Cagayan State University

College of Business, Entrepreneurship and Accountancy

Andrews Campus
Caritan Centro Tuguegarao City 3500

FAMILY LAW
____________________________________________

A Compilation of Case Digests Submitted

As a Requirement in

Legal Research and Writing

_____________________________________________

Alaysa, Jessa Mae

Ariz, Hannah

Catriz, Francisco

Dangarang, Mina

Dela Cruz, Darwin

Escobar, Kristel Anne

Gonzales, Maria Kristen

Sardeng, Sarah Jhoy

Serrano, Maria Peachy

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

Petitioner: CHI MING TSOI

Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI
Ponente: TORRES, JR., J.

FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao got married in 1988. They lived together in the house of Chi
Ming Tsoi’s mother. After 10 months of living together, Gina Lao-Tsoi filed a case for the
annulment of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. During the trial, it was
established that Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi had no sexual intercourse despite living
together as husband and wife for ten months nor did they see each other’s private parts. When
submitted for examinations, Gina was declared a virgin while Chi Ming was declared potent and
capable of erection despite the fact that the latter’s penis measured only 2 inches, and 3 inches in
its full length.

Gina claimed that their marriage be annulled because Chi Ming was psychologically
incapacitated for his failure to consummate their marriage by refusing to have sexual congress
with her. On rebuttal, Chi Ming claimed that there is no psychological incapacity for their
differences can still be reconciled and cured through medical technology and science.

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City decreed the annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. When appealed, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether refusal to have sexual intercourse with your spouse constitutes psychological
incapacity which is a ground for annulment of marriage.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that marriage contracted by any party who was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall
be void. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage.

In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Thus, the marriage between Chi Ming and Gina was declared void by the Supreme Court.
JOEL JIMENEZ vs. REMEDIOS CANIZARES and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960

Petitioner: JOEL JIMENEZ

Respondent: REMEDIOS CANIZARES
Ponente: JUDGE PADILLA

FACTS:
The petitioner married the respondent August 3,1950 before a judge of the Municipal
court of Zamboanga City. June 7,1955: Joel Jimenez, petitioner, filed for a complaint that prays
for a decree annulling his marriage to Remedios Canizares in the court of first instance in
Zamboanga. The ground of such complaint is that the office of the defendant’s genitals or vagina
was too small to allow penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation. The respondent was
summoned by the court and gave a copy but did not file any response. December 17,1956: the
court required the respondent to submit herself into a physical examination and to file a medical
certificate within 10 days upon receipt of the order. March 14,1957: The defendant was granted
additional five days to comply with the order of December 17,1956 and that her failure to do so
would be deemed lack of interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the
petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent.

RULING:
No. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by the will of the parties. The
law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable
evidence, to annul a marriage. The husband’s claim of impotency is not satisfactorily established,
for his wife- the defendant, abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to take part
shows indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women in this country is inferred
to as being coy, bashful and shy and not wanting to submit their selves into a physical
examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the court may do without doing
violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimation. She is not charged with any offense
and that she is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.
Therefore, impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband that tends or aims to
secure the annulment he sought and seeks saying his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and
wife.
HALILI vs. SANTOS- HALILI
G.R. No. 165424 June 9, 2009

Petitioner: LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI

Respondents: CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Ponente: CORONA, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona
Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rights thinking that it was a
joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife. However, they started
fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and
started dating other women. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the
marriage was not "fake."

ISSUE:
Whether or not his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis
of his psychological incapacity.

RULING:
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have
this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend
to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or
doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval
from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned.
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was
grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. Based on the foregoing, it has been shown
that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him
unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage and thus the Court declared the marriage
null and void.
Yes, because ultimately the psychologist sufficiently established that petitioner had
psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause and that
already existed at the time of the celebration of his marriage to the respondent.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge
of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and
RICHARD UPTON
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

Petitioner: ALICE REYES VAN DORN

Respondents: HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH
CX, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION PASAY CITY
AND RICHARD UPTON
Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

FACTS:

Alicia Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton, the
private respondent is a citizen of the United States.They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and
after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines. They had two children. But
they were divorced in Nevada, United States in 1982. The petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn.

On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn
be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with right
to manage the conjugal property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in
Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen

RULING:

Yes, Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that only Filipino nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorce, as it is considered contrary to the concept of public policy and
morality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this sense, the Philippine laws
recognized the validity of the Nevada divorce since as an American citizen, the private
respondent is bound by the decision of his own country’s court which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him.

Therefore, the private respondent cannot sue the petitioner and cannot lay claim on the
alleged conjugal property, as the former is no longer the husband.
MALLION vs. ALCANTARA
GR No. 141528 October 31, 2006

Petitioner: OSCAR P. MALLION

Respondent: EDITHA ALCANTARA
Ponente: AZCUNA, J.

FACTS:
Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court seeking a declaration of
nullity oh his marriage with Editha Alcantara due to psychological incapacity. The RTC denied
the petition. As the decision attained finality, Mallion filed another petition for a declaration of
nullity of marriage, this time alleging that his marriage was null and void due to the fact that it
was celebrated without a valid marriage license.

ISSUE:
Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the grounds of
lack of marriage license?

RULING:
Res judicata applies.
Mallion is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action which is the
nullity of marriage. When the second case was filed based on another ground, there is a splitting
of a cause of action which is prohibited. He is estopped from asserting that the first marriage had
no marriage license because in the first case he impliedly admitted the same when he did not
question the absence of a marriage license.
PATRICIA FIGUEROA vs. SIMEON BARRANCO
SB Case No. 519 July 31, 1997

Petitioner: PATRICIA FIGUEROA

Respondent: SIMEON BARRANCO JR.
Ponente: ROMERO, J.

FACTS:

In 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that Simeon Barranco,Jr., the respondent, denied to
the legal profession. After several unsuccessful attempts in the years 1966, 1967, and 1968. The
respondent formally had passed the 1970 BAR examinations on his 4th attempt. The complainant
filed the instant petition averring that the respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child
of wedlock was born to them and that the respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to
marry her.

Respondents and the complaint were townmates in January, IloIlo. Since 1953, when
they were both in their teenage years, they were steadies. Simeon Barranco, the respondent, even
acted as escort to Patricia Figueroa, the complainant when she reigned as queen at the 1953 town
fiesta. The complainant first acceded to sexual congress with the respondent sometime in 1960,
which their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11 1964. It was after the
child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he
passes the BAR examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more
than 20-30 promises of marriage. The respondents gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter’s
birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she knew that the
respondent married another woman.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Are the charges set against the respondent enough to disbar him from taking the lawyer’s
oath?

RULING:

No. The charges required to constitute disbarment not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral. In the case at hand, the allegation on respondent merely suggest a doubtful moral
character. Furthermore, the complainant continued to see the respondent for a while, even after
giving birth to their child, and they have intimate relationship, thus suggesting that the sexual
relations were consensual and not forced.
AGRAVIADOR vs. ERLINDA AGRAVIADOR and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R.No. 170729 December 08, 2010

Petitioner: ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR

Respondent: ERLINDA AGRAVIADOR
Ponente: BRION, J.

FACTS:
Enrique Agraviador first met Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador in 1971 at a beer house where
Erlinda worked. Their meeting led into a courtship, became sweethearts and finally got married
in 1973 whereby, they begot four children.
In year 2001, Enrique filed a petition to have his marriage with Erlinda be nullified der
Article36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Erlinda was psychologically incapacitated to
exercise the essential obligations of marriage. He claimed that she was carefree and
irresponsible, refused to do household chores, did not take care of their sick child to the point of
his death, refused to use the family name in her activities, had extramarital affairs and refused to
have sexual intercourse with him. Aside from Enrique's testimony, he also presented a
psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Patac. In Dr.Patac's psychiatric evaluation report, he found
that Erlinda was not able to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage as she manifested
unpleasant behaviour even at the time before their marriage. He concluded that Erlinda is
suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder of which she has been having this disorder since her
adolescence where there is no definite treatment for such illness.
Erlinda moved to dismiss the petition but the Regional Trial Court denied her motion and
took the side of Enrique.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Enrique can invoke Article 36 of the Family Code as the basis to nullify
his marriage to Erlinda.
RULING:
No. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code does not involve a
species of vice of consent. The spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage,
notwithstanding, incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. Psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligation does not affect the consent to the marriage. The
totality of Enrique's evidence is insufficient to prove Erlinda's psychological incapacity. Her
refusal or unwillingness to perform obligations and number of unpleasant personality traits do
not raise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires. Dr. Patac's psychiatric
evaluation report do not hold sufficient amount of proving that Erlinda was psychologically
incapacitated to perform marital duties for which he did not personally evaluate and examine
Erlinda, as he just relied on the information fed by Enrique, the parties' second child and their
household helper.
ROLANDO LANDICH vs. HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-22579 February 23, 1968

Petitioner: JOSE W. DIOKNO

Respondent: OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
Ponente: FERNANDO, J.

FACTS:
On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was
alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay,
which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action
was filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent
Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab
initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by
petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as
defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira
Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be
declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she
compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of
Makati, Rizal.
Petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case but the respondent judge
denied the motion for lack of merit. A motion for recommendation was filed and likewise
denied.
Hence this petition, filed on March 13, 1964.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case filed is a prejudicial question.

RULING:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in
a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions
as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be
considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that
the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and
cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is
markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the
fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was
the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the
civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with
her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming
that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not
be material to the outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much
less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
TE vs. TE
G.R No. 161793 February 13, 2009

Petitioner: EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE

Respondent: ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE
Ponente: NACHURA, J.

FACTS:

The relevant facts and proceedings follow:

1. The petitioner got a glimpse of the respondent in a gathering by the Filipino-Chinese

during their college.

2. On January 1996, the Petitioner, a sophomore students courted the Respondent, a

freshman.

3. March 1996, after three months of their first meeting, the Respondent asked the
Petitioner to elope. Thus, they left Manila and went to Cebu.

4. The P80 000 from the Petitioner lasted for only a month and they were both jobless.
April 1996, they both went back to Manila; Rowena to her uncle’s house, and Edward to his
parent’s home.

5. Rowena kept threatening Edward through phone call that she would commit suicide,
thus making Edward agree to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s house.

6. April 23, 1996 the two got married at court, and they both stayed at her uncle’s house
where Edward was treated as a prisoner.

7. After a month, Edward escaped where his family hid him from Rowena. In June 1996,
Edward talked to Rowena through phone, where she said it was better for them to live their
separate ways, and so they did.

8. January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena
on the basis of Rowena’s psychological incapacity.

9. July 11, 2000 the trial court ordered to investigate of there was collusion between the
two parties; August 23, 2000 the investigation could not determine if there’s collusion.

10. The clinical psychologist who examined the petitioner found both parties
psychologically incapacitated.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and Respondent should be null and
void.

RULING:

Yes. The marriage between Edward Te and Rowena Te should be declared null and void
due to the following reasons:

1. Both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of
their won selves.

2. Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for
them to take.
NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

Petitioner: ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR.
Respondent: NORMA BAYADOG
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot
Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.

After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license.

ISSUE:

What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now
Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt
the future spouses from securing a marriage license.

RULING:

The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and
it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.

Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage
was dissolved or annulled.

In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
 The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as “husband and wife”.

Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element.
SOURCES

Case:

Site: https://www.lawphil.net

Other sources:

 https://dictionary.law.com/
 https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/