103 Phil 629 Civil Law Torts and Damages Breach of Promise to Marry Moral Damages

In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a school teacher, later she became an insurance
underwriter), and Francisco Hermosisima, 23 years old (apprentice ship pilot), fell in love with each other.
Since 1953, both had a refular intimate and sexual affair with each other. In 1954, Soledad got pregnant.
Francisco then promised to marry Soledad. In June 1954, Soledad gave birth to a baby girl. The next
month, Francisco got married but with a different woman named Romanita Perez.
Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the latter to recognize his daughter with
Soledad and for damages due to Franciscos breach of his promise to marry Soledad. The trial court ruled
in favor of Soledad. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and even increased the
award of damages. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Francisco is liable for damages because he
seduced Soledad. He exploited the love of Soledad for him in order to satisfy his sexual desires that
being, the award of moral damages is proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry.
HELD: No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. The Court of Appeals based its
award of damages on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which says in part that Moral damages may be
recovered from (3) Seduction, xxx However, it must be noted that the Seduction being
contemplated in the said Civil Code provision is the same Seduction being contemplated in Article 337
and 338 of the Revised Penal Code. Such seduction is not present in this case.
Further, it cannot be said that Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of criminal seduction) Soledad given the
circumstances of this case. Soledad was 10 years older than Francisco. Soledad had a better job
experience and a better job overall than Francisco who was a mere apprentice. Further still, it was
admitted by Soledad herself that she surrendered herself to Francisco and that she wanted to bind by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

Galang vs CA Jan 29, 1962

Facts:This is an action against Rodrigo Quinit and his father Maximo Quinit to recover damages claimed
to have been sustained by plaintiff Beatriz Galang for an alleged breach of promise on the part of Rodrigo
Quinit to marry her.
The evidence on other pertinent facts is, however, conflicting. On the side of the plaintiff, Ms. Galang, she
maintains that that Rodrigo courted her in 1953 and they, thereafter, became engaged, albeit Rodrigo's
mother was opposed to their marriage; that on April 15, 1955 Rodrigo and his father went to her house
and her marriage with Rodrigo were arranged, with the concurrence of her mother, appellant Maximino
Quinit having agreed to give dowry and to defray the expenses of the marriage, with the exception of the
wedding dress of appellee; that they agreed to have the marriage celebrated in Baguio, for which reason
on April 27, 1955, appellee, Rodrigo and the latter's father left for Baguio; that upon arriving at Colorado
Falls, however, Maximino made them alight from the bus and took them to the house of Adolfo Dagawan
with whom Maximino agreed that appellee and Rodrigo would stay in said house, Maximino to pay P5.00
daily for their lodging and asked Dagawan to make all arrangements for their wedding in Baguio and to
act as their sponsor; that after making these arrangements Maximino left, while appellee and Rodrigo
remained in Dagawan's house where they lived as husband and wife until May 9, that on May 7, appellee
and Rodrigo, accompanied by Dagawan, went to Baguio to secure a marriage license but failed because
Rodrigo did not have a residence certificate, although both prospective contracting parties signed the
corresponding application; that on May 9, on the pretext that he going to their hometown to get his
residence certificate, Rodrigo left Colorado Falls and never returned; that when appellee returned to their
hometown (Sison, Pangasinan), she found out that Rodrigo's parents had sprinted him away because, in
their opinion, appellee's reputation was unsavory.
Upon the other hand, the defendants sought to establish that Rodrigo and plaintiff . were engaged; that
Rodrigo's parents were opposed to their marriage; that while Rodrigo was agreeable to marrying
appellee, he wanted the marriage to take place after his graduation, while appellee was impatient and
wanted the marriage to be held at an earlier date; that on April 26, 1955, in view of Rodrigo's continued
relations with appellee, his parents told him to leave the parental home, for which reason on that date he
left their house with his belongings and some gantas of rice; that before leaving their hometown he
passed by the house of appellee and told her what had happened and further told her that he was
intending to go to Manila to look for a job; that appellee convinced him to go, instead to Colorado Falls
where they could discuss their plans and so there he went - followed later by appellee - both staying at
the house of Dagawan; that because Rodrigo persistently refused to marry appellee, the latter's relatives,

accompanied by policemen and constabulary soldiers, arrived at the place and tried to intimidate him; that
in view of his continued refusal they brought him down to Sison where he was allowed to go home; that
thereupon his parents placed him under the custody of Mayor Madriaga of the neighboring town of
Rosario where he stayed from May 1, to June, 1955; that sometime during the month of June, Adolfo
Dagawan sought Rodrigo on the pretext that he was going to tell him something important and was able
to lure him to a secluded place where he was made to sign an application for a marriage license; that
because of his non-appearance before a notary public, the latter refused to acknowledge the application.
The court of first instance sustained plaintiff's pretense, but the Court of Appeals considered her evidence
unworthy of credence, and, hence, reversed said decision insofar as Maximino Quinit is concerned, and
modified it as regards Rodrigo Quinit, by eliminating the awards for moral damages and attorney's fees.
This is an appeal by certiorari taken by plaintiff Beatriz Galang.
Issue: Whether or not Rodrigo Quinit and his father Maximino Quinit are liable for breach of promise
against Beatriz Galang.
Held: Plaintiff maintains that the Court of Appeals had erred in the appreciation of the evidence, but the
findings of said Court on the credibility of said evidence are beyond our power of review on appeal by
certiorari and, consequently, conclusive upon us.
It is next urged that said Court had also erred in not awarding moral damages to plaintiff, who insists that
moral damages for breach of promise to marry are collectible under our laws, but this question has
already been settled adversely to plaintiff's pretense in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals.
Dispo: The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, without special
pronouncement as to cost. It is so ordered

12 SCRA 648 Civil Law Torts and Damages Article 21 of the Civil Code Moral Damages
Exemplary Damages Breach of Promise to Marry
FACT: In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to
schedule it on September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending
wedding invitations, bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2
days before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be
able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the
wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will be
returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually
judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of
Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous
events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer
because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of
exemplary and moral damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is
true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was not
a simple breach of promise to marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the
wedding. Velezs unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. Wassmers cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in
part any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral
damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages
is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to
Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner this warrants the imposition of exemplary
damages against him.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents. 219 SCRA 115
FACTS: Private respondent Marilou Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against Gasheem Shookat,
an Iranian Citizen, of breach of promise to marry. She said that both of them agreed to marry after the end
of the school semester and the petitioner asked the approval of her parents. She stated that the petitioner
forced to live with him in his apartments. Respondent was a virgin before she was forced to live with the
Iranian (petitioner). A week before she filed her complaint, petitioner maltreated, assaulted and asked not
to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
On the petitioners counterclaim, he said that he never proposed marriage with the private
respondent; he neither forced her to live with him and he did not maltreat her but only told her to stop from
coming into his apartment because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and
passport. He insisted that he must be awarded for damages for he suffered mental anxiety and a
besmirched reputation due to the complaint of the private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is to be held liable for damages for breach of promise to marry.
HELD: A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This court held that where a
mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a
subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of fraud and deceit and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. Such act done by the petitioner is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country. The court
ordered that the petition be denied with costs against the petitioner.