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ABRC2018.Magic Areas in Political Law PDF
ABRC2018.Magic Areas in Political Law PDF
Constitution mandates self-reliant economy, but does not impose policy of monopoly.
The 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does not
encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The key, as in all economies in the
world, is to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and
services.
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas
of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus, Congress can
determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the
entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has
decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving them exclusively to
Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy. (Rep. Espina, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., G.R. No. 143855,
September 21, 2010).
Right to information.
Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information about themselves. Considering
that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable
to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If
such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez is most instructive:
A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to
such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the defendant did not employ protective measures or
devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
Even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends, STC did not
violate the minors’ right to privacy, as it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents
were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it
was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. (RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES, et al. v.
ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, et al., G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.).
Disclosure of SALN.
Right to information goes hand in hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the
public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in government decision-making as well as in
checking abuse in government. The importance of the said right was pragmatically explicated that the incorporation of this
right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can
be no realistic perception by the public of the nation’s problems nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are
denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of the times. However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law (Valmonte v. Berlmonte,
Jr.).
Doctrine of Incorporation
Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty stipulations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international
customs as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. “General principles of law recognized by civilized
nations” are principles “established by a process of reasoning” or judicial logic, based on principles which are “basic to
legal systems generally,” such as “general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice,” and the
“general principles against discrimination” which is embodied in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.” These are the same core principles which underlie the
Philippine Constitution itself, and embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights. (Mary
Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016, En Banc [Perez])
President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to Congress
While Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two
other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null
and void.
As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 87, but also those of the 1987 Constitution. X x x
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President himself enter into any
service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the DOE
(Department of Energy) through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement.
Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of
such contract.
The rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency and the development of their moral
character are characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means that parents are not only
given the privilege of exercising their authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this authority
conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that the
youth would eventually grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during
childhood that minors are prepared for additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these
[obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship” (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; 92 S. Ct. 1526;32 L. Ed. 2d 15[1972] U.C. LEXIS 144; emphasis and
underscoring supplied). "This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to
the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens" (Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622; 99 S. Ct. 3035; 61 L.
Ed. 2d 797 [1979] U.S. LEXIS17; Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, et al, G.R. No. 225442, August 8,
2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of
their children, (See Spouses lmbong v. Ochoa, Jr.) and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental
obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[l]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may
be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society
meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and others,
teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of
the laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility" (Bellotti, supra note 59, citing See Hafen, Children's
Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights," 1976 B. Y. U. L.
4 |ABRC2018.Magic Areas in Political Law (revised with insertions)revised/EVSA/crys
Rev. 605 and Ginsberg v. New York, supra note 61; emphasis and underscoring supplied; Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan v. Quezon City, et al, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Ex-parte application and inquiry of AMLC of bank deposit not violative of substantive due process.
The contention that there is violation of the right to due process is not correct. Section 11 of the AMLA providing
for ex-parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive
due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage. It is the preliminary and actual seizure of
the bank deposits or investments in question which brings these within reach of the judicial process, specifically a
determination that the seizure violated due process (Republic of the Phils. v. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc.,
et al., 566 Phil. 94, 106-107 [2008]). In fact, in Eugenio it was said that:
“A bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical seizure of
property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the
particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The
monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in a
physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder's record of deposits
and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the records to be inspected under a bank
inquiry order cannot be physically seized or hidden by the account holder. Said records are in the
possession of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of the account holder alone as
that would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank.”
At the stage in which the petition was filed, the inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments by the AMLC
still does not contemplate any form of physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property (Subido, Pagente, Certeza,
Mendoza & Binay Law Offices v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 216914, December 6, 2016, Perez, J).
Reason for the rule that a temporary protection order under RA 9262 can be issued ex parte.
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their
family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from
further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their
life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all
the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the
employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect
the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support. (Tua v.
Hon. Mangrobang, et al., G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014, Peralta, J).
Routine baggage inspection at the port by port authorities valid even without warrant.
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants, are not
unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to
deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.
Searches pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray
scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.
The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into airports or
ports of travel.
Search conducted by the port authorities are reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused’s
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions, accused is
deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in the course of such valid search are thus
admissible as evidence against the accused (Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 209387, January
11, 2016; Same as People v. Leila Johnson – where the SC ruled that the intrusion into the privacy of an airplane passenger
is so minimal compared to the danger to which the passengers are exposed to).
Overbreadth doctrine.
Sec. 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law penalizes the intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or
deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the
introduction or transmission of viruses does not suffer from overbreadth.
7 |ABRC2018.Magic Areas in Political Law (revised with insertions)revised/EVSA/crys
While it seeks to discourage data interference, it does not intrude into the area of protected speech and
expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may
not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.
But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of
vandalism, the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom
to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents. (Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Sec. of Justice, et al., G.R. No.
203335 & other cases, February 11, 2014).
Clear and present danger is not the only test to restrain forms of speech.
The clear and present danger doctrine is not the only test which has been applied by the courts. Generally, said
doctrine is applied to cases involving the overthrow of the government and even other evils which do not clearly
undermine national security. Since not all evils can be measured in terms of “proximity and degree” the Court, however, in
several cases – Ayer Productions vs. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861 (1988) and Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 28 SCRA 835 (1969)
applied the balancing of interests test. In Gonzales vs. COMELEC, it was said that “where the legislation under
constitutional attack interferes with the freedom of speech and assembly in a more generalized way and where the effect
of the speech and assembly in terms of the probability of realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even of
impressionistic calculation,” then the “balancing interests” test can be applied. (Soriano v. Laguardia, et al., supra.).
Police power and freedom of speech; press guarantee of equal opportunity to public service.
The names of those who commission or pay for election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms, must be
disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act is a valid regulation in the exercise of police power and effects
the constitutional policy of "guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service." Section 5.2(a)'s requirement of
disclosing subscribers neither curtails petitioners' free speech rights nor violates the constitutional proscription against
the impairment of contracts. (SWS, Inc., et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015, 755 SCRA 124, Leonen, J). This is
so because if there is a clash between police power and non-impairment of contract, the former shall prevail, it being the
most irresistible power of government. (Kabiling v. NHA).
On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome
the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, (INC v. CA, 328 Phil. 893 [1996]) with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck down (INC v.
CA; ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Comelec, 380 Phil. 780 [2000]; SWS v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, 357
SCRA 496).
With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the speech sought
to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm otherwise the prior
restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, but only
by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground. As formulated, the
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It
is a question of proximity and degree (Cabansag v. Fernandez; ABS-CBN v. Comelec).
The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an important or substantial government
interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of free expression (Adiong v. Comelec; Chavez v. Raul Gonzales, et al., G.R.
No. 168338, February 15, 2008, CJ Puno).
Content-neutral regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely control
the place where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech
clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
While Resolution No. 9615, including the herein assailed provisions, furthers an important and substantial
governmental interest, i.e., ensuring equal opportunity, time and space among candidates aimed at the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. It is further conceded that the governmental interest in imposing the said
prohibition is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. However, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to
Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4,
Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of
PUVs and transport terminals. (1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015, 755 SCRA 411).
Right to Information
The right to information goes hand in hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in
the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in government decision-making as well as in
checking abuse in government. The importance of the said right was pragmatically explicated that the incorporation of this
right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can
be no realistic perception by the public of the nation’s problems nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are
denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of the times. However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law (citing Valmonte v.
Belmonte).
Thus, while “public concern” like “public interest” eludes exact definition and has been said to embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen, the Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article IX, has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as
a matter of public concern and interest. In other words, a “duty to disclose” sprang from the “right to know.” Both of
constitutional origin, the former is a command while the latter is a permission. Hence, there is a duty on the part of
members of the government to disclose their SALNs to the public in the manner provided by law.
There are valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of some individuals in
their requests for access to such personal information and their publication. However, custodians of public documents
must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking to access to the records. The
moral or material injury which their misuse might inflict on others is the requestor’s responsibility and lookout. While
public manner in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested parties, such discretion does not
carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records. After all, public office is a
public trust (Re: Request for copy of 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN) and Personal Data Sheet or
Curriculum Vitae of the Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judiciary (A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC,
June 13, 2012, En Banc [Mendoza]).
Roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop cannot be considered a formal arrest.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner Rodel Luz could not be said to
have been “under arrest.” There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take
him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which Luz was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact xx x PO3 Altea himself testified that the only reason they went to the police
sub-station was the Luz had been flagged down “almost in front” of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take Luz into custody. (Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788,
February 29, 2012, 2nd Div., Sereno).
A letter admitting shortage of dollars in the collection in a bank is not an uncounselled confession.
The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on its being executed with the assistance
of counsel and its being under oath, but a voluntary party admission under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that is
admissible against her. Such rule provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given
in evidence against him. An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for the reason that it is fair to
presume that the admission corresponds with the truth, and it is the admitter’s fault if the admission does not. (US v. Ching
Po, 23 Phil. 578). By virtue of its being made by the party himself, an admission is competent primary evidence against the
admitter.
The letter was not a confession due to its not expressly acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified theft.
Under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt for the
offense charged, or for any offense necessarily included therein. (People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011,
Bersamin, J).
Not necessary that a person be assisted by a counsel when he writes the letter.
There was no need for a counsel to have assisted the accused when she wrote the letter because she
spontaneously made it while not under custodial investigation. Her insistence on the assistance of a counsel might be valid
and better appreciated had she made the letter while under arrest, or during custodial investigation, or under coercion by
the investigating authorities of the Government. The distinction of her situation from that of a person arrested or detained
and under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense derived from the clear intent of insulating the latter
from police coercion or intimidation underlying Section 12 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. (People v.
Cristobal, G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011, Bersamin, J).
R.A. No. 7483 (An Act defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well
as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers and providing penalties for violations thereof)
Extra-judicial confession to a bantay bayan is not admissible as evidence if there was no compliance with the
Miranda Rule.
People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III, Section
12[1] and [3] of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given
to the barangay chairman and a neighbour of the private complainant. The Supreme Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanod’s, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may
be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12[1] and [3], of the
Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001,
she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was,
therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x xx [the] Constitution
should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay
Chairman x x x was made in response to the ‘interrogation’ made by the latter – admittedly conducted
without first informing accused-appellant for her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of
counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as
the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x (People v. Lauga).
Effect if the holding of religious rituals within the halls of justice would be prohibited.
To disallow the holding of religious rituals within halls of justice would set a dangerous precedent and commence
a domino effect. Strict separation, rather than benevolent neutrality/accommodation, would be the norm. Thus, the
establishment of Shari'a courts, the National Commission for Muslim Filipinos, and the exception of Muslims from the
provisions of the RPC relative to the crime of bigamy would all be rendered nugatory because of strict separation. The
exception of members of Iglesia ni Cristo from joining a union or the non-compulsion recognized in favor of members of
the Jehovah's Witnesses from doing certain gestures during the flag ceremony, will all go down the drain simply because
we insist on strict separation (In Re: Letter of Tony Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building
in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017, Mendoza, J).
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines (In Marcos v. Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479, 497-498 (1989), the Court ruled that the right to travel
under our Constitution refer to right to move within the country, or to another country, but not the right to return to one's
country. The latter right, however, is provided under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines
is a signatory.). It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty (UP Law Center Constitutional Revision Project
61 (1970). See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116; 78 S. Ct. 1113; 2 L. Ed. 2d 1204 (1958) U.S. LEXIS 814. See also Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 705-706 (1919), where the Court stated that the right of locomotion is one of the chief
elements of the guaranty of liberty. 91). Liberty - a birthright of every person - includes the power of locomotion (See
Duran v. Abad Santos, 75 Phil. 410, 431-432 (1945)) and the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways
and to live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the ends of life (See Salvador H Laurel. Proceedings
of the Philippine Constitutional Convention. As Faithfully Reproduced from the Personal Record of Jose P. Laurel, Vol. III,
652 (1966). See also Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro; Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, et al,
G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as the rights
to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion. The inter-relation of the right to travel with other
fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W. 2d 179 [1992] Iowa Sup. LEXIS 91,as
follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association
require one to move about, such ovement must necessarily be protected under the First Amendment.
Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights cannot be
exercised without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has eloquently
pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to
freedom of travel and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their
freedom to worship is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting all,
freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or
drive the streets of a community, opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of
movement is inextricably involved with freedoms set forth in the First Amendment.
City councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances and enforce the same through their local officials. In
other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise
of the right to travel (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, et al, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017,
Perlas-Bernabe, J).
CITIZENSHIP
The COMELEC’s ruling in Sen. Poe’s repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in
the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship is not correct.
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregarded consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in
general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 409 Phil. 633, 649 [2001], repatriation was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as an "abbreviated repatriation process that
restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." (Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, 692 Phil. 407, 420 [2012]). Also included is
Parreno v. Commission on Audit, 551 Phil. 368, 381 [2007], which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, 531 Phil. 407, 417
[2006], where it was said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under
R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-born citizenship." (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v. COMELEC, et
al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016).
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal
proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings (374 Phil. 810
[1999]). There is no rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and for
not considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative proceedings.
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may result in deprivation
of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal system would require, i.e., proof
beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard, so too may it suffice to satisfy the
less stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence (Rizalito David v. SET, et al.).
DELEGATION OF POWERS
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The “Pork Barrel” System Declared Unconstitutional: Reasons; violation of separation of powers.
The Court declared the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within
which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-
enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers;
insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from
which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized
into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure ofpresentment and, in the process, denied the
President the power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving
legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and
scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are
national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has
likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other
public funds under the broad classification of “priority infrastructure development projects,” it has once more transgressed
the principle of non-delegability. (Belgica, et al. v. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, et al., G.R. No. 208566, 710 SCRA 1, 50-
51, November 19, 2013, En Banc [Perlas-Bernabe].
The court imposes a penalty on accused and provides that there can be no pardon. It violates the discretion of the
President. It is violative of the principle of separation of powers (San Diego v. People, April 8, 2015).
HRET has sole power to decide on the issue of qualifications of members of Congress including Party-List.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the
qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a
disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as
member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group;
petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the
COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
Mandatory drug testing as additional qualification of an elected public officer before assumption of office.
It is unconstitutional for the COMELEC to impose mandatory drug testing before an elected official may assume
office because it is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution.
The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. (SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY(SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD(DDB), et al., G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.).
Post-enactment measures like project identification, etc. not part of the oversight power of Congress.
These post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have
been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – “the various operational aspects of
budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the ―regulation and release
of funds” in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada,
cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any
of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards
this end, the Court abandoned its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise
that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same faltered altogether. (Belgica, et
al. v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013).
Requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution, must be made
upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to
transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations of their respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices. (Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No., 209287, 728 SCRA
1, July 1, 2014, En Banc [Bersamin])
Accordingly, the Court "will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the
Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any
officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government" (Baguilat v. Alvarez, G.R. No. 227557, July 25, 2017).
Four (4) Constitutional provisions relative to the role of Congress when the President declares Martial Law.
There are four provisions in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution specifically pertaining to the role of
the Congress when the President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, viz. :
a. Within forty-eight ( 48) hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress;
b. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President;
c. Upon the initiative of the_ President, the Congress may, in the same manner extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist; and
d. The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours (24) following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of call (Padilla, et al. v. Congress of the Phils., et al. &
companion cases, G.R. No. 231671, 231694, July 25, 2017, Leonardo-De Castro, J).
When Congress required to vote jointly when martial law is declared; when it revokes proclamation.
The Congress is only required to vote jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The deliberations on Article VII, Section 18 of the 1986
ConCom do not reveal a manifest intent of the framers to make it mandatory for the Congress to convene in joint session
following the President's proclamation and/or suspension, so it could deliberate as a single body, regardless of whether its
Members will concur in or revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension (Padilla, et al. v. Congress of the Phils.,
et al. & companion cases, G.R. No. 231671, 231694, July 25, 2017, Leonardo-De Castro, J).
The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the Congress to vote jointly in a joint
session is specifically for the purpose of revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the petitions at bar, the Senate and House of Representatives already
separately adopted resolutions expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Given the express
support of both Houses of the Congress for Proclamation No. 216, and their already evident lack of intent to revoke the
same, the provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution on revocation did not even come into operation and,
therefore, there is no obligation on the part of the Congress to convene in joint session (Padilla, et al. v. Congress of the
Phils., et al. & companion cases, G.R. No. 231671, 231694, July 25, 2017, Leonardo-De Castro, J).
Note: Extension of martial law is done upon initiative of the President with the concurrence of Congress. As t time
limitation of the extension, it is dependent upon the discretion of Congress (Lagman v. Medialdea, February 6, 2018)
If the House of Representatives desires to punish the person cited in contempt beyond its adjournment, then
criminal prosecution must be brought. In that instance, the said person shall be given an opportunity to defend himself
before the courts (Balag v. Senate of the Phils., et al., G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018, Gesmundo, J).
Statements in media interviews are not covered by the parliamentary "speech or debate" privilege.
Petitioner admitted that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private respondent as former VP
Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the so-called Hacienda Binay, in response to media interviews during gaps
and breaks in plenary and committee hearings in the Senate.With Jimenez as our guidepost, it is evident that petitioner's
remarks fall outside the privilege of speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The statements
were clearly not part of any speech delivered in the Senate or any of its committees. They were also not spoken in the
course of any debate in said fora. It cannot likewise be successfully contended that they were made in the official discharge
or performance of petitioner's duties as a Senator, as the remarks were not part of or integral to the legislative process
(Trillanes IV v. Hon. Evangeline Castillo-Marigomen, et al., G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018, Tijam, J).
Purpose of privilege.
The Speech or Debate Clause in our Constitution did not turn our Senators and Congressmen into "super-citizens"
whose spoken words or actions are rendered absolutely impervious to prosecution or civil action. The Constitution
conferred the privilege on members of Congress "not for their private indulgence, but for the public good." It was intended
to protect them against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing their decision-making prerogatives.
Such grant of legislative privilege must perforce be viewed according to its purpose and plain language. Indeed, the
privilege of speech or debate, which may "(enable) reckless men to slander and even destroy others," is not a cloak of
unqualified impunity; its invocation must be "as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the
legislative department." As this Court emphasized in Pobre, "the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to
members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people's
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other
forums outside the congressional hall" (Trillanes IV v. Hon. Evangeline Castillo-Marigomen, et al., G.R. No. 223451, March
14, 2018, Tijam, J).
Effect/s if the heads of offices are allowed to transfer funds within their respective offices..
By allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer funds within their respective offices, the Constitution
itself ensures the fiscal autonomy of their offices, and at the same time maintains the separation of powers among the
three main branches of the Government. In Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150, it was
said that the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the
independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court,
of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
In the case of the President, the power to transfer funds from one item to another within the Executive has not
been the mere offshoot of established usage, but has emanated from law itself. It has existed since the time of the
American Governors-General. Act No. 1902 (An Act authorizing the Governor-General to direct any unexpended balances of
appropriations be returned to the general fund of the Insular Treasury and to transfer from the general fund moneys which
have been returned thereto), passed on May 18, 1909 by the First Philippine Legislature, was the first enabling law that
granted statutory authority to the President to transfer funds. The authority was without any limitation, for the Act
explicitly empowered the Governor-General to transfer any unexpended balance of appropriations for any bureau or
office to another, and to spend such balance as if it had originally been appropriated for that bureau or office. (Araullo, et
al. v. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209135 & companion cases, July 11, 2014).
Requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Art. VI, Section 25(5) of the Constitution must be made upon
a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within
their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.
(Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209135 & companion cases, July 11, 2014).
Concept of “savings.”
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in the GAA free from any obligation or
encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work,
23 |ABRC2018.Magic Areas in Political Law (revised with insertions)revised/EVSA/crys
activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii)from appropriations balances arising from unpaid
compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from
appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and
thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs and services approved at a lesser
cost.
The three instances are a sure indication that savings could be generated only upon the purpose of the
appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the need for the appropriation being no longer existent. (Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III,
et al., G.R. No. 209135 & companion cases, July 11, 2014, Bersamin, J).
Operative Fact Doctrine Applied in the DAP (Disbursement Acceleration Program) Case
The doctrine of operative fact is applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its application to the
DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be
ignored or could no longer be undone.
The implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of savings pooled by the Executive to finance the PAPs that
were not covered in the GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well as to augment items pertaining to
other departments of the Government in clear violation of the Constitution. To declare the implementation of the DAP
unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative fact that produced
consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair.
Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients
could be required to undo everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be
enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.
The other side of the coin is that it has been adequately shown as to be beyond debate that the implementation of
the DAP yielded undeniably positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the country. To count the positive
results may be impossible, but the visible ones, like public infrastructure, could easily include roads, bridges, homes for the
homeless, hospitals, classrooms and the like. Not to apply the doctrine of operative fact to the DAP could literally cause the
physical undoing of such worthy results by destruction, and would result in most undesirable wastefulness. (Maria
Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No., 209287, 728 SCRA 1, July 1, 2014, En Banc
[Bersamin])
Duty of the State to protect its citizens, represented by the President; Constitutional provision on such duty.
The 1987 Constitution has “vested the executive power in the President of the Republic of the Philippines”
(Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1). While the vastness of the executive power that has been consolidated in the person of the
President cannot be expressed fully in one provision, the Constitution has stated the prime duty of the government, of
which the President is the head:
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call
upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service. (Sec. 4, Article II, Constitution;
Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 212426 and companion cases, January 12,
2016, Sereno, J)
The duty to protect the State and its people must be carried out earnestly and effectively throughout the whole
territory of the Philippines in accordance with the Constitutional provision on national territory. Hence, the President of
the Philippines, as the sole repository of executive power, is the guardian of the Philippine archipelago, including all the
islands and waters embraced therein and all other territories over which it has sovereignty or jurisdiction. These
territories consist of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains; including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the
insular shelves, and other submarine areas; and the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions.
Martial law power; meaning of appropriate proceedings covered by Sec. 18[3], Article VII of the Constitution.
Section 18[3], Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
The phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" does not refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or
Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is
not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. Under Section 18,
Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency
powers. Put differently, if the Court applies the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would
emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII (Rep. Ecel Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Medialdea, et al., G.R. No.
231658, July 4, 2017, Del Castillo, J).
Unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII make it sui generis.
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui
generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a
petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the
Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his
emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its decision.
The phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to
any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the
Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be
resolved by the Court (Rep. Ecel Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Medialdea, et al., G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, Del Castillo, J).
Burden of proof to show insufficiency of the bases by the President falls in the petitioners.
The burden of proof to show insufficiency in the bases of the President in declaring martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus lies on the shoulders of the citizen initiating the proceedings. Such laying of the
burden of proof is constitutional, natural and practical – constitutional, because the President is entitled to the strong
presumption of the constitutionality of his or her acts as the Chief Executive and head of one of the great branches of
Government; natural, because the dutiful performance of an official duty by the President is always presumed; (Dimapilis-
Baldoz v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 199914, July 16, 2013, 701 SCRA 318); and practical, because the alleging party is
expected to have the proof to substantiate the allegation.
Foreign relations.
There is a broad range of vitally important areas that must be regularly decided by the Executive Department
without either challenge or interference by the Judiciary. One such area involves the delicate arena of foreign relations. It
would be strange indeed if the courts and the executive spoke with different voices in the realm of foreign policy. Precisely
because of the nature of the questions presented, and the lapse of more than 60 years since the conduct complained of, we
make no attempt to lay down general guidelines covering other situations not involved here, and confine the opinion only
to the very questions necessary to reach a decision on this matter.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in
this region. For us to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
(Vinuya, et al. v. The Honorable Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010, En Banc [Del
Castillo]).
The power and duty to conduct foreign relations; its nature; reason for the rule.
The President carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations (SeeConstitution,
Art. VII, Sec. 1 in relation to Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV [Executive Branch], Title I Foreign Affairs), Secs. 3[1]
and 20; Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino, 580 Phil. 422 [2008]; Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 501
Phil. 303 (2005); People's Movement for Press Freedom v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 84642, 13 September 1988 (unreported)
(citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 [1936]); Joaquin Bernas, Foreign Relations in
Constitutional Law, 101 (1995); Irene R. Cortes, The Philippine Presidency: A Study of Executive Power 187 [1966];
Vicente G. Sinco, Philippine Political Law: Principles and Concepts 297 [10th ed., 1954]). Since every state has the capacity
to interact with and engage in relations with other sovereign states (See1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States, Art. 1, 165 LNTS 19; James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 61 [2"d ed. 2007]),it is
but logical that every state must vest in an agent the authority to represent its interests to those other sovereign states
(Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra).
Role of the Senate in relation to the power of the President as the sole organ in international relations.
The power to defend the State and to act as its representative in the international sphere inheres in the person of
the President. This power, however, does not crystallize into absolute discretion to craft whatever instrument the Chief
Executive so desires. The Senate has a role in ensuring that treaties or international agreements the President enters into,
as contemplated in Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution, obtain the approval of two-thirds of its members (Saguisag,
et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra).
The President is granted a vast power to enter into executive agreements; role of the Supreme Court.
In the field of external affairs, the President must be given a larger measure of authority and wider discretion,
subject only to the least amount of checks and restrictions under the Constitution. The rationale behind this power and
discretion was recognized by the Court in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.
Section 9 of Executive Order No. 459, or the Guidelines in the Negotiation of International Agreements and its
Ratification, thus, correctly reflected the inherent powers of the President when it stated that the DF A "shall determine
whether an agreement is an executive agreement or a treaty."
Accordingly, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court does not look into whether an international
agreement should be in the form of a treaty or an executive agreement, save in cases in which the Constitution or a statute
requires otherwise. Rather, in view of the vast constitutional powers and prerogatives granted to the President in the field
of foreign affairs, the task of the Court is to determine whether the international agreement is consistent with the
applicable limitations (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 212426 and companion cases, January 12,
2016, Sereno, J). This is so because of the principle of separation of powers that the SC cannot intrude into the wisdom of
the Executive Department.
Senate investigation of a case already pending in court does not violate the sub-judice rule.
The sub-judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the
issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution or
administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose. (See Sabio v. Gordon, 504
SCRA 704, October 17, 2006)
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts
conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia,
undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to
determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need
not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of
legislation.
When the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its
investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a
Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. (REGHIS M. ROMERO II, et al. v. SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA,
et al., G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.)
The rule-making power of the Supreme Court (Section 5[5], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of
Legal Fees, The Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which
exempts it from “all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot operate to exempt it from the payment
of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed
this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts.
In said case, the Court ruled that:
“The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the
sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue
orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court.
Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees
under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees
without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence –
fiscal autonomy, Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and
collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which
established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to “guarantee the
independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.” legal fees therefore do
not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential element
of the Court’s fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to
governments-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the
JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s
guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence. (GSIS v. Heirs of Fernando F. Caballero, G.R.
No. 158090, 623 SCRA 5, 14-15, Oct. 4, 2010, 2nd Div. [Peralta])
The constitutional commissions observe the regular rotational plan which cannot apply to the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The regular rotation or cycle that is explicitly provided in Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution and inherently unique
to the constitutional commissions is an argument that works heavily against the position of the petitioner that the
limitations on the term of office of these commissions equally apply to the Ombudsman and his deputies.
In Nationalista Party v. De Vera, 85 Phil. 126 [1949]:
In order to carry out the purpose of the Constitution of placing in the Commission a new
member every three years, it is essential that after the first Commissioners have been appointed, every
subsequent appointment shall so fix the appointee’s term of office as to maintain the three years
difference between the dates of expiration of the respective terms of the incumbents. And this can be
done if after the appointments of the first three Commissioners, the successor of any one of them who
ceases prior to the expiration of his term, be appointed only for the unexpired portion of that term. Of
course, when a Commissioner ceases because of the expiration of his term his successor must be
appointed for a term of nine years; but when he ceases on other grounds prior to the expiration of his
term, his successor must be appointed only for the unexpired portion of that term, otherwise the
appointment would be offensive to the Constitution (Nationalista Party v. De Vera, 85 Phil. 126 [1949];
Ifurung v. Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018).
Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official
may be removed from office.
The PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to
question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers. Following
respondent’s theory that an impeachable officer can be removed only through impeachable means that a President or
Vice-President against whom an election protest has been filed can demand for the dismissal of the protest on the ground
that it can potentially cause his/her removal from office through a mode other than by impeachment. To sustain
respondent’s positionis to render election protests under the PET Rules nugatory. The Constitution could not have
intended such absurdity since fraud and irregularities in elections cannot be countenced, and the will of the people as
reflected in their votes must be determined and respected. The Court could not, therefore, have unwittingly curtailed its
own judicial power by prohibiting quo warranto proceedings against impeachable offices (Rep. v. Sereno, supra).
The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Section 3[1] and 3[6], Article XI of the Constitution respectively provides that the House of Representatives shall
have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment while the Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide
all cases of impeachment. Thus, there is no argument that the constitutionally-defined instrumentality which is given the
power to try impeachment cases is the Senate.
Nevertheless, the Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who
would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional
provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate.
Again, an action for quo warranto tests the right of a person to occupy a public position. It is a direct proceeding
assailing the title to a public office. The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the defendant is legally
occupying a public position which goes into the questions of whether defendant was legally appointed, was legally
qualified and has complete legal title to the office. If defendant is found to be not qualified and without any authority, the
relief that the Court grants is the ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office. In other words, while impeachment
concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue exercising his or her office, quo warranto involves matters that
render him or her ineligible to hold the position to begin with (Rep. v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018).
Designation of CSC Chairman to the Board of GSIS, ECC, etc. violates the independence of the Commission.
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with various powers and
functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions associated with
appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and
welfare of government officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform other
corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether personnel-
related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence,
when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may
exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as imposing
interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care providers, or
approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations. Duque’s designation as member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional
compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the
proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex
officio position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque’s designation as member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An
office that is legally not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch. (Dennis Funa v. The
Chairman, CSC, Francisco Duque III, et al., G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014, Bersamin, J).
Agreements involving Technical or Financial Assistance are Service Contracts with Safeguards
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new
ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the government as
principal or “owner” of the works. In the new service contacts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and
technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises;
and the government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire
operation.
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in
place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in
La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The
grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform
terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions to avoid the
possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory of the government because, supposedly before an agreement is
presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to
ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.
The term ―franchise includes not only authorizations issuing directly from Congress in the form of statute, but also
those granted by administrative agencies to which the power to grant franchise has been delegated by Congress.
The TRB was granted sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to operate the toll
facility/system. By explicit provisions of the PDs, the TRB was given power to grant administrative franchise for toll
facility projects. The limiting thrust of Article 12, Section 11 of the Constitution on the grant of franchise or other forms of
authorization to operate public utilities may, in context, be stated as follows: (a) the grant shall be made only in favor of
qualified Filipino citizens or corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of franchises, as contracts; and (c) no
such authorization shall be exclusive or exceed fifty years. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority
to grant a public utility franchise. However, it may validly delegate its legislative authority, under the power of
subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities to some administrative agencies. (Ernesto Francisco,
Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, GR Number 166910, October 19, 2010, VELASCO, JR., J.).
Alien cannot own land in the Phils.; purpose is conservation of national patrimony.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, it has been held that "[a]liens, whether individuals or corporations, are
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands.
The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony" (Muller v.
Muller, 531 Phil. 460, 466 [2006]).
Taina herself admitted that it was really Mike who paid with his own funds the subject lot; hence, Mike was its
real purchaser or buyer. More than that if the deed of sale at all proclaimed that she (Taina) was the purchaser or buyer of
the subject property and this subject property was placed under her name, it was simply because she and Mike wanted to
skirt or circumvent the constitutional prohibition barring or outlawing foreigners or aliens from acquiring or purchasing
lands in the Philippines. Indeed, the lower courts exposed and laid bare her posturing and pretense for what these really
are: that in the transaction in question, she was a mere dummy, a spurious stand-in, for her erstwhile common-law
husband, who was not a Filipino then, and never attempted to become a natural Filipino citizen thereafter. They cannot do
directly what is prohibited by law (Taina Manigque-Stone v. Cattleya Land, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 195975, September 5, 2016,
Del Castillo, J; Ang v. The Estate of Sy So, G.R. No. 182252, August 3, 2016).
34 |ABRC2018.Magic Areas in Political Law (revised with insertions)revised/EVSA/crys
Academic Freedom
Even if the education department had not issued such prohibition, private schools still have the authority to
promulgate and enforce a similar prohibition pursuant to their right to establish disciplinary rules and regulations. This
right has been recognized in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which has the character of law. Section 78 of
the 1992 Manual of Regulations of Regulations for Private Schools.(Espiritu Santo Parochial School v. NLRC, 258 Phil. 600
(1989)).
The right to establish disciplinary rules is consistent with the mandate in the Constitution (Art. XIV, Sec. 3(2),
Constitution) for schools to teach discipline; (Jenosa v. Dalariate, G.R. No. 172138, September 8, 2010) in fact, schools have
the duty to develop discipline in students. (Marian College, Inc. v. CA, 401 Phil. 431 (2000) Corollarily, the Court has always
recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions on students who violate disciplinary rules. The penalty for
violations includes dismissal or exclusion from re-enrollment.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Effect of voluntary renunciation of the office of an elected official on the 3-term limit.
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC, voluntary
renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall not, in determining service for
three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected. This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to
skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as
distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes. (MAYOR ABELARDO
ABUNDO, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, G.R. No. 20171, January 8, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.).
Plebiscite; the phrase “by the qualified voters therein” includes all voters in the LGU affected; issue, a novel one of
first impression.
The COMELEC’s ruling that only the voters of Cabanatuan City shall participate in the plebiscite to convert
Cabanatuan City into a highly urbanized city is not correct.
The phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 means the qualified voters not only in the city proposed
to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in order to
harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. This means that the entire province of Nueva Ecija shall
participate in the plebiscite (Umali v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 203974, & companion cases, April 22, 2014).
LGUs have the power to classify and reclassify their properties; police power measure.
Ordinance No. 8187, otherwise known as “An Ordinance Amending Ord. No. 8119, Otherwise Known as “The
Manila Comprehensive Land Use and Zoning Ordinance of 2006 By Creating a Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy
Industrial Zone (1-3). The creation of the industrial zones lifted the prohibition against owners and operators of
businesses including Chevron and the other oil companies from operating in designated commercial zones, an industrial
zone prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is valid. The petition is a sequel to the case of SJS v. Mayor Atienza, J.
where the SC found that said ordinance (No. 8027) was enacted to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of the
inhabitants of Manila, hence it ordered the operators of the Pandacan depots to immediately relocate and transfer their oil
terminals. But despite the finality of said judgment, the City of Manila enacted an ordinance, (Ordinance No. 8171)
repealing Ordinance No. 8027 on the theory that a local government unit can classify and reclassify its own properties.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code, the LGU is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents that the
removal of the oil depots in the Pandacan area is necessary to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic
devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. The oil companies’ contention that the Pandacan
terminals have never been the subject of terrorist attacks, hence, the petitions are based on unfounded fears and mere
conjectures is not correct. (SJS, et al. v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836 & companion cases, November 25, 2014, Perez, J).
The requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement. (Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 2, 2010).
When the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area
requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be
created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the
requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that
islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or
municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for
provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended
to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then,
be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. (Navarro, et al. V. Executive Secretary Ermita,
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011).
Prohibition against midnight appointments; applies only to Presidential appointees; not to LGUs.
A midnight appointment “refers to those appointments made within two months immediately prior to the next
presidential election.” Midnight appointments are prohibited under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not make the appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
Midnight appointments are prohibited because an outgoing President is “duty-bound to prepare for the orderly
transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he or she should not do acts which he or she ought to know, would
embarrass or obstruct the policies of his or her successor.” (Aytona v. Castillo, No. L-193313, January 19, 1962, 4 SCRA 1,
9-10). An outgoing President should not “deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding
appointments.
However, the constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It
does not apply to appointments made by local chief executives. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. (The Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No.
202331, April 22, 2015, 757 SCRA 222, Leonen, J, citing De Rama v. CA, 405 Phil. 531, 353 SCRA 94).
It can, thus, be concluded that the Vice Governor forms part of the composition of the SP as its Presiding Officer,
and should be counted in the determination of the existence of a quorum. However, the nature of the position of the
Presiding Officer as a component of the SP is distinct from the other members comprising the said body (J. Tobias M.
Javier, et al. v. Rhodora Cadiao, et al., G.R. No. 185369, August 3, 2016).
Reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in
the Sanggunian.
Under Section 45[b] only the nominee of the political party under which the Sanggunian member concerned has
been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be
appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the
Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy x x x.”
The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy
occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the election.
With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy
occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with someone who should belong to the political party of petitioner
Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LM’s representation in the Sanggunian would be diminished. To argue that the vacancy
created was that formerly held by Rolando Lalas, a LAKAS-NUCD-Kampi member, would result in the increase of that
party’s representation in the Sanggunian at the expense of the REFORMA-LM. This interpretation is contrary to the letter
and spirit of the law and thus violative of a fundamental rule in statutory construction which is to ascertain and give effect
to the intent and purpose of the law. As earlier pointed out, the reason behind par. [b], Section 44 of the Local Government
Code is the maintenance of party representation in the Sanggunian in accordance with the will of the electorate.
The “last vacancy” in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of the member of formerly occupying
the next higher in rank which in turn also had become vacant by any of the causes already enumerated. The term “last
vacancy” is thus used in Sec. 45[b] to differentiate it from the other vacancy previously created. The term by no means
refers to the vacancy in the No. 8 position which occurred with the elevation of Rolando Lalas to the seventh position in
the Sanggunian. Such construction will result in absurdity (Navarro v. Court of Appeals, 335 SCRA 672, Mar. 28, 2001, 1st
Div. [Kapunan]).
Police Power
Cost-recovery mechanics imposed by ERC does not violate the non-impairment clause; exercise of police power.
The regulation of rates imposed to public utilities such as electricity distributors is an exercise of the State’s
police power, like the order to refund over-recoveries charged to their customers.
When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected by public interest, it ceases to be juris privati
only and becomes subject to regulation. As the state agency charged with the regulation of electric cooperatives, ERC is
mandated to protect public interest by directing NEECO to refund over-charges it made to its consumers. Moreover, the
computation made by the ERC to determine the cap was a mechanism purely for cost-recovery and should not be income-
generating.
Nor can the cost-recovery mechanism imposed be deemed an impairment of the contracts entered into by
NEECO prior to the enactment of RA 7832 since all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures
taken by the State to promote public welfare (Nueva Ecija Electric Coop., Inc (NEECOI) v. ERC, G.R. No. 180642, February
3, 2016).
R.A. Nos. 9257 & 94427 do not violate the equal protection clause
"The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from another." For a classification to be valid, (1) it must be based upon substantial
distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
To recognize all senior citizens as a group, without distinction as to income, is a valid classification. The
Constitution itself considered the elderly as a class of their own and deemed it a priority to address their needs. When the
Constitution declared its intention to prioritize the predicament of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children, it did not make any reservation as to income, race, religion or any. other personal circumstances. It was a blanket
privilege afforded the group of citizens in the enumeration in view of the vulnerability of their class.
R.A. No. 9257 is an implementation of the avowed policy of the Constitution to enact measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities. Specifically, it
caters to the welfare of all senior citizens. The classification is based on age and therefore qualifies all who have attained
the age of 60. Senior citizens are a class of their own, who are in need and should be entitled to government support, and
the fact that they may still be earning for their own sustenance should not disqualify them from the privilege.
Eminent Domain
The Two (2) Types of “Taking” under the Power of Eminent Domain
39 |ABRC2018.Magic Areas in Political Law (revised with insertions)revised/EVSA/crys
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the government
confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of the property. (City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005)
In Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al. (G.R. No. 189185, August
16, 2016), it was ruled that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone in all agricultural entities under Section 6 of an
ordinance of Davao City prohibiting aerial spraying unduly did not deprive all agricultural landowners in that City of the
beneficial use of their property amounting to taking without just compensation, hence did not amount to taking. Citing City
of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. (G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005), it clarified that taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially
divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property. According to the Court:
The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the effects of aerial
spraying within and near the plantations. Although Section 3(e) of the ordinance requires the planting of
diversified trees within the identified buffer zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed as
confiscatoy requiring payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be entitled to compensation if the
taking amounts to a permanent denial of all economically beneficial or productive uses of the land. The
respondents cannot be said to be permanently and completely deprived of their landholdings because they can
still cultivate or make other productive uses of the areas to be identified as the buffer zones.
RA No. 8974 otherwise known as An Act to Facilitate Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Project
and for Other Purposes provides for guidelines for expropriation proceedings.
The requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real property are: (1)
the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2) due notice to the defendant; (3) payment of
an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR
including payment of the value of the improvements and/or structures if any, or if no such valuation is available and in
cases of utmost urgency, the payment of the proffered value of the property to be seized; and (4) presentation to the court
of a certificate of availability of funds from the proper officials.
Upon compliance with the requirements, a complainant in an expropriation case is entitled to a writ of possession
as a matter of right, and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue the writ of possession. No
hearing is required, and the court exercises neither its discretion nor its judgment in determining the amount of the
provisional value of the properties to be expropriated, as the legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 8974. (Rep. v. Far East Ent. Inc., et al., G.R. No. 176487, August 25, 2009 citing Capitol Steel Corp. v. PHIVIDEC
Industrial Authority, G.R. No. 169453, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 590).
ELECTION LAWS
Requirement to be met to justify the cancellation of a COC on the ground of material/false representation.
In order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation pertains to
a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right
to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. (Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377, 386
[1999]). The material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the
requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided
for in the Local Government Code. (Villafuerte v. Commission on Election, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014, 717 SCRA
312, 323, citing Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, supra, at 389, citing RA 7160, Section 39 on qualifications).
Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. (Arnado v. COMELEC, et al., G.R.
No. 210164, August 18, 2015, Del Castillo, J). So, when he stated in his COC that he was qualified to run despite using his
foreign passport after renouncing his other citizenship, he committed material misrepresentation.
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election. (Agustin v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin, J).
Sections 78 and 68 of the OEC should not be confused.
A Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or confused with a Section 68 petition. The remedies under the
two sections are different, for they are based on different grounds, and can result in different eventualities. A person who
is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied
due course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his status is that of a person who has not filed a
CoC. Miranda v. Abaya has clarified that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted
pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due
course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate (Talaga v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 196804; 197015, October 9, 2012, Bersamin, J).
Effect if candidate was declared disqualified by final judgment before election day, effect on votes cast for him.
The effect of his disqualification depends upon whenthe disqualification attained finality. The distinction exists
because of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), which states that any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Cayat v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163776, and G.R. No. 165736, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23; Agustin v. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin, J).
Substitution of candidate.
Substitution to be valid, the existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua not for a valid substitution.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate
under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may
not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as
any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate (Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999).
Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code
may not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a substitution if the substitute candidate submits
prior to the election a sworn CoC as required by Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code (Luna v. Comelex, G.R. No.
165983, April 25, 2007; Talaga v. Comelec, G.R. No. 196804; 197015, October 9, 2012, Bersamin, J).
Administrative Law
The Philippine Baseline Law (RA 9522) can constitutionally “convert” internal waters into archipelagic waters,
hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including over flight.
Whether referred to as Philippine “internal waters” under Article I of the Constitution or as “archipelagic waters”
under UNCLOS III (Article 49(1)), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. The fact of sovereignty, however, does not
preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation,
consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the
Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes
within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. (Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v. Eduardo
Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011).
Under Sec. 31 of the UNCLOS, a flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the
Coastal State resulting from non-compliance with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage
through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
Although the US has not yet ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long standing policy the US considers itself bound
by customary international rules on the traditional uses of the ocean as codified in the UNCLOS.
Section 1.Precautionary Hold Departure Order. – is an order in writing issued by a court commanding the
Bureau of Immigration to prevent any attempt by a person suspected of a crime to depart from the Philippines, which shall
be issued ex-parte in cases involving crimes where the minimum of the penalty prescribed by law is at least six (6) years
and one (1) day.
Section.Where filed. – The application for precautionary hold departure order may be filed by a prosecutor with
any regional trial court within whose territorial jurisdiction the alleged crime was committed. Provided, that for
compelling reason, it can be filed with any regional trial court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if
the place of the commission of the crime is known; Provided, further, that the regional trial courts in the City of Manila,
Quezon City, Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City, and Cagayan de Oro City shall also have the authority to act on applications
filed by the prosecutor based on complaints instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation, regardless where the
alleged crime was committed.
Section 3.Finding of probable cause. – Upon motion by the complainant in a criminal complaint filed before the
office of the city or provincial prosecutor, and upon a preliminary determination of probable cause based on the complaint
and attachment, the investigating prosecutor may file an application on behalf of the complainant for a precautionary hold
departure order with the proper regional trial court. The application shall be accompanied by the complaint-affidavit and
its attachments, and a photo of the respondent, if available.
Section 4.Grounds for issuance. – A precautionary hold departure order shall not issue except upon
determination by the judge, in whose court the application is filed, that probable cause exists, and there is a high
probability that he or she will depart from the Philippines to evade arrest and prosecution of crime against him or her. The
judge shall personally examine under oath or affirmation, in the form of searching questions and answers in writing, the
applicant and the witnesses he or she may produce on facts personally known to them and attaching to the record their
sworn statements.
If the judge finds that probable cause exists and there is a high probability that the respondent will depart, he or
she shall issue the order and direct the Bureau of Immigration to hold and prevent the departure of the respondent at the
Philippine ports. Otherwise, the judge shall order the dismissal of the application.
Section 5.Preliminary finding of probable cause. – Since the finding of probable cause by the judge is solely
based on the complaint and is specifically issued for the purpose of issuing the hold departure order, the same shall be
Section 6.Form and validity of the precautionary hold departure order. – The precautionary hold departure
order shall indicate the name of the respondent, his or her alleged crime; the time and place of its commission, and the
name of the complainant. A copy of the application, and photograph of the respondent, if available, shall be appended to
the order. The order shall be valid until recalled by the court.
The court shall furnish the Bureau of Immigration with a copy of the hold departure order within twenty-four
(24) hours from issuance.
Section 7.Lifting of the Order. – The respondent may file a verified motion before the issuing court for the
cancellation of the order on the grounds that, based on the complaint-affidavit and the evidence that he or she will present,
there is doubt that probable cause exists; or it is shown that he or she is not a flight risk; Provided, that the respondent
posts a bond. Provided, further, that the filing of the order is without prejudice to the resolution of the preliminary
investigation against the respondent.
Section 8.Bond. – Respondent may ask the issuing court to allow him or her to leave the country upon posting a
bond in an amount to be determined by the court.
God Bless