G.R. No.

163757 November 23, 2007

GORDOLAND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:

The instant petition assails the Decision1 dated January 13, 2003 and the Resolution2 dated May 20, 2004
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62545 which reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated
January 16, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55, Mandaue City and denied the
corresponding motion for reconsideration, respectively.

Petitioner is engaged in the business of real property development. On November 18, 1996, it filed with
the RTC, Branch 55, Mandaue City, an application docketed as LRC Case No. N-5474 for original
registration of title over eight parcels of land totaling 86,298 square meters located in different barangays
within the Municipality of Lilo-an, Cebu.

Petitioner avers it obtained title over said parcels in 1995 by virtue of several deeds of sale and
assignments of appurtenant rights from the alleged owner-possessors whom petitioner claims had been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation as would entitle them to acquire
title by acquisitive prescription, under Commonwealth Act No. 141,5 or the Public Land Act, in relation to
Republic Act No. 4966 and Presidential Decree No. 1529.7

The petitioner presented (1) testimonies of its predecessors-in-interest with respect to the eight parcels of
land and (2) documentary exhibits; among them: tax declarations, certifications from the Register of
Deeds that there are no subsisting titles over the subject properties, and certifications from the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, declaring that there are no subsisting public land applications with respect to the
same.

After submitting its formal offer of exhibits and resting its case, the petitioner filed a Manifestation8 dated
November 14, 1997 with an attached photocopy of a Certification9 dated January 10, 1996 from the Cebu
CENRO declaring that,

…per projection and ground verification…a tract of land with list of lot numbers attached herewith
containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT POINT FOUR SIX FIVE SEVEN (138.4657) hectares,
more or less, situated in the Barangay at Sta. Cruz, San Vicente and Lataban Lilo[-]an, Cebu. As shown and
described in the Sketch Plan at the back hereof…The same was found to be:

A. Within the Alienable and Disposable Block-1, land classification project no. 29 per LC Map no. 1391 of
Lilo[-]an, Cebu. Certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-537 dated July 31, 1940; and

EDUARDO M. INTING
Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (signed)
ATTY. ROGELIO C. LAGAT
Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer
(Emphasis supplied.)

However, the list of lot numbers referred to in the certification was not included in the certification, nor
was it attached to the Manifestation. The list was never submitted to the trial court. The petitioner’s
Manifestation merely informed the court that it had failed to include the said certification in its formal
offer of exhibits, and that it was "submitting" the same "in compliance with the requirements of the
application." Petitioner did not move to re-open the proceedings to present the certification in evidence,
have it authenticated and subjected to cross-examination, or have it marked as an exhibit and formally
offered in evidence. The original was never submitted.

The State, through the Director of Lands, entered its formal opposition to the application, asserting that
registration should be denied on the following grounds:

1. [T]hat neither the applicant/nor his/her/their predecessors-in-interest have been in open[,]

continuous[,] ex[c]lusive[,] and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto…
2. [T]hat the muniment/s of title and/or tax declaration/s and tax payment/s receipt/s of applicant/s if any,
attached to or alleged in the application, do/es not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a
bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his/her/their open, continuous, exclusive[,] and
notorious possession and occupation…[;]

3. [T]hat the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish Title or grant can no longer be
availed of by the applicant/s who have failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the
period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892.10 From the
records, it appears that the instant application was filed on November 18, 1996[;]

That the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the [N]ew Philippine Constitution to hold
alienable lands of the public domain…

4. [T]hat the parcel/s applied for in/are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines not subject to private appropriation.11

On January 16, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision granting the application, and directed the
issuance of the respective decrees of registration for each of the eight parcels of land, all in petitioner’s
name.

WHEREFORE, premises con[s]idered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the issuance of title to the
lands designated as follows:

[1.] Lot No. 4221 described in the Technical [D]escription (Exhibit "L"), situated at San Vicente, Lilo-an,
Cebu[,] containing an area of Ten Thousand Two Hundred [F]orty[-][E]ight (10,248) square meters, more
or less;
2. Lot No. 4222 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit "T"), situated at Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu[,]
containing an area of Two Thousand [F]our [H]undred [T]wenty-[O]ne square meters (2,421), more or less;

3. Lot No. 4242 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit "AA"), situated at San Vicente, Lilo-an,
Cebu, containing an area of Three Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Eight (3,428) square meters, more or
less;

4. Lot No. 7250 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit "MM"), situated at Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu,
containing an area of Forty-Six Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-Seven (46,487) square meters, more or
less;

5. Lot No. 7252 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit "XX"), situated at Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu,
containing an area of Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Two (7,932) square meters, more or less;

6. Lot No. 7260 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit "QQQ"), situated at Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu,
containing an area of Two Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty (2,920) square meters, more or less;

7. Lot No. 7264 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit "CCC"), situated at Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu,
containing an area of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Seven (2,787) square meters, more or less;

8. Lot No. 7269 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit "III"), situated at Barangay Lataban, Lilo-an,
Cebu, containing an area of Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Eight (9,978) square meters, more or
less;

All in [f]avor and in the name of Gordoland Development Corporation, a corporation duly organized and
existing under and by virtue of Philippine Laws with address at Suite 801, Ermita Center Building, Roxas
Blvd., Manila.

Upon finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued in favor of applicants
in accordance with Section 39, P.D. 1529.

SO ORDERED.12

The State filed its notice of appeal.

Meanwhile, on February 23, 1998, the trial court received a Report13 from the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), Office of the Director, Department on Registration, which declared that LRA was not in a position to
verify whether or not the subject lands were covered by land patents, or within the area classified as
alienable and disposable. It recommended that the Land Management Bureau (LMB) in Manila, the
CENRO and the Forest Management Bureau (FMB) in Cebu be ordered to determine and make a finding if
the lots were alienable and disposable.

Thereafter, the trial court, acting upon the LRA report, directed the LMB, Cebu CENRO and FMB to report
on the true status of the lands.14 It did not, however, recall or suspend its judgment in the main.1âwphi1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, upon the following grounds:

WHEREFORE, finding merit to the appeal of [respondent] Republic of the Philippines, the Decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 55 dated January 16, 1998 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.15

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition, raising
the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE APPLICATION FOR LAND
REGISTRATION AND THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING WERE DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF
AUTHORITY FROM THE CORPORATION’S BOARD OF DIRECTORS.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE
THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WERE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE PUBLIC LAND

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER AND ITS
PREDECESSOR[S]-IN-INTEREST FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 30-YEAR POSSESSION REQUIRED BY
LAW.16

Stated simply, the petitioner raises the following issues, to wit: (1) whether or not its petition for
registration is defective; (2) whether or not the subject parcels of land are alienable and disposable; and
(3) whether or not petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the properties for a period of at least 30 years.

Petitioner contends that its petition for registration is not defective because the Rules of Court is not
applicable in land registration cases,17 the parcels of land are alienable and disposable as can be readily
gleaned from the annexes to its application,18 and it presented more than enough documentary and
testimonial evidence to show possession of the subject parcels of land in the nature and duration required
by law, even going way back to World War II.19

On the other hand, respondent contends that petitioner’s petition for registration is defective because
Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga, petitioner’s counsel, was not authorized by petitioner’s board of directors to
file the application and sign the certification on non-forum shopping.20 Respondent also contends that
petitioner failed to prove that the subject lands were alienable and disposable public lands,21 and to
present convincing proof that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the subject lands in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years.22

Anent the first issue, this Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding verification of a
pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is a condition affecting the form of the pleading;
non-compliance with this requirement does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in
good faith.23 Further, the purpose of the aforesaid certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of
forum-shopping. Considering that later on Atty. Paderanga’s authority to sign the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping was ratified24 by the board, there is no circumvention of the
aforestated objectives.

We now go to the second issue. At the outset we note that this issue involves a question of fact. As a
general rule, this Court does not resolve questions of fact in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case
falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.25

Exception (7) as quoted above is present in this case. In its decision the trial court found that the subject
parcels of land were within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. On the other hand,
the Court of Appeals found that petitioner had not been able to prove that the subject parcels of land
were indeed alienable and disposable.26

A review of the records shows that the conclusions of the Court of Appeals are well-founded. There is no
evidence on record showing that the subject lots have already been classified as alienable and disposable.
The CENRO certifications offered in evidence by petitioner, particularly exhibits "DD," "OO," "ZZ" and
"SSS" only similarly, except as to the lot numbers, state:

This is to certify that according to the records available in this office, Lot Nos. 4221, 7264, 7260, 7270 and
4325, Pls-823, Liloan, Cebu are not covered by any subsisting public land application.27

There is no mention in any of these certifications that the subject lots are within the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.

The photocopy of a Certification dated January 10, 1996 from the Cebu CENRO, attached to petitioner’s
Manifestation before the trial court, cannot be given any probative value. As suitably explained by the
Court of Appeals:

…What was attached to the Manifestation quoted above is merely a photocopy of the Certification dated
January 10, 1996 without the list of lot numbers attached thereto. It does not appear that said
Certification was ever utilized by Gordoland in support of its application, neither was the original copy or
certified true copy thereof ever presented nor submitted to the lower court to form part of the records of
the case. It was not marked and formally offered in evidence. Evidence not formally offered before the
trial court cannot be considered on appeal, for to consider them at such stage will deny the other parties
their right to rebut them. (Ong v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 387 [1997]). The reason for the rule
prohibiting the admission of evidence that has not been formally offered is to afford the other party the
chance to object to their admissibility (Ong Chia v. Republic, 328 SCRA 749 [2000]).

It is true that the trial court had noted the said Certification in its questioned decision of January 16, 1998.
Thus:

"In resolving the Opposition interposed by the State,…And as certified to by the CENRO, these lots are
already within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain and therefore susceptible to private
appropriation."…

Verily, the trial court just adopted entirely the statements embodied in the said Certification, a
photocopied document, which had not been formally offered in evidence, without inquiring into the
supposed attachments thereto, without examining the contents thereof, and without verifying whether
such Certification really pertained to the lands in question. The trial court simply could not ascertain such
facts, for nowhere in the records can be found the alleged attachments.28

It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of
the application is alienable and disposable.29

In view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that the subject lots were already classified as alienable
and disposable lands of the government, and when they were so classified, there is no reference point for
counting adverse possession for purposes of an imperfect title. The Government must first declare the
land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive
and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.30 Consequently, there is no
point in discussing the third issue on the length of petitioner’s possession.
In conclusion, we see no reason to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals, which we find supported
by evidence on record. In our considered view, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:

The facts and circumstances in the record render untenable that Gordoland had performed all the
conditions essential to reinforce its application for registration under the Property Registration Decree.…

The Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject Lot No. 4221, Lot No. 4222, Lot No. 4242, Lot No.
7250, Lot No. 7252, Lot No. 7260, Lot No. 7264, and Lot No. 7269 form part of the public domain not
registrable in the name of Gordoland. To reiterate, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands belong to the
State. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its basic rights over the same as dominus.…31

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and the Resolution dated
January 13, 2003 and May 20, 2004, respectively, of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
Decision dated January 16, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Mandaue City, are hereby
AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 155051 : May 29, 2007]

RURAL BANK OF ANDA, INC., Petitioner, v. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF LINGAYEN -

DAGUPAN, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a Petition for Review 1 of the Decision2 dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution dated 23
August 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66478.

The Facts

The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley, Pangasinan. Lot
736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739 also
form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imelda's Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for
commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by the national
road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help of Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1.

Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6375 (TCT 6375). An
annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both respondent and the
Municipality of Binmaley.

In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot 736 from the
national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the smell of horse manure was already
bothering the priests living in the seminary.3 The concrete fence enclosing Lot 736 has openings in the
east, west, and center and has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at any time of the day.4

On 22 December 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan, passed and approved Resolution
Nos. 1045 and 105.6 Resolution No. 104 converted Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot.
Resolution No. 105 authorized the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the
Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 with an area of 252 square meters.7

In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence was being
constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor of Binmaley, Rolando
Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss the situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr.
Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the Rural Bank of Anda should be stopped.

On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence and restore the
concrete fence. On 20 May 1998, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that the construction of the
building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willing to discuss with respondent to
resolve the problem concerning Lot 736.
On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions, Injunction and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan. On 24
August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

On 4 January 2000, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen-Dagupan]:

1. Making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent;

2. Ordering the defendants to cause to be restored the concrete wall with iron railings, to cause to be
removed the sawali fence, both at the expense of the defendants, jointly and severally, and

3. Condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally, to the plaintiff the amount of P25,000.00 as
litigation expenses, attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00 and the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.8

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with the modification that the awards of litigation
expenses, attorney's fees, and costs should be deleted. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied the
motion for reconsideration of the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court found that Lot 736 is not covered by any Torrens title either in the name of respondent or
in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. The trial court held that Lot 736 is public in nature. Since Lot
736 is property of public dominion, it is outside the commerce of man. Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Binmaley, Pangasinan exceeded its authority when it adopted Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 converting Lot
736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot and authorizing the municipal mayor to enter into a
contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a 252 square meter portion of Lot 736 .

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that Lot 736 is property of public dominion and is used
by the public as a pathway. Respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley are mere claimants with no
sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of Lot 736. The Court of Appeals held that property of public
dominion is intended for the common welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation either by the
state or by private persons. Since Lot 736 is for public use, it is a property of public dominion and it is not
susceptible of private ownership. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void for being enacted beyond
the powers of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley. The contract of lease between the Municipality of
Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda is therefore void.

The Court of Appeals also ruled that since neither the respondent nor the Municipality of Binmaley owns
Lot 736, there is no basis for the monetary awards granted by the trial court.
The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are
valid.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not have title over Lot 736. The
Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land Management Services in Region I testified
that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was ever presented to their office.9

Respondent claims Lot 736 based on its alleged open, continuous, adverse, and uninterrupted possession
of Lot 736. However, the records reveal otherwise. Even the witnesses for respondent testified that Lot 736
was used by the people as pathway, parking space, and playground.10

On the other hand, the Municipality of Binmaley alleged that it is the sole claimant of Lot 736 based on
the Property Identification Map, Tax Mapping Control Roll of the Municipality of Binmaley, and the Lot
Data Computation in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. However, these documents merely show
that the Municipality of Binmaley is a mere claimant of Lot 736. In fact, the chief of Survey Division of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, San Fernando City, La Union testified that the
cadastral survey11 of Lot 736, which was surveyed for the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989, had not been
approved.12 The cadastral survey was based on the Lot Data Computation13 of Lot 736 which was
likewise contracted by the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989.

The records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to the school, the seminary, or the church,
which are all located on lots adjoined to Lot 736.14 Lot 736 was also used for parking and playground.15
In other words, Lot 736 was used by the public in general.

Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since Lot 736
has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of acquisition, Lot 736
remains part of the public domain and is owned by the state. As held in Hong Hok v. David:16

There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or
their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information
title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public
domain. For it is well settled "that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from the government." It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from
the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatement of the
doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes follows: "The applicant, having failed to establish his
right or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being
no showing that the same has been acquired by any private person from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public domain."
This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and waters of
the public domain.17 Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: "All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state."

Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without prior grant
from the government.18 Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley
exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are
void and consequently, the contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of
Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution
dated 23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204626 June 9, 2014

PAUL P. GABRIEL, JR., IRENEO C. CALWAG, THOMAS L. TINGGA-AN, and the Heirs of JULIET B.
PULKERA, Petitioners,
vs.
CARMELING CRISOLOGO, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the June 14, 2012 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) and its November 14, 2012 Resolution2 which reversed the April 18, 201 1 Decision3 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City (RTC), and reinstated the September 15, 2009 Decision4 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Baguio City (MTCC). in Civil Case No. 13209, a complaint for
recovery of possession.

The Facts

Records show that Carmeling Crisologo (Crisologo), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Pedro Isican
(Isican), filed her complaint5 for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership with Damages against Juliet B.
Pulkera, Paul P. Gabriel, Ireneo C. Calwag, and Thomas L. Tingga-an (petitioners) before the MTCC.

Crisologo alleged, among others, that she was the registered owner of two parcels of land with a total
area of approximately 2,000 square meters, described in, and covered by, two (2) certificates of title –
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)Nos. T-13935 and T-13936;that the properties were covered by an
Assessment of Real Property; that the payments of realty taxes on the said properties were updated; that
sometime in 2006, she discovered that petitioners unlawfully entered, occupied her properties by stealth,
by force and without her prior consent and knowledge, and constructed their houses thereon; that upon
discovery of their illegal occupation, her daughter, Atty. Carmelita Crisologo, and Isican personally went to
the properties and verbally demanded that petitioners vacate the premises and remove their structures
thereon; that the petitioners begged and promised to buy the said properties for 3,500.00 per square
meter; that she gave petitioners time to produce the said amount, but they reneged on their promise to
buy them; that petitioners refused to vacate the subject properties despite several demands; that the
petitioners knew full well that the subject premises they were occupying were titled properties but they
insisted on unlawfully holding the same; and that she was unlawfully dispossessed and displaced from the
subject properties due to petitioners’ illegal occupation.

On the other hand, petitioners countered that the titles of Crisologo were products of Civil Registration
Case No. 1, Record 211, which were declared void by the Supreme Court in Republic v. Marcos,6 and
reiterated in Republic v. Marcos;7 that the said case was later enacted into law, Presidential Decree
(P.D.)No. 1271, entitled "An Act Nullifying Decrees of Registration and Certificates of Title within the
Baguio Town site Reservation Case No.1, GLRO Record No. 211, pursuant to Act No. 931, as amended, but
Considering as Valid Certain Titles of Lands that are Alienable and Disposable Under Certain Conditions
and For Other Purposes" which took effect on December 22, 1977; that Crisologo failed to comply with
the conditions provided in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for the validation of said titles, hence, the titles were
void; that petitioners had been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious, uninterrupted, and continuous
possession of the subject land, in good faith; and that Crisologo was never in prior possession and had no
valid title over the subject land.8

MTCC Ruling

On September 15, 2009, the MTCC rendered a decision in favor of Crisologo, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff directing the defendants, their heirs,
assigns, representatives and/or any person acting for and in their behalves to:

a) Immediately vacate the subject properties, and to demolish/dismantle all their houses and other
structures on the properties; should defendants refuse to comply, the plaintiff may demolish/dismantle
them at the expense of the defendants;

b) Pay reasonable rentals of the use and occupation of the subject properties at Php4,000.00 per month
from January 2006 for each of the defendants;

c) Pay Php20, 000.00 as attorney’s fees, and

d) Costs of litigation.

SO ORDERED.

The MTCC ruled that Crisologo was the registered owner of the subject parcels of land, who, as such, had
declared these properties for taxation purposes since 1969 and regularly paid the realty taxes thereon. It
stated that with Crisologo being the owner, petitioners were illegally occupying the land.

The MTCC added that petitioners could not question Crisologo’s titles over the subject parcels of land in
an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession because such defense was a collateral attack which was
prohibited under P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. Thus, it could not
inquire into the intrinsic validity of Crisologo’s titles.

Ruling of the RTC

On April 18, 2011, the RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTCC. It was of the view that
petitioners’ assertion of the TCTs’ invalidity was not a collateral attack. It cited the rulings in Republic v.
Marcos,9 and Republic v. Marcos,10 which perpetually prohibited the reopening of Civil Reservation Case
No. 1, LRC Rec. No. 211, and, therefore, the registration of parcels of lands. For said reason, the titles of
Crisologo were products of illegal proceedings nullified by this Court. She also failed to comply with the
conditions set forth in P.D. No. 1271. Accordingly, the titles were void and the same could not be a legal
basis for Crisologo to justify the eviction of petitioners from the subject premises. Having been nullified,
these certificates of title ceased to be the best proof of ownership.

Ruling of the CA
On June 14, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed decision, setting aside the RTC decision and reinstating
that of the MTCC.

The CA held that Crisologo was entitled to the possession of the subject parcels of land. It explained that
her possession was established when she acquired the same by sale sometime in 1967 and when the
certificates of title covering the properties were subsequently issued. It added that her payment of realty
taxes due on the said properties since 1969 further strengthened her claim of possession. Moreover, her
appointment of Isican as administrator of the subject properties and her offer to sell the lots to the
petitioners showed that she had control over the same. Accordingly, the CA concluded that Crisologo’s
right to remain in possession of the subject lots should be preferred over the petitioners’ possession
regardless of the actual condition of her titles. Hence, the petitioners, who used force in occupying her
properties, should respect, restore and not disturb her lawful possession of the subject parcels of land.

Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the petitioners instituted this petition anchored on the following

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

(1)

THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT
RESPONDENT HAS ACTUAL OR WAS IN PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE LANDS INVOLVED CONTRARY TO
THE EVIDENCE, THE FACTS AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.

(2)

THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE
PURPORTED EXECUTION AND REGISTRATION OF THE PUBLIC INSTRUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE SALE IN
1967 OF THE SUBJECT LANDS AND THE SUBSEQUENT ISSUANCE OF THE TITLES IN HER NAME ESTABLISH
POSSESSION.

(3)

THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE TAX
DECLARATIONS AND RECEIPTS IN THE NAME OF THE RESPONDENT ESTABLISH HER POSSESSION OVER
THE SUBJECT LOTS.

(4)

THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE SUPPOSED
APPOINTMENT OF PEDRO ISICAN AS ADMINISTRATOR ESTABLISHES HER POSSESSION OVER THE LANDS
IN DISPUTE.

(5)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS THE PRESENT
POSSESSOR OF THE SUBJECT LANDS REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL CONDITION OF HER TITLES,
IGNORING THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS AND ADHERENCE TO LAW.

(6)

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS DISTURBED THE
POSSESSION OF HEREIN RESPONDENT BY FORCE.

(7)

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT’SSUPPOSED

POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS SHOULD BE PREFERRED DESPITE THE NATURE OR CONDITION OF
THE PROPERTY AS PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.11

Petitioners’ position

Petitioners aver that Crisologo failed to show documentary or testimonial evidence that she acquired the
subject properties by sale or by any other mode of acquisition from its previous owner. Her only bases in
claiming them were the titles issued in her name, without a deed of sale.

Petitioners further argue that assuming that there was really a sale that took place, its execution and
registration cannot establish her right of possession, whether actual or constructive. First, the validity of
the subject titles was stricken down by Republic vs. Marcos cases and P.D. No. 1271.

Hence, the TCTs could not be sources of legal rights. Second, Crisologo never took actual possession of
the subject properties after the alleged sale in 1967. She appointed an administrator over the said
property only in 2006.

Moreover, petitioners claim that her tax declarations and receipts evidencing payment of taxes cannot
prove her possession or ownership over the subject properties without proof of actual possession.

Finally, petitioners submit that there are facts and circumstances that militate against her claim of
possession. They point out that the titles over the subject properties have no encumbrances or
annotations whatsoever; that for more than forty (40) years, the subject lots have not been subjected to
any deed, agreement, contract, mortgage or any other property dealings; that the said titles are not
validated up to the present as certified by the Register of Deeds of Baguio City; that she presented no
witnesses to prove her intention to possess the subject lots; that the documents she presented are not
reliable because they were issued only in 2008; that no improvements were introduced by her; and that
she is guilty of laches due to her inaction to validate her titles.

Respondent’s position

Crisologo opposes the petition mainly on technical grounds. First, she argues that the supposed
representatives of the petitioners who filed this petition and signed the certification on non-forum
shopping have no authority to do so. Hence, they have no standing to prosecute because they are not the
real parties in interest. Second, she claims that the petitioners failed to furnish the CA a copy of their
motion for extension of time to file this petition for review.

The Court’s Ruling

The only question that needs to be resolved in this petition is – who between petitioners and respondent
Crisologo have a better right of possession over the subject parcels of land. Both contending parties claim
that they have a superior possessory right over the disputed lands.

After a careful review of the records, the Court holds that Crisologo has a better right of possession over
the subject parcels of land.

Accion Publiciana: its nature and purpose

Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine
the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty.

The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. When
parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue to determine who
between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, nonetheless, is not a final and
binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication
of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving
title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.12

In her complaint, Crisologo prayed that she be declared in prior actual possession of the properties in
dispute and that petitioners vacate the same and demolish their houses therein. She alleged, among
others, that she was the registered owner of the subject parcels of land and that petitioners unlawfully
entered her properties by stealth, force and without her prior consent and knowledge. Clearly, she
primarily wanted to recover possession of the subject parcels of land from petitioners. Hence, the case is
an accion publiciana.

Nonetheless, the petitioners have raised the issue of ownership in their pleadings. They mainly argue that
Crisologo’s titles on the subject properties are void and that they have been in open, actual, exclusive,
notorious, uninterrupted and continuous possession over the subject properties in good faith.

The nullity of the decrees of registration and certificates of titles in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 is not
absolute

Although Section 1 of P.D. No. 127113 invalidated decrees of registration and certificates of title within
the Baguio Town site Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, the nullity, however, is not that
sweeping. The said provision expressly states that "all certificates of titles issued on or before July 31,
1973shall be considered valid and the lands covered by them shall be deemed to have been conveyed in
fee simple to the registered owners" upon 1) showing proof that the land covered by the subject title is
not within any government, public or quasi-public reservation, forest, military or otherwise, as certified by
appropriating government agencies; and 2) compliance by the titleholder with the payment to the
Republic of the Philippines of the correct assessed value of the land within the required period.

In the case at bench, the records show that the subject parcels of land were registered on August 24,
1967. The titles are, thus, considered valid although subject to the conditions set. But whether or not
Crisologo complied with the said conditions would not matter because, this would be a collateral attack
on her registered titles, as would be discussed later.

At any rate, petitioners, as private individuals, are not the proper parties to question the status of the
respondent’s registered titles. Section 6 of P.D. No. 127114 expressly states that the "Solicitor General
shall institute such actions or suits as may be necessary to recover possession of lands covered by all void
titles not validated under this Decree."

The respondent’s certificates of title give her the better right to possess the subject parcels of land

It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose
name the title appears.1âwphi1 It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land
described therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the
property, including possession. Thus, in Arambulo v. Gungab,15 this Court declared that the "age-old rule
is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof."16

The records show that TCT No. T-1393517 and TCT No. T-1393618 bear the name of Carmeling P.
Crisologo, as the registered owner. Petitioners do not dispute the fact that she has a Torrens title over the
subject parcels of land.

The respondent’s Torrens certificates of title are immune from a collateral attack.

As a holder of a Torrens certificate of title, the law protects Crisologo from a collateral attack on the same.
Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides that a
certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus:

SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

This rule has been applied in innumerable cases, one of which was Francisco Madrid v. Spouses Mapoy,19
where it was written:

Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the title and rendering it indefeasible
after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the title immune from collateral attack. A
collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the
present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title.
This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title,
through an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such
judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been
disposed of. To permit a collateral attack on respondents-plaintiffs' title is to water down the integrity and
guaranteed legal indefeasibility of a Torrens title.

The petitioners-defendants' attack on the validity of respondents-plaintiffs' title, by claiming that fraud
attended its acquisition, is a collateral attack on the title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend
their possession of the properties in an "accion publiciana," not in a direct action whose main objective is
to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title. This is the attack that possession of a Torrens
Title specifically guards against; hence, we cannot entertain, much less accord credit to, the petitioners-
defendants' claim of fraud to impugn the validity of the respondents-plaintiffs' title to their property.

As the lawful possessor. the respondent has the right to eject the petitioners

The Court agrees with the CA that the only question that needs to be resolved in this suit to recover
possession is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the subject
parcels of land. Therefore, the foremost relevant issue that needs to be determined here is simply
possession, not ownership.

The testimonial and documentary evidence on record prove that Crisologo has a preferred claim of
possession over that of petitioners. It cannot be denied that she bought the subject properties from the
previous owner in 1967, which was why the transfer certificates of title were subsequently issued in her
name. Records further show that she has been paying the realty taxes on the said properties since 1969.
She likewise appointed Isican as administrator of the disputed lands. More importantly, there is no
question that she offered to sell to petitioners the portions of the subject properties occupied by them.
Hence, she deserves to be respected and restored to her lawful possession as provided in Article 539 of
the New Civil Code.20

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164687 February 12, 2009
SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ANGELA V. MADAYAG, Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 19,
2004 and Resolution dated July 15, 2004, which set aside the lower court’s order to suspend the
proceedings on respondent’s application for land registration.

On July 12, 2001, respondent Angela V. Madayag filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan an application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,492 square meters located
in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.2 Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey
Plan Psu-01-008438, approved by the Land Management Services (LMS) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 1, San Fernando City.

On August 20, 2001, petitioner SM Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Chief, Regional Survey
Division, DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation of the respondent’s survey plan because the lot
encroached on the properties it recently purchased from several lot owners and that, despite being the
new owner of the adjoining lots, it was not notified of the survey conducted on June 8, 2001.3

Petitioner then manifested its opposition to the respondent’s application for registration. The Republic of
the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed
their respective oppositions.

On February 6, 2002, petitioner filed its formal opposition. Petitioner alleged that it had recently bought
seven parcels of land in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta, delineated as Lots B, C, D, E, G, H and I in
Consolidation-Subdivision Plan No. (LRC) Pcs-21329, approved by the Land Registration Commission on
August 26, 1976, and previously covered by Survey Plan No. Psu-236090 approved by the Bureau of Lands
on December 29, 1970. These parcels of land are covered by separate certificates of title, some of which
are already in the name of the petitioner while the others are still in the name of the previous owners.

On February 20, 2002, the RTC declared a general default, except as to the petitioner, the Republic, and
the heirs of Romulo Visperas. Thereafter, respondent commenced the presentation of evidence.

Meanwhile, acting on petitioner’s request for the cancellation of the respondent’s survey plan, DENR
Assistant Regional Executive Director for Legal Services and Public Affairs, Allan V. Barcena, advised the
petitioner to file a petition for cancellation in due form so that the DENR could properly act on the same.4
Accordingly, petitioner formally filed with the DENR a petition5 for cancellation of the survey plan
sometime in March 2002, alleging the following grounds:

I.

THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT LOT IN
THIS CASE
II.

NO NOTICE WAS MADE UPON PETITIONER (AS ADJOINING LANDOWNER AND WHO BEARS INTEREST
OVER THE SUBJECT LOT) MUCH LESS THE OWNERS OF ADJOINING LANDS.

III.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENTLY SHOW THAT BAD FAITH AND/OR MALICE ATTENDED THE APPROVAL
OF (PLAN WITH PSU NO. 01-008438).6

On July 17, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings7 in the land registration case,
alleging that the court should await the DENR resolution of the petition for the cancellation of the survey
plan "as the administrative case is prejudicial to the determination" of the land registration case.

On October 8, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion, thus:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby GRANTS the instant motion and suspends the
proceedings herein. In the meantime, and until receipt by this Court of a copy of the resolution of the
petition for cancellation by the DENR, the instant case is hereby ARCHIVED.

SO ORDERED.8

Emphasizing that a survey plan is one of the mandatory requirements in land registration proceedings,
the RTC agreed with the petitioner that the cancellation of the survey plan would be prejudicial to the
petition for land registration.9

On February 13, 2003, the RTC denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration of its order.10
Respondent thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the order suspending the
proceedings.

On March 19, 2004, finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the
proceedings, the CA granted the petition for certiorari, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Orders dated
October 8, 2002 and February 13, 2003 of the respondent Court are declared NULL and VOID.

The Court a quo is directed to continue the proceedings until its final determination. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.11

The CA ratiocinated that the survey plan which was duly approved by the DENR should be accorded the
presumption of regularity, and that the RTC has the power to hear and determine all questions arising
from an application for registration.12
On July 15, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution13 denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner was, thus, compelled to file this petition for review, ascribing the following errors to the CA:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUSPENSION OF
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LAND REGISTRATION CASE IS LEGAL AND PROPER PENDING THE
DETERMINATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES-REGION 1.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE ASSAILED
ORDERS OF THE LOWER COURT HAVE PROPER AND SUFFICIENT BASES IN FACT AND IN LAW.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE LOWER COURT HAS
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SUSPENDING THE PROCEEDINGS AND ARCHIVING THE
CASE.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE FILING OF
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, UNDER RULE 65 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, IS NOT
THE ONLY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW ON THE PART
OF HEREIN RESPONDENT.14

The petition has no merit.

Petitioner contends that, since the respondent’s cause of action in the land registration case depends
heavily on the survey plan, it was only prudent for the RTC to suspend the proceedings therein pending
the resolution of the petition for cancellation of the survey plan by the DENR.15 It, therefore, insists that
recourse to a petition for certiorari was not proper considering that respondent was not arbitrarily
deprived of her right to prosecute her application for registration.16

Undeniably, the power to stay proceedings is an incident to the power inherent in every court to control
the disposition of the cases in its dockets, with economy of time and effort for the court, counsel and
litigants. But courts should be mindful of the right of every party to a speedy disposition of his case and,
thus, should not be too eager to suspend proceedings of the cases before them. Hence, every order
suspending proceedings must be guided by the following precepts: it shall be done in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants
and courts,17 or when the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the
questions raised in the first action are settled.18 Otherwise, the suspension will be regarded as an
arbitrary exercise of the court’s discretion and can be corrected only by a petition for certiorari.

None of the circumstances that would justify the stay of proceedings is present. In fact, to await the
resolution of the petition for cancellation would only delay the resolution of the land registration case and
undermine the purpose of land registration.

The fundamental purpose of the Land Registration Law (Presidential Decree No. 1529) is to finally settle
title to real property in order to preempt any question on the legality of the title – except claims that were
noted on the certificate itself at the time of registration or those that arose subsequent thereto.1avvphi1
Consequently, once the title is registered under the said law, owners can rest secure on their ownership
and possession.19

Glaringly, the petition for cancellation raises practically the very same issues that the herein petitioner
raised in its opposition to the respondent’s application for registration. Principally, it alleges that the
survey plan should be cancelled because it includes portions of the seven properties that it purchased
from several landowners, which properties are already covered by existing certificates of title.

Petitioner posits that it is the DENR that has the sole authority to decide the validity of the survey plan
that was approved by the LMS.20 It cites Section 4(15), Chapter 1, Title XIV, Administrative Code of 1987
which provides that the DENR shall

(15) Exercise (of) exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling
of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies.

However, respondent argues that the land registration court is clothed with adequate authority to resolve
the conflicting claims of the parties, and that even if the DENR cancels her survey plan, the land
registration court is not by duty bound to dismiss the application for registration based solely on the
cancellation of the survey plan.21lawphil.net

Without delving into the jurisdiction of the DENR to resolve the petition for cancellation, we hold that, as
an incident to its authority to settle all questions over the title of the subject property, the land
registration court may resolve the underlying issue of whether the subject property overlaps the
petitioner’s properties without necessarily having to declare the survey plan as void.

It is well to note at this point that, in its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the expeditious
resolution of cases, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the latter’s limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration
court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial and contentious
cases, as well as those involving substantial issues.22 When the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the
latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.23 It
may, therefore, hear and determine all questions that arise from a petition for registration.

In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to determine whether the
issuance of a new certificate of title will alter a valid and existing certificate of title.24 An application for
registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title, 25 which is not
allowed by law.26 But the RTC need not wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the
survey plan in order to determine whether the subject property is already titled or forms part of already
titled property. The court may now verify this allegation based on the respondent’s survey plan vis-à-vis
the certificates of title of the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey plan precisely
serves to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a
portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will
be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land.27
Should the court find it difficult to do so, the court may require the filing of additional papers to aid in its
determination of the propriety of the application, based on Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529:

SEC. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. – The court may require facts to be
stated in the application in addition to those prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and
may require the filing of any additional papers.

The court may also directly require the DENR and the Land Registration Authority to submit a report on
whether the subject property has already been registered and covered by certificates of title, like what the
court did in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals.28 In that case, we commended such move by

the land registration court for being "in accordance with the purposes of the Land Registration Law."29

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 19,
2004 and Resolution dated July 15, 2004 are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan
is DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings in L.R.C. Case No. U-1134 and to resolve the same with
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 219500, August 09, 2017
MAMERTO DY, Petitioner, v. MARIA LOURDES ROSELL ALDEA, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the January 30, 2015 Decision1
and July 1, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 03974, which nullified the
November 18, 2009 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Cebu City (RTC) in Civil Case No.
CEB-31689.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Mamerto Dy (Mamerto) is the owner of Lot 5158 located in Vito, Minglanilla, Cebu, with an area
of 6,738 square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-24849.

In June 2005, Mamerto agreed to sell the subject land to his brothers Nelson Dy (Nelson) and Sancho Dy,
Jr. (Sancho). He asked them to secure copies of the tax declarations covering the subject land from the
Municipal Assessor's Office. Nelson found out that the subject land had gone through a series of
anomalous transactions. The owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.T-24849 was declared lost. As a result, a
new owner's duplicate copy of the same TCT was issued and the subject land was subsequently
mortgaged.

On August 17, 2005, Mamerto, through his lawyer, sent a letter to the Register of Deeds of Cebu
informing the said office that his owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24849 was never lost and that he
never mortgaged his property to anyone.4

When Mamerto discovered that the subject land was being fenced upon the instruction of respondent
Maria Lourdes Rosell Aldea (Lourdes), he immediately filed a complaint against the latter before the
barangay office of Minglanilla. Lourdes, however, failed to attend the hearing. A certificate to file action
was subsequently issued.

On September 16, 2005, Atty. Manolo D. Rubi, Deputy Register of Deeds, informed Nelson that TCT No. T-
134753 covering the subject land was issued in Lourdes' name.5 Mamerto insisted that he never executed
any deed of sale in favor of Lourdes and that the signature appearing on the purported deed of sale was
not his authentic signature.6

For her part, Lourdes countered that in 2004, a certain Mila Labang (Mila) was introduced to her by her
aunt Luz Aldea (Luz). Mila told her that several parcels of land in Minglanilla, including the subject land,
were purportedly for sale.7

After she visited the lots in Minglanilla, Lourdes signified her intention to buy the subject land. Mila
informed Lourdes that the subject land was mortgaged to a certain Atty. Lim and further told her that she
should pay the loan secured by the mortgage. Thereafter, Mila introduced her to Fatima Nadela (Fatima),
who allegedly knew the owner of the subject land and promised Lourdes that she would prepare the deed
of sale.8
On June 20, 2004, Lourdes met with the person impersonating Mamerto (the impostor) at a hotel in Cebu
City. She gave the impostor P1,010,700.00 as payment for the 3,369 square meter-portion of the subject
land. Thereafter, they signed the Deed of Sale9 in the presence of Mila, Fatima and Zenon Aldea (Zenon),
Lourdes' uncle. Afterwards, Lourdes, Fatima and the impostor went to the office of Atty. Lim to pay the
mortgage loan.10

A few weeks thereafter, the impostor called Lourdes and insisted that she should buy the entire land for it
would be difficult and expensive to subdivide the same. Lourdes agreed and paid an additional
P673,800.00. Lourdes and the impostor signed a second deed of sale. For the 6,738 square meter-
property, Lourdes paid an aggregate sum of P1,684,500.00.11

After weeks of waiting, Lourdes was informed by Fatima that the impostor was dead and he had not given
any money to process the transfer of the subject land. Lourdes went to the Office of the Provincial
Assessor to process the payment of capital gains tax and the transfer of title in her name. Eventually, the
Register of Deeds issued TCT No. T-134753 under her name.12 Consequently, Mamerto filed a complaint
for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and TCT No. T-134753, and recovery of real property with
injunction and damages.

The RTC Ruling

In its November 18, 2009 Decision, the RTC ruled that Mamerto had a better right over the subject land
and was the rightful and lawful owner thereof. It found that Mamerto's owner's duplicate copy was never
lost, and so ruled that the reconstituted title issued in favor of the impostor was null and void. Hence, the
RTC nullified Lourdes' title as it was based on a void reconstituted title. It further opined that the contract
of sale between Lourdes and the impostor was null and void because the latter did not have the right to
transfer ownership of the subject land at the time it was delivered to Lourdes.

The trial court held that Lourdes could not be considered a buyer in good faith because she should have
been suspicious of the transaction which occurred at a hotel room and without any lawyer present. It
noted that Lourdes gave her money to the seller even if the owner's copy of the certificate of title was not
handed to her; and that she decided to buy the remaining portion of the subject land when the price was
reduced to P200.00 per square meter for the flimsy reason that it would be hard for the seller to subdivide
the subject land.

Unconvinced, Lourdes elevated an appeal to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed January 30, 2015 Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling. It declared that
Lourdes was an innocent purchaser for value. The appellate court ruled that a person dealing with
registered land is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of
the register or the certificate of title. It observed that the only annotation at the back of the title was that
it was mortgaged to Audie C. Uy (Uy).
The CA added that Lourdes exercised ordinary prudence because during the signing of the deed of sale,
she asked for an identification card and she was given a senior citizen's I.D., showing that the person she
was dealing with was "Mamerto Dy." It stated that while it turned out that the I.D. exhibited by the seller
was fake and that the person claiming to be the owner of the land was a fraud, Lourdes could not be
blamed for believing that she was dealing with the real owner of the land. The appellate court held that
the confirmation of Fatima; Engracia Mondrel and Rena Canio, the overseers of the subject land; and Uy,
the named mortgagee lead Lourdes to believe that she was dealing with the rightful owner.

Aggrieved, Mamerto moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its July 1, 2015
Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

(1)
WHETHER THE RECONSTITUTED TITLE, FROM WHICH TCT NO. T-134753 IN THE NAME OF LOURDES WAS
DERIVED, IS VALID.

(2)
WHETHER LOURDES IS AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE WHO IS ENTITLED TO THE APPLICATION
OF THE MIRROR DOCTRINE.

(3)
WHETHER MAMERTO HAS BETTER RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT LAND.

Mamerto argues that the fact that the title was reconstituted should have urged Lourdes to conduct
further investigation on the identity of the vendor; that even though Fatima, Uy and the purported
overseers assured Lourdes that the person she was dealing with was the real owner of the subject land,
she should have taken into consideration that these persons might have been lying and that a possible
syndicated sale might have been planned; that the impostor did not accompany her when she visited the
subject land; that she should have asked for other documents to establish the identity of the seller; and
that the market value of the subject land ranges from P800.00 to P1,000.00, thus, Lourdes should have
wondered why the purchase price was inexpensive.

In her Comment,13 dated December 18, 2015, Lourdes contends that she is an innocent purchaser for
value; that while it may be true that an impostor had fraudulently acquired a void reconstituted title over
the subject land, such circumstance did not necessarily invalidate her own title; that a valid transfer could
issue from a void reconstituted title if an innocent purchaser for value intervenes; and that where innocent
third persons rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued and acquire rights over the property,
courts cannot disregard such right and order the total cancellation of the certificate of title for that would
impair public confidence in the certificate of title.

In his Reply,14 dated April 8, 2016, Mamerto insists that Lourdes' argument that a spurious deed can
become the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value comes into the picture is not
applicable where the real owner still holds a valid and existing certificate of title; and that Lourdes has met
the impostor, thus, she should have inquired further into the details of why the title was reconstituted.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

When the Owner's Duplicate

Certificate of Title has not been
lost, the reconstituted
certificate is void

The governing law for judicial reconstitution of title is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26, Section 15 of which
provides when reconstitution of a title should be allowed:

Section 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents presented, as supported by parole
evidence or otherwise, are sufficient and proper to warrant the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed
certificate of title, and that petitioner is the registered owner of the property or has an interest therein,
that the said certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, and that the description,
area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed
certificate of title, an order of reconstitution shall be issued. The clerk of court shall forward to the register
of deeds a certified copy of said order and all the documents which, pursuant to said order, are to be used
as the basis of the reconstitution. If the court finds that there is no sufficient evidence or basis to justify
the reconstitution, the petition shall be dismissed, but such dismissal shall not preclude the right of the
party or parties entitled thereto to file an application for confirmation of his or their title under the
provisions of the Land Registration Act. [Emphases supplied]

From the foregoing, it appears that the following requisites must be complied with for an order for
reconstitution to be issued: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the
documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an
interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e)
that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those contained in
the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Verily, the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration
in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a
piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures
prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction
occurred.15

Indubitably, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner's duplicate certificate of title is crucial in clothing
the RTC with jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution proceedings. In Spouses Paulino v. CA,16 the
Court reiterated the rule that when the owner's duplicate certificate of title was not actually lost or
destroyed, but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void because the
court that rendered the order of reconstitution had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, viz.:
As early as the case of Strait Times, Inc. v. CA, the Court has held that when the owner's duplicate
certificate of title has not been lost, but is, in fact, in the possession of another person, then the
reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.
Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original certificate. This rule was reiterated in
the cases of Villamayor v. Arante, Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v. [CA], Eastworld Motor Industries
Corporation v. Skunac Corporation, Rodriguez v. Lim, Villanueva v. Viloria, and Camitan v. Fidelity
Investment Corporation. Thus, with evidence that the original copy of the TCT was not lost during the
conflagration that hit the Quezon City Hall and that the owner's duplicate copy of the title was actually in
the possession of another, the RTC decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

xxx xxx xxx

In reconstitution proceedings, the Court has repeatedly ruled that before jurisdiction over the case can be
validly acquired, it is a condition sine qua non that the certificate of title has not been issued to another
person. If a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the
petition for issuance of new title. The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by (such) third
parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly
issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The existence of a prior title ipso
facto nullifies the reconstitution proceedings. The proper recourse is to assail directly in a proceeding
before the regional trial court the validity of the Torrens title already issued to the other person.17
[Emphases supplied and citations omitted]

In this case, Mamerto asserted that he never lost his owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24829 and that
he had always been in possession thereof. Moreover, it is beyond doubt that another person
impersonated Mamerto and represented before the court that the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-
24829 was lost in order to secure a new copy which was consequently used to deceive Lourdes into
purchasing the subject land. Hence, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner's duplicate certificate of
title, which is the primordial element in the validity of reconstitution proceedings, is clearly missing.
Accordingly, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the reconstitution proceedings initiated by the
impostor, and its judgment rendered thereafter is null and void. This alone is sufficient to declare the
reconstituted title null and void.

Only an innocent purchaser for

value may invoke the mirror
doctrine

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land and to put a stop to any
question of legality of the title except claims which have been recorded in the certificate of title at the
time of registration or which may arise subsequent thereto.18 As a consequence, the mirror doctrine
provides that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the
condition of the property.19
Every registered owner and every subsequent purchaser for value in good faith holds the title to the
property free from all encumbrances except those noted in the certificate.20 As such, a defective title, or
one the procurement of which is tainted with fraud and misrepresentation — may be the source of a
completely legal and valid title, provided that the buyer is an innocent third person who, in good faith,
relied on the correctness of the certificate of title, or an innocent purchaser for value.21

Thus, in order to resolve whether Lourdes holds an indefeasible title to the subject land, it becomes
necessary to determine whether she is an innocent purchaser for value.

Lourdes cannot be considered a

purchaser in good faith

In Nobleza v. Nuega,22 the Court defined an innocent purchaser for value, to wit:

An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right or interest in the property, for which a full and fair price is paid by the buyer at the time
of the purchase or before receipt of any notice of claims or interest of some other person in the property.
It is the party who claims to be an innocent purchaser for value who has the burden of proving such
assertion, and it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith. To successfully invoke
and be considered as a buyer in good faith, the presumption is that first and foremost, the "buyer in good
faith" must have shown prudence and due diligence in the exercise of his/her rights. It presupposes that
the buyer did everything that an ordinary person would do for the protection and defense of his/her
rights and interests against prejudicial or injurious concerns when placed in such a situation. The
prudence required of a buyer in good faith is not that of a person with training in law, but rather that of
an average man who 'weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibration of our technical
rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil.' A buyer in good faith does his homework and verifies that
the particulars are in order — such as the title, the parties, the mode of transfer and the provisions in the
deed/contract of sale, to name a few. To be more specific, such prudence can be shown by making an
ocular inspection of the property, checking the title/ownership with the proper Register of Deeds
alongside the payment of taxes therefor, or inquiring into the minutiae such as the parameters or lot area,
the type of ownership, and the capacity of the seller to dispose of the property, which capacity necessarily
includes an inquiry into the civil status of the seller to ensure that if married, marital consent is secured
when necessary. In fine, for a purchaser of a property in the possession of another to be in good faith, he
must exercise due diligence, conduct an investigation, and weigh the surrounding facts and circumstances
like what any prudent man in a similar situation would do.23 [Emphases supplied and citations omitted]

In the case at bench, Lourdes was deficient in her vigilance as buyer of the subject land.

During cross-examination, Lourdes admitted that she did not conduct a thorough investigation and that
she merely instructed her uncle to check with the Register of Deeds whether the subject land is free from
any encumbrance.24 Further, it must be noted that Lourdes met the seller only during the signing of the
two deeds of sale.25 Yet, she did not call into question why the seller refused to see her during the
negotiation. For sure, an ordinary prudent buyer of real property who would be relinquishing a significant
amount of money would want to meet the seller of the property and would exhaust all means to ensure
that the seller is the real owner thereof.
Indeed, Lourdes conducted an ocular inspection of the subject land. When she asked Engracia Mondrel,
the overseer, if she knows the owner, Engracia affirmed that the property is owned by a person named
"Mamerto Dy." Noteworthy, however, is Lourdes' admission that the seller was not present when she
talked to Engracia such that there was no way for the latter to ascertain whether she and Lourdes were
talking about the same Mamerto Dy.26

Another circumstance indicating that Lourdes was not an innocent purchaser for value was the gross
undervaluation of the property in the deeds of sale at the measly price of P1,684,500.00 when the true
market value was at least P5,390,400.00 for the entire property. Moreover, Lourdes initially decided to buy
only half of the subject land or 3,369 square meters. When the impostor, however, insisted that she
should buy the remaining half just because it would be difficult to divide the subject land, Lourdes readily
acceded without questioning why the seller was willing to sell at P200.00 per square meter.27

Certainly, it was not enough for Lourdes to show that the property was unfenced and vacant; otherwise, it
would be too easy for any registered owner to lose his property, including its possession, through illegal
occupation.28 It was also imprudent for her to simply rely on the face of the imposter's TCT considering
that she was aware that the said TCT was derived from a duplicate owner's copy reissued by virtue of the
alleged loss of the original duplicate owner's copy.29 That circumstance should have already alerted her
to the need to inquire beyond the face of the impostor's TCT.30

In sum, the Court rules that Lourdes is not an innocent purchaser for value.

Mamerto may recover the

subject land notwithstanding its
registration in Lourdes' name

While it is true that under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 the decree of registration becomes
incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The
acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real
owners.31

Furthermore, ownership is not the same as a certificate of title. Registering a piece of land under the
Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.32
A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described
therein.33 The indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud
against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith must concur with registration, otherwise,
registration would be an exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the
whole world. The legal principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose
name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.34

Hence, the fact that Lourdes was able to secure a title in her name neither operates to vest ownership
upon her of the subject land nor cures the void sale. Accordingly, the Court deems it proper to restore
Mamerto's rights of dominion over Lot 5158.
WHEREFORE, the January 30, 2015 Decision and July 1, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 03974 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The November 18, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-31689 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170528 August 26, 2008
HEIRS OF JULIAN TIRO, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE ESTATES CORPORATION, respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1
dated 1 July 2005, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78582, which affirmed the
Decision2 dated 16 April 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Lapu-Lapu City, in Civil Case
No. 4824-L dismissing petitioners’ complaint and declaring the respondent as the owner of the disputed
property.

Petitioners Guillerma Tiro, Dominga Tiro Nunez and Maximo Tiro filed before the RTC a Complaint for
Quieting of Title against respondent Philippine Estates Corporation, a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 4824-L.
Petitioners alleged that they are the children of the late Julian Tiro and the authorized representatives of
the Heirs of the late Pedro Tiro. Both decedents were purportedly, during their lifetime, the lawful
absolute and registered owners of the disputed land as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. RO-1121.3 The disputed property is herein described as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot 2914 of the Cadastral Survey of Opon, L.R.C. Record No. 1003) situated in the Barrio
of Marigondon, Municipality of Opon, Province of Cebu, Island of Mactan x x x; containing an area of
EIGHT THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (8,120) SQUARE METERS.4

Petitioners averred that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual possession of the
disputed land since time immemorial until they were prevented from entering the same by persons
claiming to be the new owners sometime in 1995. After examining the records found in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, they discovered that OCT No. RO-1121 had already been cancelled
as early as 1969 and that the subject property, after several other transfers, was presently registered in the
name of respondent under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 35672.5

The records in the Office of the Register of Deeds showed each transfer involving the disputed land.
Petitioners learned that OCT No. RO-1121, registered in the names of Julian and Pedro Tiro, was cancelled
on 10 September 1969. In its place, TCT No. 2848 was issued in favor of Spouses Julio Baba and Olimpia
Mesa. The registration of the disputed property in favor of the Spouses Baba was supported by two
documents: (1) an Extrajudicial Declaration of Heir and Confirmation of Sale6 dated 20 August 1969,
executed by Maxima Ochea (Ochea), claiming to be the only surviving heir of Julian and Pedro Tiro,
wherein she confirmed and ratified an alleged sale of the subject land made before World War II by Julian
and Pedro Tiro in favor of Spouses Bibiano Amores and Isabel Digno; and (2) another document entitled
"Deed of Confirmation,7" also dated 20 August 1969, executed by the Spouses Amores, wherein they
verified that they subsequently transferred the disputed property to the Spouses Baba sometime in 1947.

On 20 June 1979, TCT No. 2848 was cancelled to give way to the issuance of TCT No. 9415 in the name of
Spouses Ronaldo Velayo and Leonor Manuel, after the Spouses Baba sold the disputed property to
them.8 Subsequently, the same property was sold by the Spouses Velayo to Pacific Rehouse Corporation,
as a consequence of which TCT No. 9415 was cancelled and TCT No. 30186 was issued in the name of the
latter on 16 February 1995.9 Finally, on 25 October 1996, following the sale of the disputed land to
respondent, TCT No. 30186 was cancelled and TCT No. 35672 was issued in its name.10

Petitioners averred that Ochea, who executed the document "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heir and
Confirmation of Sale," which resulted in the cancellation of OCT No. RO-1121 in the name of Julian and
Pedro Tiro, was not in any way related to Julian and Pedro Tiro. It was the petitioners’ contention that
since Ochea was not an heir of the original registered owners, she had no right to cause the transfer of
the disputed property and, thus, her transfer and all subsequent transfers of said property, including that
made to respondent, were invalid.11 Instead of presenting documents to evidence their relationship to
the decedents Julian and Pedro Tiro, petitioners offered the testimonies of petitioners Maximo Tiro12 and
his son-in-law Joveniano Diasana.13 Finally, the petitioners prayed that all the transactions emanating
from the "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and Confirmation of Sale," executed by Maxima Ochea, be
declared void, including the transfer made in favor of the respondent; that the title which was issued in
the name of respondent be cancelled; and that the property be restored and registered in the name of the
petitioners.14

In its Answer dated 10 February 1998, respondent claimed that its predecessor-in-interest Pacific Rehouse
Corporation acquired the subject land from the Spouses Velayo, the registered owners of the property
who were also in possession of the same at the time of the sale. There was nothing in the title or any
circumstances during the sale that would indicate any defect in the Spouses Velayo’s title to the property.
Respondent pointed out that 27 years had elapsed since the cancellation of OCT No. RO-1121 before
petitioners asserted their rights over the disputed land. Moreover, petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest
Julian and Pedro Tiro did not question the cancellation of their title to the property during their lifetimes.
Hence, respondent argued that petitioners’ action for quieting of title was barred by laches and
prescription.15

To support its allegations, respondent presented TCT No. 2914 in the name of the Spouses Velayo as
proof that they were the registered owners of the disputed property at the time they sold it to Pacific
Rehouse Corporation.16 Additionally, respondent presented a Decision17 dated 28 June 1994 in Civil Case
No. R-1202, entitled Spouses Velayo v. Spouses Tiro, rendered by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lapu-
Lapu City to further prove that the Spouses Velayo were also in possession of the disputed property at the
time of its sale to Pacific Rehouse Corporation. Civil Case No. R-1202 was a case for Forcible Entry with
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and in its Decision dated 28 June 1994, the MTC declared the
Spouses Velayo the rightful possessors of the subject property and ordered petitioner Maximo Tiro and
his co-defendant spouse to vacate the portion of the property which they forcibly entered on 7 May 1994.
Respondent likewise presented the Deed of Sale18 dated 4 October 1994 executed by the Spouses Velayo
in favor of Pacific Rehouse Corporation; the Deed of Transfer19 dated 23 October 1996 executed by
Pacific Rehouse Corporation in favor of respondent; and various tax declarations issued in the names of
the Spouses Baba, Spouses Velayo, Pacific Rehouse Corporation, and respondent during the years that
each of them claimed ownership over the disputed property.20

On 16 April 2002, the RTC issued a Decision21 in Civil Case No. 4824-L dismissing petitioners’ Complaint.
The trial court noted that petitioners’ claims of filiation to Julian and Pedro Tiro were not supported by
documents. The testimonies of petitioners’ witnesses were also inconsistent as to the location of the
disputed land, as well as the number of Pedro Tiro’s children. The RTC stressed that even assuming that
petitioners were heirs of the late Julian and Pedro Tiro, and Maxima Ochea was in no way related to them,
petitioners’ claims had already prescribed, considering that the Complaint was filed more than ten years
since the registration of the disputed property in the name of the Spouses Baba in 1969. Petitioners’
allegation that they were in continuous possession of the subject property until 1995 was also belied by
the Decision dated 28 June 1994 of the MTC in Civil Case No. R-1202, ordering petitioners to vacate the
disputed property, which they forcibly entered, and to restore possession to the Spouses Velayo. Lastly,
the RTC ruled that respondent was an innocent purchaser for value who relied on the correctness of the
certificate of title in the name of the vendor.

Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on 2 May 2002 questioning the 16 April 2002 Decision of the RTC. The
petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals an appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 78582, questioning the
decision rendered by the trial court.

However, instead of filing an Appellants’ Brief as required by the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed before
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78582 a Motion to Grant New Trial Pursuant to Section 1, Rule
53,22 on 8 January 2004. They attached as annexes to their motion the following documents to prove that
Julian Tiro was their father: (1) Certificates of Baptism of Pastor Tiro and Dominga Tiro;23 (2) marriage
contract of Dominga Tiro;24 (3) Certificate of Marriage of Guillerma Tiro;25 (4) Certification of Marriage of
Pastor Tiro;26 and (5) Certificate of Baptism of Victoria Tiro.27 In a Resolution28 dated 5 August 2004, the
appellate court denied the motion.

In its Decision dated 1 July 2005, the Court of Appeals likewise denied the petitioners’ appeal in CA-G.R.
CV No. 78582 and affirmed the RTC Decision dated 16 April 2002 in Civil Case No. 4824-L. The appellate
court found that petitioners failed to prove that they were the heirs of Julian and Pedro Tiro. It also took
into account the fact that during their lifetime, Julian and Pedro Tiro never questioned the transactions
which affected their land. The Court of Appeals gave significant weight to the respondent’s statements
that it had acquired the subject property from the registered owners, supported by the registered titles
that were presented in court. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that even assuming that the first few
transfers turned out to be fraudulent, the transfer to respondent, a purchaser in good faith, may be the
root of a valid title.29

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 25 July 2005,30 which the Court of Appeals denied in
a Resolution dated 28 October 2005.31

Hence, the present Petition, in which petitioners make the following assignment of errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACT OF THE
REGISTER (sic) OF DEEDS OF REGISTERING A CLEARLY VOID AND UNREGISTRABLE DOCUMENT CONFERS
NO VALID TITLE ON THE PRESENTOR AND HIS SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE IN SPOUSES SANTIAGO, ET
AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. [NO.] 103959, AUGUST 21, 1997 WHEREBY IT IS HELD [THAT]
"THE TORRENS SYSTEM DOES NOT CREATE OR VEST TITLE. IT ONLY CONFIRMS AND RECORDS TITLE
ALREADY EXISTING AND VESTED. IT DOES NOT PROTECT A USURPER FROM THE TRUE OWNER NOR CAN
IT BE A SHIELD IN THE COMMISSION OF FRAUD. WHERE ONE DOES NOT HAVE ANY RIGHTFUL CLAIM
OVER A REAL PROPERTY, THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION CONFIRM[S] OR RECORD[S]
NOTHING.32

This Petition lacks merit.

Petitioners’ main contention is, since Ochea was not even related to either Julian or Pedro Tiro, the
"Declaration of Heir and Confirmation of Sale" which she executed could not have resulted in the
cancellation of OCT No. RO-1121 in the names of Julian and Pedro Tiro. They further argue that since the
initial transfer of the disputed land was fraudulent, therefore, all the subsequent transfers, including that
made to respondent, were all invalid.

Petitioners’ arguments are unfounded.

Insofar as a person who has fraudulently obtained property is concerned, the consequently fraudulent
registration of the property in the name of such person would not be sufficient to vest in him or her title
to the property. Certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. The
indefeasibility of the torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful
owner of real property. Good faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would
be an exercise in futility.33 However, where good faith is established, as in the case of an innocent
purchaser for value, a forged document may become the root of a valid title. 34

A person is considered in law as an innocent purchaser for value when he buys the property of another,
without notice that some other person has a right or an interest in such property, and pays a full price for
the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other
person in the property. A person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the
certificate to determine the condition of the property. The courts cannot disregard the rights of innocent
third persons, for that would impair or erode public confidence in the torrens system of land registration.
Thus, a title procured by fraud or misrepresentation can still be the source of a completely legal and valid
title if the same is in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.35

In the present case, respondent was clearly an innocent purchaser for value. It purchased the disputed
property from Pacific Rehouse Corporation, along with other parcels of land for a valuable consideration,
i.e., shares of common stock of respondent with a value of P148,100,400.00. Pacific Rehouse Corporation,
in turn, purchased the property from Spouses Velayo, also for valuable consideration in the amount of
P1,461,600.00. The certificates of title of Pacific Rehouse Corporation and the Spouses Velayo were clean
and appeared valid on their face, and there was nothing therein which should have put the respondent on
its guard of some defect in the previous registered owners’ title to the disputed property. In addition to
their certificate of title, the Spouses Velayo even presented to Pacific Rehouse Corporation a copy of the
MTC Decision dated 28 June 1994 in Civil Case No. R-1202 ordering petitioners to vacate the disputed
property, which they forcibly entered, and to restore possession thereof to the Spouses Velayo. The said
Decision supported the Spouses Velayo’s claim of title to the disputed property.

In Spouses Chu, Sr. v. Benelda Estate Development Corporation,36 this Court pronounced that it is crucial
that a complaint for annulment of title must allege that the purchaser was aware of the defect in the title,
so that the cause of action against him or her will be sufficient. Failure to do so, as in the case at bar, is
fatal for the reason that the court cannot render a valid judgment against the purchaser who is presumed
to be in good faith in acquiring said property. Failure to prove, much less impute, bad faith to said
purchaser who has acquired a title in his or her favor would make it impossible for the court to render a
valid judgment thereon, due to the indefeasibility and conclusiveness of his or her title.

In this case, petitioners directed all allegations of bad faith solely at Ochea. The property in question had
already been the subject of five succeeding transfers to persons who were not accused of having
purchased the same in bad faith. Petitioners’ attempt, therefore, to have respondent’s certificate of title to
the disputed property annulled, must fail.

In Veloso v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court enunciated that a title issued to an innocent purchaser and for
value cannot be revoked on the basis that the deed of sale was falsified, if he had no knowledge of the
fraud committed. The Court also provided the person prejudiced with the following recourse:

Even granting for the sake of argument, that the petitioner’s signature was falsified and consequently, the
power of attorney and the deed of sale were null and void, such fact would not revoke the title
subsequently issued in favor of private respondent Aglaloma. In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it
was held, viz:

"The right of an innocent purchaser for value must be respected and protected, even if the seller obtained
his title through fraud. The remedy of the person prejudiced is to bring an action for damages against
those who caused or employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of
the Philippines may be filed for recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund." (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners cite Sps. Santiago v. Court of Appeals.38 In Santiago, the plaintiff and the defendants were the
parties to the void contract of sale of the disputed property. The contract was considered simulated for
lack of consideration and given the fact that defendants failed to take possession of the subject property.
For this reason, the Court did not hesitate to cancel the certificates of title in the defendants’ names, since
they were found not to be the rightful owners of the property. More importantly, the defendants were not
innocent purchasers for value, since they were privy to the nullity of the contract of sale covering the
property. Santiago is clearly inapplicable to the present case. Respondent herein who paid adequate
consideration for the disputed land, took possession of the same, and is already the fifth transferee
following the allegedly fraudulent initial transfer of the land, cannot be placed in the same position as a
vendor who was a party to a simulated sale of a real property.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78582, promulgated on 1 July 2005, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 114299 March 9, 2000

TRADERS ROYAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS

In our Decision dated September 29, 1999, we disposed of the consolidated cases as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1994, in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 33920, as
modified by its Resolution dated August 10, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED. In addition, Traders Royal Bank is
ordered to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time it was sold to Emelita
Santiago.

This Decision is without prejudice to whatever criminal, civil or administrative action against the Register
of Deeds and/or his assistants that may be take by the party or parties prejudiced by the failure of the
former to carry over the notice of lis pendens to the certificate of title in the name of TRB.

SO ORDERED. 1

On October 21, 1999, the Capays and Ramon Gonzales, private respondents in G.R. No. 114299 and
petitioners in G.R. No. 118862, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the above Decision. They pray
for the inclusion in the dispositive portion of said Decision of an award to each of them the amount of
P100,000.00 as moral damages, P40,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P40,000.00 as attorney’s fees, all
with legal interest at the time of the filing of the complaint. They also ask that Traders Royal Bank (TRB) be
ordered to pay them the amount of P47,730.00, the price stipulated in the Deed of Absolute Sale between
said bank and its transferee, Emelita Santiago, plus interest at 12% per annum from the date of said
contract, instead of the fair market value of the disputed property at the time of said sale.

We clarify that we did not delete the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and interest
in favor of the movants. It may be recalled that the trial court, in ruling for the Capays and Atty. Gonzales,
ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the certificate of titles issued in the names of the transferees and
to issue new ones in favor of the movants. In addition, the trial court ordered TRB to pay movants
P100,000.00 as moral damages, P40,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P40,000.00 as attorney’s fees, with
legal interest from the filing of the complaint. 2

The Court of Appeals initially affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. TRB appealed to this Court
while the subsequent transferees filed a motion for reconsideration in the appellate court. The Court of
Appeals, in a Resolution dated August 10, 1994, granted the transferees’ motion thus:

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions and finding merit in the motion for reconsideration,
the same is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the decision of this Court, promulgated on February 24,
1994, is hereby RECONSIDERED. The complaint filed against defendants-appellants with the court a quo is
hereby ordered DISMISSED, and the certificate of titles originally issued to them in their individual names
are hereby restored and duly respected. We make no pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 3

As stated in the above Resolution, the appellate court merely dismissed the complaint as against the
subsequent transferees, not as against TRB. In effect, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court ordering the cancellation of the certificates of title in the name of the subsequent transferees
but sustained the award of damages in favor of the movants herein. The decision of the Court of appeals
affirming the award of damages remained unaffected by the subsequent resolution. TRB did not
specifically question the award of damages when it appealed to this Court; hence, such issue was beyond
our review.

Inasmuch as we affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, as modified by its resolution, the award of
damages in favor of movants need not be stated in detail. The omission should not be read as a deletion
of the award for damages. Accordingly, we deny the prayer for the inclusion of such award in the
dispositive portion of our decision.

II

Movants ask that TRB be ordered to pay them the amount the former received from its immediate
transferee, Emelita Santiago, and interest thereon, instead of the fair market value of the property at the
time of said transfer. The basis for the award of the amount constituting the value of the property, which
we decreed in our decision, is found in Article 1400 of the Civil Code:

Art. 1400. Whenever the person obliged by the decree of annulment to return the thing can not do so
because it has been lost through his fault, he shall return the fruits received and the value of the thing at
the time of the loss, with interest from the said date.

In accordance with the above provision, movants would ordinarily be entitled to, aside from the value of
the property, interest thereon from the date of the loss, in this case, from the sale of the property by TRB
to Emelita Santiago, with interest from said date. Pursuant also to the above provision, movants would be
entitled to the fruits received from said property, if evidence of such receipt of fruits is presented.

Movants, however, insist upon the price of the property at the time of the sale to Emelita Santiago, which
was in the amount of P47,730.00 as appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale. To this, TRB poses no
objection and we take the price stated in the deed of sale as a stipulation between the parties on the
value of the property. Accordingly, we grant movants’ prayer for said amount, with 12% per annum from
said sale, the value of the property being equivalent to a forbearance of credit. 4

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to GRANT IN PART the Partial Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of this Court’s Decision in G.R.
Nos. 114299 and 118862 dated September 24, 1999 is hereby AMENDED as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 33920, as
modified by its Resolution dated August 10, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED. In addition, Traders Royal Bank is
ordered to pay the Capays the amount of P47,730.00, with 12% interest from the date of said sale until
the same is paid.

This Decision is without prejudice to whatever criminal, civil or administrative action against the Register
of Deeds and/or his assistants that may be take by the party or parties prejudiced by the failure of the
former to carry over the notice of lis pendens to the certificate of title in the name of TRB.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180027 July 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL C. SANTOS, VANNESSA C. SANTOS, MICHELLE C. SANTOS and DELFIN SANTOS, all
represented by DELFIN C. SANTOS, Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:

For review1 is the Decision2 dated 9 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86300. In
the said decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 14 February 2005 ruling3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 15, of Naic, Cavite in LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals’ decision accordingly reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision dated February 14, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 15) in Naic, Cavite, in LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292 is AFFIRMED in toto. No
costs.4

The aforementioned ruling of the RTC granted the respondents’ Application for Original Registration of a
parcel of land under Presidential Decree No. 1529.

The antecedents are as follows:

Prelude

In October 1997, the respondents purchased three (3) parcels of unregistered land situated in Barangay
Carasuchi, Indang, Cavite.5 The 3 parcels of land were previously owned by one Generosa Asuncion
(Generosa), one Teresita Sernal (Teresita) and by the spouses Jimmy and Imelda Antona, respectively.6

Sometime after the said purchase, the respondents caused the survey and consolidation of the parcels of
land. Hence, per the consolidation/subdivision plan Ccs-04-003949-D, the 3 parcels were consolidated
into a single lot—"Lot 3"—with a determined total area of nine thousand five hundred seventy-seven
(9,577) square meters.7

The Application for Land Registration

On 12 March 2002, the respondents filed with the RTC an Application8 for Original Registration of Lot 3.
Their application was docketed as LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292.

On the same day, the RTC issued an Order9 setting the application for initial hearing and directing the
satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. The
same Order, however, also required the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to
submit a report on the status of Lot 3.10

On 13 March 2002, the DENR Calabarzon Office submitted its Report11 to the RTC. The Report relates
that the area covered by Lot 3 "falls within the Alienable and Disposable Land, Project No. 13 of Indang,
Cavite per LC12 3013 certified on March 15, 1982." Later, the respondents submitted a Certification13
from the DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) attesting that, indeed, Lot
3 was classified as an "Alienable or Disposable Land" as of 15 March 1982.

After fulfillment of the jurisdictional requirements, the government, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed the lone opposition14 to the respondents’ application on 13 May 2003.

The Claim, Evidence and Opposition

The respondents allege that their predecessors-in-interest i.e., the previous owners of the parcels of land
making up Lot 3, have been in "continuous, uninterrupted, open, public and adverse" possession of the
said parcels "since time immemorial."15 It is by virtue of such lengthy possession, tacked with their own,
that respondents now hinge their claim of title over Lot 3.

During trial on the merits, the respondents presented, among others, the testimonies of Generosa16 and
the representatives of their two (2) other predecessors-in-interest.17 The said witnesses testified that they
have been in possession of their respective parcels of land for over thirty (30) years prior to the purchase
thereof by the respondents in 1997.18 The witnesses also confirmed that neither they nor the interest they
represent, have any objection to the registration of Lot 3 in favor of the respondents.19

In addition, Generosa affirmed in open court a Joint Affidavit20 she executed with Teresita.21 In it,
Generosa revealed that the portions of Lot 3 previously pertaining to her and Teresita were once owned
by her father, Mr. Valentin Sernal (Valentin) and that the latter had "continuously, openly and peacefully
occupied and tilled as absolute owner" such lands even "before the outbreak of World War 2."22

To substantiate the above testimonies, the respondents also presented various Tax Declarations23
covering certain areas of Lot 3—the earliest of which dates back to 1948 and covers the portions of the
subject lot previously belonging to Generosa and Teresita.24

On the other hand, the government insists that Lot 3 still forms part of the public domain and, hence, not
subject to private acquisition and registration. The government, however, presented no further evidence
to controvert the claim of the respondents.25

The Decision of the RTC and the Court of Appeals

On 14 February 2005, the RTC rendered a ruling granting the respondents’ Application for Original
Registration of Lot 3. The RTC thus decreed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court confirming its previous Order of general default, decrees
and adjudges Lot 3 (Lot 1755) Ccs-04-003949-D of Indang, Cadastre, with a total area of NINE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN (9,577) square meters and its technical description as above-
described and situated in Brgy. [Carasuchi], Indang, Cavite, pursuant to the provisions of Act 496 as
amended by P.D. No. 1529, it is hereby decreed and adjudged to be confirmed and registered in the
name of herein applicants MICHAEL C. SANTOS, VANESSA C. SANTOS, MICHELLE C. SANTOS, and DELFIN
C. SANTOS, all residing at No. 60 Rockville Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City.
Once this decision has become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued by the
Administrator, Land Registration Authority.26

The government promptly appealed the ruling of the RTC to the Court of Appeals.27 As already
mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision on appeal.

Hence, this petition.28

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC ruling granting
original registration of Lot 3 in favor of the respondents.

The government would have Us answer in the affirmative. It argues that the respondents have failed to
offer evidence sufficient to establish its title over Lot 3 and, therefore, were unable to rebut the Regalian
presumption in favor of the State.29

The government urges this Court to consider the DENR Calabarzon Office Report as well as the DENR-
CENRO Certification, both of which clearly state that Lot 3 only became "Alienable or

Disposable Land" on 15 March 1982.30 The government posits that since Lot 3 was only classified as
alienable and disposable on 15 March 1982, the period of prescription against the State should also
commence to run only from such date.31 Thus, the respondents’ 12 March 2002 application—filed nearly
twenty (20) years after the said classification—is still premature, as it does not meet the statutory period
required in order for extraordinary prescription to set in.32

OUR RULING

We grant the petition.

Jura Regalia and the Property Registration Decree

We start our analysis by applying the principle of Jura Regalia or the Regalian Doctrine.33 Jura Regalia
simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the general source of all
private titles.34 Thus, pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to land, save those acquired from
native title,35 must be traced from some grant, whether express or implied, from the State.36 Absent a
clear showing that land had been let into private ownership through the State’s imprimatur, such land is
presumed to belong to the State.37

Being an unregistered land, Lot 3 is therefore presumed as land belonging to the State. It is basic that
those who seek the entry of such land into the Torrens system of registration must first establish that it
has acquired valid title thereto as against the State, in accordance with law.

In this connection, original registration of title to land is allowed by Section 14 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, or otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The said section provides:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law. (Emphasis
supplied)

Basing from the allegations of the respondents in their application for land registration and subsequent
pleadings, it appears that they seek the registration of Lot 3 under either the first or the second paragraph
of the quoted section.

However, after perusing the records of this case, as well as the laws and jurisprudence relevant thereto,
We find that neither justifies registration in favor of the respondents.

Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529

Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 refers to the original registration of "imperfect" titles to
public land acquired under Section 11(4) in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, or
the Public Land Act, as amended.38 Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 specify identical requirements for the judicial confirmation of "imperfect"
titles, to wit:39

1. That the subject land forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain;.

2. That the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide
claim of ownership, and;

3. That such possession and occupation must be since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

In this case, the respondents were not able to satisfy the third requisite, i.e., that the respondents failed to
establish that they or their predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession and occupation of Lot 3
"since June 12, 1945 or earlier." An examination of the evidence on record reveals so:
First. The testimonies of respondents’ predecessors-in-interest and/or their representatives were patently
deficient on this point.

None of them testified about possession and occupation of the subject parcels of land dating back to 12
June 1945 or earlier. Rather, the said witnesses merely related that they have been in possession of their
lands "for over thirty years" prior to the purchase thereof by respondents in 1997.40

Neither can the affirmation of Generosa of the Joint Affidavit be considered as sufficient to prove
compliance with the third requisite. The said Joint Affidavit merely contains a general claim that Valentin
had "continuously, openly and peacefully occupied and tilled as absolute owner" the parcels of Generosa
and Teresita even "before the outbreak of World War 2" — which lacks specificity and is unsupported by
any other evidence. In Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation,41 this Court dismissed
a similar unsubstantiated claim of possession as a "mere conclusion of law" that is "unavailing and cannot
suffice:"

Moreover, Vicente Oco did not testify as to what specific acts of dominion or ownership were performed
by the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest and if indeed they did. He merely made a general claim that
they came into possession before World War II, which is a mere conclusion of law and not factual proof of
possession, and therefore unavailing and cannot suffice.42 Evidence of this nature should have been
received with suspicion, if not dismissed as tenuous and unreliable.

Second. The supporting tax declarations presented by the respondents also fall short of proving
possession since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest declaration submitted by the respondents i.e., Tax
Declaration No. 9412,43 was issued only in 1948 and merely covers the portion of Lot 3 previously
pertaining to Generosa and Teresita. Much worse, Tax Declaration No. 9412 shows no declared
improvements on such portion of Lot 3 as of 1948—posing an apparent contradiction to the claims of
Generosa and Teresita in their Joint Affidavit.

Indeed, the evidence presented by the respondents does not qualify as the "well-nigh incontrovertible"
kind that is required to prove title thru possession and occupation of public land since 12 June 1945 or
earlier.44 Clearly, respondents are not entitled to registration under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529.

Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529

The respondents, however, make an alternative plea for registration, this time, under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. Notwithstanding their inability to comply with Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, the respondents claim that they were at least able to establish possession and
occupation of Lot 3 for a sufficient number of years so as to acquire title over the same via prescription.45

As earlier intimated, the government counters the respondents’ alternative plea by arguing that the
statutory period required in order for extraordinary prescription to set in was not met in this case.46 The
government cites the DENR Calabarzon Office Report as well as the DENR-CENRO Certification, both of
which state that Lot 3 only became "Alienable or Disposable Land" on 15 March 1982.47 It posits that the
period of prescription against the State should also commence to run only from such date.48 Hence, the
government concludes, the respondents’ 12 March 2002 application is still premature.49

We find the contention of the government inaccurate but nevertheless deny registration of Lot 3 under
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 sanctions the original registration of lands acquired by
prescription "under the provisions of existing law." In the seminal case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic,50 this Court clarified that the "existing law" mentioned in the subject provision refers to no
other than Republic Act No. 386, or the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Malabanan acknowledged that only lands of the public domain that are "patrimonial in character" are
"susceptible to acquisitive presecription" and, hence, eligible for registration under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.51 Applying the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code,52 Malabanan further
elucidated that in order for public land to be considered as patrimonial "there must be an express
declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial."53 Until
then, the period of acquisitive prescription against the State will not commence to run.54

The requirement of an "express declaration" contemplated by Malabanan is separate and distinct from the
mere classification of public land as alienable and disposable.55 On this point, Malabanan was reiterated
by the recent case of Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr.56

In this case, the respondents were not able to present any "express declaration" from the State, attesting
to the patrimonial character of Lot 3. To put it bluntly, the respondents were not able to prove that
acquisitive prescription has begun to run against the State, much less that they have acquired title to Lot 3
by virtue thereof. As jurisprudence tells us, a mere certification or report classifying the subject land as
alienable and disposable is not sufficient.57 We are, therefore, left with the unfortunate but necessary
verdict that the respondent are not entitled to the registration under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529.

There being no compliance with either the first or second paragraph of Section 14 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, the Regalian presumption stands and must be enforced in this case. We accordingly overturn
the decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals for not being supported by the evidence at hand.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 9 October 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 86300 affirming the 14 February 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of
Naic, Cavite in LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondents’
application for registration is, accordingly, DENIED.

Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.