Bibliografia - Società Giapponese Contemporanea - 2019 - 20 - PDF

Società Giapponese Contemporanea
(LT2730)
a.a. 2019/20
Toshio Miyake

Letture obbligatorie

I. Sakai, Naoki (2018), “La fine e i fini degli studi di area. Sul problema della teoria e della differenza
antropologica”, in M. Cestari, G. Coci, D. Moro, A. Specchio (a cura di), Orizzonti giapponesi, pp. 33-
66 [lezioni 1-15].
II. Vlastos, Stephen (1998), “Tradition: Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History”, in S.
Vlastos (ed.), Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Japan, Berkeley: University of California
Press, pp. 1-17 [lezioni 6, 7, 8, 9].
III. Weiner, Michael (1997), “The Invention of Identity: Race and Nation in Pre-war Japan”, in F. Dikotter
(ed.), The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical and Contemporary
Perspectives, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 96-117 [lezioni 7, 8, 10, 12, 13].
IV. Miyake, Toshio (2014), “Occidentalismo, orientalismo, auto-orientalismo, doppio orientalismo del
Giappone”, in T. Miyake, Mostri del Giappone. Narrative, figure, egemonie della dis-locazione
identitaria, Venezia: Edizioni Ca' Foscari, pp. 31-37, 120-130 [lezioni 1-15].
V. Sugimoto, Yoshio (2010), “1 The Japan Phenomenon and the Social Sciences”, in Y. Sugimoto, An
Introduction to Japanese Society, New York: Cambridge University Press (III° ed.), pp. 1-23 [lezioni
9, 11, 12].
VI. Sugimoto, Yoshio (2010), “2 Class and Stratification: An Overview”, in Y. Sugimoto, An Introduction
to Japanese Society, ibidem,, pp. 37-60 [lezioni 9, 11, 12].
VII. Sugimoto, Yoshio (2010), “7 ‘Japaneseness’, Ethnicity, and Minority Groups”, in Y. Sugimoto, An
Introduction to Japanese Society, ibidem, pp. 189-218 [lezioni 10, 12, 13].
VIII. Coates, Jamie (bozza 2019), “Japan as an ‘erotic paradise’ in the Sino-Japanese mobility context:
ethnographic encounters” [lezione 10].
IX. Miyake, Toshio (2013), “Italian Transnational Spaces in Japan Doing Racialised, Gendered and
Sexualised Occidentalism”, in M. Marinelli, F. Ricatti (eds.), Emotional Geographies of the Uncanny:
Reinterpreting Italian Transnational Spaces, special issue of Cultral Studies Review, vol. 19 (2), pp.
99-124 [lezioni 14, 15].
X. Miyake, Toshio (2013), “Doing Occidentalism in contemporary Japan: Nation anthropomorphism
and sexualized parody in Axis Powers Hetalia, in Transnational Boys' Love Fan Studies, K. Nagaike-
K. Suganuma (eds.), special issue, Transformative Works and Cultures, no. 12. [lezioni 14, 15].
XI. Concetti chiave: “critique” [lezioni 1-15], “critical theory” [lezioni 1-15], “essentialism” (lezioni 1-
15), “bias di conferma” [lezioni 1-15], “modernity” [lezioni 8, 9], “society” [lezioni 9, 12], “social
stratification” [lezioni 9, 11, 12], “race and society” [lezioni 10, 12, 13, 14, 15], “whiteness theory”
[lezioni 13, 14, 15 ], “sexual racism” [lezioni 14, 15].

Video presentati e commentati a lezione:

• What kind of Asian are you? [lezione. 2]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DWynJkN5HbQ

• [lez. 2]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oLt5qSm9U8

• Orientalism and power.BBC Ideas (2019) [lez. 5]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =ZST6qnRR1mY

• Sigla di apertura di Turisti per caso: Giappone-ep. 1 (1999) [lez. 5]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0JBWdSvUvY

• The sakoku edict (esempio di mito euro-centrico e auto-orientalizzante) [lez. 8]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CP48bpSxJvw

• Social stratification [lez. 9]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SlkIKCMt -Fs

• Why is there social stratification ? [lez. 11]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RtxtI5IGr fw

• Japan's Hidden Apartheid: Koreans in Japan (part1-2) AL Jazeera English [lez. 12]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gvxLHIXGFRA
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwn6NK0tT9E

• Japan's pariah descendants fight present-day discrimination (France 24, 2017) [lez. 13]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=upE7BNG5N1w

• Charisma Man [lez. 14]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BsDPkY1EtxQ

• Sexual Racism (Miki Dezaki, 2019) [lez. 14]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8NaupJgXNPs

• Girolamo Panzetta (lezioni di italiano, NHK) [lez. 15]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dm7Qm3T8Tis
I.
La fine e i fini degli studi di area

Sul problema della teoria e della
differenza antropologica
sakai naoki
Negli ultimi due secoli, a partire cioè dall’inaugurazione

dell’università moderna, le discipline umanistiche o scienze
umane hanno giocato un ruolo imprescindibile nel definire la
produzione della conoscenza nel mondo internazionale. Va da sé
che in questo frangente, quello cioè dell’espansione dell’univer-
sità moderna e dell’istruzione superiore, non si può sottovalu-
tare il sorprendente sviluppo nelle scienze naturali e l’emergere
delle scienze sociali. Eppure non è possibile ignorare le disci-
pline umanistiche, in quanto il mondo attuale è caratterizzato
dall’internazionalità. Se da una parte l’istituzione delle discipli-
ne umanistiche riflette tale principio, il concetto specificamente
moderno di internazionalità implica che il mondo è ora diviso
in due tipi di “umanità”: humanitas e anthropos. In riferimento
alla geografia delle loro regioni di residenza, questi due termini
distinti possono essere rinominati anche l’Occidente (West) e il
Resto del mondo (Rest).
L’Occidente indicava in origine i popoli (e le regioni da loro
abitate) che potevano organizzare la propria società e i propri ter-
ritori in base al principio della sovranità territoriale dello stato-
nazione, mentre il Resto del mondo indicava quelle regioni al di
fuori del mondo occidentale i cui abitanti non erano in grado di
fare altrettanto. La mancanza della sovranità tipica dello stato-
nazione serviva a giustificare l’intervento di una forza esterna
al fine della colonizzazione. Non formando un proprio stato-
33
34 Sakai Naoki
nazione, gli abitanti di quelle regioni erano giudicati incapaci

di auto-governarsi e pertanto si dichiarava che dovevano essere
governati da popoli più civilizzati e superiori. Di conseguenza, il
mondo moderno internazionale è stato caratterizzato dalla consa-
crazione dello stato-nazione da una parte e dall’ordine coloniale
del mondo dall’altra.
Non sorprende constatare che l’ordine coloniale e internazio-
nale stia progressivamente svanendo ovunque nel mondo. Si trat-
ta di un processo che, negli ultimi decenni, è stato accompagnato
dalla crisi dello stato-nazione. Si tratta di un processo ancora in
atto, il quale vede il collasso dell’ordine coloniale e imperiale
assieme a un indebolimento progressivo degli stati-nazione che
possiamo definire, in linea di massima, globalizzazione.
Anche se nel presente intervento non mi occuperò in maniera
esclusiva di analizzare ciò che accade nello studio di una deter-
minata area, mi permetto di accennare ai problemi che si osserva-
no in Asia orientale come una sorta di preludio a una discussione
più ampia sull’internazionalità e la differenza antropologica.
I conflitti che si osservano nell’Asia orientale oggi non sono
indipendenti da questo processo storico di globalizzazione. Par-
ticolare importanza riveste l’eredità dei colonialismi che aleg-
giavano come spettri sul Pacifico occidentale. Tenendo conto
della storia coloniale in cui il moderno sistema educativo venne
istituito dai colonialismi degli inglesi (Singapore, Hong Kong
e altrove), dei giapponesi (Taiwan, Corea e Giappone) e degli
americani (Asia orientale in generale fino alla fine della Guerra
del Pacifico e la Cina negli ultimi anni), non si può trascurare la
schiacciante presenza dell’internazionalità della modernità nella
formazione dell’istruzione moderna e delle università a Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Corea del sud e persino in Cina. Allo stesso modo, è
innegabile che gli effetti della globalizzazione siano più evidenti
in Asia orientale.
La fine della modernità coloniale-imperiale avrebbe dovuto
spianare la strada a una modalità di produzione della conoscen-
za del tutto nuova. Ma questo è chiaramente quello che NON è
accaduto. Nella stragrande maggioranza dei casi, i cambiamenti
La fine e i fini degli studi di area 35
in corso nelle discipline umanistiche oggi – come la digitalizza-

zione, il focus crescente sulle scienze cognitive, i metodi delle
diverse valutazioni – possono essere visti come le forme più va-
rie di risposta alla sfida della globalizzazione. Questa però non
va intesa come un mero evento geopolitico. Ha infatti svelato il
crollo della struttura della differenza antropologica tra humani-
tas e anthropos, mentre ciò che è stato perorato come “moder-
nizzazione” (con tutta probabilità, il programma più importante
oltre alla classificazione disciplinare degli studi di area dagli anni
Cinquanta fino agli anni Ottanta del Novecento) è stato compre-
so come un processo evolutivo guidato dal principio teleologico
della differenza antropologica verso un’intelligenza e una com-
plessità superiori; questo ha orientato tanto l’organizzazione del-
le popolazioni quanto la divisione disciplinare degli studi umani-
stici per tutta la precedente modernità coloniale-imperiale.
Purtroppo, come Jon Solomon ha notato e analizzato in ma-
niera approfondita, il crollo della struttura della differenza antro-
pologica viene per lo più vissuto come una crisi di valori anziché
come un’opportunità storica per stabilire nuove relazioni sociali
in nuove comunità. La burocrazia della valutazione, sempre più
evidente in tutti i livelli dell’educazione, va vista come un ela-
borato meccanismo di risposta a questa crisi percepita. Tuttavia,
quello che appare una valutazione è in realtà un tipo di inter-
vento molto particolare nel processo della valorizzazione, una
nuova ri-territorializzazione della differenza antropologica sulla
base dei regimi capitalisti di accumulazione, che accompagna la
drastica trasformazione del mercato del lavoro globale. Quello
che si deve notare in questa nuova articolazione della differenza
antropologica è una sua edizione riveduta in direzione diversa
dall’opposizione fra humanitas e anthropos verso qualcosa di
differente. Solomon mette in guardia sul fatto che una delle gran-
di mancanze degli studi postcoloniali era che, fatta eccezione per
alcuni rari casi, questi non si fossero dedicati a una critica delle
distinzioni disciplinari delle materie umanistiche come proble-
ma fondamentale della modernità coloniale-imperialista per poi
collegarle alla critica della sovranità e della differenza di civiltà
36 Sakai Naoki
sviluppata altrove. Di conseguenza, gli attuali cambiamenti nelle

discipline umanistiche sono prove onnipervasive di una tendenza
reazionaria a consolidare ancora una volta le discipline umanisti-
che sulla base di un presunto legame intrinseco tra evoluzione e
conoscenza.
Nell’affrontare le difficoltà delle discipline umanistiche oggi,
porrò un numero di domande correlate tra loro: che ruolo costi-
tuzionale hanno giocato gli studi di area nello sviluppo storico
delle discipline umanistiche? In che modo gli studi di area pos-
sono giustificare la loro esistenza che continua nelle università
moderne e nell’istruzione superiore in contrapposizione a quelle
discipline umanistiche non integrate nei programmi degli studi di
area? Sulla base di quale regime di divisione del lavoro intellet-
tuale continuano ad auto-legittimarsi gli studi di area? E, infine,
gli studi di area continueranno a giustificare la propria esistenza
in futuro?
La differenza antropologica e lo status degli studi di area
Per comprendere il motivo per il quale il principio teleologico

della differenza antropologica abbia giocato un ruolo tanto signi-
ficativo nell’accademia moderna, si deve per prima cosa osser-
vare la configurazione disciplinare della conoscenza della natura
umana, a cui ci si riferisce spesso con i termini “discipline uma-
nistiche” o “scienze umane”, che è stata istituzionalizzata nella
struttura bipolare storicamente specifica.
Questa bipolarità consiste in due orientamenti, entrambi re-
lativi agli esseri umani: humanitas e anthropos. Il primo com-
prende il gruppo delle scienze normative prive di qualificazioni
geopolitiche e i generi disciplinari di produzione della conoscen-
za come la psicologia e la filosofia, quelle scienze cioè relative
a ciò che è stato considerato come humanitas o esseri umani in
generale. Il secondo, invece, comprende le discipline particolari
di produzione della conoscenza relative a ciò che è stato consi-
derato come anthropos o esseri umani nella loro specificità, la
cui particolarità è contraddistinta da attributi geopolitici quali

‘indiano’ o ‘cinese’ quando si parla di filosofie indiana o cinese.
Di conseguenza, questi due orientamenti corrispondono ai tipi di
esseri umani, la cui reciproca differenza si presume dia legitti-
mazione a una differenziazione disciplinare. In genere, si crede
che questi nomi delle scienze normative senza modificatori siano
derivati dalla tradizione europea e che si siano sviluppati come
forme disciplinari della conoscenza, mentre le università si tra-
sformavano in moderne istituzioni educative e disciplinari per le
moderne sovranità territoriali e nazionali in Europa. La presunta
universalità delle humanitas e il loro status normativo sono stati
promossi nel quadro dell’educazione della nazione moderna.
Al contrario, le scienze umane relative all’anthropos si sono
occupate della natura umana nelle sue specificità regionali, cul-
turali o storiche, e con una conoscenza esotica che si accumulava
mentre l’Europa si espandeva e incontrava popolazioni aliene e
strani luoghi. In altre parole, si suppone che le scienze umanisti-
che relative all’anthropos coprano l’incontro dell’Europa con i
suoi altri o con il resto del mondo.
Nella misura in cui l’Europa assume una posizione di cen-
tralità, l’umanità europea funge da standard per la produzione
della conoscenza, in quanto norma per le discipline umanistiche.
Di conseguenza, si è ritenuto che le scienze umane relative alla
humanitas dovessero avere uno status normativo e che la loro
conoscenza fosse impiegata nel modo dell’universalità, mentre le
scienze umane (e sociali) relative all’anthropos dovessero avere
uno status derivato con le loro conoscenze nella modalità della
particolarità.
È sulla base del principio teleologico della differenza antro-
pologica che sono stati prodotti e riprodotti questi due distinti
orientamenti. La differenza antropologica ha quindi svolto la
funzione di principio di identità di civiltà, grazie a cui una tipo-
logia unica di modo di vita, definito come “la forma spirituale
dell’umanità europea e occidentale”, si distingue dalle altre tipo-
logie che si trovano nel resto dell’umanità.
38 Sakai Naoki
A questo proposito, dobbiamo ricordare a noi stessi che questi

due orientamenti nelle discipline umanistiche non solo si riferi-
scono alla configurazione delle discipline nelle scienze umane,
ma anche che, nell’era della globalizzazione, raffigurano e deli-
neano il modo in cui è stata accumulata e disseminata nel mondo
la conoscenza nelle discipline umanistiche. Sotto questo aspetto,
i discorsi prevalenti sulla circolazione globale della conoscenza
tracciano due flussi distinti di conoscenza come merce, ovvero
come informazioni.
Il primo è un flusso centrifugo di informazioni su come classi-
ficare i domini di conoscenza, come valutare determinati dati em-
pirici, come affrontare la varietà e l’incommensurabilità presenti
nel corpo dei dati empirici provenienti dalle periferie in rapporto
alla generalità internazionale e, infine, come rendere intellegibile
al pubblico dei centri urbani metropolitani i dettagli e le nozioni
di base derivati da determinati siti periferici. Le informazioni ac-
cademiche di questo tipo sono generalmente chiamate “teoria” e
la loro produzione è avvenuta perlopiù in base a una divisione del
lavoro intellettuale che è storicamente determinata,secondo cui
la “teoria” è associata al costrutto storico chiamato “l’Occidente”
e da esso procede al resto del mondo.
Il secondo è un flusso centripeto che si muove da siti periferici
a diversi centri metropolitani. Questo flusso di dati reali fattuali
fornito dalle periferie non è tuttavia subito intelligibile a coloro
che non hanno familiarità con i contesti locali. Tali ostacoli a
una comunicazione trasparente sono spesso attribuiti in maniera
concettuale alle condizioni particolari dei siti locali, delle popo-
lazioni indigene e della loro storia. Tali informazioni sono consi-
derate troppo “grossolane” o troppo particolaristiche per essere
comprese da lettori metropolitani non specializzati, a causa del
loro denso contenuto empirico. Ecco perché necessitano di esse-
re tradotte in una lingua teorica più generale, più spesso l’inglese.
La struttura bipolare della conoscenza umanistica sintetizza
due formazioni: da una parte la differenziazione fra scienze nor-
mative e scienze derivate e dall’altra il contrasto della circola-
zione centrifuga e centripeta. Quando parliamo di eurocentrismo
implicito nelle discipline umanistiche, stiamo dunque richiaman-

do l’attenzione non solo sulla biforcazione della conoscenza in
termini di esseri umani in generale (la generalità normativa che
si applica all’essere umano in generale) e di esseri umani in par-
ticolare (la peculiarità specifica della località), ma anche sulla
potenzialità della disseminazione globale e della mancanza che
ne deriva.
Subito dopo la devastazione della Prima guerra mondiale,
Paul Valéry concluse che l’Europa avrebbe potuto trovare la sua
unicità solo in quell’apertura essenziale e in quell’universalità
a cui presumeva di essersi dedicata. Solo attraverso la sua con-
tinua auto-trasformazione e auto-innovazione in un progetto di
auto-trascendenza avrebbe potuto mantenere la propria identità
di Europa.
Per Valéry, l’Europa emerse per la prima volta come un tutto
unificato al suo interno solo quando la sua auto-trascendenza e
coerenza, o ciò che alla fine – suo malgrado – egli si arrese a
definire in termini hegeliani come “spirito”, vennero minacciate
nelle loro fondamenta. L’Europa venne all’essere insieme alla
“crisi” del suo spirito. Si potrebbe trovare un’espressione forte
del progetto di pensiero trascendentale e universalistico in questa
sua adozione del termine “spirito”, così come nella sua nozione
peculiare di “metodo”. Valéry sottolineò che l’Europa non è un
continente,1 cosa che implicherebbe che si era distinta dal resto
del mondo non tanto in termini di marcatori geografici, di patri-
monio storico, di popolazione locale o di altre persistenze stori-
che. Al contrario, ciò che lui riconosceva come la realtà dell’Eu-
ropa consisteva in uno squilibrio miracoloso o straordinario e in
una distribuzione ineguale di risorse e benessere nel mondo; al
di là di questa unilateralità esistente, l’Europa poteva essere de-
finita solo come capacità di riprodurre questo squilibro contro la
legge naturale della dispersione dell’energia. Proprio come una
goccia di sangue nell’oceano si sparge, si diluisce e infine scom-
1
Jacques Derrida adottò la retorica di Valéry nella sua discussione sul fato dell’Eu-
ropa in L’autre cap, Parigi: Les Editions de Minuit, 1991.
40 Sakai Naoki
pare, così uno squilibro creato in maniera artificiale si dissolve

per gradi e si sposta verso una sorta di equilibro in cui il sangue è
diluito in modo omogeneo. L’Europa è una perversione della leg-
ge dell’equilibrio; tradisce la progressione naturale secondo cui
l’entropia è destinata a crescere; possiede la miracolosa capacità
di rovesciare questo processo imposto dalla natura.2
Valéry credeva che l’Europa potesse trovare la sua unicità
esclusivamente nell’apertura essenziale e nell’universalità a cui
è dedicata. Ma proprio per la sua fedeltà a ciò che rende possibile
la sua stessa esistenza, l’Europa non poté evitare di esporsi al
pericolo costante della sua diluizione, dispersione e dissoluzione.
In poche parole, l’Europa era sul punto di esprimere i due estremi
intrinseci nel capitalismo: massimizzazione nella distribuzione
ineguale di benessere e risorse da un lato e infinita mercifica-
zione e standardizzazione dall’altro. L’Europa era “teoria” nel
senso che doveva significare così una dedizione ai principi reci-
procamente contraddittori di apertura e universalità che operano
in accordo con l’aumento dell’entropia nel sistema mondiale da
un lato, e un miracoloso rovesciamento della natura che riprodu-
ceva lo squilibrio contro la legge della termodinamica dall’altro.
Quello che Valéry aveva sintetizzato come la caratteristica es-
senziale dell’Europa può essere osservato oggi, ovvero quasi un
secolo dopo, nella visione irradiante della modernità coloniale-
imperiale.
In uno sguardo retrospettivo, possiamo osservare che, forse
in maniera inconsapevole, la sua diagnosi della crisi dello spirito
europeo ha rivelato una condizione essenziale per la formazione
dell’umanità europea, ovvero il colonialismo moderno.
Risulta dunque possibile affermare che ciò che a suo tempo
era percepita come crisi, era in realtà un indizio dell’età della
de-colonizzazione, in cui la distinzione tra humanitas e anthro-
pos non può più essere proiettata su un piano cartografico. For-
2
A questo proposito, si veda: Paul Valéry, (1957) “La crise de l’esprit” in Oeuvres I,
ed. Jean Hytier, Paris, Gallimard, pp. 988-1014, (“The Crisis of the Mind” in The Outlo-
ok for Intelligence, trans. by Denise Folliot and Jackson Mathews, Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1962, pp. 23-36).
se la crisi dell’umanità europea anticipò una situazione in cui

l’Europa non comanda più uno squilibro miracoloso e in cui si
è provincializzata appieno – l’umanità europea ridotta a tipi an-
tropologici. In questa situazione, la “teoria” non avrebbe dovuto
essere imputata ad alcun luogo determinato a livello geopolitico.
Negli ultimi svariati decenni, la struttura eurocentrica della
conoscenza umanistica è stata rivelata e criticata in un certo nu-
mero di lavori straordinari. Non intendo oggi lanciare un’altra di
queste critiche. Un problema che vorrei invece porre, a partire
dalle conseguenze di tali rivelazioni, è il seguente: perché ancora
oggi tale struttura della conoscenza basata sulla differenza antro-
pologica resta sostanzialmente intatta nella configurazione disci-
plinare delle materie umanistiche, e che tipo di attività si possono
cercare di incoraggiare e alimentare per minare il bipolarismo
delle materie umanistiche?
Gli studi di area e gli indizi della fine della pax americana
Gli studi di area sono un accordo interdisciplinare in cui sia

le scienze umane normative che la conoscenza regionale e loca-
le sono state mobilitate per produrre conoscenza su determinate
aree. A differenza della nozione di territorio, che è strettamente
associata alla popolazione e alla sovranità dello stato nel moder-
no mondo internazionale, l’area è prima di tutto un apparato at-
traverso cui catturare, regolare, gestire e regnare su una regione o
una popolazione che rappresenti un oggetto d’interesse remoto o
esotico. Mentre il territorio definisce l’estensione della sovranità
di uno stato sovrano nel sistema del diritto internazionale, l’area
è un apparato coloniale, un’estensione della governamentalità
imperiale, oltre lo spazio della sovranità territoriale e nazionale
dello stato. Questa è una delle ragioni per cui, nonostante ripetuti
tentativi, gli studi di area sono stati applicati solo a quelle regioni
al di fuori del nord dell’Atlantico, a volte chiamate Occidente,
ovvero in questo caso l’Europa occidentale e il Nord America,
con l’esclusione del Messico.
42 Sakai Naoki
A questo proposito, l’area è una nozione specifica del mondo

del secondo dopoguerra caratterizzato dalla pax americana che
conserva una governamentalità coloniale in fase di cancellazio-
ne, e che riflette una nuova sintesi del principio di territorialità
e di governamentalità coloniale. Tuttavia, è importante tenere a
mente che il principio di territorialità, che rappresenta l’unità in-
tegrante della sovranità dello Stato-nazione, non è stato abbando-
nato del tutto. Di conseguenza, le discipline nazionali organizza-
te sotto la regola generale della territorialità ‒ la storia nazionale,
la letteratura nazionale e via dicendo ‒ nei paesi del resto del
mondo si trovano in una peculiare complicità con le discipline
degli studi di area negli Stati Uniti.
A partire dal XVIII secolo sono state costitute alcune discipli-
ne importanti come la storia nazionale, la letteratura nazionale e
la linguistica storica al fine di alimentare la soggettività nazionale
per gli stati-nazione. Tali discipline sono infatti state inquadrate
nella nozione di territorio nazionale. Nella formazione dello stato
e della sua popolazione governata, ogni Stato-nazione ha cercato
di creare i propri apparati di tecnologie nazionali soggettive ‒
storia nazionale, letteratura nazionale, lingua nazionale eccetera
‒ anche se lo sviluppo di tali istituzioni non ha necessariamente
seguito la stessa cronologia.
Assieme alla formazione della sovranità territoriale dello
stato-nazione, si ebbe l’invenzione della lingua nazionale come
mezzo fondamentale attraverso cui portare avanti conversazioni
accademiche. Il progetto centrale nella produzione dell’indivi-
dualità nazionale è stata la tecnologia soggettiva della traduzione
nazionale. Prima dello stabilirsi delle scienze umane moderne,
la conoscenza accademica era espressa e conservata in lingue
classiche come il latino, il sanscrito, l’arabo o il cinese classico,
che erano tutte indipendenti da una particolare nazione, etnicità o
territorio nazionale. Com’è logico che sia, le lingue locali erano
spesso utilizzate nella pedagogia, nella corrispondenza, in dibat-
titi accademici e nelle transazioni quotidiane, ma la forma auto-
rizzata di conoscenza accademica era più spesso cercata in quelle
lingue universali e cosmopolite; erano concepite come il mezzo
esclusivo per la Verità. E alla conoscenza che non era espressa in

queste lingue universali si garantiva di rado lo status di verità au-
tentica ed eterna. Si può dire pertanto che, prima dell’introduzio-
ne della lingua nazionale/etnica, ovunque nel mondo l’umanità
vivesse in società multilinguistiche. Dobbiamo però prestare at-
tenzione a un aspetto: ciò che si intende per multilinguismo non è
una giustapposizione di una pluralità di diverse lingue specifiche.
A questo punto, la domanda decisiva è: la lingua è numerabile
(countable)?
Come facciamo a riconoscere l’identità numerica di ciascuna
lingua o, parlando più in generale, come giustifichiamo l’idea
che la diversità di una lingua o delle lingue possa essere definita
in termini di uno e molti? Così, facendo ricorso alla categoria
grammaticale [inglese] a noi tutti familiare, posso porre la que-
stione in questo modo. La lingua è numerabile, come lo sono
le mele o le arance ma non l’acqua? Quello che voglio mettere
in discussione è l’unità del linguaggio, una certa “positività del
discorso” o un “a priori storico” attraverso cui comprendiamo
l’argomento in questione ogni qualvolta che è in gioco una diver-
sa lingua o una differenza nella lingua. La mia domanda è: come
ci permettiamo di definire una lingua rispetto alle altre? Che cosa
ci permette di rappresentare una lingua come un’unità?
Fin dall’inizio della riforma nell’Europa occidentale, tuttavia,
la relazione tra le lingue classiche universali e quelle locali e par-
ticolari è stata sottoposta a cambiamenti radicali. Ciò a cui ci
riferiamo quando parliamo del“regime moderno di traduzione”
ha giocato un ruolo decisivo nel formare la nuova configurazione
delle lingue nazionali, da cui è dipeso lo sviluppo delle scienze
umane. Nel diciottesimo secondo, è comparso in Nord America e
in Europa occidentale un nuovo tipo di sovranità statale, ovvero
la sovranità territoriale nazionale, e ha avuto origine un nuovo
tipo di sistema di governo, lo stato-nazione, e un tipo parimenti
nuovo di comunità, la nazione. Le università moderne furono per
certo condizionate dai risultati di queste vicissitudini storiche, e
le scienze umane moderne o le discipline umanistiche sono state
coinvolte nel compito di produrre una soggettività nazionale se-
44 Sakai Naoki
condo l’immagine o lo schema della lingua nazionale. Per com-

prendere le discipline umanistiche come sviluppo storico, pertan-
to, non si può ignorare il ruolo significativo giocato dal regime
moderno di traduzione.
Assieme alla formazione dello Stato-nazione e della comunità
nazionale emerse il mondo internazionale. La nozione di mondo
internazionale era associata al sistema del diritto internazionale,
a cui ci si riferiva di solito con il termine di Jus Publicum Eu-
ropœum; nelle prime fasi della modernità, a differenza di quanto
accade oggi, ciò non significava il rispetto reciproco degli stati
su tutto il pianeta. Il mondo internazionale indicava la parte del
mondo in cui dominavano gli stati sovrani territoriali e, a tempo
debito, il resto del mondo che non accettava il sistema della legge
internazionale ne era escluso.
Dunque la configurazione disciplinare delle materie umanisti-
che riflette questa realtà politica del mondo moderno; si è svilup-
pata all’interno di quella struttura istituzionale che, negli ultimi
decenni, è stata denominata come “l’Occidente” e “il Resto del
mondo” e, con la distinzione di cui si è detto prima, come hu-
manitas distinta da anthropos. Anche se per più di due secoli la
produzione di conoscenza nelle discipline umanistiche era legit-
timata da una ricerca universalistica della natura umana in ogni
epoca storica e in ogni luogo del pianeta terra, le discipline delle
scienze umane sono state organizzate in base a un’economia sto-
ricamente specifica di generalità e particolarità.
La comunità “nazione”, è una formazione del tutto nuova, in
cui il principio di affiliazione fra affini ha giocato soltanto un
ruolo limitato nel creare il senso dell’identità individuale. La na-
zione ha introdotto una forma del tutto diversa di identificazione
individuale e di cameratismo, oltre a una netta distinzione tra
chi si trova all’interno e chi all’esterno della comunità naziona-
le di partecipazione. La nazione è una formazione sociale senza
precedenti, perché ciò che costituisce i vincoli di legame collet-
tivo tra i suoi membri è un costrutto estetico, che il liberalismo
britannico descrive come “il sentimento di nazionalità”. A que-
sto sentimento corrisponde l’idea di una lingua nazionale, che si
presume sia innata in ogni membro nativo della nazione e che è

immanente al sentimento della sua identità collettiva. Secondo il
nazionalismo, la lingua nazionale può essere retrodatata a un’o-
rigine preistorica. Naturalmente, però, questa è una finzione che
ha permesso di mantenere la realtà della nazione come etnicità
fittizia. Questa finzione venne introdotta e in un momento suc-
cessivo promossa dalle discipline formate di fresco della lettera-
tura nazionale, della storia nazionale e della linguistica storica.
A questo punto, diventa essenziale tenere a mente che la na-
zione rappresenta la condizione necessaria del razzismo moder-
no. Nelle formazioni sociali che precedevano la formazione della
nazione esistevano molte forme di discriminazione sociale, ma il
razzismo emerse con la moderna comunità nazionale.3 Tuttavia,
è altresì importante notare che la nazione non è una condizione
sufficiente per lo svilupparsi del razzismo. La presenza di una
comunità nazionale non significa per forza il continuo scoppiare
della violenza sulla base di categorie razziali. Ciò che si vuole
dire è che il razzismo è possibile solo nella formazione sociale
della nazione.4
Nonostante il mito della sua origine, tuttavia, la lingua nazio-
nale stessa è sempre prodotto dell’internazionalità, di una proce-
dura comparativa attraverso cui una lingua è posta come esterna
rispetto ad un’altra. Non deriva da un’origine remota. Al contra-
rio, è costituita in relazione a un’altra lingua, attraverso quello
che altrove ho chiamato lo schematismo della co-figurazione.
Tutte le lingue nazionali moderne, come l’inglese, il tedesco, il
francese, il giapponese, il cinese e via dicendo, si sono forma-
te attraverso il moderno regime di traduzione, con la scomparsa
dell’autorità associata alle lingue classiche universali. Sin dalla
3
Per una brillante esposizione di questo tema, si veda: Étienne, Balibar. (1991).
“The Nation Form: History and Ideology”, in Etienne Balibar e Immanuel Wallerstein,
Race, Nation, Class – Ambiguous Identities, London, Verso, pp. 86-106.
4
A questo proposito si veda Sakai, Naoki. (2015) “From Relational Identity to Spe-
cific Identity: One Equality and Nationality”, in Nosco, Peter et al. (a cura di), Values,
Identity, and Equality in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Japan, , Leiden, Brill, pp.
290-320.
46 Sakai Naoki
nascita dell’università moderna nel diciottesimo secolo in Eu-

ropa, le discipline umanistiche sono state organizzate con uno
sguardo alla produzione della soggettività nazionale, come la
“tecnologia soggettiva della traduzione nazionale”.
In una relazione ambigua con queste discipline nazionali, le
discipline degli studi di area vennero costituite sotto il principio
dell’interdisciplinarità. Questa formazione interdisciplinare degli
studi di area presuppone il presunto oggetto della loro ricerca in
modo abbastanza diverso da quello delle scienze umane norma-
tive, il cui oggetto si presume che sia un aspetto o l’altro dell’u-
niversale natura umana. Ciò che lega le svariate discipline degli
studi di area ‒letteratura, sociologia, storia, linguistica, studi re-
ligiosi, scienze politiche, etnografia, eccetera ‒ non è un qualche
aspetto della natura umana, ma la regione o la popolazione di
una certa area. Al di sotto degli Studi cinesi come area di studio,
per esempio, si danno materie come letteratura cinese, sociologia
dello sviluppo rurale in Cina, linguistica storica della lingua cine-
se, storia della politica e del pensiero cinese, diritto cinese e altro
ancora; nessuna di queste condivide oggetti epistemici con altre
materie della stessa aria di studio, fatta eccezione per la regione
che comprende la Cina e la sua popolazione.
Gli studi di area seguono una grammatica differente, per così
dire, secondo cui i loro oggetti di indagine sono organizzati in
modo differente dalle scienze normative nelle discipline umani-
stiche. Come suggerito in precedenza, tale ambigua distinzione
tra scienze umane normative e studi di area si riduce alla diffe-
renza tra humanitas e anthropos.
Cerchiamo di cogliere questo principio di configurazione
binaria come pertinente a un tipo di quanto Étienne Balibar ha
chiamato differenza antropologica, la distinzione di un genere di
umanità dal resto, secondo i cui termini la conoscenza nelle di-
scipline umanistiche è stata prodotta, organizzata e giustificata in
modo che le regole accademiche di comportamento, i protocolli
di ricerca, i metodi d’insegnamento e l’importanza delle veri-
tà ottenute siano istituzionalizzati rispetto alla posizionalità di
ricercatori, del pubblico e di manager accademici come corpo
docente, tirocinanti o studenti, amministratori e tutto il resto del-

lo staff accademico. In breve, la differenza antropologica è uno
strumento di potere che ha sorretto la conoscenza nelle discipline
umanistiche.
Oggigiorno è fin troppo evidente che l’eredità della Guerra
fredda nella formazione storica degli studi di area sia da elimi-
nare. Inoltre, le discipline umanistiche nell’istruzione superiore
sono subbuglio, e non solo negli Stati Uniti, ma anche in altre
parti del mondo, comprese l’Europa occidentale e l’Asia orienta-
le. A prescindere dal fatto di essere d’accordo o meno, non si può
negare che le discipline umanistiche siano in una fase di transi-
zione. Così, in risposta a questa situazione contemporanea con
cui si confrontano le discipline umanistiche oggi, proponiamo
pertanto di meditare sul tema della differenza antropologica e
il fine degli studi di area, e con ciò discuteremo della struttura
internazionale “dell’Occidente e del Resto del mondo” e dell’op-
posizione tra humanitas e anthropos.
L’ambiguità dell’area: performatività e posizione fissa
Nella nostra indagine sugli studi di area, l’area potrebbe pri-

ma di tutto apparire come un indicatore geografico, una regione
circoscritta di territorio, comunità o istituzioni sociali coordinate
in rapporto ad altri indicatori geografici. Si potrebbe essere tenta-
ti di partire dal presupposto che l’area sia un luogo o un indicato-
re spaziale identificabile che, sin dall’inizio, è collocato entro lo
spazio di una località geografica.
A ogni modo, è importante notare che l’area nella formazione
disciplinare degli studi di area non si riferisce solo alla località
determinata in una configurazione geografica; deve anche e sem-
pre designare la nascita di un ordine geografico senza il quale
un luogo, un confine o un recinto non possono essere allocati. In
altre parole, l’area è un atto o una performatività che corrispon-
de alla categoria grammaticale del predicato verbale, mentre è
anche considerata come predicato nominale. Ed è esattamente
48 Sakai Naoki
riguardo a questo che l’area è ambigua. Per rendere una località

geografica comprensibile a tutti, è necessario introdurre nell’al-
trimenti amorfo flusso materiale o machinic phylum un ordine
di misurazione, un’asse di valori o un sistema a griglia.5 Difatti,
è impossibile identificare la posizione di un territorio, una co-
munità o una sovranità in senso geografico e geopolitico, senza
che la porzione di superficie terrestre in questione sia ordinata ri-
spetto alla sua misurabilità spaziale, senza che sia trasformata in
uno spazio di confronto. Identificare un’area significa iscriverla
entro l’ordine delle coordinate spaziali in relazione ad altri refe-
renti localizzabili e quindi renderla uno spazio in cui confrontare
un’area all’infuori di altre. In breve, l’area significa non solo una
determinata località nello spazio geografico ordinato e misurato
in termini di latitudine e longitudine; implica anche una trasfor-
mazione dello spazio da liscio a striato, per prendere a prestito il
vocabolario di Gilles Deleuze e Félix Guattari.6
Al contempo, un’area si presenta come un gruppo o un’as-
semblea di una moltitudine di cose che sono in un modo o nell’al-
tro qualitativamente simili fra loro, o prossime l’una all’altra a
formare una prossimità (neighborhood); un’area è riconosciuta
come se fosse un recinto unificato al suo interno. Ne consegue
che ci si aspetta che i componenti di un’area condividano cer-
te caratteristiche comuni; si presume che siano omogenei. A sua
volta, le caratteristiche comuni di un gruppo o di un’assemblea
sono spesso rappresentate dall’immagine di un’area. Negli studi
di area è ben noto che l’immagine di una cultura o una lingua
5
Gilles Deleuze e Félix Guattari introdussero questo termine, machinic phylum,
come correttivo del modello ilomorfico, lo schema di materia e forma. «Il machinic
phylum è materialità, naturale o artificiale, ed entrambe simultaneamente; è materia in
movimento, in flusso, in variazione, materia come convettore di singolarità e tratti di
espressione. Questo ha ovvie conseguenze: ossia, questa materia-flusso può solo essere
seguita». (Corsivo nell’originale) (Delueze, Gilles e Guattari, Félix. (1987). A Thousand
Plateaus – Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Brian Massumi trans. Minneapolis, University
of Minnesota Press, p. 409). Ciò che è estremamente importante per noi è che il machinic
phylum sia qualcosa che va seguito ma non paragonato. Per paragonare, è necessaria una
certa condotta aggiuntiva.
6
Deleuze, Gilles e Guattari, Félix.A Thousand Plateaus – Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia, op cit.
etnica o nazionale è spesso stata confusa con l’area stessa, così

che è sempre stato difficile sfuggire all’assunto che un’area desi-
gni l’estensione geografica di una cultura o una lingua comune,
come spesso osservato nelle prime fasi degli studi di area,a cui
ci si riferisce con l’espressione “Studi sul carattere nazionale”.
Privata della sua capacità di svolgere proiezioni e mappature,
l’area si pone così in un punto di congiunzione fra somiglianza
e difformità: un’omogeneità interna con componenti simili fra
loro, e un’eterogeneità esterna dei membri di un’area rispetto ai
membri di un’altra area.
Dobbiamo tenere a mente che tale economia di omogenei-
tà ed eterogeneità territoriale è un’invenzione piuttosto recente.
Non si può dare per scontato che l’intera superficie della terra
sia sempre stata intesa come spazio di localizzazione e di misure
comparative. Al contrario, è solo nell’epoca delle grandi scoperte
che l’ordine globale della terra, definito da Carl Schmitt come
nomos, è stato attuato a livello globale come risultato di quan-
to Schmitt chiamava “rivoluzione spaziale”, e quindi ancora più
consolidato nel sistema eurocentrico del diritto internazionale.7
La scoperta del Nuovo Mondo suggerì il primo nomos della terra,
segnando così l’inizio di ciò che più tardi avremmo chiamato “il
mondo internazionale moderno”. Non è un caso che il mondo
internazionale sia venuto alla luce quasi nello stesso momento in
cui sono comparse le invenzioni moderne della tecnologia car-
tografica e della navigazione, e un nuovo modo di percepire lo
spazio planetario.
Oscillando tra la storia della cartografia e la storia del capi-
tale, pertanto, Sandro Mezzadra e Brett Neilson interrogano «…
the intertwining of geographical with cognitive borders and the
role of civilizational divides in making the modern state and cap-
italism, European imperialism, the rise of area studies, and the
7
Schmitt, Carl. (2006). The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus
Publicum Europaeum, G. L. Ulman (trad. di)New York: Telos Press Publishing. Per la
nozione di “rivoluzione spaziale”, che è strettamente collegata alla sua nozione di nomos,
Si veda: Carl Schmitt, Land and Sea, Draghichi, Simona (trad. di) Corvallis: Plutarch
Press, 1997.
50 Sakai Naoki
emergence of contemporary world regionalism».8 Ecco perché la

questione degli studi di area ci spinge a prestare attenzione alle
questioni che riguardano la costruzione del mondo, o ciò che è
stato chiamato fabrica mundi: il primo tentativo sistematico di
rappresentare o immaginare mondi introducendo dei confini.
Come Tongchai Winichakul ha brillantemente illustrato nel
suo Siam Mapped – A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation, il
processo di trasformazione della sovranità statale e l’ordine dello
spazio geografico devono essere ripetuti ogni volta che si costru-
isce una nazione.9 In questo senso, l’internazionalità del mondo
internazionale moderno non può essere raggiunta una volta per
tutte; deve essere ripetuta finché si mantiene come istituzione.
Com’è ovvio che sia, questo ci ricorda che la storicità dell’inter-
nazionalità dev’essere concettualizzata in forma omologa a quel-
la della “accumulazione originaria del capitale”.10
Osservando la storia del mondo internazionale moderno, per-
tanto, non si può ignorare l’ambiguità morfologica inerente al
termine “area”. Proprio come lo stesso processo o operazione
con cui l’ordine delle misure e standard geografici sono proiettati
su un machinic phylum nella nozione di “località”, che connota
la località come un indicatore geografico ‒ un punto determi-
nato nel sistema delle coordinate geografiche ‒ anche l’area di
necessità comprende i due aspetti della determinazione del pre-
sunto oggetto di questa formazione disciplinare chiamata “Studi
di area”. Un’area è una regione geografica circoscritta, che serve
come cornice (frame) per la produzione di conoscenza in una
8
«[…] L’intreccio tra i confini geografici e quelli cognitivi e il ruolo delle differenze
delle civiltà nella costruzione dello stato moderno e del capitalismo, dell’imperialismo
europeo, della nascita degli studi di area e dell’emergere del regionalismo mondiale con-
temporaneo». Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, Border As Method or, the Multiplica-
tion of Labor, Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2013. p. 23.
9
Winichukul, Tongchai. (1994) Siam Mapped – A History of the Geo-Body of a
Nation, Honolulu: University of HawaiiPress.
10
Varie letture storiciste del Capitale di Marx hanno trascurato questo punto. L’ac-
cumulazione primitiva del capitale non si riferisce a uno stadio storico dopo il quale il
capitalismo è stabilito una volta per tutte. Ciò che Marx chiamava “il peccato originale
del capitalismo” deve essere ripetuto, ed è in questo senso che l’area è necessariamente
implicata più volte.
disciplina degli studi di area, ma allo stesso tempo connota una

condotta o un’operazione in cui una particolare estensione geo-
grafica è mappata come tale. Finché ignoriamo questo secondo
aspetto rimarremo inconsapevoli della storicità della stessa idea
di area in sé, dello stesso apparato in cui è ipotizzata un’area,
insieme a una particolare condotta di mappatura.
Quello che delineerò qui di seguito è un’indagine sulla storici-
tà delle stesse condizioni in base a cui un’area è stata routinizzata
tanto come cornice (frame) – e anche struttura (framework) – del-
la produzione di conoscenza, quanto come apparato di mappa-
tura per una forma disciplinare di produzione della conoscenza.
Un’epistemologia del riconoscimento della razza e la logica

dell’area.
Il termine “Studi di area” delinea il nome specifico di una for-

mazione disciplinare: una nuova formazione di discipline acca-
demiche istituzionalizzate nelle università e nelle organizzazioni
di ricerca degli Stati Uniti dopo la Seconda guerra mondiale. A
differenza dei quattro secoli della storia del mondo internazio-
nale moderno, gli studi di area sono una convenzione piuttosto
recente, perlopiù confinati all’istruzione superiore americana,
anche se sono stati poco alla volta adottati nei sistemi educativi
di altri paesi nel tardo XX e nel XXI secolo.
La definizione “Studi di area” non esisteva prima della Se-
conda guerra mondiale. Durante la guerra contro le potenze
dell’Asse, emerse un’intensa consapevolezza fra i decisori poli-
tici, di non avere cioè l’apparato di intelligence per raccogliere,
decifrare e analizzare informazioni provenienti da quelle aree
che gli Stati Uniti avrebbero controllato dopo la sconfitta delle
potenze dell’Asse. A differenza dei poteri coloniali dell’Europa e
del Giappone, gli Stati Uniti dovevano ancora consolidare l’isti-
tuzione della raccolta e produzione di conoscenza per sostenere
la futura egemonia globale americana. Di conseguenza, verso la
fine degli anni Quaranta del Novecento, subito dopo la fine della
52 Sakai Naoki
seconda Guerra mondiale, si propose di istituire gli studi di area

in vista dell’arrivo imminente della pax americana. In seguito,
gli studi di area trasformarono in maniera drastica l’ideazione
degli studi umanistici nelle università americane. Non sorprende
che tanti esperti di area delle vecchie generazioni fossero agenti o
collaboratori della Central Intelligence Agency, anch’essa creata
dopo la seconda Guerra mondiale.
Alcuni rari specialisti di area insistevano sul fatto che l’ege-
monia degli Stati Uniti, che gli studi di area avrebbero dovuto
promuovere e sostenere, rappresentavano una netta presa di di-
stanza dalle precedenti forme di studi orientali o africani, che
erano strettamente affiliati alle amministrazioni coloniali euro-
pee; ma è innegabile che gli studi di area siano cresciuti a partire
da ciò che Stuart Hall ha chiamato “the discourse of the-West-
and-the-Rest”, una disposizione di potere tipico del mondo inter-
nazionale moderno.11
Ancora oggi non si può trascurare l’aspetto delle politiche di
identità dell’Occidente nella stessa nozione di area, perché questa
nozione è ancora articolata all’interno del discorso dell’Occiden-
te-e-il-Resto-del-mondo. A questo proposito, dobbiamo ricono-
scere che l’area nella formazione disciplinare degli studi di area
non può essere esaminata senza fare riferimento alla divisione
del mondo nei termini del principio teleologico di differenza an-
tropologica, anche se la biforcazione geografica dell’Occidente e
del Resto del mondo è stata resa sempre più inefficace. E neppure
la si può valutare senza considerare l’ordine razziale del mondo.
Il termine “area” può essere sostituito da sinonimi come re-
gione, dominio, territorio, vicinanze, sezione, località o luogo a
seconda del contesto della discussione. La rilevanza di ciascuna
di queste sostituzioni si basa per la maggior parte sulla funzione
semantica e tropica del termine, in modo tale che possa eviden-
ziare la sua connotazione spaziale (regione, territorio o luogo),
Stuart, Hall (1996). “The West and the Rest” in Modernity: An Introduction to
11
Modern Societies, Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, & Kenneth Thompson (a cura
di), Londra: Wiley-Blackwell.
la sua funzione tropica nella classificazione (dominio, sezione);

potrebbe anche attirare l’attenzione sul luogo della performance
(palco, vicinanze, località). Nelle discipline degli studi di area,
tuttavia, “l’area” acquisisce una specificità storica, il cui chiari-
mento richiede che prestiamo ancora più attenzione all’economia
di tali sostituzioni polisemiche, e che quindi distinguiamo delibe-
ratamente il termine dai suoi equivalenti semantici.
Equiparando l’area al territorio, per esempio, alcuni tratti di-
stintivi dell’area che operano nella produzione della conoscenza
nelle discipline degli studi di area sarebbero con molta probabili-
tà ignorati o soffocati. Tale equiparazione è giustificata finché si
coglie l’area soltanto in una configurazione geografica come og-
getto la cui conoscenza è prodotta negli studi di area. Un aspetto
dell’area che è del tutto trascurato quando la si equipara a un
territorio – cosa che avviene di norma nella pratica degli studi di
area – è proprio l’aspetto della sua ubicazione, non come nomi-
nale ma come performatività, dell’introduzione di una divisione
geopolitica o l’atto di mappatura del mondo, ossia la condotta
originaria attraverso cui il mondo si presenta come un palcosce-
nico per una comparazione. Ciò che necessariamente si implica
nell’area è l’identificazione di un oggetto di conoscenza in rela-
zione all’agente che sa di, specula e investe in esso, un’identifica-
zione che è spaziale nell’essenza in quanto l’introduzione di una
divisione spaziale comporta una separazione geografica, in base
alla quale all’agente e all’oggetto della conoscenza si assegnano
due posizioni distinte.
Tuttavia è importante notare che questa separazione è para-
dossale, o, per così dire, contraddittoria nella sua essenza, dal
momento che non si tratta della separazione di un termine dall’al-
tro su uno stesso piano, quanto piuttosto di una separazione che
comprende una certa incommensurabilità. Ed è in questo senso
preciso che l’area è intrinsecamente ambigua; è sempre caricata
di due sensi incompatibili di ubicazione: ubicazione nel senso
di creare un ordine di localizzabilità da un lato e ubicazione nel
senso di un determinato indice geografico, di una determinata
vicinanza spaziale identificabile nel sistema delle coordinate
54 Sakai Naoki
geografiche, dall’altro; ubicazione nel senso della performance

di localizzare da una parte e ubicazione nel senso del luogo o
dell’oggetto identificato all’interno dello spazio geografico stria-
to.
Di conseguenza, l’ambiguità dell’ubicazione ci spinge a ritor-
nare a quell’argomento che io stesso ho chiamato regime moder-
no di traduzione, i cui meccanismi ho rivelato trovarsi al di sotto
delle pratiche istituzionali degli studi di area.12
Traduzione e formazione di confini
Come risulta ormai evidente, la problematica che ispira la mia

indagine in questo saggio è piuttosto diversa dalla preoccupazio-
ne nazionalistica condivisa da molti intellettuali nel ventesimo e
nel ventunesimo secolo. Si tratta infatti della questione di come
emancipare la nostra immaginazione dal regime dello stato-na-
zione, senza negare il regime stesso, ma piuttosto problematiz-
zando i nazionalismi metodologici che permeano la produzione
della conoscenza nelle discipline umanistiche, in particolare nel-
le discipline accademiche degli studi di area, e di conseguenza di
presentare una comprensione alternativa della comunità transna-
zionale. Pur riconoscendo la realtà del mondo internazionale mo-
derno oggi, non considero i principi organizzativi di nazionalità e
internazionalità come una prerogativa inevitabile o una qualche
forma di imperativo che si è obbligati ad attuare nella propria
condotta e nei propri sentimenti. Mettendo in sospeso la creden-
za nazionalista, rifiuto di vedere la nazionalità come un dato; al
contrario, rovescio l’ordine di priorità senza mai sottostimare la
12
La tecnologia dominante che definisce come si dovrebbe rappresentare la tra-
duzione nel mondo internazionale moderno è stata definita sia come “il regime della
traduzione”, sia, più recentemente, come “il moderno regime della traduzione”. Ci pos-
sono essere molti diversi modi di rappresentare la traduzione, ma nel mondo moderno
internazionale sono state squalificate tutte le altre forme di rappresentare la traduzione.
Il regime moderno della traduzione regola non solo la sua rappresentazione, ma anche la
produzione della conoscenza in generale. La forma immaginaria della nazione per esem-
pio sarebbe impossibile senza questa tecnologia soggettiva della traduzione nazionale.
retorica nazionalistica mobilitata nelle nostre lotte alla modernità

coloniale. In altre parole, io procedo dall’idea che la nazionalità
è un derivato ristretto e distorto della transnazionalità. In altre pa-
role, la nazionalità è sempre secondaria rispetto alla transnazio-
nalità. La mia domanda ispiratrice è come la modalità primaria,
transnazionale di socialità sia delimitata, regolata e ristretta dalle
regole del mondo internazionale. È in questo contesto che devo
affrontare la questione della formazione di confini: per mettere in
discussione la priorità della nazionalità e dell’internazionalità nel
mondo internazionale moderno, bisogna per prima cosa studiare
i tropici del confine.
Il confine non può esistere in natura; i marcatori fisici come
i fiumi, le catene montuose, i muri e perfino le linee sul terreno
diventano confini solo quando sono usati per rappresentare un
certo modello di azione sociale. In questo senso, un confine è
sempre costruito dall’uomo e presume una socialità umana. Solo
quando le persone reagiscono fra loro si forma un confine. Anche
se un confine separa, discrimina o distanzia un gruppo da un al-
tro, le persone devono trovarsi in una qualche forma di relazione
sociale perché quel confine funga da marcatore o da rappresenta-
zione della separazione, discriminazione o distanza. Un confine
è un tropo che serve a rappresentare in maniera paradossale e
irrevocabile una socialità primordiale. Solo laddove le persone
sono d’accordo di “stabilire un confine” possiamo parlare di un
confine come istituzione. Per questa ragione, il “delimitare (bor-
dering) un confine (border)” precede sempre il confine stesso.
Comprendere il confine significa studiare il modo in cui questo è
iscritto, cancellato, ridisegnato o riprodotto. Quindi nel compren-
dere il confine (border) e il delimitare (border-ing), il tropo della
“guerra” è di primaria importanza.
Prima di questa delimitazione dei confini, è impossibile con-
cettualizzare il confine nazionale. Così, prima di esso il territorio
nazionale è indeterminato. Mentre “delimitare confini” riguar-
da una gran quantità di questioni, permettetemi di concentrarmi
unicamente su uno di questi problemi, quello dell’individualità
della lingua. Proprio come il territorio nazionale è indeterminato
56 Sakai Naoki
prima della “delimitazione dei confini”, è impossibile determina-

re una lingua nazionale prima di essa. Ciò che per convenzione
chiamiamo “lingua” non è un’unità; è una sorta di sistema ma
mai una sistematicità; non consiste in un insieme finito di regole
fisse; persino un errore grammaticale ha senso e diventa un’e-
spressione efficace nella lingua. È modificata e riprodotta in ogni
suo uso o in quello che De Saussure ha definito come parole, in
contrasto con langue. In breve, la lingua è molteplice e risulta
impossibile parlarne come se fosse un’unità primordiale o iden-
tificabile. Ne consegue che senza alcun riferimento alla “delimi-
tazione” non si riesce a comprendere come sia giunta a prevalere
l’individualità di una particolare lingua nazionale, la stessa unità
indivisibile di una lingua che si suppone risieda nell’immagine
della lingua nazionale. In altre parole, non è a riguardo della lin-
gua in sé, ma a livello della sua rappresentazione che sono attri-
buibili e dovuti la sua identità e unità. A tempo debito, l’opera-
zione di paragone, per mezzo di cui si presuppone, si misura e si
giudica la differenza di specie tra lingue, è impossibile senza che
si postuli l’individualità di una particolare lingua o di un’altra,
che va paragonata a livello di rappresentazione.13
Solo a livello della rappresentazione una lingua può essere
paragonata a un’altra come esempio di una particolarità, in quan-
to opposta a un’altra all’interno di un’economia di specie e di
genere. Quando siamo perplessi, quando ci imbattiamo in una
situazione di incommensurabilità, quando affrontiamo il nonsen-
so prima della traduzione, siamo in presenza di una differenza
culturale – un tipo di differenza che non si può includere nella
diaspora o nella differenza di specie – che non si conforma all’e-
conomia logica dell’internazionalità.
A questo punto risulta spontaneo domandarsi: a che cosa
corrisponde il “delimitare” nel contesto di una lingua? Alla
traduzione, è ovvio. Quello che intendo sottolineare qui è che,
nel contesto della differenza culturale, la traduzione precede la
Si veda Mezzadra, Sandro e Sakai, Naoki (2014). “Introduction”, in Translation,

13
Issue 4, Rimini, Rafaelli Editore, pp. 9-29.

determinazione delle unità linguistiche che si presume abbia la

funzione di collegare. Questo spiega il motivo per cui, contro
un pregiudizio di buonsenso, bisogna insistere che esiste e c’è
la traduzione prima dell’affermazione di una lingua nazionale o
etnica. La traduzione deve avvenire prima dell’attribuzione di
un’identità a una lingua, proprio come la transnazionalità si situa
prima della nazionalità e dell’internazionalità. In breve, per ciò
che riguarda la rappresentazione delle lingue, la traduzione viene
prima della determinazione della differenza di specie. Solo dopo
la traduzione le lingue individuali possono essere disponibili al
confronto. Per formularla con parole differenti, è proprio nella
traduzione che possiamo parlare di similitudine e differenza fra
lingue. E non dimentichiamo che non c’è alcuna ragione per cui
la similitudine e la differenza così incontrate debbano necessaria-
mente essere ristrette dall’economia del genere e della specie.14
A questo punto, possiamo vedere una ragione per cui è ne-
cessario accennare all’atto del delimitare prima di concentrarci
sulla comparazione. Va da sé che non si può iniziare il processo
di comparazione a meno che i termini da comparare non siano
assunti come comparabili. In altre parole, in una situazione di
discontinuità dove si è perplessi, incapaci di comprendere cosa
stia accadendo e si è di fronte a un nonsenso, non si può neppure
cominciare un confronto. Eppure, è proprio questa situazione di
discontinuità che richiede traduzione. In questo particolare con-
testo della nostra discussione, ciò che sblocca il luogo della com-
parazione non è nient’altro che la traduzione. Prima di compara-
re, si deve tradurre. Solo dopo la traduzione giunge l’inclusione
logica di specie e genere, di nazionalità e di internazionalità.
Non so fino a che punto il fuoco tematico del “delimitare”
abbia preso slancio tra diverse discipline umanistiche. Ma è pos-
sibile affermare che delimitare e tradurre siano due problema-
tiche proiettate dalla stessa prospettiva teoretica. Proprio come
14
Una potente confutazione dell’economia logica del genere e della specie si può
trovare nel ragionamento di Wittgenstein sulle somiglianze familiari. Si veda Wittgen-
stein, Ludwig (1968). Philosophical Investigations. G. E. M. Anscombe trans., Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, pp. 31e – 35e.
58 Sakai Naoki
delimitare non comporta solamente la demarcazione di un terri-

torio, la traduzione non riguarda solamente la lingua (nel senso
dilangue).
Questo spiega la ragione per la quale nel presente saggio ho
perseguito un’indagine preliminare circa la discussione sulla tra-
duzione, oltre il territorio convenzionale della linguistica. Eppure,
la prima tematica da affrontare è come comprendere la lingua dal
punto di vista della traduzione, o in altri termini come rovesciare
la comprensione convenzionale della traduzione che dipende dal
tropo della traduzione come un mezzo di collegamento o di co-
municazione tra due lingue o langues separate o differenti.15 Ma
proprio perché il mio approccio è quello di un’analisi discorsiva
non confinata al territorio della linguistica o è condotta al di fuori
delle regole, dei protocolli e delle assunzioni della linguistica in
generale, implica, tra gli altri, problemi di raffigurazione, sche-
matismo, mappatura, rappresentazione cartografica e l’asserzio-
ne di posizioni strategiche. Nella comprensione convenzionale
della traduzione – che altrove ho caratterizzato come «schemati-
smo della co-figurazione»16 – si presuppone che due lingue siano
già separate o che fra loro esista già un confine. Questo modo
di vedere la traduzione presuppone sempre l’unità di una lingua
(=langue) e quella di un’altra, poiché la loro separazione è data
per scontata o considerata un dato di fatto; il contorno di una
lingua non è mai inteso come qualcosa di disegnato o inscritto,
poiché si presume che sia all’interno della lingua stessa. In altre
parole, la concezione convenzionale di traduzione non ammette
il “delimitare”.
La traduzione coinvolge quasi sempre una lingua diversa o
almeno una differenza in una lingua o fra le lingue. Ma dobbiamo
porre ancora una volta la stessa domanda. Di che differenza o
15
Un esempio luminoso della nozione di ‘comunicazione’ da cui ho imparato molto
è stato portato a termine da Briankle G. Chang nel suo Deconstructing Communication
– Representation, Subject, and Economies of Exchange (Minneapolis, University of Min-
nesota Press, 1996).
16
Sakai Naoki, Translation and Subjectivity – On ‘Japan’ and Cultural Nationalism,
op cit. pp. 1-17, e pp. 41-71.
differenziazione si parla qui? Come richiede che espandiamo la

nostra comprensione della traduzione? Sin dall’inizio dobbiamo
proteggerci da una prospettiva statica della traduzione in cui si
sostanzializza la differenza; non dovremmo cedere alla reifica-
zione della traduzione, perché questo negherebbe alla traduzione
la sua potenzialità di de-territorializzazione. Di conseguenza, è
importante introdurre la differenza nella lingua e tra le lingue,
per comprendere la traduzione non in termini di modello comu-
nicativo di equivalenza o scambio, quanto piuttosto come una
forma di fatica politica che crea una continuità nel punto elusivo
di discontinuità nel sociale. E, più di ogni altra cosa, la traduzio-
ne è un atto di socialità attraverso cui è creata, ridefinita o modi-
ficata la stessa relazione tra mittente e destinatario. Considerati
questi aspetti, che idea di paragone possiamo acquisire?
Consentitemi di ripetere ancora una volta lo stesso gruppo
di domande. Come riconosciamo l’identità di ciascuna lingua, o
come giustifichiamo la supposizione secondo cui le lingue pos-
sono essere categorizzare in termini di uno e molti? La lingua è
numerabile, come lo sono una mela o un’arancia e diversamente
dall’acqua? Non è possibile pensare alla lingua, per esempio, in
termini di quelle grammatiche in cui la distinzione tra plurale e
singolare è irrilevante?
La mia risposta a tutte queste domande, che ho elaborato circa
una ventina di anni fa, è che l’unità di una lingua è simile all’i-
deale regolativo di Kant.17 Organizza la conoscenza ma non è
verificabile a livello empirico. L’ideale regolativo non ha a che
fare con la possibilità dell’esperienza; non partecipa della facoltà
costitutiva; non è niente più di una regola attraverso cui si stabili-
sce una ricerca nella serie dei dati empirici. Garantisce una verità
non-verificabile-empiricamente ma, al contrario, «vietando [la ri-
cerca della verità] per portar[la] a termine trattando qualsiasi cosa
a cui potrebbe arrivare come assolutamente incondizionato”18. E
17
Sakai Naoki. (1992) Voices of the Past – the Status of Language in Eighteenth
Century Japanese Discourse, Ithaca e Londra: Cornell University Press, p. 326
18
Kant, Immanuel. (1929) Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith transl.,
New York: St. Martin’s Press, p.450 (A 509; B 537).
60 Sakai Naoki
dunque l’ideale regolativo dà solo un oggetto nell’idea; significa

solo “uno schema per cui nessun oggetto, nemmeno ipotetico, è
dato in maniera diretta».19 L’unità della lingua non si può dare
nell’esperienza perché non è altro che un ideale regolativo che
ci permette di comprendere dati affini sulle lingue «in un modo
indiretto, nella loro unità sistematica, per mezzo della loro rela-
zione a questa idea».20 Non è possibile sapere se una certa lingua
esista come unità o no. Ma concordando con l’idea dell’unità
della lingua, possiamo organizzare la conoscenza delle lingue in
modo sistematico e scientifico.
Nella misura in cui l’unità di una lingua nazionale serve essen-
zialmente come uno schema per la nazionalità e offre un senso
di integrazione nazionale, l’idea dell’unità della lingua dischiude
un discorso non solo sull’origine naturalizzata di una comunità
etnica, ma anche sull’intero immaginario associato alla lingua
nazionale e alla cultura. Anche Kant qualifica l’ideale regolativo
come uno schema, ossia un’immagine, un progetto, un profilo, o
una figura, non soltanto nell’ordine dell’idea ma anche nell’ordi-
ne del sensoriale. A questo punto è forse necessario riaffermare
che l’unità della lingua nazionale non è mai data a livello di re-
cettività primordiale, quanto piuttosto a livello di rappresenta-
zione. Vale a dire che l’unità della lingua appartiene alla dimen-
sione di uno schermo o di una coscienza su cui la nostra mente
proietta immagini. Pertanto, questa unità si colloca nell’ordine
dell’immagine, della figura o dello schema: viene a essere nella
rappresentazione. E questa rappresentazione figurativa della lin-
gua nazionale ci permette di discutere l’esperienza comune della
comune lingua etnica o nazionale. Una lingua può essere pura,
autentica, ibrida, inquinata o corrotta, ma senza una sua parti-
colare valutazione, la possibilità stessa di lodarla, stabilirne la
veridicità, lamentarcene a riguardo o addirittura disapprovarla è
offerta dall’unità di quella lingua come ideale regolativo.
19
Ibid., 550 (A 670; B 698); enfasi aggiunta.
20
Ibid., 550.
Tuttavia, è assai ben noto che l’istituzione dello stato-nazione

è un’invenzione piuttosto recente. Presuppone la presenza della
sovranità territoriale dello stato-nazione nel mondo internazio-
nale moderno, in quanto non avrebbe potuto esistere prima della
sua forma più antica di sovranità dello stato territoriale. 21 Sia-
mo dunque portati a sospettare che l’idea dell’unità della lingua
come lo schema per una comunanza etnica e nazionale debba
essere un’invenzione recente, con una storicità marcata.
La somiglianza oltre lo schematismo della co-figurazione
Ovviamente, traduzione è un termine dalle connotazioni mol-

to più ampie del trasferimento di significato da una lingua na-
zionale o etnica a un’altra, ma in questa sede sono interessato in
particolar modo alla delimitazione della traduzione, secondo il
regime moderno di traduzione grazie al quale è messa in pratica
l’idea della lingua nazionale. Io suggerisco che in questo regime
di traduzione [tale idea] sia rappresentata attraverso uno schema
di co-figurazione: solo quando la traduzione è resa rappresentabi-
le, grazie allo schematismo della co-figurazione, l’unità presunta
di una lingua nazionale ne deriva come ideale regolativo.
Questa proiezione di schemi ci permette di immaginare o
rappresentare ciò che accade in una traduzione, per darci un’im-
magine o una rappresentazione della traduzione. Una volta im-
maginata, la traduzione non è più un movimento potenziale. La
sua immagine o rappresentazione ipotizza o proietta sempre due
figure accompagnate per necessità da una divisione spaziale in
termini di confini. Per quanto riguardala rappresentazione o l’im-
magine della traduzione, più che l’atto della rappresentazione,
ci troviamo già di fronte ai tropi e alle immagini della traduzio-
ne. Finché rappresentiamo la traduzione a noi stessi nel moder-
21
È piuttosto interessante che Carl Schmitt non discuta la specificità storica dello
stato-nazione e della sovranità dello stato territoriale nazionale nel suo The Nomos of the
Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum. Si veda la precedente nota 8.
62 Sakai Naoki
no regime di traduzione, è impossibile evadere dai tropi della

traduzione. Per prima cosa, il confine è una questione di tropi
per quello che riguarda la traduzione perché l’unità di una lingua
nazionale o etnica come schema è già accompagnata da un’altra
per l’unità di una lingua differente; tale unità di una lingua è pos-
sibile solo nell’elemento dei molti in uno; ma perché ce ne siano
molti, un’unità deve essere distinguibile dalle altre. Nella rappre-
sentazione convenzionale della traduzione – secondo il regime di
traduzione istituzionalizzato nel mondo moderno internazionale
– una lingua deve essere chiaramente e visibilmente distinta dalle
altre. Nei tropi della traduzione, l’unità di uno comporta l’ipotesi
di un confine o un intervallo per separarlo da un altro.
La traduzione presuppone processi e forme, al punto da essere
una fatica politica per superare i punti di incommensurabilità.
Non è altro che la testimonianza dell’universalità della socialità.
Non ha bisogno di essere confinata nel moderno regime di tradu-
zione: potrebbe benissimo trovarsi al di fuori di questo partico-
lare regime a cui la maggior parte di noi è ormai abituata. Sono
esistiti svariati regimi di traduzione, ma sono stati sopraffatti uno
dopo l’altro per raggiungere il livello dove non siamo in grado di
cogliere la traduzione in termini diversi da quelli dello schemati-
smo della co-figurazione.22
Ritornando alla questione della relazione fra traduzione e di-
scontinuità, ho descritto a grandi linee come la nostra nozione di
traduzione legata al senso comune sia delimitata dallo schemati-
smo del mondo internazionale (ossia, la nostra rappresentazione
del mondo secondo l’economia logica della specie e del genere
ai livelli di nazionalità e internazionalità) e al contrario come la
figura moderna del mondo [concepito] come internazionale (os-
sia, il mondo che consiste nell’unità fondamentale di nazioni)
sia dettata dalla nostra rappresentazione della traduzione come
22
Ho discusso la storia di una formazione discorsiva in cui il moderno regime di
traduzione ha sostituito altri regimi. Si veda Voices of the Past: the status of language in
18th-century Japanese discourse, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.
trasferimento comunicativo e internazionale di un messaggio tra

un paio di unità di lingue etno-linguistiche.
La misura con cui siamo in grado di classificare una lingua
come unità – qui ancora non mi riferisco ai sistemi fonetici, alle
unità morfologiche o alle regole sintattiche di una lingua, ma alla
lingua nel suo insieme come langue – ci è data solo nel luogo in
cui è segnato il limite di una lingua, al confine dove ci imbattia-
mo in un nonsenso che ci obbliga a fare qualcosa per conferirgli
un senso. Questa occasione di dare un senso al nonsenso, di fare
qualcosa a livello sociale – agire nei confronti degli stranieri, sol-
lecitare la loro risposta, cercare la loro conferma e così via – è in
genere chiamata traduzione, poiché si sospende per un momento
la distinzione convenzionale tra traduzione e interpretazione.
È dunque necessario tenere presente che l’unità di una lingua
è sempre rappresentata in relazione a un’altra: non è mai data in
sé e per sé. Questo significa che l’unità della lingua è possibile
solo e soltanto nello spazio del confronto. L’internazionalità è già
implicita nella stessa nozione di una lingua (= langue) quando
rappresentiamo a noi stessi il tutto o la totalità di una lingua come
un’unità.
Quando si determina l’unità di una lingua risulta difficile elu-
dere la dualità dialogica. La lingua come unità evoca sempre la
compresenza di un’altra. Non posso sottolineare mai abbastanza
che il luogo di confronto non può mai essere identificato carto-
graficamente con un confine nazionale sulla superficie geogra-
fica della terra. La rappresentazione della traduzione in termini
del tropo del confine non è altro che un effetto dei tropici della
traduzione, proprio perché si tratta in primo luogo dell’atto di
tracciare un confine, di delimitare un confine, prima ancora che
possa essere rappresentato o immaginato come attraversamento
di un confine o come superamento di un intervallo che si suppone
esista tra lingue. L’atto della traduzione avviene nel luogo che
precede l’ubicazione in cui si traccia un confine, in un luogo che
precede l’area. Di conseguenza, il luogo della traduzione desi-
gna un luogo che precede quello assegnato cartograficamente nel
contesto del mondo internazionale. È in questo senso che il luogo
64 Sakai Naoki
della traduzione è dislocato, al di fuori del sistema dei luoghi ge-

ografici all’interno del mondo internazionale; è anche in questo
senso che l’area non è solo un determinato luogo all’interno del-
lo spazio striato del paragone ma anche una performatività, una
condotta attraverso cui introdurre una comparabilità.
Una delle conseguenze possibili che si può trarre da questa di-
scussione è che il luogo della traduzione è potenzialmente in gra-
do di dislocare il sistema di allocazione con cui una lingua è al-
locata nell’economia della nazionalità e internazionalità, ossia di
dislocare la presunta coerenza del moderno regime di traduzione.
Il luogo della traduzione apre il luogo del confronto, ma non può
essere posizionato all’interno della configurazione già prescritta
dagli schemi di specie e genere. Non è posizionata nel mondo
internazionale. Al contrario, rende possibile la localizzazione –
nel senso di identificare un oggetto all’interno della griglia di
coordinate già esistenti – di nazionalità e internazionalità; facilita
il luogo del paragone, mentre indica un luogo senza posizione.
Per transnazionalità, voglio indicare non il sistema di loca-
lizzazione configurato dall’economia logica di specie e genere,
quanto piuttosto lo spazio di traduzione che apre il luogo di com-
parazione. Mentre l’internazionalità opera all’interno dell’eco-
nomia logica di specie e genere, la transnazionalità mina e ri-
configura gli schemi di nazionalità e internazionalità. È in questo
senso che la traduzione de-territorializza. E questo potenziale
de-territorializzante della traduzione è stato obbligatoriamente
ri-territorializzato dallo schema della co-figurazione. Perciò, la
transnazionalità ci indica il luogo dello straniero, qualcosa di ir-
riducibile all’economia logica di specie e genere. Per usare un’e-
spressione paradossale, la traduzione ha luogo nel luogo della
dislocazione; essa disloca la stessa distinzione fra dentro e fuori.
È lo straniero che non arriva per necessità dal di fuori del confine
nazionale; è lo straniero innato in tutti noi, a prescindere dal fatto
che si trovi all’interno o all’esterno della nazione. Il topos con-
cettuale dello straniero, laddove la traduzione è richiesta, non si
può trovare nell’internazionalità ma nella transnazionalità, pro-
prio perché la traduzione è precedente la determinazione della

differenza di specie.
Non serve dire che chi agisce nel luogo della dislocazione è
chiamato “traduttore”.
Infine, possiamo tornare alla discussione iniziale sulla diffe-
renza culturale. Ora è comprensibile perché sia di fondamentale
importanza discernere due diversi approcci alla differenza cul-
turale. La nozione convenzionale di differenza culturale, secon-
do cui ci si appropria dell’esperienza della discontinuità e del
nonsenso nello schema dell’internazionalità, proietta nella nostra
esperienza della differenza culturale la stessa logica di specie
e genere: presuppone la presenza dello straniero, della lingua
straniera e della cultura straniera come esterni alla nazionalità,
spazialmente esterni a ciò che John Stuart Mill chiamava “una
società di simpatia”, al di fuori di una specie di regno essenzia-
lizzato caratterizzato da una cultura nazionale e da una lingua
omogenee. Ma nella nostra esperienza della differenza culturale,
la logica dell’interno opposto all’esterno, che ha sempre definito
lo straniero come un’intrusione dall’esterno, non è imminente.
La differenza culturale non ha bisogno di essere regolata dall’e-
conomia di specie e genere. E questo perché, prima della tradu-
zione, la differenza culturale non può essere ridotta alla differen-
za di specie tra una specie e un’altra nella generalità del genere.
Troppo spesso il multiculturalismo è stato catturato dalla retorica
dell’internazionalità e dalla logica della differenza specifica.
In questo articolo ho provato a esaminare la nozione di area
nella formazione disciplinare degli studi di area. Dal momento
che noi la esaminiamo come performatività, come condotta, che
stabilisce l’ordine di paragone, non possiamo tralasciare l’affini-
tà dell’area con la traduzione. Inoltre, l’area della performatività
che introduce lo spazio della comparabilità si nasconde nel di-
scorso dell’Occidente-e-del-Resto-del-mondo, serve per raffor-
zare la biforcazione fra l’Occidente-e-il-Resto-del-mondo e la
differenza antropologica. Il nostro tentativo di delineare un’e-
conomia di somiglianza e differenza mira al progetto delle di-
scipline umanistiche comparative a partire dal modo dominante
66 Sakai Naoki
della nazionalità comparata, in modo tale da permettere confi-

gurazioni di somiglianze al di fuori dell’economia dell’interna-
zionalità della razza, dell’etnia, della cultura, della civiltà e della
nazionalità. Si tratta però di un tentativo tutt’altro che esauriente:
in questo luogo posso solo suggerire come possiamo forse con-
cepire in una direzione diversa la produzione di conoscenza negli
studi di area, con una spinta alternativa allo schematismo della
co-figurazione.
(Traduzione di Anna Specchio)

II.
ONE
Tiadition
Past/Present Culture
and ModernJapanese History
Stephen Wastos
ModernJapan is widely regarded as a society saturated with customs, values, and

social relationships that organically link present generations of Japanese to past
generations. Especially since rg45 and the eclipse of the ideology of the emperor-
centered family-state, Japanese have come to know themselves, and to be known
by others, through their cultural traditions. Group harmony, aversion to litigation,
the martial arts, industrial paternalism: these and other "traditional" values and
practices are assumed both to predate Japan's modernization and to have con-
tributed to its unparalleled success. It was not that long ago, in f;act, that Japan
specialists ascribedJapan's successful modernization to the utility of its premod-
ern values and institutions, on the assumption "traditions" were direct cultural
legacies.l
Readers will be surprised to discover the recent origins of "age-old" Japanese
traditions. Examined historically, familiar emblems of Japanese culture, including
treasured icons, turn out to be modern. Much of the ritual and the rules of
Japan's "ancient" national sport, sumo, are hventieth-century creations. Prince
Shotoku's enshrinement as an icon of Japanese communal harmony dates from
the r93os and wartime spiritual mobilization. There is little evidence ofJapanese
I want to thank Dipcsh Chakrabarty for his challenging Afterword and subsequent e-mail exchanges;
Arif Dirlik and Imin Scheiner for their valuable input; and the anonymous readers for the University
of Calilornia Press.
r. For example, see Donald H. Shively, ed., Tradition and Moderni4tioninJapanese Culhtre (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, r97r), xii xvii. Uncritical use of tradition was a conspicuous feature of
modernization studies and provided the theoretical lramework for the influential, multivolume series
of the Conference on ModernJapan, rg5g 1969, published by Princeton University Press under the
general editorship ofJohn W. Hzrll and Marius B.Jansen. Early on, RobertJ. Smith pointed to the per-
ils of "invented history" and "an imagined past" in the social sciences. See his "Town and City in Pre-
modern Japan," in A. Southall, ed., Urban Anthropolog (Oxford: Oxford University Press, tg73), 164.
STEPHEN VI′ ASTOS
cultural aversion to litigation before the twentieth century; a misnomeq theJapa-

nese "weak legal consciousness" is largely the legacy of institutional innovations
of political elites since World War I. The rhetoric of "warm-hearted" worker-
management relations was invented in the r8gos by capitalists seeking to fend off
government regulation. At that time labor relations on the shop floor tended to be
strife-ridden and chaotic; the labor practices that today constitute 'Japanese-style
labor management" were introduced piecemeal decades later. Some were even
borrowed from abroad.
What does it mean that so much of Japanese "tradition" is a modern inven-
tion? The essays in this volume build on the critical historical approach to tra-
dition developed by Eric Hobsbawm and employed to startling effect by the
contributors to The Inaention of Tradition.2 The methodological breakthrough of
Hobsbawn and his collaborators was to historicize modern British and British
colonial traditions and thereby reveal the ideological and constructed nature of
modern tradition an aspect of tradition scholars had only dimly perceived.
Social scientists have conventionally used tradition in two overlapping and
somewhat contradictory senses. First, tradition designates a temporal frame (with
no clear beginning), which marks offthe historical period preceding modernity.
Used in this way tradition aggregates and homogenizes premodern culture and
posits a historical past against which the modern human condition can be mea-
sured. Thus Anthony Giddens contrasts the pervasive condition of "radical
doubt" institutionalized by modernity with the "ontological security" and "moral
bindingness" of life in traditional sociery where kinship, rcligion, custom, and cer-
emony impart feelings of belonging.3 Used in this way tradition is discontinuous
with, and stands in opposition to, modernity.
Tradition in the second and more frequent usage represents a continuous cul-
tural transmission in the form of discrete cultural practices of "the past" that re-
main vital in the present. In Edward Shils's formulation, tradition is "far more
than the statistically frequent reoccurrence over a succession of generations of
similar beliefs, practices, institutions, and works." The core of tradition is strongly
normative; the intention (and the effect) is to reproduce patterns of culture. Shils
writes, "It is this normative transmission which links the gencrations of the dead
with the generations of the living."a In this conception, rather than representing
culture left behind in the transition to moderniry tradition is what modernity ra-
quires to prevent society from flying apart.
Both conceptions of tradition are resolutely ahistorical, reproducing the
linked binaries of premodern/modern and stasis/change central to the Western
conception of modernity that achieved a kind of apotheosis in post World War II
z. EricJ. Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger, eds., The Inrmtion of Tradition (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, r983).
3. Anthony Giddens, Moderniy and Sef:ldmtiA (Stanford: Stanford University Press, rggr), 3.
4. Edward Shlls, Tiatlition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, r98r), 24.
TRADIT10N
modernization theory.s Yet scholars who would reject out of hand the notion of
timeless culture and a static past have often failed to problematize the historicity
of tradition, for the normative status and repetitive practice of invented tra-
ditions powerfully naturalize them. Thus the provocative title of Hobsbawm's
volume, and especially the lead essay by Hugh Trevor-Roper debunking the
Scottish highland tradition, served as a wake-up call.6 The timing was just right.
The broad movement across the humanities to deconstruct culture had just been
launched, and Hobsbawm's ironic representation of tradition as invention made
an important fact unmistakably clear: tradition is not the sum of actualpastprac-
tices that have perdured into the present; rather, tradition is as a modern trope, a
prescriptive representation of socially desirable (or sometimes undesirable) insti-
tutions and ideas thought to have been handed down from generation to genera-
tion.7
The choice of the subtitle of this project, "Invented Traditions of Modern
Japan," explicitly acknowledges our intellectual debt to the conceptual model de-
veloped in Hobsbawm and Rangeq which mandates skepticism with regard to the
historical claims of tradition. Nevertheless, a word of caution is in order. "The in-
vention of tradition," rather like the now-ubiquitous concept of "imagined com-
munities," is both the title of a well-known book whose thesis broke new intellec-
tual ground and a mobile and elastic concept, captured in a seductive title phrase,
which has been adopted, used, and criticized, sometimes without close attention
to the specificity of the original concept. Because the contributors to this volume
both borrow from and revise Hobsbawm's conception of the invention ol tradi-
tion, a short sketch of its salient features is useful.
In the introduction to The Inaention of Tiadition, Hobsbawm lays out a rigorous
sociological definition of tradition (practically identical to Shils's) in which invari-
ance is the salient characteristic.s Hobsbawm does this in order to distinguish in-
vented tradition, which he identifies with superstructural institutions and elites,
from custom, which he conceives as popular and capable of being mobilized by
groups at society's base. Drawing out the contrast, Hobsbawm argues that while
traditions impose fixed practices, custom is flexible, capable of accommodating a
certain amount of innovation while still providing the sanction of "precedent, so-
cial continuiry and natural law as expressed in history." Accordingly, in a world
5. See, for example, Robert A. Scalapino, "Ideology and Modernization: TheJapanese Case," in
David E. Apter, ed., Ideologt and lts Discontznts (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), esp. g7-roo.
6. Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Invention of Tradition: The Highland tadition of Scotland," in
Hobsbawm and Ranger, Inumlion.
7. See alsoJennifer Robertson, "It Ta.kes a Village: Internationalization and Nostalgia in Postlvar
Japan," in this volume.
8. Dipesh Chakrabarry 'l{ftemord: Revisiting the Tradition/Modernity Binary" in this volume.
Chakrabarty's insightful discussion singles out this feature of Hobsbawm's model and explores the
conceptual and epistemological difficulties it entails.
STEPHEN VLASTOS
marked by constant change, the invention of tradition functions "to structure at

least some parts of social life within it as unchanging and invariant." Finally, in-
vented traditions are distinguished from other (genuine?) traditions by the fact
that continuity with a historical past "is largely fictitious."e
A frequent criticism of the concept of the invention of tradition is that all tra-
ditions are (and always have been) socially constructed, and hence in some sense
invented. The invention of tradition, in this view, at best restates something
everyone should already know, and at worst improperly denies the possibility of
authentic tradition by collapsing the distinction between (legitimate) agency and
artifice. A second and related criticism of the model arises from the dichotomy
drawn betlveen tradition and custom. Tradition, unlike custom, is said to be
rigid-and must be so since the intent, Hobsbawm insists, is to represent some
part of modern life as unchanging. Speaking from the theoretical position of
postcolonial studies, Dipesh Chakrabarty raises an important epistemological
issue in the Afterword related to the attribution of invariance in Hobsbawm's
model. The point I will pursue is different: the conspicuous disjuncture between
the rhetorical aspect of tradition represented in the claim to invariance, and the
continually shifting substantive aspect, which is institutionalized in practices and
texts that are reorganized and reformulated over brief spans of time without
apparent forleiture of authority. This observation leads to a third and final criti-
cism. The elite/popular typologizing of tradition/custom is useful only up to
a point, especially when applied to cultural, rather than to political, traditions. It
is true, of course, that most traditions are instituted and regulated by elites;
in fact, it is exactly this feature that makes their study so revealing of how dis-
course is constituted in relation to social power in specific historical contexts.
But even when elites make tradition "just as they please," the practices and ideas
they authorize have a tendency to take on a life of their own. taditions, like cus-
toms, are embedded in larger social structures that are continuously reshaped by
the very forces ol change endemic in capitalist modernity that they aim to ar-
rest. l0
Each of these points warrants further discussion, both to develop a better un-
derstanding of the uses and misuses of the invention of tradition, and to indicate
with reference to specific cases how the concept is deployed by the contributors to
this volume. I began by noting the common criticism of the invention of tradition,
which is also the most sweeping that the concept itself is theoretically naive since
everyone should know by now that culture is socially constructed. What if any-
thing, then, is gained by conjoining invention with tradition?
9. Eric Hobsbam, "Introduction," in Hobsbawm and Ranger, Inumtion, z. Hobsbawm is inter-

ested in the appearance of new or newly confieured cultural practices that claim, or are accorded, the
status of traditions. He does not dcvelop criteria to differentiate "invented" from other traditions.
Io. Arif Dirlik pointed out to me the similariry of this conception of tradition to Bourdieu's con-
ceptof habitus. Pierrc Bourdieu,The lqtc of hactie (Stanford: Stanfi:rd University Press, rggo), espe-
cially chap. 3, pp.52 65.
TRADITION
The criticism misses the point. The primary value of the invention of tradition
to the critical study of culture is heuristic rather than theoretical; it raises new and
important historical questions concerning the formation of culture, even if it does
not in the end produce criteria capable of sustaining a new, or rigorous, typology.
Even if one were to assume (which would be foolish) common knowledge of the
comparatively recent origins of most modern traditions, establishing the fact of
their invention is only the first step. The significant findings will be historical and
contextual. How, by whom, under what circumstances, and to what social and po-
litical effect are certain practices and ideas formulated, institutionalized, and
propagated as tradition? Take, for example, the Japanese tradition of "weak legal
consciousness," which is the subject of Frank Upham's essayll It is instructive
(perhaps even startling) to learn, as Upham argues in the first part of the essay,
that before the modern eraJapanese apparently demonstrated little cultural aver-
sion to litigation as a means of resolving conflicts. More instructive, though, is his
account of the historical process through whichJapanese political elites produced
what, after the fact, became the tradition of weak legal consciousness. Finally, he
offers an analysis of the larger implications of successful invention. The political
decision to channel dispute resolution away from courts, Upham argues, imposed
on subsequent generations a "choice" of legal cultures, whose primary effect has
been to restrict the latitude and initiative, not only of citizens as private actors but
also of the judiciary in the implementation of legislation, while increasing those of
the bureaucracy and the executive branches of government.
There are potential pitlalls inherent in the problematic of the invention of tradi-
tion, however. \4rhen "invention" is narrowly construed as artifice, the possibility of
a legitimate exercise of agency is erased, leaving only manipulation and mystifica-
tion. Qyite apart from producing boring history such a reading entails real political
costs. As fuif Dirlik recently noted in relation to the history maling of indigenous
peoples, a theoretical position that ignores the social conditions of the production
and reception of invented traditions (and other tropes of identification) denies to
marginal and oppressed populations legitimate recourse to the authority of the past
in their ongoing struggle to fashion counterhegemonic cultural identities.12 Though
not as forcelirlly as Dirlik, Marilp Ir,y also expresses reservations in the introduction
to her study of popular traditions ofJapan's Tono region with "the now comnon
critique" that all tradition is invention. Ir.y makes an important point: "To say that
all tradition is invented is still to rely upon a choice betvyeen invention and authen-
ticiry between fiction and reality, between discourse and history."l3
rr. Kawashima Takeyoshi introduced the phrase "weak legal consciousness" to characterize the
presumed longstanding cultural aversion ofJapanese to the formal legal processes. See Frank Upham,
"Weak Legal Consciousness as Invented Tradition," in this volume.
r q. Arif Dirlik, "The Past as Legacy and Project: Postcolonial Criticism in the Perspective of In-
digenous Historicism," Amnitan Indian Culture and ResearchJournal zo, no. z (1996): r-3.
13. Marilyn lly, Discourses of tlu Vanishing: Modnnig, Phnntasn, Japan (Chicago: Universiry of
Chicago Press, rgg5), zr.
STEPHEN VLASTOS
The essays in this volume take account of the double meaning of "invention,"
which the dictionary tells us signifies both imagination and contrivance, creation
and deception.la Every tradition trades between these two poles; and if traditions
are to retain their vitality under changing historical conditions, one can expect to
find constant shifting and overlapping of signifying positions. Traditions of any
duration are diastrophic rather than flat and unified; hence they function as mul-
tivalent and somewhat unstable cultural signifiers.
This aspect of the invention of tradition, which is not sufficiently recognized,
is well illustrated in Ito Kimio's discussion of one ofJapan's most celebrated tra-
ditions, wa no seishin ("the spirit of peace and harmony"). Wa, one hears re-
peated tirelessly, has regulatedJapanese community life since the misty begin-
nings of Japanese civilization. The injunction "Harmony is to be valued" is
indeed recorded in the first article of Prince Shotoku's "Seventeen-Article Con-
stitution," a foundational document dating to the seventh century. But as Ito
shows, this famous precept has traversed a circuitous path in arriving at the pre-
sent "traditional" meaning. Looking at shifts of meaning in the modern period
alone, one sees that in Meiji (r868 rgrz) uta no seisltin signified the ethical basis of
the state and prescribed a hierarchical social order. Under the pressure of
wartime mobilization in the rg3os and during the Pacific War, wa, Ito argues,
first came to signify communal uniry as in the ubiquitous slogan 'All People, One
Mind." However, it was only in the radically altered political, social, and eco-
nomic conditions of the postwar era that ua no seishin acquired its current mean-
ing of cooperation among equals. Finally, as marvelously illustrated by the spa-
tial ordering of the employees' faces in a bank's New Year's greeting card from
the era of high economic growth (see fig. r) the earlier hierarchical meanings of
ua have not been completely erased but are partially retained in the spatial
order.
It is not hard to explain why, despite the strong rhetorical claim to represent
unchanging culture, the signifying functions of traditions turn out to be anyhing
but invariant over time. Like other modern institutions, traditions are shaped by
everything from capitalist markets to technological innovation in the ongoing
process of incorporating and reorganizing new knowledge and information that
Anthony Giddens usefully characterizes as "institutional reflexivity."l5 Formalized
and strongly ideological, traditions are not, of course, as plastic as commodities of
mass consumer capitalism. Adjustments are likely to be "sticky" rather than con-
tinuous and may provoke moments ol resistance. Nevertheless, it would be diffi-
cult to differentiate tradition from custom solely on the basis of degree of substan-
tive rigidity. Both appear to be remarkably flexible.
I4. According to Gaurav Desai, "Invention is at once a process o[ taking and making" Desai,
"The Invention of Invention," Culntral Citique, no. z4 (Spring r9g3): rzz.
15. Giddens, Modoni1,, z.
TRADITION
The puzzle posed by modern traditions is the disjuncture between the rhetori-
cal posture of invariance the strong claim at the heart of every tradition to rep-
resent "time-honored" beliefs and practices-and their actual historicity. Why is it
that stardingly recent origins, frequent "tailorfing] and embellish[ing],"16 and
even shifting signifying functions, do not, as a rule, impair traditions' authenticity
and authority? The essays in this volume reveal, but do not address, this paradox,
which is deeply implicated in the related but separate problematic of public mem-
ory. Nevertheless, promoted by Dipesh Chakrabarty's well-warranted criticism of
the neglect of affect, it is worth reconsidering, as one relevant example, the in-
vented tradition of thelokoluna, the highest rank in sumo.
As Lee A. Thompson notes, authoritative histories of sumo date the origin of
theltokoluna system to November r78g, when two wrestlers were allowed to per-
form a ring-entering ceremony wearing a white rope around the waist. This priv-
ilege continues today. Thompson argues, however, that the modern Tokoluna is
very much the product of the tournament champion system-a twentieth-century
innovation that placed new emphasis on objective and quantifiable measures of
sumo wrestlers'performance. Today the criteria for appointmentto2okoqunarank,
and the expectations for performance once promoted, bear faint resemblance to
those of the historic institution. New rules have been added and a good deal of
the ritual is new, including the archaizing gestures of the referee's costume and the
Shinto-style roof suspended over the wrestling ring which frame the spectacle. In
less than a century the substantive aspect of theylco4na tradition has been trans-
formed. Nevertheless, the fact of slim continuiry with the original practice has
not undermined the status of the2okoquna as a powerful signifier of this "ancient"
and uniquelyJapanese tradition of physical prowess. Hence, the prospect of an
American-born sumo wresder meeting the existing requirements for promotion to
2okoluna precipitated a moment of cultural crisis, which, Thompson argues, led to
a tortured reformulating of the criteria for promotion.
The case of the2okoruna lends force to Chakrabarty's critical reminder-which
applies to all of the essays-of the importance "of smelling tasting and touching,
of seeing and hearing" the sensory dimension of cultural practices such as tra-
ditions. Noting that "ideas acquire materiality through the history of bodily
practices, they work not simply because they persuade through their logic,"
Chakrabarty warns against reducing memory to "the simple and conscious mental
act. The past is embodied through a long process of the training of the senses."
The lokoluna provides a particularly striking reminder of the importance of the
performative aspect of invented traditions. Substantive continuity with the historic
institution of the 2oko4namay be slender. But the dignified ring-entering ceremony
16. The phrase is fromJocelyn Linnekan, "The Politics of Culture in the Paci6c," inJocelltr Lin-
nekan and Lin Poyer, eds., Cultural ldenig, and Ethniciry in the Pacifc (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, Iggo), r6I. Cited in Nicolas Thomas, "The Inversion of Tradition,",4rcrican Ethnologis, rg, no. 2
(Ntlay r99z): zr3.
STEPHEN VLASTOS
repeated each day at the opening of the senior division matches provides the audi-
ence with a convincing sensory spectacle of continuity with an "age-old" past.
The third point to be discussed in relation to invention of tradition is the com-
plicated relationship of modern traditions to social power. Most (though not all)
traditions are produced by elites, and some are consciously fashioned as instru-
ments of control. This process is quite clear in the political sphere. In Japan as
throughout the industrialized world, the rise of the nation-state in the late nine-
teenth century produced an outpouring of new national symbols and rites such as
flags, anthems, and holidays, as well as new (e.g., public health) or reorganized
(e.g., armed forces) state institutions that created and imposed their own dis-
courses of social control. The idea of "the nation," after all, stands as the mega in-
vented tradition of the modern era.
The essays in this volume examine developments in the cultural sphue. Here, too,
one finds new traditions that served hegemonic interests. Several of these have al-
ready been introduced in other contexts. Perhaps the clearest example, however; is
provided in Andrew Gordon's discussion of the tradition of Japanese-style man-
agement. In the r8gos industrialists opposed to factory legislation, Gordon point-
edly observes, had to concoct the neologism onj0-shugt ("warm-heartedness") to
give a name to the purportedly timelessJapanese custom of benevolent workshop
relationships. Yet examination of even this clear-cut case of invention soon pro-
duces a complicated picture. Gordon's discussion, which does not stop with the
fact of the invention at the turn of the century but follows its progress down to the
bubble economy of the late rg8os, reveals sharp swings at the level of discourse.
Not once but twice, managers'passionate insistence on preservingJapan's "beau-
tiful customs" of workplace cooperation and harmony rapidly dissipated when it
appeared that greater economic advantage was to be had by adopting Western
models. Still, during the periods when or{o-shugi was out of favor, industrial elites
were not able to remake the workplace; to a large degree, management was con-
strained by the normative, as well as the institutional, inertia of the discourse of
Japanese-style management it had initiated.lT
Inoue Shun's discussion of the modern martial arts tradition shows how easily
the inventors of traditions lose control of their progeny. KanoJigoro, the founder
of Kodokan judo on which the twentieth-century martial arts tradition is mod-
eled, was an unapologetic rationalist committed to modernizing the techniques,
mode of instruction, philosophy, and organization of the Tokugawa-era martial
arts. A patriot, KanO was not a narrow nationalist or a social conservative; he
opened the Kodokan to women and worked hard to make judo an international
sport. Yet with the rise of militarism in the r93os and the ascendancy of a xeno-
phobic ethos of Japanese exceptionalism, the idea of the martial arts Kan6 had
17. See also RobertJ. Smith, "The Cultural Context of theJapanese Political Economy," in S.
Kumon and H. Rosovsky, cds., The Political Econoryt oJ Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
rggr),3:r7 rg.
TRADITION
pioneered was reinvented by ultranationalists and promoted as a counterweight to

Western values, with the express purpose of infusingJapan's burgeoning modern,
and largely Western, sports culture with 'Japanese spirit."
Up to this point I have primarily addressed conceptual issues related to the use
of invention of tradition as a historical problematic with the aim of revising, and
perhaps extending, the original model. Here my emphasis shifts from the model to
several larger historical themes that emerge from the essays in this volume. The
appearance and trajectories of new traditions are "important symptoms and
therefore indicators" of larger social developments.ls Constitutive of modern cul-
tural formation, they also mirror modern society's anxieties, fissures, and rup-
tures. The discussion that follows is organized around tlvo themes: the relation-
ship of invented traditions to social conflict and to national identity.
Capitalism drives the production of new cultural practices, just as the nation-
state mobilizes the production of modern political traditions. InJapan the begin-
nings of industrial capitalism can be dated to the last decade of the nineteenth
century consumer capitalism to the decade following World War I. The dis-
courses of tradition analyzed in this volume are infused with anxiety over neq
more sharply delineated and disturbing social divisions. Tenant militancy, rural
impoverishment, industrial strikes, sprawling urban slums, periodic violent
protests (culminating in the massive rice riots that swept through 368 cities, towns,
and villages in the summer of rgr8): these and other signs that capitalism was re-
making the social landscape in new and frightening ways fueled deep apprehen-
sions. Not surprisingly, new traditions attempted to contain these social divisions
by imagining a society made whole.
One such discourse was the invented tradition of kltddotai, Japanese village
communiry whose origins Irwin Scheiner Iocates in the mid-nineteenth century
and the development of capitalistic social relations in villages. Following the open-
ing of major ports to unrestricted trade in r85g, a development that greatly stim-
ulated farm by-employments and rural manufacture, villages increasingly became
polarized between the poor (insecure wage-laborers and small holders) and the
wealthy (rural manufactures, middlemen, moneylenders, and landlords). But the
phenomenon of lonaoshi (world renewal) uprisings, Scheiner suggests, cannot be
adequately grasped by SasakiJunnosuke's influential theory of the revolutionary
struggle of the "semi-proletariat." Scheiner argues, rather, that it should be seen
as the attempt by the new rural poor to renegotiate the village, via "world re-
newal," as a community in which norms of mutuality and unity are enforced.
By the end of the nineteenth century the transition to industrial capitalism in-
creasingly accentuated the disparity between the rural and urban sectors and, at
the same time, sharpened class divisions within both. The unevenness of capitalist
development produced two overlapping but distinct discourses, which addressed
18. Hobsbawm and Ranger, Inumtion, n.

STEPHEN VLASTOS
(and refigured) the rural/urban divide: agrarianism (ndhdnshugl and native ethnol-
ogy (mtnzolwgaku). Both reified the difference between country and ciry though
to quite diflerent ends. Louise Young's essay on the sti-ll-born tradition of Man-
churian colonization and my essay on the radical agrarianism of the Ibaragi
Aikyokai examine the bureaucratic and popular streams of agrarianism in the tu-
multuous interwar period. The former emanated from the highest levels of the
bureaucracy and the latter from village-level activism bitterly critical of the cen-
ral government, but both imagined theJapanese farm village as (the only) social
space withinJapan's capitalist modernity capable of transcending class divisions.
While to agrarianists of all stripes the relative poverty of the village was a sign
ol backwardness, a deplorable social condition that impelled spiritual and politi-
cal mobilization, Yanagita Kunio and the native ethnology movement he
founded celebrated cultural unevenness. As discussed in the essays of Hashimoto
Mitsuru and H. D. Harootunian, Yanagita reacted to the social indeterminacy of
capitalist modernization by constructing an imaginary folk (jomin) and space
(chihdl free of social division. Hashimoto argues that Yanagita, unable to go back
in time to recover a unified 'Japan," rendered the diachronic dimension of cul-
ture synchronically as center/periphery thereby creating a space where the
"true"Japan lived on. In Harootunian's striking formulation, Yanagita, Orikuchi
Shinobu, and legions of followers "searched out practices they believed predated
modernity and constructed an imaginary folk, complete, coherent, and unchang-
ing in lives governed by immutable custom." Many scholars read Yanagita as a
critic of capitalist moderniry which in some sense he was. But Harootunian's
analysis shows that despite a rhetorical opposition, native ethnology actually
worked to stabilize capitalism by offering the appearance of an alternative to capi-
talist modernity.
Strenuous denial by capitalists of conflict in Japan's new factories was, of
course, the principal impetus to the invention of the discourse (and later the prac-
tice) ofJapanese-style management. But anxiery over class also appeared in other,
more unlikely places. Jordan Sand's analysis of the invention of "home" in the
late Meiji period primarily revolves around the gendering of domestic space but
also reveals the insecurity of Japan's nascent middle class hemmed in by the
masses of new urban poor on one side, and on the other by the still culturally in-
fluential aristocracy of birth. The discourse and architectural practices that pro-
moted the new progressive ideal of the intimate conjugal family (which quite
quickly became established as "traditional") was part of a broader effort to make
middle-class values normative of 'Japan." Thus, one such reformer at the turn of
the century insisted, against all evidence, that Japan was "65 percent middle
class."
The second theme that emerges with great clarity is the role of new traditions in
the lormation of Japanese national identity. Japan specialists, at least, now recog-
nize that below the level of the politically active samurai and wealthy peasant
classes (and even here one must speak in qualified terms),Japan did not enter the
TRADITION
modern era with a strong or unified sense of national identityle Despite a compar-
atively high degree of common ethniciry language, material culture, and religious
practice, in Japan no less than in the newly formed nation-states of Europe and
America, a sense of "being Japanese" developed afteq rather than before, the
building of the modern state. Following the first phase of economic, social, and cul-
tural modernaaion, which ended in the late r88os, the oligarchy launched a broad
effort to push the imperial institution to the forefront of the people's consciousness.
Drafted at the highest levels of government, such celebrated texts as the Preamble
to the rBBg Meiji Constitution and the r8go Imperial Rescript on Education made
unbroken dlmastic succession the cornerstone of the family-state ideology Their
success, Carol Gluck has shown, is partly explained by the fact that provincial offi-
cials and local notables played a key role in interpreting and disseminating the
"modern myhs" of a continuous emperor-centered polity.2o More recently,
Takashi Fujitani has expanded our understanding of the mechanisms of imperial
myth making by focusing on "material vehicles of meaning" such as national cere-
monies, holidays, emblems, and monuments, which created "a memory of an
emperor-centered national past that, ironically, . . . had never been known."2t Fuji-
tani extends his analysis to "a torrent of policies" regulating everlthing from hair
styles to hygiene, which "aimed at bringing the common people into a highly disci-
plined national community and a unified and totalizing culture."22
Yet it is important to remember that instilling a consciousness of being impe-
rial subjects was only part of the process ol (mis)using history to create a cohesive
Japanese identity. The process involved-in fact it required-the wide circulation
of common practices that claimed to represent continuous and stable culture. In
other words, "tradition" contributed to the formation of national identity though
the ideological function of collapsing time and reifying space. Troping new or
newly configured cultural practices as tradition removed these practices from his-
torical time. They were read back into the undifferentiated time of "theJapanese
past," to be recuperated not merely as values and practices that had withstood the
test of time, but as signs of a distinct and unifiedJapanese culture.
19. Marilyn Iry, citing Naoki Sakai, Voires of the Past: The Slatus of Language in Eightemth-Cattury Dis-
course(lthaca'. Cornell University Press, rggr), writes, "It is arguable that there was no discursively uni-
fied notion of the 'Japanese' before the eighteenth century and that the articulation of a unifiedJapa-
nese ethnos with the'nation'to produce Japanese culture'is entirely modnn" (Discourses,4). Mariko
Tamanoi notes that Western theorists of the nation-state such as Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gell-
ner tend to assumeJapan's ethnic and cultural homogeneity prior to modernization (Polifia and Poetics
of Rural Womm in Modtrn Japan: Mohinq of a National Subject $lonoldu: University o[ Hawaii Press,
r9981).
zo. Carol Gluck, Japan! Modern Mltlu: Idtolog in tlu hte Mtfri Periol (Princeton: Princeton lJniver-
sity Press, rgB5).
zr. T[akashi] Fujitani, Spbndid Monarclry: Power and Pageantry in ModnnJapaz (Berkeley and Los An-
geles: University of California Press, r996), rr.
zz. Ibid.
2
′ STEPHEN VLASTOS
I am not suggesting
that the historical past played no role in the formation of
modernJapanese identity. None of the "traditional" cultural practices we have dis-
cussed was cut from whole cloth; rather, as in the
of the invention of the modern
case
emperor system, cultural traditions were fashioned from both material and discursive
antecedents. Even in the clearest cases of instrumental and self-interested inven-
tion-that is, the discourse of industrial paternalism-the capitalists who coined the
neologism onjo-shugi did not invent the concept of orio, an old and celebrated norm
whose prescriptive meaning was widely understood.23 The point, rather, is that cul-
tural traditions are "chosen," not inherited.2a Fabrication enters when the rhetoric
of Japanese "ffadition" functions to deny the historicity of cultural production;
when it authorizes communalism and cultural particularism while obscuring the
"strategic" character of the process through which the past enters the present.2s
Yanagita Kunio's native ethnology is not only an immensely influential tradi-
tion in its own right, as demonstrated by its followers. As Hashimoto Mitsuru
shows, Yanagita invented the tradition ofJapanese tradition by claiming thatJapan's
preservation of its original cu-lture made Japair unique among modern nations.
Countries of the West, Yanagita argued, were disconnected from their past; in
Japan, however, tradition lived on in the latent but ubiquitous world of the "abid-
ing folk." CitingJames George Frazer's classic study Tlte Goldm Bough,Yanaglta
boasted that only inJapan, where traditional culture lived on, was it possible to
have "nation-specifi c folklore studies" (ikko ku min4 kugaku).26
Like the invention of the "abiding folk," Yanagita's remarkable assertion that
Japan alone had achieved modernity without cutting itself off from its original
culture has meaning only as the assertion of an ideological position. Nevertheless,
it draws attention to the specificity of the historical conditions ofJapanese moder-
nity. Unlike most of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa,Japan was never colonized;
infringement on Japanese sovereignty through the "unequal treaty system" was
largely limited to the commercial sphere. Its retention of sovereignty, in turn, ac-
celerated political, social, and economic modernization, creating the material
basis for new forms of cultural production, including "tradition," which appeared
only after modernization was well under way. More directly, sovereignty ensured
thatJapanese elites (rather than colonial administrators) did the inventing. The re-
sult: inJapan the invention of tradition furthered the national project of modern-
ization. Here Japan presents a striking contrast with India, where "the British
were . . . implicated in the production ol those very components of Indian tradi-
tion that have in postcolonial times been seen as the principal impediments to full-
a3. Ct Smith, "Cultural Context," r7-r9.

24. The very useful concept of "choosing a tradition" is taken from Upham, "Weak lrgal Con-
sciousness."
25. Andrew E. Barshay, "'Doubly Cruel': Maxism and the Presence of the Past inJapanese Cap-
italism," in this volume.
26. Hashimoto Mitsuru, "Chihi:Yanaglta Kunio's 'Japan,"'in this volume. Scc also lty, Discourses,
especially 6G-97.
TRADIT10N じ
scalc mOdcrniり "27 simply put,ItO Hirobumi,thc principal architcct ofJapan'S

modcrnizatiOn pttcct in thC lattcr part of thc ninctccnth ccntutt c可 9cd alux_
uw dcnicd to」 a、 vahanal Nchru morc than a h』 F century latcn Nchru,bccausc Of
thc po、 vcrful,prior Oricntalizing of prcc010nial lndian culturc by thc British,had
to nnd c、 .dcncc of mOdcrnity in lndian tradition;for cxamplc,he wcntto painsto
arguc thc``scicntiflc tcmpcr and apprOach"of lndian thought.281t5,ァヘndrcw Bar‐
shり tcuin」y obscwcs,had tllc frccdom to look uponJapan's“ fcudal''lcgacy as
an``cnormous historical opportunity"for promotin3 for cxamplc,“ thc bOnd bc―
NCCn Patron andttη そ ′"inJapan'S rnodcrn factorics.
Thc stratcgに usc of traditiOn did in fact fll油 cr the state's modcrnization pro」 cct.
Thc discourscs of“ thc sprlt ofpcacc and harmony"and industrial bcncvolcncc arc
orJy dle most obious cxarnPles,but thcrc wcrc othcrs.Karcn Wigcn analyzcs thc
fOrging of a sharcd,primordial“ ShinanO"idcnuり amOng Кsidcnも Of thc ncwly
dra、 m prcfecturc of Nagano.The mvcntion of rc」 ontt idCntitics inル fcji,shc sug‐
∼
gests,playcd a crltlc」 rolc in cxtracting flnancial sacriflccs fron■ prcfcctural rcsidcnも
け」ヽ咀 g thCm an afFccti、 ℃stakc in thc prOgrcss of thcir prctcturc
lt is sobcring to disc∝ ℃r how broadly thc nOtiOn ofJapan's particulariり was
sharcd.It invadcd,and Partitty disarmcd,cvcn oppositional discoursc.Alldrcゃv
Barshay's analysis of prcwar Marxist histo五 ograplッ shows how Yamada
Moritar5's scmind tcxt,し τ 力οπ動物ο η動を ιακ∫ 蒻体 naい iS OfJapanCSC Capitalism)
∼
(19341,inadVCrtcntl17 PartiCや atCd in thc discOursc of a uniquc■ lpanCSC modcrniり
Outra〔委d by7thc sOcial costs and impcrialist agcnda of thc fOrccd maК h to“ na‐
tional wcalth and powcち "Yamada hingcd his anaけ siS OfJapancsc capitalism on
“scmi― fcudal"land tcnure inJapan'SV■ lagcs and the“ scrf likc"rcttmC Of WOrkcrs
in Japan's dual― structurc rnanufacturing sccton tthmada's tcxt,Barshay argucs,
forgcd“ an irOn link"bc“ vccn discourscs ofIPanCSC particularism and histOrical
backwardncss whosc influcncc cxtcndcd far b、 snd h/11arxist circlcs.29 0n this
point,at icast,thc Marxists convcr"d蒟 thJapanCSC― stylc managcmcnt both as―
seicd that capitalism inJapan Was sui gncris bccausc thc corc consistcd Of prc―
modcrn valucs and social rclations. By constructing tradition at thc hcart Of
JapanCSC Capitalism,dlc prccmincnt sign Of modcrniじ Yamada un、組 ttingly
joined his intcⅡ cctual cncmics in fashiOning thc myth that capitalism in Japan
wasn't rcally caPitalism aftcr al bccausc of thc strcn」 h ofJapan'S tradition.Dc―
sPitc enormous intcllcctual achicvcmcnt and moral passion,Barshay concludcs,
Yamada's analysis“ misscd thc inttntcd一 and∫ 姥燿″―Charactcr of thc prOccss"
thrOugll、 vhich“ tradition"cntcrcd thc prcscnt.
27・ Nicholas B Dirks,``Histow as a Sign of thc MOdcrn,"Д 腸 C“ 滋 ″ 2,n02(SP五 ng 199o)28

"う
28. Ibid,27
29 BarShay“ `Doubly Crucl"'Itshould bc pointcd outthat MaDosm was obiously anything but
normatl■ c h thc prc、 var pcriod Butin thc pOs●var pcriod thc臨てαschOO1 0f historical ccononlics
wlcldcd grcat influcncc, at icast unti thc 1970S, in intcllccttlal clrclcs, in thc labor movcmcnt,and
ll■ thm tllc lcft political partics ln this scnsc,onc can spcak of Yamada as ha■ lng invcntcd a tradition
14 STEPHEN VLASTOS
Traditions, I noted early on, are normative and establish themselves through rep-
etition. Two essays on gendered cultural practices of the prewar period suggest that
tradition is amenable to reform but not to radical change.Jordan Sand analyzes the
new gendering of domestic urban space initiated in the Iate Meiji period by social re-
formers and middle-class professionals. Focusing equally on architecture and ideol-
ogy, Sand traces the evolution of the concept of katzi, a neologism for home / home
life, from its origins in nineteenth-centuryJapanese Protestant reformers'moral criti-
cism of "feudal" family life, to the point where it became a societal norm. A great
deal had to be invented: for example, architectural innovations such as the interior
corridor (naknrdka),which divided interior residential space into separate spheres, and
the shortJegged dining table (cltabudar) which introduced the common dining table
into theJapanese house and made it possible for the family to eat together. \Vhile
conservative state ideologues wrote the patriarchal family into the Meiji Civil Code, a
more democratic, affect-centered family prevailed in the redesigning of actual living
space. What became the iconic (and today nostalgic) image of the "traditional"
Japanese family----tonsanguine members seated on tntami and gathered around the
chabudaito share tea or a meal-in fact originated in turn-of-the-century discourses of
architectural and social reform, which drew heavily from the West.
In the decade following World War I,Japanese capitalism entered a new stage,
characterized by the explosive growth of modern media technologies, mass mar-
keting of items of personal consumption, and new forms of entertainment and
pleasure seeking. The stylish moga (modern girl) of the rgzos represented bour-
geois women's challenge to established gender norms. As Miriam Silverberg ar-
gues, the cafe, where rural and urban lower class young women sought employ-
ment as waitresses, created a narrow but new social space for the renegotiation of
gender relations. But while the cafe and the cafe waitress drew from a long history
of female sex workers in food service occupations, the social indeterminacy of the
cafe waitress, whose role allowed seduction to go both ways, posed too radical a
challenge to gender norms. First restricted, and finally prohibited, in the period of
wartime mobilization, the culture of the cale and cafe waitress, Silverberg claims,
died out. It never became a tradition.
In Jennifer Robertson's critical analysis, contemporary furusato-4kuri (native
place-making) represents more than a nostalgia for rootedness and wholesome liv-
ing associated with the farm village. Robertson argues that the affective pull of
furusato-ykui, especially to the males who engineer these projects, resides in the
equation of furusato with mother, as illustrated in the quite amazing statement of
the director of the Ig83 movie Furusalo: "Furusato is the ancestral land fsokolat).
My/our lwagaf ancestral land isJapan, it is Gifu prefecture, it is Saigo village, it is
the village's subsection Lo<o) . .. , it is [my] household, it is mother." This associa-
tion, Robertson suggests, points to the recuperative aspect of native place-making
in the paternalistic attempt to reconstruct an authentic, ontologically secure rep-
resentation of stable gender relations in the much less certain present.
I noted that tradition is used in two distinct, though overlapping senses: on the
one hand, "the past" against which the modern is measured and on the other,
TRADITION 6
specnc cultur」 practices believcd to reprcscnt cultural continuity「 Fhc EdO pc‐
riod(16o← 1867),Car01 Gluck argucs,has functioncd sincc carly Mcji as thc in‐
℃ntcd past in rclation tO which」 apan'S modcrnity dcfhcd itsclf ldcntincd as
“ η
tradition,"Edo was to McjiJapan What thc αθルηη
ttη ιWaS tO rcЮ lutiona7
Francc:a historic」 imaginaw that evokcd the past to gctto the futurc.Thc Origi¨
nalinvcntion of Edo occurred in thc latc nineteenth centur"、 vhen commcntators
conccived the national pr● ectin terms of a telos of prOgrcss on an East― ヽ
やLst axis
and madc Edo thc ob℃ rsc of the Meti ViSiOn.Thw mappcd EdO using trOpcs
likc fcudalism,thc cultural and cconOmic cncr」 cs of COrrmoncr socicし thC Cra Of
grcat pcacc,and sttο んα,`à closed countぅぇ ''lDepending on the v■ sion of rnodcr‐
nit"llnages of Edo somctimcs attrmcd and sometllncs oppOsed the dircction Of
thc Mcji state.Whatcver thc initial political and social valcncc of the tropcs,thり
constitutcd an allcgedly indigcnOus tradition.In(vccF caSC,frOm thc anti― Ed0 0f
thc fascist 1930S tO thc rosc― colored Edo of thc postlnodern 198os,thc pcriod is
constructcd as thc rnirror llnage of a particular rnodern future.
A flnal point conccrns thc idcological modalitics of thc invcntiOn of tradition.
Onc of thc intcrcsting issucs that(3hakrabarw raiscs in hisノヽRcぃ ″ord conccrns
thc troPcs of tCmpOraliw and afFcct.Addrcssing thc articlcs On Yanagita KuniO by
H.D.Harootunian and Hashilnotoル Iitsuru,he distinguishcs、 vo modcs oftcrn―
porality in Yana」 ta's writing:``nostal」 c''and“ Cpiphanic."The nostalgic modc
corrcsponds to thc familiar scnsc of bclatcdness in inv℃ nted traditions,thc idco―
10」 Cal COnstruction of a pastthat must bc rcc∝ crcd w adherencc to pracdccs of
quitc rcccnt oridn・ HOヽ vcvcち thC Cpiphanic mOdc r● ectS thC flttrc Of 10ss and rc―
cNヽ事 It cscapcs frOm histOrical tirnc and constructs a、 ■sion of ctcrnity a`Ìnod―
crn nationalist cpiphany"produccd by a pcrformativ・ c agcncy resistant to state irl―
stitutions.(〕 iting thc cxamplcs ofル lahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagorc,
and carcfuny noting that``thc shado、 vs of bOth capitalisn■ and thc nation― state 2■ 1
much mOrc hcady and lcngthJy on our discussion of」 apanCSC history"than in
South Asian studics,Chakrabarw arguCS against thc notion that thc romantic/
acsthctic nationalism lcads incxOrabけ tO Statist andjingoist fascism.
Ccrtainサ nOt CV3rttlcrc at all tinlcs,and probabけ nOt again inJapan.Thc
changcs in domcstic and wOrld political ccOnOmy sincc thc Pacincゃ、 rar havc bccn
cpochal,and historical coordinates arc always dccisivc.Thc cvidencc of thc cssays
in this volume is sobcrin3 ho、 vcvcn ln thc 1930S and during thc Pacinc wvar onけ
LIIarxisnl,、vith all its modcrnist baggagc,hcld its grOund as an oppositional dis¨
coursc.ル do,harmon);industrial patcrnalism,fOlk10rc studics,“ homc":thcsc and
thc othcr ncw cultural practiccs of thc prcwar pcriod cithcr acti■ 7cly conaboratcd
with mnitarism and impcrialism or wcrc scvcrcly compromiscd"not rcsisting
Thc suttcct Of my Cssa);thC populist strain of agrarianism,is ttustrati■ 7c in this
rcspcct.I charactcrizc thc sOcial imaginatiOn of Tachibana K5zaburo and Ai―
け。kai as romantic and utopian― cpiphanic,in Chakrabarり 's fOrmulatiOn.In■ s
populist phasc that is,prior to Tachibana invoNヽ mcnt in thc lncidcnt ofル lay
15,1932-the rhctoric of thc AkyOkai was ncithcr nostalgic nor jingoistic,sug―
gcsting that utopia posits ncw soci」 rclations in ima」 naヮ p01itical sPace.But
′δ STEPHEN VLASTOS
Tachibana held this posture only as long as his politics remained local. When he
superimposed the ideology of native place on the nation, he allied with fascist ele-
ments in the military. H. D. Harootunian's analysis of Yanagita's representation of
theJapanese folk is similar-and equally bleak. "Yanagita was never able to suffi-
ciently diflerentiate the native place from the boundaries fixed by the state; his
communitarian discourse was never able to articulate a sufficiently different nar-
rative from that other place-from the outside-that might lastingly challenge the
state's capacity to appropriate whatever version it wished to project as its own." In
the end, Harootunian concludes, Yanagita's project of native ethnology supplied
ideological support to imperial and colonial policies.3o
The case of India may suffice to show that romantic/aesthetic nationalism
need not end up in fascism, and there surely are others. But this observation only
confirms the potential peril of the rush in historical studies toward a history of
subjectivities-particularly if the subject position comes to occupy so much of the
historical frame that powerful historically determined structures such as the na-
tion, state, capitalism, and the world systems to which they are inextricably linked
fade out of the picture. It was different inJapan between the turn of the century
and the Pacific War. To varying degrees but with discouragingly few exceptions
even outside the political sphere, invented traditions aided----or did litde to ob-
struct-the mobilization ofJapanese affective identification with a pernicious vi-
sion of the modern nation-state whose demise as a consequence of defeat in the
Pacific War was tlle only welcome consequence of that historic tragedy.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to view the invented traditions of modern
Japan only in terms of the ultimate failure in the prewar period to establish intel-
lectual and cultural autonomy from the state. One also sees many examples of
creative responses by ordinary people who resisted the norms and values that con-
servative elites and t}le state sought to impose. Upham shows how the Burakumin
of Hozu village turned the state-sanctioned norm of cooperation and the mecha-
nisms of informal dispute resolution to their advantage in winning restitution of
their ancestors'property. Gordon observes thatJapanese workers have taken the
grant of "warm-hearted" Iabor-management relations to resist changes inimical
to their interests. Sand shows how the ideal of the emotionally bonded residential
family promoted by social reformers and given material expression by progressive
architects compromised the coldly hierarchical and patriarchal it fatrily system
beloved by conservative ideologues. Finally, Scheiner shows that notions of com-
munity have remained a conflicted discourse in the postwar period. These are
only a few examples of the sigrrificance of individual agency in cultural produc-
tion. They are all the more meaningful in light of the unrelenting efforts of con-
servative social forces to monopolize the invention of tradition.3l
3o. H.D. Harootunian, "Figuring the Folk," in this volume.

3r. Irwin Scheiner contributed to the writing of the final paragraph.
III.
Part II. JAPAN
THE INVENTION OF IDENTITY

RACE AND NATION IN PRE-WAR JAPAN
Michael Weiner
Where a nation is assumed to possess a set of unique characteristics

which make it a nation and distinguish it from other populations,
these same characteristics may be used as 'racial' boundary markers. 1
In these circumstances, rather than existing as independent
categories, 'race' and nation may come together ideologically. 2
The extent to which inJapan such assumptions inform the national
agenda rather than a narrow nationalist one has been discussed
many times in recent years. 3
The assumptions which underpin claims to national exclusivity
have also been, and remain, a cardinal feature of the class of
literature associated with the nihonjinron, orJapaneseness; a discourse
of difference, which sets forth the unique capabilities of the Japanese
and the distinctive features of their culture. Although voluminous,
this literature has also lacked a clear conceptual distinction between
cultural and 'racial' categories. A single term, minzoku, is regularly
used as a synonym for the Japanese 'race', ethnie and nation. 4
1 This chapter is a revised version of an article which first appeared in Ethnic and Racial Studies
(18.3, July 1995). Gratitude is also due to the anonymous readers for their critical suggestions
and to the Japan Foundation Endowment Committee which generously supported the initial
research.
2 David Goldberg, Racist culture, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, p. 79; Onuma Yasuaki, Tanitsu
minzoku shakai no shinwa '0' koete (Beyond the myth of the homogeneous society), Tokyo:
Toshindo, 1986,. p. 69; Harada Tomohiko et al. (eds), Koza sabetsu to jinken [4] (On
discrimination and human rights), Tokyo: Yiizankaku, 1985, pp. 201-2 and 208-14.
3 See, for example, Yamanaka Keiko, 'New immigration policy and unskilled foreign
workers in Japan', Pacific Review, 66, no. I (1993), p. 73; Shimada Haruo, Japan's "Guest
Workers"; Issues and public policies, University of Tokyo Press, 1994, p. 47; Sankei Shinbun, 19
Dec. 1990; Nikkei Weekly, 14 June 1993.
4 Yoshino Kosaku, Cultural nationalism inJapan, London: Roudedge, 1992, p. 25.
96
The Invention of Identity in Pre-war Japan 97
Within the literature both 'race' and 'culture' have also been
treated as phenomena that occur naturally, further reinforcing
their credibility as factors that explain social relationships. 5 This
conflation of biological and cultural determinants is by no means
confined to the present or earlier post-war period but has its
origins before 1945.
In light of the above, this chapter has three objectives: to
evaluate the claim that the modem Japanese state has evolved
as an expression of the specific characteristics of a homogeneous
people; to trace the relationship between ideologies of 'race' and
nation in the construction of a modem Japanese identity; and
to identifY those elements which have historically informed per-
ceptions of the excluded Other against whom this identity has
been produced and reproduced.
The argument advanced here is that historically social structures
and attitudes in Japan have been imbued with 'racial' meaning,
and that these meanings are themselves fluid, dynamic and con-
tingent. That is to say, both 'racial' meanings and 'racialised'
identities are historically specific, and can only be understood
in relation to other factors - economic and political- and the in-
ternational environment within which they emerged and have
since been transformed. Rather than displacing a sense of
'nationness', the ideological space connoted by 'race' has intersected
with that of nation.
A second concern here is to identifY the various strands of
'racialised' discourse which developed, and the processes by which
European imperialist perspectives on 'race' were adopted in Japan.
Although the state is presented here as the primary focus ofideologi-
cal articulation and struggle, areas of contestation and confrontation
have been, and remain, diverse. The marginalised groups referred
to here are not cast in the role of passive participants. As elsewhere,
the minorities in modem Japan have resisted the imposition of
'racialised' identities, and the exploitation which these identities
countenanced.6
5 Michael Weiner, 'Discourses of race, nation and empire in pre-1945 Japan', Ethnic and
Racial Studies, 18, no. 3 (1995).
6 Ian Neary, Political protest and social control in pre-war japan: The origins of Buraku liberation,
Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1989, pp. 50-74; Susan Pharr, Losingjace: Status
politics in japan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, pp. 75-89; Michael Weiner,
Race and migration in imperialjapan, London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 154-86.
98 Michael Weiner
To appreciate how racialised ideologies have transformed at-

titudes to Self and Other, it is necessary to distinguish between
two terms: jinshu and minzoku. For example, the Japanese En-
cyclopedia of the Social Sciences enumerates skin colour, physical
stature, hair texture, cranial form, nose shape and blood type
as the defining criteria of jinshu (race). 7 In contrast, the term
minzoku is commonly rendered as equivalent to 'ethnicity' or
'ethnos'.8 Suzuki Jiro has noted in this context that the possession
of fixed physical characteristics is not a necessary element of a
minzoku. 9
Although this distinction seems clear enough, the literature
of both the pre- and post-war periods is full of contradictory
evidence. As noted at the outset, the term minzoku has come
to denote both cultural and physiological determinants. 1O In the
Japanese edition of Ruth Benedict's Race: Science and Politics,
minzoku is preferred to jinshu, while the Encyclopedia if the Social
Sciences contains a definition of minzoku which allows for factors
of consanguinity to be included. 11 An even more explicit overlap
is contained in the 1930 edition of the same encyclopedia, where
minzoku is defined as having three essential components: common
blood, a shared culture and collective consciousness. 12
The conflation of cultural and 'racial' criteria by which minzoku
could be identified has taken various forms. In a 1938 publication
entitled The New Japanism and the Buddhist View on Nationality,
Takakusu Junjiro argued that a dominant Yamato or stem 'race'
existed, which had assimilated various pre-historic racial groupings.
This 'culture of the Japanese blood', Takakusu concluded, had
subsequently been preserved through the 'virtuous rule of suc-
ceeding emperors'. 13 A parallel discourse of' consanguineous unity'
is contained in an English-language History of Japan, published
7 Shakai kagaku daijiten, Tokyo: Kagoshima shuppankai, 1968, vol. 11, pp. 27-8.
8 Yasuda Hiroshi, 'Kindai Nihon ni okeru 'hunzoku "kannen no keisei' (Formation of ,racial'
consciousness in modern Japan), Shiso to Gendai, no. 31 (1992, p. 62.)
9 Cullen T. Hayashida, 'Identity, race and the blood ideology of Japan', unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Washington, 1976, p. 14.
10 Yasuda, 'Kindai Nihon', p. 62; Yun Kwan-cha, 'Minzoku no genso to satesu' (The fantasy
and failure of minzoku) , Shiso (Dec. 1993), p. 16.
11 Shakai kagaku daijiten, Tokyo: Kagoshima shuppankai, 1968, vol. 17, p. 366.
12 Shakai kagaku'daijiten, Tokyo: Shakai shisOsha, 1930, p. 587.
13 Hayashida, 'Identity', p. 29.

through a Japanese government tourist agency in 1939. 14 The

putative relationship between blood and culture is made more
explicit in Kada Tetsuji's Jinshu minzoku senso (Jinshu, minzoku,
war), published in 1940. These three terms are treated inde-
pendently, but in the text the biological basis of minzoku is never
in doubt. The origins of minzoku lie in the distinctive jinshuteki
(racial) and seishinteki (spiritual) qualities of a people; listing among
the specific properties of a minzoku - common blood, culture,
language, customs and religion. Kada concludes: 'We cannot
consider minzoku without taking into account its relation to
blood.'15
In fact, throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, numerous pub-
lications appeared which argued a biological or genetic basis for
the distinctiveness and superiority of the Japanese people. For
example, a 1930 edition of the populist journal Nihonshugi
(Japanism) carried an article in which the unique qualities of
the Japanese nation were identified as a manifestation of what
the author, Ihei Setsuzo, termed ketsuzokushugi (the ideology of
the blood family).16 A parallel argument can be found in Hozumi
Nobushige's Ancestor Worship and Japanese Law (1901).17 In
Hozumi's view, Japanese society had always had three primary
elements (the Imperial family, the regional clan and the family
unit), each forming a discrete though inter-related consanguineous
community .18
The precise historical moment when minzoku displaced jinshu
in social science is difficult to determine, but the process was
well under way by the late 1920s, and completed during the
14 John Dower, War without mercy: Riue and power in the Pacific War, New York: Pantheon,
1986, p. 222.
15 Kada Tetsuji.]inshu, minzoku, sensa (jinshu, minzoku and war), Tokyo: Keio shobo, 1940,
pp. 70-l.
16 Hayashida, 'Identity', p. 82.
17 Though less well known than his brother Hozumi Yatsuka, a specialist in constitutional
law who later assisted Yamagata Aritomo draft his famous attack on the perils of socialism,
Hozumi Nobushige was a respected legal scholar in his own right. Having spent the year,;
1876-80 in England, Nobushige returned to Japan where he became one of the principal
commentator,; on the theories of Herbert Spencer. See I. Kikuchi, 'Hozumi Nobushige to
shakai ken' (Hozumi Nobushige and social rights), Nihon Gakushi-in Kiyo, 30, no. I, March
1972, pp. 24-5. Ancestor worship andJapanese law was written on his return from a second visit
to England in 1899.
18 Ito Mikiharu, Kazoku kokka kan no jinruigaku (Anthropology offamily state consciousness),
Tokyo: Minerva shobo, 1982, pp. 31-2.
100 Michael Weiner
Pacific war. According to Dower, minzoku were perceived as

'organic collectivities that transcended their individual members
and gave rise to distinctive national characters, representing in
toto a fluid conjunction of blood, culture, history and political
form.'19 Culture had, in effect, been transformed into a pseudo-
biological property of communal life. Moreover, both terms had
already come to have a functional equivalence as concepts which
made any distinction irrelevant. It has been argued elsewhere
that if culture is regarded as manifesting a primordial or innate
essence, reliance on cultural or ethnic criteria in distinguishing
between peoples works in the same way as biological deterrninism. 20
The important distinction is not between cultural or physiological
characteristics, but between the ways in which these criteria are
signified and acted upon. The historical processes through which
groups or nations evolve have been based on these assumed innate
qualities - either cultural or biological - and subsequently located
within specific material and power relations.
THE IMAGINED COMMUNITY OF NATION

The categories of inclusion and exclusion on which the Japanese
of the Tokugawa period (1603-1867) relied to distinguish them-
selves from other groups of people did not assume a 'racialised'
form. Likewise, although there is evidence of xenophobia in
Tokugawa law, as in the exclusion edicts against Christian mis-
sionaries, there is little to suggest that the inequality it assumed
was 'racially' based. The yabanjin (barbarian) was viewed as inferior,
but this reflected cultural or political considerations. Indeed, it
was not until the Japanese encountered the European enslavement
of Africans that negative images of 'blacks' began to emerge.
But, as Leupp has argued, Tokugawa accounts of barbarian be-
haviour were not informed by the colour stigma alone:
The term kuronbo applied to black people was of course
derogatory, but so were the terms applied to the white
Westerners. Myths about black people were invidious, but so
were the myths about the Dutch. It was said, for example,
Dower, War without mercy, p. 267.

20 Robert Miles, Racism qfter 'race relations', London: Routledge, 1993, p. 101.
The Invention oj Identity in Pre-war Japan 101
that they had no heels, or urinated, like dogs, when ralSlng

one leg. 21
The development of national consciousness in post-:1868 Japan
was itself contingent on a series of articulations and re-articulations
following the Meiji Restoration of1868. In due course the political,
economic and social rupture which the restoration signified would
be re-defined as a historical continuity, with links to an ancient
past. The language and imagery of nationalism, in erecting a
set of new symbolic boundaries around Japan, also suggested that
the nation was a naturally occurring or primordial community
of which the citizenry had always been a part. 22 The naturalisation
of culture, of which these processes forned an integral part, re-cast
the meaning of 'Japaneseness' in powerful images of the purity
and of the nation, the family and the Japanese way
of life. The nation was conceived as an extended family, with
the Emperor as semi-divine father to the national community
and head of state. The imagined community thus received its
ultimate sanctification at the sacred level, in Shinto, while reverence
for the Emperor as minzoku no Gsa (head of the people) and
loyalty and obedience to the state were given equivalent status.
However, new ways of viewing the world did not emerge
unchallenged in a vacuum. Just as Meiji industrialisation depended
on the existence of well-established market relations and the im-
portation of Western technology, Japanese ideologues drew in-
spiration for their construction of a national identity both from
the West aDd through the appropriation and manipulation of
indigenous myths. The search for a usable past engaged the resources
of academics, educators, journalists, politicians and government
officials. Their interests and concerns often intersected; politicians
were frequent contributors to newspapers, while academics were
called on to advise on matters of public policy and education.
Although there was no master theme to which they all subscribed,
their efforts would also assist in the dissemination of 'racial'
knowledge and the production of 'Otherness'.
Throughout the final decades of the nineteenth century, in
particular, statesmen, bureaucrats and unofficial publicists alike
21 Gary P. Leupp, 'Images of black people in late mediaeval Japan and early modern Japan',
Japan Forum, 7, no. 1 (1995), p. 6.
22 Yasuda, 'Kindai Nihon', p. 63.
102 Michael Weiner
were occupied in attempts to establish the criteria for 'Japaneseness'.

It was recognised that the muscular nationalism of the imperial
powers would have to be met by an equally assertive Japanese
nationalism if sovereignty were to be preserved. 23 The contours
of this identity, which invoked powerful images of communal
solidarity and exclusivity, were further refined through the lens
of scientific 'racism' embodied in the writings ofHaeckel, Lamarck
and Spencer.24 The diffusion of social Darwinism, in particular,
would provide scientific legitimacy both for the laws of the market
place and for the notion that social and political development
was a manifestation of the aggressive interplay of natural forces. 25
For Shiga Shigetaka and other intellectuals associated with the
newspaper Nihon and the journal Nihonjin, the nation was in-
creasingly identified with minzoku - a term first popularised by
Shiga in the late 1880s. In common with other terms like kokusui
(national essence) and kokuminshugi (civic nationalism), minzoku
was a critical element in the development of a popular nationalism
which arose partly in response to what was regarded as the excessive
Westernisation of the previous decades. As articulated by Shiga
and his contemporary Kuga Katsunan, minzoku manifested the
unique characteristics (historical, geographical and cultural) of the
nation. 26 This sense of nation was later appropriated by con-
stitutional scholars like Hozumi Yatsuka, for whom the kokutai
(national polity) was identified with the imperial line and the
network of beliefS sustaining it -principally ancestor worship.27
In common with Inoue Tetsujiro, Kato Hiroyuki and other family
state theoreticians, Hozurni argued that the Japanese minzoku was
the manifestation of common ancestry rather than shared culture.
23 Kenneth B. Pyle, The new generation in MeijiJapan, Stanford University Press, 1969, p. 75.
24 Shimao £ikoh, 'Darwinism in Japan', Annals ofScien[e, no. 38, (1981), pp. 93-102; Sharon
H. Nolte, Liberalism in modem Japan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, p. 44;
Marius B. Jansen, 'Japanese imperialism: Late Meiji perspectives' in Ramon H. Myers and
Mark R. Peattie (eds) , The Japanese colonial empire, 1895-1945, Princeton University Press,
1984, p. 66.
25 Carol Gluck, Japan's modem myths, Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 209; Michael
Weiner, The origins of the Korean community in Japan, 1910-1923, Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press, 1989, pp. 14-22.
26 Kuga Katsu nan , 'Kokumin teki no kannen' (Citizen's consciousness), 1889, cited in
Nishida Taketoshi and Uete Michiari (eds) , Kuga Katsunan zenshii, Tokyo: Misuzu shobo,
1969, vol. 2, pp. 7-8.
27 Hozumi Yatsuka, Kasei oyobi kokutai (The family system and the national polity), 1892,
cited in Yun, 'Minzoku', p. 16.
A parallel line of argument was pursued by Ueda Kazutoshi in

Kokugo to Kokka to, published in 1894. In this seminal piece,
Ueda emphasised that the Japanese polity had been, and would
continue to be, sustained by the Japanese 'race', and argued that
the Japanese language itself was a manifestation of the inherited
qualities of its people. 28 Like his contemporary Fukuzawa Yukichi,
Kato Hiroyuki's early advocacy of the 'natural rights' of man
would later be replaced by a firm commitment to Darwinian
theories of social evolution. 29 In 1905, Kato provided a Darwinian
analysis of the current struggle between Japan and Russia for
hegemony in East Asia. A Japanese victory, he concluded, was
inevitable due to the superiority of a homogeneous polity which
had been thoroughly integrated within the emperor system. 30
To their credit, other intellectuals were prepared to contest
the assumptions underpinning belief in Japanese exceptionalism.
For example, Onishi Iwao challenged the existence of a Yamato
'race', descended from a common ancestor. 31 Another critic of
the Spencerian interpretation of social development and inter-
national relations was Tanaka Odo, who rejected the 'mystical
patriotism and national self-worship surrounding the Russo-
Japanese war' as impediments to Japan's development as a modern
industrial state. In a study ofFukuzawa Yukichi, Tanaka challenged
the existence of a uniquely Japanese polity (kokutai), replacing
it with a constantly evolving sense of nationality (kokuminsei).
Writing in 1915, Tanaka advanced this argument a stage further
in suggesting that co-existence with other nationalities and respect
for them were the criteria on which the Japanese kokuminsei should
be judged. It was a stance which defended the right of all peoples
to maintain their political and cultural autonomy, and contested
the ideological basis of imperial expansion. 32
Although intellectuals and journalists performed an important
28 Yun 'Minzoku', p. 16.

29 Kato Hiroyuki, 'Kokutai shinron' (New treatise on the national polity), 1875, in Meiji
bunka zenshii, Tokyo: Nihon hyoron shinsha, 1955, vol. 2, pp. 111-12. See also Irokawa
Daikichi, The culture of the Meiji period (edited and translated by Marius Jansen), Princeton
University Press, 1986, p. 253.
30 Kawamura Nozomu, 'Sociology and sociology in the interwar period' in J. Thomas
Rimmer (ed.), Culture and identity: Japanese intellectuals during the interwar years, Princeton
University Press, 1990, p. 67.
31 Yasuda, 'Kindai Nihon', pp. 81-2.
32 Nolte, Liberalism, pp. 44, 51-2, 145-6.

104 Michael Weiner
role as channels oflegitimation, the idea of nationalism was nurtured

primarily through the institutions of the state. By about 1910,
state-inspired nationalism had penetrated all strata of society and
offered the Japanese people an easily accessible explanation of
their social, political and economic position, both domestically
and internationally. It was a nationalist ideology whose central
motif was that of the kazoku kokka (family state), itself the product
of a re-working of the concepts of citizen and nation in accordance
with myths of common ancestry.33 The existence of a Yamato
minzoku sharing a common ancestry, history and culture had be-
come as canonical and 'natural' to the Japanese as it was to their
contemporaries in England. While the physical and historical
evidence of migrations to the Japanese islands was not denied,
the migrations were deemed to be of such antiquity that they
had long since formed a single 'race' and culture. 34
In defining the Japanese nation as a collective personality, char-
acterised by uniformity and homogeneity, the family state was
itself conceived as a reflection of the inherited qualities and capacities
of its people. The immutable characteristics which distinguished
the Yamato minzoku provided, what Balibar has termed, 'a historical
backbone ... a concentration of qualities that belong "exclusively"
to the nationals: it is in the race of "its children" that the nation
can contemplate its true identity at its purest. Consequently, it
is to the race that the nation must cleave.'35
The articulation of an ideology in which the categories of
'race' and nation so clearly overlapped was not unique to Japan.
This reification of the nation as an organic entity had clear parallels
in contemporary Europe where the conceptualisation of nations
as 'naturally occurring groups identified by cultural differentiae'
implied that the 'symbols of "nation" were themselves grounded
in race'. 36 Given that Japan was consciously modelling its behaviour
in other spheres of activity on its European and North American
contemporaries, it is hardly surprising that Japanese 'racial' thought
33 Irokawa, Culture of the Meiji period, p. 283.
34 Representative of this school of thought was Kida Sadakichi's Nihon minzoku no IWsei
(Characteristics of the Japanese minzoku), published in 1938; cited in Yun, 'Minzoku', p. 27.
35 Etienne Balibar, 'Racisme et nationalisme' in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein
(eds) , Race, nation, classe, Paris: Eclitions de laDecouverte, 1988, cited in David Theo Goldberg
(ed.), Anatomy of racism, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990, p. 284.
36 Miles, Racism, p. 62. See also Paul G. Lauren, Power and prejudice: The politics and diplomacy
of racial discrimination, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988, p. 40.
The Invention cif Identity in Pre-warJapan 105
drew much of its inspiration from the most advanced Western
nations and developed in response to it. In the context of late
nineteenth-century imperial expansion, the new Japanese national
identity interacted with and was further refined through
with the scientific 'racism' of the West.
SOCIAL DARWINISM IN JAPAN

The agents through which social Darwinism entered Japan in
the late nineteenth century were extremely diverse. It is, however,
possible to identifY two distinct, though mutually reinforcing,
sources of Darwinist inspiration: the role of foreign academics
employed by the Meiji state, and the direct experience ofJapanese
diplomats and scholars while posted abroad.
It was from the vantage point of Tokyo Imperial University,
where they held professorial appointments, that a number offoreign
academics introduced an entire generation of Japanese scholars
to the scientific disciplines of anthropology and linguistics, as well
as the pseudo-science of social Darwinism. Darwinian theories
of natural selection were first introduced by Edward Morse, a
founder member of the Tokyo Anthropological Society and first
Professor of Zoology at Tokyo Imperial University, in a series
of lectures on evolutionary theory given in 1877. A Japanese
edition of Thomas Huxley's Lectures on the Origin cifSpecies appeared
two years later, while the publication of Morse's 1877 Tokyo
lectures in 1881 brought Darwin's theories to an even larger
audience. 37 The evolutionary theories of both Haeckel and
Lamarck were also available to Japanese intellectuals, although
neither achieved the immense popularity of Herbert Spencer.
A Japanese translation of Spencer's evolutionary theory first ap-
peared in 1884, and some thirty translations of his works had
appeared by the turn of the century. The provision of a classificatory
grid which located the Japanese within a hierarchy of 'race' and
offered a scientifically reasoned yet easily accessible explanation
for both the complexities of a modern society and national survival
found a receptive audience among academics, journalists and
politicians alike.
The dissemination of social Darwinism was also encouraged
37 Shimao, 'Darwinism', pp. 93-102.

106 Michael Weiner
by early Japanese encounters with the various 'racisms' prevalent

in the United States and the European colonies. These extend
from a mission to the United States in 1860 to the Iwakura
mission of 1871-3. In addition to the official reports, which were
unavailable to the public, individual envoys and their attendants
published personal accounts, often in diary form. For example,
Yanagawa Kenzaburo, a member of the 1860 mission, seems to
have uncritically absorbed the prejudices of his American hosts;
his reference to the inherent stupidity and inferiority of blacks
is paralleled by comparisons between blacks and the Eta outcasts
drawn by Kimura Tetsuya. 38 Far more expansive was Kume
Kunitake, later professor of history at Tokyo University, and one
of two official secretaries who accompanied the Iwakura mission
to Europe and the United States a decade later, whose two-volume
account of the mission was first published in 1878 with the title
Tokumei zen ken taishi Beio kairan jikki (A true account of the
tour in America and Europe of the special embassy). In this and
later publications Kume wrote at length of the origins and distinctive
characteristics of the various peoples encountered by the mission. 39
His assessment of the industrial and military achievements of the
Western powers included the following on the 'racial' ongms
of the British:
The people of Britain are descended from two shu (races),
the Celts and the Goths, and are divided into four shu (nations)
- the English, Welsh, Scots and Irish - each possessing different
languages and jazoku (customs). The Celtic jinshu (race) were
the original inhabitants of the country, but from about the
year 450 AD Angles and Saxons gradually occupied the lowlands
of England. The original inhabitants withdrew to the mountains
of Scotland and Wales and the island of Ireland. The invaders
from Germany were of the Gothic shu [race] and are referred
to as the Anglo-Saxon shu. Later invasions by the Danes and
the Normans took place, with all occupying the country of
England. This was the origin of the English jinshu [race].40
38 Leupp, 'Images', p. 7.
39 I am indebted "to my colleague, G.H. Healey, for bringing this source to my attention,
and for making his notes available.
40 Kume Kunitake, Tokumei zenken taishi BeiO kairan jikki, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1985,
vol. 2, p. 38 (hereafter Jikkl).
In contrast to the British, whose inherent industriousness Kume

regarded as the basis of their country's wealth and power, Spain's
decline as a world power had come about through the indolence
of its people:
The people of Britain are unable to be idle for even a moment.
The Spaniard makes a profession of sleeping all day, but a
sole of an Englishmen's foot never rests on the ground. In
Spain, as a consequence, merely to reduce the length of one's
siesta is sufficient to gain a reputation for hard work.41
In these passages, Kume relies exclusively on the same character
(shu) which appears in jinshu to describe various populations. Rather
than signifying physiological differences, jinshu is defined in terms
of cultural attributes. But an earlier passage in which Kume uses
the character shu to describe the condition of the 'Indian' population
of North America contains references to both physiological and
cultural characteristics. Like Kimura a decade earlier, Kume also
draws a direct physiological comparison between certain American
'Indians' and the senmin (literally lowly people) ofJapan, a category
which during the Tokugawa period incorporated the Eta and
Hinin outcast groups:
The American dojin [aboriginals] are known generally as
'Indians'. [... ] Their physiognomy is like that often encountered
among the senmin in Japan; swarthy skin, large nose, thick
lips and high cheekbones. Their clothes are cast-oflS which
they beg from the ordinary citizens. They are incapable .of
learning a fixed mode of life. 42
Kume's memoirs, Kyujunen kaikoroku (A record of my ninety
years), published in 1935, manifests the same conflation of cultural
and 'racial' determinants. A section detailing the Iwakura mission's
passage through the American Mid-West and California contains
numerous references to relations between the Caucasian settler
and native Americans. In the following, he comments on the
fate of weaker 'races' when they come into contact with the
more aggressive whites:
The assertion by those who comment on the nse and fall
41 Jikki, vol. 2, p. 39.

42 Jikki, vol. 1, pp. 132-5.
108 Michael Weiner
ofjinshu that the blond white-skinned shuzoku (race) will flourish

while the Indians, Ainu et al. will become extinct is no ex-
aggeration. 43
Further evidence of the impact of social Darwinism on Japanese
racial discourse can be found in a 1883 publication, Nihon jinshu
kairyoron (Improvement of the Japanese race), in which the author,
Takahashi Yoshio, advocated intermarriage with Westerners as
the preferred means of enhancing the inferior physical and in-
tellectual capacities of the Japanese. 44 Four years later, views iden-
tical to these were expressed by Kato Hiroyuki in a short piece
entitled Nihon jinshu kairyo no ben (A justification for the im-
provement of the Japanese race).45 The then prime minister, Ito
Hirobumi, sought a second opinion from Herbert Spencer, who
subsequently advised against interbreeding with Europeans on the
grounds that hybridisation between disparate 'races' would, as
in Latin America, produce disastrous consequences for both. 46
Though of a later date, the social-Darwinist imprint could
also be found in the pseudo-scientific disciplines of eugenics and
serology embraced by a number of scholars during the interwar
years. In their search for the unique origins of the Japanese 'race',
Furuhata Tanemoto and Furukawa Takeji, for example, attempted
to establish a deterministic link between blood type and social
characteristics on the basis of fieldwork among the Ainu of Hok-
kaido and the aboriginal population of Taiwan. Their claim for
a definitive relationship between blood-type and temperament
were widely publicised in such respected journals as Hanzaigaku
Zasshi (Journal of Criminology) and Minzoku Eisei (Race Hygiene).
The impact of 'racial' as well as related theories of geographical
or climatic determinism was also evident in contemporary
textbooks, in which national achievement was cast in terms of
the inherent capacities of its people or other natural factors. The
work of Thomas Buckle, whose History of Civilisation in England
was widely admired in Japan, represented a prime example of
43 Kume Kunitake, KYiijunen kaikoroku (A record of my ninety years), Osaka: Waseda

Daigaku shuppanbu, 1935, vol. 2, p. 238.
44 Ishii Ryoichi, Population pressure and economic life in Japan, Chicago University Press, 1937,
pp.38-9.
45 Yun, 'Minzoku', p. 15.
46 Nancy Stepan, The idea of race in science: Great Britain 1800-1960, London: Macmillan,
1982, p. 105.
this latter school of thought. 47 Along with history, geography

- and, through it, knowledge of the outside world - fonned an
integral part of the national curriculum in Meiji schools. Early
texts like Fukuzawa Yukichi's Sekai kunizukushi (World geography
[1869]), of which more than a million copies were sold, grouped
countries into an evolutionary hierarchy of barbarian, semi-civilised
and civilised. Japan was cast as a country in transition from semi-
civilised to civilised status. Although all civilised states were
European in character, not all European nations were civilised.
Echoing the views of Kume Kunitake, Fukuzawa wrote of Spain
as a nation whose decline as a world power had come about
as a result of inherent character deficiencies in its people. Scholarly
enthusiasm for and interest in deterministic theories of social evolu-
tion also ensured that the assumed relationship between geography
and kokka ;shiki (national consciousness) featured prominently in
secondary school textbooks. As a frequent contributor to school
textbooks, Tsuboi Shogoro, professor of Anthropology at Tokyo
Imperial University and a fonner student of Edward Morse, was
typical of scholars who brought social Darwinism to a wider
audience.
Increased ministerial control over textbook content in the years
following the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) did little
to dampen enthusiasm for deterministic theories of social evolution.
On the contrary, 'racial' differences between and within individual
nations featured even more prominently. In that part of the Bankoku
chir; shoho (Geography for beginners) which charts relations between
the native American and Caucasian populations of the United
States, the destitution of the former is portrayed as a consequence
of their 'primitive and simple nature,.48
The social-Darwinian vocabulary thus provided an analytical
framework which, as elsewhere, would be employed to justify
wars of imperial expansion, while stifling complaints of social
injustice and inequality within Japan. Within the context of the
late nineteenth century and the early twentieth, characterised by
both the social and economic upheavals associated with rapid
47 Stefan Tanaka,Japan's Orient: Rendenngpasts into history, Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1993, pp. 39-40.
48 Takeuchi Keiichi, 'How Japan learned about the outside world: The views of other
countries incorporated in Japanese school textbooks, 1868-1986', Hitotsubashi Journal of Social
Studies, vol. 19 (1987), p. 9.
110 Michael Weiner
industrialisation within Japan and the gradual acquisition of colonial

territories, national success was increasingly perceived as a manifes-
tation of seizon kyoso (struggle for survival) and yiisho reppai (survival
of the fittest). 49 This sense of national pride itself depended almost
entirely on how well Japan measured up against its most potent
rivals, and how far these accomplishments were recognised in-
ternationally. Everything else was relegated to the background,
with the indigenous populations of Hokkaido, Taiwan and Korea
classified as stagnant, degenerate and incapable of appreciating
the resources they possessed.
Paradoxically, perhaps, it was also in the area of international
relations, particularly between Japan and the other imperial powers,
that a 'two-tiered' and, at least on the surface, contradictory con-
ception of'race' was articulated. 50 It was a conceptualisation which,
on the one hand, was predicated on a conflict between the white
and yellow 'races',51 while on the other it assumed distinct and
immutable differences in intellectual and cultural capacities between
the Yamato minzoku and those of China and Korea. This allowed
Japanese ideologues to conceive of the world's population as com-
prising three 'races', along the lines set out by Arthur de Gobineau
and other European 'racial' theorists. Within this framework, the
Japanese were identified as belonging to the same 'racial' stock
as Koreans and Chinese. This did not, however, preclude the
existence of a further definition, which identified 'race' with
nation; a definition which, in equally deterministic terms, dis-
tinguished members of the Yamato minzoku from Chinese or
Koreans.
THE EXCLUDED OTHER

The production of theories of inclusion and exclusion was not
limited to those who lived beyond the spatial confines of Japan.
Social and economic relations within Japan were also commonly
viewed through a parallel, deterministic framework of the survival
of the fittest. These 'racisms' of the interior affected not only
49 Gluck,Japan's modern myths, p. 209.

50 Shimazu Naoko, 'The Japanese attempt to secure racial equality in 1919',Japan Forum, 1,
no. 1 (April 1989), p. 93.
51 Oyama Azusa (ed.), Yamagata Aritomo ikensho (Memoranda of Yamagata Aritomo),
Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1966, p. 341.
traditional outsider populations, but the urban and rural poor

in general. In each case, particular groups were identified not
only by their poverty, but by certain assumed physical or cultural
characteristics which set them apart.
In late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Japan, kaso
shakai (lower-class society) was excluded from mainstream society
by virtue of both economic position and what were adjudged
innate moral deficiencies. Although such groups were also referred
to as tenni) no sekishi (children of the emperor), evoking images
of a seamless family state, they existed mostly beyond the pale
of normal society. As with the adventures of Boken Dankichi,
referred to below, early accounts of the urban poor read like
'adventure stories in faraway lands'. That such reports were often
compiled by officials engaged in the task of civilising the savage
interior was itself significant, since it depended on the prior iden-
tification and exclusion of certain groups within the boundaries
of the state. The urban slum was represented in contemporary
newspapers and journals as the symbolic opposite of bunmei (civilisa-
tion). In contrast to the modern and civilised city, of which
it was undeniably a part, the urban slum of the Meiji period
was presented as a world existing somehow beyond civilisation;
its inhabitants were depicted as the descendants of 'remote foreign
races' on whom images of both yaban (savagery) and ikai (barbarism)
were projected. In a classic 1897 study of Osaka slum-dwellers,
for example, the area is described as a different world; inhabited
by 'countless deaf, crippled, limbless and pygmies, all wrapped
up in worst rags, wriggling like worms with griefs filling the
air.'52
Such contemporary accounts are broadly comparable to those
applied to the peasantry, whose 'peculiar physiognomy' made
them readily identifiable. 53 In Mayama Seika's Minami koizumi
mura, published several years after the Russo-Japanese war, peasant
life was depicted as one of unspeakable misery, and the peasantry
likened to 'insects that crawl on the ground. ,54 The author found
52 Chubachi Masayoshi and Taira Koji, 'Poverty in modem Japan: Perceptions and realities'
in Hugh Patrick (ed.) ,Japanese industrialization and its social consequences, Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1976, pp. 391-437.
53 Mikiso Hane, Peasants, rebels and outcasts: The underside of modern Japan, New York:
Pantheon, 1982, pp. 34-5.
54 lrokawa, Culture of the Meiji period, pp. 223 and 244.
112 Michael Weiner
it impossible to accept that 'the blood flowing in those miserable

peasants also flows in my body'. The former outcasts, too, despite
formal emancipation in 1871, were described by officials in Mie
prefecture thirty years later as a 'race' apart; ruthless, cruel and
lacking in any moral sense. 55 In all cases parallels can be drawn
across time, to the negative images of commoner and peasant
held by the samurai elites of the Tokugawa period, and across
space to the imagery employed against the 'lower orders' in the
industrialising nation states of late nineteenth- and early twen-
tieth-century Europe and North America.
The Meiji period also witnessed the establishment of a colonial
order in Hokkaido. Employing institutional and administrative
mechanisms very similar to those later deployed in Korea and
Taiwan, the Meiji state moved to exploit the island's strategic
and economic potential. In a process repeated elsewhere in the
empire, the Ainu were constructed as a primitive and 'racially'
immature population in a discourse which justified the colonial
project and made it inevitable. The colonial relationship with
the Ainu, and their categorisation as primitive savages, also provided
an initial context in which images of indigenous inferiority could
be contrasted with those of a modern, civilised Japan.
The maturation of a Japanese national identity thus found its
fullest expression in the context of the political, economic and
social processes which developed under colonial rule in Hokkaido,
Korea and Taiwan. If a strongly collectivistic nationalism allowed
the Japanese to partake of a vibrant and assertive identity, the
existence of empire confirmed not only Japan's status as a truly
civilised nation but their own manifest superiority vis-a-vis the
peoples of East Asia. If industrial and technological achievements
were the indices of civilisation and enlightenment, then a lack
of material development could be regarded as scientific evidence
of inferior status. It was this very. lack of both a martial spirit
and the institutions of modern industry which persuaded many
in Japan that the peoples of East Asia could only achieve a civilised
state through exposure to the work habits and martial values
which had produced a powerful Japan. 56 The first official history
of Hokkaido, edited by the prominent Ainu scholar, Kono
55 Hane, Peasants, rebels, p. 146.
56 Jiji Shimpo, 13 Aug. 1885, in Keio Gijuku (ed.) Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshii (The collected
works of Fukuzawa Yukichi), Tokyo: Keio gijuku, 1964, vol. 10, p. 381.
Tsunekichi, in 1918, confirmed that responsibility for the colonisa-

tion of Hokkaido had fallen to the Japanese because 'no other
superior race was in contact with the Ezo'.
When the process of colonial acquisition began, first as a means
ofacquiring economic privilege and later through territorial control,
it was justified in Tokyo as it had been in Europe. For some,
like Fukuda Tokuzo, the clear correlation between economic
development and the inherent and differing capacities of human
societies made Japanese expansion inevitable. Writing in 1902,
Fukuda argued that the transformation of Korea from a pre-
industrial to a modem capitalist society could only be accomplished
through Japanese intervention. 57 Imperial expansion was, in effect,
a redemptive mission to which the Japanese, by virtue of the
superiority of their minzoku, would have to resign themselves.
This perspective, founded upon the assumed inability of native
populations to manage their own affairs, reaffirmed a sense of
national solidarity and 'racial' superiority among the Japanese
people, regardless of what class they occupied at home. The sub-
division of the human species, which these assumptions affirmed,
also imposed a set of obligations onJapan as the colonising power.
These included not only raising colonial peoples to a level com-
mensurate with their 'natural' abilities, but preserving the essential
and superior qualities ofthe Japanese 'race'. For some like Tokutomi
Soho, imperial expansion was not merely an expression ofJapan's
distinctive 'national essence' and the equally unique kokuminsei
(characteristics ofits people), but the best available means ofensuring
the survival of the Japanese 'race'. His application of the laws
of natural survival in the arena of international relations also bears
comparison with a contemporary European publicist like Jules
Harmand. 58 Using terms remarkably similar to those ofTokutomi,
Harmand argued that 'conquest' was but a 'manifestation of the
law of struggle for existence' to which France was unavoidably
committed 'not merely by nature which condemns us to perish
or conquer, but also by our civilisation'. 59
57 Hatada Takashi, Nihonjin no Chosen kan (The Japanese image of Korea), Tokyo: Keiso
Shobo, 1972, pp. 34-5; Yamabe Kentaro, Nikkan heigo shoshi (A short history of the
annexation of Korea) , Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1978, p. 242.
58 Jansen, 'Japanese imperialism', p. 66.
59 Raymond F. Betts, The false dawn: European imperialism in the nineteenth century,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975, pp. 12-13.
114 Michael Weiner
The marginalisation ofsubordinate populations, either as colonial

subjects or as migrant labour drawn to the metropolitan core,
was interpreted almost exclusively within the complementary dis-
courses of 'race' and nation. Kawamura Minato has argued in
this context that by the late 1920s 'mass orientalism', in which
images of colonial and other inferior populations were contrasted
with Japanese modernity and civilisation, had become an integral
part of popular commonsense discourse. Imagery of this type
was a regular feature in both novels and children's comic strips,
the most popular of which was Shimada Keizo's Boken Dankichi
(Dankichi the Adventurer), which serialised the South Seas ad-
ventures ofa Tintin-like protagonist. Second only to Boken Dankichi
were tales of the apdy-named common soldier, Nora-kura (Black
Mutt), in which the (Chinese) enemy were regularly depicted
as pigs. 60
Core ideas of progress and civilisation, of which social scientific
discourse formed an important part, further assisted in the ordering
of popular knowledge of the excluded Other. An extremely popular
vehicle for the celebration of modernity, civilisation and, sub-
sequendy, imperial expansion were the hakurankai (national ex-
positions). In addition to Japanese participation in a number of
international expositions held in Europe and the United States,
the Meiji government hosted a similar series of expositions in
Tokyo and Osaka between 1877 and 1903 as showcases of in-
dustrialisation and progress. Modelled on the first international
exposition held in the Crystal Palace in 1851, Japanese variants
were held in 1877, 1881, 1890, 1895 and 1903. Designed by
the respected anthropologist, Tsuboi Shogoro, dIe Jinrnikan (Hall
of Mankind) was intended as the centrepiece of the Fifth Industrial
Exposition held in Osaka in 1903. Tsuboi's plan to exhibit the
'races' of the world in their 'natural' settings encountered vigorous
opposition from Chinese, Koreans and Ryukyuans who objected
to representations of their cultures as frozen in the past. The
stark imagery of a primitive Asia, in contrast to a modem, civilised
Japan, was however preserved in other exhibits detailing the lives
of Ainu, Taiwanese aboriginals and Malays. The popular discourse
60 Kawamura Minato, 'Taishii Orientarizumu to Ajia ninshiki' (Mass Orientalism and the
perception of Asia) in Kawamura Minato (ed.), Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi: Bunka no Mka
no shokuminchi (Modem Japan and its colonies: Colonies in popular culrure), vol. 7, Iwanami
shoten, 1993, p. 119; Hane, Peasants, rebels, p. 75.
of the primitive Other was also sustained by the imagery of the

Japanese civilising mission. Representations of this type were evi-
dent at both the Takushoku Hakurankai (Colonial Exposition) of
1912 and at the Natural History Museum in Sapporo. The latter
contained life-size waxwork reproductions depicting the Japanese
'exploration' ofHokkaido in 1870. The 'new' history ofHokkaido,
cast in images of a redemptive Japanese project and tethered to
invidious stereotypes of racial infantilism and primitivism, was
there for all to see. 61
The set of meanings which the expositions and museum ex-
hibitions of this type attached to the populations of outlying ter-
ritories fused popular and socially scientific understandings of the
Other within a dominant discourse of ' race'. By providing detailed
and scientifically verified information about the 'racial' character,
behaviour and habits of the Other, the social sciences offered
both a further justification for paternalistic control and an archival
resource on which colonial administrators could draw. Within
the colonial context itself, 'racialised' discourses informed both
policy formulation and administrative practice. Inequality was at-
tributed to differences in national or 'racial' characteristics; dif-
ferences which marked some peoples as unfit to survive in the
struggle for existence. As such, their exclusion from the national
community was adjudged natural and inevitable. Writing in 1918,
Hiraoka Sadataro, the former governor of Karfuto, drew on the
diverse threads of 'racial' knowledge in defining the Ainu as 'un-
adapted members of humanity ... who have nothing to contribute
to its well-being'. He further warned his readers that 'the in-
troduction of Ainu blood into that of the Japanese will violate
the movement to preserve our kokusui' (national essence).62
Even liberal-minded theorists like Nitobe Inazo and Takekoshi
y osaburo reasoned that, given the immense gulf separating the
Japanese from their colonial subjects, it might be centuries before
the latter could be raised to a level commensurate with civilisation. 63
Nitobe's assessment of the 'hairy Ainu' as a stone-age people
iiI Richard Siddle, 'Racialisation and resistance: The evolution of Ainu-Wajin relations in
modern Japan', unpub!. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sheffield, 1995, pp. 198-201.
1i2 Ibid, pp. 184-5.
1i3 Takekoshi Yosaburo, 'Japan's colonial policy' in Oriental Review, 3, no. 2 (1912),
pp. 102-3; Mark R. Peattie, Japanese attitudes toward colonialism, 1895-1945' in Myers and
Peattie, Japanese colonial empire, p. 94.
116 Michael Weiner
doomed to extinction also bears comparison with his earlier account

of the Korean people, written in 1909:
The very physiognomy and life-style of these people are so
bland, unsophisticated and primitive that they belong not to
the twentieth or the tenth - or indeed to the first century.
They belong to a prehistoric age. [... ] The Korean habits of
life are the habits of death. They are closing the lease of their
ethnic existence. 64
The colonial project would therefore respect the laws of social
evolution while enabling the Japanese to fulfil the obligations
imposed by 'racial' superiority and cultural maturity. This
dominant-subordinate structure was further reinforced by the tradi-
tional Confucian concept of taigi mibun (proper place), which
locked the peoples of the empire into a fixed set of power relation-
ships. This in turn not only assisted in the construction of colonial
populations as 'racially' and culturally immature, but provided
a gloss of tradition to the most extreme forms of political oppression
and labour exploitation.
Paradoxically the same discourse of empire which reified assumed
'racial' differences between coloniser and colonised also presup-
posed the ultimate assimilation of the latter by the former. In
acknowledging shared cultural and, in certain instances, 'racial'
origins, some colonial theorists argued in favour of a common
'racial' destiny for the peoples of East Asia. But prewar assimilation
policies demanded nothing less than complete abandonment of
an independent Ainu, Taiwanese or Korean identity and its re-
placement by Japanese forms of behaviour. Nor did the objectives
of assimilation necessarily extend to the eventual provision of
equal citizenship rights. Instead, assimilation was perceived as a
process which would enable colonial peoples to assume their natural
and proper place in a 'racially' defined hierarchy of dependent
states within the empire. o5 The outcome, it was assumed, would
be a new colonial identity retaining certain aspects of indigenous
culture, while sharing a sense of community and purpose with
64 Nitobe inazo, Thoughts and essays, Tokyo: Teibi Publishing Company, 1909, pp. 214 and
216.
"5 Takeda Yukio, 'Naichi zaijii hanrojin mondai' (The problem of peninsula" [Koreans]
residing in Japan), Shakai SeisakuJiho, no. 213 (1938), p. 121.
The Invention oj Identity in Pre-war Japan 117
the Japanese. 66 The state could thus project the colonial enterprise
as familial and as an expression of the natural social order. Moreover,
by fulfilling its civilising mission in Asia, a role thrust upon Japan
by virtue of the dynamic qualities of its own people, the continued
purity and vitality of the Japanese race would also be ensured.
66 Dower, War without mercy, pp. 274 and 281.

IV.
Mostri del Giappone
1. Tradizioni animiste che hanno favorito in passato credenze su entità

spirituali (reikon) in grado di risiedere e impossessarsi di esseri viventi
e oggetti, fino a indurre una loro metamorfosi.
2. Storia religiosa premoderna in cui diverse scuole religiose (buddhiste,
shintō, taoiste, confuciane ecc.) hanno per molti secoli convissuto in
modo più o meno sincretico, con il loro pantheon specifico di divinità e
mostri, senza il monopolio assoluto di una singola religione.
3. Sviluppo di una cultura urbana in periodo Tokugawa in grado di diffe-
renziare il patrimonio mostruoso precedente attraverso forme espres-
sive molto eterogenee, di standardizzarlo, e di secolarizzarlo infine per
scopi ludico-ricreativi non dissimili da quelli moderni.
4. A ffermazione in epoca Meiji di un ambito di studi come lo yōkaigaku
interamente dedicato ai mostri autoctoni, all’interno di un discorso
identitario moderno sulla nazione.
È proprio quest’ultimo aspetto sulle implicazioni identitarie in epoca mo-

derna del discorso sui mostri e sulla mostruosità, intrecciata alla compli-
cità già accennata di studiosi euro-americani, che rimanda ad un quinto
motivo relativo alla ricchezza dei mostri in Giappone, soprattutto in epo-
ca contemporanea. Per riuscire a comprenderlo in tutta la sua attuale
complessità è necessario un allargamento di prospettiva, oltre a quella
nippocentrica considerata finora, in modo da poter affrontare le domande
inedite poste da questo libro: perché i mostri giapponesi piacciono così
tanto anche all’estero? Quali sono quindi i nessi reciproci fra autorappre-
sentazioni in Giappone ed eterorappresentazioni del Giappone mediati dai
mostri e dalla mostruosità in generale? E infine, in un’ottica più critica ed
autoriflessiva, che cosa possono dire i mostri di noi stessi?
4 Giappone mostruoso? Occidentalismo, orientalismo e auto-

orientalismo
We are deformed monsters. We were discriminated against as «less than

humans» in the eyes of the «humans» of the West. […] the Superflat pro-
ject is our «Monster Manifesto», and now more than ever, we must pride
ourselves on our art, the work of monsters. (Murakami 2005, p. 161; fig. 8)
Se c’è un fantasma che sembra ossessionare il discorso identitario sui

mostri è l’idea di ‘Occidente’. Tutti i dualismi visti finora sono riconduci-
bili in ultima istanza a quello fondativo dell’identità moderna nipponica:
‘Occidente’ in antitesi a ‘Giappone’.
What gives the majority of Japanese the characteristic image of Japanese

culture, is still its distinction from the so-called West. […] the loss of
1 Introduzione 31
Mostri del Giappone
the distinction between the West and Japan would result in the loss of
Japanese identity in general. (Sakai 2002, pp. 563-564)
La proclamazione di un «Monster Manifesto» da parte dell’artista neo-pop

Murakami Takashi (1962-) per sottolineare auto-ironicamente la deforma-
zione dei giapponesi come mostri da parte dell’‘Occidente’, ma anche la
constatazione del filosofo Sakai Naoki (1947-) sull’impossibilità dei suoi
connazionali di pensare alla cultura giapponese se non per contrasto con
l’‘Occidente’, ancora nel XXI secolo, risentono entrambe delle teorie post-
coloniali sull’orientalismo formulate da Edward Said (1978).
La geografia immaginaria articolata dall’orientalismo, imposta in tutto il
mondo attraverso secoli di colonialismo, imperialismo e capitalismo eurocen-
trico o USA-centrico, è sostanzialmente una cartografia binaria dell’identità
e dell’alterità. L’orientalismo rimanda ad un processo di appropriazione, di
definizione e di inferiorizzazione come ‘Oriente’ delle regioni, persone e
culture subalterne soprattutto del mondo asiatico da parte dei Paesi ege-
moni euro-americani in epoca moderna, per poter pensare per contrasto la
propria identità come ‘Occidente’. L’identità egemone in veste di ‘Occidente’
è configurata attraverso l’intersezione multipla e cumulativa di paradigmi
attribuiti alla propria modernità: universalistica, razionale, scientifica, libe-
ra, individualistica, bianca, mascolina, matura ecc. Questa idea identitaria
di ‘Occidente’ viene articolata idealmente attraverso un’antitesi contrastiva
rispetto all’altro ‘orientale’ sottomesso, conquistato o solo influenzabile, su
cui proiettare tutto ciò che si è voluto lasciare alle spalle, soprattutto del
proprio passato feudale: quindi un altro asiatico o arabo da (ri)scoprire e
spiegare (orientalismo accademico), da educare o riformare (paternalismo),
da disprezzare (razzismo), o su cui fantasticare nostalgicamente (esotismo).
L’‘Oriente’ in quanto configurato come alterità subalterna, diventa in tutti
questi casi indispensabile per far risaltare per contrasto più o meno impli-
cito un’identità ‘occidentale’. L’‘Oriente’ dovrà essere quindi definito – a
prescindere che lo sia o meno – soprattutto come tradizione: particolaristica,
irrazionale, emotiva, conformista, coloured, femminea, infantile ecc.11 Se
l’‘Occidente’ con tutti i suoi paradigmi identificativi deve fungere idealmente
sullo sfondo e in modo implicito (unmarked) da modello universale, giusto,
bello, vero dell’umanità intera, allora la configurazione per contrasto ed
esplicita (marked) dell’‘Oriente’ come sua alterità antitetica non potrà avere
che degli esiti disumanizzanti, o mostruosi, come suggerito da Murakami.
È importante sottolineare che questa geografia immaginaria non co-
stituisce un semplice stereotipo, che si può facilmente superare mossi da
11 Il dualismo antitetico della geografia immaginaria ‘Occidente’ (modernità) vs ‘Oriente’

(tradizione) costituisce solo una cornice ideale sul modello indicato da Edward Said (1978),
visto che in concreto sono possibili combinazioni più eterogenee e fluide, secondo diversi
periodi storici, luoghi e attori sociali.
32 1 Introduzione
Mostri del Giappone
Figura 8. Tan Tan Bo Puking-a.k.a Gero Tan di Murakami Takashi 村上隆, 2002
buoni propositi o da una conoscenza più approfondita o vera dell’‘Oriente’ o

dell’estremo ‘Oriente’, e quindi del ‘Giappone’. Se l’orientalismo è da inten-
dere in termini foucaultiani come episteme, come un sistema moderno che
articola sapere e potere, allora si tratta di una formazione discorsiva che
fornisce le condizioni stesse di intelligibilità e di possibilità di ciò che può
essere pensato, visto, detto, agito o esperito. Si tratta di una cartografia al
contempo geoculturale e geopolitica sostenuta da un insieme di presuppo-
sti paradigmatici che sono così radicati da diventare alla fine naturalizzati,
e quindi invisibili ai più. In altre parole, diventa difficile, se non impossibile,
pensare in epoca moderna a identità o alterità culturali collettive, senza
fare ricorso ai termini di ‘Occidente’ e ‘Oriente’, che vengono infatti anco-
ra oggi evocati senza virgolette, mobilitando l’insieme di paradigmi a loro
attribuiti e ri-producendone il dualismo gerarchico ed essenzializzante.
Un’ulteriore indicazione fondamentale sui risvolti globali delle nozioni
di ‘Occidente’ e ‘Oriente’ è offerta pionieristicamente da Antonio Gramsci
(1891-1937), il primo a metterne in luce il carattere non solo epistemo-
logicamente arbitrario e storicamente costruito, ma anche la diffusione
egemone in tutto il mondo moderno, fino a comprendere anche il Giappone:
Oggettività del reale: Per intendere esattamente i significati che può

avere il problema della realtà del mondo esterno, può essere opportuno
svolgere l’esempio della nozione di ‘Oriente’ e ‘Occidente’ che non ces-
sano di essere ‘oggettivamente reali’ seppure all’analisi si dimostrano
niente altro che una ‘costruzione’ convenzionale cioè ‘storico-culturale’.
[…] È evidente che Est e Ovest sono costruzioni arbitrarie, convenzio-
nali, cioè storiche, poiché fuori dalla storia ogni punto della terra è Est
1 Introduzione 33
Mostri del Giappone
e Ovest nello stesso tempo. Ciò si può vedere più chiaramente dal fatto
che questi termini si sono cristallizzati non dal punto di vista di un ipo-
tetico e malinconico uomo in generale ma dal punto di vista delle classi
colte europee che attraverso la loro egemonia li hanno fatti accettare
ovunque. Il Giappone è Estremo Oriente non solo per l’Europeo ma for-
se anche per l’Americano della California e per lo stesso Giapponese,
il quale attraverso la cultura politica inglese potrà chiamare Prossimo
Oriente l’Egitto. (Gramsci [1933] 1975, pp. 1419-1420)
La teoria dell’egemonia elaborata da Gramsci risulta particolarmente

preziosa non solo per capire come mai lo stesso Giappone finisca per
considerarsi ‘Oriente’ o ‘Estremo Oriente’, nonostante l’assenza di una
colonizzazione diretta, ma anche come questo avvenga attraverso un pro-
cesso relazionale o reciproco, che coinvolge congiuntamente sia la parte
euro-americana, sia quella giapponese. L’egemonia infatti non è da confon-
dersi con il dominio che si riduce ad un potere imposto in modo unilate-
rale con la forza, ma si costituisce piuttosto attraverso una combinazione
fra coercizione materiale e consenso culturale. Per essere efficace come
blocco storico di forze sociali eterogenee, sia all’interno di un contesto
nazionale, sia fra Stati nazionali diversi, richiede un processo polifonico, in
cui discorsi e pratiche, sia convergenti, sia divergenti, concorrono ad arti-
colarsi a vicenda. In altre parole, la portata di un’egemonia storicamente
costituita è direttamente proporzionale alla sua capacità di mobilitare un
consenso attivo, più ampio e spontaneo possibile anche da parte subalter-
na. In quest’ottica, l’orientalismo in epoca moderna non è riducibile ad un
semplice monologo – come sembrerebbe invece suggerire l’interpretazione
saidiana – una prassi discorsiva unilaterale imposta con il puro dominio su
di un altro subalterno, muto e passivo. Per essere effettivo come egemonia,
l’orientalismo richiede il consenso, la complicità e l’accettazione attiva,
e non passiva, da parte dell’altro orientalizzato. Non può esserci quindi
orientalismo come egemonia senza auto-orientalismo da parte subalterna.
L’aspetto relazionale dell’egemonia euro-americana richiama l’attenzio-
ne all’occidentalismo, anch’esso trascurato da Said e altri teorici dell’o-
rientalismo, e alla necessità di metterne in luce i presupposti fondativi in
termini non solo autoriflessivi, ma anche come storicamente specifici all’e-
poca moderna, e quindi aperti ad una possibile trasformazione a venire.
L’occidentalismo non è solo, come suggerito da molti studiosi che hanno re-
so popolare questo termine, un orientalismo rovesciato o un contro-orienta-
lismo (Chen 2002); o, peggio ancora, solo l’insieme delle rappresentazioni
stereotipate, sia filo- che anti-‘occidentali’, da parte di ideologi europei o
statunitensi, fondamentalisti arabi o nazionalisti asiatici; un’interpretazio-
ne che finisce per assimilare sullo stesso piano rappresentazioni o pratiche
anti-‘orientali’ e anti-‘occidentali’ (Carrier 1995; Buruma, Margalit 2004).
Si tratta della stessa prospettiva che tende ad assimilare il razzismo degli
34 1 Introduzione
Mostri del Giappone
euro-americani con quello contro gli euro-americani stessi, sussumendo il

tutto sotto l’etichetta indistinta di un etnocentrismo generico e astorico.
In altre parole, si misconosce la natura asimmetrica su scala globale dei
due ambiti, in termini di relazioni di potere storicamente specifici in epoca
moderna (colonialismo, imperialismo, capitalismo).
L’occidentalismo invece, come suggerisce l’antropologo Fernando Coro-
nil (1944-2011), è la condizione stessa di possibilità dell’orientalismo (1996).
L’attenzione critica da lui rivolta nei confronti della nozioni di ‘Occiden-
te’ e di ‘Oriente’ ricorda quella ormai consolidata dalla teoria critica nei
confronti di altre categorie identitarie moderne, come ‘nazione’, ‘razza’ o
‘donna’. Non si è semplicemente nazionalisti, razzisti o sessisti, perché si
pensa che la propria ‘nazione’ sia superiore ad un’altra, i ‘bianchi’ ai ‘gial-
li’, l’‘uomo’ alla ‘donna’, o viceversa; ma soprattutto perché si è convinti
che esista qualcosa come la nazione, la razza o la donna, che comporta
tra l’altro il loro uso scritto senza virgolette. È invece proprio questa na-
turalizzazione che rende possibile l’occultamento dei rapporti di potere
storicamente asimmetrici che hanno portato in essere queste nozioni, con-
dizionandone, volenti o nolenti, la portata egemonica. In questa ottica, si
potrebbe considerare l’occidentalismo l’insieme dei discorsi, pratiche e
istituzioni che contribuiscono alla convinzione che esista qualcosa come
l’‘Occidente’ e l’‘Oriente, o qualcosa di ‘occidentale’ o di ‘orientale’, a pre-
scindere dagli indirizzi filo- o anti-‘occidentali’, oppure, dal loro carattere
stereotipato o meno.12
Tornando invece a Coronil, l’occidentalismo critico da lui proposto ri-
chiede uno spostamento radicale di prospettiva per porre in luce la natura
politica dei presupposti epistemologici di questa egemonia moderna:
It entails relating the observed [the non-Euro-American world] to the

observers [the Euro-American world], the product to production, knowl-
edge to its sites of formation.
[…] by guiding our understanding toward the relational nature of
representations of human collectivities […]. […] in the context of equal
relations, difference would not be cast as otherness.
[...] by ‘Occidentalism’ I refer to the ensemble of representational
practices that participate in the production of conceptions of the world,
which 1) separate the world’s components into bounded units; 2) disag-
gregate their relational histories; 3) turn difference into hierarchy; 4)
naturalize these representations; and thus 5) intervene, however un-
wittingly, in the reproduction of existing asymmetrical power relations.
(Coronil 1996, pp. 56-57)
12 Per evitare le connotazioni culturalistiche, essenzializzate e gerarchizzate dei termini

‘Occidente’ e ‘occidentale’, si è preferito fare ricorso a una terminologia di tipo più empirico
come ‘euro-americano’ inteso in senso geografico-continentale.
1 Introduzione 35
Mostri del Giappone
Nel caso del Giappone nella seconda metà dell’Ottocento, di fronte all’e-
mergenza posta dalle grandi potenze euro-americane che impongono al
Paese una sovranità limitata dai ‘Trattati Ineguali’, preventivandone la
colonizzazione come avveniva già nei confronti dei suoi vicini asiatici, la
formazione della propria identità nazionale si confronta necessariamente
con l’occidentalismo eurocentrico, ormai egemone in tutto il mondo. Tutta-
via, non si tratta solo, come suggerirebbe idealmente uno slogan popolare
di fine Ottocento «spirito giapponese, sapere occidentale» (wakon yōsai 和
魂洋才) di un’imitazione e appropriazione strumentali dei saperi, tecnolo-
gie, prodotti di derivazione euro-americana, condotta da una soggettività
autonoma giapponese. È piuttosto la stessa identità nazionale che si forma
attraverso un processo di auto-orientalismo che presuppone un’operazione
molto più radicale e attiva: l’interiorizzazione dell’occidentalismo euro-
americano. Si tratta di assumere la sua grammatica essenzializzante e
contrastiva di fondo, la sua struttura generativa di identità e alterità col-
lettive, i suoi presupposti paradigmatici: Occidente = modernità = univer-
salismo vs Oriente = tradizione = particolarismo. In altre parole, guardare
sé stessi come ‘Oriente’ attraverso lo sguardo eurocentrico. (Sakai 1997;
Miyake 2010b).
Il dilemma della modernità giapponese è condizionato proprio dall’oscil-
lazione costante fra vettori identitari così ingombranti come ‘Occidente’
e ‘Oriente’, con esiti e soluzioni diverse, tutti volti ad evitarne i risvolti
inevitabilmente inferiorizzanti: da una soluzione più difensiva raggiun-
ta attraverso l’accentuazione unilaterale della propria orientalità come
identità tradizionale tanto irrazionale, emotiva, semi-mistica da renderla
incomprensibile, indefinibile e quindi incontrollabile alla ragione moderna
‘occidentale’; fino ad arrivare alla promozione più ottimistica, di un’iden-
tità invece ibrida, come sintesi del meglio dell’‘Occidente’ e dell’‘Oriente’
per giustificarne il ruolo guida in Asia o nel mondo.
La mostruosità del Giappone segnalata da Murakami rimanderebbe
quindi ad una dis-locazione identitaria ambivalente insita nel rapporto
reciproco fra occidentalismo, orientalismo e auto-orientalismo. In primo
luogo, il Giappone intero, la nazione, le persone, la cultura, l’arte, sono stati
orientalizzati, inferiorizzati e localizzati storicamente in termini mostruosi
da parte euro-americana, come qualcosa di disumano o subumano rispetto
al modello euro-centrico o ‘occidentale’. In secondo luogo, i singoli mostri
prodotti in Giappone possono affascinare lo sguardo euro-americano per
le loro connotazioni non moderne, tradizionali, irrazionali, soprannatura-
li, per cui verrebbero configurate cumulativamente da un doppio orien-
talismo. Infine, il Giappone può, come nel caso illustrato dal «Monster
Manifesto» neo-pop di Murakami, provare ad auto-orientalizzarsi strate-
gicamente come mostro, per esplorarne le potenzialità identitarie di tipo
dislocante. Oltre ai quattro motivi elencati in precedenza sulla ricchezza
dei mostri in Giappone, è quindi da questa specifica dinamica relazionale
36 1 Introduzione
Mostri del Giappone
sintomo generico delle contraddizioni intrinseche e irrisolte di un’identi-

tà nazionale sempre subalterna all’egemonia degli Stati Uniti, ma viene
rivendicata addirittura con orgoglio come possibile progetto estetico ed
autoironico della nuova arte giapponese sulla scena globale. Il suo Mon-
ster Manifesto (kaibutsu sengen 怪物宣言)1 e l’incorporazione delle culture
popolari mostruose del Giappone postbellico nel suo progetto estetico, no-
nostante il tono provocatorio e promozionale, offrono lo spunto per porre
l’attenzione su un aspetto strategico nel rapporto fra mostri e costruzione
collettiva dell’identità/alterità nel Giappone moderno e contemporaneo.
Pur concentrandosi su una riflessione circa la genealogia e lo statuto
dell’arte in Giappone, l’enfasi posta sull’autorialità euro-americana come
logos normativo e «umano» che non riconosce varianti di se stesso, se
non come versione «subumana» di «mostro deformato», evidenzia il ruolo
fondamentale dello sguardo ‘occidentale’ nel determinare e deformare a
priori qualsiasi discorso o prassi sull’arte giapponese e per estensione sui
suoi stessi autori e sulla loro identità nazionale.
In altre parole, i mostri contemporanei non sarebbero solo il prodotto
storico, estetico, commerciale o ludico di auto-rappresentazioni interne
alla nazione per dare forma a una qualche alterità deformata, compreso
lo stesso rapporto difficile con il mondo euro-americano rappresentato
dall’idea di ‘Occidente’, ma sarebbero piuttosto condizionati proprio dallo
statuto egemone di quest’ultimo, in grado di imporre al Giappone intero
una subalternità disumanizzata e mostruosa. Pertanto, almeno secondo
la formulazione estrema di Murakami, qualsiasi espressione artistica o
culturale nel Giappone contemporaneo non può che essere mostruosa.
Sono tuttavia proprio la constatazione di questa condizione e la sua appro-
priazione critica in veste di alterità deformante a costituire i primi passi
per un’inversione creativa: una possibile elaborazione autonoma e ibrida
dell’identità culturale giapponese, tanto da poter rivendicare nel suo Mon-
ster Manifesto la propria mostruosità con orgoglio, sulla falsariga del A
Manifesto for Cyborgs (1985) della post-femminista Donna Haraway, di cui
riecheggia non a caso titolo e intenti libertari.
2 Doppio orientalismo mostruoso del Giappone
Risulta dunque fondamentale cambiare punto di vista e porre l’attenzione

sulla natura di questo sguardo egemone ‘occidentale’, sulla sua capacità
di configurare di volta in volta un altro ‘orientale’, tanto subalterno da
poterne decretare eventualmente la disumanizzazione mostruosa. L’orien-
1 « We are deformed monsters. We were discriminated against as ‘less than humans’ in the eyes
of the ‘humans’ of the West. […] the Superflat project is our ‘Monster Manifesto’, and now more
than ever, we must pride ourselves on our art, the work of monsters.» (Murakami 2005, p. 161).
120 5 Giappone, paese dei mostri o paese mostruoso?

Mostri del Giappone
talismo moderno da parte euro-americana nei confronti del Giappone, cioè

l’insieme delle idee, rappresentazioni, pratiche ed istituzioni per pensare,
raffigurare e interagire con l’ alterità nipponica, è stato sostanzialmen-
te articolato secondo una dinamica antitetica, del tutto analoga a quella
teorizzata da Said per quanto riguarda l’orientalismo nei confronti delle
regioni del Vicino o Medio ‘Oriente’; ovvero, attraverso un dualismo con-
trastivo rispetto alla presupposta modernità dell’identità ‘occidentale’ e
i vari paradigmi attribuiti a tale modernità (Said 1978; Iwabuchi 1994;
Sakai 1997). La sua specificità e complessità risiede tuttavia in una confi-
gurazione doppia dovuta all’inaspettata irruzione del Giappone nella storia
mondiale come primo Paese non euro-americano a essersi velocemente
modernizzato e industrializzato.
La prima dinamica dell’orientalismo nei confronti del Giappone è quel-
la classica, a lungo collaudata anche nei confronti di altri Paesi arabi o
asiatici, definiti come alterità ‘orientale’ in senso gerarchico e oppositivo
all’identità ‘occidentale’. Se il pilastro di quest’ultima è l’idea di moderni-
tà, declinata con una serie di paradigmi caratterizzanti quali la ragione, la
tecnica, l’individuo, il progresso ecc., allora l’‘Oriente’ dovrà necessaria-
mente essere sopra ogni cosa tradizione o iper-tradizione, quindi emotivo,
rigoglioso di natura incontaminata, collettivista, statico ecc. L’efficacia
distanziante di questa geografia immaginaria può essere ulteriormente
innalzata dall’intersezione multipla con forme di subalternità sociale (di
classe, di genere, etnico/razziale, generazionale) interna agli stessi Paesi
euro-americani; per cui l’‘Oriente’ potrà essere configurato anche come
povero, femminile, colorato (non bianco), infantile ecc.
Nel caso specifico del Giappone questa patente di orientalità è stato man
mano elaborato negli ultimi due secoli grazie all’accumulazione strategi-
ca di un vasto repertorio di icone familiari che si sono consolidate nella
storia culturale euro-americana: geisha, samurai, zen, monte Fuji, fiori
di ciliegio ecc. Tutte articolate preferibilmente in un modo a-temporale o
arcaico, fuori dal tempo e dallo spazio. Il Giappone definito quindi in modo
esplicito (marked) come iper-tradizione, a indicare la selezione e l’enfasi
unilaterale dello sguardo euro-americano sui suoi aspetti tradizionali o
passati, articolati per contrasto spesso implicito (unmarked) con la propria
modernità ‘occidentale’.2
Ma, come è noto, questo non è oggi l’unico quadro o l’unica cornice,
anche se tuttora molto influente, come dimostrano il best seller mondiale
Memoirs of a Geisha (Memorie di una Geisha, 1997) di Arthur Golden o film
popolari quali The Last Samurai (L’Ultimo Samurai, 2003) di Edward Zwick
con Tom Cruise. Lo Stato-nazione Giappone si è sottoposto sin dalla fine
dell’Ottocento al proprio difficile processo di modernizzazione, arrivando
2 Per una breve ma ottima storia di questi stereotipi, cfr. Wilikinson 1982, pp. 21-72.
5 Giappone, paese dei mostri o paese mostruoso? 121

Mostri del Giappone
infine a insidiare il monopolio euro-americano della tecnica, della scienza,

della ricchezza; rischiando quindi di sconfinare, di oltrepassare i confini
radicati dell’identità ‘occidentale’ e della sua modernità. Nel corso degli
anni Ottanta del Novecento, quelli di massima ascesa economica e finanzia-
ria del Giappone, si è assistito pertanto a una nuova forma di orientalismo,
definita da alcuni osservatori critici come «tecno-orientalismo» (Morley,
Robins 1995): un processo di articolazione dell’alterità, di allontanamento
pratico-discorsivo, analogo a quello precedente, che in questo caso spinge
il Paese nipponico verso il lontano futuro, di nuovo ancora fuori dal tempo e
dallo spazio. Il Giappone come iper-modernità, frutto di una configurazione
sempre contrastiva e gerarchica rispetto all’idea di ‘Occidente’, declinata
questa volta in base alla selezione strategica di alcuni aspetti moderni e
high-tech. Ciò consente di proiettare su di esso i tratti ritenuti negativi o
disfunzionali della propria modernità, dando luogo a un nuovo repertorio
di icone altrettanto familiari: computer-robot-cyborg, suicidi giovanili, ota-
ku, bomba atomica ecc. Il Giappone, cioè, come Paese del futuro, ma in
termini sostanzialmente distopici data l’associazione implicita di tali icone
alla reificazione dell’uomo in macchina, all’alienazione urbana e agli effetti
devastanti della tecnica. Un nuovo orientalismo funzionale a salvaguardare
il monopolio euro-americano di almeno alcuni paradigmi identificativi della
propria modernità: la ragione, l’individualismo, i diritti umani, il progresso.
I singoli tasselli che compongono questa geografia immaginaria egemo-
ne possono variare di volta in volta. Tuttavia, quello che accomuna sia il
tecno-orientalismo che l’orientalismo classico è la loro logica di allonta-
namento del Giappone in quanto ‘orientale’ che conduce alla reificazione
delle differenze, configurandole in definitiva come alterità assolute ‘non-
occidentali’. L’identità ‘occidentale’ che viene in tal modo affermata per
contrasto non è solo definita per la sua modernità dalle pretese universa-
listiche, ma contiene anche il riferimento etnocentrico di fondo dell’idea
stessa di umanità. Diventa quindi facile intuire come le attribuzioni anti-
tetiche di tipo particolaristico nei confronti del Giappone concorrano nel
loro insieme a degli esiti dis-umanizzanti. La geisha potrà essere evocata
come una super-donna per eleganza, sensualità e gentilezza, ma anche
come una sub-donna per obbedienza, passività e devozione incondizionata
al desiderio maschile; il samurai un super-uomo per doti marziali, lealtà
eroica, senso estetico, ma anche un sub-uomo per impassibilità, crudeltà e
obbedienza fanatica tale da squarciarsi lo stomaco (seppuku 切腹) o, nella
sua versione moderna, schiantarsi con il proprio aereo sul nemico (kami-
kaze 神風); e infine, il sararīman サラリーマン (colletto bianco) potrà essere
anch’egli un super-uomo per efficienza, disciplina, produttività, ma anche
un sub-umano conforme agli imperativi sociali, robotizzato o alienato dalla
reificazione tecnologica o economica (fig. 51).
Certo è che queste icone, e per estensione il Giappone intero, non pos-
sono assolutamente essere del tutto normali, almeno all’interno della ge-
Mostri del Giappone
‘Giappone’ vs ☜ ‘Occidente’ ☞ vs ‘Giappone’

(loro/alterità) (noi/identità euro americana) (loro/alterità)
(iper) tradizione ‘modernità’ (iper) modernità

natura tecnica metropoli
(monte Fuji, giardini, ciliegi) (grattacieli, cemento, neon)
religione, arte scienza invenzioni high tech

(zen shint , ikebana,
(zen, ikebana ukiyoe) (robot cyborg
(robot, cyborg, accessori digital elettronici)
ritualità estetico emotiva ragione formalismo, infantilismo, perversione

((cerimonia
i i d
dell tè,
è artii marziali,
i li seppuku)
k ) (i hi i kawaii,
(inchini, k ii sesso estremo))
geisha, samurai individuo sarar man, hikikomori, otaku
imperatore, clan, comunità, famiglia società stato, azienda, gruppo
onore, fedeltà, destino diritti umani autoritarismo, sessismo, razzismo
miti ancestrali storia progresso alienazione, apocalisse nucleare
⬇ ⬇ ⬇
? modello universale di umanità ?
Figura 51. Doppio orientalismo euro-americano nei confronti del Giappone: orientalismo classico
+ tecno-orientalismo
ografia immaginaria dell’orientalismo: una cartografia tanto radicata e

collaudata nella memoria culturale euro-americana da poter prescindere
dalle intenzioni dei suoi singoli autori, precedendone e orientandone la
scelta secondo una cornice selettiva. Una cartografia geoculturale, insom-
ma, che tende a precludere l’inclusione del ‘Giappone’ nell’idea di umanità
caratterizzata in sostanza dalla ragione, dalla libertà individuale e demo-
cratica, dal progresso sociale. Esso sarà sempre smisurato rispetto agli
standard fondativi dell’identità ‘occidentale’, o per eccesso o per difetto;
sarà necessariamente fonte ambivalente di fascino esotico o di disprezzo
razzista, che, nonostante le apparenze, costituiscono in definitiva due facce
della stessa medaglia imposta dall’occidentalismo moderno.
Lo statuto deformato o mostruoso del Giappone in quanto ‘orientale’ allo
sguardo euro-americano è tuttavia potenziato da un’ulteriore dinamica,
visto che si tratta di un estremo ‘Oriente’, quindi per definizione qualcosa
di completamente diverso. L’idea del Giappone non solo come estrema-
mente tradizionale o moderno, ma più di ogni cosa come un qualcosa del
tutto incongruo o contradditorio nel suo insieme, è effetto della somma del
tecno-orientalismo con quello classico. Un esempio figurativo di questo
Mostri del Giappone
Figura 52. Il Giappone come

ossimoro (iper-tradizione +
iper-modernità).
doppio orientalismo: il treno superveloce Shinkansen, uno dei simboli della

modernità giapponese postbellica, che sfreccia sullo sfondo del monte Fuji,
uno dei simboli invece della tradizione nipponica. L’idea complessiva del
Giappone non è quindi solo la sua riduzione a qualche essenza arcaica o
futuristica, ma questi aspetti essenzializzati possono essere ulteriormente
combinati, sommando elementi opposti o contraddittori fra loro in modo da
dar luogo a un vero e proprio ossimoro culturale (fig. 52).
Il risultato di questo doppio orientalismo (iper-tradizione + iper-moder-
nità), o di altre combinazioni analoghe, è sempre lo stesso: un contrasto,
un estremo contrasto, una vera e propria contraddizione.3 Il Giappone
come un topos che sembra essere fuori portata rispetto a una spiegazione
razionale; un Paese che soprattutto deve essere misterioso e bizzarro, una
‘mente giapponese’ imperscrutabile nella sua essenza ultima, se non per
intuizione mistico-estetica del suo enigma, o per riduzione tradizionalista
a qualche tratto feudale, comunitario, animista. Come il mostro, il Giap-
pone risultante da questa geografia immaginaria è un’alterità deformata,
funzionale a ribadire i confini impliciti della propria identità modellata
secondo la logica di una cartografia geoculturale collaudata; un’alterità
ambivalente, smisurata e incongrua, che proprio per questo può tanto af-
3 Si possono avere ovviamente altre combinazioni non necessariamente diacroniche, per

esempio di tipo sincronico: Estremo Oriente + Estremo Occidente; di tipo culturale come esem-
plificato da un classico dell’antropologia sul Giappone, Il crisantemo e la spada (1946) di Ruth
Benedict, impostato sull’associazione estrema belligeranza, aggressività + estrema estetica,
gentilezza; o ancora di tipo affettivo- psicologico: estrema estraneità + estrema familiarità =
familiarità estraniante. Per una genealogia del Giappone come «Paese dei contrasti», immagine
rintracciabile fin dal XVI nei resoconti dei missionari gesuiti, cfr. Wilkinson [1981] 1982.

Mostri del Giappone
fascinare ma anche inquietare. Come il mostro, il Giappone orientalizzato

è una costruzione, una proiezione che rivela in definitiva molto più degli
investimenti identitari dei suoi autori euro-americani o del loro retaggio
storico che di sé stesso.
3 Mostri e auto-orientalismo
Il Giappone però, diversamente dai mostri, non è solo immaginario, un’i-

dea o una rappresentazione. Esso è anche un’esistenza empirica, un luogo
reale, come reali sono le persone che vi abitano assieme alla loro storia, so-
cietà e cultura. Ciò significa che qualsiasi orientalismo non è del tutto ridu-
cibile a una mera costruzione fantastica o arbitraria, visto che è chiamato
a confrontarsi concretamente con una realtà empirica e vivente, come di-
mostra anche l’aggiustamento strategico espresso dal tecno-orientalismo
nei confronti di un Giappone modernizzato e superpotenza economica. La
forza di questa cartografia geoculturale non dipende tuttavia dall’esattezza
o meno delle sue asserzioni in termini quantitativi, o dagli stereotipi nei
confronti delle sue icone più rappresentative, che possono essere tutte
descritte e analizzate in modo empiricamente verificabile, senza alterarne
la logica tassonomica di tipo identitario, contrastivo e gerarchico. I limiti e
le possibilità in termini di egemonia euro-americana si misurano piuttosto
sul riscontro dialettico con la realtà vivente del Giappone stesso, con le
reazioni più o meno discordanti da parte nipponica.
L’orientalismo non è infatti un semplice monologo, una prassi discor-
siva unilaterale imposta con il puro dominio su di un ‘Oriente’ muto e
passivo. Se vuole essere effettivo e pervasivo, se è da considerarsi un
processo egemone secondo l’accezione data da Antonio Gramsci (Gramsci
[1929-1935] 1975), allora l’orientalismo deve fare affidamento sul consen-
so e sull’accettazione, radicale, spontanea, attiva, e non passiva, da parte
dell’altro orientalizzato o subalterno. Quindi, auto-orientalismo in primo
luogo come interiorizzazione dei presupposti fondativi dell’occidentalismo
in epoca moderna, della sua grammatica essenzializzante e contrastiva di
fondo, della sua struttura generativa di identità e alterità collettive, dei
suoi presupposti paradigmatici: Occidente = modernità = universalismo vs
Oriente = tradizione = particolarismo. Si è trattato di un processo storico
complesso e non sempre lineare, considerando soprattutto le implicazioni
inferiorizzanti di questa geografia immaginaria interiorizzata, testimoniate
in precedenza da Sōseki, Miyazaki o Murakami col loro tentativo di opporvi
una distanza critica. Il problema di fondo di questa operazione subalterna,
che ha reso possibile la formazione stessa dello Stato-nazione Giappone
nel periodo Meiji (1868-1912) e la sua immissione nell’ordine geopolitico
mondiale, riguarda l’inversione valutativa nei confronti dell’‘Oriente’ e
quindi dell’‘identità giapponese’ in chiave nazionale, all’epoca ancora tut-
Mostri del Giappone
ta da inventare e costruire, che nei contenuti doveva per necessità essere

positiva e umanizzante. L’auto-orientalismo giapponese scaturisce dagli
stessi imperativi identitari dell’orientalismo, in cui la rappresentazione di
un altro ‘orientale’ riconducibile a una presunta essenza culturale è funzio-
nale per configurare secondo un’opposizione binaria una propria identità
‘occidentale’ altrettanto unitaria e omogenea. Nel caso giapponese, l’uso
strategico moderno a fini nazionalistici di questa cartografia geoculturale
consiste quindi nell’articolazione di un altro euro-americano come ‘Occi-
dente’ (seiyō 西洋, ōbei 欧米) in termini altrettanto essenzialistici, in modo
da poter configurare per contrasto binario una propria essenza giappone-
se, tale da poter uniformare i tratti di un’identità nazionale ancora etero-
genea e in fieri a fine Ottocento (Iwabuchi 1994; Sakai 1997).
La storia della prima metà Novecento, e soprattutto la Guerra del Paci-
fico (1937-1945), ha evidenziato le implicazioni disumanizzanti dell’assun-
zione e riproduzione dell’occidentalismo euro-americano, sfociati in una
cartografia geoculturale triadica: ‘Occidente’, ‘Oriente’ e ‘Giappone’. 4 Da
una parte, ri-produzione di alterità essenzializzate, sia nei confronti dei
Paesi euro-americani come ‘Occidente’, sia rispetto ai vicini asiatici come
‘Oriente’; dall’altra, invenzione di una propria identità nazionale come la
sintesi più riuscita di ‘Occidente’ e ‘Oriente’, riassunta nell’ideologia pana-
siatica della «Sfera di co-prosperità della grande Asia Orientale» (Daitōa
kyōeiken 大東亜共栄圏) o in quella imperiale dei «Principi della politica
nazionale» (Kokutai no hongi 国体の本義). Tuttavia, nonostante gli esiti
tragici di una politica imperialista basata su questa geografia immaginaria,
l’efficacia coesiva in termini identitari di tale operazione si è rivelata tale
da risultare ancora rilevante a più di un secolo di distanza.5
Il nihonjinron, le teorie per evocare o dimostrare il carattere unicamente
unico del Giappone, dei giapponesi e della loro cultura, è stato nel periodo
postbellico uno dei contributi più determinanti alla riproduzione di questa
cartografia basata sull’egemonia dell’occidentalismo moderno; ovvero,
dell’insieme dei discorsi, pratiche e istituzioni che contribuiscono alla con-
vinzione che esista qualcosa come l’‘Occidente’ e l’‘Oriente’, o qualcosa
di ‘occidentale’ o di ‘orientale’, a prescindere dagli indirizzi filo- o anti-
‘occidentali’, o che siano stereotipati o meno. Il nihonjinron è una forma
di nazionalismo culturale, un nazionalismo popolare non necessariamente
4 Per i risvolti razzisti durante il conflitto bellico fra Giappone e Stati Uniti nella Guerra del
Pacifico, cfr. Dower 1986; mentre per gli effetti disumanizzanti dell’orientalismo giapponese
nei confronti dei Paesi asiatici colonizzati, cfr. Kang 1996. Infine, cfr. Iwabuchi 2002 per la
struttura triadica dell’auto-orientalismo giapponese.
5 Per la teoria dello «schema co-figurativo» e la sua struttura binaria che rende l’idea es-
senzializzata e moderna dell’‘Occidente’ così indispensabile all’idea di ‘Giappone’, cfr. Sakai
1997; mentre per gli effetti unificanti sul piano sociale dell’auto-orientalismo giapponese, cfr.
Iwabuchi 1994.

Mostri del Giappone
istituzionalizzato in termini statali, costituito da un insieme sterminato di

monografie accademiche e non, programmi televisivi, articoli giornalistici,
conferenze, convegni ecc. 6 Per molti decenni, grosso modo dagli anni Ses-
santa ai Novanta, esso si è basato, a prescindere dalle sue mille versioni,
sul tentativo non solo generico di definire gli aspetti caratterizzanti del
Giappone, ma di farlo anche in termini particolaristici, per costruire l’idea
di un’autenticità o di un’essenza giapponese, non solo unica in generale
come altri Paesi al mondo ma, unicamente unica in termini contrastivi con
un presunto ‘universalismo occidentale’. Tra le nozioni più note vi sono
«popolo omogeneo» (tan’itsu minzoku 単一民族), «amore passivo» (amae
甘え), «società verticale» (tate shakai タテ社会), «gruppismo» (shūdanshugi
集団主義), «cultura della vergogna» (haji no bunka 恥の文化). In questo caso,
a sottolineare la complicità e reciprocità di fondo con l’orientalismo euro-
americano v’è, oltre all’assunzione dei suoi paradigmi epistemologici ‘Oc-
cidente’ e ‘Oriente’, l’inclusione concreta di autori soprattutto statunitensi,
quali la citata Ruth Benedict (The Chrysanthenum and the Sword, 1946),
Edwin O. Reischauer (The Japanese, 1977), Ezra Vogel (Japan as Number
One, 1979), le cui traduzioni giapponesi in milioni di copie sono fra i best
seller assoluti dello stesso nihonjinron. 7
Il nihonjinron è caratterizzato dallo stesso processo essenzializzante
e dicotomico dell’orientalismo euro-americano, anche se gli scopi sono
diametralmente opposti. In questo caso abbiamo una dinamica di articola-
zione dell’altro euro-americano come ‘Occidente’, un suo allontanamento
pratico-discorsivo per contrasto rispetto ad un processo di identificazione
del Giappone. Ma il punto importante è che i paradigmi sui quali si fonda
questa geografia immaginaria sono sostanzialmente gli stessi dell’orienta-
lismo: modernità tecnico-razionale (‘Occidente’) contrapposta a tradizione
emotivo- irrazionale (‘Giappone’) (fig. 53). L’aspetto distintivo riguarda tut-
tavia il ribaltamento valutativo in modo da evocare un’identità culturale in
termini affermativi e umanizzanti, cioè in modo da poter trasferire l’ anima
dal polo dell’‘Occidente-modernità’ a quello del ‘Giappone- tradizione’. Si
tratta di un rovesciamento che ricorda quello avvenuto nel romanticismo
tedesco a inizio Ottocento nel definire la propria cultura nazionale (Kultur)
in termini particolaristici, istintivi e naturali, in contrapposizione all’illu-
minismo francese (Zivilisation) e alle sue attribuzioni universalistiche,
6 L’antropologo Harumi Befu interpreta il nihonjinron come un nazionalismo popolare «dal

basso» o «religione civile» (nihonkyō 日本教), fondamentale nel compensare nel periodo post-
bellico il deficit identitario da parte del nazionalismo istituzionale «dall’alto» con la sua in-
sistenza su simboli controversi, e quindi non sempre accettati dall’opinione pubblica, quali
la bandiera nazionale (hi no maru 日の丸), l’inno nazionale (kimi gayo 君が代) o l’istituzione
imperiale (Befu 2001).
7 Per un’analisi sistematica dei limiti teorici, metodologici e ideologici dei massimi esponenti
del nihonjinron, cfr. Mouer, Sugimoto 1986.

Mostri del Giappone
‘Giappone’ ☞ vs ‘Occidente’
‘Nihon/Nippon 日本’ ‘seiyō 西洋, ōbei 欧米’
(noi/identità nazionale) (loro/alterità euro-americana)

criterio geo-‐clima-co:
insularità, clima monsonico, natura ricca con-nentalità, clima regolare, natura povera

criterio etnico:
omogeneità, purezza, unicità mescolanza

criterio produ8vo-‐diete-co:
agricoltura, comunità, riso nomadico-‐pastorale, schiavismo, carnivori

criterio sociale:
gruppo, gerarchia, vergogna società, individualismo, colpa

criterio intelle:uale:
ambiguità, emo-vità, sogge8vità, silenzio logica, ragione, ogge8vità, prolissità

criterio generale:
par-colarismo, armonia, spontaneità universalismo, ro:ura, ar-ficio

Figura
53. Il nihonjinron come auto-orientalismo (schema liberamente adattato da Dale 1988,
pp.
38-55)

razionalistiche e materialistiche. L’enfasi sull’unicità della cultura giappo-
nese in termini particolaristici è in modo analogo il risultato della dinamica
contrastiva rispetto al presupposto universalismo dell’‘Occidente’, il quale
diventa il termine di riferimento imprescindibile di qualsiasi buon autore
di nihonjinron. L’insistenza sulla intrinseca natura intuitiva o emotiva della
cultura giapponese e dei giapponesi, evocata da nozioni più o meno ani-
mistiche quali «spirito yamato » (yamato damashii 大和魂) o «spirito delle
parole» (kotodama 言霊), diventa una strategia difensiva per porre fuori
portata il suo presunto nocciolo più intimo dallo sguardo così invasivo della
ragione ‘occidentale’. 8 Anzi, è proprio l’enfasi sugli aspetti più irrazionali
e configurati da un’intersezione estetico-religiosa, al limite del mistico ed
esoterico, a garantire l’effetto congiunto di tipo sia distintivo sia nobilitan-
te rispetto allo sguardo euro-americano e alle sue implicazioni reificanti.
Tradizione quindi non più come possibile sintomo di arretratezza rispetto
8 Per uno studio sistematico della mistificazione spirituale della lingua giapponese in epoca
moderna, cfr. Miller 1982.

Mostri del Giappone
alla modernità, ma come sua cifra nobilitante e soprattutto inafferrabile e

incontrollabile dalla ragione ‘occidentale’.
Lo stesso statuto contraddittorio di Paese dei contrasti, risultante
dall’accostamento di aspetti estremizzati e incongrui, può venire ribaltato
in statuto ibrido o addirittura in una sintesi superiore: una cultura che
avrebbe saputo coniugare il meglio della tradizione asiatica e della moder-
nità euro-americana, come in effetti già teorizzato nel periodo bellico dall’i-
deologia imperiale. Alla luce di questa geografia immaginaria, si potrebbe
ipotizzare una necessità strategica insita nell’investimento mitico delle
origini nazionali o in tante altre operazioni nostalgiche in epoca moderna.
Un continuo re-incantamento della ‘cultura giapponese’, testimoniato non
solo dall’istituzione imperiale o dalla proliferazione di nuovi movimenti
religiosi, ma anche dal ruolo fondamentale degli studi folclorici giappone-
si (minzokugaku), compreso lo yōkaigaku, lo studio dei mostri autoctoni,
e, più in generale, dall’ubiquità del mostruoso o del fantastico in ambito
letterario e in seguito nelle culture popolari moderne e contemporanee.
Tornando alla questione che riguarda la rilevanza moderna dei mostri in
Giappone, si potrebbe a questo punto intendere lo statuto mostruoso della
nazione in veste di identità doppiamente deformata, sia dall’orientalismo
euro-americano, sia dall’auto-orientalismo nipponico. Dell’orientalismo
viene assunta la caratterizzazione ambivalente, smisurata e incongrua del
‘Giappone’ rispetto alla modernità razionale dell’‘Occidente’, ma con un
rovesciamento valutativo tale da fare del proprio statuto orientalizzato e
subalterno un possibile fattore di identificazione culturale. Il segreto di
ogni egemonia consiste infatti non solo nell’imposizione più o meno for-
zata della propria Weltanschauung, ma nella capacità di offrire alla parte
subordinata degli elementi utili e gratificanti insiti nella subalternità, in
modo da renderlo un agente spontaneamente attivo nella riproduzione
stessa di questa egemonia.9
L’intersezione fra orientalismo e auto-orientalismo rivela come la loro
complicità reciproca alimenti un gioco di specchi, in cui entrambe le pro-
spettive si rimandano una rappresentazione del Giappone che si conferma
a vicenda: un’immagine in cui proiettare e rispecchiare le proprie necessità
identitarie. Si tratta di un processo che nel suo complesso tende a configu-
rare un’alterità/identità deformata o mostruosa, una sorta di monstering
process. Tuttavia questo specchio, analogamente all’ambivalenza mediatri-
ce e ibrida del mostro, oltre a segnalare i confini che separano, comprende
9 La complicità reciproca di egemonia/subalternità risulta un processo altrettanto strategico

nella riproduzione di differenze essenzializzate di genere, etnico-razziste o generazionali an-
che in assenza di un dominio coercitivo. Per esempio, la riproduzione della secolare riduzione
patriarcale della donna ai suoi aspetti emotivi, fisici, sensuali (‘tradizione’), in contrapposizio-
ne al logos normativo razionale e maschile (‘modernità’), è direttamente proporzionale alla
gratificazione e utilità che le stesse donne trovano nell’identificarsi in questa ‘femminilità’.

Mostri del Giappone
anche la possibilità di un avvicinamento fra dimensioni e mondi diversi.

Qualsiasi cornice conoscitiva più o meno stereotipata costituisce infatti la
condizione necessaria per favorire almeno un primo contatto, che può por-
tare in alcuni casi anche a una dinamica più aperta e dialogica nel rapporto
interculturale. A prescindere però dalle intenzioni e dagli esiti personali dei
singoli, è bene ricordare la più ampia dimensione storico-politica di questa
cartografia geoculturale: una geografia immaginaria la cui logica essen-
zializzante, antitetica e gerarchica, con i suoi effetti disumanizzanti, trova
la sua ragion d’essere negli imperativi identitari posti dall’imperialismo e
dai vari nazionalismi in epoca moderna.
4 J-culture, cool Japan e soft power
Che ne è di questa geografia immaginaria moderna in epoca contempo-

ranea? Da ormai alcuni decenni si teorizza una condizione postmoderna
e quindi il superamento delle logiche fondative della modernità. Viviamo
in un mondo globalizzato in cui i flussi crescenti di capitali, informazioni
e persone sembrano avere eroso i confini degli Stati a favore dell’inte-
grazione di regioni, nazioni e le loro culture in una società mondiale o
cosmopolita. Ha ancora senso parlare di orientalismo/auto-orientalismo
e delle sue dinamiche distanzianti o mostruose in un villaggio globale, in-
terconnesso in un’unica rete telematico-digitale e avviato all’eliminazione
delle distanze culturali?
In ambito euro-americano, il Giappone ha in effetti perso molto del suo
alone esotico e misterioso. La pervasività dei prodotti materiali della sua
industria elettronica e meccanica prima, e la diffusione della sua industria
ludico-culturale poi, hanno fatto del made in Japan un elemento integrante
dell’inculturazione mainstream, ovvero una realtà familiare e quotidiana
per gran parte delle nuove generazioni. Anzi, una realtà, sembrerebbe,
sempre più unilateralmente attraente, tanto da far parlare di nuovo japoni-
sme. 10 Non solo intrattenimento giovanile, come anime, manga, giocattoli,
mode subculturali, ma anche letteratura popolare, alimentazione, design,
architettura, fanno della nuova cultura giapponese, o J-culture, un’indi-
scussa icona trendy sullo scenario internazionale. Cool Japan è la designa-
zione governativa per sottolinearne l’attualità, attraverso uno slogan reso
popolare in seguito alla pubblicazione di «Japan’s Gross National Cool»
(2002) di Douglas McGray su Foreign Policy. In questo influente articolo
10 L’idea di nuovo japonisme è stata diffusa da Sugiura Tsutomu, direttore del Marubeni
Research Institute, con una serie di diciassette articoli pubblicati sul quotidiano Nikkei
Shinbun (settembre-ottobre 2003). La traduzione inglese («Cultural Power and Corporate
Strategy») è consultabile online: http://Marubeni.com/dbps_data/_material_/maruco_en/
data/research/pdf/0404_a.pdf (2013-11-05).

V.
1 The Japan Phenomenon and

the Social Sciences
I Multicultural Japan
1 Sampling Problem and the Question of Visibility
Hypothetical questions sometimes inspire the sociological imagination.

Suppose that a being from a different planet arrived in Japan and wanted
to meet a typical Japanese, one who best typified the Japanese adult
population. Whom should the social scientists choose? To answer this
question, several factors would have to be considered: gender, occupa-
tion, educational background, and so on.
To begin, the person chosen should be a female, because women out-
number men in Japan; sixty-five million women and sixty-two million
men live in the Japanese archipelago. With regard to occupation, she
would definitely not be employed in a large corporation but would work
in a small enterprise, since one in eight workers is employed in a company
with three hundred or more employees. Nor would she be guaranteed life-
time employment, since those who work under this arrangement amount
at most to only a quarter of Japan’s workforce. She would not belong
to a labor union, because less than one out of five Japanese workers is
unionized. She would not be university-educated. Fewer than one in six
Japanese have a university degree, and even today only about 40 percent
of the younger generation graduate from a university with a four-year
degree. Table 1.1 summarizes these demographic realities.
The identification of the average Japanese would certainly involve
much more complicated quantitative analysis. But the alien would come
closer to the ‘center’ of the Japanese population by choosing a female,
non-unionized and non-permanent employee in a small business without
university education than a male, unionized, permanent employee with
a university degree working for a large company.
When outsiders visualize the Japanese, however, they tend to think of
men rather than women, career employees in large companies rather than
non-permanent workers in small firms, and university graduates rather
than high school leavers, for these are the images presented on television
1
2 An Introduction to Japanese Society
Table 1.1 Japan’s population distribution
Variables Majority Minority
Gendera Female: 65.40 million (51%) Male: 62.15 million (49%)

Employees by firm sizeb Small firms – less than 300 Large firms – 300 or more:
employees: 47.21 million (87%) 6.97 million (13%)
Educational backgroundc Those without university University graduates: 14.7
education: 80.8 million (85%) million (15%)
Union membership in Non-unionists: 45.6 million Unionists: 10.1 million
labor forced (83%) (18%)
Sources:
a Population estimates (final) as of 1 June 2009, provided by the Statistics Bureau of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau 2009.

b Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in 2006a. The data cover all private-
sector establishments except individual proprietorship establishments in agriculture,

forestry and fishery.
c Population census conducted in 2000. University graduates do not include those who
have completed junior college and technical college. Figures do not include pupils and
students currently enrolled in schools and pre-school children.
d Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in 2008a.
and in newspaper and magazine articles. Some academic studies have

also attempted to generalize about Japanese society on the basis of obser-
vations of its male elite sector, and have thereby helped to reinforce
this sampling bias.1 Moreover, because a particular cluster of individuals
who occupy high positions in a large company have greater access to
mass media and publicity, the lifestyles and value orientations of those in
that cluster have acquired a disproportionately high level of visibility in
the analysis of Japanese society at the expense of the wider cross-section
of its population.
2 Homogeneity Assumptions and the Group Model
While a few competing frameworks for understanding Japanese society

are discernible, a discourse that is often labeled as Nihonjinron (theories
of Japaneseness) has persisted as the long-lasting paradigm that regards
Japan as a uniquely homogeneous society. The so-called group model of
Japanese society represents the most explicit and coherent formulation
of this line of argument, though it has drawn serious criticism from
empirical, methodological and ideological angles.2 Put most succinctly,
the model is based upon three lines of argument.
1 See Mouer and Sugimoto 1986, p. 150.
2 Befu 1980; Sugimoto and Mouer 1980; Dale 1986; McCormack and Sugimoto 1986;
Sugimoto and Mouer 1989; Yoshino 1992. See also Neustupný 1980.
The Japan Phenomenon and the Social Sciences 3
First, at the individual, psychological level, the Japanese are portrayed

as having a personality which lacks a fully developed ego or independent
self. The best-known example of this claim is Doi’s notion of amae,
which refers to the allegedly unique psychological inclination among the
Japanese to seek emotional satisfaction by prevailing upon and depending
on their superiors.3 They feel no need for any explicit demonstration of
individuality. Loyalty to the group is a primary value. Giving oneself to
the promotion and realization of the group’s goals imbues the Japanese
with a special psychological satisfaction.
Second, at the interpersonal, intra-group level, human interaction is
depicted in terms of Japanese group orientation. According to Nakane,
for example, the Japanese attach great importance to the maintenance of
harmony within the group. To that end, relationships between superiors
and inferiors are carefully cultivated and maintained. One’s status within
the group depends on the length of one’s membership in the group.
Furthermore, the Japanese maintain particularly strong interpersonal
ties with those in the same hierarchical chain of command within their
own organization. In other words, vertical loyalties are dominant. The
vertically organized Japanese contrast sharply with Westerners, who tend
to form horizontal groups which define their membership in terms of such
criteria as class and stratification that cut across hierarchical organization
lines.4
Finally, at the inter-group level, the literature has emphasized that inte-
gration and harmony are achieved effectively between Japanese groups,
making Japan a ‘consensus society’. This is said to account for the excep-
tionally high level of stability and cohesion in Japanese society, which has
aided political and other leaders in their efforts to organize or mobilize the
population efficiently. Moreover, the ease with which the energy of the
Japanese can be focused on a task has contributed in no small measure
to Japan’s remarkably rapid economic growth during the half-century
since the war. From a slightly different angle, Ishida argues that inter-
group competition in loyalty makes groups conform to national goals and
facilitates the formation of national consensus.5
For decades, Japanese writers have debated on the essence of ‘Japanese-
ness’. Numerous books have been written under such titles as What are the
Japanese? and What is Japan?6 Many volumes on Nihon-rashisa (Japanese-
like qualities) have appeared.7 Social science discourse in Japan abounds
with examinations of Nihon-teki (Japanese-style) tendencies in business,
politics, social relations, psychology, and so on. Some researchers are
preoccupied with inquiries into the ‘hidden shape’,8 ‘basic layer’, and
3 Doi 1973. 4 Nakane 1967, 1970, and 1978. 5 Ishida 1983, pp. 23–47.
6 For example, Umesao 1986; Yamamoto 1989; Sakaiya 1991 and 1993; Umehara 1990.
7 For example, Hamaguchi 1988; Watanabe 1989; Kusayanagi 1990.
8 Maruyama, Katō, and Kinoshita 1991.
‘archetype’9 of Japanese culture. These works portray Japanese society

as highly homogeneous, with only limited internal variation, and give it
some all-embracing label. Hamaguchi, for example, who presents what
he calls a contextual model of the Japanese, maintains that the concept of
the individual is irrelevant in the study of the Japanese, who tend to see
the interpersonal relationship itself (kanjin) – not the individuals involved
in it – as the basic unit of action.10 Amanuma argues that the Japanese
core personality is based on the drive for ganbari (endurance and persis-
tence), which accounts for every aspect of Japanese behavior.11 Publish-
ing in Japanese, a Korean writer, Lee, contends that the Japanese have a
unique chijimi shikō, a miniaturizing orientation which has enabled them
to skillfully miniaturize their environment and products, ranging from
bonsai plants, small cars, and portable electronic appliances to computer
chips.12 The list of publications that aim to define Japanese society with
a single key word is seemingly endless and, although the specific appel-
lation invariably differs, the reductive impulse is unchanged.
At least four underlying assumptions remain constant in these studies.
First, it is presumed that all Japanese share the attribute in question – be
it amae or miniaturizing orientation – regardless of their class, gender,
occupation, and other stratification variables. Second, it is also assumed
that there is virtually no variation among the Japanese in the degree
to which they possess the characteristic in question. Little attention is
given to the possibility that some Japanese may have it in far greater
degree than others. Third, the trait in question, be it group-orientation
or kanjin, is supposed to exist only marginally in other societies, partic-
ularly in Western societies. That is, the feature is thought to be uniquely
Japanese. Finally, the fourth presupposition is an ahistorical assumption
that the trait has prevailed in Japan for an unspecified period of time,
independently of historical circumstances. Writings based on some or
all of these propositions have been published in Japan ad nauseam and
have generated a genre referred to as Nihonjinron (which literally means
theories on the Japanese). Although some analysts have challenged the
validity of Nihonjinron assertions on methodological, empirical, and ide-
ological grounds, the discourse has retained its popular appeal, attract-
ing many readers and maintaining a commercially viable publication
industry.
The notion of Japan being homogeneous goes in tandem with the
claim that it is an exceptionally egalitarian society with little class differ-
entiation. This assertion is based on scattered observations of company
9 For example, Takatori 1975.
10 Hamaguchi 1985 and 1988. For a debate on this model, see Mouer and Sugimoto 1987,
pp. 12–63.
11 Amanuma 1987. 12 Lee 1984.
life. Thus, with regard to resource distribution, some contrast the rel-
atively modest salary gaps between Japanese executive managers and
their employees with the marked discrepancy between the salaries of
American business executives and their workers. Focusing on the alleged
weakness of class consciousness, others point out that Japanese man-
agers are prepared to get their hands dirty, wear the same blue overalls
as assembly workers in factories and share elevators, toilets, and com-
pany restaurants with low-ranking employees.13 Still others suggest that
Japanese managers and rank-and-file employees work in large offices
without status-based partitions, thereby occupying the work-place in an
egalitarian way. Furthermore, public opinion polls taken by the Prime
Minister’s Office have indicated that eight to nine out of ten Japanese
classify themselves as middle class. While there is debate as to what all
these figures mean, they have nevertheless strengthened the images of
egalitarian Japan. A few observers have gone as far as to call Japan a
‘land of equality’14 and a ‘one-class society’.15 Firmly entrenched in all
these descriptions is the portrayal of the Japanese as identifying them-
selves primarily as members of a company, alma mater, faction, clique,
or other functional group, rather than as members of a class or social
stratum.
3 Diversity and Stratification
The portrayal of Japan as a homogeneous and egalitarian society is,

however, contradicted by many observations that reveal it is a more
diversified and heterogeneous society than this stereotype suggests. Two
frameworks, one emphasizing ethnic diversity and the other stressing
class differentiation, appear to have taken root around the turn of the
twentieth century that challenge Nihonjinron images of Japanese society.
(a) Minority Issues and the Multi-ethnic Model
The notion of Japan as a racially homogeneous society has come under

question as a consequence of the growing visibility of foreign migrants
in the country. The shortage of labor in particular sectors of Japan’s
economy has necessitated the influx of workers from abroad for the
last quarter of a century or so, making the presence of various ethnic
groups highly conspicuous. Throughout manufacturing cities and towns
across the nation, Japanese Brazilians, descendents of Japanese migrants
to Brazil, work in large numbers. At many train stations and along major
13 White and Trevor 1984. 14 Tominaga 1982. 15 De Roy 1979.

city roads, multilingual signs and posters, including those in English,

Korean, Chinese and Portuguese, depending upon the area, are promi-
nently displayed.
In rural Japan, a significant number of farmers are married to women
from other Asian countries in order to help with farm and domestic work
because of a shortage of Japanese women willing to share a rural lifestyle.
Asian women also form indispensable support staff in medical institu-
tions, nursing care centers, and welfare facilities. International marriages
are on the rise, with some 6 percent of all marriages in Japan being
between Japanese and non-Japanese nationals.16 The ratio is nearly
10 percent in Tokyo.
In the national sport of professional sumo wrestling, overseas wrestlers,
particularly those from Mongolia, Eastern Europe, and Hawaii, occupy
the summit levels of the top sumo ranks of Grand Champion, Cham-
pion and other. In the popular sport of professional baseball, American,
Korean, Taiwanese, and other international players have become famil-
iar public faces. On national television, many Korean soap operas attract
exceptionally high ratings.
These casual observations have drawn attention to the reality that
Japan has an extensive range of minority issues, ethnic and quasi-ethnic,
which proponents of the homogeneous Japan thesis tend to ignore. One
can identify several minority groups in Japan even if one does so nar-
rowly, referring only to groups subjected to discrimination and prejudice
because of culturally generated ethnic myths, illusions, and fallacies, as
Chapter 7 will detail.
In Hokkaidō, the northernmost island of the nation, over twenty thou-
sand Ainu live as an indigenous minority. Their situation arose with
the first attempts of Japan’s central regime to unify the nation under its
leadership around the sixth and seventh centuries and to conquer the
Ainu territories in northern Japan. In addition, some two to three mil-
lion burakumin are subjected to prejudice and many of them are forced
to live in separate communities, partly because of an unfounded myth
that they are ethnically different.17 Their ancestors’ plight began in the
feudal period under the Tokugawa shogunate which ruled the nation for
two and a half centuries from the seventeenth century and institutional-
ized an outcast class at the bottom of a caste system. Though the class
was legally abolished after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, discrimination
and prejudice have persisted. Some four hundred thousand permanent
Korean residents form the biggest foreign minority group in Japan. Their
16 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2007.

17 This is why some observers called them ‘Japan’s invisible race’ (De Vos and Wagatsuma
1966).
problem originated with Japan’s colonization of Korea at the beginning

of the twentieth century, and the Japanese importation of Koreans as
cheap labor for industries. More than two million foreign workers, both
documented and undocumented, live in the country as a result of their
influx into the Japanese labor market since the 1980s, mainly from Asia
and the Middle East, in their attempt to earn quick cash in the appre-
ciated Japanese yen. Finally, over 1.3 million Okinawans, who live in
the Ryukyu islands at the southern end of Japan, face occasional bigotry
based on the belief that they are ethnically different, and incur suspicion
because of the islands’ longstanding cultural autonomy.
The estimated total membership of these groups is about six to seven
million, which represents some 5 percent of the population of Japan.18
If one includes those who marry into these minority groups and suffer
the same kinds of prejudice, the number is greater. In the Kansai region
where burakumin and Korean residents are concentrated, the proportion
of the minority population exceeds 10 percent. These ratios may not be
as high as those in migrant societies, such as the United States, Canada,
and Australia,19 but they seem inconsistent with the claim that Japan
is a society uniquely lacking minority issues. These issues tend to be
obfuscated, blurred, and even made invisible in Japan partly because the
principal minority groups do not differ in skin color and other biological
characteristics from the majority of Japanese.
In international comparison, Japan does not rank uniquely high in its
composition of minority groups which exist because of their ethnicity or
the ethnic frictions that surround them. Table 1.2 lists some of the nations
whose ethnic minority groups constitute less than 11 percent. Given that
the Japanese figure is 5 percent, Japan’s position would be somewhere
in the second band; it is certainly difficult for it to be in the top band.
To be sure, different groups and societies define minority groups on
the basis of different criteria, but that is exactly the point. The bound-
aries of ethnic and racial groups are imagined, negotiated, constructed,
and altered over time and space. In defining them, administrative agen-
cies, private institutions, voluntary organizations, individual citizens, and
marginalized groups themselves have different and competing interests
and perspectives. Furthermore, international numerical comparisons of
ethnic minority groups are complicated and compounded by the fact
that the government of each country has different criteria for defining
and identifying ethnic minorities. The case here is not that each figure in
the table is definitive but that Japan seems to be unique, not in its absence
18 De Vos and Wetherall 1983, p. 3, provide a similar estimate. Nakano and Imazu 1993
also provide an analogous perspective.
19 These societies are perhaps ‘unique’ in their high levels of ethnic and racial diversity.
Table 1.2 Estimated proportions of ethnic and pseudo-ethnic minorities in

selected countries
Minority groups in
Level the total population Specific countries
Band 1 0–3% Austria, Bangladesh, Denmark, Dominican Republic,

Greece, Iceland, Korea (North), Korea (South),
Libya, Portugal
Band 2 3–6% Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Haiti, Japan,
Lebanon, Liberia, Netherlands
Band 3 6–11% Albania, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Mongolia,
Romania, Sweden
Note: Calculated from Famighetti 1994.
of minority issues, but in the decisiveness with which the government and
other organizations attempt to ignore their existence.
For the last couple of decades, studies that undermine the supposed
ethnic homogeneity of Japanese society have amassed. Befu who chal-
lenges what he calls the hegemony of homogeneity20 shows how deeply
seated ‘primordial sentiments’ spelled out in Nihonjinron are and reveals
how they play key roles in hiding the experiences and even existence of
various minority groups. In tracing the origin of the ‘myth of the ethni-
cally homogeneous nation’, Oguma demonstrates that this notion started
to take root only after Japan’s defeat in World War II; in prewar years
Japan was conceptualized as a diverse nation incorporating a mixture of
a variety of Asian peoples with which the Japanese were thought to share
blood relations. The transition from the prewar mixed nation theory to
the postwar homogeneous nation theory is a rather recent conversion.21
Weiner argues that the alleged racial purity of the Japanese is an illusion
and discusses the realities of minority groups subjected to prejudice
and discrimination.22 Lie, in his aptly titled book Multiethnic Japan,23
argues that Japan is a society as diverse as any other and discusses the
ways in which the ‘specter of multiethnicity’ strengthens the hegemonic
assumption of monoethnicity. Building on his studies on Zainichi Kore-
ans, Fukuoka suggests that there are several types of ‘non-Japanese’ on
the basis of lineage, culture, and nationality, the three analytical criteria
that sensitize us to multiple dimensions of what it is to be Japanese.24
Covering a significant time span from the archaeological past to the con-
temporary period, historians and sociologists put together a volume titled
Multicultural Japan25 which focuses upon the fluctuations in ‘Japanese’
identities and shows that Japan has had multiple ethnic presences in
20 Befu 2001. 21 Oguma 2002. 22 Weiner 2009.
23 Lie 2001. 24 Fukuoka 2000, p. xxx.
25 Denoon, Hudson, McCormack, and Morris-Suzuki 1996.
one form or another over centuries. The accumulation of these scholarly

studies has now led to a discourse that can be labeled as the multi-ethnic
model of Japanese society. It is still a moot point as to whether this new
framework has wide acceptance at Japan’s grassroots level.
Though regions themselves do not constitute ethnic groups in the
conventional sense, regional identities are only one step away from that
of the nation.26 Japan is divided into two subcultural regions, eastern
Japan with Tokyo and Yokohama as its center, and western Japan with
Osaka, Kyoto, and Kobe as its hub. The two regions differ in language,
social relations, food, housing, and many other respects. The subcultural
differences between the areas facing the Pacific and those facing the
Sea of Japan are also well known. Japan has a wide variety of dialects.
A Japanese from Aomori Prefecture, the northernmost area of Honshū
Island, and one from Kagoshima, the southernmost district in Kyūshū
Island, can scarcely comprehend each other’s dialects. Different districts
have different festivals, folk songs, and local dances. Customs governing
birth, marriage, and death differ so much regionally that books explaining
the differences are quite popular.27 The exact degree of domestic regional
variation is difficult to assess in quantitative terms and by internationally
comparative standards, but there is no evidence to suggest that it is lower
in Japan than elsewhere.
(b) Social Stratification and the Class Model
On the other front, the image of Japan as an egalitarian society experi-

enced a dramatic shift at the beginning of the twenty-first century with the
emerging claim that Japan is kakusa shakai, literally a ‘disparity society’,
a socially divided society with sharp class differences and glaring inequal-
ity, a point which Chapter 2 will examine in some detail. This view
appears to have gained ground among the populace during Japan’s pro-
longed recession in the 1990s, the so-called lost decade, and in the 2000s
when the second largest economy in the world experienced a further
downturn as a consequence of the global financial crisis. While job sta-
bility used to be the hallmark of Japan’s labor market, one out of three
employees are now ‘non-regular workers’ whose employment status is
precarious. Even ‘regular’ employees who were guaranteed job security
throughout their occupational careers have been thrown out of employ-
ment because of their companies’ poor business outcomes and the unsat-
isfactory performance of their own work. In mass media, on the one end
of the spectrum, the new rich who have almost instantly amassed vast
wealth in such areas as information technology, new media and financial
manipulation are celebrated and lionized as fresh billionaires. On the
26 Anderson 1983. 27 For example, Shufu to Seikatsusha 1992.

other end of the spectrum are the unemployed, the homeless, day labor-
ers and other marginalized members of society who are said to form karyū
shakai (the underclass), revealing a discrepancy which gives considerable
plausibility to the imagery of kakusa shakai. In regional economic com-
parisons, affluent metropolitan lifestyles often appear in sharp contrast
with the deteriorated and declining conditions of rural areas.
Comparative studies of income distribution suggest that Japan cannot
be regarded as uniquely egalitarian. On the contrary, it ranks roughly
middle among major advanced capitalist countries with the medium level
of unequal income distribution. Table 1.3 confirms this pattern, with the
international comparative analysis of the Gini index, which measures the
degree to which a given distribution deviates from perfect equality (with
larger figures indicating higher levels of inequality).
Japan’s relative poverty rate, an indicator of the percentage of low-
income earners, was 14.9 percent in 2004, the fourth highest among the
OECD’s thirty member nations, and rose to 15.7 percent in 2007 (see
Table 1.4). The relative poverty rate represents the percentage of income
Table 1.3 Gini index of some OECD countries in 2000
Countries Countries
(above average) Gini index (below average) Gini index
USA 0.357 Australia 0.305

Italy 0.347 Canada 0.301
Greece 0.345 Germany 0.277
New Zealand 0.337 France 0.273
Spain 0.329 Austria 0.252
UK 0.326 Sweden 0.243
Japan 0.314 Denmark 0.225
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2008.

Note: The values are based on the distribution of household disposable income
among individuals in each country.
The mean average of the Gini indices of all OECD countries in 2000 was 0.310.
Table 1.4 Relative poverty rates in some OECD countries
High rate Relative Low rate Relative

countries poverty rate countries poverty rate
Mexico 18.4 Denmark 5.2

Turkey 17.5 Sweden 5.3
USA 17.1 France 7.1
Japan 14.9 UK 8.3
Australia 12.4 Germany 11.0
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2008.

earners whose wage is below half of the median income. One in seven
workers lives under the poverty line in Japan, a reality that hardly makes
the country a ‘homogenous middle-class society’.
Even to casual observers, the stratification of Japanese society is dis-
cernible in a variety of areas. Those who own or expect to inherit land
and other assets have a considerable advantage over those who do not,
and asset differentials are so wide that it could be argued that Japan
is a class society based upon land ownership.28 In the area of consumer
behavior, those who possess or expect to inherit properties such as houses
and land spend lavishly on high-class, fashionable, and expensive goods,
while those without such property assets are restricted to more mundane
purchases designed to make ends meet.29 The Social Stratification and
Mobility (SSM) project conducted by a team of Japanese sociologists
over the last fifty years identifies five distinct clusters in its 2005 sur-
vey in the Japanese male adult population on the basis of such major
stratification variables as education, occupation, and income.30 With
regard to opportunities for education, students from families of high
educational and occupational background have a much better chance
of gaining admission to high-prestige universities,31 and this pattern has
persisted over time. About three-quarters of the students of the Univer-
sity of Tokyo, the most prestigious university in Japan, are the sons and
daughters of company managers, bureaucrats, academics, teachers, and
other professionals.32 Although approximately half of those advanced to
four-year universities at the age of eighteen,33 entry into many universi-
ties is non-competitive, with a considerable number accepting applicants
without formal entrance examinations and, overall, 91 percent of uni-
versity applicants gaining admission. Thus, most Japanese students have
little to do with the widely publicized ‘examination hell’.
Subcultural groups are reproduced inter-generationally through the
inheritance of social and cultural resources. Mindful of the inter-
generational reproduction of social advantages and cultural prestige, the
mass media have sarcastically used the term nanahikari-zoku in reference
to those who have attained prominence thanks to the ‘seven colorful rays
of influence emanating from their parents’. Unlike company employees,
professionals, and managers, small independent proprietors frequently
hand over their family business to one of their children.34 In the world of
entertainment, numerous sons and daughters of established entertainers
and television personalities have achieved their status with the aid of their
28 Shimono 1991. 29 Ozawa 1989. 30 Hayashi 2008.

31 SSM 95a, IV, p. 167.
32 Tokyo Daigaku Kōhō Iinkai 2008. The data were gathered in 2007.
33 The 2009 School Basic Survey of the Ministry of Education. 34 Ishida 2000.
parents’ national celebrity. The SSM study also suggests that the class
characteristics of parents significantly condition their children’s choice
of spouse.35 Ostensibly spontaneous selections of partners are patterned
in such a way that it is clear the class attributes of parents creep into the
decision-making process, whether consciously or not.
Gender differences in value orientation are arguably more pronounced
than ever with the gradual rise of feminist consciousness at various lev-
els. Opinion surveys have consistently shown that more women than
men disagree with the notion of home being the woman’s place.36 The
proportion of women who feel that marriage is not necessary if they can
support themselves invariably outnumbers that of men.37 Women show
much more commitment than men to welfare, medical, educational,
consumer, and other community activities.38
These observations of social diversification and segmentation, and of
the polarization of lifestyles, imply that Japanese society is not as class-
less and egalitarian as the conventional theory suggests; it is not only
diversified horizontally but also stratified vertically like other advanced
capitalist societies.
(c) Multicultural Model
While the two frameworks – the multi-ethnic model and the social strat-
ification model – stress different aspects of diversity and variation in
Japanese society, one can combine them into a more comprehensive per-
spective that locates both ethnic diversity and social stratification as key
elements of Japanese society. Table 1.5 graphically illustrates the loca-
tion of this perspective, which can be labeled the multicultural model of
Japanese society, the model that forms the basis of this book.
Table 1.5 Emphasis placed in the four models of Japanese society
Class variation
Ethnic diversity No Yes
No Group model Multi-class model

Yes Multi-ethnic model Multicultural model
Subcultures do proliferate on a number of dimensions, such as ethnic-

ity, region, gender, age, occupation, education, and so forth. To the extent
that subculture is defined as a set of value expectations and lifestyles
35 SSM 95a, IV, p.167. 36 Kokuritsu Josei Kyōiku Kaikan 2009, p. 178.
37 See, for example, Kokuritsu Josei Kyōiku Kaikan 2009, p. 178.
38 See, for example, the Economic Planning Agency 1985.
shared by a section of a given population, Japanese society reveals an

abundance of subcultural groupings along these lines. As a conglom-
erate of subcultures, Japan may be viewed as a multicultural society,
or a multi-subcultural society. Furthermore, most subcultural units are
rank-ordered in terms of access to various resources, including economic
privilege, political power, social prestige, information, and knowledge.
In this sense, Japan as a multicultural society is multi-stratified as well as
multi-ethnic.
Let us pose another hypothetical question. Suppose that a being from
another planet has capped all adult Japanese with hats of different colors
(visible only through special glasses) depending upon their educational
background: blue hats for university graduates, yellow hats for those who
have completed high school, and red hats for those who have completed
middle school or less. The alien might also place invisible color marks
on the foreheads of all working Japanese: white on employees in large
corporations, gray on those in medium-sized firms, and black on those
in small enterprises. If we wore glasses that made these colors visible,
would we see different color combinations depending on the location of
our observations? Would the color mixtures differ between an exclusive
golf club in the outskirts of Tokyo, a meeting at a buraku community in
Kyoto, a museum in Nara, a karaoke bar in a fishing village in Hokkaidō,
a pachinko pinball parlor in Hiroshima, a PTA session at a prestigious
private high school in Yokohama, and so on?
The alien could use many more invisible colors, denoting such things
as the value of an individual’s assets (such as properties and stocks),
the individual’s occupational position, region of residence or origin, and
minority/majority status. If we were to see these colors, how would they be
distributed and in what patterns would they cluster? These are questions
that a multicultural model of Japanese society can attempt to address by
rejecting the thesis of a homogeneous and egalitarian Japan.
4 Control of Ideological Capital
Japanese culture, like the cultures of other complex societies, comprises a

multitude of subcultures. Some are dominant, powerful, and controlling,
and form core subcultures in given dimensions. Examples are manage-
ment subculture in the occupational dimension, large corporation sub-
culture in the firm size dimension, male subculture in the gender dimen-
sion, and Tokyo subculture in the regional dimension. Other subcultures
are more subordinate, subservient, or marginal, and may be called the
peripheral subcultures. Some examples are part-time worker subculture,
small business subculture, female subculture, and rural subculture.
Core subcultures have ideological capital to define the normative

framework of society. Even though the lifetime employment and the
company-first dogma associated with the large corporation subculture
apply to less than a quarter of the workforce, that part of the popula-
tion has provided a role-model which all workers are expected to follow,
putting their companies ahead of their individual interests. The lan-
guage of residents in uptown Tokyo is regarded as standard Japanese not
because of its linguistic superiority but because of those residents’ social
proximity to the national power center.
Dominating in the upper echelons of society, core subcultural groups
are able to control the educational curriculum, influence the mass media,
and prevail in the areas of publishing and publicity. They outshine their
peripheral counterparts in establishing their modes of life and patterns
of expectations in the national domain and presenting their subcultures
as the national culture. The samurai spirit, the kamikaze vigor, and the
soul of the Yamato race,39 which some male groups may have as part of
the dominant subculture of men, are promoted as representing Japan’s
national culture. And although the liberalization of the domestic agri-
cultural market affects many consumers positively, producer groups that
have vested interests in maintaining the status quo and are connected
with the country’s leadership have often succeeded in presenting their
interests as those of the entire nation.
More generally, the slanted views of Japan’s totality tend to reproduce
because writers, readers, and editors of publications on the general char-
acteristics of Japanese society belong to the core subcultural sphere. Shar-
ing their subcultural base, they conceptualize and hypothesize in a similar
way, confirm their portrayal of Japan among themselves, and rarely seek
outside confirmation. In many Nihonjinron writings, most examples and
illustrations are drawn from the elite sector, including male employees in
managerial tracks of large corporations and high-ranking officials of the
national bureaucracy.40
Core subcultural groups overshadow those on the periphery in inter-
cultural transactions too. Foreign visitors to Japan, who shape the images
of Japan in their own countries, interact more intensely with core sub-
cultural groups than with peripheral ones. In cultural exchange pro-
grams, Japanese who have houses, good salaries, and university education
predominate among the host families, language trainers, and introduc-
ers of Japanese culture. Numerically small but ideologically dominant,
core subcultural groups are the most noticeable to foreigners and are
39 The Japanese phrase for this is Yamato damashii. Most Japanese are popularly presumed
to belong to the Yamato race.
40 Kawamura 1980; Sugimoto and Mouer 1995, pp. 187–8.
capable of presenting themselves to the outside world as representative

of Japanese culture.
To recapitulate the major points: Japanese society embraces a signifi-
cant degree of internal variation in both ethnic and stratificational senses.
It comprises a variety of subcultures based upon occupation, education,
asset holdings, gender, ethnicity, age, and so forth. In this sense, Japan
is multicultural and far from being a homogeneous, monocultural entity.
One can grasp the complexity and intricacy of Japanese society perhaps
only when one begins to see it as a mosaic of rival groups, competing
strata, and various subcultures.
II Multicultural Paradigm
1 Temporal Fluctuations in Understanding Japan
At popular levels, the Japanese self-images have been fairly consistent over
time as a time-series study spanning half a century demonstrates. The
Institute of Statistical Mathematics survey results, as shown in Table 1.6,
suggest that the Japanese regard themselves, more or less unchangingly
over the last five decades, as industrious, well-mannered, generous and
patient while being uncreative and cheerless. Regardless of whether these
self-portrayals reflect social realities or not, such images have taken hold
and got fixed in the minds of many Japanese, forming the solid bedrock
Table 1.6 The Japanese self-images (1958–2008)

Which words represent the characteristics of the Japanese?
1958 1963 1968 1973 1983 1988 1998 2003 2008
Diligent 55 60 61 66 69 72 71 66 67
Courteous 47 43 47 37 47 50 50 48 60
Kind 50 42 45 31 42 38 42 41 52
Persevering 48 55 58 52 60 50 51 46 49
Idealistic 32 23 23 21 30 27 23 20 20
Rational 11 8 10 13 22 22 18 17 17
Liberal 15 10 12 9 17 14 13 14 15
Easy-going 19 15 13 14 12 13 14 14 11
Cheerful 23 14 13 9 12 9 8 8 10
Creative 8 7 8 7 11 10 7 9 9
Source: Institute of Statistical Mathematics 2009, Table 9.1.

Notes:
1. The question was not asked in the surveys conducted in 1978 and 1993.
2. The figures are the percentages of people who chose the items in the left column in each
survey year. Because the respondents were allowed to make multiple choices, the total
of each year exceeds 100 percent.
of Nihonjinron culture. These self-perceptions are not derived from sys-

tematic comparative analysis, though the characterization of any society
would have to be based upon its comparison with other societies. To that
extent, the Japanese self-images represented here are popular stereotypes.
At a more conceptual and theoretical level, Japanese society has
inspired social scientists over several decades to address a complex set of
issues. For the last few decades, the pendulum of Japan’s images over-
seas has swung back and forth between positive and negative poles, and
between universalist and particularist approaches. As Table 1.7 displays,
seven distinctive phases are discernible during the postwar years.41
The first phase, immediately following the end of World War II and
continuing through the 1950s, saw a flow of writings which character-
ized the defeated Japan as a backward, hierarchical, and rather exotic
society which Western societies should educate. In particular, Benedict’s
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword42 had a most significant impact on the
postwar development of Japanese studies. Methodologically, Benedict
took a ‘patterns of culture’ approach which assumed that Japanese soci-
ety could best be understood as a social or cultural whole composed of
a rather homogeneous set of individuals. Benedict used anthropological
techniques for describing small societies with relatively undifferentiated
populations in her study of the complex society of Japan. Substantively,
Benedict highlighted what she regarded as the most common denomina-
tors in Japanese social organization which contrasted markedly with their
counterparts in the West. The influence of the anthropological frame-
work can be seen in Village Japan,43 Japanese Factory,44 and Tokugawa
Religion.45 This vein of literature set the stage for the persistent style of
analysis in which Japanese society was portrayed as both monolithic and
unique.
In the second phase, which dominated the 1960s, modernization the-
ory provided a framework within which Japan was assessed in a more
positive light. The mainstream of American scholarship began to regard
Japan as a successful case of evolutionary transformation without revolu-
tionary disruption. In the context of the intense Cold War, the US estab-
lishment also began to see Japan as the showpiece of the non-communist
model of development in Asia. The five-volume series on the modern-
ization of Japan published by Princeton University Press represented the
culmination of the collective efforts to examine Japan on the basis of
a set of universalistic criteria. Using the yardstick of pattern variables
developed by Parsons,46 a leading sociological theorist of modernization,
41 See Kawamura 1980, pp. 56–7; Mouer and Sugimoto 1986, pp. 57–8.
42 Benedict 1946. 43 Beardsley, Hall, and Ward 1959. 44 Abegglen 1958.
45 Bellah 1957. 46 Parsons 1951.
Table 1.7 Fluctuations in the frameworks and analytical tools of Japanese studies in English-language publications
Focus on
Possibility of Conceptual internal
Phase US–Japan relationship Evaluation of Japan convergence tools Key words variation
1945–60 Japan’s total dependence on Negative and positive No Particularistic on, giri, oyabun, kobun No
the US
1955–70 Japan as the showcase of the Positive Yes/no Universalistic Evolutionary change No
US model (modernization)
1965–80 Japan’s high economic Positive No (unique Japan) Particularistic amae, tate shakai, No
growth and emerging groupism
competition with the US
1970–90 Japan out-performing the US Positive Yes (reverse Universalistic Japan as number one No
in some areas of the economy convergence) Particularistic
and technology
1980–90 Intense trade war between Negative No (different Universalistic Enigma, threat No
Japan and the US capitalism)
1990– Japan’s recession and the US Negative Yes (global Universalistic Borderlessness, structural Yes/No
boom standard) reform
2000– Japan as soft power, the US Negative and positive Yes (cultural Particularistic manga, animation, sushi Yes/No
recession and the rise of capitalism) Universalistic
China
one of the most influential volumes, entitled Social Change in Modern

Japan,47 attempted to measure the degree to which Japan exemplified
the expected changes from traditional to modern patterns. While using
the universalistic model as its overall framework, however, the empirical
findings of the series were equivocal, pointing out a number of distinctive
features of Japan’s modernization.
The third phase saw the revival of a more particularistic approach,
lasting for about a decade from the late 1960s. Partly as a reaction to the
universalistic modernization framework, there was emphasis on the sup-
posed uniqueness of Japanese psychology, interpersonal relations, and
social organization. The notion of amae, which Doi48 spotlighted as the
key to unlock the psychological traits of the Japanese, attracted much
attention. Reischauer49 contended that the Japanese were essentially
group-oriented and differed fundamentally from individualistic Western-
ers. According to Nakane,50 Japanese social organizations were vertically
structured and apt to cut across class and occupational lines, unlike their
Western counterparts, which were horizontally connected and inclined to
transcend company kinship lines. These writings were published when
the Japanese economy began to make some inroad into the US mar-
ket. To a considerable extent, they reflected increasing confidence in the
Japanese way on the part of both Japanese and Western writers.
The fourth phase, which commenced toward the end of the 1970s and
persisted for a decade or so, witnessed waves of ‘learn-from-Japan’ cam-
paigns. Japan’s management practices, industrial relations, and education
programs were praised as the most advanced on earth and endorsed as
what other societies should emulate. Against the background of a grad-
ual decline of American hegemony in the international economy and
a visible ascendancy of Japanese economic performance, Vogel’s Japan
as Number One51 was one of a number of works which championed
what they regarded as the Japanese model. Many who wrote along these
lines suggested the possibility of injecting some Japanese elements into
the Western system to revitalize it. In the main, this argument empha-
sized transferable, transplantable, and therefore transcultural attributes
of Japanese society.
The fifth phase, which started in the mid-1980s and continued in the
1990s, witnessed the rise of the revisionists, who saw the Japanese social
system in a much more critical light than previously. Johnson, the author
of MITI and the Japanese Miracle,52 argues that Japanese capitalism is a
different kind of capitalism, based on the developmental state in which
the national bureaucracy plays a pivotal role in shaping national policy for
47 Dore 1967. 48 Doi 1973. 49 Reischauer 1977.

50 Nakane 1967, 1970, and 1978. 51Vogel 1979. 52 Johnson 1982.
Japan’s national interests only. He cautions that this structure poses an

increasingly grave threat to the wellbeing of the international community.
In a similar vein, Wolferen addresses The Enigma of Japanese Power53 and
maintains that the Japanese system, in which leaders lack accountability,
makes each citizen unhappy. Against the background of Japan’s economic
super-power status, the intensification of trade friction between Japan
and the West, and the rise of Japan-bashing, the revisionist writings point
to the strategies with which Western societies may be able to contain
the influence of Japan and make its social system more compatible with
theirs. The revisionist analysis attaches importance to the institutional
peculiarities of Japanese society and their consequences both at home
and overseas.
The sixth phase started after the collapse of the so-called bubble econ-
omy, with the commencement of the unprecedentedly prolonged reces-
sion that persisted throughout the 1990s and continued into the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century. During this period, Japanese advocates
of Nihonjinron lost confidence in promoting Japan’s cultural uniqueness,
let alone attributing to it the characteristics of the Japanese economy.
Overseas observers also gradually lost interest in the once hotly debated
‘Japanese model’. Many opinion-makers from business consultants to
media columnists started calling for the globalization of Japanese society
and for structural reform at various social and economic levels. Such
titles as The End of the Nation State and The Borderless World hit the best-
seller lists.54 The cultural elite of the Japanese establishment appears to
have abandoned justifying the economic and political behavior of the
Japanese in terms of cultural uniqueness and to advocate the necessity of
integrating Japan into the international community.
Furthermore, the critical analysis of Nihonjinron initiated by a hand-
ful of social scientists in the late 1970s and the 1980s55 gradually took
root in Japan’s intellectual community,56 making it difficult for cultural
essentialists to naively write about Japan’s ‘cultural essence’ without qual-
ifications. Imported from the West, cultural studies became popular
among Japanese social scientists and established itself as a new genre
called karuchuraru sutadiizu, which challenges epistemological assump-
tions about the primacy of the nation state as the fundamental unit of
social analysis.
Though the tide of overt Nihonjinron has somewhat waned, it continues
to exert persistent influence over Japan’s intellectual life. For instance,
53 Wolferen 1990. 54 See Ohmae 1990 and 1995.
55 For example, Sugimoto and Mouer 1980; Befu 1990a; Mouer and Sugimoto 1986; and
Dale 1986.
56 See, for example, Yoshino 1992 and 1997; Oguma 2002; Amino 1990, 1992, 1994 and
2000; Takano and Ōsaka 1999; Befu 2001; and Takano 2008.
in psychology, Kitayama and his associates assert that Japanese culture

and the Japanese mind interact with one another, that Japanese concep-
tions of individuality emphasize the ‘relatedness of individuals with each
other’. Hence, while American culture values an independent view of
the self, Japanese culture assumes an inter-dependent view of the self.57
In economics, Arai maintains that the Japanese system of mutual trust
in corporations must be upheld as the basis for the revival of the
Japanese economy.58 The key concepts that prevail in Nihonjinron-style
stereotyping – group orientation, mutual cooperation, in-group harmony,
a sense of unity with nature, egalitarianism, and racial uniformity –
continue to frame many contemporary attempts to analyze and under-
stand Japanese society in the 1990s and the 2000s.
During this time, the polemic surrounding so-called ‘Asian values’ has
echoed and, in effect, reinforced many controversial aspects of Nihon-
jinron. Proclaimed by Singapore’s ex-Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yu,
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir59 and other political leaders and
intellectuals in Southeast Asia, ‘Asian values’ are defined in contradis-
tinction to Western ones, and assert that Asians value groups and collec-
tivities ahead of individuals. This, then, is almost a pan-Asian version of
Nihonjinron, which explains why Mahathir and the Japanese nationalist
Shitarō Ishihara were able to join forces to write a best-selling book on
how to say ‘No’ to the United States and other Western countries.60 It is
noteworthy that the advocacy of Asian values arose only once countries
in the region had attained a measurable level of development and could
compete with the West economically. Cultural nationalism, like Nihon-
jinron and the notion of Asian values, appear to flourish when a society
reaches a significant level of economic maturity and can then defend its
national sense of self against other ideologies.
In the seventh and latest phase, dating from the end of the last century,
Japan’s images around the world have been resurrected with the global
spread of Japanese cultural goods, ranging from manga and anime through
computer games to sushi and sashimi. Dubbed ‘Japan cool’, these com-
modities have received enthusiastic acceptance, with Japan showing a
playful, fun-loving and ‘postmodern’ face diametrically opposite its seri-
ous, diligent and monotonous appearance during earlier decades. They
are packaged as being technologically sophisticated, suave, and refined
with a touch of humour and light-heartedness. These representations
reflect the expansion of the sphere of what one might call cultural capital-
ism that thrives on outputting knowledge and information products – as
57 Markus and Kitayama 1991; Kitayama 1998; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, and
Norsakkunkit 1997.
58 Arai 2000. 59 Mahathir 1999. 60 Mahathir and Ishihara 1996.
distinguished from industrial capitalism that is based on the production

of material and physical goods – a point that Chapter 4 examines in detail.
While Japan’s industrial capitalism displayed the faces of hardworking,
scrupulous, rigid, and bureaucratic businessmen in gray suits, Japanese
cultural capitalism attempts to display funny, fashionable, unassuming,
maverick, and at times bizarre individuals in various modes.61 McGray’s
oft-cited notion, Japan’s Gross National Cool,62 epitomizes these attain-
ments and points to how Japanese cultural capitalism might develop
and appropriate new areas of production and consumption, even if the
nation’s industrial capitalism stagnates. Yet, one should not lose sight
of the fact that the global enhancement of Japan’s cultural merchandise
owes much to the success of the nation’s industrial commodities; the
notion that Japan’s industrial goods, such as cars and electronic appli-
ances are of high quality has aided the expansion of the idea that Japanese
cultural products are of a similarly high standard.
To attain soft domination in worldwide competition, Japan’s cultural
export industry requires calculations of the positives and negatives of two
rival representations. At one end of the spectrum, exoticism is consid-
ered to be good business. The supposed peculiarities of Japanese culture
in housing, architecture, gardening, food, clothing, and so on attract
tourism on the appeal of mystery, divergence, and ‘otherness’. At the
other end, the trans-spatial and trans-cultural appearance of products –
such as high-tech robots, supermodern city life and, suave gadgets – are
market-friendly to the extent that their narratives can be entertaining
and captivating in any cultural milieu, thus they appeal to a wide range
of global consumers, cutting across national and ethnic lines.
The success of cultural export products depends much on the ways
in which these two orientations interact and coalesce. On the whole,
the Japanese cultural industry finds it profitable to present its prod-
ucts in a globally palatable and hybrid fashion, while it also does not
forget to inject some elements of ‘Japaneseness’ to underscore their
national background. Although many Japanese manga and anime charac-
ters have ‘un-Japanese’ big and round eyes and manipulate pan-cultural
technological devices, the landscape, customs, and symbols that are asso-
ciated with ‘Japan’ form indispensable components of these cultural
export products. Doraemon, the main character in a globally popular ani-
mation for children, uses a highly sophisticated dokodemo door (a door
to wherever you like) while he lives in a Japanese house with tatami mats
and interacts with very Japanese-looking friends. The imagery is neither
61 To put it differently, the emphasis has shifted from the top items to the bottom ones in
Table 1.6.
62 McGray 2002.
completely exotic, foreign, and inscrutable nor is it fully cosmopolitan,

trans-national, and trans-boundary, but it is a balanced mixture of both,
to the extent that it proves of much benefit and interest to the expansion
of Japan’s cultural capitalism.
This process has unfolded alongside the main features of Nihonjinron.
The assumption of Japanese homogeneity has hardly been questioned,
and the traditional continuity and supremacy of Japanese culture has been
underscored. It is argued, for example, that Japan’s manga and animation
products have a long domestic history, and were exposed to diverse mar-
kets long before their popularity exploded abroad in recent decades. The
oldest Japanese manga is believed to be chōjū giga, illustrated in the twelfth
century on horizontal picture scrolls by a high priest in Kyoto and fea-
turing personified and playing frogs, rabbits, monkeys, birds, and other
animals in a caricature fashion. Some famous artists drew up comical pic-
tures in ukiyo-e (colored woodblock prints of the demimonde) during the
feudal period. These partial historical episodes are used to advance the
notion of the continuous superiority of Japan’s national culture despite
their tenuous linkage with the current propagation of Japanese manga.63
At the beginning of the twenty-first century the Japanese national ethos
continues to be glorified in a variety of cultural arenas. Saitō, for instance,
produced many bestselling works that admire the beauty of the Japanese
language.64 In praise of the ‘dignity of the Japanese nation’, Fujiwara
maintained that the Japanese must revive the samurai spirit rather than
pursuing democracy, and must restore Japan’s traditional warm emo-
tions and feelings rather than adhere to Western-style logic.65 In the
sphere of food culture, in 2006, Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries tried to draw a plan to provide certificates of ‘authen-
ticity’ to a limited number of overseas Japanese food restaurants, an
attempt that eventually went nowhere. The Nihonjinron belief that there
is something genuinely Japanese remains deeply ingrained in Japan’s
cultural establishment.
It is important to remember that the rise of Japan’s cultural industry
received international recognition only after its soft power status was
debated in the United States, though Japanese cultural goods have been
most extensively exported and linked to the cultural markets of Asia.
To be accepted in the United States, Japan’s animation entrepreneurs
have been willing to cut or change some scenes and even story lines. The
success of Japanimation owes much to considerable ‘de-Japanization’ and
partial ‘Americanization’.
Since the middle of the twentieth century, Japan’s economic perfor-
mance on the international stage in general and the changing political and
63 Iwabuchi 2007, p. 83. 64 For example, Saitō 2001. 65 Fujiwara 2005.

economic relationships between Japan and the United States in particu-

lar have shaped the framework of analysis of Japan. Observed from out-
side, the analytical tools used to assess Japanese society have alternated
between particularistic and universalistic types, while foreign evaluation
of Japanese society has swung between positive and negative appraisals.
2 The Convergence Debate
At the highest level of abstraction, the so-called convergence debate has

made Japan the focal point of analysis for decades. The debate itself is
as old as social sciences and has had many twists and turns. At one end
of the continuum, convergence theorists have maintained that all indus-
trial societies become akin in their structural arrangements and value
orientations because the logic of industrialism entails a common batch
of functional imperatives. At the other end, anti-convergence theorists
have argued that the cultural background and historical tradition of each
society are so firmly entrenched that the advent of industrialism cannot
simply mold them into a uniform pattern; no convergence eventuates
because each culture develops its own style of industrial development on
the basis of its own momentum and dynamics. Japan provides a logi-
cal testing ground for this debate since it is the only nation outside the
Western cultural tradition that has achieved a high level of industrializa-
tion. On balance, a majority of Japan specialists, be they culturologists
or institutionalists, have tended to underscore the unique features of
Japanese society, thereby siding either explicitly or implicitly with the
anti-convergence stance. Yet this position has presupposed that the West
continues to lead the direction of industrialism, though the Japanese
pattern deviates from it.
Many convergence theorists see the so-called unique features of
Japanese society mostly as the expression of the nation’s late develop-
ment, lagging behind the early-developer countries. Tominaga, for exam-
ple, regards four patterns of transformation presently in progress in Japan
as pointers that suggest that it is becoming increasingly like advanced
Western societies.66
First, Japan’s demographic composition is changing from one in which
a young labor force comprises an overwhelming majority of the popula-
tion to one in which the aged comprise the larger portion. The proportion
of those who are sixty-five years of age or older exceeded the 10 percent
mark in France in the 1930s, in Sweden and Britain in the 1940s, in
Germany and Switzerland in the 1950s, and in the United States and
66 The description below follows Tominaga 1988, pp. 2–50.

VI.
2 Class and Stratification: An Overview
The public discourse on class and stratification in Japan experienced a

dramatic paradigm shift towards the end of the twentieth century. While
widely portrayed as an egalitarian and predominantly middle class society
during the period of high economic growth until the early 1990s, Japan
has suddenly been deemed a society divided along class lines under the
prolonged stagnation that has characterized the Japanese economy for a
couple of decades.
In the heyday of the ‘Japanese miracle’, the spectacular comeback
of Japan’s economy after the devastation of World War II, a consider-
able amount of literature suggested that the basic rifts in Japan were
not those between social classes but between corporate groups.1 It was
argued that in Japan ‘it is not really a matter of workers struggling
against capitalists or managers but of Company A ranged against Com-
pany B’.2 Some went so far as to claim that the Western notions of
class and stratification did not find expression in the daily realities of
the Japanese. Others contended that class-consciousness was weaker in
Japan than in Western countries.3 Often-publicized government statis-
tics which showed that some 90 percent of Japanese regarded them-
selves as belonging to the ‘middle class’ appeared to bear out this line of
thinking.
However, with the economic recession in the 1990s and the 2000s,
the public perception has shifted to emphasize the advent of ‘disparity
society’ with marked divisions between classes with rival interests.4 Satō
maintains that due to the sharp decline of social mobility to the privileged
upper middle white-collar sector Japan cannot be characterized as an
egalitarian society.5 Tachibanaki argues that the level of social inequality
in Japanese society has increased so much that it ranks among the most
1 The most influential books which take this line are Nakane 1967, 1970, and 1978.
2 Nakane 1970, p. 87. 3 Reischauer 1977, pp. 161–2.
4 For a good analysis of the paradigm change, see Chiavacci 2008. 5 Satō 2000.
37
highly disparate societies in the world.6 The new discourse has gained
ground further since the worldwide financial crisis from 2008 onwards.
All of a sudden, it is widely being argued that ‘the middle class society’
has collapsed and kakusa shakai (disparity society) has come into being.
Interestingly, despite the claim of the emergence of kakusa shakai, an
overwhelming majority of the Japanese continue to regard themselves as
belonging to the ‘middle class’, a pattern that has persisted for decades.
However, as Table 2.1 shows, comparative studies of class affiliation in a
number of nations found that 80–90 percent of people identify themselves
as ‘middle class’, which suggests that this phenomenon is far from being
unique to Japan. The notion that Japan is a highly egalitarian society is
palatable for overseas soto consumption, but it does not accurately reflect
the uchi reality of Japan’s material and cultural inequality.
Table 2.1 International comparison of ‘middle class consciousness’ (%)
Class identification
Upper Middle Lower Total of

Country Upper middle middle middle Lower ‘middle’
Japan 0.8 14.1 44.0 28.5 8.6 86.6

Australia 0.7 27.0 32.7 31.5 3.3 91.2
China 0.3 4.9 38.5 27.9 18.7 71.3
Finland 1.2 21.6 36.1 33.0 3.0 91.7
Germany 0.7 20.0 36.4 32.2 4.0 88.6
Italy 0.7 26.1 27.3 33.4 4.4 86.8
Korea (South) 0.7 23.7 54.2 15.8 5.7 93.7
Sweden 1.8 33.9 33.4 14.6 4.3 81.9
USA 0.9 26.4 33.0 28.3 6.0 87.7
Source: The Fifth World Values Survey conducted by the World Values Survey Association
based in Stockholm, Sweden, in 2005–6. See Dentū Sōken and Nihon Research Center
2008, p. 218.
Note: The national total of each country does not amount to 100 because ‘no answer’ and
‘don’t know’ cases are not included in this table.
The sense of inequality is quite marked in many dimensions of strat-

ification, including those of income, assets, education, gender, and eth-
nicity. While the nation and companies may be rich, many individual
Japanese do not feel that they themselves are, suspecting that a privileged
fraction must be reaping the increasing wealth. Reliable nationwide sur-
veys indicate that a significant proportion of respondents deem Japan
a society of inequity and unfairness,7 a pattern similar to other major
6 Tachibanaki 2005.
7 Yomiuri Shimbun conducted a survey in collaboration with the BBC and found that
72 percent of respondents thought of Japan as a society of fukōhei (inequity) while
16 percent did not feel so. YM, 22 September 2009.
Class and Stratification: An Overview 39
countries. They also regard ‘selfishness’ (migatte), ‘inequity’ (fukōhei)

and ‘self-responsibility’ (jiko sekinin) as the attributes that best character-
ize contemporary Japanese society.8 The widespread notion that Japan
is gakureki shakai (a society oriented inordinately to educational creden-
tialism) testifies to the popular belief that it is unfairly stratified on the
basis of educational achievement. Moreover, unlike the United States
and the United Kingdom, Japan has a relatively strong Communist party
which constantly polls about 10 percent of total votes in national elec-
tions and 20–30 percent in its strongholds like Kyoto, suggesting that
some sections of the community harbor a strong sense of class inequality.
These observations suggest that the ‘90 percent middle class’ thesis may
be losing sight of the honne side of Japan’s social stratification structure.
There is an abundance of data on class in Japan. A group of Japan’s
class analysts have conducted a Social Stratification and Mobility (SSM)
Survey every ten years since 1955, the most recent being in 2005, and
have thereby amassed systematic time-series data over five decades.9 Gov-
ernment agencies, newspaper organizations, and private research institu-
tions have also published a large amount of quantitative data on the ways
in which resources, values, and behavior patterns are distributed among
different strata in Japanese society. Taken together, these resources pro-
vide ample material for understanding internal stratification in Japanese
society.
Studies of class and stratification have long been a battleground
between those who follow Marx and various non-Marxists and anti-
Marxists, most notably those who favor a framework that originates in
the work of Max Weber. The Marxian tradition tends to define social class
as a grouping of people who share a common situation in the organiza-
tion of economic production. Those who disagree with this framework
are inclined to take the structural-functional approach and to classify
individuals into statistically defined strata according to income, power,
and prestige.
This chapter tries to provide preliminary signposts to issues covered in
subsequent chapters. To these ends, it will:
1 present some quantitative studies by Japanese sociologists of the

ways in which classes and strata are formed;
2 schematize the ways in which economic and cultural resources
are distributed;
8 According to the annual survey of the Asahi Shimbun on the consciousness of the Japanese
(Teiki kokumin ishiki chōsa), at the end of 2006, the largest proportion of people
(21 percent) see ‘selfishness’ as the term that best describes Japanese society. ‘Inequality’
and ‘self-responsibility’ (18 percent) rank equal second. AM, 5 January 2007, p. 29.
9 Hara and Seiyama 2006 and Hashimoto 2003 are based on the 1995 survey. See Kosaka
1994 for a summary of the 1985 survey.
3 examine the extent to which inequality is reproduced from one

generation to another;
4 discuss several points about which one has to be cautious in
examining the ‘disparity society’ thesis; and
5 investigate a number of Japan-specific concepts related to class
and stratification.
I Classification of Classes and Strata
Exactly how many classes or strata are there in contemporary Japan?

Researchers on social stratification have failed to come up with a defini-
tive answer to this elementary question. Marxian analysts apply con-
ventional class categories to the Japanese situation, but sometimes do
so dogmatically, while non-Marxists tend to rely mainly on standard
occupational classifications and engage in highly sophisticated statistical
analysis without producing a clear overall portrayal of the class situation.
In both camps, analysts tend to borrow, and sometimes refine, Western
concepts and theories, and methodological techniques first developed in
the United States and Europe.
Marxian researchers have produced empirical representations of class
distribution in contemporary Japan on the basis of Marxian categories.10
For example, using SSM data, Hashimoto identifies four classes with
distinct characteristics and estimates Japan’s changing class composition
as displayed in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
Table 2.2 Class distribution based on Marxian categories (1955–2005)
Male Female
Class 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 1985 1995 2005
Capitalist 5.6 8.4 7.2 7.3 10.6 8.0 4.6 6.7 4.5
New middle 15.4 21.4 24.0 29.4 32.2 30.3 7.8 11.3 16.0
Working 21.2 36.0 38.3 38.8 37.0 42.2 58.9 59.2 63.3
Old middle 57.9 34.2 30.4 24.5 20.1 19.5 28.7 22.9 16.1
Farming 39.2 18.1 14.1 6.6 4.9 5.1 11.4 6.3 4.7
Self-employed 18.7 16.1 16.3 17.9 15.2 14.3 17.3 16.6 11.5
Source: Revised and expanded version of Hashimoto 2003, Table 3.1, p. 59. Provided by
Hashimoto.
Note: All numbers are percentage figures. No data were gathered for females before 1985.
The capitalist class consists of corporate executives and managers.

They have high incomes, considerable assets, and many durable
10 For example, Hashimoto 2003.

Table 2.3 Characteristics of major classes
Working class II
Capitalist New middle Working class I Non-regular Old middle
class class Regular workers workers (underclass) class
Percentage of class members in the workforcea 5.0 20.2 35.7 24.3d 14.8
Average income of households (in ten thousand yen) 1,027e 824 592 407 640
Percentage of households with no assets 3.4 5.8 12.4 23.8 7.3
Relative poverty rate f 3.3 3.3 10.0 34.8 16.6
Percentage of married persons (35–54 years of age) 87.4 85.2 73.0 32.5 86.9
Percentage of university graduatesb 41.1 70.8 32.9 25.2 21.2
Percentage of individuals who regard themselves as 35.0 13.1 7.8 4.7 11.3
‘higher than middle’g
Percentage of individuals who are satisfied with their jobc 40.2 25.1 16.9 16.6 29.3
Percentage of individuals who feel that they may 7.7 14.8 17.6 40.8 11.6
potentially be unemployedc
Sources: Adapted from data provided by Kenji Hashimoto. All the data are based on SSM05 except
a 2007 Employment Status Survey (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2007d)
b 2001 Employment Status Survey (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2001)
c 2003 JGSS (Japanese General Social Surveys) data. See Tanioka, Nida, and Iwai (eds), 2008.
Notes:
d The underclass section (type II) of the working class includes housewife part-timers who constitute 11.5 percent of the entire workforce. However,
for technical reasons, this group is not included in the calculations of the figures below in this column.
e Those members of the capitalist class who work for companies with 30 or more employees earn 1,410 on average.
f See Chapter 1, Section 3 (b) and Table 1.4.
g The proportion of those persons who feel that they belong to the ‘upper middle’ section of the population or above.
consumer goods. Their political orientation is conservative and, by and

large, they regard the status quo as impartial and fair.
The working class is comprised mainly of blue-collar workers, both
skilled and unskilled, plus temporary and part-time workers. This is by
far the largest class in Japan today. A majority of the working class have
only the lowest levels of education and income and express the highest
level of discontent with the existing situation. However, they remain apa-
thetic and pessimistic about political change. As discussed in Chapter 1,
the major line of demarcation in the working class is drawn between
‘regular workers’ (type I) whose employment status is relatively safe and
‘non-regular workers’ (type II) whose job security is precarious. The latter
group that can be called Japan’s underclass11 constitutes about a quar-
ter of the workforce and shows distinctively different characteristics, as
Table 2.3 demonstrates.
In both small and large enterprises, the culture of blue-collar workers
differs significantly from that of office employees. Generally, blue-collar
workers view their work as a means of livelihood and not as a source of
gratification and fulfillment. They see themselves as holding ignominious
and inglorious positions on low rungs of the social ladder. On the whole,
blue-collar workers begin each working day early and prefer to leave their
working environment as early as possible.12 They find more satisfaction
at home and in community life than do white-collar employees. Gener-
ally, they value family life and take an active part in community affairs.
In community baseball teams, after-hours children’s soccer teams, and
other sports clubs, blue-collar workers are prominent. They pursue these
leisure activities to compensate for their honne sense of cynicism, alien-
ation, and dissatisfaction with their workplace.13
The middle class is divided into two groups: the old middle class,
composed mainly of farmers and self-employed independent business
people, and the new middle class made up of white-collar employees,
including middle managers, professionals, and clerical office workers.
The old middle class comprises two groups: the farming population
whose numbers have consistently declined as a consequence of industri-
alization and urbanization, and independent small proprietors, classified
as jieigyō, whose numbers have not significantly changed over time. Many
of the latter run the small and medium-sized stores that line the streets
of shopping areas (called shōten-gai) throughout the country. Running
greengroceries, liquor stores, barber shops, pharmacies, fish shops, con-
fectioneries, and so on, within or adjacent to residential communities,
these small, independent business people form a formal association in
each shopping area, with executives and other office-holders, and play
11 See Aoki 2006; Gill 2000; and Iwata and Nishizawa 2008 for their life conditions.
12 NHK 1992, pp. 82–3. 13 Hamashima 1991, p. 362.
lively and leading roles in community affairs. Owners of small family

factories and backstreet workshops comprise another important group
of independent proprietors. Some with highly specialized manufacturing
skills and others serving as subcontractors, they buttress Japan’s econ-
omy and technology. The old middle class, some members of which are
cash-rich, is generally conservative both politically and socially, low in
educational credentials, and not inclined to engage much in cultural or
leisure activities.
The model figure in Japan’s new middle class is (in the Japanese English
phrase) a ‘salaryman’, a white-collar, male company employee in the
private sector. He embodies all the stereotypical images associated with
the Japanese corporate employee: loyalty to his company, subservience to
the hierarchical order of his enterprise, devotion to his work, a long and
industrious working life, and job security in his career. The new middle
class, which salarymen typify, constitutes less than a quarter of the labor
force, but is an ideological reference group for the working population.
In literature, the genre of ‘salaryman novels’ focuses on the joys and
sorrows of Japanese organization men. In the world of manga, ‘salaryman
manga’, such as Salaryman Kintarō and Kachō Shima Kōsaku, attract
a substantial readership. In housing, ‘salaryman dwellings’ are simple
units with three small rooms and a kitchen. In money management,
the ‘salaryman finance’ system enables financially ambitious corporate
employees to borrow substantial amounts at high interest rates without
the need to mortgage property. In psychoanalysis, ‘salaryman apathy’
refers to white-collar employees’ psychological state of work rejection, in
which they display psychosomatic symptoms every morning when they
have to leave for work. Members of the new middle class are generally
well educated but dissatisfied with their income.
Non-Marxian sociologists are inclined to use occupational categories
as the classificatory basis for stratification analysis. For example, in the
2005 SSM study analysts identified eight occupational categories as
representative of the fundamental stratification groups, as displayed in
Table 2.4:
1 professionals;
2 white-collar employees in large corporations with 1,000 or more
employees (white-collar large);
3 white-collar employees in small businesses (white-collar small);
4 white-collar self-employed;
5 blue-collar workers in large corporations (blue-collar large);
6 blue-collar workers in small businesses (blue-collar small);
7 blue-collar self-employed; and
8 farmers and others in the primary sector of the economy
(agricultural).
Table 2.4 Occupationally based social strata (1955–2005)
Male Female
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 1985 1995 2005
Professional 6.8 6.7 7.3 9.7 12.1 12.8 10.5 12.4 17.6
White-collar Large 8.7 14.2 14.7 17.2 17.3 17.5 10.3 12.7 11.4
White-collar Small 5.0 8.4 11.1 12.3 12.8 12.4 19.2 21.7 22.7
White-collar Self 10.0 12.1 11.5 11.4 13.0 9.4 11.0 16.4 9.9
Blue-collar Large 7.8 11.3 10.3 9.8 9.0 8.3 4.9 4.7 9.9
Blue-collar Small 8.9 15.9 19.1 21.2 19.3 23.1 24.4 19.4 23.4
Blue-collar Self 12.1 10.7 10.2 10.6 10.2 9.9 7.1 5.2 4.2
Agricultural 40.8 20.6 15.8 7.9 6.2 6.5 12.5 7.4 5.5
Source: SSM05, I, p. 78.

Notes:
1. Data on women were not collected before 1985.
2. Large, Small and Self mean workers respectively in Large corporations, Small compa-
nies and the Self-employed.
These classifications point to at least three significant trends.

First of all, Table 2.3 reveals that blue-collar employees in small enter-
prises have grown to become the largest group for both males and females.
The self-employed remain a stable and durable group, while the agricul-
tural population has declined sharply over time. Males are represented
more than females in the relatively high-ranking white-collar group in
large corporations. It is also obvious that a sizeable professional female
group has emerged and expanded.
Second, non-Marxian researchers maintain that the types of aspirations
and rewards that Japanese workers desire have qualitatively changed, with
the society as a whole exhibiting more and more postmodern character-
istics. Specifically, a considerable number of people, whose basic daily
needs are fulfilled, now attach more importance to lifestyle values in their
priority map. To capture such a value shift one can make a conceptual
distinction between two types of status positions: ‘achieved’ status, based
upon the attainment of high income, occupation, educational credentials,
and material possessions; and ‘relational’ status, derived from active par-
ticipation in volunteer work and community activity, leadership in hobby
and leisure clubs, and civic activities in the community.14
It is argued that the overall affluence of the nation has offered an
ample breeding ground to ‘class transcendentalists’, people who give a
high priority to values other than class betterment. Satisfied with their
current level of consumption, they now seek satisfaction in less material
aspects of life. Some individuals increase their quality of life through
14 SSM 95a V, pp. 19–25.
the pursuit of hobbies, creative expression or spiritual fulfillment, while

others engage in volunteer work, environmental protection and forms
of socially meaningful or relationship-oriented activity that earns them
respect and esteem in their family. According to some surveys,15 one-
third of Japanese people are oriented to this expressive, ‘relational’ form
of status, with the remaining two-thirds continuing to focus on the attain-
ment of instrumental, ‘achieved’ status within the class structure. Some
observers suggest that most Japanese lead a schizophrenic existence. On
the one hand they are forced to deal with the market economy, yet on
the other they yearn for a more satisfying and fulfilling mode of life. Put
another way, during business hours many Japanese are attracted to the
world of Bill Gates, but after hours their identification turns to Ryōkan, a
legendary zen priest and poet of the late Tokugawa period who renounced
the world and lived in the country, spending his days playing with the
village children.16
Third, non-Marxian and Weberian analysts posit a multidimensional
framework and attempt to identify several class groups using the concept
of status-inconsistency. They define an individual as status-inconsistent
when he or she ranks high on one scale of social stratification (for exam-
ple, occupation) but low on another (for instance, school background).
A Korean, female doctor in Japan, for example, would be a status-
inconsistent person in the sense that she is high on the ladders of income
and educational qualifications but low on those of gender and ethnicity
because of prevailing prejudice and discrimination. Using the notion of
status-inconsistency and the 2005 SSM data, Hayashi dichotomizes the
population into two groups – high and low – according to three criteria:17
(1) in terms of educational background between four-year university
graduates and those who have completed junior college, high-school
or middle-school education only; (2) according to occupation between
professionals/managers and those who are not; and (3) in terms of income
between those above and below the relative poverty line.18 This method
identifies eight analytical categories, three of which are empirically small
in number and practically negligible, with five groups constituting major
classes in contemporary Japan, as Figure 2.1 demonstrates. Two of these
(A and E) are status-consistent and form the upper and lower ends of
Japan’s class structure, consistently showing high or low scores respec-
tively on all three measures. Four other groups are status-inconsistent,
exhibiting different patterns of incongruence across the three ladders of
stratification.
15 Japan Institute of Labour Policy and Training; SSM 95a V, pp. 19–25.
16 Bungei Shunjū 2001, p. 72. 17 This section is based on Hayashi 2008.
18 See Table 1.4 and the explanation associated with it.
High
Low
Status variables E O I E O I E O I E O I E O I
A B C D E
Cluster percentage 15.4 13.6 8.0 56.9 6.1
Occupants of managerial posts (%) 68.5 49.2 82.2 31.3 7.5

Average household income 989.0 700.1 701.7 663.4 234.0
High class identification (%) 39.7 27.4 23.8 14.7 8.3
Figure 2.1 Status-consistent and inconsistent clusters (2005)

Source: Adapted from Hayashi 2008, pp. 159–66.
Notes:
1. E, O and I respectively stand for Educational background, Occupational prestige and
Income level.
2. The income figures are in 10,000 yen.
3. High class classification indicates proportion of individuals in the relevant cluster who
identify themselves with either upper class or middle class.
Class A mostly comprises individuals whose positions are high in all

three dimensions – with a good educational background, prestigious job,
and sizeable income. Between the thirties and fifties, at the height of
their occupational career, most of these individuals have four-year uni-
versity degrees or postgraduate qualifications, occupy either managerial
or professional posts and enjoy the highest levels of household income
and assets. Members of this class can afford to relish ample cultural lives,
possessing high-tech goods and studying foreign languages. They visit
museums, art galleries and libraries, enjoy sporting activities, travel over-
seas, and read books more frequently than any other class. They form
the top layer of Japan’s stratification hierarchy.
Class B is mostly made up of relatively young university graduates
with reasonably good incomes but without managerial or professional
positions. They are status-inconsistent in the sense that their positions
are high on education and income scales but low on occupational attain-
ment. While they are still in the early phase of their career and in their
twenties and thirties, they strive to move up to Class A. Many of them are
employees of large corporations or public servants and form the middle
layer of these large organizations. Their income and asset levels are lower
than those of Class C, with their house ownership rate being the second
lowest among the five classes.
Class C is another status-inconsistent group in the sense that its mem-
bers are high in terms of occupation and income but low on education.
Most of them are not university-educated but have managerial or
professional positions and earn good incomes, second only to Class A.

Most are in their forties or older, a pattern that suggests that they are at
the height or towards the end of their career, having achieved the good
occupational and income status with only high school education. The
members of this class have the highest house ownership ratio among
all the classes and tend to participate in volunteer work and other civic
activities more actively than any other class.
Class D is the largest class in Japan today, constituting more than half
of the working population that is status inconsistent in the sense that
their income exceeds the subsistence level (namely, the relative poverty
line), while their educational background and occupational status are on
the lower side of the scale. More than two thirds of this class are either
blue-collar or agricultural workers and are employed by or own small
businesses. With some three quarters of this group having completed
high-school education only, their positions are neither managerial nor
professional, while the proportion of the self-employed is relatively large.
The house ownership rate of this class is the second highest among
the five, but their cultural and leisure activities are quite limited. An
overwhelming majority of the members of this class regard themselves
as belonging either to the lower middle class or the upper lower class,
a perception that perhaps correctly reflects their position in the nation’s
stratification structure.
Class E represents the lowest and status-consistent class in Japan, low
on all the three dimensions. This is the only class whose average income
is below the poverty line. Compared with other classes, workers in their
thirties and below as well as in their sixties and above are dispropor-
tionately represented in this class, an indication that poverty prevails
mainly among the young and senior citizens. A majority of the members
of Class E are employed by small businesses, with blue-collar and agri-
cultural workers being predominant in this class. They constitute Japan’s
working poor who hardly enjoy cultural activities in their leisure time and
rarely travel overseas, let alone learn foreign languages. A majority of this
group see themselves as belonging to the lower class.
Notably, the share of status-inconsistent individuals steadily increased
from 48.2 percent in 1955, to 59.5 percent in 1965, 65.2 percent in
1975, and 70.6 percent in 1985, while the trend was recently reversed
when the percentage declined to 61.8 in 1995.19 Though based on a
different method of measurement, the 2005 data show that the pro-
portion is 78.5 percent as Figure 2.2 demonstrates. Boundaries between
classes were generally blurred during the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, with a definite majority of persons leading a split-level existence,
19 Hara 2000, p. 31.

high in one dimension of social stratification and low in another. Status-

inconsistent individuals tend to find it difficult to share coherent class-
based interests and class solidarity. Accordingly, the growth of status-
inconsistent conditions has led to the decline of clearly demarcated class
lines.
The profile of Japan’s class structure differs depending on whether it is
analyzed according to a Marxian class framework or a multidimensional
stratification approach. Whichever method is employed, however, the
fact remains that a comprehensive examination of Japanese society can
neither ignore nor avoid an analysis of class and stratification and the
inequality and disparity in Japan’s distribution of social rewards. This
remains true whether one’s theoretical orientation is towards positivism,
constructionism, postmodernism, or cultural studies.
II Distribution of Economic and Cultural Resources
The foregoing studies make no analytical distinction between two aspects

of social stratification. The first concerns various societal resources that
one acquires as a consequence of occupying a position in a stratification
hierarchy. They include economic, political, and cultural resources.
The other relates to the agents of stratification, those variables which
determine individuals’ differential access to societal resources. These
agents include occupation, education, gender, ethnicity, and place of
residence.20 While Chapters 3 to 7 are organized around different agents
of stratification, it might be helpful to draw a schematic picture of how
two key types of resources – economic and cultural – are distributed
among the Japanese.
Economic resources can be classified into two types. On one hand,
income such as salaries and wages constitute flow-type resources.21 On
the other hand, a variety of assets form stock-type resources, including
immovable assets such as houses and land and movable assets, such as
shares, bonds, and golf club membership rights.
Cultural resources cover knowledge- and information-based preroga-
tives, which some sociologists call cultural capital.22 These resources in
Japan tend to derive from educational credentials and overwhelmingly
are determined in teenage years according to whether youngsters win
or lose what Japanese media call the ‘education war’. In a finely graded
20 For more details, see Mouer and Sugimoto 1986, part 4.

21 ‘Incomes’ in this chapter refers to flow-type resources, not stock-type resources.
22 Bourdieu 1986.
rank-ordered system of high schools and universities, the amount of pres-

tige that they earn derives from the status of the school or university they
attended and graduated from. Japanese leaders in bureaucracies and large
firms tend to place excessive emphasis upon their members’ schooling
backgrounds, and this pattern has filtered through other social strata. The
dominant definition of cultural resources in Japan is extremely education-
based in this sense. One can also enhance one’s cultural resources through
receipt of honors, awards, and titles from established institutions, by win-
ning popularity as a sportsperson or entertainer, and by acquiring fame
through the mass media.
As the status-inconsistency model suggests, the levels of one’s eco-
nomic and cultural resources do not necessarily coincide. A rich store
owner might not be a graduate of a prestigious university. A well-educated
female graduate might not have a high-paying job. Academics at univer-
sities of low standing tend to receive higher salaries than those in high-
ranking institutions. The very notion of status-inconsistency points to
such incongruity.
Cross-tabulation of the dimensions of economic and cultural resources
produces a four-fold conceptual chart like Table 2.5.
Table 2.5 Cross-tabulation of economic and

cultural resources
Economic resources
Cultural resources High Low
High A C
Low B D
Cell A represents the upper class that possesses great quantities of both
resources: executive managers of big corporations, high-ranking officials
in the public bureaucracy, large landowners and real-estate proprietors,
and those who own large amounts of movable assets. Generally, they have
university degrees, usually from top institutions.
Some of these people may not have education-based cultural resources
but acquire their functional substitutes by obtaining some honor or dec-
oration for distinguished services, for establishing and managing a school
or university, or starting an endowment or foundation in their name for
charitable work or to support various cultural activities.
Cell B comprises those who have considerable economic resources
but not a commensurate level of cultural assets. Many belong to the
above-mentioned old middle class, including independent farmers and
petty-scale manufacturers and shop owners.
The self-employed business class has remained a self-perpetuating

stratum which is more or less free of the influence of educational
qualifications. These self-employed business owners tend to hold both
traditional and authoritarian views and, in this respect, resemble farmers
in their value orientations. They generally find it desirable to follow a
conventional way of life and look askance at those who question existing
traditions and practices.23 Many well-educated children of these inde-
pendent people who succeed to their parents’ businesses move into the
upper class in Cell A with relative ease.
A television drama heroine called Oshin, a figure who moved many
Japanese to tears, arrived at Cell B in the later phase of her life. Born
in an impoverished family, she worked as a live-in nanny, maid, and
in many other jobs in her childhood and adolescence with remarkable
patience and perseverance. Without formal education, she succeeded as
a businesswoman in establishing and managing a chain of supermarkets.
Given that educational credentials are the most significant cultural
resource for upward social mobility, one should not lose sight of the fact
that the majority of high school students do not advance to university
and have little choice but to establish themselves through the acquisition
of economic resources, abandoning cultural prestige.
Cell C consists of those with high cultural credentials, who lack cor-
responding income and wealth. The major group in this category com-
prises well-educated salaried employees, ‘organization men’ who include
administrative, clerical, sales, and non-manual employees as well as
corporate professionals. High-circulation weekly magazines that target
this group have many stories of their discontent and disillusion. Many
Japanese organization men with good cultural resources feel frustrated
by the present institutional order precisely because their earnings do not
appear to match their cultural privilege; it seems to them that more une-
ducated people, such as those in Cell B, lead more monetarily rewarding
lives. A newspaper reporter who has much leverage in conditioning public
opinion may lead a financially mediocre life. Some people in the higher
substratum of this category eventually move up to Cell A as they climb to
the top of their occupational pyramid, becoming directors of large com-
panies, high-ranking officials of the public bureaucracy, or professionals
with handsome earnings.
Cell D represents the underclass that lacks both economic and cultural
capital. Most blue-collar workers, female workers in the external labor
market, minority workers, and immigrant foreign workers fall into this
category. This group is numerically quite large and will be the focus of
analysis in subsequent chapters.
23 SSM 85 I, p. 57.
III Reproduction of Inequality
How are economic and cultural resources transmitted from one gener-
ation to another? Occupation and education are the most visible fac-
tors that perpetuate inequality inter-generationally across social classes.
Chapters 4 and 5 deal with these areas in some detail, but here we will
briefly look at two processes. On the economic side, the degree to which
assets are handed down from one generation to another has consequences
for the continuity of inter-class barriers. Furthermore, the cultural
continuity of different class groups is affected by the ways in which people
are socialized into certain values and whether marriage partners come
from a similar class background. Though often less conspicuous and
more latent, these variables are fundamental to the processes of inter-
generational economic and cultural reproduction of classes.
1 Asset Inheritance
The differentials of land assets have invariably been twice as much as

those of income differentials, as Figure 2.2 displays. To examine inequal-
ities in contemporary Japan, therefore, one must investigate its land
ownership pattern, in view of the fact that land assets constitute about
45.2 percent of national wealth.24 Though land prices have declined in
the 1990s and the early 2000s and property-based inequalities shrunk
during the period, they constitute the most crucial dimension of social
disparity in Japan today.
Shimono and Ishikawa estimate that 57 percent of net household asset
holdings are inherited and argue that bequests constitute 39 percent of
national wealth.25 This means that the asset owners of Japan have largely
sustained and even expanded their holdings inter-generationally through
inheritance. Asset disparities have not only produced, but also repro-
duced, two subcultural groups that show distinctly different consumer
behavior patterns in Japan today: a small number of spenders who have
resources to pay for costly de luxe commodities, and a large group of
those who cannot afford to do so. Those who have considerable finan-
cial assets and large property incomes form a minority stratum at the
top, and only they can enjoy an extravagant lifestyle, purchasing expen-
sive houses, bearing inordinate social expenses, and spending lavishly on
fashion goods. The remaining majority, whose livelihood is constrained
by housing mortgages and bank loans, must carefully calculate their
24 Calculated from Cabinet Office 2006. 25 Shimono and Ishikawa 2002.

0.70
Housing and land
0.680 0.641 asset disparity
0.65
0.60 0.577 0.573
0.55 0.563 0.556

0.538 0.542
Gini index
0.50 Financial asset

disparity
0.45
Durable consumer
goods disparity
0.40
0.368
0.360
0.341
0.35
0.301 0.308
0.293 0.297
0.30
Annual income disparity
0.25
1989 1994 1999 2004
Year
Figure 2.2 Changes in the Gini indices over time

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2004.
expenditure and cannot assume such profligate lifestyles.26 However,

there is very little difference between the asset ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ in
their purchasing of more ordinary commodities, including cars, bicycles,
medical services, musical instruments, sports goods, audio equipment,
and education.
26 Though the groups that are called the ‘neo-rich,’ shin-fuyūsō (new affluent class) and
‘celebs’ have attracted attention in mass media and popular publications in recent years,
some analysts identified them as early as the 1980s. The Hakuhōdō Advertising Corpo-
ration, for example, distinguished between the ‘new rich’ and the ‘new poor,’ an attempt
to pinpoint the polarization of the middle class into two groups which exhibit distinctly
contrasting patterns of consumer behavior. The ‘new rich’ can buy high class, fashion-
able, and expensive goods because they have a good quantity of properties and stocks or
expect to have them through inheritance. In contrast, the ‘new poor’ have difficulty in
satisfying their swelling consumer desires because of the slow increase in their income
and their increasing expenditure on housing, education, and leisure activities. Though
they have such basic middle class commodities as electric appliances, television sets, and
cars, they still feel poor because they cannot keep up with and purchase ever-diversifying
consumer goods. See Hakuhōdō 1985.
High land prices, in particular, have given rise to a situation where

the level of inequality between property owners and renters is so stu-
pendous and so predetermined that those without properties to inherit
cannot catch up with those with inheritable assets simply by working
hard and attempting to save. It is notable, as Figure 2.2 shows, that
social disparities based on such financial assets as stocks and savings are
also much more substantial than those on income. Accordingly, one’s
income as measured in terms of salary and wage levels does not directly
represent one’s power to purchase commodities. The point is obvious
when one compares, for instance, two company employees (Yamada and
Suzuki) who have the same annual net salary of five million yen. Yamada
inherited his parents’ house and flat, and leases the apartment at two
million yen a year, thereby enjoying a net annual disposable income of
seven million yen. Suzuki has not yet been able to purchase a house
and rents a condominium at two million yen a year, having therefore
a net yearly disposable income of three million yen. One can imagine
that, though their corporate salaries are identical, their purchasing power
is substantially different.27 Purchasing power and consumption capacity
are determined chiefly by the size of property and financial assets rather
than wage income, and this pattern is transmitted from one generation
to another through asset inheritance.
2 Socialization and Marriage
More broadly, cultural capital appears to be transmitted through highly

stratified channels. Kataoka and others28 have explored the extent to
which the amount of inherited cultural capital of individuals in their child-
hood affects the amount of cultural capital that they possess in adulthood.
To generate a quantitative indicator of cultural capital in childhood, she
examines the cultural environment of individuals in their primary school
and preschool days and uses a combined index that takes into account
how frequently they listened to classical music at home, made family trips
to art galleries and museums, had family members read books for them,
and whether they had collections of children’s literature at home, and
played with building blocks. She also looks at the types of cultural activ-
ities of individuals in their adulthood and classifies them into ‘orthodox’
culture and ‘mass’ culture. ‘Orthodox’ cultural activities include writing
27 For a similar illustration, see Ozawa 1989, p. 177.

28 Kataoka 1998 devotes the entire volume to the studies of social stratification and cultural
reproduction and, on the whole, sustains the claims of Bourdieu and Passeron developed
in the French context. Kataoka 1992 represents her initial work in this area.
poems, visiting art galleries, museums, and exhibitions, and appreciating

classical music, while ‘mass’ cultural activities include going to con-
certs of popular music, rock-and-roll, and jazz, singing karaoke songs,
and playing pachinko pinball. For both males and females, the study
demonstrates very significant connections between cultural environment
in childhood and participation in ‘high’ cultural activities in adulthood.
The cultural capital available before one’s teenage years influences one’s
style of cultural activity more strongly than do other variables, such as
one’s occupational prestige, household income, and even educational
background. The cultural resources of a family condition and even deter-
mine its children’s cultural lives after they reach adulthood.
In an empirical study of family socialization in Osaka, Kataoka29
observes that parents of high social standing tend to inculcate the values
of social conformity in their children, while those of low social status gen-
erally attempt to orient their children to individual integrity and family
obligations. Specifically, fathers of high occupational position and moth-
ers of high educational background are inclined to train their children
to acquire proper etiquette and language, and well-educated mothers
in particular try to discipline their daughters to behave decorously. The
children of parents (especially mothers) of high educational background
feel burdened by intense parental expectations of conformity.
In contrast, fathers with less education place more emphasis on the
honesty of their children than do university-educated fathers. Compared
with children from wealthy families, those from poor backgrounds are
taught to refrain from being dishonest, and daughters of worse-off fami-
lies are instructed not to break their promises. Parents with only compul-
sory education try to educate their daughters to avoid disgracing family
members and to attend to family chores.
In the main, families of higher status appear to concern themselves
with the outward appearance of their children’s behavior. In contrast,
parents of low status tend to stress internal probity and family respon-
sibilities. These findings appear to run counter to the observations of
Western studies30 which suggest that middle class socialization stresses
the formation of a non-conformist, individualistic self while working-class
families socialize their children into collective values.
The process of choosing marriage partners is neither random nor
unstructured. The extent to which people find partners from the same
occupational and educational background has always been great.31 Intra-
class marriages within identical occupational and educational categories
remain predominant, and in that sense ‘ascriptive homogamy’ persists as
an entrenched pattern.
29 Kataoka 1987. 30 Kohn 1977. See also Kohn and Schooler 1983.
31 Shirahase 2008, especially pp. 73–7.
This is most robust among university graduates, and inter-generational

class continuity endures most firmly in most educated strata of Japanese
society. On the basis of data from the SSM study, Table 2.6 shows the
extent to which a married couple shares the same educational qualifica-
tions; a pattern indicated by the numbers in bold characters. The total
number of educational intra-class marriages amounts to about two-thirds
of the total sample. The table also demonstrates that marriages between
a woman and a man with higher educational qualifications (shown in
italics) are more prevalent than those between a man and a more highly
educated woman (in roman characters). This not only suggests that, in
general, men attain higher levels of education than women, but also that
marriage remains one means by which women acquire upward social
mobility.
Table 2.6 Intra-class marriages in terms of partners’ educational backgrounds
Wife’s education
Husband’s education I II III Total
I University or college 701 (68.9) 607 (24.2) 29 (4.1) 1,337

II High school 304 (29.9) 1,621 (64.6) 227 (31.8) 2,152
III Middle school 12 (1.2) 283 (11.3) 457 (64.1) 752
Total (Percentage) 1,017 (100) 2,511 (100) 713 (100) 4,241
Intra-class marriage ratio = (701 + 1,621 + 457)/4,241 = 0.655

Source: Calculated from SSM 05, 2, p. 73.
Notes:
Bold figures: Marriages between a man and a woman who share the same educational
qualifications (intra-class marriages).
Italic figures: Marriages between a woman and a more highly educated man (women
marrying upwardly).
Roman figures: Marriages between a man and a more highly educated woman (men mar-
rying upwardly).
Table 2.7 displays the degree to which husbands and wives share similar
occupational backgrounds. Intra-class marriages, where the occupations
of the couple’s fathers belong to the same category (shown in bold char-
acters), constitute more than 50 percent of the sample. While this is a
smaller proportion than the similarity rate of educational backgrounds
(66 percent), occupational backgrounds remain a significant force in the
formation of marriages. Relatively independent of occupational back-
ground, the educational environment appears to influence the choice of
marriage partners. The popular perception then, that Japan is a society
based on educational credentialism, seems correct; at least as it relates to
the marriage market.
Table 2.7 Intra-class marriages in terms of partners’ occupation backgrounds
Occupation of wife
Occupation of husband I II III IV Total
I Professional and managerial 88 (33.8) 143 (14.1) 22 (6.7) 2 (2.7) 255

II Clerical and sales 106 (40.8) 495 (48.7) 64 (19.6) 7 (9.6) 672
III Manual 61 (23.5) 358 (35.2) 224 (68.5) 23 (31.5) 666
IV Agricultural 5 (1.9) 20 (2.0) 17 (5.2) 41 (56.2) 83
Total 260 (100) 1,016 (100) 327 (100) 73 (100) 1,676
Intra-class marriage ratio = (88 + 495 + 224 + 41)/1,676 = 0.506

Source: Calculated from SSM 05, 2, p. 74.
Notes:
Bold figures: Marriages in which the occupations of husbands and those of wives belong
to the same category (intra-class marriages).
Roman figures: Marriages in which the occupations of husbands and those of wives belong
to different categories (inter-class marriages).
At the top end of the highest class, a complex web of elite-school old
boy networks, hereditary successions, marriage connections, and uxo-
rial nepotism stretch among political, bureaucratic, business, and media
elites, who are interconnected to form a ‘class of privilege’.32 Approxi-
mately one quarter of the members of the House of Representatives have
inherited their constituencies from their parents or relatives, with the cur-
rent and four recent prime ministers all falling into this category.33 Many
elite diplomats come from the families of high-ranking diplomats and
inherit their status, having moved from one country to another in their
childhood with their parents and accumulated linguistic skills and per-
sonal networks.34 Pedigree and lineage play significant roles in preserving
the inter-generational continuity of the nation’s establishment.
IV Debate and Caution about the Kakusa Society Thesis
While gaining broad acceptance, the so-called kakusa society thesis – the
view that Japanese society is socially divided and fraught with class dis-
parities – is subject to much debate and must be examined with caution.
First of all, the assertion that Japanese society has suddenly become
a kakusa society raises much skepticism. There is much well-founded
32 Takarajima Henshūbu 2007.

33 In this calculation, ‘inheritance members’ of the House of Representatives are defined
as those who have or had Members of the Parliament among their relatives within the
third degree of consanguity or their spouse’s relatives within the second degree. Some
82 percent of ‘inheritance candidates’ were elected in the 2005 general election.
34 Takarajima Henshūbu 2007, pp. 70–3.
argument that Japan has always been a class-divided and stratified society
and never a unique ‘middle-class society’ as described by the Nihonjin-
ron model. From this perspective, an abrupt shift took place in public
awareness and sensitivity, not in empirical substance and reality. Even
at the prime of the ‘uniquely egalitarian society’ argument, a consid-
erable number of studies demonstrated that such claim may represent
only the tatemae side of Japanese society. Some comparative quantita-
tive studies suggest that Japanese patterns of socioeconomic inequality
show no systematic deviance from those of other countries of advanced
capitalism.35 Income inequality is higher in Japan than in Western
countries.36 The overall social mobility rate in Japan is basically simi-
lar to patterns observed in other industrialized societies.37
The second proviso bears upon the optical illusion that appears to have
persisted during the high economic era. There is no doubt that the high-
growth economy of postwar Japan led to changes in the occupational
composition of the population and shifted large numbers from agricul-
ture to manufacturing, from blue-collar to white-collar, from manual to
non-manual, and from low-level to high-level education.38 However, this
transfiguration left a false impression – as though industrialization were
conducive to a high measure of upward social mobility. In reality, the
relative positions of various strata in the hierarchy remained unaltered.
For example, the educational system which produced an increasing
number of university graduates cheapened the relative value of degrees
and qualifications. To put it differently, when everyone stands still on an
ascending escalator, their relative positions remain unaltered even though
they all go up. A sense of upward relative mobility in this case is simply
an illusion. When the escalator stops or slows down, it becomes difficult
for the illusion to be sustained. The occupational system cannot con-
tinue to provide ostensibly high-status positions, and eventually it must
be revealed that some of the social mobility of the past was in fact due
to the inflationary supply of positions. This is exactly what many in the
labor force began to feel when Japan’s economy came to a standstill,
recording negative growth and entering into a deflationary spiral in the
early 2000s. The reality of class competition began to bite only when the
economic slowdown failed to discernibly enlarge the total available pie.
35 For instance, Ishida 1993 and Seiyama 1994.

36 Tachibanaki 1998. 37 Ishida, Goldthorpe, and Erikson 1991.
38 The total index of structural mobility records a consistent upward trend throughout the
postwar years. The agricultural population provides the only exception to this propensity,
showing a consistent downward trend. The total index arrived at its peak in 1975,
reflecting a massive structural transformation which transpired during the so-called
high-growth period starting in the mid 1960s.
Third, a widening gap between haves and have-nots may be exag-

gerated because of the increase in the proportion of the aged in the
population. Since social disparities are the largest among senior citizens,
an aging society tends to show a greater chasm between the rich and the
poor. The demographic transformation towards a greying society over-
states the general levels of class differentiation of the total population.
Fourth, Japan’s socio-economic disparities were accelerated not only
by unorganized structural transformations but by deliberately engineered
policy changes in the taxation system. They have decreased the rate of
progressive taxation with the result that its redistribution functions have
been weakened. For one thing, the consumption taxation scheme was
put into motion in 1989, making it necessary for each consumer to pay
five percent of the price of the purchased goods as sales tax. This system
benefits the wealthy and harms the poor, because the consumption tax
is imposed on all consumers in the same way regardless of their incomes
and assets. Further, the reduction of the inheritance tax rate in 2003 has
lessened the burdens of asset owners in the intergenerational transfer of
ownership. This advantaged the relatively rich and enhanced the class
discrepancies in this area.
Finally, one would have to see the perception shift in class structure in
Japan from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge. Apparent or
real, recent changes in class situations took place close to the everyday
life of opinion-makers and data analysts. Even when economic hard-
ship and class competition were daily realities in the lower echelons of
Japanese society, many of these commentators paid little heed to the issue
because they occupied privileged positions distant from the lower levels
of social stratification. However, their perceptions began to alter with the
shifting class structure affecting their acquaintances and friends in their
networks as a consequence of the economic stagnation and downturn
in the 1990s and 2000s. The job security of full-time employees in the
elite track of large companies is now at risk.39 The upper white-collar
employees, a category that comprises managers and professionals, are an
increasingly closed group, which the children of other social strata find it
difficult to break into.40 A decline in scholastic achievements even among
the pupils of the upper middle classes and above has aroused concern
among parents.41 There are grounds to suspect that the class position of
‘class observers’ influences their sensitivity to stratificational divisions in
Japanese society.
39 Morioka 2009.
40 Satō 2000. Some experts dispute this thesis. See, for example, Hara and Seiyama 2005,
pp. xxiii–vi.
41 Chūō Kōron Henshūbu and Nakai 2003.
V Japanese Emic Concepts of Class
How do the Japanese conceptualize dimensions of social stratification?

The Japanese equivalents of class and stratum, kaikyū and kaisō, are both
terms translated from English. As such, they do not constitute part of the
everyday folk vocabulary of most ordinary citizens in Japan. Yet anyone
familiar with the Japanese language would attest to the wide circulation of
such Japanese terms as jōryū kaikyū (upper class), chūsan kaikyū (middle
class), kasō shakai (lower-stratum society), and shakai no teihen (bottom
of society). The Japanese have a clear conception of stratification in their
society even if their notions may not be conceptually identical to their
Western counterparts.42
One can easily list several Japanese emic terms that describe the dimen-
sions of stratification. Kaku denotes a finite series of ranks. As a generic
term, it can be applied to a wide range of ranking systems. Mibun implies
a status position into which one is born. Though used more loosely at
times, the term connotes ascriptive characteristics and points to caste-
like features. In feudal times, a samurai’s mibun clearly differed from a
peasant’s mibun. Even today, ‘blue-blood’ families are supposed to have
higher mibun than that of the masses. The term kakei (family line) has
a similar connotation, with a more explicit emphasis upon lineage and
pedigree. In contrast, chii means a status position that one achieves over
time. One’s chii moves up or down in an occupational hierarchy. A com-
pany president occupies a higher chii than a section chief of the company.
The most common word for rapid social mobility is shusse. It applies
to successful promotion to high positions accompanied by wide social
recognition. When one moves from a low chii to a high chii, one would
achieve an appreciable level of shusse.
With regard to the concept of the middle class, different imagery under-
lies each of the three terms used by survey analysts to indicate a middle
position in a pyramid of ranks.43 The first of these, chūsan, tends to point
to the dimensions of property and income and to the middle to upper
positions in the economic hierarchy. The second category, chūryū, has
connotations of a middle domain of social status, respect, and prestige,
rather than straight economic capacity. In interpreting this term, respon-
dents primarily think of their occupational ranking and of such things
as their family status, educational background, and friendship network,
situating themselves in the middle on the basis of a combination of these
criteria. A white-collar company employee might see himself as located
below small business owners and skilled blue-collar workers economi-
cally, but would still describe himself as middle with regard to educational
42 Befu 1980, p. 34. 43 Odaka 1961.

qualifications and occupational prestige. In contrast to the first two con-

cepts, the third yardstick, chūkan, carries somewhat negative implications
and suggests a middle location of insecurity, uncertainty, instability, and
ambivalence between high and low positions. Survey results have shown
that the largest percentage of the population classifies itself as chūryū,
followed by a considerable proportion assessing itself as chūsan. The
smallest segment identifies itself as chūkan.
While the Japanese may not define stratification in precisely the same
way as do other nationalities, there is little doubt that people in one of
the most competitive capitalist economies on earth live with their own
sense of class and inequality, as subsequent chapters will reveal in greater
depth. Chapter 3 examines geographical and generational variations and
inequalities as two basic sets of demographic diversities. Chapters 4 and
5 investigate the worlds of work and education in which people compete
in an attempt to optimize their resources and rewards through achieve-
ment. Chapters 6 and 7 shift the focus onto such ascriptive modes of
stratification as gender and ethnicity, attributes which are determined
at birth and determine one’s life opportunities and lifestyle in a funda-
mental way. The five chapters also probe the institutional and ideological
apparatuses which sustain and reproduce the patterns of inequality and
stratification.
VII.
7 ‘Japaneseness’, Ethnicity, and

Minority Groups
I Japanese Ethnocentrism and Globalization
Japan has frequently been portrayed as a uniquely homogeneous society

both racially and ethnically.1 For decades, the Japanese leadership had
inculcated in the populace the myths of Japanese racial purity and of the
ethnic superiority which was supposed to be guaranteed by the uninter-
rupted lineage of the imperial household over centuries. In the years of
rapid economic growth since the 1960s, many observers have attributed
Japan’s economic success and political stability to its racial and ethnic
homogeneity. Conscious of the extent of support for racist ideology of
this type, the Japanese establishment has often resorted to the argument
that mono-ethnic Japanese society has no tradition of accepting outsiders.
Exploiting this, the government accepted only a small fraction of refugees
from Vietnam and other areas of Indochina into Japan in the 1970s and
1980s, although the nation had brought millions of Koreans and Chinese
into Japan as cheap labor before and during World War II. The ideol-
ogy of mono-ethnic Japan is invoked or abandoned according to what
is expedient for the interest groups involved in public debate. Since the
ratification of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1981,
Japan has accepted only 451 refugees up to 2007.2
Analysts of the social psychology of the Japanese suggest that the infe-
riority complex towards the Caucasian West and the superiority complex
towards Asian neighbors have played a major role in Japanese percep-
tions of other nationalities. The leadership of modern Japan envisaged a
‘ladder of civilizations’ in which Euro-American societies occupied the
highest rungs, Japan was somewhere in the middle, and other Asian coun-
tries were at the bottom.3 Also notable is the persistence of the doctrine
of wakon yōsai (Japanese spirit and Western technology), the dichotomy
which splits the world into two spheres, Japan and the West, and assumes
1 Oguma 2002 presents a detailed analysis of how Japan’s cultural elites have formulated
and propagated this thesis.
2 AM, 6 January 2009, p. 3. 3 See Ṫsurumi 1986, pp. 5, 53, 62.
189
that the spiritual, moral, and cultural life of the Japanese should not be
corrupted by foreign influences no matter how much Japan’s material way
of life may be affected by them.4 Borrowing some elements of imported
Western imagery, the Japanese mass culture industry has portrayed blacks
in derogatory ways in comics, TV programs, and novels.5 Popular among
business elites, books which perpetuate anti-Semitic stereotypes based
upon the old propaganda of the ‘international Jewish conspiracy’, hit the
bestseller chart from time to time.
At the same time, Japanese society is exposed to the international com-
munity on an unprecedented scale. With the appreciation of the Japanese
yen, many Japanese firms have no choice but to move their factories off-
shore and interact directly with the local population. The Japanese travel
abroad in numbers unparalleled in history. Satellite television technol-
ogy brings images of the outside world into the living rooms of many
Japanese. Both cities and rural areas witness an increasing flow of foreign
students, overseas visitors, and long-term residents from abroad. The
attraction of the yen and the Japanese demand for manual labor have
brought phenomenal numbers of foreign workers into Japan. Grassroots
Japan is undergoing a process of irreversible globalization. This has sensi-
tized some sectors of the Japanese public to the real possibility of making
Japanese society more tolerant and free from bigotry.
Thus, contemporary Japanese society is caught between the contra-
dictory forces of narrow ethnocentrism and open internationalization.
Intolerance and prejudice are rampant, but individuals and groups pur-
suing a more open and multicultural Japan are also active, challenging
various modes of racism and discriminatory practices.
A nationwide time-series survey conducted by Japan’s Institute of
Statistical Mathematics over more than half a century includes a con-
troversial yet thought-provoking question: In a word, do you think the
Japanese are superior or inferior to Westerners? It is intriguing that a pres-
tigious research institute has kept asking the question for more than five
decades, a pattern that in itself reflects the degree to which the Japanese
are ethnically conscious of their location in the international rank order.
The long-term survey results, shown in Table 7.1, indicate that Japanese
national self-confidence fluctuates in accordance with the economic per-
formance and achievements of the country. During the period of national
humiliation and devastation in the 1950s, following the defeat in World
War II, a majority accepted the notion of Japanese being mediocre and
ordinary in comparison with those vaguely referred to as Westerners.
With the resurgence of the Japanese economy in the 1960s and 1970s,
the Japanese appeared to regain self-esteem and pride, which culminated
4 Kawamura 1980. 5 Russell 1991a and 1991b.

‘Japaneseness’, Ethnicity, and Minority Groups 191
Table 7.1 Time-series survey results on the superiority of the Japanese to Westerners.
In a word, do you think the Japanese are superior or inferior to Westerners?
Superior Inferior Same Cannot say in Other Don’t

Year (%) (%) (%) a word (%) (%) know (%) Total
1953 20 28 14 21 1 13 99 (2,254)
1963 33 14 16 27 1 9 100 (2,698)
1968 47 11 12 21 1 7 99 (3,033)
1973 39 9 18 26 0 7 99 (3,055)
1983 53 8 12 21 2 5 101 (2,256)
1993 41 6 27 20 0 5 99 (1,833)
1998 33 11 32 19 0 6 101 (1,339)
2003 31 7 31 24 1 6 100 (1,192)
2008 37 9 28 22 0 4 100 (1,729)
Source: Institute of Statistical Mathematics 2009, Table 9.6.

Notes:
1. The question was not asked in 1958, 1978, and 1988.
2. The figures in brackets in the total column indicate sample sizes.
in the decade of self-glorification in the 1980s when Japan’s economy

enjoyed a wave of unprecedented prosperity and the nation attained the
status of economic superpower. As Japan entered the period of stagnation
and recession and struggled under the weight of a sluggish economy in
the 1990s and thereafter, the public perceptions became sober, though
the ‘superiority’ group far outnumbers the ‘inferiority’ group. Notably,
those who tend to see no difference between the Japanese and Westerners
have risen in numbers in recent years, a tendency possibly reflecting a
gradual decline in competitive race consciousness and a steady rise in
global identity. In the age groups in and below the thirties, the ‘no differ-
ence’ respondents outnumber the ‘superior’ respondents. These trends
form the backdrop behind the competing ethnic paradigms discussed in
Chapter 1.
II Deconstructing the ‘Japanese’
Japan has a variety of minority issues, ethnic and otherwise, which the
proponents of the homogeneous Japan thesis tend not to address. As
discussed in Chapter 1, some 5 percent of the Japanese population can be
classified as members of minority groups. In the Kinki area, the center of
western Japan, the proportion amounts to some 10 percent. The minority
issues are the ura and uchi realities of contemporary Japanese society.
This chapter will survey the contemporary situations of four main
minority groups in Japan, as shown in Table 7.2: the Ainu, burakumin,
Koreans, and foreign workers. Their minority status results from different
Table 7.2 Characteristics of minority groups
Geographical Cause of
Group Population concentration minority presence
Burakumin 2,000,000 Kansai region Caste system during the

feudal period
Resident Koreans 400,000 Kansai region Japan’s colonization of Korea
Ainu 24,000 Hokkaidō Honshū inhabitants’
aggression in northern Japan
Foreign workers 2,220,000 Major cities Shortage of unskilled labor
historical circumstances, as sketched in Chapter 1 and detailed in later

sections: the Ainu situation derived from the Honshū race’s attempt
at internal colonization of the northern areas since the sixth century;
the buraku problem stems from the caste system in the feudal period;
the Korean issues originated from Japan’s external aggression into the
Korean peninsula in the first half of the twentieth century; and the foreign
workers’ influx began with Japan’s economic performance in the 1980s
and the 1990s.
These minority groups bring to the fore the fundamental question of
who the Japanese (Nihonjin) really are. One may consider at least seven
aspects of Japaneseness – nationality, ethnic lineage, language compe-
tence, place of birth, current residence, subjective identity, and level of
cultural literacy – as Table 7.3 indicates. While each dimension is in
some respect problematic,6 the main objective of the table is to show that
there can be a number of measures of Japaneseness and multiple kinds of
Japanese. In combining the presence or absence of their attributes, one
can analytically classify the Japanese into numerous types.
If we do not define who the Japanese are solely on the basis of citizen-
ship, on which bureaucrats make decisions, a number of questions occur.7
The distinction between Korean Japanese, who differ only in terms of
citizenship, seems in many cases to be rather artificial. Should natural-
ized sumo wrestlers such as Takamiyama, Akebono, and Musashimaru,
who have acquired Japanese passports, be considered more Japanese than
expatriate Japanese who have forfeited Japanese citizenship? What about
two Japanese who work in similar situations overseas and who consider
themselves Japanese, but one retains his or her citizenship while the other
6 For example, the conceptual boundary of the Japanese race remains an unresolved ques-
tion, though this table relies on the conventional racial classification. Language fluency
is also a variable. Here it is defined as native or near-native competency in Japanese.
7 The following discussion follows Sugimoto and Mouer 1995, pp. 296–7; Mouer and
Sugimoto 1995, pp. 7–8.
Table 7.3 Various types of ‘Japanese’
Nationality ‘Pure Japanese Language Place of Current Level of cultural Subjective

Specific examples (citizenship) genes’ competence birth residence literacy identity
Most Japanese + + + + + ? ?
Korean residents in Japan − − + + + ? ?
Japanese businessmen posted overseas + + + + − ? ?
Ainu and naturalized foreigners + − + − + ? ?
First-generation overseas who forfeited − + + + − ? ?
Japanese citizenship
Children of Japanese overseas settlers −/+ + +/− +/− − ? ?
Immigrant workers in Japan − − −/+ − + ? ?
Third-generation Japanese Brazilians − + −/+ − + ? ?
working in Japan
Some returnee children + + − + + ? ?
Some children of overseas settlers + + − − − ? ?
Children of mixed marriage who live in + +/− + +/− + ? ?
Japan
Third-generation overseas Japanese who − + − − − ? ?
cannot speak Japanese
Naturalized foreigners who were born in + − + + − ? ?
Japan but returned to their home
country
Most overseas Japan specialists − − + − −/+ ? ?
Source: Expanded from Fukuoka 2000, p. xxx; Mouer and Sugimoto 1995, p. 31.
takes up citizenship in the country in which he or she resides? What about

Japanese-born children growing up abroad, for whom English or some
other language might be considered their first language? What about
Japanese Brazilians who have come to live in Japan? Who has the right to
decide who the Japanese are?
The notions of biological pedigree and pure Japanese genes are
widespread but controversial and questionable. Especially important
is the ill-defined criterion labeled simply as Japanese cultural literacy.
Depending upon which culture of Japan one refers to, the amount of cul-
tural literacy one has differs greatly. For instance, many foreign workers
in Japan may lack polite Japanese and know nothing about the tea cere-
mony, but be more knowledgeable than middle-class housewives about
the culture of subcontracting firms in the construction industry. Some
returnee school children from overseas may not be fluent in Japanese
but be more perceptive than their teachers about the culture of Japanese
education observed from a comparative perspective.
There may be different interpretations of the rules which delineate
Japanese from other peoples. One can be exclusivist and define only
those who satisfy all seven criteria in Table 7.3 as Japanese. One can
be inclusivist and argue that those who satisfy at least one criterion can
be regarded as Japanese. There are also many middle ground positions
between these two extremes.
Figure 7.1 presents the expansion and contraction of the definition of
‘the Japanese’ in a pyramid form. In climbing the pyramid (A), we rigor-
ously and restrictively apply all the criteria in Table 7.3 and make each
a necessary condition for being ‘pure Japanese’. The higher we ascend,
the smaller the numbers who qualify as Japanese. Those occupying the
base of the pyramid can become ‘Japanese’ only through monocultural
assimilation. In contrast, in descending the pyramid (B), we regard fewer
criteria as a sufficient condition for being a ‘multicultural Japanese’. The
further we descend, the larger the number of people defined as ‘Japanese’,
so that this term becomes inclusive and multicultural and allows for the
coexistence of many ethnic subcultures.
Empirical studies, particularly that conducted by Tanabe based on a
national random sample,8 appear to suggest that contemporary Japanese
deem ‘self-definition’ the most important criteria for determining who
the ‘Japanese’ are, as Table 7.4 shows. Citizenship ranks as the second
most important yardstick, followed by language competence. The racial
dimension (‘pedigree’) figures relatively low in its significance in com-
parison with other criteria.
8 Tanabe 2008. The data are based on a random sample of 1,102 collected in 2003 for the
project which formed a part of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP).
Table 7.4 Distribution of importance attached to criteria for

determining ‘Japaneseness’
Important Unimportant
Self-definition 84.8 12.4

Citizenship (kokuseki) 84.5 13.3
Language competence 76.4 21.4
Place of birth 74.4 23.2
Length of residence 71.3 25.9
‘Pedigree’ (kettō) 69.7 27.4
Adherence to the laws 61.4 31.0
Religion 23.1 69.1
Source: Adapted from Tanabe 2008, p. 294.

Note: The figures indicate the percentage of people who find
the criteria ‘important’ or ‘unimportant’. Since there are ‘no
response’ cases, the total does not amount to 100 percent.
‘First-class
Japanese’
Many
Inclusivist and Exclusivist and
‘second-class
multicultural B A monocultural
Japanese’
Denizens
‘Japanese peripheral to
the Japanese state’
Figure 7.1 Pyramid of the definition of ‘the Japanese’

Notes:
Arrow A: the result of zealously applying all the criteria in Table 7.2 and making each a
necessary condition to being a pure ‘Japanese’. The ‘Japanese’ population thus defined,
is small but increases through a process of monocultural assimilation. Demands cultural
homogeneity.
Arrow B: the result of eschewing an overly exclusionist definition. Allows for fewer criteria
to be viewed as a sufficient condition to being a multicultural ‘Japanese’. The population
is increased through a process of multicultural acceptance. Allows for many subcultures to
coexist. The bold line indicates the Japanese state barrier. Citizenship is the most significant
factor that determines who is above or below the line.
See Mouer and Sugimoto 1995, p. 244 for a presentation of a similar idea.
Table 7.5 Distribution of four clusters of national identities
Clusters (3) Ardent

Variables (1) Globalist (2) Culturalist nationalist (4) Xenophobe
Definition of Highly inclusive Inclusive Highly exclusive Exclusive

‘Japaneseness’
Political pride Very low Low Very high Very low
Cultural pride Very low High Very high Low
Anti-foreign Very low Low High Very high
immigration
Average age 41.0 42.0 57.6 57.4
Educational level High High Low Low
Percentage 15.2 28.1 31.5 25.1
Source: Adapted from Tanabe 2008, p. 302.
Tanabe’s research further endeavors to examine the distribution of

national identities among the population. He classifies all respondents in
terms of the extent to which (1) they are inclusive or exclusive in defining
who the Japanese are, (2) they are proud of Japan politically, (3) they are
proud of Japanese culture, and (4) they are prone to accept foreigners into
Japan. As Table 7.5 demonstrates, the project then combines these four
dimensions and shows that contemporary Japanese form four clusters
with respect to their national identities.
The first cluster comprises those internationally oriented individuals
who are highly open to accepting foreigners and inclusive in defining
‘Japaneseness’. These globalists have lower levels of political and cultural
pride in comparison with other clusters. The second cluster resembles
the first except that they have a high degree of pride in Japanese culture
and can be labeled ‘culturalists’ or ‘traditionalists’. These two groups are
relatively young and well educated.
The third cluster is made up of fervent nationalists who are infused
with national pride and hold exclusive orientations to ‘non-Japanese’.
The fourth cluster is similar to the third in its strict definition of the
‘Japanese’ and is closed to receiving foreigners into Japan. They are
generally xenophobic but not as confident about Japan’s politics and
culture as the third group. These two clusters are relatively old and less
educated.
These observations exhibit diverse national identities in the Japanese
populace and, in particular, cast doubt over the claim about the alleged
nationalistic tendencies of Japanese youth. It appears that older people
are more entrenched in ethnocentric orientations. More broadly, larger
questions regarding the right to define the ‘Japanese’ frames the debate
about minority and ethnicity issues in Japan today.
III The Buraku Problem
The largest minority group is that of burakumin, an outcast group who

share the racial and ethnic origin of the majority of Japanese. There are
no biological differences between burakumin and majority Japanese, nor
is there any means of distinguishing them at sight. The burakumin have
fallen victim to the bigoted belief that, since their ancestors belonged to
a social category below ordinary citizens during the feudal period, they
constitute a fundamentally inferior class. A wide range of nasty discrim-
inatory practices against burakumin reflect an invisible caste system in
Japanese society.
The term buraku means a settlement, hamlet, or village community
and burakumin denotes the residents of such units. Unfounded preju-
dice has forced buraku members to live in secluded communities under
conditions of relative impoverishment. The exact size of the burakumin
population remains unknown because they are Japanese citizens by race
and nationality, and discrimination is based upon elusive labeling. The
latest official survey conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications gives the number of buraku communities as 4,442 and
that of their residents as 2,158,789.9 This survey focused upon localities
which the government has designated as entitled to benefit from public
projects aimed at the elimination of discrimination. There are at least
one thousand localities whose status is the subject of dispute between the
government and community groups. Taking these factors into consider-
ation, informed guesses put the number of communities at six thousand
and that of burakumin at three million.10
Some buraku communities have existed for nearly four centuries. Seg-
regated communities began to emerge around the sixteenth century and
were institutionalized by the strengthening of the class system of the
Tokugawa feudal regime. This system classified the population into four
recognized ranks – samurai warriors at the top, farmers in the second
rank, artisans in the third, and tradespeople at the bottom – but placed
the ancestors of present-day burakumin outside these ranks, locating
them in separate neighborhoods.
Two types of outcasts dwelt in these communities. The first, known as
eta (which literally means the amply polluted or highly contaminated),
comprised several groups: workers in the leather industry, including those
who butchered and skinned cattle and those who produced leather goods;
low-ranking craftsmen, such as dyers and bambooware and metalware
makers; transport workers, including watermen and seamen; shrine and
9 The survey was conducted in 1993. See Buraku Kaihō Jinken Kenkyūsho 2001, p. 736.
10 Buraku Kaihō Jinken Kenkyūsho 2001.
temple laborers; and irrigation workers and guards of agricultural fields.

The second major category was that of hinin (which literally means non-
human people), comprising entertainers, beggars, executioners, and so
forth. While regarded as lower than eta in rank, those in the hinin clas-
sification were allowed to climb to non-outcast status (under limited
circumstances), whereas those in the eta category were not.11
Prejudice exists against burakumin in marriage, employment, educa-
tion, and many other areas. The marriage patterns of burakumin give
an indication of persistent discrimination against them. A government
survey of buraku communities12 shows that three out of five marriages
in the sample are between those who were born in these communities.
Inter-community marriages between burakumin and non-burakumin are
in the minority, and marriages between a buraku male and a non-buraku
female are much more frequent than between a buraku female and a
non-buraku male. There are numerous examples of non-buraku parents
or relatives opposing marriages with burakumin, refusing to attend mar-
riage ceremonies, or declining to associate with a couple after marriage.
Discriminatory practices in marriage sometimes involve private detec-
tive agencies called kōshinjo. At the request of conservative parents, these
agencies investigate the family backgrounds, friends, political orientation,
and other private and personal details of a prospective bride or groom.
At the same time, there are signs that youngsters are gradually freeing
themselves from entrenched prejudice and taking a more open stance.
Inter-community marriages have increased among the younger genera-
tion, the survey13 showing that they constituted more than 60 percent of
the marriages where the husband was less than thirty-five years of age.
This appears to suggest that the attitude of the majority community is
changing.
Several features of the employment patterns of buraku inhabitants are
conspicuous. A significant proportion work in the construction industry;
the proportion employed in the wholesale, retail, restaurant, and service
industries remains relatively low. Compared with the labor force in gen-
eral, workers from buraku are more likely to be employed in small or petty
businesses at low wages. Yet a considerable improvement in work oppor-
tunities for young people is discernible, indicating that discriminatory
practices in workplaces have gradually declined.
11 A widespread myth is that burakumin are ethnically different from majority Japanese.
A version of this fiction insinuates that the ancestors of burakumin came from Korea,
an account that reflects Japanese prejudice against Koreans.
12 A 1993 survey of 59,646 couples resident in buraku communities. Prime Minister’s
Office 1993.
13 The same 1993 survey.
Discrimination against burakumin has been sustained in covert ways.

It was revealed (mainly in the early 1970s) that some companies secretly
purchased copies of clandestinely published documents which listed the
locations of, and other data on, buraku communities. The companies
engaged in such activities in an attempt to identify job applicants with
a buraku background and to eliminate them at the recruitment stage.
The companies were able to accomplish this by checking the lists against
the permanent address that each job applicant entered on their koseki
papers, which they were normally required to submit at the time of
application. At least ten blacklists of buraku communities surfaced in the
1970s and 1980s. The resolute condemnation of this practice by buraku
liberation movements revealed the way in which the koseki system was
used to discriminate against minority groups. The protest led to the
establishment of a new procedure requiring applicants to write only the
prefecture of their permanent address on the application form, so that
address details remain unknown to prospective employers.
Members of buraku communities have been disadvantaged cultur-
ally and linguistically too. The rate of illiteracy in buraku communities
remains high, partly because a considerable number of the older gen-
eration could not complete compulsory education in their childhood.
Though the situation has improved considerably in recent years, some
buraku inhabitants still have difficulty in writing. This reality prompted
buraku-movement activists to mount a literacy campaign across their
communities. Buraku children go to high school at a lower rate than the
national average, and there are pronounced differences between buraku
communities and the Japanese population generally in the ratio of stu-
dents advancing to universities and colleges. In the Kansai area, the
proportion of burakumin students who go beyond compulsory educa-
tion is 10–20 percent less than the national average, a situation traceable
to their low test results.14 A study in Osaka, which focused upon the lan-
guage development of infants, sheds light upon a complex process which
hinders the full growth of language skills in buraku children. While more
or less equal to other children in their development of verbal language,
they fall behind in comprehension and use of sentences. Researchers
attribute this to the lack of role-playing opportunities at home, and espe-
cially to it being less common for burakumin parents to read stories to
their children.15 Because written language dominates in formal educa-
tion, children from buraku communities are disadvantaged early and face
difficulties in dealing with an educational curriculum which is organized
14 Ikeda 1987.
15 Osaka-fu Kagaku Kyōiku Center’s study (1974–82) reported in Ikeda 1987.
Table 7.6 Types of burakumin
Blood relations Present Absent

Current residence
Buraku (A) (C) Drifters

Not buraku (B) Escapers
on the assumption that children receive considerable exposure to written

language before entering school.
The government has introduced special anti-discrimination legisla-
tion since 1969 in an attempt to counter discrimination against buraku
communities. These laws ensure that the government provides financial
support to projects that will improve the economic, housing, and edu-
cational conditions of burakumin. These legal steps enabled burakumin
to apply for special funds and loans to improve their houses, commu-
nity roads, and business infrastructures, and to allow their children to
advance beyond compulsory education.
Defining who burakumin are is made more complicated by the fact that
the common prejudice against them stems from a belief that they live in
particular, geographically confined communities and that their ancestors
engaged in unclean acts of animal butchery during the feudal period.
The prejudice, then, contains two clear markers: residential location and
blood relations. As Category A in Table 7.6 illustrates, though, gov-
ernment authorities and buraku activists disagree as to which localities
constitute buraku communities. Furthermore, a considerable number
of people have moved out of buraku to live in mainstream communi-
ties, often deliberately obscuring their identities (Category B, escapers).
Conversely, a significant number of other people settled in buraku after
the Meiji Restoration, when the outcaste system was officially abolished.
They, then, have no blood links with those who lived in buraku areas
during the feudal period (Category C, drifters). This suggests that three
different categories exist among burakumin.16
The social movements of buraku organizations have been militant
in pressing their case for the eradication of prejudice and the insti-
tutionalization of equality. Their history dates from the establishment
in 1922 of Suiheisha, the first national burakumin organization com-
mitted to their liberation. Because of its socialist and communist ori-
entation and radical principles, Suiheisha was disbanded during World
War II, but was revived in postwar years and became Buraku Kaihō
Dōmei (the Buraku Liberation League). The largest buraku organi-
zation, it claims a membership of some two hundred thousand and
16 For more on this point, see Aoki 2009 and Davis 2000.
takes the most radical stance, maintaining that buraku discrimination is

deep-rooted and widespread throughout Japanese society. Kaihō Dōmei
adopted the strategy of publicly confronting and denouncing individu-
als and groups that promote discrimination either openly or covertly.
This method, known as kyūdan (impeachment), has often been accom-
panied by the tactic of confining the accused in a room until he or she
makes satisfactory self-criticisms. As the most militant buraku organiza-
tion, the League has also mounted a number of legal challenges. The
best-known case is the so-called Sayama Struggle, in which the League
has maintained that a buraku man, who was sentenced to life impris-
onment for having murdered a female high school student in 1963,
was framed by police and the prosecution, who were prejudiced against
burakumin.
As a means of combating prejudice against minority groups, activists
have pressed hard for exclusion of biased words and phrases from print
and electronic media. The Buraku Liberation League, in particular, has
targeted newspapers, magazines, television and radio stations, and indi-
vidual writers and journalists who have used expressions that it regarded
as prejudicial. Under pressure of public accusation by the League, many
have been compelled to offer public self-criticism and apologies. Other
minority groups have followed suit and have effectively shaken the com-
placency of the Japanese majority. No doubt this tactic has contributed
to the increasing community awareness of the deep-seated unconscious
prejudice built into some expressions.17 The physically handicapped, who
also see themselves as a minority, are sensitive to the use of particular
expressions and often publicly join the fray.
While the anti-discrimination campaign waged by buraku movements
resulted in visible material improvements of buraku communities, their
educational and cultural disadvantages remain relatively unchanged.
With a shifting of emphasis to the software rather than the hardware
aspects of buraku liberation in the 1990s, activists started reviewing the
impeachment measures which terrified some sections of the majority
17 As a consequence of these attempts to correct discriminatory language, self-discipline
by major cultural organizations has often verged upon self-censorship. Some novel-
ists, comic writers, and popular magazines voice concern over what they regard as the
minority groups’ nitpicking and witch-hunting tendencies. These critics maintain that
minority charges regarding ‘language correctness’ have become so excessive and trivial
that they now put freedom of expression in jeopardy. Some complain that they can-
not use even such expressions as ‘blind’ and ‘one-handed’ for fear of being accused
of prejudice towards the physically disadvantaged. Others complain that the language
correctness argument suppresses various forms of humorous or comic conversation and
writing. Countering these arguments, activists and representatives of minority groups
maintain that freedom of expression exists not to defend the powerful and the status
quo but to bolster the human rights of the weak and the deprived.
Japanese. They now place emphasis on institutional solutions, campaign-

ing for the legislation of the Buraku Emancipation Basic Law, which
would make it a national imperative to root out buraku discrimination
and prejudice. They also promote broader issues of social justice and
human rights in collaboration with minority groups who share similar
problems.
IV Korean Residents
Resident Koreans, often referred to as zainichi Koreans, comprise the

largest minority group with foreign origin. According to Ministry of Jus-
tice official figures, they number approximately four hundred thousand,18
and an overwhelming majority of them are third, fourth, and even fifth
generation residents who do not have Japanese citizenship but whose
native language is Japanese.
Given that citizenship is not the only criterion to determine one’s iden-
tity, it is a contentious issue who zainichi Koreans are: even after taking
up Japanese citizenship, many define themselves as Japanese nationals of
Korean heritage, regard themselves as distinct from Japanese nationals
of Japanese heritage, and form a part of zainichi Koreans.
After the colonization of Korea in 1910, the Japanese establishment
brought their parents and grandparents to Japan as cheap labor in mining,
construction, and shipbuilding. In 1945, some 2.3 million Koreans lived
in Japan and about 1.7 million, nearly three-quarters, returned home
during the six months after the end of World War II. The remaining
six hundred thousand chose to settle in Japan, realizing that they had
lost contact with their connections in Korea and would have difficulty in
earning a livelihood there. As second-class residents, Koreans in Japan
are subjected to discrimination in job recruitment, promotion, eligibility
for pensions, and many other spheres of civil rights.
Because the Korean peninsula is divided into two nations, capitalist
South and communist North, the Korean population in Japan is also split
into two groups: the South-oriented organization Mindan (the Korean
Residents Union in Japan) and the North-affiliated Chongryun (the Gen-
eral Association of Korean Residents in Japan). At a rough estimate, some
80 percent are oriented to South Korea and less than 20 percent to North
Korea,19 though increasing numbers have become non-committal.
18 At the beginning of 2009, the Alien Registration Statistics (Ministry of Justice 2009)
shows that special status permanent residents, an overwhelming portion of whom are
zainichi Koreans, number 420,305.
19 Estimated on the basis of Nishinippon Shimbun 17 May 2006.
Political conflicts on the Korean peninsula are often translated into

tensions in the Korean communities in Japan. During the Korean War
in the early 1950s, the two Korean organizations engaged in bitter con-
frontations at the community level. In more recent years, the Japanese
public opinion got stirred up because of North Korea’s suspected nuclear
development and missile launches over the Japanese archipelago as well
as the revelation that its secret agents had abducted Japanese nationals
in the last quarter of the twentieth century, many of whom are still unac-
counted for. Because of the Chongryun’s loyalty to the North Korean
government on these issues, the North-oriented Koreans received a seri-
ous setback, though remaining active in ethnic education, managing a
total of one hundred and forty-four full-time ethnic schools across the
country, including one university and twelve high schools, in an attempt
to maintain the Korean language and culture among young, now mainly
third and fourth generation, Koreans.
1 Nationality Issue
Japan’s nationality law reflects the imagery of a racially homogeneous

society. The law adopts the personal rather than territorial principle of
nationality – the jus sanguinis rather than jus soli principle – in determining
one’s nationality according to that of one’s parents rather than according
to the nation of one’s birth. Foreign nationals’ children born in Japan can-
not obtain Japanese citizenship, while children whose father or mother
is a Japanese national automatically become Japanese citizens at birth
regardless of where they are born. Therefore, the second and third gen-
eration children of Koreans resident in Japan can become Japanese only
after they take steps towards naturalization and the Ministry of Justice
approves their application. The nationality law still requires that appli-
cants should be persons of ‘good conduct’, an ambiguous phrase, which
permits the authorities to use their discretion in rejecting applications.
From the Korean perspective, the Japanese government’s position on
the Korean nationality question has been inconsistent. During the colo-
nial period, Koreans were made Japanese nationals, though a separate
law regulated their family registration system. Accordingly, male Koreans
had the right to vote and to be elected to national and local legislatures;
some were in fact elected as national parliamentarians and city legisla-
tors. However, with the independence of South and North Korea and the
enactment of a fresh election law immediately after the end of World War
II, Korean residents in Japan were deprived of voting rights. On 2 May
1947, one day before the promulgation of the new postwar Constitu-
tion, the Japanese government put into effect the Alien Registration
Ordinance, which virtually targeted Koreans in Japan, classified them as

foreigners, and made them register as alien residents. Following the out-
break of the Korean War and the intensification of the Cold War in eastern
Asia, the Japanese authorities hardened their attitude towards Koreans
in Japan and enacted the Alien Registration Law upon the termination of
the Allied occupation of Japan and the advent of independence in 1952.
With the passage of time, a growing number of resident Koreans
have chosen to take up Japanese citizenship. From the mid-1990s to the
mid-2000s, approximately ten thousand zainichi Koreans forefeited their
Korean citizenship every year to naturalize as Japanese.20 While deciding
to change their nationality for complex and mixed reasons, they all appear
to cherish the notion that they should now live as Korean Japanese, not
as Koreans living in Japan, and share the same obligations and rights
with Japanese citizens.21 While pragmatic and realistic in many respects,
this position encounters criticism from within the zainichi community as
instrumental and expedient but might represents a future trend as fifth
and sixth generation Koreans who have little knowledge about Korean
culture and language come to the fore.
Housing discrimination against Koreans is widespread and often sur-
reptitious. Some owners of flats and apartments openly require occupants
to be Japanese nationals. Some real estate agents make it a condition for
applicants to submit copies of their resident cards for identification pur-
poses. This excludes non-Japanese because foreign residents have alien
registration certificates but do not have resident cards, which are issued
only to Japanese.
The Alien Registration Law stipulates that foreign nationals who intend
to reside in Japan for one year or more must be fingerprinted at the
beginning of their stay; those who refuse to comply with this provision
are liable for up to one year’s imprisonment and/or a fine of two hundred
thousand yen. The law was enacted in the context of the intense Cold War
in East Asia. National security authorities regarded Koreans, especially
those with links to North Korea, as potential security risks. In response
to persistent protests by Korean organizations in Japan and by Korean
governments, the Japanese authorities have made piecemeal revisions to
the law, loosening its provisions relating to the legal status of Korean
residents in Japan. In the 1991 amendment, they were given the status of
‘special permanent residents’ who cannot be deported as easily as other
long-term residents. This applies not only to first and second generation
Koreans but also to the third generation and thereafter.
20 The statistics compiled by the Civil Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice. See
<http://www.moj.go.jp/TOUKEI/t minj03.html>.
21 Asakawa 2003, especially Chapter 4 and concluding remarks.
A 1993 amendment removed the fingerprinting requirements for per-

manent residents, who are mainly from the former Japanese colonies of
Korea and Taiwan. However, these residents are still required to carry
their alien registration cards at all times, and a failure to do so incurs a
fine. Even when taking a walk or jogging, a Korean resident must carry
his or her card to avoid the risk of being fined. The card lists the names
and dates of birth of the Korean resident’s family members as well as
his or her photo and signature. Long-term residents without permanent
residency status, such as business people and missionaries, are still fin-
gerprinted. These permanent residents must report any change, not only
of their place of residence but also of their place of work, to the local
authorities.
Another contentious issue is the names that naturalized Koreans may
assume. The Japanese government long took the position that foreign-
ers must officially assume Japanese-sounding names as a condition of
naturalization. Those Koreans who acquired Japanese citizenship had to
give up such Korean names as Kim, Lee, and Park for more Japanese-
sounding names such as Tanaka, Yamada, and Suzuki. Though this
requirement has been removed, the name issue is a particularly sensi-
tive point among Koreans in Japan because of the historical fact that the
Japanese colonial regime in Korea forced all Koreans to assume Japanese
surnames and to officially register them with government offices. The
program known as sōshi kaimei (creation and revision of names), which
reflected the Japanese method of total psychological control, humiliated
Koreans.
Yet, a majority of zainichi Koreans now use Japanese names either
always or usually for their daily living, with three quarters of teenagers
adopting this course of action.22 One out of three switches between
Korean and Japanese names, depending on the situation. A tiny minority,
just over one in ten, keeps their Korean names, indicating that ‘Japaniza-
tion’ appears to be an inevitable trend in this regard.
Within the zainichi Korean community, a generation gap is discernible.
The first generation, now a numerical minority that nevertheless retains
considerable influence over Korean organizations in Japan, remains com-
mitted and loyal to their home country and government, some hoping
to eventually return home. Second and third generation Koreans born
and raised in Japan have little interest in living in Korea, but feel ambiva-
lent towards both Korean and Japanese societies. Many had to struggle
to learn Korean as a second language in the Japanese environment. An
overwhelming majority have studied in Japanese educational institutions,
22 A national survey conducted by Mindan in 2000. For details, see AE, 23 March 2001,
p. 22.
have only limited knowledge of Korean society and history, and enjoy
Japanese popular culture as much as the Japanese. Some have the trau-
matic experience of discovering their real Korean name only in their
adolescence, because their parents used a Japanese name to hide their
ethnic origin. Few have escaped anti-Korean prejudice and discrimina-
tion in employment, marriage, and housing. The younger generations,
committed permanent residents with interests in Japan, increasingly put
priority on the expansion of their legal, political, and social rights.
Despite the changing climate, marriage between Koreans and Japanese
remains a sensitive issue. Many first and second generation Koreans
who retain memories of Japan’s colonial past and its direct aftermath
feel that marrying Japanese was a kind of betrayal of Korean com-
patriots. Over time, however, the proportion of intra-ethnic marriages
between Koreans has declined. After the mid 1970s, Koreans who mar-
ried Japanese outnumbered those who married Koreans. The youngest
Koreans, many of whom are the fourth and fifth generations and in their
twenties and younger, do not accept the older generations’ argument
that Koreans should marry Koreans to maintain their ethnic conscious-
ness and identity.23 Incapable of speaking Korean and acculturated into
Japanese styles of life, young Koreans find it both realistic and desirable
to find their partner without taking nationality into consideration: an
overwhelming majority of Koreans now marry Japanese nationals. Like-
wise, the younger generation is more prepared to seek naturalization as
Japanese citizens.24
Overall, the passage of time since the end of Japan’s colonization of
Korea in 1945 has altered the shape of the Korean issue in Japanese soci-
ety. An overwhelming majority of Korean residents now speak Japanese
as their first language and intend to live in Japan permanently. With
an increase in inter-ethnic marriages with Japanese and the rise of the
South Korean economy, many Japanese Koreans are reluctant to take
a confrontationist stance and are eager to establish an internationalist
identity and outlook, taking advantage of their dual existence.25 Against
this background, young Koreans have become divided about the extent
to which Koreans should remember and attach importance to the history
of Japan’s colonization and exploitation, and the degree to which they are
attached to Japanese society as the environment where they have grown
up. Combining these two factors, Fukuoka constructs a model of four
23 Min 1994, pp. 253–64. According to a report in the Tōitsu Nippō, South Korean news-
paper published in Japan on 23 January 2008, 8,376 zainichi Koreans married Japanese
nationals in 2006, quadruple the figure in 1971, accounting for approximately 1 percent
of all marriages in Japan.
24 Min 1994, p. 272.
25 See Chapman 2008 for various forms of resident Koreans’ identities.
Table 7.7 Four identity types of Korean youth in Japan
Attachment Importance attached to Japan’s colonial history

to Japanese
society Strong Weak
Weak (A) Fatherland orientation (we are (B) Individualistic orientation

Koreans who happen to be in (we seek self-actualization
Japan) privately)
Bilingual Mostly speak Japanese; eager to
learn English
Korean name Not concerned about the name
issue
Strong (C) Multicultural orientation (D) Assimilation orientation
(we want to find ways of (we want to be Japanese)
cohabiting with Japanese)
Primarily Japanese Japanese only
Korean name Japanese name
Source: Adapted from Fukuoka 2000, p. 49.
types of Koreans, as shown in Table 7.7.26 At the practical level, young

Koreans differ in terms of the language they use in everyday life, and
whether they use a Korean or Japanese name.
The first type (Type A) of Koreans have a strong sense of loyalty to their
home country and define themselves as victims of Japan’s annexation of
Korea, who reject any form of assimilation into Japanese society.27 Many
Koreans of this type were educated in ethnic schools and became bilin-
gual. Generally, they take pride in being Korean, use Korean names,
and hold membership in the North-orientated General Association of
Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryun). Sharply critical of Japanese dis-
crimination against Koreans and primarily reliant upon Korean busi-
ness networks, they tend to form closed Korean communities, have
close friends only among Koreans, and see themselves as foreigners in
Japan.
In contrast, Koreans with an individualistic orientation (Type B) nei-
ther take much notice of the past relationship between Korea and Japan
nor have strong attachment to Japanese society. They seek to advance
their career in an individualistic way without depending on organizational
support. Cosmopolitan, achievement-orientated, and confident of their
26 The discussion here is based on Fukuoka 2000, pp. 42–60.

27 This group (Type A) is cautious about the movement of the multiculturalist group
(Type C) that demands voting rights for Koreans and other foreigners in Japan. Type A
Koreans tend to regard such a move as assimilationist.
ability, they are interested in acquiring upward social mobility by going

to top Japanese universities or studying in the United States or Europe.
Most of them are not concerned about the name issue, use Japanese
in most situations, and are eager to learn English as the language of
international communication.
The multicultural type (Type C) represents a new breed of Koreans
who remain critical of the legacy of Japan’s attitude to Korea, have a
strong Korean identity, and use Korean names. However, unlike Type
A, they regard Japanese society as their home base and establish a mul-
ticultural lifestyle in which they live with the Japanese without losing
their sense of Korean autonomy and individuality. Many used Japanese
names in the past to hide their Korean identities but became conscious
and proud of their ethnic duality while taking part in anti-discrimination
movements with Japanese citizens. Having studied in Japanese schools,
most of them consider Japanese their first language but some study the
Korean language on their own initiative. These Koreans are politically
conscious and reform-orientated, while having a deep attachment to the
Japanese local community in which they were brought up. The activists
of this group work closely with Japanese groups to press for equal rights
for Koreans and other foreign nationals in Japan.
Assimilationist Koreans (Type D) put the first priority on becoming
Japanese in every way. Brought up in a predominantly Japanese environ-
ment, they are totally Japanese, culturally and linguistically, and believe
that what’s done cannot be undone with regard to Japan’s past colo-
nial policy. Many attempt to remove their ‘Korean characteristics’, adapt
themselves fully to Japanese society, and thereby seek to be accepted by
the Japanese. Most of them become naturalized Japanese nationals.
Over time, the Japanese authorities have taken a conciliatory posi-
tion, with local governments in particular assuming generally sympathetic
stands towards Korean communities. In response to Korean residents’
appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in 1995 that the Constitution does not
prohibit permanent residents without Japanese citizenship from having
voting rights in local elections. In 2002, Maibara City, Shiga Prefec-
ture, became the first municipality to grant these rights to non-Japanese
permanent residents. Reform-minded Japanese are vocal in their claim
that Japan cannot be an internationalized society without cultivating
genuine openness and tolerance towards the largest ethnic minority in
Japan.
Ethnic minority groups do not necessarily lack economic resources,
nor do they always fall behind mainstream groups in educational and
occupational accomplishment. A comparative analysis of the 1995 SSM
data and the data on zainichi South Koreans gathered in 1995 and 1996,
casts doubt on stereotypical images of Koreans resident in Japan as being
Table 7.8 Comparative class positions of majority Japanese and Zainichi Koreans
Japanese at large Zainichi Koreans
Class indicators Average Average

Educational attainment (Years of schooling) 12.35 12.01
Occupational prestige score 47.32 48.02
Annual personal income (in ten thousand 494.23 531.84
Japanese yen)
Occupational classification Percentage Percentage
Upper white-collar 22.4 14.2
Lower white-collar 20.2 12.4
Self-employed (jieigyō) 23.2 52.1
Blue-collar 28.3 21.0
Agriculture 5.9 0.3
Total percentage 100.0 100.0
Sample size 1,092 676
Source: Adapted from Kim and Inazuki 2000, p. 189.
relatively poor and uneducated (see Table 7.8).28 At the end of the
twentieth century, Japanese Koreans enjoy higher levels of income than
Japanese nationals and, as such, no longer form an economic minor-
ity. Neither their overall educational level nor their average occupational
prestige score differs significantly from those of Japanese nationals. It is
noteworthy, though, that Korean residents in Japan are predominantly
self-employed small business owners, a fact which suggests that they
continue to face employment and promotional discrimination in larger,
Japanese-owned corporations and enterprises. As independent business
people, many zainichi Koreans manage yakiniku restaurants and pachinko
parlors and run small financial or construction-related enterprises. With
the avenues of upward social mobility obstructed in large institutions,
most Koreans rely on kinship networks within the Korean community
in order to find work or establish their businesses. These informal webs
of personal and ethnic connections have proven to be valuable social
resources, given that the meritocratic route to class betterment in the
broader Japanese society remains largely closed to them.
V Indigenous Ainu
The Ainu race, the indigenous population of northern Japan, now

comprises some twenty-four thousand persons and seven thousand
28 Kim and Inazuki 2000, pp. 188–9. The zainichi sample does not include women, North
Korean nationals, or Koreans who have naturalized as Japanese. The Japanese sample
used for comparison comprises only male respondents.
households living mainly in Hokkaidō.29 For more than ten centuries,

they have suffered a series of attempts by Japan’s central government
to invade and deprive them of their land, and to totally assimilate them
culturally and linguistically.30 In this sense, their history resembles that
of American Indians and Australian Aborigines. Under pressure, the
Japanese parliament and government formally recognized the Ainu as
an indigenous people of Japan in 2008, though much still remains to be
debated and reformed, including textbook contents, employment secu-
rity, and heritage preservation.
Immediately after the Meiji Restoration, the Tokyo government took
steps to designate Hokkaidō as ‘ownerless land’, confiscated the Ainu
land, and established a governmental Land Development Bureau. The
dispatch of government-supported militia paved the way for the assault
of Japanese capital on virgin forests. Until recently, the national govern-
ment regarded the Ainu as an underdeveloped and uncivilized race, took
a high-handed assimilation policy, and demolished much of the Ainu
traditional culture. The land reform, which was implemented during the
Allied Occupation of Japan in the late 1940s and equalized land own-
ership for the agrarian population in general, had the reverse effect for
the Ainu community, because Ainu land that non-Ainu peasants had
cultivated was confiscated on the grounds of absentee land ownership.
As a result, the Ainu lost approximately one-third of their agricultural
land in Hokkaidō. Governmental and corporate development projects
are still degrading the conditions of the Ainu community. The most con-
tentious such project was the construction of a dam near Nibutani in
the southwest of Hokkaidō, where the Ainu have traditionally captured
salmon. The Sapporo District Court ruled in favor of the Ainu in 1997
and recognized their indigenous rights.
Occupationally, many Ainu work in primary industry or the construc-
tion industry, with a considerable number being employed as casual day
laborers. Sharing a plight common to aboriginal people subjected to the
commercial forces of the industrialized world, Ainu have often been por-
trayed as leading exotic lives and made showpieces for the tourism indus-
try. The Ainu community is increasingly cautious about the exploitation
of the curiosity value of their arts and crafts. Nonetheless, the fact remains
that Ainu culture differs in many respects from the culture of the majority
of Japanese, bearing further testimony to the diversity of Japanese ways
of life. Some ecologists and environmentalists find fresh inspiration in
29 Hokkaidō Prefectural Government 2006.

30 There are a number of place names of Ainu origin in the eastern and northern parts of
Honshū island. This is testimony to the fact that the Ainu lived in these areas in ancient
Japan and a reminder that Japanese military power pushed the Ainu to the north after a
series of military conquests.
the customary Ainu mode of life, which emphasizes ‘living with nature’.
Ainu culture is based on a world-view which presumes that everything in
nature, be it tree, plant, animal, bird, stone, wind, or mountain, has a life
of its own and can interact with humanity. But only the very old remem-
ber the songs and folklore which have been orally transmitted through
generations, because the Ainu language has no written form. With most
Ainu being educated in Japanese schools and their everyday language
being Japanese, the preservation of Ainu culture requires positive inter-
vention, without which it might disappear entirely.
The continuance of discrimination and prejudice against Ainu
prompted the Hokkaidō Ainu Association to alter its name to the
Hokkaidō Utari Association to avoid the negative image of the Ainu
label (utari in the Ainu language means comrades, intimates, and kin).
Against the backdrop of the rise of ethnic consciousness around the
world since the late 1960s, Ainu groups became involved in international
exchanges with ethnic minority groups in similar plights in other coun-
tries, including North American Indians and Eskimos. In 1994, the Year
of Indigenous Peoples, Ainu groups organized an international confer-
ence in Nibutani in Hokkaidō, paving the way for increased international
exchanges between such groups.
After years of the utari groups’ demands, in 1977 the Japanese parlia-
ment put into effect a new law governing the Ainu population into effect,
to ‘promote Ainu culture and disseminate knowledge about the Ainu tra-
dition’. This historic charter urged the Japanese public to recognize the
existence of the Ainu ethnic community and its distinctive culture within
Japan. The law also pressed for respect for the ethnic dignity and rights
of the Ainu population. At the same time, a century-old discriminatory
law called Kyū-dojin hogohō (Law for the Protection of Former Savage
Natives), which had been in force since 1899, was repealed.
An Ainu representative who ran on a socialist ticket gained a seat in
the Upper House of the Japanese parliament in 1994 – the first Ainu to
do so – and made a speech there partly in the Ainu language. While few
high school social studies and history textbooks give an account of the
contemporary life of the Ainu,31 their voices at the parliamentary level
have both made them visible to the Japanese public and given some hope
for its better understanding of Ainu issues.
VI Immigrant Workers from Overseas
Foreigners resident in Japan increased dramatically in the 1980s and early

1990s. An influx of workers from the Philippines, China, Brazil, Peru,
31 AM, 21 December 1993, p. 29.
Thailand, and other developing countries boosted the total number of

foreign residents in Japan to nearly 2.22 million at the beginning of 2009,
approximately 1.74 percent of the total population.32 The figure includes
long-term Korean and Chinese residents, the so-called ‘old comers’, who
are descendants of those who came to Japan during the Japanese colo-
nization period in the first half of the twentieth century. In addition,
nearly 113 thousand undocumented foreign workers are believed to be
working in the margins of the Japanese economy, with Koreans, Chinese,
and Filipinos forming the largest groups. In total, then, the ‘newcom-
ers’, both registered and undocumented – who do not include zainichi
Koreans and Chinese – are estimated to come close to two million. This
situation has produced a significant diversification in the composition of
the foreign population, with new migrants forming the fourth minority
group in Japan.
Numerically, the largest foreign population in 2009 was Chinese, fol-
lowed by Koreans, Brazilians, Filipinos, Peruvians, and Americans.33
The Census data shows that the national background of foreigners in the
workforce is correlated with their occupational status.34 Approximately
half of them are employed as production process workers and laborers,
most of whom are Latin American and Asian. More than 10 percent
work as professional and technical workers, many of whom are North
American and British.
The unprecedented flow of foreign workers into Japan stemmed from
the situations in both the domestic and foreign labor markets. ‘Pull’
factors within Japan included the aging of the Japanese workforce and
the accompanying shortage of labor in unskilled, manual, and physi-
cally demanding areas. In addition, the changing work ethic of Japanese
youth has made it difficult for employers to recruit them for this type of
work, which is described in terms of the three undesirable Ks (or Ds in
English): kitanai (dirty), kitsui (difficult), and kiken (dangerous). Under
these circumstances, a number of employers found illegal migrants, in
particular from Asia, a remedy for their labor shortage. On the ‘push’
side, the strong Japanese yen is attractive to foreign workers who wish to
save money in Japan in the hope of establishing good lives in their home
countries after working hard for a few years.
The overwhelming majority of employers who hire foreign workers
are themselves on the bottom rung of the subcontracting pyramid in
construction and manufacturing, or are in the most financially shaky
sectors of the service industry. These employers generally manage very
petty businesses which involve late-night or early-morning work, and
32 Ministry of Justice 2009. 33 Ministry of Justice 2009. 34 The 2005 Census data.
which must weather economic fluctuations at the lowest level of the occu-
pational hierarchy. Male immigrants who work as construction labor-
ers usually perform heavy work at construction sites. Most of those
who are employed in manufacturing work in metal fabrication, operate
presses and stamping machinery, make car parts, or work for printers and
binders. In the service sector, migrant workers are employed in restau-
rants and other establishments to do much of the dirty work.35 Many
female foreign workers are hired as bar hostesses, strip-teasers, and sex-
industry workers. Without Japanese language skills and knowledge of
Japanese culture, these new immigrants form the most marginalized clus-
ter within the marginalized population in Japan.
The ‘new-comer’ migrants do not form a monolithic block. Many ‘self-
actualization’ types exist alongside the stereotyped ‘money-seekers’, who
come to Japan to earn Japanese yen.36 Some are pseudo-exiles who left
their countries of origin because they had grown dissatisfied or disillu-
sioned with the political, economic, or social conditions there. Others are
students – both secondary and tertiary – learning the Japanese language
and other subjects while working as ‘irregular employees’. Moreover,
because of the shortage of Japanese young women who are willing to
marry farmers, a significant number of women from Asia married into
agricultural Japan. More recently, a growing demand for nursing care
workers has prompted a rise in qualified Asian women working in the
nursing service sector in Japan.
Undocumented foreign workers face numerous institutional and cul-
tural barriers.37 They are not entitled to enroll in the National Health
Insurance scheme and are therefore required to pay the full costs of
medical treatment. In cases of work-related accidents, they can file appli-
cations for workers’ accident compensation, but in doing so they risk
being reported to authorities and deported back to their countries of ori-
gin. Japanese schools, where the children of migrant workers enroll, face
the challenge of teaching Japanese to them with sensitivity to their lin-
guistic backgrounds. The longer undocumented foreign families reside
in Japan, the more firmly and extensively their children develop their
networks of friends. Many acquire Japanese as their first language and
cannot develop fluency in their parents’ mother tongue. These families
encounter a situation in which both staying and leaving present cultural
and linguistic dilemmas.
The influx of undocumented foreign workers has led to unfounded fear
in the public that they are potential criminals contaminating an allegedly
safe, crime-free society. These workers have difficulty in accessing legal
means, and the tightened police control has compelled some of them to
35 Komai 2001. 36 Komai 2001, pp. 54–64. 37 Komai 2001, pp. 105–17.
go ‘underground’ and enabled Japan’s criminal and semi-criminal ele-

ments to manipulate them more easily. Media tend to play up crimes
committed by foreigners, fueling xenophobic apprehensions in the com-
munity. Considerable evidence suggests that crime statistics on foreigners
in Japan are distorted and inflated.38
The Ministry of Justice instituted special treatment for the descendants
of overseas Japanese, allowing second and third generation Japanese from
foreign countries to work as residents in Japan, regardless of skill level.
Consequently, the number of young Japanese Brazilians, for instance, has
increased drastically in Aichi, Kanagawa, and Shizuoka prefectures where
the car plants of Toyota, Nissan, Suzuki, and Honda operate. Observers
attribute the preferential treatment of Japanese offspring to the Japanese
authorities’ ethnocentric belief that those of Japanese extraction are more
dependable, trustworthy, and earnest than other foreigners.
In addition, a program to train foreign workers in Japanese firms was
established. It was supposed to provide foreign workers with residence
permits and enable them to learn techniques and skills and to gain experi-
ence which they would use in their home countries. For many small firms
suffering labor shortages, the trainee program serves as a practical way of
recruiting cheap labor, because of ambiguities regarding the distinction
between real training and disguised labor. For large multinational cor-
porations with plants overseas, the program is a way to train future core
employees for their branch firms and solve their labor problems within
Japan.39
Two stances compete regarding the ways in which Japan should accept
non-Japanese as part of the nation. One position contends that the coun-
try should admit only skilled workers, already well educated and well
trained in their home countries. Underlying this argument is the obvi-
ous concern that unskilled workers will lower the standard of Japan’s
workforce, and that the nation will have to bear the cost of their train-
ing and acquisition of skills. There is also a tacit fear that, uneducated
and undisciplined, they may ‘contaminate’ Japanese society, leading to
its destabilization and disintegration.
The opposing position, which argues for the acceptance of unskilled
workers, is partly based on the pragmatic consideration that the Japanese
economy simply cannot survive without unskilled foreign workers fill-
ing the lowest segment of the nation’s labor force. The pro-acceptance
position also maintains that how Japan addresses its minority issues will
perhaps prove the most critical test of its globalization; the nation can
hardly claim to have a cosmopolitan orientation while it fails to accept
ethnic and racial diversity within.40
38 Herbert 1996. 39 Komai 2001. 40 See Komai 2001.

The grass-roots community attitudes to foreign residents in Japan are

varied and diverse. Many studies41 point out that Japanese nationals
residing in areas in which foreigners live in large numbers tend to take a
positive view towards them. Conversely, Japanese who have less contact
with foreign residents are likely to be more prejudicial and intolerant.
Research has also shown that blue-collar workers and low income earners
are likely to believe that Japanese society should remain monocultural and
believe that there is neither race-based nor nationality-based inequality.
In contrast, multiculturalists who feel that Japan should accept foreign
residents and believe that ethnic inequality is prevalent in Japan are well
educated and white-collar and occupy relatively high socio-economic
positions in Japanese society. They take an open-minded, egalitarian,
and progressive stance, while enjoying a comfortable standing as the
‘victors’ of status competition.42
VII Problems and Pitfalls
The notion of internationalization propels some segments of the Japanese

population toward more open, universalistic, and global orientations.
A considerable number of citizens’ groups devote themselves to assisting
and protecting foreign residents in Japan. Across the country many indi-
viduals of various ages attend study sessions on Japan’s ethnic issues, per-
form voluntary work in support of workers from overseas, and participate
in political rallies for the human rights of minority groups. With the inter-
national collapse of Cold War structures and the domestic realignment
of labor union organizations, minority movements too have shifted their
ideological framework away from the orthodox model of class struggle in
which links with the working class were given prime importance. Instead,
minority-group activists have moved towards international cooperation
with ethnic and other minority groups abroad.43
There is perhaps much truth in minority groups’ claims that their prob-
lems are the product of distortion and prejudice on the part of a majority
of Japanese. Until 1995 Japan was among the few nations which had not
ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, which the United Nations brought into effect
in 1969. Even after the ratification, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does
not consider the buraku discrimination problem as an area covered by
the Convention, on the grounds that it is not a racial issue. Challenging
41 For example, Nakazawa 2007, Tanabe 2001.

42 Ōtsuki 2008, p. 119. 43 AM, 5 March 1994, p. 3.
this view, buraku liberation movements argue that their minority sta-
tus derives from community prejudice based upon lineage or pedigree,
precisely the realm of discrimination which the Convention attempts
to eliminate. Japan’s peculiarity lies not in its freedom from minority
problems, but in its lack of recognition and admission that it has such
problems.
At the same time, minority groups face an awkward dilemma in
defending their culture. On one hand, they take it for granted that they
have every right to maintain and advocate their practices and values
to challenge the assimilationist ideas of the mainstream majority à la
Nihonjinron. This is why Ainu groups, for example, vigorously protest
whenever leading Japanese politicians commit gaffes by claiming that
Japan is a mono-ethnic and mono-cultural society. On the other hand,
if one accepts the blurring boundaries of each minority group and its
internal variations, one would have to avoid falling into the pitfall of
stereotyping it. When we say, for example, that zainichi Koreans are
entitled to uphold and expound Korean culture, we must ask, which
Korean culture? Given that it is diverse, dynamic, and multiple, its sub-
stance would differ, depending upon class, region, gender, and other
factors. In advancing the idea of a singular Korean culture, one would
be formulating Kankokujinron (theories of Koreans) that is concentric to
Nihonjinron. To the extent that other minority groups – be they buraku-
min or Okinawans – are internally variegated, they cannot avoid the
same trap if they advance the illusion of their singularity, uniformity, and
homogeneity.
VIII Japan Beyond Japan
The globalization of Japanese society has produced considerable num-

bers of three types of Japanese who live beyond Japan’s national boundary.
The total number of Japanese nationals living overseas exceeded one mil-
lion in 2008.44 The first of these are Japanese business people and their
families who are stationed abroad to manage company business under the
direction of corporate headquarters in Japan. With ample financial back-
ing from their head office, these Japanese nationals enjoy lavish lifestyles
far above those of the middle-class of their country of residence. In most
cases, they live in residences larger than their houses in Japan and relish
the good living which the strong yen allows them. Since their lives are
44 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009.

tied to Japanese corporate and state interests, their notion of internation-

alization is often coupled with a concern to maintain smooth business
relations with foreign countries and foreign nationals, to conduct peace-
ful diplomatic negotiations, and to present favorable images of Japanese
society abroad. To that extent, the tatemae of internationalization advo-
cated by these overseas business representatives is tinged with the honne
of nationalism.
The second type comprises Japanese citizens who choose of their
own volition to live overseas semi-permanently. Many are ‘cultural
refugees from Japan’ who have expatriated themselves from the corporate
world, the education system, or the community structure of Japanese
society.45 These people differ from previous Japanese emigrants who
fled economic hardship. New emigrants attempt to establish themselves
abroad to escape what they regard as Japan’s rigid social system. They
find satisfaction in living beyond the confines of the uchi world of Japan
and interacting with the soto world in a liberated fashion. By and large,
the new ‘lifestyle emigrants’ intend to stay in the country of their choice
for a reasonably long period, though they may not plan to settle there
permanently.46 They have one foot outside and the other inside Japan,
and endeavor to find some balance between the two worlds. To that
extent they live cross-culturally. Some go as far as to savor the pleasure of
‘cultural schizophrenia’. Others choose to forfeit Japanese citizenship and
become non-Japanese nationals, though their numbers are exceptionally
small. In Australia, one of the most popular destinations of such lifestyle
migrants, the citizenship acquisition rate of the Japanese is the lowest
among all migrant groups. The ‘strong loyalty of the Japanese to their
nationhood and the notion of “we Japanese” appear to be deep-seated’,
even among those who have chosen to live abroad indefinitely.47
The third type consists of an increasing number of foreigners who
reside outside Japan, have acquired fluency in the Japanese language and
are ‘Japan literate’, being capable of understanding not only the omote side
of Japanese society but the ura side as well. These people are ‘Japanese’,
linguistically and intellectually, if not in terms of national citizenship.
Some readers of this book may regard themselves as belonging to this
community of ‘cultural Japanese’.
With an increasing number of Japanese going beyond Japan’s geo-
graphical boundaries and more foreigners entering Japan, there is no
single answer to the vexed questions of who the Japanese are and
what Japanese culture is. While conventional analysis of the Japanese
and Japanese culture focuses upon the comparison between ‘straight
45 Sugimoto 1993, pp. 73–85. 46 Sato 2001. 47 Sato 2001, pp. 156–61.
Japanese’ and ‘straight foreigners’, knowledge of globalized Japan will

not improve without thorough investigation into the mixed categories,
some of which Table 7.3 displays.48 Japan beyond Japan sensitizes one to
the viability of conceiving of Japanese society, both inside and outside
the Japanese archipelago.
48 On this point, see Mouer and Sugimoto 1995, p. 244.

VIII.
ATTENZIONE: bozza (non ancora pubblicata).

Su richiesta dell’autore, si invitano gli studenti a non far circolare il saggio al di fuori dello
studio personale per l’esame.
Japan as an ‘erotic paradise’ in the Sino-Japanese mobility context: ethnographic

encounters
Jamie Coates,
Lecturer in East Asian Studies
University of Sheffield
The movement of people, media and commodities between Japan and its Sinophone
neighbours has had a kaleidoscopic effect on young Chinese desires and perceptions.
These mobilities have shaped Japan’s image as an ‘alternative east Asian modernity’
(Iwabuchi 2003). In particular, Japan’s early role as a major producer of popular culture
and luxury commodities informs what is considered desirable among young people in
places such as Beijing, Taipei and Hong Kong (Chua 2012; Iwabuchi, 2004; Lewis et al.,
2016). Mobilities between Japan and its neighbours have also contributed to emerging
gender norms (Louie and Low, 2005), expectations around professional practice (Wong,
2014), desire for education and social mobility (Fong, 2011), and debates around
historical memory (Ching, 2019). These circulations are the affective and imaginative
elements of relations between Japan and its neighbours (Yang, 2014), constituting the
informal and quotidian aspects of international relations (Schneider, 2015). These
processes have influenced how sexuality is visually and discursively understood in East
Asia (Wong 2014; Jacobs 2011), and the image of Japan is infused with erotic
associations in China and many other parts of East Asia. This chapter explores how the
perceptions and expectations of young mobile Chinese people in Japan are influenced
by its sexualised image, suggesting that Japan has become an important, but sometimes
problematic, site for young Chinese sexual experimentation.
Pluralising ethnosexual mobilities to Japan
My interest in young Chinese sexualities was somewhat of an accident. During my PhD
research with young Chinese people who had moved to Japan for study and work in the
early 2010s I had included an interview question about the role of Japanese popular
culture in young Chinese study participants’ decision to move to Japan. Many of them
could not point to any particular media production, whether a TV show, band,
animation or comic (manga), that had inspired them to come to Japan, but they would
often say that animations and manga left them with a ‘positive impression’ of the place.
At the time, I lived in a small private dormitory in Ikebukuro with a group of young
Chinese students. The dorm was mixed gender with small rooms separated by paper-
thin walls. We became relatively close over my fieldwork period because of this day-to-
day proximity.
After one of our dormmates made a joke about the ‘thinness’ of the walls, referring to
privacy issues and behaviours that residents may have preferred to conduct alone, one of
the young men admitted that he was a fan of Japanese pornography. He later confided
that perhaps his love of Japanese Adult Video (AV) influenced his decision to move to
Japan, and started to joke in Mandarin Chinese that there was something about Japanese
women that ‘suited him’ (shihe wo). This joke about Japan ‘suiting him’ turned into a
1
catchphrase in our dorm, the phrase shihe becoming the source material for a range of
silly innuendos. In this playful context, my interlocutor introduced me to some of the
major AV stars of the time, including Aoi Sola, whose influence and representation
became a side project in my work on Sino-Japanese mobilities and media (Coates 2014,
2017). None of my other informants at that time spoke as frankly as my dormmate, but I
came to notice more and more comments and behaviours that suggested many young
Chinese people found their time in Japan more sexually charged than I had thought at
first.
When I returned to do follow-up fieldwork in 2014, I found that those who had
remained in Japan had become more confident in discussing these matters with me, and
that a new cohort of young students and workers were much more explicit in their
interest in exploring their sexualities while abroad. My fieldwork saw me stumbling into
a variety of sexualised spaces in Tokyo where young Chinese people would observe, act
upon and talk about sex. These behaviours can be partly explained by their age (all of
my participants were under 45 and the majority were under 35), and the possibilities
afforded by being in a temporary situation while working or studying abroad. However,
over the two year period of my second round of fieldwork in Tokyo, I observed a
variety of references to media, and the way they intersected with performances and
behaviours in daily life that suggested the strong appeal of Japan as a space for sexual
exploration among young Chinese people.
In his ethnography of Tokyo’s famous hub of gay culture, Shinjuku ni chōme, Thomas
Baudinette interviewed non-Japanese visitors to the area to better understand racialized
forms of exclusion found within Japanese gay-subcultures (2016). Baudinette draws on
Nagel’s concept of ‘ethnosexual frontiers’ to discuss the way ethno-racial and sexual
identities intersect in contexts of encounter, such as touristic hotspots, acting as:
‘erotic locations and exotic destinations… that are constantly penetrated by
individuals forging sexual links with ethnic Others across ethnic borders’ (Nagel
2003: 14).
Baudinette notes that in coming to ni chōme, many young Chinese and South Korean
men saw themselves as ‘ethnosexual sojourners’, seeking new sexual experiences and
connections on short-term visits to Japan. Taking inspiration from Baudinette’s turn of
phrase, I extend this question of the ‘ethnosexual frontier’ to consider a broader range of
young Chinese experiences and desires in and of Japan. Amounting to roughly 300
regular contacts over 4 years of participant-observation, my encounters with young
Chinese sexualities are more varied and less focused than Baudinette’s work on a
particular field of sexual practices. Baudinette’s study of a select group of men in a
bounded area of Tokyo famous for its gay nightlife reveals the expectations of Japan
held by this particular group of largely short-term visitors engaging with Japan as a
leisure and holiday space. We might expect these visitors to have expectations and ideas
of Japan that would change during longer-term contact with the country, and through
daily life experiences in Japan. Yet my multi-sited and multi-method participant
observation reveals that similar expectations and attitudes endure among the longer-
term Chinese population around Tokyo. At the same time, the ethnographic material
analysed in this chapter draws out the nuance of these attitudes. Many of those who had
stayed in Japan for several years sought to maintain an exoticized or sexualized longing
2
for the imagined Japan that inspired their migration while negotiating the banalities of
everyday life in Tokyo. This ‘in-between’ state in turn shaped the very sexualized
imaginaries which engagement with Japan had fostered for my study participants, as
they find opportunities to explore their more ambiguous and amorphous desires in the
city..
As James Farrer noted in his classic work Opening Up (2002), sexuality and play are
fruitful sites to understand how young Chinese people imagine and negotiate the
contradictions of an increasingly global China. Spaces of encounter, as both Farrer,
Nagel and Baudinette note, are useful sites to analyse the complexities of these
imaginaries because they afford the enactment of at times contradictory and problematic
desires and perceptions. I connect Japan’s role as a major hub of sexualised media
content production to my observations during fieldwork to argue that young Chinese
imaginaries increasingly posit Japan as a place where ambiguous desires can be
explored - kind of playground, or seqing tiantang ‘erotic paradise’, as one of my
interlocutors once called it. I do not suggest that this is the only image of Japan among
young Chinese people, but nonetheless see it as an important and evocative part of the
plural imaginaries that circulate in the Sino-Japanese context. Given the complexities of
the relationship between China and Japan, and the global importance of this context, a
more pluralistic, multiscalar, and transnational approach to peoples perceptions helps us
move beyond the methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Schiller, 2003) common in
studies that discuss Chinese and Japanese perceptions of each other.
Young Chinese desires in Tokyo
The northwest corner of Ikebukuro has a reputation for adult entertainment and a
‘riskier’ nightlife than many other parts of Tokyo. As a well-known Japanese barman in
the area once said to me in a mixture of Japanese and English, Ikebukuro is a
‘borderland’ at the intersection of Tokyo’s inner circle and its surrounding suburbs
(Coates 2018). Ikebukuro is difficult to define in many ways due to its liminal position
in the city. This liminality has also ensured that it is home to a variety of people and
practices that do not fit within hegemonic figurations of Japanese culture and urban
space. Ikebukuro attracted all kinds of ‘outsiders’ over the twentieth century, including
migrants, avant garde artists, and organized crime. The northwest corner is unofficially
known as a Chinatown because of over 300 Chinese owned businesses in the area
(Yamashita 2010) and the large number of Chinese residents in the region surrounding
Ikebukuro. It is not where long-term Chinese residents tend to live, but it is a major hub
for Chinese sociality in Tokyo.
When I returned to Tokyo in 2014 for my second period of fieldwork, I found that many
of my former participants had become considerably richer. One person in particular led
a small group of Chinese business owners to buy an old cabaret club in Ikebukuro and
refurbished it to become a venue for live musical performances. According to the
managers, roughly 90 per cent of their customers were Chinese-speaking, including
Chinese ethnic minorities, such as Uyghurs, and overseas Chinese visitors from places
such as Singapore. Since finishing my fieldwork, a significant number of Vietnamese
students have also been attracted to the Chinese-owned businesses in the area. Of the
Chinese customers that I met, the gender split was relatively even, with customers
tending to come in large groups. There were students, local business owners, office
3
workers, and construction workers, as well as artists, academics, musicians, and
filmmakers. In this sense, the customers who frequented the bar in Ikebukuro were not
representative of any particular demographic in Japan’s over 750,000 registered Chinese
migrant population (Ministry of Justice, Japan, 2017) but reflected a cross-section of
Chinese-speaking urbanites in Tokyo.
As the bills grew, the venue started to take on a wider variety of acts, and in discussion
with his circle of shareholders the manager decided to try to attract more young Chinese
students by including ‘fresh’ (xinxian) and ‘sexy’ (xinggan) acts. This space became an
ideal place for me to get to know young Chinese people in a different way, learning how
and why they came to see different performances. I observed pole dancing, a variety of
fetish circus acts, twerking competitions and burlesque stripteases. I saw a singing
competition for Tokyo’s ‘little fresh meat’ (xiaoxianrou), a term for young men with
soft features who have become popular among female audiences (Xu and Tan 2019),
and a regular strip show performed by bodybuilders from the Japanese staff at a local
‘muscleman’ (kinniku men) bar. To celebrate the anniversary of the place, they invited
specialist Nyōtaimori performers, a practice where food is artfully arranged on naked
women, although in this context they wore underwear.
As the manager of the bar said, ‘our customers mostly come to gawk (guiwang) at all
the strange things Japan has to offer’. Novelty, curiosity, and a sense of transgression
were the major objectives of these acts, rather than appealing to specific sexual tastes.
One irony of this emphasis was that ‘what Japan had to offer’ was largely constructed
by the bar manager and his peers. Yet, there was an open and experimental attitude to
what might be popular, and they welcomed any kind of performance at least once. Their
choices reflected the appeal of a sexually charged atmosphere to a wide variety of
clientele, and the popularity of the bar acted as a litmus test for the sexual imaginaries
of its young mobile Chinese customers. As one young woman from Northeast China
laughed and said while we sat in a group and watched two bodybuilders lift and undress
a Japanese woman, in the eyes of many young Chinese people ‘Japan is an erotic
paradise! (seqing tiantang)’.
Since the opening reforms, scholars have noted an increasing focus on the individual
(Yan, 2009), and the importance of sexuality within young Chinese people’s efforts to
understand themselves (Farrer 2002; Jacobs 2011). As Lisa Rofel argues, this trend has
also seen an increasing desire for ‘consumerist cosmopolitan’ lifestyles in China (Rofel
2007). Particularly among the young, this ‘cosmopolitanism with Chinese
characteristics’ has been explored through the consumption of public allegories that
denote a shift from a socialist moral ‘consciousness’ to a postsocialist terrain of ‘desire’
(2007:33). Comments such as those of the young woman mentioned above, suggest the
ways travelling overseas and participating in playful spaces such as this bar facilitate the
exploration of different sexual desires. Moreover, as the young woman shows, it also
allows people to experiment with how they discuss these desires with their peers.
Like many bars, the sexually-charged environment would often result in customers
hooking up in later hours, going home together, or sneaking off to a love hotel. It would
also foster extended networks of people who, having seen something risqué, became
curious about what else they might experience in Tokyo. It was in these instances where
the connection between Japanese sexualised media and Chinese imaginaries were
4
easiest to trace. For example, a group of men, mostly office workers and recent
graduates, discovered a passion for erotic photography. One of them found a contact
who would let them pay to privately photograph AV stars in specially designated spaces
(hotel rooms, studios, and a few rentable penthouse apartments) so they started to
arrange monthly meetups where they would share the costs. The group was led by a
photographer who took risqué shots that he described as giving viewers the sense that
they are interacting with AV stars. He had a significant following online in China,
where he would only post shots that carefully complied with Chinese regulations. In the
private circle of Chinese photographers in Japan, however, they would post far more
explicit material.
Similarly, one of the organizers of the performances in the bar was heavily involved in
Tokyo’s wider BDSM community. A bisexual man originally from Suzhou, he would
often invite people he met at the bar to join him at other events across the city. On one
occasion, for instance, after talking late into the evening with a young woman who was
a fan of the photographer Nobuyoshi Araki, the organizer invited her to come to a
special event. Araki’s work blurs the line between photography and pornography as he
has often worked for porn magazines and largely explores erotic themes in his solo
exhibitions (Coates 2019). His eccentric star persona also popularised Japanese rope
bondage, a craft that involves elaborate knots and suspension using soft ropes. The
special event that the young woman was invited to was designed for people curious
about rope bondage. Run by two Japanese women in a private residence, there were
only a few people when the young woman went and she was able to experiment with
rope suspension and latex wear. After attending, she told me she became a regular at
similar events and was eager to learn more about BDSM. She even helped the man from
Suzhou organize a China-themed fetish event in Roppongi called Shanghai Rouge,
where a reimagined 1920s cosmopolitan Shanghai aesthetic was converted into latex,
such as tightfitting latex Cheongsam, and performances combined Manchurian
iconography, Japanese rope bondage and various kinds of avant garde fetish
performances.
Playful discussions and experiments with sexuality among the young Chinese people I
met also afforded explorations of gender. Often these explorations served to consolidate
heterosexual and hegemonic masculine norms. For example, I often heard of men
visiting local massage parlours together after a night out, although I was never witness
to their participation in these activities. As one of them said to me ‘this is what brothers
(xiongdi) do’ echoing established scholarship on gender in China which argues that
expression of homosocial desire and the sharing of sexual experiences compliment each
other in the assertion of hegemonic Chinese masculine ideals (Louie 2002; Osburg
2013). Yet even these practices created spaces for the negotiation of new gender
identities. I met a young person who was negotiating whether or not to start telling
people that they identified as a trans man. In conversation with their friends in a
restaurant that we often went to, they spoke about how they did not see themselves as
‘trans’ (kua) but yet in their heart they also felt they were a man. As they spoke with
their friends they talked about how this became increasingly apparent since coming to
Japan, where they desired women like a man but did not see themselves as homosexual
(tongxinglian). They also talked about the time that they and one of their male friends
decided to go to a ‘soapland’ together. Soaplands are bathhouses where customers can
5
pay for a range of non-penetrative sex acts while also being massaged and washed. This
experience, according to my interlocutor, sparked a sense that a whole world of
different experiences were possible in Japan. Being both away from their parents, and in
a context that they had idealised as a sexual paradise thus afforded a range of
possibilities in the eyes of my young Chinese informants.
Media flows and the sexualisation of Japan

Japan has long been an object of sexualised fascination and orientalism (Said 1979)
within wider media and material culture flows. Through the Japonisme movement in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Japanese popular culture heavily influenced
the erotic tropes found within European art (Bru 2013), becoming both a source of
orientalist desire and queer critique in wider discourses of western sexuality at the time
(Ricard 2016). After 1945, additional connotations and expectations were added to
Japan’s sexualised image. As Naoko Shibusawa has shown, the sexualisation of Japan
served as a significant method for transforming Japan’s image from enemy to desirable
ally in Anglophone media following the war (2006). During the Cold War era, desire
for Japan accelerated under the globalisation of its new image (Befu 2001), its own
economic successes and media productions, positioning Japan as an important hub of
eroticised ‘cool’ by the 1980s. These trends and efforts continued into the 1990s and
2000s, shaping how Japan is perceived in popular media, and how Japanese government
sponsored agencies have tried to promote Japan as ‘cool’ (Daliot-Bul 2009; Mclelland
2016). As Michal Daliot-Bul notes, in places such as Israel this popular representation
has resulted in an image of Japan as ‘a land of eroticism, grotesqueness and non-sense’
(2007:175). Daliot-Bul’s critique applies to places such as the United Kingdom too,
where some of the earliest distributors of Japanese popular culture, such as Tartan Asia
Extreme, focused on the more explicit and strange productions of Japan and East Asian
cinema. As a consequence, teaching about Japan in countries such as the UK, the US,
and Australia, often necessitates problematising the appeal of ‘weird’ and eroticised
Japan among students (Mclelland 2016).
As the experimental play that many of my informants engaged in demonstrates, Japan’s
image as a land of sexual fantasy and desire is not relegated to the Anglo-European
world. Many of the stereotypes that fill Japan’s sexualised image in East Asia are
similar to those found in the ‘west’, but the trajectories and histories that shape these
flows differ. As Koichi Iwabuchi has argued (2002), Japan became a powerful cultural
and economic force within East Asia from the 1980s onwards, in many senses acting as
an alternative global hegemon within the region. The centrality of Japan’s position in
global flows is perhaps less certain than it once was, but its historical influence on East
Asian popular culture reverberates into new sites of cultural production today
(Otmazgin, 2013). In particular, Japan’s historic role in East Asian pornographic media
and its associated sexualities is significant (Wong and Yau 2010).
The circulation of Japanese pornographic materials in the Sinophone world has a
distinct history that differs from the ways Japan has appeared in Anglo-European media.
There was very little distribution of Japanese popular culture in mainland China before
the ‘opening and reform’ (gaige kaifang) period starting in 1978, whereas Hong Kong
6
and Taiwan had significant cultural ties with Japan over the Cold War period. As a
consequence, when China opened its borders to cultural products from ‘foreign’
countries, Hong Kong and Taiwan became important mediators and channels for
Japanese popular culture in the mainland (Li 2004; Yang and Xu 2016). The 1990s saw
the popularity of Japanese television dramas rise in mainland China where ‘beautiful
people, beautiful clothes, good food, and good entertainment’ (Chua 2004: 206)
portrayed new possible modernities to Chinese audiences (Iwabuchi 2002; Lewis,
Martin and Sun 2016). Today, domestic productions and the popularity of a wider range
of foreign products in China, particularly Korean music and dramas, has seen the
decline of Japanese dramas. Yet, the powerful historic position of Japanese media over
the past 40 years ensures that its influence can still be traced economically, aesthetically,
and politically (Berry et al 2009). Moreover, media featuring sexual content, including
live AV, games, manga, animation and literature, are more likely to be of Japanese
origin or style in Chinese-speaking contexts (Chao 2016; Jacobs 2016; Saito 2017).
The spread of pornography in Japan and among its neighbours is closely related to
changes in the technology used to distribute them (Wong and Yau 2014, 2016). Erotic
film productions such as ‘pink films’ (pinku eiga) and ‘soft-core narrative-based
pornography’ (roman poruno) were screened in cinemas during their peak popularity in
the 1970s (Sharp 2008). The only forms of portable erotic imagery available at this time
were illicit photographs, provocative record covers, and magazines featuring sexual
content. Much like in other parts of the world, the advent of video technology changed
the way the moving image was consumed particularly in relation to sexually
transgressive material, as Alex Zahlten has noted (Zahlten, 2017). These changes
afforded possibilities for pornography to be consumed in different settings and to cross
national borders in new ways. After pornographic content was mobilised through these
new affordable technologies in the 1980s, Japanese AV became influential and popular
in neighbouring countries (Yau 2009; Yau and Wong 2010; Wong and Yau 2014).
Since the opening reforms of the early 1980s, the influence of pornography has been a
vocal concern of the Chinese Communist Party, and at the time of writing this chapter
in 2019, pornography remains illegal in the PRC. Article 363 of the Criminal Law states
that ‘anyone who produces, duplicates, publishes, sells or disseminates obscene articles
for the purpose of profit-making can be sentenced to a maximum of life imprisonment,
plus a fine and confiscation of property’ (National People’s Congress 1997 cited in
Yang and Xu 2016). This concern has seen a variety of ‘anti-corruption’ campaigns set
to balance the cultural influences of ‘opening up’ among conservative government
agencies since early 1980s (Jacobs 2011). In 2014 the National Office against
Pornographic and Illegal Publications in China, set out a nationwide campaign to curb
the distribution of pornographic content, resulting in the closure of an estimated 1.8
million media accounts across a variety of platforms (SCMP 2014). These efforts
appear to be largely unable to prevent young people from accessing sexually explicit
material. For example, sexologist Pan Suiming’s national survey found that some 79 per
cent of young Chinese men and 50 per cent of young Chinese women have accessed
pornography in 2015 (Pan, 2018). Moreover, although there was considerable growth in
the number of women accessing pornography since his survey started in the early
2000s, there has not been a significant change in young men’s rate of consumption. The
gap between China’s restrictive legal environment and the persistent consumption of
7
pornography suggests that the largest part of the Chinese-speaking world, those in
mainland China, depend on hidden, informal and illegal distribution mechanisms to
access sexually explicit material. The formal and informal distribution of Japanese
sexually explicit popular culture in the Chinese-speaking world has grown
exponentially since the early 2000s, fostering new imaginative connections and sexual
vernacular.
Yau and Wong have shown how intermediaries such as those who subtitle, repackage,
and sell Japanese pornography in Taiwan act as important translators and distributors in
the transnational circulation of Japanese AV (2010). Firstly via pirated videos, VCDs
and DVDs, and later through the use of online sharing systems, informal pornographic
economies have created a bedrock of sexual consumption in China today. However,
Japanese media’s influence on young Chinese sexual imaginaries is not limited to adult
videos. Japanese ‘Boys Love’ (BL) manga, which typically features male-male sexual
and romantic couplings of fictional characters in novel ways, has been incredibly
popular since the late 1990s, largely through the efforts of local Chinese and Taiwanese
translators (Yang and Xu 2016). It has since inspired the popularisation of danmei
literature which follows similar themes in literary form, where the female gaze is turned
upon male-male relationships between beautiful fictional men. Erotic Japanese
computer games have similarly influence Chinese sexualities, with fans sharing a
variety of games since the early 2000s. These games have become increasingly popular
since the introduction of international online game retail platforms such as Steam
(Technode 2019). These various mediums and genre afford quasi-legal ways of
exploring a variety of transgressive sexualities in China through largely digital written
and animated forms.
Wong and Yau’s work on the reception of Japanese pornography in Taiwan suggests
that complex translational politics occur when media content moves between contexts
(2010, 2012, 2014). As Wong and Yau point out (2010, 2012) the popularity of
Japanese AV among Taiwanese men largely depends on the resonance between
dominant ‘sexual scripts’ (Simon and Gagnon 1986) in Japan and Taiwan. In contrast,
Taiwanese women’s engagement with video pornography appears to be more mixed,
showing a preference for American pornography as a form of opposition to hegemonic
male tastes in Taiwan (2014). In a slightly different Sinophone context, Katrien Jacobs’
research shows how female web users in mainland China engage with Japanese
pornography most, but that their goals in consuming sexually explicit media are as
much about transgressive affects and gender play as they are about sexual excitement
(2016). Beyond these examples found in extant scholarship, my own fieldwork among
young Chinese people in Ikebukuro suggests that a wide range of sexual interests from
Japanese AV and erotic fan-fiction to BDSM manuals and the works of explicit
photographers such as Nobuyoshi Araki all feed into a kaleidoscopic range of sexual
imaginaries among young Chinese consumers that inform the ‘image’ of Japan as a
space of encounter and exploration.
Trouble in ‘Erotic Paradise’
As many of the examples mentioned above suggest, the sexual explorations of many
young Chinese people are enmeshed with problematic geopolitical, affective and
gendered issues. In recent years, the increase in Chinese migrants and students has been
8
matched by an increase in tourists. In my fieldsite the line between tourist, migrant and
student was often blurred, and many young migrants worked side jobs as guides and
organizers for Chinese visitors. Japan’s image as an ‘erotic paradise’ has seen new
discussions and practices grow among Chinese tourists in Japan, suggesting that Japan
is increasingly viewed as an ‘ethnosexual frontier’. These desires have played out in
recent scandals featuring Chinese people in Japan. For example, in April 2015 during
the peak tourism season, 3 Chinese tourists travelling in Japan were charged with sexual
harassment offences; one for taking photos from underneath a young Japanese woman’s
skirt, one for lifting a woman’s skirt on a crowded train, and the other for grabbing a
woman’s buttocks in Akihabara (Record China, 2015). When asked why they did it, the
men responded that they thought it was an acceptable practice within Japan. While these
men’s reasoning can be easily interpreted as merely an excuse, they also hint towards
perceptions of Japan in China that rely on particular kinds of sexual imaginaries. At
times these sexual practices can be seen as nationalistic (Barme, 1995) and an example
of the increasing political and economic heft of Chinese sojourners. However, they are
also suggestive of the ways that desire and transgression in everyday China relate to the
consumption of sexualized media content (Jacobs 2011).
On an early evening walk back to one of my interviewee’s apartment in the summer of
2015, these issues became particularly apparent to me. I was working on a project
about young Chinese people’s media habits in Tokyo, and my interviewee invited me
back to his home to show me the content that he typically consumed on his computer.
We had been chatting as we walked, but my interviewee repeatedly had to stop to take
calls. Trying not to intrude, I looked away at the sunset and focused on the questions I
wanted to ask, while my interviewee stood behind me negotiating a schedule and a
series of prices. I overheard him say ‘that’s right, they asked for an AV actress’ as my
interviewee hung up. Noticing my attention, he smiled with embarrassment and
explained how a couple of his ‘old mates’ (laogemenr) had come on a package tour
from mainland China to Japan, and had hoped for a few extra services beyond the tour.
They had read online that it was possible to arrange sexual encounters with less famous
Japanese porn stars and were hoping that my interviewee might be able to arrange it.
This phone conversation derailed our initial interview plans. Surprised at my ignorance
about the rise of this practice, my interviewee was keen to explain that, although he did
not use them, he knew of a few ‘Delivery Health’ (Deri Heru) services that were
starting to provide ‘Japanese AV star’ experiences. He continued that it did not really
matter if the women were actually AV stars, so long as they looked the part. When I
asked what looking like an AV star meant, he jokingly said, ‘Well, there are all kinds of
AV stars. You don’t even have to be good looking. Approachable Japanese women who
are decent looking (hai bucuo) have a certain AV quality to them. Am I right?’
Delivery Health is a sexual service in Japan where a customer books a timeslot in a
hotel room and pays a second party to have someone come and perform non-penetrative
sexual acts for them. These acts include various forms of massage, fellatio and manual
sex acts that are often framed as forms of iyashi (healing/comforting) (Koch 2016;
Plourde 2014), hence the name ‘Delivery Health’. This service, alongside many others
already mentioned within this chapter, carefully negotiates Japan’s laws around adult
entertainment and sex work. Many young Chinese sojourners to Japan are interested in
exploring this world of commercial sex.
9
The sexual discourses and practices that occur when Chinese sojourners encounter
Japan as a sexual playground speak to multiple imaginaries. They speak to Chinese
youths’ imaginations of sexual liberty and modernity, where China represents a past
constituted by conservatism and responsibility, and Japan represents an alternative
Asian modernity of ‘open’ (kaifang) morals. They also speak to the promise of a near
future where being Chinese no longer excludes you from that modernity, but rather
provides you with the economic and sociocultural privilege to explore. The consumerist
and nationalistic logics that filter into these imaginaries can be problematic, such as the
various ways Japanese women’s bodies are commodified in the examples above. And
they reflect the way that gender and sexuality manifest in the geopolitical rise of a more
assertive global Chinese public. Yet, as I have shown, even in the clearly hegemonic
masculine framings of many of these sexual practices and discourses, other possibilities
emerge. These ambiguous dynamics suggest that it would be too simplistic to argue that
Japan is merely stereotyped and consumed by young Chinese people as a discursive
object. Rather, echoing Baudinette, Farrer, and Nagel’s use of ‘ethnosexual frontier’ it is
a space where multiple possibilities unfold. In this sense, Japan is positioned as an
‘heterotopia’ (Foucault and Miskowiec, 1986), a place framed as ‘outside of the
ordinary’ where normative perceptions and rules change. As both a discursive object
and spatial construct filtered through sexualized popular culture, Japan’s image as an
‘erotic paradise’ and ‘playground’ appear to be an increasingly popular frame among
young Chinese sojourners, reflecting a reconfiguration of Japan’s place in globalizing
Chinese imaginaries.
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13
IX.
Cultural Studies Review

volume 19 number 2 September 2013
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/csrj/index
pp. 99–124
 Toshio Miyake 2013
!
Italian Transnational Spaces in Japan
Doing Racialised, Gendered and Sexualised Occidentalism
TOSHIO MIYAKE
UNIVERSITÀ CA' FOSCARI VENEZIA
—INTRODUCTION: ‘JAPAN’ MEETS ‘ITALY’
Following( the( global( success( of( the( ‘Made( in( Italy’( brand( in( the( 1980s,( Japan(
witnessed( an( Italian( consumer( boom( (Itaria& būmu)( in( the( early( 1990s( that( turned(
Italy( into( the( most( loved( foreign( country,( especially( of( women( and( young( people,(
over( the( last( decade.1( The( recent( attractiveness( of( Italy( in( Japan( is( arguably(
unparalleled( around( the( world( in( its( intensity( and( duration,( but( the( phenomenon(
has(gone(largely(unnoticed(in(scholarly(literature.(Italy’s(popularity(relies(to(a(large(
extent( on( how( the( country( has( been( constructed( as( an( idealised( and( orientalised(
‘West’:(an(imagined(geography(resulting(from(an(ambivalent(process(involving(both(
the( superiorisation( of( its( antique( or( classical( past( (the( Roman( Empire,( the(
Renaissance)(and(the(inferiorisation(of(its(recent(past(and(contemporary(present.(It(
is( the( very( configuration( of( Italy( as( a( strategic( interface( between( the( hegemonic(
EuroLAmerican(other(and(the(subaltern(Japanese(self(that(proves(to(be(particularly(
ISSN 1837-8692
seductive(in(the(mediation(of(deepLrooted,(unresolved(and(uncanny(tensions(of(proL(
and(antiLWesternism.2(
However,(a(peculiarity(in(the(initial(formation(of(this(imagined(geography(is(the(
relatively( small( degree( of( direct( and( significant( contributions( coming( from( Italian(
institutions,( corporations( and( migrants.( At( present,( Italy–Japan( relations( are( quite(
marginal(in(their(overall(political(significance(and(the(degree(of(economic(exchange(
and(migration(between(the(two(nations.(So,(how(did(this(kind(of(simulacrum(become(
so( popular( in( Japan( throughout( the( twentieth( century?( What( (un)familiar(
implications( might( the( ‘Italy’( made( by( and( for( others( have( on( the( experience( of(
Italianness(among(Italian(students,(workers(and(migrants(in(contemporary(Japan?(
As( it( happens,( Japan( has( also( become( increasingly( attractive( in( Italy( over( the(
last(few(decades,(due(to(the(international(success(of(its(transmedial(constellation(of(
J/culture—manga,( anime,( video( games,( subcultural( styles( and( so( on.( It( is( intriguing(
that( this( has( happened( without( an( overly( strong( or( significant( intervention( from(
Japanese(institutions,(corporations(or(migrants.(Over(the(last(thirty(years,(Italy,(like(
many( other( countries( in( the( world,( has( witnessed( its( younger( generations( become(
broadly( enculturated( from( early( childhood( through( contact( with( Japanese( popular(
cultures;( it( does,( however,( stand( out( for( broadcasting( the( greatest( number( of(
television(anime&series(outside(Japan,(a(fact(that(has(contributed(to(the(configuration(
of(Japan(as(a(highly(popular(and(‘cool’(Far(East.3(
The( growing( popularity( of( Japan( in( Italy( relies( upon( the( conflation( of( modern(
Orientalism( with( postmodern( technoLOrientalism,( intermingling( hyperLtraditional(
icons—such( as( geisha,( samurai( and( zen( aesthetics—with( hyperLmodern( icons( of(
Japan’s( highLtech( cityscape,( mangaesque( consumer( culture( and( fashionable( youth(
culture.(As(a(result,(Japan(is(understood(as(a(cultural(oxymoron,(a(contradictory(and(
exciting( fusion( of( extreme( differences:( East/West,( tradition/modernity,(
nature/technique,( mysticism/alienation.4( This( imagined( geography( of( Japan( is( also(
sustained,( even( if( to( a( lesser( extent( than( its( Italian( counterpart( in( Japan,( by( its(
potential(to(mediate(tensions(of(identification(and(othering(related(to(notions(of(‘the(
East’( and( ‘the( West’.( Finally,( it( has( induced( more( and( more( young( Italians( to(
experiment(with(the(hybridisation(of(a(‘Japan(made(in(Italy’(in(terms(of(globalising(
culture,(as(well(as(to(study(Japanese(or(visit(or(work(in(Japan.5(
100 ! !VOLUME19 NUMBER2 SEP2013!

This(essay(engages(with(the(concept(of(the(uncanny(in(Italy–Japan(relations(by(
considering( them( as( configured( by( the( broader( hegemony( of( modern(
Occidentalism.6( To( investigate( how( Italian( transnational( spaces( in( modern( and(
contemporary( Japan( are( invested( with( complex( projections( of( un/familiarity,( it(
focuses( on( the( interrelational,( intersectional( and( positional( process( engendered( by(
the(interaction(of(Occidentalism,(Orientalism(and(selfLOrientalism.((
The( interrelational( approach( highlights( how( imagined( and( emotional(
geographies( of( ‘Italy’( in( Japan( have( been( shaped( by( the( asymetrical( and( liminal(
positions( of( both( nationLstates( in( regard( to( the( centre( of( colonial( and( imperialist(
capitalism.( This( essay( argues( that( it( is( the( founding( ambivalence( of( modern( Japan(
and( Italy( as( both( orientalising( and( orientalised( nationLstates( that( has( to( be(
repressed( to( guarantee( the( reproduction( of( Occidentalism,( something( that(
periodically(resurfaces,(haunting(the(reassuring(unity(of(‘the(West’,(‘the(East’,(‘Italy’(
and(‘Japan’.((
The( intersectional( approach( employed( here( points( to( the( intertwined( and(
cumulative( effect( of( multiple( dimensions( of( identification( and( othering,( such( as(
civilisation,( nation,( class,( race/ethnicity,( gender,( sexual( orientation,( on( the( intraL
societal( level.7( This( enables( Occidentalism( to( bridge( different( fields( of( discourse,(
representations( and( emotions,( ultimately( resulting( in( the( naturalisation( of( its(
effectiveness(as(an(almost(invisible(hegemony.((
Finally,(the(positional(approach(employed(by(this(study(provides(a(more(spaceL(
and( timeLspecific( perspective( in( order( to( facilitate( a( focus( on( the( consumerLdriven(
Italian(boom(in(Japan(during(the(1990s.(More(specifically,(it(offers(the(opportunity(to(
investigate( the( dis/conjunctive( impact( and( selfLreflexive( potential( of( the( othering(
gaze(to(the(subjective(experience(of(Italian(young(migrants(in(contemporary(Japan(in(
terms(of(whiteness,(gender(and(sexual(orientation.(
—TOWARD A CRITICAL OCCIDENTALISM: INTERRELATIONALITY, INTERSECTIONALITY, POSITIONALITY
From( a( historical( perspective,( Italy( and( Japan( share( the( important( commonality( of(
being( latecomers( in( the( process( of( the( formation( of( modern( nationLstates( (Italy( in(
1861,( Japan( in( 1868).( This( results( in( both( a( relatively( marginal( position( for( each(
country( in( relation( to( the( centre( of( world( modernisation( and( an( ambiguous( status(
with( regard( to( the( East/West( divide.( Both( became( imperialist( nations( in( the( late(
Toshio Miyake—Italian Transnational Spaces in Japan 101

nineteenth(and(early(twentieth(centuries,(imposing(colonialist(domination(on(NorthL
East( Africa( or( East( Asia;( but( they( have( also( both( been( ultimately( subordinated( to(
more( powerful( nationLstates,( such( as( Great( Britain,( Germany( or( the( United( States.(
Both( countries( have( undergone( the( process( of( modern( nation( building( as( an(
imagined( community( without( being( either( fully( hegemonic( or( subaltern,( or(
completely( ‘Western’( or( ‘Eastern’.( In( other( words,( Italy( and( Japan( share( a( liminal(
position,(having(been(agents(in(the(recent(past(of(orientalistic(othering(in(terms(of(
race/ethnicity,(gender,(class,(and(so(on(through(the(colonisation(of(subaltern(regions(
and( peoples( on( the( one( hand,( but( also( because( they( have( been( objects( of( the( very(
same( Orientalism( imposed( upon( them( by( more( hegemonic( nationLstates( on( the(
other.(Accordingly,(it(can(be(argued(that(modern(national(identity(in(Italy(and(Japan,(
and( especially( its( dispersion( over( transnational( spaces,( has( been( shaped( by( a(
complex( network( of( selfL( and( heteroLrepresentations( as( well( as( by( a( mutually(
constitutive( process( of( asymmetrical( relations( within( the( broader( imagined(
geography(of(Occidentalism.(
As(a(constellation(of(discourses,(practices(and(institutions(based(upon(the(idea(
of( ‘the( West’,( Occidentalism( has( played( a( hegemonic( role( in( the( configuration( of(
collective(identity(and(alterity(since(the(age(of(colonialist(and(imperialist(capitalism.(
The(imagined(geography(of(‘the(West’(has(been(effective(in(inscribing(the(whole(of(
humanity(along(hierarchical(yet(fluid(lines(of(inclusion(and(exclusion,(encompassing(
global( power( relations( in( geopolitical( contexts,( and( knowledge( practices( and(
affective( investments( in( geocultural( spheres.( In( its( extended( sense,( Occidentalism(
refers( to( every( discourse,( practice( or( emotion( that( contributes( to( shaping( the( very(
idea( of( the( existence( of( something( called( ‘the( West’( or( ‘Western’,( irrespective( of(
whether(these(influences(are(proL(or(antiLWestern.(Accordingly,(Occidentalism(is(not(
limited(to(a(simple(reverse(or(counter(Orientalism(that(is(expressed(by(antiL(or(proL
Western( ideologies( and( used( strategically( to( generate( internal( nationalism( or( the(
subversion( of( EuroLAmerican( colonialism.( Rather,( Occidentalism( must( be( more(
radically( understood( as( the( precondition( of( Orientalism’s( very( possibility,( and( it(
refers( both( to( selfLdefinition( on( the( EuroLAmerican( side( as( well( as( to( otherL
definition(on(the(nonLEuroLAmerican(side.8(
The( critical( approach( adopted( in( this( investigation( builds( upon( Edward( Said’s(
work(on(Orientalism(but(is(mostly(inspired(by(the(notion(of(hegemony(elaborated(by(

Antonio( Gramsci.9( The( following( passage( from( Gramsci’s( Prison& Notebooks& (1929–
35)(stands(out(for(its(pioneering(questioning(of(the(very(concept(of(‘the(West’(as(an(
epistemological(category,(as(well(as(for(the(interesting(suggestion(that(Japanese(selfL
Orientalism(is(a(consequence(of(modern(Eurocentric(hegemony:(
The& objectivity& of& the& real.& In( order( to( understand( precisely( what(
significance(this(concept(might(have,(it(seems(to(me(opportune(to(dwell(on(
the( example( of( the( concepts( of( ‘East’( and( ‘West’,( which( never( cease( to( be(
‘objectively( real’( even( though( when( analyzed( they( turn( out( to( be( nothing(
more(than(a(‘historical’(or(‘conventional(construct’(…(It(is(obvious(that(East(
and( West( are( arbitrary( and( conventional( (historical)( constructions,( since(
(outside( of( real( history)( every( spot( on( earth( is( simultaneously( East( and(
West.(Japan(is(probably(the(Far(East(not(only(for(the(European(but(also(for(
the( American( from( California,( and( even( for( the( Japanese( himself,( who,(
through( English( political( culture,( might( call( Egypt( the( Near( East,( which(
from( his( viewpoint( should( be( the( West,( etc.( Furthermore,( the( purely(
historical( nature( of( the( significance( attached( to( these( terms( can( be( seen(
from( the( fact( that( the( words( ‘East’( and( ‘West’( have( now( acquired(
supernumerary( meaning( and( even( refer( to( relations( between( whole(
civilizations.10(
Gramsci(only(occasionally(reflected(upon(the(concept(of(a(Eurocentric(imagined(
geography,(but(this(passage(is(particularly(useful(in(the(context(of(my(essay,(where(
its(ideas(are(integrated(with(Gramsci’s(more(fully(expressed(notion(of(hegemony(as(a(
dynamic(balance(of(coercion(and(consent(performed(by(different(social(groups(in(a(
historical( and( mutually( articulated( process.( By( applying( this( perspective( to( the(
international( context( of( contact( between& nationLstates( as( well( as( within( national(
societies,( it( becomes( clear( that( Occidentalism( is( reducible( neither( to( a( oneLsided(
imperialist( rule( exercised( by( dominant( and( powerful( actors( within( the( broader(
capitalistic( world( order,( nor( to( a( unilateral( repression( suffered( by( those( who( are(
dominated( against( their( own( interests.( Instead,( Occidentalism( is( the( highly(
interrelational,( and( even( complicit,( process( enacted( by( the( dominant( and( the(
subaltern( sides( that( makes( hegemony( effective( and( ultimately( leads( to( its(
reproduction( even( without( its( imposition( by( force.( Although( the( transnational,(
transcultural( and( hybrid( signifying( practices( induced( by( globalisation( have(

intensified(over(the(last(decades,(‘the(West’(nonetheless(continues(to(be(reproduced(
as(an(unmarked(assumption—a(deepLrooted,(selfLevident(and(ultimately(naturalised(
term—that(is(still(common(in(academic(jargon(as(well(as(in(the(bridging(of(the(public(
and( private( spheres.( In( this( sense,( borrowing( from( Stuart( Hall’s( discussion( of( the(
contrast( between( 'inferential( racism'( and( 'overt( racism',( Occidentalism( too( has(
become( 'inferential'( through( the( hegemonic( mobilisation( of( discourses,( practices(
and( emotions( in( which( a( subtle( naturalisation( of( unquestioned( occidentalist(
assumptions( remains( largely( invisible( to,( or( even( repressed( by,( those( who( deploy(
them.11(
The( key( to( the( hegemonic( effectiveness( of( this( imagined( geography( is( the(
mutual( processuality( of( Occidentalism( to( both( Orientalism( and( selfLOrientalism,(
which( can( be( summed( up( as( follows.( In( the( modern( age( Occidentalism( has( been( a(
selfLdefinition( as( ‘the( West’,( first( in( Europe( and( then( in( the( United( States,( that( is(
articulated(via(intertwined(paradigms(aimed(at(defining(its(modern(identity:(reason,(
science,( progress,( universalism,( individualism,( masculinity,( the( white( race,(
adulthood( and( so( on.( Like( any( kind( of( hegemonic( identity,( it( is( not( limited( to( an(
isolated( or( homogenous( paradigm.( Occidentalism( relies( on( its( ability( to( intersect(
very( different( axes( of( socialLcultural( identification( related( to( nationality,( class,(
race/ethnicity,( gender,( sexual( orientation( and( age.( On( the( intraLnational( level,( this(
cumulative( intersectionality( is( what( enables( Occidentalism( to( mobilise( very(
different( modes( of( representation,( practice( and( emotion,( arguably( causing( it( to(
permeate(every(dimension(of(human(existence,(and(ultimately(resulting(in(its(most(
effective(form:(selfLevidence,(naturalisation(and,(eventually,(invisibility.(As(Said(has(
shown,(this(selfLdefinition(has(been(configured(through(hierarchic(contrast(with(an(
otherLdefinition(about(what(is(or(should(be(other(to(itself((Orientalism).(Depending(
on(the(context(and(the(time(period,(this(other(could(be(configured(as(‘the(East’,(‘the(
Rest’,( ‘Islam’,( ‘Africa’( or( even( as( a( single( nationLstate( like( ‘Japan’.( Being( imagined,(
defined,(desired(or(hated(as(fundamentally(other(to(EuroLAmerican(modernity,(this(
other( will( be,( or( must( be,( reduced( to( traditional( paradigms( such( as( emotionality,(
stasis,(particularism,(groupism,(femininity,(coloured(race(and(so(on.(
The( crucial( point( is( that( the( employment( of( this( identification( and( othering(
process( to( become( hegemonic( on( a( global( scale( implies( more( than( a( oneLsided(
exercise( of( exoticising( fantasies( expressed( in( texts,( pictures( and( music,( or( a(

unilateral(imposition(on(the(passive,(mute(and(subaltern(other(sustained(by(military,(
political( or( economic( power.( The( effectiveness( of( hegemony( relies( upon( the(
hegemony’s( acceptance,( interiorisation( and( active( reproduction( by( the( subaltern(
itself.( This( applies( to( the( otherLdefinition( of( ‘the( West’( as( hegemonic( other(
(Occidentalism)(as(well(as(to(selfLdefinition(as(the(more(or(less(subaltern(‘East’((selfL
Orientalism).( In( other( words,( Occidentalism( becomes( completely( hegemonic( only(
through(its(interrelation(with(the(nonLEuroLAmerican(subaltern,(and(only(when(the(
latter(accepts(the(imagined(geography(of(‘the(West’(as(a(lookingLglass(to(make(sense(
of( themself( as( well( as( others,( thereby( mobilising( a( similar( process( of( intersecting(
discourses,(practices(and(emotions.(
Occidentalism( can( be( further( rearticulated( in( the( case( of( the( modern( nationL
state(of(Japan(as(the(otherLdefinition(of(its(colonised(Asian(neighbours(as(a(subaltern(
‘East’( (Orientalism)( through( the( employment( of( a( strategic( hybrid( of( selfL
Occidentalism( and( selfLOrientalism( to( define( its( own( national( identity( as( a( unique(
(and( superior)( synthesis( of( ‘the( West’( and( ‘the( East’.12( Regardless( of( historical( or(
regional(variation,(and(regardless(of(being(configured(necessarily(through(a(dualistic(
antithesis,(interrelational(dynamics(between(nations(and(intersectional(mobilisation(
within& nations( have( contributed( jointly( to( the( hegemonic( effectiveness( of(
Occidentalism( since( modern( times.( The( result( is( a( mutually( constitutive( and(
intersubjective(process,(a(sort(of(mirror(game(in(which(specular(identity(and(alterity(
representations( enforce( one( another,( reproducing( ‘the( West’( as( the( ultimate( and(
universal(point(of(reference.(
Nevertheless,( Occidentalism( is( neither( a( static( structure( nor( a( closed( system;(
rather,(it(is(a(historical(process(whereby(negotiation(and(disjunctions(are(always(at(
stake.( Its( hegemonic( range( relies( upon( how( the( imitation,( interiorisation( and(
reproduction(of(its(intersecting(discourses,(practices(and(emotions(contribute(to(the(
corroboration(of(the(sameness(of(discursive(identity(and(alterity,(or,(on(the(contrary,(
are( able( to( introduce( some( ambiguity,( slippages( or( even( subversive( disruptions.(
Hegemony(is(an(intrinsically(polyphonic(process.(Thus,(the(liminal(positions(of(both(
Japan(and(Italy(reveal(how(Occidentalism(is(not(only(a(mutually(constituted(process(
shaped( by( a( generic( centre/periphery( model,( but( more( particularly( is( an(
asymmetrical( network( of( relations( articulated( through( multiple,( nuanced( and( fluid(
positions(of(dominance(and(subalternity.(

This( preliminary( discussion( of( the( interrelational( and( intersectional(
processuality(of(hegemony(has(focused(on(the(broader(geopolitical(and(geocultural(
frame( of( modern( Occidentalism.( The( additional( focus( on( positionality( in( the(
discussion( that( follows( will( provide( a( more( contingent( perspective( particularly(
suited(to(the(specific(cases(of(Japan(and(Italy.(Positionality(in(terms(of(the(imagined(
geography( of( Italy( in( Japan( will( be( employed( in( a( diachronic( sense,( first( to(
concentrate( on( the( resulting( effect( of( an( already( given( process( of( asymmetrical(
relations,(and(second,(to(address(the(generative(potential(of(change(embedded(in(the(
spaceL(and(timeLspecific(experience(of(individual(subjectivity.(
—IMAGINED GEOGRAPHIES OF ITALY IN MODERN JAPAN
What( gives( the( majority( of( Japanese( the( characteristic( image( of( Japanese(
culture,( is( still( its( distinction( from( the( soLcalled( West( ...( The( loss( of( the(
distinction( between( the( West( and( Japan( would( result( in( the( loss( of(
Japanese(identity(in(general.13(
How( does( the( imagined( geography( of( Italy( fit( within( the( broader( process( of( the(
interaction( of( Occidentalism,( Orientalism( and( selfLOrientalism( in( Japan?( What( kind(
of( strategic( advantages( is( ‘Italy’( able( to( mobilise( with( regard( to( tensions( of(
identification(and(othering?(In(reality,(the(idea(of(Italy(has(had(a(marginal(role(in(the(
articulation( of( the( notion( of( ‘the( West’( in( modern( Japan,( which( has( been( modelled(
mainly( on( Great( Britain,( Germany,( France( and( the( United( States.14( This( is( partly(
because( of( the( limited( contact( between( Japan( and( Italy,( except( during( the( brief(
military( alliance( of( the( Tripartite( Pact( during( World( War( II.( But( it( is( also( a(
consequence( of( the( very( interiorisation( of( the( hegemonic( gaze( of( European(
Occidentalism,( which( had( already( defined( Italy( as( a( southern( and( less( developed(
country( compared( to( the( nationLstates( considered( to( define( the( paradigm( of(
European(modernity.15((
In( many( ways,( this( idea( of( Italy( is( rooted( in( the( representations( diffused( by(
central( and( northern( European( literary( and( artistic( traditions( as( a( consequence( of(
the(established(experience(of(the(Grand(Tour.16(The(alluring(image(of(the(bel&paese(is(
framed(through(an(emphasis(of(its(preLmodern(aspects:(ancient(Rome,(Renaissance(
art,( beautiful( landscapes( and( a( spontaneous( and( cheerful( people.( But( for( the( very(
same( reason,( nineteenthLcentury( Italy( could( be( dismissed( through( an( emphasis( on(

its( apparent( nonLmodernity:( a( lack( of( industrialisation,( rationality,( efficiency( and(
other( such( characteristics.( Looking( at( the( first( accounts( of( Italy( by( Japanese(
travellers(in(the(late(nineteenth(and(early(twentieth(century,(it(is(revealing(how(their(
gaze( was( already( framed( by( English,( French( and( German( perspectives,( but( never(
directly(by(Italian(texts.((
The(following(is(a(passage(from(the(diary(of(Natsume(Sōseki((1867–1916),(the(
most(acclaimed(modern(Japanese(writer,(who(went(to(London(in(the(early(twentieth(
century(to(study(English(literature:(
I(thought(I(saw(a(short(and(peculiarly(ugly(man(coming(toward(me(along(
the( street,( only( to( realise( that( it( was( myself,( reflected( in( a( mirror( [of( a(
shop].(It(has(only(been(since(coming(to(this(place(that(I(realised(we(really(
are(yellow((London,(5(January(1901).17(
This(diary(entry(exposes(in(the(clearest(way(the(hegemonic(mirror(of(‘the(West’(as(a(
device( of( ambiguous( inscription:( superiorising( modernisation( as( well( as(
inferiorising( racialisation.( It( is( this( basic( ambivalence( of( being( configured( as( a(
modern(but(yellow(nation(that(would(haunt(the(dilemma(of(modernisation(in(Japan(
throughout(the(first(half(of(the(twentieth(century,(from(unsuccessful(governmental(
attempts( to( be( recognised( as( a( world( power( with( equal( racial( status,( to( scholars(
elaborating(theories(of(Caucasian(origins(for(the(Japanese(people.18(Since(then,(‘the(
West’(has(become(progressively(the(most(familiar(other&imaginable,(especially(in(its(
postwar( American( version.( But( this( increasing( familiarity,( conflated( with( more(
hybrid( versions( of( national( identity—such( as( Japan( being( the( best( mixture( of( ‘the(
West’( and( ‘the( East’—is( possible( only( to( the( extent( of( reassuring( the( removal( or(
repression( of( its( founding( ambivalence.( It( is( no( surprise( that( even( a( century( later(
this( uncanny( inscription( continues( to( resurface( and( be( addressed( as( a( generative(
principle(by(leading(figures(of(contemporary(Japanese(culture.19(
Returning( to( Sōseki,( what( makes( his( diary( so( interesting( is( not( only( the(
spatialised(experience(of(his(embodied(exposition(to(the(‘Western’(mirror,(but(also(
its(diachronic(relation(to(his(Italian(experience,(which(reveals(another(paradigmatic(
configuration( in( modern( Japan:( Italy( as( an( orientalised( (or( orientalisable)( ‘West’.(
Before( arriving( in( London,( Sōseki( passed( through( Italy,( where( he( appreciated(
classical( architecture( and( museums( in( Naples( and( Genoa( in( accordance( with( the(
Grand( Tour( paradigm.( However,( it( is( very( revealing( that( at( this( stage( he( described(

the(Italian(passengers(travelling(with(him(on(a(train(from(Turin(as('hairy(barbarians'(
(ketōjin):('I(spent(a(good(deal(of(time(wandering(around(in(a(daze,(led(by(the(porter.(
In(the(end(I(squeezed(in(among(some(hairy(barbarians((Turin,(20(October(1900)'.20(
Just( two( months( later,( the( English( lookingLglass( self( would( induce( him( to( see(
himself( as( short,( yellow( and( ugly.( This( shift( also( demonstrates( the( different( effects(
caused(by(the(Italian(mirror.(The(term(he(uses(to(describe(the(Italian(passengers(is(
ketōjin,&literally('hairy(Tang(people',(a(derogatory(term(for(Chinese(and(other(Asian(
people(which(became(common(after(the(subjection(of(the(Chinese(Empire(to(British(
colonialism(and(its(defeat(by(Japan(in(the(Sino–Japanese(War(of(1894–95.(In(reality,(
during(the(transition(from(the(feudal(Tokugawa(regime(to(the(modern(nationLstate(
in( the( mid( nineteenth( century,( the( term( was( initially( also( applied( to( all( EuroL
Americans,( but( its( use( became( more( and( more( restricted( over( the( course( of( the(
twentieth( century.( The( crucial( point( here( is( that( the( increasing( Orientalisation( of(
China—which( had( been( the( overwhelmingly( superiorised( other( in( the( cultural(
history(of(Japan(for(more(than(a(millennium—has(been(transposed(to(Italy,(at(least(
in(a(lexical(sense.((
The(limited(Japanese(interest(in(Italy,(mediated(mainly(by(English,(German(and(
American( resources( and( perspectives,( continued—except( during( the( brief( military(
alliance( of( the( Tripartite( Pact—almost( unchanged( until( recent( years.( Since( World(
War(II(there(has(been(an(increase(in(direct(contact(with(Italy,(scholars(of(Italy(and(
students(of(the(Italian(language,(as(well(as(in(the(range(of(interests(regarding(Italy.(
However,( the( prevailing( notion( of( Italy( has( remained( very( ambivalent:( Italy( is(
configured( as( superior( because( it( is( ‘Western’( and( because( of( the( riches( of( its(
cultural( past( (the( Roman( Empire,( Christianity,( Humanism,( art),( but( also( as( inferior(
because(of(a(presumed(prevalence(of(preLmodern(characteristics(in(comparison(with(
Japanese( standards( of( modernity( (the( mafia,( corruption,( political( instability,(
economic(inefficiency(and(so(on).(Even(in(1986,(a(general(survey(conducted(by(Dime,(
a( magazine( targeting( young( Japanese( businessmen,( declared( that( its( participants(
had( voted( Italians( as( the( stupidest( people( in( the( world.( The( reasons( for( this( were(
that(they(were(too(euphoric;(they(were(always(going(on(strike;(the(women(were(ugly(
and(the(men(were(always(chasing(girls(and(eating,(but(never(working.21(
Twenty( years( later,( in( 2006,( a( more( positive( image( emerged( from( a(
comparative(national(survey(commissioned(by(the(Italian(Chamber(of(Commerce(in(

Japan.( Compared( to( other( ‘Westerners’( (Americans,( English,( Germans,( French( and(
Spanish),(Italians(are(now(considered(the(kindest,(most(creative(and(sexiest,(even(if(
also(the(most(emotive(and(irresponsible,(thereby(making(Italy(the(place,(other(than(
Japan,( where( most( Japanese( would( like( to( live.22( In( 2008,( according( to( another(
national( survey( carried( out( by( Japan’s( NHK( (the( public( broadcasting( organisation)(
about(the(mostLloved(countries(around(the(world,(Italy(was(second(only(to(Australia,(
rising( from( twelfth( place( in( 1983.( What( is( more,( Italy( is( the( mostLloved( nation(
among( female( and( young( respondents,( a( fact( that( underlines( the( specificity( of( the(
country’s( popularity( in( terms( of( gender( and( age.23( At( present,( consumer( analyses(
continue( to( identify( Italy( as( the( most( attractive( travel( destination( among( all( age(
groups(and(both(genders.24(
So(what(has(happened(since(1986(to(change(ideas(about(Italy(in(Japan?(
—THE ITALIAN BOOM OF THE 1990S
Beginning(in(the(early(1990s(and(reaching(its(peak(around(1997–98,(an(explosion(of(
popularity(for(all(things(Italian(has(occurred(in(Japan.(Gastronomy,(fashion,(design,(
the( Italian( football( league( (Serie( A),( package( holidays( to( Italy( and( interest( in( the(
Italian( language( have( been( the( driving( elements( behind( this( sudden( and( ongoing(
popularity.( The( reasons( for( this( phenomenon( are( related,( as( in( other( countries,( to(
the(success(of(the(‘Made(in(Italy’(brand(in(the(1980s,(when(Italian(output,(especially(
in(the(fields(of(fashion(and(design,(excelled(in(international(commercial(competition.(
On(the(other(hand,(this(success(has(reached(unparalleled(levels(in(Japan(as(a(result(
of(contingent(intersections(of(specific(internal(conditions.(
The(Italian(boom(in(Japan(was(initially(a(female,(urban(and(mainly(consumerist(
phenomenon.( It( was( activated( and( amplified( by( fashion( and( lifestyle( magazines,(
which( play( a( dominant( role( in( the( creation( of( new( trends( and( in( the( guidance( of(
consumer( choices.( The( magazine( Hanako,( a( trendsetting( publication( in( the( 1990s(
that( targeted( young,( metropolitan,( whiteLcollar( women,( had( the( most( prominent(
role(in(marketing(the(first(consumerist(fad(for(Italian(cuisine.(In(its(April(1990(issue,(
Hanako&featured(tiramisù,(an(Italian(desert(that(became(a(sort(of(national(obsession(
for( much( of( that( year.( This( inaugurated( the( boom( of( seeing( Italian( food( as( stylish,(
young( and( informal,( and( contributed( to( the( displacement( of( French( cuisine,(
considered(more(conservative(and(formal,(as(the(defining(hallmark(of(‘Western’(food(

in( Japan.( This( primacy( in( the( context( of( international( cuisine( is( particularly(
relevant—in( fact,( the( Italian( boom( is( also( often( referred( to( as( the( ‘Italian( dining(
boom’((itameshi&būmu)—in(the(light(of(a(general(trend(in(more(frequent(dining(out.(
The(sales(figures(of(eating(and(drinking(establishments(grew(from(410(billion(yen(in(
1960( to( 13,135( billion( yen( in( 1992,( making( dining( out( the( most( popular( leisure(
activity(in(contemporary(Japan.25!
Italy’s(sudden(popularity(in(Japan(is(directly(related(to(the(restructuring(of(the(
labour(market(and(the(consequent(emergence(of(women(as(workers(and(consumers(
in(the(1980s.26(Compared(to(male(workers,(the(new(generation(of(women(has(a(great(
deal( more( autonomy( in( leisure( time,( disposable( income( and( personal( savings.( The(
new( purchasing( power( of( young( women,( specifically( directed( at( Italian( products—
mainly( fashion,( accessories( and( gastronomic( products—was( further( enhanced( by(
the(dramatic(rise(in(the(strength(of(Japanese(currency(in(relation(to(the(Italian(lira,(
which( almost( trebled( in( the( early( 1990s.( This( favourable( exchange( rate( made(
package(tours(to(Italy(and(shopping(in(Milan,(Florence(and(Venice(a(very(affordable(
and(popular(activity.(
But( the( Italian( boom( has( also( extended( to( the( male( population.( A( passion( for(
Italian(cars(as(unique(and(exclusive(products(continues(strongly.(In(spite(of(limited(
imports,(models(from(the(Fiat(500(to(the(Ferrari(or(Lamborghini(are(now(invested(
with( a( distinctive( aura( not( only( as( masterpieces( of( design( or( handicraftLlike(
technology,(but(also,(after(the(renewed(success(of(the(Formula(1(Ferrari(in(the(late(
1990s,(as(highly(competitive(sports(cars.(There(is(an(even(more(widespread(passion(
for( Italian( football.( JLLeague,( the( first( Japanese( professional( football( league,( was(
launched(in(1993(with(a(huge(marketing(campaign(sustained(by(promoters(and(the(
mass( media.( Previously( a( virtually( unknown( sport,( football( became( almost( as(
popular(as(established(national(sports(like(baseball(and(sumo(in(just(a(few(years.(In(
this(period,(the(Italian(Serie(A(was(by(far(the(richest(football(league(in(the(world(and(
boasted( most( of( the( world’s( top( players.( Arrigo( Sacchi’s( AC( Milan( or( Totò( Schillaci(
and( Roberto( Baggio’s( Juventus( Turin( became( models( to( dream( about( and( emulate(
for( a( whole( new( generation( of( young( football( fans.( Additional( media( coverage( of(
Italy( has( been( guaranteed( by( the( career( of( the( fashionLforward( Japanese( football(
player(Hidetoshi(Nakata,(who(is(known(as(the(‘Asian(Beckham’(and(is(one(of(the(best(
players(Japan(has(ever(produced.(Nakata(rose(to(international(stardom(by(playing(on(

various( Serie( A( teams( based( in( different( cities( from( 1998( to( 2005( (Perugia,( Rome,(
Parma,(Bologna(and(Florence).27!
Another(curious(aspect(of(the(Italian(boom(has(been(the(increase(in(popularity(
of(Italian(language(lessons.(This(contributed(to(transforming(Girolamo(Panzetta,(an(
Italian( from( Avellino( who( was( a( language( instructor( for( an( Italian( language(
programme(that(aired(on(Japanese(public(television(from(1991(to(2005,(into(a(media(
star.( He( brilliantly( exploited( the( stereotype( of( the( Neapolitan( man( who( is( always(
eating(pizza(and(pasta,(as(well(as(those(of(the(joyful(scamp(and(the(fashionLconscious(
Latin( lover,( as( a( personal( trademark.( First,( he( overhauled( the( boring( formats( of(
television( language( programs,( and( then( he( deployed( his( popularity( to( become( an(
omnipresent( columnist,( an( author( of( dozens( of( books( on( Italian( culture( and( a(
successful( spokesperson( in( television( commercials( and( magazine( advertisements.(
This( celebrity( has( made( him( the( most( famous( Italian( in( Japan( today( apart( from(
Leonardo(da(Vinci.28(
The( Italian( boom( has( not( only( assured( the( increasing( ubiquity( of( an( imagined(
and( mainly( consumerLoriented( geography( in( terms( of( ideas,( icons,( narratives( and(
commodities,( but( has( also( triggered( a( proliferation( of( ItalianLstyle( spaces( in(
Japanese( metropolitan( areas.29( Among( the( most( spectacular( are( the( simulations( of(
Italian( cityscapes,( like( the( Comune( Shiodome,( a( thirtyLoneLhectare( multiLpurpose(
district( in( Tokyo( vaguely( inspired( by( Renaissance( and( neoclassical( architecture.30(
Opened( in( 2007,( local( investors( have( filled( this( ‘Italian( town’( (Italia& machi)( with(
Italian(shops,(restaurants,(exhibition(spaces(and(gardens(to(offer(an(added(value(of(
refined( Italianness( to( the( fiveLstar( hotels,( business( offices,( television( networks( and(
residential(complexes(nearby.((
In( contrast( to( the( slick,( though( quite( aseptic,( atmosphere( of( the( Comune(
Shiodome,(there(is(the(DisneylandL(or(Las(Vegas–like(Venus(Fort,(an(overtly(kitschy(
combination( of( a( theme( park( and( a( shopping( mall( that( opened( in( 1999( on( the(
waterfront( of( the( artificial( Odaiba( Island( in( Tokyo( Bay.31( The( interior( of( the( threeL
floor( complex( presents( streets,( squares,( marble( fountains( and( fake( churches( freely(
inspired( by( eighteenthLcentury( urban( and( architectural( styles( that( mimic( Venice,(
Rome( and( Florence.( It( comprises( about( one( hundred( and( sixty( shops( (including(
fashion( boutiques,( restaurants,( cafés)( mainly( targeted( at( women( and( is(covered( by(
an( artificial( sky( ceiling,( which( simulates( a( sunset( every( half( hour.( This( has( made(

Venus(Fort(not(only(one(of(the(most(popular(shopping(malls(in(the(capital,(but(also(
an(international(tourist(attraction.(Other(Japanese(cities(besides(Tokyo(have(created(
their( own( more( or( less( spectacular( simulacra( of( Italian( classical( or( mediaeval(
cityscapes(over(the(last(twenty(years.(
The( most( pervasive( impact( of( the( Italian( boom( in( terms( of( spatialised(
experience,(however,(was(that(of(its(initial(gastronomic(impetus(in(the(early(1990s.(
There(are(at(present(17,881(Italian(dining(or(drinking(establishments((restaurants,(
pizzerias,(coffee(shops,(wine(bars)(scattered(all(over(Japan,(with(a(concentration(of(
4,357( of( them( in( Tokyo( alone.32( Apart( from( the( extreme( variety( of( these( places( in(
their(authenticity,(style,(price,(menu(and(so(on,(a(concentration(of(symbolic(markers(
of( Italianness( are( commonly( displayed( and( experienced( by( almost( every( Japanese(
urban( resident( in( everyday( life.( As( in( other( more( or( less( (selfL)ethnicised( Italian(
restaurants(in(the(world,(this(can(range(from(the(visual(impact(of(the(Tricolore((the(
Italian(flag),(pictures(or(posters(of(Italian(cities,(the(menu(or(wall(text(to(the(acoustic(
surroundings( of( Neapolitan,( classical( or( pop( music( and( greetings( such( as(
‘Buongiorno!’,(and(from(the(material(display(of(Italian(interior(design,(furniture(and(
objects(to(the(gastronomic(experience(of(Italian(or(ItalianLlike(cuisine.33(
There( is( no( doubt( the( Italian( boom( has( induced( more( positive( evaluations( of,(
increased( information( about,( widespread( familiarity( with( and( sympathy( toward(
Italians.( What( is( still( at( stake( is( whether( the( modern( hegemony( of( Italy( as( an(
orientalised(‘West’(has(been(fundamentally(challenged(or(not.(In(the(past,(exoticism(
and( racism( have( been( different( but( ultimately( inseparable( sides( of( the( same( coin(
configured( by( the( interrelation( of( Occidentalism,( Orientalism( and( selfLOrientalism.(
What(kind(of(effects(might(this(imagined(geography(and(its(related(othering(process(
have(on(Italians(coming(to(Japan?((
—LOST IN ITALIAN SIMULACRA: RACE, GENDER AND SEXUALITY
Sofia( Coppola’s( film( Lost& in& Translation( (2003),& starring( Bill( Murray( and( Scarlett(
Johansson,( offers( a( vivid( description( of( how( Tokyo’s( metroscape( might( induce( an(
ambivalent( dialectic( of( excitement( and( repulsion,( belonging( and( not( belonging,(
familiarity(and(unfamiliarity.(It(exemplifies(how(cultural(displacement(experienced(
by( a( EuroLAmerican( traveller( or( migrant( can( be( framed( by( violent( oscillations(
between( the( perception( of( ‘far( Eastern’( otherness( (language,( somatic( appearance,(

customs,( history)( on( the( one( hand( and( ‘Western’( sameness( (infrastructures,(
architecture,(dresses,(consumerism)(on(the(other.(The(imagined(geography(of(Japan(
as( a( cultural( oxymoron( owes( much( of( its( strength( to( the( possibility( of( being(
consumed( as( a( voyeuristic( spectacle( from( a( reassuring( distance.( This( neoL
Orientalism( is( also( enacted( in( the( film,( in( which,( for( the( better( part( of( their( short(
stay,(both(American(protagonists(experience(a(caricature(of(Japan(hampered(by(the(
comforts(of(the(fiveLstar(Park(Hyatt(Tokyo(Hotel,(where(they(can(overlook(the(whole(
cityscape.34( While( the( hotel( is( the( refuge( where( both( can( ultimately( resolve( their(
initial(estrangement(in(a(delicate(moment(of(intimacy,(it(does(not(completely(protect(
them( from( occasional( exposure( to( uncanny( othering( imposed( upon( them( by( being(
physically( in( Japan.( One( of( the( most( revealing( scenes( is( the( one( in( which( Bill(
Murray’s(character,(an(aged,(fading(Hollywood(star,(arrives(in(Tokyo(to(shoot(a(twoL
millionLdollar( paid( advertisement( for( a( Japanese( whisky( company.( Looking( out( the(
window(of(his(taxi,(he(sees(a(giant(image(of(himself(smiling(right(back(at(him(from(a(
huge(billboard(advertising(the(same(product.(
The( uncanny( dislocation( displayed( in( Lost& in& Translation( can( also( be(
experienced(by(Italian(travellers(and(migrants(living(in(Japan,(who(are(first(defined(
as( ‘Westerners’( or—to( their( personal( displeasure—as( ‘Americans’,( and( only(
secondly(as(‘Italians’.35(But(in(contrast(to(the(experience(of(the(cosmopolitan,(upperL
class( protagonists( of( Coppola’s( film,( whose( sojourn( in( Japan( is( brief,( different(
experiences( and( emotions( are( induced( by( longer( or( permanent( stays.( In( the( latter(
case,( a( confrontation( with( the( othering( gaze( with( regard( to( one’s( own( specific(
positionality(in(terms(of(class,(race,(gender(and(sexuality(usually(becomes(inevitable.(
In( 2011,( there( were( only( 2,600( registered( Italian( residents( in( Japan,( a( very( small(
number( compared( to( the( 49,815( American( residents,( which( places( the( Italians(
numerically( in( thirtieth( place( among( foreigners.36( These( numbers( acquire( further(
significance( if( confronted( with( the( 17,881( Italian( drinking( and( dining(
establishments,(which(include(the(750(familyLstyle(Italian(restaurants(owned(by(the(
large(Japanese(chain(Saizeriya.37(In(other(words,(Italian(transnational(spaces(are(not(
only( mainly( made( by& Japanese( capital,( but( also,( and( most( importantly,( for& the(
Japanese( consumer.( Besides( institutional( sites,( such( as( the( Italian( Embassy( and(
Consulate,(Chamber(of(Commerce(and(Institute(of(Culture,(and(their(related(events,(
which( are( limited( mainly( to( Tokyo( and( Osaka,( and( to( a( lesser( extent( Italian(

companies’( headquarters,( there( are( no( extensive( or( aggregating( spaces( of(
Italianness(created(from(above.(It(is(difficult(to(speak(of(some(kind(of(stable(Italian(
community(even(in(Tokyo,(not(to(mention(something(resembling(a(Little(Italy.(Most(
of( the( topography( made( by& and( for( Italians( is( created( from( below( and( dispersed(
within( a( network( of( ItalianLowned( restaurants( or( bars( (like( the( Segafredo( bar( in(
Shibuya),( language( schools,( private( apartments( and( nightclubs.( Participation( in(
these( unstable,( fluid( and( informal( microLspaces( of( national( belonging( is( quite(
common(for(many(Italians,(who(may(continue(to(feel(their(cultural(affiliation(or(not(
depending(upon(how(their(personal(experience(of(Japan(evolves(over(time.((
The( initial( experience( of( Italian( newcomers( to( Japan( can( be( very( exciting( and(
trigger(a(boundless(sense(of(narcissistic(selfLesteem,(especially(among(young(and/or(
middleL(or(lowerLclass(migrants.(An(anonymous(life(at(home(in(Italy(as(an(average,(
underprivileged(citizen(or(as(a(geeky(JapanLloving(nerd(is(magically(transformed(in(
Japan(into(that(of(a(superstar(in(a(racialised(and(cultural(sense,(regardless(of(class,(
education,( gender( or( even( physical( appearance.( Widespread( attention( is( assured(
first(of(all(due(to(the(simple(fact(of(being(a(‘Westerner’:(suddenly,(countless(people(
want(to(meet(the(white(foreigner((gaijin),(listen(carefully(to(him(or(her((and(possibly(
want(to(make(conversation(in(American(English,(even(if(the(foreigner(indicates(that(
he( or( she( is( Italian),( appreciate( his( or( her( enlightening( comments( regarding( Japan,(
pay(compliments(on(his(or(her(somatic(appearance(or(style,(and(invite(him(or(her(to(
dine(out(and(become(friends.(In(addition,(simply(being(‘Italian’(may(provide(access(
to( a( range( of( ethnicityLbased( employment,( like( being( a( waiter( or( a( language(
instructor,(regardless(of(the(possession(of(any(kind(of(certified(qualification(or(even(
the(ability(to(speak(Japanese.(
The(intensity(and(duration(of(emotional(attachment(to(his(or(her(whiteness(and(
Italianness( can( vary( considerably.( It( can( range( from( a( minimum( degree( among(
migrants( who( are( highly( skilled( professionals( (for( example,( scientists,( engineers,(
technicians)( that( is( unrelated( to( the( Italian( ethnic( economy.( More( ambivalent(
attitudes( are( common( among( managers( and( workers( involved( in( the( fashion,(
gastronomy( and( language( industries,( and( particularly( among( JapanLlovers( or(
scholars( who( aim( to( understand( Japan( and( be( appreciated( for( their( passion( and(
knowledge(of(the(country.(It(often(reaches(its(highest(degree(among(the(increasing(
number( of( unskilled( migrants( with( no( proficiency( in( the( Japanese( language( who(

move( to( Japan( because( of( the( economic( promise( of( the( Italy( boom.( For( these(
migrants,( whiteness( and( Italianness( is( their( only( cultural( and( symbolic( capital( and(
they(often(depend(completely(upon(it(to(stay(in(Japan.38(
Another( defining( variable,( however,( is( gendered( experience.( This( is( best(
exemplified(by(Girolamo(Panzetta,(who(rose(from(complete(anonymity(to(become(a(
media(celebrity(and(marry(a(Japanese(woman(by(strategically(‘performing’(the(role(
of(the(stereotypical(Italian(male,(thus(demonstrating(that(this(path(can(be(the(most(
rewarding( in( terms( of( economic,( cultural( and( sexual( capital.( The( correlation(
becomes(further(evident(if(we(consider(the(perspectives(expressed(by(three(young,(
single,(longLterm(Italian(residents(in(Japan,(chosen(because(they(offer(male,(female(
and(homosexual(views.((
The( first( individual’s( experience( is( a( nostalgic( and( ironic( recollection( of( the(
Italian(boom(of(the(1990s(posted(online(by(A.,(another(former(male(ItalianLlanguage(
instructor:(
Teaching( only( a( few( [Italian( language]( lessons( was( enough( to( live( a( good(
life.([I(made](a(lot(of(money(and([had](a(lot(of(leisure(time.(You(might(think,(
Great!( Just( a( few( hours( of( conversation( in( my( native( language( with( some(
beautiful(girls,(a(flexible(work(schedule(and(being(paid(to(do(this(allows(me(
to(live(in(Japan.(This(is(paradise(on(earth.(
Maybe( it( was.( And( you( might( also( add( to( the( picture( that( as( a( single(
person( (or( even( when( you( aren’t( single),( a( teacher( could( put( his( hand( in(
the(cookie(jar(with(incredible(frequency...39(
I(know(only(one(teacher(who(has(never(tried(the(cookies.(I(respect(him(
for(it,(but(if(he(is(reading(this,(I(have(to(say(something(to(him:(Hey(dude!(
Maybe( you( should( give( it( a( try.( You( don’t( know( what( you’re( missing.(
Japanese(cookies(are(the(tastiest(and(most(varied.40(
'Putting( one’s( hand( in( the( cookie( jar( with( incredible( frequency'( or( appreciating(
Japanese( 'cookies'( as( 'the( tastiest( and( most( varied'( not( only( metaphorically(
expresses( a( markedly( masculinist( attitude,( but( also( bears( witness( to( the( mutually(
reinforcing(connection(between(the(eroticised(fascination(with(the(‘yellow(Japanese(
girl’( among( Italian( men( and( the( romanticised( fascination( with( the( ‘white( (Italian)(
man’(among(Japanese(women,(as(well(as(the(actual(sexual(contact(to(which(this(can(
lead.41( Furthermore,( his( account( is( a( vivid( translation( of( the( interrelational(

hegemony( of( Occidentalism,( Orientalism( and( selfLOrientalism( in( terms( of(
intersecting( levels( of( race,( gender( and( sexuality.( In( the( light( of( its( ‘functional’(
satisfaction(of(both(parties(involved,(it(may(not(come(as(a(surprise(that(this(specific(
heterosexual( conjunction( is( still( evident( in( the( widespread( phenomenon( of(
international(couples(and(marriages(between(Italians(and(Japanese,(something(that(
continues( to( be( nurtured( by( a( (selfL)Orientalising( Madame( Butterfly–inspired(
libidinal(economy.((
More(selfLreflexive(aspects(emerge(in(the(second(account(of(life(in(Japan(offered(
by( B.,( fortyLfour( years( old( and( another( Italian( teacher( who,( due( to( his( homosexual(
orientation,( might( ironically( even( be( the( male( Italian( instructor( mentioned( in( the(
web(post(above(who(has(never(tried(Japanese('cookies'.(On(his(almost(twenty(years(
of( experience( at( private( language( schools( and( the( pressure( to( conform( to( Italian(
stereotypes(of(Italians,(he(remarks:((
Of(course,(all(Italian(language(classrooms(are(marketLoriented(and(aim(to(
display( Italianness.( This( can( range( from( the( authentic( reproduction( of(
modern( Italian( design,( furniture( and( objects( without( overt( national(
symbolism( to( that( of( cheaper,( easier( and( kitschier( styles.( In( contrast( to(
English( or( German( language( classes,( many( students( coming( to( Italian(
classes(are(women(who(want(to(have(an(entertaining(experience(or(meet(a(
typical(Italian(man,(which(was(especially(true(during(the(boom(in(the(late(
1990s…(
The(difficulty(for(me(in(the(beginning(was(that(I(also(had(to(conform(to(
all(the(stereotypes(on(a(personal(level,(which(meant,(among(other(things,(
downplaying(my(proficiency(in(Japanese.(But(over(the(course(of(the(years(I(
have( learned( to( distance( myself( from( the( role( that( I( have( been( playing.(
Despite(my(northern(Italian(origins(and(my(pride(in(a(serious(commitment(
to( a( strong( work( ethic( and( to( working( efficiently,( I( have( ended( up(
providing( an( ever( more( professional( performance( of( the( Panzetta( icon( of(
the(lightLhearted,(flirting(southern(Italian(man.(I(came(to(realise(that(it(was(
not(necessarily(a(lie.(After(all,(isn’t(Japan(the(country(of(masks,(rituals(and(
putting(on(an(appropriate(appearance(according(to(different(situations?42(
A(key(aspect(in(distancing(oneself(from(the(dilemma(of(true(versus(false(Italian(
identity(is(achieving(proficiency(in(Japanese.(Better(communication(skills(have(been(

pointed( to( by( other( interviewees( as( the( element( that( empowers( an( individual’s(
integration(into(Japanese(society(outside(the(confines(of(the(Italian(ethnic(economy.(
But(for(B.,(too,(whiteness(means(privileged(access(to(Japanese('cookies',(even(if(this(
happens(outside(the(classroom,(and(it(represents(a(significant(reward(in(his(libidinal(
economy:(
The( female( attraction( to( or( fetish( for( the( white( man( (gaijin& akogare)( is(
quite( similar( among( male( homosexuals( in( Japan.( I( have( profited( greatly(
from(being(Caucasian(and(taller(than(most(of(Japanese(men,(which(means(
that( I( am( associated( with( being( strong( and( having( a( nice( skin( colour,( a(
huge( penis,( sexual( stamina,( etc.( My( male( partners( love( to( show( me( off( to(
their( friends( as( a( kind( of( status( symbol,( which( is( not( dissimilar( to( how(
Japanese( girls( show( off( their( Italian( boyfriends.( The( difference( might( be(
that( while( these( Japanese( girls( prefer( Italian( men( to( American( ones(
because( they( consider( them( more( refined,( artistic( and( gentle,( this( has(
never( been( a( factor( in( my( experience( with( Japanese( men.( With( regard( to(
female(homosexuality,(I(have(noticed(a(very(similar(pattern(to(that(of(male(
homosexuality.(The(white(man(or(woman(assumes(the(role(of(the(stronger(
or( more( mature( member( of( the( couple;( it( is( rare( to( see( things( work( the(
other( way( around—for( instance,( a( tall,( muscular( Japanese( man( together(
with(a(smaller(Western(partner.43(
On(the(contrary,(living(the('other(way(around'(can(become(very(problematic(for(the(
heterosexual(economy(of(Italian(girls(or(women.(As(C.,(a(thirtyLfiveLyearLold(Italian(
female( student( of( Japanese( culture( in( Tokyo( from( 2001,( recalls( her( five( years’(
experience(as(follows:(
For(many(other(Italians(coming(to(Japan,(the(initial(exposure(to(all(of(the(
sudden(interest(in(Italy(can(be(both(gratifying(and(amusing.(In(the(second(
stage,( a( very( common( reaction( is( to( make( an( effort( to( explain( the( ‘truth’(
about( or( more( nuanced( aspects( of( Italy—to( show( that( not( all( Italians,(
including(myself,(of(course,(conform(to(the(prevailing(stereotypes.(But(it(is(
in(this(stage(that(the(first(feelings(of(incongruity(arise.(I’ve(also(met(a(lot(of(
Japanese(who(knew(so(much(more(than(I(did(about(Italy—its(music(or(its(
football—and(who(actually(taught(me(a(lot.(This(created(the(first(moments(

of( doubt( about( my( sense( of( automatically( knowing( more( about( my( own(
country(than(the(Japanese(do(simply(because(I(am(Italian…(
But( it( was( not( so( much( general( stereotypes( about( Italy( that( were(
problematic(for(me.(The(most(difficult(were(male(stereotypes(about(Italian(
or(white(women.(On(the(one(hand(I(have(been(often—too(often—admired(
for(being(beautiful,(for(being(a(white(girl,(for(having(a(face(like(a(statue!(But(
on(the(other(hand,(it(was(very(hard(for(me(to(find(a(Japanese(boyfriend.(It(
was( not( difficult( to( make( friends,( but( for( a( long( time( it( was( virtually(
impossible( to( go( beyond( that.( They( all( seemed( to( be( afraid,( to( avoid(
physical(contact,(and(they(would(never(clearly(explain(why.(It(was(a(very(
frustrating( sensation,( one( that( was( difficult( to( cope( with( when( a( person(
stays([in(Japan](for(such(a(long(time…(
Of( course,( this( has( become( the( favourite( topic( of( discussion( among(
many( other( Italian( female( friends( who( have( shared( the( same( frustration;(
[we( have( had]( very( long( discussions( about( perceptions( of( us( as( a( kind( of(
femme( fatale,( a( manLeating( threat,( that( are( nurtured( by( fears( of(
emasculation(or(performance(anxiety.(
The(most(uncanny(experience(for(me(in(Japan(has(not(so(much(been(my(
ambivalent( and( changing( relationship( to( my( Italianness,( but( the( always(
haunting(perception(of(being(dislocated(with(regard(to(my(womanhood.44(
Reactions(and(manners(of(adaptation(to(the(imagined(geography(of(the(Italian(
‘West’( on( the( part( of( Italian( migrants( obviously( vary( according( to( the( specific(
personality(and(situation(of(each(individual((Italian(couples,(families(with(children,(
international(marriages(and(so(on).(In(this(regard,(further(investigation(addressing(a(
more(extended(range(of(experiences(as(well(as(the(intertwined(relations(of(Italians(
with( Japanese( will( be( essential( to( achieving( a( more( complete( understanding( of( the(
complex( interplay( between( Occidentalism,( Orientalism( and( selfLOrientalism( that(
shapes(Italian(transnational(spaces(in(contemporary(Japan.(
At( this( point,( however,( it( can( already( be( argued( that( it( is( the( embodied( and(
emotional( experience( of( singles( who( are( most( exposed—and( potentially( open—to(
the( dislocating( effects( of( Japanese( othering( that( highlights( some( crucial( aspects(
induced(by(the(intersectional(and(positional(processuality(of(Occidentalism(in(terms(
of( race,( gender( and( sexuality.( The( dis/conjunctive( effects( pointed( out( by( the( three(

different( voices( (A.,( B.( and( C.)( underscore( how( Italianness( shaped( by( modern(
Occidentalism(is(neither(equally(distributed(nor(equally(rewarding.(But(at(the(same(
time,(they(also(imply(that(the(very(exposure(to(these(asymmetries(has(the(potential(
to( increase( selfLreflexivity( and( eventually( introduce( slippages( in( the( hegemonic(
mirror(game(of(othering(and(identification.(
—BEYOND ‘THE WEST’ AND ‘THE EAST’?
The(doubling(or(monstrous(repetition(of(oneself(produced(by(the(Japanese(mimicry(
of(‘the(West’(and(‘Italy’(exemplifies(the(ambivalent(potential(of(Italian(transnational(
spaces( permeated( by( the( uncanny( dialectic( between( familiarity( and( unfamiliarity.(
This( emotional( geography( is( often( sustained( by( a( narcissistic( lure( that( is( mutually(
configured(by(both(sides(participating(in(the(mirror(game,(nurturing(the(very(root(of(
the( psychological( economy( of( Occidentalism.( But( it( can( also( be( experienced( as( a(
threat(of(cognitive(dissonance(and(alienation.(Lastly,(it(can(offer(the(potential(for(an(
empowering(‘double(vision’(that(engenders(selfLreflexivity(and(new(agency.45(
The(imagined(geography(of(modern(Occidentalism’s(reproduction(of(reassuring(
effects(in(the(geopolitical,(geocultural(and(geoemotional(structuring(of(the(world(has(
to(a(large(extent(relied(upon(the(repression(of(its(colonising,(reifying(and(ultimately(
deLhumanising(impulses.(This(has(been(crucial(to(making(its(hegemony(so(effective(
and(familiar,(and(to(it(being(ultimately(perceived(as(natural.(In(order(to(uncover(and(
expose( this( repression,( attention( to( more( unnatural& principles( may( help( provide(
different(alternatives.(
A(concluding—and(tempting—proposal(for(further(investigation,(at(least(at(the(
microLlevel(of(subjective(positionality,(is(provided(by(the(very(uncanny(potential(of(
monstrosity( in( mediating( a( more( hybrid( process( of( otherness( and( identification.46(
On(one(hand,(the(other(can(function(as(a(deformed(and(confining(monstrous(mirror:(
a(projection(of(all(that(is(most(feared(or(hated,(from(generic(aversions(and(anxieties(
to(more(intimate(desires(and(impulses.(The(reassuring,(and(ultimately(static,(effect(
of(this(othering(mirror(in(terms(of(contrastive(identity(is(guaranteed(by(the(extreme(
distortion(of(the(projections(as(a(means(of(making(one’s(own(authoriality(invisible.(
On(the(other(hand,(it(is(the(embodied(and(mutual(exposure(to(the(looking(glass(that(
is( involved( in( the( direct( experience( of( transnational( spaces( which( fosters( the(
deforming& and( crossLcutting( potential( of( monstrosity.( This( implies( a( critical(

recognition( of( oneself( in( the( monstrous( mirror,( including( all( of( the( repressed(
projections(that(have(mutually(shaped(the(contours(of(the(past(identities(of(all(of(the(
actors(involved(in(this(process.(SelfLrecognition(and(selfLreflexivity(may(trigger(the(
transforming( and( metamorphosic( principle( of( monstrosity,( leading( to( an( open( and(
transcultural(identification,(a(more(creative(future(that(has(yet(to(arrive:(
A( future( that( would( not( be( monstrous( would( not( be( a( future;( it( would(
already( be( a( predictable,( calculable,( and( programmable( tomorrow.( All(
experience( open( to( the( future( is( prepared( or( prepares( itself( to( welcome(
the(monstrous(arrivant,(to(welcome(it,(that(is,(to(accord(hospitality(to(that(
which( is( absolutely( foreign( or( strange,( but( also,( one( must( add,( to( try( to(
domesticate(it,(that(is(to(make(it(part(of(the(household(and(have(it(assume(
the( habits,( to( make( us( assume( new( habits.( This( is( the( movement( of(
culture.47(
(
—(
(
Toshio( Miyake( is( a( Marie( Curie( International( Incoming( Fellow( at( Ca’( Foscari(
University( of( Venice( (Department( of( Asian( and( North( African( Studies).( His( main(
research(interests(lie(in(Occidentalism,(Orientalism(and(selfLOrientalism(relating(to(
issues( of( hegemony,( nation,( whiteness,( gender( and( youth.( He( has( published( a(
monograph(on(representations(of(‘the(West’(and(‘Italy’(in(Japan(titled(Occidentalismi(
(2010)(and(essays(on(trans/national(identity,(Japanese(popular(cultures((literature,(
manga,(anime,(youth(subcultures)(and(cultural(industries(in(relation(to(globalisation.(
(
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
—NOTES
1(NHK(Broadcasting(Culture(Research(Institute((ed.),(Nihonjin&no&sukina&mono&(What(Japanese(People(
Like),(Nihon(hōsō(shuppan(kyōkai,(Tokyo,(2008,(pp.(113–16.(
2(Toshio(Miyake,(‘Italy(Made(in(Japan:(Occidentalism,(Orientalism(and(SelfLOrientalism(in(
Contemporary(Japan’,(in(New&Perspectives&in&Italian&Cultural&Studies,(vol.(1,(ed.(Graziella(Parati(Fairleigh(
Dickinson(University(Press,(New(York,(2012,(pp.(195–214.(

!
3(Marco(Pellitteri,(The&Dragon&and&the&Dazzle:&Models,&Strategies,&and&Identities&of&Japanese&Imagination:&
A&European&Perspective,(Tunué,(Latina,(2010,(p.(556.(
4(Toshio(Miyake,(‘Mostri(Made(in(Japan.(Orientalismo(e(autoLOrientalismo(nell’epoca(della(
globalizzazione’(('Monsters(Made(in(Japan:(Orientalism(and(SelfLOrientalism(in(the(Age(of(
Globalisation'),(in(Culture&del&Giappone&contemporaneo,(ed.(Matteo(Casari(Tunué,(Latina,(2011,(pp.(161–
93.(
5(In(contrast(to(an(overall(decline(in(enrolment(in(Italian(universities,(students(of(Japanese(studies(have(
dramatically(increased,(even(since(the(tragic(earthquake,(tsunami(and(nuclear(accident(in(northL
eastern(Japan(in(2011.(At(Ca’(Foscari(University(of(Venice,(the(institution(with(which(the(author(is(
affiliated,(there(are(at(present(1,871(undergraduate(and(graduate(students(of(Japanese((1,205(as(a(first(
language).(For(an(investigation(of(the(Japanese(pop(culturesLinspired(hybrid(style(displayed(by(Italian(
artist(Simone(Legno,(see(Emiko(Okayama(and(Francesco(Ricatti,(‘Tokidoki,(Cute(and(Sexy(Fantasies(
between(East(and(West:(Contemporary(Aesthetics(for(the(Global(Market’,(Portal:&Journal&of&
Multidisciplinary&International&Studies,(vol.(5,(no.(2,(2008,(pp.(1–23.(
6(This(study(is(part(of(a(broader(research(project(entitled(‘Beyond(“the(West”(and(“the(East”:(
Occidentalism,(Orientalism(and(SelfLOrientalism(in(Italy–Japan(Relations’,(which(has(been(made(
possible(by(a(European(FP(7–Marie(Curie(International(Incoming(Fellowship(at(Ca’(Foscari(University(of(
Venice((2011–13).(
7(Intersectionality(has(been(theorised(since(the(late(1980s(by(feminist(sociologists(in(the(United(States(
as(a(means(of(highlighting(how(the(axes(of(identity(are(not(limited(to(one(single(level,(but(instead(
interact(on(multiple(and(interdependent(levels,(contributing(cumulatively(to(systematic(social(
inequality,(as(in(the(case(of(AfroLAmerican(women.(See(Kimberlé(W.(Crenshaw,(‘Mapping(the(Margins:(
Intersectionality,(Identity(Politics,(and(Violence(against(Women(of(Color’,(Stanford&Law&Review,(vol.(43,(
no.(6,(1991,(pp.(1241–99.(
8(Stuart(Hall,(‘The(West(and(the(Rest:(Discourse(and(Power’,(in(Formations&of&Modernity,(ed.(Stuart(Hall(
and(Bram(Gieben,(Polity(Press,(Cambridge,(1992,(pp.(275–333;(Fernando(Coronil,(‘Beyond(
Occidentalism:(Toward(Nonimperial(Geohistorical(Categories’,(Cultural&Anthropology,(vol.(11,(no.(1,(
1996,(pp.(51–87;(Toshio(Miyake,(Occidentalismi:&La&narrativa&storica&giapponese((Occidentalisms:(
Historical(Narrative(in(Japan),(Cafoscarina,(Venezia,(2010.(
9(Edward(W.(Said,(Orientalism,(Vintage,(New(York,(1978;(Antonio(Gramsci,(Quaderni&del&carcere,(ed.(
Valentino(Gerratana,(Einaudi,(Turin,(1975.(
10(Gramsci,(pp.(1419–20.(English(translation(from(Antonio(Gramsci,(Gramsci:&Prison&Notebooks,(trans.(
Joseph(A.(Buttigieg,(Volume(III,(Columbia(University(Press,(New(York,(2010,(p.(176.(
11(Stuart(Hall,(‘The(Whites(in(Their(Eyes:(Racist(Ideology(and(the(Media’,(in(The&Media&Reader,(eds(
Manual(Alvarado(and(John(O.(Thompson,(British(Film(Institute,(London,(1990,(pp.(7–23.(

!
12(Kōichi(Iwabuchi,(‘Complicit(Exoticism:(Japan(and(its(Other’,(Continuum,(vol.(8,(no.(2,(1994,(pp.(49–82;(
Kang(SangLjung,(Orientarizumu&no&kanata(e((Beyond(Orientalism),(Iwanami(Shoten,(Tokyo,(1996;(Stefan(
Tanaka,(Japan’s&Orient:&Rendering&Pasts&into&History,(University(of(California(Press,(Berkeley,(1993.(
13(Naoki(Sakai,(‘The(West’,(in(Encyclopedia&of&Contemporary&Japanese&Culture,(ed.(Sandra(Buckley,(
Routledge,(London(and(New(York,(2002,(p.(564.(
14(For(the(most(comprehensive(collection(of(essays(regarding(historical(relations(between(Italy(and(
Japan,(see(Adolfo(Tamburello((ed.),(Italia/Giappone&450&anni,&2(vols.,(IsiaoLIuo,(Rome(and(Naples,(2003.&
15(John(Agnew,(‘The(Myth(of(Backward(Italy(in(Modern(Europe’,(in(Revisioning&Italy:&National&Identity&
and&Global&Culture,(ed.(Beverly(Allen(and(Mary(Russo,(University(of(Minnesota(Press,(Minneapolis(and(
London,(1997,(pp.(23–42.(
16(Cesere(De(Seta,(‘L’Italia(nello(specchio(del(“Grand(Tour”’,(in(Storia&d’Italia.(Vol.(5,&Il&paesaggio,(ed.(C.(
De(Seta,(Einaudi,(Turin,(1982,(pp.(125–263.(
17(Natsume(Sōseki,(Sōseki&zenshū&(The(Complete(Works(of(Sōseki),(Vol.(13,(Iwanami(shoten,(Tokyo,(
1966,(p.(30.(English(translation(from(Donald(Keene,(Modern&Japanese&Diaries,(Henry(Holt(and(Company,(
New(York,(1995,(p.(219.(
18(Naoko(Shimazu,(Japan,&Race&and&Equality:&The&Racial&Equality&Proposal&of&1919,(Routledge,(London,(
1998;(Eiji(Oguma,(A&Genealogy&of&‘Japanese’&Self/Images,(Trans(Pacific(Press,(Melbourne,(2002((1995).(
19(For(instance,(neoLPop(artist(Takashi(Murakami((b.(1962),(at(present(the(most(celebrated(Japanese(
artist(on(the(international(stage,(has(been(able(to(spectacularise(the(uncanny(ambivalence(of(
Occidentalism(and(strategically(turn(it(into(his(own(aesthetic(manifesto:('We(are(deformed(monsters.(
We(were(discriminated(against(as("less(than(humans"(in(the(eyes(of(the("humans"(of(the(West(…(The(
Superflat(project(is(our("Monster(Manifesto",(and(now(more(than(ever,(we(must(pride(ourselves(on(our(
art,(the(work(of(monsters'.(Takashi(Murakami,(‘Superflat(Trilogy:(Greetings,(You(Are(Alive’,(in(Little&Boy:&
The&Arts&of&Japan’s&Exploding&Subculture,(ed.(T.(Murakami,(Yale(University(Press,(London,(2005,(p.(161.(
20(Keene,(p.(217.(
21(The(survey(was(conducted(by(journalist(Ichirō(Enokido(with(sixty(respondents(who(were(asked(to(
name(the(stupidest(people(in(the(world(and(the(reasons(for(their(choice((Dime,(6(November(1986).(It(
was(met(by(harsh(protest(from(both(the(Italian(Embassy(in(Tokyo(and(the(Japanese(Ministry(of(Foreign(
Affairs.(
22(Survey(commissioned(from(the(agency(NetRatings(and(based(on(answers(from(5,000(respondents.(
See(Pio(D’Emilia,(‘Mad(for(Italy’,(in(Viste&dalla&Camera,(ed.(Italian(Chamber(of(Commerce,(special(edition,(
June/July(2006,(pp.(33–43.(
23(The(survey(was(conducted(in(2007(and(involved(a(total(of(3,600(respondents(who(were(sixteen(years(
of(age(or(older.(Italy(ranked(first(as(a(whole(among(female(respondents.(Among(the(male(respondents,(
Italy(ranked(first(in(the(16–29(age(group,(third(in(the(30–59(age(group(and(seventh(in(the(overL60(age(

!
group.(NHK(Broadcasting(Culture(Research(Institute((ed.),(Nihonjin&no&sukina&mono&(What(Japanese(
People(Like),(Nihon(hōsō(shuppan(kyōkai,(Tokyo,(2008,(pp.(113–16.(
24(Brand(Databank(and(Nikkei(Design((eds),(Sanmannin&no&shōhi:&sedai&x&seibetsu&x&burando&de&kiru(
(Consumption(of(30,000(Persons(by(Age,(Gender(and(Brand),(NikkeiBPsha,(Tokyo,(2009,(pp.(196–201.(
It(should(be(noted(that(the(top(ranking(desire(to(travel(to(Italy(is(not(equivalent(to(real(travel,(which(is(
conditioned(by(financial,(working(and(family(criteria.(In(2002,(Italy(as(a(real(travel(destination(ranked(
sixth((849,000),(far(behind(the(topLranked(United(States((5,896,000).(See(Japanese(Ministry(of(Land,(
Infrastructure,(Transport(and(Tourism((ed.),(Kankō&hakusho&2004&(White(Paper(on(Tourism(2004),(
Kokuritsu(insatsukyoku,(2004,(Tokyo,(p.(9.(
25(Katarzyna(J.(Cwiertka,(Modern&Japanese&Cuisine:&Food,&Power&and&National&Identity,(Reaktion(Books,(
University(of(Chicago(Press,(London,(2006,(p.(165.(
26(For(investigation(of(the(emergence(of(women(as(a(paid(labour(force(and(consumers(in(relation(to(the(
tranforming(mediascape(in(1980s(and(1990s(Japan,(see(Lise(Skov(and(Brian(Moeran((eds),(Women,&
Media&and&Consumption&in&Japan,(Curzon(Press,(Surrey,(UK(and(University(of(Hawai’i(Press,(Honolulu,(
1995.(
27(Dario(Lolli,(‘Orientalizing(Football:(The(Transnational(Experience(of(Nakata(Hidetoshi’,(MA(thesis,(
Birkbeck(College,(University(of(London,(London,(2009.(
28(Chris(Betros,(‘Italian(Dressing:(Fashion(and(Food(make(Girolamo(Panzetta(One(of(Japan’s(Most(
Famous(Italians’,(Metropolis,&no.(710,&2(November(2007,((
<http://archive.metropolis.co.jp/tokyo/710/faces.asp>,(accessed(20(April(2010.(
29(For(an(investigation(of(images(of(Italy(in(Japanese(literature,(including(the(work(of(Nanami(Shiono((b.(
1937),(the(most(popular,(prolific(and(authoritative(Japanese(writer(on(Italy,(see(Toshio(Miyake,(
Occidentalismi:&La&narrativa&storica&giapponese((Occidentalisms:(Historical(Narrative(in(Japan),(
Cafoscarina,(Venice,(2010,(pp.(117–246.(
30(See(<http://www.comune.jp/>.(
31(See(http://www.venusfort.co.jp/multi/index_e.html>.(
32(See(<http://tabelog.com/italian/>;(<http://tabelog.com/italian/tokyo/>((in(Japanese;(accessed(10(
November(2012).(
33(Rossella(Ceccarini,(Pizza&and&Pizza&Chefs&in&Japan:&A&Case&of&Culinary&Globalization,(Brill,(Leiden(and(
Boston,(2011.(
34(For(the(film’s(neoLOrientalism,(see(Homay(King,(Lost&in&Translation:&Orientalism,&Cinema,&and&the&
Enigmatic&Signifier,(Duke(University(Press,(Durham,(2010,(pp.(138–70.(
35(This(final(section(on(the(lived(experience(of(Italians((relies(to(some(extent(on(the(author’s(own(
experience(as(a(teacher(of(Japanese(studies(at(four(different(Italian(universities(from(2003(to(2008(and(
2010(to(2011,(as(well(as(participant(observation(and(almost(daily(conversation(with(Italian(travellers,(
students(and(migrants(in(contemporary(Japan(from(2008(to(2010.(((

!
36(See(the(website(of(the(Japanese(Ministry(of(Justice,(<http://www.eL
stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001089591>((in(Japanese,(accessed(10(November(2012).(
37(See(<http://tabelog.com/italian/>;(<http://tabelog.com/italian/tokyo/>((in(Japanese;(accessed(10(
November(2012).(
38(I(owe(this(provisional(subdivision(to(informal(talks(with(Alessandro(Mantelli,(a(former(graduate(
student(of(Japanese(studies(in(Italy(who(has(worked(as(a(game(localisation(operator(and(information(
systems(analyst(for(different(Japanese(companies(in(Tokyo((1999–2006).(
39(The(original(Italian(post(uses(the(phrase(‘mettere(le(mani(nella(marmellata’,(which(literally(translates(
as(‘to(put(one’s(hands(in(the(jam(jar’,(or(‘taste(the(jam’,(a(common(expression(used(to(refer(to(something(
a(child(has(been(forbidden(to(do(but(does(anyway.(In(this(context(it(means(to(have(sex(with(female(
students,(which(is(forbidden(by(the(rules(of(most(language(schools(in(Japan.(
40(See(<http://giappopazzie.blogspot.it/2009/07/insegnamento.html>((in(Italian;(accessed(11(
November(2012).(
41(For(a(more(detailed(ethnography(of(gendered(positionality(and(the(dis/conjunctions(between(male(
EnglishLlanguage(instructors(and(female(students(in(Japan,(see(Keiron(Bailey,(‘Akogare,(Ideology,(and(
“Charisma(Man”(Mythology:(Reflections(on(Ethnographic(Research(in(English(Language(Schools(in(
Japan’,(Gender,(Place(and(Culture,((vol.(14,(no.(5,(October(2007,(pp.(585–608.
42(Summary(of(a(twoLhour(interview(via(Skype((Venice–Tokyo)(on(11(November(2012.(
43(Ibid.(
44(Summary(of(a(twoLhour(interview(in(Venice(on(2(November(2012.(
45(For(the(‘migrant’s(double(vision’,(see(Homi(K.(Bhabha,(The&Location&of&Culture,(Routledge,(London,(
1994,(p.(5.(
46(See(Miyake,(‘Mostri(Made(in(Japan'.(
47(Jacques(Derrida,(‘Passages—From(Traumatism(to(Promise’,(in(Points:&Interviews&1974–1994,(ed.(
Elizabeth(Weber,(Stanford(University(Press,(Stanford,(1995,(p.(387.(

X,
7/10/2014 Miyake
Transformative Works and Cultures, Vol 12 (2013)
Theory
Doing Occidentalism in contemporary Japan: Nation
anthropomorphism and sexualized parody in Axis Powers
Hetalia
Toshio Miyake
Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Venice, Italy
[0.1] Abstract—Axis Powers Hetalia (2006–present), a Japanese gag
comic and animation series, depicts relations between nations personified
as cute boys against a background of World War I and World War II. The
stereotypical rendering of national characteristics as well as the reduction
of historically charged issues into amusing quarrels between nicelooking
but incompetent boys was immensely popular, especially among female
audiences in Japan and Asia, and among EuroAmerican manga, anime,
and cosplay fans, but it also met with vehement criticism. Netizens from
South Korea, for example, considered the Korean character insulting and in
early 2009 mounted a protest campaign that was discussed in the Korean
national assembly. Hetalia's controversial success relies to a great extent
on the inventive conflation of maleoriented otaku fantasies about nations,
weapons, and concepts represented as cute little girls, and of female
oriented yaoi parodies of malemale intimacy between powerful "white"
characters and more passive Japanese ones. This investigation of the
original Hetalia by male author Hidekaz Himaruya (b. 1985) and its many
adaptations in femaleoriented dōjinshi (fanzine) texts and conventions
(between 2009 and 2011, Hetalia was by far the most adapted work) refers
to notions of interrelationality, intersectionality, and positionality in order to
address hegemonic representations of "the West," the orientalized "Rest" of
the world, and "Japan" in the crossgendered and sexually parodied
mediascape of Japanese transnational subcultures.
[0.2] Keywords—BL; Boys' love; Critical Occidentalism; Dōjinshi;
Hegemony; Manga; Nation anthropomorphism; Parody; Yaoi; Youth
subculture
Miyake, Toshio. 2013. "Doing Occidentalism in Contemporary Japan: Nation
Anthropomorphism and Sexualized Parody in Axis Powers Hetalia." In
"Transnational Boys' Love Fan Studies," edited by Kazumi Nagaike and
Katsuhiko Suganuma, special issue, Transformative Works and Cultures,
no. 12. doi:10.3983/twc.2013.0436.
1. Introduction: Critical Occidentalism and hegemony

from below
[1.1] In the modern age of colonialism and imperialism, Occidentalism as a
http://journal.transformativeworks.org/index.php/twc/rt/printerFriendly/436/392 1/29
7/10/2014 Miyake
constellation of discourses, practices, and institutions based on the idea of
"the West" has played a hegemonic role in the configuration of collective
identity and alterity. The imagined geography of "the West" has been effective
in inscribing the whole of humanity along hierarchic yet fluid lines of inclusion
and exclusion, encompassing global relations of power in geopolitical contexts
as well as knowledge practices in geocultural spheres. Although since the
1990s transnational, transcultural, and hybrid signifying practices induced by
globalization have intensified, and critical engagements that question notions
of "the West" have increased in postcolonial and cultural studies, "the West"
continues to be reproduced as an unmarked assumption—a deeprooted, self
evident, and ultimately naturalized term—in every sphere of public and private
life, as well as in academic jargon (Hall 1992; Coronil 1996).
[1.2] I rely here on an extended notion of Occidentalism as referring to every
discourse or practice that contributes to the idea of the existence of "the West"
or "Western," setting aside whether it is a proWestern or an antiWestern
discourse. As has been pointed out in postcolonial and cultural studies,
Occidentalism is not limited to a simple reversed or counterOrientalism,
expressed by anti or proWestern ideologies, and used strategically for
internal nationalism or subversion. Rather, Occidentalism is the condition of
Orientalism's very possibility and refers both to selfdefinition on the Euro
American side as well as to the definition of the other on the nonEuro
American side (Coronil 1996).
[1.3] The ambivalent historical position of modern Japan with regard to the
EuroAmerican world order has already provided a strategic perspective to
overcome monological studies focusing unilaterally on either the hegemonic or
the subaltern, and to stress instead the interrelational process of
Occidentalism, Orientalism, and selfOrientalism in regard to the construction
of national identity (note 1). But today, even in the absence of direct
domination or coercion exercised by a EuroAmerican power, Occidentalism
continues to be hegemonic in Japan, as Naoki Sakai argues: "What gives the
majority of Japanese the characteristic image of Japanese culture, is still its
distinction from the socalled West…The loss of the distinction between the
West and Japan would result in the loss of Japanese identity in general" (2002,
564).
[1.4] In order to contribute to further critical understanding of Occidentalism
and to explore its contemporary rearticulation in Japan, I draw on an
interrelational, intersectional, and positional approach inspired by the
Gramscian concept of hegemony (note 2). Gramsci has suggested that there
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can be no effective hegemony without the active consent of the subaltern. This
means that it is not only important to address, from above, the interiorization
of the imagined geography of "the West" on an international and institutional
level, but also its reproduction in common sense, everyday life, and popular
cultures on an intrasocietal level, from below.
[1.5] The crucial question to ask is, what kind of strategic advantages does
this subaltern selfpositioning offer in relation to "the West" as universal
reference? And focusing on the intrasocietal level, what kind of heterogeneous
axes of sociocultural identification and othering (nation, race/ethnicity, gender,
sexuality, age, class) cumulatively intersect in this selfpositioning? What kind
of pleasures, desires, and emotions are mobilized to articulate it as attractive?
Finally, how does this selfpositioning and reaction to Occidentalism differ
according to the specific positionality of the actors involved?
[1.6] Karen Kelsky (2001) has critically highlighted the gendered fetish of
the "white" man and the longing (akogare) for everything "Western" among
young women in contemporary Japan; such objects are strategic signifiers of
emancipatory projects, internationalism, and social upward mobility. Similarly,
the wider dissemination through mass media and urban consumption of an
idealized "West" has been investigated by Yuiko Fujita (2009) as motivating
middleclass youth to migrate to London and New York. And mostly significant
for the purposes of this study, Kazumi Nagaike (2009), in analyzing boys' love
magazines, has convincingly examined the stimulation in female fantasies of
romantic tensions and male homosexual eroticism. These tensions and this
eroticism are articulated through the superiorization of racialized "white" men.
[1.7] The tremendous popularity of the amateur Web manga Axis Powers
Hetalia, which focuses on malemale intimacy between anthropomorphized
EuroAmerican nations and Japan, offers a precious opportunity to reexamine,
from below, Occidentalism and its intersection with a wide range of spheres of
identity and alterity, be it geopolitical, historical, national, racial, gendered, or
sexual (note 3). Hetalia, as the most adapted work among femaleoriented
dōjinshi (Japanese fanzines, ranging from manga to light novels and
simulation games), provides further insight into the ways in which different
dimensions of pleasure, such as parody and sexuality, are strategically
mobilized in yaoiinspired fantasies (note 4).
[1.8] This investigation of Hetalia builds on an earlier examination of its
multimedia platform, including Web manga, printed manga, anime series, and
amateur adaptations, and the heterogenous discourses surrounding it. Further
integration of textual and visual reading of Hetalia relies on participant
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observation of national dōjinshi conventions ("Hetalia Only" events), informal
interviews with organizers, authors, and attendants, and participation in the
everyday Hetaliarelated practices of fans, which includes Web surfing,
karaoke, and gadget shopping (note 5). Finally, because the nation inspiring
the original work is Italy, a brief period of fieldwork I conducted in Italy on
cosplay groups and interviews with fan fiction writers has provided further
insight into the transnational diffusion of Hetalia (note 6).
2. The boom of Axis Powers Hetalia

[2.1] Hetalia is a gag comic and animation series depicting historical and
military relations between (so far) more than 40 nations, anthropomorphized
as cutelooking and incompetent boys and kids (note 7). These male
characters personify broadstroke national, ethnic, and linguistic stereotypes;
international relations are transfigured as intimate and childish quarrels,
mainly between the trio of the historic Axis Powers (Italy, Germany, and
Japan) and between the characters of the Allied Forces (the United States,
England, France, Russia, and China). There is no general and linear narrative
providing a unifying frame to the mostly fourpanel manga format and to the
5minute anime episodes. It is basically plotless, a loosely connected series of
nationcharactercentered, short, silly gags played across the background of
World War I and World War II, but including also episodes from ancient and
medieval history and presentday geopolitics.
[2.2] Hetalia started as a Web manga drawn by a male amateur artist,
Hidekaz Himaruya (b. 1985), and posted on his personal Web site Kitayume
(http://www.geocities.jp/himaruya/hetaria/index.htm) in 2006 while he was a
student in an art school in New York (figure 1). In the months that followed,
the online text slowly gained a cult following among female Net surfers. This
convinced publisher Gentōsha Comics in Japan to release in 2008 two printed
volumes of Hetalia's vignettes. By late 2009, a million copies had been sold.
This was followed by the release of a third volume in 2010, a fourth in 2011,
and a fifth in 2012. At present, the estimated total sales are 2 million copies
(figure 2). Meanwhile, starting in 2009, an adaptation of the first series of
short animation episodes (Hetalia Axis Powers) by Studio Dean in Tokyo was
also released online by Animate.tv (http://animate.tv/); in late 2012, it was in
its fourth season. A featurelength animated film, Paint It, White!, was
released in 2010. As is usual for successful Japanese manga or anime, it has
been heavily merchandised: CDs of character songs, dramatic CDs, video
games, cute figurines, vending machines with Hetalia drinks, photo booths
(purikura), and gadgets (note 8).
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Figure 1. Screen shot of Kitayume
(http://www.geocities.jp/himaruya/hetaria/index.html), the Web site of the
original Web manga by Hidekaz Himaruya. [View larger image.]
Figure 2. Hetalia printed manga editions by Gentōsha Comics (2008–12).
[View larger image.]
[2.3] If we consider that Hetalia was originally an amateur work with no
aesthetic or graphic sophistication, nor any narrative consistency, even more
remarkable than its commercial success has been its extraordinary popularity
among dōjinshi (fanzines). During the summer and autumn of 2010, hundreds
of Hetaliainspired amateur adaptations were piled in boys' love corners in the
biggest Animate and Mandrake manga stores in Tokyo, especially at Otome
Road in Eastern Ikebukuro, one center of yaoi fandom and related fujoshi
(rotten girls/women) subculture. An even larger number of texts—thousands
of different titles, ranging from manga to light novels—were exhibited for sale
at manga and cosplay conventions dedicated to the Hetalia world. Hundreds of
"Hetalia Only" events have been held in major Japanese cities, from the all
inclusive "World Series" to the more segmented "Kyara Only" events, which
are limited to specific characters and combinations (figure 3). Besides the
biggest amateur manga/anime event in Japan, known as Comic Market or
Comiket, attendance at "Hetalia Only" events from June to October 2010
ranged from 50 fan circles (approximately 1,000 visitors) to 450 circles
(approximately 10,000 visitors). Excluding some of the organizers and myself,
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most of these events had an astonishing 100% female attendance. At the
summer 2010 Comiket 78, the 1,586 registered Hetalia fan circles ranked
second in number, only behind the more maleoriented shooting game Tōhō
Project circles (note 9). From 2009 to late 2011, Hetalia was by far the most
adapted work among femaleoriented dōjinshi in Japan (note 10).
Figure 3. "Hetalia Only" events organized by Youmedia. "World Series" event
(left); "Japan Only" event (right). [View larger image.]
[2.4] The chain of derivative works, parodies, and spinoffs of the original is
not limited to Japanese versions but has spread to almost every language
used on the Internet. Through the Web, thanks to intensive scanning
(scanlation) and fan subbing, Hetalia has had a dramatic impact around the
world among female lovers of Japanese comics and animation, even before
being translated into English or other main languages (note 11). Since 2009,
an Axis Powers Hetalia Day has been celebrated on October 24 among
international fandom, especially in Englishspeaking nations, by gathering
together, cosplaying Hetalia characters, exhibiting huge national flags, and
discussing coupling combinations. In 2010, Hetalia Day was celebrated in 35
countries, with 160 registered meetups (http://hetalia
day.com/2010/directory.html). In late 2010, the first two manga volumes
were finally published by Tokyopop in English, topping the New York Times
manga bestseller list in the United States and entering a more
commercialized stage of international diffusion.
3. Controversial success
[3.1] Hardcore fans, especially fans in Japan, prefer to consume and display
their reproductions of Hetalia (dōjinshi, cosplay, fan art, fan fiction) in mostly
intimate spheres together with other fans; they venture out to more public
spaces such as dōjinshi events only when they are sure to meet other fans.
There is a widespread reluctance to expose this hobby to the nonfan gaze,
possibly to avoid incomprehension or refusal, or simply because it is easier,
more enjoyable, and more rewarding to experience it only in intimate spaces
or with other fans. This applies in general to many subcultural spheres as well,
but it is arguably more relevant for a boys' love/yaoi–inspired and mostly
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female subculture, especially considering its overtly male homoerotic tone.
Among all the Hetalia fans I interviewed in Japan, nobody expressed the
desire to go public or to be acknowledged by the mainstream, and academic
attention was considered surprising and extremely embarrassing. However, in
Italy, as in many EuroAmerican countries, public display of huge Hetalia
national flags and uniforms in the streets are standard during Japan festivals
or events centered around Jculture (manga, anime, video games), likely the
result of the variety of cosplay conventions and the accepted coolness of J
culture (figures 4 and 5). Still, as a result of homophobia, critical parents, and
hate speech from other Jculture fans (and even some Hetalia fan girls), there
is widespread criticism of yaoiinspired activities (note 12).
Figure 4. The Italian Hetalia Cosplay Project at Lucca Comics & Games 2010
(personal photo, November 1, 2010). [View larger image.]
Figure 5. The Hetalia Cosplay Project performing at the Lucca Comics &
Games 2010 cosplay competition, November 1 (personal video, posted on
YouTube by the organizer of the group; http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=w0BhIDvzppw). [View larger image.]
[3.2] Hetalia might have passed quite unnoticed—like many works addressed
to and reproduced by a specific, more or less subcultural audience, in this case
mostly girls and young women in their late teens and 20s—by the mainstream
had there not been some vocal protest among netizens outside Japan, who
reacted vehemently to Hetalia's representation of history, nationhood, and
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ethnicity. On the occasion of the scheduled broadcasting of the anime
adaptation in early 2009 on Kids Station, a Japanese cable and satellite TV
channel, a huge protest movement arose among South Koreans. They
criticized the stereotypical rendering of the Korean character in the original
Web manga, organizing a petition signed by about 17,000 netizens to stop the
broadcast of the TV program. Finally, Congresswoman Jeong MiKyeong of the
South Korean Grand National Party, a conservative party holding the majority
in the assembly, brought the protest to the National Assembly Committee. At
the Special Assembly Committee on Defensive Measures for the Liancourt
Rocks, on January 13, 2009, she accused the manga of being insulting to the
Korean people, calling Hetalia a criminal act, even if created by a private
person, and urging the government to take diplomatic action against the
Japanese government as well as to draft a law in order to handle this kind of
national offense. One of the most criticized aspects of this protest was the
Korea character's obsession in the original manga with touching Japan's breast
(and Japan's reluctance to allow it). The breast was arguably taken to
represent the Liancourt Rocks, a small group of islands, the sovereignty of
which is disputed between South Korea and Japan (figure 6) (note 13).
Figure 6. Episode ("Boobs are forever!") showing Korea touching Japan's
breast in the original Web manga. [View larger image.]
[3.3] This accusation was covered by both the South Korean and the
Japanese media, and it brought about the cancellation of the TV broadcast of
Hetalia. The anime adaptation continued its diffusion via Webcasts and mobile
phones after the Korean character had been removed. More informal criticism
was ubiquitous among online discussions worldwide, condemning the omission
in the original Hetalia of disturbing aspects related to modern history, such as
genocide, the Holocaust, and fascist totalitarianism, and disapproving of Euro
American cosplayers for dealing casually with controversial symbols of World
War II, such as national flags and military uniforms.
[3.4] In other words, Hetalia's national and global popularity, even if limited
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to a subculture, is inevitably embedded in complex, contested, and intertwined
issues of identity, history, and power—issues that are not easy to disentangle.
If we consider Hetalia in terms of its possibilities and limits, three sorts of
questions may be raised according to their different positions and aims.
[3.5] First, is Hetalia antiKorean? Is it a stereotyped, essentialized, and
racialized rendering of national cultures? Is it historically misleading about the
tragic reality of war and of totalitarian ideologies, contributing to aestheticism,
banalization, and uncritical appreciation of global power relations? (Modernists,
mostly male.)
[3.6] Second, is Hetalia a creative and empowering expression of an
autonomous and femaleoriented subculture inspired by boys' love/yaoi
fantasies? Is it a typical mode of parodic, playful, and postmodern
consumption of late capitalism, a mangaesque media mix detached from direct
connections to social, political, or historical references (note 14)? Does it favor
a transcultural network of international fandom, thanks to increasing media
convergence, Internet literacy, and the globalized popularity of Cool Japan?
(Postmodernists and postfeminists, mostly academics.)
[3.7] Third, is Hetalia stimulating a cosmopolitan and genuine interest in
other countries, their histories, and their people? Or is it simply funny, joyful,
and entertaining, and therefore immune to critical scrutiny? After all, it is
basically a gag comic created for fun by a young amateur and enjoyed
privately as a hobby without any explicit message or ideological intention.
(Fans, mostly female.)
[3.8] It would be easy to argue that each interpretation has validity.
Furthermore, this division into three groups is inevitably shaped by my own
subject position. I am Japanese, but not a Japanese native speaker (I grew up
in Germany and Italy); I am middleaged and married; and I am a man.
During fieldwork, I displayed the following: a modernist impatience with
historical mystification and ethnic stereotyping in regard to representational
content; a sensibility inspired by cultural studies and gender studies for the
potential of popular media and female youth subcultures; and, to a more
limited extent, an appreciation of some of the fan practices as an enjoyable
aspect of participant observation. In addition, considering the large and
proliferating Hetalia world, all the questions listed above may be affirmable
with empirical evidence. I suggest instead that a perspective inspired by
critical Occidentalism can contribute to the understanding of some of the
underlying assumptions of Hetalia's popularity, for both the original and its
adaptations, and on national and global levels.
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4. Doing interrelational Occidentalism: Eurocentric

cartography and whiteness
[4.1] A first crucial aspect for understanding the hegemonic role of
Occidentalism and its ongoing reproduction is interrelationality with regard to
the international sphere. In the contemporary postcolonial, postimperialistic
age, the effectiveness of hegemony relies less on direct imposition from above
supported by the political, military, or economical supremacy of a specific
EuroAmerican nation, institution, or individual. Rather, Occidentalism relies
for its reproduction more and more on acceptance and active consent from
below by the nonEuroAmerican sides, more or less subaltern, including
Japan. One effect of this interrelational process, a sort of globalized and
dispersed mirror game articulating representations of specular identity and
alterity, has been in modern times to mutually reinforce and reproduce the
Eurocentric cartography of "the West" as the universal reference of the world
(Miyake 2010).
[4.2] With regard to contemporary Japan, Yuiko Fujita in her fieldwork on
Japanese cultural migrants highlights a revealing imagined geography, which
can also be seen in the fact that the author, Himaruya, started composing
Hetalia while he was studying in New York as an international student.
Japanese young women and men were asked, before migrating to or going to
study in New York or London, to draw a world map and write placenames on
it. The main aspects of these drawings were, first, that Japan was drawn in the
center of the world and oversized relative to other countries and continents;
and second, that the drawings focused on EuroAmerican countries. Nearly all
respondents drew North America and Europe, but most omitted the socalled
"Rest" of the world—Africa, the Arabian nations, and large parts of Asia (Fujita
2009, 44–45).
[4.3] The imagined geography as displayed in Hetalia world maps replicates
these drawings and their interiorization of a Eurocentric cartography
(Himaruya 2008, 10–11) (figure 7). Apart from Japan, almost all the main
characters in the original manga and anime versions are cute "whites," namely
the Axis Powers (Italy and Germany) and the Allied Forces (the United States,
the England, France, Russia) and the Five Nordic Nations (Norway, Sweden,
Finland, Iceland, Denmark). Most of the episodes are inspired by events that
occurred during and between World War I and World War II, and they center
on intimate quarrels between the European characters, the American
character, and Japan. In reality, most of the actual historical and military
events in this period involved dramatic and tragic contact between imperial
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Japan and its Asian neighbors. However, in Hetalia, only a few Asian
characters are included—mainly China as a member of the Allied Forces in
some independent episodes, and to a limited extent Korea in the original Web
manga. Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Vietnam appear mainly as sketch
characters on Himaruya's Web page and blog.
Figure 7. Eurocentric geography in the original Hetalia (Himaruya 2008, 10–
11). [View larger image.]
[4.4] In addition to the textual and visual levels of the text, the modern
cultural history of national identity as regards "Japan" versus "the West" is
confirmed by reader preferences for "white" characters. A readers' poll by
Hetalia publisher Gentōsha Comics about the most loved characters looks like
a kind of gaijin akogare (fascination for Western foreigners) ranking. After
Japan, which was voted top, the most popular characters are the England,
Germany, Russia, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Greece, the United States, and
Sweden, with China, at a rank of 17, being the only character representing
"the Rest" of the world (figure 8) (http://www.gentosha
comics.net/hetalia/enquete/index_02.html).
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Figure 8. Gentōsha Comics survey on preferred characters among Hetalia
readers (July 2010). [View larger image.]
[4.5] This kind of mangaesque and gendered attraction for the "white" man
is also confirmed by the dōjinshi scene. Catalog maps at Hetaliacentered
conventions show how the distribution of the author circles is framed
according to the boys' love/yaoi code of seme (active, stronger, penetrating
character) and uke (passive, weaker, receiving character) pairings. The most
popular is the seme United States/uke England pairing, followed by the seme
England/uke Japan pairing, the uke Prussia corner, the seme France/uke
England pairing, and the Scandinavian characters' corner (note 15). Japan is
not only the most popular character among general readers of the original, but
also very popular as an uke character in the dōjinshi scene (figure 9). The
circle distribution in the conventions that center exclusively on Japan as an
uke character show that the most popular seme partners are all "white":
England ranks first, followed by the United States, France, Prussia, Italy, and
Russia (note 16).
Figure 9. Polymorphous and crossgendered Japan (Kiku Honda) in dōjinshi
works including amateur manga, illustrations, and postcards. [View larger
image.]
[4.6] But Occidentalism is not only a matter of generic relevance attributed
to "the West," to "Western" history, or to "whites." Occidentalism is deeply
rooted in the modern history of colonialism and imperialism, framing
asymmetrical and hierarchic dispositions of identity and alterity. This is evident
and enforced in the parody configuration and appropriation by dōjinshi authors
according to the seme/uke code of the yaoi grammar. Almost all pairings are
framed by and reproduce a geopolitical and geocultural topdown hierarchy.
The stronger, aggressive, more experienced, taller, masculine seme character
is performed by the more powerful nation, while the more passive, younger,
effeminate uke character is played by the weaker nation: seme United
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States/uke England, seme Germany/uke Italy, seme England/uke Japan, and
so on (figure 10).
Figure 10. Dōjinshi manga covers. From left: United States × England,
Germany × Italy, England × Japan (Koffy 2012; GessekikanHaiyoruloop
2010; Chimamire moimoigō, 2010). [View larger image.]
[4.7] As regards the interrelational process of Occidentalism, the
interiorization of a Eurocentric cartography plays a relevant role in the
popularity of Hetalia not only in Japan, but also worldwide, especially in Euro
American contexts. Eurocentrism and whiteness contribute to the immediate
familiarity and to the direct appropriation of the Hetalia world and characters
by EuroAmerican readers, without any complex mediation imposed by
displacing difference or otherness (note 17). This familiarity is further
enhanced by the specific stereotyping of Hetalia's original characters according
to modern clichés of the socalled national characters, which have been
adopted by Himaruya after mostly ethnic jokes diffused among his American
friends while he was studying in New York. For instance, Japan is shy and well
mannered, and loves the changes of seasons and technological gadgets, but is
clumsy in communicating his feelings and thoughts. On the other hand, Italy is
a lighthearted idler, a pizza, pasta, and musicloving coward. The United
States is an energetic, selfconfident, hamburgereating character who loves
to play the hero but is superstitious and afraid of supernatural beings.
5. Doing intersectional and positional Occidentalism:

Nation anthropomorphism, moe, and sexualized parody
[5.1] A second crucial aspect for the hegemonic effectiveness of
Occidentalism is intersectionality, which refers to a more intrasocietal level
(note 18). Occidentalism has been in the modern age a selfdefinition as "the
West," first in Europe and then in the United States, articulated through
intertwined paradigms aimed at defining its presumed modern identity:
reason, science, progress, universalism, individualism, masculinity, white race,
adulthood. In other words, Occidentalism, as any kind of hegemonic identity,
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is not limited to an isolated or homogenous paradigm. It is instead the effect
of a cumulative intersection, mobilizing very different axes of sociocultural
identification related to nation, class, race/ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and
age, activating very different modes of representation, practices, and affect,
and arguably cutting across every dimension of human existence.
[5.2] As Edward Said has shown, this modern selfdefinition of the socalled
West was configured in the imperialist age by a hierarchic contrast with an
otherdefinition about what is or should be other to itself (Orientalism),
framing the existence and meaning of "the Rest" of the world as "the East,"
including Japan. This cultural other, being mainly constructed as antithetical to
EuroAmerican modernity, will be, or must be, reduced to nonmodern
paradigms: "the East" or the subaltern "Rest" of the world has been configured
as a cumulative intersection of nonmodern paradigms including tradition,
emotionality, stasis, particularism, groupism, femininity, colored race, and
infancy. The paradigms and combinations of this imagined geography can
obviously vary, depending on specific periods, contexts, and actors, and it may
not necessarily be configured through a dualistic antithesis.
[5.3] Hegemonic effectiveness requires both interrelationality and
intersectionality with regard to the acceptance and active consent from the
subaltern other. This applies both to the otherdefinition of "the West" as
cultural other (Occidentalism) made by the subaltern, as well as to the self
definition of the subaltern themselves as "the East" or "the Rest" (self
Orientalism), in both cases interiorizing and reproducing the paradigms and
contrastive dualism articulated by EuroAmerican Occidentalism. The key
aspect for Occidentalism is how the interrelational process is combined with a
specific cumulative intersectionality activated from the subaltern side. Its
hegemonic range relies on how imitation, interiorization, and reproduction of
its intersecting paradigms contribute to corroborating the sameness of
discursive identity and alterity; or, on the contrary, are able to introduce some
ambiguity, slippages, or even subversive disruptions to the game of mirrors.
Hegemony is intrinsically a polyphonic process, which means that
Occidentalism is always a mutually constituted process, according to multiple
and fluid positions of dominance and subalternity, as well as to the interacting
convergence of different discourses and practices.
[5.4] Returning to Hetalia, besides its general Eurocentric cartography and
fascination for whiteness, it is therefore important to pay attention to specific
positions and differences introduced by its recontextualization of
Occidentalism, and to acknowledge other intersections related to more
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ambivalent spheres of identification and to nuanced modes of appropriation.
According to a survey conducted by Hetalia manga publisher Gentōsha Comics
(http://www.gentoshacomics.net/hetalia/enquete/index.html) of general
readers who were asked to define Hetalia in one word, nation was the second
most appreciated aspect (figure 11). Nations are anthropomorphized as cute
boy characters (shōnen), and, in the absence of a supporting narrative and
graphic sophistication, are condensed as the exclusive focus of the short
episodes. This means that on the one hand Eurocentrism, whiteness, and
geopolitical asymmetry are made clearer and more essentialized as a result of
the wide use of stereotypes related to nation, ethnicity, and language, and
because characters, at least in the original text, hold only nation names like
Japan, Italy, and Germany (note 19). Entire nations are personified through a
unified human body, personality, and name, contributing to the erasure of
internal diversities and historical complexities. For instance, Occidentalism is
enhanced by personifying the United States, Russia, or Germany as strong,
blond, active characters, while selfOrientalism is reaffirmed by Japan as a
shy, passive, insecure character.
Figure 11. Gentōsha Comics survey among readers on defining keywords of
Hetalia: 1, love; 2, nation; 3, pleasure, 4, moe (burningbudding passion); 5,
laughter (July 2010). [View larger image.]
[5.5] But on the other hand, it is the very anthropomorphic and caricatured
incarnation of modern nationhood, as seen in the insistence on childish and
intimate malemale relations, that introduces an ironic slippage to
conventional images of world history, international relations, and national
politics. This contributes to its exhilarating effects and stimulates a
polymorphous range of symbolic associations and emotions, which have all
been crucial in mobilizing the text's widespread readings and adaptations. It is
evident in the readers' preferences, where love ranked first, pleasure third,
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moe fourth, and laughter fifth (figure 11). It is even more evident if we
consider Hetalia's appropriation and multiplication among the dōjinshirelated
fandom. According to authors, cosplayers, readers, and organizers of the
"Hetalia Only" events in Japan, two revealing points are recurrently underlined
with regard to the attractiveness of the original Hetalia, as follows.
[5.6] First, by resorting to cuteboy (shōnen) personifications, Hetalia has
extended to a female readership moe inspiring nation personification. Nation
anthropomorphism has become popular in the last decade and was originally
developed among maleoriented otaku culture (hardcore fans of manga,
anime, video games, and figurines), but it was limited to cutegirl (shōjo)
personifications and therefore was mainly targeted to boys and men (note 20).
[5.7] Second, compared with other popular original works adopted among
dōjinshi, stories and characters in Hetalia are extremely loose in terms of
emplotment, setting, and psychological characterization. This discloses infinite
spaces of appropriation and parody. It stimulates the most genuine fantasy
with regard to preferred nations and coupling combinations of characters.
[5.8] In relation to the first point, Hetalia's male author, Himaruya, claims
being originally inspired by discussions on the popular Japanese message
board 2channel about war and military themes, and specifically about Italy
being judged as having the weakest and clumsiest army in the world
(http://www.geocities.jp/himaruya/d_i0.htm). His inspiration can be
considered quite maleoriented, as can be seen in the widespread otaku
interest in online discussions about weapons, national characters, history, and
race. However, the personification of this idea did not take the form of cute
and sexy girls, inspiring the complex affective responses of moe (Galbraith
2009)—a conflation of childlike innocence and adult desire, an ambivalent and
polymorphous stimulation of pure, protecting, and nurturing feelings for cute
and helpless characters (lolicon, Lolita complex), and the stimulation of desire
for eroticized young girls (bishōjo, beautiful girls). In Hetalia, the male
oriented and heterosexualized fantasy of moe has been transposed to a more
femaleoriented version, staging a combination of cute boys and preadolescent
characters (shotakon, or Shōtaro complex), as well as emphasizing their
intimate and malemale relationality. All main nations are personified in the
original Hetalia as cute or androgynous boy characters and are alternated with
mini cute versions. For instance, the ancient version of Italy, with his origins in
the Roman Empire, is personified as adult, masculine, and strong; the
premodern version of Italy is depicted as Chibitalia (MiniItaly), a babyish and
feminized version, wearing the characteristic maid outfit of male moe fantasies
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and shown as the object of attraction for the stronger and aggressive mini
cute version of premodern Austria (figure 12) (note 21).
Figure 12. Polymorphous Italy in the original Hetalia. From left, cuteboy
modern Italy (main version), grandpa Roman Empire, mini cute modern Italy,
mini cute premodern Italy (Mitarai 2009, 54, 61, 57, 108). [View larger
image.]
[5.9] In relation to the second point, regarding the pleasure of parodying
Hetalia, it is important to stress that the original is not a straight
personification of EuroAmerican nations or of Japan, but rather a parody of
them, a pastiche that oscillates between a homage to Eurocentric history and
fascination for whiteness, and the mocking caricature of their national
stereotypes and their infantile behavior. Occidentalism thus functions in the
original as a kind of discursive hypotext. The hegemonic grand narrative of
Eurocentric history performed by "white" actors, so familiar in both Euro
American and Japanese contexts, is transformed by resorting to an effective
bricolage of highly popular icons, strategically borrowed from both male
oriented otaku and femaleoriented fujoshi subcultures (note 22).
[5.10] Boys' love and yaoi fantasies are instead dominant in the dōjinshi
adaptations, displaying in many cases a male homoerotic and sexually explicit,
often pornographic version of Occidentalism (figure 13). On the one hand,
anthropomorphized Eurocentrism and geopolitical hierarchy may be further
emphasized as a result of the topdown yaoi code of seme/uke, focusing on a
far more restricted relation and narrative as in the original (note 23). This
makes the hierarchic and dualistic dialectic of identity and alterity even more
evident. As Kazumi Nagaike (2009) has highlighted in her study on the
racialized textuality of commercial boys' love magazines, this hierarchic
dialectic is mostly performed as the masculine superiorization of the Euro
American other as seme, the feminine inferiorization of the Japanese self as
uke, and the exotic orientalization or erasure of "the Rest" of the world.
Figure 13. "Learning Western culture." Dōjinshi sexualized parody of United
States (seme) × Japan (uke) (3x3Cross 2009, cover, 10). [View explicit
image.]
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[5.11] On the other hand, unlike commercial and original boys' love works,
these yaoiinspired dōjinshi are amateur adaptations, parodies of the original
Hetalia. So if Himaruya's Hetalia is already itself a parody of the hegemonic
hypotext of Occidentalism, then these dōjinshi are a parody of a parody. As a
result of the different subject positions of dōjinshi authors living in Japan, the
discursive distance with regard to Occidentalism and to EuroAmerican
referentiality is therefore further enhanced and diluted. Himaruya was
composing Hetalia while living in New York and was inspired directly by Euro
American friends and students when creating his manga characters. Dōjinshi
authors are instead living in Japan, and therefore recontextualization is shaped
both by different gendered positions and by reference to different material,
social, and institutional conditions.
[5.12] According to my interviews, dōjinshi authors and readers are actually
not very keen on EuroAmerican history and nations, whiteness, the original
work and its author, or male homosexuality. That is, Hetalia authors and
cosplayers are not necessarily interested in foreign countries or concrete
persons per se. Most of them have never been to Europe or North America,
have never met a white boy or man, and do not necessarily express interest in
doing so. Instead, they focus on how to use these settings and icons according
to the visual grammar and established conventions of the boys' love/yaoi
genre in order to share and enjoy them with other fans. Much time may be
invested in studying the preferred nation character's history, language,
customs, dress, food, and architecture, all in the most minute detail. This
includes bibliographic research, online or in libraries, and in some cases short
trips to European cities, which may become on their return the setting for their
own dōjinshi adaptation. Interestingly, this acquired knowledge can also be
used to legitimate what might be perceived as an embarrassing hobby. What
matters to these fans are the specific and concrete needs of a teenager or
young woman in relation to the gendered and sexualized norms informing
external relations with other teenagers, men, and adults, as well as their
internal relations with the dōjinshi or Hetalia fandom (note 24).
[5.13] As the readers' poll suggests, it is the two topranked keywords, love
and nation, that provide the reading paradigm among general readers of
Hetalia, as well as, arguably, the discursive hypotext for the dōjinshi parodies.
Love as an intense and idealized longing for absolute intimacy among nation
characters is ubiquitous and often the only framing narrative of the very short
dōjinshi adaptations, regardless of the presence or absence of explicit sexual
content. It is often romanticized, with a profusion of dating, courting, and
bridal symbolism (figure 14). But as the male homoeroticism and often overt
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sexualization suggest, most of the dōjinshi transfigure and parody both
hegemonic love (in its modern form of a heteronormative ideology sustained
by patriarchal, reproductive, or consumptive societal imperatives) and modern
nationalism by insisting on an idealized love, explicit sex, and childish quarrels
among nations (note 25).
Figure 14. Dōjinshi romanticism. From left, Italy × Japan, England × Japan,
Germany × Italy (Malomondo 2010; MiwaSakakibara 2010; Miyasha 2010).
[5.14] Crossgendering or transgendering, combined with explicit
representation of sexual intercourse, may induce playful and even therapeutic
effects with regard to heteronormative, homophobic, or patriarchal restraints
on female readers, fans, and authors in Japan (Suzuki 1998; Azuma 2009). It
is this specific kind of mangaesque intertwining of ultimate love, male
homosexual relations, and polymorphous cuteness that has proven to be
effective in exonerating participants from anxieties regarding real
heterosexism and in disclosing autonomous space for experimental fantasies
and intimate fan practices. In a more general sense, it has been strategic in
establishing over the last few decades the mangaesque media mix of boys'
love/yaoi as arguably the most diffused genre of femaleoriented erotica or
porn production and consumption in Japan (note 26). The displacement and
creative results are immediately evident on the textual and visual level of
Hetalia dōjinshi, considering the sheer numbers and polymorphous parodies of
nation characters. It is also visible on the social and interpersonal levels—
consider the proliferating network of Hetalia communities, fostered by
conventions, circles, cosplaying, and online fandom in Japan and worldwide
(figure 15).
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Figure 15. Collective cosplay performance in Italy (including the contested
KoreaJapan episode) at Rimini Comics, June 2010 (video posted on YouTube
by a member of the group, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qfLtXG98T4).
[5.15] However, parodies exhibit ambivalence, a paradoxical double bind
with regard to their hegemonic hypotext in terms of critical subversion or
repetitive confirmation; this also applies to youth subcultures and their
relationship to wider society. Regardless of cosmopolitan idealism, socializing
effects, and liberating potential, these parodies do not erase their founding
hypotext or pretext, making it invisible or ineffective. On the contrary—
racialized Eurocentrism and Orientalism, hierarchic geopolitics, and revisionist
history still remain visible, as the South Korean protest and hate speech by
European Net surfers both show. It may be too simple to dismiss it as nothing
more than narrowminded nationalism and essentialism.
6. Conclusion: The West or "the West"?

[6.1] Karen Kelsky's account of women's internationalist narratives and
practices in late 1990s Japan might also apply to the Hetalia world: "The West
becomes not so much a source of critical comparative perspective (which can
be evaluated for its 'accuracy,' for example) as an imaginative simulacrum
infinitely available for the production of discourses that motivate and explain
resistance or accommodation" (2001, 28). But if "the West" as a simulacrum is
everywhere, then does it make sense to criticize it? Should we instead resign
ourselves to this ubiquity and limit our focus to its strategic uses in order to
highlight resistance or accommodation in more specific contexts?
[6.2] Yet Hetalia's textuality and related practices display many of the de
essentializing and liberating aspects for female authors, readers, and
practitioners, at least in specific terms of sociality, gender, sexuality, and
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subjectivity, that have been widely investigated in boys' love/yaoi studies.
Fieldwork on Hetalia fandom outside Japan, as in China, has focused on the
critical potential in stimulating engagement with domestic politics and
overcoming parochial nationalism (Yang 2011), or, in North America, on
contributing to transcultural networks and allowing socially transformative,
critical, and reflexive conversations, even on the controversial issues Hetalia
itself has raised (Annett 2011).
[6.3] Nevertheless, if we shift our perspective to very different gendered and
national positions (male Koreans, Italians, Japanese), we may reactivate
mutually exclusive interpretations similar to the ones that have animated the
heated debate on boys' love/yaoi discrimination of gay men and culture over
the last two decades. On the one hand, boys' love/yaoi is entertainment for
women who indulge in fantasies about homoerotic male intimacy shaped by
idealized stereotypes in order to enjoy escapist stories about ultimate love;
they may have no interest in reallife, concrete gay men or in their realistic
depiction. On the other hand, it may be disturbing for gay men, who may feel
uneasy at being objectified by this othering process, or who may criticize its
ineffectiveness in overcoming homophobic prejudice in contemporary Japan
(Hori 2010).
[6.4] From the wider perspective of a critical Occidentalism, "the West"
constitutes a problem not only for its historical origin embedded in colonial and
imperialist capitalism, which has configured difference between civilizations,
cultures, and people according to asymmetrical relations of geopolitical power.
It also constitutes a problem on the intrasocietal level, because as a globalized
and dispersed form of hegemony, it frames more specific axes of modern
identity/alterity (nation, race/ethnicity, gender, sexuality) and is reactivated
through their cumulative and fluid intersection. In Hetalia, "love" and "nation"
may be enjoyable objects of cosmopolitan, crossgendered, and sexualized
parody, at least for its boys' love/yaoi–inspired fandom. Nevertheless, as a
kind of hegemonic hypotext or pretext, they continue to function as underlying
criteria of reference used to mobilize more emotional, spontaneous, and
physical dimensions, ultimately contributing to a biopolitical extension of
Occidentalism. Without Eurocentric history and "white" men, and also without
"love" and "nation," both the original and its adaptations would be impossible.
[6.5] What is at stake in this critical reading of Hetalia is not only the
mangaesque reproduction of Occidentalism from below, but also its
intersecting paradigms. Are the notions of "the West" intersecting "race,"
"nation," and "love," as established in the modern age, even if reproduced as
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postmodern simulacra devoid of empirical referentiality, like the air we must
inevitably breathe? Is it even possible to imagine texts and images, or to
practice alternative ways of geopolitical, societal, and personal relations,
without relying on these criteria, even as parodic hypotexts?
[6.6] Stuart Hall (1990) has discussed inferential racism in contrast to overt
racism, referring to those kind of discourses in which a subtle naturalization of
unquestioned racial assumptions remains largely invisible even to those who
deploy them. I suggest that the contemporary reproduction of Occidentalism
relies largely on this inferential process, without depending on an overt or
intentional Occidentalism with regard to representational contents in terms of
modern racism, nationalism, sexism, and classism. Thus its hegemonic
effectiveness is directly proportional to its becoming familiar, naturalized, and
ultimately invisible, like the air we breathe.
7. Acknowledgments
This essay was presented in part at Global Polemics of BL [Boys' Love]:
Production, Circulation, and Censorship, Oita University, Japan, January 23,
2011. I am indebted to Ling Yang for her suggestions and critical reading. My
deepest gratitude goes to my younger sister, Yuka, for her indispensable
mediation with Hetalia fandom in Japan. Special thanks to Valentina Montanari
(aka Yoko), the founding organizer of the Hetalia Cosplay Project in Italy, and
to the more than 30 members competing as a cosplay group at Lucca Comics
& Games 2010 for allowing me to participate in their preparation and
performance, and for introducing me to the wider Hetalia fan girl scene.
8. Notes
1. Even if not using the same terminology, the tangled process involved in the
construction of cultural identity in Japan regarding the West and the East has
been investigated since the 1980s (Dale 1986; Iwabuchi 1994; Yoshino 1992;
Sakai 1997).
2. Long before postcolonial studies and Edward Said's Orientalism (1978),
Antonio Gramsci addressed the arbitrary notions of West and East, as well as
the mutually constitutive relations of hegemonic effectiveness and subaltern
interiorization, including Japan (Gramsci [1929–35] 1975, 874, 1419–20).
3. Studies on Hetalia have mostly addressed its transnational reception (South
Korea, China, and North America), focusing on Web fandom and discourses
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(Kim 2009; Yang 2011; Annett 2011).
4. Like boys' love, yaoi refers to the transmedial constellation of female
oriented manga, anime, light novels, games, and so on, featuring idealized
malemale intimacy. Unlike boys' love, which is related to original and
commercialized works, yaoi is more associated with fan fiction, mostly self
produced, homosexualized short parodies of already existing mainstream
works.
5. Fieldwork in Japan was conducted from May to October 2010 as a Japan
Society for the Promotion of Science postdoctoral fellow, Department of
Sociology, Kyoto University, Japan.
6. The word Hetalia of the title is a contraction of the Japanese slang term
hetare, "incompetent, useless, pathetic," and Italia, "Italy." Fieldwork in Italy
was conducted from October 2010 to January 2011 as a Marie Curie
International Incoming Fellow, Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Italy.
7. Some of the minor characters are female personifications (Belarus, Belgium,
Hungary, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Seychelles, Taiwan, Ukraine). For a detailed
description in English of all the characters throughout the different media
platforms, see the Hetalia wiki
(http://hetalia.wikia.com/wiki/List_of_Axis_Powers_Hetalia_characters).
8. As for the CD nation character songs from the anime series, my informants
(female college students) in Nara, Japan, used to spend 5–6 hours even on
weekdays in karaoke boxes, singing, dancing, and performing their preferred
character. Except for the first Italy CD, seven character CDs (Germany, Japan,
England, and so on) were released monthly during 2009–10, and all hit the
top 10 in the Oricon weekly rankings (http://www.oricon.co.jp/).
9. Comiket 78 (summer 2010): 1, Tōhō Project (2,416 circles); 2, Hetalia
(1,586); 3, Reborn (822); 4, Sengoku Basara (575); 5, Gin Tama (532)
(http://news020.blog13.fc2.com/blogentry788.html). An online survey of
visitors to Comiket 78 have confirmed Hetaliainspired works to be the most
desired items for purchase among female attendees: 1, Hetalia; 2, Reborn; 3,
Durarara!!; 10, Tōhō Project (http://otalab.net/news/detail.php?
news_id=1024).
10. At Comiket 80 (summer 2011), Hetalia circles diminished but still ranked
second: 1, Tōhō Project (2,808 circles); 2, Hetalia (1,302); 3, Sengoku Basara
(880); 4, Reborn (572); 5, Vocaloid (558)
(http://otanews.livedoor.biz/archives/51807832.html); YahooAuctionsJapan
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listed 8,443 Japanese Hetalia dōjinshirelated titles and 2,565 cosplayrelated
items (http://auctions.search.yahoo.co.jp).
11. In Italy—which according to Pellitteri (2010, 556) is the EuroAmerican
nation with the highest number of Japanese animation series broadcast on
television since 1978—Hetalia has been the most popular work among
hardcore female cosplay and fan fiction fandoms since late 2009, even before
being officially translated into Italian.
12. Some Hetalia cosplayers and fan fiction authors in Italy denied me
interviews because I mentioned the term yaoi. Interestingly, Lucia Piera De
Paola, the founder of the first Italian publishing house of yaoi manga and
novels, Tekeditori, is a veteran activist against homophobia.
13. The picture of Korea touching Japan's breast shown at the National
Assembly Committee was not an original but was arguably a product of Web
fan art. An English translation of part of the speech is available on YouTube
("Hetalia is like a criminal act. Koreans are furious,"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yo_btds9kM).
14. Jaqueline Berndt (forthcoming) has suggested considering the
mangaesque as pointing to "collaborative creativity, codification and
mediation, an aesthetic emphasis on fantasy rather than realism and impacts
rather than messages, further, an astonishingly precise depiction of emotions
and intimate relationships, often at the expense of allegorical and
metaphorical thinking."
15. See catalogs of "Hetalia Only" events (Sekai Kaigi Series) organized by
StudioYOU in Osaka (Intex Osaka, September 19, 2010, 1) and Nagoya
(Sangyō Rōdō Center, September 12, 2010, 8).
16. See catalog of "Hetalia Nihon Uke Only Event: Sekai no Honda 2,"
organized by StajioYou in Tokyo (Ryutsu Center, September 5, 2010, 1).
17. For a critical investigation on whiteness in EuroAmerican media, see Dyer
(1997).
18. Intersectionality has been theorized since the late 1980s by feminist
sociologists in the United States to examine how attributions of identity
interact on different, interdependent, and often simultaneous levels, thus
contributing to a systematic configuration of social inequality, as in the case of
AfroAmerican women.
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19. In dōjinshi adaptations, personal names suggested by Himaruya himself
on his Web site are widely used: Italy = Feliciano Vargas; Germany = Ludwig;
Japan = Kiku Honda; United States = Alfred F. Jones, and so on.
20. For an investigation of the wider popularity of moe anthropomorphism in
Japan, see Thompson (2009).
21. Fascination for Italy in Japan has played a prominent role in terms of
gender and age since the early 1990s, resulting in recent national surveys
listing Italy as the most loved foreign country when considering all female age
groups (15–59 years) and all young respondents (15–29 years) (NHK
Broadcasting Culture Research Institute 2008, 113–16). A crucial aspect of
this popularity has been the ambivalent configuration of Italy as an
orientalized "West" framed by an ambivalent process of both a superiorization
of its past (Roman Empire, Renaissance) and inferiorization of its premodern
present (chaotic nation, joyful people, familystyle cuisine, romanticism,
fashion, and so on) (Miyake 2012).
22. Sexualized and male homoerotic overtones of Himaruya's Hetalia
characters remain mostly implicit, allowing appreciation by a wider readership
who are not interested in or may even detest yaoiinspired themes.
23. Most of the Hetalia cosplayers in Japan perform as an seme/uke couple,
while cosplayers in Italy appear more often in large groups as well as alone.
24. Among fandom in Italy, these needs and problems are very similar,
attesting to the globalized structure of heteronormative and patriarchal norms,
as well as the potential of Hetalia and yaoi fantasy to cope with them and to
stimulate liberating pleasures, expressions, and practices. What differs is the
specific way of expressing and performing the Hetalia world. Compared with
Japan, there is less manga parody and much more emphasis on collective
cosplaying and fan fiction, as well as some involvement of male manga/anime
fans. For a public, collective, and joyous performance, see the Hetalia Cosplay
Group at Rimini Comics 2010 (figure 15).
25. In this sense, love may be considered as an expression of the recent pure
love (jun'ai) boom, which cuts across both maleoriented otaku and female
oriented fujoshi subcultures (Honda 2005). Love as an ambivalent coexistence
of both emotional attachment and ironic formalism and its connection to
nation may well represent a gendered variation of the more general tendency
to enjoy the nation as a depoliticized icon. In this regard, cynical romanticism
has been pointed out as an emergent mode of postpostmodern youth
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nationalism in contemporary Japan (Kitada 2005).
26. See Akiko Hori (2009) for an analysis of the gendered gaze and visuality in
male and femaleoriented erotic/porn manga.
9. Works cited
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Annett, Sandra. 2011. Animating Transcultural Communities: Animation
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Azuma, Sonoko. 2009. "Josei no homosōsharu na yokubō no yukue: Nijisōsaku
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Ōno and Nobuhiko Ogawa, 263–80. Tokyo: Bunrikaku.
Berndt, Jaqueline. Forthcoming. "Facing the Nuclear Issue in a 'Mangaesque'
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XI.
CONCETTI CHIAVE
• critique
• critical theory
• essentialism
• bias di conferma
• modernity
• society
• social stratification
• race and society
• whiteness theory
• sexual racism
Critique
Critique is a method of disciplined, systematic study of a written or oral discourse. Although critique is
commonly understood as fault finding and negative judgment,[1] it can also involve merit recognition,
and in the philosophical tradition it also means a methodical practice of doubt.[1] The contemporary
sense of critique has been largely influenced by the Enlightenment critique of prejudice and authority,
which championed the emancipation and autonomy from religious and political authorities.[1]
The term critique derives, via French, from Ancient Greek κριτική (kritikē), meaning "the faculty of
judgment", that is, discerning the value of persons or things.[2] Critique is also known as major logic, as
opposed to minor logic or dialectics.
Contents
Critique in philosophy
Critique vs criticism
Critical theory
See also
References
External links
Critique in philosophy
Philosophy is the application of critical thought[3], and is the disciplined practice of processing the
theory/praxis problem. In philosophical contexts, such as law or academics, critique is most influenced
by Kant's use of the term to mean a reflective examination of the validity and limits of a human capacity
or of a set of philosophical claims. This has been extended in modern philosophy to mean a systematic
inquiry into the conditions and consequences of a concept, a theory, a discipline, or an approach and/or
attempt to understand the limitations and validity of that. A critical perspective, in this sense, is the
opposite of a dogmatic one. Kant wrote:
We deal with a concept dogmatically ... if we consider it as contained under another concept
of the object which constitutes a principle of reason and determine it in conformity with this.
But we deal with it merely critically if we consider it only in reference to our cognitive
faculties and consequently to the subjective conditions of thinking it, without undertaking to
decide anything about its object.[4]
Later thinkers such as Hegel used the word 'critique' in a broader way than Kant's sense of the word, to
mean the systematic inquiry into the limits of a doctrine or set of concepts. This referential expansion led,
for instance, to the formulation of the idea of social critique, such as arose after Karl Marx's theoretical
work delineated in his Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), which was a critique of
the then-current models of economic theory and thought of that time. Further critique can then be applied
after the fact, by using thorough critique as a basis for new argument. The idea of critique is elemental to
legal, aesthetic, and literary theory and such practices, such as in the analysis and evaluation of writings
such as pictorial, musical, or expanded textual works.[5]
Critique vs criticism
In French, German, or Italian, no distinction is drawn between 'critique' and 'criticism': the two words
both translate as critique, Kritik, and critica, respectively.[6] In the English language, according to
philosopher Gianni Vattimo, criticism is used more frequently to denote literary criticism or art criticism,
that is, the interpretation and evaluation of literature and art; while critique may be used to refer to more
general and profound writing as Kant's Critique of pure reason.[6] Another proposed distinction is that
critique is never personalized nor ad hominem, but is instead the analyses of the structure of the thought
in the content of the item critiqued.[6] This analysis then offers by way of the critique method either a
rebuttal or a suggestion of further expansion upon the problems presented by the topic of that specific
written or oral argumentation. Even authors that believe there might be a distinction suggest that there is
some ambiguity that is still unresolved.[6]
Critical theory
Marx's work inspired the 'Frankfurt School' of critical theory, now best exemplified in the work of Jürgen
Habermas.[7] This, in turn, helped inspire the cultural studies form of social critique, which treats cultural
products and their reception as evidence of wider social ills such as racism or gender bias. Social critique
has been further extended in the work of Michel Foucault[8] and of Alasdair MacIntyre.[9] In their
different and radically contrasting ways, MacIntyre and Foucault go well beyond the original Kantian
meaning of the term critique in contesting legitimatory accounts of social power. Critique as critical
theory has also led to the emergence of critical pedagogy, exemplified by Paulo Freire, bell hooks, and
others.
See also
Criticism
Dance critique
References
1. Rodolphe Gasché (2007) The honor of thinking: critique, theory, philosophy (https://books.g
oogle.com/books?id=_CZVDv6bdXIC&pg=PA12) pp. 12–13 quote:
Let us also remind ourselves of the fact that throughout the eighteenth century,
which Kant, in Critique of Pure Reason, labeled "in especial degree, the age of
criticism" and to which our use of "critique", today remains largely indebted,
critique was above all critique of prejudice and established authority, and hence
was intimately tied to a conception of the human being as capable of self-
thinking, hence authonomous, and free from religious and political authorities.
2. "critick" (http://oed.com/search?searchType=dictionary&q=critick). Oxford English Dictionary
(3rd ed.). Oxford University Press. September 2005. (Subscription or UK public library
membership (http://www.oed.com/public/login/loggingin#withyourlibrary) required.)
3. Laurie, Timothy; Stark, Hannah; Walker, Briohny (2019), "Critical Approaches to Continental
Philosophy: Intellectual Community, Disciplinary Identity, and the Politics of Inclusion" (http
s://www.academia.edu/38122177), Parrhesia: A Journal of Critical Philosophy, 30: 1–17
4. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment section 74.
5. For an overview of philosophical conceptions of critique from Spinoza to Rancière see K. de
Boer and R. Sonderegger (eds.), Conceptions of Critique in Modern and Contemporary
Philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2012).
6. Gianni Vattimo Postmodern criticism: postmodern critique (https://books.google.com/books?
id=i7QOAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA57) in David Wood (1990) Writing the future, pp. 57–58
7. David Ingram, Habermas: Introduction and Analysis, New York: Cornell University Press,
2010.
8. Michel Foucault, Was ist Kritik?, Berlin: Merve Verlag 1992. ISBN 3-88396-093-4
9. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dama Press, 1981.
External links
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Critical theory
Critical theory is the reflective assessment and critique of society and culture by applying knowledge
from the social sciences and the humanities to reveal and challenge power structures. Critical theory has
origins in sociology and also in literary criticism. The sociologist Max Horkheimer described a theory as
critical insofar as it seeks "to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them."[1]
In sociology and political philosophy, the term "Critical Theory" describes the Western Marxist
philosophy of the Frankfurt School, which was developed in Germany in the 1930s. This use of the term
requires proper noun capitalization, whereas "a critical theory" or "a critical social theory" may have
similar elements of thought, but does not stress the intellectual lineage specific to the Frankfurt School.
Frankfurt School critical theorists drew on the critical methods of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. Critical
theory maintains that ideology is the principal obstacle to human liberation.[2] Critical theory was
established as a school of thought primarily by the Frankfurt School theoreticians Herbert Marcuse,
Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, and Erich Fromm. Modern critical theory has
additionally been influenced by György Lukács and Antonio Gramsci, as well as the second generation
Frankfurt School scholars, notably Jürgen Habermas. In Habermas's work, critical theory transcended its
theoretical roots in German idealism and progressed closer to American pragmatism. Concern for social
"base and superstructure" is one of the remaining Marxist philosophical concepts in much of
contemporary critical theory.[3]
Postmodern critical theory analyzes the fragmentation of cultural identities in order to challenge
modernist era constructs such as metanarratives, rationality and universal truths, while politicizing social
problems "by situating them in historical and cultural contexts, to implicate themselves in the process of
collecting and analyzing data, and to relativize their findings."[4]
Contents
Overview
Critical theory and academic fields
Postmodern critical social theory
Public relations
Communication studies
Pedagogy
Criticism
See also
Lists
Journals
Footnotes
References
External links
Archival collections
Overview
Critical theory (German: Kritische Theorie) was first defined by Max Horkheimer of the Frankfurt
School of sociology in his 1937 essay Traditional and Critical Theory: Critical theory is a social theory
oriented toward critiquing and changing society as a whole, in contrast to traditional theory oriented only
to understanding or explaining it. Horkheimer wanted to distinguish critical theory as a radical,
emancipatory form of Marxian theory, critiquing both the model of science put forward by logical
positivism and what he and his colleagues saw as the covert positivism and authoritarianism of orthodox
Marxism and Communism. He described a theory as critical insofar as it seeks "to liberate human beings
from the circumstances that enslave them".[5] Critical theory involves a normative dimension, either
through criticizing society from some general theory of values, norms, or "oughts", or through criticizing
it in terms of its own espoused values.[6]
The core concepts of critical theory are as follows:
1. That critical social theory should be directed at the totality of society in its historical
specificity (i.e. how it came to be configured at a specific point in time), and
2. That critical theory should improve understanding of society by integrating all the major
social sciences, including geography, economics, sociology, history, political science,
anthropology, and psychology.
This version of "critical" theory derives from Kant's (18th-century) and Marx's (19th-century) use of the
term "critique", as in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Marx's concept that his work Das Kapital
(Capital) forms a "critique of political economy". For Kant's transcendental idealism, "critique" means
examining and establishing the limits of the validity of a faculty, type, or body of knowledge, especially
through accounting for the limitations imposed by the fundamental, irreducible concepts in use in that
knowledge system.
Kant's notion of critique has been associated with the overturning of false, unprovable, or dogmatic
philosophical, social, and political beliefs, because Kant's critique of reason involved the critique of
dogmatic theological and metaphysical ideas and was intertwined with the enhancement of ethical
autonomy and the Enlightenment critique of superstition and irrational authority. Ignored by many in
"critical realist" circles, however, is that Kant's immediate impetus for writing his "Critique of Pure
Reason" was to address problems raised by David Hume's skeptical empiricism which, in attacking
metaphysics, employed reason and logic to argue against the knowability of the world and common
notions of causation. Kant, by contrast, pushed the employment of a priori metaphysical claims as
requisite, for if anything is to be said to be knowable, it would have to be established upon abstractions
distinct from perceivable phenomena.
Marx explicitly developed the notion of critique into the critique of ideology and linked it with the
practice of social revolution, as stated in the famous 11th of his Theses on Feuerbach: "The philosophers
have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it."[7]
One of the distinguishing characteristics of critical theory, as Adorno and Horkheimer elaborated in their
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947), is a certain ambivalence concerning the ultimate source or foundation
of social domination, an ambivalence which gave rise to the "pessimism" of the new critical theory over
the possibility of human emancipation and freedom.[8] This ambivalence was rooted, of course, in the
historical circumstances in which the work was originally produced, in particular, the rise of National
Socialism, state capitalism, and culture industry as entirely new forms of social domination that could not
be adequately explained within the terms of traditional Marxist sociology.[9]
For Adorno and Horkheimer, state intervention in economy had effectively abolished the tension between
the "relations of production" and "material productive forces of society", a tension which, according to
traditional critical theory, constituted the primary contradiction within capitalism. The market (as an
"unconscious" mechanism for the distribution of goods) had been replaced by centralized planning.[10]
Yet, contrary to Marx's famous prediction in the Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy, this shift did not lead to "an era of social revolution", but rather to fascism and totalitarianism.
As such, critical theory was left, in Jürgen Habermas' words, without "anything in reserve to which it
might appeal; and when the forces of production enter into a baneful symbiosis with the relations of
production that they were supposed to blow wide open, there is no longer any dynamism upon which
critique could base its hope".[11] For Adorno and Horkheimer, this posed the problem of how to account
for the apparent persistence of domination in the absence of the very contradiction that, according to
traditional critical theory, was the source of domination itself.
In the 1960s, Jürgen Habermas, a proponent of critical social theory,[12] raised the epistemological
discussion to a new level in his Knowledge and Human Interests, by identifying critical knowledge as
based on principles that differentiated it either from the natural sciences or the humanities, through its
orientation to self-reflection and emancipation.[13] Although unsatisfied with Adorno and Horkeimer's
thought presented in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Habermas shares the view that, in the form of
instrumental rationality, the era of modernity marks a move away from the liberation of enlightenment
and toward a new form of enslavement.[14] In Habermas's work, critical theory transcended its theoretical
roots in German idealism, and progressed closer to American pragmatism.
Habermas is now influencing the philosophy of law in many countries—for example the creation of the
social philosophy of law in Brazil, and his theory also has the potential to make the discourse of law one
important institution of the modern world as a heritage of the Enlightenment.[15]
His ideas regarding the relationship between modernity and rationalization are in this sense strongly
influenced by Max Weber. Habermas dissolved further the elements of critical theory derived from
Hegelian German Idealism, although his thought remains broadly Marxist in its epistemological
approach. Perhaps his two most influential ideas are the concepts of the public sphere and
communicative action; the latter arriving partly as a reaction to new post-structural or so-called
"postmodern" challenges to the discourse of modernity. Habermas engaged in regular correspondence
with Richard Rorty and a strong sense of philosophical pragmatism may be felt in his theory; thought
which frequently traverses the boundaries between sociology and philosophy.
Critical theory and academic fields
Postmodern critical social theory

While modernist critical theory (as described above) concerns itself with "forms of authority and
injustice that accompanied the evolution of industrial and corporate capitalism as a political-economic
system," postmodern critical theory politicizes social problems "by situating them in historical and
cultural contexts, to implicate themselves in the process of collecting and analyzing data, and to relativize
their findings."[4] Meaning itself is seen as unstable due to the rapid transformation in social structures.
As a result, the focus of research is centered on local manifestations, rather than broad generalizations.
Postmodern critical research is also characterized by the crisis of representation, which rejects the idea
that a researcher's work is an "objective depiction of a stable other". Instead, many postmodern scholars
have adopted "alternatives that encourage reflection about the 'politics and poetics' of their work. In these
accounts, the embodied, collaborative, dialogic, and improvisational aspects of qualitative research are
clarified".[16]
The term "critical theory" is often appropriated when an author works within sociological terms, yet
attacks the social or human sciences (thus attempting to remain "outside" those frames of inquiry).
Michel Foucault is one of these authors.[17]
Jean Baudrillard has also been described as a critical theorist to the extent that he was an unconventional
and critical sociologist;[18] this appropriation is similarly casual, holding little or no relation to the
Frankfurt School.[19] Jürgen Habermas of The Frankfurt School is one of the key critics of
postmodernism.[20]
Critical theory is focused on language, symbolism, communication, and social construction. Critical
theory has been applied within the social sciences as a critique of social construction and postmodern
society. [21]
Public relations
The critical theory allows public relations practitioners to recognize participatory planning by allowing
previously unheard voices to be heard. Furthermore, this allows professionals the ability to create more
specialized campaigns using the knowledge of other areas of study; moreover, it provides them with the
ability to comprehend and change social institutions through advocacy.[22]
Communication studies
From the 1960s and 1970s onward, language, symbolism, text, and meaning came to be seen as the
theoretical foundation for the humanities, through the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ferdinand de
Saussure, George Herbert Mead, Noam Chomsky, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Roland Barthes, Jacques
Derrida and other thinkers in linguistic and analytic philosophy, structural linguistics, symbolic
interactionism, hermeneutics, semiology, linguistically oriented psychoanalysis (Jacques Lacan, Alfred
Lorenzer), and deconstruction.
When, in the 1970s and 1980s, Jürgen Habermas redefined critical social theory as a study of
communication, i.e. communicative competence and communicative rationality on the one hand,
distorted communication on the other, the two versions of critical theory began to overlap to a much
greater degree than before.
Pedagogy
Critical theorists have widely credited Paulo Freire for the first applications of critical theory towards
education/pedagogy. They consider his best-known work, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, a seminal text in
what is now known as the philosophy and social movement of critical pedagogy. For a history of the
emergence of critical theory in the field of education, see Isaac Gottesman (2016), The Critical Turn in
Education: From Marxist Critique to Postructuralist Feminism to Critical Theories of Race (New York:
Routledge).
Criticism
While critical theorists have been frequently defined as Marxist intellectuals,[23] their tendency to
denounce some Marxist concepts and to combine Marxian analysis with other sociological and
philosophical traditions has resulted in accusations of revisionism by classical, orthodox, and analytical
Marxists, and by Marxist–Leninist philosophers. Martin Jay has stated that the first generation of critical
theory is best understood as not promoting a specific philosophical agenda or a specific ideology, but as
"a gadfly of other systems".[24]
Critical theory has been criticized for not offering any clear road map to political action following
critique, often explicitly repudiating any solutions (such as with Herbert Marcuse's concept of "the Great
Refusal", which promoted abstaining from engaging in active political change).[25]
See also
Outline of critical theory
Critical philosophy
Lists
Information criticism
List of critical theorists
List of works in critical theory
Journals
Constellations
Representations
Critical Inquiry
Telos
Law and Critique
Footnotes
1. (Horkheimer 1982, 244)
2. Geuss, R. The Idea of a Critical Theory (https://books.google.com/books?id=oS47wcTHj2E
C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
ch. 4.
3. Outhwaite, William. 1988. Habermas: Key Contemporary Thinkers 2nd Edition (2009), pp.
5-8 (ISBN 978-0-7456-4328-1)
4. Lindlof, Thomas R.; Taylor, Bryan C. (2002). Qualitative Communication Research Methods
(https://books.google.com/?id=Op-GRnkSCGgC&q=forms+of+authority+and+injustice+that
+accompanied+the+evolution+of+industrial+and+corporate+capitalism+as+a+political-econ
omic+system#v=snippet&q=forms%20of%20authority%20and%20injustice%20that%20acc
ompanied%20the%20evolution%20of%20industrial%20and%20corporate%20capitalism%2
0as%20a%20political-economic%20system&f=false). SAGE. p. 49. ISBN 9780761924944.
5. Horkheimer 1982, p. 244.
6. Bohman, James (1 January 2016). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/critical-theory/) (Fall 2016
ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
7. "Theses on Feuerbach" (https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.h
tm). §XI. Marxists Internet Archive. Retrieved 11 April 2015.
8. Adorno, T. W., with Max Horkheimer. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Trans. Edmund Jephcott.
Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002. 242.
9. "Critical Theory was initially developed in Horkheimer's circle to think through political
disappointments at the absence of revolution in the West, the development of Stalinism in
Soviet Russia, and the victory of fascism in Germany. It was supposed to explain mistaken
Marxist prognoses, but without breaking Marxist intentions." "The Entwinement of Myth and
Enlightenment: Horkheimer and Adorno." in Habermas, Jürgen. The Philosophical
Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. trans. Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987. 116. Also, see Helmut Dubiel, Theory and Politics:
Studies in the Development of Critical Theory, trans. Benjamin Gregg (Cambridge,
Massachusetts and London, 1985).
10. "[G]one are the objective laws of the market which ruled in the actions of the entrepreneurs
and tended toward catastrophe. Instead the conscious decision of the managing directors
executes as results (which are more obligatory than the blindest price-mechanisms) the old
law of value and hence the destiny of capitalism." Dialectic of Enlightenment. p. 38.
11. "The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment," p. 118.
12. George N. Katsiaficas, Robert George Kirkpatrick, Mary Lou Emery, Introduction to Critical
Sociology, Irvington Publishers, 1987, p. 26.
13. On critical social theory as a form of self-reflection, see Laurie, Timothy; Stark, Hannah;
Walker, Briohny (2019), "Critical Approaches to Continental Philosophy: Intellectual
Community, Disciplinary Identity, and the Politics of Inclusion" (https://www.academia.edu/3
8122177), Parrhesia: A Journal of Critical Philosophy, 30: 1–17
14. Outhwaite, William. 1988. Habermas: Key Contemporary Thinkers 2nd Edition (2009). p6.
ISBN 978-0-7456-4328-1
15. Bittar, Eduardo C. B., Democracia, Justiça e Emancipação Social, São Paulo, Quartier
Latin, 2013.
16. Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 53
17. Rivera Vicencio, E. (2012). "Foucault: His influence over accounting and management
research. Building of a map of Foucault's approach" (http://www.inderscience.com/info/inarti
cle.php?artid=51466). Int. J. Critical Accounting. 4 (5/6): 728–756.
doi:10.1504/IJCA.2012.051466 (https://doi.org/10.1504%2FIJCA.2012.051466).
18. "Introduction to Jean Baudrillard, Module on Postmodernity" (https://www.cla.purdue.edu/en
glish/theory/postmodernism/modules/baudrillardpostmodernity.html). www.cla.purdue.edu.
Retrieved 16 June 2017.
19. Kellner, Douglas (2015). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/baudrillard/) (Winter 2015 ed.).
Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
20. Aylesworth, Gary (2015). "Postmodernism" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/postmodernis
m/#9). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University. Retrieved 24 June 2017.
21. Agger, Ben (2012), "Ben Agger", North American Critical Theory After Postmodernism,
Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 128–154, doi:10.1057/9781137262868_7 (https://doi.org/10.10
57%2F9781137262868_7), ISBN 9781349350391
22. Stephen Tindi (13 October 2013). "Theorical basis: Excellence, Critical and Rhetorical
theories in Publ…" (https://www.slideshare.net/StephenTindi/excellence-critical-and-rhetoric
al-theories-in-public-relations).
23. See, e.g., Leszek Kołakowski's Main Currents of Marxism (1979), vol. 3 chapter X; W. W.
Norton & Company, ISBN 0393329437
24. Jay, Martin (1996) The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the
Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950. University of California Press, ISBN 978-0-520-
20423-2, p. 41 (https://books.google.com/?id=nwkzVdaaB2sC&dq=%22gadfly+of+other+sy
stems%22&pg=PA41)
25. "The Frankfurt School and Critical Theory" (https://www.iep.utm.edu/frankfur/#SH2a),
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
References
Horkheimer, Max. 1982. Critical Theory Selected Essays. New York: Continuum Pub.
An accessible primer for the literary aspect of Critical Theory is Jonathan Culler's Literary
Theory: A Very Short Introduction ISBN 0-19-285383-X
Another short introductory volume with illustrations: "Introducing Critical Theory" Stuart Sim
& Borin Van Loon, 2001. ISBN 1-84046-264-7
A survey of and introduction to the current state of critical social theory is Craig Calhoun's
Critical Social Theory: Culture, History, and the Challenge of Difference (Blackwell, 1995)
ISBN 1-55786-288-5
Problematizing Global Knowledge. Theory, Culture & Society. Vol. 23 (2–3). (Sage, 2006)
ISSN 0263-2764
Raymond Geuss The Idea of a Critical Theory. Habermas and the Frankfurt School.
(Cambridge University Press, 1981) ISBN 0-521-28422-8
Charles Arthur Willard Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric for
Modern Democracy (https://books.google.com/books?id=OU75AafuhvcC&printsec=frontcov
er#v=onepage&q&f=false). University of Chicago Press. 1996.
Charles Arthur Willard, A Theory of Argumentation. University of Alabama Press. 1989.
Charles Arthur Willard, Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge (https://philpa
pers.org/rec/WILAAT-22). University of Alabama Press. 1982.
Harry Dahms (ed.), No Social Science Without Critical Theory. Volume 25 of Current
Perspectives in Social Theory (Emerald/JAI, 2008).
Charmaz, K. (1995). Between positivism and postmodernism: Implications for methods.
Studies in Symbolic Interaction, 17, 43–72.
Conquergood, D. (1991). "Rethinking ethnography: Towards a critical cultural politics" (htt
p://www.csun.edu/~vcspc00g/301/RethinkingEthnog.pdf) (PDF). Communication
Monographs. 58 (2): 179–194. doi:10.1080/03637759109376222 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2
F03637759109376222).
Gandler, Stefan (2009), Fragmentos de Frankfurt. Ensayos sobre la Teoría crítica (in
German), México: Siglo XXI Editores/Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, ISBN 978-607-
03-0070-7
Lindlof, T. R., & Taylor, B. C. (2002). Qualitative Communication Research Methods, 2nd
Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Morgan, Marcia. (2012). Kierkegaard and Critical Theory (https://philpapers.org/rec/MORKA
C). New York: Lexington Books.
An example of critical postmodern work is Rolling, Jr., J. H. (2008). Secular blasphemy:
Utter(ed) transgressions against names and fathers in the postmodern era (https://surface.s
yr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=tl). Qualitative Inquiry, 14, 926–948.
Thomas, Jim (1993). Doing Critical Ethnography. London, New York (NY): Sage 1993,
pp. 1–5 & 17–25
An example of critical qualitative research is Tracy, S. J. (2000). Becoming a character for
commerce: Emotion labor, self subordination and discursive construction of identity in a total
institution (https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Sarah_Tracy3/publication/34040485_Emotio
n_labor_and_correctional_officers_A_study_of_emotion_norms_performances_and_uninte
nded_consequences_in_a_total_institution/links/57ba215608aedfe0ec96ebc2.pdf).
Management Communication Quarterly, 14, 90–128.
Eduardo C. B. Bittar, Democracy, Justice and Human Rights: Studies of Critical Theory and
Social Philosophy of Law. Saarbruken: Lambert, 2016.
Luca Corchia, La logica dei processi culturali. Jürgen Habermas tra filosofia e sociologia (htt
ps://books.google.com/?id=U56Sag72eSoC), Genova, Edizioni ECIG, 2010, ISBN 978-88-
7544-195-1.
Axel Honneth, La société du mépris. Vers une nouvelle Théorie critique, La Découverte,
2006 (ISBN 978-2707147721)
External links
Critical Theory (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory/), Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
"The Frankfurt School and Critical Theory" (http://www.iep.utm.edu/frankfur). Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Gerhardt, Christina. "Frankfurt School." The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and
Protest. Ness, Immanuel (ed). Blackwell Publishing, 2009. Blackwell Reference Online (htt
p://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/tocnode.html?id=g9781405184649_chunk_g97
81405184649586).
"Theory: Death Is Not the End" (https://nplusonemag.com/issue-2/the-intellectual-situation/d
eath-is-not-the-end/) N+1 magazine's short history of academic Critical Theory.
Critical Legal Thinking (http://www.criticallegalthinking.com/) A Critical Legal Studies
website which uses Critical Theory in an analysis of law and politics.
L. Corchia, Jürgen Habermas. A Bibliography: works and studies (1952-2013) (https://book
s.google.com/?id=-T14AQAAQBAJ), Pisa, Edizioni Il Campano – Arnus University Books,
2013, 606 pages.
Sim, S., & Van Loon, B. (2009). Introducing Critical Theory: A Graphic Guide. Icon Books
Ltd.
Archival collections
Guide to the Critical Theory Offprint Collection. (http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/t
f5q2nb391) Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, Cali Guide to
the Critical Theory Institute Audio and Video Recordings, University of California, Irvine. (htt
p://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt5k403303) Special Collections and Archives, The
UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California.
University of California, Irvine, Critical Theory Institute Manuscript Materials. (http://www.oa
c.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt9x0nf6pd) Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine
Libraries, Irvine, California.
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Critical_theory&oldid=931696235"
This page was last edited on 20 December 2019, at 15:59 (UTC).
essentialism
(cfr. Oxford Dictionary on-line: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/essentialism)

NOUN
mass noun Philosophy
1 A belief that things have a set of characteristics which make them what they are, and that
the task of science and philosophy is their discovery and expression; the doctrine that essence
is prior to existence.

1.1 The view that all children should be taught on traditional lines the ideas and methods
regarded as essential to the prevalent culture.
1.2 The view that categories of people, such as women and men, or heterosexuals and
homosexuals, or members of ethnic groups, have intrinsically different and characteristic
natures or dispositions.

ESSENTIALISM (Social Science)
(http://what-when-how.com/social-sciences/essentialism-social-science/)

Essentialism is the idea that members of certain categories have an underlying, unchanging
property or attribute (essence) that determines identity and causes outward behavior and
appearance. An essentialist account of gender, for example, holds that differences between
males and females are determined by fixed, inherent features of those individuals. The
doctrine of essentialism is widespread in practice, underlying many approaches (both
historical and current) in the biological sciences, the social sciences, and cultural studies.
Essentialist ideas underlie much lay skepticism toward biological evolution; such ideas
saturate discussions of race and gender as well as of ethnicity and nationality. In gender
studies, essentialism has been important as a focus of criticism and, less often, as an
explanatory strategy (e.g., the notion of a "gay gene").
TYPES OF ESSENTIALISM
Essentialism may be divided into three types: sortal, causal, and ideal. The sortal essence is
the set of defining characteristics that all and only members of a category share. This notion of
essence is captured in Aristotle’s distinction between essential and accidental properties. For
example, on this view the essence of a mother would be the property of having given birth to a
person (rather than an accidental property, such as baking cookies). In effect, this
characterization is a restatement of the classical view of concepts: Meaning (or identity) is
supplied by a set of necessary and sufficient features that determine whether an entity does
or does not belong in a category. However, the viability of this account has been called into
question by psychological research on human concepts. The causal essence is the entity or
1
quality that causes other category-typical properties to emerge and be sustained, and that
confers identity. The causal essence is used to explain the observable properties of category
members. Whereas the sortal essence could apply to any entity, the causal essence applies
only to entities for which inherent, hidden properties determine observable qualities. For
example, the causal essence of water may be something like H2O, which is responsible for
various observable properties that water has. Thus, the cluster of properties "odorless,
tasteless, and colorless" is not a causal essence of water, despite being true of all members of
the category, because the properties have no direct causal force on other properties.

The ideal essence has no actual instantiation in the world. For example, on this view the
essence of "justice" is some abstract quality that is imperfectly realized in real-world
instances of people performing just deeds. None of these just deeds perfectly embodies
"justice," but each reflects some aspect of it. Plato’s cave allegory (in The Republic), in which
what we see of the world are mere shadows of what is real and true, exemplifies this view.
The ideal essence thus contrasts with both the sortal and the causal essences. There are
relatively little empirical data available on ideal essences in human reasoning.
CRITICISMS OF ESSENTIALISM
Essentialism is often implicit. Theorists rarely self-identify as essentialist; more often, a

position is characterized as "essentialist" by others, typically as a form of criticism.
Essentialist indications include a cluster of separable ideas—for example, treating properties
as genetically rather than socially determined, assuming that properties are immutable, or
assuming that a category captures a wealth of nonobvious properties, thereby having the
potential to generate many novel inferences (e.g., Arthur R. Jensen’s arguments in his 1969
article regarding racial differences in IQ). Any of these assumptions could be considered
evidence for an essentialist framework.
In the social sciences, essentialist accounts are highly controversial. Essentialist
accounts of race, ethnicity, or gender have been criticized for reducing complex, historically
contingent effects to fixed and inherent properties of individuals. Anti-essentialist accounts
emphasize the importance of social context, environmental factors, and structural factors
(including economics and class). Such accounts are often grouped together under the heading
social (or cultural or discursive) constructionism; as Laura Lee Downs noted in her 1993
article, at their best they provide detailed accounts of the social reproduction of gender,
ethnic, and racial categories, and at their worst slide into voluntarism. An important analytic
strategy, put forward by Fredrik Barth in 1969 and Judith Irvine and Susan Gal in 2000, has
been to eschew an account of the categories of social groups in favor of examining the social
and cultural conditions by which they are differentiated.
Racial categories illustrate the perils and shortcomings of essentialism. Although race is
often essentialized, anthropologists and biologists widely agree that race has no essence. The
2
superficial physical dimensions along which people vary (such as skin color or hair texture)
do not map neatly onto racial groupings. Observable human differences also do not form
correlated feature clusters. Skin color is not predictive of "deep" causal features (such as gene
frequencies for anything other than skin color). There is no gene for race as it is commonly
understood.
Culture frequently serves as a stand-in for race in sor-tal essentialist frameworks, as it did in
South Africa under the apartheid regime. The doctrine of ethnic primordial-ism (that
ethnicities are ancient and natural) was a popular explanatory device in the 1950s and 1960s
to account for apparent ethnic and regional fissures in the developing world. It returned after
the fall of the Berlin wall to account for the instability of former socialist republics, most
dramatically in Yugoslavia, and remains a powerful force in international relations despite the
availability of nuanced, nonessentialist explanatory accounts.
Essentialism is also criticized for its political and social costs, in particular for
encouraging and justifying stereotyping of social categories (including race, gender, and
sexual orientation), and perpetuating the assumption that artificial distinctions (such as caste
or class) are natural, inevitable, and fixed. Nonetheless, some feminists and minorities
appropriate essentialism for their own group(s)—at least temporarily—for political
purposes. Strategic essentialism, Gayatri Spivak’s term from her 1985 study, can devolve into
an embrace of essentialism, with the argument that essential differences are deserving of
celebration. Other theorists, while recognizing many of the problems of essentialism
characterized above, have proposed that at least some tenets of essentialism (e.g., that
categories may have an underlying basis) are rooted in real-world structure.
However, criticisms of essentialism extend to biological species as well. In the case of
biological species, essen-tialism implies that each species is fixed and immutable, thus leading
Ernst Mayr to note, "It took more than two thousand years for biology, under the influence of
Darwin, to escape the paralyzing grip of essentialism" (1982, p. 87). An additional concern, for
biological as well as social categories, is that essentialism assumes that the essence is a
property of each individual organism. In contrast, according to evolutionary theory, species
cannot be characterized in terms of properties of individual members but rather in terms of
properties of the population. Elliott Sober (1994) distinguishes between "constituent
definitions" (in which groups are defined in terms of characteristics of the individual
organisms that make up the group) and "population thinking" (in which groups need to be
understood in terms of characteristics of the larger group; e.g., interbreeding populations, in
the case of species). Sober suggests there is no essence for biological species—let alone
groupings of people, such as races—at a surface level or even at a genetic level.
3
PSYCHOLOGICAL ESSENTIALISM
Some psychologists, such as Susan A. Gelman in her 2003 book and Douglas Medin in his
1989 article, have proposed that (causal) essentialism is a cognitive bias (psychological
essentialism) found cross-culturally and even in early childhood, with important implications
for a range of human behaviors and judgments: category-based inductive inferences,
judgments of constancy over time, and stereotyping. Psychological essentialism requires no
specialized knowledge, as people may possess what Medin calls an "essence placeholder" for a
category, without knowing what the essence is. Preschool children expect category members
to share nonobvious similarities, even in the face of obvious dissimilarities. For example, on
learning that an atypical exemplar is a member of a category (e.g., that a penguin is a bird),
children and adults draw inferences from typical instances that they apply to the atypical
member (e.g., they infer that penguins build nests, like other birds). Young children judge
nonvisible internal parts to be especially crucial to the identity and functioning of an item.
Children also treat category membership as stable and unchanging over transformations such
as costumes, growth, metamorphosis, or changing environmental conditions. Therefore,
essentialism as a theoretical construct may emerge from fundamental psychological
predispositions.

Essentialism: It Is What It Is And That’s It

(cfr. http://sociologyinfocus.com/2016/11/essentialism-it-is-what-it-is-and-thats-it/)

“Professor Palmer, do sociologists think everything is a social construction?” a student asked
me. I laughed; it was one of the “don’t be silly” varieties. In truth, I was stalling. Standing in
front of 300 students, I needed a moment to rack my brain. “No… well?… Um.” I cocked my
head to the side and squinted in anticipation of how my answer was going to land, “Yes.” My
answer was a declarative statement, but it sounded like a question. “I’m Ron Burgundy?”
In successive weeks, my intro students and I discussed how race, ethnicity, sex, gender, and
sexuality were all social constructions (Omi and Winant 1994; Ridgeway 2011). Before that
we chewed on the idea that every symbol is inherently empty until we socially construct a
meaning to fill it with (Zerubavel 1991). Before that we learned about symbolic
interactionists who argue that reality is a social construction (Beger and Luckmann 1967).
In truth, every aspect of human life is at least partially a social construction. That’s a bold
claim, and I’m prepared to back it up, but before we do that, we need to talk about two
opposing ideas essentialism and constructionism.
Essentialism is the idea that things have qualities, attributes, or meanings that cannot be
separated from them. It’s the belief that things have an inherent essence or true nature to
them. Or to borrow the words of one of my brilliant students, essentialism is arguing that, “it
is what it is and that’s it.”
4
Essentialism often pops up throughout our day-to-day lives. For instance, “boys will be boys,”
or the idea that women are inherently better parents because they have, “maternal instincts,”
are both based on the logic of essentialism. The same logic is behind the belief that Muslims
are inherently violent or prone to terrorism. Chances are, if someone is making a broad over-
generalization or arguing that there are natural biological differences between social groups,
they are being essentialist.
Constructionism: It Is What We Say It Is.

Social constructionism is the polar opposite of essentialism. Social Constructionism argues
that nothing has an inherent, immutable quality to it, but rather the qualities of things are
created through social interaction. Social Constructions are the meanings we attach to
symbols, objects, and other things which are created through an informal process of social
negotiation. Or simply put, “it is what we say it is.”
Sociologists see race, ethnicity, sex, gender, sexuality, and pretty much everything else as a
social construction. This is not to say that these things aren’t real. A $1 bill and a $100 bill are
basically the exact same thing in terms of their physical characteristics. The fact that one of
them is worth 100 times more than the other does not come from their material differences,
but rather the differences in how they were socially constructed. The Thomas
Theorem states that situations defined as real are real in their consequences (Thomas and
Thomas 1928).[1] Thus, even if both the $1 bill and the $100 bill are nearly identical
physically, if people believe that the Benjamin is worth 100 Washingtons then the value of a
Benjamin is real in its consequences.
Everything is a Social Construction

The big idea here is that the meanings we attach to symbols, objects, and every other thing in
society are separate from the symbols, objects and things themselves. The meanings are not
inside the things, but rather they are attached to them socially.
With this in mind, think about everything around you now. The names you call these things,
the ways you think to use these things and the messages you think these symbols
communicate to others are all social constructions. The very words you would use to describe
these things come from language, which is obviously a social construction.
Why This Matters

Essentialism is an oppressive and dangerous logic. If boys will be boys, then there is no reason
even to try changing how our society conceptualizes masculinity as violent and dominating. If
all Muslims are violent terrorists, then discriminating against them is both logical and just. If
an entire group of people all have an inherent nature to them, then there is no reason to
consider the individuality of each member of that group. When we pretend like social
constructions are natural or inherent to the people, objects, and things around us, we flatten
the complexity of the real world, impede critically thinking, and legitimate discrimination and
oppression.
Dig Deeper:
1. If a person believed the essentialist idea that women are naturally better parents because
they have maternal instincts, how might that affect their behavior?
2. If the meaning of everything is socially constructed, then doesn’t that mean it fake? How
can social constructions be real? In your answer, be sure to use the Thomas Theorem.
5
3. In the United States, the color yellow is often associated with cowardice. For instance, in
cowboy movies being “yella” meant you were a coward. Do a Goolge search for what the
color yellow means in China. Report back what you find and discuss how the differences
in the meanings we attach to the color yellow is an example of social constructionism.
4. Critically think about the author’s argument that everything is (at least partially) socially
constructed? Is his claim fair and accurate? Can you think of examples of things that are
not socially constructed?
References:
• Berger, Peter L. and Thomas A. Luckmann. 1967. Social Construction of Reality: Treatise in
the Sociology of Knowledge. 2nd Revised edition edition. London: Allen Lane
• Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. 1994. Racial Formation in the United States: From the
1960s to the 1990s. 2 edition. New York: Routledge.
• Ridgeway, Cecilia L. 2011. Framed by Gender: How Gender Inequality Persists in the
Modern World.Oxford University Press.
• Thomas, William Isaac and Dorothy Swaine Thomas. 1928. The Child in America: Behavior
Problems and Programs. A. A. Knopf.
• Zerubavel, Eviatar. 1991. The Fine Line : Making Distinctions in Everyday Life. 1st edition.
New York: The Free Press.

Essentialism
(cfr. https://sociologydictionary.org/essentialism/)

(noun) The principle or theory that any entity such as a person, group, object, or concept has
innate and universal qualities.
Example: A person is born gay.
Usage Notes:
• The essentialist perspective advocates that individuals in categories such as class,
ethnicity, gender, or sex share an intrinsic quality that is verifiable through empirical
methods (whether currently known or unknown). Furthermore, essentialism focuses
on what individuals are, not who they are and individuals are viewed as inherently a
certain way and not developing through dynamic social processes.
• Essentialism is contrasted to social constructionism.
• Essentialist ideas can exist within the framework of social constructionism, but social
constructionism cannot fit into the framework of essentialism.
• A type of reductionism.
• Also called biological reductionism.
• An (noun) essentialist studies (adjective) essentialistic aspects of society
(adverb) essentially to understand its (noun)essentiality or (noun) essentialness.

Related Quotations:
• “For essentialists, race, sex, sexual orientation, disability, and social class identify
significant, empirically verifiable differences among people. From the essentialist
perspective, each of the these exist apart from any social processes; they are objective
categories of real differences among people” (Rosenblum and Travis 2012:3).

6
Additional Information:
• Smaje, Chris. 2000. Natural Hierarchies: The Historical Sociology of Race and Caste.
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

7
Bias di conferma
Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera.
Il bias di conferma (in inglese confirmation bias / confirmatory bias) in psicologia indica un fenomeno cognitivo umano per il quale
le persone tendono a muoversi entro un ambito delimitato dalle loro convinzioni acquisite.
Indice
Cenni storici
Descrizione
Tipologie
Ricerca di informazioni
Interpretazione
Memoria
Fenomeni associati
Polarizzazione delle opinioni
Persistenza di credenze screditate
Preferenza per le prime informazioni ricevute
Associazione illusoria di eventi disconnessi
Gli studi
La ricerca di Wason sull'esame delle ipotesi
La critica di Klayman e Ha
Conseguenze
Impatto nell'attività finanziaria
Nella salute fisica e mentale
Nella politica
Nel paranormale
Nella psicologia
Nella pratica forense
Note
Bibliografia
Voci correlate
Cenni storici
Nel corso della storia, decisioni di scarsa qualità dovute a questo bias sono state documentate in contesti militari, politici e
organizzativi.
Una serie di esperimenti negli anni '60 del XX secolo suggerisce che le persone tendono a voler confermare le loro convinzioni
acquisite. Studi successivi hanno reinterpretato questi risultati come una tendenza all'essere parziali nell'esaminare idee,
concentrandosi su una possibilità e ignorando le alternative. In certe situazioni questa tendenza può pregiudicare le conclusioni.
Descrizione
È un processo mentale che consiste nel ricercare, selezionare e interpretare informazioni in modo da porre maggiore attenzione, e
quindi attribuire maggiore credibilità a quelle che confermano le proprie convinzioni o ipotesi, e viceversa, ignorare o sminuire
informazioni che le contraddicono. Il fenomeno è più marcato nel contesto di argomenti che suscitano forti emozioni o che vanno a
toccare credenze profondamente radicate.
Spiegazioni per questo bias includono il pensiero illusorio e la limitata capacità umana di gestire informazioni. Un'altra spiegazione è
che le persone sopravvalutano le conseguenze dello sbagliarsi invece di esaminare i fatti in maniera neutrale, scientifica.
Tipologie
I bias di conferma sono fenomeni riguardanti il processare le informazioni. Alcuni psicologi usano il termine "bias di conferma" per
riferirsi a qualsiasi metodo usato dalle persone per evitare di disfarsi di una credenza, che si tratti della ricerca di prove a favore, della
loro interpretazione di parte o del loro recupero selettivo da memoria. Altri restringono l'uso del termine ad una ricerca selettiva di
prove.[1][Nota 1]
Ricerca di informazioni
Gli esperimenti hanno ripetutamente confermato che le persone tendono a verificare
a senso unico la validità delle ipotesi, cercando prove coerenti con le loro stesse
ipotesi.[3][4] Piuttosto che cercare tutte le prove rilevanti, tendono a costruire le
domande in modo da ricevere risposte che sostengano le loro idee.[5] Cercano i
risultati che si aspetterebbero se le loro ipotesi fossero vere, piuttosto che quelli che
si avrebbero se fossero false.[5] Per esempio, qualcuno che deve trovare un numero
attraverso domande a risposta sì/no e che sospetta si tratti del numero 3 potrebbe
domandare “è un numero dispari?” La gente preferisce questo tipo di domanda,
chiamato “test positivo”, anche quando un test negativo come “è un numero pari?”
avrebbe la stessa resa informativa.[6] Tuttavia, questo non significa che le persone
ricerchino test che garantiscano una risposta positiva.
Negli studi in cui i soggetti potevano scegliere sia questi pseudo-test sia altri
veramente diagnostici, questi ultimi sono stati preferiti.[7][8] La preferenza per test
positivi non è di per sé una distorsione dato che i test positivi possono dare molte
informazioni.[9] Tuttavia, in combinazione con altri effetti, questa strategia può
confermare credenze o assunzioni indipendentemente dal fatto che siano vere.[10]
Nelle situazioni del mondo reale, le prove sono complesse e mescolate. Per esempio, Il bias di conferma è stato descritto
varie opinioni contraddittorie su qualcuno possono essere sostenute focalizzandosi come uno yes man interiore che
su un certo aspetto del suo comportamento.[4] Così una qualunque ricerca di prove a conferma le credenze della persona,
favore di una certa ipotesi avrà probabilmente successo.[10] Questo è ben come Uriah Heep, il personaggio di
rappresentato dal fatto che il modo di porre una domanda può significativamente Charles Dickens [2]
cambiare la risposta che si ottiene.[4] Per esempio, i soggetti a cui è stato domandato
“sei felice della tua vita sociale?” hanno riferito una soddisfazione maggiore di
quelli a cui è stato chiesto “sei “in”felice della tua vita sociale?” [11] Anche un piccolo cambiamento nella formulazione di una
domanda può modificare il modo in cui le persono cercano, tra le informazioni loro disponibili, e quindi le conclusioni a cui arrivano.
Questo è stato dimostrato usando un caso fittizio di custodia infantile.[12] I partecipanti hanno letto che il Genitore A era
moderatamente adatto (ad avere la custodia) da diversi punti di vista. Il Genitore B aveva un mix di qualità particolarmente positive e
negative: un’ottima relazione con il bambino ma un lavoro che l’avrebbe tenuto lontano per lunghi periodi di tempo. Quando è stato
chiesto “Quale genitore dovrebbe avere la custodia del bambino?” la maggioranza dei partecipanti ha scelto il Genitore B, guardando
principalmente alle qualità positive. Tuttavia, quando è stato chiesto “A quale genitore deve essere negata la custodia?” i partecipanti
hanno guardato alle qualità negative e la maggioranza ha risposto che al Genitore B deve essere negata la custodia, implicando che
questa dovesse essere assegnata al Genitore A.[12]
Studi simili hanno dimostrato come la gente si impegna in una ricerca distorta delle informazioni ma anche che questo fenomeno può
essere limitato da una preferenza per test veramente diagnostici. In un esperimento iniziale, i partecipanti valutavano la personalità di
un’altra persona nella sua dimensione introversa-estroversa sulla base di un’intervista le cui domande venivano scelte da una lista
data. Quando l’intervistato veniva presentato come introverso, i partecipanti sceglievano domande che presumevano introversione,
tipo “Che cosa non ti piace delle feste rumorose?” mentre quando l’intervistato veniva presentato come estroverso, quasi tutte le
domande presumevano estroversione tipo “cosa faresti per ravvivare una festa noiosa?” Queste domande davano agli intervistati
poche (o nessuna) possibilità di falsificare le ipotesi fatte su di loro.[13]
Una successiva versione dell’esperimento dava, ai partecipanti, una lista di domande da scegliere meno presuntive, tipo “Rifuggi le
interazioni sociali?” [14] I partecipanti hanno preferito fare queste domande più diagnostiche mostrando una debole distorsione verso
i test positivi. Questo schema, di una preferenza principale verso i test diagnostici e di una più debole verso i test positivi è stato
replicato in altri studi.[14] I tratti della personalità influenzano e interagiscono con i processi distorti di ricerca.[15] Le persone variano
nella loro capacità di difendere le loro opinioni dagli attacchi esterni in relazione alla esposizione selettiva. La esposizione selettiva
avviene quando gli individui cercano informazioni che sono coerenti, piuttosto che in contraddizione, con le loro credenze
personali.[16] Un esperimento ha esaminato fino a che punto le persone rifiutano gli argomenti che contraddicono le loro credenze
personali.[15] Le persone con un alto livello di autostima vanno più facilmente in cerca di opinioni che contraddicono le loro
posizioni in modo da formarsi un’opinione. Le persone con bassi livelli di fiducia in se stessi non cercano informazioni
contraddittorie ma preferiscono quelle che confermano le loro posizioni. La gente genera e valuta prove che sono distorte verso le
loro credenze e opinioni.[17] Maggiori livelli di fiducia in se stessi abbassano la preferenza verso informazioni a sostegno delle
proprie credenze.
In un altro esperimento è stato dato ai partecipanti il compito di scoprire delle complesse regole riguardanti il movimento di oggetti
simulati al computer.[18] Gli oggetti sullo schermo del computer seguivano specifiche leggi che i partecipanti dovevano capire. Così i
partecipanti potevano “sparare” agli oggetti per verificare le loro ipotesi. Malgrado molti tentativi, lungo una sessione di dieci ore,
nessuno dei partecipanti riuscì a capire le regole del sistema. Tipicamente cercavano di confermare piuttosto che falsificare le loro
ipotesi ed erano riluttanti a considerare delle alternative. Persino dopo aver visto prove oggettive che contraddicevano le loro ipotesi
di lavoro, spesso continuavano a fare gli stessi tentativi. A qualche partecipante è stato insegnato il modo corretto di verifica delle
fetto. [18]
ipotesi ma queste istruzioni non hanno quasi avuto alcun ef
Interpretazione
Memoria
Fenomeni associati
Polarizzazione delle opinioni
Persistenza di credenze screditate

« Le credenze possono sopravvivere a potenti sfide logiche o empiriche. Esse possono sopravvivere, e
persino essere rafforzate, da prove che, per osservatori più distaccati, le dovrebbero indebolire. Queste
credenze possono anche sopravvivere alla distruzione totale delle loro basi probatorie originali. »
(Lee Ross e Craig Anderson [19])

Il bias di conferma può essere usato per spiegare il motivo per cui alcune credenze persistono quando si rimuove la loro evidenza
iniziale.[20] Questo effetto di persistenza delle convinzioni è stato dimostrato da una serie di esperimenti utilizzando quello che viene
chiamato il debriefing paradigm: i partecipanti leggono prove false per una ipotesi e viene misurato il cambiamento delle loro
opinioni, poi viene loro mostrata la falsità delle prove e vengono misurate ancora le loro opinioni per verificare se le loro credenze
tornano al livello precedente.[19] Un risultato usuale è che almeno alcune delle convinzioni iniziali rimangono anche dopo un
debriefing completo.[21]
In un esperimento, i partecipanti dovevano distinguere tra lettere di suicidi veri e falsi. Il feedback è stato casuale: ad alcuni è stato
detto che avevano distinto bene, mentre ad altri che l’avevano fatto male. Anche dopo che tutto è stato completamente acclarato, i
partecipanti sono rimasti influenzati dal feedback. Pensavano di aver svolto quel tipo di compito meglio o peggio, rispetto alla media,
[19]
a seconda di ciò che era stato loro detto inizialmente.
In un altro studio, i partecipanti hanno letto le valutazioni delle prestazioni lavorative di due vigili del fuoco insieme con le loro
risposte a un test di avversione al rischio.[19] Questi dati fittizi sono stati organizzati per mostrare o un'associazione negativa o
positiva: ad alcuni partecipanti è stato detto che il vigile del fuoco che era più disposto al rischio aveva fatto meglio, mentre ad altri è
stato detto che aveva fatto meno bene rispetto al collega che era avverso al rischio.[22] Anche se questi due casi fossero stati veri,
sarebbero stati poveri di prove dal punto di vista scientifico per una conclusione circa i vigili del fuoco in generale. Tuttavia i
partecipanti li hanno trovati soggettivamente convincenti [22] Quando è stato rivelato che i casi di studio erano fittizi, la convinzione
dei partecipanti sull’esistenza di un nesso è diminuita, ma circa metà dell’effetto originale rimaneva.[19] Le interviste di follow-up
hanno stabilito che i partecipanti avevano capito e preso sul serio il debriefing e sembravano fidarsi di quanto esposto ma
[22]
consideravano le informazioni screditate come irrilevanti per le loro credenze personali.
Il continued influence effectè la tendenza a credere a false informazioni precedentemente apprese anche dopo che sono state corrette.
La falsa informazione può anche influenzare deduzioni fatte dopo il verificarsi della correzione.
Preferenza per le prime informazioni ricevute
Associazione illusoria di eventi disconnessi

[23] Questa tendenza è stata dimostrata per
La correlazione illusoria è la tendenza a vedere correlazioni inesistenti in un gruppo di dati.
la prima volta in una serie di esperimenti nei tardi anni ‘60.[24] In un esperimento i partecipanti hanno letto un set di casi di studio
psichiatrici, incluse le risposte al Test di Rorschach. I partecipanti hanno riferito che gli uomini omosessuali del gruppo erano più
propensi a segnalare di aver visto, nelle macchie di inchiostro, natiche, ani o figure dall’ambiguo significato sessuale. In realtà i casi
di studio fittizi erano stati costruiti in modo che gli uomini omosessuali non fossero più propensi a segnalare questo tipo di immagini
o, in una delle versioni dell’esperimento, fossero meno propensi a segnalarlo rispetto agli uomini eterosessuali.[23] In un’indagine, un
[23][24]
gruppo di psicoanalisti esperti hanno evidenziato lo stesso tipo di associazioni illusorie con l’omosessualità.
Un altro studio ha registrato i sintomi, in funzione del clima, riferiti da pazienti artritici lungo un periodo di 15 mesi. Quasi tutti i
pazienti hanno riferito che i loro sintomi erano correlati con le condizioni climatiche nonostante la correlazione reale fosse pari a
zero.[25]
Questo effetto è una specie di interpretazione distorta, nella quale prove oggettivamente neutre o sfavorevoli sono interpretate per
confermare le credenze pre-esistenti. È anche correlato con le distorsioni nel comportamento di verifica delle ipotesi.[26] Nel
giudicare se due eventi, come dolori e cattivo tempo, sono correlati, la gente si affida molto al numero di casi “positivo-positivo” (in
questo esempio sono le occasioni di dolore e cattivo tempo) e prestano poca attenzione alle altre combinazioni (di non dolore e/o bel
tempo).[27] Ciò è analogo alla dipendenza alle risposte positive nella verifica delle ipotesi.[26] Può anche riflettere il ricordo selettivo,
[26]
per quelle persone può essere sensato correlare due eventi perché è più facile ricordare le volte in cui successero insieme.
Gli studi
La ricerca di Wason sull'esame delle ipotesi

La critica di Klayman e Ha
Conseguenze
Impatto nell'attività finanziaria

Bias di conferma possono condurre investitori all'essere troppo fiduciosi e a ignorare le prove che le loro strategie genereranno
perdite.[28] In studi dei mercati per la predizione del risultato di elezioni politiche (Election Stock Market), gli investitori generarono
maggiori profitti se resistenti ai bias. Per esempio, partecipanti che interpretarono la performance di un candidato durante un dibattito
in maniera neutrale piuttosto che di parte di norma ebbero più successo nel generare profitti.[29] Per combattere il fenomeno del bias
di conferma gli investitori possono adottare un punto di vista contrario "ragionando per assurdo".[30] In una delle tecniche disponibili
in questo contesto, un investitore immagina che i propri investimenti sono precipitati di valore e deve quindi chiedersi come questo
sia potuto accadere.[28]
Nella salute fisica e mentale

Raymond Nickerson, psicologo, considera i bias di conferma come la causa delle inefficaci procedure mediche usate nei secoli
precedenti l'arrivo della medicina scientifica.[31] Se un paziente recuperava la salute per esempio, le autorità mediche del tempo
consideravano il trattamento adottato come efficace, senza considerare spiegazioni alternative quali la possibilità che la malattia
avesse seguito un decorso naturale.[31] Bias di assimilazione sono fattori nell'interesse moderno per la medicina alternativa, i
proponenti della quale vengono persuasi da prove positive aneddotiche ma al tempo stesso considerano prove scientifiche in maniera
ipercritica.[32][33][34]
La terapia cognitiva venne sviluppata da Aaron T. Beck negli anni sessanta e nel frattempo è divenuta un metodo molto popolare.[35]
Secondo Beck, il processare informazioni in maniera non-imparziale è un fattore nella depressione.[36] Il suo approccio educa le
persone a trattare prove in maniera imparziale piuttosto che usarle per rinforzare in maniera selettiva la propria negatività. Anche
ansia, fobia e ipocondria sono state dimostrate coinvolgere bias di conferma nei confronti di informazioni riguardanti una qualche
forma di minaccia.[37]
Nella politica
Nel paranormale
Uno dei fattori che contribuiscono al fascino della precognizione è che colui che ascolta i pronostici applica un bias di conferma che
modella le asserzioni delchiaroveggente alla vita del soggetto.[38] Facendo un grande numero di asserzioni ambigue in ogni seduta, il
chiaroveggente fornisce al cliente molte opportunità per trovare agganci alla propria vita. Questa è una delle tecniche della lettura a
freddo con la quale un chiaroveggente può fornire un pronostico soggettivamente impressionante senza avere conoscenze a priori del
cliente.[38] L'investigatore James Randi ha confrontato la trascrizione di una seduta di chiaroveggenza con la relazione redatta dal
cliente riguardante le dichiarazioni del chiaroveggente nella stessa seduta, dimostrando come il cliente avesse una memoria
fortemente selettiva ricordandosi in particolar modo le asserzioni del chiaroveggente che fettivamente
ef lo riguardavano.[39]
Come caso lampante di bias di conferma nel mondo reale, Nickerson menziona la piramidologia numerologica: la pratica del trovare
significato nelle proporzioni delle piramidi egizie.[40] È possibile effettuare molte misure lineari, per esempio, della Piramide di
Cheope e vi sono molti modi per combinarle e manipolarle. È quindi quasi inevitabile che delle persone che studiano queste cifre in
maniera selettiva troveranno delle corrispondenze apparentemente impressionanti, per esempio con le dimensioni della Terra[40] o
con quelle di qualsiasi altro ente o soggetto.
Nella psicologia
Gli psicologi sociali hanno identificato due tendenze nella maniera in cui le persone cercano o interpretano informazioni riguardanti
se stessi. L'auto-verifica (Self-verification) è il desiderio di rinforzare l'immagine di sé stessi, l'auto-miglioramento (Self-
enhancement) è il desiderio di cercare giudizi positivi esterni. I bias di conferma vanno a servire ambedue i desideri.[41] In
esperimenti, soggetti a cui vengono forniti giudizi che entrano in conflitto con l'immagine che hanno di sé stessi hanno meno
probabilità di considerarli o di ricordarli rispetto a quando ottengono osservazioni che consentono invece l'auto-verifica.[42][43][44] I
soggetti riducono l'impatto di tali informazioni interpretandole come non affidabili.[42][45][46] Esperimenti simili hanno trovato una
[41]
preferenza per giudizi positivi e per le persone che li forniscono, rispetto a giudizi negativi.
Nella pratica forense

Nel 2013 Kassin, Dror e Kuckucka hanno analizzato l'influenza persuasiva che il bias di conferma puù avere in ambito forense non
solo rispetto ai testimoni e giurati ma anche sui giudici professionisti, ed hanno coniato il termine specifico forensic confirmation
bias (cioè la tendenza nel processo alla conferma). Un classico esempio è evidenziato nella pellicola cinematografica La parola ai
giurati (film 1957), in cui la trama si svolge attorno al tentativo di smascherare questo bias nell'ambito di un processo per
omicidio.[47]
Note
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novembre 2009. URL consultato il 13 giugno 2010.
3. ^ Nickerson, pp. 177–78
4. ^ a b c Kunda, pp. 112–15
5. ^ a b Baron, pp. 162–64
6. ^ Kida, pp. 162–65
7. ^ Patricia Devine, Edward R. Hirt e Elizabeth M. Gehrke,Diagnostic and confirmation strategies in trait hypothesis
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of Personality and Social Psychology, 43 (1), American Psychological Association, 1982,pp. 22–34,
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14. ^ a b Kunda
15. ^ a b D. Albarracin e Mitchell, A.L.,The Role of Defensive Confidence in Preference for Proattitudinal Information:
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Bibliografia
Michael M. Pompian, Behavioral finance and wealth management: how to build optimal portfolios that account for
investor biases, John Wiley and Sons, 2006,pp. 187–190, ISBN 978-0-471-74517-4, OCLC 61864118.
Voci correlate
Bias (psicologia)
Cherry picking
Pregiudizio
Pensiero laterale
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Modernity
Modernity, a topic in the humanities and social sciences, is both a historical period (the modern era), as
well as the ensemble of particular socio-cultural norms, attitudes and practices that arose in the wake of
the Renaissance—in the "Age of Reason" of 17th-century thought and the 18th-century "Enlightenment".
Some commentators consider the era of modernity to have ended by 1930, with World War II in 1945, or
the 1980s or 1990s; the following era is called postmodernity. The term "contemporary history" is also
used to refer to the post-1945 timeframe, without assigning it to either the modern or postmodern era.
(Thus "modern" may be used as a name of a particular era in the past, as opposed to meaning "the current
era".)
Depending on the field, "modernity" may refer to different time periods or qualities. In historiography,
the 17th and 18th centuries are usually described as early modern, while the long 19th century
corresponds to "modern history" proper. While it includes a wide range of interrelated historical
processes and cultural phenomena (from fashion to modern warfare), it can also refer to the subjective or
existential experience of the conditions they produce, and their ongoing impact on human culture,
institutions, and politics (Berman 2010, 15–36).
As an analytical concept and normative ideal, modernity is closely linked to the ethos of philosophical
and aesthetic modernism; political and intellectual currents that intersect with the Enlightenment; and
subsequent developments such as existentialism, modern art, the formal establishment of social science,
and contemporaneous antithetical developments such as Marxism. It also encompasses the social
relations associated with the rise of capitalism, and shifts in attitudes associated with secularisation and
post-industrial life (Berman 2010, 15–36).
By the late 19th and 20th centuries, modernist art, politics, science and culture has come to dominate not
only Western Europe and North America, but almost every civilized area on the globe, including
movements thought of as opposed to the West and globalization. The modern era is closely associated
with the development of individualism,[1] capitalism,[2] urbanization[1] and a belief in the possibilities of
technological and political progress.[3][4] Wars and other perceived problems of this era, many of which
come from the effects of rapid change, and the connected loss of strength of traditional religious and
ethical norms, have led to many reactions against modern development.[5][6] Optimism and belief in
constant progress has been most recently criticized by postmodernism while the dominance of Western
Europe and Anglo-America over other continents has been criticized by postcolonial theory.
In the view of Michel Foucault (1975) (classified as a proponent of postmodernism though he himself
rejected the "postmodernism" label, considering his work as "a critical history of modernity"—see, e.g.,
Call 2002, 65), "modernity" as a historical category is marked by developments such as a questioning or
rejection of tradition; the prioritization of individualism, freedom and formal equality; faith in inevitable
social, scientific and technological progress, rationalization and professionalization, a movement from
feudalism (or agrarianism) toward capitalism and the market economy, industrialization, urbanization
and secularisation, the development of the nation-state, representative democracy, public education (etc.)
(Foucault 1977, 170–77).
In the context of art history, "modernity" (modernité) has a more limited sense, "modern art" covering the
period of c. 1860–1970. Use of the term in this sense is attributed to Charles Baudelaire, who in his 1864
essay "The Painter of Modern Life", designated the "fleeting, ephemeral experience of life in an urban
metropolis", and the responsibility art has to capture that experience. In this sense, the term refers to "a
particular relationship to time, one characterized by intense historical discontinuity or rupture, openness
to the novelty of the future, and a heightened sensitivity to what is unique about the present" (Kompridis
2006, 32–59).
Contents
Etymology
Phases
Definition
Political
Sociological
Cultural and philosophical
Secularization
Scientific
Technological
Artistic
Theological
Defined
See also
Notes
References
Further reading
External links
Etymology
The Late Latin adjective modernus, a derivation from the adverb modo "presently, just now", is attested
from the 5th century, at first in the context of distinguishing the Christian era from the pagan era. In the
6th century, Cassiodorus appears to have been the first writer to use modernus "modern" regularly to
refer to his own age (O'Donnell 1979, 235 n9). The terms antiquus and modernus were used in a
chronological sense in the Carolingian era. For example, a magister modernus referred to a contemporary
scholar, as opposed to old authorities such as Benedict of Nursia. In early medieval usage, modernus
referred to authorities younger than pagan antiquity and the early church fathers, but not necessarily to
the present day, and could include authors several centuries old, from about the time of Bede, i.e.
referring to the time after the foundation of the Order of Saint Benedict and/or the fall of the Western
Roman Empire (Hartmann 1974, passim).
The Latin adjective was adopted in Middle French, as moderne, by the 15th century, and hence, in the
early Tudor period, into Early Modern English. The early modern word meant "now existing", or
"pertaining to the present times", not necessarily with a positive connotation. Shakespeare uses modern in
the sense of "every-day, ordinary, commonplace".
The word entered wide usage in the context of the late 17th-century quarrel of the Ancients and the
Moderns within the Académie française, debating the question of "Is Modern culture superior to
Classical (Græco–Roman) culture?" In the context of this debate, the "ancients" (anciens) and "moderns"
(modernes) were proponents of opposing views, the former believing that contemporary writers could do
no better than imitate the genius of classical antiquity, while the latter, first with Charles Perrault (1687),
proposed that more than a mere "Renaissance" of ancient achievements, the "Age of Reason" had gone
beyond what had been possible in the classical period. The term modernity, first coined in the 1620s, in
this context assumed the implication of a historical epoch following the Renaissance, in which the
achievements of antiquity were surpassed (Delanty 2007).
Phases
Modernity has been associated with cultural and intellectual movements of 1436–1789 and extending to
the 1970s or later (Toulmin 1992, 3–5).
According to Marshall Berman (1982, 16–17), modernity is periodized into three conventional phases
(dubbed "Early," "Classical," and "Late," respectively, by Peter Osborne (1992, 25)):
Early modernity: 1500–1789 (or 1453–1789 in traditional historiography)

Classical modernity: 1789–1900 (corresponding to the long 19th century (1789–1914) in
Hobsbawm's scheme)
Late modernity: 1900–1989
In the second phase Berman draws upon the growth of modern technologies such as the newspaper,
telegraph and other forms of mass media. There was a great shift into modernization in the name of
industrial capitalism. Finally in the third phase, modernist arts and individual creativity marked the
beginning of a new modernist age as it combats oppressive politics, economics as well as other social
forces including mass media (Laughey 2007, 30).
Some authors, such as Lyotard and Baudrillard, believe that modernity ended in the mid- or late 20th
century and thus have defined a period subsequent to modernity, namely Postmodernity
(1930s/1950s/1990s–present). Other theorists, however, regard the period from the late 20th century to
the present as merely another phase of modernity; Zygmunt Bauman (1989) calls this phase "liquid"
modernity, Giddens (1998) labels it "high" modernity (see High modernism).
Definition
Political
Politically, modernity's earliest phase starts with Niccolò Machiavelli's works which openly rejected the
medieval and Aristotelian style of analyzing politics by comparison with ideas about how things should
be, in favour of realistic analysis of how things really are. He also proposed that an aim of politics is to
control one's own chance or fortune, and that relying upon providence actually leads to evil. Machiavelli
argued, for example, that violent divisions within political communities are unavoidable, but can also be
a source of strength which lawmakers and leaders should account for and even encourage in some ways
(Strauss 1987).
Machiavelli's recommendations were sometimes influential upon kings and princes, but eventually came
to be seen as favoring free republics over monarchies (Rahe 2006, 1). Machiavelli in turn influenced
Francis Bacon (Kennington 2004, chapt. 4), Marchamont Needham (Rahe 2006, chapt. 1), James
Harrington (Rahe 2006, chapt. 1), John Milton (Bock, Skinner, and Viroli 1990, chapt. 11), David Hume
(Rahe 2006, chapt. 4), and many others (Strauss 1958).
Important modern political doctrines which stem from the new Machiavellian realism include
Mandeville's influential proposal that "Private Vices by the dextrous Management of a skilful Politician
may be turned into Publick Benefits" (the last sentence of his Fable of the Bees), and also the doctrine of
a constitutional "separation of powers" in government, first clearly proposed by Montesquieu. Both these
principles are enshrined within the constitutions of most modern democracies. It has been observed that
while Machiavelli's realism saw a value to war and political violence, his lasting influence has been
"tamed" so that useful conflict was deliberately converted as much as possible to formalized political
struggles and the economic "conflict" encouraged between free, private enterprises (Rahe 2006, chapt. 5;
Mansfield 1989).
Starting with Thomas Hobbes, attempts were made to use the methods of the new modern physical
sciences, as proposed by Bacon and Descartes, applied to humanity and politics (Berns 1987). Notable
attempts to improve upon the methodological approach of Hobbes include those of John Locke (Goldwin
1987), Spinoza (Rosen 1987), Giambattista Vico (1984, xli), and Rousseau (1997, part 1). David Hume
made what he considered to be the first proper attempt at trying to apply Bacon's scientific method to
political subjects (Hume & 1896 [1739], intro.), rejecting some aspects of the approach of Hobbes.
Modernist republicanism openly influenced the foundation of republics during the Dutch Revolt (1568–
1609) (Bock, Skinner, and Viroli 1990, chapt. 10,12), English Civil War (1642–1651) (Rahe 2006, chapt.
1), American Revolution (1775–1783) (Rahe 2006, chapt. 6–11), the French Revolution (1789–1799),
and the Haitian revolution (1791–1804). (Orwin and Tarcov 1997, chapt. 8).
A second phase of modernist political thinking begins with Rousseau, who questioned the natural
rationality and sociality of humanity and proposed that human nature was much more malleable than had
been previously thought. By this logic, what makes a good political system or a good man is completely
dependent upon the chance path a whole people has taken over history. This thought influenced the
political (and aesthetic) thinking of Immanuel Kant, Edmund Burke and others and led to a critical
review of modernist politics. On the conservative side, Burke argued that this understanding encouraged
caution and avoidance of radical change. However more ambitious movements also developed from this
insight into human culture, initially Romanticism and Historicism, and eventually both the Communism
of Karl Marx, and the modern forms of nationalism inspired by the French Revolution, including, in one
extreme, the German Nazi movement (Orwin and Tarcov 1997, chapt. 4).
On the other hand, the notion of modernity has been contested also due to its Euro-centric underpinnings.
This is further aggravated by the re-emergence of non-Western powers. Yet, the contestations about
modernity are also linked with Western notions of democracy, social discipline, and development
(Regilme 2012, 96).
Sociological
In sociology, a discipline that arose in direct response to the social problems of "modernity" (Harriss
2000, 325), the term most generally refers to the social conditions, processes, and discourses consequent
to the Age of Enlightenment. In the most basic terms, Anthony Giddens describes modernity as
...a shorthand term for modern society, or industrial
civilization. Portrayed in more detail, it is associated with
(1) a certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of
the world as open to transformation, by human intervention;
(2) a complex of economic institutions, especially industrial
production and a market economy; (3) a certain range of
political institutions, including the nation-state and mass
democracy. Largely as a result of these characteristics,
modernity is vastly more dynamic than any previous type of
social order. It is a society—more technically, a complex of
institutions—which, unlike any preceding culture, lives in
the future, rather than the past (Giddens 1998, 94).
Cover of the original

Other writers have criticized such definitions as just being a listing of German edition of Max
factors. They argue that modernity, contingently understood as marked Weber's The Protestant
by an ontological formation in dominance, needs to be defined much Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism
more fundamentally in terms of different ways of being.
The modern is thus defined by the way in which prior

valences of social life ... are reconstituted through a
constructivist reframing of social practices in relation to
basic categories of existence common to all humans: time,
space, embodiment, performance and knowledge. The word
'reconstituted' here explicitly does not mean replaced.
(James 2015, 51–52)
This means that modernity overlays earlier formations of traditional and customary life without
necessarily replacing them.
Cultural and philosophical

The era of modernity is characterised socially by industrialisation and the division of labour and
philosophically by "the loss of certainty, and the realization that certainty can never be established, once
and for all" (Delanty 2007). With new social and philosophical conditions arose fundamental new
challenges. Various 19th-century intellectuals, from Auguste Comte to Karl Marx to Sigmund Freud,
attempted to offer scientific and/or political ideologies in the wake of secularisation. Modernity may be
described as the "age of ideology." (Calinescu 1987, 2006).
For Marx, what was the basis of modernity was the emergence of capitalism and the
revolutionary bourgeoisie, which led to an unprecedented expansion of productive forces
and to the creation of the world market. Durkheim tackled modernity from a different angle
by following the ideas of Saint-Simon about the industrial system. Although the starting
point is the same as Marx, feudal society, Durkheim emphasizes far less the rising of the
bourgeoisie as a new revolutionary class and very seldom refers to capitalism as the new
mode of production implemented by it. The fundamental impulse to modernity is rather
industrialism accompanied by the new scientific forces. In the work of Max Weber,
modernity is closely associated with the processes of rationalization and disenchantment of
the world. (Larraín 2000, 13)
Critical theorists such as Theodor Adorno and Zygmunt Bauman propose that modernity or
industrialization represents a departure from the central tenets of the Enlightenment and towards
nefarious processes of alienation, such as commodity fetishism and the Holocaust (Adorno 1973,;
Bauman 1989). Contemporary sociological critical theory presents the concept of "rationalization" in
even more negative terms than those Weber originally defined. Processes of rationalization—as progress
for the sake of progress—may in many cases have what critical theory says is a negative and
dehumanising effect on modern society. (Adorno 1973,; Bauman 2000)
Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed
at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the wholly
enlightened earth radiates under the sign of disaster triumphant. (Adorno 1973, 210)
What prompts so many commentators to speak of the 'end of history', of post-modernity,

'second modernity' and 'surmodernity', or otherwise to articulate the intuition of a radical
change in the arrangement of human cohabitation and in social conditions under which life-
politics is nowadays conducted, is the fact that the long effort to accelerate the speed of
movement has presently reached its 'natural limit'. Power can move with the speed of the
electronic signal – and so the time required for the movement of its essential ingredients has
been reduced to instantaneity. For all practical purposes, power has become truly
exterritorial, no longer bound, or even slowed down, by the resistance of space (the advent
of cellular telephones may well serve as a symbolic 'last blow' delivered to the dependency
on space: even the access to a telephone market is unnecessary for a command to be given
and seen through to its effect. (Bauman 2000, 10)
Consequent to debate about economic globalization, the comparative analysis of civilizations, and the
post-colonial perspective of "alternative modernities," Shmuel Eisenstadt introduced the concept of
"multiple modernities" (Eisenstadt 2003; see also Delanty 2007). Modernity as a "plural condition" is the
central concept of this sociologic approach and perspective, which broadens the definition of "modernity"
from exclusively denoting Western European culture to a culturally relativistic definition, thereby:
"Modernity is not Westernization, and its key processes and dynamics can be found in all societies"
(Delanty 2007).
Secularization
Modernity, or the Modern Age, is typically defined as a post-traditional, and post-medieval historical
period (Heidegger 1938, 66–67, 66–67 (https://books.google.com/books?id=QImd2ARqQPMC&pg=PA6
6)). Central to modernity is emancipation from religion, specifically the hegemony of Christianity, and
the consequent secularization. Modern thought repudiates the Judeo-Christian belief in the Biblical God
as a mere relic of superstitious ages (Fackenheim 1957, 272-73; Husserl 1931,).[note 1] It all started with
Descartes' revolutionary methodic doubt, which transformed the concept of truth in the concept of
certainty, whose only guarantor is no longer God or the Church, but Man's subjective judgement
(Alexander 1931, 484-85; Heidegger 1938,).[note 2]
Theologians have tried to cope with their worry that Western modernism has brought the world to no
longer being well-disposed towards Christianity (Kilby 2004, 262, 262 (https://books.google.com/books?
id=G26xfiuhCmIC&pg=PA262); Davies 2004, 133, 133 (https://books.google.com/books?id=G26xfiuhC
mIC&pg=PA133); Cassirer 1944, 13–14 13–14 (https://books.google.com/books?id=x46qiaccZLYC&pg
=PA14)).[note 3] Modernity aimed towards "a progressive force promising to liberate humankind from
ignorance and irrationality" (Rosenau 1992, 5).
Scientific
In the 16th and 17th centuries, Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and others developed a new approach to
physics and astronomy which changed the way people came to think about many things. Copernicus
presented new models of the solar system which no longer placed humanity's home, on Earth, in the
centre. Kepler used mathematics to discuss physics and described regularities of nature this way. Galileo
actually made his famous proof of uniform acceleration in freefall using mathematics (Kennington 2004,
chapt. 1,4).
Francis Bacon, especially in his Novum Organum, argued for a new methodological approach. It was an
experimental based approach to science, which sought no knowledge of formal or final causes. Yet, he
was no materialist. He also talked of the two books of God, God's Word (Scripture) and God's work
(nature) (Bacon 1828, 53). But he also added a theme that science should seek to control nature for the
sake of humanity, and not seek to understand it just for the sake of understanding. In both these things he
was influenced by Machiavelli's earlier criticism of medieval Scholasticism, and his proposal that leaders
should aim to control their own fortune (Kennington 2004, chapt. 1,4).
Influenced both by Galileo's new physics and Bacon, René Descartes argued soon afterward that
mathematics and geometry provided a model of how scientific knowledge could be built up in small
steps. He also argued openly that human beings themselves could be understood as complex machines
(Kennington 2004, chapt. 6).
Isaac Newton, influenced by Descartes, but also, like Bacon, a proponent of experimentation, provided
the archetypal example of how both Cartesian mathematics, geometry and theoretical deduction on the
one hand, and Baconian experimental observation and induction on the other hand, together could lead to
great advances in the practical understanding of regularities in nature (d'Alembert & 2009 [1751]; Henry
2004).
Technological
One common conception of modernity is the condition of Western history since the mid-15th century, or
roughly the European development of movable type[7] and the printing press.[8] In this context the
"modern" society is said to develop over many periods, and to be influenced by important events that
represent breaks in the continuity.[9][10][11]
Artistic
After modernist political thinking had already become widely known in France, Rousseau's re-
examination of human nature led to a new criticism of the value of reasoning itself which in turn led to a
new understanding of less rationalistic human activities, especially the arts. The initial influence was
upon the movements known as German Idealism and Romanticism in the 18th and 19th century. Modern
art therefore belongs only to the later phases of modernity (Orwinand Tarcov 1997, chapt. 2,4).
For this reason art history keeps the term "modernity" distinct from the terms Modern Age and
Modernism – as a discrete "term applied to the cultural condition in which the seemingly absolute
necessity of innovation becomes a primary fact of life, work, and thought". And modernity in art "is more
than merely the state of being modern, or the opposition between old and new" (Smith 2009).
In the essay "The Painter of Modern Life" (1864), Charles Baudelaire gives a literary definition: "By
modernity I mean the transitory, the fugitive, the contingent" (Baudelaire 1964, 13).
Advancing technological innovation, affecting artistic technique and the means of manufacture, changed
rapidly the possibilities of art and its status in a rapidly changing society. Photography challenged the
place of the painter and painting. Architecture was transformed by the availability of steel for structures.
Theological
From theologian Thomas C. Oden's perspective, "modernity" is marked by "four fundamental values"
(Hall 1990):
"Moral relativism (which says that what is right is dictated by culture, social location, and
situation)"
"Autonomous individualism (which assumes that moral authority comes essentially from
within)"
"Narcissistic hedonism (which focuses on egocentric personal pleasure)"
"Reductive naturalism (which reduces what is reliably known to what one can see, hear, and
empirically investigate)"
Modernity rejects anything "old" and makes "novelty ... a criterion for truth." This results in a great
"phobic response to anything antiquarian." In contrast, "classical Christian consciousness" resisted
"novelty" (Hall 1990).
Pope Pius IX and Pope Pius X of the Roman Catholic Church claim that Modernism (in a particular
definition of the Catholic Church) is a danger to the Christian faith. Pope Pius IX compiled a Syllabus of
Errors published on December 8, 1864 to describe his objections to Modernism (Pius IX 1864). Pope
Pius X further elaborated on the characteristics and consequences of Modernism, from his perspective, in
an encyclical entitled "Pascendi dominici gregis" (Feeding the Lord's Flock) on September 8, 1907 (Pius
X 1907). Pascendi Dominici Gregis states that the principles of Modernism, taken to a logical
conclusion, lead to atheism. The Roman Catholic Church was serious enough about the threat of
Modernism that it required all Roman Catholic clergy, pastors, confessors, preachers, religious superiors
and seminary professors to swear an Oath Against Modernism (Pius X 1910) from 1910 until this
directive was rescinded in 1967.
Defined
Of the available conceptual definitions in sociology, modernity is "marked and defined by an obsession
with 'evidence'," visual culture, and personal visibility (Leppert 2004, 19). Generally, the large-scale
social integration constituting modernity, involves the:
increased movement of goods, capital, people, and information among formerly discrete
populations, and consequent influence beyond the local area
increased formal social organization of mobile populaces, development of "circuits" on
which they and their influence travel, and societal standardization conducive to socio-
economic mobility
increased specialization of the segments of society, i.e., division of labor, and area inter-
dependency
increased level of excessive stratification in terms of social life of a modern man
Increased state of dehumanisation, dehumanity, unionisation, as man became embittered
about the negative turn of events which sprouted a growing fear.
man became a victim of the underlying circumstances presented by the modern world
Increased competitiveness amongst people in the society (survival of the fittest) as the
jungle rule sets in.
See also
Buddhist modernism
Hypermodernity
Industrialization
Islam and modernity
Late modernity
Mass society
Modern Orthodox Judaism
Modernisation
Modernism (Roman Catholicism)
Mythopoeic thought
Postmodernity
Rationalization (sociology)
Second modernity
Traditional society
Transmodernity
Urbanization
Notes
1. Quotation from Fackenheim 1967, 272–73:
But there does seem to be a necessary conflict between modern thought and
the Biblical belief in revelation. All claims of revelation, modern science and
philosophy seem agreed, must be repudiated, as mere relics of superstitious
ages. ... [to a modern phylosopher] The Biblical God...was a mere myth of
bygone ages.
Quotation from Husserl 1931,:

When, with the beginning of modern times, religious belief was becoming more
and more externalized as a lifeless convention, men of intellect were lifted by a
new belief, their great belief in an autonomous philosophy and science.
2. Quotation from Heidegger 1938:
The essence of modernity can be seen in humanity's freeing itself from the
bonds of Middle Ages... Certainly the modern age has, as a consequence of the
liberation of humanity, introduced subjectivism and indivisualism. ... For up to
Descartes... The claim [of a self-supported, unshakable foundation of truth, in
the sense of certainty] originates in that emancipation of man in which he frees
himself from obligation to Christian revelational truth and Church doctrine to a
legislating for himself that takes its stand upon itself.
3. Quotation from Kilby 2004, 262:
... a cluster of issues surrounding the assessment of modernity and of the

apologetic task of theology in modernity. Both men [Rahner and Balthasar] were
deeply concerned with apologetics, with the question of how to present
Christianity in a world which is no longer well-disposed towards it. ... both
thought that modernity raised particular problems for being a believing Christian,
and therefore for apologetics.
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Press. ISBN 0-8014-9265-3 (pbk).
Further reading
Adem, Seifudein. 2004. "Decolonizing Modernity: Ibn-Khaldun and Modern Historiography."
In Islam: Past, Present and Future, International Seminar on Islamic Thought Proceedings,
edited by Ahmad Sunawari Long, Jaffary Awang, and Kamaruddin Salleh, 570–87. Salangor
Darul Ehsan, Malaysia: Department of Theology and Philosophy, Faculty of Islamic Studies,
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.
Arendt, Hannah. 1958. "The Origins Of Totalitarianism" Cleavland: World Publishing Co.
ISBN 0-8052-4225-2
Buci-Glucksmann, Christine. 1994. Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity.
Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications. ISBN 0-8039-8975-X (cloth) ISBN 0-8039-8976-8
(pbk)
Carroll, Michael Thomas. 2000. Popular Modernity in America: Experience, Technology,
Mythohistory. SUNY Series in Postmodern Culture. Albany: State University of New York
Press. ISBN 0-7914-4713-8 (hc) ISBN 0-7914-4714-6 (pbk)
Corchia, Luca. 2008. "Il concetto di modernità in Jürgen Habermas. Un indice ragionato (htt
ps://web.archive.org/web/20110722063716/http://arp.unipi.it/dettaglioar.php?ide=132051)."
The Lab's Quarterly/Il Trimestrale del Laboratorio 2:396ff. ISSN 2035-5548.
Crouch, Christopher. 2000. "Modernism in Art Design and Architecture," New York: St.
Martins Press. ISBN 0-312-21830-3 (cloth) ISBN 0-312-21832-X (pbk)
Davies, Oliver. 2004. "The Theological Aesthetics". In The Cambridge Companion to Hans
Urs von Balthasar, edited by Edward T. Oakes and David Moss, 131–42. Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-89147-7.
Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah. 2003. Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities, 2 vols.
Leiden and Boston: Brill.
Everdell, William R. 1997. The First Moderns: Profiles in the Origins of Twentieth-Century
Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-22480-5 (cloth); ISBN 0-226-
22481-3 (pbk).
Gaonkar, Dilip Parameshwar (ed.). 2001. Alternative Modernities. A Millennial Quartet Book.
Durham: Duke University Press. ISBN 0-8223-2703-1 (cloth); ISBN 0-8223-2714-7 (pbk)
Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University
Press. ISBN 0-8047-1762-1 (cloth); ISBN 0-8047-1891-1 (pbk); Cambridge, UK: Polity
Press in association with Basil Blackwell, Oxford. ISBN 0-7456-0793-4
Horváth, Ágnes, 2013. Modernism and Charisma. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan. ISBN 9781137277855 (cloth)
Jarzombek, Mark. 2000. The Psychologizing of Modernity: Art, Architecture, History.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kolakowsi, Leszek. 1990. Modernity on Endless Trial. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
ISBN 0-226-45045-7
Kopić, Mario. Sekstant. Belgrade: Službeni glasnik. ISBN 978-86-519-0449-6
Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern, translated by Catherine Porter.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-94838-6 (hb) ISBN 0-674-94839-4
(pbk.)
Perreau-Saussine, Emile. 2005. " "Les libéraux face aux révolutions: 1688, 1789, 1917,
1933" " (http://www.sps.cam.ac.uk/pol/staff/eperreausaussine/libAraux_et_rAvolutions.pdf)
(PDF). (457 KB). Commentaire no. 109 (Spring): 181–93.
Vinje, Victor Condorcet. 2017. The Challenges of Modernity. Nisus Publications.
Wagner, Peter. 1993. A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline. Routledge: London.
ISBN 9780415081863
Wagner, Peter. 2001. Theorizing Modernity. Inescapability and Attainability in Social Theory.
SAGE: London. ISBN 978-0761951476
Wagner, Peter. 2008. Modernity as Experience and Interpretation: A New Sociology of
Modernity. Polity Press: London. ISBN 978-0-7456-4218-5
External links
1. National, Cultural, and Ethnic Identities: Harmony Beyond Conflict by Jaroslav Hroch, David
Hollan
2. Capitalism and Modernity: The Great Debate by Jack Goody
3. Progress and Its Discontents (https://books.google.com/books?id=m9Ha1fmAXk4C)
American Academy of Arts and Sciences. "Technology and politics (https://books.google.co
m/books?id=ov86j30F96EC&pg=PA297)." Western Center
4. A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology by Jan-Kyrre Berg Olsen, Stig Andur
Pedersen, Vincent F. Hendricks
5. Marx, Durkheim, Weber: Formations of Modern Social Thought by Kenneth L. Morrison. p.
294.
6. William Schweiker, The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics. 2005. p. 454. (cf., "In
modernity, however, much of economic activity and theory seemed to be entirely cut off from
religious and ethical norms, at least in traditional terms. Many see modern economic
developments as entirely secular.")
7. Early European History by Henry Kitchell Webster
8. The European Reformations by Carter Lindberg
9. The new Cambridge modern history: Companion volume by Peter Burke
10. Plains Indian History and Culture: Essays on Continuity and Change by John C. Ewers
11. Weber, irrationality, and social order by Alan Sica
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Modernity&oldid=921807041"
This page was last edited on 18 October 2019, at 01:04 (UTC).
Society
A society is a group of individuals involved in persistent social interaction, or a large social group sharing the same geographical or
social territory, typically subject to the same political authority and dominant cultural expectations. Societies are characterized by
patterns of relationships (social relations) between individuals who share a distinctive culture and institutions; a given society may be
described as the sum total of such relationships among its constituent of members. In the social sciences, a larger society often
exhibits stratification or dominance patterns in subgroups.
Insofar as it is collaborative, a society can enable its members to benefit in ways that would not otherwise be possible on an
individual basis; both individual and social (common) benefits can thus be distinguished, or in many cases found to overlap. A
society can also consist of like-minded people governed by their own norms and values within a dominant, larger society. This is
sometimes referred to as asubculture, a term used extensively withincriminology.
More broadly, and especially within structuralist thought, a society may be illustrated as an economic, social, industrial or cultural
infrastructure, made up of, yet distinct from, a varied collection of individuals. In this regard society can mean the objective
relationships people have with the material world and with other people, rather than "other people" beyond the individual and their
familiar social environment.
Contents
Etymology and usage
Conceptions
In political science
In sociology
Types
Pre-industrial
Hunting and gathering
Pastoral
Horticultural
Agrarian
Feudal
Industrial
Post-industrial
Contemporary usage
Western
Information
Knowledge
Other uses
See also
Notes
Further reading
External links
Etymology and usage

Society
A society is a group of individuals involved in persistent social interaction, or a large social group
sharing the same geographical or social territory, typically subject to the same political authority and
dominant cultural expectations. Societies are characterized by patterns of relationships (social relations)
between individuals who share a distinctive culture and institutions; a given society may be described as
the sum total of such relationships among its constituent of members. In the social sciences, a larger
society often exhibits stratification or dominance patterns in subgroups.
Societies construct patterns of behavior by deeming certain actions or speech as acceptable or

unacceptable. These patterns of behavior within a given society are known as societal norms. Societies,
and their norms, undergo gradual and perpetual changes.
Insofar as it is collaborative, a society can enable its members to benefit in ways that would otherwise be
difficult on an individual basis; both individual and social (common) benefits can thus be distinguished,
or in many cases found to overlap. A society can also consist of like-minded people governed by their
own norms and values within a dominant, larger society. This is sometimes referred to as a subculture, a
term used extensively within criminology.
More broadly, and especially within structuralist thought, a society may be illustrated as an economic,
social, industrial or cultural infrastructure, made up of, yet distinct from, a varied collection of
individuals. In this regard society can mean the objective relationships people have with the material
world and with other people, rather than "other people" beyond the individual and their familiar social
environment.
Contents
Etymology and usage
Conceptions
In sociology
Types
Pre-industrial
Pastoral
Horticultural
Agrarian
Feudal
Industrial
Post-industrial
Contemporary usage
Western
Information
Knowledge
Other uses
See also
Notes
References
Further reading
External links
Etymology and usage
A half-section of the 12th-century South Tang Dynasty version of Night Revels of Han Xizai, original by Gu
Hongzhong. The painting portrays servants, musicians, monks, children, guests, and hosts all in a single social
environment. It serves as an in-depth look into the Chinese social structure of the time.
The term "society" came from the Latin word societas, which in turn was derived from the noun socius
("comrade, friend, ally"; adjectival form socialis) used to describe a bond or interaction between parties
that are friendly, or at least civil. Without an article, the term can refer to the entirety of humanity (also:
"society in general", "society at large", etc.), although those who are unfriendly or uncivil to the
remainder of society in this sense may be deemed to be "antisocial". However, the Scottish economist,
Adam Smith taught instead that a society "may subsist among different men, as among different
merchants, from a sense of its utility without any mutual love or affection, if only they refrain from doing
injury to each other."[1]
Used in the sense of an association, a society is a body of individuals outlined by the bounds of
functional interdependence, possibly comprising characteristics such as national or cultural identity,
social solidarity, language, or hierarchical structure.
Conceptions
Society, in general, addresses the fact that an individual has rather limited means as an autonomous unit.
The great apes have always been more (Bonobo, Homo, Pan) or less (Gorilla, Pongo) social animals, so
Robinson Crusoe-like situations are either fictions or unusual corner cases to the ubiquity of social
context for humans, who fall between presocial and eusocial in the spectrum of animal ethology.
Cultural relativism as a widespread approach or ethic has largely replaced notions of "primitive",
better/worse, or "progress" in relation to cultures (including their material culture/technology and social
organization).
According to anthropologist Maurice Godelier, one critical novelty in society, in contrast to humanity's
closest biological relatives (chimpanzees and bonobos), is the parental role assumed by the males, which
supposedly would be absent in our nearest relatives for whom paternity is not generally
determinable.[2][3]
Societies may also be structured politically. In order of increasing size and complexity, there are bands,
tribes, chiefdoms, and state societies. These structures may have varying degrees of political power,
depending on the cultural, geographical, and historical environments that these societies must contend
with. Thus, a more isolated society with the same level of technology and culture as other societies is
more likely to survive than one in close proximity to others that may encroach on their resources. A
society that is unable to offer an effective response to other societies it competes with will usually be
subsumed into the culture of the competing society.
In sociology
Sociologist Peter L. Berger defines society as "...a human
product, and nothing but a human product, that yet continuously
acts upon its producers." According to him, society was created
by humans, but this creation turns back and creates or molds
humans every day.[4]
Sociologist Gerhard Lenski differentiates societies based on their

level of technology, communication, and economy: (1) hunters
and gatherers, (2) simple agricultural, (3) advanced agricultural,
The social group enables its
(4) industrial, and (5) special (e.g. fishing societies or maritime members to benefit in ways that
societies).[5] This is similar to the system earlier developed by would not otherwise be possible on
anthropologists Morton H. Fried, a conflict theorist, and Elman an individual basis. Both individual
Service, an integration theorist, who have produced a system of and social (common) goals can thus
classification for societies in all human cultures based on the be distinguished and considered. Ant
(formicidae) social ethology.
evolution of social inequality and the role of the state. This
system of classification contains four categories:
Hunter-gatherer bands (categorization of duties and

responsibilities). Then came the agricultural society.
Tribal societies in which there are some limited
instances of social rank and prestige.
Stratified structures led by chieftains.
Civilizations, with complex social hierarchies and
organized, institutional governments.
In addition to this there are:
Canis lupus social ethology
Humanity, humankind, upon which rest all the elements
of society, including society's beliefs.
Virtual society, a society based on online identity, which is evolving in the information age.
Over time, some cultures have progressed toward more complex forms of organization and control. This
cultural evolution has a profound effect on patterns of community. Hunter-gatherer tribes settled around
seasonal food stocks to become agrarian villages. Villages grew to become towns and cities. Cities turned
into city-states and nation-states.[6]
Many societies distribute largess at the behest of some individual or some larger group of people. This
type of generosity can be seen in all known cultures; typically, prestige accrues to the generous individual
or group. Conversely, members of a society may also shun or scapegoat any members of the society who
violate its norms. Mechanisms such as gift-giving, joking relationships and scapegoating, which may be
seen in various types of human groupings, tend to be institutionalized within a society. Social evolution
as a phenomenon carries with it certain elements that could be detrimental to the population it serves.
Some societies bestow status on an individual or group of people when that individual or group performs
an admired or desired action. This type of recognition is bestowed in the form of a name, title, manner of
dress, or monetary reward. In many societies, adult male or female status is subject to a ritual or process
of this type. Altruistic action in the interests of the larger group is seen in virtually all societies. The
phenomena of community action, shunning, scapegoating, generosity, shared risk, and reward are
common to many forms of society.
Types
Societies are social groups that differ according to subsistence strategies, the ways that humans use
technology to provide needs for themselves. Although humans have established many types of societies
throughout history, anthropologists tend to classify different societies according to the degree to which
different groups within a society have unequal access to advantages such as resources, prestige, or power.
Virtually all societies have developed some degree of inequality among their people through the process
of social stratification, the division of members of a society into levels with unequal wealth, prestige, or
power. Sociologists place societies in three broad categories: pre-industrial, industrial, and postindustrial.
Pre-industrial
In a pre-industrial society, food production, which is carried out through the use of human and animal
labor, is the main economic activity. These societies can be subdivided according to their level of
technology and their method of producing food. These subdivisions are hunting and gathering, pastoral,
horticultural, agricultural, and feudal.

The main form of food production in such societies is the daily
collection of wild plants and the hunting of wild animals. Hunter-
gatherers move around constantly in search of food. As a result,
they do not build permanent villages or create a wide variety of
artifacts, and usually only form small groups such as bands and
tribes. However, some hunting and gathering societies in areas
with abundant resources (such as people of tlingit) lived in larger
groups and formed complex hierarchical social structures such as San people in Botswana start a fire
chiefdom. The need for mobility also limits the size of these by hand.
societies. They generally consist of fewer than 60 people and
rarely exceed 100. Statuses within the tribe are relatively equal, and decisions are reached through
general agreement. The ties that bind the tribe are more complex than those of the bands. Leadership is
personal—charismatic—and used for special purposes only in tribal society. There are no political offices
containing real power, and a chief is merely a person of influence, a sort of adviser; therefore, tribal
consolidations for collective action are not governmental. The family forms the main social unit, with
most members being related by birth or marriage. This type of organization requires the family to carry
out most social functions, including production and education.
Pastoral
Pastoralism is a slightly more efficient form of subsistence. Rather than searching for food on a daily
basis, members of a pastoral society rely on domesticated herd animals to meet their food needs.
Pastoralists live a nomadic life, moving their herds from one pasture to another. Because their food
supply is far more reliable, pastoral societies can support larger populations. Since there are food
surpluses, fewer people are needed to produce food. As a result, the division of labor (the specialization
by individuals or groups in the performance of specific economic activities) becomes more complex. For
example, some people become craftworkers, producing tools, weapons, and jewelry, among other items
of value. The production of goods encourages trade. This trade helps to create inequality, as some
families acquire more goods than others do. These families often gain power through their increased
wealth. The passing on of property from one generation to another helps to centralize wealth and power.
Over time emerge hereditary chieftainships, the typical form of government in pastoral societies.
Horticultural
Fruits and vegetables grown in garden plots that have been cleared from the jungle or forest provide the
main source of food in a horticultural society. These societies have a level of technology and complexity
similar to pastoral societies. Some horticultural groups use the slash-and-burn method to raise crops. The
wild vegetation is cut and burned, and ashes are used as fertilizers. Horticulturists use human labor and
simple tools to cultivate the land for one or more seasons. When the land becomes barren, horticulturists
clear a new plot and leave the old plot to revert to its natural state. They may return to the original land
several years later and begin the process again. By rotating their garden plots, horticulturists can stay in
one area for a fairly long period of time. This allows them to build semipermanent or permanent villages.
The size of a village's population depends on the amount of land available for farming; thus villages can
range from as few as 30 people to as many as 2000.
As with pastoral societies, surplus food leads to a more complex division of labor. Specialized roles in
horticultural societies include craftspeople, shamans (religious leaders), and traders. This role
specialization allows people to create a wide variety of artifacts. As in pastoral societies, surplus food can
lead to inequalities in wealth and power within horticultural political systems, developed because of the
settled nature of horticultural life.
Agrarian
Agrarian societies use agricultural technological advances to cultivate crops over a large area.
Sociologists use the phrase agricultural revolution to refer to the technological changes that occurred as
long as 8,500 years ago that led to cultivating crops and raising farm animals. Increases in food supplies
then led to larger populations than in earlier communities. This meant a greater surplus, which resulted in
towns that became centers of trade supporting various rulers, educators, craftspeople, merchants, and
religious leaders who did not have to worry about locating
nourishment.
Greater degrees of social stratification appeared in agrarian

societies. For example, women previously had higher social
status because they shared labor more equally with men. In
hunting and gathering societies, women even gathered more food
than men. However, as food stores improved and women took on
Ploughing with oxen in the 15th
lesser roles in providing food for the family, they increasingly
century
became subordinate to men. As villages and towns expanded into
neighboring areas, conflicts with other communities inevitably
occurred. Farmers provided warriors with food in exchange for protection against invasion by enemies. A
system of rulers with high social status also appeared. This nobility organized warriors to protect the
society from invasion. In this way, the nobility managed to extract goods from "lesser" members of
society.
Feudal
Feudalism was a form of society based on ownership of land. Unlike
today's farmers, vassals under feudalism were bound to cultivating their
lord's land. In exchange for military protection, the lords exploited the
peasants into providing food, crops, crafts, homage, and other services to
the landowner. The estates of the realm system of feudalism was often
multigenerational; the families of peasants may have cultivated their
lord's land for generations.
Cleric, knight and peasant;
an example of feudal
societies Industrial
Between the 15th and 16th centuries, a new economic system emerged
that began to replace feudalism. Capitalism is marked by open
competition in a free market, in which the means of production are privately owned. Europe's exploration
of the Americas served as one impetus for the development of capitalism. The introduction of foreign
metals, silks, and spices stimulated great commercial activity in European societies.
Industrial societies rely heavily on machines powered by fuels for the production of goods. This
produced further dramatic increases in efficiency. The increased efficiency of production of the industrial
revolution produced an even greater surplus than before. Now the surplus was not just agricultural goods,
but also manufactured goods. This larger surplus caused all of the changes discussed earlier in the
domestication revolution to become even more pronounced.
Once again, the population boomed. Increased productivity made more goods available to everyone.
However, inequality became even greater than before. The breakup of agricultural-based feudal societies
caused many people to leave the land and seek employment in cities. This created a great surplus of labor
and gave capitalists plenty of laborers who could be hired for extremely low wages.
Post-industrial
Post-industrial societies are societies dominated by information, services, and high technology more than
the production of goods. Advanced industrial societies are now seeing a shift toward an increase in
service sectors over manufacturing and production. The United States is the first country to have over
half of its work force employed in service industries. Service industries include government, research,
education, health, sales, law, and banking.
Contemporary usage
The term "society" is currently used to cover both a number of political and scientific connotations as
well as a variety of associations.
Western
The development of the Western world has brought with it the emerging concepts of Western culture,
politics, and ideas, often referred to simply as "Western society". Geographically, it covers at the very
least the countries of Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand. It sometimes also
includes Eastern Europe, South America, and Israel.
The cultures and lifestyles of all of these stem from Western Europe. They all enjoy relatively strong
economies and stable governments, allow freedom of religion, have chosen democracy as a form of
governance, favor capitalism and international trade, are heavily influenced by Judeo-Christian values,
and have some form of political and military alliance or cooperation.[7]
Information
Although the concept of information society has been under
discussion since the 1930s, in the modern world it is almost always
applied to the manner in which information technologies have
impacted society and culture. It therefore covers the effects of
computers and telecommunications on the home, the workplace,
schools, government, and various communities and organizations, as
well as the emergence of new social forms in cyberspace.[8]
One of the European Union's areas of interest is the information World Summit on the Information
Society, Geneva
society. Here policies are directed towards promoting an open and
competitive digital economy, research into information and
communication technologies, as well as their application to improve social inclusion, public services, and
quality of life.[9]
The International Telecommunications Union's World Summit on the Information Society in Geneva and
Tunis (2003 and 2005) has led to a number of policy and application areas where action is envisaged.[10]
Knowledge
As access to electronic information resources increased at the beginning of the 21st century, special
attention was extended from the information society to the knowledge society. An analysis by the Irish
government stated, "The capacity to manipulate, store and transmit large quantities of information
cheaply has increased at a staggering rate over recent years. The digitisation of information and the
associated pervasiveness of the Internet are facilitating a new
intensity in the application of knowledge to economic activity, to the
extent that it has become the predominant factor in the creation of
wealth. As much as 70 to 80 percent of economic growth is now said
to be due to new and better knowledge."[11]
The Seoul Cyworld control room

Other uses
People of many nations united by common political
and cultural traditions, beliefs, or values are
sometimes also said to form a society (such as
Judeo-Christian, Eastern, and Western). When used
in this context, the term is employed as a means of
contrasting two or more "societies" whose members
represent alternative conflicting and competing
worldviews.
Scheme of sustainable development:
Some academic, professional, and scientific at the confluence of three constituent parts. (2006)
associations describe themselves as societies (for
example, the American Mathematical Society, the American Society of Civil Engineers, or the Royal
Society).
In some countries, e.g. the United States, France, and Latin America, the term "society' is used in
commerce to denote a partnership between investors or the start of a business. In the United Kingdom,
partnerships are not called societies, but co-operatives or mutuals are often known as societies (such as
friendly societies and building societies).
See also
Civil society Sociobiology
Consumer society Social actions
Community (outline) Social capital
Culture (outline) Social cohesion
High society (group) Societal collapse
Mass society Social contract
Open society Social disintegration
Outline of society Social order
Professional society Social solidarity
Religion (outline) Social structure
Scientific society Social work
Secret societies Structure and agency
Notes
1. Briggs 2000, p. 9
2. Maurice Godelier, Métamorphoses de la parenté, 2004
3. Jack Goody. "The Labyrinth of Kinship" (http://newleftreview.org/?view=2592). New Left
Review. Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20070927004209/http://newleftreview.org/?vi
ew=2592) from the original on 27 September 2007. Retrieved 24 July 2007.
4. Berger, Peter L. (1967). The Scared Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion.
Garden City, NYC: Doubleday & Company, Inc. p. 3.
5. Lenski, G. 1974. Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology.
6. Effland, R. 1998. The Cultural Evolution of Civilizations (http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/dept/d
10/asb/anthro2003/glues/model_complex.html) Archived (http://arquivo.pt/wayback/201605
15120848/http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/dept/d10/asb/anthro2003/glues/model_complex.htm
l) 15 May 2016 at the Portuguese Web Archive.
7. John P McKay, Bennett D Hill, John Buckler, Clare Haru Crowston and Merry E Wiesner-
Hanks: Western Society: A Brief History. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009 (http://www.palgrave.co
m/Products/title.aspx?pid=355705). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2011010111233
9/http://www.palgrave.com/Products/title.aspx?pid=355705) 1 January 2011 at the Wayback
Machine
8. The Information Society. Indiana University. (http://www.indiana.edu/~tisj/) Archived (https://
web.archive.org/web/20091007160838/http://www.indiana.edu/~tisj/) 7 October 2009 at the
Wayback Machine Retrieved 20 October 2009.
9. Information Society Policies at a Glance. From Europa.eu. (http://ec.europa.eu/information_
society/tl/policy/index_en.htm) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20100324134651/htt
p://ec.europa.eu/information_society/tl/policy/index_en.htm) 24 March 2010 at the Wayback
Machine Retrieved 20 October 2009.
10. WSIS Implementation by Action Line. From ITU.int. (http://www.itu.int/wsis/implementation/i
ndex.html) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20120326203825/http://www.itu.int/wsis/i
mplementation/index.html) 26 March 2012 at the Wayback Machine Retrieved 20 October
2009.
11. Building the Knowledge Society. Report to Government, December 2002. Information
Society Commission, Ireland (http://www.isc.ie/downloads/know.pdf) Archived (https://web.a
rchive.org/web/20071121152730/http://www.isc.ie/downloads/know.pdf) 21 November 2007
at the Wayback Machine. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
References
Boyd, Robert, and Peter J Richerson. “Culture and the Evolution of Human Cooperation.”
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences,
The Royal Society, 12 Nov. 2009, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2781880/.
Bicchieri, Cristina, et al. “Social Norms.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford
University, 24 Sept. 2018, plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/social-norms/.
Clutton-Brock, T, et al. “The Evolution of Society.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, The Royal Society, 12 Nov. 2009,
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2781882/.
THE STATE, POLITICAL SYSTEM, AND SOCIETY,
www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/TCH.CHAP31.HTM.
“What Is Social Change and Why Should We Care?” Southern New Hampshire University,
www.snhu.edu/about-us/newsroom/2017/11/what-is-social-change.
Further reading
Effland, R. 1998. The Cultural Evolution of Civilizations (http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/dept/d
10/asb/anthro2003/glues/model_complex.html) Mesa Community College.
Jenkins, Richard (2002). Foundations of Sociology. London: Palgrave MacMillan. ISBN 978-
0-333-96050-9.
Lenski, Gerhard E. (1974). Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology (https://arc
hive.org/details/humansocietiesin00lens). New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. ISBN 978-0-07-
037172-9.
Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Fontana, 1976.
Althusser, Louis and Balibar, Étienne. Reading Capital. London: Verso, 2009.
Bottomore, Tom (ed). A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell
Publishing, 1991. 45–48.
Calhoun, Craig (ed), Dictionary of the Social Sciences Oxford University Press (2002)
Hall, Stuart. "Rethinking the Base and Superstructure Metaphor". Papers on Class,
Hegemony and Party. Bloomfield, J., ed. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1977.
Chris Harman. "Base and Superstructure (https://www.marxists.org/archive/harman/1986/x
x/base-super.html)". International Socialism 2:32, Summer 1986, pp. 3–44.
Harvey, David. A Companion to Marx's Capital. London: Verso, 2010.
Larrain, Jorge. Marxism and Ideology. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983.
Lukács, Georg. History and Class Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972.
Postone, Moishe. Time, Labour, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical
Theory. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Williams, Raymond. Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
Briggs, Asa (2000). The Age of Improvement (2nd ed.). Longman. ISBN 978-0-582-36959-
7.
External links
What Is Society? (https://mises.org/library/what-society)
Lecture notes on "Defining Society" (http://core.ecu.edu/soci/juskaa/SOCI2110/Lectures/Le
ct1.htm) from East Carolina University.
Internet Modern History Sourcebook: Industrial Revolution (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/
mod/modsbook14.html)
The Day the World Took Off Six-part video series from the University of Cambridge tracing
the question "Why did the Industrial Revolution begin when and where it did." (http://www.ds
pace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/270)
BBC History Home Page: Industrial Revolution (https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/scottishhistor
y/enlightenment/features_enlightenment_industry.shtml)
National Museum of Science and Industry website: machines and personalities (http://www.
makingthemodernworld.org.uk/)
Industrial Revolution and the Standard of Living (http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Industria
lRevolutionandtheStandardofLiving.html) by Clark Nardinelli – the debate over whether
standards of living rose or fell.
Perceptions of Knowledge, Knowledge Society, and Knowledge Management (http://www.k
nowledge-experts.com/knowledgemanagement.htm)
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Society&oldid=932343015"
Social stratification
Social stratification refers to society’s categorization of its people into groups based on socioeconomic
factors like wealth, income, race, education, occupation, and social status, or derived power (social and
political). As such, stratification is the relative social position of persons within a social group, category,
geographic region, or social unit. [1] [2] [3]
In modern Western societies, social stratification is typically defined in terms of three social classes: (i)
the upper class, (ii) the middle class, and (iii) the lower class; in turn, each class can be subdivided into ,
e.g. the upper-stratum, the middle-stratum, and the lower stratum.[4] Moreover, a social stratum can be
formed upon the bases of kinship, clan, tribe or caste, or all four.
The categorization of people by social strata occurs most clearly in complex state-based, polycentric, or
feudal societies, the latter being based upon socio-economic relations among classes of nobility and
classes of peasants. Historically, whether or not hunter-gatherer, tribal, and band societies can be defined
as socially stratified, or if social stratification otherwise began with agriculture and large-scale means of
social exchange, remains a debated matter in the social sciences.[5] Determining the structures of social
stratification arises from inequalities of status among persons, therefore, the degree of social inequality
determines a person's social stratum. Generally, the greater the social complexity of a society, the more
social exist, by way of social differentiation.[6]
Social stratification is a type of differentiation.
Contents
Overview
Definition and usage
Four underlying principles
Complexity
Social mobility
Theories of stratification
Historical
Karl Marx
Max Weber
C. Wright Mills
Anthropological theories
Kinship-orientation
Variables in theory and research
Economic
Social
Gender
Race
Ethnicity
Global stratification
See also
References
Further reading
External links
Overview
Definition and usage

Social stratification is a term used in the social sciences to describe the relative social position of persons
in a given social group, category, geographical region or other social unit. It derives from the Latin
strātum (plural '; parallel, horizontal layers) referring to a given society's categorization of its people
into rankings of socioeconomic tiers based on factors like wealth, income, social status, occupation
and power. In modern Western societies, stratification is often broadly classified into three major
divisions of social class: upper class, middle class, and lower class. Each of these classes can be
further subdivided into smaller classes (e.g. "upper middle").[4] Social may also be delineated on
the basis of kinship ties or caste relations.
The concept of social stratification is often used and interpreted differently within specific theories. In
sociology, for example, proponents of action theory have suggested that social stratification is commonly
found in developed societies, wherein a dominance hierarchy may be necessary in order to maintain
social order and provide a stable social structure. Conflict theories, such as Marxism, point to the
inaccessibility of resources and lack of social mobility found in stratified societies. Many sociological
theorists have criticized the fact that the working classes are often unlikely to advance socioeconomically
while the wealthy tend to hold political power which they use to exploit the proletariat (laboring class).
Talcott Parsons, an American sociologist, asserted that stability and social order are regulated, in part, by
universal values. Such values are not identical with "consensus" but can indeed be an impetus for social
conflict, as has been the case multiple times through history. Parsons never claimed that universal values,
in and by themselves, "satisfied" the functional prerequisites of a society. Indeed, the constitution of
society represents a much more complicated codification of emerging historical factors. Theorists such as
Ralf Dahrendorf alternately note the tendency toward an enlarged middle-class in modern Western
societies due to the necessity of an educated workforce in technological economies. Various social and
political perspectives concerning globalization, such as dependency theory, suggest that these effects are
due to changes in the status of workers to the third world.
Four underlying principles

Four principles are posited to underlie social stratification. First, social stratification is socially defined as
a property of a society rather than individuals in that society. Second, social stratification is reproduced
from generation to generation. Third, social stratification is universal (found in every society) but
variable (differs across time and place). Fourth, social stratification involves not just quantitative
inequality but qualitative beliefs and attitudes about social status.[6]
Complexity
Although stratification is not limited to complex societies, all complex societies exhibit features of
stratification. In any complex society, the total stock of valued goods is distributed unequally, wherein the
most privileged individuals and families enjoy a disproportionate share of income, power, and other
valued social resources. The term "stratification system" is sometimes used to refer to the complex social
relationships and social structures that generate these observed inequalities. The key components of such
systems are: (a) social-institutional processes that define certain types of goods as valuable and desirable,
(b) the rules of allocation that distribute goods and resources across various positions in the division of
labor (e.g., physician, farmer, ‘housewife’), and (c) the social mobility processes that link individuals to
positions and thereby generate unequal control over valued resources.[7]
Social mobility
Social mobility is the movement of individuals, social groups or categories of people between the layers
or within a stratification system. This movement can be intragenerational (within a generation) or
intergenerational (between two or more generations). Such mobility is sometimes used to classify
different systems of social stratification. Open stratification systems are those that allow for mobility
between , typically by placing value on the achieved status characteristics of individuals. Those societies
having the highest levels of intragenerational mobility are considered to be the most open and malleable
systems of stratification.[6] Those systems in which there is little to no mobility, even on an
intergenerational basis, are considered closed stratification systems. For example, in caste systems, all
aspects of social status are ascribed, such that one's social position at birth persists throughout one's
lifetime.[7]
Theories of stratification
Historical
Karl Marx
In Marxist theory, the modern mode of production consists of two main economic parts: the base and the
superstructure. The base encompasses the relations of production: employer–employee work conditions,
the technical division of labour, and property relations. Social class, according to Marx, is determined by
one's relationship to the means of production. There exist at least two classes in any class-based society:
the owners of the means of production and those who sell their labor to the owners of the means of
production. At times, Marx almost hints that the ruling classes seem to own the working class itself as
they only have their own labor power ('wage labor') to offer the more powerful in order to survive. These
relations fundamentally determine the ideas and philosophies of a society and additional classes may
form as part of the superstructure. Through the ideology of the ruling class—throughout much of history,
the land-owning aristocracy—false consciousness is promoted both through political and non-political
institutions but also through the arts and other elements of culture. When the aristocracy falls, the
bourgeoisie become the owners of the means of production in the capitalist system. Marx predicted the
capitalist mode would eventually give way, through its own internal conflict, to revolutionary
consciousness and the development of more egalitarian, more communist societies.
Marx also described two other classes, the petite bourgeoisie and
the lumpenproletariat. The petite bourgeoisie is like a small
business class that never really accumulates enough profit to
become part of the bourgeoisie, or even challenge their status.
The lumpenproletariat is the underclass, those with little to no
social status. This includes prostitutes, beggars, the homeless or
other untouchables in a given society. Neither of these subclasses
has much influence in Marx's two major classes, but it is helpful
to know that Marx did recognize differences within the classes.[8]
According to Marvin Harris[9] and Tim Ingold,[10] Lewis Henry

Morgan's accounts of egalitarian hunter-gatherers formed part of
Karl Marx' and Friedrich Engels' inspiration for communism.
Morgan spoke of a situation in which people living in the same
community pooled their efforts and shared the rewards of those
The 1911 "Pyramid of Capitalist
efforts fairly equally. He called this "communism in living." But System" cartoon is an example of
when Marx expanded on these ideas, he still emphasized an socialist critique of capitalism and of
economically oriented culture, with property defining the social stratification
fundamental relationships between people.[11] Yet, issues of
ownership and property are arguably less emphasized in hunter-
gatherer societies.[12] This, combined with the very different social and economic situations of hunter-
gatherers may account for many of the difficulties encountered when implementing communism in
industrialized states. As Ingold points out: "The notion of communism, removed from the context of
domesticity and harnessed to support a project of social engineering for large-scale, industrialized states
with populations of millions, eventually came to mean something quite different from what Morgan had
intended: namely, a principle of redistribution that would override all ties of a personal or familial nature,
and cancel out their effects."[10]
The counter-argument to Marxist's conflict theory is the theory of structural functionalism, argued by
Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore, which states that social inequality places a vital role in the smooth
operation of a society. The Davis–Moore hypothesis argues that a position does not bring power and
prestige because it draws a high income; rather, it draws a high income because it is functionally
important and the available personnel is for one reason or another scarce. Most high-income jobs are
difficult and require a high level of education to perform, and their compensation is a motivator in society
for people to strive to achieve more.[13]
Max Weber
Max Weber was strongly influenced by Marx's ideas but rejected the possibility of effective communism,
arguing that it would require an even greater level of detrimental social control and bureaucratization
than capitalist society. Moreover, Weber criticized the dialectical presumption of a proletariat revolt,
maintaining it to be unlikely.[14] Instead, he develops a three-component theory of stratification and the
concept of life chances. Weber held there are more class divisions than Marx suggested, taking different
concepts from both functionalist and Marxist theories to create his own system. He emphasizes the
difference between class, status and power, and treats these as separate but related sources of power, each
with different effects on social action. Working half a century later than Marx, Weber claims there to be
four main social classes: the upper class, the white collar workers, the petite bourgeoisie, and the manual
working class. Weber's theory more-closely resembles contemporary Western class structures, although
economic status does not currently seem to depend strictly on earnings in the way Weber envisioned.
Weber derives many of his key concepts on social stratification by examining the social structure of
Germany. He notes that, contrary to Marx's theories, stratification is based on more than simple
ownership of capital. Weber examines how many members of the aristocracy lacked economic wealth yet
had strong political power. Many wealthy families lacked prestige and power, for example, because they
were Jewish. Weber introduced three independent factors that form his theory of stratification hierarchy,
which are; class, status, and power:
Class: A person's economic position in a society, based on birth and individual

achievement.[15] Weber differs from Marx in that he does not see this as the supreme factor
in stratification. Weber notes how corporate executives control firms they typically do not
own; Marx would have placed these people in the proletariat despite their high incomes by
virtue of the fact they sell their labor instead of owning capital.
Status: A person's prestige, social honor, or popularity in a society. Weber notes that
political power is not rooted in capital value solely, but also in one's individual status. Poets
or saints, for example, can have extensive influence on society despite few material
resources.
Power: A person's ability to get their way despite the resistance of others, particularly in
their ability to engage social change. For example, individuals in government jobs, such as
an employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a member of the United States
Congress, may hold little property or status but still wield considerable social power.[16]
C. Wright Mills
C. Wright Mills, drawing from the theories of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, contends that the
imbalance of power in society derives from the complete absence of countervailing powers against
corporate leaders of the Power elite.[17][18] Mills both incorporated and revised Marxist ideas. While he
shared Marx's recognition of a dominant wealthy and powerful class, Mills believed that the source for
that power lay not only in the economic realm but also in the political and military arenas.[17] During the
1950s, Mills stated that hardly anyone knew about the power elite's existence, some individuals
(including the elite themselves) denied the idea of such a group, and other people vaguely believed that a
small formation of a powerful elite existed.[17] "Some prominent individuals knew that Congress had
permitted a handful of political leaders to make critical decisions about peace and war; and that two
atomic bombs had been dropped on Japan in the name of the United States, but neither they nor anyone
they knew had been consulted."[17]
Mills explains that the power elite embody a privileged class whose members are able to recognize their
high position within society.[17] In order to maintain their highly exalted position within society,
members of the power elite tend to marry one another, understand and accept one another, and also work
together.[17][18][pp. 4–5] The most crucial aspect of the power elite's existence lays within the core of
education.[17] "Youthful upper-class members attend prominent preparatory schools, which not only open
doors to such elite universities as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton but also to the universities' highly
exclusive clubs. These memberships in turn pave the way to the prominent social clubs located in all
major cities and serving as sites for important business contacts."[17][18][p. 63–67] Examples of elite
members who attended prestigious universities and were members of highly exclusive clubs can be seen
in George W. Bush and John Kerry. Both Bush and Kerry were members of the Skull and Bones club
while attending Yale University.[19] This club includes members of some of the most powerful men of
the twentieth century, all of which are forbidden to tell others about the secrets of their exclusive club.
Throughout the years, the Skull and Bones club has included presidents, cabinet officers, Supreme Court
justices, spies, captains of industry, and often their sons and daughters join the exclusive club, creating a
social and political network like none ever seen before.[19]
The upper class individuals who receive elite educations typically have the essential background and
contacts to enter into the three branches of the power elite: The political leadership, the military circle,
and the corporate elite.[17]
The Political Leadership: Mills held that, prior to the end of World War II, leaders of
corporations became more prominent within the political sphere along with a decline in
central decision-making among professional politicians.[17]
The Military Circle: During the 1950s-1960s, increasing concerns about warfare resulted in
top military leaders and issues involving defense funding and military personnel training
becoming a top priority within the United States. Most of the prominent politicians and
corporate leaders have been strong proponents of military spending.
The Corporate Elite: Mills explains that during the 1950s, when the military emphasis was
recognized, corporate leaders worked with prominent military officers who dominated the
development of policies. Corporate leaders and high-ranking military officers were mutually
supportive of each other.[17][18][pp. 274–276]
Mills shows that the power elite has an "inner-core" made up of individuals who are able to move from
one position of institutional power to another; for example, a prominent military officer who becomes a
political adviser or a powerful politician who becomes a corporate executive.[17] "These people have
more knowledge and a greater breadth of interests than their colleagues. Prominent bankers and
financiers, who Mills considered 'almost professional go-betweens of economic, political, and military
affairs,' are also members of the elite's inner core.[17][18][pp. 288–289]
Anthropological theories
Most if not all anthropologists dispute the "universal" nature of social stratification, holding that it is not
the standard among all societies. John Gowdy (2006) writes, "Assumptions about human behaviour that
members of market societies believe to be universal, that humans are naturally competitive and
acquisitive, and that social stratification is natural, do not apply to many hunter-gatherer peoples.[12]
Non-stratified egalitarian or acephalous ("headless") societies exist which have little or no concept of
social hierarchy, political or economic status, class, or even permanent leadership.
Kinship-orientation
Anthropologists identify egalitarian cultures as "kinship-oriented," because they appear to value social
harmony more than wealth or status. These cultures are contrasted with economically oriented cultures
(including states) in which status and material wealth are prized, and stratification, competition, and
conflict are common. Kinship-oriented cultures actively work to prevent social hierarchies from
developing because they believe that such stratification could lead to conflict and instability.[20]
Reciprocal altruism is one process by which this is accomplished.
A good example is given by Richard Borshay Lee in his account of the Khoisan, who practice "insulting
the meat." Whenever a hunter makes a kill, he is ceaselessly teased and ridiculed (in a friendly, joking
fashion) to prevent him from becoming too proud or egotistical. The meat itself is then distributed evenly
among the entire social group, rather than kept by the hunter. The level of teasing is proportional to the
size of the kill. Lee found this out when he purchased an entire cow as a gift for the group he was living
with, and was teased for weeks afterward about it (since obtaining that much meat could be interpreted as
showing off).[21]
Another example is the Indigenous Australians of Groote Eylandt and Bickerton Island, off the coast of
Arnhem Land, who have arranged their entire society—spiritually and economically—around a kind of
gift economy called renunciation. According to David H. Turner, in this arrangement, every person is
expected to give everything of any resource they have to any other person who needs or lacks it at the
time. This has the benefit of largely eliminating social problems like theft and relative poverty. However,
misunderstandings obviously arise when attempting to reconcile Aboriginal renunciative economics with
the competition/scarcity-oriented economics introduced to Australia by Anglo-European colonists.[22]
Variables in theory and research

The social status variables underlying social stratification are based in social perceptions and attitudes
about various characteristics of persons and peoples. While many such variables cut across time and
place, the relative weight placed on each variable and specific combinations of these variables will differ
from place to place over time. One task of research is to identify accurate mathematical models that
explain how these many variables combine to produce stratification in a given society. Grusky (2011)
provides a good overview of the historical development of sociological theories of social stratification
and a summary of contemporary theories and research in this field.[23] While many of the variables that
contribute to an understanding of social stratification have long been identified, models of these variables
and their role in constituting social stratification are still an active topic of theory and research. In
general, sociologists recognize that there are no "pure" economic variables, as social factors are integral
to economic value. However, the variables posited to affect social stratification can be loosely divided
into economic and other social factors.
Economic
Strictly quantitative economic variables are more useful to describing social stratification than explaining
how social stratification is constituted or maintained. Income is the most common variable used to
describe stratification and associated economic inequality in a society.[7] However, the distribution of
individual or household accumulation of surplus and wealth tells us more about variation in individual
well-being than does income, alone.[24] Wealth variables can also more vividly illustrate salient
variations in the well-being of groups in stratified societies.[25] Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
especially per capita GDP, is sometimes used to describe economic inequality and stratification at the
international or global level.
Social
Social variables, both quantitative and qualitative, typically provide the most explanatory power in causal
research regarding social stratification, either as independent variables or as intervening variables. Three
important social variables include gender, race, and ethnicity, which, at the least, have an intervening
effect on social status and stratification in most places throughout the world.[26] Additional variables
include those that describe other ascribed and achieved characteristics such as occupation and skill levels,
age, education level, education level of parents, and geographic area. Some of these variables may have
both causal and intervening effects on social status and stratification. For example, absolute age may
cause a low income if one is too young or too old to perform productive work. The social perception of
age and its role in the workplace, which may lead to ageism, typically has an intervening effect on
employment and income.
Social scientists are sometimes interested in quantifying the degree of economic stratification between
different social categories, such as men and women, or workers with different levels of education. An
index of stratification has been recently proposed by Zhou for this purpose.[27]
Gender
Gender is one of the most pervasive and prevalent social characteristics which people use to make social
distinctions between individuals. Gender distinctions are found in economic-, kinship- and caste-based
stratification systems.[28] Social role expectations often form along sex and gender lines. Entire societies
may be classified by social scientists according to the rights and privileges afforded to men or women,
especially those associated with ownership and inheritance of property.[29] In patriarchal societies, such
rights and privileges are normatively granted to men over women; in matriarchal societies, the opposite
holds true. Sex- and gender-based division of labor is historically found in the annals of most societies
and such divisions increased with the advent of industrialization.[30] Sex-based wage discrimination
exists in some societies such that men, typically, receive higher wages than women for the same type of
work. Other differences in employment between men and women lead to an overall gender-based pay-
gap in many societies, where women as a category earn less than men due to the types of jobs which
women are offered and take, as well as to differences in the number of hours worked by women.[31]
These and other gender-related values affect the distribution of income, wealth, and property in a given
social order.
Race
Racism consists of both prejudice and discrimination based in social perceptions of observable biological
differences between peoples. It often takes the form of social actions, practices or beliefs, or political
systems in which different races are perceived to be ranked as inherently superior or inferior to each
other, based on presumed shared inheritable traits, abilities, or qualities. In a given society, those who
share racial characteristics socially perceived as undesirable are typically under-represented in positions
of social power, i.e., they become a minority category in that society. Minority members in such a society
are often subjected to discriminatory actions resulting from majority policies, including assimilation,
exclusion, oppression, expulsion, and extermination.[32] Overt racism usually feeds directly into a
stratification system through its effect on social status. For example, members associated with a
particular race may be assigned a slave status, a form of oppression in which the majority refuses to grant
basic rights to a minority that are granted to other members of the society. More covert racism, such as
that which many scholars posit is practiced in more contemporary societies, is socially hidden and less
easily detectable. Covert racism often feeds into stratification systems as an intervening variable affecting
income, educational opportunities, and housing. Both overt and covert racism can take the form of
structural inequality in a society in which racism has become institutionalized.[33]
Ethnicity
Ethnic prejudice and discrimination operate much the same as do racial prejudice and discrimination in
society. In fact, only recently have scholars begun to differentiate race and ethnicity; historically, the two
were considered to be identical or closely related. With the scientific development of genetics and the
human genome as fields of study, most scholars now recognize that race is socially defined on the basis
of biologically determined characteristics that can be observed within a society while ethnicity is defined
on the basis of culturally learned behavior. Ethnic identification can include shared cultural heritage such
as language and dialect, symbolic systems, religion, mythology and cuisine. As with race, ethnic
categories of persons may be socially defined as minority categories whose members are under-
represented in positions of social power. As such, ethnic categories of persons can be subject to the same
types of majority policies. Whether ethnicity feeds into a stratification system as a direct, causal factor or
as an intervening variable may depend on the level of ethnographic entrism within each of the various
ethnic populations in a society, the amount of conflict over scarce resources, and the relative social power
held within each ethnic category.[34]
Global stratification
The world and the pace of social change today are very different than in the time of Karl Marx, Max
Weber, or even C. Wright Mills. Globalizing forces lead to rapid international integration arising from the
interchange of world views, products, ideas, and other aspects of culture.[35][36] Advances in
transportation and telecommunications infrastructure, including the rise of the telegraph and its posterity
the Internet, are major factors in globalization, generating further interdependence of economic and
cultural activities.[37]
Like a stratified class system within a nation, looking at the world economy one can see class positions in
the unequal distribution of capital and other resources between nations. Rather than having separate
national economies, nations are considered as participating in this world economy. The world economy
manifests a global division of labor with three overarching classes: core countries, semi-periphery
countries and periphery countries,[38] according to World-systems and Dependency theories. Core
nations primarily own and control the major means of production in the world and perform the higher-
level production tasks and provide international financial services. Periphery nations own very little of
the world's means of production (even when factories are located in periphery nations) and provide low
to non-skilled labor. Semiperipheral nations are midway between the core and periphery. They tend to be
countries moving towards industrialization and more diversified economies.[39] Core nations receive the
greatest share of surplus production, and periphery nations receive the least. Furthermore, core nations
are usually able to purchase raw materials and other goods from noncore nations at low prices, while
demanding higher prices for their exports to noncore nations.[40] A global workforce employed through a
system of global labor arbitrage ensures that companies in core countries can utilize the cheapest semi-
and non-skilled labor for production.
Today we have the means to gather and analyze data from economies across the globe. Although many
societies worldwide have made great strides toward more equality between differing geographic regions,
in terms of the standard of living and life chances afforded to their peoples, we still find large gaps
between the wealthiest and the poorest within a nation and between the wealthiest and poorest nations of
the world.[41] A January 2014 Oxfam report indicates that the 85 wealthiest individuals in the world have
a combined wealth equal to that of the bottom 50% of the world's population, or about 3.5 billion
people.[42] By contrast, for 2012, the World Bank reports that 21 percent of people worldwide, around
1.5 billion, live in extreme poverty, at or below $1.25 a day.[43] Zygmunt Bauman has provocatively
observed that the rise of the rich is linked to their capacity to lead highly mobile lives: "Mobility climbs
to the rank of the uppermost among coveted values -and the freedom to move, perpetually a scarce and
unequally distributed commodity, fast becomes the main stratifying factor of our late modern or
postmodern time."[44]
See also
Age stratification Intersectionality
Caste system Marxism
Class stratification Microinequity
Cultural hegemony Religious stratification
Dominance hierarchy Social class
Egalitarianism Social inequality
Elite theory Socioeconomic status
Elitism Systems of social stratification
Gini coefficient The Power Elite
Globalization
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(https://books.google.com/books?id=TlgVAAAAIAAJ). Routledge. ISBN 0-7591-0133-7.
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and Richard H. Daly (eds.), The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Hunters and Gatherers, p. 400.
New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-60919-4
11. Barnard, Alan (2006) "Images of hunters and gatherers in European social thought," in
Richard B. Lee and Richard H. Daly (eds.), The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Hunters and
Gatherers, p. 379. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-60919-4
12. Gowdy, John (2006). "Hunter-gatherers and the mythology of the market". In Lee, Richard
B. and Richard H. Daly (ed.). The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Hunters and Gatherers.
Cambridge University Press. pp. 391–393. ISBN 0-521-60919-4.
13. Davis, Kingsley; Moore, Wilbert E. (1945-04-01). "Some Principles of Stratification".
American Sociological Review. 10 (2): 242–249. doi:10.2307/2085643 (https://doi.org/10.23
07%2F2085643). JSTOR 2085643 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2085643).
14. Holborn, M. & Langley, P. (2004) AS & A level Student Handbook, accompanies the Sixth
Edition: Haralambos & Holborn, Sociology: Themes and perspectives, London: Collins
Educational
15. Macionis, Gerber, John, Linda (2010). Sociology 7th Canadian Ed. Toronto, Ontario:
Pearson Canada Inc. p. 243.
16. Stark, Rodney (2007). Sociology, Tenth Edition. Thompson Wadsworth.
17. Doob, Christopher (2013). Social Inequality and Social Stratification in US Society. Upper
Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc. p. 38. ISBN 978-0-205-79241-2.
18. Mills, Charles W. (1956). The Power Elite (https://archive.org/details/powerelite000mill).
London: Oxford University Press.
19. Leung, Rebecca. "Skull and Bones" (http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-576332.ht
ml). Frontline (CBS) (accessed 12/03/2012).
20. Deji, Olanike F. (2011). Gender and Rural Development. London: LIT Verlag Münster. p. 93.
ISBN 978-3643901033.
21. Lee, Richard B. (1976), Kalahari Hunter-Gatherers: Studies of the !Kung San and Their
Neighbors, Richard B. Lee and Irven DeVore, eds. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
22. Turner, David H. (1999), Genesis Regained: Aboriginal Forms of Renunciation in Judeo-
Christian Scriptures and Other Major Traditions, pp. 1-9, Peter Lang.
23. Grusky, David B (2011). "The Past, Present and Future of Social Inequality." In Social
Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective (Second Edition) (http://
web.stanford.edu/group/scspi/grusky/article_files/past_present_future_social_inequality.pdf)
(PDF). Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 3–51.
24. Domhoff, G. William (2013). Who Rules America? The Triumph of the Corporate Rich.
McGraw-Hill. p. 288. ISBN 978-0078026713.
25. Perry-Rivers, P. (October 2014). "Stratification, Economic Adversity, and Entrepreneurial
Launch: The Converse Effect of Resource Position on Entrepreneurial Strategy".
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice. 40 (3): 685. doi:10.1111/etap.12137 (https://doi.org/10.
1111%2Fetap.12137).
26. Collins, Patricia Hill (1998). "Toward a new vision: race, class and gender as categories of
analysis and connection" in Social Class and Stratification: Classic Statements and
Theoretical Debates. Boston: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 231–247.
27. Zhou, Xiang (2012). "A Nonparametric Index of Stratification". Sociological Methodology. 42
(1): 365–389. doi:10.1177/0081175012452207 (https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0081175012452
207).
28. Friedman, Ellen & Jennifer Marshall (2004). Issues of Gender. New York: Pearson
Education, Inc.
29. Mason, K. & H. Carlsson (2004). "The Impact of Gender Equality in Land Rights on
Development". Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement. Human
Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement. New York.
30. Struening, Karen (2002). New Family Values: Liberty, Equality, Diversity. New York:
Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-0-7425-1231-3.
31. Mies, Maria (1999). Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the
International Division of Labour. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
32. Henrard, Kristen (2000). Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual
Human Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination. New York: Springer.
ISBN 978-9041113597.
33. Guess, Teresa J (July 2006). "The Social Construction of Whiteness: Racism by Intent,
Racism by Consequence" (https://semanticscholar.org/paper/15f6f3e42e761c26f0a6832c59
c9e7c51258ce76). Critical Sociology. 32 (4): 649–673. doi:10.1163/156916306779155199
(https://doi.org/10.1163%2F156916306779155199).
34. Noel, Donald L. (Autumn 1968). "A Theory of the Origin of Ethnic Stratification". Social
Problems. 16 (2): 157–172. doi:10.2307/800001 (https://doi.org/10.2307%2F800001).
JSTOR 800001 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/800001).
35. Al-Rodhan, R.F. Nayef and Gérard Stoudmann. (2006). Definitions of Globalization: A
Comprehensive Overview and a Proposed Definition. (http://www.sustainablehistory.com/art
icles/definitions-of-globalization.pdf) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2012111921540
1/http://www.sustainablehistory.com/articles/definitions-of-globalization.pdf) 2012-11-19 at
the Wayback Machine
36. Albrow, Martin and Elizabeth King (eds.) (1990). Globalization, Knowledge and Society
London: Sage. ISBN 978-0803983243 p. 8.
37. Stever, H. Guyford (1972). "Science, Systems, and Society". Journal of Cybernetics. 2 (3):
1–3. doi:10.1080/01969727208542909 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F01969727208542909).
38. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974). The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the
Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic
Press.
39. Paul Halsall Modern History Sourcebook: Summary of Wallerstein on World System Theory
(http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/wallerstein.html), August 1997
40. Chirot, Daniel (1977). Social Change in the Twentieth Century (https://archive.org/details/so
cialchangeintw00chi_ex4). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
41. "2013 World Population Data Sheet" (http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2013/201
3-world-population-data-sheet.aspx). Population Research Bureau. 2013. Retrieved
27 June 2014.
42. Rigged rules mean economic growth increasingly "winner takes all" for rich elites all over
world (http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2014-01-20/rigged-rules-mean-eco
nomic-growth-increasingly-winner-takes-all-for-rich-elites). Oxfam. 20 January 2014.
43. Olinto, Pedro & Jaime Saavedra (April 2012). "An Overview of Global Income Inequality
Trends" (http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/isp/publication/inequality-in-focus). Inequalitty in
Focus. 1 (1).
44. Bauman, Z. (1988) Globalization: The Human Consequences. Cambridge: Polity
Further reading
Grusky, David B. (2014). Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological
Perspective (4th edition). Boulder: Westview Press. ISBN 978-0813346717.
Solon, Gary (March 2014). "Theoretical models of inequality transmission across multiple
generations" (http://www.nber.org/papers/w18790.pdf) (PDF). Research in Social
Stratification and Mobility. 35: 13–18. doi:10.1016/j.rssm.2013.09.005 (https://doi.org/10.101
6%2Fj.rssm.2013.09.005).
External links
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Social_stratification&oldid=931017641"

Race and society
Social interpretations of race regard the common categorizations of people into different races, often
with biologist tagging of particular "racial" attributes beyond mere anatomy, as more socially and
culturally determined than based upon biology. Some interpretations are often deconstructionist and
poststructuralist in that they critically analyze the historical construction and development of racial
categories.
Contents
Social interpretation of physical variation
Incongruities of racial classifications
Race as a social construct and populationism
Race and intelligence
Race in biomedicine
Case studies in the social construction of race
Race in the United States
Race definitions in the United States
Race in Brazil
Race in politics and ethics
Race in law enforcement
See also
Footnotes
Other references
Social interpretation of physical variation
Incongruities of racial classifications

Marks (1995) argued that even as the idea of "race" was becoming a powerful organizing principle in
many societies, the shortcomings of the concept were apparent. In the Old World, the gradual transition
in appearances from one racial group to adjacent racial groups emphasized that "one variety of mankind
does so sensibly pass into the other, that you cannot mark out the limits between them," as Blumenbach
observed in his writings on human variation.[1] In parts of the Americas, the situation was somewhat
different. The immigrants to the New World came largely from widely separated regions of the Old
World—western and northern Europe, western Africa, and, later, eastern Asia and southern and eastern
Europe. In the Americas, the immigrant populations began to mix among themselves and with the
indigenous inhabitants of the continent. In the United States, for example, most people who self-identify
as African American have some European ancestors—in one analysis of genetic markers that have
differing frequencies between continents, European ancestry ranged from an estimated 7% for a sample
of Jamaicans to ∼23% for a sample of African Americans from New Orleans.[2] In a survey of college
students who self-identified as white in a northeastern U.S. university, the west African and Native
American genetic contribution were 0.7% and 3.2%.[3]
In the United States, social and legal conventions developed over time that forced individuals of mixed
ancestry into simplified racial categories.[4] An example is the "one-drop rule" implemented in some
state laws that treated anyone with a single known African American ancestor as black.[5] The decennial
censuses conducted since 1790 in the United States also created an incentive to establish racial categories
and fit people into those categories.[6] In other countries in the Americas, where mixing among groups
was more extensive, social non racial categories have tended to be more numerous and fluid, with people
moving into or out of categories on the basis of a combination of socioeconomic status, social class,
ancestry.[7]
Efforts to sort the increasingly mixed population of the United States into discrete racial categories
generated many difficulties.[8] Additionally, efforts to track mixing between census racial groups led to a
proliferation of categories (such as mulatto and octoroon) and "blood quantum" distinctions that became
increasingly untethered from self-reported ancestry.[9] A person's racial identity can change over time.
One study found differences between self-ascribed race and Veterans Affairs administrative data.[10]
Race as a social construct and populationism

The notion of a biological basis for race originally emerged through speculations surrounding the "blood
purity" of Jews during the Spanish Inquisition, eventually translating to a general association of one's
biology with their social and personal characteristics. In the 19th century, this recurring ideology was
intensified in the development of the racial sciences, eugenics and ethnology, which meant to further
categorize groups of humans in terms of biological superiority or inferiority.[11] While the field of racial
sciences, also known as scientific racism, has expired in history, these antiquated conceptions of race
have persisted throughout the 21st century. (See also: Historical origins of racial classification)
Contrary to popular belief that the division of the human species based on physical variations is natural,
there exists no clear, reliable distinctions that bind people to such groupings.[12] According to the
American Anthropological Association, "Evidence from the analysis of genetics (e.g., DNA) indicates
that most physical variation, about 94%, lies within so-called racial groups. Conventional geographic
"racial" groupings differ from one another only in about 6% of their genes."[13] While there is a
biological basis for differences in human phenotypes, most notably in skin color,[14] the genetic
variability of humans is found not amongst, but rather within racial groups – meaning the perceived level
of dissimilarity amongst the species has virtually no biological basis. Genetic diversity has characterized
human survival, rendering the idea of a "pure" ancestry as obsolete.[11] Under this interpretation, race is
conceptualized through a lens of artificiality, rather than through the skeleton of a scientific discovery. As
a result, scholars have begun to broaden discourses of race by defining it as a social construct and
exploring the historical contexts that led to its inception and persistence in contemporary society.[15]
Most historians, anthropologists,[16] and sociologists[17] describe human races as a social construct,
preferring instead the term population or ancestry, which can be given a clear operational definition.
Even those who reject the formal concept of race, however, still use the word race in day-to-day speech.
This may either be a matter of semantics, or an effect of an underlying cultural significance of race in
racist societies. Regardless of the name, a working concept of sub-species grouping can be useful,
because in the absence of cheap and widespread genetic tests, various race-linked gene mutations (see
Cystic fibrosis, Lactose intolerance, Tay–Sachs disease and Sickle cell anemia) are difficult to address
without recourse to a category between "individual" and "species". As genetic tests for such conditions
become cheaper, and as detailed haplotype maps and SNP databases become available, identifiers of race
should diminish. Also, increasing interracial marriage is reducing the predictive power of race. For
example, babies born with Tay–Sachs disease in North America are not only or primarily Ashkenazi
Jews, despite stereotypes to contrary; French Canadians, Louisiana Cajuns, and Irish-Americans also see
high rates of the disease.[18]
Experts in the fields of genetics, law, and sociology have offered their opinions on the subject. Audrey
Smedley and Brian D. Smedley of Virginia Commonwealth University Institute of Medicine[19] discuss
the anthropological and historical perspectives on ethnicity, culture, and race. They define culture as the
habits acquired by a society. Smedley states "Ethnicity and culture are related phenomena and bear no
intrinsic connection to human biological variations or race" (Smedley 17). The authors state using
physical characteristics to define an ethnic identity is inaccurate. The variation of humans has actually
decreased over time since, as the author states, "Immigration, intermating, intermarriage, and
reproduction have led to increasing physical heterogeneity of peoples in many areas of the world"
(Smedley 18). They referred to other experts and their research, pointing out that humans are 99% alike.
That one percent is caused by natural genetic variation, and has nothing to do with the ethnic group of the
subject. Racial classification in the United States started in the 1700s with three ethnically distinct
groups. These groups were the white Europeans, Native Americans, and Africans. The concept of race
was skewed around these times because of the social implications of belonging to one group or another.
The view that one race is biologically different from another rose out of society's grasp for power and
authority over other ethnic groups. This did not only happen in the United States but around the world as
well. Society created race to create hierarchies in which the majority would prosper most.
Another group of experts in sociology has written on this topic. Guang Guo, Yilan Fu, Yi Li, Kathleen
Mullan Harris of the University of North Carolina[20] department of sociology as well as Hedwig Lee
(University of Washington Seattle), Tianji Cai (University of Macau) comment on remarks made by one
expert. The debate is over DNA differences, or lack thereof, between different races. The research in the
original article they are referring to uses different methods of DNA testing between distinct ethnic groups
and compares them to other groups. Small differences were found, but those were not based on race.
They were from biological differences caused from the region in which the people live. They describe
that the small differences cannot be fully explained because the understanding of migration,
intermarriage, and ancestry is unreliable at the individual level. Race cannot be related to ancestry based
on the research on which they are commenting. They conclude that the idea of "races as biologically
distinct peoples with differential abilities and behaviors has long been discredited by the scientific
community" (2338).
One more expert in the field has given her opinion. Ann Morning of the New York University
Department of Sociology,[21] and member of the American Sociological Association, discusses the role
of biology in the social construction of race. She examines the relationship between genes and race and
the social construction of social race clusters. Morning states that everyone is assigned to a racial group
because of their physical characteristics. She identifies through her research the existence of DNA
population clusters. She states that society would want to characterize these clusters as races. Society
characterizes race as a set of physical characteristics. The clusters though have an overlap in physical
characteristics and thus cannot be counted as a race by society or by science. Morning concludes that
"Not only can constructivist theory accommodate or explain the occasional alignment of social
classifications and genetic estimates that Shiao et al.'s model hypothesizes, but empirical research on
human genetics is far from claiming—let alone demonstrating—that statistically inferred clusters are the
equivalent of races" (Morning 203). Only using ethnic groups to map a genome is entirely inaccurate,
instead every individual must be viewed as having their own wholly unique genome (unique in the 1%,
not the 99% all humans share).
Ian Haney López, the John H. Boalt Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley[22]
explains ways race is a social construct. He uses examples from history of how race was socially
constructed and interpreted. One such example was of the Hudgins v. Wright case. A slave woman sued
for her freedom and the freedom of her two children on the basis that her grandmother was Native
American. The race of the Wright had to be socially proven, and neither side could present enough
evidence. Since the slave owner Hudgins bore the burden of proof, Wright and her children gained their
freedom. López uses this example to show the power of race in society. Human fate, he argues, still
depends upon ancestry and appearance. Race is a powerful force in everyday life. These races are not
determined by biology though, they are created by society to keep power with the majority. He describes
that there are not any genetic characteristics that all blacks have that non-whites do not possess and vice
versa. He uses the example of Mexican. It truly is a nationality, yet it has become a catch-all for all
Hispanic nationalities. This simplification is wrong, López argues, for it is not only inaccurate but it
tends to treat all "Mexicans" as below fervent Americans. He describes that "More recently, genetic
testing has made it clear the close connections all humans share, as well as the futility of explaining those
differences that do exist in terms of racially relevant gene codes" (Lopez 199–200). Those differences
clearly have no basis in ethnicity, so race is completely socially constructed.
Through this small sampling of experts, it is clear that race as a social construction is a common theory.
All of the experts in this sampling say that biological race is non-existent. Race therefore must have been
created by societies. They were created to do what humans do, to serve the purposes of the majority. The
hierarchies created by race have kept the majority "race" in control of everything from public policy to
the workforce to law enforcement. They benefit from this construction of race. Yet, the minorities, who
are just the same genetically, suffer under this system. Most of the points made by the experts expose this
issue, yet none truly suggest a way to fix the problem. Bill Nye weighs in on the issue on the same side
as the experts in the sample. He says that humans are humans, we are all one species. We have to fix it. If
society created the problem, society has to take it on itself to fix it.
Some argue it is preferable when considering biological relations to think in terms of populations, and
when considering cultural relations to think in terms of ethnicity, rather than of race.
These developments had important consequences. For example, some scientists developed the notion of
"population" to take the place of race. It is argued that this substitution is not simply a matter of
exchanging one word for another.
This view does not deny that there are physical differences among peoples; it simply claims that the
historical conceptions of "race" are not particularly useful in accounting for these differences
scientifically. In particular, it is claimed that:
1. knowing someone's "race" does not provide comprehensive predictive information about
biological characteristics, and only absolutely predicts those traits that have been selected
to define the racial categories, e.g. knowing a person's skin color, which is generally
acknowledged to be one of the markers of race (or taken as a defining characteristic of
race), does not allow good predictions of a person's blood type to be made.
2. in general, the worldwide distribution of human phenotypes exhibits gradual trends of
difference across geographic zones, not the categorical differences of race; in particular,
there are many peoples (like the San of S. W. Africa, or the people of northern India) who
have phenotypes that do not neatly fit into the standard race categories.
3. focusing on race has historically led not only to seemingly insoluble disputes about
classification (e.g. are the Japanese a distinct race, a mixture of races, or part of the East
Asian race? and what about the Ainu?) but has also exposed disagreement about the
criteria for making decisions—the selection of phenotypic traits seemed arbitrary.
Neven Sesardic has argued that such arguments are unsupported by empirical evidence and politically
motivated. Arguing that races are not completely discrete biologically is a straw man argument. He
argues "racial recognition is not actually based on a single trait (like skin color) but rather on a number of
characteristics that are to a certain extent concordant and that jointly make the classification not only
possible but fairly reliable as well". Forensic anthropologists can classify a person's race with an
accuracy close to 100% using only skeletal remains if they take into consideration several characteristics
at the same time.[23] A.W.F. Edwards has argued similarly regarding genetic differences in "Human
genetic diversity: Lewontin's fallacy".
Race and intelligence

Researchers have reported significant differences in the average IQ test scores of various racial groups.
The interpretation and causes of these differences are controversial, as researchers disagree about
whether this gap is caused by genetic differences. The social interpretations of the race concept is
incompatible with the idea that the IQ gap between racial groups is caused by genetic factors, and those
who see race as a social construction posit purely environmental and sociological explanations for the
gap. Such explanations include different access to education for different racial groups, different social
attitudes towards test-taking, stereotype threat, lack of effort optimism due to low social status and many
other proposed explanations. For example, psychologist Jefferson Fish argues that race is a social
construction and argues that for this reason the question of racial differences in intelligence is not
scientific, though his opinion has been repeatedly disproven. For example, one might want to compare
black-white IQ differences in Brazil with those in the United States. Since many people who are
considered black in the U. S. would not be considered black in Brazil, and since many people who are
considered white in Brazil would not be considered white in the U. S., such a comparison is not
possible.[24]
Richard Lynn, however, in his book Race Differences in Intelligence does not define races based on
current social classification but on ancestral populations. Many current ethnic groups would be mixtures
of several races in this classification. Arthur Jensen and J. Philippe Rushton have also defined race based
on ancestral home, although somewhat differently from Lynn, when speaking of Black–White–East
Asian IQ differences in the US. "Blacks (Africans, Negroids) are those who have most of their ancestors
from sub-Saharan Africa; Whites (Europeans, Caucasoids) have most of their ancestors from Europe; and
East Asians (Orientals, Mongoloids) have most of their ancestors from Pacific Rim countries."[25]
Race in biomedicine
There is an active debate among biomedical researchers about the meaning and importance of race in
their research. The primary impetus for considering race in biomedical research is the possibility of
improving the prevention and treatment of diseases by predicting hard-to-ascertain factors on the basis of
more easily ascertained characteristics. The most well-known examples of genetically determined
disorders that vary in incidence between ethnic groups would be sickle cell disease and thalassemia
among black and Mediterranean populations respectively and Tay–Sachs disease among people of
Ashkenazi Jewish descent. Some fear that the use of racial labels in biomedical research runs the risk of
unintentionally exacerbating health disparities, so they suggest alternatives to the use of racial
taxonomies.
Case studies in the social construction of race
Race in the United States

In the United States since its early history, Native Americans, African-Americans and European-
Americans were classified as belonging to different races. For nearly three centuries, the criteria for
membership in these groups were similar, comprising a person's appearance, his fraction of known non-
White ancestry, and his social circle.[26] But the criteria for membership in these races diverged in the
late 19th century. During Reconstruction, increasing numbers of Americans began to consider anyone
with "one drop" of "Black blood" to be Black.[27] By the early 20th century, this notion of invisible
blackness was made statutory in many states and widely adopted nationwide.[28] In contrast,
Amerindians continue to be defined by a certain percentage of "Indian blood" (called blood quantum)
due in large part to American slavery ethics.
Race definitions in the United States

The concept of race as used by the Census Bureau reflects self-identification by people according to the
race or races with which they most closely identify. These categories are sociopolitical constructs and
should not be interpreted as being scientific or anthropological in nature. They change from one census to
another, and the racial categories include both racial and national-origin groups.[29]
Race in Brazil
Compared to 19th-century United States, 20th-century Brazil was characterized by a relative absence of
sharply defined racial groups. This pattern reflects a different history and different social relations.
Basically, race in Brazil was recognized as the difference between ancestry (which determines genotype)
and phenotypic differences. Racial identity was not governed by a rigid descent rule. A Brazilian child
was never automatically identified with the racial type of one or both parents, nor were there only two
categories to choose from. Over a dozen racial categories are recognized in conformity with the
combinations of hair color, hair texture, eye color, and skin color. These types grade into each other like
the colors of the spectrum, and no one category stands significantly isolated from the rest. That is, race
referred to appearance, not heredity.
Through this system of racial identification, parents and children and even brothers and sisters were
frequently accepted as representatives of opposite racial types. In a fishing village in the state of Bahia,
an investigator showed 100 people pictures of three sisters and they were asked to identify the races of
each. In only six responses were the sisters identified by the same racial term. Fourteen responses used a
different term for each sister. In another experiment nine portraits were shown to a hundred people. Forty
different racial types were elicited. It was found, in addition, that a given Brazilian might be called by as
many as thirteen different terms by other members of the community. These terms are spread out across
practically the entire spectrum of theoretical racial types. A further consequence of the absence of a
descent rule was that Brazilians apparently not only disagreed about the racial identity of specific
individuals, but they also seemed to be in disagreement about the abstract meaning of the racial terms as
defined by words and phrases. For example, 40% of a sample ranked moreno claro as a lighter type than
mulato claro, while 60% reversed this order. A further note of confusion is that one person might employ
different racial terms to describe the same person over a short time span. The choice of which racial
description to use may vary according to both the personal relationships and moods of the individuals
involved. The Brazilian census lists one's race according to the preference of the person being
interviewed. As a consequence, hundreds of races appeared in the census results, ranging from blue
(which is blacker than the usual black) to pink (which is whiter than the usual white).
However, Brazilians are not so naïve to ignore one's racial origins just because of his (or her) better
social status. An interesting example of this phenomenon has occurred recently, when the famous football
(soccer) player Ronaldo declared publicly that he considered himself as White, thus linking racism to a
form or another of class conflict. This caused a series of ironic notes on newspapers, which pointed out
that he should have been proud of his African origin (which is obviously noticeable), a fact that must
have made life for him (and for his ancestors) more difficult, so, being a successful personality was, in
spite of that, a victory for him. What occurs in Brazil that differentiates it largely from the US or South
Africa, for example, is that black or mixed-race people are, in fact, more accepted in social circles if they
have more education, or have a successful life (a euphemism for "having a better salary"). As a
consequence, inter-racial marriages are more common, and more accepted, among highly educated Afro-
Brazilians than lower-educated ones.
So, although the identification of a person by race is far more fluid and flexible in Brazil than in the U.S.,
there still are racial stereotypes and prejudices. African features have been considered less desirable;
Blacks have been considered socially inferior, and Whites superior. These white supremacist values were
a legacy of European colonization and the slave-based plantation system. The complexity of racial
classifications in Brazil is reflective of the extent of miscegenation in Brazilian society, which remains
highly, but not strictly, stratified along color lines. Henceforth, Brazil's desired image as a perfect "post-
racist" country, composed of the "cosmic race" celebrated in 1925 by José Vasconcelos, must be met with
caution, as sociologist Gilberto Freyre demonstrated in 1933 in Casa Grande e Senzala.
Race in politics and ethics

Michel Foucault argued the popular historical and political use of a non-essentialist notion of "race" used
in the "race struggle" discourse during the 1688 Glorious Revolution and under Louis XIV's end of reign.
In Foucault's view, this discourse developed in two different directions: Marxism, which seized the
notion and transformed it into "class struggle" discourse, and racists, biologists and eugenicists, who
paved the way for 20th century "state racism".
During the Enlightenment, racial classifications were used to justify enslavement of those deemed to be
of "inferior", non-White races, and thus supposedly best fitted for lives of toil under White supervision.
These classifications made the distance between races seem nearly as broad as that between species,
easing unsettling questions about the appropriateness of such treatment of humans. The practice was at
the time generally accepted by both scientific and lay communities.
Arthur Gobineau's An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races (1853–1855) was one of the
milestones in the new racist discourse, along with Vacher de Lapouge's "anthroposociology" and Johann
Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), who applied race to nationalist theory to develop militant ethnic
nationalism. They posited the historical existence of national races such as German and French,
branching from basal races supposed to have existed for millennia, such as the Aryan race, and believed
political boundaries should mirror these supposed racial ones.
Later, one of Hitler's favorite sayings was, "Politics is applied biology". Hitler's ideas of racial purity led
to unprecedented atrocities in Europe. Since then, ethnic cleansing has occurred in Cambodia, the
Balkans, Sudan, and Rwanda. In one sense, ethnic cleansing is another name for the tribal warfare and
mass murder that has afflicted human society for ages.
Racial inequality has been a concern of United States politicians and legislators since the country's
founding. In the 19th century most White Americans (including abolitionists) explained racial inequality
as an inevitable consequence of biological differences. Since the mid-20th century, political and civic
leaders as well as scientists have debated to what extent racial inequality is cultural in origin. Some argue
that current inequalities between Blacks and Whites are primarily cultural and historical, the result of
past and present racism, slavery and segregation, and could be redressed through such programs as
affirmative action and Head Start. Others work to reduce tax funding of remedial programs for
minorities. They have based their advocacy on aptitude test data that, according to them, shows that
racial ability differences are biological in origin and cannot be leveled even by intensive educational
efforts. In electoral politics, many more ethnic minorities have won important offices in Western nations
than in earlier times, although the highest offices tend to remain in the hands of Whites.
In his famous Letter from Birmingham Jail, Martin Luther King Jr. observed:
History is the long and tragic story of the fact that privileged groups seldom give up their
privileges voluntarily. Individuals may see the moral light and voluntarily give up their
unjust posture; but as Reinhold Niebuhr has reminded us, groups are more immoral than
individuals.[30]
King's hope, expressed in his I Have a Dream speech, was that the civil rights struggle would one day
produce a society where people were not "judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their
character".
Because of the identification of the concept of race with political oppression, many natural and social
scientists today are wary of using the word "race" to refer to human variation, but instead use less
emotive words such as "population" and "ethnicity". Some, however, argue that the concept of race,
whatever the term used, is nevertheless of continuing utility and validity in scientific research. Science
and politics frequently take opposite sides in debates that relate to human intelligence and
biomedicine.[31]
Race in law enforcement

In an attempt to provide general descriptions that may facilitate the job of law enforcement officers
seeking to apprehend suspects, the United States FBI employs the term "race" to summarize the general
appearance (skin color, hair texture, eye shape, and other such easily noticed characteristics) of
individuals whom they are attempting to apprehend. From the perspective of law enforcement officers, a
description needs to capture the features that stand out most clearly in the perception within the given
society.
Thus, in the UK, Scotland Yard use a classification based on the ethnic composition of British society:
W1 (White British), W2 (White Irish), W9 (Other White); M1 (White and black Caribbean), M2 (White
and black African), M3 (White and Asian), M9 (Any other mixed background); A1 (Asian-Indian), A2
(Asian-Pakistani), A3 (Asian-Bangladeshi), A9 (Any other Asian background); B1 (Black Caribbean),
B2 (Black African), B3 (Any other black background); O1 (Chinese), O9 (Any other).
In the United States, the practice of racial profiling has been ruled to be both unconstitutional and also to
constitute a violation of civil rights. There also an ongoing debate on the relationship between race and
crime regarding the disproportional representation of certain minorities in all stages of the criminal
justice system.
Studies in racial taxonomy based on DNA cluster analysis (See Lewontin's Fallacy) has led law
enforcement to pursue suspects based on their racial classification as derived from their DNA evidence
left at the crime scene.[32] DNA analysis has been successful in helping police determine the race of both
victims and perpetrators.[33] This classification is called "biogeographical ancestry".[34]
See also
Acculturation
Colonial mentality
Colonialism
Colorism
Creolization
Cultural assimilation
Cultural cringe
Cultural identity
Enculturation
Ethnocide
Globalization
Intercultural competence
Language shift
Paper Bag Party
Passing (racial identity)
Race of the future
Racialism
Racialization
Self-fulfilling prophecy
Syncretism
Westernization
Footnotes
1. J. Marks, Human Biodiversity: Genes, Race, and History (New York: Aldine de Gruyter,
1995), 54.
2. Parra, Esteban J. (1998). "Estimating African American Admixture Proportions by Use of
Population-Specific Alleles" (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1377655).
American Journal of Human Genetics. 63 (6): 1839–51. doi:10.1086/302148 (https://doi.org/
10.1086%2F302148). PMC 1377655 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13776
55). PMID 9837836 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9837836).
3. Shriver, Mark D. (2003). "Skin Pigmentation, Biogeographical Ancestry, and Admixture
Mapping" (https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00439-002-0896-y). Human Genetics.
112 (4): 387–99. doi:10.1007/s00439-002-0896-y (https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs00439-002-0
896-y). PMID 12579416 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12579416).
4. Thomas F. Gossett, Race: The History of an Idea in America, New ed. (New York: Oxford
University, 1997).
5. F. James Davis, Who is Black?: One Nation's Definition (University Park PA: State
University of Pennsylvania, 1991).
6. M. Nobles, Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics (Stanford:
Stanford University, 2000).
7. Magnus Mörner, Race Mixture in the History of Latin America (Boston: Little Brown, 1967).
8. P.R. Spickard, "The illogic of American racial categories," in M.P.P. Root, ed., Racially mixed
people in America (Newbury Park CA: Sage, 1992), 12–23.
9. Powell, Brenna; Hochschild, Jennifer L. (2008). "Racial Reorganization and the United
States Census 1850–1930: Mulattoes, Half-Breeds, Mixed Parentage, Hindoos, and the
Mexican Race" (https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/3153295). Studies in American Political
Development. 22: 59–96. doi:10.1017/S0898588X08000047 (https://doi.org/10.1017%2FS0
898588X08000047). ISSN 0898-588X (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0898-588X).
10. Kressin, N.R.; et al. (Oct 2003). "Agreement between administrative data and patients' self-
reports of race/ethnicity" (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1448042).
American Journal of Public Health. 93 (10): 1734–9. doi:10.2105/ajph.93.10.1734 (https://do
i.org/10.2105%2Fajph.93.10.1734). PMC 1448042 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/article
s/PMC1448042). PMID 14534230 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14534230).
11. Gallagher, Charles A. (2011). "Defining Race and Ethnicity". Rethinking the Color Line:
Readings in Race and Ethnicity. McGraw-Hill Education. ISBN 978-0078026638. ""In the
nineteenth century, race and racial differences were the preeminent concerns of the racial
sciences, eugenics and ethnology, better known today as scientific racism."
12. Gannon,LiveScience, Megan. "Race Is a Social Construct, Scientists Argue" (https://www.sc
ientificamerican.com/article/race-is-a-social-construct-scientists-argue/). Scientific
American. Retrieved 2018-10-03.
13. Smedley, Audrey (May 17, 1998). "AAA Statement on Race" (http://www.americananthro.or
g/ConnectWithAAA/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=2583.). American Anthropological
Association. Retrieved October 8, 2016.
14. Harris, Marvin (1989). Our Kind: Who We Are, Where We Came From, Where We Are
Going. New York: Harper & Row. pp. 112–114 – via
http://homepage.smc.edu/delpiccolo_guido/Soc34/Soc34readings/HOW%20OUR%20SKIN
S%20GOT%20THEIR%20COLOR.pdf.
15. Omi, Michael; Winant, Howard (1986). "Racial Formations". Racial Formation in the United
States. Routledge. ISBN 978-0415520317.
16. Wagner, Jennifer K.; Yu, Joon‐Ho; Ifekwunigwe, Jayne O.; Harrell, Tanya M.; Bamshad,
Michael J.; Royal, Charmaine D. (2017). "Anthropologists' views on race, ancestry, and
genetics" (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5299519). American Journal of
Physical Anthropology. 162 (2): 318–327. doi:10.1002/ajpa.23120 (https://doi.org/10.1002%
2Fajpa.23120). ISSN 0002-9483 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0002-9483). PMC 5299519
(https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5299519). PMID 27874171 (https://www.ncb
i.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27874171).
17. Golash-Boza, Tanya (2016-02-23). "A Critical and Comprehensive Sociological Theory of
Race and Racism" (https://semanticscholar.org/paper/904c99052563f1a43b1344122dadf07
463505fec). Sociology of Race and Ethnicity. 2 (2): 129–141.
doi:10.1177/2332649216632242 (https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2332649216632242).
ISSN 2332-6492 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/2332-6492).
18. "Tay–sachs Disease – National Tay–Sachs & Allied Diseases Association of Delaware
Valley (NTSAD-DV)" (http://www.tay-sachs.org/taysachs_disease.php). www.tay-sachs.org.
Retrieved 2018-10-03.
19. Smedley, Audrey; Smedley, Brian D. (1994). "Race as Biology Is Fiction, Racism as a
Social Problem Is Real" (http://aaronhood.net/wp-content/SocialConstructionRace.pdf)
(PDF): 16–26. Retrieved 7 April 2015.
20. Guo, Guang; Yilan, Fu; Hedwig, Lee; Tianji, Cai; Li, Yi; Harris, Kathleen Mullan (December
2014). "Recognizing a Small Amount of Superficial Genetic Differences across African,
European and Asian Americans Helps Understand Social Construction of Race".
Demography. 51 (6): 2337–2342. doi:10.1007/s13524-014-0349-y (https://doi.org/10.1007%
2Fs13524-014-0349-y). PMID 25421523 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25421523).
21. Morning, Ann (2014). "Does Genomics Challenge the Social Construction of Race?".
Sociological Theory. 32 (3): 189–207. doi:10.1177/0735275114550881 (https://doi.org/10.1
177%2F0735275114550881).
22. Haney Lopez, Ian (1994). "The Social Construction of Race". Critical Race Theory: 191–
203.
23. Sesardic, Neven (2010). "Race: a social destruction of a biological concept". Biology &
Philosophy. 25 (2): 143–162. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.638.939 (https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdo
c/summary?doi=10.1.1.638.939). doi:10.1007/s10539-009-9193-7 (https://doi.org/10.1007%
2Fs10539-009-9193-7).
24. Fish, J. M. (Ed.) (2002). Race and intelligence: Separating science from myth. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
25. Rushton, J. P.; Jensen, A. R. (2005). "Thirty years of research on race differences in
cognitive ability" (https://web.archive.org/web/20151103215722/http://psychology.uwo.ca/fa
culty/rushtonpdfs/PPPL1.pdf) (PDF). Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. 11 (2): 235–294.
CiteSeerX 10.1.1.186.102 (https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.186.1
02). doi:10.1037/1076-8971.11.2.235 (https://doi.org/10.1037%2F1076-8971.11.2.235).
Archived from the original (http://psychology.uwo.ca/faculty/rushtonpdfs/PPPL1.pdf) (PDF)
on 2015-11-03.
26. See "Chapter 9. How the Law Decided if You Were Black or White: The Early 1800s" in
Legal History of the Color Line: The Rise and Triumph of the One-Drop Rule by Frank W.
Sweet, ISBN 0-939479-23-0. A summary of this chapter, with endnotes, is available online
at How the Law Decided if You Were Black or White: The Early 1800s (http://backintyme.co
m/Essay040811.htm) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20060422051613/http://backint
yme.com/Essay040811.htm) April 22, 2006, at the Wayback Machine.
27. See chapters 15–20 of Legal History of the Color Line: The Rise and Triumph of the One-
Drop Rule by Frank W. Sweet, ISBN 0-939479-23-0. Summaries of these chapters, with
endnotes, are available online at The Invention of the One-Drop Rule in the 1830s North (htt
p://backintyme.com/Essay050401.htm) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20060429221
840/http://backintyme.com/Essay050401.htm) April 29, 2006, at the Wayback Machine.
28. See chapters 21–20 of Legal History of the Color Line: The Rise and Triumph of the One-
Drop Rule by Frank W. Sweet, ISBN 0-939479-23-0. Summaries of these chapters, with
endnotes, are available online at Jim Crow Triumph of the One-Drop Rule (http://backintym
e.com/Essay050501.htm) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20060422051537/http://ba
ckintyme.com/Essay050501.htm) April 22, 2006, at the Wayback Machine.
29. "American Indian and Alaska Native persons, percent, 2000" (http://quickfacts.census.gov/q
fd/meta/long_68178.htm). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20060207222529/http://qui
ckfacts.census.gov/qfd/meta/long_68178.htm) February 7, 2006, at the Wayback Machine
30. Letter From Birmingham City Jail (Excerpts) (1963-04-16). "Letter From Birmingham City
Jail (Excerpts)" (http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-from-birmingham-
city-jail-excerpts/). Teaching American History. Retrieved 2013-10-22.
31. Suhay, Elizabeth; Jayaratne, Toby Epstein (2013). "Does Biology Justify Ideology? The
Politics of Genetic Attribution" (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4567596).
Public Opinion Quarterly. 77 (2): 497–521. doi:10.1093/poq/nfs049 (https://doi.org/10.109
3%2Fpoq%2Fnfs049). ISSN 0033-362X (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0033-362X).
PMC 4567596 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4567596). PMID 26379311
(https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26379311).
32. "Molecular eyewitness: DNA gets a human face Controversial crime-scene test smacks of
racial profiling, critics say - workopolis.com" (https://web.archive.org/web/20051115054204/
http://transobj.workopolis.com/servlet/Content/fasttrack/20050625/DNA25?
section=Biotech). Archived from the original (http://transobj.workopolis.com:80/servlet/Conte
nt/fasttrack/20050625/DNA25?section=Biotech) on 15 November 2005.
33. Willing, Richard (2005-08-16). "DNA tests detect race" (https://www.usatoday.com/news/nati
on/2005-08-16-dna_x.htm). USA Today. Retrieved 2010-05-23.
34. "United States Patent Application: 0040229231" (http://appft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parse
r?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-bool.html&r=1&f
=G&l=50&co1=AND&d=PG01&s1=20040229231&OS=20040229231&RS=20040229231).
Appft1.uspto.gov. Retrieved 2013-10-22.
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examination of population structure and marker characteristics in European Americans,
Mexican Americans, Amerindians and Asian". Human Genetics. 114 (3): 263–71.
doi:10.1007/s00439-003-1058-6 (https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs00439-003-1058-6).
PMID 14628215 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14628215).
Condit, CM; Parrott, R; Harris, TM (2002). "Lay understandings of the relationship between
race and genetics: development of a collectivized knowledge through shared discourse" (htt
ps://semanticscholar.org/paper/3097692dfb3ff0251b1af9122053306a2fbda281). Public
Understand Sci. 11 (4): 373–387. doi:10.1088/0963-6625/11/4/305 (https://doi.org/10.108
8%2F0963-6625%2F11%2F4%2F305).
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ps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12493671).
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and Islam. Princeton University Press, Princeton
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Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Race_and_society&oldid=928671359"
This page was last edited on 30 November 2019, at 22:11 (UTC).
Whiteness theory
Whiteness theory is understood as a specific approach in Whiteness Studies, examining how white
identity affects a non-exhaustive list of identities in an adult's life.[1] This list includes, but is not limited
to: social, political, racial, economic, and cultural identity. Whiteness Theory also looks at how whiteness
is centric in culture, creating a blindness to the set of privileges associated with White identity, also
known as white privilege.[2]
Whiteness Theory is an offshoot of critical race theory that sees race as a social construct. It posits that
whiteness is invisible yet is associated with a system of racial privilege.[3] Whiteness Theory, however, is
not to be confused with white privilege, although the privilege associated with white identity is a topic of
Whiteness Theory. Critical Whiteness Theory positions whiteness as the default of American culture, and
as a result of this default, white people are blind to the advantages and disadvantages of being white due
to a lack of cultural subjectiveness towards whiteness.[1] Stemming from the lack of cultural awareness
and empathy with racial disprivileges as a result of being white, Whiteness Theory looks at the social,
power, and economic challenges that arise from blind, white privilege.[4]
Contents
Pillars of Whiteness Theory
Whiteness as Default
Whiteness as Centric
White Identity
White Privilege
White Bias
Whiteness as Unspoken
Critiquing Whiteness
Whiteness Theory in Communication Studies
References
Pillars of Whiteness Theory
Whiteness as Default
Whiteness is a socially constructed concept, identified as the normal and centric racial identity. As
whiteness is the standard to which racial minorities are compared, whiteness is understood as the default
standard.[5] Whiteness Theory establishes whiteness as default, through which social, political, and
economic complications arise from whiteness and its creation of color blindness.[4] The ideologies, social
norms, and behaviors associated with white culture are the comparative standard to which all races are
objectified to.[6]
The defaulting of whiteness establishes a reality in which white people, as victims of their race as centric,
do not experience the adversity of those with minority identification. An otherization of minorities can
occur with whiteness as a default, where Whiteness Theory identifies whiteness as invisible to those who
possess it, resulting in both intended and untended otherization.[7] Whiteness as default presents
socioeconomic privileges and advantages over racial minorities, which also might go unrecognized by
white people that are not objectified by some other standard of adversity.[5]
Whiteness as Centric
As whiteness is considered the default race of America, the existing cultural norms of whiteness are
classified as the norms of American culture. Such classifications of white culture include stereotypical
expectancies of behavior, in which a binary system is created that classifies a person's culture as either
"white" or "other."[8] Majority racial status plays a major role for those of white identity creating cultural
"norms," as one's behaviors and expectations of how a culture should live and interact is more easily
reinforced by association with the majority.[9] Lack of awareness parallels the centric nature of whiteness
as majority through self-imposed color blindness, existing through the reality of white privilege.
Whiteness Theory studies the way that white identity passively creates the otherization of color. Color is
a construct that can be objectified, made from the existence of whiteness as majority and centric.[10] Such
a perception whiteness as "normal" leads to an underrepresentation and misrepresentation of minority
individuals.
White Identity
The idea of whiteness as "normal" reinforces the idea of racial marginalization, through which an identity
of whiteness may be created through the antithesis of subjugated "otherized" cultures.[11] Much of white
identity is formulated around the absence of an identity. Because there is no association towards being
objectified by social, racial, economic, or judicial systems for the middle-class white identifiers, white
identity for an individual may be intentionally crafted to suit the wants and needs of the individual.[12]
Such a choice of "coloring in" one's whiteness is a reflection of the privileges of whiteness and a lack of
diverse community association.[13]
White Privilege
In the United States, white privilege exists due to the hierarchy of power distribution, where white men
were granted institutional power over minorities in the establishment of the country's political, social, and
economic systems.[1] White privilege resides in the idea that white people inherit a color blindness due to
their majority status, refuting the existence of racism and racial privilege because of a lack of association
with those realities.[14] The privileges of being in the majority are unknown by the majority,
paradoxically, because they are the majority and are not subjected to the social trials of being a
minority.[15] Also white people have been portrayed by the media as mentally ill, after they had
committed a serious crime such as a mass shooting. This has given an unfair judgement to black shooters
because of racial skin color that the media portraits them. When black people do a mass shooting they are
often viewed as being a threat with criminal intent & so they are less likely to be seen as mentally ill
Lack of discrimination is an underlying principle of white privilege, as the privileges available to the
white majority are not as readily enjoyed by those of minority status. Such privileges include, but are not
limited to: owning/renting of property, equal racial representation in law and society, unbiased education,
assumption of intellectual,
social, or financial
capability, unbiased
credibility. [16] Privilege is
multi-faceted in its
existence; each of these
realities and countless others
are the subject of white
privilege, as discrimination
is faced by minority subjects
while trying to enjoy such
realities.
White Bias
White bias is in reference to
majority stronghold that
white people possess. Those
of a particular racial identity The spheres of privilege and discrimination possibilities based on identity,
(whiteness) have selective notably citing whiteness as one of the platforms of dominance.
preference of granting power

and privileges to those of the
same ethnicity, referred to as ingroup bias.[17] Such strongholds may be categorically associated to the
social, educational, economic, political, racial, and cultural privileges associated by the majority white.
Institutionally power is granted hierarchically, and in majority, to those who that associate most with the
power holders. Racial bias exists as a barrier to entry for many minority power seekers, where a
gatekeeping effect is created by those in the majority who are reluctant to pass power onto the minority,
whether through qualification-based or discrimination-based motives.[18]
Socially, institutional slavery, then racism has played a major role in the discrimination of not only
African-Americans, but as well other minority affiliations as suboptimal. Economically, access to higher-
paying jobs and wage gap discrimination are an ongoing discourse demanding institutional change, both
as a result of white bias.[19] Politically, racial bias is seen with the highly sought after Presidential office,
where America's first black president Barack Obama was not elected until 2008, being preceded by 43
white presidents by him and being followed by a white president Donald Trump as the 45th.
Whiteness as Unspoken
Privileges of whiteness are well-known to those of minority status, but not to white people themselves. In
efforts of diversity education, white people are often taught to understand the way in which minorities are
discriminated against, but not how those of white identity experience a lack of discrimination – this
creates an unspoken element of white identity, where white people are often fixated on the objectification
of other people, but not as much on the lack of objectification of themselves.[20] The debate on
meritocracy, and its legitimacy is one that facilitates patterns of racial injustice towards marginalized
groups as it validates the assumption that success is solely a result of individual efforts; this disguises the
social, economic, and cultural privileges intersected with all institutions that actively work to benefit
whiteness.[1] (https://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=soe_etd)
Through the objectification of minorities, race is concerted as the root motivation of such objectification.
White identity goes unspoken due to its default and centric nature in culture. Whiteness is only
objectified in a situation where whiteness is not normalized or considered the majority. For example, if a
person of white identity is immersed in a context where people of minority are situationally the majority
by quantity, then the white person (who is usually the situational majority based on quantity) is caught in
an uncommon reality where their association with the majority is the subject of otherization.
Critiquing Whiteness
Communication research revolving around critical race theory seeks to understand the privileges and
associations of whiteness. The critical aspect of research involves the realization of white enrichment,
where white people have profited from the injustices done unto minorities (see slavery) both knowingly
and unknowingly. Systems in the United States more often than not create privileged realities where
white people may succeed more than those of minority identity, also allowing those of white identity to
more easily change and manipulate the system to their favor.[21]
A component of critical whiteness theory seeks to understand how white people acknowledge their
privileges, as well as the corresponding positive or negative behaviors through their acknowledgements.
Unique qualitative research is derived from how normative whiteness is in our culture, associated with
how color blindness and privilege blindness affect interracial contexts of communication, as well as the
white perception of injustices done unto minorities in America.[22]
Whiteness Theory in Communication Studies

The tenants of white privilege are incorporated into whiteness theory to understand the respective
communicative possibilities of each tenant. Studying how white privilege is perceived by white people,
how well white people perceive white privilege, how white people think their white privilege affects their
identity, how white identity is derived from and conflicts with other racial identities, and how white
privilege is perceived by minorities are all a limited set of possibilities created by whiteness theory.[23]
These theoretical studies can be manipulated by the following variables of whiteness theory:
Centric whiteness
Whiteness as the default
Whiteness as normative
Whiteness and rhetoric
White identity
White racial culture
White bias
White interaction with minorities
Whiteness and inequality
White cultural cannibalism
Whiteness and education
Whiteness and politics
Whiteness and popular culture
Whiteness and gender
References
1. Hartmann, D., Gerteis, J., & Croll, P. R. (2009). "An empirical assessment of whiteness
theory: Hidden from how many?". Social Problems. 56 (3): 403–424.
doi:10.1525/sp.2009.56.3.403 (https://doi.org/10.1525%2Fsp.2009.56.3.403).
JSTOR 10.1525/sp.2009.56.3.403 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/sp.2009.56.3.403).
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La fine e i fini degli studi di area

Negli ultimi due secoli, a partire cioè dall’inaugurazione

nazione, gli abitanti di quelle regioni erano giudicati incapaci

in corso nelle discipline umanistiche oggi – come la digitalizza-

sviluppata altrove. Di conseguenza, gli attuali cambiamenti nelle

La differenza antropologica e lo status degli studi di area

Per comprendere il motivo per il quale il principio teleologico

cui particolarità è contraddistinta da attributi geopolitici quali

A questo proposito, dobbiamo ricordare a noi stessi che questi

implicito nelle discipline umanistiche, stiamo dunque richiaman-

pare, così uno squilibro creato in maniera artificiale si dissolve

se la crisi dell’umanità europea anticipò una situazione in cui

Gli studi di area sono un accordo interdisciplinare in cui sia

A questo proposito, l’area è una nozione specifica del mondo

esclusivo per la Verità. E alla conoscenza che non era espressa in

condo l’immagine o lo schema della lingua nazionale. Per com-

presume sia innata in ogni membro nativo della nazione e che è

nascita dell’università moderna nel diciottesimo secolo in Eu-

docente, tirocinanti o studenti, amministratori e tutto il resto del-

L’ambiguità dell’area: performatività e posizione fissa

Nella nostra indagine sugli studi di area, l’area potrebbe pri-

riguardo a questo che l’area è ambigua. Per rendere una località

etnica o nazionale è spesso stata confusa con l’area stessa, così

emergence of contemporary world regionalism».8 Ecco perché la

disciplina degli studi di area, ma allo stesso tempo connota una

Un’epistemologia del riconoscimento della razza e la logica

Il termine “Studi di area” delinea il nome specifico di una for-

seconda Guerra mondiale, si propose di istituire gli studi di area

la sua funzione tropica nella classificazione (dominio, sezione);

geografiche, dall’altro; ubicazione nel senso della performance

Traduzione e formazione di confini

Come risulta ormai evidente, la problematica che ispira la mia

retorica nazionalistica mobilitata nelle nostre lotte alla modernità

prima della “delimitazione dei confini”, è impossibile determina-

Si veda Mezzadra, Sandro e Sakai, Naoki (2014). “Introduction”, in Translation,

Issue 4, Rimini, Rafaelli Editore, pp. 9-29.

determinazione delle unità linguistiche che si presume abbia la

delimitare non comporta solamente la demarcazione di un terri-

differenziazione si parla qui? Come richiede che espandiamo la

dunque l’ideale regolativo dà solo un oggetto nell’idea; significa

Tuttavia, è assai ben noto che l’istituzione dello stato-nazione

La somiglianza oltre lo schematismo della co-figurazione

Ovviamente, traduzione è un termine dalle connotazioni mol-

no regime di traduzione, è impossibile evadere dai tropi della

trasferimento comunicativo e internazionale di un messaggio tra

della traduzione è dislocato, al di fuori del sistema dei luoghi ge-

prio perché la traduzione è precedente la determinazione della

della nazionalità comparata, in modo tale da permettere confi-

(Traduzione di Anna Specchio)

ModernJapan is widely regarded as a society saturated with customs, values, and

cultural aversion to litigation before the twentieth century; a misnomeq theJapa-

marked by constant change, the invention of tradition functions "to structure at

9. Eric Hobsbam, "Introduction," in Hobsbawm and Ranger, Inumtion, z. Hobsbawm is inter-

pioneered was reinvented by ultranationalists and promoted as a counterweight to

18. Hobsbawm and Ranger, Inumtion, n.

a3. Ct Smith, "Cultural Context," r7-r9.

scalc mOdcrniり "27 simply put,ItO Hirobumi,thc principal architcct ofJapan'S

27・ Nicholas B Dirks,``Histow as a Sign of thc MOdcrn,"Д 腸 C“ 滋 ″ 2,n02(SP五 ng 199o)28

3o. H.D. Harootunian, "Figuring the Folk," in this volume.

Part II. JAPAN

THE INVENTION OF IDENTITY