G.R. No.
109373 March 20, 1995 On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION,
PAULA S. PAUG, and its officers and members, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N.
NAÑAGAS II, as Liquidator of Pacific Banking
Corporation, respondents.
G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, as Liquidator of the Pacific Banking Corporation
, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II,
DEPUTY SHERIFF RAMON ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG JOO, ANG
KEONG LAN and E.J ANG INT'L. LTD., represented by their
Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
These cases have been consolidated because the principal question
involved is the same: whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep.
Act No. 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is a special
proceeding or an ordinary civil action. The Fifth and the Fourteenth
Divisions of the Court of Appeals reached opposite results on this
question and consequently applied different periods for appealing.
The facts are as follows:
I.
Proceedings in the CB and the RTC
On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed
under receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to
Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was
placed under liquidation1 and a Liquidator was appointed.2
Manila Branch 31, a petition entitled "Petition for Assistance in the
Liquidation of Pacific Banking Corporation." 3 The petition was approved,
after which creditors filed their claims with the court.
On May 17, 1991, a new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Nañagas,4 President of
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), was appointed by
the Central Bank.
On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees
Organization (Union for short), petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a
complaint-in-intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month
pay differential, salary increase differential, Christmas bonus, and cash
equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as employees of
PaBC. In its order dated September 13, 1991, the trial court ordered
payment of the principal claims of the Union.5
The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On
October 16, 1991, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification
of the order. In his order of December 6, 1991, the judge modified his
September 13, 19916 but in effect denied the Liquidator's motion for
reconsideration. This order was received by the Liquidator on December
9, 1991. The following day, December 10, 1991, he filed a Notice of
Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal.
On December 23, 1991, another Notice of Appeal was filed by the Office
of the Solicitor General in behalf of Nañagas.
In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the
Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was late, i.e., more
than 15 days after receipt of the decision. The judge declared his
September 13, 1991 order and subsequent orders to be final and
executory and denied reconsideration. On March 27, 1992, he granted
the Union's Motion for issuance of a writ of Execution.
Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No.
112991, likewise filed claims for the payment of investment in the PaBC
allegedly in the form of shares of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18.
The shares of stocks, consisting of 154,462 common shares, constituted
11% of the total subscribed capital stock of the PaBC. They alleged that
their claim constituted foreign exchange capital investment entitled to
preference in payment under the Foreign Investments Law.
In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order
directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents the total amount of appealed from, deducting the period during which his motion for
their claim as preferred creditors.7 reconsideration was pending, the notice of appeal was filed late.
Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed the Liquidator's petition.
The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On
September 30, 1992 he moved for reconsideration, but his motion was III.
denied by the court on October 2, 1992. He received the order denying
his Motion for Reconsideration on October 5, 1992. On October 14, Present Proceedings
1992 he filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders of September 16, 1992
and October 2, 1992. As in the case of the Union, however, the judge The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this
ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it Court.
had been filed without authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15
days. In his order of October 28, 1992, the judge directed the execution
In G.R. No. 109373 the Union contends that:
of his September 11, 1992 order granting the Stockholders/ Investors'
claim.
1. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction over
the subject matter or nature of the suit.
II.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking
Proceedings in the Court of Appeals
cognizance of the petition for certiorari filed by Nañagas
who was without any legal authority to file it.
The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to set aside the orders of the
3. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the
trial court denying his appeal from the orders granting the claims of
case is a special proceeding governed by Rules 72 to
Union and of the Stockholders/Investors. The two Divisions of the Court
109 of the Revised Rules of Court.
of Appeals, to which the cases were separately raffled, rendered
conflicting rulings.
4. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding
that the notice of appeal filed by Nañagas was filed on
In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now
time.
G.R. No. 09373) the Fifth Division8 held in the case of the Union that the
proceeding before the trial court was a special proceeding and,
therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order 5. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in declaring that
rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the Liquidator the second notice of appeal filed on December 23, 1991
was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision granting the by the Solicitor General is a superfluity.
Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time. The Fifth Division,
therefore, set aside the orders of the lower court and directed the latter On the other hand, in G.R. No. 112991 the Liquidator contends that:
to give due course to the appeal of the Liquidator and set the Record on
Appeal he had filed for hearing. 1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the
Pacific Banking Corporation s a Special Proceeding case
On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth and/or one which allows multiple appeals, in which case
Division9 ruled in CA-G.R. SP No. 29351 (now G.R. No. 112991) in the the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from
case of the Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation proceeding is an receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.
ordinary action. Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or
final order rendered therein is 15 days and that since the Liquidator's
 2. Private respondents are not creditors of PaBC but are
plain stockholders whose right to receive payment as
such would accrue only after all the creditors of the
insolvent bank have been paid.
3. The claim of private respondents in the amount of
US$22,531,632.18 is not in the nature of foreign
investment as it is understood in law.
4. The claim of private respondents has not been clearly
established and proved.
5. The issuance of a writ of execution against the assets
of PaBC was made with grave abuse of discretion.
The petitions in these cases must be dismissed.
First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is
whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the
nature of a special proceeding. If it is, then the period of appeal is 30
days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file
with the trial court a record on appeal in order to perfect his appeal.
Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action, the period of
appeal is 15 days from notice of the decision or final order appealed
from.
BP Blg. 129 provides:
§39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court
in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or
decision appealed from: Provided, however, that
in habeas corpus cases the period for appeal shall be
forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment
appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal.
In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with
all the pages prominently numbered consecutively,
together with an index of the contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special
proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple appeals
are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of
Court.
The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:
19. Period of Appeals. —
(a) All appeals, except in habeas
corpus cases and in the cases referred to
in paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment, order, resolution or award
appealed from.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in
accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of
Court and other cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed, the period of
appeals shall be thirty (30) days, a record
on appeal being required.
The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding
is an ordinary action similar to an action for interpleader under Rule
63. 10 The Fourteenth Division stated:
The petition filed is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63
of the Rules of Court where there are conflicting
claimants or several claims upon the same subject
matter, a person who claims no interest thereon may file
an action for interpleader to compel the claimants to
"interplead" and litigate their several claims among
themselves. (Section I Rule 63).
An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action
under Rule 62 which, like an ordinary action, may be
appealed only within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or order appealed from. Under Rule 62, the
preceding rules covering ordinary civil actions which are
not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the
provisions of the rule relating to such civil actions are
applicable to special civil actions. This embraces Rule 41
 covering appeals from the regional trial court to the Court
of Appeals.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an
action is defined as "an ordinary suit in a court of justice
by which one party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or
redress of a wrong." On the other hand, Section 2 of the
same Rule states that "every other remedy including one
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact shall be by special proceeding."
To our mind, from the aforequoted definitions of an
action and a special proceeding, the petition for
assistance of the court in the liquidation of an asset of a
bank is not "one to establish the status or right of a party
or a particular fact." Contrary to the submission of the
petitioner, the petition is not intended to establish the fact
of insolvency of the bank. The insolvency of the bank
had already been previously determined by the Central
Bank in accordance with Section 9 of the CB Act before
the petition was filed. All that needs to be done is to
liquidate the assets of the bank and thus the assistance
of the respondent court is sought for that purpose.
It should be pointed out that this petition filed is not
among the cases categorized as a special proceeding
under Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, nor
among the special proceedings that may be appealed
under Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules.
We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2
of the Rules of Court provide:
§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a
court of justice, by which the party prosecutes another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.
§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other
remedy, including one to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact, shall be by special proceeding.
Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a
special proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states:" 11
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of
justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while special
proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence,
action is distinguished from special proceeding in that
the former is a formal demand of a right by one against
another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration
of a status, right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to
recover property from another, his remedy is to file an
action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of
a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special
proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity
calling for an appointment of guardianship.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent
corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an
ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or
protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a
party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's
wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be
enforced against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the
corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able to file their
claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in
another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's
debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a
declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant
right of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the
disposition of the corporation's assets.
Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation
proceedings do not resemble petitions for interpleader. For one, an
action for interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a
person who has no interest therein. 12 This is not the case in a liquidation
proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the corporation,
takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the
creditors.13 He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the
corporation are paid only to rightful claimants and in the order of
payment provided by law.
Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the
settlement of state of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the
Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the determination of
all the assets and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of the
insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the administrator
or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the
claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and the
estate is not disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of
creditors and their rights and the determination of their order of payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are
allowed in proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent corporation. As the
Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, quoting the Liquidator, correctly
noted:
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which
consists of a number of cases properly classified as
"claims." It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The
first phase is concerned with the approval and
disapproval of claims. Upon the approval of the petition
seeking the assistance of the proper court in the
liquidation of a close entity, all money claims against the
bank are required to be filed with the liquidation court.
This phase may end with the declaration by the
liquidation court that the claim is not proper or without
basis. On the other hand, it may also end with the
liquidation court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the
claim shall be classified whether it is ordinary or
preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either
case, the order allowing or disallowing a particular claim
is final order, and may be appealed by the party
aggrieved thereby.
The second phase involves the approval by the Court of
the distribution plan prepared by the duly appointed
liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in detail the
total amount available for distribution to creditors whose
claim were earlier allowed. The Order finally disposes of
the issue of how much property is available for disposal.
Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the liquidation
proceeding — payment of all allowed claims in
accordance with the order of legal priority and the
approved distribution plan.
Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of
allowance or disallowance of a particular claim cannot be
overemphasized. It is the operative fact that constitutes a
liquidation proceeding a "case where multiple appeals
are allowed by law." The issuance of an Order which, by
its nature, affects only the particular claims involved, and
which may assume finality if no appeal is made
therefrom, ipso facto creates a situation where multiple
appeals are allowed.
A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a
single petition by the Solicitor General with a court of
competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for Assistance in
the Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All
claims against the insolvent are required to be filed with
the liquidation court. Although the claims are litigated in
the same proceeding, the treatment is individual. Each
claim is heard separately. And the Order issued relative
to a particular claim applies only to said claim, leaving
the other claims unaffected, as each claim is considered
separate and distinct from the others. Obviously, in the
event that an appeal from an Order allowing or
disallowing a particular claim is made, only said claim is
affected, leaving the others to proceed with their ordinary
course. In such case, the original records of the
proceeding are not elevated to the appellate court. They
remain with the liquidation court. In lieu of the original
record, a record of appeal is instead required to be
prepared and transmitted to the appellate court.
Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation
proceedings. Consequently, a record on appeal is
necessary in each and every appeal made. Hence, the
period to appeal therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a
record on appeal being required. (Record pp. 162-164).
In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the
Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the
23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not file a record on
appeal with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already
stated a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and
Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals
are allowed. The reason for this is that the several claims are actually
separate ones and a decision or final order with respect to any claim can
be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal must remain in
the trial court where other claims may still be pending.
Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order
granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors became final.
Consequently. the Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing the
Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus must be
affirmed albeit for a different reason.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), we
find that the Fifth Division correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition
for Certiorari. Prohibition and Mandamus. As already noted, the
Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file a
record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his
receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for the
resolution of his motion for extension, he filed on December 20, 1991
within the extension sought a record on appeal. Respondent judge thus
erred in disallowing the notice on appeal and denying the Liquidator's
motion for extension to file a record on appeal.
The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the
Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus and its
decision should, therefore, be affirmed.
Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under §29 of Rep.
Act No. 265, the court merely assists in adjudicating the claims of
creditors, preserves the assets of the institution, and implements the
liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board and that, therefore, as
representative of the Monetary Board, the Liquidator cannot question the
order of the court or appeal from it. It contends that since the Monetary
Board had previously admitted PaBC's liability to the laborers by in fact
setting aside the amount of P112,234,292.44 for the payment of their
claims, there was nothing else for the Liquidator to do except to comply
with the order of the court.
The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the
function of the trial court is not limited to assisting in the implementation
of the orders of the Monetary Board. Under the same section (§29) of
the law invoked by the Union, the court has authority to set aside the
decision of the Monetary Board "if there is a convincing proof that the
action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith." 14 As this Court held
in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 15
There is no question, that the action of the monetary
Board in this regard may be subject to judicial review.
Thus, it has been held that the Court's may interfere with
the Central Bank's exercise of discretion in determining
whether or not a distressed bank shall be supported or
liquidated. Discretion has its limits and has never been
held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith
(Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567
[1971]).
In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank
but also of the insolvent bank. Under §§28A-29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he
acts in behalf of the bank "personally or through counsel as he may
retain, in all actions or proceedings or against the corporation" and he
has authority "to do whatever may be necessary for these purposes."
This authority includes the power to appeal from the decisions or final
orders of the court which he believes to be contrary to the interest of the
bank.
Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and motion for
extension of time to file the record on appeal filed in behalf of the Central
Bank was not filed by the office of the Solicitor General as counsel for
the Central Bank. This contention has no merit. On October 22, 1992, as
Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta informed the trial court in
March 27, 1992, the OSG had previously authorized lawyers of the
PDIC to prepare and sign pleadings in the case. 16 Conformably thereto
the Notice of Appeal and the Motion for Additional Time to submit
Record on Appeal filed were jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I.
Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by lawyers of the PDIC. 17
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the decisions
appealed from are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192828 : November 28, 2011
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES,
INC., Petitioners, v. HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG,
MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by
her son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45
red
of the Rules of Court assailing the December 14, 2009
Decision2 and July 8, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
red red
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99856. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision reads:
chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment
is hereby rendered by us DENYING the petition filed in this
case and AFFIRMING the assailed Orders dated March 15,
2007 and May 16, 2007 issued by the respondent Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, in Manila in Civil Case
No. 02-105251.4
red
The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Factual Antecedents
Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3,
2002,5 the respondents filed a Complaint6 against the
red
petitioners and Stronghold Insurance Company, Global
Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar,
Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds
of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles
from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-interest.
The Complaint, captioned as one for " Disinheritance,
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of
Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer
Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a]
Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, " was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 and
raffled to Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).
In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as
causes of action: chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry
First Cause of Action. They are the heirs of Lim San, also
known as Antonio Ching / Tiong Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy
(Antonio). Respondents Joseph Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime
Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children of Antonio with his
common-law wife, respondent Mercedes Igne (Mercedes).
Respondent Lucina Santos (Lucina) claimed that she was also a
common-law wife of Antonio. The respondents averred that
Ramon misrepresent edhimself as Antonio's and Lucina's son
when in truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth
certificate was merely simulated. On July 18, 1996, Antonio
died of a stab wound. Police investigators identified Ramon as
the prime suspect and he now stands as the lone accused in a
criminal case for murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest
issued against him have remain edunserved as he is at large.
From the foregoing circumstances and upon the authority of
Article 9197 of the New Civil Code (NCC), the respondents
red
concluded that Ramon can be legally disinherited, hence,
prohibited from receiving any share from the estate of Antonio.
Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the
conclusion of the police investigations tagging Ramon as the
prime suspect in the murder of Antonio, the former made an
inventory of the latter's estate. Ramon misrepresented that
there were only six real estate properties left by Antonio. The
red
respondents alleged that Ramon had illegally transferred to his
name the titles to the said properties. Further, there are two
other parcels of land, cash and jewelries, plus properties in
Hongkong, which were in Ramon's possession.
Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational
attainment, was sweet-talked by Ramon into surrendering to
him a Global Business Bank, Inc. (Global Bank) Certificate of
Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio, and
the certificates of title covering two condominium units in
Binondo which were purchased by Antonio using his own
money but which were registered in Ramon's name. Ramon
also fraudulently misrepresented to Joseph, Jaime and
Mercedes that they will promptly receive their complete shares,
exclusive of the stocks in Po Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing),
from the estate of Antonio. Exerting undue influence, Ramon
had convinced them to execute an Agreement8 and a red
Sixth Cause of Action . Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of
land in Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic Business
Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of
Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu
Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price. By reason of Ramon's
lack of authority to dispose of any part of Antonio's estate, the
conveyances are null and void ab initio.
Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now
manages Antonio's estate. She has no intent to convey to the
respondents their shares in the estate of Antonio.

Waiver9 on August 20, 1996. The terms and conditions

red

The respondents thus prayed for the following in their

stipulated in the Agreement and Waiver, specifically, on the Complaint: chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes of the

amount of P22,000,000.00, were not complied with. Further, 1. x x x a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the
Lucina was not informed of the execution of the said defendant RAMON CHING and/or his attorney-in-fact Belen Dy
instruments and had not received any amount from Ramon. Tan Ching from disposing, selling or alienating any property
Hence, the instruments are null and void. that belongs to the estate of the deceased ANTONIO CHING;

Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, xxx

which constitute 60% of the latter's total capitalstock, were
illegally transferred by Ramon to his own name through a 4. x x x
forged document of sale executed after Antonio died. Po Wing
owns a ten-storey building in Binondo. Ramon's claim that he
a.) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who murdered
bought the stocks from Antonio before the latter died is
his father ANTONIO CHING disqualified as heir and from
baseless. Further, Lucina's shares in Po Wing had also banished
inheriting to (sic) the estate of his father;
into thin air through Ramon's machinations.
b.) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING
Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed
transfer (sic) of the six [6] parcels of land from the name of his
an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
father ANTONIO CHING to his name covered by TCT No. x x x;
Estate adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate
10
red

to the prejudice of the respondents. By virtue of the said

instrument, new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering
eight real properties owned by Antonio were issued in Ramon's
name. Relative to the Po Wing shares, the Register of Deeds of
Manila had required Ramon to post a Surety Bond conditioned
to answer for whatever claims which may eventually surface in
connection with the said stocks. Co-defendant Stronghold
Insurance Company issued the bond in Ramon's behalf.
c.) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER
executed by plaintiffs x x x in favor of x x x RAMON CHING for
being patently immoral, invalid, illegal, simulated and (sic)
sham;
d.) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of stocks
at (sic) PO WING from the names of ANTONIO CHING and
LUCINA SANTOS to the defendant ANTONIO CHING's name for
having been illegally procured through the falsification of their
signatures in the document purporting the transfer thereof;
e.) Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect the
AFFIDAVIT OF SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE executed by x x x
RAMON CHING for being contrary to law and existing
jurisprudence;
f.) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic) executed
by x x x RAMON CHING (i) over two (2) parcels of land x x x to
defendant ASIA ATLANTIC BUSINESS VENTURES, Inc.; and (ii)
one (1) parcel of land x x x sold to x x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR
for having illegally procured the ownership and titles of the
above properties;
x x x.
11
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The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to
Dismiss12 alleging
red forum shopping, litis pendentia, res
judicata and the respondents as not being the real parties in
interest.
On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order13 denying
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the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.
The respondents filed an Amended Complaint14 dated April 7,
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2005 impleading Metrobank as the successor-in-interest of co-
defendant Global Bank. The Amended Complaint also added
a seventh cause of action relative to the existence of a
Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the amount
of P4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The
respondents prayed that they be declared as the rightful
owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately released to
them. Alternatively, the respondents prayed for the issuance of
a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve it during the
pendency of the case.
On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated
Answer with Counterclaim.
On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order16 admitting the red
respondents' Amended Complaint. The RTC stressed that
Metrobank had already filed Manifestations admitting that as
successor-in-interest of Global Bank, it now possesses custody
of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed willingness to abide
by any court order as regards the disposition of Antonio's
deposits. The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed to
assail the aforecited Order was denied by the RTC on May 3,
2006.
On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated
Answer with Counterclaim to the respondents' Amended
Complaint.
On August 11, 2006, the RTC issued a pre-trial order.17 red
On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss18 the respondents' Amended Complaint on the alleged
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ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the
Amended Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the
respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and
the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit partakes of
the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action
for declaration of nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a
probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting as an
ordinary court.
On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order19 denying the red
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss on grounds: chanroblesvi rtua llawl ibra ry
In the case at bar , an examination of the Complaint would
disclose that the action delves mainly on the question of
ownership of the properties described in the Complaint
which can be properly settled in an ordinary civil action.
And as pointed out by the defendants, the action seeks to
declare the nullity of the Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-
Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer
Certificates of Title, which were all allegedly executed by
defendant Ramon Ching to defraud the plaintiffs. The relief of
establishing the status of the plaintiffs which could have
translated this action into a special proceeding was
nowhere stated in the Amended Complaint. With regard
[to] the prayer to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful
owner[s] of the CPPA and that the same be immediately
released to them, in itself poses an issue of ownership
which must be proved by plaintiffs by substantial
evidence. And as emphasized by the plaintiffs, the Amended
Complaint was intended to implead Metrobank as a co-
defendant.
As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes that
during the Pre-trial of this case, one of the issues raised by the
defendants Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties is: Whether
or not there can be disinheritance in intestate succession?
Whether or not defendant Ramon Ching can be legally
disinherited from the estate of his father? To the mind of the
Court , the issue of disinheritance, which is one of the
causes of action in the Complaint, can be fully settled
after a trial on the merits. And at this stage, it has not
been sufficiently established whether or not there is a
will.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
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The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007
denying the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, became
the subjects of a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. The
petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99856, raised the issue of
whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it
denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact that
the Amended Complaint sought to establish the status or rights
of the respondents which subjects are within the ambit of a
special proceeding.
On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed
Decision21 denying the petition for certiorari on grounds:
red chanroblesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations
supporting the causes of action of the amended complaint
induced us to infer that nothing in the said complaint
shows that the action of the private respondents should
be threshed out in a special proceeding, it appearing
that their allegations were substantially for the
enforcement of their rights against the alleged
fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon
Ching. The private respondents also instituted the said
amended complaint in order to protect them from the
consequence of the fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching by
seeking to disqualify Ramon Ching from inheriting from
Antonio Ching as well as to enjoin him from disposing or
alienating the subject properties, including the P4
Million deposit with Metrobank. The intestate or probate
court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such issues, which must
be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Furthermore, we agree
with the trial court that the probate court could not take
cognizance of the prayer to disinherit Ramon Ching,
given the undisputed fact that there was no will to be
contested in a probate court.
The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended
complaint and complicates the issue of jurisdiction by
reiterating the grounds or defenses set up in the petitioners'
earlier pleadings. Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint without regard to whether
or not the private respondents (plaintiffs) are entitled to
recover upon all or some of the causes of action
asserted therein. In this regard, the jurisdiction of the
court does not depend upon the defenses pleaded in the
answer or in the motion to dismiss, lest the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
petitioners (defendants).22 Hence, we focus our resolution
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on the issue of jurisdiction on the allegations in the amended
complaint and not on the defenses pleaded in the motion to
dismiss or in the subsequent pleadings of the petitioners.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there
being no compelling reason to still subject the action of
the petitioners in a special proceeding since the
nullification of the subject documents could be achieved
in the civil case, the lower court should proceed to evaluate
the evidence of the parties and render a decision thereon upon
the issues that it defined during the pre-trial in Civil Case No.
02-105251.23 (Emphasis supplied)
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The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the
CA through a Resolution24 issued on July 8, 2010.
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The Issue
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari25 is anchored on
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the issue of:
Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to
Dismiss filed by the PETITIONERS on the alleged ground of the
RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
Amended Complaint, to wit, (a) filiations with Antonio of
Ramon, Jaime and Joseph; (b) rights of common-law wives,
Lucina and Mercedes, to be considered as heirs of Antonio; (c)
determination of the extent of Antonio's estate; and (d) other
matters which can only be resolved in a special proceeding and
not in an ordinary civil action.
The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the
authority to determine (a) who are the heirs of a decedent; (b)
the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights; (c) the status of
each heir; and (d) whether the property in the inventory is
conjugal or the exclusive property of the deceased
spouse. Further, the extent of Antonio's estate, the status of
26
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the contending parties and the respondents' alleged
entitlement as heirs to receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA
now in Metrobank's custody are matters which are more
appropriately the subjects of a special proceeding and not of an
ordinary civil action.
The respondents opposed27 the instant petition claiming that
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the petitioners are engaged in forum shopping. Specifically,
G.R. Nos. 17550728 and 183840,29 both involving the
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contending parties in the instant petition were filed by the
petitioners and are currently pending before this Court.
Further, in Mendoza v. Hon. Teh,30 the SC declared that
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whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate
jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of
procedure. Besides, the petitioners, having validly submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC and having actively
participated in the trial of the case, are already estopped from
challenging the RTC's jurisdiction over the respondents'
Complaint and Amended Complaint.31 red
The Court's Ruling
We resolve to deny the instant petition.
The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this
Court directing them to file their reply to the respondents'
Comment/Opposition to the instant Petition. While the
prescribed period to comply expired on March 15, 2011, the
petitioners filed their Manifestation that they will no longer file
a reply only on October 10, 2011 or after the lapse of almost
seven months.
Further, no reversible errors were committed by the RTC and
the CA when they both ruled that the denial of the petitioners'
second motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 02-105251 was
proper.
Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the
respondents that the petitioners engaged in forum shopping
and are already estopped from questioning the RTC's
jurisdiction after having validly submitted to it when the latter
participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant
Petition is still in order.Although the respondents' Complaint
and Amended Complaint sought, among others, the
disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the
respondents of the CPPA now under Metrobank's custody, Civil
Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and
not a special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of
the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the
Rules of Court.32 A special proceeding is a remedy by which a
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party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact.33 It is distinguished from an ordinary civil action where a
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party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong.34 To initiate a special
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proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected
only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while
the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint
sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument
supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was
ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's
disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of
the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the
probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended
Complaint, seeking the release in favor of the respondents of
the CPPA under Metrobank's custody and the nullification of the
instruments subject of the complaint, necessarily require the
determination of the respondents' status as Antonio's heirs.
It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was
that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which
was in Mercedes' possession prior to the execution of the
Agreement and Waiver. The respondents also prayed for the
alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of a hold
order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with
Metrobank during the pendency of the case. It can thus be said
that the respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was premised
on Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged collective
ownership of the same, and not on the declaration of their
status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be emphasized
that the respondents were parties to the execution of the
Agreement35 and Waiver36 prayed to be nullified. Hence, even
red red
without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the
respondents have the standing to seek for the nullification of
the instruments in the light of their claims that there was no
consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised
undue influence and committed fraud against them.
Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonio’s estate executed by
Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said
affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a
resolution of the issues raised shall first require a declaration of
the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not
determinative of which court shall properly exercise
jurisdiction.
In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma
Hugo,37 the Court declared:
red chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction
of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set
up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise,
the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon
the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is
the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint
and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be
consulted.
In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of
the documents subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be
achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case
was instituted to protect the respondents from the supposedly
fraudulent acts of Ramon . In the event that the RTC will find
grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the
only consequence will be the reversion of the properties
subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. Civil Case No.
02-105251 was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues
relating to the administration, liquidation and distribution of
Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the
RTC may not be strategically sound, because a settlement
proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to
recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been
illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained
from taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint and
Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers
indicated therein are matters which need not be threshed out
in a special proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners'

(a) Opposition to the respondents' Motion to Admit Substitution
of Party;38 and (b) Manifestation39 through counsel that they
red red

will no longer file a reply to the respondents'

Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18799 March 31, 1964
HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance,
Negros Occidental,
ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HERMINIO MARAVILLA, respondent.
Jose Gutierrez David, A. Aveto, A. Mirasol and P. C. Ramos for
petitioners.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
Petitioners herein appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 27200-R) wherein, over their objection, raising
the question of jurisdiction petition, the appellate court took cognizance
of the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Herminio Maravilla
and, in consequence thereof, set aside the appointment of petitioner
Eliezar Lopez as a special co-administrator of the estate of the
deceased Digna Maravilla. The pertinent antecedent facts are as
follows:
On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with he Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for probate of the will
(Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla who died
on August 12 of that same year. In the will the surviving spouse was
named as the universal heir and executor.
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla
(brother and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla) filed an opposition
to the probate of the will, on the ground, inter alia, that the will was not
signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting
witnesses and of one another.
On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was
opposed by Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, the court issued an
order appointing him special administrator of the estate of the deceased,
for the reason that:
... all the properties subject of the will are conjugal properties of
the petitioner and his late wife, Digna Maravilla, and before any
partition of the conjugal property is done, the Court cannot
pinpoint which of the property subject of the Will belongs to
Digna Maravilla, exclusively, that shall be administered by the
special administrator. Hence, although it is true that the
petitioner Herminio Maravilla has an adverse interest in the
property subject of the Will, the Court finds it impossible for the
present time to appoint any person other than the petitioner as
special administrator of the property until after the partition is
ordered, for the reason that the properties mentioned in the Will
are in the name of the petitioner who is the surviving spouse of
the deceased.
On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of
the will, as it was not duly signed on each page by the testatrix in the
presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with
the court a petition for appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion
Maravilla) as special co-administrator to protect their interests, on the
ground that the will, having been denied probate, they are the legal heirs
of the decedent. Said petition was heard on February 20, at which
hearing, respondent's counsel orally moved for postponement, because
respondent's principal counsel (Salonga) had not been notified and was
not present. The court ordered presentation of oral evidence, consisting
of the testimonies of Eliezar Lopez, and Regina and Francisco Maravilla.
On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of
appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal, from the decision denying
probate of the will. Some devisees under the will, likewise, appealed
from said decision.
On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with
the court a petition for the removal of respondent as special
administrator, as he failed to file an inventory within 3 months from his
appointment and qualification as special administrator, as provided for in
Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court. To this petition, respondent
filed an opposition, on the ground that said provision of the Rules of
Court does not apply to a special administrator, and an inventory had
already been submitted by him, before said petition for his removal was
filed.
1äwphï1.ñët
On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas
filed with the court a petition for appointment of Conchita as special co-
administratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo, likewise, filed a similar petition
February 29.
On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint hearing the (1) petition to
appoint Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, (2) approval of
respondent's record appeal and appeal bond, (3) petition to remove
respondent as special administrator, (4) petition to appoint Conchita
Kohlhaas as special co-administratrix, and (5) petition to appoint Adelina
Sajo as special co-administrator. At said hearing, respondent objected to
the appointment of Eliezar Lopez was special co-administratrix, on
grounds that (a) the law allows only one special co-administrator (b) the
order of March 16, 1959 estops the court from appointing Eliezar Lopez
as special co-administrator (c) such appointment is unfair to respondent,
because owns at least 3/4 of the whole property, conjugal nature, which
would be subjected to the administrate of a stranger, and (d) a deadlock
between two special administrators would ruin the management of the
property, including those of respondent. On cross-examination of Eliezar
Lopez, respondent's counsel elicited the facts that (1) Lopez was
employed full time in the PCAPE, with office in Manila. and could not
discharge the functions of a co-administrator, and (2) there was merely
intention on Lopez part to resign from office.
After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator in an order dictated open court, to protect the interests of
Pedro, Asuncion and Regina Maravilla.
From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for
preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing Eliezar Lopez as
special co-administrator, and to prohibit the probate court from further
proceeding with the petition for the removal of respondent as special
administrator. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary
injunction on March 9, 1960 which was amended on March 11, 1960 to
make it more specific.
On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition to certify the case to the Supreme Court, on
the grounds that the principal amount in controversy in this case
exceeds P200,000.00, and the writs (of certiorari and prohibition) prayed
for are not in aid of appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since
the probate case is not on appeal before it. To this petition, respondent
filed an opposition. on the grounds that the amount in controversy is less
than P200,000.00 and the decision of the probate court (of February 8,
1960) is now on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
and the present case does not involve title to or possession of real
estate exceeding in value P200,000.00.1
On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the
writs (certiorari and prohibition) prayed for by respondent, and declaring
null and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator.
Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of
said decision, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this
appeal.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue
the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent, the same
not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision
appealed from, assumed jurisdiction over the present case on the theory
that "the amount in controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar
Lopez as special co-administrator to protect the interests of respondents
(herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e., one fourth of
the conjugal property" (of respondent and the deceased Digna
Maravilla) which, is per inventory submitted by respondent as special
administrator is valued at P362,424.90. This theory is untenable. Note
that the proceedings had on the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special
co-administrator are merely incidental to the probate or testate
proceedings of the deceased Digna Maravilla presently on appeal before
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where petitioners' motion
to elevate the same to the Supreme Court, on the ground that the
amount herein involved is within the latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is still
pending, resolution. That the Court of Appeals has no appellate
jurisdiction over said testate proceedings cannot be doubted,
considering that the properties therein involved are valued at
P362,424,90, as per inventory of the special administrator.
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be
administered and liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining
to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has
already held that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the
dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse (Vda. de
Roxas v. Pecson, et al., L-2211, December 20, 1948; 82 Phil. 407; see
also Vda. de Chantengco v. Chantengco, et al., L-10663, October 31,
1958). In a number of cases where appeal was taken from an order of a
probate court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized that the
amount or value involved or in controversy therein is that of the entire
estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-3087, July 31, 1954, 50 O.G. 5321; Vano v.
Vda. de Garces, et al., L-6303, June 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3045). Not
having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in probate (CA-G.R.
No. 27478-R), considering that the amount involved therein is more than
P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original jurisdiction
to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in
the instant case, which are merely incidental thereto.
In the United States, the rule is that "proceedings in probate are
appealable where the amount or value involved is reducible to a
pecuniary standard, the amount involved being either the appellant's
interest or the value of the entire estate according as the issues on
appeal involve only the appellant's rights or the entire administration of
the estate. ... In a contest for administration of an estate the amount or
value of the assets of the estate is the amount in controversy for
purposes of appeal." (4 C.J.S. 204). In line with this ruling, it is to be
observed that respondent's interest as appellant in the probate
proceedings (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) is, according to his theory, the
whole estate amounting to P362,424.90, or, at least more than 3/4
thereof, or approximately P270,000.00. Such interest, reduced to a
pecuniary standard on the basis of the inventory, is the amount or value
of the matter in controversy, and such amount being more than
P200,000.00, it follows that the appeal taken in said proceedings falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and should,
therefore, be certified to it pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended.
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the
annulment of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing
respondent as special administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the
administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or value of
the assets of the whole estate is the value in controversy (4 C.J.S. 204).
It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is much more than
P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no original jurisdiction to
issue the writs in question.
The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, arrived at the
amount of "P90,000.00 more or less", as the amount involved in the
case, upon authority of the case of Vistan v. Archbishop (73 Phil. 20).
But this case is inapplicable, as it does not refer to the question of
administration of the estate, nor to an order denying probate of a will, but
only to the recovery of a particular legacy consisting of the rentals of a
fishpond belonging to the estate. In an analogous case involving the
administration of a trust fund, the United States Supreme Court held:
Where the trust fund administered and ordered to be distributed
by the circuit court, in a suit to compel the stockholders of a
corporation to pay their subscriptions to stock to realize the fund,
amounts to more than $5,000.00, this court has jurisdiction of
the appeal, which is not affected by the fact that the amounts
decreed to some of the creditors are less than that sum (Handly
et al. vs. Stutz, et al., 34 Law Ed. 706).
Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as
distinguished from ordinary civil cases, are within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not enumerated in
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting, arguendo, that a
special proceeding is not a civil action, it has never been decided that a
special proceeding is not a "civil case" (Carpenter v. Jones, 121 Cal.
362; 58 p. 842). On the other hand, it has been held that the term "civil
case" includes special proceedings (Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680,
N.W. 178). Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of Court provides
that the rules on ordinary civil actions are applicable in special
proceedings where they are not inconsistent with, or when they may
serve to supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings.
Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same in civil actions as in
special proceedings. (See Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.)
The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate
total claim of the parties and not the combined claims against each other
determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are not applicable to, the
instant case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court is explicit
that the amount or value involved or in controversy in probate
proceedings is that of the entire estate. Assuming, arguendo, that the
rule in the cases cited by respondent is here applicable, it should be
noted that respondent claims the whole estate of at least more than 3/4
thereof. Said claim, reduced to a pecuniary standard, on the basis of the
inventory, would amount to more than P200,000.00 and, consequently,
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115, May 10, 1954) cited by

respondent in his brief, is also inapplicable, because unlike the instant
case, it did not involve a contest in the administration of the estate.

While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate
proceedings (Spec. Proc. No. 4977, CFI of Negros Occidental) which
was appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, it becomes
immaterial, in view of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, providing that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the value in controversy
exceeds two hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs",
and that "all cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme
Court, or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which
shall hear the same as if it had originally been brought before it".

On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as

special administrator, we agree with respondent that there was no need
for it. Note that the Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-
administrator, the reason being, that the appointment of such special
administrator is merely temporary and subsists only until a regular
executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus, it would not only be
unnecessary but also impractical, if for the temporary duration of the
need for a special administrator, another one is appointed aside from the
husband, in this case, upon whom the duty to liquidate the community
property devolves merely to protect the interests of petitioners who, in
the event that the disputed will is allowed to probate, would even have
no right to participate in the proceedings at all. (Roxas v. Pecson, 82
Phil. 407.)

In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the amount

involved in the controversy, it is suggested that appropriate steps be
taken on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals involving the
probate of the will (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) to comply with the provisions
of the Judiciary Act on the matter.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is

set aside and another one entered also setting aside the order of the
trial court of March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator. Without costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 168913 March 14, 2007
ROLANDO TING, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L.
ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L.
DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L.
ALCOVER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC)
No. N-983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the Spouses
Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281
(the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January
29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10,
1982 directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of
the spouses Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the
same lot. The application was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio,
Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David,
Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the
opportunity to file an opposition to petitioner’s application by Branch 21
of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer2 calling attention to the December
10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and
executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing
of petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu
RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner’s application on the
ground of res judicata. 31ªvvphi 1.nét
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole
issue of whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata
in LRC No. 1437-N.
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had
become final and executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of
registration has been issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA);4 it
was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct" decision belatedly surfaced
as basis of respondents’ motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N;5 and as no
action for revival of the said decision was filed by respondents after the
lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the
dormant judgment passé[d] into extinction."6
Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis
of res judicata.7
The petition fails.
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of
decree. – The judgment rendered in a land registration
proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days8 to be
counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal
may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon
the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of
this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of
registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the
person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied)
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private
land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the
title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its
registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the
whole world.9 It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary
period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.10
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration
court’s approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora
Atienza’s application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and
is binding on the whole world including petitioner.
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No.
N-983 had become "extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA has not
issued the decree of registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief
of the Survey Assistance Section, Land Management Services,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7,
Cebu City having claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral
Extension is erroneous and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral
extension must first be approved by the Land Management Services of
the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in
court; and that the spouses Lirio did not comply with the said
requirement for they instead submitted to the court a mere special work
order.11
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of
Engineer Belleza and that it reported such claim to the land registration
court for appropriate action or reconsideration of the decision which was
its duty.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials
to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that
they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in
conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the
record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are
in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance
of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They
act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as
administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They
are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in
ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings."12 (Emphasis
supplied)
As for petitioner’s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and
executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before
it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five
(5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is
barred by the statute of limitations[,]
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure
of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the
same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.13 enunciates the raison d’etre why Section 6,
Rule 39 does not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE
DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON
NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET
BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the
above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a
decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be
enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another
proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory
is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be
enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10
years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules
refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings,
such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a
civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as
against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same
within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the
decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or
fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed
by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said
ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party
had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires
to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to
Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action,
except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a
writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the
adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any
further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions,

DENIED.

Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.

SO ORDERED.