TO
UNWANTED CONSEQUENCES.
2. IDENTIFY THE BARRIERS RESPONSE (OR KNOWN AS SAFETY FUNCTION eg AN AUTOMATIC
EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN, ALARMS TO ALERT OPERATORS ETC.)) THAT ARE DESIGNED TO DEAL
WITH THE ACCIDENTAL EVENT
3. CONSTRUCT THE EVENT TREE
4. DESCRIBE THE (POTENTIAL) EVENT SEQUENCES RESULTING ACCIDENT SEQUENCES (VARIETY OF
OUTCOMES THAT COULD OCCUR FOLLOWING THE INITIATING EVENT)
5. DETERMINE THE FREQUENCY OF THE ACCIDENTAL EVENT AND THE PROBABILITIES OF THE
BRANCHES IN THE EVENT TREE
6. CALCULATE THE PROBABILITIES/FREQUENCIES FOR THE IDENTIfiED CONSEQUENCES
(OUTCOMES).
7. COMPILE AND PRESENT THE RESULTS FROM THE ANALYSIS.

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 EXAMPLE OF EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

• THE CASE OF THE FLAT TYRE ON AN AUTOMOBILE.

• THE INITIATING EVENT IN THIS CASE IS THE FLAT TIRE.
• THERE ARE TWO SAFETY FUNCTIONS THAT CAN BE DEFINED:
A SPARE TIRE AND
AN EMERGENCY ROAD PATROL.
OTHER SAFETY FUNCTIONS MIGHT BE INCLUDED DEPENDING ON THE
PARTICULAR SITUATION.

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 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS
{EXAMPLE}
• THE EVENT TREE IS DRAWN BY FIRST IDENTIFYING THE INITIATING EVENT, ON
THE LEFT-HAND SIDE OF THE DRAWING SHEET.
• THE TWO SAFETY FUNCTIONS ARE IDENTIFIED ON THE TOP OF THE SHEET.
• A LINE IS DRAWN FROM THE INITIATING EVENT TO A POSITION IMMEDIATELY BELOW
THE FIRST SAFETY FUNCTION, IN THIS CASE THE SPARE TYRE.
• AT THIS POINT THE LINE BRANCHES, THE UPPER BRANCH REPRESENTING THE SUCCESS
OF THE SAFETY FUNCTION AND THE LOWER BRANCH REPRESENTING THE FAILURE OF
THIS SAFETY FUNCTION.
• THE LINES ARE CONTINUED IN THIS FASHION SO THAT BRANCHING OCCURS
BELOW EACH SAFETY FUNCTION.
• THE RESULT/CONSEQUENCES OF THE INITIATING EVENT IS IDENTIFIED AT THE
RIGHT-HAND SIDE OF THE DRAWING SHEET
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CKB 30103 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

 ETA SCHEMATIC – FLAT TYRE

CKB 30103 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

 Reactor Temperature Control EXAMPLE 2 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

In the reactor system, a high temperature alarm has been installed to warn the operator of a high
temperature within the reactor.
• A loss of coolant initiating event
• 4 safety functions are identified.
These are written across the top of
the event tree:
1. High temperature alarm
2. Operator noticing the high
reactor temperature during normal
inspection
3. Operator re-establishing the
coolant flow by correcting the
problem within time
4. Operator performing an
emergency shutdown of the reactor
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CKB 30103 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

 STEP 1 IDENTIFY THE INITIATING EVENT

• SYSTEM OR EQUIPMENT FAILURE

• HUMAN ERROR

• PROCESS UPSET

[EXAMPLE]
“LOSS OF COOLING WATER”
TO AN OXIDATION REACTOR

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 Step 2 Identify the Safety Functions Designed to Deal with the
Initiating Event

• Safety system that automatically respond to the

initiating event.
• Alarms that alert the operator when the initiating
event occurs and operator actions designed to be
performed in response to alarms or required by
procedures.
• Barriers or Containment methods that are intended
to limit the effects of the initiating event.

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 High Temp Operator Operator Operator
Safety Function: Alarm Alerts Notices Re-starts Shuts Down
Operator High Temp Cooling Reactor Result

Identifier: B C D E
Failures/Demand: 0.01 0.25 0.25 0.1
A Continue Operation
0.7425
0.99 AD Shut Down
0.2227
0.247 ADE Runaway
A 5 0.02475
AB Continue Operation
1 0.00562
5
ABD
Initiating Event: Shut Down
0.007 0.001688
Loss of Cooling 5 0.00187 ABDE Runaway
1 Occurrence/yr. 0.0001875
5
0.01 ABC Continue Operation
0.00187
5
ABCD
0.002 Shut Down
5 0.000562
5
ABCDE
0.000625 Runaway
0.0000625 12
Shutdown = 0.2227 + 0.001688 + 0.005625 = 0.2250 occurrences/yr.
Runaway = 0.02475 + 0.0001875 + 0.0000625 = 0.02500 occurrences/yr.
CKB 30103 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
 High Temp Operator Operator Operator Operator
Safety Function: Alarm Alerts Notices Re-starts Shuts Down Shuts Down
Operator High Temp Cooling Reactor Result
Identifier: B C D E F
Failures/Demand: 0.01 0.25 0.25 0.01 0.1
A Continue Operation
0.7425
AD Shut Down
0.99 0.2450
ADE
0.2475 0.002228 Shut Down

0.002475 ADEF Runaway

0.0002475
A
AB Continue Operation
1 0.005625
Initiating Event: ABD Shut Down
0.00750 0.001856
Loss of Cooling
ABDE
Shut Down
1 Occurrence/yr. 0.001875 0.00001688
0.00001875 ABDEF Runaway
0.000001875
0.01
ABC Continue Operation
0.001875
ABCD Shut Down
0.0025 0.0006187
ABCDE
0.000625 0.00000563 Shut Down

Potential Accident consequences 0.00000675 ABCDEF Runaway

0.00000062
5
Shutdown = 0.2450 + 0.001856 + 0.00001688 + 0.0006187 = 0.2475 occurrences/yr. 13
Runaway = 0.0002475 + 0.000001875 + 0.000000625 = 0.0002500 occurrences/yr.

CKB 30103 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

 WHAT IS FAULT TREE ANALYSIS?

• A COMMON TOOL USING GRAPHICS AND

STATISTICS TO ANALYZE AN EVENT AND
PREDICT HOW AND HOW OFTEN IT WILL FAIL
• USED IN ENGINEERING AND BUSINESS TO AID
PROCESS AND SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT

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 HOW DOES IT WORK?

• USES A VARIETY OF GATES (BASIC AND EVENTS

GATES) TO EXPLAIN THE SYSTEM
• USES A TOP-DOWN APPROACH TO ITS LOGIC
• END RESULT IS AT THE TOP OF THE TREE AND
WHAT LEADS TO THAT RESULT FOLLOWS UNDER IT

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 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

• DEDUCTIVE METHOD FOR IDENTIFYING WAYS

IN WHICH HAZARDS CAN LEAD ACCIDENTS
• APPROACH STARTS WITH A WEE-DEFINED
ACCIDENT OR TOP EVENT
• LOGIC SYMBOLS ARE USED TO PROVIDE
GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION

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17
 ‘AND’ GATE
• ONE OF MAIN GATES
USED
• THE OUTPUT ABOVE
WILL OCCUR IF THE
TWO EVENTS BELOW
BOTH OCCUR

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 ‘OR’ GATE
• THE SECOND MAIN
GATE USED
• THE OUTPUT ABOVE
WILL OCCUR IF EITHER
OF ONE OR MORE
EVENTS HAPPENS
BELOW

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 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN FTA CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING STEPS:

1. IDENTIFY THE TOP EVENT

2. IDENTIFY THE SECOND-LEVEL EVENTS ( E.G DANGEROUS
OCCURRENCE)
3. DEVELOP THE TREE LOGIC (USE THE AND, OR, OR OTHER GATE
LOGIC STRUCTURE)
4. IDENTIFY LOWER LEVEL EVENTS (E.G HAZARDOUS DEVIATION)
5. PROCEED TO THE DESIRED LEVEL OF DETAIL (E.G PROCESS
DEVIATION) FOLLOWED BY THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE.
6. QUATIFY THE TREE LOGIC (COMPUTE THE PROBABILITY OF
FAILURES AND TOP EVENT PROBABILITY)
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CKB 30103 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

 GENERIC FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

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CKB 30103 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

 GENERIC EXAMPLE OF FTA

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CKB 30103 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

EXAMPLE OF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
• The Figure shows a fault tree for a flat
tyre on an automobile. The top event,
the flat tyre, is broken down into two
immediate contributing events, road
debris and tire failure.
• The contributing event, road debris, is
a basic event. This event, which cannot
be broken down into other events
unless additional information is
provided, is enclosed in a circle to
denote it as a basic event. The other
event, tire failure, is enclosed in a
rectangle to denote it as an
intermediate event.

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 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT USING FTA

The fault tree can be used to perform quantitative

calculations to determine the probability of the top event.
Given the Failure rate of equipment, the risk of
equipment break down can be predicted.
For probabilities are multiplied across an AND gate
and reliabilities are multiplied across an OR gate. The
computations are continued in this fashion until the top
event is reached.
Inhibit gates are considered a special case of
an AND gate
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CKB 30103 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

 PROBABILITY RULES
• PROBABILITY OF OUTCOME A
AND OUTCOME B
OCCURRING
• GIVEN TWO ENTIRELY
SEPARATE EVENTS WHICH = PAPB
CAN LEAD TO OUTCOMES A
AND B RESPECTIVELY WHICH • PROBABILITY OF OUTCOME A
ARE ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT OR OUTCOME B OCCURRING
OF EACH OTHER PA AND PB
= PA + PB - PA . P B

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 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT USING FTA

Given the Failure

rate of
equipment, the
risk of equipment
brake down can
be predicted.

CKB 30103 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 26

 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT - PRA

P=Probaility
R=Reliability

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CKB 30103 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

 PROBLEM 2 : FLUID FLOW
T-1 LA-1
P-2 V-1

P-1

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 PROBLEM 2 ; DESCRIPTION

a. SULFURIC ACID IS PUMPED FROM AN ATMOSPHERIC STORAGE

TANK, T-1 TO A PRESSURIZED PROCESS VESSEL, V-1.
b. TWO PUMPS CAN PERFORM THIS SERVICE; P-1 IS DRIVEN BY A
DIESEL ENGINE; P-2 HAS AN ELECTRIC MOTOR.
c. DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS THE SYSTEM USES P-2.
d. IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY, P-1 CAN BE SWITCHED INTO
SERVICE.
e. IF P-2 FAILS, THE OPERATOR HAS 4 MINUTES TO SWITCH TO P-1
BEFORE A POTENTIAL HAZARD OCCURS.
f. THERE IS A LOW-FLOW ALARM, LA-1, TO THE PROCESS VESSEL,
V-1.

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CKB 30103 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

 EXERCISE

• CONSTRUCT THE FAULT TREE ANALYSIS OF PROBLEM 2.

• CONSTRUCT THE EVENT TREE ANALYSIS OF PROBLEM 2.

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 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

• EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

• FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
• LAYER OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS
• THE QRA CAN BE DETERMINED IF THE FAILURE RATE
FOR EACH EQUIPMENT IS GIVEN.
• EXAMPLE IN PG 488 & 495 , CROWL & LOUVAR
“CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY- FUNDAMENTALS
WITH APPLICATIONS
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