G.R. No.
94053 March 17, 1993 Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of
the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared
null and void.1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the
Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that
Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead,"2 and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage
annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent
the law on marriage.3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that
he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England
during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards,
Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6)
months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose,
Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15
January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose,
Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the
Cathedral of San Jose.
he obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife
with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while
working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing
him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed
him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then
immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived
in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself
whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that
all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road,
Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet
Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he
inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later
married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family
background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such
information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not
report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine
government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness.
She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire
to return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7
December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished
to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got
used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said
that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given
birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do
so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22
December 1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no
information as to the missing person's present whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October
1988 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, July 6,
1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987)
 this Court hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet
Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her
reappearance.4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial
court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because
respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded
belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that
respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his
absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a
Petition for Review where the following allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's
finding that there existed a well-founded belief on the part
of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's
declaration that the petition was a proper case of the
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family
Code.5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or
not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead."6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of
the Family Code which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code,
which it superseded,7 the following crucial differences emerge. Under
Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry.8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard
than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that
there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee
is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code.9 The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded
belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these
requirements.11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that
respondent failed to prove that he had complied with the third
requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent
spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for
his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded
belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required
in searching for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas
was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good
faith belief that his first wife had already died. The Court held that
defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of
his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries
concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of
whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to
the parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of
Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information
concerning her whereabouts. He admits that he had a
suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that
the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had
been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly
conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-
founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose,
Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the
help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured another
seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of
inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique,
did you exert efforts to inquire the
whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship
and we had a trip to London and I went to
London to look for her I could not find
her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for
Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in
England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know
the geographical difference between London and
Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two
places could mean one — place in England, the port where
his ship docked and where he found Janet. Our own
provincial folks, every time they leave home to visit
relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Parañaque, would
announce to friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila."
This apparent error in naming of places of destination does
not appear to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring
cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as
pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350)
kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like
Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one
particular person there — which is in effect what Nolasco says he did —
can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give
any information as to her personal background even after she had married
respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her.
The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent
to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent
said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion
that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering
that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court
of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence
during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its
nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with
credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious doubts to respondent's
credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely
tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate
with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter
sometime in January 1983, he cut short his employment contract to return
to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9)
months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain,
to November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent,
moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring
about her parents and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to
explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other
authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The
circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's subsequent
behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet
Monica was dead a well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in
its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relationship
for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter
period by virtue of any contract they make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis
supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple
expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and never
to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The
Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled
before the trial court in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the
parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through
existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry
Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail.
Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his
petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied.
The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the
Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and
an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need to
protect.
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family
in the preservation of which the State bas the strongest
interest; the public policy here involved is of the most
fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution there is set forth the following basic state
policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family
life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social
institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family
Code of the Philippines in Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of the
nation, is a basic social institution which
public policy cherishes and protects.
Consequently, family relations are
governed by law and no custom, practice
 or agreement destructive of the family shall
be recognized or given effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief
required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain
the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively
dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February
1990, affirming the trial court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.
Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-5877 September 28, 1954
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant-appellant.
Nestor A. Andrada for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felicisimo R.
Rosete for appellee.
PARAS, C.J.:
The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding him guilty of the crime of
bigamy and sentencing him to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of
from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, with costs.
The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and
Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the
subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema
in the City of Manila. On February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August
19, 1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with Carmencita
Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution
for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941
is null and void and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while
his first marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and
that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot
be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the death of
Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming
that appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt
from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of
said bigamous marriage; and the case of People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz.,
3134, is cited.
The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the Court of
Appeals, is not controlling. Said case is essentially different, because the
defendant therein, Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage
for lack of necessary formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his factual
contention to be without merit.
In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga
Lema was contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita
de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the
appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows: 1âwphïl. nêt
Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with
any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or
the absentee being generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so
contracted being valid in either case until declared null
and void by a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted
by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from
its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is here
no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was
contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been
absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to
render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent
court.1âwphïl .nêt
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de officio so ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes,
J.B.L., JJ., concur.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross
Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001.
Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent
judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia
without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which
is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage
until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity,
petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not
recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia,
a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy. 1âwphi 1. nêt
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for
his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused
her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to
then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño for appropriate
action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required
respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was
requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the
marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all
the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a
difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan
which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo
then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in
Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he
carefully examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When
he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage
license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to
another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of
visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to
solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he
reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who
just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the
necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their
failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia
assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the
afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge
followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties
that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He
attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as
due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28
August 2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that
respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the
want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her
prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She
confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after
reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own
shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia
filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was
stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17
January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a
Certification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly took
place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001
that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties
since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the
latter could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent
judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter
dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed
respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to
the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous
spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation
dated 15 November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing
a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside
his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be
imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority
of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize
marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court. 1âwphi 1. nêt
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs.
Domagtoy,1 respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of
the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance
to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice
or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as
long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However,
judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect
the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the
ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts,
are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more
than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent
in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they
be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in
the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make
mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons."3
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited
to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is
contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may
not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the
marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid
liability for violating the law on marriage.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage

without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara,4 we held that a
marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and
that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even
add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is
the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority
when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent
judge acted in gross ignorance of the law. 1âwphi1.nêt

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance

filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases
that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal
effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the
prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court
personnel, would be undermined.5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do
not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to
depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral
act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Court's constitutional
power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught,
undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity
and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.6

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of

the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined
P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.