ARTICLE 774

1. G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which
seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No.
48831 affirming the dismissal2 of the petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez
entered into a loan agreement3 in the amount of ₱128,000.00. The amount was intended for the
payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In
view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the
principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and
every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement,4 this time in the
amount of ₱123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of
Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard
Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the
said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing
Guaranty Agreement5 for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.6 Subsequently in March 1981,
testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent. 7 During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint
Agreement8 dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for
Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding
to the tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities9 was executed by and
between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among
others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on
February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint11 for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil
Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not
served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of
his return to the Philippines.12 Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent
Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer 13 and alleged that the loan
documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement
signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void;
hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch
63.14 Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the
court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.15
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court
before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending, as the sum of money
being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the
Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in
effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement was void, considering
that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until after
the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was
the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and
liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of
assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly
refer to the decedent’s account. Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and
void, the trial court held that the petitioner’s cause of action against respondent Florence S. Ariola
must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of Appeals (CA),
assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A)
SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION
AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED
HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.16
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of the
joint agreement marked as Exhibit "A" estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot
deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in their
personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before the probate court for
approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of those enumerated in the
holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly
respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-
litigate the claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of the petitioner
should have been presented before the probate court.17
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the petitioner should
have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid
partition may be had until after the will has been probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph
(e) of the holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic terms when the
deceased referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the active participation of respondent
Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.18
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT

AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.

II.
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ UNTIL AFTER
THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.

IV.

RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH

THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF
THE CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.

V.

THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF ₱128,000.00 AND
DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF ₱123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY
ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ
IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.19

The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as provided
in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint
agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the
obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement without
any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position contrary thereto. The petitioner also
points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors
subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The active participation
and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioner’s
claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the probate proceedings, and
to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of
the tractors under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves
to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts failed to
consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan
documents, all establishing the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibañez
and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated
May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibañez, together with his
heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are
concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the continuing
guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by the named respondents, the latter must
be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its
money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving heirs are
being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the petitioner is trying to
recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim should have been
filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement
there was already an existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about. However, to
avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the obligation, the petitioner opted
to require them to execute the said agreement. 1a\^/phi1.net

According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that the agreement
was null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her
brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice
the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as she even stated
in her answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the probate court. Thus, the
petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any continuing guaranty
agreement, nor was there any document presented as evidence to show that she had caused
herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the Agreement
executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the
deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the
deceased. 1awphi1.nét

At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered.20 The said court is primarily concerned with the
administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.21
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will
has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property
by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such
as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.22
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced
in the will.23 In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibañez, left a holographic will24 which
contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise,
shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of
Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he
was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three
(3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not
valid. The joint agreement25 executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among
themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending
proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the
properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without
the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot
allow.26 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any
other transaction.27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an
extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just
divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of
the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent.28 In the instant case, there is
no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it
was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to
determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola
to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other
possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the
decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs
as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the
above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel
taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp."29 The assumption of
liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession
and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the
partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were
each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive
any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor
l^vvphi1.net

of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. — All claims
for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action
that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased
in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off
against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim
had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due,
or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. 30 As we
held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:31

… This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the
rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to
the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition
of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.32
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented,
particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed
only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money
claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent
under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses
Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the
successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its
assets and liabilities.33 The petitioner in its complaint alleged that "by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit Corporation
and Union Bank of the Philippines…"34 However, the documentary evidence35 clearly reflects that the
parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can
the petitioner’s participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial
evidence was presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact,
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:

… [T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did not
present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the
Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. "The power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised
by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative." (Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).36
This being the case, the petitioner’s personality to file the complaint is wanting. Consequently, it
failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and
the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals
Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
2. G.R. No. 169129 March 28, 2007
SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS, &
LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and TADEO F. SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. JOSE LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60450 entitled, Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao v.
Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F.
Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos, dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively,
which granted the appeal filed by herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina
Lumbao (Spouses Lumbao) and ordered herein petitioners Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and
Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo
F. Santos to reconvey to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to pay the latter
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, thus, reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, dated 17 June 1998 which dismissed the Complaint for Reconveyance with
Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao for lack of merit.
Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and
surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20 October 1985. The other
petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the daughters-in-law of Rita.
Herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao are the alleged owners of the
107-square meter lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during her lifetime.
The facts of the present case are as follows:
On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the
subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc
(Maria), who died intestate on 19 September 1978. On the first occasion, Rita sold 100 square
meters of her inchoate share in her mother’s estate through a document denominated as "Bilihan ng
Lupa," dated 17 August 1979.4 Respondents Spouses Lumbao claimed the execution of the
aforesaid document was witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by their signatures
affixed therein. On the second occasion, an additional seven square meters was added to the land
as evidenced by a document also denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 9 January 1981.5
After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof
and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the
present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao made
several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for
them to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of
respondents Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property is concerned. Respondents Spouses
Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not
deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs
from Maria had not yet been partitioned.
On 2 May 1986, the Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy
with one another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement,6 adjudicating and partitioning among
themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already
sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao and now covered by TCT No. 817297 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pasig City.
On 15 June 1992, respondents Spouses Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal demand letter 8 to
petitioners but despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still failed and refused to reconvey
the subject property to the respondents Spouses Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed a Complaint
for Reconveyance with Damages9 before the RTC of Pasig City.
Petitioners filed their Answer denying the allegations that the subject property had been sold to the
respondents Spouses Lumbao. They likewise denied that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement had
been fraudulently executed because the same was duly published as required by law. On the
contrary, they prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action because
respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law
under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which
repealed Presidential Decree No. 150810 requiring first resort to barangay conciliation.
Respondents Spouses Lumbao, with leave of court, amended their Complaint because they
discovered that on 16 February 1990, without their knowledge, petitioners executed a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage in favor of Julieta S. Esplana for the sum of ₱30,000.00. The said Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage was annotated at the back of TCT No. PT-81729 on 26 April 1991. Also, in answer
to the allegation of the petitioners that they failed to comply with the mandate of the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, respondents Spouses Lumbao said that the Complaint was filed
directly in court in order that prescription or the Statute of Limitations may not set in.
During the trial, respondents Spouses Lumbao presented Proserfina Lumbao and Carolina Morales
as their witnesses, while the petitioners presented only the testimony of petitioner Virgilio.
The trial court rendered a Decision on 17 June 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
Premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby denied for lack of merit.
Considering that [petitioners] have incurred expenses in order to protect their interest, [respondents
spouses Lumbao] are hereby directed to pay [petitioners], to wit: 1) the amount of ₱30,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, and 2) costs of the suit.11
Aggrieved, respondents Spouses Lumbao appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 8 June 2005, the
appellate court rendered a Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed
Decision dated June 17, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 in Civil Case No.
62175 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered ordering
[petitioners] to reconvey 107 square meters of the subject [property] covered by TCT No. PT-81729
of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, Metro Manila, and to pay to [respondents spouses Lumbao]
the sum of ₱30,000.00 for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
No pronouncement as to costs.12
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision but it was denied
in the Resolution of the appellate court dated 29 July 2005 for lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are the following:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, THEREBY CREATING A VARIANCE ON THE FINDINGS OF
FACTS OF TWO COURTS.

II. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING

THE PETITIONERS TO RECONVEY THE SUBJECT [PROPERTY] TO THE
RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO] AND IN NOT RULING THAT THEY ARE
GUILTY OF LACHES, HENCE THEY CANNOT RECOVER THE LOT ALLEGEDLY
SOLD TO THEM.

III. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

HEREIN PETITIONER[S] TO BE IN GOOD FAITH IN EXECUTING THE "DEED OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT" DATED [2 MAY 1986].

IV. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT LEGALLY BOUND TO COMPLY WITH THE
SUPPOSED BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981]
THAT WERE SUPPOSEDLY EXECUTED BY THE LATE RITA CATOC.

V. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO’S] ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE
WITH DAMAGES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED WITH AN UNENFORCEABLE
 DOCUMENTS, SUCH AS THE BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9
JANUARY 1981].

VI. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO’S] COMPLAINT FOR RECONVEYANCE
IS DISMISSABLE (SIC) FOR NON COMPLIANCE OF THE MANDATE OF [P.D. NO.]
1508, AS AMENDED BY Republic Act No. 7160.

VII. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO] SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR
PETITIONERS’ CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY[‘]S FEES.

Petitioners ask this Court to scrutinize the evidence presented in this case, because they claim that
the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting. They allege that the
findings of fact by the trial court revealed that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo did not witness the
execution of the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa"; hence, this finding runs counter to the
conclusion made by the appellate court. And even assuming that they were witnesses to the
aforesaid documents, still, respondents Spouses Lumbao were not entitled to the reconveyance of
the subject property because they were guilty of laches for their failure to assert their rights for an
unreasonable length of time. Since respondents Spouses Lumbao had slept on their rights for a
period of more than 12 years reckoned from the date of execution of the second "Bilihan ng Lupa," it
would be unjust and unfair to the petitioners if the respondents will be allowed to recover the subject
property.
Petitioners allege they are in good faith in executing the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement because
even respondents Spouses Lumbao’s witness, Carolina Morales, testified that neither petitioner
Virgilio nor petitioner Tadeo was present during the execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17
August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Petitioners affirm that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was
published in a newspaper of general circulation to give notice to all creditors of the estate subject of
partition to contest the same within the period prescribed by law. Since no claimant appeared to
interpose a claim within the period allowed by law, a title to the subject property was then issued in
favor of the petitioners; hence, they are considered as holders in good faith and therefore cannot be
barred from entering into any subsequent transactions involving the subject property.
Petitioners also contend that they are not bound by the documents denominated as "Bilihan ng
Lupa" because the same were null and void for the following reasons: 1) for being falsified
documents because one of those documents made it appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were
witnesses to its execution and that they appeared personally before the notary public, when in truth
and in fact they did not; 2) the identities of the properties in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August
1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to the subject property in litigation were not established by the
evidence presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao; 3) the right of the respondents Spouses
Lumbao to lay their claim over the subject property had already been barred through estoppel by
laches; and 4) the respondents Spouses Lumbao’s claim over the subject property had already
prescribed.
Finally, petitioners claim that the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents
Spouses Lumbao was dismissible because they failed to comply with the mandate of Presidential
Decree No. 1508, as amended by Republic Act No. 7160, particularly Section 412 of Republic Act
No. 7160.
Given the foregoing, the issues presented by the petitioners may be restated as follows:
I. Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents
spouses Lumbao is dismissible for their failure to comply with the mandate of the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R.A. No. 7160.
II. Whether or not the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa" are valid and enforceable, thus,
they can be the bases of the respondents spouses Lumbao’s action for reconveyance with
damages.
III. Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound to comply with the "Bilihan ng Lupa"
dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 and consequently, reconvey the subject property
to herein respondents spouses Lumbao.
It is well-settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the court is not a trier of
facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court.13 But, the rule is not without exceptions. There are
several recognized exceptions14 in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court. One of these
exceptions is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court. This
exception is present in the case at bar.
Going to the first issue presented in this case, it is the argument of the petitioners that the Complaint
for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao should be dismissed for
failure to comply with the barangay conciliation proceedings as mandated by the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No. 7160. This argument cannot be sustained.
Section 408 of the aforesaid law and Administrative Circular No. 14-9315 provide that all disputes
between parties actually residing in the same city or municipality are subject to barangay
conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any
government offices. Non-compliance with the said condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of
the plaintiff’s cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of
cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from
exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants failed to object to
such exercise of jurisdiction.16
While it is true that the present case should first be referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation
because the parties involved herein actually reside in the same city (Pasig City) and the dispute
between them involves a real property, hence, the said dispute should have been brought in the city
in which the real property, subject matter of the controversy, is located, which happens to be the
same city where the contending parties reside. In the event that respondents Spouses Lumbao
failed to comply with the said condition precedent, their Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages
can be dismissed. In this case, however, respondents Spouses Lumbao’s non-compliance with the
aforesaid condition precedent cannot be considered fatal. Although petitioners alleged in their
answer that the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao
should be dismissed for their failure to comply with the condition precedent, which in effect, made
the complaint prematurely instituted and the trial court acquired no jurisdiction to hear the case, yet,
they did not file a Motion to Dismiss the said complaint.
Emphasis must be given to the fact that the petitioners could have prevented the trial court from
exercising jurisdiction over the case had they filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, instead of doing
so, they invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer seeking an affirmative relief from it.
Worse, petitioners actively participated in the trial of the case by presenting their own witness and by
cross-examining the witnesses presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao. It is elementary that
the active participation of a party in a case pending against him before a court is tantamount to
recognition of that court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case which
will bar said party from later on impugning the court’s jurisdiction. 17 It is also well-settled that the
non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in
nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to
dismiss.18 Hence, herein petitioners can no longer raise the defense of non-compliance with the
barangay conciliation proceedings to seek the dismissal of the complaint filed by the respondents
Spouses Lumbao, because they already waived the said defense when they failed to file a Motion to
Dismiss.
As regards the second issue, petitioners maintain that the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979
and 9 January 1981 are null and void for being falsified documents as it is made to appear that
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the execution of the said documents and that the
identities of the properties in those documents in relation to the subject property has not been
established by the evidence of the respondents Spouses Lumbao. Petitioners also claim that the
enforceability of those documents is barred by prescription of action and laches.
It is the petitioners’ incessant barking that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979
and 9 January 1981 were falsified because it was made to appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo
were present in the executions thereof, and their allegation that even respondents Spouses
Lumbao’s witness Carolina Morales proved that said petitioners were not present during the
execution of the aforementioned documents. This is specious.
Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this Court finds that in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated
17 August 1979, the signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon. Moreover, in
petitioners’ Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages, both
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as witnesses in the
execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. 19 However, in order to avoid their
obligations in the said "Bilihan ng Lupa," petitioner Virgilio, in his cross-examination, denied having
knowledge of the sale transaction and claimed that he could not remember the same as well as his
appearance before the notary public due to the length of time that had passed. Noticeably, petitioner
Virgilio did not categorically deny having signed the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and in
support thereof, his testimony in the cross-examination propounded by the counsel of the
respondents Spouses Lumbao is quoted hereunder:
ATTY. CHIU:
Q. Now, you said, Mr. Witness…Virgilio Santos, that you don’t know about this document which was
marked as Exhibit "A" for the [respondents spouses Lumbao]?
ATTY. BUGARING:
The question is misleading, your Honor. Counsel premised the question that he does not have any
knowledge but not that he does not know.
ATTY. CHIU:
Q. Being… you are one of the witnesses of this document? [I]s it not?
WITNESS:
A. No, sir.
Q. I am showing to you this document, there is a signature at the left hand margin of this document
Virgilio Santos, will you please go over the same and tell the court whose signature is this?
A. I don’t remember, sir, because of the length of time that had passed.
Q. But that is your signature?
A. I don’t have eyeglasses… My signature is different.
Q. You never appeared before this notary public Apolinario Mangahas?
A. I don’t remember.20
As a general rule, facts alleged in a party’s pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are
binding upon him, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of
fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. 21 And in spite of the presence of
judicial admissions in a party’s pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other
evidence presented.22 However, in the case at bar, as the Court of Appeals mentioned in its
Decision, "[herein petitioners] had not adduced any other evidence to override the admission made
in their [A]nswer that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17
August 1979] except that they were just misled as to the purpose of the document, x x x."23 Virgilio’s
answers were unsure and quibbled. Hence, the general rule that the admissions made by a party in
a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in this case.
On the testimony of respondents Spouses Lumbao’s witness Carolina Morales, this Court adopts the
findings made by the appellate court. Thus -
[T]he trial court gave singular focus on her reply to a question during cross-examination if the
[petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were not with her and the vendor [Rita] during the transaction. It must
be pointed out that earlier in the direct examination of said witness, she confirmed that [respondents
spouses Lumbao] actually bought the lot from [Rita] ("nagkabilihan"). Said witness positively
identified and confirmed the two (2) documents evidencing the sale in favor of [respondents spouse
Lumbao]. Thus, her subsequent statement that the [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were not with
them during the transaction does not automatically imply that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] did not
at any time sign as witnesses as to the deed of sale attesting to their mother’s voluntary act of selling
a portion of her share in her deceased mother’s property. The rule is that testimony of a witness
must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated
passages therein.24
Furthermore, both "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were
duly notarized before a notary public. It is well-settled that a document acknowledged before a
notary public is a public document25 that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie
evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and
due execution.26 To overcome this presumption, there must be presented evidence that is clear and
convincing. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be upheld.27 In addition, one who denies
the due execution of a deed where one’s signature appears has the burden of proving that contrary
to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to
be a voluntary act. Nonetheless, in the present case petitioners’ denials without clear and convincing
evidence to support their claim of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow the above-
mentioned presumption; hence, the authenticity, due execution and the truth of the facts stated in the
aforesaid "Bilihan ng Lupa" are upheld.
The defense of petitioners that the identities of the properties described in the "Bilihan ng Lupa,"
dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to the subject property were not established by
respondents Spouses Lumbao’s evidence is likewise not acceptable.
It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the documents denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa,"
the entire property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided among her and her co-
heirs and so the description of the entire estate is the only description that can be placed in the
"Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981" because the exact metes and bounds
of the subject property sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao could not be possibly determined at
that time. Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of sale between Rita and respondents
Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law and jurisprudence have categorically held that even
while an estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of their respective aliquots
or undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them.28 The co-owner,
however, has no right to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common,
because such right over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion without any physical
division. In any case, the mere fact that the deed purports to transfer a concrete portion does not per
se render the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-
owner. Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of the partition upon the termination of the co-
ownership.29
In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been partitioned on 2 May 1986 by virtue of a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, the 107- square meter lot sold by the mother of the petitioners to
respondents Spouses Lumbao should be deducted from the total lot, inherited by them in
representation of their deceased mother, which in this case measures 467 square meters. The 107-
square meter lot already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the
petitioners because the same was no longer part of their inheritance as it was already sold during
the lifetime of their mother.
Likewise, the fact that the property mentioned in the two "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents was described
as "a portion of a parcel of land covered in Tax Declarations No. A-018-01674," while the subject
matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was the property described in Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 3216 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal in the name of Maria is of no
moment because in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981, it is clear that
there was only one estate left by Maria upon her death. And this fact was not refuted by the
petitioners. Besides, the property described in Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and the property
mentioned in TCT No. 3216 are both located in Barrio Rosario, Municipality of Pasig, Province of
Rizal, and almost have the same boundaries. It is, thus, safe to state that the property mentioned in
Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and in TCT No. 3216 are one and the same.
The defense of prescription of action and laches is likewise unjustifiable. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is
the transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person’s name to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right. It is, indeed, true that the
right to seek reconveyance of registered property is not absolute because it is subject to extinctive
prescription. However, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed, prescription
cannot set in. Such an exception is based on the theory that registration proceedings could not be
used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another.30
In the case at bar, the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to seek reconveyance does not
prescribe because the latter have been and are still in actual possession and occupation as owners
of the property sought to be reconveyed, which fact has not been refuted nor denied by the
petitioners. Furthermore, respondents Spouses Lumbao cannot be held guilty of laches because
from the very start that they bought the 107-square meter lot from the mother of the petitioners, they
have constantly asked for the transfer of the certificate of title into their names but Rita, during her
lifetime, and the petitioners, after the death of Rita, failed to do so on the flimsy excuse that the lot
had not been partitioned yet. Inexplicably, after the partition of the entire estate of Maria, petitioners
still included the 107-square meter lot in their inheritance which they divided among themselves
despite their knowledge of the contracts of sale between their mother and the respondents Spouses
Lumbao.
Under the above premises, this Court holds that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August
1979 and 9 January 1981 are valid and enforceable and can be made the basis of the respondents
Spouses Lumbao’s action for reconveyance. The failure of respondents Spouses Lumbao to have
the said documents registered does not affect its validity and enforceability. It must be remembered
that registration is not a requirement for validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect
of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. The principal purpose of registration is merely to
notify other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property had been
entered into. Where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the
time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the
effect of registration as to him.31 Hence, the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and
9 January 1981, being valid and enforceable, herein petitioners are bound to comply with their
provisions. In short, such documents are absolutely valid between and among the parties thereto.
Finally, the general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-
interest applies in the present case. Article 131132 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from
the said provision that whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were
transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and
obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs.33 Thus, the heirs
cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest
because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor.
Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed
to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as
against them. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a
property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the
deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party
has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract.34
In the end, despite the death of the petitioners’ mother, they are still bound to comply with the
provisions of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Consequently, they
must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses Lumbao the 107-square meter lot which they bought
from Rita, petitioners’ mother. And as correctly ruled by the appellate court, petitioners must pay
respondents Spouses Lumbao attorney’s fees and litigation expenses for having been compelled to
litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest.35 On this matter, we do not find reasons to
reverse the said findings.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively, are hereby
AFFIRMED. Herein petitioners are ordered to reconvey to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject
property and to pay the latter attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 777

1. G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953

MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR
NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.
Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.
Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in
the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario
and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda,
who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However,
plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario
took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and
her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to
separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a
parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property
that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision
ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in
dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former
owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that
Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late
Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise
appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With
this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he
was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria
Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to
them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that
moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question
because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and
leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot
be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor
can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio
and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of
the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status
and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the
latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were
declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil
Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are
declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them
may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right
should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or
event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation,
provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same
origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over
the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so
because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the
new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to
the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of
pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that
they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to
assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that
this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a
donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may
be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or
in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been
followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
2.
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE
BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE
BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de
Borja, appellant. .
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA,
special Administratrix appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972
TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Francisco de
Borja, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa Tangco, defendant-
appellant.
L-28040
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of the testate estate of
Francisco de Borja,1 from the approval of a compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its Special Proceeding No. R-
7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".

Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the same
compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special
Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja,
Special Administratrix".
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala
Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and
exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with his
first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is
under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch II.
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October
1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-
7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946,
Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was
appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole
administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja
allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana
instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was
appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in
said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued
with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases
remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been
unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all these litigations, a
compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963, 2 by and between "[T]he heir and son
of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of
the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by
his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis
Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with finality,
the various court litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc., between them
in connection with the administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and
distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without any
reservations to enter into and execute this agreement under the following terms and
conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties
situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del
Municipio de Pililla de la Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte
Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por el Sur con los herederos
de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la Familia
Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per
square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda.
de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000)
Philippine Currency, in cash, which represent P200,000 as his share in the payment
and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all
surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete payment and
settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well
as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No.
7866-Rizal, respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by
the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or
Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise. The
funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall depend upon the receipt of full
payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that
particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development Bank of the Philippines,
amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes payment of her 1/5 share
of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja or the
sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala,
"Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under
paragraph 2 of this Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of the
Philippines and the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her under
paragraph 2 of this Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of
 Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury
warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose
de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs, successors,
executors, administrators, and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw,
waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or actions, cause
or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money, accounts, damages, claims
and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or now have or
may have against each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and
1955, CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI Nueva
Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed against Manuel
Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to completely,
absolutely and finally release each other, their heirs, successors, and assigns, from
any and all liability, arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from the
administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the
estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja,
and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and specifically renounce
absolutely her rights as heir over any hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de
Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under
paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and
documents belonging to Francisco de Borja which are in her possession and said
heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn the corresponding receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the
properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the
total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion",
otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this instrument NULL AND
VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966,
to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement,
but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R.
case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.R. case
No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not
disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the
heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja;
(2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja
and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate
Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the
Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the
settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is
against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial
settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the
decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the
Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those
circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses
that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule
74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a
deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion
of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the
parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is
a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will
is worse than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from
an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco.
Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana
Ongsingco —
shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her hereditary share
in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, ...
and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de
Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or
purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the
cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja
among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any
other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. 4 Of course, the
effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.
However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither
does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving
order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered
settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the
contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it
serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja,
Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code.
Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed
independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were
not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the
Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally
and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the
heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the
perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The
only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the
Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is
explicit on the point:
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no
definite period for its performance, the same was intended to have a resolutory
period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred that
such a limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms entered into by
 said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde
and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except that the consideration was fixed at
P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and which
contained the following clause:
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of
the property mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the
proceeds of the sale by the herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja,
namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no
sale of the said property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt of the
purchase price thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty (60) days from
the date hereof, this agreement will become null and void and of no further effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this
particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no
date, the day being left blank "this — day of October 1963"; and while signed by the parties, it was
not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed notarial ratification
clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2
heretofore transcribed that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000
represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde all surnamed de Borja"
which corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is
proof that the duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963
(Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate unformalize agreement with the
other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1)
not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is
moreover manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made
within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly
omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was
to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the estate of
Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days
counted from the finality of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for the
terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the
compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate
of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja,
whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her
eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that
eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not
bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of
whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088 of
the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could
not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it
amounts to a compromise as to her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point
is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex "A")
describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil status. There is
nothing in the text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as
the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her
hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
in its order of 21 September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in
L-28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been
abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
in its order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable settlement had been arrived at by
the parties", and that Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the
proposed amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and motion
above-mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had been
formally signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What the record discloses is that
some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out from the
compromise agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's approval
of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse
of the allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not preceded by
the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that
Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of Francisco de
Borja, etc., all of which objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in view of the
widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory agreement
before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step might ultimately
entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy. That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is
apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief
for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and it is more than probable that the order of 21
September 1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a
more satisfactory compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the
original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order
for its approval and enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore
described, decreed that the agreement be ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of
the order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its order
should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should
be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her
unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the
value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in receiving the payment of
the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreement
(Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And
as to the devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30
June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with
every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties of the estate", is particularly
opposite in the present case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion),
concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the
husband's private property (as contended by his second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it
forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate evidence to overcome
the presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has
become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding
cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in
the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the accompanying
reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the question may affect the rights of possible
creditors and legatees, its resolution is still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired
jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was duly
registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda
was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong
section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco
de Borja (V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena
Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay; containing an area of
13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7
and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452)
against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first
wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private property of
Francisco, while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was conjugal
property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption
established by Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code of
1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and exemplary,
as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff had
adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco de Borja, and his Administratrix,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then
appealed to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda in question
as owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late Francisco
de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended Inventory that, as executor of the estate of
his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended Accounting of the
same date, also filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda.
de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein an inventory dated 7
September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties of the
Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as
administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an inventory wherein she listed
the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de
Borja and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of
the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal"
(Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain admissions against
interest made by both Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of judicial
proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal presumption in favor of the
conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not
conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on the
strength of the following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951
(Exhibit "F") that —
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte,
337 hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala,
Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda had
been bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed by
Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent demand
from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo
that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the
proposal, Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount
would represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further
testified that —
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de
Borja when he was still a bachelor and which he derived from his business
transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the admissions
in the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can not
finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that the testimony of Gregorio
de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original Hacienda with his private
funds, for which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as
exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4)
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness Gregorio de
Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay,
hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja
had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both
Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the
statement itself is improbable, since there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain
to Gregorio how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A
ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's testimony.
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does not
clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) " refers
precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there were two
real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600,
and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion). To which of these lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In
addition, Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo" is plainly self-
serving, and not admissible in the absence of cross examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7")
are not conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in question; but as already noted, they
are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the declarants, Francisco de Borja and his
executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight than the self-
serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal
character of the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually
confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for damages should
be ventilated in the corresponding special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the
deceased, the same requires no pro announcement from this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case
No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are
reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3)
cases.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
3. G.R. No. 166236 : July 29, 2010
NOLI ALFONSO and ERLINDA FUNDIALAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES HENRY and LIWANAG ANDRES, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving.

In the present petition for review, petitioners assail the August 10, 2004 Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
cralaw

CV. No. 78362, which dismissed the appeal before it for failure of petitioners to file their brief within the extended reglementary
period.

Factual Antecedents

The present case stemmed from a complaint for accion publiciana with damages filed by respondent spouses Henry and Liwanag
Andres against Noli Alfonso and spouses Reynaldo and Erlinda Fundialan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, San
Mateo, Rizal.

On July 8, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision2 in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants and all persons
claiming rights under them who are ordered:

1. to vacate the premises located at 236 General Luna St., Dulongbayan 11, San Mateo, Rizal;

2. to jointly and severally pay the sum [of] P100.00 as reasonable compensation for the use of
said premises commencing from 04 September 1995; [and]

3. to jointly and severally pay the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and to pay the cost
of suit.

SO ORDERED.3 cralaw

Petitioners,4 thus, appealed to the CA.

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Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

On November 5, 2003, petitioners' previous counsel was notified by the CA to file appellants' brief within 45 days from receipt of
the notice. The original 45-day period expired on December 21, 2003. But before then, on December 8, 2003, petitioners' former
counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw Appearance. Petitioners consented to the withdrawal.

On December 19, 2003, petitioners themselves moved for an extension of 30 days or until January 21, 2004 within which to file
their appellants' brief. Then on March 3, 2004, petitioners themselves again moved for a fresh period of 45 days from March 3,
2004 or until April 18, 2004 within which to file their appellants' brief.

On March 17, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution:5 a) noting the withdrawal of appearance of petitioners' former counsel; b)
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requiring petitioners to cause the Entry of Appearance of their new counsel; and c) granting petitioners' motions for extension of
time to file their brief for a period totaling 75 days, commencing from December 21, 2003 or until March 5, 2004.

Petitioners themselves received a copy of this Resolution only on April 6, 2004. By that time, the extension to file appellants'
brief had already long expired.

On April 14, 2004, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), having been approached by petitioners, entered6 its appearance as new
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counsel for petitioners. However, on August 10, 2004, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners' appeal, to
wit:

FOR failure of defendants-appellants to file their brief within the extended reglementary period which expired on March 5, 2004
as per Judicial Records Division report dated July 26, 2004, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Sec. 1 (e), Rule 50 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

On September 6, 2004, the PAO filed their Motion for Reconsideration7 which requested for a fresh period of 45 days from
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September 7, 2004 or until October 22, 2004 within which to file appellants' brief. On October 21, 2004, the brief 8 was filed by cralaw

the PAO.

On November 26, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution 9 which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition
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for review.

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

 I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' APPEAL FOR

FAILURE TO FILE THEIR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF, DESPITE THE ATTENDANCE OF
PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING SUCH FAILURE, LIKE THE GROSS AND
RECKLESS NEGLIGENCE OF THEIR FORMER COUNSEL, THE ABSENCE OF MANIFEST INTENT TO
CAUSE DELAY, THE SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF LAW POSED FOR RESOLUTION BEFORE THE
APPELLATE COURT, AND THE FACT THAT THE APPELLANTS' BRIEF HAD ALREADY BEEN FILED
WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ALREADY FORMED PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.

II

THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS' APPEAL BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS HIGHLY

UNJUSTIFIED, INIQUITOUS AND UNCONSCIONABLE BECAUSE IT OVERLOOKED AND/OR
DISREGARDED THE MERITS OF PETITIONERS' CASE WHICH INVOLVES A DEPRIVATION OF THEIR
PROPERTY RIGHTS.10

Petitioners' Arguments

Petitioners contend that their failure to file their appellants' brief within the required period was due to their indigency and
poverty. They submit that there is no justification for the dismissal of their appeal specially since the PAO had just entered its
appearance as new counsel for petitioners as directed by the CA, and had as yet no opportunity to prepare the brief. They contend
that appeal should be allowed since the brief had anyway already been prepared and filed by the PAO before it sought
reconsideration of the dismissal of the appeal and is already part of the records. They contend that the late filing of the brief
should be excused under the circumstances so that the case may be decided on the merits and not merely on technicalities.

Respondents' Arguments

On the other hand, respondents contend that failure to file appellants' brief on time is one instance where the CA may dismiss an
appeal. In the present case, they contend that the CA exercised sound discretion when it dismissed the appeal upon petitioners'
failure to file their appellants' brief within the extended period of 75 days after the original 45-day period expired.

Our Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Failure to file Brief On Time

Rule 50 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.-An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of
the appellee, on the following grounds:

xxxx

(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or
memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;

Petitioners plead for the suspension of the rules and cite a number of cases where the Court excused the late filing
of a notice of appeal as well as the late filing of the appellant's brief. They further cite Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals11 where the late filing of the appellant's brief was excused because the Court
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found the case impressed with public interest.

The cases cited by petitioners are not in point. In the present civil case which involves the failure to file the
appellants' brief on time, there is no showing of any public interest involved. Neither is there a showing that an
injustice will result due to the application of technical rules.

Poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners' complacency in allowing months to pass by before
exerting the required effort to find a replacement lawyer. Poverty is not a justification for delaying a case. Both
parties have a right to a speedy resolution of their case. Not only petitioners, but also the respondents, have a right
to have the case finally settled without delay.

Furthermore, the failure to file a brief on time was due primarily to petitioners' unwise choices and not really due
to poverty. Petitioners were able to get a lawyer to represent them despite their poverty. They were able to get two
other lawyers after they consented to the withdrawal of their first lawyer. But they hired their subsequent lawyers
too late.

It must be pointed out that petitioners had a choice of whether to continue the services of their original lawyer or
consent to let him go. They could also have requested the said lawyer to file the required appellants' brief before
consenting to his withdrawal from the case. But they did neither of these. Then, not having done so, they delayed
in engaging their replacement lawyer. Their poor choices and lack of sufficient diligence, not poverty, are the
main culprits for the situation they now find themselves in. It would not be fair to pass on the bad consequences
of their choices to respondents. Petitioners' low regard for the rules or nonchalance toward procedural
requirements, which they camouflage with the cloak of poverty, has in fact contributed much to the delay, and
hence frustration of justice, in the present case.

No compelling reason to disregard technicalities

Petitioners beg us to disregard technicalities because they claim that on the merits their case is strong. A study of
the records fails to so convince us.

Petitioners theorize that publication of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Marcelino Alfonso is
required before their father, Jose Alfonso (Jose) could validly transfer the subject property. We are not convinced.
In Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals,12 the Court upheld the effectivity of a deed of extrajudicial settlement that
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was neither notarized nor published.

Significantly, the title of the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such
transmission is subject to the claims of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the
purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death
of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. 13 The deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Filomena Santos
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Vda. de Alfonso and Jose evidences their intention to partition the inherited property. It delineated what portion of
the inherited property would belong to whom.

The sale to respondents was made after the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. The
extrajudicial settlement of estate, even though not published, being deemed a partition 14 of the inherited
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property, Jose could validly transfer ownership over the specific portion of the property that was assigned to
him.15 cralaw

The records show that Jose did in fact sell to respondents the subject property. The deed of sale executed by Jose
in favor of the respondents being a public document, is entitled to full faith and credit in the absence of competent

evidence that its execution was tainted with defects and irregularities that would warrant a declaration of nullity.
As found by the RTC, petitioners failed to prove any defect or irregularities in the execution of the deed of sale.
They failed to prove

by strong evidence, the alleged lack of consent of Jose to the sale of the subject real property. As found by the
RTC, although Jose was suffering from partial paralysis and could no longer sign his name, there is no showing
that his mental faculties were affected in such a way as to negate the existence of his valid consent to the sale, as
manifested by his thumbmark on the deed of sale. The records sufficiently show that he was capable of boarding a
tricycle to go on trips by himself. Sufficient testimonial evidence in fact shows that Jose asked respondents to buy
the subject property so that it could be taken out from the bank to which it was mortgaged. This fact evinces that
Jose's mental faculties functioned intelligently.

In view of the foregoing, we find no compelling reason to overturn the assailed CA resolution. We find no
injustice in the dismissal of the appeal by the CA. Justice dictates that this case be put to rest already so that the
respondents may not be deprived of their rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 10, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV. No. 78362 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
4. G.R. No. 172804 January 24, 2011
GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This resolves the petition for review1 of the ruling2 of the Court of Appeals dismissing a suit to
recover a realty.
The Facts
Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his heirs,3 sued respondents,
spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco (respondents), in the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran
(trial court) to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land in Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte (Property)
and collect damages. Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July 1971
from Casimiro Vere (Vere), who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo (Rodrigo) in
August 1970. Petitioner declared the Property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it.
In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July
1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May 1965. The
two-page deed of donation (Deed), signed at the bottom by the parties and two witnesses, reads in
full:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, ALVEGIA RODRIGO, Filipino, of legal age, widow of the late Juan Arcillas, a
resident of Barrio Bool, municipality of Culaba, subprovince of Biliran, Leyte del Norte,
Philippines, hereby depose and say:

That as we live[d] together as husband and wife with Juan Arcillas, we begot children,
namely: LUCIO, VICENTA, SEGUNDINA, and ADELAIDA, all surnamed ARCILLAS, and
by reason of poverty which I suffered while our children were still young; and because
my husband Juan Arcillas aware as he was with our destitution separated us [sic] and
left for Cebu; and from then on never cared what happened to his family; and because
of that one EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, one of my nieces who also suffered with our
poverty, obedient as she was to all the works in our house, and because of the love and
affection which I feel [for] her, I have one parcel of land located at Sitio Amambajag,
Culaba, Leyte bearing Tax Decl. No. 1878 declared in the name of Alvegia Rodrigo, I
give (devise) said land in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, her heirs, successors, and
assigns together with all the improvements existing thereon, which parcel of land is
more or less described and bounded as follows:

1. Bounded North by Amambajag River; East, Benito Picao; South, Teofilo Uyvico; and
West, by Public land; 2. It has an area of 3,492 square meters more or less; 3. It is
planted to coconuts now bearing fruits; 4. Having an assessed value of ₱240.00; 5. It is
now in the possession of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the concept of
an owner, but the Deed of Donation or that ownership be vested on her upon my
demise.

That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above described, I already
devise in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and
that if the herein Donee predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted to the
Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;

That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the land above described from Inay
Alvegia Rodrigo and I am much grateful to her and praying further for a longer life;
 however, I will give one half (1/2) of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her
lifetime.4

Respondents entered the Property in 1983 and paid taxes afterwards.

The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled for petitioner, declared him owner of the Property, and ordered respondents to
surrender possession to petitioner, and to pay damages, the value of the Property’s produce since
1982 until petitioner’s repossession and the costs.5 The trial court rejected respondents’ claim of
ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by
selling the Property to Vere in 1970.6 Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the Property to respondents
in 1983, she had no title to transfer.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), imputing error in the trial court’s interpretation
of the Deed as a testamentary disposition instead of an inter vivos donation, passing title to
Rodriguez upon its execution.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA granted respondents’ appeal and set aside the trial court’s ruling. While conceding that the
"language of the [Deed is] x x x confusing and which could admit of possible different
interpretations,"7 the CA found the following factors pivotal to its reading of the Deed as
donation inter vivos: (1) Rodriguez had been in possession of the Property as owner since 21 May
1962, subject to the delivery of part of the produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the Deed’s consideration was
not Rodrigo’s death but her "love and affection" for Rodriguez, considering the services the latter
rendered; (3) Rodrigo waived dominion over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her,
implying its inclusion in Rodriguez’s estate; and (4) Rodriguez accepted the donation in the Deed
itself, an act necessary to effectuate donations inter vivos, not devises.8 Accordingly, the CA upheld
the sale between Rodriguez and respondents, and, conversely found the sale between Rodrigo and
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Vere, void for Rodrigo’s lack of title.
In this petition, petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the trial court’s ruling. Alternatively, petitioner
claims ownership over the Property through acquisitive prescription, having allegedly occupied it for
more than 10 years.9
Respondents see no reversible error in the CA’s ruling and pray for its affirmance.
The Issue
The threshold question is whether petitioner’s title over the Property is superior to respondents’. The
resolution of this issue rests, in turn, on whether the contract between the parties’ predecessors-in-
interest, Rodrigo and Rodriguez, was a donation or a devise. If the former, respondents hold
superior title, having bought the Property from Rodriguez. If the latter, petitioner prevails, having
obtained title from Rodrigo under a deed of sale the execution of which impliedly revoked the earlier
devise to Rodriguez.
The Ruling of the Court
We find respondents’ title superior, and thus, affirm the CA.
Naked Title Passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez Under a Perfected Donation
We examine the juridical nature of the Deed – whether it passed title to Rodriguez upon its execution
or is effective only upon Rodrigo’s death – using principles distilled from relevant jurisprudence.
Post-mortem dispositions typically –
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power
in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.10
 Further –
[4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor
indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa[;]
[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the
effect that the donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor" are not controlling criteria;
such statements are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give
effect to the real intent of the transferor[;] [and]
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather
than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of
the deed.11
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected
donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the
[Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez,"
signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate, waiving Rodrigo’s right to
reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s
acceptance of the disposition12 which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its
execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in
presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.13 Indeed, had
Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator
did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the
properties here donated x x x"14 or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title
over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.
In a bid to diffuse the non-reversion stipulation’s damning effect on his case, petitioner tries to profit
from it, contending it is a fideicommissary substitution clause.15 Petitioner assumes the fact he is
laboring to prove. The question of the Deed’s juridical nature, whether it is a will or a donation, is the
crux of the present controversy. By treating the clause in question as mandating fideicommissary
substitution, a mode of testamentary disposition by which the first heir instituted is entrusted with the
obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the
inheritance,16 petitioner assumes that the Deed is a will. Neither the Deed’s text nor the import of the
contested clause supports petitioner’s theory.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property, evident from
Rodriguez’s undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her
lifetime."17 Thus, the Deed’s stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my
demise," taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo’s beneficial title.
We arrived at the same conclusion in Balaqui v. Dongso18 where, as here, the donor, while "b[inding]
herself to answer to the [donor] and her heirs x x x that none shall question or disturb [the donee’s]
right," also stipulated that the donation "does not pass title to [the donee] during my lifetime; but
when I die, [the donee] shall be the true owner" of the donated parcels of land. In finding the
disposition as a gift inter vivos, the Court reasoned:
Taking the deed x x x as a whole, x x x x it is noted that in the same deed [the donor] guaranteed to
[the donee] and her heirs and successors, the right to said property thus conferred. From the
moment [the donor] guaranteed the right granted by her to [the donee] to the two parcels of land by
virtue of the deed of gift, she surrendered such right; otherwise there would be no need to guarantee
said right. Therefore, when [the donor] used the words upon which the appellants base their
contention that the gift in question is a donation mortis causa [that the gift "does not pass title during
my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels"] the
donor meant nothing else than that she reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of
said two parcels of land until her death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of
them freely.19 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary for her to
reserve partial usufructuary right over it.20
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death, such as the donor’s love and
affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless
"corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers."21 Thus, the CA committed no
error in giving weight to Rodrigo’s statement of "love and affection" for Rodriguez, her niece, as
consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding.
It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from the Deed tending to serve his
cause (e.g. "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise" and "devise").
Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations are interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the
donor’s intent. In no less than seven cases featuring deeds of donations styled as "mortis causa"
dispositions, the Court, after going over the deeds, eventually considered the transfers inter
vivos,22 consistent with the principle that "the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a
provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is ‘to take effect at the death of the donor’ are not
controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to
give effect to the real intent of the transferor."23 Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are
resolved to favor inter vivos transfers "to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed."24
Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo’s post-donation transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of
her retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of donation, not only will
great legal uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property
owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid
mode of passing ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels against licensing
such practice.25
Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in 1965,
Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of
another."26 Thus, Rodrigo’s post-donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Vere’s
successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On the other hand, respondents
bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter’s title which they may invoke against all
adverse claimants, including petitioner.
Petitioner Acquired No Title Over the Property
Alternatively, petitioner grounds his claim of ownership over the Property through his and Vere’s
combined possession of the Property for more than ten years, counted from Vere’s purchase of the
Property from Rodrigo in 1970 until petitioner initiated his suit in the trial court in February
1986.27 Petitioner anchors his contention on an unfounded legal assumption. The ten year ordinary
prescriptive period to acquire title through possession of real property in the concept of an owner
requires uninterrupted possession coupled with just title and good faith.28 There is just title when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law
for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.29 Good faith, on the other hand, consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom the possessor received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership.30
Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having successively acquired the Property
through sale, neither was a good faith possessor. As Rodrigo herself disclosed in the Deed,
Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the Property "in the concept of an owner" ("como tag-
iya"31) since 21 May 1962, nearly three years before Rodrigo’s donation in 3 May 1965 and seven
years before Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. This admission against interest binds Rodrigo
and all those tracing title to the Property through her, including Vere and petitioner. Indeed,
petitioner’s insistent claim that Rodriguez occupied the Property only in 1982, when she started
paying taxes, finds no basis in the records. In short, when Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo in
1970, Rodriguez was in possession of the Property, a fact that prevented Vere from being a buyer in
good faith.
Lacking good faith possession, petitioner’s only other recourse to maintain his claim of ownership by
prescription is to show open, continuous and adverse possession of the Property for 30
years.32 Undeniably, petitioner is unable to meet this requirement. 1avvphil

Ancillary Matters Petitioner Raises Irrelevant

Petitioner brings to the Court’s attention facts which, according to him, support his theory that
Rodrigo never passed ownership over the Property to Rodriguez, namely, that Rodriguez registered
the Deed and paid taxes on the Property only in 1982 and Rodriguez obtained from Vere in 1981 a
waiver of the latter’s "right of ownership" over the Property. None of these facts detract from our
conclusion that under the text of the Deed and based on the contemporaneous acts of Rodrigo and
Rodriguez, the latter, already in possession of the Property since 1962 as Rodrigo admitted,
obtained naked title over it upon the Deed’s execution in 1965. Neither registration nor tax payment
is required to perfect donations. On the relevance of the waiver agreement, suffice it to say that Vere
had nothing to waive to Rodriguez, having obtained no title from Rodrigo. Irrespective of Rodriguez’s
motivation in obtaining the waiver, that document, legally a scrap of paper, added nothing to the title
Rodriguez obtained from Rodrigo under the Deed.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 6 June 2005 and the
Resolution dated 5 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 781

1.
G.R. No. 168970 January 15, 2010
CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner,
vs.
SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041 which set
aside the February 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4
in Civil Case No. 3263.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus.
Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July 6, 1984.
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as security for a loan he
obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank). The said property was originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-439(788) and more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land with all the improvements thereon, containing an area of 3.0740 hectares, more or
less, situated in the Barrio of Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, and bounded as follows: Bounded on
the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 5122, Csd-292; along line 2-12, by Dodiongan River; along line 12-13
by Lot 4649, Csd-292; and along line 12-1, by Lot 4661, Csd-292. x x x 2
Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was
subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. On
November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale3 was executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The
property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the auction,
or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale 4 in the Bank's favor. Thereafter,
a new title was issued in the name of the Bank.
On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate5 adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of
10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties
admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that
they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the
subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land 6 was
executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-39,484(a.f.)7 was issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession
of the subject lot.
On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint8 for Recovery of Possession and Damages
against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the
new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the
same to them. Respondents claimed that they had exhausted all remedies for the amicable
settlement of the case, but to no avail.
On February 7, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision9 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the plaintiffs to execute a Deed of Sale in
favor of the defendant, the one-third share of the property in question, presently possessed by him,
and described in the deed of partition, as follows:
A one-third portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-39,484 (a.f.), formerly Original Certificate of
Title No. P-788, now in the name of Saturnino Balus and Leonarda B. Vda. de Calunod, situated at
Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, bounded on the North by Lot 5122; East by shares of Saturnino
Balus and Leonarda Balus-Calunod; South by Lot 4649, Dodiongan River; West by Lot 4661,
consisting of 10,246 square meters, including improvements thereon.
and dismissing all other claims of the parties.
The amount of ₱6,733.33 consigned by the defendant with the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered
delivered to the plaintiffs, as purchase price of the one-third portion of the land in question.
Plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed
property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties
had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA.
On May 31, 2005, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision, reversing and setting aside
the Decision of the RTC and ordering petitioner to immediately surrender possession of the subject
property to the respondents. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the
subject property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the
issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished.
Hence, the instant petition raising a sole issue, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT CO-OWNERSHIP AMONG THE PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENTS
OVER THE PROPERTY PERSISTED/CONTINUED TO EXIST (EVEN AFTER THE TRANSFER OF
TITLE TO THE BANK) BY VIRTUE OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE
REPURCHASE THEREOF BY THE RESPONDENTS; THUS, WARRANTING THE PETITIONER'S
ACT OF ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT BY REIMBURSING THE RESPONDENTS OF HIS
(PETITIONER'S) JUST SHARE OF THE REPURCHASE PRICE.11
The main issue raised by petitioner is whether co-ownership by him and respondents over the
subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred
to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank.
Petitioner insists that despite respondents' full knowledge of the fact that the title over the disputed
property was already in the name of the Bank, they still proceeded to execute the subject
Extrajudicial Settlement, having in mind the intention of purchasing back the property together with
petitioner and of continuing their co-ownership thereof.
Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by itself, a contract between him
and respondents, because it contains a provision whereby the parties agreed to continue their co-
ownership of the subject property by "redeeming" or "repurchasing" the same from the Bank. This
agreement, petitioner contends, is the law between the parties and, as such, binds the respondents.
As a result, petitioner asserts that respondents' act of buying the disputed property from the Bank
without notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the right to claim his rightful portion of the
property, comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid
to the Bank.
The Court is not persuaded.
Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the time of the execution of the
Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed part of the estate of their deceased father to
which they may lay claim as his heirs.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject
property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was
mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court
on October 28, 1996.12 Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale 13 was issued in favor of the
Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that
a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no
question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. 14 In addition, the
inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at
the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession.15 In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his
lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part
of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never
inherited the subject lot from their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-owners of the
subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the
contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not
pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in
time.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds a necessity for a complete determination of the
issues raised in the instant case to look into petitioner's argument that the Extrajudicial Settlement is
an independent contract which gives him the right to enforce his right to claim a portion of the
disputed lot bought by respondents. 1avvphi1

It is true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, contracts are perfected by mere
consent; and from that moment, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law.
Article 1306 of the same Code also provides that the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided these are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
In the present case, however, there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement to indicate any
express stipulation for petitioner and respondents to continue with their supposed co-ownership of
the contested lot.
On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement would not, in any
way, support petitioner's contention that it was his and his sibling's intention to buy the subject
property from the Bank and continue what they believed to be co-ownership thereof. It is a cardinal
rule in the interpretation of contracts that the intention of the parties shall be accorded primordial
consideration.16 It is the duty of the courts to place a practical and realistic construction upon it,
giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended
to serve.17 Such intention is determined from the express terms of their agreement, as well as their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts.18 Absurd and illogical interpretations should also be
avoided.19
For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement between him and his siblings
to continue what they thought was their ownership of the subject property, even after the same had
been bought by the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far.
In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk about and no property to
partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their deceased father.
Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and respondents' intention of continuing with their
supposed co-ownership is negated by no less than his assertions in the present petition that on
several occasions he had the chance to purchase the subject property back, but he refused to do so.
In fact, he claims that after the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it offered to re-sell the same to him
but he ignored such offer. How then can petitioner now claim that it was also his intention to
purchase the subject property from the Bank, when he admitted that he refused the Bank's offer to
re-sell the subject property to him?
In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial Settlement that, at the time of the
execution thereof, the parties were not yet aware that the subject property was already exclusively
owned by the Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of knowledge on the part of petitioner and respondents
that the mortgage was already foreclosed and title to the property was already transferred to the
Bank does not give them the right or the authority to unilaterally declare themselves as co-owners of
the disputed property; otherwise, the disposition of the case would be made to depend on the belief
and conviction of the party-litigants and not on the evidence adduced and the law and jurisprudence
applicable thereto.
Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-
ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement
where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by
assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls
for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It
seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate
in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or
interference from the other.20 In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-
ownership,21 an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
ARTICLE 798

1.LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, G.R. No. 157451

Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales, and ' Garcia, JJ
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Promulgated:
' Respondent.
December 16, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of
showing why it should not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to
discharge this burden satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any
reversible error on the part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the
will.
The Case: before Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to reverse and set aside the December 12, 2002 Decision[2] and the March 7, 2003
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the Decision appealed from

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its place judgment is rendered approving and
allowing probate to the said last will and testament of Placido Valmonte and ordering the
issuance of letters testamentary to the petitioner Josefina Valmonte. Let this case be
remanded to the court a quo for further and concomitant proceedings. [4]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:
x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the
United States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to
stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San
Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte
and titled in their names in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from the United
States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony
solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a little more than
two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down
as COR PULMONALE.

Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of
two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The
first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause,
and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand
margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of
the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the
end of the attestation clause and again on the left hand margin. It provides in the body
that:

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE

NAME OF THE LORD AMEN:

I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to Josefina Cabansag

Valmonte, and a resident of 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro , 83
years of age and being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do
hereby declare this to be my last will and testament:

1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery, under the

auspices of the Catholic Church in accordance with the rites and said
Church and that a suitable monument to be erected and provided my by
executrix (wife) to perpetuate my memory in the minds of my family and
friends;

2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C.

VALMONTE, one half (1/2) portion of the follow-described properties,
which belongs to me as [co-owner]:

a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC,

(GLRO), situated in Makati, Metro , described and covered
by TCT No. 123468 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig,
Metro- registered jointly as co-owners with my deceased
sister (Ciriaca Valmonte), having share and share alike;

b. 2-storey building standing on the above-described property,

made of strong and mixed materials used as my residence
and my wife and located at No. 9200 Catmon Street, Makati,
Metro also covered by Tax Declaration No. A-025-00482,
Makati, Metro-, jointly in the name of my deceased sister,
Ciriaca Valmonte and myself as co-owners, share and share
alike or equal co-owners thereof;

3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal

properties, including my savings account bank book in USA which is in
the possession of my nephew, and all others whatsoever and wherever
 found, I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife, Josefina C.
Valmonte;

4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix of

my last will and testament, and it is my will that said executrix be
exempt from filing a bond;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of

June 1983 in Quezon City, Philippines.

The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:

1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator,

especially those found in the USA;

2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and

residences of the heirs of the testator; or to give them proper notice
pursuant to law;

3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal
solemnities and formalities were not complied with;

4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the

alleged execution he being in an advance sate of senility;

5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats;

6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure

on the part of the petitioner and/or her agents and/or assistants;
and/or

7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not

intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of affixing
his signature thereto;

and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of
understanding and integrity.

At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary public
Atty. Floro Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will, and the instrumental
witnesses spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the
opposition, the oppositor Leticia and her daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.

According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in her parents house
at Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union but they came to every month to get his $366.00
monthly pension and stayed at the said Makati residence. There were times though when
to shave off on expenses, the testator would travel alone. And it was in one of his travels
by his lonesome self when the notarial will was made. The will was witnessed by the
spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who were their wedding sponsors, and by Josie
Collado. Josefina said she had no knowledge of the existence of the last will and
testament of her husband, but just serendipitously found it in his attache case after his
death. It was only then that she learned that the testator bequeathed to her his properties
and she was named the executrix in the said will. To her estimate, the value of property
both real and personal left by the testator is worth more or less P100,000.00. Josefina
declared too that the testator never suffered mental infirmity because despite his old age
he went alone to the market which is two to three kilometers from their home cooked and
cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if she could not accompany him, even traveled to
alone to claim his monthly pension. Josefina also asserts that her husband was in good
health and that he was hospitalized only because of a cold but which eventually resulted
in his death.

Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testator's will,
testified that it was in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the
three witnesses of the will went to his house cum law office and requested him to prepare
his last will and testament. After the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions
he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give
him time to prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary public kept it safely
hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed
date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come
back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before the testator and his witnesses signed
the prepared will, the notary public explained to them each and every term thereof in
Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and understood. He likewise explained that
though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his witnesses on June 15,
1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of town, the formal
execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the
typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty.
The notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was physically and
mentally capable at the time he affixed his signature on the will.

The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public, and
testified that the testator went alone to the house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez at
GSIS Village, Quezon City and requested them to accompany him to the house of Atty.
Floro Sarmiento purposely for his intended will; that after giving his instructions to Atty.
Floro Sarmiento, they were told to return on June 15, 1983; that they returned on June 15,
1983 for the execution of the will but were asked to come back instead on August 9, 1983
because of the absence of the notary public; that the testator executed the will in question
in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that he was strong and in
good health; that the contents of the will was explained by the notary public in the
Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all of them as witnesses attested and signed the will
in the presence of the testator and of each other. And that during the execution, the
testator's wife, Josefina was not with them.

The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from
her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit
from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of
the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer
of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati
residence and asked Leticia's family to live with him and they took care of him. During
that time, the testator's physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations
and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido
took a fancy and wanted to marry.

Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t] he evidence adduced, reduces
the opposition to two grounds, namely:

1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution

and attestation of the will; and
 2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as
he was then in an advanced state of senility

'It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate.[5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate.
The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had
acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his 'sexual exhibitionism and
unhygienic, crude and impolite ways' [6] did not make him a person of unsound mind.

Hence, this Petition.[7]

Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

I.

Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great respect.

II.

Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by
fraud or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument should be
his last will and testament.

III.

Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly
executed the subject will.[8]

In short, petitioner assails the CA's allowance of the probate of the will of Placido Valmonte.

This Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:

Probate of a Will

At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review under
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, however, the evidence presented
during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this Court when, as in the
instant case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial court.[9]
The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every will
presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and requisites that
must be satisfied for the probate of a will.[10] Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states the
instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:

Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the
time of its execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats;

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of
the beneficiary or of some other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed
should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.

In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmonte's will by imputing fraud in its
execution and challenging the testator's state of mind at the time.
Existence of Fraud in the
Execution of a Will

Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will, but maintains
that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud. Particularly, she alleges that
respondent, who is the testator's wife and sole beneficiary, conspired with the notary public and the three
attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the
execution and the attestation of the will.

Petitioner contends that it was 'highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life [to] almost
immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who happened to be [a]
Fil-American pensionado,[11] thus casting doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking the probate of
the will. Moreover, it supposedly 'defies human reason, logic and common experience[12] for an old man
with a severe psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament.
We are not convinced. Fraud 'is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of
it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents
of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the
deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not
have made.[13]

We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time
of its execution.[14] The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a
showing of credible evidence of fraud.[15] Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving
allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a
will. [16] That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had
instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded
petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken 'the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his
twilight years.[17]

Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will
does not invalidate the document, 'because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be
executed and acknowledged on the same occasion.[18] More important, the will must be subscribed by
the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the
testator and of one another.[19] Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will
before a notary public.[20] In any event, we agree with the CA that 'the variance in the dates of the will as
to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary
public and the instrumental witnesses.[21]

The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25, 1985, October 13,
1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced respectively as follows:

Atty. Floro Sarmiento:

Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15 when the testator and
his witnesses were supposed to be in your office?
A Yes sir.

Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your house?
A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town.

xxxxxxxxx
Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per acknowledgement
appearing therein. Was this the actual date when the document was
acknowledged?
A Yes sir.

Q What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses affixed their respective
signature on the first and second pages of exhibit C?
A On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9, 1983.

Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date appearing on the body of
the document as well as the attestation clause?
A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it in my own
handwriting August 9, 1983 on the acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-
10)

Eugenio Gomez:

Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15, 1983, whereas in the
acknowledgement it is dated August 9, 1983, will you look at this document and
tell us this discrepancy in the date?
A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and the two witnesses; that
was first week of June and Atty. Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June
but when we returned, Atty. Sarmiento was not there.

Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you again go back?
A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.

Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed, who were your
companions?
A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8)

Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:

Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three times?

xxxxxxxxx

A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of June was out first
time. We went there to talk to Atty. Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the
last will and testament. After that what they have talked what will be placed in
the testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said was that he will go back on the 15th of
June. When we returned on June 15, Atty. Sarmiento was not there so we were
not able to sign it, the will. That is why, for the third time we went there on
August 9 and that was the time we affixed our signature. (tsn, October 13, 1986,
pp. 4-6)

Josie Collado:

Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15, 1983, what transpired?
A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August 9, 1983.

Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty. Sarmiento?
A Yes, Sir.
 Q For what purpose?
A Our purpose is just to sign the will.

Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?

A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)[22]

Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a 'grand conspiracy in the

commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent
stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of
the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due
execution.[23] Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in
accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed,absent any
showing of ill motives.[24]

Capacity to Make a Will

In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following guidelines:

Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the
time of its execution.

Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession
of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
shattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character
of the testamentary act.

Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of
proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one
month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid
interval.

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered
of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the
testator's bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we
find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of
the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of
property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects
of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the
omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of
fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, [25] which held thus:

"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably
carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally
known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or
incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial
imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of
making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has
understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and
how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing
mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by
disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily
require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind."[26]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED , and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED . Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
2.G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M.
MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO, Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAXA, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the decedent
was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is
duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner
provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.1
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 of the June 15, 2006 Decision3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which reversed the September 30, 2003 Decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in Special Proceedings No. G-1186. The
assailed CA Decision granted the petition for probate of the notarial will of Paciencia Regala
(Paciencia), to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit, the decision in
SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30 September 2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered
GRANTING the petition for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA REGALA.
SO ORDERED.5
Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution 6 which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration thereto.
Petitioners call us to reverse the CA’s assailed Decision and instead affirm the Decision of the RTC
which disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia.
Factual Antecedents
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang
Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala"7 (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981.
The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to
Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that
the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the
said document on page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.9
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia
(Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Will’s due execution by
affixing their signatures below its attestation clause10 and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4
thereof,11 in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary
public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent
Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and
Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:
xxxx
Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the present by the spouses
LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my
properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F.
LAXA and their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses Lorenzo
R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio Sta. Monica,
[Sasmuan], Pampanga and their children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are
still not of legal age and living with their parents who would decide to bequeath since they are the
+hildren of the spouses;
xxxx
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the properties mentioned in
this last will and testament, I am also bequeathing and giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R.
Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also command them to offer masses yearly
for the repose of my soul and that of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Regala and their spouses
and with respect to the fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the wishes of
D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala in accordance with her testament as stated in my testament. x x x12
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew
whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his
own mother.13 Paciencia lived with Lorenzo’s family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who
raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will or on September
19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and
his family until her death on January 4, 1996.
In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition 14 with
the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of
Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. G-1186.
There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an Order on June
13, 200015 allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra. Limpin
testified that she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the execution of the last will and
testament of Paciencia on September 13, 1981.16 The Will was executed in her father’s (Judge
Limpin) home office, in her presence and of two other witnesses, Francisco and Faustino.17 Dra.
Limpin positively identified the Will and her signatures on all its four pages. 18 She likewise positively
identified the signature of her father appearing thereon.19 Questioned by the prosecutor regarding
Judge Limpin’s present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her father had a stroke in 1991 and
had to undergo brain surgery.20 The judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember her name.
Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated that her father can no longer testify in court.21
The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition22 to
Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to
Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to
bequeath them to Lorenzo.23
Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners Sebastian M. Baltazar,
Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and
Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental Opposition24 contending that Paciencia’s Will was null
and void because ownership of the properties had not been transferred and/or titled to Paciencia
before her death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. 25 Petitioners also opposed
the issuance of Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to
be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the USA.26 Petitioners prayed that Letters of
Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.27
Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition 28 asking the RTC to deny
the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will
at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear
or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the
Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery;
and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an
Opposition and Recommendation29 reiterating their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as
administrator of the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead.
On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order30 denying the requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio
to be appointed administrator since the former is a citizen and resident of the USA while the latter’s
claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of the Will has not yet been established.
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra. Limpin was
recalled for cross-examination by the petitioners. She testified as to the age of her father at the time
the latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living arrangements of Paciencia at the time of the
execution of the Will; and the lack of photographs when the event took place. 31
Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the witness stand. Monico,
son of Faustino, testified on his father’s condition. According to him his father can no longer talk and
express himself due to brain damage. A medical certificate was presented to the court to support this
allegation. 32
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in April 1980, he lived in
Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA
and lived with him and his family until her death in January 1996; the relationship between him and
Paciencia was like that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care of him since birth and took
him in as an adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster without children, and without brothers and
sisters; at the time of Paciencia’s death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of
sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody of Judge Limpin and was only
given to him after Paciencia’s death through Faustino; and he was already residing in the USA when
the Will was executed.33 Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three different
documents and in the Will itself and stated that he was familiar with Paciencia’s signature because
he accompanied her in her transactions.34 Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having used force,
intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the
Philippines when the same was executed.35 On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia
informed him about the Will shortly after her arrival in the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only
after her death.36
As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on May 21, 2000.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins. 37 She claimed to
have helped in the household chores in the house of Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay therein
from morning until evening and that during the period of her service in the said household, Lorenzo’s
wife and his children were staying in the same house.38 She served in the said household from 1980
until Paciencia’s departure for the USA on September 19, 1981.39
On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring "something" for Paciencia to
sign at the latter’s house.40 Rosie admitted, though, that she did not see what that "something" was
as same was placed inside an envelope.41 However, she remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino
to first look for money before she signs them.42 A few days after or on September 16, 1981,
Paciencia went to the house of Antonio’s mother and brought with her the said envelope. 43 Upon
going home, however, the envelope was no longer with Paciencia. 44 Rosie further testified that
Paciencia was referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful" because she would sometimes leave her
wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later. 45 On cross examination, it was
established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was
"magulyan" was based on her personal assessment,46 and that it was Antonio who requested her to
testify in court.47
In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt.48 He identified the Will and
testified that he had seen the said document before because Paciencia brought the same to his
mother’s house and showed it to him along with another document on September 16,
1981.49 Antonio alleged that when the documents were shown to him, the same were still
unsigned.50 According to him, Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a lease of one of
her rice lands,51 and it was he who explained that the documents were actually a special power of
attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and other properties upon her departure for the USA, and a
Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family upon her death. 52 Upon hearing
this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words: "Why will I never [return], why will I sell all my
properties?" Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I have other relatives [who should] benefit
from my properties. Why should I die already?"53 Thereafter, Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign
the documents if she does not want to, to which the latter purportedly replied, "I know nothing about
those, throw them away or it is up to you. The more I will not sign them." 54 After which, Paciencia left
the documents with Antonio. Antonio kept the unsigned documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981.55
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision56 denying the petition thus:
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000; and (b) disallows the
notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala.
SO ORDERED.57
The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time
Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to
have testamentary capacity.58
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The
appellate court did not agree with the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when
she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a person
mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will."59 Moreover, the oppositors
in the probate proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound
mind. Further, no concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation that Paciencia
was tricked or forced into signing the Will.60
Petitioners moved for reconsideration61 but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution62 dated
August 31, 2006.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA
the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE
PROBATE OF PACIENCIA’S WILL DESPITE RESPONDENT’S UTTER FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS
NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE
TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED63
The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate.
Our Ruling
We deny the petition.
Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in probate
proceedings.64 This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which
states:
 Rule 75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.
Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. – No will shall pass either real or
personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal,
such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind,
freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. 65 These formalities are
enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the
will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin,
and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that
the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name,
under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of
the Clerk of Court.
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid
down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary
public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the
critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence
of one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the
testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in
the Will may be authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed the same as
well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies
on the shoulders of the petitioners.
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was "magulyan" or forgetful so much
so that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in their Motion for
Reconsideration66 filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only "magulyan" but was actually suffering
from paranoia.67
We are not convinced.
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a
person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.68 Forgetfulness is not equivalent
to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at
the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra.
Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s
house and voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will
concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and
intelligent."69 More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the
execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New
Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the
contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is
on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before
making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will
must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less
before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind
lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence
was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s finding that petitioners failed
to discharge such burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed
of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out
by the CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she
executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She
was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is
bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was born
after the execution of the will and was not included therein as devisee.70
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and
pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to execute
the document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death. Petitioners claim
that Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the
execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo
or by some other persons for his benefit; and that assuming Paciencia’s signature to be genuine, it
was obtained through fraud or trickery. These are grounded on the alleged conversation between
Paciencia and Antonio on September 16, 1981 wherein the former purportedly repudiated the Will
and left it unsigned.
We are not persuaded.
We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her own
son and that love even extended to Lorenzo’s wife and children. This kind of relationship is not
unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old maids or spinsters to care for and raise their
nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and accepted cultural
practice that has resulted in many family discords between those favored by the testamentary
disposition of a testator and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.
In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencia’s relationship with Lorenzo and
his family is different from her relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she cared for and
raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even if the latter was already married and
already has children, highlights the special bond between them. This unquestioned relationship
between Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said document as
against petitioners’ allegations of duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence,
pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in nature, are not supported by
concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no
matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the
Court to uphold said allegations.71 Furthermore, "a purported will is not [to be] denied legalization on
dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its
foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be probated would
have to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in [the estate of the deceased]."72
Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will was duly executed.
Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s Will on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court was not complied with. It provides:
RULE 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. – If the will is
contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills executed under the Civil
Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and
examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the
court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the province where
the will has been filed, their deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due
execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility,
the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses
and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner required
by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know
the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting
of the testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary,
expert testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)
They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been presented in court
since all but one witness, Francisco, are still living.
We cannot agree with petitioners.
We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was
satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino had a
heart attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and express himself due to brain
damage. To prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For her part,
Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo
brain surgery. At that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk and could not even remember his
daughter’s name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such condition, her father could no longer
testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners neither interposed
any objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross examination.
We thus hold that for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the
incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court.
Because of this the probate of Paciencia’s Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpin’s
testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her
handwriting. It is an established rule that "[a] testament may not be disallowed just because the
attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed
just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the
court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they
must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law."73 1âwphi1

Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties as regards
the authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of the law that it is
the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that] ought to be before it that is controlling." 74 "The
very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed that
[her] estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if
legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected
thereby."75 This, coupled with Lorenzo’s established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and
the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by
petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the
authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the Resolution dated
August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 800

1.
G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926
In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL TORRES, special
administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir, appellee,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant.
Marcaida, Capili and Ocampo and Camus, Delgado and Recto for appellant.
Araneta and Zaragoza for appellee.

STREET, J.:
This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, decedent. The
appellant, Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the intestate succession as next of kin and nearest
heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by accredition and in the character of
universal heir the will of the decedent. The trial court decided the point of controversy in favor of Luz
Lopez de Bueno, and Margariat Lopez appealed.
The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are these: On January 3, 1924, Tomas
Rodriguez executed his last will and testament, in the second clause of which he declared:
I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and
his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno.
Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially
declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin
Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7, 1924, or only four days after the will above-mentioned
was made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924,
thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his final accounts as
guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death. Margariat
Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The will referred to, and after having been
contested, has been admitted to probate by judicial determination (Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs.
Lopez, 48 Phil., 772).
Our discussion of the legal problem presented should begin with article 753 of the Civil Code which
in effect declares that, with certain exceptions in favor of near relatives, no testamentary provision
shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his guardian before the final accounts of the latter
have been approved. This provision is of undoubted application to the situation before us; and the
provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez was not any general
incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity due to the accidental relation of guardian and ward
existing between the parties.
We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining the right of accretion. It is there declared, in
effect, that accretion take place in a testamentary succession, first when the two or more persons
are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof without special designation of shares;
and secondly, when one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the
inheritance or is disqualifying to receive it. In the case before us we have a will calling Vicente F.
Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without special designation of
shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has predeceased the testator, this
person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the
testator's death. This article (982) is therefore also of exact application to the case in hand; and its
effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half which she would
have received in conjunction with her father if he had been alive and qualified to take, but also the
half which pertained to him. There was no error whatever, therefore, in the order of the trial court
declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.
The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that there has supervened a partial intestacy with
respect to the half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that this half has
descended to the appellant, Margarita Lopez, as next of kin and sole heir at law of the decedent. In
this connection attention is directed to article 764 of the Civil Code wherein it is declared, among
other things, that a will may be valid even though the person instituted as heir is disqualified to
inherit. Our attention is next invited to article 912 wherein it is declared, among other things, that
legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when the heir instituted is
disqualified to succeed. Upon these provisions an argument is planted conducting to the conclusion
that the will of Tomas Rodriguez was valid, notwithstanding the fact that one of the individuals named
as heirs in the will was disqualified to take, and that as a consequence Margarita Lopez s entitled to
inherit the share of said disqualified heir.
We are the opinion that this contention is untenable and that the appellee clearly has the better right.
In playing the provisions of the Code it is the duty of the court to harmonize its provisions as far as
possible, giving due effect to all; and in case of conflict between two provisions the more general is
to be considered as being limited by the more specific. As between articles 912 and 983, it is
obvious that the former is the more general of the two, dealing, as it does, with the general topic of
intestate succession while the latter is more specific, defining the particular conditions under which
accretion takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the provisions of the former article must be
considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with respect to
intestate succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no
right of accretion." It is true that the same express qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article
912, yet it must be so understood, in view of the rule of interpretation above referred to, by which the
more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this interpretation supplies the only possible
means of harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to this, article 986 of the Civil Code affords
independent proof that intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur when accretion is
impossible.
The attorneys for the appellant direct attention to the fact that, under paragraph 4 of article 912,
intestate succession occurs when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed (incapaz de suceder),
while, under the last provision in paragraph 2 of article 982, accretion occurs when one of the
persons called to inherit under the will is disqualified to receive the inheritance (incapaz de recibirla).
A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed and incapacity to take, and it is contended
that the disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such as to bring the case under article 912 rather than
982. We are of the opinion that the case cannot be made to turn upon so refined an interpretation of
the language of the Code, and at any rate the disability to which Vicente F. Lopez was subject was
not a general disability to succeed but an accidental incapacity to receive the legacy, a consideration
which makes a case for accretion rather than for intestate succession.
The opinions of the commentators, so far as they have expressed themselves on the subject, tend to
the conclusion that the right of accretion with regard to portions of an inheritance left vacant by the
death or disqualification of one of the heirs or his renunciation of the inheritance is governed by
article 912, without being limited, to the extent supposed in appellant's brief, by provisions of the
Code relative to intestate succession (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español, 4th ed., vol.
VII, pp. 310, 311; id., 34; 13 Mucius Scaevola, pp. 372, 373, 285-287; 16 Mucius Scaevola, 186).
Says Escriche: "It is to be understood that one of the coheirs or colegatees fails if nonexistent at the
time of the making of the will, or he renounces the inheritance or legacy, if he dies before the
testator, if the condition be not fulfilled, or if he becomes otherwise incapacitated. . . . (Diccionario de
Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, vol. I, p. 225.)lawphil.net
In conclusion it may be worth observing that there has always existed both in the civil and in the
common law a certain legal intendment, amounting to a mild presumption, against partial intestacy.
In Roman law, as is well known, partial testacy systems a presumption against it, — a presumption
which has its basis in the supposed intention of the testator.
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.

ARTICLE 804

1.
A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19, 1981
NENITA DE VERA SUROZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25 and
EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk of Court, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a will,
which on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate
testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear
before the notary as admitted by the notary himself?
That question arises under the pleadings filed in the testate case and in the certiorari case in the
Court of Appeals which reveal the following tangled strands of human relationship:
Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th Infantry of the U.S. Army (Philippine Scouts), Fort McKinley,
married Marcelina Salvador in 1923 (p. 150, Spec. Proc. No. 7816). They were childless. They
reared a boy named Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considered them as his
parents as shown in his 1945 marriage contract with Nenita de Vera (p. 15, Rollo of CA-G.R. No.
08654-R; p. 148, Rollo of Testate Case showing that Agapito was 5 years old when Mauro married
Marcelina in 1923).
Mauro died in 1942. Marcelina, as a veteran's widow, became a pensioner of the Federal
Government. That explains why on her death she had accumulated some cash in two banks.
Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia who became a medical technologist and went abroad.
Agapito also became a soldier. He was disabled and his wife Nenita was appointed as his guardian
in 1953 when he was declared an incompetent in Special Proceeding No. 1807 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch I (p. 16, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. 08654-R).
In that connection, it should be noted that a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz wanted also to be his
guardian in another proceeding. Arsenia tried to prove that Nenita was living separately from Agapito
and that she (Nenita) admitted to Marcelina that she was unfaithful to Agapito (pp. 61-63, Record of
testate case).
Judge Bienvenido A. Tan dismissed the second guardianship proceeding and confirmed Nenita's
appointment as guardian of Agapito (p. 16, Rollo of CA case). Agapito has been staying in a
veteran's hospital in San Francisco or Palo Alto, California (p. 87, Record).
On a date not indicated in the record, the spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child
named Marilyn Sy, who, when a few days old, was entrusted to Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girl
friend of Agapito) and who was later delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her up as
a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter (pp. 23-26, Rollo of CA-G.R. No.SP-
08654-R). Marilyn used the surname Suroza. She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted
by Agapito. She married Oscar Medrano and is residing at 7666 J.B. Roxas Street, Makati,
apparently a neighbor of Marina Paje, a resident of 7668 J.B. Roxas Street.
Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when she was 73 years
old. That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. Her letters in English to
the Veterans Administration were also thumbmarked by her (pp. 38-39, CA Rollo). In that wig,
Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
Marcelina died on November 15, 1974 at the Veterans Hospital in Quezon City. At the time of her
death, she was a resident of 7374 San Maximo Street, Olimpia, Makati, Rizal. She owned a 150-
square meter lot and house in that place. She acquired the lot in 1966 (p. 134, Record of testate
case).
On January 13, 1975, Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina (P. 97, CA Rollo) and
the executrix in her will (the alternate executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar, Marilyn's
husband), filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25, a petition for the probate of
Marcelina's alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado.
As there was no opposition, Judge Honrado commissioned his deputy clerk of court, Evangeline S.
Yuipco, to hear the evidence. The transcripts of the stenographic notes taken at the hearing before
the deputy clerk of court are not in the record.
In an order dated March 31, 1975, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratrix. On the
following day, April 1, Judge Honrado issued two orders directing the Merchants Banking
Corporation and the Bank of America to allow Marina to withdraw the sum of P10,000 from the
savings accounts of Marcelina S. Suroza and Marilyn Suroza and requiring Corazon Castro, the
custodian of the passbooks, to deliver them to Marina.
Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order dated April 11, 1975, instructing a
deputy sheriff to eject the occupants of the testatrix's house, among whom was Nenita V. Suroza,
and to place Marina in possession thereof.
That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of
Marcelina's estate. She and the other occupants of the decedent's house filed on April 18 in the said
proceeding a motion to set aside the order of April 11 ejecting them. They alleged that the
decedent's son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia, that
Nenita was Agapito's guardian and that Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter nor the decedent's
granddaughter (pp. 52-68, Record of testate case). Later, they questioned the probate court's
jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order.
In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado was already apprised that persons, other than Marilyn, were
claiming Marcelina's estate, he issued on April 23 an order probating her supposed will wherein
Marilyn was the instituted heiress (pp. 74-77, Record).
On April 24, Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition "to set aside proceedings, admit
opposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary injunction". Nenita in that motion
reiterated her allegation that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina, that the will was not duly executed
and attested, that it was procured by means of undue influence employed by Marina and Marilyn and
that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were procured by fraud or trick.
Nenita further alleged that the institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of the preterition of
Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to act as executrix (pp. 83-91, Record).
To that motion was attached an affidavit of Zenaida A. Penaojas the housemaid of Marcelina, who
swore that the alleged will was falsified (p. 109, Record).
Not content with her motion to set aside the ejectment order (filed on April 18) and her omnibus
motion to set aside the proceedings (filed on April 24), Nenita filed the next day, April 25, an
opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters of administration. In that
opposition, Nenita assailed the due execution of the will and stated the names and addresses of
Marcelina's intestate heirs, her nieces and nephews (pp. 113-121, Record). Nenita was not aware of
the decree of probate dated April 23, 1975.
To that opposition was attached an affidavit of Dominga Salvador Teodocio, Marcelina's niece, who
swore that Marcelina never executed a win (pp. 124-125, Record).
Marina in her answer to Nenita's motion to set aside the proceedings admitted that Marilyn was not
Marcelina's granddaughter but was the daughter of Agapito and Arsenia de la Cruz and that Agapito
was not Marcelina's son but merely an anak-anakan who was not legally adopted (p. 143, Record).
Judge Honrado in his order of July 17, 1975 dismissed Nenita's counter-petition for the issuance of
letters of administration because of the non-appearance of her counsel at the hearing. She moved
for the reconsideration of that order.
In a motion dated December 5, 1975, for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita V. Suroza
reiterated her contention that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear before the
notary and because it is written in English which is not known to her (pp. 208-209, Record).
Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976 "denied" the various incidents "raised" by Nenita (p. 284,
Record).
Instead of appealing from that order and the order probating the wig, Nenita "filed a case to annul"
the probate proceedings (p. 332, Record). That case, Civil Case No. 24276, Suroza vs. Paje and
Honrado (p. 398, Record), was also assigned to Judge Honrado. He dismissed it in his order of
February 16, 1977 (pp. 398-402, Record).
Judge Honrado in his order dated December 22, 1977, after noting that the executrix had delivered
the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been paid, closed the testamentary proceeding.
About ten months later, in a verified complaint dated October 12, 1978, filed in this Court, Nenita
charged Judge Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina. The complainant
reiterated her contention that the testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her
thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English, the language in which the win was written.
(In the decree of probate Judge Honrado did not make any finding that the will was written in a
language known to the testatrix.)
Nenita further alleged that Judge Honrado, in spite of his knowledge that the testatrix had a son
named Agapito (the testatrix's supposed sole compulsory and legal heir), who was preterited in the
will, did not take into account the consequences of such a preterition.
Nenita disclosed that she talked several times with Judge Honrado and informed him that the
testatrix did not know the executrix Marina Paje, that the beneficiary's real name is Marilyn Sy and
that she was not the next of kin of the testatrix.
Nenita denounced Judge Honrado for having acted corruptly in allowing Marina and her cohorts to
withdraw from various banks the deposits Marcelina.
She also denounced Evangeline S. Yuipco, the deputy clerk of court, for not giving her access to the
record of the probate case by alleging that it was useless for Nenita to oppose the probate since
Judge Honrado would not change his decision. Nenita also said that Evangeline insinuated that if
she (Nenita) had ten thousand pesos, the case might be decided in her favor. Evangeline allegedly
advised Nenita to desist from claiming the properties of the testatrix because she (Nenita) had no
rights thereto and, should she persist, she might lose her pension from the Federal Government.
Judge Honrado in his brief comment did not deal specifically with the allegations of the complaint.
He merely pointed to the fact that Nenita did not appeal from the decree of probate and that in a
motion dated July 6, 1976 she asked for a thirty day period within which to vacate the house of the
testatrix.
Evangeline S. Yuipco in her affidavit said that she never talked with Nenita and that the latter did not
mention Evangeline in her letter dated September 11, 1978 to President Marcos.
Evangeline branded as a lie Nenita's imputation that she (Evangeline) prevented Nenita from having
access to the record of the testamentary proceeding. Evangeline was not the custodian of the
record. Evangeline " strongly, vehemently and flatly denied" Nenita's charge that she (Evangeline)
said that the sum of ten thousand pesos was needed in order that Nenita could get a favorable
decision. Evangeline also denied that she has any knowledge of Nenita's pension from the Federal
Government.
The 1978 complaint against Judge Honorado was brought to attention of this Court in the Court
Administrator's memorandum of September 25, 1980. The case was referred to Justice Juan A.
Sison of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. He submitted a report
dated October 7, 1981.
On December 14, 1978, Nenita filed in the Court of Appeals against Judge Honrado a petition for
certiorari and prohibition wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the
proceedings in the probate case be declared void.
Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Domingo P. Aquino, who notarized the will. He swore that
the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses did not appear before him and that he notarized the
will "just to accommodate a brother lawyer on the condition" that said lawyer would bring to the
notary the testatrix and the witnesses but the lawyer never complied with his commitment.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because Nenita's remedy was an appeal and her failure
to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari (Suroza vs. Honrado, CA-
G.R. No. SP-08654, May 24, 1981).
Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed on November 17, 1981 a motion to dismiss the
administrative case for having allegedly become moot and academic.
We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper
disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the
decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the void win should have inherited the
decedent's estate.
A judge may be criminally liable or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order or
rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or interlocutory order by reason of inexcusable negligence or
ignorance (Arts. 204 to 206, Revised Penal Code).
Administrative action may be taken against a judge of the court of first instance for serious
misconduct or inefficiency ( Sec. 67, Judiciary Law). Misconduct implies malice or a wrongful intent,
not a mere error of judgment. "For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence
showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the
law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules" (In re lmpeachment of Horrilleno, 43
Phil. 212, 214-215).
Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A judge would be
inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the performance of his duties that diligence, prudence
and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service (In re Climaco, Adm.
Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107, 119).
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was
thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and
known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the
testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". (p. 16, Record of testate case). That could only
mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is
void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not
known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed (Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. 660).
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment
where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the "testator" instead of "testatrix".
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to
the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed
granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.
Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court, respondent judge
could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness.
In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the
hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly
executed.
Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be inexcusable.
WHEREFORE, for inefficiency in handling the testate case of Marcelina S. Suroza, a fine equivalent
to his salary for one month is imposed on respondent judge (his compulsory retirement falls on
December 25, 1981).
The case against respondent Yuipco has become moot and academic because she is no longer
employed in the judiciary. Since September 1, 1980 she has been assistant city fiscal of Surigao
City. She is beyond this Court's disciplinary jurisdiction (Peralta vs. Firm Adm. Matter No. 2044-CFI
November 21, 1980, 101 SCRA 225).
SO ORDERED.

2.
G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919
In re will of Ana Abangan.
GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
Filemon Sotto for appellants.
M. Jesus Cuenco for appellee.

AVANCEÑA, J.:
On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will
executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponent's appealed.
Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which
contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the
name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains
only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of
these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by
letters; and these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of
the will should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was duly admitted to probate.
In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the
testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one applicable
in the case) evidently has for its object (referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution
of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions. But when these dispositions are
wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses (as the
instant case), their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless. In
requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a
will written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the testator and the
witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would assume that the statute
requires that this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute to the
statute such an intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator and the witnesses in
the presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of the sheet guaranties its
authenticity, another signature on its left margin would be unneccessary; and if they do not guaranty,
same signatures, affixed on another part of same sheet, would add nothing. We cannot assume that
the statute regards of such importance the place where the testator and the witnesses must sign on
the sheet that it would consider that their signatures written on the bottom do not guaranty the
authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give sufficient security.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any
sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one
sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although
unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, without considering
whether or not this clause is an essential part of the will, we hold that in the one accompanying the
will in question, the signatures of the testatrix and of the three witnesses on the margin and the
numbering of the pages of the sheet are formalities not required by the statute. Moreover, referring
specially to the signature of the testatrix, we can add that same is not necessary in the attestation
clause because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator
since the latter does not attest, but executes, the will.
Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all
the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and
the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three
witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and
the witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the
law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already
given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded. lawphil.net

As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the testarix knew the
dialect in which the will is written. But the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was
executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is
enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which
this will is written.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against
the appellants. So ordered.
3.
G.R. No. L-19079 January 15, 1923
PRIMITIVO GONZALEZ Y LAUREL, applicant-appellee, vs. JOVITA LAUREL
Y TAPIA, opponent-appellant.
Juan S. Rustia for appellant.
The appellee in his own behalf.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
By an order dated December 16, 1921, the Court of First Instance of Batangas
allowed the document, Exhibit A, to probate as the last will and testament of the
deceased Maria Tapia, thus granting the petition of Primitivo L. Gonzalez and
overruling the opposition presented by Jovita Laurel. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Jovita Laurel now appeals to this court from that ruling of the court below, alleging
that court erred:
1. In Holding that Exhibit A, the supposed will of the deceased Maria Tapia y
Castillo, was executed with the solemnities prescribed by the law, notwithstanding
that there was no proof of the dialect known by the said deceased and of the fact
that it was the same in which said Exhibit A was written. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. In not holding that the signatures of Maria Tapia appearing in said

Exhibit A had been obtained through deceipt, surprise, fraud, and in an
illegal and improper manner. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. In not finding that said Exhibit A was obtained through unlawful

pressure, influence and machinations of the applicant, Primitivo L.
Gonzalez, one of the legatees, in connivance with Attorney Modesto
Castillo. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

4. In not finding that the deceased Maria Tapia was physically and
mentally incapacitated at the time she is said to have executed Exhibit
A.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

5. In declaring said Exhibit A valid and authentic and allowing it to

probate as the will and testament of the deceased Maria Tapia y Castillo.

Concerning the first error assigned, it appears that the deceased Maria Tapia was a
resident of the Province of Batangas, a Tagalog region, where said deceased had
real properties for several years. It also appears that she requested Modesto Castillo
to draw her will in Tagalog. From the record taken as a whole, a presumption arises
that said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect, which presumption is now
conclusive for not having been overthrown nor rebutted. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The three following errors have reference to the question whether or not the
testatrix acted voluntarily and with full knowledge in executing and signing the
will. The preponderance of evidence in this respect is that said document was
executed and signed by Maria Tapia voluntarily and with full knowledge, without
fraud, deceit, surprise, or undue influence or machinations of anybody, she being
then mentally capacitated and free. Such is the fact established by the evidence,
which we have carefully examined. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In connection with the evidence, our attention was called to an irreconcilable

conflict between the transcript of an answer of the witness Primitivo L. Gonzalez,
presented by the appellant as "Annex 1" to his motion filed in this court (fol. 16 of
the Rollo), and the official transcript, in that while said answer is " Yes, sir,"
according to the transcript of the appellant, it is " Certainly, that is not true,"
according to the official transcript of the stenographic notes attached to the record.
But it is to be noted that at the continuation of the hearing held on a subsequent
date, in which said witness Primitivo L. Gonzalez was examined on this
contradiction, he said in the course of the rebuttal evidence of the applicant: " No,
sir. I did not answer in that way. I did not take her hand to make her sign. I did not
by any means answer that question to that effect. I very well remember that fact,
because it affects much the probate of the will." (Fols. 56 and 57 of transcript and
documentary evidence.) chanrobles virtual law library

It appearing from the record that the document Exhibit A is the will of the deceased
Maria Tapia, executed with all the formalities and solemnities required by the law,
the trial court did not commit any error in admitting it to probate. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For the purposes of this decision, we deem it unnecessary to pass upon the question
raised by the appellee as to whether or not this appeal was perfected within the
time fixed by the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The order appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.