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Torts and Damages

Full Text of Cases

Compiled by Rehne Gibb N. Larena | JD-WT-3 | AY 2019-20 | University of San Carlos

Torts and Damages CASES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

First Reading Assignment 3
Gashem Shookat Baksh v Court of Appeals, GR No.
97336, 19 February 1993 3
Child Learning v Tagorio, GR No. 150920, November
25, 2005 8
Lumantas, MD v Calapiz, GR No. 163753, 15 January
2014 11
Air France v Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 12
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et al. v Reyes, GR No.
154259, 28 February 2005 17
Libi v IAC, GR No. 70890, 18 September 1992 21
Regino v Pangasinan Colleges of Science and
Technology, GR No. 156109, 18 November 2004 26

Based on Syllabus of Atty. Pandi By RGL 2 of 30


First Reading Assignment and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod

City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
Gashem Shookat Baksh v Court of Appeals, GR No. petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than
97336, 19 February 1993 P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to
P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other
G.R. No. 97336
relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint

was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.

THIRD DIVISION* In his Answer with Counterclaim,[3] petitioner admitted only the
personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint
[ G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993 ]
and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, PETITIONER, VS. HON. because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARILOU T. GONZALES,
Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed
RESPONDENTS.
marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent;
he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor
forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only
D E C I S I O N
told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that
she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and
DAVIDE, JR., J.: finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the
barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was
[1]
seeking to review and set aside the Decision of the respondent unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched
the 16 October 1989 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be
recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court
21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. issued a Pre-Trial Order[4] embodying the stipulated facts which the
parties had agreed upon, to wit:
The antecedents of this case are not complicated: "1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian, citizen
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since
counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint[2] for September 1, 1987 up to the present;
damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she 2. That the defendant is presently studying at
is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of Lyceum-Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second
good moral character and reputation duly respected in her year medicine proper.
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an 3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay
exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Luncheonette, Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his
love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore 4. That the parties happened to know each other when the
agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which Manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino
was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986."After
respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil
their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision[5] favoring the
petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the
she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the
the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started decision reads:
to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of "IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby
such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day
before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their 1. Condemming (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.


so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That
2. Condemning further the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents,
of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the
thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her
the costs. godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain
went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but
[6]
3. All other claims are denied." The decision is anchored on the defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was
trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still
loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual single.
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, (d) because of Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant
his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already
deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the
respondent and her parents -- in accordance with Filipino customs reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already
and traditions -- made some preparations for the wedding that was invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming
to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and wedding.”[8]Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the
chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R.
(f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such CV No. 24256. In his Brief,[9] he contended that the trial court erred
acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation
customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to expenses and costs.
the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would
not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the
expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if challenged decision[10] affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16
her claim was false.[7] October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact,

respondent Court made the following analysis:
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed "First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met
summary of the evidence for the private respondent in the defendant who was already 29 years old at the time, does not
foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows: appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she
"According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant
time and that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started and never had a boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower
courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed court, a barrio lass 'not used and accustomed to the trend of
marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as modern urban life', and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day 'herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no
he went with her to her hometown of Banaga, Bugallon, persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her.' In fact,
Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must
their relationship and their intention to get married. The have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought
photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would
with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in
day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiff's parents and public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the
brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore,
semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a
thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact
for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Banaga, Bugallon,
stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27,
they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with
to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant's the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Lancheonette on
apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he
would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he allegedly talked to plaintiff’s mother who told him to marry her
even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan
sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go
of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but to plaintiff’s hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic)
defendant gave her some medicine to abort the foetus. Still some kind of special relationship between them? And this special
plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him relationship must indeed have led to defendant’s insincere
of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but


also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the possess good moral character. Moreover, his controversial
restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first "common law wife" is now his legal wife as their marriage had
proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to
defendant’s proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner
was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the
restaurant after she had accepted defendant’s proposal (pp. 6-7, live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted
tsn March 7, 1988). for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner
asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of had professed his love to the private respondent and had also
good moral character and must think so low and have so little promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view
respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
that when he studied in Bacolod city for several years where he promise is not actionable.[14]

finished he B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study
medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her
words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply
not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required
surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they
pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, subsequently complied with.
innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on
[11]
her.” and then concluded: As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the
“In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that
defendant-appellant’s fraudulent and deceptive protestations of questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the
and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses
likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant’s part that and having had the opportunity to observe closely their
made plaintiff’s parents agree to their daughter’s living-in with him deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had
preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if
appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good considered, might affect the result of the case.[15]

customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the
foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or
taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our value which could alter the result of the case.
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all
case.”[12]Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the
petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this
whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr.,[16] this Court took the time,
bar.[13] again, to enumerate these exceptions:

x x x
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because
he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any “(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil.
proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where
Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453
since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings
familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957;
he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto
allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The findings of
basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia


v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of
142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are action.
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing rule is approved,
in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of
respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is for specifically in the statutes."[21]Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 which defines a quasi-delict thus:
SCRA 242 [1970])."Petitioner has not endeavored to point out to Us "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case. being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
must be respected. relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter."is limited to negligent
And now to the legal issue. acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent.
Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana,
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common
[17]
an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because
draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well
so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the
Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote: general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
"The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code,
promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be
[18]
the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. The history of breach of governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code.[22] In
no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus,
to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with
[19]
in many of the American states ...." This notwithstanding, the said Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become
the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs torts.[23]

which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate
and punish in the statute books.[20] In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of

the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report: fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
"’But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes
wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
Civil Code the following rule: pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
‘ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public however, that such injury should have been committed in a
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.' manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

'An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the
seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of 'X.’ A promise of petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and
marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere
the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to
and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and their supposed marriage."[24] In short, the private respondent
her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single


Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction -- the sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely
kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act.
adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases
seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be
Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction. be swift to profit.' (47 Am. Jur. 662)

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be x x x
applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a
victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that
[25]
Appeals, this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a
because: woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with
"x x x we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
years younger than the complainant -- who was around thirty-six voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
(36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit,
school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be -- artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have
when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that, exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and
complainant ‘surrendered herself’ to petitioner because, would have cut short all sexual relations upon -finding that
‘overwhelmed by her love' for him, she 'wanted to bind' him 'by defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no
[26]
benefit of clergy.’"In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, while this other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by
Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint."[27]

seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not
convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening In his annotations on the Civil Code,[28] Associate Justice Edgardo
disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case: L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a
"The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal
set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is "x x x if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the
seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of
breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of Appeals, L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733,
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang
part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be
the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that -- moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If
it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral
‘To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). x x
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the x."together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal the expenses for the wedding preparations (See Domalagon v.
lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471)."
seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be
induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some Senator Arturo M. Tolentino[29] is also of the same persuasion:
species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to "It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos[30] still subsists,
have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article[31] in the
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer' (27 Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if
Phil. 123). there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the
vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is
And in American Jurisprudence we find: accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of
abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has
'On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an
persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by wilfullness
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of (sic), the action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of


fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not
circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in
years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in
woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault."[35] At most,
and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have "Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the
been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the
reason."We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative imposition or undue influence of the party on whom the burden of
proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the
did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is transaction was itself procured by fraud.”[36]In Mangayao vs.
nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in Lasud,[37] We declared:
pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and "Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there
[32]
the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, the private should be no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil
respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only
even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does
"sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other
[33]
because of her own doing," for: one is not (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209)."We should
"x x x She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it
become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of
high school graduate and a mere employee ... (Annex "C") or a her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the
waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It
without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their
security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance (TSN, pp. daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and
51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept dignity.
a proposition that may have been offered by the
petitioner.”[34]These statements reveal the true character and WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged
motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent the petitioner.
on account of the latter’s ignoble birth, inferior educational SO ORDERED.
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable
employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not Feliciano, (Acting Chairman), Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a
woman so circumstanced could not have even remotely occurred
to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were Child Learning v Tagorio, GR No. 150920, November
empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and 25, 2005
deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her 512 Phil. 618
and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but

pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly
believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of
FIRST DIVISION
marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security.
Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of morality and so [ G.R. No. 150920, November 25, 2005 ]
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their
women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. AND SPOUSES
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code EDGARDO L. LIMON AND SYLVIA S. LIMON,
which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his
PETITIONERS, VS. TIMOTHY TAGARIO, ASSISTED BY HIS
PARENTS BASILIO TAGORIO AND PROMULGATED:
due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his
HERMINIA TAGORIO, RESPONDENTS.
rights and in the performance of his obligations.
D E C I S I O N
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws,

customs and traditions.
AZCUNA, J.:

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed,
This petition started with a tort case filed with the Regional Trial
the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest
Court of Makati by Timothy Tagorio and his parents, Basilio R.
of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
Tagorio and Herminia Tagorio, docketed as Civil Case No.
congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it
91-1389. The complaint[1] alleged that during the school year
is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire


1990-1991, Timothy was a Grade IV student at Marymount School, located in the third floor of the school building on March 5,
an academic institution operated and maintained by Child 1991 was allegedly defective and that the same lock set
Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, was involved in previous incidents of alleged
between 1 and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the boy's comfort room at malfunctioning;
the third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of
nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to 5. That petitioner Child Learning Center, Inc. allegedly failed
get out. Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked to install iron grills in the window of the boy's comfort room
the door and yelled several times for help. When no help arrived at the third floor of the school building;
he decided to open the window to call for help. In the process of
opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down 6. That petitioner Child Learning Center, Inc. allegedly failed
three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical to exercise the due care of a good father of a family in the
treatment for serious multiple physical injuries. selection and supervision of its employees;

An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by 7. That the proximate cause of respondent's accident was
respondents against the CLC, the members of its Board of allegedly not due to his own contributory negligence;
Directors, namely Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso
Cruz, Carmelo Narciso and Luningning Salvador, and the 8. That there was an alleged basis to apply the legal principle
Administrative Officer of Marymount School, Ricardo Pilao. In its of "piercing the veil of corporate entity" in resolving the
[2]
defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about issue of alleged liability of petitioners Edgardo L. Limon
the locking mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy was and Sylvia S. Limon;
not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further maintained that it
had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a 9. That there was alleged basis for petitioners to pay
family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its respondent actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus
students. attorney's fees;

After trial, the court a quo found in favor of respondents and 10. That there was an alleged basis in not awarding
ordered petitioners CLC and Spouses Limon to pay respondents, petitioners' prayer for moral and exemplary damages,
jointly and severally, P200,253.12 as actual and compensatory including attorney's fees.
damages, P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the Court
damages, P100,000 as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
The trial court disregarded the corporate fiction of CLC and held appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the inference
the Spouses Limon personally liable because they were the ones made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there
who actually managed the affairs of the CLC. is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the
Petitioners CLC and the Spouses Limon appealed the decision to judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of
the Court of Appeals. facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
On September 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals[3] affirmed the the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
decision in toto. Petitioners elevated the case to this Court under appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, after their motion for reconsideration conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
[4]
was denied by Resolution of November 23, 2001. based; (8) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked

certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
Petitioners question several factual findings of the trial court, properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9)
[5]
which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, namely: when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
1. That respondent was allegedly trapped inside the boy's the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
comfort room located at the third floor of the school record.[6]

building on March 5, 1991;
On the basis of the records of this case, this Court finds no
2. That respondent allegedly banged and kicked the door of justification to reverse the factual findings and consider this case
said comfort room several times to attract attention and as an exception to the general rule.
that he allegedly yelled thereat for help which never came;
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff
3. That respondent was allegedly forced to open the window has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages
of said comfort room to seek help; suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond;
4. That the lock set installed at the boy's comfort room and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or


negligence and the damages incurred.[7]

As to the absence of grills on the window, petitioners contend that
Fault, in general, signifies a voluntary act or omission which there was no such requirement under the Building Code.
causes damage to the right of another giving rise to an obligation Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as petitioners
on the part of the actor to repair such damage. Negligence is the themselves point out, was approximately 1.5 meters from the floor,
failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another so that it was within reach of a student who finds the regular exit,
person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the the door, not functioning. Petitioners, with the due diligence of a
circumstances justly demand. Fault requires the execution of a good father of the family, should have anticipated that a student,
positive act which causes damage to another while negligence locked in the toilet by a non-working door, would attempt to use
consists of the omission to do acts which result in damage to the window to call for help or even to get out. Considering all the
[8]
another. circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis to sustain a

finding of liability on petitioners' part.
In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to provide
precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury to its students in Petitioners' argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a
two instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
having been notified of the problem; and (2) failure to install safety employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and
grills on the window where Timothy fell from. supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is
being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under
The trial court found that the lock was defective on March 5, Article 2180 of the Civil Code.[12] In this case, CLC's liability is
1991:[9] under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its
The door knob was defective. After the incident of March 5, 1991, own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly
said door knob was taken off the door of the toilet where Timothy maintained.
was in. The architect who testified during the trial declared that
although there were standard specifications for door knobs for Our pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window
comfort room[s], and he designed them according to that because he could not get out using the door, negates petitioners'
requirement, he did not investigate whether the door knob other contention that the proximate cause of the accident was
specified in his plans during the construction [was] actually put in Timothy's own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall
place. This is so because he did not verify whether the door knob were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
he specified w[as] actually put in place at the particular comfort by any intervening cause, that originated from CLC's own
room where Timothy was barred from getting outside. (TSN, pp. negligence.
19-20, December 8, 1994).The Court of Appeals held that there
[10]
was no reason to disturb the factual assessment: We, however, agree with petitioners that there was no basis to
After having perused the records, We fail to see any indication of pierce CLC's separate corporate personality. To disregard the
whim or arbitrariness on the part of the trial magistrate in his corporate existence, the plaintiff must prove: (1) Control by the
assessment of the facts of the case. That said, We deem it not to individual owners, not mere majority or complete stock ownership,
be within Our business to recast the factual conclusions reached resulting in complete domination not only of finances but of policy
by the court below. Petitioners would make much of the point that and business practice in respect to a transaction so that the
no direct evidence was presented to prove that the door knob was corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate
indeed defective on the date in question. mind, will or existence of its own; (2) such control must have been
used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate
The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window shows the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a
that the door could not be opened from the inside. That dishonest and unjust act in contravention of the plaintiff's legal
sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the right; and (3) the control and breach of duty must proximately
door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was these elements prevents piercing the corporate veil.[13] The
of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have evidence on record fails to show that these elements are present,
happened except for the defendant's negligence; (2) the accident especially given the fact that plaintiffs' complaint had pleaded that
must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the CLC is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
exclusive management or control of the person charged with the the Philippines.
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the On 9th and 10th points raised concerning the award of damages,
person injured.[11] Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to the resolution would rest on factual determinations by the trial
see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and no legal issue
working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the warrants our intervention.
window, instead of the door, shows that something was wrong
with the door. WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted and the Decision and


Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50961 dated antibiotics.

September 28, 2001 and November 23, 2001, respectively, are On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a hospital because of
MODIFIED in that petitioners Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of his
are absolved from personal liability. The Decision and Resolution penis. Presuming that the ulceration was brought about by Hanz’s
are AFFIRMED in all other respects. No pronouncement as to appendicitis, the petitioner referred him to Dr. Henry Go, an
costs. urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a damaged urethra.
Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and thereafter was operated
SO ORDERED. on three times to repair his damaged urethra.
When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and reconstructed, Hanz’s parents brought a criminal charge against
Carpio, JJ., concur. the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries. On April 17, 1997, the information[3] was filed in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Oroquieta City (MTCC), to which
Lumantas, MD v Calapiz, GR No. 163753, 15 January the latter pleaded not guilty on May 22, 1998.[4] Under the order of
2014 April 30, 1999, the case was transferred to the RTC pursuant to
724 Phil. 248 Supreme Court Circular No. 11-99.[5]
At the trial, the Prosecution presented several witnesses, including

Dr. Rufino Agudera as an expert witness and as the physician who
had operated on Hanz twice to repair the damaged urethra. Dr.
FIRST DIVISION
Agudera testified that Hanz had been diagnosed to have urethral
[ G.R. No. 163753, January 15, 2014 ] stricture and cavernosal injury left secondary to trauma that had
necessitated the conduct of two operations to strengthen and to
DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D., PETITIONER, lengthen the urethra. Although satisfactorily explaining that the
VS. HANZ CALAPIZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS, injury to the urethra had been caused by trauma, Dr. Agudera
HILARIO CALAPIZ, JR. AND HERLITA CALAPIZ, could not determine the kind of trauma that had caused the injury.
RESPONDENT.
In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge. He contended

D E C I S I O N that at the time of his examination of Hanz on January 16, 1995, he
had found an accumulation of pus at the vicinity of the appendix

two to three inches from the penis that had required immediate
BERSAMIN, J.:
surgical operation; that after performing the appendectomy, he

had circumcised Hanz with his parents’ consent by using a congo
The acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean his
instrument, thereby debunking the parents’ claim that their child
absolution from civil liability.
had been cauterized; that he had then cleared Hanz on January
The Case
27, 1995 once his fever had subsided; that he had found no
In this appeal, an accused desires the reversal of the decision
complications when Hanz returned for his follow up check-up on
promulgated on February 20, 2003,[1] whereby the Court of
February 2, 1995; and that the abscess formation between the
Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on August 6, 1999
base and the shaft of the penis had been brought about by Hanz’s
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, in Oroquieta City
burst appendicitis.
ordering him to pay moral damages despite his acquittal of the
Ruling of the RTC
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries
In its decision rendered on August 6, 1999,[6] the RTC acquitted the
charged against him.[2]
petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of the evidence. It
Antecedents
held that the Prosecution’s evidence did not show the required
On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and Herlita
standard of care to be observed by other members of the medical
Calapiz brought their 8-year-old son, Hanz Calapiz (Hanz), to the
profession under similar circumstances. Nonetheless, the RTC
Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital, Oroquieta City, for an
ruled that the petitioner was liable for moral damages because
emergency appendectomy. Hanz was attended to by the
there was a preponderance of evidence showing that Hanz had
petitioner, who suggested to the parents that Hanz also undergo
received the injurious trauma from his circumcision by the
circumcision at no added cost to spare him the pain. With the
petitioner. The decision disposed as follows:
parents’ consent, the petitioner performed the coronal type of
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, this court renders
circumcision on Hanz after his appendectomy. On the following
judgment acquitting the accused, Dr. Encarnacion Lumantas, of
day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters.
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries, but
His testicles were swollen. The parents noticed that the child
ordering him to pay Hanz Calapiz P50,000.00 as moral damages.
urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly removed the
No costs.
catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the abnormality as normal.
SO ORDERED.
On January 30, 1995, Hanz was discharged from the hospital over
Ruling of the CA
his parents’ protestations, and was directed to continue taking
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC,[7] sustaining the award of


moral damages. It opined that even if the petitioner had been negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him
acquitted of the crime charged, the acquittal did not necessarily that there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold
mean that he had not incurred civil liability considering that the him civilly liable.[14] With the RTC and the CA both finding that Hanz
Prosecution had preponderantly established the sufferings of had sustained the injurious trauma from the hands of the petitioner
Hanz as the result of the circumcision. on the occasion of or incidental to the circumcision, and that the
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the trauma could have been avoided, the Court must concur with their
[8]
motion on April 28, 2004. uniform findings. In that regard, the Court need not analyze and
Hence, this appeal. weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings a quo.
Issue The Court, by virtue of its not being a trier of facts, should now
Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioner’s civil liability accord the highest respect to the factual findings of the trial court
despite his acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting as affirmed by the CA in the absence of a clear showing by the
in serious physical injuries. petitioner that such findings were tainted with arbitrariness,
Ruling capriciousness or palpable error.
The petition for review lacks merit. Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his body.
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also Although we have long advocated the view that any physical
[9]
civilly liable. Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the injury, like the loss or diminution of the use of any part of one’s
crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In body, is not equatable to a pecuniary loss, and is not susceptible
Manantan v. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court elucidates on the two of exact monetary estimation, civil damages should be assessed
kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as well as on the different once that integrity has been violated. The assessment is but an
effects of acquittal on the civil liability of the accused, viz: imperfect estimation of the true value of one’s body. The usual
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on practice is to award moral damages for the physical injuries
the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground sustained.[15] In Hanz’s case, the undesirable outcome of the
that the accused is not the author of the act or omission circumcision performed by the petitioner forced the young child to
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a endure several other procedures on his penis in order to repair his
person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or damaged urethra. Surely, his physical and moral sufferings
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or properly warranted the amount of P50,000.00 awarded as moral
omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the damages.
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered the injury. Interest
be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is of 6% per annum should then be imposed on the award as a
the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The sincere means of adjusting the value of the award to a level that is
second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the not only reasonable but just and commensurate. Unless we make
guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused the adjustment in the permissible manner by prescribing legal
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil interest on the award, his sufferings would be unduly
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. compounded. For that purpose, the reckoning of interest should
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the be from the filing of the criminal information on April 17, 1997, the
judgment shall state “whether the evidence of the prosecution making of the judicial demand for the liability of the petitioner.
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the February 23, 2003, with the modification that legal interest of 6%
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil per annum to start from April 17, 1997 is imposed on the award of
[11]
liability might arise did not exist.” P50,000.00 as moral damages; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an the costs of suit.
accused does not prevent a judgment from still being rendered SO ORDERED.
against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless the court Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ.,
finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability might concur.
arise did not exist.
Although it found the Prosecution’s evidence insufficient to sustain
a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime Air France v Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155
charged, the RTC did not err in determining and adjudging his civil 124 Phil. 722
liability for the same act complained of based on mere

preponderance of evidence.[12] In this connection, the Court
reminds that the acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not

require that the complainant’s recovery of civil liability should be
through the institution of a separate civil action for that purpose.[13] [ G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966 ]
The petitioner’s contention that he could not be held civilly liable
because there was no proof of his negligence deserves scant AIR FRANCE, PETITIONER, VS. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO
consideration. The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,


RESPONDENTS. open to direct attack. [8] The law, however, solely insists that a
decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's
D E C I S I O N
conclusion is drawn. [9] A court of justice is not hidebound to write
in its decision every bit and piece of evidence [10] presented by one
SANCHEZ, J.: party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be
burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts"
The Court of First Instance of Manila [1] sentenced petitioner to pay which a party "considered as proved”. [11] This is but a part of the
respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate
damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that
representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the
class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its
amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any
the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the
the costs of suit. defense". Because, as this Court well observed, "There is no law
On appeal, [2] the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of that so requires". [12]] Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the
refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for
voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary
costs against petitioner. to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution".
The case is now before us for review on certiorari. It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as "fully supported by that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the
the evidence of record", are: prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning
"Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own
pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. [13] If the court did not
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or each
authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a 'first item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not
class' round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item
to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in 'first class', but at Bangkok, the of evidence. [14] At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within
class' seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the an issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man', who, the it. [15]
Manager alleged, had a 'better right’ to the seat. When asked to Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make,
vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, maybe defined as "the written statement of the ultimate facts as
refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be found by the court x x x and essential to support the decision and
[16]
taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to judgment rendered thereon". They consist of the court's
said Ernesto G. Cuento, 'many of the Filipino passengers got "conclusions with respect to the determinative facts in issue". [17] A
nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man which does not call for an examination of the probative value of
[manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. the evidence presented by the parties." [18]
Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man’ (Transcript, p. 12, 2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal
Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. [19] That
class' seat in the plane." [3] judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the
1. The thrust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review “all business of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions
the findings" [4] of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges of fact. [20]
that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the
all the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support its judgment.
facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate 3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
court's decision. It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts
shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did
based". [5] This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific
determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly,
[6]
the facts and the law on which it is based"; and that "Every the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would
decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the
fact on all issues properly raised before it". [7] availability of first class seats.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and


discussed in its brief before the Court of Appeals under its third raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the
assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as
[25]
that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first free from all error". We reached this policy construction
class seats on the 'definite’ segments of his journey, particularly because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this
[21]
that from Saigon to Beirut". point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus: with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court
"Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which
of a first-class ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. [26]
whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in the If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not
first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat
make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air
first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What
We cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy
airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very
never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal
in payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule
be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document
ordinary course of business that the company should know speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously
[22]
whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not." unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is
disposed of petitioner's contention, thus: desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to
"On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a ‘First class' believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the
ticket, there can be no question. Apart from his testimony, see ticket.
plaintiff's Exhibits 'A’, 'A-1', 'B’, 'B-1’, 'B-2’, 'C’ and 'C-1’, and The foregoing are the considerations which point to the
defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court of Appeals
testimony and testified as follows: predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class
Q. In these tickets there are marks 'O.K.’ From what you know, ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a
what does this O.K. mean? stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. [27] We perceive
A. That the space is confirmed. no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's
Q. Confirmed for first class? statement of its position", as charged by petitioner. [28] Nor do we
A. Yes, 'first class'. (Transcript, p. 169) subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso
x x x x "surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue". [29] And
"Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the
Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because
was issued a 'first class' airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". [30] Why, then,
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if
testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits 'A’, 'A-1', 'B', 'B-1', 'C’ and 4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages.
'C-1’ belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted
the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral
reservation whatever. damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; [31] and
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of
Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a 'first class' bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this
accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot issue are:
believe that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal "3. That x x x plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with
understanding with plaintiff that the 'first class’ ticket issued to him the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable consideration, the latter
[23]
by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong." acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed
difference of a few pesos in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's plane during
ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as
the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, x x x
such a judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of the 4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to
[24]
lower court. Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to the
Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after protestations,
was free from prejudicial error and that "all questions raised by the arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with
assignments of error and all questions that might have been so defendant's employees.


5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of
instead furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class accommodations from defendant ever contradicted or denied this evidence for the
Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, x x x the plaintiff has been plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to present its
compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated. secure his deposition; but defendant did neither. [37]
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the The Court of Appeals further stated -
inconvenience and embarrassments brought by defendant's "Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation
breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American World was made by the white man. Hence, if the employees of the
[32]
Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila. defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the
x x x x seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First been picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be
Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his
inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white
causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the
feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff
[33]
damages in the amount of P30,000.00." who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened
was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, there, by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga
amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said who, when asked to explain the meaning of the letters 'O.K.'
contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said 'that the space is
transportation at Bangkok; and Third, That there was bad faith confirmed’ for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another
when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his witness for defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office
first class accommodation berth "after he was already seated" and of defendant, testified as follows:
to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered ‘Q. How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing reservation the passenger has arranged with you?
him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social A. They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation,' (t.s.n., p.
humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no 247, June 19, 1959)
specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has
inference of bad faith is there; it may be drawn from the facts and said on this point:
circumstances set forth therein. [34] The contract was averred to 'Why did the, using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,
establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the 'white man’ have a 'better right' to the seat occupied by Mr.
action is put on wrongful expulsion. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The defendant airline did not
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right at the start of the prove ‘any better', nay, any right on the part of the 'white man’ to
trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard on what the 'First class’ seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which
Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in he paid and was issued a corresponding 'first class' ticket.
Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who 'If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's
[35]
gave his seat to a white man; and (b) evidence of bad faith in Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could have easily proven it by
the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on having taken the testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but
the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully
to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par. (e), Rules
justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained
any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to to find, as it does find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in
[36]
conform to the evidence is not even required. On the question Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw
of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared: him out of the plane if he did not give up his 'first class’ seat
"That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the
compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air France words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the 'white man’” [38]
while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted
without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently portion first transcribed did not use the term "bad faith". But can it
established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court, be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The
corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to
the plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows: a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly
'First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of
his will, and that the captain refused to intervene’, *** and by the having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to
testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a another passenger whose right thereto has not been established.
co-passenger. The captain of the plane who was asked by the Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has
manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For,


"bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train
[39]
for ulterior purpose." reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger
finding of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance, which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as
thus: by calling him a lunatic," and the Supreme Court of South Carolina
"The evidence shows that defendant violated its contract of there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said
transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating passenger. [48]
circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public
extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed
passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the 'first upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by
class’ seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of the the petitioner-air carrier - a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a 'white man’ whom he (defendant's proper.
Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not 7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's
proven that this 'white man’ had any 'better right' to occupy the testimony, thus -
'first class' seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and "Q. You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and
for which the corresponding 'first class’ ticket was issued by the purser?
defendant to him." [40] A. When we left already - that was already in the trip - I could not
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its help it. So one of the flight attendants approached me and
[41]
employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. For the requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said,
willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his 'We will note that you were transferred to the tourist class'. I said,
employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: 'Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to accepting my transfer.'
And I also said, 'You are not going to note anything there because
"ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in I am protesting to this transfer'.
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy Q. Was she able to note it?
shall compensate the latter for the damage." A. No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q. About that purser?
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; A. Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable
and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil and you don't have enough leg room, I stood up and I went to the
Code, moral damages are recoverable. [42] pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, 'I
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and have recorded the incident in my notebook.' He read it and
[43]
degree from any other contractual relation. And this, because of translated it to me - because it was recorded in French - 'First class
the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to that the captain refused to intervene.'
avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air MR. VALTE -
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, because the best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor.
could give ground for an action for damages. COURT -
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a I will allow that as part of his testimony." [49]
right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First class
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rude that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence
or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
carrier. [44] incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the
[45]
Thus, "Where a steamship company had accepted a proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a admissible. [49A]
right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the
falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still
payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died
[46]
not insulting and she was not ejected. And this, because, down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part
although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both of the res gestae. [50] For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement
[51]
in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract and mental and physical condition of the declarant". The
[47]
may be also a tort". And in another case, "Where a passenger utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was
on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare, spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster


[52]
incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res
gestae. In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)[1] and Ruby Lim assail the Decision[2] of
an employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the
petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the 104, as well as the Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals dated 09
purser could have cleared up the matter. July 2002 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is
admissible in evidence. The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the brought under the human relations provisions of the New Civil
court ample power to grant exemplary damages - in contracts and Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more
quasi-contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have popularly known by the screen name “Amay Bisaya,” alleged that
"acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he
[53]
manner". The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,[5] he was spotted by
from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached
[54]
addition to moral damages. him.[6] Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s
9. The right to attorneys’ fees is fully established. The grant of penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager,
exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.[7] Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for
The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but him for which she replied: “of course.”[8] Mr. Reyes then went up
just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. [55] We do not with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was
intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well the latter’s present for the celebrant.[9] At the penthouse, they first
exercised - as it was here - should not be disturbed. had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the with the party of Dr. Filart.[10] After a couple of hours, when the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00, as moral buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but,
damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by
P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko
[56]
primarily with the trial court. The Court of Appeals did not as Executive Secretary thereof.[11] In a loud voice and within the
interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a
we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party
[57]
circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof. (“huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals lang”).[12] Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr.
does not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm Filart.[13] Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however,
the same. Costs against petitioner. completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and
SO ORDERED. humiliation.[14] Not long after, while he was still recovering from the
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked
Zaldivar and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur. him to step out of the hotel.[15] Like a common criminal, he was
Bengzon, J.P., J., no part. escorted out of the party by the policeman.[16] Claiming damages,
Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One
Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.[17]
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et al. v Reyes, GR No.
154259, 28 February 2005 Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave
492 Phil. 615 the party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by
the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotel’s Executive

Secretary for the past twenty (20) years.[18] One of her functions
included organizing the birthday party of the hotel’s former
SECOND DIVISION
General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.[19] The year 1994 was no different.
[ G.R. NO. 154259, February 28, 2005 ] For Mr. Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive
guest list and extended invitations accordingly.[20] The guest list
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIM, was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest
PETITIONERS, VS. ROBERTO REYES, A.K.A. “AMAY friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one
BISAYA,” RESPONDENT. of those invited.[21] At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at

D E C I S I O N the bar counter ordering a drink.[22] Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s
wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy
Miller, the “captain waiter,” to inquire as to the presence of Mr.


Reyes who was not invited.[23] Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. therefore fail.[42]On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.[24] As Dr. Filart was engaged in ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the
conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud
interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. voice within hearing distance of several guests:
Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him
Reyes.[25] Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to that he should not finish his food and to leave the place within the
[26]
leave the party as he was not invited. Mr. Reyes, however, hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to
lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate
[27]
Mr. Reyes did not want to leave. When Ms. Lim turned around, the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a
she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability
[28]
later approached. Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not
knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely,
Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity
party as he was not invited.[29] Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to
Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to morals or good customs.[43]The Court of Appeals likewise ruled
speak to him herself as there were no other guests in the that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to
[30]
immediate vicinity. However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to
himself to the food, she decided to wait.[31] When Mr. Reyes went to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr.
a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in
“alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha private:
na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been
pwede lang po umalis na kayo.”[32] She then turned around done by appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and
trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the
to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and latter should leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close
[33]
even threatened to dump food on her. friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to

approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s invitation, appellant could
lower court, also gave her version of the story to the effect that not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is
[34]
she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party. According to her, it was equally liable.
Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended
for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not . . .
[35]
to the penthouse but to Altitude 49. When they reached the
penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are
properly dressed and was not invited.[36] All the while, she thought predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one
that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but
[37]
bar talking to Col. Batung. Then there was a commotion and she respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every
[38] [39]
saw Mr. Reyes shouting. She ignored Mr. Reyes. She was person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages,
embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad
[40]
invited him. faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence.

It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
[41]
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some
giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud
discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).[44]Consequently, the
likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr.
thrown out of the party as he was uninvited: Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred
of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorney’s fees in the amount
invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).[45] On motion for
the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision
some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants as the argument raised in the motion had “been amply discussed
Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered.”[46]

(Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was
not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim
join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His contend that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in –
action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must I.


… NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA reviewing and revising errors of law.[51] One of the exceptions to
CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS this general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the
A GATE-CRASHER Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.[52] The
lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr.
II. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and
… HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms.
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr.
ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA “COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place
SUCH HUMILIATION,” “WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILART’S within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however,
INVITATION” were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that brought Mr.
Reyes to the party.
III.
… DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
COURT AS REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY
CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible
the lower court’s findings of fact.
IV.
… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT
THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,[53]
PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotel’s former Manager, a
Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited
V. (by the celebrant)[54] and who could not just disappear into the
… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor. While he was
THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE already spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the
PROCEEDINGSPetitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the
pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be celebrant’s instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally
made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of want to get rid of the “gate-crasher” in the most hush-hush manner
being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in in order not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless
the process) as he was a “gate-crasher.” affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her
former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr.
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to follow
not esteemed in law as injury”[47]) refers to self-inflicted injury[48] or the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and
[49]
to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of some of the hotel’s personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden
damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him
[50]
himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. As to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim
formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find would do that and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the
application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed
assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very
under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under close. Close enough for him to kiss:
obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you
unnecessary ridicule and shame. while you were at the buffet table? How close was she when she
approached you?
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted
abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. “Amay Bisaya,” to leave A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof
thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close
Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not and she shouted?
Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
A: Yes. She said, “wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito,
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and bumaba ka na lang.”
irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and
evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed, the general
rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to . . .


Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in

A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.[55]In the a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate shall compensate the latter for the damage.Article 21[65] refers to
Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There
unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good
Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent
wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the to injure.[66]

testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not
inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,[67] and that is,
correct in observing that – the act complained of must be intentional.[68]

Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the
request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has
nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him.
him only and there could have been no intention on her part to These two people did not know each other personally before the
cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer
request that must have made the other guests aware of what for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except
transpired between them. . . the statement that Ms. Lim, being “single at 44 years old,” had a
“very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign
[56]
for the police to take him out. Moreover, another problem with businessmen.”[69] The lameness of this argument need not be
Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19
basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to
however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
his witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander
Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to
party.[57] leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the

circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the appellate court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of personally
party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if
damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action
neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability “predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one
[58]
springs from that of its employee. person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but

respect of such dignity.”[70] Without proof of any ill-motive on her
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to
[59]
principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs.
and social grievances. Article 19 states: Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the Reyes.[71] If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
and observe honesty and good faith.Elsewhere, we explained that
when “a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the exemplary damages[72] especially for the reason stated by the
[60]
wrongdoer must be responsible.” The object of this article, Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held –
therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because
only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of of the latter’s lowly station in life. This has to be limited
one’s duties.[61] These standards are the following: act with justice, somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established.
[62]
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions under
antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety (Code
injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of public good and to avert further commission of such acts,
[63]
prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees.[73]The
action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs
Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of counter with the very facts of the case and the evidence on hand.
law[64] which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in question, Mr.
her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, Reyes was “an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program
states: over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer Composer


(MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz extended judicial contest resulting from the unfortunate
Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of occurrence.
the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages
of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines.”[74] During his whereof were alternately initiated by the parties, petitioners are
direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of respondent
income[75] and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, court promulgated on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060
the records are bereft of any information as to the social and with the following decretal portion:
economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the "WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiff's
conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot withstand complaint is hereby reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby
scrutiny as it is without basis. rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to
plaintiffs the following amounts:1. Moral damages, P30,000.00;2.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;3. Attorney's fees, P20,000.00,
damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s and costs.However, denial of defendants-appellees' counterclaims
exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety is affirmed."[1]
and good faith, must be his to bear alone. Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that
respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took
and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the place and from which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year
Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos,
dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid
dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong
SO ORDERED. and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when
Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the
concur. first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering
Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted
in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her.
In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best
Libi v IAC, GR No. 70890, 18 September 1992 friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana
288 Phil. 780 Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a
single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and
Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi,
EN BANC which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the
[ G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992 ] residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom

and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the
CRESENCIO LIBI* AND AMELIA YAP LIBI, PETITIONERS,
VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their parents,
GOTIONG AND SHIRLEY GOTIONG, RESPONDENTS. who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective
theories drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence,

available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.

D E C I S I O N Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter,
submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the

aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to
REGALADO, J.: commit suicide. On the other hand, petitioners, puzzled and
likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the

imputation and contended that an unknown third party, whom
One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his
sometimes a touchstone of love. A tragic illustration is provided by work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics
the instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of
Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell's death and then shot
their years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they have Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.
touched. While we cannot expect to award complete assuagement As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case
to their families through seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this
No. R-17774 in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
disposition should at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an
parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's


vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance
the court below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as which are general characteristics of contact or near-contact fire.
follows: On direct examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby clarification:
rendered dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for insufficiency of the "Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made
evidence. Defendants’ counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of that there would be no black residue or tattooing that could result
[2]
sufficient merit." from these guns because they are what we call clean?A Yes, sir. I
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court know that there are what we call smokeless powder.ATTY.
dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set ORTIZ:Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder
aside and another judgment was rendered against is smokeless, those indications that you said may not rule out the
defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal by possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches, is that
certiorari, now submit for resolution the following issues in this correct?A If the … assuming that the gun used was ... the bullet
case: used was a smokeless powder.Q At any rate, doctor, from . . .
1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial disregarding those other matters that you have noticed, the
court in accordance with established decisional laws; and2. singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on the trajectory of the
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly bullets as shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact that the gun
interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for could have been fired by the person himself, the victim himself,
vicarious liability.[3] Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little above the
In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police right ear and point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on
Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions your oath?A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as
on some postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot far as the trajectory of the bullet is concerned and as far as the
wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. angle or the manner of fire is concerned, it could have been fired
However, undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the by the victim."[7]
absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets[8]
of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that this is found at the scene of the crime, each of which were the bullets
not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the
determination of whether it was suicide or not. sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the National
It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of Bureau of Investigation,[9] shows that there is only one gunshot
contact or close-contact of an explosive discharge in the entrance wound of entrance located at the right temple of Wendell Libi. The
wound. However, as pointed out by private respondents, the body necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna states:
of deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral x x x"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with
parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) contusion collar widest inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges inverted,
hours from the occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself oriented upward, located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8
could not categorically state that the body of Wendell Libi was left cms. Behind and 5.5 cms. above right external auditory meatus,
untouched at the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his directed slightly forward, upward and to the left, involving skin and
autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not soft tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the temporal bone,
conducting a paraffin test on Wendell Libi, hence possible right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating extensively along its
evidence of gunpowder residue on Wendell's hands was forever course the brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally
lost when Wendell was hastily buried. making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted,
More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy parietal region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left
on the body of Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident external auditory meatus.x x x"Evidence of contact or
or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on close-contact fire, such as burning around the gunshot wound of
the record of death; that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan entrance, gunpowder tattooing (sic), smudging, singeing of hair,
Funeral Homes, the body of the deceased was already on the extensive laceration or bursting of the gunshot wound of entrance,
autopsy table and in the stage of rigor mortis; and that said body or separation of the skin from the underlying tissue are absent."[10]
was not washed, but it was dried.[4] However, on redirect On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which
examination, he admitted that during the 8-hour interval, he never was made of record, thus:
saw the body nor did he see whether said body was wiped or "Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and
washed in the area of the wound on the head which he examined following the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet
because the deceased was inside the morgue.[5] In fact, on and the exit of the wound, and measuring yourself 24 inches, will
cross?examination, he had earlier admitted that as far as the you please indicate to the Honorable Court how would it have
entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of been possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please
the wound are concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot indicate the 24 inches?WITNESS:A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is
himself.[6] approximately one arm's length . . .ATTY. SENINING:I would like to
He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on make of record that the witness has demonstrated by extending
the head of the victim and that he found no burning or singeing of his right arm almost straight towards his head."[11]


Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave good father of a family, hence they should not be civilly liable for
credence to the testimonies of defendants' witnesses Lydia Ang the crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the
and James Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of an apartment evidence on record either.
across the street from the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her
the house adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who declared having husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety
seen a "shadow" of a person at the gate of the Gotiong house deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these
after hearing shots therefrom. petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's key
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell.
where she was staying faces the gas station; that it is the second They have never been their son Wendell taking or using the gun.
apartment; that from her window she can see directly the gate of She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no
the Gotiongs; and, that there is a firewall between her apartment longer in the safety deposit box.[16] We, accordingly, cannot but
and the gas station.[12] After seeing a man jump from the gate of entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been
the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the Tans, she called the police exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely
station but the telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold
with James Enrique Tan and told him that she saw a man leap from thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was
[13]
the gate towards his rooftop. negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on his mother where the other key was.
top of the gate of the Gotiongs, but denied having talked with The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a
anyone regarding what he saw. He explained that he lives in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the
duplex house with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely
Felipe Gotiong's house; and he further gave the following answers remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the
to these questions: activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much
"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).Q What is the height of the wall of so that it was only at the time of Wendell's death that they
the Gotiong's in relation to your house?WITNESS:A It is about 8 allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that
feet.ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)Q And where were you looking Cresencio's gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both
from?WITNESS:A From upstairs in my living room.ATTY. ORTIZ parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in
(TO WITNESS)Q From your living room window, is that monitoring and knowing the activities of their children who, for all
correct?WITNESS:A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being
[14]
high." drug informers,[17] or even drug users. Neither was a plausible
Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a
court that the same do not inspire credence as to the reliability handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof,[18] holding
and accuracy of the witnesses' observations, since the visual uptight what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he
perceptions of both were obstructed by high walls in their was in possession of that firearm.
respective houses in relation to the house of herein private In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding
respondents. On the other hand, witness Manolo Alfonso, petitioners civilly liable, as explained at the start of this opinion,
testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he and respondent court waved aside the protestations of diligence on
his sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when the part of petitioners and had this to say:
they heard her scream; that when Manolo climbed the fence to "x x x It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their
see what was going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the children who may be engaged in this dangerous activity involving
first shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he heard the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent
another shot. Consequently, he went down from the fence and in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping
drove to the police station to report the incident.[15] Manolo's direct said gun from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from
and candid testimony establishes and explains the fact that it was killing, Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under
he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:
of a man at the gate of the Gotiong house. ‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
We have perforce to reject petitioners' effete and unsubstantiated responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who
pretension that it was another man who shot Wendell and Julie live in their company.'
Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or "Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from
present any suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against having access to said gun which was allegedly kept in a safety
any alleged "John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial court's deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the
dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was
because of the overwhelming evidence -- testimonial, living in their company. This various liability herein
documentary and pictorial -- the confluence of which point to defendants-appellees has been reiterated by the Supreme Court
Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for in many cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas vs.
her rejection of his persistent pleas for a reconciliation. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held
Petitioners' defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a that:


'The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their readings that if the liability of the parents for crimes or
minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents
covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense
offenses.' that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to
'The subsidiary liability of parent's arising from the criminal acts of prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to
their minor children who acted with discernment is determined the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would
under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 constitute a valid and substantial defense.
of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their
covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of
absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors,
the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the
caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is minor and the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
caused with criminal intent.' (3 SCRA 361-362). mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is
"x x x In the instant case, minor son of herein primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article
defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key 2180 provides that "(t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall
to the drawer where said gun was kept under lock without cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
defendant-spouses ever knowing that said gun had been missing observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi ha(d) a picture damage."
taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and dedicated this We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies
picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not
Wendell Libi was said to have kept said gun in his car, in keeping subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
up with his supposed role of a CANU agent. x x x."x x x"Based on "Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. ?x x xFirst. In
the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court holds cases of subdivisions x x x 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability
that the lower court was not correct in dismissing herein for acts committed by x x x a person under nine years of age, or by
plaintiffs-appellants' complaint because as preponderantly shown one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted
by evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there
son from committing this crime by means of the gun of was no fault or negligence on their part." (Emphases supplied.)[21]
defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under the foregoing provision the civil liability of the parents for
under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and
[19]
box only after the crime had been committed." (Emphases ours.) primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or
We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a
should be held liable for the civil liability based on what appears good father of a family.
from all indications was a crime committed by their minor son. We That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond
take this opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in
ratiocination therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or
clarification. shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case
In imposing sanctions for the so-called, vicarious liability of of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto
[20]
petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas vs. Cadano, et al. of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that "(i)f the minor
which supposedly holds that "(t)he subsidiary liability of parents for causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor x x x shall
damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 be answerable with his own property in an action against him
of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex
quasi-delicts and criminal offenses," followed by an extended delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third
quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal "Should there be no person having such x x x minor under his
Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be
caused by their minor children. The quoted passages are set out insolvent, said x x x minor shall respond with (his) own property,
two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for purposes of excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with
the discussion hereunder. civil law."
Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor
the parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as being children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the
subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code
considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which has, aside from the aforecited case of FueIlas, been the subject of
warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our a number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde vs.


Capuno, et al.,[22] Araneta vs. Arreglado,[23] Salen, et al. vs. Balce,[24] the other classes.[30]

Paleyan, etc., et al. vs. Bangkili, et al.,[25] and Elcano, et al. vs. Hill, Also, coming back to respondent court's reliance on Fuellas in its
[26]
et al. Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the decision in the present case, it is not exactly accurate to say that
issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A
minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with careful scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted
discernment, and also of minors 15 years of age or over, since verbatim in its decision now on appeal in the present case, and
these situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal which it attributed to Fuellas, was the syllabus on the law report of
Code. In both instances, this Court held that the issue of parental said case which spoke of "subsidiary" liability. However, such
civil liability should be resolved in accordance with the provisions categorization does not specifically appear in the text of the
of Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in decision in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing therein the cases of
Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the discussions in said cases of
hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of
quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in the the Civil Code, this Court concluded its decision in this wise.
absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents "Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals
would be liable but not where the damage is caused with criminal on the basis of evidence submitted therein by both parties,
intent. In said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances independent of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or
resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the Court's negligence under Article 2176 upon which the present action was
determination of whether the liability of the parents, in cases instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children, is arising from fault or negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177),
primary or subsidiary. and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double stated, any discussion as to the minor's criminal responsibility is of
homicide through reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action no moment."
arising from the crime the minor and his father were held jointly Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that
and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence the parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil
Of a good father of a family. The same liability in solidum and, liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor
therefore, primary liability was imposed in a separate civil action in children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their
Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son who was found company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the
guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages.
the Civil Code providing for solidary responsibility of two or more That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict. the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto
However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but
damages arising from the conviction of his son, who was over 15 under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with
but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who
time, disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of
case, as already explained, the petitioners herein were also held age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article
liable but supposedly in line with Fuellas which purportedly 2180 of the Civil Code.[31]
declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be
serious physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On the effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
other hand, in Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son were the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare
adjudged solidarity liable for damages arising from his conviction Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father
for homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case
since this is likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may
Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano, although the son was acquitted in a also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the
homicide charge due to "lack of intent, coupled with mistake," it youthful offender.[32] However, under the Family Code, this civil
was ruled that while under Article 2180 of the Civil Code there liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the
should be solidary liability for damages, since the son, "although responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental
married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from authority over the minor offender.[33] For civil liability arising from
him at the time of the occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
of equity" the father was only held subsidiarily liable. accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides modified.
for subsidiary liability only for persons causing damages under the In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann
compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by
[27]
uncontrollable fear; innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners
of establishments;[28] employers, teachers, persons and liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding
[29]
corporations engaged in industry; and principals, accomplices modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the
and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused in bases of the legal imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its


findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite science student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science
diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages. and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went to
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed college mainly through the financial support of her relatives.
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, During the second semester of school year 2001-2002, she
with costs against petitioners. enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents
SO ORDERED. Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Romero, Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur. In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the
Feliciano, J., on leave. “Rave Party and Dance Revolution,” the proceeds of which were to
Davide, Jr., and Campos, Jr., JJ., no part. go to the construction of the school’s tennis and volleyball courts.
Melo, J., no part, on leave. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of
P100 each. The project was allegedly implemented by
recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional
points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied
Regino v Pangasinan Colleges of Science and the opportunity to take the final examinations.
Technology, GR No. 156109, 18 November 2004
485 Phil. 446 Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending
dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the

tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the scheduled dates of
the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers --
THIRD DIVISION
Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad -- allegedly
[ G.R. No. 156109, November 18, 2004 ] disallowed her from taking the tests. According to petitioner,
Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her classmates
KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, ASSISTED AND were taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after
REPRESENTED BY ARMANDO REGINO, PETITIONER, VS. announcing to the entire class that she was not permitting
PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND petitioner and another student to take their statistics examinations
TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A. GAMUROT AND ELISSA
for failing to pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected them from the
BALADAD, RESPONDENTS.
classroom. Petitioner’s pleas ostensibly went unheeded by
DECISION Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions
as compliance with PCST’s policy.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a

Complaint[5] for damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. In
Upon enrolment, students and their school enter upon a reciprocal
her Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal damages;
contract. The students agree to abide by the standards of
P500,000 as moral damages; at least P1,000,000 as exemplary
academic performance and codes of conduct, issued usually in the
damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus the costs of litigation
form of manuals that are distributed to the enrollees at the start of
and attorney’s fees.
the school term. Further, the school informs them of the itemized

fees they are expected to pay. Consequently, it cannot, after the
On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[6] on the
enrolment of a student, vary the terms of the contract. It cannot
ground of petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
require fees other than those it specified upon enrolment.
According to respondents, the question raised involved the

determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of the
The Case
PCST; hence, the case should have been initiated before the

proper administrative body, the Commission of Higher Education
Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,[1] seeking
(CHED).
to nullify the July 12, 2002[2] and the November 22, 2002[3] Orders

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan
In her Comment to respondents’ Motion, petitioner argued that
(Branch 48) in Civil Case No. U-7541. The decretal portion of the
prior exhaustion of administrative remedies was unnecessary,
first assailed Order reads:
because her action was not administrative in nature, but one
“WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the instant motion to dismiss for
purely for damages arising from respondents’ breach of the laws
lack of cause of action.”[4]The second challenged Order denied
on human relations. As such, jurisdiction lay with the courts.
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

On July 12, 2002, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of
The Facts
cause of action.

Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court


In granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, the trial court noted Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no relevance to the
that the instant controversy involved a higher institution of present case since she is praying for damages, a remedy beyond
learning, two of its faculty members and one of its students. It the domain of the CHED and well within the jurisdiction of the
added that Section 54 of the Education Act of 1982 vested in the courts.[11]

Commission on Higher Education (CHED) the supervision and
regulation of tertiary schools. Thus, it ruled that the CHED, not the Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of exhaustion of
[7]
courts, had jurisdiction over the controversy. administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case. In

Factoran Jr. v. CA,[12] the Court had occasion to elucidate on the
In its dispositive portion, the assailed Order dismissed the rationale behind this doctrine:
Complaint for “lack of cause of action” without, however, “The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic.
explaining this ground. Courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not
entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present Petition on pure questions first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given
[8]
of law. the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors,

if any, committed in the administrative forum. x x x.[13]”Petitioner is
Issues not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she
demanding it to allow her to take her final examinations; she was
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our already enrolled in another educational institution. A reversal of
consideration: the acts complained of would not adequately redress her
“Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative grievances; under the circumstances, the consequences of
remedies applies in a civil action exclusively for damages based respondents’ acts could no longer be undone or rectified.
on violation of the human relation provisions of the Civil Code,
filed by a student against her former school. Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when
there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act
“Whether or not there is a need for prior declaration of invalidity of upon the matter complained of.[14] Administrative agencies are not
a certain school administrative policy by the Commission on courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they
Higher Education (CHED) before a former student can successfully deemed judicial tribunals.[15] Specifically, the CHED does not have
maintain an action exclusively for damages in regular courts. the power to award damages.[16] Hence, petitioner could not have
commenced her case before the Commission.
“Whether or not the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) has
exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for damages based Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which
upon violation of the Civil Code provisions on human relations arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction
filed by a student against the school.”[9]All of the foregoing point to of the trial court.[17] Petitioner’s action for damages inevitably calls
one issue -- whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a
remedies is applicable. The Court, however, sees a second issue function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.[18]

which, though not expressly raised by petitioner, was impliedly
contained in her Petition: whether the Complaint stated sufficient Second Issue:
cause(s) of action. Cause of Action

The Court’s Ruling Sufficient Causes of Action Stated
The Petition is meritorious. in the Allegations in the Complaint

First Issue: As a rule, every complaint must sufficiently allege a cause of
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies action; failure to do so warrants its dismissal.[19] A complaint is said
to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears
Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on petitioner’s solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the
alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting relief prayed for. Assuming the facts that are alleged to be true,
to the RTC. According to them, the determination of the the court should be able to render a valid judgment in accordance
controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom and the propriety of with the prayer in the complaint.[20]

PCST’s academic policy. Thus, the Complaint should have been
lodged in the CHED, the administrative body tasked under A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action
Republic Act No. 7722 to implement the state policy to “protect, hypothetically admits the truth of the alleged facts. In their Motion
foster and promote the right of all citizens to affordable quality to Dismiss, respondents did not dispute any of petitioner’s
education at all levels and to take appropriate steps to ensure allegations, and they admitted that “x x x the crux of plaintiff’s
[10]
that education is accessible to all.” cause of action is the determination of whether or not the


assessment of P100 per ticket is excessive or oppressive.”[21] They . another forced distribution of tickets to its students in the first semester
thereby premised their prayer for dismissal on the Complaint’s of school year 2001-2002; x x x ” [22]
alleged failure to state a cause of action. Thus, a reexamination of The foregoing allegations show two causes of action; first, breach
the Complaint is in order. of contract; and second, liability for tort.

The Complaint contains the following factual allegations: Reciprocity of the
“10. In the second week of February 2002, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot,
School-Student
Contract
in connivance with PCST, forced plaintiff and her classmates to buy
or
take two tickets each, x x x; In Alcuaz v. PSBA,[23] the Court characterized the relationship
between the school and the student as a contract, in which “a
“11. Plaintiff and many of her classmates objected to the forced distribution once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for
student,
and selling of tickets to them but the said defendant warned them one
that ifsemester.”
[24]
Two years later, in Non v. Dames II,[25] the Court
they refused [to] take or pay the price of the two tickets they would not the “termination of contract theory” in Alcuaz by holding
modified
be allowed at all to take the final examinations; that the contractual relationship between the school and the
student is not only semestral in duration, but for the entire period
“12. As if to add insult to injury, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot bribed are expected to complete it.”[26] Except for the variance
the latter
students with additional fifty points or so in their test score in her
in the period during which the contractual relationship is
subject just to unjustly influence and compel them into taking the
considered to subsist, both Alcuaz and Non were unanimous in
tickets; characterizing the school-student relationship as contractual in

nature.
“13. Despite the students’ refusal, they were forced to take the tickets

because [of] defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot’s coercion and act of
The school-student relationship is also reciprocal. Thus, it has
intimidation, but still many of them including the plaintiff did not attend
consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of such
the dance party imposed upon them by defendants PCST and Rachelle
kind -- it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations.
A. Gamurot;
The school undertakes to provide students with education

sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or a
“14. Plaintiff was not able to pay the price of her own two tickets because
profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by the
aside form the fact that she could not afford to pay them it is also
academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and
against her religious practice as a member of a certain religious
regulations.[27]
congregation to be attending dance parties and celebrations;

The
“15. On March 14, 2002, before defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot gave terms
her of the school-student contract are defined at the
class its final examination in the subject ‘Logic’ she warnedmoment
that of its inception -- upon enrolment of the student.
students who had not paid the tickets would not be allowed Standards
to of academic performance and the code of behavior and
discipline
participate in the examination, for which threat and intimidation many are usually set forth in manuals distributed to new
students were eventually forced to make payments: students at the start of every school year. Further, schools inform
prospective enrollees the amount of fees and the terms of
payment.
“16. Because plaintiff could not afford to pay, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot
not
inhumanly made plaintiff sit out the class but the defendant did
allow her to take her final examination in ‘Logic;’ In practice, students are normally required to make a down
payment upon enrollment, with the balance to be paid before
“17. On March 15, 2002 just before the giving of the final examination in the preliminary, midterm and final examination. Their failure to
every
subject ‘Statistics,’ defendant Elissa Baladad, in connivance pay
with financial obligation is regarded as a valid ground for the
their
defendants Rachelle A. Gamurot and PCST, announced in the classroom
school to deny them the opportunity to take these examinations.
that she was not allowing plaintiff and another student to take
the
examination for their failure and refusal to pay the price of the tickets,
The foregoing practice does not merely ensure compliance with
and thenceforth she ejected plaintiff and the other student from the obligations; it also underlines the importance of major
financial
classroom; examinations. Failure to take a major examination is usually fatal
to the students’ promotion to the next grade or to graduation.
“18. Plaintiff pleaded for a chance to take the examination but all defendants
Examination results form a significant basis for their final grades.
could say was that the prohibition to give the examinations to tests are usually a primary and an indispensable requisite to
These
non-paying students was an administrative decision; their elevation to the next educational level and, ultimately, to their
completion of a course.
“19. Plaintiff has already paid her tuition fees and other obligations in the

school;
Education is not a measurable commodity. It is not possible to

determine who is “better educated” than another. Nevertheless, a
“20 That the above-cited incident was not a first since PCST also did
student’s grades are an accepted approximation of what would


otherwise be an intangible product of countless hours of study. make such declaration accessible to all.
The importance of grades cannot be discounted in a setting where
education is generally the gate pass to employment opportunities “Every student has a right to select a profession or course of study,
and better life; such grades are often the means by which a subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
prospective employer measures whether a job applicant has requirements.”The same state policy resonates in Section 9(2) of
acquired the necessary tools or skills for a particular profession or BP 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982:
trade. “Section 9. Rights of Students in School. – In addition to other
rights, and subject to the limitations prescribed by law and
Thus, students expect that upon their payment of tuition fees, regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the
satisfaction of the set academic standards, completion of following rights:
academic requirements and observance of school rules and
regulations, the school would reward them by recognizing their x x x x x x x x x
“completion” of the course enrolled in. (2) The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing
curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,
The obligation on the part of the school has been established in except in cases of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary
[28] [29]
Magtibay v. Garcia, Licup v. University of San Carlos and regulations.”Liability for Tort
[30]
Ateneo de Manila University v. Garcia, in which the Court held
that, barring any violation of the rules on the part of the students, In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private respondents
an institution of higher learning has a contractual obligation to “inhumanly punish students x x x by reason only of their poverty,
afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon
they seek to pursue. [petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness;”[33] as
a result of such punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any
We recognize the need of a school to fund its facilities and to meet of her subjects for the second semester of that school year and
astronomical operating costs; this is a reality in running it. Crystal had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of
[31]
v. Cebu International School upheld the imposition by respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental
respondent school of a “land purchase deposit” in the amount of agony and “demoralization of unimaginable proportions” in
P50,000 per student to be used for the “purchase of a piece of violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. These
land and for the construction of new buildings and other facilities x provisions of the law state thus:
x x which the school would transfer [to] and occupy after the “Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
expiration of its lease contract over its present site.” the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.”
The amount was refundable after the student graduated or left the
school. After noting that the imposition of the fee was made only “Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
after prior consultation and approval by the parents of the in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
students, the Court held that the school committed no actionable policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
wrong in refusing to admit the children of the petitioners therein
for their failure to pay the “land purchase deposit” and the 2.5 “Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
percent monthly surcharge thereon. privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
measure belatedly, in the middle of the semester. It exacted the prevention and other relief:
dance party fee as a condition for the students’ taking the final (1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
examinations, and ultimately for its recognition of their ability to (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
finish a course. The fee, however, was not part of the (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
school-student contract entered into at the start of the school (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in
year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.”
of the enrollees. Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not
otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution, however,
Such contract is by no means an ordinary one. In Non, we may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its
stressed that the school-student contract “is imbued with public students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a
interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to tort. We ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA,[34] from which we quote:
education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory “x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that
[32]
powers over all educational institutions.” Sections 5 (1) and (3) of obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution provide: extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not
“The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.
quality education at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to However, this impression has not prevented this Court from


determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a Complaint and, with all deliberate speed, to continue the
contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private proceedings in Civil Case No. U-7541. No costs.
respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion
from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, SO ORDERED.
however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline’s liability
as one arising from tort, not one arising form a contract of Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability Corona, J., on leave.
from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort. x x x This view was not all
that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already
of a similar mind. In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr.
Justice Fisher elucidated thus: ‘x x x. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the
contract would have constituted the source of an
extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the
parties.’

“Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code
on Human Relations, particularly Article 21 x x x.”[35]Academic
Freedom

In their Memorandum, respondents harp on their right to
“academic freedom.” We are not impressed. According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1)
who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and
(4) who may be admitted to study.[36] In Garcia v. the Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,[37] the Court
upheld the respondent therein when it denied a female student’s
admission to theological studies in a seminary for prospective
priests. The Court defined the freedom of an academic institution
thus: “to decide for itself aims and objectives and how best to
attain them x x x free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.”[38]

In Tangonan v. Paño,[39] the Court upheld, in the name of academic

freedom, the right of the school to refuse readmission of a nursing
student who had been enrolled on probation, and who had failed
her nursing subjects. These instances notwithstanding, the Court
has emphasized that once a school has, in the name of academic
freedom, set its standards, these should be meticulously observed
and should not be used to discriminate against certain students.[40]
After accepting them upon enrollment, the school cannot renege
on its contractual obligation on grounds other than those made
known to, and accepted by, students at the start of the school
year.

In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient
causes of action against respondents, and that it should not have
been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the Court is not
holding respondents liable for the acts complained of. That will
have to be ruled upon in due course by the court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed
Orders REVERSED. The trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the

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Compiled by Rehne Gibb N. Larena | JD-WT-3 | AY 2019-20 | University of San Carlos

Torts and Damages CASES

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First Reading Assignment and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod

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negligence and the damages incurred.[7]

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Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50961 dated antibiotics.

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Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in

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[ G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992 ] residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom

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Capuno, et al.,[22] Araneta vs. Arreglado,[23] Salen, et al. vs. Balce,[24] the other classes.[30]

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