[CASE DIGEST] Macalintal v. PET (G.R. No.

191618)

June 7, 2011 | G.R. No. 191618

Atty. Romulo Macalintal, petitioner

Presidential Electoral Tribunal, respondent

FACTS:

Atty. Romulo Macalintal filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the previous ruling of the SC
that found the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by the SC as constitutional. In his
motion, Macalintal contended that the creation of the PET by the SC did not fall within the ambit
of the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. He also contended that
the PET exercises quasi-judicial power, and thus, its members violate Section 12, Art. VIII of the
1987 Constitution,

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PET is constitutional.

HELD:

Yes, the Court held that PET is constitutional. A look at the deliberations of the framers reveals
that the exclusive authority granted to the SC in judging cases relating to the elections of
President and Vice-President does not impinge on the supposed separation of power between
the judiciary and the executive departments, even if the said provision can be found in Art. VII.

The Court held that election issues are adversarial and judicial proceedings, and are essentially
justiciable questions.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL – ARROYO

G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just
days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President
from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales;
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and
January 25, 2010, respectively.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90
days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have
easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article
VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s
power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political
vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall
appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one
from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate
Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement.

HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or
in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the
power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15
between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the
framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article
VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,
Respondents.

Facts:

The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme
Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.

Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate,
competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived
of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial and
Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In compliance
therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative
from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only
seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives
from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from
the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat
in JBC as representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a
unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to
the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism
which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also
contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral
legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in
the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a
member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of
balance.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be
members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the
presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other
six (6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern,
not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

Issue:

Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of
whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:

No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the
functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from
Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative
of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members
of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from
the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear
and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is
associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the
context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the
latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
“Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No
particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is
being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in
the JBC

Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous,
there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission.
Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the
Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to
conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of
Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.

With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the
Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of
Constitutional Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be
considered as one body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses
and that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative
powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening
and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department.

The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three
branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the
members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative
influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half
(1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution.”

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half
(1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing
Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to
the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be
countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic
and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the
highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no
matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the
call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and
the people who run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of
operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
They are not nullified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and
Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This
disposition is immediately executory.