G.R. No.

165842 November 29, 2005

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7,

2001, the accusatory portion of which reads:

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was
married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which
was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.4 He met the private
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January
1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a
friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while
Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her.
Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite
Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo
proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single.
Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents,
and was assured by them that their son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March
1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes,
the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.5 It appeared in
their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life.
Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress
Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making
himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year.

Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would
slap her.6 Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and
did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from
the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that
Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy
of the marriage contract.7 She was so embarrassed and humiliated when
she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they
exchanged their own vows.8

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar
where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with
her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus
Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship
was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a "love-bite"
on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he
declared he was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know
that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage
before marrying Tina.

Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife
because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the
private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of ₱200,000.00 by way of
moral damages, plus costs of suit.9

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the
RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the
prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the
contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply.
Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should
have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s presumptive death as the absent
spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v.
Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of Appeals16 to support its ruling.

Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari,
The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes
bigamy, reads:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon

any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.

The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:

El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legítimamente

disuelto el anterior, será castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to

prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she
contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been
lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
second marriage or subsequent marriage.22 It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage.23 Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the
second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion
fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony by dolo.24 On the
other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of
bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully
dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter
whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have
juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent
jurisdiction.25 As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of
Appeals26 and Mercado v. Tan,27 under the Family Code of the Philippines,
the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view
as Viada and declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an
undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention
constituting the felony of the act. He explained that:

… This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is

undoubtedly incorporated in the principle antedating all codes, and,
constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where
there is no willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the
subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be
supported by very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be
deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second
marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is
dead, because of the many years that have elapsed since he has had any
news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, cannot be
deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent
which is one of the essential elements of the crime.

As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with
bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with
deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent.

Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is

deemed voluntary.30 Although the words "with malice" do not appear in
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word
"voluntary."

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt

act without legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury. 

When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have

been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been
intentional.33 Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends
the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of
proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a
reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a

confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. 

Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was
married to Gaña in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially
declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. The
prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private
complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent
when he married the private complainant.

As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid

defense in a prosecution for a felony by  dolo; such defense negates
malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem
excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he
married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded
belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from
her for more than 20 years since 1975.

He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court

declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in
good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married
the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty
of bigamy in such case.

The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.

The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless
words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the
absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from
the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because
he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good
faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing
spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new
relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life
and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to
innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take
means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence
of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent
spouse38 after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such
means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse
contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of
the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true," is
a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a
first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make
the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic
facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the
subjective condition of individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be
treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.40 Thus, Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage
dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain
objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance, 41 namely, a
judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for
his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.

Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not,
the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except
for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the
age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in
order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including
the division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane

which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of
the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been
missing for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances
and his existence has not been known for four years.

The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven
years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created
by law and arises without any necessity of judicial declaration.42 However,
Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on
presumptive death, reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a

previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions
of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the
first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four
consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for
the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse,45 without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As
explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent

bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following
conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party
must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where
there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of
the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is,
unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is
consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention
in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article
40, of the Family Code.

The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a

petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid
second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy.
Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings
of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the
purpose of the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she
must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration
of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter’s
reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present spouse
from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal
Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses
presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a
second marriage is already established.58

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.62

In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and
proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even
brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and
his parents made the same assurance – that he was single. Thus, the
private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the
certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and
dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was
her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly
abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already
married to another before they were married.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s

chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act
alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the
appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the
consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have married
lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man
who it turned out was not her lawful husband.72
The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit
before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were
willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she
did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral
damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,73 the New Jersey Supreme Court
ruled:

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the
award of ₱200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The

assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES,
SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO
LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:

The antecedent facts are as follows:

At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome

Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened
from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto
informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada,
and thus would like to surrender to the authorities.

Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and
Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a
nephew of his to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal
Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales
spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to the municipal
building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed
the police on duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman Salvador
Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to
Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's
residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno,
and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where
the killing incident allegedly occurred. There they saw the lifeless body of
Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside
the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about an hour during which time
Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started to make a rough
sketch thereof and the immediate surroundings. 10 The next day, February
22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno,
accompanied by a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to
conduct further investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was
brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the police
substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at
Sitio Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in
Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the incident, were already
there conducting their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with
his sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise taken. The body of the
victim was then brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.

The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20

a.m. on February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was made with the

The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds,
five (5) of which are fatal because they penetrated the internal organs,
heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." 

On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared
before the police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily
surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective
custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He
requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where
his wife, Fausta, was already detained having been indorsed thereat by the
Ajuy police force. 

Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy

police force and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for murder dated
August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as follows:

When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered
a plea of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to
have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented himself to
Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and
volunteered to testify for the prosecution.

A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by the Provincial

Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended Information, 16 dated
March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the
herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio
Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as earlier explained,
Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.

At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health
physician of Ajuy who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim;
Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman
Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt.
(ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C.
Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the
widow.

By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged

eyewitness account of the incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his
age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in
Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio,
and walked home; 20 he took a short-cut route. 21 While passing at the
vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the
evening, he heard cries for help.  Curiosity prompted him to approach the
place where the shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20
meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of banana trees.  From where
he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns
in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or
threshing platform.

Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her

honor as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied
participation in the crime.

The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the
testimony of Huntoria.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, The Court of Appeals found no merit in

both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony,

The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the

Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.

After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find

the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave
much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his
sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the commission of the crime as
"March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of little
help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their
locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was however no
indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the prosecution
because, considering that there are two versions proferred on where the
killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have
provided a more definite clue as to which version is more credible.

It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by
the lower courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the
testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous
scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.

To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including

From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and

specific act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing
of Lloyd Peñacerrada.

It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial
court and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal
liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation under
Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that
inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17,
or by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof.

What then was the direct part in the killing did the appellant perform to
support the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court of Appeals on him?

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is

incurred.

Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the

wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense

against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is

through the commission of a felony.

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how
felonies are committed.

Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are

felonies (delitos).
 Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but
also by means of fault (culpa).

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent;

and there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the elements of felonies in general are:

(1) there must be an act or omission;

(2) the act or omission must be punishable under the RPC; and

(3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit or

fault.

Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found,
that the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, forsooth there is insufficiency of proof as to what act was
performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3
of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement
tending to produce some effect in the external world."  

In this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by

the appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the
victim that produced his death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he
did not see who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim.

Thus this principal witness did not say, because he could not whether
the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not
know what specific act was performed by the appellant .

This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid
down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously discussed.

Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of
the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while there are six
accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six
accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound.

Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the

fact that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months
since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily the

Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by

the prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact,
he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was because
the victim was also his landlord.

Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate

circumstances, like in the instant case in which the participation of the
appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory.
Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if
taken in the light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to
acquit the accused. 

In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and

SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 120744-46               June 25, 2012

SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 122677

These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the June 30, 1995 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614 – cases for murder, frustrated
murder and multiple counts of attempted murder, respectively.

The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in

Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga which caused the death
of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva).

Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and Generoso

Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were members of
the Integrated National Police (INP)2 stationed at the Sindalan Substation in
San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes,
who were barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively;
Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos
David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan
(Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either members of the Civil
Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays
Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all charged with
murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in three
Informations, the inculpatory portions of which read:

Criminal Case No. 16612:

That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being then
policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home
Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping
one another, and while responding to information about the presence of
armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus
committing the offense in relation to their office, did then and there, with
treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the
latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota
Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting multiple
gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the
body, thereby causing the direct and immediate death of the latter.

At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived the
pre-trial inquest. 16 Hence, joint trial on the merits ensued and picked up
from where the presentation of evidence left off at the hearing on the bail
applications.

The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva,

Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of
Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and
7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after
the religious procession had passed. As they were all inebriated,
Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully
and watch out for potholes and open canals on the road.

With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the
back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph
with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on
the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup
were both wounded and bleeding profusely.

Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim,
allegedly did not see any one on the road flag them down. 

In open court, Flores executed a sketch19 depicting the relative location of

the Tamaraw jeepney on the road, the residence of Salangsang where they
had come from and the house situated on the right side of the road right
after the curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified said
house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly
took post and opened fire at him and his companions. He could not tell how
many firearms were used. He recounted that after the shooting, he,
unaware that Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped out of the
jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the yard
of Naron’s house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced
himself and his companions to be employees of San Miguel Corporation
but instead, Pamintuan reproved them for not stopping when flagged. At
this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to
summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were wounded.
He dashed back to Salangsang’s house as instructed and, returning to the
scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and
Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the
hospital.20 This was corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as soon as
the firing had ceased, two armed men, together with Pamintuan,
approached them and transferred him and Licup to another jeepney and
taken to the nearby St. Francis Hospital.21
The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had
acted in the regular and lawful performance of their duties in the
maintenance of peace and order either as barangay officials and as
members of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in the
justifying circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal
Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the
intent of killing them.

With the evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera

and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals in the separate offense
of homicide for the eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as charged
in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of attempted homicide for the injury
sustained by Villanueva (instead of frustrated murder as charged in
Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It
acquitted all of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No.
16613 in respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma. The dispositive
portion of the June 30, 1995

The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to

Villanueva and which brought the eventual death of Licup has been
committed by petitioners herein willfully under the guise of maintaining
peace and order;54 that the acts performed by them preparatory to the
shooting, which ensured the execution of their evil plan without risk to
themselves, demonstrate a clear intent to kill the occupants of the subject
vehicle; that the fact they had by collective action deliberately and
consciously intended to inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily
performed those acts negates their defense of lawful performance of official
duty;55 that the theory of mistaken belief could not likewise benefit
petitioners because there was supposedly no showing that they had
sufficient basis or probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuan’s report that
the victims were armed NPA members, and they have not been able by
evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross inexcusable negligence
when they acted as they did;56 that there was insufficient or total absence of
factual basis to assume that the occupants of the jeepney were members
of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the shooting incident could
not have been the product of a well-planned and well-coordinated police
operation but was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted by
Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty and
amateurish attempt to gain commendation.57

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present

recourse.

In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayan’s finding of

conspiracy and labels the same to be conjectural. He points out that the
court a quo has not clearly established that he had by positive acts
intended to participate in any criminal object in common with the other
accused, and that his participation in a supposed common criminal object
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He believes the finding is
belied by Flores and Villanueva, who saw him at the scene only after the
shooting incident when the wounded passengers were taken to the hospital
on his jeepney.73 

The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences

that seem to rest on loose predicates. Yet we have pored over the records
of the case and found that evidence nonetheless exists to support the
penultimate finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

I.

It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were

at the situs of the incident on the date and time alleged in the Informations.
Yapyuco, in his testimony – which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno – as
well as Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes in their affidavits which
had been offered in evidence by the prosecution,88 explained that their
presence at the scene was in response to the information relayed by
Pamintuan through David that armed rebel elements on board a vehicle
described to be that occupied by the victims were reportedly spotted in
Barangay Quebiawan.

It is on the basis of this suspicion that petitioners now appeal to justification

under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code and under the concept of
mistake of fact. Petitioners admit that it was not by accident or mistake but
by deliberation that the shooting transpired when it became apparent that
the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention arises as to
whether or not there was intention to harm or even kill the passengers
aboard, and who among them had discharged the bullets that caused the
eventual death of Licup and injured Villanueva.

The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify
the criminal.89 

II.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful
exercise of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code
rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty or
in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the
offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance
of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.

The justification is based on the complete absence of intent and negligence

on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it
was committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.

Where invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts to an acknowledgment

that the accused has caused the injury or has committed the offense
charged for which, however, he may not be penalized because the
resulting injury or offense is a necessary consequence of the due
performance of his duty or the lawful exercise of his right or office.

Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the accused relative to the crime
charged were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the burden necessarily
shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.

We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code do not obtain in this case.

The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a
legitimate law enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to
defeat the claim that all of them – who were either police and barangay
officers or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of peace and
order – were bound to, as they did, respond to information of a suspected
rebel infiltration in the locality. Theirs, therefore, is the specific duty to
identify the occupants of their suspect vehicle and search for firearms
inside it to validate the information they had received; they may even effect
a bloodless arrest should they find cause to believe that their suspects had
just committed, were committing or were bound to commit a crime. While, it
may certainly be argued that rebellion is a continuing offense, it is
interesting that nothing in the evidence suggests that the accused were
acting under an official order to open fire at or kill the suspects under any
and all circumstances. Even more telling is the absence of reference to the
victims having launched such aggression as would threaten the safety of
any one of the accused, or having exhibited such defiance of authority that
would have instigated the accused, particularly those armed, to embark on
a violent attack with their firearms in self-defense. In fact, no material
evidence was presented at the trial to show that the accused were placed
in real mortal danger in the presence of the victims, except maybe their
bare suspicion that the suspects were armed and were probably prepared
to conduct hostilities.

But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA
members and whether or not they were at the time armed, are immaterial in
the present inquiry inasmuch as they do not stand as accused in the
prosecution at hand. Besides, even assuming that they were as the
accused believed them to be, the actuations of these responding law
enforcers must inevitably be ranged against reasonable expectations that
arise in the legitimate course of performance of policing duties. The rules of
engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly
knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the highest caution,
do not require that he should immediately draw or fire his weapon if the
person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger
should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a
damaged pride. Police work requires nothing more than the lawful
apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the process pertains to
other government officers or agencies.108

III.

At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact
faces certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a
misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or
omission which is the subject of the prosecution.118 

Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime

where it negates the intent component of the crime.119 It may be a defense
even if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent.120 

The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant,121 and it does not
look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person.122 A proper
invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and
reasonable;123 (b) that it be a matter of fact;124 and (c) that it negate the
culpability required to commit the crime125 or the existence of the mental
state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the
offense.126

The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in

United States v. Ah Chong,127 but in that setting, the principle was treated
as a function of self-defense where the physical circumstances of the case
had mentally manifested to the accused an aggression which it was his
instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by
the sound of his bedroom door being broken open and, receiving no
response from the intruder after having demanded identification, believed
that a robber had broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder but at that
moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed against the door
and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed
the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Charged with homicide, he
was acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact. Finding that the
accused had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained:

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to
believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms
more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if
without fault or carelessness he does not believe them — he is legally
guiltless of homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an
innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with
reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious
authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently sustained in
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse,
whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the
facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled
concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus
supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him though they are in
truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the extreme measure. x x
x 128
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis129 and Baxinela v. People,130 the
justification of an act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a
mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of
the accused. Thus, Ah Chong further explained that –

The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one
can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the
facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of
the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think
there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances
there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or
mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.132

IV.

This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated
homicide has been established beyond cavil of doubt.

The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable

doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive
evidence.136 Corpus delicti consists of two things: first, the criminal act and
second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act.

In homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must

prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was
produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not
the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant
committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for
the act which produced the death. In other words, proof of homicide or
murder requires incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the
victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill. Such
evidence may consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words
uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing
of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the
malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.138 In such case, even if
there is no intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with respect to
crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material
results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for
all the consequences thereof. 139 Evidence of intent to kill is crucial only to a
finding of frustrated and attempted homicide, as the same is an essential
element of these offenses, and thus must be proved with the same degree
of certainty as that required of the other elements of said offenses.140

The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the

prosecution. It is interesting that, in negating the allegation that they had by
their acts intended to kill the occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to
their co-accused Pamintuan, whose picture depicted in the defense
evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners’ affidavits as well as
Yapyuco’s testimony are replete with suggestions that it was Pamintuan
alone who harbored the motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who
their (petitioners’) minds that which they later on conceded to be a
mistaken belief as to the identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in
court that Pamintuan had once reported to him that Flores, a relative of his
(Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA members and that the San
Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were employed was being
penetrated by NPA members. He also affirmed Yapyuco’s claim that there
had been a number of ambuscades launched against members of law
enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas supposedly by
NPA members at around the time of the incident. But as the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died
during the pendency of these cases even before his opportunity to testify in
court emerged.141

Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades

relevance and materiality. Motive is generally held to be immaterial
inasmuch as it is not an element of a crime.

It gains significance when the commission of a crime is established by

evidence purely circumstantial or otherwise inconclusive. The question of
motive is important in cases where there is doubt as to whether the
defendant is or is not the person who committed the act, but when there is
no doubt that the defendant was the one who caused the death of the
deceased, it is not so important to know the reason for the deed.143

In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did
not intend to kill anyone of the victims, admit having willfully discharged
their service firearms; and the manner by which the bullets concentrated on
the passenger side of the jeepney permits no other conclusion than that the
shots were intended for the persons lying along the line of fire. We do not
doubt that instances abound where the discharge of a firearm at another is
not in itself sufficient to sustain a finding of intention to kill, and that there
are instances where the attendant circumstances conclusively establish
that the discharge was not in fact animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is
that in ascertaining the intention with which a specific act is committed, it is
always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all
the attendant circumstances so far as they develop in the evidence.144

V.

Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with
the deliberate intent of killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss
Yapyuco’s alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744 that he and his co-
petitioners must be found guilty merely of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and frustrated homicide.

First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal
negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
the incident of another act performed without malice.147 People v.
Guillen148 and People v. Nanquil 149 declare that a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence. And in People v. Castillo,150 we held that that there can be no
frustrated homicide through reckless negligence inasmuch as reckless
negligence implies lack of intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime of
frustrated homicide cannot exist.

VI.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-
principals in the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only,
respectively for the death of Licup and for the non-fatal injuries sustained
by Villanueva, and that they deserve an acquittal together with the other
accused, of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the unharmed
victims.154 The allegation of evident premeditation has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt because the evidence is consistent with the fact
that the urge to kill had materialized in the minds of petitioners as
instantaneously as they perceived their suspects to be attempting flight and
evading arrest. The same is true with treachery, inasmuch as there is no
clear and indubitable proof that the mode of attack was consciously and
deliberately adopted by petitioners.

Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by

reclusion temporal whereas an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in relation
to Article 51, warrants a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed
for principals in a consummated homicide. Petitioners in these cases are
entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and
there being no aggravating circumstance proved and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan has properly fixed in
Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the penalty from six (6) years and
one (1) day, but should have denominated the same as prision mayor, not
prision correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal.

However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had
committed attempted homicide, a modification of the penalty is in order.
The penalty of attempted homicide is two (2) degrees lower to that of a
consummated homicide, which is prision correccional. Taking into account
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence to be meted out on petitioners is within the
minimum period of prision correccional, which is six (6) months and one (1)
day to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, whereas
the minimum of the sentence, which under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law must be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
for the offense, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
of arresto mayor.

We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance

with prevailing jurisprudence, and order herein petitioners, jointly and
severally, to indemnify the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount of
₱77,000.00 as actual damages and ₱50,000.00 in moral damages. With
respect to Noel Villanueva, petitioners are likewise bound to pay, jointly and
severally, the amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages
and ₱20,000.00 as moral damages. The award of exemplary damages
should be deleted, there being no aggravating circumstance that attended
the commission of the crimes.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the

Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated
June 27, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer

the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
 reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the
indeterminate sentence is hereby modified to Two (2) years and four
(4) months of prision correccional, as the maximum, and Six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as the minimum.

(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the

heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual
damages, ₱50,000.00 in moral damages, as well as Noel Villanueva,
in the amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages,
and ₱20,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673             August 11, 2004

EDUARDO P. DIEGO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
DAGUPAN CITY, BRANCH 43, respondent.

AZCUNA, J.:

The facts and circumstances of the criminal case are summarized, as

follows:

a) On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage

with Jorge de Perio, Jr., solemnized before then Mayor Liberato
Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were both Filipinos. In the
marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name
Crescencia Escoto, with a civil status of single;

b) In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a

"Decree of Divorce" and purportedly issued to Jorge de Perio as
petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas
(247th Judicial District), it was "ordered, adjudged and decreed, that
 the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between Jorge de Perio
and Crescencia de Perio are hereby Dissolved, Cancelled and
Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce."

c) Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto

contracted marriage with herein complainant’s brother, Manuel P.
Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy, parish
priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time,
the accused used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with
a civil status of single.1

After trial of the criminal case for bigamy, respondent Judge promulgated a
decision, on February 24, 1999, the dispositive part of which stated:

WHEREFORE, for failure of the STATE to prove accused’s guilt

beyond whisper of doubt, the COURT hereby orders her ACQUITTAL
with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.2

The decision states that the main basis for the acquittal was good faith on
the part of the accused. Respondent Judge gave credence to the defense
of the accused that she acted without any malicious intent. The combined
testimonial and documentary evidence of the defense was aimed at
convincing the court that accused Lucena Escoto had sufficient grounds to
believe that her previous marriage to Jorge de Perio had been validly
dissolved by the divorce decree and that she was legally free to contract
the second marriage with Manuel P. Diego.
In rendering the decision, respondent Judge reasoned, thus:

While it is true that in our jurisdiction the matrimonial bond between

Jorge de Perio and the accused are not yet annulled, it remains
undisputed that cessation of the same was decreed in the Family
District Court of Harris County, Texas, 247th Judicial District, effective
February 15, 1978.

xxx

The CHARGE filed against the accused is categorized as Mala en se

(sic) which requires the indispensable presence of criminal
intent/dolo.

The felony on BIGAMY as defined and penalized by the Revised

Penal Code explicitly mandates that it must be committed with
criminal intent. In other words, there must be an unquestionable
demonstration on the part of the perpetrator that he/she criminally,
willfully and unlawfully contracted a second marriage despite
knowledge that his/her first marriage is still existing.

As borne out by the evidence adduced, the accused contracted the

second marriage after she was informed and furnished of the Divorce
Decree which was granted by the Family District Court of Harris
County Texas in her favor.

As an ordinary laywoman accused being a recipient of a divorce

decree, she entertains the impression that she can contract a
 subsequent marriage which she did when she married the late
Manuel Diego.

To the honest evaluation of the Court the act complained of against

the accused is not patently illegal for the reason that she acted in
good faith believing that her marriage was already annulled by a
foreign judgment.3

Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent

Judge is manifestly against the law and contrary to the evidence. He
questions the evidentiary weight and admissibility of the divorce decree as
a basis for the finding of good faith. In addition, complainant stresses that
the evidence on record negates respondent Judge’s finding of good faith on
the part of the accused. Thus, complainant urges this Court to impose
sanctions upon respondent Judge as, according to complainant, these acts
amount to knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance
of the law.

In his comment, respondent Judge explains that what was in issue was the
criminal culpability of the accused under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Respondent Judge does not dispute that the second marriage was
bigamous because at the time it was contracted, the first marriage was still
subsisting since divorce is not recognized in our country and because the
accused’s first husband was still alive. Respondent Judge, however,
maintains that what was controlling was whether by virtue of the
divorce decree the accused honestly believed, albeit mistakenly, that
her first marriage had been severed and she could marry again.
According to respondent Judge, the same is a state of mind personal to the
accused. He further stressed that knowledge of the law should not be
exacted strictly from the accused since she is a lay person, and that
ineptitude should not be confused with criminal intent.

By separate manifestations, both parties agreed to submit the case for

resolution based on the pleadings.

The Disputed Decision

A careful study of the disputed decision reveals that respondent Judge had
been less than circumspect in his study of the law and jurisprudence
applicable to the bigamy case.

In his comment, respondent Judge stated: "That the accused married

Manuel P. Diego in the honest belief that she was free to do so by virtue of
the decree of divorce is a mistake of fact."

This Court, in People v. Bitdu,4 carefully distinguished between a mistake of

fact, which could be a basis for the defense of good faith in a bigamy case,
from a mistake of law, which does not excuse a person, even a lay person,
from liability. 

Bitdu held that even if the accused, who had obtained a divorce under the
Mohammedan custom, honestly believed that in contracting her second
marriage she was not committing any violation of the law, and that she had
no criminal intent, the same does not justify her act.

This Court further stated therein that with respect to the contention that the
accused acted in good faith in contracting the second marriage, believing
that she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to
say that everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does
not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him
from the consequences thereof.

Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal case for bigamy, is People v.

Schneckenburger, 6 where it was held that the accused who secured a
foreign divorce, and later remarried in the Philippines, in the belief
that the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy.

These findings notwithstanding, the issue before us is whether or not

respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.

Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and

penalized under Article 2047 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to
lie, it must be proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows
that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, willfully or
intentionally. It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be
held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown
that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the
evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate
intent to do an injustice.8

The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment
in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he
knew that said judgment is unjust.9 This Court reiterates that in order to
hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it
was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That
good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment remains the law.10

As held in Alforte v. Santos,11 even assuming that a judge erred in

acquitting an accused, she still cannot be administratively charged lacking
the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. Malice or bad faith on
the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must still be proved
and failure on the part of the complainant to prove the same warrants the
dismissal of the administrative complaint.12

There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an

unjust judgment.

Gross Ignorance of the Law

Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law, Mañozca v. Domagas,13 is

instructive. Therein respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance of
the law resulting in a manifestly unjust judgment for granting a demurrer to
the evidence in a bigamy case. The grant of the demurrer to the evidence
was based on the judge’s finding of good faith on the part of the accused,
anchored upon a document denominated as a "Separation of Property with
Renunciation of Rights." This Court stated that said act of the judge
exhibited ignorance of the law, and accordingly he was fined in the amount
of P5,000.
Also, in Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr.,14 where therein respondent judge was
given a reprimand with a stern warning of a more severe penalty should the
same or similar act be committed in the future, this Court explained:

We have heretofore ruled that a judge may not be held

administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he
renders. To unjustifiably hold otherwise, assuming that he has erred,
would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position
doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment. The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or
in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the judge
acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative
sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court.

As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official

capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts
are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge
charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. It does not mean,
however, that a judge, given the leeway he is accorded in such
cases, should not evince due care in the performance of his
adjudicatory prerogatives.

Furthermore, in Wingarts v. Mejia,15 where therein respondent judge,

although absolved of any guilt for the charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, was still imposed sanctions by this Court, thus:
 In any event, respondent judge deserves to be appropriately
penalized for his regrettably erroneous action in connection with
Criminal Case No. 2664 of his court. We have repeatedly stressed
that a municipal trial judge occupies the forefront of the judicial arm
that is closest in reach to the public he serves, and he must
accordingly act at all times with great constancy and utmost probity.
Any kind of failure in the discharge of this grave responsibility cannot
be countenanced, in order to maintain the faith of the public in the
judiciary, especially on the level of courts to which most of them
resort for redress.16

Applying these precedents to the present case, the error committed by

respondent Judge being gross and patent, the same constitutes ignorance
of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action.

Penalty

After evaluation of the merits of the case, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondent Judge be reprimanded
with a stern warning of a more severe penalty in the future.

The act of respondent Judge in rendering the decision in question took

place on February 24, 1999 or before the effectivity, on October 1, 2001, of
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which classified gross ignorance of the law as a
serious charge and penalized the offense with a fine of not less
than P20,000 but not more than P40,000.
Applying the rule as then prevailing,17 and in line with applicable
jurisprudence,18 the sanction on respondent Judge should be a fine in the
amount of P10,000.

WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is hereby

FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-5272             March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is
limited to the testimony of the accused himself, because from the very
nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident
upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts
was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think,
however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight
of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can
be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts
disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters,

No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual
Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho.
"Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters
from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an
officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants,
who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door
of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the
building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house.
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and
height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or
lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook
or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this
somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a
chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door,
opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other
openings of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who
had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force
open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is
there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door
that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into
the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the
room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a
robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I
will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge
of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and
confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the
person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar,
though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely
thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which
it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow,
the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out,
was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down
on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the
defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that
Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next
house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up
Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the
date of the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in
which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it
was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow
for his personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to
have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an
understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the
door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the
house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino
Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No.
28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk
at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at
No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the
party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and
upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally
wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and
called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of
the wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate,
but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron"
because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite
defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of

Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was
playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by
forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was,
in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to
the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the
following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and
found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating
circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor,
the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his
roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow
without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of
self-defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from
criminal liability:

xxx             xxx             xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are

the following attendant circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel

it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending

himself.

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant
would be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of
the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his
room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant
believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the
right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief
having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated
warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he
persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the
night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing
upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified
in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and
in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts
and deliver the first blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a
"ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property
under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal
blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or
"ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that
there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person
or his property or the property under his charge.

The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one
can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the
facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of
the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think
there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances
there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or
mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake

of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a
necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus
furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of
intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching
criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of
the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs
criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be
different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law,
sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited;
Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596;
Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213;
Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the
only question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is
an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and
assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said
that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes
and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that
the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or
with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the
commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor
to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted
from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the
code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the
general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of
crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions
expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient
of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code
clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential
requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of
express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching
liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts
done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act
committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be
observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for
"There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful
thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is
criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal
intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so
little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition
to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure
of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition
to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this
disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the
crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same
proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature
does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been
otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is
to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or
another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

 Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions
punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be

voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur

criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different
from that which he had intended to commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word
"voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free,
intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention
(intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that
the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which
were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of
1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their
use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the
word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can
only be said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was
actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence
of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his
discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without
intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have
shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent
than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that

where there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm,
without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if
there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if
there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain,
as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the
following language:

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all

the malice which is supposed from the operation of the will and an
intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.

And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that
"considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his
three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial
church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary
element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or
ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use
of the following language:

. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or
malice or their absence in the commission of an act defined and
 punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact
submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be
an essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein
defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article
568, which are as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done

with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision
correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave
crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through

simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed

according to their discretion, without being subject to the rules
prescribed in article 81.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty

prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those contained in the
first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next
one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the

words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that
the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice
(criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any
criminal liability on the actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to
approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American
statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the
word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly,
yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and
approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies
an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as
employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in
another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And
Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely
`voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English
and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious,"
"maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more
purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them
is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require
general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the
intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs.
428 and 429, and cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a

condition in the definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily,"
willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various
modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that
reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the rare
exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must
combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous
citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than
in the rule as to the intent. In controversies between private parties
the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important,
not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other

words, punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it
can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or
mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man
should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a
principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the
essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not
exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —

Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the
modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us
such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself
does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me
incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will
is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal
jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By

reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or
 ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually
produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man
guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we
hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this
doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance
takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast
down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where
the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors does not
offend. And —

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by

God to man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for what
he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And
whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark
upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself
spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what
has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the
plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts
are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is,
then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because
first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be
punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent

departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of
the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law
excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our
tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts
have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of
cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal
without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have
always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the
commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer
is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases
cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance
of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from
the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at
fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if
suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing
necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that
in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the
maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of
fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's
Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any

such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from
no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal
liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as
laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the
circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387;
P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32
N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C.,
41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is
to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without
fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the
circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was
made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might
reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal
or other wise, upon which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable

cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing
— or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the
rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them
— he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts,
and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In
other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the
not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and
sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some
decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-
defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If,
without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and
defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the
facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth
otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures.
 (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there
cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the

application of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as
a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of
mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed
by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the
pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in
imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the
facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of
the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability,
although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his
friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or
assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of
the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and
(since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act
punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the
same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act
punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."

Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the
person slain had a felonious design against him, and under that
supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there
was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either
manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of
 caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the
grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report
of the case, p.7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as
follows:

A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly

toward him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and
using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having
approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in
his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is
discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was
loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was only
to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that
he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those
who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must,
before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is
loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential
right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try
the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable
grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow
from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)

To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain,
cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are
somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his
hearth, at night, in company only of his wife, without other light than
reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was
attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did
not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a
contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the
person and took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly
been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to
the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head,
leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned
out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered
assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about
six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the
blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained
pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his
sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be
considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-
defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8,
of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient
provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the
employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419
and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of
imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the
accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following
sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have
been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in
his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked,
struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they
might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was
no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a
situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might
endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more
especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have
defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he
was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he
use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because
the instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from
his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the
darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted
from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or
distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms
which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and
considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts
that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that
it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred,
etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.)
(Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .

QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was

situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where
there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8
paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of
which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his
pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who
had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed
me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the
ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am
ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not
receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he
retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from
responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just
self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article
8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did
not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the
requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the
means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the
accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The
supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this
sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and
excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to
him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and
remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the
shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.)
(Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is

awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his window — at
this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted,
and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house
would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley
 adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with
blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next
morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be
declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just
self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of
the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that
of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned
the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide
committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the
condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who
attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and
incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property,
and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces

us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the
information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of
his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril,
both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his
charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented
themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without
malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than
exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he
believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal
liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been
guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his
mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself
from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his
property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court
should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he
is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de
oficio. So ordered.

G.R. No. 209464               July 1, 2015

DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

The fraternal contract should not be signed in blood, celebrated with pain,
marred by injuries, and perpetrated through suffering. That is the essence
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside
the April 26, 2013 Decision1 and the October 8, 2013 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05046, which affirmed the
February 23, 2011 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36,
Calamba City (RTC). The RTC found petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo)
and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr. (Sibal), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049, and sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Facts

On February 1, 2006, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba,

Laguna, filed the Information4 against the petitioners before the R TC, the
accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about 2:30 in the early
morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba ,City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, during an initiation rite and
being then members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in
conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers, whose
identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one M4-RLON
VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his
admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm,
resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On February 7, 2006, upon motion, the RTC admitted the Amended

Information5 which reads:

That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa
Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-name accused, during a
planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of Alpha Phi
Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less
twenty other members and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal
violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof
and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him
to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.

On February 7, 2006, Dungo filed a motion to quash for lack of probable

cause,6 but it was denied by the trial court because the ground cited therein
was not provided by law and jurisprudence. When arraigned, the petitioners
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.7 Thereafter, trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented twenty (20) witnesses to prove the crime

charged. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:

At around 3:20 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, the victim
Marlon Villanueva (Villanueva) was brought to the emergency room of Dr.
Jose P. Rizal District Hospital (JP Rizal Hospital). Dr. Ramon Masilungan
(Dr. Masilungan), who was then the attending physician at the emergency
room, observed that Villanueva was motionless, not breathing and had no
heartbeat. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Villlanueva for about 15 to 30
minutes. Villanueva, however, did not respond to the resuscitation and was
pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion hematoma on
the left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms and legs.
He further attested that Villanueva 's face was cyanotic, meaning that blood
was no longer running through his body due to lack of oxygen; and when
he pulled down Villanueva's pants, he saw large contusions on both legs,
which extended from the upper portion of the thighs, down to the couplexial
portion, or back of the knees.

Dr. Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men brought Villanueva to the
hospital. The two told him that they found Villanueva lying motionless on
the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, and brought him to the
hospital. When he asked them where they came from, one of them
answered that they came from Los Baños, Laguna, en route to San Pablo
City. He questioned them on how they found Villanueva, when the latter
was in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City. One of the men just said that they were
headed somewhere else.

Dr. Masilungan reduced his findings in a medico-legal report.8 Due to the

nature, extent and location of the injuries, he opined that Villanueva was a
victim of hazing. He was familiar with hazing injuries because he had
undergone hazing himself when he was a student, and also because of his
experience in treating victims of hazing incidents.

Dr. Roy Camarillo (Dr. Camarillo), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine

National Police Crime Laboratory (PNP-CL) in Region IV, Camp Vicente
Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he performed an autopsy on
the body of Villanueva on January 14, 2006 and placed down his findings in
an autopsy report.9 Upon examination of the body, he found various
external injuries in the head, trunk and extremities. There were thirty-three
(33) external injuries, with various severity and nature. He concluded that
the cause of death was subdural hemorrhage due to head injury contusion-
hematoma. Based on multiple injuries and contusions on the body, and his
previous examinations of hazing injuries, Dr. Camarillo opined that these
injuries were hazing-related. During the autopsy, he retrieved two (2)
matchsticks from the cadaver with the marking of Alpha Phi Omega (APO)
Fraternity.10

Susan Ignacio (Ignacio) was the owner of the sari-sari store located at
Purok 5, Pansol, Calamba City, in front of Villa Novaliches Resort, which
was barely ten steps away. On January 13, 2006, at around 8:30 to 9:00
o'clock in the evening, she was tending her store when she saw a jeepney
with more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the resort. Ignacio identified
Dungo as the person seated beside the driver of the jeepney.11 She
estimated the ages of these persons in the group to be between 20 to 30
years old. They were in civilian clothes, while the other men wore white
long-sleeved shirts. Before entering the resort, the men and women shook
hands and embraced each other. Three (3) persons, riding on a single
motorcycle, also arrived at the resort.

Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace of the
resort who looked like they were praying, and then the lights of the resort
were turned off. Later that evening, at least three (3) of these persons went
to her store to buy some items. During her testimony, she was shown
photographs and she identified Christopher Braseros and Sibal as two of
those who went to her store.12 It was only on the morning of January 14,
2006 that she learned from the policemen visiting the resort that the
deceased person was Villanueva.
Donato Magat (Magat), a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba
City, testified that at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14,
2006, he was waiting for passengers at the comer of Villa Novaliches
Resort. A man approached him and told him that someone inside the resort
needed a ride. Magat went to the resort and asked the two (2) men at the
gate who needed a ride. Afterwards, he saw three (3) men in their 20's
carrying another man, who looked very weak, like a vegetable, towards his
tricycle. Magat touched the body of the man being carried and sensed it
was cold.

Magat asked the men what happened to their companion. They replied that
he had too much to drink. Then they instructed Magat to go to the nearest
hospital. He drove the tricycle to JP Rizal Hospital. Upon their arrival, two
of his passengers brought their unconscious companion inside the
emergency room, while their other companion paid the tricycle fare. Magat
then left to go home. Several days after, he learned that the person brought
to the hospital had died.

Abelardo Natividad (Natividad) and Seferino Espina y Jabay (Espina) were

the security guards on duty at JP Rizal Hospital, from 11 :00 o'clock in the
evening of January 13, 2006 until 7:00 o'clock in the morning of January
14, 2006. In the early morning of January 14, 2006, two men, who signed
on the logbook13 under the names Brandon Gonzales and Jerico Paril,
brought the lifeless body of a person. Pursuant to the standard operating
procedure of the hospital, the security guards did not allow the two men to
leave the hospital because they called the police station .so that an
investigation could be conducted. Two policemen arrived later at the
hospital. During his testimony, Natividad identified Sibal and Dupgo as the
two persons who brought Villanueva to the hospital.

PO2 Alaindelon Ignacio (P02 Ignacio). testified that on January 14, 2006 at
around 3:30 o'clock in the early morning, Natividad called up the PNP
Calamba City Station to report that a lifeless body of a man was brought to
JP Rizal Hospital. When P02 Ignacio arrived, he saw Villanueva' s corpse
with contusions and bite marks all over his body. P02 Ignacio and his
policemen companions then brought Dungo and Sibal to the police station.
He asked them about what happened, but they invoked their right to remain
silent. The policemen then proceeded to Brgy. Pansol at around 9:00
o'clock in the morning. After finding Villa Novaliches Resort, they knocked
on the door and the caretaker, Maricel Capillan (Capillan), opened it.

The police asked Capillan if there were University of the Philippines Los
Baños (UP Los Baños) students who rented the resort on the evening of
January 13, 2006. Capillan said yes and added that about twenty (20)
persons arrived onboard a jeepney and told her that they would be renting
the resort from 9:30 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock the following
morning.

Gay Czarina Sunga (Sunga) was a food technology student at UP Los

Baños during the academic year of 2005-2006 and a member of the
Symbiosis UPLB Biological Society. Around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
January 13, 2006, she was at their organization's tambayan in the UPLB
Biological Sciences Building, when she noticed three (3) men seated two
meters away from her. She identified the two of the three men as Sibal and
Dungo.14 They were wearing black shirts with the logo of APO. Later at
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men arrived and, with their heads
bowed, approached the three men. One of them was Villanueva, who was
carrying a 5-gallon water container. Dungo then stood up and asked
Villanueva why the latter did not report to him when he was just at their
tambayan. Dungo then punched Villanueva twice, but the latter just kept
quiet with his head bowed. Fifteen minutes later, all the men left.

Joey Atienza (Atienza) had been a good friend of Villanueva since 2004.
They were roommates at the UP Los Baños Men's Dormitory and
housemates at the DPS Apartment in Umali Subdivision, Los Baños,
Laguna. According to Atienza, on January 9, 2006, Villanueva introduced
him to Daryl Decena (Decena) as his APO - Theta Chapter batchmate, who
was also to undergo final initiation rites on January 13, 2006.

Severino Cuevas, Director of the Students Affairs at UP Los Baños,

testified that Dungo and Sibal were both members of the APO Fraternity,
and that there was no record of any request for initiation or hazing activity
filed by the said fraternity.

McArthur Padua of the Office of the Registrar, UP Los Baños, testified that
Villanueva was a B.S. Agricultural Economics student at the UP Los
Baños,15 as evidenced by his official transcript of record.16

Atty. Eleno Peralta and Dina S. Carlos, officers of the Student Disciplinary
Tribunal (SDT) of the UP Los Baños, testified that an administrative
disciplinary case was filed on March 31, 2006 against the APO Fraternity
regarding the death of Villanueva. They confirmed that Capilla of Villa
Novaliches Resort and Irene Tan (Tan) of APO Sorority Theta Chapter
appeared as witnesses for the complainant.17

Roman Miguel De Jesus, UP - Office of the Legal Aid (UP-OLA)

supervising student, testified that he met Tan of the APO Sorority sometime
between July and August 2006 in UP Diliman: to convince her to testify in
the criminal case. Tan, however, refused because she feared for her
safety. She said that after testifying in the SDT hearing, her place in Imus,
Cavite was padlocked and vandalized.

Evelyn Villanueva, mother of victim Villanueva, testified that, as a result of

the death of her son, her family incurred actual damages consisting of
medical, burial and funeral expenses in the aggregate amount of
₱140,000.00 which were evidenced by receipts.18 Her husband also
incurred travel expenses in the amount of ₱7,000.00 in returning to the
Philippines to attend his son's wake and burial, as supported by a plane
ticket.19 She further attested that she experienced mental anguish,
sleepless nights, substantial weight loss, and strained family relationship as
a result of her son's death.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented seven (7) witnesses to prove the innocence of the
petitioners. Their testimonies are summarized as follow:

Richard Cornelio (Cornelio), an APO Fraternity member, testified that on

January 13, 2006, around 4:00 to 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, he met
Dungo at the UP Los Baños Graduate School. Dungo asked him if he
would attend the initiation ceremony, and Cornelio answered in the
negative because he had other things to do. At 10:00 o'clock in the evening
of the same day, Cornelio again met Dungo and his girlfriend while eating a
hamburger at the Burger Machine along Raymundo Street, Umali
Subdivision, Los Baños, Laguna (Raymundo Street). He asked Dungo if he
would attend the initiation ceremony. Dungo replied that he would not
because he and his girlfriend had something to do.

Ana Danife Rivera (Rivera), the girlfriend of Dungo, testified that on

January 13, 2006 at around 1 :00 o'clock in the afternoon, Dungo came
and visited her at her boarding house on Raymundo Street. Around 4:00
o'clock of the same afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños Graduate
School and saw Cornelio. Afterwards, they went back to her boarding
house and stayed there from 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 7:00 o'clock in
the evening. Then, they went to Lacxo Restaurant for dinner and left at
around 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On their way back to her boarding
house, they encountered Cornelio again at the Burger Machine. Dungo
then stayed and slept at her boarding house. Around 2:00 o'clock in the
early morning of January 14, 2006, they were roused from their sleep by a
phone call from Sibal, asking Dungo to go to a resort in Pansol, Calamba
City. Dungo then left the boarding house.

Dungo testified that around 1:00 o'clock in the early afternoon of January
13, 2006, he arrived at the boarding house of his girlfriend, Rivera, on
Raymundo Street. At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, they went to the
UP Los Baños Graduate School and inquired about the requirements for a
master's degree. They walked back to the boarding house and met
Cornelio. They talked about their fraternity's ,final initiation ceremony for
that night in Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo and Rivera then reached the
latter's boarding house around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At around 7:00
o'clock in the evening, they went out for dinner at the Lacxo Restaurant,
near Crossing Junction, Los Baños. They ate and stayed at the restaurant
for at least one and a half hours. Then they walked back to the boarding
house of Rivera and, along the way, they met Cornelio again at the Burger
Machine along Raymundo Street. Cornelio asked Dungo if he would attend
their fraternity's final initiation ceremony, to which he replied in the
negative. Dungo and Rivera reached the boarding house around 9:00
o'clock in the evening and they slept there.

Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, Dungo was
roused from his sleep because Sibal was palling him on his cellphone.
Sibal asked for his help, requesting him to go to Villa Novaliches Resort in
Pansol, Calamba City. Upon Dungo 's arrival at the resort, Sibal led him
inside. There, he saw Rudolfo Castillo (Castillo), a fellow APO fraternity
brother, and Villanueva, who was unconscious. Dungo told them that they
should bring Villanueva to the hospital. They all agreed, and Castillo called
a tricycle that brought them to JP Rizal Hospital. He identified himself
before the security guard as Jerico Paril because he was scared to tell his
real name.

Gilbert Gopez (Gopez) testified that he was the Grand Chancellor of the
APO -Theta Chapter for years 2005-2006. At around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening of January 13, 2006, he was at the tambayan of their fraternity in
UP Los Baños because their neophytes would be initiated that night.
Around 8:30 o'clock in the evening, they met their fraternity brothers in
Bagong Kalsada, Los Baños. He noticed that their neophyte, Villanueva,
was with Castillo and that there was a bruise on the left side of his face.
Then they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in
Pansol, Calamba City. There, Gopez instructed Sibal to take Villanueva to
the second floor of the resort. He confronted Castillo as to what happened
to Villanueva. Around 11:00 or 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Gopez decided
to cancel the final rites. He told Sibal to stay at the resort and accompany
Villanueva and Castillo. Together with the other neophytes, Gopez left the
resort and went back to UP Los Baños.

Sibal testified that he was a DOST Scholar at the UP Los Baños from 2002
to 2006, taking up B.S. Agricultural Chemistry. He was a Brother Actuary of
the APO - Theta Chapter, and was in charge of fraternity activities, such as
tree planting, free medical and dental missions, and blood donations. On
January 13, 2006, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was at the
fraternity's tambayan for the final initiation rites of their neophytes. After
preparing the food for the initiation rites, Sibal, together with some
neophytes, went to Bagong Kalsada, Los Baños, where he saw fellow
fraternity brother Castillo with their neophyte Villanueva, who had a bruised
face. Thereafter, they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa
Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Once inside the resort, he
accompanied Villanueva upstairs for the latter to take a rest. A few minutes
later, he went down and confronted Castillo about the bruises on
Villanueva's face. He was angry and irritated with Castillo. He then stayed
outside the resort until Gopez and the other neophytes came out and told
him that the final initiation rite was cancelled, and that they were returning
to UP Los Baños. Sibal wanted to go with them but ;he was ordered to stay
with Villanueva and Castillo.
After the group of Gopez left, Sibal checked on the condition of Villanueva,
who was sleeping on the second; floor of the resort. Then he went outside
for one hour, or until 1 :00 o 'dock in the early morning of January 14, 2006.
Sibal entered the resort again and saw Villanueva, who looked
unconscious, seated in one of the benc6es on the ground floor. Sibal
inquired about Villanueva's condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He
then called Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the resort, they hailed a
tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false
name to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the same.

The RTC Ruling

On February 23, 2011, the RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime
of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court stated that the prosecution
established the presence of Dungo and Sibal (1) at the UP Los Banos
Campus on January 13, 2006 around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by the
testimony of Sunga and (2) at the Villa Novaliches Resort around 9:00
o'clock in the evening of the same day by the testimony of Ignacio. With the
extensive testimonies of Dr. Masilungan and Dr. Camarillo, the prosecution
also proved that Villanueva died from hazing injuries.

According to the RTC, the evidence of the prosecution undeniably proved

that Villanueva, a UP Los Bafios student, was a neophyte of the APO -
Theta Chapter Fraternity; that Dungo and Sibal were members of the said
fraternity; that on the evening of January 13, 2006, Dungo and Sibal,
together with the other fraternity members, officers and alumni, brought and
transported Villanueva and two other neophytes to Villa Novaliches Resort
at Barangay Pansol, Calamba City, for the final initiation rites; that the
initiation rites were conducted inside the resort, performed under the cover
of darkness and secrecy; that due to the injuries sustained by Villanueva,
the fraternity members and the other two neophytes haphazardly left the
resort; and that Dungo and Sibal boarded a tricycle and brought the lifeless
body of Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital, where Villanueva was pronounced
dead.

The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and
Sibal participated to bodily assault and harm the victim, it was irrefutable
that they brought Villanueva to the resort for their final initiation rites.
Clearly, they did not merely induce Villanueva to attend the final initiation
rites, but they also brought him to Villa Novaliches Resort.

The RTC held that the defense of denial and alibi were self-serving
negative assertions. The defense of denial and alibi of Dungo, which was
corroborated by the testimony of his girlfriend Rivera and his co-fraternity
brother, could not be given credence. The witnesses presented by the
defense were partial and could not be considered as disinterested parties.
The defense of denial of Sibal likewise failed. The corroborative testimonies
of his fraternity brothers were suspect because they had so much at stake
in the outcome of the criminal action.

The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Dandy Dungo and Gregorio
Sibal GUILTY of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and order them to
jointly and severally pay the family /heirs of Deceased Marlon Villanueva
the following sums of money:

1. ₱141,324.00 for and as actual damages;

2. ₱200,000.00 for and as moral damages;

3. ₱100,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and

4. ₱50,000.00 for the death of Marlon Villanueva.

SO ORDERED.20

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In their brief, they

contended that the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for violating R.A. No. 8049. They also assailed the
constitutionality of Section 4 of the said law, which stated that mere
presence in the hazing was prima facie evidence of participation therein,
because it allegedly violated the constitutional presumption of innocence of
the accused.

The CA Ruling

The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit. It
stated that, in finding them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049, the RTC
properly relied on circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution. The
CA painstakingly discussed the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence
to convict Dungo and Sibal as principals in the crime of hazing.
It further found that the defense of denial and alibi of Dungo and Sibal
failed to cast doubt on the positive identification made by the prosecution
witnesses; and that denial, being inherently weak, could not prevail over
the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime.
The CA also stated that Dungo and Sibal were not only convicted based on
their presence in the venue of the hazing, but also in their act of bringing
the victim to Villa Novaliches Resort for the final initiation rites.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2011 Decision of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba City in CRIM. Case No.
13958-2006-C, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Violation of R.A. 8049 is hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.

SO ORDERED.21

Dungo and Sibal moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by
the CA in the assailed October 8, 2013 Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR HE JUDGMENTS OF THE RTC AND

THE CA A QUO CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST THEM BECAUSE THE OFFENSE
PROVED AS FOUND AND PRONOUNCED THEREBY IS DIFFERENT
FROM THAT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION, NOR DOES ONE
INCLUDE OR NECESSARILY INCLUDE THE OTHER.22
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal argue that the amended information charged
them as they "did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault
and use personal violence upon one Marlon Villanueva y Mejilla."23 Yet,
both the RTC and the CA found them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049
because they "[i]nduced the victim to be present" 24 during the initiation rites.
The crime of hazing by inducement does not necessarily include the
criminal charge of hazing by actual participation. Thus, they cannot be
convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily included in the information.
By reason of the foregoing, the petitioners contend that their constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them
has been violated.

In its Comment,25 filed on May 23, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General
(DSG) asserted that Dungo and Sibal were charged in the amended
information with the proper offense and convicted for such. The phrases
"planned initiation" and "in conspiracy with more or less twenty members
and officers" in the amended information sufficiently cover "knowingly
cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present
thereat." The planned initiation rite would not have been accomplished
were it not for the acts of the petitioners in inducing the victim to be present
thereat and it was obviously conducted in conspiracy with the others. 26 In
their Reply27 filed on September 10, 2014, Dungo and Sibal insisted that
there was a variance between the, offense charged of "actually participated
in the infliction of physical harm," and the offense "knowingly cooperated in
carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat." 28 The
prosecution, moreover, failed to establish conspiracy because no act or
circumstance was proved pointing to a joint purpose and design between
and among the petitioners and the other twenty accused.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Procedural Matter

An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by

bringing it to a higher court authority.29 The right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of law.30

Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as

amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the
procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court when the penalty
imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.31 According to
the said provision, "[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and
enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals."

Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment had been imposed by the CA, can simply file a notice of
appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of right before the
Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any
question including one not raised by the parties.32 Section 13(c), Rule 124
recognizes the constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court in all
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.33

An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by

certiorari to the Court via Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An appeal to
this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of
law.34 Moreover, such review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons.35 In other words, when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may: (1) file a notice of appeal
under Section 13( c ), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right
before the Court and open the entire case for review on any question; or (2)
file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as
a matter of discretion and raise only questions of law.

In this case, the CA affirmed the R TC decision imposing the penalty of

reclusion perpetua upon the petitioners. The latter opted to appeal the CA
decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Consequently, they
could only raise questions of law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail the
existence of conspiracy in their reply,36 which is a question of fact that
would require an examination of the evidence ;presented. In the interest of
justice, however, and due to the novelty of the issue presented, the Court
deems it proper to open the whole case for review.37 Substantive Matter

In our contemporary society, hazing has been a nightmare of parents who

send their children to college or university. News of deaths and horrible
beatings primarily among college students due to hazing injuries continue
to haunt us. Horrid images of eggplant-like buttocks and thighs and
pounded arms and shoulders of young men are depicted as a fervent
warning to those who dare undergo the hazing rites. The meaningless
death of these promising students, and the agony, cries and ordeal of their
families, resonate through the very core of our beings. But no matter how
modem and sophisticated our society becomes, these barbaric acts of
initiation of fraternities, sororities and other organizations continue to thrive,
even within the elite grounds of the academe.

The history and phenomenon of hazing had been thoroughly discussed in

the recent case of Villareal v. People.38 It is believed that the fraternity
system and its accompanying culture of hazing were transported by the
Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century.39 Thus, a study of the
laws and jurisprudence of the United States (US) on hazing can enlighten
the current predicament of violent initiations in fraternities, sororities and
other organizations.

United States Laws and

Jurisprudence on Hazing

There are different definitions of hazing, depending on the laws of the

states.40 In the case of People v. Lenti,41 the defendant therein challenged
the constitutionality of the state law defining hazing on the ground of
vagueness. The court rejected such contention and held that it would have
been an impossible task if the legislature had attempted to define hazing
specifically
because fraternal organizations and associations never suffered for ideas
in contriving new forms of hazing. Presently, the acceptable definition of
hazing is the practice of physically or emotionally abusing newcomers to an
organization as a means of initiation.42

Hazing can be classified into various categories including, but not limited
to, acts of violence, acts of humiliation, sexual-related acts, and alcohol-
related acts.43 The physical form of hazing may include beating, branding,
paddling, excessive exercise, drinking, and using drugs. Sexual hazing
have included simulated sex acts, sodomy and forced kissing.44 Moreover,
hazing does not only result in physical injuries and hospitalization, but also
lead to emotional damage and traumatic stress.45

Based on statistics and alarming frequency of hazing, states have

attempted to combat hazing through the passage of state laws that prohibit
such acts.46 Forty-four states, with the exception of Alaska, Hawaii,
Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming, have passed anti-
hazing laws.47 The severity of these laws can range from minor penalties to
a prison sentence for up to six years.48 In the states of Illinois, Idaho,
Missouri, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, hazing that result in death or "great
bodily harm" is categorized as a felony.49

In Florida, the Chad Meredith Act,50 a law named after a student who died
in a hazing incident, was enacted on July 1, 2005. It provides that a person
commits a third degree felony when he or she intentionally or recklessly
commits any act of hazing and the hazing results in serious bodily injury or
death. If a person only creates substantial risk of physical injury or death,
then hazing is categorized as a first degree misdemeanor. A similar
provision can be observed in the Penal Law of New York.51

Interestingly, some states included notable features in their anti-hazing

statute to increase its effectiveness. In Alabama, Arkansas, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, South Carolina and Texas, the law imposes a duty on
school personnel to report hazing.52 In fact, in Alabama, no person is
allowed to knowingly permit, encourage, aid, or assist any person in
committing the offense of hazing, or willfully acquiesces in its commission.53

Also, some states enacted statutes that have been interpreted to mean that
persons are guilty of hazing even if they have the consent of the victim. 54 In
New Jersey, consent is not a defense to a hazing charge, and its law
permits the prosecution of offenders under other applicable criminal
statutes.55 By including these various provisions in their anti-hazing
statutes, these states have removed the subjective inquiry of consent from
consideration, thus, presumably allowing courts to effectively and properly
adjudicate hazing cases.56

In the US, hazing victims can either file a criminal action, based on anti-
hazing statutes, or a civil suit, arising from tort law and constitutional law,
against the members of the local fraternity, the national fraternity and even
against the university or college concerned.57 Hazing, which threatens to
needlessly harm students, must be attacked from whatever legal means
are possible.58

In State v. Brown,59 a member of the Alpha Kappa Alpha at Kent State

University was indicted for complicity to hazing. The group physically
disciplined their pledges by forcing them to stand on their heads, beating
them with paddles, and smacking and striking initiates in the face and
head. The Ohio court held that evidence presented therein was more than
sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Excessive intake of alcohol in the fraternity initiations can be considered as

hazing. In Oja v. Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity Inc., 60 a 17-year old
college freshman died as a result of aspirating his own vomit after
consuming excessive amounts of alcohol in a fraternity initiation ritual. The
defendants in the said case contended that they only furnished the alcohol
drinks to the victim. The court denied the defense because such acts of the
fraternity effectively contributed to the death of the victim as part of their
hazing.

Even in high school, hazing could exist. In Nice v. Centennial Area School
District,61 a tenth-grade wrestler at William Tennet High School was
subjected to various forms of hazing, including; a ritual where the victim
was forcibly held down, while a teammate sat on his face with his buttocks
exposed. The parents of the student sued the school because it failed to
prevent the incident despite its knowledge of the hazing rites. The court
approved the settlement of the parties in the amount ofUS$151,000.00.

More recently, the case of Yost v. Wabash College62 involved the hazing of

an 18-year old freshman, who suffered physical and mental injuries in the
initiation rites conducted by the Phi Kappa Psi fraternity. As a pledge, the
victim was thrown into a creek and was placed in a chokehold, until he lost
consciousness. The court upheld that action against the local fraternity
because, even if the student consented, the fraternity had the duty to
ensure the safety of its activities.

The US anti-hazing laws and jurisprudence show that victims of hazing can
properly attain redress before the court. By crafting laws and prosecuting
offenders, the state can address the distinct dilemma of hazing.

Anti-Hazing Law in the

Philippines

R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law .of 1995, has been enacted to
regulate hazing and other forms of initiation rites in fraternities, sororities,
and other organizations. It was in response to the rising incidents of death
of hazing victims, particularly the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa. 63 Despite
its passage, reports of deaths resulting from i hazing continue to emerge.
Recent victims were Guillo Servando of the College of St. Benilde, Marc
Andre Marcos and Marvin Reglos of the San', Beda College - Manila, and
Cris Anthony Mendez of the University of the Philippines - Diliman. With the
continuity of these senseless tragedies, one question implores for an
answer: is R.A. No. 8049 a sufficient deterrent against hazing?

To answer the question, the Court must dissect the provisions of the law
and scrutinize its effect, implication and application.

Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called
acts mala in se; and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that
positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita. This distinction is
important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The
rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts
mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act
is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.64 When the doing of an act
is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the
doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.65

A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the

Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by
special penal laws. In reality, however, there may be mala in se crimes
under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as
amended.66 Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the
RPC, such as technical malversation.67

The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita

crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the
penalized act. If the punishable act or .omission is immoral in itself, then it
is a crime mala in se,- on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there
is a statute prohibiting its commission b)". reasons of public policy, then it is
mala prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.68

The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The Senate
deliberations would show that the lawmakers intended the anti-hazing
statute to be ma/um prohibitum, as follows: SENATOR GUINGONA: Most
of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised Penal
Code.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA If hazing is done at present and it results in death,
the charge would be murder or homicide.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated

homicide or serious physical injuries.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does
so it can be penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense
under this definition of the crime of hazing?

SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either

composing a sorority, fraternity or any association from making this
requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these specific acts or
results, Mr. President.

That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land
that no group or association can require the act of physical initiation before
a person can become a member without being held criminally liable.

x x x           x x x          x x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that
imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not
punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an
initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain
acts that resulted in death, etcetera as a result of hazing which are already
covered crimes.

The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage

hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two
or more charges or offenses, because these very same acts are already
punishable under the Revised Penal Code

That is my difficulty, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. x x x

Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference:
When a person or group of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for
gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit a wrong is not
visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes,
Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if
one files a case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But
if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the
act of hazing.

To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the
sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called
"hazing." Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even
consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness
are even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage, is the so-called initial innocent act. That is
why there is need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari.
Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang
intensiybng makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso.
Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang
intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo,
na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after the
fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag
ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan,
mataas ang penalty sa inyo."

x x x           x x x          x x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the

distinguished Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his statement that the
prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in the death,
that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of
lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent
of the accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems,
to me, a novel situation where we create the special crime without having
to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.

If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate,

then there is no offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that
the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new society or a
new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts
that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by
intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the
basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being

criminalized because in the context of what is happening in the sororities
and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their
intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of
inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it
stopped, deterred, discouraged.

If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the
masters intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What is important
is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict
the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not
have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal.
We do not have any intention to kill or maim."

This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged
therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, etcetera, where
the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if they are
separate offenses.

x x x           x x x          x x x

SENATOR LINA. x x x

I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea
of intent or whether it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical
amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special
law on hazing. We will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal
Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr.
President.69

[Emphases Supplied]

Having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the
core principle of mala in se adhered to under the RPC, the Congress did
not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law
on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita.70 In Vedana v.
Valencia,71 the Court noted that in our nation's very recent history, the
people had spoken, through the Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of
hazing, an act previously considered harmless by custom, as
criminal.72 The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral, but the law
deems the same to be against public policy and must be prohibited.
Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of
hazing. Also, the defense of good faith cannot be raised in its prosecution.73

Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as

a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or
organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial,
silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him
to physical or psychological suffering or injury. From the said definition, the
elements of the crime of hazing can be determined:
 1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization;

2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity,

sorority or organization; and

3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some

embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do
menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise
subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.

From the said definition of hazing, it is apparent that there must be an

initiation rite or practice performed by the fraternities, sororities or
organization. The law, however, did not limit the definition of these groups
to those formed within academic colleges and universities.74 In fact, the
second paragraph of Section 1 provides that the term "organization" shall
include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine
National Police (PNP), Philippine Military Academy (PMA), or officer and
cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training.
Even the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a
corporation engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment are
covered by the law.75 R.A. No. 8049 qualifies that the physical, mental and
psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine
and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective
regular members of the AFP and the PNP, as approved by the Secretary of
National Defense and the National Police Commission, duly recommended
by the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director General of the PNP, shall
not be considered as hazing.
And not all forms of initiation rites are prohibited by the law. Section 2
thereof provides that initiation rites of fraternities, sororities or organizations
shall be allowed provided that the following requisites are met:

1. That the fraternity, sorority or organization has a prior written notice

to the school authorities or head of organization;

2. The said written notice must be secured at least seven (7) days
before the conduct of such initiation;

3. That the written notice shall indicate:

a. The period of the initiation activities, which shall not exceed

three (3) days;

b. The names of those to be subjected to such activities; and

c. An undertaking that no physical violence be employed by

anybody during such initiation rites. Section 3 of R.A. No. 8049
imposes an obligation to the head of the school or organization
or their representatives that they must assign at least two (2)
representatives, as the case may be, to be present during these
valid initiations. The duty of such representative ,is to see to it
that no physical harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a
recruit, neophyte or applicant.

Noticeably, the law does not provide a penalty or sanction to fraternities,

sororities or organizations that fail to comply with the notice requirements of
Section 2. Also, the school and organization administrators do not have a
clear liability for non-compliance with Section 3.
Any person who commits the crime of hazing shall be liable in accordance
with Section 4 of the law, which provides different classes of persons who
are held liable as principals and accomplices.

The first class of principals would be the actual participants in the hazing. If
the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any
physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the
fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the infliction
of physical harm shall be liable as principals. Interestingly, the presence of
any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of actual participation,
unless he prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein.76

The prescribed penalty on the principals depends on the extent of injury

inflicted to the victim.77 The penalties appear to be similar to that of
homicide, serious physical injuries, less serious physical injuries, and slight
physical injuries under the RPC,78 with the penalties for hazing increased
one degree higher. Also, the law provides several circumstances which
would aggravate the imposable penalty.79

Curiously, although hazing has been defined as consisting of those

activities involving physical or psychological suffering or injury, the
penalties for hazing only covered the infliction of physical harm. At best, the
only psychological injury recognized would be causing insanity to the
victim. Conversely, even if the victim only sustained physical injuries which
did not incapacitate him, there is still a prescribed penalty.80

The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or

alumni of the organization, group, fraternity or sorority who actually planned
the hazing.81 Although these planners were not present when the acts
constituting hazing were committed, they shall still be liable as principals.
The provision took in consideration the non-resident members of the
organization, such as their former officers or alumni.

The third class of principals would ht; officers or members of an

organization group, fraternity or sorority who knowingly cooperated in
carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present
thereat.82 These officers or members are penalized, not because of their
direct participation in the infliction of harm, but due to their indispensable
cooperation in the crime by inducing the victim to attend the hazing.

The next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser who
was present when the acts constituting hazing were committed, and failed
to take action to prevent them from occurring.83 The liability of the adviser
arises, not only from his mere presence in the hazing, but also his failure to
prevent the same.

The last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members
of the fraternity, group, or organization.84 The hazing must be held in the
home of one of the officers or members. The parents must have actual
knowledge of the hazing conducted in their homes and failed to take any
action to avoid the same from occurring.

The law also provides for accomplices in the crime of hazing. The school
authorities, including faculty members, who consented to the hazing or who
have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the
same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices.85 Likewise, the
owner of the place where the hazing was conducted can also be an
accomplice to the crime.86 The owner of the place shall be liable when he
has actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein and he failed to take
any steps to stop the same. Recognizing the malum prohibitum
characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any person charged with the
said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there
was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.87 Also, the framers of the law
intended that the consent of the victim shall not be a defense in hazing.
During the discussion of whether sodomy shall be included as a punishable
act under the law, the issue of consent was tackled: SENATOR LINA x x x

But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that
the act may even be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The
infliction of pain may be done with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is
passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the
neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.

If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said,
"Well, he allowed it upon himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that
reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of the victim, then we
would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we
pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the
infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.

But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit.
That the defense of consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting
physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. The
result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely aggravates
the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to
nullify the criminal nature of the act.

So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the
offense if it is committed without consent of the victim, then the whole
foundation of this proposed law will collapse.

SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment?

(Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same is approved.88

[Emphasis supplied]

Further, the law acknowledges that the offended party in the crime of
hazing can seek different courses of action. n '.'provides that the
responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or citizen's army
training organization, may impose the appropriate administrative sanctions
on the person or the persons charged under this provision even before their
conviction.89 Necessarily, the offended party can file either administrative,
civil, or criminal actions against the offenders.90

The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049 shows that, on paper, it is
complete and robust in penalizing the crime of hazing. It was made malum
prohibitum to discount criminal intent and disallow the defense of good
faith. It took into consideration the different participants and contributors in
the hazing activities. While not all acts cited in the law are penalized, the
penalties imposed therein involve various and serious terms of
imprisonment to discourage would-be offenders. Indeed, the law against
hazing is ideal and profound. As to whether the law can be effectively
implemented, the Court begs to continue on the merits of the case.

The Information properly

charged the offense proved

The petitioners claim that the amended ,information avers a criminal charge
of hazing by actual participation, but the only offense proved during the trial
was hazing by inducement. Their1 contention must fail. The Amended
Information reads:

That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa
Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, during a
planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of Alpha Phi
Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less
twenty other members and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal
violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof
and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him
to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.91

On the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9, Rule

110 of the Rules of Court, is enlightening:
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the
court to pronounce judgment.

It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the
statute in alleging the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense. The test is whether it enables a person of common understanding
to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment
properly.92

The Court agrees with the OSG that the "planned initiation rite" as stated in
the information included the act of inducing Villanueva to attend it. In
ordinary parlance, a planned event can be understood to have different
phases. Likewise, the hazing activity had different stages and the
perpetrators had different roles therein, not solely inflicting physical injury to
the neophyte. One of the roles of the petitioners in the hazing activity was
to induce Villanueva to be present. Dungo and Sibal not only induced
Villanueva to be present at the resort, but they actually brought him there.
They fulfilled their roles in the planned hazing rite which eventually led to
the death of Villanueva. The hazing would not have been accomplished
were it not for the acts of the petitioners that induced the victim to be
present.
Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of
hazing.93 To require the prosecutor to indicate every step of the planned
initiation rite in the information at the inception of the criminal case, when
details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous task,
if not downright impossible. The law does not require the impossible (lex
non cognit ad impossibilia).

The proper approach would be to require the prosecution to state every

element of the crime of hazing, the offenders, and the accompanying
circumstances in the planned initiation activity which has been satisfied in
the present case. Accordingly, the amended information sufficiently
informed the petitioners that they were being criminally charged for their
roles in the planned initiation rite.

Conspiracy of the
offenders was duly proven

The petitioners assail that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of
conspiracy.

The Court disagrees.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To
determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a
felony.94 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of
moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or
implement the criminal plan.95
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together
and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design.
The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually
inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
indicate that they are parts of some complete whole.96 Responsibility of a
conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of
conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and
growing out of the purpose intended.97

The lawmakers deliberated on whether the prosecution was still obliged to

prove the conspiracy between the offenders under R.A. 8049, to wit:

SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that

initiated and a person died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under
this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy
or not anymore?

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the

prosecution have to prove conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution
have to prove intent to kill or not?

SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that

occurs, there is no need to prove intent to kill.

SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.

SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should
be hazing, Mr. President.98
The Court does not categorically agree that, under R.A. No. 8049, the
prosecution need not prove conspiracy. Jurisprudence dictates that
conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and
mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate,
is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose.99

R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that introduces a

disputable presumption of actual participation; and which modifies the
concept of conspiracy. Section 4, paragraph 6 thereof provides that the
presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of
participation as principal, unless he prevented the commission of the
punishable acts. This provision is unique because a disputable
presumption arises from the mere presence of the offender during the
hazing, which can be rebutted by proving that the accused took steps to
prevent the commission of the hazing.

The petitioners attempted to attack the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A.

No. 8049 before the CA, hut did not succeed. "[A] finding of prima facie
evidence x x x does not shatter the presumptive innocence the accused
enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises, certain facts have still
to be proved; the trial court cannot depend alone on such evidence,
because precisely, it is merely prima facie. It must still satisfy that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Neither
can it rely on the weak defense the latter may adduce."100
Penal laws which feature prima facie evidence by disputable presumptions
against the offenders are not new, and can be observed in the following: (1)
the possession of drug paraphernalia gives rise to prima facie evidence of
the use of dangerous drug;101 (2) the dishonor of the check for insufficient
funds is prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit;102 and (3) the possession of any good which has been the subject of
robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.103

Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No. 8049 can be related to
the conspiracy in the crime of hazing. The common design of offenders is
to haze the victim. Some of the overt acts that could be committed by the
offenders would be to (1) plan the hazing activity as a requirement of the
victim's initiation to the fraternity; (2) induce the victim to attend the hazing;
and (3) actually participate in the infliction of physical injuries.

In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the petitioners' participation
in the hazing because of their presence in the venue. As correctly held by
the RTC, the presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing at Villa
Novaliches Resort was established by the testimony of Ignacio. She
testified that she saw Sibal emerge from the resort and approach her store,
to wit:

MR. DIMACULANGAN

Q: And how many persons from this group did you see again?

WITNESS

A: Three (3), sir.

Q: Where did they come from, did they come out from the resort? Where
did this 3 people or this group of people coming from?

A: Inside the resort, sir.

Q: And around what time was this?

A: Around 9:00, sir.

Q: And what did they do if any if they came out of the resort?

A: They went to my store, sir.

xxxx

Q: Did you have any other visitors to your store that night?

xxxx

A: "Meron po".

Q: Who were these visitors?

A: I don't know their names but I recognize their faces, sir.

Q: If I show you pictures of these people, will you be able to identify them
before this Court.

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx
Q: Mrs. Ignacio, I am showing you this picture of persons marked as Exhibit
"L" in the Pre-Trial, can you please look over this document carefully and
see if any of the persons whom you said visited your store is here?

xxxx

A: "Siya rin po."

COURT:

Make it of record that the witness pinpointed to the first picture appearing
on the left picture on the first row.

xxxx

ATIY. PAMAOS:

For the record, your Honor, we manifest that the picture and the name
pointed by the witness has been previously marked as Exhibit "L-3" and
previously admitted by the defense as referring to Gregorio Sibal, Jr.,
accused in this case…104

Ignacio, also positively identified Dungo as among the guests of Villa

Novaliches Resort on the night of the hazing, to wit:

COURT

Q: xx x Now, when you say other people you could identify who are not in
the pictures then how would you know that these people are indeed those
people you could identify?
WITNESS

A: "Iyon pong ... di ba po nagkuwento ako na dumating sila tapos nag

shake hands at saka iyong nagyakapan po ... "

Q: And what will be the significance of the alleged embrace and shake
hands for you to say that you could identify those people?

A: "Hindi po. Noong dumating po sila nasa isang jeep, meron pong lalaki
doon sa may tabi ng driver bumaba siya tapos po noong bumaba siya
tapos iyong mga kasamahan nya sa likod nagbaba-an din, iyon po nagbati-
an po sila."

Q: And from these greeting, how could you identify these people?

A: "Ngayon ko lang po napag masdan ang taong iyon, hindi ko po alam na

akusado po sa kabila iyon."

Q: And who was that person?

A: "Siya po, iyon po."

Q: Who are you pointing to?

A: "Iyon pong naka-dilaw na ... " (Witness pointing to Dandy Dungo)

Q: So, are you telling the Court that this person you positively saw seated
beside the driver came out and subsequently embraced and shook hands
with the other people from the jeepney, is that your testimony?

A: Yes, your Honor.105

The testimony of Ignacio was direct and straightforward. Her testimony was
given great weight because she was a disinterested and credible witness.
The prosecution indubitably established the presence of Dungo and Sibal
during the hazing. Such gave rise to the prima facie evidence of their actual
participation in the hazing of Villanueva. They were given an opportunity to
rebut and overcome the prima facie evidence of the prosecution by proving
that they prevented the commission of the hazing, yet they failed to do so.

Because of the uncontroverted prima facie evidence against the petitioners,

it was shown that they performed an overt act in the furtherance of the
criminal design of hazing. Not only did they induce the victim to attend the
hazing activity, the petitioners also actually participated in it based on the
prima facie evidence. These acts are sufficient to establish their roles in the
conspiracy of hazing.

Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in
itself amount to conspiracy.106 Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the
participation of the offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be proven by
the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the hazing, unless
they prevented the commission of the acts therein.

The guilt of the

petitioners was proven
beyond reasonable doubt

Aside from inducing Villanueva to attend the initiation rites and their
presence during the hazing, the petitioners? guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the sequence of circumstantial evidence presented by
the prosecution. Their involvement in the hazing of Villanueva is not merely
based on prima facie evidence but was also established by circumstantial
evidence.

In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own

starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal
prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.107 In criminal law, proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof that
produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.108

While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable

doubt is required for a conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude
resort to circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available.
Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence,
the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under
conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is
insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who
commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not
impossible, to prove.109 Needless to state, the crime of hazing is shrouded
in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities, especially the Greek organizations,
are secretive in nature and their members are reluctant to give any
information regarding initiation rites.110 The silence is only broken after
someone has been injured so severely that medical attention is required. It
is only at this point that the secret is revealed and the activities become
public.111 Bearing in mind the concealment of hazing, it is only logical and
proper for the prosecution to resort to the presentation of circumstantial
evidence to prove it.

The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an

accused through circumstantial evidence require the existence of the
following requisites: (1) there are more than one circumstance; (2) the
inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt
of the accused.112 To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable
doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused. Jurisprudence
requires that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken
chain of events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime.113

The CA meticulously wrote in detail the unbroken chain of circumstantial

evidence which established the petitioners' gult in the death of Villanueva
as follows:

1. Marlon Villanueva is a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega, as testified

by his roommate Joey Atienza.

2. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, Sunga

was staying at their tambayan, talking to her organization mates.
Three men were seated two meters way from her. She identified two
of the men as appellants Sibal and Dungo, while she did not know the
third man. The three men were wearing black shirts with the seal of
the Alpha Phi Omega.

3. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men coming from
the entomology wing arrived and approached the three men. Among
the men who just arrived was the victim, Marlon Villanueva. One of
the men wearing black APO shirts handed over to the two fraternity
neophytes some money and told the men "Mamalengke na kayo." He
later took back the money and said, "Huwag na, kami na lang."

4. One of the men wearing a black APO shirt, who was later identified
as appellant Dungo, stood up and asked Marlon if the latter already
reported to him, and asked him why he did not report to him when he
was just at the tambayan. Dungo then continuously punched the
victim on his arm. This went on for five minutes. Marlon just kept quiet
with his head bowed down. Fifteen minutes later, the men left going
towards the Entomology wing.

5. The deceased Marlon Villanueva was 'last seen alive by Joey

Atienza at 7:00 in the evening of 13 January 2006, from whom he
borrowed the shoes he wore at the initiation right [sic]. Marlon told
Joey that it was his "finals" night.

6. On January 13, 2006 at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening,

Susan Ignacio saw more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the Villa
Novaliches Resort onboard a jeepney.1âwphi1 She estimated the
ages of these persons to be between 20 to 30 years old. Three (3)
persons riding a single motorcycle likewise arrived at the resort.
7. Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace
at the resort who looked like they were praying. Later that evening, at
least three (3) of these persons went to her store to buy some items.
She did not know their names but could identity [sic] their faces. After
she was shown colored photographs, she pointed to the man later
identified as Herald Christopher Braseros. She also pointed out the
man later identified as Gregorio Sibal, Jr.

8. Donato Magat, a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba

City, testified that around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14,
2006, he was waiting for passengers at the corner of Villa Novaliches
Resort when a man approached him and told him that someone
inside the resort needed a ride. Magat then went to the resort and
asked the two (2) men standing by the gate who will be riding his
tricycle.

9. The four (4) men boarded his tricycle but Magat noticed that when
he touched the body of the man who was being carried, it felt cold.
The said man looked very weak like a vegetable.

10. Seferino Espina y Jabay testified that he worked as a security

guard at the J.P. Rizal Hospital and was assigned at the emergency
room. At around 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14,
2006, he was with another security guard, Abelardo Natividad and
hospital helper Danilo Glindo a.k.a. Gringo, when a tricycle arrived at
the emergency room containing four (4) passengers, excluding the
driver. He was an arm's length away from said tricycle. He identified
two of the passengers thereof as appellants Dungo and Sibal. Espina
said he and Glinda helped the passengers unload a body inside the
tricycle and brought it to the emergency room.

11. Afterwards, Espina asked the two meq for identification cards.
The latter replied that they did not bring with them any I.D. or
wallet.1âwphi1 Instead of giving their true names, the appellants
listed down their names in the hospital logbook as Brandon Gonzales
y Lanzon and Jericho Paril y Rivera. Espina then told the two men not
to leave, not telling them that they secretly called the police to report
the incident which was their standard operating procedure when a
dead body was brought to the hospital.

12. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was then the attending physician at
the emergency room, observed that Marlon was motionless, had no
heartbeat and already cyanotic.

13. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Marlon for about 15 to 20 minutes.

However, the latter did not respond to resuscitation and was
pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion hematoma
on the left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms
and legs. He further attested that Marlon's face was already cyanotic.

14. When Dr. Masilungan pulled down Marlon's pants, he saw a large
contusion on both legs which extended from the upper portion of his
thigh down to the couplexial portion or the back of the knee.

15. Due to the nature, extent and location of Marlon's injuries, Dr.
Masilungan opined that he was a victim of hazing. Dr. Masilungan is
familiar with hazing injuries, having undergone hazing when he was a
 student and also because of his experience treating victims of hazing
incidents.

16. Dr. Roy Camarillo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime

Laboratory in Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba
City, testified that he performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the
victim on January 14j 2006; that the victim's cause of death was blunt
head trauma. From 1999 to 2006, he was able to conduct post-
mortem examination of the two (2) persons whose deaths were
attributed to hazing. These two (2) persons sustained multiple
contusions and injuries on different parts of their body, particularly on
the buttocks, on both upper and lower extremities. Both persons died
of brain hemorrhage. Correlating these two cases to the injuries
found on the victim's body, Dr. Camarillo attested that the victim,
Marlon Villanueva, sustained similar injuries to those two (2) persons.
Based on the presence of multiple injuries and contusions on his
body, he opined that these injuries were hazing-related.114

Petitioners Dungo and Sibal, on the other hand, presented the defense of
denial and alibi. These defenses, however, must fail. Time and time again,
this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the weakest of all defenses,
because they are easy to concoct and fabricate.115 As properly held by the
RTC, these defenses cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of the petitioners by prosecution witnesses Sunga and
Ignacio. The testimonies of the defense witnesses also lacked credibility
and reliability. The corroboration of defense witness Rivera was suspect
because she was the girlfriend of Dungo, and it was only logical and
emotional that she would stand by the man she loved and cared for. The
testimonies of their fellow fraternity brothers, likewise, do not hold much
weight because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the case.
Stated differently, the petitioners did not present credible and. disinterested
witnesses to substantiate their defenses of denial and alibi.

After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA and the
R TC that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was
overwhelming enough to establish the guilt of the petitioners beyond a
reasonable doubt. The unbroken chain of events laid down by the CA
leaves us no other conclusion other than the petitioners' participation in the
hazing. They took part in the hazing and, together; with their fellow
fraternity officers and members, inflicted physical injuries to Villanueva as a
requirement of his initiation to the fraternity. The physical injuries eventually
took a toll on the body of the victim, which led to his death. Another young
life lost.

With the fact of hazing, the identity ,of the petitioners, and their participation
therein duly proven, the moral certainty that produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind has been satisfied.

Final Note

Hazing has been a phenomenon that has beleaguered the country's

educational institutions and communities. News of young men beaten to
death as part of fraternities' violent initiation rites supposedly to seal
fraternal bond has sent disturbing waves to lawmakers. Hence, R.A. No.
8049 was signed into to law on June 7, 1995. Doubts on the effectiveness
of the law were raised. The Court, however, scrutinized its provisions and it
is convinced that the law is rigorous in penalizing the crime of hazing.

Hopefully, the present case will serve as a guide to the bench and the bar
on the application of R.A. No. 8049. Through careful case-build up and
proper presentation of evidence before the court, it is not impossible for the
exalted constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused to be
overcome and his guilt for the crime of hazing be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution must bear in mind the secretive nature
of hazing, and carefully weave its chain of circumstantial evidence.
Likewise, the defense must present a genuine defense and substantiate
the same through credible and reliable witnesses. The counsels of both
parties must also consider hazing as a malum prohibitum crime and the
law's distinctive provisions.

While the Court finds R.A. No. 8049 adequate to deter and prosecute
hazing, the law is far from perfect. In Villareal v. People,116 the Court
suggested that the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or
alumni fraternity members during hazing should be considered as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
Equally, based on the discussion earlier, this Court suggests some further
amendments to the law. First, there should be a penalty or liability for
noncompliance with Section 2, or the written notice requirement, and with
Section 3, or the representation requirement. Second, the penalties under
Section 4 should also consider the psychological harm done to the victim of
hazing. With these additional inputs on R.A. No. 8049, the movement
against hazing can be invigorated. R.A. No. 8049 is a democratic response
to the uproar against hazing. It demonstrates that there must, and should,
be another way of fostering brotherhood, other than through the culture of
violence and suffering. The senseless deaths of these young men shall
never be forgotten, for justice is the spark that lights the candles of their
graves.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 26, 2013 Decision and
the October 8, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C.
No. 05046 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Let copies of this Decision be
furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice as guidance for the
proper implementation and prosecution of violators of R.A. No. 8049; and
to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to
include the penalty for noncompliance with its Section 2 and 3, and the
:penalty for the psychological harms to the surviving victims of hazing.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192330               November 14, 2012

ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food
intended for those suffering from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of
reconsideration projects affecting the homes of victims of calamities.
The Facts and the Case

The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M.
Ysidoro before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 of violation of
illegal use of public propertry (technical malversation) under Article 220 of
the Revised Penal Code.1

The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office
(MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program
(CSAP) that provided construction materials to indigent calamity victims
with which to rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries provided the labor
needed for construction.

On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a,
Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting
for work for the reason that they had to find food for their families. This
worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such
construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction materials
particularly the cement. Thus, she sought the help of Cristina Polinio
(Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality’s
Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished
children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes
of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already distributed food to
the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP
beneficiaries.

Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte
Municipal Mayor, to seek his approval. After explaining the situation to him,
Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks
of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.2 Mayor
Ysidoro instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to consult the accounting
department regarding the matter.

On being consulted, Eldelissa Elises, the supervising clerk of the Municipal

Accountant’s Office, signed the withdrawal slip based on her view that it
was an emergency situation justifying the release of the goods.
Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries. Afterwards,
Garcia reported the matter to the MSWDO and to the municipal auditor as
per auditing rules.

On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang

Bayan of Leyte, filed the present complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller,
Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head, testified that the subject SFP
goods were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte’s malnourished
children. She also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding
Implementation Guidelines for Local Government Units governed the
distribution of SFP goods.3 Thus, Ysidoro committed technical malversation
when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.

In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a
project also meant for the poor of the municipality was valid since they
came from the savings of the SFP and the Calamity Fund. Ysidoro also
claims good faith, believing that the municipality’s poor CSAP beneficiaries
were also in urgent need of food. Furthermore, Ysidoro pointed out that the
COA Municipal Auditor conducted a comprehensive audit of their
municipality in 2001 and found nothing irregular in its transactions.
On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of technical malversation. But, since his action caused no
damage or embarrassment to public service, it only fined him P1,698.00 or
50% of the sum misapplied. The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied
public property to a pubic purpose other than that for which it has been
appropriated by law or ordinance. On May 12, 2010 the Sandiganbayan
denied Ysidoro’s motion for reconsideration. On June 8, 2010 Ysidoro
appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision to this Court.

The Questions Presented

In essence, Ysidoro questions the Sandiganbayan’s finding that he

committed technical malversation. He particularly raises the following
questions:

1. Whether or not he approved the diversion of the subject goods to a

public purpose different from their originally intended purpose;

2. Whether or not the goods he approved for diversion were in the

nature of savings that could be used to augment the other authorized
expenditures of the municipality;

3. Whether or not his failure to present the municipal auditor can be

taken against him; and

4. Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical

malversation.

The Court’s Rulings

One. The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of
the Revised Penal Code4 has three elements: a) that the offender is an
accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds or property under
his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use for which
such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which
they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.5 Ysidoro claims that
he could not be held liable for the offense under its third element because
the four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines he gave the CSAP
beneficiaries were not appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific
purpose.

But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan
of Leyte enacted Resolution 00-133 appropriating the annual general fund
for 2001.6 This appropriation was based on the executive budget7 which
allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the
Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services8 which covers
the CSAP housing projects.9 The creation of the two items shows the
Sanggunian’s intention to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the
CSAP in the annual budget.

Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then
those goods should be used for SFP’s needs, observing the rules
prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its feeding programs.
The target clientele of the SFP according to its manual10 are: 1) the
moderately and severely underweight pre-school children aged 36 months
to 72 months; and 2) the families of six members whose total monthly
income is P3,675.00 and below.11 This rule provides assurance that the
SFP would cater only to the malnourished among its people who are in
urgent need of the government’s limited resources.

Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of

the goods to those providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own
homes. This is technical malversation. If Ysidoro could not legally distribute
the construction materials appropriated for the CSAP housing beneficiaries
to the SFP malnourished clients neither could he distribute the food
intended for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.

Two. Ysidoro claims that the subject goods already constituted savings of
the SFP and that, therefore, the same could already be diverted to the
CSAP beneficiaries. He relies on Abdulla v. People12 which states that
funds classified as savings are not considered appropriated by law or
ordinance and can be used for other public purposes. The Court cannot
accept Ysidoro’s argument.

The subject goods could not be regarded as savings. The SFP is a

continuing program that ran throughout the year. Consequently, no one
could say in mid-June 2001 that SFP had already finished its project,
leaving funds or goods that it no longer needed. The fact that Polinio had
already distributed the food items needed by the SFP beneficiaries for the
second quarter of 2001 does not mean that the remaining food items in its
storeroom constituted unneeded savings. Since the requirements of hungry
mouths are hard to predict to the last sack of rice or can of sardines, the
view that the subject goods were no longer needed for the remainder of the
year was quite premature.
In any case, the Local Government Code provides that an ordinance has to
be enacted to validly apply funds, already appropriated for a determined
public purpose, to some other purpose. Thus:

SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. – Funds shall be

available exclusively for the specific purpose for which they have been
appropriated. No ordinance shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations from one item to another. However, the local chief executive
or the presiding officer of the sanggunian concerned may, by ordinance, be
authorized to augment any item in the approved annual budget for their
respective offices from savings in other items within the same expense
class of their respective appropriations.

The power of the purse is vested in the local legislative body. By requiring
an ordinance, the law gives the Sanggunian the power to determine
whether savings have accrued and to authorize the augmentation of other
items on the budget with those savings.

Three. Ysidoro claims that, since the municipal auditor found nothing
irregular in the diversion of the subject goods, such finding should be
respected. The SB ruled, however, that since Ysidoro failed to present the
municipal auditor at the trial, the presumption is that his testimony would
have been adverse if produced. Ysidoro argues that this goes against the
rule on the presumption of innocence and the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions.

Ysidoro may be right in that there is no basis for assuming that had the
municipal auditor testified, his testimony would have been adverse to the
mayor. The municipal auditor’s view regarding the transaction is not
conclusive to the case and will not necessarily negate the mayor’s liability if
it happened to be favorable to him. The Court will not, therefore, be drawn
into speculations regarding what the municipal auditor would have said had
he appeared and testified.

Four. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of
using the SFP goods for the CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but
from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the accounting
department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having
no criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the
crime.1âwphi1

But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law

punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance
for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is
mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but
becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission
based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.13 It is the
commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect
thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated.
Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.14

Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro’s act, no matter how noble or miniscule the
amount diverted, constitutes the crime of technical malversation. The law
and this Court, however, recognize that his offense is not grave, warranting
a mere fine.
WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in its entirely the assailed Decision of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 dated February 8, 2010.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 235071

EVANGELINE PATULOT Y GALIA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated July
13, 2017 and the Resolution2 dated September 25, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 37385 which affirmed with modification
the Decision3 dated November 19, 2014 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 163, Taguig City Station, finding
Evangeline Patulot y Galia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
charges of child abuse.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

In two (2) separate Informations, Patulot was charged with child abuse,
defined and penalized under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, otherwise
known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act,4 the accusatory portions of which read:
That on or about the 14th day of November 2012, in the City of Taguig,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit acts of child abuse upon one BBB, a two (2) month old baby, by
throwing on her a boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon said victim-minor
physical injuries, which acts are inimical and prejudicial to the child's
normal growth and development. CONTRARY TO LAW.6

During arraignment, Patulot, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the

charges. Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued wherein the prosecution
presented CCC, mother of minors AAA and BBB, three (3) years old and
two (2) months old, respectively; DDD, father of the minors; and Dr. Francis
Jerome Vitales as its witnesses and offered documentary evidence 7 to
establish the following facts:

At around 2:00 p.m. of November 14, 2012, CCC gathered clothes from the
clothesline outside her house. As she was about to enter the house, she
was surprised to see Patulot who was holding a casserole. Without
warning, Patulot poured the contents of the casserole - hot cooking oil - on
her. CCC tried to dodge, but to no avail. AAA and BBB, who were nearby,
suddenly cried because they were likewise hit by the hot cooking oil. CCC
hurriedly brought AAA and BBB to her three neighbors who volunteered to
bring the children to the Polyclinic at South Signal, Taguig City, for
treatment. She then went to the barangay hall also at South Signal, Taguig
City, to report the incident. Accompanied by barangay personnel, she went
to Patulot's house, but Patulot was not there. She instead returned to her
children at the Polyclinic. While there, she learned from a neighbor that
Patulot had been arrested. Consequently, having been assured that her
children were all right and that medication had already been given, they
returned to the barangay hall, where DDD met them. At the barangay hall,
CCC noticed that her children were shivering. Thus, she asked her
neighbors to bring them to Pateros-Taguig District Hospital while she
stayed behind to give her statement. Afterwards, she proceeded to the
hospital where she was likewise treated for injuries. While she and BBB
were able to go home, AAA needed to be confined but was discharged the
next morning. Before going home, however, CCC proceeded to the Taguig
Police Station where she executed her Sinumpaang
Salaysay.8 Subsequently, Dr. Vitales of the Pateros-Taguig District
Hospital, who examined and treated CCC and her children, testified that
the injuries suffered by AAA and BBB would heal for an average period of
thirty (30) days. Next, DDD testified that he incurred ₱7,440.00 in medical
expenses for his wife and children.9

Solely testifying in her defense, Patulot denied the allegations against her.
She recounted that prior to the alleged incident, she was on her way to the
market to sell her merchandise when CCC bumped her on the arm, uttering
foul words against her. Due to the impact, Patulot's merchandise fell.
Because of this, she cursed CCC back who, in turn, merely laughed and
repeated the invectives as she moved away. Then, from 11:00 a.m. to 2:30
p.m. on November 14, 2012, she was repacking black pepper at her house
when she heard CCC taunt her in a loud voice, "Bakit hindi ka pa sumama
sa asawa mo? Dapat sumama ka na para pareha kayong
paglamayan." Because of this, Patulot proceeded to Barangay Central
Signal, Taguig City, to file a complaint against CCC, but she was ignored.
So she went instead to the Barangay South Signal, Taguig City. But upon
reaching said location, she was apprehended by the Barangay Tanod and
brought to the Barangay Hall of South Signal, Taguig City for
questioning. 10

On November 19, 2014, the RTC found Patulot guilty of child abuse and
disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:

1) In Criminal Case No. 149971, the Court finds accused Evangeline

Patulot y Galia GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged
and hereby sentences her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to seven (7) years
and four (4) months of pris[i]on mayor, as maximum. Accused is further
ordered to pay the offended party the amount of Three Thousand Seven
Hundred Two Pesos (₱3,702), as actual damages, and Ten Thousand
Pesos (₱l 0,000) by way of moral damages;

2) In Criminal Case No. 149972, the Court finds accused Evangeline

Patulot y Galia GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged
and hereby sentences her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to seven (7) years
and four (4) months of pris[i]on mayor, as maximum. Accused is fm1her
ordered to pay the offended party the amount of Three Thousand Seven
Hundred Two Pesos (₱3,702), as actual damages, and Ten Thousand
Pesos (₱l 0,000) by way of moral damages; and
3) Finally, accused is ordered to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos
(₱5,000) in each case, conformably with section 31 (f) of R.A. 7610.

SO ORDERED. 11 (Italics supplied.)

The RTC found that while Patulot may not have intended to cause harm on
AAA and BBB, her negligence nonetheless caused injury on them, which
left visible scars that are most likely to stay on their faces and bodies for
the rest of their lives. Besides, the trial court added that R.A. No. 7610 is a
special law such that intent is not necessary for its violator to be liable. 12

In a Decision dated July 13, 2017, the CA affirmed Patulot's conviction, but
modified the penalty imposed by the RTC in the following wise:

WHEREFORE, the 19 November 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court

of Pasig City, Branch 163 (Taguig City Station) is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that:

1) in Criminal Case No. 149971, Evangeline Patulot y Galia is

SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9)
months, and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum[,] to
seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum; and

2) in Criminal Case No. 149972, Evangeline Patulot y Galia is

SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9)
months, and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum[,] to
seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED. 13 (Italics supplied, underscoring in the original.)

According to the appellate court, there was no reason to deviate from the
trial court's findings of guilt for it had the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand. It,
however, ruled that the RTC was amiss in finding it unnecessary to
determine intent merely because the act for which Patulot stood charged is
punishable by a special law. The CA clarified that the index of whether a
crime is malum prohibitum is not its form, that is, whether or not it is found
in the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or in a special penal statute, but the
legislative intent. Nevertheless, this reasoning still cannot help Patulot's
case because even if she did not intend on inflicting harm on the children,
there was still intent to harm CCC. Thus, criminal liability is incurred
although the wrongful act done be different from that which Patulot
intended. For the same reason, the mitigating circumstance of "no intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" cannot be appreciated in
Patulot's favor. Thus, Patulot must still be held guilty of the offense
charged. 14

Aggrieved by the CA's denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, Patulot

filed the instant petition on January 4, 2018, invoking the following
arguments:

I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION OF VIOLATING SEC.
10(A) R.A. 7610 DESPITE THE FACT THAT SHE HAD NO INTENT TO
DEGRADE AND DEMEAN THE INTRINSIC WORTH AND DIGNITY OF
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S CHILDREN.
II.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING

TO APPLY ARTICLE 49 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WITH
REGARD TO THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY. 15

According to Patulot, she can only be convicted of physical injuries and not
child abuse. Citing our pronouncement in Bongalon v. People, 16 she
submits that not every instance of laying hands on a child constitutes the
crime of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Only when the
laying of hands is shown to be intended to debase, degrade, or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be
punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the RPC. Thus, in
the absence of such intention on the part of Patulot, her true intention being
to pour hot oil only on CCC with AAA and BBB being merely accidentally
hit, she cannot be convicted of child abuse.

Patulot adds that even considering her to have committed child abuse, the
CA erred in determining the imposable penalty for failing to apply Article
4917 of the RPC. According to Patulot, there was error in personae as the
oil that was intended for CCC accidentally hit the children. She intended to
commit physical injuries, but ended up committing child abuse. Applying
Article 49, since the penalty of the intended crime (physical injuries) is less
than the crime committed (child abuse), the imposable penalty is that which
refers to physical injuries, in its maximum period. As to the extent of the
physical injuries intended, based on the finding of Dr. Vitales that the
injuries suffered by AAA and BBB would heal for an average period of thirty
(30) days, the offense Patulot intended to commit is only Less Serious
Physical Injuries under the first paragraph of Article 26518 of the RPC.
Thus, the proper penalty should only be arresto mayor in its maximum or
four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) months for each count.19

We deny the petition.

Under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610, "child abuse" refers to the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of
the following: (1) psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual
abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) any act by deeds or words which
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as
a human being; (3) unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for
survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) failure to immediately give medical
treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth
and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

In conjunction with this, Section 10(a) of the same Act provides:

SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and

Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development.

----

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the
child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.1âшphi1 (Italics supplied.)
Corollarily, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases defines the term "child abuse" as the
infliction of physical or psychological injury, cruelty to, or neglect, sexual
abuse or exploitation of a child. In turn, the same Section defines "physical
injury" as those that include but are not limited to lacerations, fractured
bones, burns, internal injuries, severe injury or serious bodily harm suffered
by a child.

In view of these provisions, the Court, in Araneta v. People,20 discussed the

distinct acts punishable under R.A. No. 7610, to wit:

As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those
enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four
distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and
(d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development.
The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and
separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that
these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial
to the child's development. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, an accused
can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The
prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and
child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act
prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a

disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from
other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense
which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of
Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development" supposes that there are
four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child
cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the child's development. The fourth penalized act cannot be
interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three
other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned
provision does not warrant such construal.21 (Italics supplied, citations
omitted.)

It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that when a child is subjected to
physical abuse or injury, the person responsible therefor can be held liable
under R.A. No. 7610 by establishing the essential facts above. Here, the
prosecution duly proved the following allegations in the Information
charging Patulot of child abuse: (1) the minority of both AAA and BBB; (2)
the acts committed by Patulot constituting physical abuse against AAA and
BBB; and (3) the fact that said acts are punishable under R.A. No. 7610. In
particular, it was clearly established that at the time of the incident, AAA
and BBB were merely three (3) years old and two (2) months old,
respectively; that Patulot consciously poured hot cooking oil from a
casserole on CCC, consequently injuring AAA and BBB; and that said act
constitutes physical abuse specified in Section 3(b)(1) of R.A. No. 7610.

On this score, Patulot contends that on the basis of our pronouncement

in Bongalon, she cannot be convicted of child abuse because it was not
proven that she intended to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings. Her reliance on said ruling,
however, is misplaced. In Bongalon, the Information specifically charged
George Bongalon, petitioner therein, of committing acts which "are
prejudicial to the child's development and which demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the said child as a human being."22 Thus, we ruled that he
can only be held liable for slight physical injuries instead of child abuse in
the absence of proof that he intended to humiliate or "debase the 'intrinsic
worth and dignity"' 23 of the victim.

A cursory review of the Informations in the instant case, however, reveals

no similar allegation that Patulot's acts debased, degraded, or demeaned
the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings. Instead,
they charged Patulot for willfully committing acts of child abuse on AAA and
BBB "by throwing on [them] a (sic) boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon said
victim-minor physical injuries, which acts are inimical and prejudicial to the
child's normal growth and development."24 Accordingly, the RTC and the
CA duly found that this allegation in the Informations was adequately
established by the prosecution. It bears stressing that Patulot did not even
deny the fact that she threw boiling oil on CCC which likewise fell on AAA
and BBB. Clearly, her actuations causing physical injuries on babies, who
were merely three (3) years old and two (2) months old at the time, are
undeniably prejudicial to their development. In the words of the trial court,
Patulot's acts, which practically burned the skin of AAA and BBB, left visible
scars that are most likely to stay on their faces and bodies for the rest of
their lives. She cannot, therefore, be allowed to escape liability arising from
her actions.1âшphi1

Neither can Patulot argue that in the absence of intention on her part to
harm AAA and BBB, she cannot be convicted of child abuse because she
merely intended on committing physical injuries against CCC. Our
pronouncement in Mabunot v. People25 is squarely on point. There,
petitioner Jester Mabunot accidentally shoved a female minor child
consequently fracturing her rib while he was engaged in a fistfight with
another boy. But he points out that the injury sustained by the minor victim
was unintentional. Thus, according to Mabunot, this single and unintended
act of shoving the child while trading punches with another can hardly be
considered as within the definition of child abuse under Section 10(a) of
R.A. No. 7610. Assuming, therefore, that he was the cause of the injury,
Mabunot insists that he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries
under Section 265 of the RPC. The Court, however, rejected Mabunot's
contention and held him liable not for slight physical injuries, but for child
abuse. We explained:

The petitioner also posits that since he and Dennis were exchanging
punches then, he could not have made a deliberate design to injure Shiva.
Without intent to harm Shiva, the petitioner insists that he deserves an
acquittal.

The foregoing argument is untenable.

"When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are

deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law.
Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other
elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed."

The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A.

No. 7610, a special law. However, physical abuse of a child is inherently
wrong, rendering material the existence of a criminal intent on the part of
the offender.

In the petitioner's case, criminal intent is not wanting. Even if the Court
were to consider for argument's sake the petitioner's claim that he had no
design to harm Shiva, when he swang his arms, he was not performing a
lawful act. He clearly intended to injure another person. However, it was not
Dennis but Shiva, who ended up with a fractured rib. Nonetheless, the
petitioner cannot escape liability for his error. Indeed, criminal liability shall
be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.26 (Citations
omitted.)

Similarly, in the instant case, Patulot's criminal intent is not wanting for as
she expressly admitted, she intended on pouring hot cooking oil on CCC.
As such, even granting that it was not her intention to harm AAA and BBB,
she was performing an unlawful act when she threw the hot oil from her
casserole on CCC. She cannot, therefore, escape liability from the same in
view of the settled doctrine mentioned in Mabunot that a person incurs
criminal liability although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended. As defined in the law, child abuse charged against Patulot is
physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. To the
Court, her act of pouring hot oil on AAA and BBB falls squarely within this
definition. Thus, in view of the fact that her acts were proven to constitute
child abuse under the pertinent provisions of the law, she must be held
liable therefor.
Indeed, it cannot be denied that AAA and BBB are children entitled to
protection extended by R.A. No. 7610. Time and again, the Court has
stressed that R.A. No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the
implementation of a national comprehensive program for the survival of the
most vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino children, in
keeping with the Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3,
paragraph 2, that "[t]he State shall defend the right of the children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development."27 This piece of legislation supplies the
inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed against children,
namely, the RPC and Presidential Decree No. 603 or The Child and Youth
Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a mechanism for strong
deterrence against the commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law
has stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by which child
traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized. Also, the definition of
child abuse is expanded to encompass not only those specific acts of child
abuse under existing laws but includes also "other acts of neglect, abuse,
cruelty or exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development."28

As regards the penalties imposed by the courts a quo, we find no

compelling reason to modify the same for being within the allowable range.
To conform to recent jurisprudence, however, the Court deems it proper to
impose an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the actual damages in
the amount of Three Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos (₱3,702) and
moral damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000), to be
computed from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.29

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The

assailed Decision dated July 13, 2017 and Resolution dated September 25,
2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 37385
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the ₱3,702.00 actual damages
and P10,000.00 moral damages awarded in each Criminal Case No.
149971 and Criminal Case No. 149972 shall be subject to an interest of six
percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the finality of this Decision until full
payment.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186412               September 7, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ORLITO VILLACORTA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02550, which affirmed the Decision2 dated
September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 170, of
Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, finding accused-appellant Orlito
Villacorta (Villacorta) guilty of murder, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz (Cruz) the
sum of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus the costs of suit.

On June 21, 2002, an Information3 was filed against Villacorta charging him

with the crime of murder, as follows:

That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO
SALVADOR CRUZ, thereby inflicting upon the victim serious wounds which
caused his immediate death.

When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta pleaded not guilty.4

During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina Mendeja

(Mendeja) and Dr. Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr. Belandres).

Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her sari-sari
store located at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz and Villacorta
were regular customers at Mendeja’s store. At around two o’clock in the
morning, while Cruz was ordering bread at Mendeja’s store, Villacorta
suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left
side of Cruz’s body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick
broke and was left in Cruz’s body. Immediately after the stabbing incident,
Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to catch Villacorta. When
Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the
broken bamboo stick from Cruz’s body.5 Mendeja and Aron then brought
Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.6

Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro
Hospital. When Cruz sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he
was taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where he was treated as an out-
patient. Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on February 14,
2002, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. While
admitting that he did not personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to
determine, using Cruz’s medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz died of
tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.7 Dr. Belandres specifically
described the cause of Cruz’s death in the following manner:

The wound was exposed x x – spurs concerted, the patient developed

difficulty of opening the mouth, spastivity of the body and abdominal pain
and the cause of death is hypoxic encephalopathy – neuro transmitted –
due to upper G.I. bleeding x x x. Diagnosed of Tetanus, Stage III.8

The prosecution also intended to present Dr. Deverni Matias (Dr. Matias),
who attended to Cruz at the San Lazaro Hospital, but the prosecution and
defense agreed to dispense with Dr. Matias’ testimony based on the
stipulation that it would only corroborate Dr. Belandres’ testimony on Cruz
dying of tetanus.

For its part, the defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing
Cruz. Villacorta recounted that he was on his way home from work at
around two o’clock in the morning of January 21, 2002. Upon arriving
home, Villacorta drank coffee then went outside to buy cigarettes at a
nearby store. When Villacorta was about to leave the store, Cruz put his
arm around Villacorta’s shoulder. This prompted Villacorta to box Cruz,
after which, Villacorta went home. Villacorta did not notice that Cruz got
hurt. Villacorta only found out about Cruz’s death upon his arrest on July
31, 2002.9

On September 22, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta

guilty of murder, qualified by treachery. The dispositive portion of said
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Orlito
Villacorta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
heirs of Danilo Cruz the sum of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death
of said victim plus the costs of suit.10

Villacorta, through his counsel from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), filed
a notice of appeal to assail his conviction by the RTC.11 The Court of
Appeals directed the PAO to file Villacorta’s brief, within thirty days from
receipt of notice.

Villacorta filed his Appellant’s Brief12 on May 30, 2007; while the People,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Appellee's
Brief13 on October 2, 2007.

On July 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming
in toto the RTC judgment of conviction against Villacorta.

Hence, Villacorta comes before this Court via the instant appeal.
Villacorta manifested that he would no longer file a supplemental brief, as
he was adopting the Appellant's Brief he filed before the Court of
Appeals.14 The OSG, likewise, manifested that it was no longer filing a
supplemental brief. 15

In his Appellant’s Brief, Villacorta raised the following assignment of errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE

QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.

III

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A

CRIME, HE COULD ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES.16

Villacorta assails the credibility of Mendeja, an eyewitness to the stabbing

incident. It was Mendeja who positively identified Villacorta as the one who
stabbed Cruz in the early morning of January 23, 2002. Villacorta asserts
that Mendeja’s account of the stabbing incident is replete with
inconsistencies and incredulities, and is contrary to normal human
experience, such as: (1) instead of shouting or calling for help when
Villacorta allegedly stabbed Cruz, Mendeja attempted to run after and catch
Villacorta; (2) while, by Mendeja’s own account, there were other people
who witnessed the stabbing and could have chased after Villacorta, yet,
oddly, only Mendeja did; (3) if Cruz was stabbed so swiftly and suddenly as
Mendeja described, then it would have been physically improbable for
Mendeja to have vividly recognized the perpetrator, who immediately ran
away after the stabbing; (4) after the stabbing, both Villacorta and Cruz ran
in opposite directions; and (5) Mendeja had said that the bamboo stick, the
alleged murder weapon, was left at her store, although she had also stated
that the said bamboo stick was left embedded in Cruz’s body. Villacorta
maintains that the aforementioned inconsistencies are neither trivial nor
inconsequential, and should engender some doubt as to his guilt.

We are not persuaded.

To begin with, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of

the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is
accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive
effect. Such determination made by the trial court proceeds from its first-
hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct
and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the
unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their
truthfulness, honesty and candor.17

In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave full faith and
credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Mendeja. The Court of
Appeals rejected Villacorta’s attempts to impugn Mendeja’s testimony,
thus:

Appellant’s reason for concluding that witness Mendeja’s testimony is

incredible because she did not shout or call for help and instead run after
the appellant, fails to impress the Court because persons who witness
crimes react in different ways.

"x x x the makings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react

differently and there is no standard form of behavior when one is
confronted by a shocking incident.

Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s second reason which is, other

persons could have run after the appellant after the stabbing incident. As
explained by witness Mendeja, the other person whom she identified as
Aron was left to assist the appellant who was wounded. Further, the
stabbing occurred at 2:00 o’clock in the morning, a time when persons are
expected to be asleep in their house, not roaming the streets.

His [Villacorta’s] other argument that the swiftness of the stabbing incident
rendered impossible or incredible the identification of the assailant cannot
likewise prosper in view of his admission that he was in the store of witness
Mendeja on January 23, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the morning and that he
assaulted the victim by boxing him.

Even if his admission is disregarded still the evidence of record cannot

support appellant’s argument. Appellant and the victim were known to
witness Mendeja, both being her friends and regular customers. There was
light in front of the store. An opening in the store measuring 1 and ¼
meters enables the person inside to see persons outside, particularly those
buying articles from the store. The victim was in front of the store buying
bread when attacked. Further, immediately after the stabbing, witness
Mendeja ran after the appellant giving her additional opportunity to identify
the malefactor. Thus, authorship of the attack can be credibly
ascertained.18

Moreover, Villacorta was unable to present any reason or motivation for

Mendeja to fabricate such a lie and falsely accuse Villacorta of stabbing
Cruz on January 23, 2002. We have ruled time and again that where the
prosecution eyewitness was familiar with both the victim and accused, and
where the locus criminis afforded good visibility, and where no improper
motive can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the accused,
then her version of the story deserves much weight.19

The purported inconsistencies in Mendeja’s testimony pointed out by

Villacorta are on matters that have no bearing on the fundamental fact
which Mendeja testified on: that Villacorta stabbed Cruz in the early
morning of January 23, 2002, right in front of Mendeja’s store.

In the face of Mendeja’s positive identification of Villacorta as Cruz’s

stabber, Villacorta could only muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like
alibi, as an exonerating justification, is inherently weak and if
uncorroborated, regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also
constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.20
Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the RTC, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in

the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be
held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted
upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus
infection, and not the stab wound.

Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."21

In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early

morning of January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-
patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On February 14, 2002, Cruz was
admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus
infection, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The
prosecution did not present evidence of the emergency medical treatment
Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by Cruz to
Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up medical treatment
of his stab wound, or Cruz’s activities between January 23 to February 14,
2002.

In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 the Court was confronted with

a case of very similar factual background as the one at bar. During an
altercation on October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo,
inflicting an incised wound on Javier’s hand. Javier was treated by Dr.
Meneses. On November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital with
lockjaw and convulsions. Dr. Exconde, who attended to Javier, found that
Javier’s serious condition was caused by tetanus infection. The next day,
on November 15, 1980, Javier died. An Information was filed against
Urbano for homicide. Both the Circuit Criminal Court and the Intermediate
Appellate Court found Urbano guilty of homicide, because Javier's death
was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Urbano
appealed before this Court, arguing that Javier’s own negligence was the
proximate cause of his death. Urbano alleged that when Dr. Meneses
examined Javier’s wound, he did not find any tetanus infection and that
Javier could have acquired the tetanus germs when he returned to work on
his farm only two (2) weeks after sustaining his injury. The Court granted
Urbano’s appeal.

We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano:

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient

intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which
would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

"The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the
appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days.
However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days.
A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms
occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
"Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and
headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting
complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and
difficulty swallowing. As the disease progresses, stiffness gives way to
rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In
fact, trismus is the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible
for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved,
rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus
sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite
variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms
develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most
muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms
encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.

"Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms, an

interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation
period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are
caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery,
which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive
contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful
and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli
produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of
respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then
lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.

"Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days

and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but
dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild.
Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and
onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are
present, but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria
for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72
hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged,
generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine,
1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's

body depends on the incubation period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm
when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident
took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980,
he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that
Javier should have been infected with only a mild case of tetanus because
the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore,
the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died
on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is
that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe
form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could
have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before
he died.23

The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between
the hacking incident and the manifestation of severe tetanus infection
created doubts in the mind of the Court that Javier acquired the severe
tetanus infection from the hacking incident. We explained in Urbano that:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
(People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct
and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but
the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila
Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances, which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition
is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)24

We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set
aside the conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of
22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was
rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus
infection.

If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the
symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the
Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation
period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to
three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality.

Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the
remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been
the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz
was stabbed to the time of his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty
of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code
for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. Although the charge in the
instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight
physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is
necessarily included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight
physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of
murder.25

We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated

murder because the prosecution was not able to establish Villacorta’s intent
to kill. In fact, the Court of Appeals expressly observed the lack of evidence
to prove such an intent beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:

Appellant stabbed the victim only once using a sharpened bamboo stick,
hitting him on the left side of the body and then immediately fled. The
instrument used is not as lethal as those made of metallic material. The
part of the body hit is not delicate in the sense that instant death can ensue
by reason of a single stab wound. The assault was done only once. Thus,
there is doubt as to whether appellant had an intent to kill the victim, which
should be resolved in favor of the appellant. x x x.26

The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every
possible doubt as to the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor.
The onus probandi lies not on accused-appellant but on the prosecution.
The inference that the intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the
absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable
doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is
not frustrated murder but physical injuries only.27

Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical Center
for medical treatment immediately after the stabbing
incident.1avvphi1 Right after receiving medical treatment, Cruz was then
released by the Tondo Medical Center as an out-patient. There was no
other evidence to establish that Cruz was incapacitated for labor and/or
required medical attendance for more than nine days. Without such
evidence, the offense is only slight physical injuries.28

We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being

sufficiently alleged in the Information and proved during trial.

The Information specified that "accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo

stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the
said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ x x x."

Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against

persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly or
especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from
the defense that the offended party might make. This definition sets out
what must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed,
namely: (1) the employment of such means of execution as would give the
person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the
deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. To reiterate,
the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the
lack of expectation that the attack will take place, thus, depriving the victim
of any real opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the commission of
the crime without risk to the aggressor.29 Likewise, even when the victim
was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be
appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made
it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.30

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly
proven in this case, and we sustain such finding. Cruz, the victim, was
attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without provocation. It was two
o’clock in the morning of January 23, 2002, and Cruz, who was out buying
bread at Mendeja’s store, was unarmed. Cruz had his guard down and was
totally unprepared for an attack on his person. Villacorta suddenly
appeared from nowhere, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, and
without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz at the left side of his body, then
swiftly ran away. Villacorta’s treacherous mode of attack left Cruz with no
opportunity at all to defend himself or retaliate.

Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of slight
physical injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which
shall incapacitate the offended party from labor from one to nine days, or
shall require medical attendance during the same period.

The penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1) day to thirty (30)
days.31 The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply since said law
excludes from its coverage cases where the penalty imposed does not
exceed one (1) year.32 With the aggravating circumstance of treachery, we
can sentence Villacorta with imprisonment anywhere within arresto menor
in the maximum period, i.e., twenty-one (21) to thirty (30) days.
Consequently, we impose upon Villacorta a straight sentence of thirty (30)
days of arresto menor; but given that Villacorta has been in jail since July
31, 2002 until present time, already way beyond his imposed sentence, we
order his immediate release.

Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may
be recovered in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Moral
damages compensate for the mental anguish, serious anxiety, and moral
shock suffered by the victim and his family as being a proximate result of
the wrongful act. An award requires no proof of pecuniary loss. Pursuant to
previous jurisprudence, an award of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00)
moral damages is appropriate for less serious, as well as slight physical
injuries.33

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02550, affirming the Decision dated September 22,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case
No. 27039-MN, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered
finding Villacorta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight
physical injuries, as defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of thirty (30) days arresto
menor. Considering that Villacorta has been incarcerated well beyond the
period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons
is ordered to cause Villacorta’s immediate release, unless Villacorta is
being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court, within five
(5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the compliance with such order.
Villacorta is ordered to pay the heirs of the late Danilo Cruz moral damages
in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172896               April 19, 2010

ROÑO SEGURITAN y JARA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded
great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are
supported by substantial evidence on record.1 It is only in exceptional
circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and
relevant matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual
findings of the court below. In this case, we hold that the trial court did not
overlook such factual matters; consequently, we find no necessity to
review, much less, overturn its factual findings.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision2 of the Court of

Appeals (CA) dated February 24, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25069 which
affirmed with modification the Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 06 in Criminal Case No. VI-892 finding
petitioner Roño Seguritan y Jara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide. Likewise impugned is the Resolution4 dated May 23,
2006 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.5

Factual Antecedents

On October 1, 1996, petitioner was charged with Homicide in an

Information, 6 the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:

That on or about November 25,1995, in the municipality of Gonzaga,

province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, ROÑO SEGURITAN y JARA alias Ranio, with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and box one Lucrecio Seguritan, inflicting upon the latter head
injuries which caused his death.

Contrary to law.

During the arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter,

trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

In the afternoon of November 25, 1995, petitioner was having a drinking

session with his uncles Lucrecio Seguritan (Lucrecio), Melchor Panis
(Melchor) and Baltazar Panis (Baltazar), in the house of Manuel dela Cruz
in Barangay Paradise, Gonzaga, Cagayan. Petitioner, who was seated
beside Lucrecio, claimed that Lucrecio’s carabao entered his farm and
destroyed his crops. A heated discussion thereafter ensued, during which
petitioner punched Lucrecio twice as the latter was about to stand up.
Petitioner’s punches landed on Lucrecio’s right and left temple, causing him
to fall face-up to the ground and hit a hollow block which was being used as
an improvised stove.

Lucrecio lost consciousness but was revived with the assistance of

Baltazar. Thereafter, Lucrecio rode a tricycle and proceeded to his house in
the neighboring barangay of Calayan, Cagayan. Upon his arrival, his wife
noticed blood on his forehead. Lucrecio explained that he was stoned, then
went directly to his room and slept.

At around 9 o’clock in the evening, Lucrecio’s wife and daughter noticed

that his complexion has darkened and foamy substance was coming out of
his mouth. Attempts were made to revive Lucrecio but to no avail. He died
that same night.

After the burial of Lucrecio on December 4, 1995, his wife learned of

petitioner’s involvement in her husband’s death. Thus, she sought the
assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). NBI Medico-Legal
Officer Dr. Antonio Vertido (Dr. Vertido) exhumed Lucrecio’s body and
performed the autopsy. Dr. Vertido found hematomas in the scalp located
in the right parietal and left occipital areas, a linear fracture in the right
middle fossa, and a subdural hemorrhage in the right and left cerebral
hemisphere. Dr. Vertido concluded that Lucrecio’s cause of death was
traumatic head injury.7

On May 21, 1996, Melchor executed a sworn statement before the

Gonzaga Police Station recounting the events on that fateful day, including
the punching of Lucrecio by petitioner.
At the time of Lucrecio’s death, he was 51 years old and earned an annual
income of ₱14,000.00 as a farmer.

The Version of the Defense

Petitioner denied hitting Lucrecio and alleged that the latter died of cardiac
arrest. Petitioner claimed that he suddenly stood up during their heated
argument with the intent to punch Lucrecio. However, since the latter was
seated at the opposite end of the bench, Lucrecio lost his balance and fell
before he could be hit. Lucrecio’s head hit the improvised stove as a result
of which he lost consciousness.

Petitioner presented Joel Cabebe, the Assistant Registration Officer of

Gonzaga, Cagayan, and Dr. Corazon Flor, the Municipal Health Officer of
Sta. Teresita, Cagayan, to prove that Lucrecio died of a heart attack. These
witnesses identified the Certificate of Death of Lucrecio and the entry
therein which reads: "Antecedent cause: T/C cardiovascular disease."8

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On February 5, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting

petitioner of homicide. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of homicide and sentences the accused to an
indeterminate sentence of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum
to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum. The accused
is ordered to pay the heirs of the late Lucrecio Seguritan the amount of
₱30,000.00 as actual damages and the amount of ₱135,331.00 as loss of
earning capacity and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.9

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the Judgment of the RTC.

Thus:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is partly AFFIRMED, WITH

MODIFICATION, to read as follows: The Court finds the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and sentences the
accused to an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The accused Roño Seguritan is
ordered to pay the heirs of the late Lucrecio Seguritan the amount of ₱
30,000.00 as actual damages, the amount of ₱135,331.00 as loss of
earning capacity, ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in

its Resolution dated May 23, 2006.

Issues

Thus, this petition for review raising the following issues:

I
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment of
conviction.

II

The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the accused of the crime of

homicide.11

Our Ruling

The petition is denied.

Petitioner disputes the conclusion that the fracture on the right middle fossa
of the skull, beneath the area where a hematoma developed was due to the
blow he delivered because according to the testimony of Dr. Vertido, the
fracture may also be caused by one falling from a height. Petitioner also
maintains that the punches he threw at Lucrecio had nothing to do with the
fatal head injuries the latter suffered. According to him, Lucrecio sustained
the head injuries when he accidentally hit the hollow block that was used as
an improvised stove, after falling from the opposite end of the bench.
Petitioner insists that Lucrecio died due to a fatal heart attack.

In fine, petitioner contends that the appellate court, in affirming the

judgment of the trial court, overlooked material and relevant factual matters
which, if considered, would change the outcome of the case.

We are not persuaded.

It is on record that Lucrecio suffered two external injuries and one internal
injury in his head. The autopsy report showed that Lucrecio died of internal
hemorrhage caused by injuries located at the upper right portion of the
head, left side of the center of his head, and a "fracture, linear, right middle
fossa, hemorrhage, subdural, right and left cerebral hemisphere."

We find no reason to doubt the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the
appellate court, that petitioner punched Lucrecio twice causing him to fall to
the ground. Melchor categorically testified that petitioner punched Lucrecio
twice and as a result, Lucrecio fell to the ground and lost consciousness.
Melchor would not have testified falsely against petitioner, who was his
nephew. He even hesitated to testify as shown by his execution of a sworn
statement just after the autopsy of Lucrecio which revealed that the cause
of death was traumatic head injury attributed to petitioner.

Melchor’s eyewitness account of the fist blows delivered by petitioner to

Lucrecio and the manner by which the latter fell from the bench and hit his
head on the improvised stove is consistent with the autopsy findings
prepared and testified to by Dr. Vertido. Thus:

xxxx

Court:

Q: What is the right parietal area?

A: This is the right parietal area, sir.

(Witness pointing to the upper right portion of the head).

: And then the left occipital area, this is left occipital area with a
hematoma again measuring 5.0 x 4.0 centimeters, sir.
(Witness pointing to the back left part, middle back portion)12

xxxx

Fiscal Feril:

Q: What about this which reads "Fracture, linear, right middle fossa",
where is this injury located?

xxxx

Court:

Q: Will you point that from your head?

A: x x x [A]t the base of the brain of the skull, sir.

If you look at the head at the cut portion, the fracture is located on the
base of the brain, particularly on the right mid-cranial fossa, sir.13

xxxx

Fiscal Feril:

Q: Could it be possible that the victim suffered the injuries specifically

the fracture while he was falling to the ground, hitting solid objects in
the process?

A: Well, with regard to the hematomas there is a possibility [that it

could be caused by] falling from a height x x x although it produces
hematoma, sir.
Court:

Q: Falling from a height?

A: Yes, sir.

Fiscal Feril:

Q: If an external force is administered to such victim, such as x x x fist

blow[s] would it accelerate this force and cause these injuries?

A: Definitely it could accelerate, sir.14

We find no merit in petitioner’s argument that he could not be held

liable for the head fracture suffered by Lucrecio. The height from
which he stood to deliver the fist blows to Lucrecio’s head is sufficient
to cause the fracture.

The testimony of Dr. Vertido also ruled out petitioner’s contention that
Lucrecio died of a heart attack. The fact that Lucrecio’s cause of
death is internal hemorrhage resulting from the head injuries suffered
during his encounter with the petitioner and the certainty that he had
no heart problem are evident in the following portion of Dr. Vertido’s
testimony:

Atty. Antonio:

Q: Did you notice anything unusual in the heart of Lucrecio

Seguritan?
A: Well, with regard to our examination of the heart Your Honor I limit
only the examination on the atomic portion, gross findings, when we
say gross findings that can be seen by the eyes and so if for example
other that the findings on the brain, if I have not seen my injury from
the brain then my next examination to contemplate would be to bring
a portion of each particular organ to Manila and have it subjected to a
hispathologic examination over the microscope. But then we found
out that there is an injury to the brain so why should I now perform a
hispathologic examination on the heart, when in fact there is already
a gross finding on the brain, meaning that the cause of death now is
of course, this traumatic injury, sir.

Court:

Q: Supposed the victim had a heart attack first and then fell down
later, can you determine then x x x the cause of death?

A: Well, your Honor as I said a while ago I opened up the heart, I

examined the heart grossly and there was no findings that would find
to a heart attach on its function, the heart was okay and coronaries
were not thickened so I said well – grossly there was no heart
attack.15

xxxx

Court:

Q: Since you were conducting just a cursory examination of the heart,

my question again is that, could you have determined by further
 examination whether the victim suffered a heart attack before the
injuries on the head were inflicted?

A: That is why sir, I said, I examined the heart and I found out that
there was noting wrong with the heart, and why should I insist on
further examining the heart.16

The notation in the Certificate of Death of Lucrecio that he died of a heart

attack has no weight in evidence. Dr. Corazon Flor, who signed said
document testified that she did not examine the cadaver of Lucrecio. She
stated that a circular governing her profession did not require her to
conduct an examination of Lucrecio’s corpse, as long as the informant tells
her that it is not a medico-legal case. Renato Sidantes (Renato), the
brother-in-law of Lucrecio who applied for the latter’s death certificate, had
no knowledge of the real cause of his death. Thus, Dr. Flor was mistakenly
informed by Renato that the cause of Lucrecio’s death was heart attack.

The petitioner belatedly contends that the delay in the autopsy of Lucrecio’s
body and its embalming compromised the results thereof. To substantiate
his claim, he quotes the book entitled Legal Medicine authored by Dr.
Pedro Solis, viz:

"a dead body must not be embalmed before the autopsy. The embalming
fluid may render the tissue and blood unfit for toxilogical analyses. The
embalming may alter the gross appearance of the tissues or may result to a
wide variety of artifacts that tend to destroy or obscure evidence."
"the body must be autopsied in the same condition when found at the crime
scene. A delay in the performance may fail or modify the possible findings
thereby not serving the interest of justice."17

Petitioner’s reliance on this citation is misplaced. Petitioner failed to adduce

evidence that the one month delay in the autopsy indeed modified the
possible findings. He also failed to substantiate his claim that the
embalming fluid rendered the tissue and blood of Lucrecio unfit for
toxilogical analysis.

Further, it is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which
has been formally offered.18 The allegation that the results of the autopsy
are unworthy of credence was based on a book that was neither marked for
identification nor formally offered in evidence during the hearing of the
case. Thus, the trial court as well as the appellate court correctly
disregarded them. The prosecution was not even given the opportunity to
object as the book or a portion thereof was never offered in evidence.19

A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings
of fact and judgment only – and strictly – upon the evidence offered by the
parties at the trial. To rule otherwise would deprive the opposing party of
his chance to examine the document and object to its admissibility. The
appellate court will have difficulty reviewing documents not previously
scrutinized by the court below.20 Any evidence which a party desires to
submit to the courts must be offered formally because a judge must base
his findings strictly on the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.21
We are not impressed with petitioner’s argument that he should be held
liable only for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide due to the
absence of intent to kill Lucrecio. When death resulted, even if there was
no intent to kill, the crime is homicide, not just physical injuries, since with
respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to
the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences thereof.22 Accordingly, Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 4. Criminal liability – Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act

done be different from that which he intended.

xxxx

Petitioner committed an unlawful act by punching Lucrecio, his uncle who

was much older than him, and even if he did not intend to cause the death
of Lucrecio, he must be held guilty beyond reasonable doubt for killing him
pursuant to the above-quoted provision. He who is the cause of the cause
is the cause of the evil caused.23

Considering the foregoing discussion, we find that both the trial court and
the appellate court correctly appreciated the evidence presented before
them. Both courts did not overlook facts and circumstances that would
warrant a reevaluation of the evidence. Accordingly, there is no reason to
digress from the settled legal principle that the appellate court will generally
not disturb the assessment of the trial court on factual matters considering
that the latter as a trier of facts, is in a better position to appreciate the
same.

Further, it is settled that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded
greatest respect by the appellate court absent any abuse of
discretion.24 There being no abuse of discretion in this case, we affirm the
factual findings of the trial court.

Penalty and Damages

The penalty for Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion temporal the range of which is from 12 years and one day to 20
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in
degree is prision mayor the range of which is from six years and one day to
12 years. In this case, we find that the mitigating circumstance of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, attended the
commission of the crime. Thus, the appellate court correctly imposed the
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

As regards the amount of damages, civil indemnity must also be awarded

to the heirs of Lucrecio without need of proof other than the fact that a
crime was committed resulting in the death of the victim and that petitioner
was responsible therefor.25 Accordingly, we award the sum of ₱50,000.00
in line with current jurisprudence.26

The award of ₱135,331.00 for the loss of earning capacity was also in
order.27 The prosecution satisfactorily proved that the victim was earning an
annual income of ₱14,000.00 from the harvest of pineapples. Besides, the
defense no longer impugned this award of the trial court.

However, the other awards of damages must be modified. It is error for the
trial court and the appellate court to award actual damages of ₱30,000.00
for the expenses incurred for the death of the victim. We perused the
records and did not find evidence to support the plea for actual damages.
The expenses incurred in connection with the death, wake and burial of
Lucrecio cannot be sustained without any tangible document to support
such claim. While expenses were incurred in connection with the death of
Lucrecio, actual damages cannot be awarded as they are not supported by
receipts.281avvphi1

In lieu of actual damages, the heirs of the victim can still be awarded
temperate damages. When pecuniary loss has been suffered but the
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty,
temperate damages may be recovered. Temperate damages may be
allowed in cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of
pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is convinced that the
aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss.29 In this regard, the amount
of ₱25,000.00 is in accordance with recent jurisprudence.30

Moral damages was correctly awarded to the heirs of the victim without
need of proof other than the fact that a crime was committed resulting in
the death of the victim and that the accused was responsible
therefor.31 The award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages conforms to
existing jurisprudence.32
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25069 finding petitioner Roño Seguritan y Jara
guilty of homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of six years and
one day of prision mayor as minimum, to 12 years and one day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Lucrecio
Seguritan the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱135,331.00
as loss of earning capacity is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
petitioner is further ordered to pay ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in
lieu of actual damages, and ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005

MELBA QUINTO, Petitioners,
vs.
DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECO, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison

Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson
Quinto, who was also about eleven years old, were at Barangay San
Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents Dante Andres and Randyver
Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited
Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert.1 Wilson
assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he opted to remain
seated in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage
system.2

Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres

and Wilson, entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete
culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with water about a foot
deep.3 After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came
out of the drainage system and left4 without saying a word. Respondent
Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged again, this time,
carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the boy’s
lifeless body down in the grassy area.5 Shocked at the sudden turn of
events, Garcia fled from the scene.6 For his part, respondent Andres went
to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson’s mother, and informed her
that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while
respondent Andres followed her.7

The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having
been conducted. The police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any
criminal complaint against the respondents for Wilson’s death.

Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI) investigators took the sworn statements of respondent
Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner Quinto.8 Respondent Pacheco alleged that
he had never been to the drainage system catching fish with respondent
Andres and Wilson. He also declared that he saw Wilson already dead
when he passed by the drainage system while riding on his carabao.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic
Aguda of the NBI performed an autopsy thereon at the cemetery and
submitted his autopsy report containing the following postmortem findings:

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition, attired with

white long sleeves and dark pants and placed inside a wooden coffin in a
niche-apartment style.

Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.

Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left forearm.

Laryngo – tracheal lumina – congested and edematous containing muddy

particles with bloody path.

Lungs – hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure; section contains

bloody froth.

Brain – autolyzed and liquefied.

Stomach – partly autolyzed.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries,

contributory.9

The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres
and Pacheco in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which found
probable cause for homicide by dolo against the two.
An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac,
Tarlac, charging the respondents with homicide. The accusatory portion
reads:

That at around 8 o’clock in the morning of November 13, 1995, in the

Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Dante Andres and
Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @ Randy, conspiring, confederating, and
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three
were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die.

CONTRARY TO LAW.10

After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic Aguda,

who testified on direct examination that the hematoma at the back of the
victim’s head and the abrasion on the latter’s left forearm could have been
caused by a strong force coming from a blunt instrument or object. The
injuries in the larynx and trachea also indicated that the victim died of
drowning, as some muddy particles were also found on the lumina of the
larynx and trachea ("Nakahigop ng putik"). Dr. Aguda stated that such
injury could be caused when a person is put under water by pressure or by
force.11 On cross-examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the hematoma on
the scalp was caused by a strong pressure or a strong force applied to the
scalp coming from a blunt instrument. He also stated that the victim could
have fallen, and that the occipital portion of his head could have hit a blunt
object.
Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of
Wilson’s head could have rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he was
thrown in a body of water, the boy could have died by drowning.

In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the doctor declared

that the 4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of Wilson’s face could
have also been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement, or
by contact with a rough surface. He also stated that the trachea region was
full of mud, but that there was no sign of strangulation.12

After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the respondents had
admitted the pictures showing the drainage system including the inside
portions thereof,13 the prosecution rested its case.

The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated January 28,
1998. It also held that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages
because of the absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for
Wilson’s death.

The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as
the civil aspect of the case was concerned. In her brief, she averred that –

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN RULING

THAT NO PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD ACCUSED-
APPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM
WILSON QUINTO.14
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC on
December 21, 2001. It ruled as follows:

The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but
rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal
acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settled
jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a
criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of
acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to
them. (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672)15

The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and raised the following
issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS’ CRIMINAL

LIABILITY, LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR
CIVIL LIABILITY.

II

WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD

RESPONDENTS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON
QUINTO.16

The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere possibilities,
surmises and speculations when it held that Wilson died because (a) he
could have fallen, his head hitting the stones in the drainage system since
the culvert was slippery; or (b) he might have been bitten by a snake which
he thought was the prick of a fish fin, causing his head to hit hard on the
top of the culvert; or (c) he could have lost consciousness due to some
ailment, such as epilepsy. The petitioner also alleges that the trial court
erred in ruling that the prosecution failed to prove any ill motive on the part
of the respondents to kill the victim, and in considering that respondent
Andres even informed her of Wilson’s death.

The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the testimony of the
Medico-Legal Expert, Dr. Aguda; the nature, location and number of the
injuries sustained by the victim which caused his death; as well as
the locus criminis. The petitioner insists that the behavior of the
respondents after the commission of the crime betrayed their guilt,
considering that respondent Pacheco left the scene, leaving respondent
Andres to bring out Wilson’s cadaver, while respondent Andres returned
inside the drainage system only when he saw Garcia seated in the grassy
area waiting for his friend Wilson to come out.

The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence on record to

show that either or both the respondents caused the death of her son and,
as such, are jointly and severally liable therefor.

In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that since the
prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to prove that they committed the
crime of homicide and caused the death of Wilson, they are not criminally
and civilly liable for the latter’s death.

The petition has no merit.

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.17 The civil
liability of such person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused,
and indemnification for consequential damages.18 When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.19 With the
implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions
are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil.20

The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order
to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to
isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to
maintain social order.21 The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution,
reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage
or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the
accused.22 While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove the
cause of action of the private complainant against the accused for
damages and/or restitution.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that
the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist.23
Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural
and logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.24 "Natural" refers to an
occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while "logical"
means that there is a rational connection between the act of the accused
and the resulting injury or damage. The felony committed must be the
proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause
which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.25

There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the
felonious act of the offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or
death of the victim. The "cause and effect" relationship is not altered or
changed because of the pre-existing conditions, such as the pathological
condition of the victim (las condiciones patologica del lesionado); the
predisposition of the offended party (la predisposicion del ofendido); the
physical condition of the offended party (la constitucion fisica del
herido); or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the
negligence or fault of the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al
herido); or the conditions supervening the felonious act such as
tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.26

The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury
when:
(a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed
and the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact
absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or

(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.27

If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to

put life in jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious
act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other
causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is
criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused,
accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.28 A different doctrine
would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a
salutary and essential safeguard.29 This Court has emphasized that:

… Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties

attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be
easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause
of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the
highest crime might escape conviction and punishment. …30

In People v. Quianzon,31 the Supreme Court held:

… The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3, 1879, said in a

case similar to the present, the following: Inasmuch as a man is
responsible for the consequences of his act – and in this case, the physical
condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil,
the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the means
employed, but by the result actually produced; and as the wound which the
appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which determined his
death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that the
act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc.32

In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo.
In People v. Delim,33 the Court delineated the burden of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused for homicide or murder:

In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus

delicti which consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second,
defendant’s agency in the commission of the act. Wharton says that corpus
delicti includes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective
element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the
prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be
dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other
than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or
suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some
way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove
the felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence,
direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice);
in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter
alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the
malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim.
If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill
is conclusively presumed.34
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the
private complainant is burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or
superior weight of evidence. Although the evidence adduced by the plaintiff
is stronger than that presented by the defendant, he is not entitled to a
judgment if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain his cause of action. The
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of that of the defendants’.35

Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides how

preponderance of evidence is determined:

Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases,

the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the witnesses’ manner
of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest,
and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately
appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of
witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater
number.36

In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the
prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on
which the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a
cause of action against the respondents for damages.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective
testimonies of Garcia, who was not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.

We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report of

Dr. Dominic Aguda, the deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma
on the scalp. But as to how the deceased sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda
was equivocal. He presented two possibilities: (a) that the deceased could
have been hit by a blunt object or instrument applied with full force; or (b)
the deceased could have slipped, fell hard and his head hit a hard object:

COURT:

The Court would ask questions.

Q So it is possible that the injury, that is – the hematoma, caused on the

back of the head might be due to the victim’s falling on his back and his
head hitting a pavement?

A Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite extensive, so if the fall is

strong enough and would fall from a high place and hit a concrete
pavement, then it is possible.

Q Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a concrete pavement and the

head hit the pavement, the injury might be caused by that slipping?

A It is also possible.

Q So when the victim was submerged under water while unconscious, it is

possible that he might have taken in some mud or what?
A Yes, Sir.

Q So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still breathing?

A Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also would
indicate that the victim was still alive when he was placed under water.37

The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side of the victim’s
face could have been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or
pavement:

Q The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face, would it be
caused by the face rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement?

A Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a rough

surface.

Q Rough surface?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were there no
signs that the victim was strangled?

A There was no sign of strangulation, Your Honor.38

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the
deceased might have slipped, causing the latter to fall hard and hit his head
on the pavement, thus:
Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might have been caused
when the victim fell down and that portion of the body or occipital portion hit
a blunt object and might have been inflicted as a result of falling down?

A - If the fall … if the victim fell and he hit a hard object, well, it is also
possible.39

The trial court took into account the following facts:

Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the prosecution that
there were stones inside the culvert. (See Exhibit "D" to "D-3"). The stones
could have caused the victim to slip and hit his head on the pavement.
Since there was water on the culvert, the portion soaked with water must
be very slippery, aside from the fact that the culvert is round. If the victim hit
his head and lost consciousness, he will naturally take in some amount of
water and drown.40

The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court, as well as its
conclusion based on the said findings.

We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule is that the
findings of facts of the trial court, its assessment of probative weight of the
evidence of the parties, and its conclusion anchored on such findings,
affirmed no less by the CA, are given conclusive effect by this Court, unless
the trial court ignored, misapplied or misconstrued cogent facts and
circumstances which, if considered, would change the outcome of the case.
The petitioner failed to show any justification to warrant a reversal of the
findings or conclusions of the trial and appellate courts.
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even
Garcia testified that the drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was
so afraid that he refused to join respondents Andres and Pacheco
inside.41 Respondent Andres had no flashlight; only respondent Pacheco
had one.

Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might have caused
the abrasion on the left forearm of the deceased. He, likewise, failed to
testify whether the abrasions on the face and left forearm of the victim were
made ante mortem or post mortem.

The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either

or both the respondents hit the deceased with a blunt object or instrument,
and, consequently, any blunt object or instrument that might have been
used by any or both of the respondents in hitting the deceased.

It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed

serious crimes for no reason at all.42 However, the absence of any ill-motive
to kill the deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that no
violence was perpetrated on the person of the deceased. In this case, the
petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either
respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter was invited to join
them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent Andres used
to go to their house and play with her son before the latter’s death:

Q Do you know this Dante Andres personally?

A Not much but he used to go to our house and play with my son after
going from her mother who is gambling, Sir.
Q But you are acquainted with him, you know his face?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Will you please look around this courtroom and see if he is around?

A (Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside the courtroom.)43

When the petitioner’s son died inside the drainage culvert, it was
respondent Andres who brought out the deceased. He then informed the
petitioner of her son’s death. Even after informing the petitioner of the
death of her son, respondent Andres followed the petitioner on her way to
the grassy area where the deceased was:

Q Did not Dante Andres follow you?

A He went with me, Sir.

Q So when you went to the place where your son was lying, Dante Andres
was with you?

A No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that my son was there at
the culvert, I ran immediately. He [was] just left behind and he just followed,
Sir.

Q So when you reached the place where your son was lying down, Dante
Andres also came or arrived?

A It was only when we boarded the jeep that he arrived, Sir.44

In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove
a cause of action for damages based on the deliberate acts alleged in the
Information.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-28324-5 May 19, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL MARCO, SIMEON MARCO and DULCISIMO BELTRAN,
defendants. RAFAEL MARCO, defendant-appellant.

Jose P. Bengzon (Counsel de Oficio) for appellant.

Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Felisicimo

R. Rosete and Solicitor Teodulo R. Dino for appellee.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal by accused Rafael Marco from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Sur in Criminal Case No. 2757, entitled People
of the Philippines vs. Rafael Marco, Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco,
the dispositive part of which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment as follows:

 (1) In Criminal Case No, 2757, the Court finds Rafael Marco,
Dulcisimo Beltran, and Simeon Marco, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by abuse of
superior strength' and hereby sentences Rafael Marco, who
has neither aggravating circumstance against him or any
mitigating circumstance in his favor, to RECLUSION
PERPETUA. Simeon Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran, who
surrendered voluntarily, are hereby sentenced EACH to an
indeterminate penalty consisting of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

The Court further sentences the three defendants to pay, jointly and
severally, to the heirs of Bienvenido Sabelbero, the amount of P6,000.00,
to suffer the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs. (Page 69,
Record.)

Actually, there were two cases filed against appellant in connection with
two successive phases of a single occurrence. The two cases were
consolidated and tried together. In Criminal Case No. 2757, he was
charged together with his son Simeon and one Dulcisimo Beltran with the
alleged murder of one Bienvenido Sabelbero. 1 In Criminal Case 2758, he
was charged together also with his son Simeon with frustrated murder
allegedly committed against Constancio Sabelbero, a brother Bienvenido.
In this second case, herein appellant was found guilty only a slight physical
injuries and sentenced to twelve (12) days of arresto menor. He did not
appeal. Simeon was acquitted.
The incident in question took place on November 5, 1964 at about 2:30
o'clock in the afternoon within the vicinity of the market place of Barrio
Subang, Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur. There was a fiesta being
celebrated, but it was raining. The details, according to the the are as
follows:

Constancio Sabelbero was approached by Simeon Marco who asked him if

he was the one who boxed the latter's brother the previous year.
Constancio denied. Then Simeon asked if he had cigarettes and when he
said he had none, Simeon said, "I have cigarettes; here is my cigarette", as
he pulled out a one-foot long hunting knife. Frightened, Constancio ran
away and Simeon chased him. As Constancio was passing by the place
were appellant Rafael Marco, the father of Simeon, was standing, Rafael
struck Constancio with a round cane, hitting him on the left ear and left
shoulder. This was the basis of the information in Criminal Case No. 2758,
where appellant was convicted of slight physical injuries and his son,
Simeon, was acquitted.

Vicente, the father of Constancio, happened to be standing in the crowd

and heard shout of "Fight! Fight!" He saw Simeon about to stab
Constancio, so he grabbed the hand of Simeon that was holding the knife.

At this juncture, Rafael Marco approached Vicente armed with a cane and
a hunting knife. Sensing danger, Vicente shouted to his son Constancio,
who had been hit by Rafael, and his other son Bienvenido, who appeared
on the scene, to run away because the Marcos were armed. Constancio
was able to run away. So also Vicente. Bienvenido who was being chased
by Rafael was stabbed by the latter, and when the parried the blow, he was
wounded on the left hand. After being stabbed by Rafael, Bienvenido still
tried to run father, but unluckily, his foot got caught in a vine on the ground
and he fell, whereupon, out of nowhere, Dulcisimo Beltran, who was
accused with herein appellant and who did not appeal his conviction,
arrived and stabbed Bienvenido near his anus while he was in the position
described in the record thus "(Witness demonstrating with his two hands
touching the floor and his both feet (sic) in a forward position)". (p. 24,
t.s.n.) Beltran was followed by Simeon, 2 who stabbed Bienvenido on the
left breast and the upper part of the left arm. Afterwards, Rafael, Simeon
and Beltran ran away. "Bienvenido Sabelbero stood up slowly and walked
zigzagly towards the store of Pinda and when he arrived in front of the
store, he fell to the ground." (p.27, t.s.n.)

When Vicente came to know that his son Bienvenido was wounded, he
went to the store of Pinda and found him lying there. Vicente asked him
what happened, "Bienvenido Sebelvero answered that he was wounded
because he was ganged up by them and immediately after that he died."
(p. 28 t.s.n.)

For the purposes of this appeal, the foregoing facts We have gathered from
the recorded evidence and which coincide substantially with the findings
and basis of tea appealed decision are more or less admitted by appellant
in the brief of his counsel de oficio to be more credible version of what
happened. Nevertheless, counsel has assigned seven alleged errors of the
trial court, although the whole thrust of this appeal revolves around the
issue of whether not with what has been proven, as narrated above, to be
the participation of appellant in the Phase of the incident that led to the
death of Bienvenido appellant, Rafael Marco, may be held liable for
murder, as found by the court below.

It will be recalled that the whole incident was started by Simeon Marco, the
son of Rafael, who approached Constancio and after asking him if he was
the one who boxed his (Simeon's) brother the year before, brandished a
hunting knife, which caused Constancio to run away. While thus running,
he passed by appellant who hit him with a round cane. Such was the first
phase of the incident subject of this case. According the trial court for such
act of Rafael, he was guilty of slight physical injuries, since "it is safe to
assume that at that moment there was no intent to kill any one."

As to the second phase, according to the evidence, when Simeon was

about to pursue Constancio, Vicente grabbed Simeon's hand that was
holding the knife. But when Vicente saw that Rafael who was holding a
round cane a and a hunting knife, was approaching them, he shouted
Constancio and his other son Bienvenido who was around to run away,
which they did, as he himself released Simeon and ran away. Rafael
followed Bienvenido and stabbed him, but the latter parried the blow with
his left hand. And as Bienvenido was trying to to run farther, unluckily, his
feet got entangled with some vines and he fell down. Whereupon, Beltran,
who came from nowhere, stabbed him near the anus, followed by Simeon
who Stabbed him on the left side of the breast.

Upon these facts, the People maintain that appellant is as guilty as Simeon
and Beltran of the killing of Bienvenido, the theory being that there was
obvious conspiracy among there
The trouble with the evidence of the prosecution is that it is vague and
incomplete. For instance, as to the first phase of the incident, the relative
Positions and distances from each other Of the three Protagonist, Simeon,
Constancio and Rafael are not revealed. How far Rafael was from Simeon
and Constancio when Simeon sort of threatened him with a knife is not
clear. Neither is it shown how Rafael happened to be in the path of
Constancio when the latter was running away from Simeon, such that
Rafael was able to hit him with a cane. In this situation, We do not feel safe
in concluding that there was concerted connection between the act of
Simeon, on the one hand, and that of Rafael, on the other. Thus, the trial
court was correct in acquitting Simeon and holding Rafael guilty only of
slight physical injuries instead of frustrated murder as charged.

Likewise, in regard to the second phase of the incident, We are at a loss as

to what Bienvenido was actually doing and what participation he had at the
early stages of the incident, when Vicente shouted him to run away. 3 The
pertinent portion of testimony of the lone eye-witness, Dominador
Carbajosa, is as follows:

Q Then what happened?

A Then Vicente Sabelvero held the arm of Simeon

Marco and at the same time Vicente Sabelvero
shouted to his sons, Constancio and Bienvenido
Sabelvero to run away because they were all
armed.
Q This Vicente Sebolvero you mentioned, how is he
related to Constancio and Bienvenido Sabelvero?

A Vicente Sabelvero is the father.

Q Do you know if Constancio Sabelvero and

Bienvenido Sabelvero ran away?

A Yes, they ran away.

Q This Bienvenido Sabelvero, where was he when

this incident happened?

A He was only a few meters away,

Q What happened to him?

A He was overtaken by Rafael Marco and he was

stabbed by Rafael Marco.

Q Who stabbed him'?

A Rafael Marco.

Q Will you tell the Honorable Court what part of the

body of Bienvenido Sabelvero did Rafael Marco
stab?

A Bienvenido Sabelvero was able to parry the thrust

which was directed to his left side and he was not
wounded and instead in parrying the thrust he was
wounded on the hand.

Q Do you know what kind of weapon did Rafael

Marco use in injuries upon Bienvenido Sabelvero?

A I know.

Q What kind of weapon?

A Flamingco or hunting knife.

Q Then after Rafael Marco inflicted injuries upon

Bienvenido Sabelvero, what to Bienvenido
Sabelvero?

A While Bienvenido Sabelvero was trying to run

away his feet were wrapped by the having of the
cover crop and he fell down and right at that time
Beltran approached him and dabbed Bienvenido
Sabelvero near his anus

ATTY. ORGANO —

(Addressing the Court)

If Your Honor please I would like to make it of that

the witness indicated to a portion above his body
which is above the anus.

(To the witness)

Q What was the position of Bienvenido Sebolvero
when this Dulcisimo Beltran stabbed him?

A In this manner. (Witness demonstrating with his

two hands touching the floor and his both feet in a
forward position).

Q Then when Dulcisimo Beltran stabbed him in that

position, what happened next?

A While Bienvenido Sebolvero was in that position,

he was stabbed by Simeon Marco on the left breast
and because he was able to parry the weapon he
was wounded on the upper part of his left hand.

Q This Dulcisimo Beltran whom you said stabbed

Bienvenido Sebolvero, do you know what was his
weapon?

A I know.

Q What was his weapon?

A Bayonet.

Q This Dulcisimo Beltran, according to you, stabbed

Bienvenido Sebolvero near the buttock?....

ATTY. PIELAGO —

Misleading, Your Honor.

COURT —

This witness testified that this Bienvenido Sebolvero

was stabbed near the anus.

(To the witness)

Q This Dulcisimo Beltran whom you said also

stabbed Bienvenido (Beltran), is he here in court?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please point to him?

A That one. (Witness pointing to accused Dulcisimo

Beltran).

Q This Simeon Marco whom you said stabbed

Bienvenido Sebolvero on the left breast and hand is
he here in court?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where is he?

A That one. (Witness pointing to accused Simeon

Marco).

Q Do you know what kind of weapon did Simeon

Marco use in stabbing the left arm of Bienvenido
Sebolvero?
A I know.

Q What kind of weapon?

A A bayonet.

(to the direct examiner)

Proceed.

ATTY. ORGANO —

(continuing)

Q Presenting to you this weapon . . . . (counsel

hands over the same to the witness). . . . Will you
tell the Honorable Court whether this is the very
weapon used by Simeon Marco in stabbing
Bienvenido Sebolvero?

A It is shorter than this one.

Q Now, during that time that Rafael Marco, Simeon

Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran were inflicting injuries
on the body of Bienvenido Sebolvero, what did the
father of Bienvenido Sebolvero do? Where were
they at that time?

A Constancio Sebolvero and the father ran away

and they have not seen the incident.
 Q Do you remember if the father of Bienvenido
Sebolvero ever ran afterwards?

A No, sir.

Q Now, that happened to Bienvenido Sebolvero

after Rafael Marco, Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon
Marco stabbed him?

A They ran away and after they ran away,

Bienvenido Sebolvero stood up slowly and walked
zigzagly towards the store of Pinda and when he
arrived in front of the store he fell down to the
ground. (Pp. 23-27, t.s.n.)

The nearest indication of Bienvenido's position vis-a-vis those Of the

Marcos and Beltran at the moment that Vicente was holding the hand of
Simeon appears only in the cross-examination of Garbajosa, when he said
that "Bienvenido Sabelvero, was nearer to the three accused" than either
Vicente or Constancio, which makes the whole matter more confusing.

As matters stand, Our problem is to determine whether or not the act of

Rafael in stabbing Bienvenido is a separate one from the stabbing of said
deceased by the two other accused who did not appeal, Simeon Marco and
Dulcisimo Beltran. To be sure, the acts of each of the three of them
followed one after the other in rather fast succession, as if propelled by a
common and concerted design, but this circumstance alone does not prove
criminal conspiracy. In order that mere simultaneity or near simultaneity of
the acts of several accused may justify the conclusion that they had
conspired together, the inference must be ineludible.

It would seem that there must have been some bad blood between the
Sabelveros and the Marcos but Vicente categorically denied that there was
any misunderstanding between them and although Constancio suggested
that there was, he was quick in adding that the same had been patched up.
This makes commonality of intent on the part of the three accused not
necessarily existent.

As already stated, Simeon and Beltran did not appeal from the decision of
the trial court which credited them with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary and imposed on them the penalty of only Ten (10) Years and One
(1) Day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4)
Months and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal as maximum. And indeed
there can be no doubt as to the homicidal character of their assault on
Bienvenido. In the case of herein appellant, while it is true that he somehow
started the by trying to stab Bienvenido, and did cause him injury on the left
hand, there is no clear evidence connecting his act with those of Beltran
and Simeon. As We have noted earlier, Beltran came out of nowhere and it
is not shown that Rafael saw him before the latter stabbed Bienvenido near
the anus. On the other hand, the most that We can gather from Carbajosa's
testimony is that Simeon was being held by Vicente, when Rafael tried to
chase Bienvenido. In any event, if Rafael had any intention to really kill
Bienvenido, he did not have to await for Simeon and Beltran to do it.
Bienvenido had fallen to the ground, and that was the chance to finish with
him. But here is precisely where the prosecution's evidence is incomplete.
The distance and relative position of Rafael from where Bienvenido fell are
not indicated. What appears instead is that Beltran and Simeon were the
ones who stabbed him fatally. What Rafael did or where he was after
Bienvenido fell and while Beltran and Simeon were assaulting has not been
shown.

We find the following ratiocination of appellant's counsel de oficio to be well

taken:

2. The evidence on record does not show beyond

reasonable doubt that appellant acted in conspiracy
with the two other accused in the actual killing of
the decedent.

This Honorable Court has established the rule that conspiracy,

although implied or indirect, must, nonetheless, be positively
and convincingly proved and established (People vs.
Aplegido, 76 Phil. 571). Only recently, this Honorable Tribunal
said, through the pen of Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that:

... As a facile device by which an accused may be

ensnared and kept within the penal fold, conspiracy
requires conclusive proof if we are to maintain in full
subbed the substance of the time-honored principle
of criminal law requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt before conviction ... (People vs. Tividad,, L-
21469, June 30, 1967; 20 SCRA 549, 554;
emphasis supplied).
The Court also laid down the following norm in the said case
of People vs. Tividad:

... It is undubitably clear from the record that the

accused did not attack the deceased
simultaneously. Even if they did, this would not of
itself indicate the existence of a conspiracy among
them as simultaneity per se is not a badge of
conspiracy, absent the requisite concurrence of
wills. It is not sufficient that the attack is joint and
simultaneous; it is that the assailants are animated
by one and the same purpose (U.S. vs. Magcomot,
13 Phil 386, 389; People vs. Caballero , 53 Phil.
584, 595-596). Evidently, in a situation where the
as were not simultaneous but successive, greater
proof is demanded to establish concert of crime
design. The evidence for the prosecution was that
the assaults on the were out by a successively (Id.,
pp. 554-55; emphasis supplied)

As happened in the Tividad case, the facts established by the

evidence hem show that appellant did not attack the document
simultaneously and in concert with the two other accuse From
the testimony of Dominador Carbajosa, it will be seen that: (1) it
was the appellant who went after the decedent first. And the
situation at that moment was this: Simeon Marco was chasing
Constancio Sebelvero while appellant, on the other hand, was
approaching Vicente Sebelbero. The latter had just shouted to
his two sons to run away when the appellant overtook the
document and stabbed at hint Accused Dulcisimo Beltran, it will
be noted, was not yet a participant. (2) After the appellant
wounded the decedent on the hand, the latter continued
running. There is no evidence however, that appellant
continued running after him (3) While running, the decadent
ripped and fell down. Accused Dulcisimo Beltran just came
from nowhere and stabbed the decedent near the anus. It will
be noted from the time appellant wounded the document on the
hand up to the time Dulcisimo Beltran stabbed him at the back,
an appreciable length of time elapse There is no evidence just
how far Beltran was from the respondent when the latter felt
Neither is there evidence that the decadent was running in the
direction of Beltran The evidence is only that Dulcisimo Beltran
came upon the document who had fallen to the ground and
nabbed him. (4) After Dulcisimo Beltran had stabbed the
decedent Simeon Marco, who earlier had been chasing
Constancio Sebelbero came also and stabbed the
decedent. From Dominador Carbajosa's testimony, it appears
that there was no appreciable lapse of time between the
stabbing by Dulcisimo Beltran and that by Simeon Marco. (5)
There is no showing that appellant joined his two other accused
during or after their stabbing of the respondent Carbajosa
merely stated that after the stabbing, "they ran away" (session
of Sept. 13, 1965; t.s.n., p. 27)
From the foregoing, this Honorable Court will that the stabbing
of the decedent by the three accused (including appellant) was
not simultaneous. Rather, it was successive, with appellant
inflicting the first blow. And, Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon
Marco were nowhere around yet. It was only after the decedent
fell down that the latter two came and successively stabbed
him. The manner in which the incident occurred indicates that
there was no pre-conceived plan among the three accused to
kill the decedent. It strongly suggests, on the other hand, that
Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco participated suddenly,
unexpectedly and without any previous agreement.

Another interesting point to observe is that there is absolutely

no showing that appellant knew of the criminal intentions of
Dulcisimo Beltran or Simeon Marco as to the decedent. There
is no proof that appellant chased the decedent in the direction
of Simeon Marco or Dulcisimo Beltran. It was not even shown
that appellant knew that Dulcisimo Beltran was around at the
start. As to Simeon Marco, it will be remembered that when the
appellant started after the decedent, Simeon Marco was
running after Constancio Sebelbero. Hence, appellant could not
have intentionally chased the decedent in the direction of
Simeon Marco. Besides, as previously pointed out already,
there is no evidence showing that appellant ran after or chased
the decedent at all. Dominador Carbajosa said only that
appellant overtook the decedent who was just nearby and then
stabbed at him (Session of Sept. 13, 1965; t.s.n., p. 23).
Likewise, there is no evidence that after the decedent ran
again, the appellant continued going after him.

Neither is there any showing that after the decedent was able to
run away from the appellant with only a slight would on the
hand, the latter shouted to Dulcisimo Beltran or Simeon Marco
for assistance. As the facts were related by the star prosecution
witness. Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco just came upon
the fallen decedent and stabbed him. There is no showing that
Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco fell upon the decedent in
response to shout or cries from the appellant. Lastly, there is no
proof that while Simeon Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran were
stabbing the decedent, appellant gave them any inciting or
encouraging words, or that he even joined them.

The point appellant wants to established with all the foregoing

considerations is that the prosecution utterly failed to
established the guilty knowledge and assent of appellant
concerning the criminal design of Dulcisimo Beltran and
Simeon Marco. And the established rule is that:

xxx xxx xxx

... a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another

where, between them there has been conspiracy or unity of
purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged.
In other words, the accused must be shown to have had guilty
participation in the criminal design entertained by the
slayer, and this presupposes knowledge on his part of such
criminal design. It is not enough that there be a relation
between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to
the person charged as co-principal or accomplice; it is
furthermore, necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the
former's criminal intent, should cooperate with moral or material
aid in the consummation of the crime ... (People vs. Ibañez, 77
Phil. 664, 665-666; emphasis supplied).

The trial court, therefore, seriously erred in holding appellant

responsible together with Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco
for the death of the decedent on the basis of incorrect
conspiracy.

3. Appellant cannot be held liable for the death of decedent

under death of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code provides

that, "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito)although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended." Under this provision, one
who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the
consequences which may naturally and logically result thereto
whether form or intended or not. (I Reyes, The Revised Penal
Code, 6th ed., p. 62).

It cannot be denied that the stabbing of the decedent by the

appellant which caused a slight wound on the former's hand
 was intentionally made; hence, felony. However, the ensuing
death of the decedent was not the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the wound inflicted by the appellant. There was
an active intervening cause, which was no other than the
sudden and appearance and participation of Simeon Marco and
Beltran. And there is authority that if the consequences
produced have resulted from a distinct act or fact absolutely
from the criminal case the offender is not responsible for such
consequence. (People vs. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038; I Reyes, 75).
(Pp. 18-22, Appellant's brief — pp. 53-57, Record.)

All circumstances considered, We are not convinced beyond reasonable

doubt that appellant was in any conspiracy with Simeon and Beltran to kill
Bienvenido or any of the Sabelberos. In the absence of clear and
convincing the We can only speculate as to why appellant did not join his
son, Simeon, and Beltran in attacking Bienvenido after he had fallen to the
ground. Either the two were too fast for him and were thus able to act
ahead of him or that he voluntarily desisted from further pursuing the
deceased after hitting him on the left hand. In line with the presumption of
innocence which We are constitutionally bound to accorded. We are
constrained to hold that he had no homicidal intent. He can be held
criminally responsible only for the wound on the back of the left hand of the
deceased which is described as a "stab wound, 2-1/2 inches wide at the
back of the left hand" by witness Felix S. Toledo, the Sanitary Inspector,
who examined the corpse. And there being no evidence as to the period of
incapacity or medical attendance consequence to said wound, appellant is
guilty only of slight physical injuries. (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code,
Vol. II, p. 1258, 1961 ed.)

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby

modified, and in its stead appellant is found guilty only of slight physical
injuries and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of
arresto menor, and to pay the costs.

G.R. No. 228945, March 14, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HESSON CALLAO

Y MARCELINO AND JUNELLO AMAD, Accused,

HESSON CALLAO Y MARCELINO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

This is an Appeal1 under Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from
the Decision2 dated August 31, 2016 (assailed Decision) of the Court of
Appeals, Eighteenth (18th) Division (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No.
02007. The assailed Decision, affirmed with modification the
Judgment3 dated January 26, 2015 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Bais City, Branch 45 (trial court), in Criminal Case No. 07-25-T, which
found accused-appellant Hesson Callao y Marcelino (Hesson) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The accusatory portion of the Information4 reads:

That on or about the 15th day of July, 2006 in the Municipality [of] Tayasan,
Negros Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by
means of treachery, suddenly attack and strike the forehead of Fernando
Adlawan with the use of an iron rod and thereafter, with the use of a knife,
opened the stomach of the (sic) said Fernando Adlawan and took out his
liver and throw (sic) it to the pig which ate it and proceeded to slice the
flesh of the thigh of said victim and again throw (sic) the same to the pig
which also ate it, which injuries caused the immediate death of victim
Fernando Adlawan, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. 5 (Italics in the
original)

On February 14, 2007, when this case was filed, Hesson and fellow
accused Junello Amad (Junello) were at large causing the case to be sent
to archives.6 On February 18, 2008, Hesson was arrested and the case
was revived as to him.7 On March 17, 2008, upon arraignment, Hesson
entered a plea of "not guilty."8

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution:

The prosecution presented its lone witness, Sario Joaquin (Sario), who
testified that on July 15, 2006, he was at the flea market of Guincalaban,
Tayasan, Negros Oriental together with his friends Hesson, Junello and
one Remmy9 Casello (Remmy). While in the market, Hesson and Junello
discussed a plan to kill the victim, Fernando Adlawan (Fernando) as
ordered by one Enrile Yosores (Enrile). Sario was not part of the planning
and did not know why Enrile wanted to have Fernando killed. 10

At 8:00 in the evening of the same day, Hesson, Junello, Remmy and Sario
left the flea market and went to the house of Fernando. 11 Sario tagged
along because Hesson threatened to kill him if he separated from the
group.12

When the group reached Fernando's house, Junello, upon seeing

Fernando, approached the latter and asked for a cigarette lighter. After
Fernando gave Junello the lighter, the latter struck Fernando on the nape
with a piece of firewood. Junello then took a bolo and hacked Fernando's
body on the side. Fernando lost consciousness13 and as he laid motionless
on the ground, Hesson stabbed him twice in the chest using a
knife.14 Hesson then sliced open Fernando's chest and took out the latter's
heart using the same knife.15 Junello followed and took out Fernando's liver
using a bolo.16

Hesson and Junello then fed Fernando's organs to a nearby pig after which
they cut Fernando's neck and sliced his body into pieces.17 Thereafter, the
two (2) accused left the crime scene, followed by Sario and Remmy.18

Sario was on the opposite side watching the incident. He and Remmy did
not attempt to stop the two (2) accused or run away for fear that the latter
would kill them.19 Sario went home from the crime scene20 and did not tell
anyone about the incident because Hesson and Junello threatened to kill
him if he did so.21

After the incident, Remmy was killed by Enrile during the town fiesta of
Guincalaban.22

The testimony of Florencio Adlawan, Fernando's father, was dispensed

with after the defense admitted the accused's civil liability and the funeral
expenses incurred by the family. Likewise, the testimony of Dr. Myrasol
Zuniega, who examined the victim's body, was not presented because the
defense admitted the existence of the death certificate23 indicating that the
immediate cause of death is internal hemorrhage and the underlying cause
is multiple stab wounds.24

Version of the Defense:

Hesson put forth the defense of denial. He testified that he was resting in
his house on the night of the incident when Fernando arrived and invited
him to the latter's house.25 While Hesson was cooking rice inside
Fernando's house, he heard a loud sound from the yard so he looked
through the window and saw Junello hacking Fernando on the
chest.26 Enrile approached and stabbed Fernando as the latter was lying on
the ground.27 Hesson then shouted, "what did you do to him[?]"28 at which
point Enrile remarked, "So this Hesson is here. We better also kill him
because he might reveal this."29 Scared, Flesson jumped through the
window and ran towards a bushy area where he hid until
morning.30 Hesson denied that Sario was present during the incident31 but
admitted that Remmy was there.32 He said he could not have stabbed the
victim because the latter was the son of his godfather.33

On cross-examination, Hesson again recounted the incident but this time,

he testified that he saw Junello hack Fernando in the chest,34 once35 after
which Enrile hacked him on the left side of his body 36 twice.37

Hesson told no one about the incident because of fear.38 He and his
parents left their house and transferred to Lag-it one (1) day after the
incident.39 Upon further probing, though, Hesson testified that he and his
family transferred six (6) months after the incident.40 In the meantime that
they stayed in Guincalaban, no threats were received by him or his family.41

Hesson testified that he knew Remmy and Sario and that he was not
friends with them but neither did they have any misunderstanding or
quarrel.42

Ruling of the trial court

In the Judgment dated January 26, 2015, the trial court found Hesson guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. The
trial court gave credence to the testimony of lone prosecution witness
Sario, stating that he testified in a straightforward manner and categorically
identified Hesson. Likewise, there is nothing that indicates any improper
motive on Sario's part to falsely impute an offense as grave as murder to
Hesson. The dispositive portion of the Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused HESSON
CALLAO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of
Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and is accordingly sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the
cost.

Accused is also ordered to pay the amount of P15,000.00 as funeral

expenses; P50,000.00 for loss of life and P50,000.00 [as] moral damages.

Considering that accused JUNELLO AMAD has remained at large[,] send

this case as to him to the ARCHIVES and let there be issued an Alias
Warrant of Arrest addressed to the Chief of Police, PNP, Tayasan, Negros
Oriental; Provincial Director, PNP, Agan-an, Sibulan, Negros Oriental and
to the Chief, NBI of Dumaguete, Bacolod, Cebu and Manila for the arrest of
the said JUNELLO AMAD in the event he is sighted.

SO PROMULGATED in open Court this 26th day of January 2015 at Bais

City, Philippines.43 (Italics in the original)

Hesson appealed to the CA via Notice of Appeal.44 Hesson filed

his Brief45 dated August 26, 2015, while the People, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Brief46 dated January 22, 2016. In a
Resolution47 dated June 15, 2016, the CA considered Hesson to have
waived his right to file a Reply Brief.48

Ruling of the CA
In the assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the trial court's conviction with
modification only as to the damages awarded, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment
dated January 26, 2015 of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais
City in Crim. Case No. 07-25-T is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to the heirs
of Fernando Adlawan are INCREASED to P75,000.00 each. Exemplary
damages are also AWARDED in the amount of P30,000.00. The grant of
funeral expenses in the amount of P15,000.00 is RETAINED. The
aggregate amount of the monetary awards stated herein shall earn interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision
until the same is fully paid.49 (Emphasis in the original)

Hence, this Appeal.

In lieu of filing supplemental briefs, Hesson and plaintiff-appellee filed

separate Manifestations dated July 18, 201750 and July 17,
2017,51 respectively, foregoing their right to file the supplemental briefs and
adopting the arguments in their respective Briefs filed before the CA.

Issues

In his Brief Hesson assigns the following errors:

The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused based solely on
uncorroborated testimony of the witness;52

The trial court gravely erred in making a finding of conspiracy to commit

murder without proving the elements thereof beyond reasonable
doubt;53 and

The trial court inadvertently erred in failing to rule that the crime committed
was not murder but an impossible crime.54

The Court's Ruling

The Appeal is totally without merit. The issues, being interrelated, shall be
jointly discussed below.

The evidence sufficiently establishes Hesson's guilt beyond reasonable

doubt for the crime of Murder.

The prosecution was able to adequately establish the guilt of Hesson of the
crime charged.

First, the testimony of Sario, the lone witness for the prosecution, suffices
to establish the culpability of Hesson for Murder qualified by treachery.
Sario clearly narrated the details of the incident and positively identified
Hesson as one of the assailants. In a simple, spontaneous and
straightforward manner, Sario recounted the disturbing manner by which
the victim was killed and his body violated, thus:
[Pros. Yuseff YC Ybañez]55 Did you arrive at the house of Fernando?
[Witness] Yes.
Q When you arrived there, what happened then if any?
A This Junello asked of a lighter from Fernando.
Q Did this Fernando give the lighter to Junello?
A Yes.
Q After Fernando gave the lighter to Junello, what happened then?
A This Junello struck with a piece of firewood.
Q Where was Fernando hit?
A (witness pointing at the nape).
Q What happened to Fernando when he was hit at the nape?
A After that he was hacked by Junello.
Q And did you see where was Fernando hit when he was hacked by
Junello?
A At the side.
Q What did Junello use in hacking Fernando?
A Bolo.
Q What happened to Fernando after he was hacked by Junello?
A He was stabbed by Hesson.
Q And who was stabbed by Hesson, Fernando or this Junello?
A Fernando.
Q And was Fernando hit by the stab of Hesson?
A Yes.
Q What was the position of Fernando when he was stabbed by Hesson?
A He was lying on the ground faced (sic) up.
Q How many times did Hesson stab Fernando?
A Twice.
Q And where was Fernando hit by the stab of Hesson?
A On the chest.
Q After that, what happened then, if any?
A He took out the heart of Fernando.
Q After taking out the heart of Fernando, what happened if any?
A He also took the liver of Fernando.
Q What did he do with the heart and the liver of Fernando?
A He gave it to the pig.
Q Did you know particularly who took the heart of Fernando?
A It was Hesson.
Q And what about the liver of Fernando, who took the liver of Fernando?
A It was Junello.
Court:
Q What did Hesson use in getting the heart of Fernando?
A Knife.
Q How about Junello?
A He was using a bolo.
Q Where were you at that time?
A I was opposite in their location.
Q You were watching then when they were taking the internal organ?
A Yes.56
The Court has carefully and assiduously examined the testimony of Sario
and has found no reason whatsoever to disturb the conclusion reached by
the trial court that Sario's testimony was straightforward, guileless and very
credible.

Second, Sario's testimony, although uncorroborated, can be relied upon.

Well-settled is the principle that the testimony of a single witness, if
straightforward and categorical, is sufficient to convict.57 As clearly put by
the Court in the case of People v. Hillado.58
xxx Thus, the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if found positive and
credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction
especially when the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and
sincerity and had been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a
straightforward manner. Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.
Evidence is assessed in terms of quality and not quantity. Therefore, it is
not uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the
testimony of a lone witness. For although the number of witnesses may
be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is
not necessarily with the greatest number and conviction can still be had on
the basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness.
Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary "only when there are reasons
to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his
observation had been inaccurate." xxx59 (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the Certificate of Death of Fernando stating that he died of

multiple stab wounds corroborates Sario's testimony.

Third, there is no showing that the lone witness Sario was motivated by ill-
will which could have impelled him to falsely testify against Hesson.
Hesson's own testimony points to the absence of such ill-motive, thus:
Q What about you and Sario, are you friends or acquaintance?
A We are not friends.
Q Before July 15, 2006 do you have any quarrel or misunderstanding
with Sario Joaquin?
A No.
Q What about your family and the family of Sario?
A None.60
In the absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption is that the witness
was not moved by ill-will and was untainted by bias, and thus worthy of
belief and credence.61

Fourth, Hesson's immediate departure from the scene of the crime and
successful effort to elude arrest until his apprehension almost two (2) years
after is hardly consistent with his claim of innocence. Flight from the scene
of the crime and failure to immediately surrender militate against Hesson's
contention of innocence "since an innocent person will not hesitate to take
prompt and necessary action to exonerate himself of the crime imputed to
him."62

Fifth, the Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of the witnesses, which findings were likewise affirmed by the
CA. Indeed, there is no showing that said findings are tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment
deserves great weight, and may even be conclusive and binding, as it is in
the best position to make such determination, being the one who has
personally heard the accused and the witnesses. In People v.
Gabrino,63 the Court ruled:
We have held time and again that "the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, sometimes even
with finality." As We have reiterated in the recent People v.
Combate, where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or
misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its
discretion, then We do not disturb and interfere with its assessment
of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses. This is clearly
because the judge in the trial court was the one who personally heard
the accused and the witnesses, and observed their demeanor as well
as the manner in which they testified during trial. Accordingly, the trial
court, or more particularly, the RTC in this case, is in a better position to
assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial.

xxx To reiterate this time-honored doctrine and well-entrenched principle,

We quote from People v. Robert Dinglasan, thus:

In the matter of credibility of witnesses, we reiterate the familiar and well-

entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should be
respected. The judge a quo was in a better position to pass judgment
on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when
they testified and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying. It is doctrinally settled that the evaluation of the testimony of the
witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest
respect, because it had the direct opportunity to observe the
witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth. This
assessment is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a
clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had
plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value that if
considered might affect the result of the case. (Emphasis
Ours)64 (Additional emphasis supplied)

Sixth, Hesson's defense of denial cannot prevail over Sario's positive

identification of Hesson as one of the assailants. To be believed, denial
must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability. Otherwise, it is
purely self-serving and without merit. Greater weight is given to the
categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witness than to
the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the
crime.65 In the instant case, Hesson failed to adduce evidence to support
his denial and overcome the testimony of the prosecution witness. Denial,
unsubstantiated by any credible evidence, deserves no weight in law.66

In sum, the prosecution more than sufficiently established the participation

of Hesson in the crime charged.

Hesson is liable for Murder, not for an impossible crime.

Without admitting his guilt, Hesson argues that he should only be convicted
of committing an impossible crime. Allegedly, he cannot be held liable for
Murder because it was legally impossible for him to kill Fernando as the
latter was already dead when Hesson stabbed him.

The Court is not convinced.

Impossible crime is defined and penalized under paragraph 2, Article 4 in

relation to Article 59, both of the RPC to wit:
ART. 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:

x x x x

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against

persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to
ineffectual means.

x x x x

ART. 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime

because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When
the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts
for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced
by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of
impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such
person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the
court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown
by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a
fine from 200 to 500 pesos. (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)

Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed
would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done
with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently
impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual.67

The third element, inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime, was

explained more clearly by the Court in the case of Intod v. Court of
Appeals68 in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the

offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this
petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There
must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible
crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if

completed, would not amount to a crime. xxx

x x x x

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this

category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous

circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. xxx69 (Emphasis supplied)

To support his theory that what was committed was an impossible crime,
Hesson cites the following testimony of Sario:
Q And it was followed by the stab using a bolo?70
A Yes.
Q And he was hit at the side of the body?
Q Yes.
Q And you saw Fernando did not move anymore with that blow?
A Not anymore.
Q And you think that he is already dead?
A Yes.
Q About how many minutes when Hesson delivered the stabbing blow?
A About five (5) minutes.
Q So five minutes after he is motionless. You testified that Hesson stab
(sic) Fernando and he was already dead when Flesson stabbed
Fernando, right?
A Yes.71
The Court agrees with the CA and the People: the victim's fact of death
before he was stabbed by Hesson was not sufficiently established by the
defense. While Sario testified that he thought Fernando was already dead
after he was hacked by Junello because the former was already lying on
the ground motionless, this statement cannot sufficiently support the
conclusion that, indeed, Fernando was already dead when Hesson stabbed
him. Sario's opinion of Femando's death was arrived at by merely looking
at the latter's body. No other act was done to ascertain this, such as
checking of Fernando's pulse, heartbeat or breathing.

Likewise, considering that Sario was in the middle of a surely stressful and
frightful event, he cannot be expected to have focused enough and be fit to
determine if Fernando was indeed dead when Sario thought he was. In
other words, Sario's opinion of Femando's death at that point in time could
have easily been just an erroneous estimation coming from a very flustered
witness.
More importantly, even assuming that it was Junello who killed Fernando
and that the latter was already dead when he was stabbed by Hesson,
Hesson is still liable for murder because of the clear presence of
conspiracy between Hesson and Junello. As such, Junello's acts are
likewise, legally, Hesson's acts.

Hesson, however, challenges the trial court's finding of conspiracy, arguing

that the elements of the same were not established with proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

The argument is untenable.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Its
elements, like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt.72 The essence of conspiracy is the unity of
action and purpose.73 Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy for it
may be deduced from the acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime charged, from which it may be indicated that there
is common purpose to commit the crime.74

In this case, conspiracy is evident from the series of acts of accused

Hesson and Junello, which, when taken together, reveal a commonality
and unity of criminal design. The Court quotes, in agreement, the brief
narration of events by the CA which clearly shows unity of criminal action
and purpose between the two accused:
xxx First, Amad and Callao hatched the plan to kill Fernando in the flea
market; thereafter, they went to Fernando's house in Colasisi. Amad
pretended to borrow a lighter from Fernando who, after handing out a
lighter, was unknowingly struck on the nape. Then, Amad hacked
Fernando. After Fernando fell on the ground, Callao jumped in and stabbed
Fernando's chest with a knife. Thereafter, Callao sliced open Fernando's
chest and took out his heart. Amad then took his turn and sliced up
Fernando's body to take out his liver. All these acts clearly reveal
conspiracy. Amad and Callao committed what they agreed to do - to kill
Fernando.75

With conspiracy attending, collective liability attaches to the conspirators

Hesson and Junello and the Court shall not speculate on the extent of their
individual participation in the Murder. Hesson's defense of impossible crime
is thus completely unavailing. As extensively explained by the Court in the
landmark case of People v. Peralta76:
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission of
the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The
foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more
persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical
volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual
whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible
for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone." Although it
is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or
more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for
all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or
conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is
clearly explained in one case where this Court held that
". . . it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator)
without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each
of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by
common agreement. . . The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of
the act and intent which existed between the . . . accused, be regarded as
the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible. . ."

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired

and confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective
liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the
conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as
to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators
present at the scene of the crime. 77 (Emphasis supplied; italics in the
original)

The Court, therefore, sustains the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by
the CA, that Hesson is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the killing of
Fernando. Treachery was proven by the prosecution and the same
qualifies the killing to Murder under Article 24878 of the RPC, the elements
of which are: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him;
(3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
On the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the same was established.
The essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed
victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. It is
deemed present in the commission of the crime, when two conditions
concur, namely, that the means, methods, and forms of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and that such means, methods, and forms of execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his
person.79 In this case, Fernando was unarmed and totally unaware of the
imminent danger to his life. Junello asked for a lighter deliberately to catch
Fernando off guard. When Fernando handed the lighter, he was suddenly
hacked and thereafter stabbed to death. Fernando had no foreboding of
any danger, threat or harm upon his life at the time and occasion that he
was attacked. Treachery was attendant not only because of the
suddenness of the attack but likewise due to the absence of opportunity to
repel the same.

Thus, considering all the foregoing, Hesson's conviction of the crime of

murder must stand.

Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty for the crime of Murder qualified
by treachery is reclusion perpetua to death. As there were no aggravating
or mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime, the
Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court
and affirmed by the CA.80

Finally, with respect to the award of damages, the Court affirms and finds
correct and in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,81 the amounts
adjudged by the CA, to wit: (1) civil indemnity at Seventy Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00); (2) moral damages at Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00); (3) exemplary damages at Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00); and funeral expenses at the parties' stipulated amount of
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00). All monetary awards shall earn
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED for

lack of merit. The Decision dated August 31, 2016 of the Court of Appeals,
Eighteenth (18th) Division in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC. No. 02007, finding
accused-appellant Hesson Callao y Marcelino guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162540               July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T.

Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's
conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution2 dated March
5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y
Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified
Theft, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another,
being then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein
represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access
inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and
confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account,
Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of
₱10,000.00, representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the
Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
aforesaid stated amount of ₱10,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be
more credible, reveals the events that transpired to be as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby
Aquino, handed petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649
postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of ₱10,000.00. The check was
payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and
petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was
deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of
Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former
pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.

Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam,

received a phone call sometime in the middle of July from one of their
customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted to know if she could
issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of issuing the
checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been instructed by
Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable
to CASH. Around that time, Ricablanca also received a phone call from an
employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for
Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the
subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.

Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former

employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter to inform Jacqueline
Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced check.
Ricablanca explained that she had to call and relay the message through
Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be
reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of
Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and
instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash.
Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it
equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline
Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported
the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.

Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to

confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for
₱10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for her purchases from
Mega Foam.4 Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in July 1997,
petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check
bounced.5 Verification from company records showed that petitioner never
remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that
she had already paid Mega Foam ₱10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as
replacement for the dishonored check.6

Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the

subject BDO check in his bank account, but explained that the check came
into his possession when some unknown woman arrived at his house
around the first week of July 1997 to have the check rediscounted. He
parted with his cash in exchange for the check without even bothering to
inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was
informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as
he didn’t know where to find the woman who rediscounted the check.

Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation with its agents.
Ten pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and
dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given
to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with
Valencia's plan.

On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house.
Petitioner, who was then holding the bounced BDO check, handed over
said check to Ricablanca. They originally intended to proceed to Baby
Aquino's place to have the check replaced with cash, but the plan did not
push through. However, they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.

On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner’s house, where

she met petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and
Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided
not to go with the group because she decided to go shopping. It was only
petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded
petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca
alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino,
pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash
she actually brought out from the premises was the ₱10,000.00 marked
money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money
and upon returning to the jeep, gave ₱5,000.00 each to Valencia and
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents,
who had been watching the whole time.

Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic
Chemist found fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of
both of their hands. This showed that petitioner and Valencia handled the
marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the
two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the
wife of Generoso Capitle.

The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and
presented the following scenario.

Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she
resigned on June 30, 1997, but claimed that she had stopped collecting
payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time before her resignation
from the company. She further testified that, on the day of the arrest,
Ricablanca came to her mother’s house, where she was staying at that
time, and asked that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's
house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese
General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former and
her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City.
She allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep,
which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very
surprised when Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI
agents arrested them.

Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until
she resigned on June 30, 1997. It was never part of her job to collect
payments from customers. According to her, on the morning of August 21,
1997, Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia) could
accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims
that she agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-examination
that she did not know where Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been
to said house. They then met at the house of petitioner's mother, rode the
jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's place.
When they arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them
to wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to
her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so she even asked, "What is
this?" Then, the NBI agents arrested them.

The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4,
1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma

Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and
Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11)
DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND
TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.7

The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was
promulgated, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court

is MODIFIED, in that:

(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;

(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4

months arresto mayor medium.
 (c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.

SO ORDERED.

A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed

only for petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied per
Resolution dated March 5, 2004.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner

alone, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA. The issues raised
in the petition are as follows:

1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged

in the information;

2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and

3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond

reasonable doubt.8

The petition deserves considerable thought.

The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to

constitute the elements of the crime of qualified theft defined under Article
308, in relation to Article 310, both of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the
taking of personal property - as shown by the fact that petitioner, as
collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check payment to her
employer and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property
belonged to another − the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her
payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to
gain – this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown
by the fact that the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's
brother-in-law; (4) it was done without the owner’s consent – petitioner hid
the fact that she had received the check payment from her employer's
customer by not remitting the check to the company; (5) it was
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,
nor of force upon things – the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by
the customer, as she was known to be a collector for the company; and (6)
it was done with grave abuse of confidence – petitioner is admittedly
entrusted with the collection of payments from customers.

However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the

Revised Penal Code, the personal property subject of the theft must
have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the
thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law
provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on
the value of the thing stolen.

In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to

Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was
subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime
of qualified theft was actually produced.

The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.

Intod v. Court of Appeals9 is highly instructive and applicable to the present

case. In Intod, the accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latter’s
bedroom with bullets, but since the intended victim was not home at the
time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of
attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty
only of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2,
Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because
of the factual impossibility of producing the crime. Pertinent portions of said
provisions read as follows:

Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be

incurred:

xxxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against

persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to
ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)

Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime

because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When
the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts
for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced
by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of
impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such
person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the
court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown
by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a
fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed
would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done
with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible,
or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of
the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under Article
4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court
in Intod10 in this wise:

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the

offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this
petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There
must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible
crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,

would not amount to a crime.

xxxx

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. x x x 11

In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved

factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another
with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the
pocket is empty.

Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual

impossibility given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property.
Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully
taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be
unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she
would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers.
Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check
being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the
crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned
out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually
dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of
said dishonored check.1avvphi1

The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the ₱5,000.00 marked
money, which she thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored
check, is of no moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v. People12 that
under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, "there
is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the
taking of personal property of another." Elucidating further, the Court held,
thus:

x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308,

there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law — that
theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of
another without the latter’s consent."

xxxx

x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain
unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from
that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the
offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able
or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from
the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. x x x

xxxx

x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is

deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. x x x

x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is

the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. x x x 13

From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time
that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam,
she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had
it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case. The
circumstance of petitioner receiving the ₱5,000.00 cash as supposed
replacement for the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the
consummation of the crime of qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to
convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was
hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank.
Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of
receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation
of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the
marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of
her intent to gain.

Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored
check replaced with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent
scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or covered by
the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on
the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another
possible source of criminal liability.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated
March 5, 2004, are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is
found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in
Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively.
Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto
mayor, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 95322 March 1, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PABLITO DOMASIAN AND DR. SAMSON TAN, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Silvestre L. Tagarao for appellant Pablito Domasian.

Lino M. Patajo for appellant Dr. Samson Tan.

CRUZ, J.:

The boy was detained for only about three hours and was released even
before his parents received the ransom note. But it spawned a protracted
trial spanning all of 8 years and led to the conviction of the two accused.1

The victim was Enrico Paulo Agra, who was 8 years old at the time of the
incident in question. The accused were Pablito Domasian and Samson
Tan, the latter then a resident physician in the hospital owned by Enrico's
parents. They were represented by separate lawyers at the trial and filed
separate briefs in this appeal.

The evidence of the prosecution showed that in the morning of March 11,
1982, while Enrico was walking with a classmate along Roque street in the
poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by a man who requested
his assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate.
Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan,
where he waited outside while the man went into a building to get the
certificate. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of
taking him to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside,
holding him firmly all the while. The man told him to stop crying or he would
not be returned to his father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took
another tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from where they
walked to the market. Here the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed
him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two
then boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente, with the man still firmly
holding Enrico, who continued crying. This aroused the suspicion of the
driver, Alexander Grate, who asked the man about his relationship with the
boy. The man said he and the boy were brothers, making Grate doubly
suspicious because of the physical differences between the two and the
wide gap between their ages. Grate immediately reported the matter to two
barangay tanods when his passengers alighted from the tricycle. Grate and
the tanods went after the two and saw the man dragging the boy. Noticing
that they were being pursued, the man told Enrico to run fast as their
pursuers might behead them. Somehow, the man managed to escape,
leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep
when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and
already looking for him.2

At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra
received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1
million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would
be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After
comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the
police, which referred it to the NBI for examination.3

The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson Tan.4 On the other
hand, Enrico was shown a folder of pictures in the police station so be
could identify the man who had detained him, and he pointed to the picture
of Pablito Domasian.5 Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with
the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon.6

The defense of both accused was denial and alibi. Domasian claimed that
at the time of the incident he was watching a mahjong game in a friend's
house and later went to an optical clinic with his wife for the refraction of his
eyeglasses.7 Dr. Tan for his part said he was in Manila.8

After trial Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas found both accused guilty as charged
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all
accessory penalties. They were also required to pay P200,000.00 to Dr.
and Mrs. Enrique Agra as actual and moral damages and attorney's fees.

In the present appeal, the accused-appellants reiterate their denial of any

participation in the incident in question. They belittle the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and submit that their own witnesses are more
believable. Tan specifically challenges the findings of the NBI and offers
anew the opposite findings of the PC/INP showing that he was not the
writer of the ransom note. He maintains that in any case, the crime alleged
is not kidnapping with serious illegal detention as no detention in an
enclosure was involved. If at all, it should be denominated and punished
only as grave coercion. Finally, both Domasian and Tan insist that there is
no basis for the finding of a conspiracy between them to make them
criminally liable in equal degree.

First, on the credibility of the witnesses. This is assessed in the first

instance by the trial judge, whose finding in this regard is received with
much respect by the appellate court because of his opportunity to directly
observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand.

In the case at bar, Judge Lanzanas relied heavily on the testimony of the
victim himself, who positively identified Domasian as the person who
detained him for three hours. The trial court observed that the boy was
"straight-forward, natural and consistent" in the narration of his detention.
The boy's naivete made him even more believable. Tirso Ferreras, Enrico's
classmate and also his age, pointed to Domasian with equal certainty, as
the man who approached Enrico when they were walking together that
morning of March 11, 1982. Grate, the tricycle driver who suspected
Enrico's companion and later chased him, was also positive in identifying
Domasian. All these three witnesses did not know Domasian until that
same morning and could have no ill motive in testifying against him. By
contrast, Eugenia Agtay, who testified for the defense, can hardly be
considered a disinterested witness because she admitted she had known
Domasian for 3 years.

The defense asks why Domasian openly took Enrico to several public
places if the intention was to kidnap and detain him. That is for Domasian
himself to answer. We do no have to probe the reasons for the irrational
conduct of an accused. The more important question, as we see it, is why
Domasian detained Enrico in the first place after pretending he needed the
boy's help. That is also for Domasian to explain. As for Enrico's alleged
willingness to go with Domasian, this was manifested only at the beginning,
when he believed the man sincerely needed his assistance. But he was
soon disabused. His initial confidence gave way to fear when Domasian,
after taking him so far away from the hospital where he was going,
restrained and threatened him if he did not stop crying.

Domasian's alibi cannot stand against his positive identification by Enrico,

Grate and Ferreras, let alone the contradictions made by his corroborating
witness, Dr. Irene Argosino, regarding the time he was in the optical clinic
and the manner of his payment for the refraction.9 Tan's alibi is not
convincing either. The circumstance that he may have been in Manila at
the time of the incident does not prove that he could not have written the
ransom note except at that time.

Concerning the note, Rule 132, Section 22, of the Rules of Court provides
as follows:

The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who

believes it to be the handwriting of such person and has seen
the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon
which the witness has acted or been charged and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
 evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge.

Two expert witnesses were presented in the case at bar, one from the
NBI, 10 who opined that the ransom note and the standard documents were
written by one and the same person, and another from the PC/INP 11 who
expressed a contrary conclusion. The trial court chose to believe the NBI
expert because his examination and analysis "was more comprehensive
than the one conducted by the PC/INP handwriting expert, who virtually
limited his reliance on the perceived similarities and dissimilarities in the
pattern and style of the writing, thereby disregarding the basic principle in
handwriting identification that it is not the form alone nor anyone feature but
rather a combination of all the qualities that identify."

We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends
not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but
upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false
specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from
an unpracticed observer. 12 The test of genuineness ought to be the
resemblance, not the formation of letters in some other specimens but to
the general character of writing, which is impressed on it as the involuntary
and unconscious result
of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is, therefore itself
permanent. 13

Presented with the conflicting opinions of the witnesses in the case at bar,
the Court feels that the scales should tilt in favor of the prosecution.
Significantly, the NBI opinion was bolstered by the testimony of Agra, who
believed that the ransom note was written by Tan, with whose handwriting
he was familiar because they had been working in the hospital for four
years and he had seen that handwriting every day in Tan's prescriptions
and daily reports. 14

Cesar v. Sandiganbayan  15 is not applicable because that case involved a

forgery or the deliberate imitation of another person's signature. In the case
before us, there was in fact an effort to disguise the ransom note writer's
penmanship to prevent his discovery.

As for the nature of the crime committed, Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code provides as follows:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any

private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than

five days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon

the person kidnapped or detained; of if threats to kill him shall
have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female

or a public officer.
 The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person; even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense.

Contrary to Tan's submission, this crime may consist not only in placing a
person in an enclosure but also in detaining him or depriving him in any
manner of his liberty. 16 In the case at bar, it is noted that although the
victim was not confined in an enclosure, he was deprived of his liberty
when Domasian restrained him from going home and dragged him first into
the minibus that took them to the municipal building in Gumaca, thence to
the market and then into the tricycle bound for San Vicente. The detention
was committed by Domasian, who was a private individual, and Enrico was
a minor at that time. The crime clearly comes under Par. 4 of the above-
quoted article.

Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the
ransom note was an impossible crime which he says is not punishable. His
reason is that the second paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person performing
an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means." As the crime alleged is
not against persons or property but against liberty, he argues that it is not
covered by the said provision.
Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article, which
clearly applies to him, thus:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the

wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be
considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent
improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or
ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the
victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. The sending
of the ransom note would have had the effect only of increasing the penalty
to death under the last paragraph of Article 267 although this too would not
have been possible under the new Constitution.

On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it, whether they act through physical volition of one or all,
proceeding severally or collectively. 17

It is settled that conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by the acts of
the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interests. 18 In the instant case,
the trial court correctly held that conspiracy was proved by the act of
Domasian in detaining Enrico; the writing of the ransom note by Tan; and
its delivery by Domasian to Agra. These acts were complementary to each
other and geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate
objective, viz., to extort the ransom of P1 million in exchange for Enrico's
life.

The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to Agra,
Tan approached him six days before the incident happened and requested
a loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment
and Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra could even raise a
million pesos if he really wanted to help. 19 The refusal obviously triggered
the plan to kidnap Enrico and demand P1 million for his release.

The constitutional issues raised by Domasian do not affect the decision in

this case. His claim that he was arrested without warrant and then tortured
and held incommunicado to extort a confession from him does not vitiate
his conviction. He never gave any confession. As for the allegation that the
seizure of the documents used for comparison with the ransom note was
made without a search warrant, it suffices to say that such documents were
taken by Agra himself and not by the NBI agents or other police authorities.
We held in the case of People vs. Andre Marti, 20 that the Bill of Rights
cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals, being directed only
against the government and its law-enforcement agencies and limitation on
official action.

We are satisfied that Tan and Domasian, in conspiracy with each other,
committed the crime of kidnapping as defined and penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code and so deserve the penalty imposed upon
them by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the

accused-appellants.

Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Commission on Human Rights for
investigation of the alleged violation of the constitutional rights of Pablito
Domasian.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of
attempted murder.

From the records, we gathered the following facts.

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian,
Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in
Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with
them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and
Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto
Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed
because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should
accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner,

Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived
at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental.
At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was
in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his
family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one
was hit by the gun fire.

Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One

witness testified that before the five men left the premises, they shouted:
"We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and
we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2

After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder.
The court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that
Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court
a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible
crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal

Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense

against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on

the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime
inherently impossible.

On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the
crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an
attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that
there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent
pointed out that:

. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of

the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2),
Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than
petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous desistance
(Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that
 time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not
impossible. 3

Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This

seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:

. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been

commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should have
set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in
order that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the
result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible.
So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the
courts did not hold him criminally liable. 5

This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised

Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender
his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at
something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove
inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against
property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal
tendencies. 9

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offense against person or property because: (1) the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the

offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this
petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. 11 There
must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to
qualify the act an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,

would not amount to a crime. 13 Thus:

Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where

(1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in
violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical
act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and
(4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime. 14

The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous

circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts
his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's
wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where
he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not
present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one.
In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired
at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It turned out,
however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused failed to hit
him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an
attempt to kill. It held that:

The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking
party imagined where he was, and where the bullet pierced the
roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled
principle of criminal law in this country that where the criminal
result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of an
obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and
these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the
criminal attempt is committed.

In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish

his intent to kill the victim because the latter did not pass by the place
where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder.
The court explained that:

It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . .

It only became impossible by reason of the extraneous
circumstance that Lane did not go that way; and further, that he
was arrested and prevented from committing the murder. This
rule of the law has application only where it is inherently
impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a case
where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed,
either by outside interference or because of miscalculation as to
a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to
 materialize; in short it has no application to the case when the
impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the control
of the party.

In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for

attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the
case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:

It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment

by reason of his criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that
the protection of the public requires the punishment to be
administered, equally whether in the unseen depths of the
pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really present or
not. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime.
Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and
what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite
apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the
incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in
reason committed.

In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of

victim's room thinking that the latter was inside. However, at that moment,
the victim was in another part of the house. The court convicted the
accused of attempted murder.

The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by
Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder
against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to
resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and
the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible
crimes.

In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly

provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the
United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent
regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes
enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the
impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt
charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the
impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual
impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:

. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a

defense. If the crime could have been committed had the
circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is
no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of
commission.

Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to

avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused
was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The
law governing the matter made the act criminal if done without knowledge
and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a
letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was
performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with
the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused
liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the
contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a
charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the
proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern
view". In disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal
statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the principle of
legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made
criminal by law. Further, it said:

Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent
plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt
irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such
legislative changes in the law take place, this court will not
fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.

To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed

is factually impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape
criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the
substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears,
therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an
attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally
impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime
— neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason for
this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime.
Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge —
that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are
recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not
merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase
"inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal
Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and
legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility

which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And
under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient
to make the act an impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted

Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause
independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4,
which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances
which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an
accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted
and frustrated felonies.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby

GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner
guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner
guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4,
paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in
mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this
Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to
pay the costs.

G.R. Nos. 138943-44            September 17, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HENRY ALMAZAN, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Joint Decision1 of the trial court declaring

accused-appellant Henry Almazan guilty of murder and frustrated murder. It
traces its origin to two (2) Informations charging Henry Almazan with
shooting Noli S. Madriaga with a handgun, aggravated by treachery and
evident premeditation, which caused the latter's death; and with shooting
Noel Madriaga with the same handgun which would have produced the
latter's death if not for timely medical attendance, docketed as Crim. Cases
Nos. C-51276 and C-51277 respectively. These cases were tried jointly
pursuant to Sec. 14, Rule 119, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

On 28 September 1996, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Vicente

Madriaga and a certain Allan played chess in front of the former's house at
Pag-asa, Camarin, Caloocan City. Spectators were Vicente's son Noli, who
was carrying his 2-year old daughter, Vicente's grandson Noel, and a
neighbor named Angel Soliva. While the game was underway, Henry
Almazan unexpectedly arrived and brandished a .38 caliber revolver in
front of the group. Almazan's fighting cocks had just been stolen and he
suspected Angel, one of the spectators, to be the culprit. Thus he said,
"manos-manos na lang tayo,"2 aimed his gun at Angel and pulled the
trigger. It did not fire. He tried again, but again it failed.

At this juncture, Vicente Madriaga stood up and tried to calm down Henry,
but the latter refused to be pacified ("ayaw paawat"). Angel ran away and
Henry aimed his gun instead at Noli. Noli cried for mercy, for his life and
that of his daughter, but to no avail.3 Henry shot Noli at the left side of his
stomach sending him immediately to the ground. His daughter, unscathed,
held on to Noli, crying. Henry then turned on Noel and shot him on the left
thigh. Noel managed to walk lamely ("paika-ika") but only to eventually fall
to the ground. Thereafter, Vicente Madriaga called on his neighbors who
brought Noli and Noel to the hospital. Noli however died before reaching
the hospital, while Noel survived his injuries.

Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service conducted an
autopsy on the body of Noli which revealed that the cause of the victim's
death was a gunshot at the trunk from a .38 caliber revolver. Dr. Misael
Jonathan Ticman, attending physician of Noel, in turn declared that the
gunshot wound on the left thigh of Noel was a minor injury that would heal
in a week.4 Noel was never admitted in the hospital as his doctor sent him
home the same day.5 On cross-examination, Dr. Ticman testified that if not
medically treated the wound might get infected or lead to the victim's
death.6
Witnesses for the defense narrated a different version. They pointed to
Angel Soliva instead as the person to blame for Noli Madriaga's death while
justifying Noel Madriaga's wound as a result of self-defense.

Henry Almazan testified that at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 28

September 1996 he went home accompanied by his friend Johnald Molina.
Henry's wife informed him upon his return that his fighting cocks, twelve
(12) in number, had been stolen. He went out of the house to inquire from
neighbors as to who could have taken his cocks. He was followed by
Johnald. On their way they saw Vicente Madriaga and Allan playing chess
surrounded by Noli, Noel, Angel and other persons. They were drinking
liquor. As he (Almazan) and Johnald were passing by, Angel called Henry
and asked if he was looking for his fighting cocks. The group then burst into
laughter and pointed to their pulutan. Someone in the group advised Henry
not to look anymore for his fighting cocks as he would only be courting
trouble ("naghahanap ka lang ng sakit ng katawan"). To this advice Henry
replied, "Bakit naman ganoon?" Suddenly, Angel pulled out his gun and
shot Henry twice but the gun did not fire. Seizing the opportunity Henry
grappled with Angel for the possession of his gun. During the scuffle Angel
pulled the trigger which hit Noli. Henry finally succeeded in wresting the
gun from Angel and aimed it at him. Suddenly, he received a blow from
behind and he fell. As he raised his head from the ground, he saw Noel
poised to attack him with a broken bottle, so that he had to train his gun at
the lower part of Noel's body and fired. The bullet hit Noel on the thigh
which sent him reeling down his knees ("napaluhod"). Shocked and afraid
that he hit Noel, Henry ran home.
Johnald Molina corroborated Henry Almazan's statement in all material
points. Johnald testified that the group mocked Henry when they told him
not to look for his cocks anymore as they had already been cooked
for pulutan, and to insist in his search would only cause him physical
trouble. Henry could only reply, "Tila nga may nagnakaw ng mga manok
ko . . . . Bakit naman ganoon?" As he made his remarks, someone from the
group suddenly pulled out a gun and aimed at Henry. Henry grappled with
the gun-wielder who pressed the trigger twice but the gun misfired each
time. When the gun-wielder pulled the trigger for the third time it fired,
hitting a person who was carrying a small child and standing within the
vicinity. He was obviously referring to Noli. Johnald immediately ran
towards Henry's house to report the incident to his wife and asked for help.
Then he heard another shot, but in his haste to reach Henry's house he
ignored it. Upon reaching Henry's house, Henry also arrived. To avoid
being involved and out of fear, Johnald did not report the incident to the
police. Later however, bothered by his conscience and being the friend of
Henry, Johnald volunteered to testify on what he knew of the incident.

The court a quo found Henry Almazan's defense devoid of merit. Apart

from being positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the person
responsible for the violence and the injuries inflicted, the trial court declared
that the theft of Henry's fighting cocks constituted sufficient motive for the
killing and that as a cockfight afficionado he must have found it imperative
to exact vengeance on his suspected culprits.7 The trial court held that the
testimony of Johnald failed to create reasonable doubt on the guilt of Henry
since as a friend he was expected to extend succor to a friend, especially
one in need.8 Thus, the trial court held Henry Almazan guilty of murder and
frustrated murder as charged.

In imposing the penalty for each offense, the lower court appreciated the
qualifying circumstance of treachery against accused-appellant on the
ground that the victims were completely defenseless when attacked and
did not commit the slightest provocation, but found no justification for
evident premeditation as there was no proof as to the manner and time
during which the plan to kill was hatched. On the contrary, the trial court
found in favor of accused-appellant the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation. Thus, in Crim. Case No. C-51276, accused-appellant was
sentenced to the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death,
with all the accessory penalties according to law, and ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P8,000.00 as funeral
expenses, and to pay the costs; while in Crim. Case No. C-51277, he was
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties
provided by law, and to pay P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.9

Accused-appellant now prays to be absolved of murder in Crim. Case No.

C-51276 on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He assails the testimony of Shirley Abordo,
common-law wife of Nilo Madriaga, for being hearsay, as well as the
testimony of Vicente Madriaga for its alleged inconsistencies in various vital
points. Significantly, accused-appellant impugns the veracity of the
prosecution's evidence for its failure to present Angel Soliva who was
primarily involved in the incident and whom the defense points to as the
real transgressor. Thus, accused-appellant contends that evidence
sufficient to establish the absolute and moral certainty of his guilt being
absent he should be acquitted.

As for Crim. Case No. C-51277, accused-appellant contends that the trial
court erred in holding him guilty of frustrated murder as the wound
sustained by Noel Madriaga was not fatal that could have caused his death
if not for timely medical assistance. Moreover, accused-appellant claims
that he shot Noel only to forestall any attack on him and not to kill Noel
intentionally.

Appellate courts are doctrinally bound by the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of witnesses given the clear advantage of a trial judge in the
appreciation of testimonial evidence. The trial court is in the best position to
assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first-hand and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination - factors which
are significant in the evaluation of the sincerity of witnesses and in
unearthing the truth.10 We see no reason to depart from this doctrine.

The witnesses for the prosecution were consistent in their narration of the
manner by which the events transpired, and they remained steadfast in
their identification of accused-appellant as the author of the violence.
Despite attempts to confound them, Vicente Madriaga and Noel Madriaga
were relentless in their declaration that it was accused-appellant, armed
with a .38 caliber revolver, who pounced upon them without warning
thereby killing Noli Madriaga and wounding Noel Madriaga in the process.
They were one in their assertion that accused-appellant was inflamed by
his suspicion that Angel Soliva and Noel Madriaga had stolen his fighting
cocks and was intent on getting even with them, thus he fired at them.
Efforts to pass the blame on the group by claiming that in their inebriated
state they mocked accused-appellant and thus initiated the violence were
actually set to naught as Vicente and Noel Madriaga unfailingly denied the
same.

True, Shirley Abordo's testimony was spattered with inconsistencies

bordering at times on incoherence. As she herself admitted, her narration
was merely derived from the accounts of the other prosecution witnesses
and not from her own perception of the events. This constitutes hearsay,
which we then reject. Be that as it may, these alleged inconsistencies are
immaterial and irrelevant as they do not alter the determination of the Court
that murder was committed and accused-appellant was the assailant. For a
discrepancy to serve as basis for acquittal, it must refer to significant facts
vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused. An inconsistency, which has
nothing to do with the elements of the crime, cannot be a ground to reverse
a conviction.11

In the same vein, the testimony of Angel Soliva or of Allan, with whom
Vicente Madriaga was playing chess, is unnecessary as the facts on record
are clear enough for judicial assessment and verdict.

The defense suggests that it could be Angel Soliva instead who shot Noli
Madriaga. This is unacceptable in the face of the positive identification of
the accused by the prosecution witnesses. The allegation that the shooting
was the accidental consequence of the struggle between accused-
appellant and Angel Soliva does not inspire belief as no substantial
evidence was presented to prove it. It is highly improbable that a struggle
even occurred as accused-appellant and Angel Soliva were surrounded by
the latter's friends who would have easily ganged up on accused-appellant.
Testimonial evidence to be credible should not only come from the mouth
of a credible witness but should also be credible, reasonable and in accord
with human experience,12 failing in which, it should be rejected.

Indeed, Johnald Molina corroborated the statement of accused-appellant

pointing at Angel Soliva as the real culprit; however, we are inclined to
agree with the observation of the court a quo that it was natural for an
individual to exert effort in liberating his friend from confinement or
execution, even to the extent of distorting the truth.

It is significant to note that accused-appellant went into hiding after the

shooting incident and was only collared by the agents from the Western
Police District eight (8) months later. Flight indeed is an indication of guilt,
especially when accused-appellant failed to sufficiently explain why he left
his residence and resurrected only several months after.

The trial court properly appreciated the presence of treachery as the attack
was made upon the unarmed victims who had not committed the slightest
provocation and who were totally unaware of the murderous designs of
accused-appellant. Contrary to the finding of the court a quo, treachery in
this case qualifies the offense to murder, hence, may not be considered a
generic aggravating circumstance to increase the penalty from reclusion
perpetua to death. In other words, while the imposable penalty for murder
is reclusion perpetua to death, in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed. The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot
be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant as this was never proved
during the trial.

As for Crim. Case No. C-51277, accused-appellant admits responsibility for

the injuries inflicted on Noel but reasons out that he did so only to defend
himself. Accused-appellant therefore pleads self-defense, a justifying
circumstance that could acquit him of the charge but which we are not
disposed to grant as the elements necessary to qualify his actions13 were
not present. In alleging that the killing arose from an impulse to defend
oneself, the onus probandi rests upon accused-appellant to prove by clear
and convincing evidence the elements thereof: (a) that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) that there was reasonable
necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) that there
was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the defendant.14 This, it has
failed to discharge.

Nevertheless, we find that the accused-appellant should be held liable for

attempted murder, not frustrated murder. For the charge of frustrated
murder to flourish, the victim should sustain a fatal wound that could have
caused his death were it not for timely medical assistance. This is not the
case before us. The court a quo anchored its ruling on the statement of Dr.
Ticman on cross-examination that the wound of Noel could catch infection
or lead to his death if not timely and properly treated. However, in his direct
testimony, Dr. Ticman declared that the wound was a mere minor injury for
which Noel, after undergoing treatment, was immediately advised to go
home.15 He even referred to the wound as a slight physical injury that would
heal within a week16 and for which the victim was in no danger of
dying.17 Clear as the statement is, coupled with the fact that Noel was
indeed immediately advised to go home as he was not in any danger of
death, we have no reason to doubt the meaning and implications of Dr.
Ticman's statement. His statement that Noel could catch infection was
based on pure speculation rather than on the actual nature of the wound
which was a mere minor injury, hence, not fatal. According to
jurisprudence, if the victim was wounded with an injury that was not fatal,
and could not cause his death, the crime would only be attempted. 18 The
observation that the conviction should be for slight physical injuries only is
likewise improper as the accused-appellant was motivated by the same
impetus and intent, i.e., to exact vengeance and even kill, if necessary,
when he shot Noel Madriaga. The fact that the wound was merely a minor
injury which could heal in a week becomes inconsequential.

In the final analysis, there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance

and the more appropriate offense being attempted murder, accused-
appellant should be meted a penalty two (2) degrees lower than the
prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is prision mayor the range
of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law in the case for attempted murder, the
maximum shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor, which is
eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, while the minimum shall
be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, or prision correccional, in
any of its periods, the range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision of the trial court of 15 June 1999 finding
accused-appellant HENRY ALMAZAN guilty of Murder in G.R. No. 138943
(Crim. Case No. C-51276) and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua with
its accessory penalties, and to pay the heirs of Noli Madriaga P50,000.00
as death indemnity, P8,000.00 as funeral expenses, and to pay the costs,
is AFFIRMED. However, his conviction for Frustrated Murder in G.R. No.
138944 (Crim. Case No. C-51277) is MODIFIED by lowering the crime to
Attempted Murder and he is sentenced accordingly to an indeterminate
prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional medium as minimum, to eight (8) years two (2) months and
twenty (20) days of prision mayor medium as maximum, and to pay the
offended party Noel Madriaga the amount of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity,
and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 122099               July 5, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AGAPITO LISTERIO y PRADO and SAMSON DELA TORRE y
ESQUELA, accused,
AGAPITO LISTERIO y PRADO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For the deadly assault on the brothers Jeonito Araque and Marlon Araque,
Agapito Listerio y Prado, Samson dela Torre y Esquela, Marlon dela Torre,
George dela Torre, Bonifacio Bancaya and several others who are still at
large were charged in two (2) separate Amended Informations with Murder
and Frustrated Murder.

In Criminal Case No. 91-5842 the Amended Information1 for Murder alleges

–

That on or about the 11th day of August 1991 in the Municipality of

Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping and aiding one another, all armed with
bladed weapons and GI lead pipes, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation with abuse of superior strength did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Jeonito Araque y
Daniel at the back of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

In Criminal Case No. 91-5843, the Amended Information2 for Frustrated

Homicide charges:

That on or about the 14th day of May 1991 in the Municipality of

Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together, mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab and hit with a lead pipe
and bladed weapon one Marlon Araque y Daniel on the vital portions of his
body, thereby inflicting serious and mortal wounds which would have
cause[d] the death of the said victim thus performing all the acts of
execution which should have produce[d] the crime of Homicide as a
consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of their will, that is by timely and able medical attendance
rendered to said Marlon Araque y Daniel which prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, accused Agapito Listerio y Prado and Samson dela

Torre y Esquela pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Their other co-
accused have remained at large.

Trial thereafter ensued after which the court a quo rendered judgment only
against accused Agapito Listerio because his co-accused Samson dela
Torre escaped during the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence and
he was not tried in absentia. The dispositive portion of the decision3 reads:

WHEREFORE, finding Accused AGAPITO LISTERIO guilty beyond

reasonable doubt, he is sentenced:

1. For the death of Jeonito Araque y Daniel in Criminal Case NO. 91-
5842, RECLUSION PERPETUA;

2. For the attempt to kill Marlon Araque y Daniel, in Criminal Case

No. 91-5843, he is sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day as
minimum, to four (4) years as maximum;
 3. As civil indemnity, he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Jeonito
Araque y Daniel the sum[s] of :

P54,200.66 as actual damages;

P50,000.00 as moral damages;

P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.

4. And for the damages sustained by Marlon Araque y Daniel, he is

required to pay Marlon Araque y Daniel, the sum[s] of :

P5,000.00 as actual damages;

P5,000.00 as moral damages; and

P5,000.00 as exemplary damages

SO ORDERED.4

Dissatisfied, accused Agapito Listerio interposed this appeal alleging that –

THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE

GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE COURT CONVICTED THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF

MURDER AND ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE DESPITE ABSENCE OF
 PROOF OF CONSPIRACY AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF TREACHERY.

The version of the prosecution of what transpired on that fateful day of

August 14, 1991 culled from the eyewitness account of Marlon Araque
discloses that at around 5:00 p.m. of August 14, 1991, he and his brother
Jeonito were in Purok 4, Alabang, Muntinlupa to collect a sum of money
from a certain Tino.5 Having failed to collect anything from Tino, Marlon and
Jeonito then turned back.6 On their way back while they were passing
Tramo near Tino’s place,7 a group composed of Agapito Listerio, Samson
dela Torre, George dela Torre, Marlon dela Torre and Bonifacio
Bancaya8 blocked their path9 and attacked them with lead pipes and bladed
weapons.10

Agapito Listerio, Marlon dela Torre and George dela Torre, who were
armed with bladed weapons, stabbed Jeonito Araque from behind.11 Jeonito
sustained three (3) stab wounds on the upper right portion of his back,
another on the lower right portion and the third on the middle portion of the
left side of his back12 causing him to fall down.13 Marlon Araque was hit on
the head by Samson dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya with lead pipes and
momentarily lost consciousness.14 When he regained his senses three (3)
minutes later, he saw that Jeonito was already dead.15 Their assailants then
fled after the incident.16 Marlon Araque who sustained injuries in the arm
and back,17 was thereafter brought to a hospital for treatment.18

Marlon Araque was examined by Dr. Salvador Manimtim, head of the

Medico Legal Division of the UP-PGH, 19 who thereafter issued a Medical
Certificate20 indicating that Marlon Araque sustained two (2) lacerated
wounds, one measuring 5 centimeters in length located in the center (mid-
parietal area) of the ear.21 The second lacerated wound measuring 2
centimeters in length is located at the mid-frontal area commonly known as
the forehead.22 A third lacerated wound measuring 1.5 centimeters long is
located at the forearm23 and a fourth which is a stab wound measuring 3
centimeters is located at the right shoulder at the collar.24 Elaborating on the
nature of Marlon Araque’s injuries, Dr. Manimtim explained in detail during
cross-examination that the two (2) wounds on the forearm and the shoulder
were caused by a sharp object like a knife while the rest were caused by a
blunt instrument such as a lead pipe.25

Dr. Bievenido Munoz, NBI Medico Legal Officer conducted an autopsy on

the cadaver of Jeonito Araque26 and prepared an Autopsy Report27 of his
findings. The report which contains a detailed description of the injuries
inflicted on the victim shows that the deceased sustained three (3) stab
wounds all of them inflicted from behind by a sharp, pointed and single-
bladed instrument like a kitchen knife, balisong or any similar
instrument.28 The first stab wound, measuring 1.7 centimeters with an
approximate depth of 11.0 centimeters, perforated the lower lobe of the left
lung and the thoracic aorta.29 Considering the involvement of a vital organ
and a major blood vessel, the wound was considered fatal.30 The second
wound, measuring 2.4 centimeters, affected the skin and underlying soft
tissues and did not penetrate the body cavity.31 The third wound measuring
2.7 centimeters was like the second and involved only the soft
tissues.32 Unlike the first, the second and third wounds were non-fatal.33 Dr.
Munoz averred that of the three, the first and second wounds were inflicted
by knife thrusts delivered starting below going upward by assailants who
were standing behind the victim.34

On the other hand, accused-appellant’s version of the incident is summed

thus in his brief:

1. Accused-appellant is 39 years old, married, side walk vendor and a

resident of Purok 4, Bayanan, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He earns a
living by selling vegetables.35

2. At around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of August 14, 1991,

Accused-Appellant was in the store of Nimfa Agustin having a little
fun with Edgar Demolador and Andres Gininao drinking beer. At
around 2:00 o’clock Accused-appellant went to his house and slept.36

3. While asleep, at about 5 o’clock, Edgar Remolador and Andres

Gininao woke him up and told him there was a quarrel near the
railroad track.37

4. At around 6:00 o’clock two (2) policemen passed by going to the

house of Samson de la Torre while Accused-appellant was chatting
with Edgar Remolador and Andres Gininao. These two (2) policemen
together with co-accused Samson de la Torre came back and invited
Accused-appellant for questioning at the Muntinlupa Police
Headquarters together with Edgar Demolador and Andres Gininao.
Subsequently, Edgar Demolador and Andres Gininao were sent
home.38
 5. At the Police Station, Accused-Appellant was handed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Marlon Araque, implicating him
for the death of Jeonito Araque and the frustrated murder of Marlon
Araque. Accused-Appellant confronted Marlon Araque as to why he
was being included in the case. Marlon Araque answered "because
you eject[ed] us from your house."39

Professing his innocence, accused-appellant claims that Marlon Araque’s

uncorroborated testimony failed to clearly and positively identify him as the
malefactor responsible for his brother’s death. In fine, he insists that
Marlon’s testimony is insufficient to convict him of the crimes charged.

We disagree.

It is well settled that witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered, such that
the testimony of a single, trustworthy and credible witness could be
sufficient to convict an accused.40 More explicitly, the well entrenched rule is
that "the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if found positive and credible by
the trial court is sufficient to support a conviction especially when the
testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and had been delivered
spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward manner. It has been held
that witnesses are to be weighed not numbered; hence, it is not at all
uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a
single witness."41

The trial court found Marlon Araque’s version of what transpired candid and
straightforward. We defer to the lower court’s findings on this point
consistent with the oft-repeated pronouncement that: "the trial judge is the
best and the most competent person who can weigh and evaluate the
testimony of witnesses. His firsthand look at the declarant’s demeanor,
conduct and attitude at the trial places him in a peculiar position to
discriminate between the true and the false. Consequently appellate courts
will not disturb the trial court’s findings save only in cases where
arbitrariness has set in and disregard for the facts important to the case
have been overlooked."42

The account of Marlon Araque as to how they were assaulted by the group
of accused-appellant was given in a categorical, convincing and
straightforward manner:

Q Mr. Witness, do you know a certain Jeonito Araque y Daniel?

A Yes, sir.

Q And why do you know him?

A He is my brother.

Q Where is Jeonito Araque now?

A He is already dead.

Q When did he die?

A Last August 14.

Q Do you know of your own knowledge how he died?

A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court what is your own
knowledge?

A He was stabbed, sir.

Q Do you know the person or persons who stabbed him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court who are these person or
persons, if you know?

A Its (sic) Agapito Listerio, Samson dela Torre, George dela Torre, Marlon
dela Torre and Bonifacio.

Q Now if these persons [are] inside the courtroom, could you identify them?

A They (sic) are only two persons but the three persons is (sic) not around.

Q Could you please point to this Honorable Court who are these two
persons in side the courtroom?

A Yes, sir (Witness pointing to a persons [sic] and when asked [identified
themselves as] Agapito Listerio and Samson dela Torre.)

Q Now, at around 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of August 14, 1991, do you
recall where were you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court where were you at that time?
A I’m in Alabang at Purok 4 and I’m collecting.

Q Do you have any companion at that time?

A Yes, sir.

Q What are you doing at that time in [that] particular date?

A I’m collecting from a certain Tino.

Q Were you able to collect?

A No, sir.

Q If you said that there were no collections, what did you do?

A We went back.

Q When you went back, did you have any companion?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who was your companion?

A My brother.

Q While you were going back, was there any untoward incidents that
happened?

A Yes sir "Hinarang po kami."

Q Now, what particular place [where] you were waylaid, if you recall?
A In Tramo, near Tino’s place.

Q And who were the persons that were waylaid (sic)?

A Agapito Listerio, Samson dela Torre, George dela Torre and Bonifacio.

Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court how will (sic) you waylaid by
these persons?

A We were walking then suddenly they stabbed us with knife (sic) and ran
afterwards.

Q Who were the persons that waylaid you?

A Agapito Listerio, George and Marlon.

Q How about your brother, what happened to him?

A He fall (sic) down.

Q And after he fall (sic) down, do you know what happened?

A I was hit by a lead pipe that’s why I painted (sic).

Q Do you know the reason why your brother fall (sic) down?

A I cannot recall, sir. Because I already painted (sic).

Q Do you know the reason why your brother fall (sic) before you painted
(sic)?

A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court why your brother fall (sic)
down?

x x x           x x x          x x x

A Yes, sir, because he was stabbed.

Q What particular place of his body was [he] stabbed if you know?

A At the back of his body.

Q Do you know the person or persons who was (sic) stabbed him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court who was that persons was
stabbed him?

A Agapito, Marlon and George.

COURT

How many stabbed [him], if you know?

A Three (3), sir.

COURT

In what particular part of his body was stabbed wound (sic)?

A Witness pointing to his back upper right portion of the back, another on
the lower right portion and another on the middle portion of the left side at
the back.
COURT

Proceed.

Q Will you please inform the Honorable Court why you are (sic) lost
consciousness?

A I was hit by [a] lead pipe by Samson and Bonifacio.

Q And when did you regain consciousness?

A After three minutes.

Q And when you gain[ed] consciousness, what happened to your brother?

A He was already dead.

Q How about you, what did you do?

A I go (sic) to the Hospital.

Q How about the accused, the persons who way laid, what happened to
them?

A From what I know, they ran away.43

Persistent efforts by defense counsel to establish that the attack was

provoked, by eliciting from Marlon Araque an admission that he and the
deceased had a drinking spree with their attackers prior to the incident,
proved futile as Marlon steadfastly maintained on cross examination that he
and his brother never drank liquor on that fateful day:
Q After your work, was there an occasion when you drink something with
your borther (sic)?

A No, sir.

Q And you stand to your testimony that you never drink (sic) on August 14,
1991?

A Yes, sir.

Q Were (sic) there no occasion on August 14, 1991 when you visited
Sonny Sari-Sari Store at 4:00 p.m. on August 14, 1991?

A No, sir.

Q And did you not have a drinking spree with George dela Torre?

A No, sir.

Q Marlon dela Torre?

A No, sir.

Q Bonifacio?

A With your borther (sic)?

Q So you want to tell this Honorable Court that there was no point in time
on August 14, 1991 at 4:00 p.m. that you did not take a sip of wine?

A No, sir.

Q Neither your brother?

Atty. Agoot

Objection, Your Honor, the question is vague.

COURT

Ask another question.

Q Mr. Witness, will you please tell the Honorable Court where this George
dela Torre, Marlon dela Torre and a certain Bonifacio were?

Atty. Agoot

Witness is incompetent.

Q Mr. Witness, you testified that it was your brother the deceased who
invited you to Purok 4?

A Yes, sir.

Atty. Lumakang

That will be all for the witness, your Honor.44

That Marlon was able to recognize the assailants can hardly be doubted
because relatives of the victim have a natural knack for remembering the
faces of the attackers and they, more than anybody else, would be
concerned with obtaining justice for the victim by the felons being brought
to the face of the law.45 Indeed, family members who have witnessed the
killing of a loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the
assailants.46 Marlon’s credibility cannot be doubted in this case because as
a victim himself and an eyewitness to the incident, it can be clearly gleaned
from the foregoing excerpts of his testimony that he remembered with a
high degree of reliability the identity of the malefactors.47

Likewise, there is no showing that he was motivated by any ill-feeling or

bad blood to falsely testify against accused-appellant. Being a victim
himself, he is expected to seek justice. It is settled that if the accused had
nothing to do with the crime, it would be against the natural order of events
to falsely impute charges of wrongdoing upon him.48 Accused-appellant
likewise insists on the absence of conspiracy and treachery in the attack on
the victims.

We remain unconvinced.

It must be remembered that direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found for

criminals do not write down their lawless plans and plots.49 Conspiracy may
be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a
joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest.50 Indeed –

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To
establish the existence of a conspiracy, direct proof is not essential since it
may be shown by facts and circumstances from which may be logically
inferred the existence of a common design among the accused to commit
the offense charged, or it may be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated.51

More explicitly –
… conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of acts charged,
but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions and circumstances, which vary according to the purpose
accomplished. Previous agreement to commit a crime is not essential to
establish a conspiracy, it being sufficient that the condition attending to its
commission and the acts executed may be indicative of a common design
to accomplish a criminal purpose and objective. If there is a chain of
circumstances to that effect, conspiracy can be established.52

Thus, the rule is that conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct

or circumstantial evidence, as clearly and convincingly as the crime
itself.53 In the absence of direct proof thereof, as in the present case, it may
be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when
such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.54 Hence, it is necessary that a conspirator should
have performed some overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in the
execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act may consist
of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may
consist of moral assistance to his con-conspirators by being present at the
commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other
co-conspirators.55

Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, it denotes an intentional

participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.56 "Conspiracy to exist does not require an
agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence.57 From the
legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the
offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its
execution."58 In this case, the presence of accused-appellant and his
colleagues, all of them armed with deadly weapons at the locus
criminis, indubitably shows their criminal design to kill the victims.

Nowhere is it more evident than in this case where accused-appellant and

his cohorts blocked the path of the victims and as a group attacked them
with lead pipes and bladed weapons. Accused-appellant and his
companions acted in concert during the assault on the victims. Each
member of the group performed specific and coordinated acts as to
indicate beyond doubt a common criminal design or purpose.59 Thus, even
assuming arguendo that the prosecution eyewitness may have been
unclear as to who delivered the fatal blow on the victim, accused-appellant
as a conspirator is equally liable for the crime as it is unnecessary to
determine who inflicted the fatal wound because in conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all.60

As to the qualifying circumstances here present, the treacherous manner in

which accused-appellant and his group perpetrated the crime is shown not
only by the sudden and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting and
apparently unarmed victims but also by the deliberate manner in which the
assault was perpetrated. In this case, the accused-appellant and his
companions, all of them armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes,
blocked (hinarang) the path of the victims effectively cutting off their
escape.61 In the ensuing attack, the deceased was stabbed three (3) times
from behind by a sharp, pointed and single-bladed instrument like a kitchen
knife, balisong or similar instrument62 while Marlon Araque sustained
lacerated wounds in the head caused by blows inflicted by lead pipes as
well as stab wounds on the shoulder and forearm which were caused by a
sharp object like a knife.63

It must be noted in this regard that the manner in which the stab wounds
were inflicted on the deceased were clearly meant to kill without posing any
danger to the malefactors considering their locations and the fact that they
were caused by knife thrusts starting below going upward by assailants
who were standing behind the victim.64 Treachery is present when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.65 That circumstance qualifies the
crime into murder.

The commission of the crime was also attended by abuse of superior

strength on account of the fact that accused-appellant and his companions
were not only numerically superior to the victims but also because all of
them, armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes, purposely used force
out of proportion to the means of defense available to the persons
attacked. However, this aggravating circumstance is already absorbed in
treachery.66 Furthermore, although alleged in the information, evident
premeditation was not proved by the prosecution. In the light of the finding
of conspiracy, evident premeditation need not be further appreciated,
absent concrete proof as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or
what time had elapsed before it was carried out.67

In stark contrast to the evidence pointing to him as one of the assailants of

the victims, accused-appellant proffers the defense of alibi. At the risk of
sounding trite, it must be remembered that alibi is generally considered with
suspicion and always received with caution because it can be easily
fabricated.68 For alibi to serve as a basis for acquittal, the accused must
establish that: a.] he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the offense; and b.] it would thus be physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime.69

Suffice it to state that accused-appellant failed to discharge this burden.

The positive identification of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the
crime by the prosecution eyewitness, absent any showing of ill-motive,
must prevail over the weak and obviously fabricated alibi of accused-
appellant.70 Furthermore, as aptly pointed out by the trial court "[t]he place
where the accused was at the time of the killing is only 100 meters away.
The distance of his house to the place of the incident makes him physically
possible to be a participant in the killing [of Jeonito] and [the] wounding of
Marlon."71

All told, an overall scrutiny of the records of this case leads us to no other
conclusion than that accused-appellant is guilty as charged for Murder in
Criminal Case No. 91-5842.

In Criminal Case No. 91-5843, wherein accused-appellant was indicted for

Frustrated Homicide, the trial court convicted accused-appellant of
Attempted Homicide only on the basis of Dr. Manimtim’s testimony that
none of the wounds sustained by Marlon Araque were fatal.

The reasoning of the lower court on this point is flawed because it is not the
gravity of the wounds inflicted which determines whether a felony is
attempted or frustrated but whether or not the subjective phase in the
commission of an offense has been passed. By subjective phase is meant
"[t]hat portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act
which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the
offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime.
From that time forward, the phase is objective. It may also be said to be
that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control –
that period between the point where he begins and the point where
he voluntarily desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped
by reason of any cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the
subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so
stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated."72

It must be remembered that a felony is frustrated when: 1.] the offender has
performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; 2.] the
felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s
will.73 On the other hand, in an attempted felony: 1.] the offender commits
overt acts to commence the perpetration of the crime; 2.] he is not able to
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; and 3.]
his failure to perform all the acts of execution was due to some cause or
accident other than his spontaneous desistance.74 The distinction between
an attempted and frustrated felony was lucidly differentiated thus in the
leading case of U.S. v. Eduave:75

A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender,

after beginning the commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented,
against his will, by some outside cause from performing all of the acts
which should produce the crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime
the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency
which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he
has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a
consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has
performed all the acts which should result in the consummation of the
crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it cannot be an
attempt. The essential element which distinguishes attempted from
frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or
extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of
crime and the moment when all the acts have been performed which
should result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such
intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of
performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped
short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.

To put it another way, in case of an attempt the offender never passes the
subjective phase of the offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist
by the intervention of outside causes before the subjective phase is
passed.

On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes, the subjective phase is

completely passed. Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted
the offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime,
however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes
independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to
commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to
something beyond his control.
In relation to the foregoing, it bears stressing that intent to kill determines
whether the infliction of injuries should be punished as attempted or
frustrated murder, homicide, parricide or consummated physical
injuries.76 Homicidal intent must be evidenced by acts which at the time of
their execution are unmistakably calculated to produce the death of the
victim by adequate means.77 Suffice it to state that the intent to kill of the
malefactors herein who were armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes
can hardly be doubted given the prevailing facts of the case. It also can not
be denied that the crime is a frustrated felony not an attempted offense
considering that after being stabbed and clubbed twice in the head as a
result of which he lost consciousness and fell, Marlon’s attackers
apparently thought he was already dead and fled.

An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for
review78 and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in
the appealed judgement79 or even reverse the trial court’s decision on the
basis of grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.80 With
the foregoing in mind, we now address the question of the proper penalties
to be imposed.

With regard to the frustrated felony, Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that –

ART. 250. Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder, or homicide. – The

courts, in view of the facts of the case, may impose upon the person guilty
of the frustrated crime of parricide, murder or homicide, defined and
penalized in the preceding articles, a penalty lower by one degree than that
which should be imposed under the provisions of article 50.81
The courts, considering the facts of the case, may likewise reduce by one
degree the penalty which under article 51 should be imposed for an attempt
to commit any of such crimes.

The penalty for Homicide is reclusion temporal82 thus, the penalty one

degree lower would be prision mayor.83 With the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and no mitigating
circumstances, the penalty is to be imposed in its maximum
period.84 Prision mayor in its maximum period ranges from ten (10) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying further the Indeterminate
Sentence Law,85 the minimum of the imposable penalty shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e. prision correccional in its
maximum period which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years.

What now remains to be determined is the propriety of the awards made by

the trial court with regard to the civil aspect of the case for the death of
Jeonito Araque and the injuries sustained by Marlon Araque.

Anent actual or compensatory damages, it bears stressing that only

substantiated and proven expenses or those which appear to have been
genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim
will be recognized by the courts.86 In this case, the expenses incurred for
the wake, funeral and burial of the deceased are substantiated by
receipts.87 The trial court’s award for actual damages for the death of
Jeonito Araque should therefore be affirmed.
In line with current jurisprudence,88 the award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto must also be sustained as it requires no proof other
than the fact of death of the victim and the assailant’s responsibility
therefor.89 The award for moral damages for the pain and sorrow suffered
by the victim’s family in connection with his untimely death must likewise be
affirmed. The award is adequate, reasonable and with sufficient basis
taking into consideration the anguish and suffering of the deceased’s family
particularly his mother who relied solely upon him for support.90 The award
of exemplary damages should likewise be affirmed considering that an
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime.91

The trial court, however, correctly ignored the claim for loss of income or
earning capacity of the deceased for lack of factual basis.1âwphi1 The
estimate given by the deceased’s sister on his alleged income as a ‘pre-
cast’ businessman is not supported by competent evidence like income tax
returns or receipts. It bears emphasizing in this regard that compensation
for lost income is in the nature of damages92 and as such requires due proof
thereof.93 In short, there must be unbiased proof of the deceased’s average
income.94 In this case, the victim’s sister merely gave an oral, self-serving
and hence unreliable statement of her deceased brother’s income.

As for the awards given to Marlon Araque, the award for actual damages
must be affirmed as the same is supported by documentary
evidence.95 With regard to moral and exemplary damages, the same being
distinct from each other require separate determination.96 The award for
moral damages must be struck down as the victim himself did not testify as
to the moral suffering he sustained as a result of the assault on his person.
For lack of competent proof such an award is improper.97 The award for
exemplary damages must, however, be retained considering that under
Article 2230 of the Civil Code, such damages may be imposed "when the
crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."98

Finally, this Court has observed that the trial court did not render judgment
against accused Samson dela Torre, notwithstanding that he was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty to both charges. Under the circumstances, he
should be deemed to have been tried in absentia and, considering the
evidence presented by the prosecution against him, convicted of the crime
charged together with appellant Agapito Listerio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the following

MODIFICATIONS:

1.] the award of P5,000.00 to Marlon Araque by way of moral

damages in Criminal Case No. 91-5843 is DELETED;

2.] Accused-Appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in

Criminal Case No. 91-5843 of Frustrated Homicide and is sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years of Prision
Correccional, as minimum to Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayor, as maximum.

After finality of this Decision, the records shall be remanded to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, which is directed to render judgment based on
the evidence against Samson dela Torre y Esquela.

SO ORDERED.