ANGUB, Tani M.
209 SCRA 446
UMALI VS. ESTANISLAO
Facts:
Congress enacted RA 7167 entitled “An act adjusting the basic personal and
additional exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes to the
poverty threshold level”, amending for the purpose Sec.29 of the NIRC. The
said act was signed and approved by the President on Dec.19, 1991 and
published on Jan.14, 1992 in Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation.
Sec.3 of the said act states: “This act shall take effect upon its approval”,
while Sec.5 states: “These regulations shall take effect on compensation
income from January 1, 1992.”
Issue:
WON RA 7167 took effect upon its approval by the president on Dec.19,
1991 or on Jan.30 1992, 15 days after its publication?
Held:
RA 7167 took effect on January 30, 1992 after 15 days of its publication.
(Tanada vs Tuvera) The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself which cannot
in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date
without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case,
but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen (15) day
period shall be shortened or extended.
G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993
Chief Justice Narvasa
FACTS: Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1,
1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated
November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited
on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated
reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." A criminal complaint
for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage
company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The
case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged.
He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the check on
September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the
judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber"
or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a
punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the
Ministry of Justice.
ISSUE: whether the decision issued by the Court be applied
retroactively to the prejudice of the accused.
HELD: No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the
land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that
"laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is
expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks
forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive.
The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already
become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional
The weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's
decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14
that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective
effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied
on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall
within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. AURORA A. SALVAÑA, GR No.
192074, 2014-06-10
Facts:
On May 12, 2006, then Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority,
Melquiades Robles, issued Office Order No. 119, series of 2006.[2] The
order revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña's designation as Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) of the LRTA Administrative
Department. It "direct[ed] her instead to handle special projects and perform
such other duties and functions as may be assigned to her"[3] by the
Administrator.
Instead of complying, Salvaña questioned the order with the Office of the
President.[4]
In the interim, Salvaña applied for sick leave of absence on May 12, 2006
and from May 15 to May 31, 2006.[5] In support of her application, she
submitted a medical certificate[6] issued by Dr. Grace Marie Blanco of the
Veterans
Memorial Medical Center (VMMC).
LRTA discovered that Dr. Blanco did not issue this medical certificate. Dr.
Blanco also denied having seen or treated Salvaña on May 15, 2006, the
date stated on her medical certificate.
Administrator Robles issued a notice of preliminary investigation. The notice
directed Salvaña to explain in writing within 72 hours from her receipt of the
notice "why no disciplinary action should be taken against [her]"[8] for not...
complying with Office Order No. 119 and for submitting a falsified medical
certificate
Salvaña filed her explanation on June 30, 2006.[10] She alleged that as a
member of the Bids and Awards Committee, she "refused to sign a
resolution"[11] favoring a particular bidder. She alleged that Office Order No.
119... was issued by Administrator Robles to express his "ire and
vindictiveness"[12] over her refusal to sign.
The LRTA's Fact-finding Committee found her explanation unsatisfactory.
it issued a formal charge against her for Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
Document, Grave Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service.
On August 5, 2006, "Salvaña tendered her irrevocable
resignation."[14] None of the pleadings alleged that this irrevocable
resignation was accepted, although the resolution of the Fact-finding
Committee alluded to Administrator Robles' acceptance of... the resignation
letter.
In the meantime, the investigation against Salvaña continued
On October 31, 2006, the Fact-finding Committee issued a resolution "finding
Salvaña guilty of all the charges against her and imposed [on] her the penalty
of dismissal from . . . service with all the accessory penalties."[17] The LRTA
Board of Directors... approved the findings of the Fact-finding Committee
Salvaña appealed with the Civil Service Commission. "In her appeal, [she]
claimed that she was denied due process and that there [was] no substantial
evidence to support the charges against her.
the Civil Service Commission modified the decision and issued Resolution
No. 071364. The Civil Service Commission found that Salvaña was guilty
only of simple dishonesty. She was meted a penalty of suspension for three
months
LRTA moved for reconsideration[21] of the resolution
This was denied... the Court of Appeals[24] dismissed the petition and
affirmed the Civil Service Commission's finding t
Hence, LRTA filed this present petition.
Issues:
whether respondent's resignation mooted its proceedings,
Ruling:
[I]n the response of the Administrator to the letter of resignation filed by
Respondent there was no unconditional acceptance of the same. In fact it
was specified therein that her resignation is "without prejudice to any
appropriate action on any malfeasance or... misfeasance committed during
her tenure[."] There can [sic] be no other conclusion from the above that her
resignation does not prevent the administration from proceeding with any
charge/s appropriate under the circumstances.
Resignation from public office, to be effective, requires the acceptance of the
proper government authority. In Republic v. Singun,[106] this court stated:
Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or
implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and
the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete
and operative resignation from public... office, there must be: (a) an intention
to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an
acceptance by the proper authority.
....
In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer
to be operative and effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and
the officer remains in office. Resignation to be effective must be accepted by
competent authority,... either in terms or by something tantamount to an
acceptance, such as the appointment of the successor. A public officer
cannot abandon his office before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the
officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 of the Revised
Penal Code. The final or conclusive act of a resignation's acceptance is the
notice of acceptance. The incumbent official would not be in a position to
determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he had been duly notified
therefor.
Although the response of Administrator Robles was not attached to the
record, it can be concluded from the resolution of the Fact-finding Committee
that he accepted the resignation, albeit with the qualification that it be
"without prejudice to any appropriate action on any... malfeasance or
misfeasance committed during her tenure."
The qualified acceptance of Administrator Robles, however, did not affect the
validity of respondent's resignation. Section 1, Rule XII of the Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, as amended by
Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular
No. 15, series of 1999, requires:
Sec. 1. Resignation. The following documents shall be submitted to the
Commission for record purposes:... a. The voluntary written notice of the
employee informing the appointing authority that he is relinquishing his
position and the efffectivity date of said resignation; and,... b. The
acceptance of resignation in writing by the agency head or appointing
authority which shall indicate the date of effectivity of the resignation.
An officer or employee under investigation may be allowed to resign pending
decision of his case without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
until finally terminated.
The qualification placed by Administrator Robles on his acceptance does not
make respondent's resignation any less valid. The rules and regulations
allow the acceptance of resignations while the administrative case is pending
provided that the proceedings will still... continue.
Because of her resignation on August 5, 2006, any modification as to the
service of her suspension became moot. Her permanent employment
record, however, must reflect the modified penalty
Cui v. Arellano University
G.R. No. L-15127, 30 May 1961
FACTS:
Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then
enrolled in its College of Law from the first year until the first semester of his
4th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said
university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took
his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure
permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano
University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back
the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take
the bar without Arellano’s issuance of his TOR.
On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum
No. 38 addressing all heads of private schools, colleges, and
universities. Part of the memorandum states that “the amount in tuition and
other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently
charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to
transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to
attract and keep students in a school”.
ISSUE:
Whether the provision of the contract between plaintiff and defendant,
whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without
refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarship in cash, is valid or not.
RULING:
Not valid. Memorandum No. 38 issued by the Director of Private Schools
provides that “When students are given a full or partial scholarship, it is
understood that such scholarship is merited and earned. The amount in
tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be
subsequently charged to recipient students when they decide to quit school
or to transfer to another institution.” Scholarship should not be offered merely
to attract and keep students in a school.
Memorandum No. 38 merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy.
The defendant uses the scholarship as a business scheme designed to
increase the business potential of an educational institution. Thus,
conceived, it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also, good morals.
The practice of awarding the scholarship to attract students and keep them in
school is not a good custom nor has it received some kind of social and
practical confirmation except in some private institution as in Arellano
University. Any contract entered into between parties which is against the
law, morals, good custom, public policy, or public order is void.
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc., et al, v. Feliciano
Facts:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager
of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines
urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a
government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the Ting vs Ting
recommendation of the National Economic Council. The President submitted
said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the BENJAMIN G. TING,
cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President
designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency
authorized to undertake the importation. Considering that said importation, Petitioner,
the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters Association alleged that it is contrary to RA
3453 which prohibits the government from importing rice and tat there is no - versus -
law appropriating funds to finance the same. They said that it its illegal
because it is prohibited by RA 3452 which in Section 10 provides that the CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,
importation of rice and corn is only left to private properties upon payment of
the corresponding taxes. They claim that RCA is prohibited from doing so.
Respondent.
According to them, RA 2207 which provides that should there be an existing
or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of suh gravity as to constitute
a national emergency and certified by the NEC, the president may authorize
such importation thru any government agency he may designate - is
repealed by RA 3452. G.R. No. 166562

Issue:Whether or not RA 2207 which allows importation of rice by March 31, 2009
government agency during national emergency is repealed by RA 3452

Held: No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452.

Facts:
Section 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides "All laws
or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were
repealed or modified accordingly.". This repealing clause is not an express
classmates in medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act/s that are
26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first
intended to be repealed. Rather, is is a clause which predicates the intended
child. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed
and prior acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals
a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of
and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex
nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed
proprio vigre. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the
that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless on irreconcilable
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.
thereafter.
Here there is no inconsistency.

Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the

While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their
following manifestations:
methods of approach are different; one is by a total ban of rice importation
and the other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the
government during normal period. Also, RA 3452 only authorizes importation 1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and
during normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of sucy his profession;
gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207.
These two laws are therefore not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not 2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular
ensue. drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it
necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his
father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay
the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and
refusal to give regular financial support to his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He
maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He
also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their
children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week. Both
presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC
ruled in favor of the respondent declaring the marriage null and void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should
not be applied to this case
Issues:
1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow
the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases,
2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of
psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized,
3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Held
1. No. respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in
Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to
the principle of stare decisis is no longer new.
2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly
and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that
petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological
incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.
G. R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001356
FACTS:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four
children. She contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
“psychological incapacity” to perform his marital obligations starting 1988. His
“true color” of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband
became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker,
staying with friends daily from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o’clock
in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking,
respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner
with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the
children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her
sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two
months later, she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her
dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On the morning of 22 March
1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence
of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was imprisoned for 11
days for slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court
declared their marriage to be null and void ab initio on the basis of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals,
which in turn reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of
respondent and petitioner still subsists.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the
trial court.
(2) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina should be taken to be merely advisory and not
mandatory in nature.
HELD:
(1) The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was
absolutely no evidence showed and proved by petitioner the psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent. Article 36 of the Code has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity, as
laid down in the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further explained in
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support.
(2) The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal
maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted
and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to
be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the
familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”
Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was
given legal life by the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina,
additional procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying
cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity was
added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and Molina have the force and effect
of law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are mandatory in nature.
The petition was denied
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and
Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and
EVELINA E. SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four
counts of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police
recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China
Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case
filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and
attorney’s fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with
the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8
of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the
Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: NO.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No.
1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby
held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar
circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of
execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar
deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable
judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully
deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the
enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists,
the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being
unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when
enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright
injustice and inequality such as the case before us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the
Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were
designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and,
subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency
deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged
by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws
because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and,
therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the
protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246
against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the
extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment,
or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign
transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign
guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New
Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right
and justice to prevail.”
___________
NOTES:
– On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist,
coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with
him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for
four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on
February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On
February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen,
Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The
policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No.
368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK
Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China
Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine
Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear)
used in seducing the complainant.
National Marketing Corporation, plaintiff-appellant vs. Miguel Tecson,
defendant-appellee

GR no. L-20131
27 August 1969
Facts: December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation filed a complaint,
docketed as civil case no. 63701 on the same court, as successor of the
Price Stabilization Corporation, against the same defendant from 10 years
ago (December 21, 1955, Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Tecson).
Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss the said complaint upon the
ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of that and prescription of
action.
More than ten years have passed a year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13,
CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960 and 1964 were both leap years so that when
this present case was filed it was filed two days too late.
The lower court, then, issued an order of dismissal with regards the article 13
of the civil code. Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a
judgment “must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues,” the issue thus confined to the date on which ten years from
December 21, 1955 had expired.
However, National Marketing Corporation insists that the same “is erroneous
because a year means a calendar year. There is no question that when it is
not a leap year, December 21 to December 21 of the following year is one
year. The case reached its conclusion with the appellant’s theory that
contravenes the explicit provision of Article 13 of the civil code.
Issues:
Whether or not the term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is
limited to 365 days.
Ruling: Yes. The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited
to 365 days. However, it is said to be unrealistic and if public interest
demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the revised administrative
code, this may be done through legislative process and not by judicial
decree.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO,
petitioners,vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 162155. August 28,2007.
Facts:
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, the Vice President of Primetown
(respondent), applied for refund of the income tax which they have paid on
1997. According to Yap, the company accrued losses amounting to P/
71,879,228. These losses enabled them to be exempt from paying income
tax, which respondent paid diligently. Respondent was therefore claiming a
refund. Respondents submitted requirements but the petitioners ignored
their claim. On April 14, 2000, respondents filed a review in the Court of
Tax Appeals. The said Court, however, denied the petition stating that the
petition was filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing
judicial claim for tax refund.
According to Sec 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code, “no suit or
proceedings shall be filed after the expiration of 2-yearsfrom the date of the
payment of the tax regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment. Respondents paid the last income tax return on April 14, 1998.
Article 13 of the New Civil Code states that a year is considered 365 days;
months 30 days; days 24-hours; and night from sunset to sunrise. Therefore,
according to CTA, the date of filing a petition fell on the 731st day, which is
beyond the prescriptive period.
Issues:
Whether the two-year/730-day prescriptive period ends on April 13, 2000 or
April 14, 2000 considering that the last payment of tax was on April 14, 1998
and that year 2000 was a leap year.
Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code be repealed by EO 292 Sec
31 Chap 8 Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that when a subsequent law impliedly repeals a prior law, the
new law shall apply. In the case at bar, Art 13 of the New Civil Code, which
states that a year shall compose 365 days, shall be repealed by EO 292 Sec
31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year shall
be composed of 12 months regardless of the number of days in a month.
Therefore, the two-year prescriptive period ends on April 14, 2000.
Respondents filed petition on April 14, 2000 (which is the last day prescribed
to file a petition.
Miciano vs Brimo
TITLE: Juan Miciano v Andre Brimo
CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867
FACTS:
Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme
of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph
Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a
Turkish citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the
distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates.
HELD:
Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be
made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine
Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible
conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus,
national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial
administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the
legatees.
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD
E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO
C. AZNAR, EXECUTOR AND LUCY CHRISTENSEN, HEIR
OF THE DECEASED, EXECUTOR AND HEIR-APPELLEES,
vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-
appellant. No. L-16749. January 31, 1963.
FACTS:
Edward E Christensen was born in New York but he migrated
to California where he resided for 9 years. In 1913, he came to the
Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death.
In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter,
Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia. Counsel for the
acknowledged natural daughter Helen claims that under Article 16,
par. 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be should be applied;
that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the
domicile. On the other hand, the counsel for Maria Lucy contends that
the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not
being entitled to anything under California law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in
determining the successional rights oh his heirs.
HELD:
The Supreme Court grants more successional rights to Helen. It said
in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter: the
internal law which applies to California’s domiciled in California, and
the conflict rule for Californian’s domiciled out of California.
Christensen, being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his
domicile must be followed. For the determination of the successional
rights under Philippine Law, the case was remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings.