GAMBOA V.

CHAN
G.R. No. 193636 (24 July 2012)
Facts:

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as
someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

Issue:

WON the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to
privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or
security.

Ruling:

NO. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect
the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must
exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or
security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her
supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard,
respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation
to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the
presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the
collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful
mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
 NAVARRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
313 SCRA 153 (1999)
Facts:

Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City wnet to the police
station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At
the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman
Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim
was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on
tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the
victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified.
Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated
discussion at the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased,
Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.

Issues:

1. WON the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which prohibits
wiretapping.

2. WON the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of
the accused.

Held:

1. Yes the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200 (An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping
and Other Related Violations of Private Communication, And Other Purposes). Jalbuena's testimony is
confirmed by the voice recording he had made.

The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications

(Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Since the exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused, constituted
sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper conduct of the offended
party capable of exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must be sufficient and
must immediately precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a
person to commit the wrong, which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity. The mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong must also be considered. The
exclamations made by Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed
that he had no intent to kill the latter.
 RAMIREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995
Facts:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging
that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted
and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In support of her claim, petitioner
produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case
was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of
petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was
illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC
later on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation
of R.A. 4200. The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence
the instant petition.

Issue:

WON the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation.

Held:

YES. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by
means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by
the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a
point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or
to impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies
the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)”

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s
office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are,
furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.