Republic of the Philippines The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1),
SUPREME COURT Article IX-C:
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.
SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-
counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching
proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would
indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding -elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section
l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a
college degree. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no
jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law
as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest
of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law. An attorney
engages in the practice of law by maintaining
an office where he is held out to be-an
attorney, using a letterhead describing himself
as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel
about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is
also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights
under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law
or authorized to settle controversies and there,
in such representative capacity performs any
act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the
law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs
any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo.
852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of
legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
(5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions
consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions
may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a
wide experience with men and affairs, and
great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions
of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice
by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order,
can be drawn between that part of the work of
the lawyer which involves appearance in court
and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In
re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E.
313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in
conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of
law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling
and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following
any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and
is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the
active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment
such as this he is a practicing attorney at law
within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session,
may I make a manifestation which I forgot to
do during our review of the provisions on the
Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications
of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for
by Section I is that "They must be Members of
the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the
provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in
excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that this provision
on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does
not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean
that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the
COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent
in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on
Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that
this interpretation may be made available whenever
this provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to
just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service
in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in
the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the
work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve
legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with
the Provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction
given to this is that this is equivalent to the
practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis
supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and
which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private
practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole
practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms."
The firm is usually a partnership and members of the
firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized
as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm
are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there
are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to
traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern
Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986],
p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the
performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law.
(State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.,
145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325,
22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op.
cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a
client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the
average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their
entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to
litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of
both the public image and the self perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the
public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is
this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a
corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance
of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise:
"Even today, there are still uninformed laymen
whose concept of an attorney is one who principally
tries cases before the courts. The members of the
bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies
today, substantially more legal work is transacted in
law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the diagnostician and the
trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed]
that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be
avoided where internal medicine can be effective."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills,
legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of
lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And
even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice,
a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative
agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation,
unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types
— a litigator who specializes in this work to the
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require
the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-
giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many
clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work
or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to
remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers'
work the constraints are imposed both by the nature
of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The
most common of these roles are those of corporate
practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business
daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be
called a revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other
professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate
problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications
of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The recognition of
the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making"
and "contingency planning," has impressed
upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of
information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the
appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses
of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have
prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis,
automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an
improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making
process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to
test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are
regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal
education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for
productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through
an early introduction to multi-variable
decisional context and the various approaches
for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate
degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy
level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are
currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving
corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the
complex legal implications that arise from each
and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised.
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan.
11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate
lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time"
lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele
composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate
lawyers, many people could not explain what it
is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the
number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of
the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems
to private law firms. Many others have in-
house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and
purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern
or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate
legal research, tax laws research, acting out
as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other
adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities
and Exchange Commission), and in other
capacities which require an ability to deal with
the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume
responsibilities other than the legal affairs of
the business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have
a feeling of being isolated from the action, or
not understanding how one's work actually fits
into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a
corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this
fortune to be more closely involved in the
running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may
sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide
one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in
a relatively small number of companies and
law firms. Because working in a foreign
country is perceived by many as glamorous,
tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers.
In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go
to experienced attorneys while the younger
attorneys do their "international practice" in
law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law
Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of
the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow
the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce
Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who
fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the
excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan.
11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice
direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak.
No longer are we talking of the traditional law
teaching method of confining the subject study
to the Corporation Code and the Securities
Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal
primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances
which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to
usable disciplinary skins applicable to a
corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
organization and management of the legal
function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of
as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting
managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy
sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he
provides counsel for are required to make, and
the need to think about a corporation's;
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the
nation-state is being reduced as firms deal
both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental
units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only
with public entities but with each other — often
with those who are competitors in other
arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in
decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate
lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder
— in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance
through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new
patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers.
These trends are complicated as corporations
organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as
well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology.
New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking
to influence governmental policies. And there
are lessons to be learned from other countries.
In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is
world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning,
the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises
a distinct group within the managerial structure
of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context
interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment
coordinating work with outsiders, promoting
team achievements within the organization. In
general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal
group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial
capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis
the managerial mettle of corporations are
challenged. Current research is seeking ways
both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships of
financial liability and insurance considerations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate
counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems
dynamics has been found an effective tool for
new managerial thinking regarding both
planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow,
enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic
problems — physical, economic, managerial,
social, and psychological. New programming
techniques now make the system dynamics
principles more accessible to managers —
including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users
to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law
department, it can be used to appraise the
settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk
involved in managing a portfolio of cases.
(Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management.
Computer-based models can be used directly
by parties and mediators in all lands of
negotiations. All integrated set of such tools
provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in
these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to
illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and
management of the legal function, concern
three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers
requires special skills that comprise a major
part of the general counsel's responsibilities.
They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities
at that time when transactional or similar facts
are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the
framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic
and organizational fabric as firms change to
stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law"
is not adequate today to facilitate the
relationships needed in trying to make a global
economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate
Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most
vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key
aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing
improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-
makers, coping internally with more complex
make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis
that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel
nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even
if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on corporate
activities, he must, at the very least, also gain
a working knowledge of the management
issues if only to be able to grasp not only the
basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the
modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and
the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each
aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
 territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he
feign understanding and risk exposure?
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan.
11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by
the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments
on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath
of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed
the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine
Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been
paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and
having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the
law office of his father. During his stint in the World
Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica
and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with
the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the
Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he
worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since
1986, has rendered services to various companies
as a legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the
field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity
and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen's Conference for Human Development,
has worked with the under privileged sectors, such
as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform
bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge
as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast
judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings
(1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for
which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government
functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House
of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis
supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of
which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a
negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various
contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as
the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who
comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo
V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper
No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila,
1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a
country's Constitution; it lays down the law as
far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus,
the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important
role in any debt restructuring program. For
aside from performing the tasks of legislative
drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty.
(Condensed from the work paper, entitled
"Wanted: Development Lawyers for
Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael
Hager, regional legal adviser of the United
States Agency for International Development,
during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August
26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps
even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of
contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting
and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign
lawyer may work with an international
business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain
such a mixture of technical language that they
should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International
Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts,
an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate
School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt
restructuring/contract construction is the set of
terms and conditions which determines the
contractual remedies for a failure to perform
one or more elements of the contract. A good
agreement must not only define the
responsibilities of both parties, but must also
state the recourse open to either party when
the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a
compleat debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate
analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs of whose
kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no
banners, they beat no drums; but where they
are, men learn that bustle and bush are not
the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery."
(See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers
in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third
and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the
term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary
power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights,
 the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by
law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others
better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. (emphasis
supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of
(Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is
qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission
has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the
ground that another person is more qualified
for a particular position. It also has no authority
to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an encroachment
on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within
the discretionary power of whomsoever it is
vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as
in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and
(4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond,
etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14,
1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to
give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office
for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
 Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate
opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of
the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the
practice of law, which modern connotation
is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover,
Justice Padilla's definition would require
generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year
for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far
from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice
Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made
use of a definition of law practice which really means
nothing because the definition says that law practice
" . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice
of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of
sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since
the law covers almost all situations, most individuals,
in making use of the law, or in advising others on
what the law means, are actually practicing law. In
that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of
the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of
the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for
over ten years. This is different from the acts of
persons practising law, without first becoming
lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can
even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or
more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For
one thing, how can an action or petition be brought
against the President? And even assuming that he is
indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the
necessary qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere
with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case,
there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave
abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on
Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the
appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the
nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the
confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be
incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth,
but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah.
Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was
captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing
of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was
beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word.
The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch
his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the
spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of
Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with
the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of
the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused
was represented by counsel de officio but later on
replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the
same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston
Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the
permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition
of his appearance as such, was that every time he
would appear at the trial of the case, he would be
considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services. The
appearance of City Attorney Fule as private
prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the
accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs.
Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that
"when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal
and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased
to engage in private law practice." Counsel then
argued that the JP Court in entertaining the
appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a
violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960
the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the
appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the
accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule
from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this
time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain
attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City
Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court
ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to
appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not
actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order
was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the
Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment
on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of
which read:
The present case is one for malicious
mischief. There being no reservation by the
offended party of the civil liability, the civil
action was deemed impliedly instituted with
the criminal action. The offended party had,
therefore, the right to intervene in the case and
be represented by a legal counsel because of
her interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court
provides that in the court of a justice of the
peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule
appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as
an agent or friend of the offended party. It
does not appear that he was being paid for his
services or that his appearance was in a
professional capacity. As Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or
intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of
crimes committed in the municipality of
Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of
criminal cases coming from Alaminos are
handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo.
There could be no possible conflict in the
duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as
private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the
other hand, as already pointed out, the
offended party in this criminal case had a right
to be represented by an agent or a friend to
protect her rights in the civil action which was
impliedly instituted together with the criminal
action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that
Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this
criminal case as an agent or a friend of the
offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of
the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston
D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed,
without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant
proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being
without merits.
1äwphï1.ñët
Aside from the considerations advanced by the
learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which
we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of
defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of
Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or compensation, as a source of his livelihood or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of in consideration of his said services.
the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give For one thing, it has never been refuted that City
professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
the case was engaging in private practice. We represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney a relative.
Fule did not constitute private practice within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts affirmed, in all respects, with costs against
of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent appellant..
habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted
as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to
the public, as customarily and demanding payment
for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one
occasion is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. The
following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law

implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO
H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he
therein asserts is "a great injustice committed
against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts
this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled
by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice,
who ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues,
who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that
he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he
ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that
justice as administered by the present members of
the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf
and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his
client "in the people's forum," so that "the people
may know of the silent injustice's committed by this
Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and
injustices that were committed must never be
repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk
of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-
law IN TRUST with reservation that at
any time in the future and in the event
we regain our faith and confidence, we
may retrieve our title to assume the
practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents
of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September
26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements
attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an
unprecedented petition, said he did it to
expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional
and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily
denying petitions or appeals without any
reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut
justice," Almacen deplored, his client
was condemned to pay P120,000,
without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law
practice, Almacen said in this
petition, "where our Supreme Court is
composed of men who are calloused to
our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reason their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting
himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the
Supreme Court "will become responsive
to all cases brought to its attention
without discrimination, and will purge
itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied
resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed
of men who are calloused to our pleas
of [sic] justice, who ignore their own
applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the
issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28,
1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that
Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of
offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself,"
and that "his charge is one of the constitutional
bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil
case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H.
Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant.
The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his
client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the
decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its
reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the
motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing
on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for
execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial
court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse
party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen
filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to
which he attached the required registry return card. This second
motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the
trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen
himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already
perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to
the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this
Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24,
1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated
March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-
appellee praying that the appeal be
dismissed, and of the opposition thereto
filed by defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby
dismisses, the appeal, for the reason
that the motion for reconsideration dated
July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record
on appeal) does not contain a notice of
time and place of hearing thereof and is,
therefore, a useless piece of paper
(Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-
16636, June 24, 1965), which did not
interrupt the running of the period to
appeal, and, consequently, the appeal
was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution,
urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading
entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration,"
citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May
30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the
motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date
filed by defendant- appellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution of May
8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some
important distinctions between this case
and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity
Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction &
Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965,
relied upon by this Court in its resolution
of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states
that in the latest case, Republic vs.
Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966,
decided by the Supreme Court
concerning the question raised by
appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary
to the doctrine laid down in the Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
 There is no substantial distinction
between this case and that of Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza,
the resolution denying the motion to
dismiss the appeal, based on grounds
similar to those raised herein was
issued on November 26, 1962, which
was much earlier than the date of
promulgation of the decision in the
Manila Surety Case, which was June
24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the
Venturanza case was interlocutory and
the Supreme Court issued it "without
prejudice to appellee's restoring the
point in the brief." In the main decision in
said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the
Supreme Court passed upon the issue
sub silencio presumably because of its
prior decisions contrary to the resolution
of November 26, 1962, one of which is
that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity
case. Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on the matter
in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by
certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by
minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly
thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well
as his petition for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence,
the second motion for reconsideration filed by him
after the Said date was ordered expunged from the
records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to
his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to —
a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end
with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful
and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced,
against this Court as well as its individual members,
a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is
unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated
September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition
until he shall have actually surrendered his
certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good
his proffer. No word came from him. So he was
reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had
earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this
Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he
manifested "that he has no pending petition in
connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs.
Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;"
that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did
not require him to do either a positive or negative
act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it
"chose to pursue the negative act." with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:

In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a At the start, let me quote passages from
member of the bar for contumely and gross the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 —
resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause
"why no disciplinary action should be taken against "Do not judge, that you may
him." Denying the charges contained in the not be judged. For with
November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to what judgment you judge,
give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action you shall be judged, and
should be taken against him ... in an open and public with what measure you
hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to measure, it shall be
require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from measured to you. But why
notice hereof, his reasons for such request, dost thou see the speck in
otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived thy brother's eye, and yet
and incident submitted for decision." To this dost not consider the beam
resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the in thy own eye? Or how can
complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to thou say to thy brother, "Let
be heard and to answer questions "in person and in me cast out the speck from
an open and public hearing" so that this Court could thy eye"; and behold, there
observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for is a beam in thy own eye?
leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Thou hypocrite, first cast
Court has no time to hear him in person." To give out the beam from thy own
him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was eye, and then thou wilt see
allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter clearly to cast out the speck
was heard in oral argument. from thy brother's eyes."

His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is "Therefore all that you wish
unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being men to do to you, even to
contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his do you also to them: for this
 is the Law and the
Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of
disavowing the statements mentioned in
his petition. On the contrary, he refirms
the truth of what he stated, compatible
with his lawyer's oath that he will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court. But he vigorously DENY
under oath that the underscored
statements contained in the CHARGE
are insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to the
individual members of the Court; that
they tend to bring the entire Court,
without justification, into disrepute; and
constitute conduct unbecoming of a
member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his
statement is borne by TRUTH and has
been asserted with NO MALICE
BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but
mainly motivated with the highest
interest of justice that in the particular
case of our client, the members have
shown callousness to our various pleas
for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us
on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications,
words of humility, appeals for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding,
sympathy and above all in the highest
interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get
from this COURT? One word, DENIED,
with all its hardiness and insensibility.
That was the unfeeling of the Court
towards our pleas and prayers, in simple
word, it is plain callousness towards our
particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts
to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the
Constitution, you remained unpunished,
this Court in the reverse order of natural
things, is now in the attempt to inflict
punishment on your respondent for acts
he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our
pleadings and supplications for
JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY
and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors
attempt to justify their stubborn denial
with any semblance of reason, NEVER.
Now that your respondent is given the
opportunity to face you, he reiterates the
same statement with emphasis, DID
YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the
Philippines today, that even our own
President, said: — "the story is current,
though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still
being circulated that justice in the
Philippines today is not what it is used to
be before the war. There are those who
have told me frankly and brutally that
justice is a commodity, a marketable
commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER.
We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR.
We attack the decision of this Court, not
the members. ... We were provoked. We
were compelled by force of necessity.
We were angry but we waited for the
finality of the decision. We waited until
this Court has performed its duties. We
never interfered nor obstruct in the
performance of their duties. But in the
end, after seeing that the Constitution
has placed finality on your judgment
against our client and sensing that you
have not performed your duties with
"circumspection, carefulness,
confidence and wisdom", your
Respondent rise to claim his God given
right to speak the truth and his
Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have
attributed to this Court and the further
violations we sought to be prevented is
impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the
very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam
Roland's famous apostrophe during the French
revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in
thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what
technicalities are committed in thy name' or more
appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are
committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free
from commission of any abuses, but
who would correct such abuses
considering that yours is a court of last
resort. A strong public opinion must be
generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize
in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have
added only two more symbols, that it is
also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense
that no members of this Court has ever
heard our cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding sympathy and
for justice; dumb in the sense, that
inspite of our beggings, supplications,
and pleadings to give us reasons why
our appeal has been DENIED, not one
word was spoken or given ... We refer to
no human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only describe the.
impersonal state of things and nothing
more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our
faith and confidence in the members of
this Court and for which reason we
offered to surrender our lawyer's
certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because
what has been lost today may be
regained tomorrow. As the offer was
intended as our self-imposed sacrifice,
then we alone may decide as to when
we must end our self-sacrifice. If we
have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence
in the members of the Court but
disregard our Constitution and to uphold
the Constitution and be condemned by
the members of this Court, there is no
choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff
which he claims is not intended as a studied
disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of
his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his
petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting
petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with
it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for
denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we
know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the
facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his
arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned
denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court
3
are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. The
rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand
critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving
due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or
write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we
would be unable to carry out effectively the burden
placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role
of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of
the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide
"only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond
the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent
here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562,
566:
A variety of considerations underlie
denials of the writ, and as to the same
petition different reasons may read
different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to
the uninformed, even confusing reasons
for denying petitions for certiorari, it has
been suggested from time to time that
the Court indicate its reasons for denial.
Practical considerations preclude. In
order that the Court may be enabled to
discharge its indispensable duties,
Congress has placed the control of the
Court's business, in effect, within the
Court's discretion. During the last three
terms the Court disposed of 260, 217,
224 cases, respectively, on their merits.
For the same three terms the Court
denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189
petitions calling for discretionary review.
If the Court is to do its work it would not
be feasible to give reasons, however
brief, for refusing to take these cases.
The tune that would be required is
prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as
already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of
the Court in concluding that a particular
case at a particular time makes review
undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this
Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar
Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this
matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a
"lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of
Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice
Bengzon:
In connection with identical short
resolutions, the same question has been
raised before; and we held that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions" within
the above constitutional requirement.
They merely hold that the petition for
review should not be entertained in view
of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules
 of Court; and even ordinary lawyers
have all this time so understood it. It
should be remembered that a petition to
review the decision of the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion; and so there is
no need to fully explain the court's
denial. For one thing, the facts and the
law are already mentioned in the Court
of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has
— as intended — helped the Court in
alleviating its heavy docket; it was
patterned after the practice of the U.S.
Supreme Court, wherein petitions for
review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this
Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review.
Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress
such petitions if this Court is to be moved into
accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the
supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over
the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every
losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in
sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision
discretionary.—A review is not a matter
of right but of sound judicial discretion,
and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor.
The following, while neither controlling
nor fully measuring the court's
discretion, indicate the character of
reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court, nor has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with law or with
the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so
far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings, or
so far sanctioned such departure by the
lower court, as to call for the exercise of
the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we
found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals
had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of
his appeal in the light of the law and applicable
decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from
the "accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by
this Court in a number of decisions. There was,
therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its
supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as
far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to
have known — that for a motion for reconsideration
to stay the running of the period of appeal, the
movant must not only serve a copy of the motion
upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify
the adverse party of the time and place of hearing
(which admittedly he did not). This rule was
unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity
vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently
is prescribed for motions in general by
Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly
Rule 26), which provides that such
notice shall state the time, and place of
hearing and shall be served upon all the
Parties concerned at least three days in
advance. And according to Section 6 of
the same Rule no motion shall be acted
upon by the court without proof of such
notice. Indeed it has been held that in
such a case the motion is nothing but a
useless piece of paper (Philippine
National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638,
Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla,
42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of
Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil.
866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45
Phil. 117). The reason is obvious:
Unless the movant sets the time and
place of hearing the Court would have
no way to determine whether that party
agrees to or objects to the motion, and if
he objects, to hear him on his objection,
since the Rules themselves do not fix
any period within which he may file his
reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to
review the lower court's judgment, he has only
himself to blame. His own negligence caused the
forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which,
incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away
from himself the consequences of his carelessness,
he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure
that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in
offering to surrender his professional certificate, he
took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It
would thus appear that there is no justification for his
scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty.
Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We
know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his
dissatisfaction each time he loses what he
sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is
why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with,
and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts'
rulings but, also the manner in which they are
handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment
upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the
criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is
5
articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where
6
the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the
court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. "Our
7
decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of
8
Nebraska, "are public property, and the press and the people have
the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them
as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must
answer for their official actions before the chancery of public
opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human
reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence
and honesty, with "imminent danger to the
administration of justice," is the reason why courts
have been loath to inflict punishment on those who
assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a
case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are
themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a
lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For
courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave
durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of
the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and
indiscretions of courts and judges.
11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should
13
and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the
executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the
soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer,
both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in
assuming the important place accorded
to him in the administration of justice,
his right as a citizen to criticize the
decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as well as of
the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6
F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an
important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the
prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of
lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects
with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of
courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that
flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v.
Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief
Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am.
Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be
allowed freer scope in the expansion or
publication of opinions as to the
capacity, impartiality or integrity of
judges than members of the bar. They
have the best opportunities for
observing and forming a correct
judgment. They are in constant
attendance on the courts. ... To say that
an attorney can only act or speak on this
subject under liability to be called to
account and to be deprived of his
profession and livelihood, by the judge
or judges whom he may consider it his
duty to attack and expose, is a position
too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a
lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No
law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of
the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am.
Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the
bar have the beat Opportunity to
become conversant with the character
and efficiency of our judges. No class is
less likely to abuse the privilege, as no
other class has as great an interest in
the preservation of an able and upright
bench. (State Board of Examiners in
Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the
foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of
those in the best position to give advice and who
might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly.
"Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned,
"the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but
as to his demerits there must be profound silence."
(State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism
that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person
obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession
places upon his shoulders no burden more basic,
more exacting and more imperative than that of
respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows
solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ...
to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
15
officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain
towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys
impliedly assume, if they do not by
express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are admitted to
the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to
the Constitution and laws, but to
maintain at all times the respect due to
courts of justice and judicial officers.
This obligation is not discharged by
merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward
judges personally for their judicial acts.
(Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647,
652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination
to the courts is essential to the orderly administration
of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients'
rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior
intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not
be an abler or more learned lawyer than
the judge, and it may tax his patience
and temper to submit to rulings which he
regards as incorrect, but discipline and
self-respect are as necessary to the
orderly administration of justice as they
are to the effectiveness of an army. The
decisions of the judge must be obeyed,
because he is the tribunal appointed to
decide, and the bar should at all times
be the foremost in rendering respectful
submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think
highly of his intellectual endowment
That is his privilege. And he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is others'
lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some
such frame of mind, however, should
not be allowed to harden into a belief
that he may attack a court's decision in
words calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez
 in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer,
L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not
divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements
made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if
couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute
the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary
action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an
examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is
neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of
his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida
in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608,
nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer
which brings into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice demands condemnation and
the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every
democratic theory to hold that a judge or
a court is beyond bona fide comments
and criticisms which do not exceed the
bounds of decency and truth or which
are not aimed at. the destruction of
public confidence in the judicial system
as such. However, when the likely
impairment of the administration of
justice the direct product of false and
scandalous accusations then the rule is
otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was
suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet
entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused
a municipal judge of having committed judicial error,
of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair
trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a
group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he
wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took
Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF
and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that
the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a
lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a
desire on the part Of the accused to
belittle and besmirch the court and to
bring it into disrepute with the general
public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme
Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension
of an attorney who published a circular assailing a
judge who at that time was a candidate for re-
election to a judicial office. The circular which
referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with
a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to
enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the
court:
We are aware that there is a line of
authorities which place no limit to the
criticism members of the bar may make
regarding the capacity, impartiality, or
integrity of the courts, even though it
extends to the deliberate publication by
the attorney capable of correct
reasoning of baseless insinuations
against the intelligence and integrity of
the highest courts. See State Board, etc.
v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.)
585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte
Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep.
637. In the first case mentioned it was
observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do
not so decide) that a
libelous publication by an
attorney, directed against a
judicial officer, could be so
vile and of such a nature as
to justify the disbarment of
its author."
Yet the false charges made by an
attorney in that case were of graver
character than those made by the
respondent here. But, in our view, the
better rule is that which requires of
those who are permitted to enjoy the
privilege of practicing law the strictest
observance at all times of the principles
of truth, honesty and fairness, especially
in their criticism of the courts, to the end
that the public confidence in the due
administration of justice be upheld, and
the dignity and usefulness of the courts
be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac.
220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123
N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who
had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who
set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the
judge a threatening letter and gave the press the
story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and
others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v.
Petersen is cleared up so that my name
is protected from the libel, lies, and
perjury committed in the cases involved,
I shall be compelled to resort to such
drastic action as the law allows and the
case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do
not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in
dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the
attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois
declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just
criticism, and whenever there is proper
ground for serious complaint against a
judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer
to submit his grievances to the proper
authorities, but the public interest and
the administration of the law demand
that the courts should have the
confidence and respect of the people.
Unjust criticism, insulting language, and
offensive conduct toward the judges
personally by attorneys, who are officers
of the court, which tend to bring the
courts and the law into disrepute and to
destroy public confidence in their
integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter
written to the judge was plainly an
attempt to intimidate and influence him
in the discharge of judicial functions,
and the bringing of the unauthorized
suit, together with the write-up in the
Sunday papers, was intended and
calculated to bring the court into
disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer
accused the courts of the state of being influenced
by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the
Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear
that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or
decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with
unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended
for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed,
would tend to weaken the authority of
the court against whose members it was
made, bring its judgments into
contempt, undermine its influence as an
unbiased arbiter of the people's right,
and interfere with the administration of
justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar
the court will not, under the guise of
disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of
any part of that freedom of speech
which he possesses as a citizen. The
acts and decisions of the courts of this
state, in cases that have reached final
determination, are not exempt from fair
and honest comment and criticism. It is
only when an attorney transcends the
limits of legitimate criticism that he will
be held responsible for an abuse of his
liberty of speech. We well understand
 that an independent bar, as well as
independent court, is always a vigilant
defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111
Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney
was suspended for six months for submitting to an
appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial
integrity of the court from which the appeal was
taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes
unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from
practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and
withdrew the statements, and asserted that the
affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what
he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that
there is a growing habit in the profession
of criticising the motives and integrity of
judicial officers in the discharge of their
duties, and thereby reflecting on the
administration of justice and creating the
impression that judicial action is
influenced by corrupt or improper
motives. Every attorney of this court, as
well as every other citizen, has the right
and it is his duty, to submit charges to
the authorities in whom is vested the
power to remove judicial officers for any
conduct or act of a judicial officer that
tends to show a violation of his duties,
or would justify an inference that he is
false to his trust, or has improperly
administered the duties devolved upon
him; and such charges to the tribunal, if
based upon reasonable inferences, will
be encouraged, and the person making
them
protected. ... While we recognize the
inherent right of an attorney in a case
decided against him, or the right of the
Public generally, to criticise the
decisions of the courts, or the reasons
announced for them, the habit of
criticising the motives of judicial officers
in the performance of their official
duties, when the proceeding is not
against the officers whose acts or
motives are criticised, tends to subvert
the confidence of the community in the
courts of justice and in the
administration of justice; and when such
charges are made by officers of the
courts, who are bound by their duty to
protect the administration of justice, the
attorney making such charges is guilty
of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published
this statement:
 I accepted the decision in this case,
however, with patience, barring possible
temporary observations more or less
vituperative and finally concluded, that,
as my clients were foreigners, it might
have been expecting too much to look
for a decision in their favor against a
widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not
only transcend the bounds of propriety
and privileged criticism, but are an
unwarranted attack, direct, or by
insinuation and innuendo, upon the
motives and integrity of this court, and
make out a prima facie case of improper
conduct upon the part of a lawyer who
holds a license from this court and who
is under oath to demean himself with all
good fidelity to the court as well as to his
client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the
attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac.
747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article
in which he impugned the motives of the court and
its members to try a case, charging the court of
having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose
undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days,
saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to
members of the bar is one most
subversive of the public good, if the
conduct of such members does not
measure up to the requirements of the
law itself, as well as to the ethics of the
profession. ...
The right of free speech and free
discussion as to judicial determination is
of prime importance under our system
and ideals of government. No right
thinking man would concede for a
moment that the best interest to private
citizens, as well as to public officials,
whether he labors in a judicial capacity
or otherwise, would be served by
denying this right of free speech to any
individual. But such right does not have
as its corollary that members of the bar
who are sworn to act honestly and
honorably both with their client and with
the courts where justice is administered,
if administered at all, could ever properly
serve their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or carelessly
 asserting the law. Truth and honesty of
purpose by members of the bar in such
discussion is necessary. The health of a
municipality is none the less impaired by
a polluted water supply than is the
health of the thought of a community
toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton,
and malignant misuse of members of
the bar of the confidence the public,
through its duly established courts, has
reposed in them to deal with the affairs
of the private individual, the protection of
whose rights he lends his strength and
money to maintain the judiciary. For
such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself
demands retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170
Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a
pending action using in respect to the several judges
the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked
conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and
confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"
"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar
phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a
member of the bar, and the name of the erring
lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W.
215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude
should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally
adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote
a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence
and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his
associates in the decisions of certain appeals in
which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants.
The letters were published in a newspaper. One of
the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved)
to one who has no better right to it than
the burglar to his plunder. It seems like
robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with
the court acting as a fence, or umpire,
watchful and vigilant that the widow got
no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a
proper motive for the decisions
discoverable, short of assigning to the
court emasculated intelligence, or a
constipation of morals and faithlessness
to duty? If the state bar association, or a
committee chosen from its rank, or the
faculty of the University Law School,
aided by the researches of its hundreds
of bright, active students, or if any
member of the court, or any other
person, can formulate a statement of a
 correct motive for the decision, which
shall not require fumigation before it is
stated, and quarantine after it is made, it
will gratify every right-minded citizen of
the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the
suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered
its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the
accused was guilty of professional
misconduct in sending to the Chief
Justice the letter addressed to him. This
was done, as we have found, for the
very purpose of insulting him and the
other justices of this court; and the insult
was so directed to the Chief Justice
personally because of acts done by him
and his associates in their official
capacity. Such a communication, so
made, could never subserve any good
purpose. Its only effect in any case
would be to gratify the spite of an angry
attorney and humiliate the officers so
assailed. It would not and could not ever
enlighten the public in regard to their
judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it
an exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege
which any reputable attorney,
uninfluenced by passion, could ever
have any occasion or desire to assert.
No judicial officer, with due regard to his
position, can resent such an insult
otherwise than by methods sanctioned
by law; and for any words, oral or
written, however abusive, vile, or
indecent, addressed secretly to the
judge alone, he can have no redress in
any action triable by a jury. "The
sending of a libelous communication or
libelous matter to the person defamed
does not constitute an actionable
publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law
(2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the
sending by the accused of this letter to
the Chief Justice was wholly different
from his other acts charged in the
accusation, and, as we have said,
wholly different principles are applicable
thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in
every way discreditable; but so far as he
exercised the rights of a citizen,
guaranteed by the Constitution and
sanctioned by considerations of public
policy, to which reference has been
made, he was immune, as we hold, from
the penalty here sought to be enforced.
To that extent his rights as a citizen
were paramount to the obligation which
he had assumed as an officer of this
court. When, however he proceeded
and thus assailed the Chief Justice
personally, he exercised no right which
the court can recognize, but, on the
contrary, willfully violated his obligation
to maintain the respect due to courts
and judicial officers. "This obligation is
not discharged by merely observing the
rules of courteous demeanor in open
court, but it includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward the judges
personally for their official acts." Bradley
v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed.
646. And there appears to be no
distinction, as regards the principle
involved, between the indignity of an
assault by an attorney upon a judge,
induced by his official act, and a
personal insult for like cause by written
or spoken words addressed to the judge
in his chambers or at his home or
elsewhere. Either act constitutes
misconduct wholly different from
criticism of judicial acts addressed or
spoken to others. The distinction made
is, we think entirely logical and well
sustained by authority. It was
recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra.
While the court in that case, as has
been shown, fully sustained the right of
a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in
actions which are ended, it held that one
might be summarily punished for
assaulting a judicial officer, in that case
a commissioner of the court, for his
rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is
it in the power of any person," said the
court, "by insulting or assaulting the
judge because of official acts, if only the
assailant restrains his passion until the
judge leaves the building, to compel the
judge to forfeit either his own self-
respect to the regard of the people by
tame submission to the indignity, or else
set in his own person the evil example
of punishing the insult by taking the law
in his own hands? ... No high-minded,
manly man would hold judicial office
under such conditions."
That a communication such as this,
addressed to the Judge personally,
constitutes professional delinquency for
which a professional punishment may
be imposed, has been directly decided.
"An attorney who, after being defeated
in a case, wrote a personal letter to the
trial justice, complaining of his conduct
and reflecting upon his integrity as a
justice, is guilty of misconduct and will
be disciplined by the court." Matter of
Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y.
Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin
(City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City
Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared
that the accused attorney had
addressed a sealed letter to a justice of
the City Court of New York, in which it
was stated, in reference to his decision:
"It is not law; neither is it common
sense. The result is I have been robbed
of 80." And it was decided that, while
such conduct was not a contempt under
the state, the matter should be "called to
the attention of the Supreme Court,
which has power to discipline the
attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel
learned in the law are permitted by
writings leveled at the heads of judges,
to charge them with ignorance, with
unjust rulings, and with robbery, either
as principals or accessories, it will not
be long before the general public may
feel that they may redress their fancied
grievances in like manner, and thus the
lot of a judge will be anything but a
happy one, and the administration of
justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v.
State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this
respect much the same as the case at
bar. The accused, an attorney at law,
wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit
judge, which the latter received by due
course of mail, at his home, while not
holding court, and which referred in
insulting terms to the conduct of the
judge in a cause wherein the accused
had been one of the attorneys. For this it
was held that the attorney was rightly
disbarred in having "willfully failed to
maintain respect due to him [the judge]
as a judicial officer, and thereby
breached his oath as an attorney." As
recognizing the same principle, and in
support of its application to the facts of
this case, we cite the following: Ex
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L.
Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2
Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo
237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep.
351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl.
134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl.
481.
Our conclusion is that the charges
against the accused have been so far
sustained as to make it our duty to
 impose such a penalty as may be
sufficient lesson to him and a suitable
warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court
affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he
accused a judge of being under the sinister influence
of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held
that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the
official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes
"moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred
for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in
general claiming that the judge was dishonest in
reaching his decisions and unfair in his general
conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney
published newspaper articles after the trial of cases,
criticising the court in intemperate language. The
invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the
court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the
legal profession into disrepute with the public, for
which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney,
dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a
period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts
involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him
unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was
ordered, even though he expressed an intention to
resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and
impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications,
made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their
judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or
not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to
bring them into disrepute or to subvert public
confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave
professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary
sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of
the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted
guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal
fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary
powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of
counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited
jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have
generally been disposed of under the power of
courts to punish for contempt which, although resting
on different bases and calculated to attain a different
end, nevertheless illustrates that universal
abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these
instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where
counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and
constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will
expressed at the polls," this Court, although
conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney,
in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor
and energy of which he is capable, but it
is not, and never will be so for him to
exercise said right by resorting to
intimidation or proceeding without the
propriety and respect which the dignity
of the courts requires. The reason for
this is that respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of their
institution. Without such guaranty, said
institution would be resting on a very
shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its
opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the
authority of the court and an intentional
contempt of its dignity, because the
court is thereby charged with no less
than having proceeded in utter disregard
of the laws, the rights to the parties, and
'of the untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and mocked
and flouted the rights of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and
the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to,
the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo,
who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source
of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be
published in i local newspaper a statement
expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not
only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once
more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow
mindedness of the majority of its members," and his
belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and
injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much
evil, is to change the members of the Supreme
Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant
peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from
the impregnable bulwark of justice of those
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino
Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who
were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary."
He there also announced that one of the first
measures he would introduce in then forthcoming
session of Congress would have for its object the
complete reorganization of the Supreme Court.
Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good
faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free
speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written
statement which he caused to be
published in the press, the respondent
does not merely criticize or comment on
the decision of the Parazo case, which
was then and still is pending
consideration by this Court upon petition
of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to
intimidate the members of this Court
with the presentation of a bill in the next
Congress, of which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the Supreme
Court and reducing the number of
Justices from eleven, so as to change
the members of this Court which
decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are
incompetent and narrow minded, in
order to influence the final decision of
said case by this Court, and thus
embarrass or obstruct the administration
of justice. But the respondent also
attacks the honesty and integrity of this
Court for the apparent purpose of
bringing the Justices of this Court into
disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court
has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and
injustices, that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of Que party knowing
that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered,
in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and
consequently to lower ,or degrade the
administration of justice by this Court.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines is,
under the Constitution, the last bulwark
to which the Filipino people may repair
to obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose
their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court
and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven
to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be
the result. As a member of the bar and
 an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as
such attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice.
Respect to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to
emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court
is under special obligation to be
respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts; he may be
removed from office or stricken from the
roll of attorneys as being guilty of
flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.],
586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re
Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al.,
supra, where counsel charged this Court with having
"repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering
to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of
Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's
misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the
sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez
stressed:
As we look back at the language
(heretofore quoted) employed in the
motion for reconsideration, implications
there are which inescapably arrest
attention. It speaks of one pitfall into
which this Court has repeatedly
fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into
question. That pitfall is the tendency of
this Court to rely on its own
pronouncements in disregard of the law
on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping
charge that the decisions of this
Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making any
reference to and analysis of the
pertinent statute governing the
jurisdiction of the industrial court. The
plain import of all these is that this Court
is so patently inept that in determining
the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it
has committed error and continuously
repeated that error to the point of
perpetuation. It pictures this Court as
one which refuses to hew to the line
drawn by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted
 statements is that the pronouncements
of this Court on the jurisdiction of the
industrial court are not entitled to
respect. Those statements detract much
from the dignity of and respect due this
Court. They bring into question the
capability of the members — and some
former members of this Court to render
justice. The second paragraph quoted
yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel
labelled as "so called" the "rule against
splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been
expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity,
need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the
aforecited cases — all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed
pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal
rule that the protective mantle of contempt may
ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks
or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a
pending case and not after the conclusion
thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of
a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for
which he is now called upon to account were made only after this
Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial
proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its
vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in
this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification
thereof, however, came when, in People vs.
Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with
the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel,
which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement
21
from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, a
contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was
adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that
the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner
after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been
resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the
view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to
the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a
case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede,
obstruct, embarrass or influence the
courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding, constitutes
criminal contempt which is 'summarily
punishable by courts. A publication
which tends to degrade the courts and
to destroy public confidence in them or
that which tends to bring them in any
way into disrepute, constitutes likewise
criminal contempt, and is equally
punishable by courts. What is sought, in
the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper
comments, is the all-important duty of
the courts to administer justice in the
decision of a pending case. In the
 second kind of contempt, the punitive
hand of justice is extended to vindicate
the courts from any act or conduct
calculated to bring them into disfavor or
to destroy public confidence in them. In
the first there is no contempt where
there is no action pending, as there is
no decision which might in any way be
influenced by the newspaper
publication. In the second, the contempt
exists, with or without a pending case,
as what is sought to be protected is the
court itself and its dignity. Courts would
lose their utility if public confidence in
them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by
the circumstance that his statements and actuations
now under consideration were made only after the
judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality.
He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as
if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the
said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or
not he could be held liable for contempt for such post
litigation utterances and actuations, is here
immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of
November 17, 1967, we have confronted the
situation here presented solely in so far as it
concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his
sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer
of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power
the morals inherent in our authority and duty to
safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to
preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled
and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In
this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case
in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole
objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity
of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a
member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit
to continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do.
By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty,
amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice
of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to
discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have
proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar.
Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who
are officers of the court, is an inherent
and incidental power in courts of record,
and one which is essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. To deny
its existence is equivalent to a
declaration that the conduct of attorneys
towards courts and clients is not subject
to restraint. Such a view is without
support in any respectable authority,
 and cannot be tolerated. Any court
having the right to admit attorneys to
practice and in this state that power is
vested in this court-has the inherent
right, in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion to exclude them from
practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a
representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect.
So much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the
court that an attorney is no longer
worthy of the trust and confidence of the
public and of the courts, it becomes, not
only the right, but the duty, of the court
which made him one of its officers, and
gave him the privilege of ministering
within its bar, to withdraw the privilege.
Therefore it is almost universally held
that both the admission and disbarment
of attorneys are judicial acts, and that
one is admitted to the bar and exercises
his functions as an attorney, not as a
matter of right, but as a privilege
conditioned on his own behavior and the
exercise of a just and sound judicial
discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has
risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been
elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court.
25
Our authority and duty in the premises being
unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances and
actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are
properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is,
of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part.
Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law
stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer,
however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
language, he actually availed of the said move as a
vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The
integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile
insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for
and disrespect to the Court and its members.
Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar
of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice
administered by this Court to be not only blind "but
also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he
virtually makes this Court and its members with
verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration
of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at
the same time branding its members as "calloused to
pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to
argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum,"
he caused the publication in the papers of an
account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to
startle the public, stir up public indignation and
disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an
explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no
apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he
rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and,
alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and
feathered the Court and its members as inveterate
hypocrites incapable of administering justice and
unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's
petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for
itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous
innuendoes they carried far transcend the
permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They
could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite
of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself
and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its
members into disrepute and destroy public
confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and
texture presents no redeeming feature, and
completely negates any pretense of passionate
commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a
classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation
of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the
Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be
allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of
our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the
need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of
immunity from criticism. Like any other Government
entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and
should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the
Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to
its high function as the court of last resort. And more
than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means
synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment
and disinterestedness, real qualities approached
only through constant striving to attain them. Any
criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of
judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective
and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the
exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of
the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and
judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is
an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not
only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also
of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary
proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not
— and does not involve — a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated
28
by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney
is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
29
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or
a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a
certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against
the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably
as much so against the individual members thereof.
But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently
with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the
individual members act not as such individuals but.
only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their
office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant
in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual
members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights,
fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave
hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the
retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the
practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate
just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce
jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be
conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved
parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the
exercise of that power because public policy demands that they.,
acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for
disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the
imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of
complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent
of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty.
Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by
the Rules of Court, these may range from mere
suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The
discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction
is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court
which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative
need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously
guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is
of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized.
However, heeding the stern injunction that
disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser
sanction would accomplish the end desired, and
believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope
that in the sober light of some future day, Atty.
Almacen will realize that abrasive language never
fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the
added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension Fernando, J., took no part.
will suffice under the circumstances. His
demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by
neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology
therefor leave us no way of determining how long
that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are
impelled to decree that the same should be
indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone
because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the
matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely
exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why
indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be
regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The
merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to
Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that
suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes
effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to
resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that

Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further
orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the

Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the
Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,

Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor
JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E.
GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON
PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY.
FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO,
JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D.
Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo
Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C.
Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for
disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions
during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a
confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and
re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar
Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who
flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar
Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and
67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the
Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one
examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate
was raised for one reason or another, before the bar
results were released this year" (Confidential Letter,
p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to
him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon
C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D.
Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are
strong reasons to believe that the grades in other
examination notebooks in other subjects also
underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior
to the release of the results. Note that this was
without any formal motion or request from the proper
parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the
examiners concerned reconsidered their
grades without formal motion, there is no reason why
they may not do so now when proper request answer
motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due
process postulates. Might not one say that some
candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their
grades were not asked to be reconsidered
'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not
afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go
into these matters by its conceded power to
ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?"
(p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court
checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations
and found that the grades in five subjects — Political
Law and Public International Law, Civil Law,
Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law —
of a successful bar candidate with office code No.
954 underwent some changes which, however, were
duly initialed and authenticated by the respective
examiner concerned. Further check of the records
revealed that the bar candidate with office code No.
954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar
candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964,
1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade
of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and
57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar
examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was
considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%,
which was considered as 75% as the passing mark
for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar
Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners
concerned to submit their sworn statements on the
matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar
Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias
Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners
for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the
circumstances under which the same was done and
his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn
statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-
checked the notebook involved pertaining to his
subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do
the same and that the examinee concerned failed
only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents
warranting a formal investigation, the Court required,
in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant
Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days
from notice why his name should not be stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore
he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar
examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March
5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten
(10) days from notice why his name should not be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No.
1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned
were also required by the Court "to show cause
within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary
action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while
respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo
and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and
35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973,
respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement
in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed
on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47,
rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer
on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-
104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the
same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it
was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-
evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet
with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public
International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who
was asked to help in the correction of a number of
examination notebooks in Political Law and Public
International Law to meet the deadline for
submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this
development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise
included as respondent in Administrative Case No.
1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a
respondent for it was also discovered that another
paper in Political Law and Public International Law
also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out
to be owned by another successful candidate by the
name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation
resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation
and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of
Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade
from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code
No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate
by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and
Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned
to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the
1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation
Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra,
alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of
Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on
September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila
committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student
of the same university. Confronted with this
information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol.
V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared
that he does not remember having been charged
with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case.
(Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the
bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact
which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced
on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2,
1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required
to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo,
Galang and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar
Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia,
where he is believed to be gainfully employed.
Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except
respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his
oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence
only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted
by them to the Court. The same became the basis
for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer,
which they offered as their direct testimony in the
investigation conducted by the Court, the
respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances
under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the
examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent
Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law,
affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in
December last year, while I was
correcting the examination notebooks,
Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained
to me that it is the practice and the
policy in bar examinations that he (Atty.
Lanuevo) make a review of the grades
obtained in all subjects and if he finds
that candidate obtained an extraordinary
high grade in one subject and a rather
low one in another, he will bring back
the latter to the examiner concerned for
re-evaluation and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of
January of this year, he brought back to
me an examination booklet in Civil Law
for re-evaluation, because according to
him the owner of the paper is on the
borderline and if I could reconsider his
grade to 75% the candidate concerned
will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under
the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do
so in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so,
I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law
was brought back to me for such re-
evaluation and upon verifying my files I
found that the notebook is numbered
'95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and
my re-evaluation of the answers were
based on the same standard used in the
correction and evaluation of all others;
thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades
of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%;
No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to
5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10%
(emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially
reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972
affidavit with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6,
9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is
no longer to make the reconsideration of
these answers because of the same
evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1,
2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6
and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the
reconsideration of examination booklet
No. 951 I did not know the identity of its
owner until I received this resolution of
the Honorable Supreme Court nor the
identities of the examiners in other
subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was
made in good faith and under the belief
that I am authorized to do so in view of
the misrepresentation of said Atty.
Lanuevo, based on the following
circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting
the papers on or about
October 16, 1971,
relationship between Atty.
Lanuevo and myself had
developed to the point that
with respect to the
correction of the
examination booklets of bar
candidates I have always
followed him and
considered his instructions
as reflecting the rules and
policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court with respect
to the same; that I have no
alternative but to take his
words;
b) That considering this
relationship and considering
his misrepresentation to me
as reflecting the real and
policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court, I did not
bother any more to get the
consent and permission of
the Chairman of the Bar
Committee. Besides, at that
time, I was isolating myself
from all members of the
Supreme Court and
specially the chairman of
the Bar Committee for fear
that I might be identified as
a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever
has been received by me in return for
such recorrection, and as proof of it, I
declined to consider and evaluate one
booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid
because I was not the one who made
the original correction of the same
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge,
Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and
Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of
April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant
went to my residence to obtain from me
the last bag of two hundred notebooks
(bearing examiner's code numbers 1200
to 1400) which according to my record
was on February 5, 1972, he came to
my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding
in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme
Court, with at least two companions.
The bar confidant had with him an
examinee's notebook bearing code
number 661, and, after the usual
amenties, he requested me if it was
possible for me to review and re-
examine the said notebook because it
appears that the examinee obtained a
grade of 57, whereas, according to the
Bar Confidant, the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which was 84, if
I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was
allowed to receive or re-examinee the
notebook as I had submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me that I was
authorized to do so because the same
was still within my control and authority
as long as the particular examinee's
name had not been identified or that the
code number decode and the
examinee's name was revealed. The
Bar Confidant told me that the name of
the examinee in the case present
bearing code number 661 had not been
identified or revealed; and that it might
have been possible that I had given a
particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the
Bar Confidant's representations to me,
and as it was humanly possible that I
might have erred in the grading of the
said notebook, I re-examined the same,
carefully read the answer, and graded it
in accordance with the same standards I
had used throughout the grading of the
entire notebooks, with the result that the
examinee deserved an increased grade
of 66. After again clearing with the Bar
Confidant my authority to correct the
grades, and as he had assured me that
the code number of the examinee in
question had not been decoded and his
name known, ... I therefore corrected
the total grade in the notebook and the
grade card attached thereto, and
properly initia(l)ed the same. I also
corrected the itemized grades (from item
No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of
grading sheets, my personal copy
thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought
with him the other copy thereof, and the
Bar Confidant brought with him the other
copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis
supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he
denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo
P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference
the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in
additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's
notebook in political and international
law, code numbered 661, I did know the
name of the examinee. In fact, I came to
know his name only upon receipt of the
resolution of March 5, 1973; now
knowing his name, I wish to state that I
do not know him personally, and that I
have never met him even up to the
present;
4. At that time, I acted under the
impression that I was authorized to
make such review, and had repeatedly
asked the Bar Confidant whether I was
authorized to make such revision and
was so assured of my authority as the
name of the examinee had not yet been
decoded or his identity revealed. The
Bar Confidant's assurance was
apparently regular and so appeared to
be in the regular course of express
prohibition in the rules and guidelines
given to me as an examiner, and the
Bar Confidant was my official liaison
with the Chairman, as, unless called, I
refrained as much as possible from
frequent personal contact with the
Chairman lest I be identified as an
examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to
see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the
evening at my residence, I felt it
inappropriate to verify his authority with
the Chairman. It did not appear to me
that his representations were
unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the
Bar Confidant was riding in the official
vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two
companions, which was usual, and thus
looked like a regular visit to me of the
Bar Confidant, as it was about the same
hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered
661 was still in the same condition as
when I submitted the same. In agreeing
to review the said notebook code
numbered 661, my aim was to see if I
committed an error in the correction, not
to make the examinee pass the subject.
I considered it entirely humanly possible
to have erred, because I corrected that
particular notebook on December 31,
1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that
the said examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the highest of
which was 84% in remedial law, if I
recall correctly. Of course, it did not
strike me as unusual that the Bar
Confidant knew the grades of the
examinee in the position to know and
that there was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the
original grade obtained by the examinee
with notebook code numbered 661 was
57%. After review, it was increased by 9
points, resulting in a final grade of 66%.
Still, the examinee did not pass the
subject, and, as heretofore stated, my
aim was not to make the examinee
pass, notwithstanding the representation
that he had passed the other subjects.
...
9. I quite recall that during the first
meeting of the Bar Examiners'
Committee consensus was that where
an examinee failed in only one subject
and passed the rest, the examiner in
said subject would review the notebook.
Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the
time of the Committee's first meeting,
we still did not know the names of the
candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception,
not a party to it. It had absolutely no
knowledge of the motives of the Bar
Confidant or his malfeasance in office,
and did not know the examinee
concerned nor had I any kind of contract
with him before or rather the review and
even up to the present (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law,
affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant
would deliver and collect examination
books to my residence at 951 Luna
Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had
already completed correction of the
books in Criminal Law and was helping
in the correction of some of the papers
in another subject, the Bar
Confidant brought back to me one (1)
 paper in Criminal Law saying that that
particular examinee had missed the
passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his paper in Criminal
Law would be raised a few points to
75% then he would make the general
passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised
the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise
of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points,
initialled the revised mark and revised
also the mark and revised also the mark
in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the
book of the examinee concerned" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent
Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar
Confidant in good faith and without the slightest
inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question
who up to now remains a total stranger and without
expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law,
stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of
January or early part of February 1972,
Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court, saw me in my house at
No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal.
He produced to me an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law which I had
previously graded and submitted to him.
He informed me that he and others (he
used the words "we") had reviewed the
said notebook. He requested me to
review the said notebook and possibly
reconsider the grade that I had
previously given. He explained that the
examine concerned had done well in
other subjects, but that because of the
comparatively low grade that I had given
him in Remedial Law his general
average was short of passing. Mr.
Lanuevo remarked that he thought that
if the paper were reviewed I might find
the examinee deserving of being
admitted to the Bar. As far as I can
recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called
my attention to the fact in his answers
the examinee expressed himself clearly
and in good enough English. Mr.
Lanuevo however informed me that
whether I would reconsider the grades I
 had previously given and submitted was
entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr.
Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to
address such a request to me and that
the said request was in order, I, in the
presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded
tore-read and re-evaluate each and
every item of the paper in question. I
recall that in my re-evaluation of the
answers, I increased the grades in some
items, made deductions in other items,
and maintained the same grades in
other items. However, I recall that after
Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new
grades that I had given after re-
evaluation, the total grade increased by
a few points, but still short of the
passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973,
respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his
sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the
notebook, with resulted in increasing the
total grade of the examinee-concerned
in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%,
herein respondent acted in good faith. It
may well be that he could be faulted for
not having verified from the Chairman of
the Committee of Bar Examiners the
legitimacy of the request made by Mr.
Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however,
pleads in attenuation of such omission,
that —
a) Having been appointed
an Examiner for the first
time, he was not aware, not
having been apprised
otherwise, that it was not
within the authority of the
Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court to request
or suggest that the grade of
a particular examination
notebook be revised or
reconsidered. He had every
right to presume, owing to
the highly fiduciary nature
of the position of the Bar
Confidant, that the request
was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of
the particular examinee
concerned, herein
respondent carefully
evaluated each and every
answer written in the
notebook. Testing the
answers by the criteria laid
down by the Court,
and giving the said
examinee the benefit of
doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation
that it was only in that
particular subject that the
said examine failed, herein
respondent became
convinced that the said
examinee deserved a
higher grade than that
previously given to him, but
that he did not deserve, in
herein respondent's honest
appraisal, to be given the
passing grade of 75%. It
should also be mentioned
that, in reappraising the
answers, herein respondent
downgraded a previous
rating of an answer written
by the examinee, from
9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law,
affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of
the Bar Examiners' Committee after the
Bar Examinations were held, I was
informed that one Bar examinee passed
all other subjects except Mercantile
Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners'
Committee that I would be willing to re-
evaluate the paper of this particular Bar
candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant
handed to me a Bar candidate's
notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade
of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and
after re-evaluating the answers of this
 particular Bar candidate I decided to
increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report
and duly initialed the changes in the
grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent
Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing
sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-
evaluated the examination notebook of
Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile
Law in absolute good faith and in direct
compliance with the agreement made
during one of the deliberations of the
Bar Examiners Committee that where a
candidate fails in only one subject, the
Examiner concerned should make a re-
evaluation of the answers of the
candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not
know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that
notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
pertained to bar examine Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and
that I have never met up to this time this
particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar
Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks,
checking the entries in the grading
sheets and the posting on the record of
ratings, I was impressed of the writing
and the answers on the first notebook.
This led me to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks. Believing that those five
merited re-evalation on the basis of the
memorandum circularized to the
examiners shortly earlier to the effect
that
... in the correction of the
papers, substantial weight
should then be given to
clarify of language and
soundness of reasoning'
(par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back
to the respective examiners for re-
evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division
that immediately after the release of the
results of the examinations, we are
usually swarmed with requests of the
examinees that they be shown their
notebooks. Many of them would copy
their answers and have them checked
by their professors. Eventually some of
them would file motions or requests for
re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right
now, we have some 19 of such motions
or requests which we are reading for
submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are
meritorious, but just the same they have
to be denied because the result of the
examinations when released is final and
irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the
occurrence of such instances that
motivated me to bring those notebooks
back to the respective examiners for re-
evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24,
rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent
Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in
question to the examiners concerned in
his hotest belief that the same merited
re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not
his intention to forsake or betray the
trust reposed in him as bar confidant but
on the contrary to do justice to the
examinee concerned; that neither did he
act in a presumptuous manner, because
the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was inorder was left alone to
the examiners' decision; and that, to his
knowledge, he does not remember
having made the alleged
misrepresentation but that he
remembers having brought to the
attention of the Committee during the
meeting a matter concerning another
examinee who obtained a passing
general average but with a grade below
50% in Mercantile Law. As the
Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the
grade in said subject, respondent
brought the notebook in question to the
Examiner concerned who thereby raised
the grade thus enabling the said
examinee to pass. If he remembers
 right, the examinee concerned is one
surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la
Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never
entertained a notion that his act would
stir such serious charges as would tend
to undermine his integrity because he
did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another
sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification
of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having
deceived the examiners concerned into
believing that the examinee involved
failed only in their respective subjects,
the fact of the matter being that the
notebooks in question were submitted to
the respective examiners for re-
evaluation believing in all good faith that
they so merited on the basis of the
Confidential Memorandum (identified
and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo,
particularly that portion marked as Exh.
1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all
the examiners earlier, leaving to them
entirely the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence
prompted me to pry into the notebooks
in question:
Sometime during the latter
part of January and the
early part of February,
1972, on my way back to
the office (Bar Division)
after lunch, I though of
buying a sweepstake ticket.
I have always made it a
point that the moment I
think of so buying, I pick a
number from any object and
the first number that comes
into my sight becomes the
basis of the ticket that I buy.
At that moment, the first
number that I saw was
"954" boldly printed on an
electrical contribance
(evidently belonging to the
MERALCO) attached to a
post standing along the
right sidewalk of P. Faura
street towards the Supreme
Court building from San
Marcelino street and almost
adjacent to the south-
eastern corner of the fence
of the Araullo High
School(photograph of the
number '954', the
contrivance on which it is
printed and a portion of the
post to which it is attached
is identified and marked as
Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the
number "954" as Exh. 4-a-
Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in
mind, I proceeded to Plaza
Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket
that would contain such
number. Eventually, I found
a ticket, which I then
bought, whose last three
digits corresponded to
"954". This number became
doubly impressive to me
because the sum of all the
six digits of the ticket
number was "27", a number
that is so significant to me
that everything I do I try
somewhat instinctively to
link or connect it with said
number whenever possible.
Thus even in assigning
code numbers on the
Master List of examinees
from 1968 when I first took
charge of the examinations
as Bar Confidant up to
1971, I either started with
the number "27" (or "227")
or end with said number.
(1968 Master List is
identified and marked as
Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the
figure "27" at the beginning
of the list, as Exh. 5-a
Lanuevo; 1969 Master List
as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the
beginning of the list, as
Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970
Master List as Exh. 7-
Lanuevo and the figure
"227" at the beginning of
the list as Exh. 7-a-
Lanuevo; and the 1971
Master List as Exh. 8-
Lanuevo and the figure
"227" at the end of the list
as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of
this number (27) was born
out of these incidents in my
life, to wit: (a) On November
27, 1941 while with the
Philippine Army stationed at
Camp Manacnac,
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I
was stricken with
pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva
Ecija Provincial Hospital as
a result. As will be recalled,
the last Pacific War broke
out on December 8, 1941.
While I was still confined at
the hospital, our camp was
bombed and strafed by
Japanese planes on
December 13, 1941
resulting in many
casualties. From then on, I
regarded November 27,
1941 as the beginning of a
new life for me having been
saved from the possibility of
being among the
casualties;(b) On February
27, 1946, I was able to get
out of the army byway of
honorable discharge; and
(c) on February 27, 1947, I
got married and since then
we begot children the
youngest of whom was born
on February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that
same afternoon after buying
the ticket, I resumed my
work which at the time was
on the checking of the
notebooks. While thus
checking, I came upon the
notebooks bearing the
office code number "954".
As the number was still
fresh in my mind, it aroused
my curiosity prompting me
to pry into the contents of
the notebooks. Impressed
by the clarity of the writing
and language and the
apparent soundness of the
answers and, thereby,
believing in all good faith on
the basis of the
aforementioned
Confidential Memorandum
 (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh.
1-a-Lanuevo) that they
merited re-evaluation, I set
them aside and later on
took them back to the
respective examiners for
possible review recalling to
them the said Confidential
Memorandum but leaving
absolutely the matter to
their discretion and
judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or
deception could have reference to either
of the two cases which I brought to the
attention of the committee during the
meeting and which the Committee
agreed to refer back to the respective
examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee
who obtained a passing
general average but with a
grade below 50% (47%) in
Mercantile Law(the
notebooks of this examinee
bear the Office Code No.
110, identified and marked
as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the
notebook in Mercantile Law
bearing the Examiner's
Code No. 951 with the
original grade of 4%
increased to 50% after re-
evaluation as Exh. 9-a-
Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee
who obtained a borderline
general average of 73.15%
with a grade below 60%
(57%) in one subject which,
at the time, I could not
pinpoint having
inadvertently left in the
office the data thereon. It
turned out that the subject
was Political and
International Law under
Asst. Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo (The
notebooks of this examinee
bear the Office Code No.
1622 identified and marked
as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and
the notebook in Political
and International Law
bearing the Examiner's
Code No. 661 with the
original grade of 57%
increased to 66% after re-
 evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-
Lanuevo). This notebook in
Political and International
Law is precisely the same
notebook mentioned in the
sworn statement of Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo
Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases
mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph, only one (1) subject or
notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated,
that is, only Mercantile Law in the
former; and only Political and
International Law in the latter, under the
facts and circumstances I made known
to the Committee and pursuant to which
the Committee authorized the referral of
the notebooks involved to the examiners
concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in
Taxation even volunteered to review or
re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in
his subject but that I told the Committee
that there was very little time left and
that the increase in grade after re-
evaluation, unless very highly
substantial, may not alter the outcome
since the subject carries the weight of
only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-
47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves
to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid
of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he
was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of
respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of
the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as
he "was going over those notebooks, checking the
entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the
record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973,
he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post
provoked him "to pry into the contents of the
notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office
code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not
acquainted with former BarConfidant
Victorio Lanuevo and never met him
before except once when, as required
by the latter respondent submitted
certain papers necessary for taking the
bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy
of the Supreme Court not to reconsider
"failure" cases; after the official release
thereof; why should it now reconsider a
"passing" case, especially in a situation
where the respondent and the bar
confidant do not know each other and,
indeed, met only once in the ordinary
course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that
the entire situation clearly manifests a
reasonable doubt to which respondent is
richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a
copy of this Honorable Court's resolution
dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge
whatsoever of former Bar Confidant
Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are
stated in particular in the resolution. In
fact, the respondent never knew this
man intimately nor, had the herein
respondent utilized anyone to contact
the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said
actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as
stated in the Resolution, which are
evidently purported to show as having
redounded to the benefit of herein
respondent, these questions arise: First,
was the re-evaluation of Respondent's
examination papers by the Bar
Examination Committee done only or
especially for him and not done
generally as regards the paper of the
other bar candidates who are supposed
to have failed? If the re-evaluation of
Respondent's grades was done among
those of others, then it must have been
done as a matter of policy of the
Committee to increase the percentage
of passing in that year's examination
and, therefore, the insinuation that only
respondent's papers were re-evaluated
upon the influence of Bar Confidant
Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far
fetched. Secondly, is the fact that
BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations
resulted in herein Respondent's benefit
an evidence per se of Respondent's
having caused actuations of Bar
confidant Lanuevo to be done in
former's behalf? To assume this could
be disastrous in effect because that
would be presuming all the members of
the Bar Examination Committee as
devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar
themselves and the result of their work
that year, as also unworthy of anything.
All of these inferences are deductible
 from the narration of facts in the
resolution, and which only goes to show
said narration of facts an unworthy of
credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution
of March 5, 1973 would make this
Respondent Account or answer for the
actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as
well as for the actuations of the Bar
Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the
Respondent. The evident imputation is
denied and it is contended that the Bar
Examiners were in the performance of
their duties and that they should be
regarded as such in the consideration of
this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp.
100-104, rec.).
I examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates
how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly
initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-
evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of
respondent Galang by deceiving separately and
individually the respondents-examiners to make the
desired revision without prior authority from the
Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had
been submitted to the Court through the respondent
Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof
for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around
the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached
Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in
the process of correcting examination booklets, and
then and there made the representations that as
BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades
obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he
finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high
grade in one subject and a rather low one on
another, he will bring back to the examiner
concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and
change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-
Law for re-evaluation, representing that the
examinee who owned the particular notebook is on
the borderline of passing and if his grade in said
subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said
examine will get a passing average. Respondent-
examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word
and under the belief that was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief
that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so,
he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the
examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%.
The particular notebook belonged to an examinee
with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office
Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent
Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee
at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-
Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision,
Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including
Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still
failed in six subjects and could not obtain the
passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or
early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel
Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with
an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which
respondent Manalo and previously corrected and
graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested
respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and
possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining
and representing that "they" has reviewed the said
notebook and that the examinee concerned had
done well in other subjects, but that because of the
comparatively low grade given said examinee by
respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general
average of said examinee was short of passing.
Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and
observation that he thought that if the notebook were
reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the
examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the
attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his
answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly
and in good English. Furthermore, respondent
Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo
to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that
read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be
more a test of logic, knowledge of legal
fundamentals, and ability to analyze and
solve legal problems rather than a test
of memory; in the correction of papers,
substantial weight should be given to
clarify of language and soundness of
reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by
respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's)
discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that
respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the
authority to make such request and further believing
that such request was in order, proceeded to re-
evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of
Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's
grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from
63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated
with his signature the changes made by him in the
notebook and in the grading sheet. The said
notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of
310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and
belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo,
Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade
due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one
occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver
to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's
house a new batch of examination papers in Political
Law and Public International Law to be corrected,
respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in
Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number
1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66,
rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular
examinee who owns the said notebook seems to
have passed in all other subjects except in Political
Law and Public International Law; and that if the said
notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be
increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass
the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from
respondent that this is possible — the respondent
Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice
of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in
just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the
request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just
leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo
thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with
leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was
increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%.
Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding
corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly
initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office
Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46,
rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee
Galang's general average was still below the passing
grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination
notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in
Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter,
who was then helping in the correction of papers in
Political Law and Public International Law, as he had
already finished correcting the examination
notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law
— that the examinee who owns that particular
notebook had missed the passing grade by only a
fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal
Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the
examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting
the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the
justification and because he did not want to be the
one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent
Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and
thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also
revised the mark in the general list and likewise
initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code
Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954.
This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61,
rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been
shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the
latter approached him for this particular re-
evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to
him that where a candidate had almost made the
passing average but had failed in one subject, as a
matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in
reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing
subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a
copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was
long before the re-evaluation requested by
respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by
him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61,
rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not
raise Galang's general average to a passing grade
because of his failing mark in three more subjects,
including Mercantile Law. For the revision of
examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law,
respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his
quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization
from the Bar Examination Committee for the
examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said
notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in
only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner
concerned would review the notebook. Nobody
objected to it as irregular and the Committee
adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo,
Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63;
Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by
respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all
other subjects except Mercantile Law. This
information was made during the meeting within
hearing of the order members, who were all closely
seated together. Respondent Montecillo made
known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular
paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to
respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook
with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of
61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the
whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers,
decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The
matter was not however thereafter officially brought
to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs.
A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41,
70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being
given the information that the particular examinee
failed only in his subject and passed all the others,
he would not have consented to make the re-
evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33,
rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that
there was only one instance he remembers, which is
substantiated by his personal records, that he had to
change the grade of an examinee after he had
submitted his report, referring to the notebook of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and
with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35,
rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when
respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of
200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the
residence of respondent Pardo riding in a
Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with two companions. According to
respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second
week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the
Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo
had with him on that occasion an examinee's
notebook bearing Examiner's Code No.
661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual
amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review
and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook
because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the
examine who owns that particular notebook obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which
is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with
respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the
grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers
of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of
grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number
1622 as office code number. It belonged to
examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24,
29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D.
Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE
ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG,
alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR
SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having
requested on his own initiative the five examiners
concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that
eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's
average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%,
or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more
or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar
examinations via a resolution of the Court making
74% the passing average for that year's examination
without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any
subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is
likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority
from the Court or the Committee to initiate such
steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers
of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the
examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed
only in their respective subjects and/or was on the
borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought
to justify his actuations on the authority of the
aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm.
Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No.
1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members
of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains
that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief
that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so,
it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary
to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that
neither did he act in a presumptuous manner
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation
was in order was left alone to the examiners'
decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162,
pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the
investigation, the said confidential memorandum was
intended solely for the examiners to guide them in
the initial correction of the examination papers and
never as a basis for him to even suggest to the
examiners the re-evaluation of the examination
papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any
such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous
but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo,
Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian —
whose declarations on the matter of the
misrepresentations and deceptions committed by
respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as
well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of
the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164)
and clarified by extensive cross-examination
conducted during the investigation and hearing of the
cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly Galang had only one passing mark and this was in
maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and
Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records individual grades of Galang before and after the
that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:
trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and
the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant BAI
as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in
and characterized his relationship with the five 1. Political Law Public
members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
who were thus deceived and induced into re- or 30 weighted points
evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang
in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his BAI
grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be
admitted a member of the Philippine Bar. Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that evaluation made.
characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied
and well-calculated moves in successively 2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
representing separately to each of the five examiners or 33 weighted points.
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only
in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized evaluation made.
re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five
(5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects 3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
while his general average was only 66.25% — which or 30 weighted points.
under no circumstances or standard could it be
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in
22 weighted points.
one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact,
before the first notebook of Galang was referred
back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation,
 5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5%
(75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————
General Weighted Averages 66.25%
74.15%
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-
evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5)
subjects under the circumstances already narrated,
Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased
to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to
the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the
Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the
other examinees. He did this in favor only of
examinee Galang, with the possible addition of
examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela
Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for
each of the latter who — Political Law and Public
International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for
Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed,
has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or
reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail
to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After
the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the
Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual
grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and
thereafter compute the general average. That done,
he will then prepare a comparative data showing the
percentage of passing and failing in relation to a
certain average to be submitted to the Committee
and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court
will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74
or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business
evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot
assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal
made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the
over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know
better than the examiner. Any request for re-
evaluation should be done by the examinee and the
same should be addressed to the Court, which alone
can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes
such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and
thereby compromises his position as well as the
image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely
doing justice to Galang without any intention of
betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by
the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in
the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out
Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the
papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far
better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which
he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.),
which could be more properly claimed as borderline
cases. This fact further betrays respondent
Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring
back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-
evaluation. For certainly, as against the original
weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can
hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid
more than ninety (90) examinees were more
deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do
justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent
Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other
examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially
the said more than ninety candidates. And the
unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to
apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar
Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after
the said re-evaluation and increase of grades,
precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any
pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in
Political Law and International Law of Ernesto
Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the
case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping
that the over ninety examinees who were far better
situated than Galang would not give him away. Even
the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and
one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the
agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the
examinee concerned fails only in one subject.
Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three
(3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the
office code number given to Galang's notebook,
unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in
his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo,
Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into
the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration.
It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching
at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was
revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time
only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than
five 95) months after he filed his answer on March
19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-
thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA
CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO
RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO
EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF
EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK
IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO
PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN
THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT
SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted
having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on
Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the
Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what
circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and
Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners
concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these
two cases were officially brought to the Bar
Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol.
VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer
them back to the Examiners concerned for re-
evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to
remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela
Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent
Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two
cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was
presented at the said first meeting of the Committee
(Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of
the dates of every meeting of the Committee was
made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.).
The alleged sheet containing the date of the two
examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of
the Committee were not presented by respondent
Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them
inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room
when he went on leave after the release of the Bar
results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears,
however, that the inventory conducted by officials of
the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent
Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh.
X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-
13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law,
maintained that there was only one notebook in
Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him
and this is substantiated by his personal file and
record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him,
this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol.
V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the
original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela
Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover
of the notebook of said examinee and the change is
authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo.
He was present when respondent Lanuevo
presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz
bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code
Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative
Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out,
replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of
Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol.
VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose
any objection to their admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo
testified that he remembers a case of an examinee
presented to the Committee, who obtained passing
marks in all subjects except in one and the
Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner
concerned the notebook in the subject in which the
examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot
recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not
Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo
declared that he is not aware of any case of an
examinee who was on the borderline of passing but
who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was
taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the
notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613
(belonging to Galang) which was referred to the
Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to
the Examiner concerned. The day following the
meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code
Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo
handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-
evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office
Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee
whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken
up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other
case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61,
rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an
examinee that was referred to the Committee that
involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers
of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the
representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the
meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the
Committee that where an examinee failed in only
one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner
in whose subject the examinee failed should re-
evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.:
Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in
Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back
to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing
grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and
after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law
are as follows:
BA
 Political Law 57% 66% = 9
pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No
reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% =
" Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————
————
Average (weighted) 73.15%
74.5%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo,
Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in
Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo
to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said
subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
Political Law
70%
Taxation 72%
His grades and averages before and after the
disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:
BA
Political Law 70% 70% =
No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% =
3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% =
no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
————————————
—————
Weighted Averages 74.95%
75.4%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in
Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar
Examination Committee in February, 1971, which
violation was due to the misrepresentation of
respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of
Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo
can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus
of the Bar Examination Committee because even at
the time of said referral, which was after the
unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4)
subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation
and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in
Remedial Law was considered 75% under the
Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the
record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently
re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious
misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby
impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and
undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He
should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela
Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they
should be required to show cause and the
corresponding investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence
of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in
five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and
International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and
Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in
admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion,
requires: (1) previous established rules and
principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or
present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a
decision as to whether these facts are governed by
the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers'
Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-
545). The determination of whether a bar candidate
has obtained the required passing grade certainly
involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice
Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts
through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of
a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and
eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners
in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject
assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer
between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one
hand, and the individual members of the Committee,
on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same
time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every
act of the Committee in connection with the exercise
of discretion in the admission of examinees to
membership of the Bar must be in accordance with
the established rules of the Court and must always
be subject to the final approval of the Court. With
respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is
primarily confidential as the designation indicates,
his functions in connection with the conduct of the
Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by
the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the
examination answers of respondent Galang in five
(5) subjects, as already clearly established, was
initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any
authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust
and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar
Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that
enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar
examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a
complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not
possess any discretion with respect to the matter of
admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed
with authority to determine whether or not an
examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-
evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of
such answers is correct. And whether or not the
examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy
thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the
proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's
admission to the Bar were in accordance with the
rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
of 1964, in connection, among others, with the
character requirement of candidates for admission to
the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission
as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,
and that no charges against him involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court
in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old
Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule
127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound
to lay before the Court all his involvement in any
criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to
enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine
applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what
crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme
Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying
before or informing the Court of one's personal
record — whether he was criminally indicted,
acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still
pending — becomes more compelling. The forms for
application to take the Bar examinations provided by
the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require
the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving
moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant
but also of all other criminal cases of which he has
been accused. It is of course true that the application
form used by respondent Galang when he took the
Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require
the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if
any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to
show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral
character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all
his involvement in any criminal case so that the
Court can consider them in the ascertainment and
determination of his moral character. And
undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records
before it, the Court will be in a better position to
consider the applicant's moral character; for it could
not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in
any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by
its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction,
has a bearing upon his character or fitness for
admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when
respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and
third time, respectively, the application form provided
by the Court for use of applicants already required
the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not
been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any
court or tribunal of any offense involving moral
turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that
nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the
Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application
form prepared by the Court for use of applicants
required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases
whether involving moral turpitude or not. In
paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required
under oath to declare that "he has not been charged
with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or
other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted
by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him"
(Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent
Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal
from the Court his criminal case of slight physical
injuries which was then and until now is pending in
the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly
omitted to make mention of the same in his
applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967,
1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and
withholding from the Court his pending criminal case
for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967,
1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971,
he committed perjury when he declared under oath
that he had no pending criminal case in court. By
falsely representing to the Court that he had no
criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang
was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar
examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was
allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his
application to take the Bar examinations of the fact
that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an
alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his
license to practice law is well — settled (see 165
ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the
conclusion that the respondent, in
withholding from the board of law
examiners and from the justice of this
court, to whom he applied for admission,
information respecting so serious a
matter as an indictment for a felony, was
guilty of fraud upon the court (cases
cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board
of law examiners, or the judge to whom
he applied for admission, been apprised
of the true situation, neither the
certificate of the board nor of the judge
would have been forthcoming (State ex
rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell,
207 N — W — 709 — 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and
annulled, and he was required to surrender to the
clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name
was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on
motion is conferred in the discretion of
the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of
the discretion, the court should be
informed truthfully and frankly of matters
tending to show the character of the
applicant and his standing at the bar of
the state from which he comes. The
finding of indictments against him, one
of which was still outstanding at the time
of his motion, were facts which should
have been submitted to the court, with
such explanations as were available.
Silence respecting them was
reprehensible, as tending to deceive the
court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis
supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his
involvement in any criminal case despite his having
been apprised by the Investigation of some of the
circumstances of the criminal case including the very
name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it
when he was confronted by the victim himself, who
was called to testify thereon), and his continued
failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in
that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his
lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and
good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of
becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of
the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to
explain why his name should not be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early
as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal
to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not
offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly
irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE
have no other alternative but to order the surrender
of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his
name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in
Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an
absolute right to be granted every one
who demands it, but is a privilege to be
extended or withheld in the exercise of
sound discretion. The standards of the
legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of the criminal law.
It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to
receive one whose integrity is
questionable as an officer of the court,
to clothe him with all the prestige of its
confidence, and then to permit him to
hold himself as a duly authorized
member of the bar (citing American
cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case
is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE
had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the
membership of the Bar on the grounds, among
others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false
pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's
educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution
of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan
T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of
the findings of the Court Investigators contained in
their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In
re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of
good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-
314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar
examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis
Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil.
399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In
the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the
Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro
were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of
falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge),
Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G.
Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel
Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted
having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction
of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation
of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however,
professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or
increased the grades of the notebooks without
knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the
said notebooks; and that they did the same without
any consideration or expectation of any. These the
records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the
opinion and WE so declare that indeed the
respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or
re-correcion in good faith and without any
consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved
in the matter of admission of members to the Bar,
the respondents bar examiners, under the
circumstances, should have exercised greater care
and caution and should have been more inquisitive
before acceding to the request of respondent Bar
Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the
Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who
would have referred the matter to the Supreme
Court. At least the respondents-examiners should
have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or
show them the complete grades and/or the average
of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo
to have failed only in their respective and particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to
fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned
was really so circumstances. This they could have
easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations
could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian,
and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that
the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or
merited the increased grades; and so with
respondent Pardo in connection with the re-
evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political
Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and
Pablo, it would appear that they increased the
grades of Galang in their respective subject solely
because of the misrepresentations of Respondent
Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent
Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you
said that this particular examinee had almost
passed, however, in my subject he received 60
something, I cannot remember the exact average
and if he would get a few points higher, he would get
a passing average. I agreed to do that because I did
not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, misrepresentation and deception committed by
pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1- respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told Montecillo —
me that this particular examinee seems to have
passed in allot her subject except this subject and Q And by reason of that
that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook information you made the
and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular re-evaluation of the paper?
examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe
I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, A Yeas, your Honor.
that is the practice used to be done before to help
out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so Q Would you have re-
I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave evaluated the paper of your
it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it own accord in the absence
with me and what i did was to go over the book and of such information?
tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark
correct the answers which were wrong, what I did A No, your Honor, because
was to be more lenient and if the answers was I have submitted my report
correct although it was not complete I raise the grade at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33,
so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did rec.; see also allegations in
was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5,
initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis Affidavit of April 17, 1972,
supplied). Exh. B-Montecillo;
allegation No. 2, Answer
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the dated march 19, 1973, Exh.
favorable re-evaluations made by respondents A-Montecillo, Adm. Case
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and
notwithstanding their declarations that the increases 72, rec.).
in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee
concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the Pamatian —
 3. That sometime in the later part of
January of this year, he brought back to
me an examination booklet in Civil Law
for re-evaluation because according to
him the owner of the paper is on the
borderline and if I could reconsider his
grade to 75% the candidate concerned
will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under
the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do
so and in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, I
re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..."
(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was
made in good faith and under the belief
that I am authorized to do so in view of
them is representation of said Atty.
Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the particular
examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every
answer written in the notebook. Testing
the answer by the criteria laid down by
the Court, and giving the said examinee
the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was
only in that particular subject that said
examinee failed, herein respondent
became convinced that the said
examinee deserved a higher grade than
that previously given him, but he did not
deserve, in herein respondent's honest
appraisal, to be given the passing grade
of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-
Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely humanly
possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on
December 31,1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar
Confidant that the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which was 84%
in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances
utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein
examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no
one among them can truly claim that the re-
evaluation effected by them was impartial or free
from any improper influence, their conceded
integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he
deserved the increased grades given after the said
re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the
records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the
explanations of the respondents-examiners, which
were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in
connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve
the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find
their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are
constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners
that their participation in the admission of members
to the Bar is one impressed with the highest
consideration of public interest — absolute purity of
the proceedings — and so are required to exercise
the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the
performance of their duties relative thereto.
V belief; because he does not impugn the motives of
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his
memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed
that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up
this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance
or support thereto ... was motivated with
vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be
pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend
— a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom
said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who,
the records will show, did not pass said examinations
(p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge
against the honor and integrity of the late Justice
Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18,
1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's
insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not
bring this out during the investigation which in his
words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension
that he did not make this charge during the
investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive,
and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice
Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho
before the latter departed for Australia "until this case
shall have been terminated lest it be misread or
misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a
favorable outcome of this case on the part of
respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite
the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them
into re-evaluating or revising the grades of
respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the
results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to
see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the
purpose of seeking his help in connection with the
1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised
Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian
mentioned in passing to Landicho that an
examination booklet was re-evaluated by him
(Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results
(Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information
was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the
official release of the bar results, it remains an
indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the
Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his
actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the
rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to
undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and
to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct
evidence that the illegal machination of respondent
Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar
examinations was committed for valuable
consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by
Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official
release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February,
1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as
Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the
BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an
area of 374 square meters, more or
less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The
deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972
but was notarized only on April 5, 1972.
On the same date, however, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife executed two
(2)mortgages covering the said house
and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the
total amount of P67,291.20 (First
mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No.
90913: date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April 20,
1972: Second mortgage — P8,411.40,
Entry No. 90914: date of instrument —
April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April
20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.].
Respondent Lanuevo paid as down
payment the amount of only
P17,000.00, which according to him is
equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the
purchase price of P84,114.00.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that
P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his
savings while the remaining the
P12,000.00 came from his sister in
Okinawa in the form of a loan and
received by him through a niece before
Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000)
[Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3,
rec.]
It appears, however, that his
alleged P5,000.00
savings and P12,000.00 loan from his
sister; are not fully reflected and
accounted for in respondent's 1971
Statement of Assets and Liabilities
which he filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent
Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank
deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00.
In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit
listed under Assets was in the amount of
P1,011.00, which shows therefore that
of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in
his 1971 statement under Assets, only
the amount of P989.00 was used or
withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00
receivable listed under Assets in his
1971 statement was not realized
because the transaction therein involved
did not push through (Statement of
Assets and Liabilities of respondent
Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII,
pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971
$2000 loan of respondent from his
married sister in Okinawa is extremely
doubtful. In the first place, said amount
of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in
his 1971 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972.
Secondly, the alleged note which he
allegedly received from his sister at the
time he received the $200 was not even
presented by respondent during the
investigation. And according to
Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he
considered this a loan, his sister did not
seriously consider it as one. In fact, no
mode or time of payment was agreed
upon by them. And furthermore, during
the investigation, respondent Lanuevo
promised to furnish the Investigator the
address of his sister in Okinawa. Said
promise was not fulfilled as borne out by
the records. Considering that there is no
showing that his sister, who has a family
of her own, is among the top earners in
Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to
give to him, the conclusion, therefore,
that the P17,000.00 of respondent
Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or
undeclared income is inevitable under
the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their
BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for
the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No.
4992: August 14, 1972 — date of
instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973,
the second mortgage in favor of BF
Homes, Entry No. 90914, was
redeemed by respondent and was
subsequently cancelled on March
20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the
first mortgage in favor of BF Homes,
Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by
respondent Lanuevo and thereafter
cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2
to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the
mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as
the encumbrance of respondent's house
and lot. According to respondent
Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of
the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month,
but that since May of 1973, he was
unable to pay the same. In his 1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
which he filed in connection with his
resignation and retirement (filed October
13, 1972), the house and lot declared as
part of his assets, were valued at
P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item
in his liabilities in the same statement
was the GSIS real estate loan in the
amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement
of Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities is
a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00.
That he acquired this car sometime
between January, 1972 and November,
1972 could be inferred from the fact that
no such car or any car was listed in his
statement of assets and liabilities of
1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It
appears, however, that his listed total
assets, excluding receivables in his
1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while
in his 1972 (as of November, 1972)
Statement, his listed total
assets, excluding the house and lot was
P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW
car worth P5,200.00.
 The proximity in point of time between
the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of the
above-mentioned properties, tends to
link or tie up the said acquisitions with
the illegal machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with respect to
respondent Galang's examination
papers or to show that the money used
by respondent Lanuevo in the
acquisition of the above properties came
from respondent Galang in
consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after
the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the
serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations
alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and
in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April
12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as
ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo
surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October
13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the
Court. His resignation before he was required to
show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was
informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a
consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official
release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations,
respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave
from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining
the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of
P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation
that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for
his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48,
rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against
respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in
relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-
Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing
another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be
presented, induced, or influenced to
commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any
party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evidence bad
 faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other
concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes
the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is
determined that his property or money "is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer
or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec.
2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent
Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and
Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the
investigation; but they were examined as they are
part of the records of this Court.
B availment of the said educational benefits and even
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible
contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang
and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo
before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary
of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the
Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days
— 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the
MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) —
1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent
Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the
Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental
agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans
including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of
Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo
successively held the position of Junior Investigator,
Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans
Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator
(Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During
that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo
had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries
of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational
benefits was approved on March 16, 1954,
retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951,
which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it
was his father who all the time attended to the
when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law
at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In
1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old,
and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a
technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol.
V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the
investigation, he claimed that he was the private
secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-
13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the
notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine
Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution
on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang
from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational
Institution effective the first semester of the school
year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished
to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal
St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that
he never went to the Office of the Philippine
Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and
claimed that he does not even know the location of
the said office. He does not also know whether
beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational
benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans
Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V,
p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he
had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila,
although he insists that he never bothered to take a
look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94,
rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans
Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely
across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an
investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he
investigated claims for the several benefits given to
veterans like educational benefits and disability
benefits; that he does not remember, however,
whether in the course of his duties as veterans
investigator, he came across the application of
Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that
he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang
and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of
the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating
at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.).
Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans
Legion especially while working with the Philippine
Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the
guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During
the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was
operating in Samar only and he had no
communications with other guerrilla organization in
other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans
Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not
remember having attended its meeting here in
Manila, even while he was employed with the
Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of
the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII,
p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo
was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was
stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was
still confined there when their camp was bombed
and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13,
1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo
dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46,
rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a
member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise
known as the Banal Regiment. He was
commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on
January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first
lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the
XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US
Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed
at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against
the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to
31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit
of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-
3, rec.).
strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar
examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above
delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO.
1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS
HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED
STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS;
AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163,
RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman
E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED
AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN
FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo,
Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Antonio, J., is on official leave.
Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has

submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar
Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any
purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the
Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its