G.R. No.

L-14628             September 30, 1960

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.

Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.

F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court of Appeals modifying
that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of
child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant.
Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite,
P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court
rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter
of defendant, and confirming the order  pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through
plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing
defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and
compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further
sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.

On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory
damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.

The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry.
The pertinent facts are:

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial
High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together
and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up
teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the
petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin
on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised
petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was
born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant
married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.

Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain permitted the recovery of
damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code provides:

ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract marriage. No court
shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such promise is sought.

ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a minor with the
concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns
have been published, the one who without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the
other for the expenses which he or she may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.
 The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be brought within one
year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.

Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil.,
866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of
the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the
report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:

Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are not enforced
in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in
said articles but also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that
might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of
moral damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing a marriage
engagement to be broken.1awphîl.nèt

Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I
thereof:

Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.

Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.

Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or guardian, be entered
into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a female between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen years. Without such consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the
basis of a civil action for damages in case of breach of the promise.

Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is not civilly actionable,
even though approved by the parent or guardian.

Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil responsibility of a male for
seduction shall not be affected.

Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be brought.

Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party even though a
minor without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or
guardian may institute the action.

Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and pecuniary losses but
also compensation for mental and moral suffering.

Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the affianced parties,
who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for damages, both material and moral, to the
engaged person who is rejected.

Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall be obliged to return
what he or she has received from the other as gift on account of the promise of the marriage.

These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the report of the
corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:

The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and
in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous
men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of
the American States.

See statutes of:

Florida 1945 — pp. 1342 — 1344

Maryland 1945 — pp. 1759 — 1762
Nevada 1943 — p. 75
Maine 1941 — pp. 140 — 141
New Hampshire 1941 — p. 223
California 1939 — p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 — p. 326
Indiana 1936 — p. 1009
Michigan 1935 — p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450

The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in legislation when it
provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of such causes of action at a
time when so many States, in consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove
to be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)

The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and manifest intent of
our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by
the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:

Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee,

overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she
being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral
damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.

Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs preceding and those
following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the
"seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the
Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that
petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher
and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice
pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even
before they had the benefit of clergy."

The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the support
of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy
and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4)
P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 — consisting of
P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance
representing expenses incurred to support the child — and increased the moral damages to P7,000.00.

With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in
all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-20089      December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.

Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious
endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.

Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:

Dear Bet —

Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.

Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a scandal.

Paquing

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .

PAKING

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before
the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees;
and the costs.

On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new
trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and
their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of
arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the
opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."

On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion
to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with
defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court
granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.

Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but
that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.

Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and
their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances
of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this
Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set
aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an
amicable settlement was being negotiated.

A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly
supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.)
Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid
defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to
fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or
opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros.,
L-15800, December 29, 1960.)

Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage,
because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before
the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the
procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule
33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for
he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First
Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).

In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law.
The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to
marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals  (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs.
Biansay  (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We
pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would
have it so.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which
was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower
girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received
(Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left
a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home
city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to
the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be
adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of
merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and]
oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case,
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with
costs.
G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992

CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 17, 1991 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which affirmed in
toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly, respondent court's
resolution of September 3, 1991 2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the factual findings of
the court below, the evidence of record and the contentions of the parties, it is appropriate that its findings, which
we approve and adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder:

Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered indisputable: On the afternoon of
September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where
they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the
house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as
husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license.

Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.,
together with an unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital
in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. The court a quo, which adopted her
evidence, summarized the same which we paraphrased as follows:

Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified, single and had finished a
college course in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It appears that on September 8,
1973, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while she was walking along Figueras Street,
Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de Dios Canteen to take her snack, defendant,
Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car driven by a male companion. Plaintiff and defendant
Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two weeks before September 8, 1973, they had a quarrel,
and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with plaintiff, so that he invited her to take their
merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila instead of at the San Juan de Dios Canteen,
to which plaintiff obliged, as she believed in his sincerity (t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).

Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat beside the driver while Bunag, Jr. seated
himself by her right side. The car travelled north on its way to the Aristocrat Restaurant but
upon reaching San Juan Street in Pasay City, it turned abruptly to the right, to which plaintiff
protested, but which the duo ignored and instead threatened her not to make any noise as
they were ready to die and would bump the car against the post if she persisted. Frightened
and silenced, the car travelled its course thru F.B. Harrison Boulevard until they reached a
motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged from the car against her will, and amidst her
cries and pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to the joint strength of the two
male combatants because of her natural weakness being a woman and her small stature.
Eventually, she was brought inside the hotel where the defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her
against her will and consent. She could not fight back and repel the attack because after
Bunag, Jr. had forced her to lie down and embraced her, his companion held her two feet,
removed her panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr. threatened her that he would ask his
companion to come back and hold her feet if she did not surrender her womanhood to him,
thus he succeeded in feasting on her virginity. Plaintiff described the pains she felt and how
 blood came out of her private parts after her vagina was penetrated by the penis of the
defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n. pp. 17-24, Nov. 5, 1974).

After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to allow her to go
home but the latter would not consent and stated that he would only let her go after they
were married as he intended to marry her, so much so that she promised not to make any
scandal and to marry him. Thereafter, they took a taxi together after the car that they used
had already gone, and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s grandmother in
Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila where they arrived at 9:30 o'clock in the evening (t.s.n.,
p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10) o'clock that same evening, defendant Conrado Bunag,
Sr., father of Bunag, Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the following day which was a
Monday, she and Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a marriage license, which they
did. They filed their applications for marriage license (Exhibits "A" and "C") and after that
plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the house of Juana de Leon and lived there as
husband and wife from September 8, 1973 to September 29, 1973.

On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating plaintiff
and compelled her to go back to her parents on October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed
when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done against
her by defendants-appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974).

The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto  by her uncle, Vivencio Bansagan who
declared that on September 8, 1973 when plaintiff failed to arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in
the evening, his sister who is the mother of plaintiff asked him to look for her but his efforts
proved futile, and he told his sister that plaintiff might have married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n.,
pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976). However, in the afternoon of the next day (Sunday), his sister told
him that Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by barrio captain Jacinto Manalili of Ligas, Bacoor,
Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and Bunag, Jr. were in Cabrera's house, so that her sister
requested him to go and see the plaintiff, which he did, and at the house of Mrs. Juana de
Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila he met defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told
him, "Pare, the children are here already. Let us settle the matter and have them married."

He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she had already lost her honor, she would bear her
sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father promised they would be married.

Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. abducted and
raped plaintiff-appellant on September 8, 1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. eloped on that date because of the opposition of the latter's father to their relationship.

Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant had earlier made
plans to elope and get married, and this fact was known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito
Rodriguez. The couple made good their plans to elope on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, when
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met plaintiff-appellant and
her officemate named Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The foursome then proceeded to
(the) aforesaid hospital's canteen where they had some snacks. Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to
Quirino Avenue where she could get a ride home, thereby leaving the defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and
plaintiff-appellant alone. According to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., after Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and Lydia
left, he and plaintiff-appellant took a taxi to the Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels where they tried to get a
room, but these were full. They finally got a room at the Holiday Hotel, where defendant-appellant
registered using his real name and residence certificate number. Three hours later, the couple check out of
the hotel and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Piñas, where they stayed until
September 19, 1873. Defendant-appellant claims that bitter disagreements with the plaintiff-appellant over
money and the threats made to his life prompted him to break off their plan to get married.

During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to the house of Juan de Leon and
telling plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned Atty.
 Conrado Adreneda, member of the board of directors of Mandala Corporation, defendant-appellant Bunag,
Jr.'s employer, three times between the evening of September 8, 1973 and September 9, 1973 inquiring as
to the whereabouts of his son. He came to know about his son's whereabouts when he was told of the
couple's elopement late in the afternoon of September 9, 1973 by his mother Candida Gawaran. He likewise
denied having met relatives and emissaries of plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to her marriage to his son. 3

A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein private respondent Zenaida B.
Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner had
forcibly abducted and raped private respondent, the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr.
to pay private respondent P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of
temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado
Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all liability.

Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court's decision disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr. from civil
liability in this case. On the other hand, the Bunags, as defendants-appellants, assigned in their appeal several errors
allegedly committed by trial court, which were summarized by respondent court as follows: (1) in finding that
defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding that
defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag,
Jr.; and (3) in awarding plaintiff-appellant damages for the breach of defendants-appellants' promise of marriage. 5

As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing both appeals
and affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
Bunag, Jr. is before us on a petition for review, contending that (1) respondent court failed to consider vital exhibits,
testimonies and incidents for petitioner's defense, resulting in the misapprehensions of facts and violative of the law
on preparation of judgment; and (2) it erred in the application of the proper law and jurisprudence by holding that
there was forcible abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement and an agreement to marry, and in the award of
excessive damages. 6

Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts failed to take into consideration the
alleged fact that he and private respondent had agreed to marry, and that there was no case of forcible abduction
with rape, but one of simple elopement and agreement to marry. It is averred that the agreement to marry has been
sufficiently proven by the testimonies of the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented in court.

This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented by the parties
and the weight accorded thereto in the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In effect, what
petitioner would want this Court to do is to evaluate and analyze anew the evidence, both testimonial and
documentary, presented before and calibrated by the trial court, and as further meticulously reviewed and discussed
by respondent court.

The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are, therefore, once again constrained to
stress the well-entrenched statutory and jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as
a rule, conclusive upon this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in case law.

Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law
imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that it is not its
function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that
might have been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are
totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 7 Neither does the instant case reveal any feature falling within,
any of the exceptions which under our decisional rules may warrant a review of the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals. On the foregoing considerations and our review of the records, we sustain the holding of respondent court
in favor of private respondent.
Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding
damages.

It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry
has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the
faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry  per se  is not actionable, except where
the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.

However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219
of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the
statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. 10

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent
and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape
criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days,
irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible
transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages,
pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.

Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of a
finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by
private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.

Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if
the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause
thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. 12

In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the
fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private
respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action
did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.

The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the same parties.
Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the
competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the
State must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil
action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al.
vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise
be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and resolution are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision1 of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch
38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of
whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges
in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the
Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she
accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end
of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner
forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week
before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened
to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of
the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in
Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the
amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and
costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as
Civil Case No. 16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in
the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He
thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but
only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and
passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily
dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation,
he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.

After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated
facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
 1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant
is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since
September 1, 1987 up to the present;

2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of
Medicine, second year medicine proper;

3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City
since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;

4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette,
Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's
fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant.

1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00)
pesos as moral damages.

2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00)
pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the
costs.

3. All other claims are denied.6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were
lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made
some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g)
such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of
morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and
reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private
respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a
boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage
on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their
intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant
with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion,
defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the
semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted
him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to
stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When
plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
 defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's
hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning
that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in
relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus.
Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her
until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City.
That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a
lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her
godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still
convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was
already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-
trial, is that defendant is still single.

Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire
to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the
reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to
the forthcoming wedding. 8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R.
CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual
and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto  the trial court's
ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following
analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at
the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior
to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the
lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly
would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the
defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must
have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant,
for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so
(sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe,
therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the
restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn
May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to
plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left
Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown
in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them? And this
special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the
restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also
knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's
proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).

Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must
think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that
when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came
to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he
also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did
to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to
 love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his
lust on her. 11

and then concluded:

In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue
and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep
said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good
customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women,
coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking
advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant
should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the
moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its
decision in this case. 12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single
issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury
or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He
stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or
tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim
to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses
good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had
been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private
respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the
private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that
even if it was to be assumed arguendo  that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also
promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere
breach of promise is not actionable. 14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed
his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear
that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this
jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter
court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner
of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or values which could alter the result of the case.

Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari  under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by
the parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina
vs.  Asistio, Jr.,  16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
 xxx xxx xxx

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap.
30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v.
Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9)
When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v.
Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.

And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry  per se  is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set
forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:

The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has
been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in
the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse
by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of
rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts
or quasi-delict  in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by
positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims
of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the
Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil
Code the following rule:

Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of
age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable
 moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed article,
she and her parents would have such a right of action.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to
provide for specifically in the statutes. 21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict  thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict  and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known
in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts  is an Anglo-American or
common law concept. Torts  is much broader than culpa aquiliana  because it includes not only negligence,
but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the
general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the
New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised
Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been
beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20
of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much
more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress,
proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with
him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception
on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in
its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either
Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs.  Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of
damages to the woman because:

. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally  guilty of seduction, not only because he
is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36)
years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but,
also, because the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind"  him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs.  Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral
seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The
following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:

The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is
seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the
part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs.
Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or

inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement.
If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire,
there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to
depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and
wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her
person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer
(27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or

deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient
to warrant a recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a
recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and
would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift
to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)

xxx xxx xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant,
with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise.
Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of
action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
complaint. 27

In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court,
opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered:

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
(Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil.
 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the
CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that
there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the
other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has
intervened). . . .

together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding presentations
(See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs.  Marcos,  30 still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation
of the present article31 in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there
was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the
sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or
influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said
that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.

But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court,
however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the
circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute
deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a
resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law
and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.

We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake,
that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both
parties are in  pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra
vs.  Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as
stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily
because of her own doing, 33 for:

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take
notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress
(TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give
her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18,
1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by
the petitioner. 34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending,
if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning,
he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not
have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and
would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of
ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional
respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The  pari delicto  rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been
impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust,
but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for
as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore,
in  pari delicto  with the petitioner. Pari delicto  means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in
legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been
brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original
wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs.  Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against
the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only
where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is
literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones
the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their
house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters
and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44190 October 30, 1980

MANILA GAS CORPORATION, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISIDRO M. ONGSIP, respondents-appellees.

MAKASIAR, J.:

This petition for certiorari treated as a special civil action seeks to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 50956-R dated July 6, 1976 affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch VII
in Civil Case No. 3019-P dated May 2,1972.

Manila Gas Corporation, the petitioner herein, is a public utility company duly authorized to conduct and operate the
gainful business of servicing and supplying gas in the City of Manila and its suburbs for public necessity and
convenience while private respondent, Isidro M. Ongsip, is a businessman holding responsible positions in a number
of business firms and associations in the Philippines.

On May 20, 1964, respondent Ongsip applied for gas service connection with petitioner Manila Gas Corporation. A 1
x 4 burner gas was installed by petitioner's employees in respondent's kitchen at his residence at 2685 Park Avenue,
Pasay City.

On July 27, 1965, respondent Ongsip requested petitioner to install additional appliances as well as additional gas
service connections in his 46-door Reyno Apartment located also in the same compound. In compliance with said
request, petitioner installed two 20-gallon capacity water storage heaters and two heavy-duty gas burners and
replaced the original gas meter with a bigger 50-light capacity gas meter. The installations and connections were all
done solely by petitioner's employees. There was no significant change in the meter reading despite additional
installations.

In May and June of 1966 no gas consumption was registered in the meter, prompting petitioner to issue a 'meter
order' with instructions to change the gas meter in respondent's residence.

On August 17, 1966, at around 1 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner's employee led by Mariano Coronal, the then
Chief of the Distribution Department, went to Ongsip's place. After Identifying themselves to the houseboy therein
that they are from the Manila Gas Corporation, but without notifying or informing respondent Ongsip, they changed
the gas meter and installed new tube connections. At the time the work was being undertaken, private respondent
was taking a nap but he was informed afterwards of what had taken place by his houseboy.

On that same afternoon, at about 5 o'clock, petitioner's employees returned with a photographer who took pictures
of the premises. Respondent Ongsip inquired from Coronel why they were taking pictures but the latter simply gave
him a calling card with instructions to go to his (Coronel's) office. There, he was informed about the existence of a
by-pass valve or "jumper" in the gas connection and that unless he gave Coronel P3,000.00, he would be deported.
Respondent Ongsip refused to give the money, saying that he was not afraid as he had committed no wrong and that
he could not be deported because he is already a Filipino citizen.By the end of August, a reading was made on the
new meter and expectedly, it registered a sudden increase in gas consumption.

Thereafter, in October, 1966, a complaint for qualified theft was filed by petitioner against respondent Ongsip in the
Pasay City Fiscal's Office docketed as I.S. No. 51441 (p. 3, Folder of Exhibits)

In February, 1967, pending investigation of the criminal complaint, petitioner disconnected respondent's gas service
for alleged failure and/or refusal to pay his gas consumptions from July, 1965 to January, 1967 in violation of
petitioner's regulation agreed upon in the 'Application for Gas Service' which states that:

xxx xxx xxx

(8) The Corporation is authorized to discontinue service to the customer for any of the following reasons:

After 72 hours' notice in writing for

a) violation of the conditions herein set forth;

b) Non-payment of bills overdue;

xx xx (p. 1, Folder of Exhibits).

Subsequently, the complaint was dismissed by the city fiscal of Pasay City in a resolution dated May 29, 1967, on the
ground that —

. . there is no evidence to establish the fact that there is an illegal installation or jumper in the
premises of Isidro Ongsip and this is sustained by the fact that the prosecution witnesses did not
attempt to excavate the premises of Isidro Ongsip in order to determine with certainty that there is
an illegal installation. Without excavating the premises of Isidro Ongsip it is impossible to conclude
with reasonable certainty that there is a jumper or illegal installation because illegal installation or
jumper must not only proceed from an assumption but must be based from actual facts as proved
(pp. 4-6 Folder of Exhibits).

On July 14, 1967, following the dismissal by the investigating fiscal of the complaint for qualified theft and the
disconnection by petitioner of his gas service, respondent Ongsip filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasay City Branch VII for moral and exemplary damages against petitioner Manila Gas Corporation based on
two causes of action, firstly: the malicious, oppressive and malevolent filing of the criminal complaint as a result of
which "plaintiff has suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, social humiliation, ridicule, embarrassment and
degradation in the eyes of his business associates, friends, relatives and the general public"; and, secondly: the illegal
closure of respondent Ongsip's gas service connection without court order and without notice of warning purely "to
further harass, humiliate and ridicule plaintiff, thereby again exposing unjustly, cruelly and oppressively the plaintiff,
as well as his family, to social humiliation and degradation, to public contempt and ridicule, to personal discredit and
dishonor and thus causing the plaintiff plaintiff and the members of his family irreparable injuries consisting of
business and social humiliation, personal dishonor, mental anguish, serious anxieties, wounded feelings and
besmirched reputation". In addition to attorney's fees and costs of litigation, respondent Ongsip likewise prayed that
"pending final determination of the case that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction forthwith issue,
commanding the defendant corporation, its agents and employees to reconnect the gas service and supply at the
residence and apartment of plaintiff at 2685 Park Avenue, Pasay City" (pp. 1-11, ROA).

On July 19, 1967, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging the complaint states no valid cause of action.
Respondent Ongsip filed an opposition thereto (pp. 12-24, ROA).

On August 11, 1967, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss (pp. 24-25, ROA).

Consequently, on September 8, 1967, petitioner filed its answer stating that the filing of the criminal complaint in
the Pasay City Fiscal's Office which was made the basis of the first cause of action was precipitated by the discovery
of an illegal by-pas tube or "jumper" in the kitchen cabinet and immediately below the gas burners in respondent's
residence. With respect to the second cause of action, petitioner stated that the cutting-off or the disconnection of
private respondent's gas service was on account of the latter's failure to settle and pay outstanding and due
payments representing gas consumptions from July, 1965 to January, 1967. In both instances, according to
petitioner, there was no intent to threaten, ridicule, embarrass or humiliate respondent Ongsip. A counterclaim for
actual or compensatory damages and exemplary damages was interposed therein (pp. 24-31, ROA).

In the meantime, the court had issued an order dated September 6, 1967 granting the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction as prayed for in the complaint for damages upon respondent Ongsip's filing of a bond in the amount of
P10,000.00 (pp. 33-34, ROA).

On May 2, 1972, the trial court rendered its decision

(a) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff:

(1) P50,000.00 as moral damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION;

(2) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION;

(3) P30,000.00 as moral damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION;

(4) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION;

(5) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

(6) the costs of the suit; AND

(b) Dismissing the defendant's counterclaim [pp. 44-76, ROA].

Within the reglementary period, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning two errors, to wit:

The lower court erred in concluding that the filing of the criminal complaint was motivated purely 'to
harass, threaten and ridicule' plaintiff despite clear and convincing evidence showing the actual
existence of a gas jumper by-pass in plaintiff's establishment.

The lower court erred in concluding without basis and findings of facts that the closure of plaintiff's
gas service was arrogant and abusive despite provision of a contract to the contrary (p. 7, Brief for
Defendant-Appellant).

On July 6, 1976, the said Court rendered its decision, pertinent portions of which are quoted hereinbelow:

We are inclined to concur with the court a quo that the existence of a 'jumper' was merely a
presumption on the part of Coronel. Indeed the discrepancy or fluctuation in the gas consumption in
appellee's place could very well be attributed to many factors, such as a defective meter or a
reduction in the use of the appliances on the premises considering that the restaurant/hotel
business is transient. Neither can appellant attribute any defect in the installation of the appliances
to the appellee as the installation was undertaken by the former's employees (T.S.N. pp. 12-13,
December 17, 1968). Similarly, the gas meter was installed by defendant corporation, so that when a
report was made that the original meter was defective, a new one was installed (T.S.N., pp. 27-28,
December 1, 1970).

Again, according to the testimony of Delfin Custodia, mechanical engineer of defendant-appellant,

the second meter that was installed on August 11, 1966 was replaced as being defective because
'some of its parts were worn out and that it was not properly registering,' (T.S.N., pp. 14-15,
December 2, 1970). Therefore, rather than impute the fluctuation in gas consumption to a 'jumper'
in the service connection, it would be more in keeping with the circumstance of the case to attribute
this to the faulty meter installed by defendant-appellant. Indeed, from the evidence for the
appellant itself that the old installation was embedded in the cement wall (which was later changed
by appellant to exposed pipes; t.s.n. p. 55, March 3, 1971). We are of the belief that it was unlikely
for the appellee to install a 'jumper' in the cement wall, a conclusion which bears support in the
report of the City Fiscal, Pasay City that 'Isidro Ongsip was agreeable to have his place excavated and
demolished provided that if there is no illegal installation or jumper found in the premises, the
Manila Gas Corporation should answer for whatever damages that may be incurred in connection
with its excavation of the premises "which offer was declined by appellant, indicating that it was not
certain as to the existence of such jumper (Resolution, Exhibit 'D'). In the light of the foregoing,
appellant's first assigmment of error must necessarily fail.

Anent the second assignment of error, it appears that the gas service to appellee's compound was
disconnected on the basis of non-payment of three-months bills, which were admittedly computed
 only on the average consumption registered, without benefit of meter reading (T.s.n. p. 13, April 30,
1971), and without previous notice of disconnection or reminder to pay (T.s.n. pp. 44-45, Id., p. 30,
May 18, 1971).

Considering that the availability of the gas service was of utmost importance to appellee in the
pursuit of his business venture (hotel-motel restaurant), it is not difficult to foresee the losses that
the business must have incurred as a consequence of appellant's unwarranted and arbitrary act. It
may not be amiss to take note at his juncture that in assessing the damages in favor of appellee, the
court a quo did not award him actual damages, but merely moral and exemplary damages plus
attorney's fees pursuant to Articles 2208 paragraphs (1) and (11); Articles 2217, 2219 paragraph (8)
and 2229 of the New Civil Code. And, considering further the provisions of Article 2216 of said Code:

No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral nominal, temperate,

liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated. Theassessment of such
damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the Court, according to
the circumstances of each case;

which is amply supported by the evidence on record, taking into consideration appellee's standing in
the community, WE find that the award must be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto, it being in accordance with the
law and evidence adduced during the trial. Costs against appellant (pp. 75-85, rec.).

Hence, on September 1, 1976, Manila Gas Corporation filed a petition for review by way of appeal to this Court
based on the following grounds, to wit:

I. The derision is not supported by the facts and the evidence. Rather, the decision is
belied and rebuked by the clear and overwhelming evidence.

A. The finding that witness Mariano Coronel is an unreliable witness is totally

unsupported by any evidence.

B. The filing of the criminal complaint against Ongsip was not actuated by malice on
the part of petitioner.

C. The filing of the criminal complaint against respondent Ongsip was based on
probable cause.

D. The closure of Ongsip's gas service was made after due notice to pay his back
accounts was given and after a warning of disconnection.

II. The decision of respondent court is contrary to settled jurisprudence enunciated

by this Honorable Supreme Court and is unsupported by any evidence.

A. Advice of counsel is a complete defense against a suit for malicious prosecution.

III. The decision of respondent court on the Second Cause of Action of respondent
Ongsip is based on a misapprehension of facts.

IV. Under the facts and the law, petitioner is not liable for moral and exemplary
damages.

V. Assuming arguendo that the petitioner is liable for moral and exemplary damages,

the amount awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals are
grossly, exorbitant as to call for a review thereof" (pp. 22-23, rec.).
On December 13, 1976, this Court, after considerating the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition
for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, private respondent's comment thereon as well as
petitioner's reply to said comment, resolved to GIVE LIMITED DUE COURSE to the petition as to whether or not the
damages awarded by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals per its decision of July 6, 1976 are excessive
and should be reduced and to TREAT the petition for review as a special civil action.

WE are thus constricted to a single issue in this case: whether or not the amount of moral and exemplary damages
awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of appeals is excessive.

Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that "moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission." On the other hand, Article 2229 provides that "exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition, to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages" (emphasis supplied).

The first cause of action, for which respondent Ongsip was awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 and P10,000.00, respectively, is predicated on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states that "moral
damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: .. . (8) malicious prosecution; .. .

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a siniter design to
vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false
and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one
liable for malicious prosecution. (Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA 65 [March 16, 1976]; Ramos vs. Ramos, 61 SCRA 284
[December 3, 19741]; Solis & Yarisantos vs. Salvador, 14 SCRA 887] [August 14, 1965]; Buenaventura, et al. vs. Sto.
Domingo, et al., 103 Phil. 239 [1958]; Barreto vs. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771 [1956]).

In the instant case, however, there is reason to believe that there was malicious intent in the filing of the complaint
for qualified theft. This intent is traceable to that early afternoon of August 17, 1966, when petitioner's employees,
upon being ordered, came to private respondent's residence and changed the defective gas meter and tube
connections without notice. In other words, respondent Ongsip had no opportunity to observe the works.
Nonetheless, if indeed he had installed an illegal by-pass tube or jumper, he could have easily asked for its
immediate removal soon after his houseboy told him what petitioner's employees did. As established by the facts, he
had not even attempted to refuse entrance to petitioner's employees headed by Mariano Coronel nor to question
their authority upon their return later that same afternoon with a photographer. Little did he realize that the
pictures of the premises that were being taken would be used as evidence against him. Surprisingly, when
respondent Ongsip asked Coronel why they were taking pictures, Coronel just gave him a calling card and instructed
him to go to his office. It was quite an unusual gesture. Obviously, Coronel had something in mind. As correctly
observed by the trial court in its decision—

A significant fact brought about by the testimony of Coronel himself is the total absence of
immediate accusation against Plaintiff right at the very moment when the by-pass valve was
allegedly discovered. Right then and there Coronel should have told Plaintiff that he was using a by-
pass valve and in effect stealing gas from Defendant. There would have been nothing wrong with
that. The circumstance was familiar to that of catching a thief in flagrante delicto. But the truth is
that when Coronel and his men entered Plaintiff's compound and made changes therein, Plaintiff
was sleeping. He had no knowledge of what was then going on. Coronel and his men told the 'boy' of
Plaintiff that the changes were being made so that the consumption of gas could be decreased. So
that when Plaintiff woke up at four o'clock in the afternoon, Coronel and his men had already made
the changes and had already gone. They returned however at five o'clock, this time with a
photographer. This was the time when Plaintiff met Coronel. Here was then the opportunity for
Coronel to confront Plaintiff with the allegedly discovered 'by-pass valve' and bluntly, even brutally,
tell him that there was thievery of gas. This, Coronel did not do. .. .. ."

It bears noting that when he was informed as to the existence of a 'jumper' in his gas connection, respondent Ongsip
did not show any sign of fear or remorse and did not yield to the threatening demand of Coronel. Experience tells us
that this is not the attitude of a guilty person. On the contrary, this is the attitude of someone who knows how to
take a firm stand where his principles and rights are concerned. To prove his innocence, he was even willing to have
his place excavated but petitioner would not dare take the consequences. Besides, Delfin Custodio, petitioner's own
mechanical engineer, testified that the second gas meter was replaced as being defective because "some of its parts
were worn out and that it was not properly registering."

Evidently, petitioner Manila Gas Corporation, in failing to recover its lost revenue caused by the gas meter's incorrect
recording, sought to vindicate its financial loss by filing the complaint for qualified theft against respondent Ongsip
knowing it to be false. It was actually intended to vex and humiliate private respondent and to blacken his reputation
not only as a businessman but also as a person. Qualified theft is a serious offense indicating moral depravity in an
individual. To be accused of such crime without basis is shocking and libelous. It stigmatized private respondent
causing him emotional depression and social degradation. Petitioner should have realized that what is believed to be
a vindication of a proprietary right is no justification for subjecting one's name to indignity and dishonor. One can
thus imagine the anguish, anxiety, shock and humiliation suffered by respondent Ongsip. The fact that the complaint
for qualified theft was dismissed by the Pasay City fiscal is no consolation. The damage had been done. Necessarily,
indemnification had to be made.

The trial court awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.

WE give due consideration to respondent Ongsip's social and financial status as a businessman and the mental
anguish he suffered as a result of the false imputation. However, We also consider petitioner's financial capability.
Petitioner is a public utility corporation whose primary concern is service to the people, the profit motive being
merely secondary. Under the circumstances, We are of the opinion that the award of moral and exemplary damages
should be reduced to P25,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively. This award is sanctioned by Article 2234 of the Civil
Code which states that:

When the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question
of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.  In case liquidated damages have been
agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be
recovered nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in
addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages
(emphasis supplied).

On the second cause of action which is based on the illegal disconnection of respondent Ongsip's gas service
constituting breach of contract, the trial court awarded P30,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

Petitioner contends that the disconnection was on account of respondent Ongsip's failure to pay his gas
consumptions for more than three months. While private respondent admits having accounts with petitioner, he
denies having been notified thereof or having received any warning of the disconnection In determining the
propriety of the award, it is material to establish that prior notice or warning had been given to respondent Ongsip
before the gas service was disconnected, in accordance with the terms of the contract. In this regard, We find the
trial court's observation in its decision to be well-founded, to quote:

Defendant would insist that the household helpers inside Plaintiff's premises refused to receive
notices or to sign them. Defendant has not given the Court any plausible reason why these persons
would refuse to receive, or sign for, notices of demands for payments or warnings of threatened
disconnection of the service. The very evidence of Defendants indicates that Plaintiff had long been a
customer of Defendant. Plaintiff has been paying his bills. Plaintiff had not suffered any financial
reverses. As a matter of fact, upon the suggestion of the Court, Plaintiff readily made payment of his
count with Defendant. He made payment not because the service would be restored. When he
made the payment the Court had already issued a mandatory preliminary injunction, ordering
Defendant to restore gas service in the premises of Plaintiff. Plaintiff made the payment to comply
 with the suggestion of the Court because the Court rather than enforce its order, would like the
parties to settle the case amicably.

What is peculiar in the stand of Defendant is that while it would insist on the giving of notices and
warnings, it did not have any competent and sufficient evidence to prove the Same. Demands in
open were made by Plaintiff counsel whether Defendant could show any written evidence showing
that notices and warnings were sent to Plaintiff. Not a single piece of evidence was produced.
Normally, if a notice is refused, then the original and its copies would still be in the hands of the
public utility concerned. In the instant case, it has to be repeated, not a single copy, original or
duplicate, triplicate, etc. of any notice to pay or warning of disconnection was produced in court. The
court cannot believe that Defendant, as what the testimonies of its witnesses would like to impress
upon this Court, conducts its business that way. Defendant is a big business concern and it cannot be
said that it treats its business as a joke. Its personnel should realize this, for only with such an
awareness can they respond faithfully to their responsibilities as members of a big business
enterprise imbued with public interest over which the Philippine Government is concerned.

Quite obviously, petitioner's act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior notice constitutes
breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to
cause additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil
Code which provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages." This is reiterated by paragraph 10 of
Article 2219 of the Code. Moreover, the award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides that
"willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith" (emphasis suplied).

WE are not unmindful of the fact that at the time the gas service was disconnected, respondent Ongsip admitted
having been in default of at least three months' bills. WE have established however that no notice to that effect has
been served on him. It must be pointed out that respondent Ongsip is an old man involved in a number of business
and social undertakings. It is quite natural and understandable that at times he forgets some minor obligations and
details of his concern. This is the time when reminders and friendly notices become indispensable. The rudiments of
procedural due proccess dictate that he should have been notified of any back accounts. In the past, respondent
Ongsip had not been remiss in the payment of his bills. Petitioner should have at least accorded him the courtesy, if
not the right, as per contract, of being notified before effecting disconnection so that he could take steps or initiate
measures to avoid such embarrassment. Apparently, such misconduct or omission on the part of petitioner formed
part of a malevolent scheme to harass and humiliate private respondent, exposing him to further ignominy and
greater mental torture. Respondent Ongsip's default in payment cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat or nullify
the claim for damages. At most, this circumstance can be considered as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the
amount of damages to which respondent Ongsip is entitled. In consequence thereof, We reduce the amount of
moral damages to P15,000.00 The award of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, on the other hand, is sustained, being
similarly warranted by Article 2234 of the Civil Code aforequoted as complemented by Article 2220.

The award of attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 is justified under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, PETITIONER MANILA GAS CORPORATION IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY

(1) RESPONDENT ISIDRO M. ONGSIP P25,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AND

P5,000.00 AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION, P15,000.00
AS MORAL DAMAGES AND P5,000.00 AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR THE SECOND
CAUSE OF ACTION, AND P10,000.00 AS ATTORNEY'S FEES; AND

(2) THE COSTS.

MODIFIED AS ABOVE STATED, THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL
OTHER RESPECTS.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151866             September 9, 2004

SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner,
vs.
LEONORA A. VALMONTE, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Assailed in the instant petition for review is the Decision  of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
69537,1 promulgated on 17 January 2002.2 The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision denying
respondent’s claim for damages against petitioner and ordered the latter to pay moral damages to the former in the
amount of P100,000.00.

Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her services
for their church wedding on 10 October 1996. At about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel
where the bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons were already there
including the bride, the bride’s parents and relatives, the make-up artist and his assistant, the official photographers,
and the fashion designer. Among those present was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was
preparing to dress up for the occasion.

After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the
gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held. She
paid the suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the band, and went back to the suite. Upon entering the suite,
Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following
words to Valmonte: "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang
and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha."  Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte’s bag.  It
turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry
which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. The jewelry pieces consist of two (2) diamond
rings, one (1) set of diamond earrings, bracelet and necklace with a total value of about one million pesos. The hotel
security was called in to help in the search. The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room were
searched. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the
evening. Later, police officers arrived and interviewed all persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted
them including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by the police officers, petitioner kept
on saying the words "Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto." Valmonte’s car which was parked at the hotel premises was
also searched but the search yielded nothing.

A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which
she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds’ relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of
petitioner’s imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus, on 20 February 1997, Valmonte
filed a suit for damages against her before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 268. In her complaint,
Valmonte prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.

Responding to the complaint, petitioner denied having uttered words or done any act to confront or single out
Valmonte during the investigation and claimed that everything that transpired after the theft incident was purely a
police matter in which she had no participation. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the
court to adjudge Valmonte liable on her counterclaim.

The trial court rendered its Decision on 21 August 2000, dismissing Valmonte’s complaint for damages. It ruled that
when petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was merely exercising her right and if damage
results from a person exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. It added that no proof was presented by
Valmonte to show that petitioner acted maliciously and in bad faith in pointing to her as the culprit. The court said
that Valmonte failed to show that she suffered serious anxiety, moral shock, social humiliation, or that her
reputation was besmirched due to petitioner’s wrongful act.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court erred in finding that petitioner did not
slander her good name and reputation and in disregarding the evidence she presented.

The Court of Appeals ruled differently. It opined that Valmonte has clearly established that she was singled out by
petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. It cited the testimony of Serena Manding, corroborating
Valmonte’s claim that petitioner confronted her and uttered words to the effect that she was the only one who went
out of the room and that she was the one who took the jewelry. The appellate court held that Valmonte’s claim for
damages is not predicated on the fact that she was subjected to body search and interrogation by the police but
rather petitioner’s act of publicly accusing her of taking the missing jewelry. It categorized petitioner’s utterance
defamatory considering that it imputed upon Valmonte the crime of theft. The court concluded that petitioner’s
verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and in bad faith since it was made in the presence of many
people without any solid proof except petitioner’s suspicion. Such unfounded accusation entitles Valmonte to an
award of moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 for she was publicly humiliated, deeply insulted, and
embarrassed. However, the court found no sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual damages.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the appellate court’s conclusion that she publicly humiliated respondent does not conform
to the evidence presented. She adds that even on the assumption that she uttered the words complained of, it was
not shown that she did so with malice and in bad faith.

In essence, petitioner would want this Court to review the factual conclusions reached by the appellate court. The
cardinal rule adhered to in this jurisdiction is that a petition for review must raise only questions of law,3 and judicial
review under Rule 45 does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of evidence unless there is a showing that
the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion.4 This Court, while not a trier of facts, may review the evidence in order to
arrive at the correct factual conclusion based on the record especially so when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are at variance with those of the trial court, or when the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals from the
facts is manifestly mistaken.5

Contrary to the trial court’s finding, we find sufficient evidence on record tending to prove that petitioner’s
imputations against respondent was made with malice and in bad faith.

Petitioner’s testimony was shorn of substance and consists mainly of denials. She claimed not to have uttered the
words imputing the crime of theft to respondent or to have mentioned the latter’s name to the authorities as the
one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.6

Respondent, however, has successfully refuted petitioner’s testimony. Quite credibly, she has narrated in great
detail her distressing experience on that fateful day. She testified as to how rudely she was treated by petitioner
right after she returned to the room. Petitioner immediately confronted her and uttered the words "Ikaw lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto. Nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw ang kumuha." Thereafter, her body was
searched including her bag and her car. Worse, during the reception, she was once more asked by the hotel security
to go to the ladies room and she was again bodily searched.7

Sereña Manding, a make-up artist, corroborated respondent’s testimony. She testified that petitioner confronted
respondent in the presence of all the people inside the suite accusing her of being the only one who went out of the
comfort room before the loss of the jewelry. Manding added that respondent was embarrassed because everybody
else in the room thought she was a thief.8 If only to debunk petitioner’s assertion that she did not utter the
accusatory remarks in question publicly and with malice, Manding’s testimony on the point deserves to be
reproduced. Thus,

Q After that what did she do?

A Then Leo came out from the other room she said, she is (sic) the one I only saw from the comfort room.
Q Now, what exact word (sic) were said by Mrs. Carpio on that matter?

A She said "siya lang yung nakita kong galing sa C.R."

Q And who was Mrs. Carpio or the defendant referring to?

A Leo Valmonte.

Q Did she say anything else, the defendant?

A Her jewelry were lost and Leo was the only one she saw in the C.R. After that she get (sic) the paper bag
then the jewelry were already gone.

Q Did she confront the plaintiff Mrs. Valmonte regarding that fact?

A Yes.

Q What did the defendant Mrs. Carpio tell the plaintiff, Mrs. Valmonte?

A "Ikaw yung nakita ko sa C.R. nawawala yung alahas ko."

Q When the defendant Mrs. Carpio said that to plaintiff Mrs. Valmonte were there other people inside the
room?

A Yes, sir.

Q Were they able to hear what Mrs. Carpio said to Mrs. Valmonte?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was your thinking at that time that Mrs. Carpio said that to Mrs. Valmonte?

A "Nakakahiya kasi akala ng iba doon na talagang magnanakaw siya. Kasi marami na kaming nandodoon,
dumating na yung couturier pati yung video man and we sir.

Q Who was the person you [were] alleging "na nakakahiya" whose (sic) being accused or being somebody
who stole those item of jewelry?

A "Nakakahiya para kay Leo kasi pinagbibintangan siya. Sa dami namin doon siya yung napagbintangan."

Q And who is Leo, what is her full name?

A Leo Valmonte.

Q Did the defendant tell this matter to other people inside the room?

A Yes, the mother of the bride.

Q And who else did she talk to?

A The father of the bride also.

Q And what did the defendant tell the mother regarding this matter?

A "Nawawala yung alahas ko." Sabi naman nung mother baka naman hindi mo dala tignan mo munang
mabuti.
 Q Who was that other person that she talked to?

A Father of the bride.9

Significantly, petitioner’s counsel elected not to pursue her cross-examination of the witness on this point following
her terse and firm declaration that she remembered petitioner’s exact defamatory words in answer to the counsel’s
question.10

Jaime Papio, Security Supervisor at Manila Hotel, likewise contradicted petitioner’s allegation that she did not
suspect or mention the name of respondent as her suspect in the loss of the jewelry.11

To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong inflicted by the defendant, and
the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not
constitute a cause of action.12

In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or
negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained.
Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are designed
to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides
for human conduct.13 First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights"
under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith."  To find the
existence of an abuse of right, the following elements must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another.14 When a right is exercised in a
manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor
can be held accountable.15 One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary
prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs. Thus, a person should be protected only
when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith; but not when
he acts with negligence or abuse.16

Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which read,
thus:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals or
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage
whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision, or an act which though not constituting a
transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.

In the case at bar, petitioner’s verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her
own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag.17 This being the
case, she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly
accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the
jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner
virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor,
but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act
which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a
manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot
justify her acts toward respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other
purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.
Owing to the rule that great weight and even finality is given to factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which
affirm those of the trial court,18 we sustain the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that respondent’s
claim for actual damages has not been substantiated with satisfactory evidence during the trial and must therefore
be denied. To be recoverable, actual damages must be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty and the
courts cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork.19

Respondent, however, is clearly entitled to an award of moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded whenever
the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury20 in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.21 Though no proof of
pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be adjudicated, courts are mandated to take into
account all the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to their discretion.22 Worthy of
note is that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant,23 or to enrich a complainant, but to enable
the latter to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of defendant’s culpable action. In any case, award of moral damages must be proportionate to
the sufferings inflicted.24

Based on the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, we rule that the appellate court did not err in awarding
moral damages. Considering respondent’s social standing, and the fact that her profession is based primarily on trust
reposed in her by her clients, the seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner has greatly tarnished her
reputation and will in one way or the other, affect her future dealings with her clients, the award of ₱100,000.00 as
moral damages appears to be a fair and reasonable assessment of respondent’s damages.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152411             September 29, 2004

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
44209, as well as its Resolution2 denying the petitioner’s motion for the reconsideration thereof. Themo1 mo2 Court of
Appeals set aside the Decision3 of Branch 150 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which dismissed the
complaint of the respondent against the petitioner for sum of money and damages.

The Facts of the Case

Sometime in 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to construct an integrated system of research
organization known as the Research Complex. As part of the project, laboratory equipment and furniture were
purchased for the National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baños.
Providentially, the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF) came forward and agreed to fund the acquisition of the
laboratory furniture, including the fabrication thereof.

Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the go-signal to BIOTECH to contact a corporation to
accomplish the project. On July 23, 1982, Dr. William Padolina, the Executive Deputy Director of BIOTECH, arranged
for Philippine Laboratory Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to fabricate the laboratory furniture and deliver the same to
BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building Project, for the account of the FEMF. Lirio directed Padolina to give the go-signal
to PHILAB to proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture, and requested Padolina to forward the
contract of the project to FEMF for its approval.

On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the issuance of the purchase order and downpayment for
the office and laboratory furniture for the project, thus:

1. Supply and Installation of Laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project
Amount : P2,934,068.90
Supplier : Philippine Laboratory Furniture Co.,
College, Laguna
Attention : Mr. Hector C. Navasero
President
Downpayment : 40% or ₱1,173,627.56
2. Fabrication and Supply of office furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project
Amount : P573,375.00
Supplier : Trans-Oriental Woodworks, Inc.
1st Avenue, Bagumbayan Tanyag, Taguig, Metro Manila
Downpayment : 50% or ₱286,687.504

Padolina assured Lirio that the contract would be prepared as soon as possible before the issuance of the purchase
orders and the downpayment for the goods, and would be transmitted to the FEMF as soon as possible.

In a Letter dated July 23, 1982, Padolina informed Hector Navasero, the President of PHILAB, to proceed with the
fabrication of the laboratory furniture, per the directive of FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio. Padolina also requested
for copies of the shop drawings and a sample contract5 for the project, and that such contract and drawings had to
be finalized before the down payment could be remitted to the PHILAB the following week. However, PHILAB failed
to forward any sample contract.

Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and laboratory furniture to BIOTECH after having been duly
inspected by their representatives and FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio.

On August 24, 1982, FEMF remitted ₱600,000 to PHILAB as downpayment for the laboratory furniture for the
BIOTECH project, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 253 to FEMF. On October 22, 1982, FEMF made
another partial payment of ₱800,000 to PHILAB, for which the latter issued Official Receipt No. 256 to FEMF. The
remittances were in the form of checks drawn by FEMF and delivered to PHILAB, through Padolina.

On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the Chancellor of UP Los Baños and FEMF, represented by its
Executive Officer, Rolando Gapud, executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant
financial support and donate sums of money to UP for the construction of buildings, installation of laboratory and
other capitalization for the project, not to exceed ₱29,000,000.00. The obligations of FEMF under the MOA are the
following:

ARTICLE II

OBLIGATIONS OF THE FOUNDATION

2.1. The FOUNDATION, in carrying out its principal objectives of promoting philantrophic and scientific
projects through financial support to such projects that will contribute to the country’s economic
development, shall grant such financial support and donate such sums of money to the RESEARCH COMPLEX
as may be necessary for the construction of buildings, installation of laboratories, setting up of offices and
physical plants and facilities and other capital investment of the RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its
component Research Institutes not to exceed ₱29 Million. For this purpose, the FOUNDATION shall:

(a) Acquire and donate to the UNIVERSITY the site for the RESEARCH COMPLEX; and

(b) Donate or cause to be donated to the UNIVERSITY the sum of TWENTY-NINE MILLION PESOS
(₱29,000,000.00) for the construction of the buildings of the National Institutes of Biotechnology
and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) and the installation of their laboratories and their physical
plants and other facilities to enable them to commence operations.

2.2. In addition, the FOUNDATION shall, subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees of the
FOUNDATION, continue to support the activities of the RESEARCH COMPLEX by way of recurrent additional
grants and donations for specific research and development projects which may be mutually agreed upon
and, from time to time, additional grants and donations of such amounts as may be necessary to provide the
RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its Research Institutes with operational flexibility especially with regard
to incentives to staff purchase of equipment/facilities, travel abroad, recruitment of local and expatriate staff
and such other activities and inputs which are difficult to obtain under usual government rules and
regulations.6

The Board of Regents of the UP approved the MOA on November 25, 1982.7

In the meantime, Navasero promised to submit the contract for the installation of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH,
by January 12, 1983. However, Navasero failed to do so. In a Letter dated February 1, 1983, BIOTECH reminded
Navasero of the need to submit the contract so that it could be submitted to FEMF for its evaluation and
approval.8 Instead of submitting the said contract, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH an accomplishment report on the
project as of February 28, 1983, and requested payment thereon.9 By May 1983, PHILAB had completed 78% of the
project, amounting to ₱2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of ₱2,934,068.90. The FEMF had already paid forty percent
(40%) of the total cost of the project. On May 12, 1983, Padolina wrote Lirio and furnished him the progress billing
from PHILAB.10 On August 11, 1983, the FEMF made another partial payment of ₱836,119.52 representing the
already delivered laboratory and office furniture after the requisite inspection and verification thereof by
representatives from the BIOTECH, FEMF, and PHILAB. The payment was made in the form of a check, for which
PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 202 to FEMF through Padolina.11

On July 1, 1984, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH Invoice No. 01643 in the amount of ₱702,939.40 for the final
payment of laboratory furniture. Representatives from BIOTECH, PHILAB, and Lirio for the FEMF, conducted a
verification of the accomplishment of the work and confirmed the same. BIOTECH forwarded the invoice to Lirio on
December 18, 1984 for its payment.12 Lirio, in turn, forwarded the invoice to Gapud, presumably sometime in the
early part of 1985. However, the FEMF failed to pay the bill. PHILAB reiterated its request for payment through a
letter on May 9, 1985.13 BIOTECH again wrote Lirio on March 21, 1985, requesting the payment of PHILAB’s bill.14 It
sent another letter to Gapud, on November 22, 1985, again appealing for the payment of PHILAB’s bill.15 In a Letter
to BIOTECH dated December 5, 1985, PHILAB requested payment of ₱702,939.40 plus interest thereon of
₱224,940.61.16 There was, however, no response from the FEMF. On February 24, 1986, PHILAB wrote BIOTECH,
appealing for the payment of its bill even on installment basis.17

President Marcos was ousted from office during the February 1986 EDSA Revolution. On March 26, 1986, Navasero
wrote BIOTECH requesting for its much-needed assistance for the payment of the balance already due plus interest
of ₱295,234.55 for its fabrication and supply of laboratory furniture.18

On April 22, 1986, PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino asking her help to secure the payment of the amount
due from the FEMF.19 The letter was referred to then Budget Minister Alberto Romulo, who referred the letter to
then UP President Edgardo Angara on June 9, 1986. On September 30, 1986, Raul P. de Guzman, the Chancellor of
UP Los Baños, wrote then Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Jovito Salonga,
submitting PHILAB’s claim to be officially entered as "accounts payable" as soon as the assets of FEMF were
liquidated by the PCGG.20

In the meantime, the PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy of the relevant contract and the MOA for its perusal.21

Chancellor De Guzman wrote Navasero requesting for a copy of the contract executed between PHILAB and FEMF. In
a Letter dated October 20, 1987, Navasero informed De Guzman that PHILAB and FEMF did not execute any contract
regarding the fabrication and delivery of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH.

Exasperated, PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against UP. In the complaint, PHILAB prayed
that it be paid the following:

(1) PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY NINE & 40/100 (₱702,939.40) plus an
additional amount (as shall be determined during the hearing) to cover the actual cost of money which at
the time of transaction the value of the peso was eleven to a dollar (₱11.00:$1) and twenty seven (27%)
percent interest on the total amount from August 1982 until fully paid;

(2) PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱100,000.00) exemplary damages;

(3) FIFTY THOUSAND [PESOS] (₱50,000.00) as and for attorney’s fees; and

(4) Cost of suit.22

PHILAB alleged, inter alia, that:

3. Sometime in August 1982, defendant, through its officials, particularly MR. WILLIAM PADOLINA, Director,
asked plaintiff to supply and install several laboratory furnitures and equipment at BIOTECH, a research
laboratory of herein defendant located at its campus in College, Laguna, for a total contract price of PESOS:
TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100 (₱2,939,058.90);

4. After the completion of the delivery and installation of said laboratory furnitures and equipment at
defendant’s BIOTECH Laboratory, defendant paid three (3) times on installment basis:

a) ₱600,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 253 dated August 24, 1982;
 b) ₱800,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 256 dated October 22, 1982;

c) ₱836,119.52 as per Official Receipt No. 202 dated August 11, 1983;

thus leaving a balance of PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE & 40/100
(₱702,939.40).

5. That notwithstanding repeated demands for the past eight years, defendant arrogantly and maliciously
made plaintiff believe that it was going to pay the balance aforestated, that was why plaintiff’s President and
General Manager himself, HECTOR C. NAVASERO, personally went to and from UP Los Baños to talk with
defendant’s responsible officers in the hope of expecting payment, when, in truth and in fact, defendant had
no intention to pay whatsoever right from the start on a misplaced ground of technicalities. Some of
plaintiff’s demand letters since year 1983 up to the present are hereto attached as Annexes A, B, C, D, E, F, G,
and H hereof;

6. That by reason of defendant’s malicious, evil and unnecessary misrepresentations that it was going to pay
its obligation and asking plaintiff so many red tapes and requirements to submit, compliance of all of which
took plaintiff almost eight (8) years to finish, when, in truth and in fact, defendant had no intention to pay,
defendant should be ordered to pay plaintiff no less than PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱100,000.00)
exemplary damages, so that other government institutions may be warned that they must not unjustly
enrich themselves at the expense of the people they serve.23

In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB had no cause of action against it because it was merely the
donee/beneficiary of the laboratory furniture in the BIOTECH; and that the FEMF, which funded the project, was
liable to the PHILAB for the purchase price of the laboratory furniture. UP specifically denied obliging itself to pay for
the laboratory furniture supplied by PHILAB.

After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint without prejudice to PHILAB’s
recourse against the FEMF. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit without prejudice to plaintiff's recourse to the
assets of the Marcos Foundation for the unpaid balance of ₱792,939.49.

SO ORDERED.24

Undaunted, PHILAB appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that the trial court erred in finding that:

1. the contract for the supply and installation of subject laboratory furniture and equipment was between
PHILAB and the Marcos Foundation; and,

2. the Marcos Foundation, not the University of the Philippines, is liable to pay the respondent the balance
of the purchase price.25

The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and held that there was never a contract between FEMF and
PHILAB. Consequently, PHILAB could not be bound by the MOA between the FEMF and UP since it was never a party
thereto. The appellate court ruled that, although UP did not bind itself to pay for the laboratory furniture;
nevertheless, it is liable to PHILAB under the maxim: "No one should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another."

The Present Petition

Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, UP, now the petitioner, filed its
petition for review contending that:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW ON CONTRACTS BETWEEN PHILAB
AND THE MARCOS FOUNDATION.
 II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHEN IT
HELD THAT THE UNIVERSITY, AND NOT THE MARCOS FOUNDATION, IS LIABLE TO PHILAB.26

Prefatorily, the doctrinal rule is that pure questions of facts may not be the subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as this mode of appeal is generally restricted to questions of law.27 However,
this rule is not absolute. The Court may review the factual findings of the CA should they be contrary to those of the
trial court.28 Correspondingly, this Court may review findings of facts when the judgment of the CA is premised on a
misapprehension of facts.29

On the first assigned error, the petitioner argues that the CA overlooked the evidentiary effect and substance of the
corresponding letters and communications which support the statements of the witnesses showing affirmatively that
an implied contract of sale existed between PHILAB and the FEMF. The petitioner furthermore asserts that no
contract existed between it and the respondent as it could not have entered into any agreement without the
requisite public bidding and a formal written contract.

The respondent, on the other hand, submits that the CA did not err in not applying the law on contracts between the
respondent and the FEMF. It, likewise, attests that it was never privy to the MOA entered into between the
petitioner and the FEMF. The respondent adds that what the FEMF donated was a sum of money equivalent to
₱29,000,000, and not the laboratory equipment supplied by it to the petitioner. The respondent submits that the
petitioner, being the recipient of the laboratory furniture, should not enrich itself at the expense of the respondent.

The petition is meritorious.

It bears stressing that the respondent’s cause of action is one for sum of money predicated on the alleged promise of
the petitioner to pay for the purchase price of the furniture, which, despite demands, the petitioner failed to do.
However, the respondent failed to prove that the petitioner ever obliged itself to pay for the laboratory furniture
supplied by it. Hence, the respondent is not entitled to its claim against the petitioner.

There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the MOA executed by the petitioner and FEMF; hence, it is not
bound by the said agreement. Contracts take effect only between the parties and their assigns.30 A contract cannot
be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it, even if he is aware of such contract and
has acted with knowledge thereof.31 Likewise admitted by the parties, is the fact that there was no written contract
executed by the petitioner, the respondent and FEMF relating to the fabrication and delivery of office and laboratory
furniture to the BIOTECH. Even the CA failed to specifically declare that the petitioner and the respondent entered
into a contract of sale over the said laboratory furniture. The parties are in accord that the FEMF had remitted to the
respondent partial payments via checks drawn and issued by the FEMF to the respondent, through Padolina, in the
total amount of ₱2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of the project of ₱2,934,068.90 and that the respondent received
the said checks and issued receipts therefor to the FEMF. There is also no controversy that the petitioner did not pay
a single centavo for the said furniture delivered by the respondent that the petitioner had been using ever since.

We agree with the petitioner that, based on the records, an implied-in-fact contract of sale was entered into
between the respondent and FEMF. A contract implied in fact is one implied from facts and circumstances showing a
mutual intention to contract. It arises where the intention of the parties is not expressed, but an agreement in fact
creating an obligation. It is a contract, the existence and terms of which are manifested by conduct and not by direct
or explicit words between parties but is to be deduced from conduct of the parties, language used, or things done by
them, or other pertinent circumstances attending the transaction. To create contracts implied in fact, circumstances
must warrant inference that one expected compensation and the other to pay.32 An implied-in-fact contract requires
the parties’ intent to enter into a contract; it is a true contract.33 The conduct of the parties is to be viewed as a
reasonable man would view it, to determine the existence or not of an implied-in-fact contract.34 The totality of the
acts/conducts of the parties must be considered to determine their intention. An implied-in-fact contract will not
arise unless the meeting of minds is indicated by some intelligent conduct, act or sign.35

In this case, the respondent was aware, from the time Padolina contacted it for the fabrication and supply of the
laboratory furniture until the go-signal was given to it to fabricate and deliver the furniture to BIOTECH as
beneficiary, that the FEMF was to pay for the same. Indeed, Padolina asked the respondent to prepare the draft of
the contract to be received by the FEMF prior to the execution of the parties (the respondent and FEMF), but
somehow, the respondent failed to prepare one. The respondent knew that the petitioner was merely the donee-
beneficiary of the laboratory furniture and not the buyer; nor was it liable for the payment of the purchase price
thereof. From the inception, the FEMF paid for the bills and statement of accounts of the respondent, for which the
latter unconditionally issued receipts to and under the name of the FEMF. Indeed, witness Lirio testified:

Q: Now, did you know, Mr. Witness, if PHILAB Industries was aware that it was the Marcos Foundation who
would be paying for this particular transaction for the completion of this particular transaction?

A: I think they are fully aware.

Q: What is your basis for saying so?

A: First, I think they were appraised by Dr. Padolina. Secondly, there were occasions during our inspection in
Los Baños, at the installation site, there were occasions, two or three occasions, when we met with Mr.
Navasero who is the President, I think, or manager of PHILAB, and we appraised him that it was really
between the foundation and him to which includes (sic) the construction company constructing the building.
He is fully aware that it is the foundation who (sic) engaged them and issued the payments.36

The respondent, in its Letter dated March 26, 1986, informed the petitioner and sought its assistance for the
collection of the amount due from the FEMF:

Dear Dr. Padolina:

May we request for your much-needed assistance in the payment of the balance still due us on the
laboratory furniture we supplied and installed two years ago?

Business is still slow and we will appreciate having these funds as soon as possible to keep up our
operations.

We look forward to hearing from you regarding this matter.

Very truly yours,

PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC.37

The respondent even wrote former President Aquino seeking her assistance for the payment of the amount due, in
which the respondent admitted it tried to collect from her predecessor, namely, the former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos:

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

At the instance of the national government, subject laboratory furnitures were supplied by our company to
the National Institute of Biotechnology & Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH), University of the Philippines, Los
Baños, Laguna, in 1984.

Out of the total contract price of PESOS: TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND FIFTY-
EIGHT & 90/100 (₱2,939,058.90), the previous administration had so far paid us the sum of ₱2,236,119.52
thus leaving a balance of PESOS: ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
FORTY-EIGHT & 61/100 (₱1,412.748.61) inclusive of interest of 24% per annum and 30% exchange rate
adjustment.

On several occasions, we have tried to collect this amount from your predecessor, the latest of which was
subject invoice (01643) we submitted to DR. W. PADOLINA, deputy director of BIOTECH. But this,
notwithstanding, our claim has remained unacted upon up to now. Copy of said invoice is hereto attached
for easy reference.
 Now that your excellency is the head of our government, we sincerely hope that payment of this obligation
will soon be made as this is one project the Republic of the Philippines has use of and derives benefit from.38

Admittedly, the respondent sent to the petitioner its bills and statements of accounts for the payments of the
laboratory furniture it delivered to the petitioner which the petitioner, through Padolina, transmitted to the FEMF
for its payment. However, the FEMF failed to pay the last statement of account of the respondent because of the
onset of the EDSA upheaval. It was only when the respondent lost all hope of collecting its claim from the
government and/or the PCGG did it file the complaint against the petitioner for the collection of the payment of its
last delivery of laboratory furniture.

We reject the ruling of the CA holding the petitioner liable for the claim of the respondent based on the maxim that
no one should enrich itself at the expense of another.

Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but
instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally
or unlawfully.39

Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that another party
knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it
would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit.40 Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of
failure to make remuneration of or for property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or
equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud,
coercion, or request.41 Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the
enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.42

Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:

Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him. (Boldface supplied)

In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has
been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or
legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.43

An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other remedy on
contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any other institution of
positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem verso will not lie.44

The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do not obtain in this case. The
respondent had a remedy against the FEMF via an action based on an implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the
payment of its claim. The petitioner legally acquired the laboratory furniture under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is
entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, is REINSTATED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145391            August 26, 2002

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,

vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution1 dated December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for
certiorari and the Resolution2 dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).

The Facts

Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya ("Laroya" for brevity) and the other owned by petitioner
Roberto Capitulo ("Capitulo" for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan ("Casupanan" for brevity), figured in
an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac.
Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.

When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the
civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the
criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.

On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC" for
brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66,3 assailing the MCTC’s Order of dismissal.

The Trial Court’s Ruling

The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas
RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore the
proper remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a
substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing
the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.

Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same in the Resolution of
August 24, 2000.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:

"In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and believe that the accident
was caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself to be the aggrieved party, opted to
file a criminal case for reckless imprudence against the second party. On the other hand, the second party,
together with his operator, believing themselves to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case
for quasi-delict against the first party who is the very private complainant in the criminal case."4

Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal
case.
 The Court’s Ruling

Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping,
constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a
counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time.
They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence,
and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain
that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally,
they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also
Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.

In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further
alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the
proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already
final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.

In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal question of whether there is forum-
shopping since they filed only one action - the independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.

Nature of the Order of Dismissal

The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal5 that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the
Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal
expressly states it is with prejudice.6 Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed without
prejudice. Thus, the MCTC’s dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.

Section 1 of Rule 417 provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that "where the
judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65."
Clearly, the Capas RTC’s order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary
appeal, is erroneous.

Forum-Shopping

The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.8 Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more
cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought.9 However, there is no forum-shopping in the
instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal action.

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code
while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these
two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa
criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:

"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant."

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered
damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate
civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal
case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("2000 Rules" for brevity) expressly
requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:

"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any
cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action." (Emphasis
supplied)

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can
be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.

Filing of a separate civil action

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("1985 Rules" for brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the
filing of a separate civil action independently of the criminal action provided the offended party reserved the right to file
such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil action before the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same act or omission were deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal case.
These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the
recovery of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.

Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to
reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed "impliedly instituted"
in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:

"Section 1. – Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file,
any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.

x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows:

"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation.

(b) x x x

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the
 trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal actions." (Emphasis supplied)

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only the action to recover
civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any
reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file
a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action "deemed
instituted" in the criminal action.10

Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action to recover civil liability
ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended
party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil
action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be
consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising
from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.11

Suspension of the Separate Civil Action

Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not
be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed before the
commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action
until final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover
liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.

The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit:

"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is
rendered in the criminal action.  Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same
may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In
case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil
actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be
instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.

x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to recover
damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the
filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.

When civil action may proceed independently

The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the criminal case, can
file a separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as
follows:
 "SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action." (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the "offended party" to
bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present
Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the "offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action."

There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict
against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended party" may bring such an action
but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.

Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs. Cantos12 where the Court held that the accused
therein could validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.
In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time the
Court noted the "absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and
the necessary consequences and implications thereof." Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself to
the criminal aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the accused
may file a separate civil case against the offended party "after the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with
the new Rules which may be promulgated." The Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint
on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.

Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address
the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision states that "any cause of action which could have
been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action." The
present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil actiosn which shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.

Conclusion

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not
deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation.
The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these
articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the
crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil
action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating
the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation
is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the
offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against
his employer or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal
case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the
accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from
setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore
forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action
for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is
filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that
the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing
a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due
process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by
the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.

We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal case may vary with the
decision of the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has always been recognized ever since the Civil
Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But
the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action "may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." In Azucena vs. Potenciano,13 the Court declared:

"x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated
in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would
render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this
action 'may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.’"

More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a civil action separate and
independent from the criminal action although arising from the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet to
encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and the other the
civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than real. In any
event, there are sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.

One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the
order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
must be given retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that -

"x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent."14

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and
August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.