Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol vs People of the Philippines; James Quibac The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are
fray are as follows:
y Rafael vs People of the Philippines
GR No. 213792; GR No. 213886; 22 June 2015
FACTS:
On April 2004, in the province of Benguet, the accused, Guillermo
Wacoy and James Quibac, conspiring with each other, and with intent
to kill, mauled and kicked the stomach of Elner Aro y Laruan, inflicting
upon him blunt traumatic injuries, which directly caused his death
thereafter. The RTC ruled that the accused are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous
Affray. In this relation, it opined that conspiracy was not proven and
the prosecution failed to show the extent and effect of injury
personally inflicted on Aro that led to his death. Contrary to the RTC’s
findings, the CA ruled that Wacoy and Quibac should not be
convicted of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray since
there were only two persons who inflicted harm on the victim, and
that there was no tumultuous affray involving several persons.
Instead, they were convicted of the crime of Homicide, with the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
as it was shown that the purpose of their assault on Aro was only to
maltreat or inflict physical harm on him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly found Wacoy and Quibac guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide
RULING:
The petition is without merit.
(a) that there be several persons;
(b) that they did not compose groups organized for the common
purpose of assaulting and attacking
each other reciprocally;
(c) that these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another
in a
confused and tumultuous manner;
(d) that someone was killed in the course of the affray;
(e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased;
and
(j) that the person or persons who inflicted
serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified.
The evidence clearly established that there were only two (2)
persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one defenseless
individual, Aro, and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting
punches and kicks on the victim. There was no confusion and
tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal
aggression. Since Wacoy and Quibac were identified as the ones
who assaulted Aro, the latter’s death cannot be said to have been
caused in a tumultuous affray.
Therefore, the CA correctly held that Wacoy and Quibac’s act of
mauling Aro was the proximate cause of the latter’s death; and as
such, they must be held criminally liable therefore, specifically for the
crime of Homicide. The penalty for the crime of Homicide must be
imposed in its minimum period due to the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. Given
the absence of evidence showing that, apart from kicking and
punching Aro on the stomach, something else had been done; thus,
evincing the purpose of merely maltreating or inflicting physical harm,
and not to end the life of Aro.
1
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLLY ADRIANO (G.R. No. causa del mal causado‘, or he who is the cause of the cause is the
205228, July 15, 2015) cause of the evil caused.

(2) YES. The accused was convicted of two separate counts of

Subject: Criminal Law 1- Aberratio Ictus (Accidental Harm)
Ponente: Justice Jose P. Perez
Doctrine: One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all
the consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom,
whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found
in the doctrine, ‘el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado’, or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused.
murder: for the killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and
Ireneo, the victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified both
killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at
bar. Thus, we follow the Flora doctrine.

FACTS: In March of 2007 in Nueva Ecija, Rolly Adriano, with his

three others, overtook a policecar and Honda CRV. With intent to
killd, treachery, and abuse of superior stregth, willfully shot Danilo
Cabiedes, the driver of CRV, resulting from his instant death.
The shooting incident caused a bystander, Ofelia Bulanan, to be hit
by a stray bullet and eventually die.

Two policemen was able to trace the car used in the incident and
ended up arresting Adriano. RTC found accused ROLLY ADRIANO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, as charged, for the death
of Danilo Cabiedes, and also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Homicide, as charged, for the death of Ofelia Bulana.
CA affrimed the decision of RTC.

ISSUES: (1) WON Adriano is responsible for the death of Bulanan.

(2) WON treachery can be appreciated in aberratio ictus?

RULING: (1) YES. Evidently, Adriano’s original intent was to kill

Cabiedes. However, during the commission of the crime of murder, a
stray bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the
consequences of his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People v.
Herrera citing People v. Ural: Criminal liability is incurred by any
person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different
from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is
responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or logically
result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale
of the rule is found in the doctrine, ‘el que es causa de la causa es

2
PEOPLE v. STANLEY BUENAMER Y MANDANE, GR No. 206227,
2016-08-31
Facts:
Buenamer and his co-accused Jerome Lambada y Landero
(Lambada) were indicted for the felony of robbery with homicide for
staging an armed robbery inside a passenger FX taxi and causing
the death of one of the passengers therein. The indictment against
them alleged—The undersigaed accuses STANLEY BUENAMER y
MANDANE and JEROME LAMBADA y LANDERO of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, committed as follows:That on or about
October 20, 2009 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each
other, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence, and
intimidation, to wit: by boarding a passenger FX taxi going to España
Blvd., Sampaloc, this City, announcing a hold up then pointing their
guns to its passengers and FERRARIE TAN y OALLESMA and
divesting from him his black bag containing a Sony PSP colored
black with casing and one (1) brown envelope with cash money in the
amount of P5,460.00, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, rob and carry away the same, against his will, to the
damage and prejudice of the said FERRARIE TANy OALLESMA in
the amount of more than P5,460.00, Philippine Currency; that on
occasion of or by reason of the said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling themselves to take, rob and carry away the personal
properties of the passengers, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon said FERRARIE TAN y OALLESMA when he chased
the said accused who boarded a passenger jeepney in order to
escape, but was boxed when he held on the handle bar of the
jeepney causing him to [lose] his grip and [fall] from the jeepney and
thereafter was ran over by the rear tire of said jeepney, thereby
inflicting upon him physical injuries which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Issues:
Buenamer appealed to the CA, arguing that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt since his identity as the
alleged perpetrator of the crime was not sufficiently established,
Buenamer also contended that the mitigating circumstance under
Article 13(3) of the RFC should have been appreciated in his favor
because he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as mat he
committed
Ruling:
We hold that both the RTC and the CA correctly found the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of robbery with
homicide. Indeed, we are satisfied that in this case the prosecution
was able to satisfactorily establish the elements of robbery with
homicide, to wit:(1) The taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons;(2) The property taken
belongs to another;(3) The taking is with animo lucrandi; and(4) By
reason of the robbery, or on the occasion thereof, homicide is
committed.[6]All the elements mentioned above are present in this
case. In point of fact, the prosecution succeeded in showing that the
primary aim or objective of the malefactors Buenamer and Lambada
was to rob the passengers of the FX taxi. Prosecution witness David,
a passenger of the FX taxi in which the two robbers staged the
heinous felony, was herself a victim of the robbery that was staged by
the malefactors that afternoon of October 20, 2009 along España
Boulevard in Sampaloc, Manila. David positively identified Buenamer
as the very perpetrator of the crime together with his co-accused
Lambada. David testified that she saw the faces of these two
malefactors when these two boarded the FX taxi at the Pantranco
terminal in Quezon Avenue, Quezon City; that Buenamer and
Lambada, then armed with firearms, declared a hold-up on board the
moving vehicle, after which these; two divested the passengers of
their personal belongings, while threatening the passengers that they
would blow off their heads ("pasabugin ang ulo namin") should the
passengers resist the robbery. By taking the personal belongings and
valuables of the passengers, employing force, violence, and
intimidation, end motivated moreover by animus lucrandi or intent to
gain or profit, and thereafter hitting Ferrarie causing him to fall from
the passenger jeepney resulting to his death, there can be no
question that Buenamer did commit robbery with homicide
3
People vs Flores

Facts: Accused-appellant, Lyndon Flores did then and there willfully,

unlawfully and feloniously with treachery assaulted and kicked the
vital parts of the victim Manuel Lazarte y Malvar. He was convicted of
murder by the trial court after proving his guilt and sentenced to suffer
reclusion perpetua. The accused had an altercation with the victim's
mother Emperatriz Lazarte regarding a cassette belonging to the
former. Afterwards, the accused kicked Ato Lazarte twice in his
stomach as the victim was lying unconscious in the pavement. The
accused denied of having kicked the victim as he asserts that he
merely touched with his right foot. In his petition, accused-appellant
that the crime committed is homicide not murder.

Issue: Whether or not the crime committed was murder?

Held: The crime was murder qualified by treachery. An attack upon a

victim who was unconscious, thus could not have put up a defense
whatsoever is treacherous. Article 14 No. 16 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that there is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tends directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party may make. However the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed (Article 13 No. 3) should be appreciated in favor of the
accused-appellant. His intention was merely to inflict injuries on the
victim. Hence the penalty of reclusion perpetua was reduced to
reclusion temporal in it's maximum period.
RTC decision AFFIRMED with modification

4

[2019 CASE DIGEST]
Evangeline Patulot vs. People
of the Philippines G.R. No.
235071, January 07, 2019
Date: March 7, 2019 0 Comments
FACTS:
As she was about to enter the house, CCC, after gathering
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see Patulot who was holding a casserole. Without warning,
Patulot poured the contents of the casserole – hot cooking oil –
on her. AAA and BBB, both minors, who were nearby, suddenly
cried because they were likewise hit by the hot cooking oil.
CCC hurriedly brought AAA and BBB to her three neighbors
who volunteered to bring the children to the hospital, for
treatment. She then went to the barangay hall also at South
Signal, Taguig City, to report the incident.
The doctor, who examined and treated CCC and her children,
testified that the injuries suffered by AAA and BBB would heal
for an average period of thirty (30) days. Next, DDD testified
that he incurred P7,440.00 in medical expenses for his wife and
children.
The Regional Trial Court found Patulot guilty of child abuse
under R.A. 7610.
The CA affirms Patulot’s conviction.
Aggrieved, Patulot elevated the case to the Supreme Court,
invoking the following arguments:
She (Patulot) can only be convicted of physical injuries and not
child abuse. Citing the case, Bongalon v. People, she submits that
not every instance of laying hands on a child constitutes the
crime of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
Only when the laying of hands is shown to be intended to
debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of
the child as a human being should it be punished as child
abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the RPC. Thus, in the
absence of such intention on the part of Patulot, her true
intention being to pour hot oil only on CCC with AAA and BBB
being merely accidentally hit, she cannot be convicted of child
abuse.
ISSUE:
Is there a need to prove that the acts where intended to debase,
degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child
as a human being should it be punished as child abuse?
RULING:
NO.
Patulot contends that on the basis of our pronouncement
in Bongalon, she cannot be convicted of child abuse because it
was not proven that she intended to debase, degrade, or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as
human beings. Her reliance on said ruling, however, is
misplaced. In Bongalon, the Information specifically charged
George Bongalon, petitioner therein, of committing acts which
“are prejudicial to the child’s development and which demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a human
being.”Thus, we ruled that he can only be held liable for slight
physical injuries instead of child abuse in the absence of proof
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that he intended to humiliate or “debase the ‘intrinsic worth
and dignity'”of the victim.
A cursory review of the Informations in the instant case,
5
however, reveals no similar allegation that Patulot’s acts
debased, degraded, or demeaned the intrinsic worth and
dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings. Instead, they
charged Patulot for willfully committing acts of child abuse on
AAA and BBB “by throwing on them boiling oil, thereby
inflicting upon said victim-minor physical injuries, which acts
are inimical and prejudicial to the child’s normal growth and
development.”
Patulot’s criminal intent is not wanting for as she expressly
admitted, she intended on pouring hot cooking oil on CCC. As
such, even granting that it was not her intention to harm AAA
and BBB, she was performing an unlawful act when she threw
the hot oil from her casserole on CCC. She cannot, therefore,
escape liability from the same in view of the settled doctrine
that a person incurs criminal liability although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended.

There are distinct acts punishable under R.A. No. 7610, to wit:
(a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d)
being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s
development.

R.A. No. 7610 and its Rules and Regulations distinctly and
separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to
show that these three acts are different from one another and
from the act prejudicial to the child’s development. Contrary to
Patulot’s assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be
convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No.
7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution
need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and
child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child
because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is
different from the former acts.

Neither can Patulot argue that in the absence of intention on

her part to harm AAA and BBB, she cannot be convicted of
child abuse because she merely intended on committing
physical injuries against CCC.

“When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they

are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special
law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established
with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed.”

The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a),

Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, a special law. However, physical
abuse of a child is inherently wrong, rendering material the
existence of a criminal intent on the part of the offender.

6
 Yapyuco vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
The accused-petitioners were Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco)
and Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno)
who were members of the Integrated National Police (INP) stationed
at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose
Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay
captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno,
Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David,
Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan
(Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either members of the
Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in
Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They
allegedly received information concerning a reported presence
of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. It was so unfortunate that the
Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable
turn to which the accused all await. Believing that the victims were
the armed NPA members, the accused opened fire to the passengers
of the said Tamaraw. Such shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in
Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga caused the death
of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva).
The accused were all charged with murder, multiple attempted
murder and frustrated murder.
Issue:
WON the theory of mistaken belief is applicable in the present
case.
Ruling:
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of
mistake of fact
faces certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a mistake of fact is
a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act
or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. Generally, a
reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it
negates the intent component of the crime. It may be a defense even
if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent. The
inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not
look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person. A proper
invocation of this defense requires
(a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable;
(b) (b) that it be a
matter of fact; and
(c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime or
the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with
respect to an element of the offense.
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis and Baxinela v. People, the
justification of an act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a
mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of
the accused. Thus, Ah Chong further explained that
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this
jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of
a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but
which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the
actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act.
To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we
hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability,
provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not
due to negligence or bad faith.
7
Gaviola vs People of the Philippines

(Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where

trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the
consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather
fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.)
(Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is qualified if coconuts
are taken from the premises of a plantation.)

Facts:

With the land dispute issue between the parties, the court clearly
identified the demarcation of the properties involve therein. Having
known of the said court decision, the accused still gathered 1500 of
coconuts from the land of Cleto Eusebio and was convicted of
qualified theft. On appeal, he invoked his honest belief that he owned
the land which negates intent to steal, an essential element of the
felony of theft.

Issues:
Whether or not the act of taking the coconuts from another’s
plantation constitutes qualified theft.

Held:

Yes. In all cases where one in good faith takes another’s property
under claim of title in himself, he is exempt from the charge of
larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in fact be. And
the same is true where the taking is on behalf of another, believed to
be the true owner. Still, if the claim is dishonest, a mere pretense, it
will not protect the taker. Gaviola cannot feign ignorance or even
unfamiliarity with the location, identity and the metes and bounds of
the properties involved as it is categorically stated clearly that the
three parcels of land are distinct and separate from each other.
Hence, Gaviola’s claim of good faith in taking the coconuts is a mere
pretense to escape criminal liability and was guilty not only of simple
theft but of qualified theft but under Article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, theft is qualified if coconuts are taken from the premises of a
plantation.

8
PEOPLE VS. VILLACORTA, G.R. No. 186412 (2011)
FACTS:
Villacorta was charged with the crime of murder. The Information
stated that Villacorta, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with
intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed Danilo Cruz, thereby
inflicting serious wounds which caused immediate death. Upon
arraignment, Villacorta pleaded not guilty.
Immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta, Cruz was rushed to
and treated as an outpatient at Tondo Medical Center. It was only
after 22 days that Cruz was admitted to San Lazaro
Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where he died the
following day. Dr. Belandres, Head of the Tetanus Department at the
San Lazaro Hospital, testified that, using Cruz’s medical chart and
diagnosis, he was able to determine that Cruz died of tetanus
infection secondary to stab wound. The prosecution did not present
evidence of the emergency medical treatment Cruz received at the
Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by Cruz to Tondo
Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up medical treatment
of his stab wound, or Cruz’s activities within the 22 days.
RTC: Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery. He was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
heirs of Danilo Cruz of P50,000 as civil indemnity plus the costs of
suit.
CA: Affirmed in toto the RTC judgment against Villacorta. Hence, this
appeal before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether Villacorta should be convicted of murder? – NO,
only slight physical injuries
HELD:
The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection, and not
the stab wound. Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."
The SC is faced with the very same doubts as that in Urbano vs. IAC
that compels it to set aside the conviction of Villacorta for murder.
There had been an interval of 22 days between the stabbing and the
date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting
symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe
tetanus from the stabbing, then the symptoms
would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court
noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation
period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with 2-3
days from the injury, have 100% mortality. Ultimately, we can only
deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its
subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate
cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later than or between the time
Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
Urbano v. IAC: Urbano appealed before the SC, alleging that when
Javier’s wound was first examined, the doctor did not find any
tetanus infection and that Javier could have acquired tetanus when
he returned to work on his farm 2 weeks after sustaining his injury.
The incubation period for tetanus and the length of time between the
hacking incident
and the manifestation of severe tetanus created doubts in the mind of
the Court that Javier acquired severe tetanus from the hacking
incident.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. The proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead to a distinct possibility that the infection of
the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of
slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the RPC for the stab
wound he inflicted. Although the charge is for murder, a finding of
guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries may be made
9
because the latter offense is necessarily included in the former – the
essential ingredients of slight physical injuries are part of those
constituting murder. We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for
attempted or frustrated murder because the prosecution was not able
to establish Villacorta’s intent to kill. Also, there was no evidence to
establish that Cruz was incapacitated for labor and/or required
medical attendance for more than 9 days. Without such evidence, the
offense is only slight
physical injuries.

We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being

sufficiently alleged in the
Information and proved during trial. Treachery exists when an
offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which
tend directly or especially to
ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the
defense that the offended
party might make.

DISPOSITIVE:
The CA decision affirming that of the RTC of Malabon is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. A new
judgment is entered finding Villacorta GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES under Article 266 of the RPC, and sentenced
to suffer the penalty of 30
days arresto menor. Considering that Villacorta has been
incarcerated beyond the period of the
penalty imposed, his immediate release is ordered. Villacorta is
ordered to pay the heirs of
Danilo Cruz moral damages in the sum of P5,000.

10
CRim Law 1 Case Digest:Intod V. CA 1992
Intod v. CA
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
Lessons Applicable:
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
• February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio
and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked
him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan.
Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told
Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a
land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany
them. Otherwise, he would also be killed.
• February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at
Palangpangan's house and fired at Palangpangan's bedroom but
there was no one in the room.
• RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony
of the witness
ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible
crime under Art. 4 (2)
HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is
hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties
provided by the law, and to pay the costs
• Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility
shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility
of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on
the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the
crime inherently impossible.
• The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School,
recognizes in the offender his formidability to punish criminal
tendencies in Art. 4(2)
• Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime
• Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in
violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime
o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
• Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime – this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty
• United States: where the offense sought to be committed is
factually impossible or accomplishment - attempt to commit a crime;
legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot be held liable for any
crime
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JACINTO vs PEOPLE crime of theft had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this
GEMMA JACINTO vs PEOPLE case.
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto
G.R. NO. 162540 13July2009 592SCRA26 is found GUILTY of an impossible crime and suffer the penalty of Six
(6) months of arresto mayor and pay courts.
FACTS: In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner -collector of
Mega Foam, a post dated checked worth P10,000 as payment for
Baby’s purchases from Mega Foam International, Inc. The said check
was deposited to the account of Jacqueline Capitle’s husband-
Generoso. Rowena Recablanca, another employee of Mega Foam,
received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, who was
looking for Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check deposited
had been dishonored. Thereafter, Joseph Dyhenga talked to Baby to
tell that the BDO Check bounced. However, Baby said that she had
already paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August 1997 as
replacement for the dishonored check.
Dyhengco filed a compliant with the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation with its agents.
Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested. The NBI filed a
criminal case for qualified theft against the two (2) and Jacqueline
Capitle.
RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita and Jacqueline GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and
each of the sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Five (5) years, Five
(5) months and Eleven (11) days to Six (6) years, Eight (8) months
and Twenty (20) days.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed falls the definition of

Impossible Crime.

HELD: Yes, Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense,

petitioner’s act of receiving the cash replacement should not be
considered as continuation of the Theft.
The requisites of an impossible crime are:
1. That the Act performed would be an offer against persons or
property;
2. That the act was alone with evil intent; and
3. That the accomplishment was inherently impossible or the
means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
The time that petitioner took a possession of the check meant for
Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate that

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