DEVELOPING AVIATION SKILLS

FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

CRITICAL SKILLS OF THE
OF THE 21ST CENTURY
 AVIATION SKILLS
OF THE 21ST CENTURY
…are needed to address:
• New generation of commanders
• Increasing use of technology
• Extensive use of synthetic devices
• Highly reliable aircraft
• Lack of non-normal event exposure
 The
Future Challenges
Preparing for the unexpected

Automation airmanship

Decision – making skills

PREPARING FOR THE UNEXPECTED
LOC-I STATISTICS
SIA’s HISTORY
ON UPRT / LOC-I
• In 2011 EASA Safety
conference in Cologne
where the issue of LOCI was
first highlighted as a concern.

• Since then LOCI has been

included in all recurrent
training.

• FCT sent representatives to

the ICAO conference.

• Attended a 5 day UPRT

specialized training

• Collaborated on the
development of IATA’s UPRT
manual
 AUTOMATION DESIGN
CRITERIA

AUTOMATION DESIGN

OPERATOR
 TECHNOLOGY
SO WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?

 ULTRA RELIABILITY IN AUTOMATION

 LITTLE EXPOSURE TO NON-NORMAL EVENTS ~ SIM
 SUSTAINED ABSENCE OF CRITICAL EVENTS IN NORMAL
LINE FLIGHTS
 NO NECESSITY TO MENTALLY REHEARSE ACTION PLANS
FOR CRITICAL EVENTS
 TECHNOLOGY
SO WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?
FROM THE RECENT HIGH PROFILE ACCIDENTS:
 PILOTS ARE FAR FROM OPTIMAL IN THEIR HANDLING OF
UNEXPECTED EVENTS

 RATHER THAN UTILIZING THEIR SKILLS, TRAINING &

KNOWLEDGE, HAVE UNDERPERFORMED AT EXACTLY THE
TIME WHEN THESE SKILLS WERE MOST NEEDED.

Expectation
of CRITICAL STARTLE
EVENTS EFFECT
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
ACCIDENT/INCIDENT ANALYSIS
 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
STARTLE EFFECT

STARTLE
EFFECT
Up to 30 sec Up to 5 sec

Information Impairment
Physical Impairment
 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
STARTLE EFFECT

STARTLE
EFFECT
WHEN ONES OWN
MORTALITY IS
THREATENED, THE
EFFECTS OF
STARTLE ARE
GREATLY
INCREASED.
 STARTLE EFFECT
RESPONSES TO UNFOLDING DISASTER
10~15%
REMAIN RELATIVELY
CALM

STARTLE
EFFECT
75%
STUNNED &
BEWILDERED
10~15%
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
BEHAVIOUR
 STARTLE EFFECT
RESEARCH USING FLIGHT SIMULATION
TEST PARAMETERS
• FULL FLIGHT SIMULATOR
• 18 TYPE RATED PILOTS.
• IDENTICAL EXERCISE:
• 2 INSTRUMENT APPROACHES WITH
CLOUD BASE REQUIRING A MISSED
APPROACH
• 1ST APPROACH: A STARTLING
STIMULUS WAS INTRODUCED AT 40
FEET ABOVE THE DECISION
ALTITUDE.

• 2ND APPROACH: NO STIMULUS WAS

INTRODUCED ON THE SECOND
APPROACH.
 STARTLE EFFECT
RESEARCH USING FLIGHT SIMULATION
 STARTLE EFFECT
RESEARCH USING FLIGHT SIMULATION

TEST SUMMARY

• THE RESULTS SHOWED THAT

APPROXIMATELY
• 1/3 (N=5) PERFORMED
OPTIMALLY,

• 1/3 (N=6) SHOWED A SLIGHT

REACTIONARY DELAY, AND

• 1/3 (N=7) PERFORMED

SIGNIFICANTLY WORSE THAN
OPTIMAL.
 SELF-EFFICACY
DIFFERENCES IN INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES

SELF-EFFICACIOUS INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE AN ‘ACTION PLAN’ SCHEMA (WHICH IS A

STRONG MEMORY AND IS THEREFORE MORE EASILY RECALLED), ARE FAR MORE LIKELY
TO PERFORM WELL DURING UNEXPECTED CRITICAL EVENTS

SELF-EFFICACY IS DERIVED FROM

 SOUND TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE,
 FROM REGULAR MENTAL REHEARSAL,

 AND FROM A HEALTHY SUSPICION FOR ABNORMALITIES

 DECISION MAKING STRATEGIES
UNDER ACUTE STRESS

ASSOCIATIVE
CODIFIED
STRATEGIES
STRATEGIES ANALYTICAL
STRATEGIES

UNDER ACUTE STRESS, PILOTS FALL BACK ON

CODIFIED STRATEGIES (ACTION PLANS)
 STARTLE CONTROL
S TRA TEGI ES FOR IMP ROVI NG S TAR TLE PER FORM ANCE

MONITOR

KNOWLEDGE

TEM

SENSING DANGER

REHEARSE THE PLAN

 STARTLE CONTROL
S TRA TEGI ES FOR IMP ROVI NG S TAR TLE PER FORM ANCE

EBT

COMMUNICATION
 STARTLE CONTROL
S U C C E S S S T O R I E S

IT DIDN’T HAPPEN BY CHANCE.

IT TOOK YEARS OF PREPARATION TO
DEAL WITH THE UNEXPECTED….
AUTOMATION AIRMANSHIP
WHY ADOPT AUTOMATION
• AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY
• CONCERN FOR SAFETY
• ECONOMY OF OPERATIONS
• WORKLOAD REDUCTION, AND THE CREW COMPLEMENT
ISSUE

• MORE PRECISE FLIGHT MANOEUVRES AND NAVIGATION

• DISPLAY FLEXIBILITY
• ECONOMY OF COCKPIT SPACE
AUTOMATION TECHNOLOGY WILL
CONTINUE TO EVOLVE
 DO WE TRULY UNDERSTAND
WHAT’S UNDER THE HOOD?

• “EXPERTS… HAVE MENTAL MODELS OF

THEIR EQUIPMENT. THEY ARE NOT JUST
PRESSING BUTTONS AND RECEIVING
MESSAGES.”
GARY KLEIN
“SOURCES OF POWER”
HOW PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS
“THE UNDERSTANDING AND APPLICATION OF
AUTOMATION TO AIRMANSHIP, TO ENSURE BALANCED
SITUATIONAL AND MODE AWARENESS AND CREW
WORKLOAD THROUGH THE FULL REALM OF AUTOMATION,
FROM NO AUTOMATION TO FULLY COUPLED, IN ORDER TO
PROVIDE FOR THE SAFEST AND MOST EFFICIENT FLIGHT.”

CHRISTOPHER LUTAT
“AUTOMATION AIRMANSHIP”
NINE PRINCIPLES FOR OPERATING GLASS COCKPIT AIRCRAFT
 AIRMANSHIP VS AUTOMATION
AIRMANSHIP – IS THERE A DIFFERENCE?
 AUTOMATION AIRMANSHIP
THE NINE PRINCIPLES
• PLANNING
• BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING
• DATA ENTRY
• COMMUNICATING
• MONITORING
• SITUATIONAL AND MODE AWARENESS
• WORKLOAD MANAGEMENT
• POSITIVE FLIGHT PATH CONTROL
• LOGIC KNOWLEDGE
Speed of the conveyor belt Beware the multi-tasking myth

MONITORING

Unable to monitor,
Disengage, Move, Engage
Communicate
 Mental model is shared
Displays reflect crew intent
by PF & PM

SITUATIONAL MODE
AWARENESS

Information is up to date with Changes in modes are

correct overlays confirmed by both pilots
 WORKLOAD
MANAGEMENT
 AUTO FLIGHT COUPLED TO FMS, IRS, GPS MODES

INCREASING SMA &

DECREASING CREW
WORKLOAD

AUTO FLIGHT COUPLED TO FLIGHT GUIDANCE

INCREASING SMA &

DECREASING CREW
WORKLOAD

MANUAL FLIGHT WITH FLIGHT DIRECTOR GUIDANCE

INCREASING SMA &

DECREASING CREW
WORKLOAD

MANUAL FLIGHT WITHOUT FLIGHT DIRECTOR GUIDANCE

 INCREASING SMA &
DECREASING CREW
WORKLOAD

MANUAL FLIGHT WITH FLIGHT DIRECTOR GUIDANCE

 Understand the stress
performance relationship Be prepared to fly first

POSITIVE FLIGHT
PATH COTROL

Balance flying, monitoring & Study & practice with crew

workload in unexpected events interfaces until they are error free
 THE GOLDEN RULES FOR PILOTS ARTICLE IN
SAFETY FIRST - THE AIRBUS SAFETY MAGAZINE,
ISSUE 15, JANUARY 2013, STATES THAT…

• ON HIGHLY AUTOMATED AND INTEGRATED AIRCRAFT, SEVERAL LEVELS

OF AUTOMATION ARE AVAILABLE TO PERFORM A GIVEN TASK;

• AND THE ‘APPROPRIATE’ LEVEL OF AUTOMATION DEPENDS ON THE

SITUATION AND TASK.

• IT ADVISES FLIGHT CREW TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPLICATION OF THE

INTENDED LEVEL OF AUTOMATION.

• BEING ABLE TO ANTICIPATE THE REACTION OF THE AUTOMATED

RESPONSE IS IMPORTANT IN DECIDING WHETHER TO PROCEED TO RULE
4 AND CHANGE THE LEVEL OF AUTOMATION.
DECISION- MAKING SKILLS
 GENERIC EVENT

Judgment Analysis Risk

Coming to Understanding the Being aware
sensible and various factors of its effects
logical and its and the
conclusions implications consequences

What is your
decision?
THE J.A.R SKILLS

A
J R
d
 THE J.A.R SKILLS
ANALYSIS

A
J
JUDGMENT
R
RISK MANAGMENT

d
decision - making
 THE J.A.R SKILLS
ANALYSIS

A
J
JUDGMENT
R
RISK MANAGMENT

d
decision - making
 KNOWLEDGE

COMPETENCY
SKILLS ATTITUDE
 KNOWLEDGE
(JUDGMENT)

DECISION MAKING
SKILLS ATTITUDE
(ANALYSIS) (RISK MANAGEMENT)
d=f(J,A,R)
d=f(J,A,R)
In short, decision making is a function of good
judgment, logical analysis and a robust risk
management thought process. This is an
embodiment of the required knowledge in the
ability to pass good judgment, sound
analytical skills to dissect information into its
simplicity for unimpeded interpretation and an
uncompromising attitude towards safety to
minimise risks or to mitigate them if necessary.
New generations Advancing aviation Highly reliable
of commanders technology operations

AVIATION SKILLS OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Prepare for the Automation Decision-making

unexpected Airmanship Skills
New generations Advancing aviation Highly reliable
of commanders technology operations

THANK YOU
AVIATION SKILLS OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Prepare for the Automation Decision-making

unexpected Airmanship Skills