REGALIAN DOCTRINE
141 provides
[CASE] Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains
and ancestral lands may be acquired in two
modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral
lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under
the Public Land Act and the Land Registration
Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights
to lands and domains which, as far back as memory
reaches, have been held under a claim of private
ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands
and are thus indisputably presumed to have been
held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to
lands and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These
lands are deemed never to have been public lands
and are indisputably presumed to have been held
that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The
rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which
also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title
shall be recognized and respected.127 Formal
recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned,
shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title
of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories
identified and delineated.
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private
ownership of land by native title. Native title,
however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly
granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and
domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral
lands and domains held by native title as never to
have been public land. Domains and lands held under
native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to
have never been public lands and are private.
Ownership over lands with native title still remains
to the State; however, indigenous people are given
preference for the utilization and exploitation of
lands which are part of the ancestral domains.
BASIC CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINES
[CASE] Dir. of Lands vs. CA
Sec. 6 of the Commonwealth Act No.
that the classification or reclassification of public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest
lands is now a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government through the Office of
the President and NOT the courts.
Positive act of the government is needed to declassify
land which is classified as forest and to convert it
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes. Unless and until the land classified
as forest is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
The possession of forest land, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership. A parcel of forest land
is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry
and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
cadastral court to register under the Torrens
System.
[CASE] Dir. of Lands and Dir. of Forest
Development vs. CA
Regalian Doctrine states that all lands of public
domain belong to the State, and that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
In the absence of any classification by the Executive
Department, the land remains as unclassified land
until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition in accordance with the Constitution and
Regalian Doctrine.
Non-presentation of evidence that the property is
within the unclassified region will not operate
against the State under the rule that the State
cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error
of its officials or agents, if omission there was, in fact.
A survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely
identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial
proceeding for adjudication of title to any of the
lands upon claim of interested parties. It does not
follow that all lands comprise in the cadastral survey
are automatically released as alienable. Besides, if
land is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest
Development, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of
the Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens
System.
Where property is still unclassified, possession of
applicants, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.

Conversion of property into fishpond or titling of
properties surrounding the subject land, does not
automatically render the subject land as alienable
and disposable, the remedy is the release of the
property from its present classification.
[CASE] Republic vs. Lee
“No person is entitled to have land registered under
the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the
owner in fee simple of the same, even though there is
no opposition presented against such registration by
third persons.” The burden of proof is upon the
applicant to show that he is the real and absolute
owner in fee simple.
No public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the
government.
All lands that were not acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain. Hence, a grant is conclusively
presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, has occupied
the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and under
a claim of title since July 26, 1894 or prior thereto.
To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence.
Lands of whatever classification belong to the State.
It retains its rights over the same as dominus unless
alienated in accordance with law.
The bare statement of the applicant that the land
applied for has been in the possession of her
predecessors-in-interest for more than 20 years,
does not constitute the ‘well-nigh incontrovertible’
and ‘conclusive’ evidence required in land
registration cases.
“Private respondent should have presented specific
facts that would have shown the nature of such
possession. The phrase ‘adverse, continuous, open,
public, peaceful, and in concept of owner’ by which
she described her own possession in relation to that
of her predecessors-in-interest are mere conclusions
of law which require factual support and
substantiation.”
[CASE] Dir. of Land Management vs. CA
Alienable public land held by the possessor
(personally or through his predecessors-in-interest)
OCEN for the prescribed statutory period of 30 years
(Commonwealth Act No. 141) is converted to private
property by mere lapse of completion of said period
by operation of law.
Possessors shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to gov’t grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. It is not
just a right to a grant but the grant itself. Thus,
public land becomes private land.
It is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued
in order that said grants be sustained by the courts.
An application is sufficient.
Juco’s admission in his application for free patent
that the land he was applying for is a public land did
not divest the title he already had even before he filed
the application on Aug. 1971.
Since the land become a private land, the Bureau of
Lands has NO jurisdiction.
REGISTRATION OF TITLES
[CASE] Garcia vs. CA
A transfer certificate of title (TCT) cannot be
nullified by the issuance 43-years later of another
TCT over the same lot to another person due to the
failure of the Register of Deeds to cancel the Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) preceding the title issued
previously (to Lapus).
In the case of two certificates of title, purporting to
include the same land, the earlier in date prevails,
whether the land comprised in the latter certificate
be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier
certificate.
In case of double registration, the owner of the land
applies to the successive vendees of the owners of
such certificates. The vendee of the earlier certificate
would be the owner of the later certificate.
In cases of involuntary registration, an entry thereof
in the day book is a sufficient notice to all persons
even if the owner’s duplicate certificate of title is not
presented to the register of deeds.
In case of voluntary registration, an innocent
purchaser for value of registered land becomes the
registered owner, and, in contemplation of law, the
holder of a certificate of title, the moment he
presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of
sale and the same is entered in the day book and at
the same time he surrenders or presents the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title covering the land sold
and pays the registration fees.
CHARACTERISTICS OF TORRENS SYSTEM OF
When a conveyance has been properly recorded,
REGISTRATION
such record is constructive notice of its contents and
all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the
purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrefutable.
He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the
record and is presumed to know every fact which an
examination of the record would have disclosed.
[CASE] Gonzales vs. CA
As between the parties to a donation of an
immovable property, all that is required is for said
donation to be contained in a public document (duly
notarized). Although the non-registration of a deed
of donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity
of registration comes into play when the rights of
third persons are affected. Thus, in order to bind
third persons, the donation must be registered in the
Registry of Land Titles and Deeds.
It is actually the act of registration that operates to
convey registered land or affect title thereto.
Registration in a public registry creates constructive
notice to the whole world.
No deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary
instrument, except a will purporting to convey or
affect registered land, shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only
as a contract between parties and as evidence of
authority to the Register of Deeds to make
registration.
Non-registration of a deed of donation does not bind
other parties ignorant of a previous transaction.
Tenant-farmers who are beneficiaries of PD 27 are
considered ‘third persons’ contemplated in laws on
registration.
The unregistered deed of donation cannot operate to
exclude the subject land from the coverage of the
Operation Land Transfer of PD 27. By virtue of PD
27, tenant-farmers are deemed owners of the land
they till. This policy is intended to be given effect by
a provision of the law which declares that, ‘the
tenant-farmer, whether in land classified as landed
estate or not, shall be DEEMED OWNER of a portion
constituting a family size farm of 5-hectares if not
irrigated and 3-hectares if irrigated (PD 27, (3)).
[CASE] Magay vs. Estiandan
Validity of torrens title cannot be collaterally
attacked (in accion publiciana). The issue on the
validity of the title can only be raised in action
expressly instituted for that purpose.
It is the Solicitor General, in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines, who is the proper party to institute
the reversion of the land to public domain.
[CASE] Heirs of Brusas vs. CA
It is a fundamental principle in land registration that
the certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein.
A title once registered under the Torrens System
cannot be defeated even by adverse, open, and
notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by
prescription.
It is a notice to the whole world and as such all
persons are bound by it and no one can plead
ignorance of the registration.
The real purpose of the Torrens System of land
registration is to quiet title to land and stop forever
any question as to its legality. Indeed, titles over
lands under the Torrens system should be given
stability for on it greatly depends the stability of the
country’s economy.
When a person obtains a certificate of title to a land
belonging to another and he has full knowledge of
the rights of the true owner, he is considered guilty
of fraud, and he may be compelled to transfer the
land to the defrauded owner so long as the property
has not passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value.
Mere allegations of fraud are not enough.
Intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his
right, or in some manner injure him, must be
specifically alleged and proved.
Survey and subdivision plans are inferior proofs of
ownership and cannot prevail against the original
certificate of title.
Tax Declarations and Tax receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land,
in the absence of any other strong evidence to
support them. Tax receipts and tax declarations are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
An affidavit of waiver, being a public document duly
acknowledged before a notary public, under his hand
and seal, with his certificate thereto attached, is
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Bureau of Lands enjoyed the presumption of
regularity in the performance of its official duties.
As a general rule, the findings of the Court of
Appeals are final and conclusive, and cannot
ordinarily be reviewed by this Court as long as they
are based on substantial evidence.
Exceptions are:
(a) when the conclusion is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible;
(c) where there is grave abuse of discretion;
ALLOWABLE APPLICATION AND APPLICANTS
(d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
(e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; and,
(f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
goes beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and
appellee.
[CASE] Lahora vs. Dayanghirang Jr.
Where land is granted by the government to a
private individual, the corresponding patent
therefor is, recorded, and the certificate of title is
issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is
automatically brought within the operation of the
Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee
becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in
Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon
expiration of one year from its issuance, the
certificate of title shall become irrevocable and
indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration
proceeding.
Having become registered land under Act 496, for all
legal purposes, by the issuance of the public land
patent and the recording thereof, further
registration of the same would lead to the obviously
undesirable result of two certificates of title being
issued for the same piece of land, even if both
certificates should be in the name of the same person.
And if they were to be issued to different persons, the
indefeasibility of the first title, which is the most
valued characteristics of Torrens Titles, would be
torn away. Hence, in a cadastral case the court has
no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of
land already decreed in an earlier case; and that a
second decree for the same land would be null and
void. Of course, if the patent had been issued during
the pendency of the registration proceedings, the
situation would be different.
The action for review of the decree should have been
filed before the one year period had elapsed.
Thereafter, the proper party to bring the action
would only be the person prejudiced by the alleged
fraudulent act—the owner and grantor—and not
another applicant or claimant.
The relief provided by the law in such instance may
be secured by the aggrieved party in an appropriate
action such as one for reconveyance or reversion, or
for damages in case the property has passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
[CASE] Republic vs. Herbieto
Since the Property Registration Decree is silent as to
the situation wherein two applicants filed a single
application for two parcels of land, but are seeking
the separate and individual registration of the
parcels of land in their respective names, the Court
refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper
course of action.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not
involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear
and decide the case—they are not even accepted as
grounds for dismissal thereof. The defect in the joint
application for registration filed by the respondents
with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of
action and parties. Instead of a single or joint
application for registration, respondents should
have filed separate applications for registration of
Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and
jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there
be constructive seizure of the land through
publication and service of notice.
Even as the Supreme Court concedes that Section
23(1) of the Property Registration Decree expressly
provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall
be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land
registration court, it still affirms its declaration in
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 276
(1996), that publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is mandatory for the land registration
court to validly confirm and register the title of the
applicant or applicants. The reason is due process
and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as
widely read and circulated as newspaper and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the
notices published therein may not reach the
interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such
parties may not be owners of neighboring
properties, and may in fact not own any other real
estate.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing
in the newspaper of general circulation is
tantamount to no publication at all, having the same
ultimate result.
No public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the
government; and it is indispensable that the person
claiming title to public land should show that his title
was acquired from the State or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law.
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of
the public domain, except timber and mineral lands,
friar lands, and privately-owned lands which
reverted to the State. It explicitly enumerates the
means by which public lands may be disposed, as
follows: (1) For homestead settlement; (2) By sale;
(3) By lease; (4) By confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles; (a) By judicial legalization; or (b)
By administrative legalization (free patent).
Any period of possession prior to the date when
public lands were classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession—
such possession can never ripen into ownership and
unless the land had been classified as alienable and
disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title shall not apply thereto.
Under the Property Registration Decree, there
already exists a title which is confirmed by the court,
while under the Public Land Act, the presumption
always is that the land applied for pertains to the
State, and that the occupants and possessors only
claim an interest in the same by virtue of their
imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious
possession; Even as an applicant may acquire
imperfect or incomplete title to certain lots under
the Public Land Act, his application for judicial
confirmation or legalization must be in accordance
with the Property Registration Decree
The Public Land Act may be considered a special law
that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a
general law.
[CASE] Meralco vs. Castro-Bartolome
Land Registration; Public Land Act; A land
maintains its status as public land until a Torrens
tide is issued covering it.—We hold that, as between
the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public
land. It would cease to be public land only upon the
issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino
citizen claiming it under section 48(b), Because it is
still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical
person, is disqualified to apply for its registration
under section 48(b), Meralco’s application cannot be
given due course or has to be dismissed.
That means that until the certificate of title is issued,
a piece of land, over which an imperfect title is
sought to be confirmed, remains public land. For that
reason in the Uy Un case, it was held that if that land
was attached by a judgment creditor of the
applicant, while his application for confirmation of
his imperfect title was pending in the Bureau of
Lands, the levy and execution sale of the land were
void.
Meralco being a juridical person cannot apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title as a
proceeding for confirmation of imperfect title
presupposes that the land is a public land.—Finally,
it may be observed that the constitutional
prohibition makes no distinction between (on one
hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which
no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other
hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to
which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to
judicial confirmation. Since Section 11 of Article XIV
does not distinguish, we should not make any
distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies
to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title
may be secured under Section 48(b). The proceeding
under section 48(b) “presupposes that the land is
public”
Fernando, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
Meralco as a juridical person is disqualified to apply
for land registration under Sec. 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act. However by legal fiction the Court can
decide the matter as if the transferors, the Piguing
spouses applied for registration.—I concur in the
ruling of the Court that Meralco “as a juridical
person” is disqualified to apply for its registration
under Section 48 (b). I dissent insofar as the opinion
of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional
defect, under the particular circumstances of this
case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief
sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts
could be distinguished, the approach followed by us
in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal
question raised, instead of being deferred and
possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By
legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable
jurisdiction. I feel that the realistic solution would be
to decide the matter as if the application under
Section 48 (b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who
I assume suffer from no such disability.
Abad Santos, J., concurring in the result:
The lands involved in this case are private lands, but
the petitioner as a corporation cannot ask for
confirmation of its title under Sec. 48 of the Public
Land Act.—I concur in the result. I am of the opinion
that the lots which are sought to be registered have
ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time
they were acquired by the petitioner corporation.
They are already private lands because of acquisitive
prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner
and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title.
Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no
private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable.
However, the petitioner is relying on Sec. 48 of the
Public Land Act for the confirmation of its title and
Mr. Justice Aquino is correct in holding that said
provision cannot be availed by juridical entities.
De Castro, J., separate opinion:
The land involved in this case has not yet become
private land there being no award yet of title by the
courts.—I cannot subscribe to the view that the land
as above described has become private land, even
before title thereto, which is, as of this stage, said to
be still “an incomplete or imperfect title,” has been
fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed
procedure known as judicial confirmation of
incomplete or imperfect title. This is the only legal
method by which full and absolute title to the land
may be granted, to convert the land into a truly
private land To secure such judicial title, only the
courts can be resorted to.
It is because of the divestiture of authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject to
judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect
title that some statements are found in many cases,
such as those cited by Justice Teehankee, to the effect
that such land has ceased to be public land. What
these statements, however, really mean is that the
land referred to no longer forms part of the mass of
public domain still disposable by the Director of
Lands, under the authority granted him by the public
land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the
land covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act has
itself become private land. The fact that its
disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act which
deals with “public land” gives rise to the very strong
implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land
referred to is still public land. Only when the court
adjudicates the land to the applicant for
confirmation of title would the land become
privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the
court may declare it public land, depending on the
evidence.
Teehankee, J., dissenting:
The Meralco is qualified to register the lands
involved in this case which were already private
lands, by operation of law, when acquired by it.—
In Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, the Court held that “(I)n
the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424, it was
observed that where all the necessary requirements
for a grant by the Government are complied with
through actual physical possession openly,
continuously, and publicly, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926
(carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act
No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have already
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts.—
an application therefor being sufficient under the
provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced
as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141),” and
“(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the
trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the
ground that plaintiff’s action is already barred by
the statute of limitations, which apparently is
predicated on the theory that a decree of
registration can no longer be impugned on the
ground of fraud one year after the issuance and
entry of the decree, which theory does not apply
here because the property involved is allegedly
private in nature and has ceased to be part of the
public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial
court erred in dismissing the case outright without
giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim.”

In fine, since under the Court’s settled doctrine,
the acquisitive prescription of alienable or
disposable public lands provided for now in section
48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act takes place by
operation of law and the public land is converted to
and becomes private property upon a showing of
open and unchallenged possession under bona
fide claim of ownership by the applicants’
predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application and “it is not necessary that a certificate
of title should be issued in order that said grant may
be sanctioned by the court” which right is expressly
backed up by the conclusive presumption or
presumption juris et de jure of the statute that the
possessor has “performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant,” the applicant Meralco
cannot be said to be barred as a corporation from
filing the application for registration of the private
property duly acquired by it.
The majority doctrine is impractical.—To uphold
respondent judge’s denial of Meralco’s application
on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows
only citizens of the Philippines who are natural
persons to apply for confirmation of their title would
be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there
was a technical error in not having filed the
application for registration in the name of the
Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no
prohibition against their sale of the land to the
applicant Meralco and neither is there any
prohibition against the application being refiled
with retroactive effect in the name of the original
owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with
the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of
ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
presumption therein provided in their favor. It
should not be necessary to go through all the rituals
at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in
their names and adding to the overcrowded court
dockets when the Court can after all these years
dispose of it here and now.
[CASE] Dir. of Lands vs. IAC and ACME
Veneer and Plywood Co
A juridical confirmation proceeding should at most
be limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of
time as it is not so much one to confer title as it is to
recognize a title already vested.—Nothing can more
clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of
considering possession of public land which is of the
character and duration prescribed by statute as the
equivalent of an express grant from the State than
the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s)
"x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title x x x." No proof being admissible to
overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining
whether the possession claimed is of the required
character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply
recognize a title already vested. The proceedings
would not originally convert the land from public to
private land, but only confirm such a conversion
already affected by operation of law from the
moment the required period of possession became
complete. As was so well put in Cariño, "x x x (T)here
are indications that registration was expected from
all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect
of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title,
but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law."
The 1973 Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
Thus where land was acquired in 1962 when
corporations were allowed to acquire lands not
beyond 1,024 hectares, the same may be registered
in 1982 although under 1973 Constitution
corporations cannot acquire lands of the public
domain.—Even on the proposition that the land
remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their
ancestors, until title in their favor was actually
confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the
Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of
Acme's right to acquire the land at the time it did,
there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution
that might be construed to prohibit corporations
from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land
to which the vendor had already acquired that type
of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The
only limitation then extant was that corporations
could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely
accidental circumstance that confirmation
proceedings were brought under the aegis of the
1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from
owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a
right already vested before that law came into effect,
or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and
proper. This Court has already held, in analogous
circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair
vested rights.
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation
proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name
must be regarded as simply another accidental
circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more
than procedural and in nowise affecting the
substance and merits of the right of ownership
sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there
being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As
it is unquestionable that in the light of the
undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or
the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in
themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid
subservience to the letter of the law would deny the
same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by
valid conveyance which violates no constitutional
mandate.
The ruling in MERALCO vs. CASTROBARTOLOME
(114 SCRA 799), that public land ceases to be so only
upon issuance of a certificate of title, is hereby
reconsidered and abandoned. Correct rule is that in
Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil 424.—The Court, in the light
of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the
majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and
no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The
correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases
already referred to, is that alienable public land held
by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30
years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that
rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land
subject of this appeal was already private property
at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme.
Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there
being at the time no prohibition against said
corporation's holding or owning private land. The
objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not
qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title
under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds
its answer in the dissent in Meralco.
A corporation that acquired private land in 1962
may have it registered in 1982 despite the
prohibition in the 1973 Constitution which cannot be
given retroactive effect as to impair vested rights.—
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from
reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter
from themselves applying for confirmation of title
and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their
names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this
would be merely indulging in empty charades,
whereas the same result is more efficaciously and
speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a
liberal application of the rule on amendment to
conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in
Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier
ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real
sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and
re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of
which has passed the test of searching examination
and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth
noting that the majority opinion, as well as the
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and
Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the
proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical
person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article
XIV, Section 11, was only tangential, limited to a
brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in
that context, be considered as essentially obiter.
Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
The provision that only natural persons may apply
for confirmation of title is a technicality of
procedure, not of substance.—The cited Act's
provision that only natural persons may apply
thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a
technicality of procedure and not of substance. My
submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly
applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served,
therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the
evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to
apply for formal confirmation of the title that they
had acquired by conclusive presumption and
mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter
duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to
hold and own private lands) and granting the
applications for confirmation of title to the private
lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." Indeed,
then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise
dissented along the same line from the majority
ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the
opinion of the Court would characterize such
jurisdictional defect that the applicant
was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the
natural persons-transferors, under the particular
circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable
obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by
analogy, although the facts could be distinguished,
the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of
Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of
being deferred and possibly taken up in another case,
was resolved.
Reason for limiting filing of applications to natural
persons.—To my mind, the reason why the Act limits
the filing of such applications to natural citizens who
may prove their undisputed and open possession of
public lands for the required statutory thirtyyear
period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest
possession is that only natural persons, to the
exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations,
can actually, physically and in reality possess public
lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That
juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is
obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled
the required statutory period of possession, the Act
confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable
title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law
that they file the applications for confirmation of
their title, although they have lawfuly transferred
their title to the land. But such procedural failure
cannot and should not defeat the substance of the
law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the
lands are already private lands because
of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's
predecessors and the realistic solution would be to
consider the application for confirmation as filed by
the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance
with the evidence, confirm their title to the private
lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully
transferred by them to the corporation. The law,
after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and
sale of the private land to the corporation. It should
not be necessary to go in a round-about way and
have the corporation reassign its rights to the
private land to natural persons—(as I understand,
was done after the decision in the Meralco and
lglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of
complying on paper with the technicality of having
natural persons file the application for confirmation
of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
The effect of the majority opinion is to nullify the
statutory provision that only natural persons can
apply for a Torrens Title.—The effect is that the
majority opinion now nullifies the statutory
provision that only citizens (natural persons) can
apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional
provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits
corporations from acquiring title to lands of the
public domain. That interpretation or construction
adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A
construction adopted should not be such as to nullify,
destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature."
The court should promote, not defeat statutory
policy.—The statutory provision and the
constitutional prohibition express a public policy.
The proper course for the Court to take is to promote
in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and
to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat
that policy.
[CASE] Borromeo vs. Descallar
Co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise
capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In
the instant case, respondent was still legally married
to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In
such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership
exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of
the partners to prove his or her actual contribution
to the acquisition of property in order to be able to
lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-
ownership and equal contribution do not apply.—
The fact that the disputed properties were acquired
during the couple’s cohabitation also does not help
respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a
man and a woman living exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other,
does not apply. In the instant case, respondent was
still legally married to another when she and
Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous
relationship, no co-ownership exists between the
parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to
prove his or her actual contribution to the
acquisition of property in order to be able to lay
claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-
ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It
is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence
with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title
are not a source of right. The mere possession of a
title does not make one the true owner of the
property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has
the titles of the disputed properties in her name does
not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make
her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title
likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate
of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is
perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there
are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the
transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not
acquire the subject properties for a valuable
consideration.—It is settled that registration is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of
confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the
world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of
right. The mere possession of a title does not make
one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere
fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed
properties in her name does not necessarily,
conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The
rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply
to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the
title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and
indefeasible. However, there are well-defined
exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not
a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject
properties for a valuable consideration. This is the
situation in the instant case. Respondent did not
contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the
properties. She had no income of her own at that
time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two
sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.
The ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation’s
land for future generations of Filipinos. As the
property in dispute is already in the hands of a
qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no
more public policy to be protected. The objective of
the constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.—The rationale
behind the Court’s ruling in United Church Board for
World Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases,
is this—since the ban on aliens is intended to
preserve the nation’s land for future generations of
Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the
acquisition of real estate by aliens who became
Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers
made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in
dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person,
a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public
policy to be protected. The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
hands has been achieved.
[CASE] Republic vs. CA and Sps. Lapina
Natural Resources; Land Registration; Confirmation
of Imperfect Title; It matters not whether the
vendee/applicant has been in possession of the
subject property for only a day so long as the period
and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title
has been complied by his predecessor-in-interest, the
said period being tacked to his possession.—It must
be noted that with respect to possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, the law employs the terms “by
themselves,” “the applicant himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest.” Thus, it matters not
whether the vendee/applicant has been in
possession of the subject property for only a day so
long as the period and/or legal requirements for
confirmation of title has been complied with by his
predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to
his possession. In the case at bar, respondents’
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even
as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except
that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in
possession of the land sought to be registered only in
1978 and therefore short of the required length of
time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were
acquired by private respondents through their
predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in
open and continued possession thereof since 1937.
Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their
predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof,
acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm
what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect
title.
Occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years
by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest
title on such applicant so as to segregate the land
from the mass of public land.—Subsequent cases
have hewed to the above pronouncement such that
open, continuous and exclusive possession for at
least 30 years of alienable public land ipso
jure converts the same to private property (Director
of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA,
183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that occupation
and cultivation for more than 30 years by an
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title
on such applicant so as to segregate the land from
the mass of public land.
When the conditions set by law are complied with,
the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued; The Torrens system was not established as a
means for the acquisition of title to private land, as
it merely confirms, but does not confer ownership.—
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must
prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and
(b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must
be either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands
v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions
set by law are complied with, the possessor of the
land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant,
a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued (National Power
Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to
be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the
authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. In
other words, the Torrens system was not established
as a means for the acquisition of title to private land
(Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32
[1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer
ownership.
The Constitution allows natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship to acquire
private lands; BP 185 governs the disposition of
private lands in favor of natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship.—
But what should not be missed in the disposition of
this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows
private respondents to register the contested parcels
of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII
of the Constitution contain the pertinent provisions.
Section 8 is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the
then 1973 Constitution. Pursuant thereto, B.P. 185
was passed into law. From the adoption of the 1987
Constitution up to the present, no other law has been
passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus,
what governs the disposition of private lands in favor
of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his
Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
A foreign national may apply for registration of title
over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the Philippines from a vendor
who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the law.—Even if private
respondents were already Canadian citizens at the
time they applied for registration of the properties in
question, said properties as discussed above were
already private lands; consequently, there could be
no legal impediment for the registration thereof by
respondents in view of what the Constitution
ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered
no longer form part of the public domain. They are
already private in character since private
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession and
occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior
to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost
his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a
private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq. m., if
urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be
used by him as his residence (BP 185). It is
undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a
private land, were natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or
acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not
significant whether private respondents are no
longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or
registered the parcels of land in question. What is
important is that private respondents were formerly
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as
transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of
Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering
that private respondents were able to prove the
requisite period and character of possession of their
predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their
application for registration of title must perforce be
approved.
The requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 are primarily
directed to the register of deeds before whom
compliance therewith is to be submitted.—The Court
is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP
185 do not apply in the instant case since said
requirements are primarily directed to the register
of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be
submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated,
much less implied, that the requirements must
likewise be submitted before the land registration
court prior to the approval of an application for
registration of title. An application for registration
of title before a land registration court should not be
confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by
the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of
the land registration court approving the
application for registration has become final that a
decree of registration is issued. And that is the time
when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the
register of deeds should be complied with by the
applicants. This decree of registration is the one that
is submitted to the office of the register of deeds for
issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the
applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of
registration, the register of deeds has no
participation in the approval of the application for
registration of title as the decree of registration is
yet to be issued.
[CASE] Mendoza vs. CA
The finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner
caused the registration of the lands in question in
favor of the respondents is a factual finding that the
Supreme Court, as a rule will not disturb in a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.—But
whether or not the petitioner did in fact cause the
registration of the land in favor of private
respondents in a question of fact which cannot
properly be raised in the present petition for review
inasmuch as Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that in an appeal from the Court
of Appeals to this Court, only questions of law may be and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to
raised. Thus, the finding of the Court of Appeals that the case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances
petitioner caused the registration of the land in favor obtaining in this case show that these requirements
of the private respondents cannot now be raised in have been complied with.
this Appeal much less disturbed by this Court.
A decree of registration may be set aside only on the
Factual finding of the Court of Appeals in the case at ground of fraud in obtaining the same, not on the
bar was based on evidence and was not grounded on ground of failure of the vendee to pay the purchase
conjecture.—A careful study and consideration of price.—It is clear from the foregoing provision that
the records of the case, however, belie petitioner’s the only ground upon which a decree of registration
claim that he did not testify relative to the may be set aside is fraud in obtaining the same. In
aforementioned deed of sale. The transcript of the the instant case, applicant-petitioner cannot
stenographic notes of the hearing on the application complain of fraud in obtaining the decree of
for registration held on July 6, 1965 all too clearly registration for as heretofore stated, it was solely
show that petitioner and his wife testified before the upon his testimony and proof that the lots were
deputed commissioner, Mr. Ricardo Cruz, that they ordered registered in the names of the vendees-
sold the property sought to be registered to the respondents and it was also upon his motion that the
private respondents. decree of registration was issued by the lower court.
What the applicant-petitioner actually invokes in
Section 29 of the Land Registration Act authorizes this case is not fraud in obtaining the decree of
the registration of land subject of a registration registration but the alleged failure of the vendees-
proceeding in the name of the person to whom the respondents to pay the purchase price of the
land was conveyed during the time between the landholdings.
filing of the application for registration and issuance
of the decree of title.—It is clear from the above-
quoted provision that the law expressly allows the
land, subject matter of an application for
registration, to be “dealt with”, i.e., to be disposed of
or encumbered during the interval of time between
the filing of the application and the issuance of the
decree of title, and to have the instruments
embodying such disposition or encumbrance
presented to the registration court by the “interested
party” for the court to either “order such land
registered subject to the encumbrance created by
said instruments, or order the decree of registration
issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to
whom the property has been conveyed by said
instruments.

The buyer in whose favor the land subject of a

registration proceeding may be ordered registered
may be a total stranger thereto provided certain
requisites of prior notice to the parties and
presentation of the sales covenant is presented.—
The law does not require that the application for
registration be amended by substituting the “buyer”
or the “person to whom the property has been
conveyed” for the applicant. Neither does it require
that the “buyer” or the “person to whom the property
has been conveyed” be a party to the case. He may
thus be a total stranger to the land registration
proceedings The only requirements of the law are:
(1) that the instrument be presented to the court by
the interested party together with a motion that the
same be considered in relation with the application;